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75 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 75-80 Hashim, H. T., Ramadhan, M. A., The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior Exploration The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior Hashim T. Hashim*, Mustafa A. Ramadhan University of Baghdad, College of Medicine, Baghdad, Iraq Abstract Post-consciousness is a state of consciousness overlapping consciousness and unconsciousness. This concept of consciousness is developed to explain what is not explained by the other concepts of consciousness, the reaction of a person after committing a mistake. The Study reported here is a cross sectional study involved 112 participants from 25 countries with higher educational levels. We tested them for reliability (Two way mixed effect) and used Pearson correlation coefficient which was significant at 0.01 (R = 0.00). The majority (67%) said that when they committed a mistake or did something wrong, their behaviors changed and became more careful. The majority (85.7%) said that their minds were responsible for these changes. There were not significant differences between age or gender and other variables. Keywords: Post-consciousness, human behavior, reaction, mistake. Introduction Consciousness as explained in psychology, is the fineness or the state of being aware of any external object or something within the oneself, such as thoughts, feelings, memories, or sensations. It has also been defined as: the awareness, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive – control system of the mind (1). Consciousness is something that cannot be touched or felt, it controls our feelings, ourselves and our sensation in the way that it thinks it is suitable for each situation and the human cannot control his consciousness by doing what he wants to do, he has to obey it (2). When someone do something wrong, his consciousness informs him and he may blame himself, but to avoid this conflicting, the brain will create an imaginary picture of needing to do the wrong thing but it will never occur again to overcome the conflicts inside the brain (3,4). There is a balance between consciousness and unconsciousness, but the stronger one is consciousness which control our feelings and what we do. When one of them become stronger, the other * Correspondence: Hashim T. Hashim, University of Baghdad, College of Medicine, Baghdad, Iraq. Email: hashim.h.t.h@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 76 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 75-80 Hashim, H. T., Ramadhan, M. A., The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior become weaker and vice versa. When the unconsciousness controls the feelings and thoughts of a person, he will be insensible and may be psychotic (5,6). Post-consciousness is a state of consciousness that convince the person to do something that he intend to and it overlap his/her consciousness and unconsciousness that can lead to a psychological problem if not controlled (7). This state of consciousness is newly developed to explain what is not explained by other concepts of consciousness. Methodology The study is a cross sectional study, conducted as an interview survey for a month during October, 2019 as face to face or video call interviews. It involved 112 participants from 25 countries. I did not exclude anyone. They were students, employees or from higher educational level because they have more awareness about the topic and can be helpful and to reduce the biases resulted from misunderstanding by illiterate people. My sampling procedure was convenient sampling. I tested them for reliability (Two way mixed effect) in a pilot study of 30 participants by asking them the questions and after one week, I asked them again, the answers were exactly the same, we used Pearson correlation coefficient and it is significant at 0.01 (R = 0.00). All the participants were well informed about the aim of the study and what we were testing for before they gave their consent. Ethical approval was obtained too. The data was analyzed by Statistical Package for Social Science Program (SPSS) version 25.0 and I used T – test in testing the significant between variables. Results The ages ranged (18 – 65) years old, with mean of 36.4 and the standard deviation is 13.2. 57.1% of them were male (64) and 42.9% were females (48). The countries of the participants were distributed as classified in (Table 1). Table1: Countries distribution for participants Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Algeria 3 2.7 2.7 2.7 Brazil 3 2.7 2.7 5.4 Canada 3 2.7 2.7 8.0 Egypt 4 3.6 3.6 11.6 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 77 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 75-80 Hashim, H. T., Ramadhan, M. A., The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior France 2 1.8 1.8 13.4 Germany 1 .9 .9 14.3 Iran 6 5.4 5.4 19.6 Iraq 42 37.5 37.5 57.1 Italy 2 1.8 1.8 58.9 Jordan 4 3.6 3.6 62.5 Kenya 2 1.8 1.8 64.3 Lebanon 2 1.8 1.8 66.1 Morocco 1 .9 .9 67.0 Oman 3 2.7 2.7 69.6 Pakistan 1 .9 .9 70.5 Peru 2 1.8 1.8 72.3 Rwanda 3 2.7 2.7 75.0 Saudi Arabia 5 4.5 4.5 79.5 Sudan 2 1.8 1.8 81.3 Switzerland 6 5.4 5.4 86.6 Syria 2 1.8 1.8 88.4 Tunis 1 .9 .9 89.3 UK 5 4.5 4.5 93.8 USA 4 3.6 3.6 97.3 Yemen 3 2.7 2.7 100.0 Total 112 100.0 100.0 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 78 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 75-80 Hashim, H. T., Ramadhan, M. A., The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior Table 2 classifies the percentages of answers for the three questions that was conducted in the questionnaire. Table2: The percentages of answers. Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative percent Q1: When you fall in a conflict between doing a mistake or stop it, does your mind tell you to do it in the that time because you need it, but you will not do it again? Yes No 101 11 90.2% 9.8% 90.2% 9.8% 90.2% 100% Q2: When you do a mistake or something wrong (you think or believe it is a mistake), do your behaviors, actions and disposals change or become more careful? Yes No 75 37 67% 33% 67% 33% 67% 100% Q3: Why do your behaviors and actions change during or after doing a mistake? * Because of 16 fears or worries * Your Mind 96 tell you to do that (even if there is no source of fear) 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 85.7% 85.7% 100% Q4: Does your mind warn you before and/or during doing the mistakes? Yes No 93 19 83.03% 16.97% 83.03% 16.97% 83.03% 100% 83.03% 10.7% 6.27% 83.03% 93.75% 100% Q5: Do you follow these warnings? Always Often Never 93 12 7 83.03% 10.7% 6.27% Q6: Did these warnings save you or become real for at least once, previously? Yes No Maybe 26 57 29 23.3% 50.8% 25.9% 23.3% 50.8% 25.9% 23.3% 74.1% 100% Q7: Do you feel comfortable after following these warnings? ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 79 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 75-80 Hashim, H. T., Ramadhan, M. A., The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior Yes No 58 54 48.2% 51.8% 48.2% 51.8% 48.2% 100% The first three questions are strongly related to the topic of mistakes' commission and the other questions are to make the idea clear to the respondents. There are not significant differences between age or gender and other variables. Discussion When one tries to do something wrong, he will be in a conflict between his consciousness that encourages him to go ahead and his unconsciousness that prevent him from doing it. This conflict will be solved by the post-consciousness that gives the excuse to do the wrong things because one needs it and it will be never done again. We as humans, have many situations and behaviors that cannot be explained by other level of consciousness because all our actions and reactions are controlled by the four levels of awareness in our consciousness. One of these reactions are the changing of our behaviors and disposals when we intend to do a mistake or it has just done. The explanation of this changings in our reactions as a result for our actions which are the mistakes are controlled as we tried to approve in this study by the fourth level of consciousness which is the post-consciousness. For example, when you want to stole something, you will have tachycardia, face's changes and you will be very careful and warned. These changes in physiology and psychology are done by post-consciousness that tries to make the process as easy as possible so you cannot feel sorry or worry about anything. The post-consciousness tell you to do these reactions or (in an accurate description) tell your body to show these reactions to overlap the worries and fears that can occur or to convince you that you cannot be discovered or caught. So it tries to protect you, and in the same time, it tries to make you as comfortable as could. The age and gender do not affect in this process, so it occurs to everyone at any age regardless the gender. Conclusion The role of post-consciousness in controlling the reactions that accompany one’s mistakes is very clear and important. In this study, We approved this role by asking three questions in a cross sectional study to 112 participants from different age groups and genders. We as humans, have many situations and behaviors that cannot be explained by other level of consciousness because all our actions and reactions are controlled by the four levels of awareness in our consciousness. One of these reactions are the changing of our behaviors and disposals when we intend to do a mistake or it has just done. What is responsible for this reactions is the post-consciousness in human mind. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 80 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 75-80 Hashim, H. T., Ramadhan, M. A., The Concept of Post-consciousness & Its Role in Human Behavior Acknowledgment: We thank Maryam A. Habib for editing the paper. We also would like to thank Waed Yassir, Abdulla Reda, Sakib Chowdhary, Ali T. Hashim, Mustafa A. Muhson, Ahmed Dhiya, Yahya Dhiya and Jack Monoro for helping with this research. Received December 20, 2019; Accepted January 7, 2020 References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Dietrich, Arne. Introduction to consciousness. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2007. Armstrong, David M. "What is consciousness" The nature of mind (1981): 55-67. Ornstein, Robert E. "The psychology of consciousness." (1972). Fireman, Gary D., Ted E. McVay, and Owen J. Flanagan, eds. Narrative and consciousness: Literature, psychology, and the brain. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2003. Bouveresse, Jacques. Wittgenstein reads Freud: The myth of the unconscious. Princeton University Press, 1995. Schimek, Jean, G. "A critical re-examination of Freud's concept of unconscious mental representation." International Review of Psycho-Analysis 2 (1975): 171-187. Hashim, H. T., and M. A. Ramadhan. "The Need for Developing a Fourth Level of Awareness in Human Consciousness: Unconsciousness." Pre consciousness, Consciousness and Post consciousness 9.361 (2019): 2161-0487. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 23 Exploration Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness Luiz G. Camelo * Abstract Consciousness is an intelligent entity of a higher order. It is creative, dynamic and transformative that interacts with nature. It manifests itself through your “semi-material mind” which is the “perennial model” of your biological brain. Throughout its existence, endlessly, it shaped its own body to interact with matter. This interaction is done through your "psychic body", semimaterial, which we call Psychosoma. It is a fluidic body that reduces high frequency vibrations that comes from Consciousness. This body at the moment of fertilization of the egg by the sperm expands and takes the form of a Human Being, whose vibrational interaction takes place molecule-by-molecule until the final modulation of your body. It is indeed a morphogenetic field. It is feasible for science only to discover the intelligent effects of Consciousness through its neuronal correlates, located not only in the brain, but also throughout the body. For example, neurotransmitters are the first neuronal correlates categorized by science. In fact, they are not found in images or in specific areas of the brain. Does anyone really believe that neurotransmitters are produced only in the brain? Keywords: consciousness; brain; dualism; neuroscience; neuronal correlates of consciousness; mind; endogenous quantum field. The human being is an electronic set governed by Consciousness. Albert Einstein 1. Introduction Man is a multidimensional being 1-6. He is similar to all beings and all things and at the same time completely different. It encompasses an animal nature and a higher order nature. Except for Consciousness, man has the same origin in fundamental elementary matter. Undoubtedly, the Consciousness that gives life to man, is a “entity” of a higher order with various levels of action in the matter3,5-8. It is an intelligent principle. Its intimate nature is unknown. It is impossible to describe it, but it is feasible for science to discover its action in matter, its neuronal correlates. Consciousness is in fact the intelligent being of the universe2,3,5-8. Undoubtedly, it is generated by the Supreme Intelligence of the universe 1-4,6-8, the primary cause of all things. Everything in the universe is generated by the mind7,8. In fact, whatever the versatility of the human being, however exceptional he may be, will always be the manifestation of Consciousness. The matter *Correspondence: Luiz G. Camelo, Independent Researcher. Email: luizgcamelo@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 24 ultimately is plastic to the intelligences evolving that make up the universe. In fact, there are no insurmountable material barriers to these minds. Without a doubt, there are only vibratory barriers. In fact, what differentiates everything in the universe is the vibratory pattern. After all, what is man, if not Consciousness 2-4,9-11 imprisoned in a body? The Intelligent Being, when covered with matter is Life at any planetary latitude or longitude. On the other hand, the “inert being” has no relationship life because Consciousness is life itself. Everything is linked and interconnected in nature. Evolution is not a confused, disordered, chaotic event, but an intelligent, disciplined movement with no possibility of mistakes. It is necessary to exist, live, experience and mature under the psycho-evolutionary impulse, of cause and effect, following a pattern of uninterrupted continuity12. Whatever the instabilities, they are always transitory. The subjective experience of Consciousness13 how to see, hear or perceive is actually a type of neuronal correlate because the agent of experience is receiving a command from Consciousness, that is, there is an interaction with your brain. However, brain activity does not generate this experience. It is generated at a higher vibratory level and is accompanied by a conscious experience13. Ever! Consciousness is never unconscious6,8,13. Here, Consciousness is the observer agent of an omnipresent nature. On the other hand, “personality” is not always conscious. However, individuality is always there! For example, preserved brain activity in an unconscious patient, means that Consciousness is conscious6,8,10,13 or is present. Here, if Consciousness drifts away, the patient will die. In fact, this is not the difficult problem of Consciousness; in fact, it is one of the easiest. The difficult thing is to describe it. In fact, it is impossible for science to discover its intimate nature. For example, it is not possible to reduce Consciousness to its intentionality 9,10. Without a doubt, this is one of her countless attributes. Therefore, "intention" and "being conscious" are exclusive attributes of Consciousness. Thus, it cannot be approached from a reductionist perspective9-11. It is possible for science to discover the mechanism by which the mind / matter interaction occurs. Despite being different categories, they are essentially similar7,10. They are able to engage in reciprocal action of active information7,10. Strictly speaking, what really matters is the correlation between the two categories, since both are made up of the same underlying matter. As the mind that acts on the biological brain and the action of an “intelligence” on matter always leaves a causal relationship, there is no incompatibility in these unusual events. In this context, science can explain the apparently insoluble causal mechanism. It is necessary that there is a flow of active information from the mind to the brain, from top to bottom and from the brain to the mind, from bottom to top for a neuronal correlate printed in matter to occur. Therefore, information of a higher order6,7,10,11. The aim of this study is to address the positive aspects of the mind / matter duality of Consciousness, as well as to show a new view on the mind and the neuronal correlates of consciousness. We will not waste time on other known aspects of literature, such as materialism, physicalism, monism, reductionism, etc., as it is an unproductive, dogmatic and infinite discussion. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 25 2. Underlying Mechanism and Theoretical Foundations towards a Higher Order Theory of Consciousness From a scientific point of view, Consciousness is inexplicable. Neuroscience can and must explain its manifestation in matter, its intelligent effects. Does science know all the secrets of the material world? The hidden world from the depths of the Earth and the darkness of the oceans? Of course not! There are natural laws that govern matter, still unknown to science. On the other hand, the “invisible world” is also governed by laws completely unknown to science. Consciousness is a non-material entity1,10, without form. It is a focus of "intelligent light" that acts on matter and vice versa. Undoubtedly, “intellectualizing matter” is one of the numerous attributes of the Intelligent Being. However, to manifest itself in matter it needs to be covered by an underlying body1-4, quasi-material8-10. For lack of a more appropriate term, by analogy, we will call it Psychic Body. This, called Psychosoma, a self-replicating biological organizing model3-5,11, has the same properties as matter, in addition to having an inseparable physical and mental aspect7-10. It is an indivisible holistic unit. It is the plastic mediator through which subtle matter flows, replacing cells and rebuilding the living organism incessantly, every day, through DNA, a holographic information field1. It is, in fact, a copy / matrix of the entire human body3-5. Therefore, Psychosoma is an electromagnetic agent1-5,8,9 that forms a non-local and non-temporal field that, in turn, gives rise to the physical body, predisposing it to health1-5 or disease1-5 without apparent cause. Here, the cause is almost always in the patient's energy field due to the inappropriate use of his modulating energies. In this context, the energies that characterize health2 or disease2 are added to the “psychic body” due to the vibratory affinity. For example, the content of sublimated or degraded thought has a bidirectional flow, from top to bottom and from bottom to top. Here we can also insert the chapter on “psychosomatic illnesses” like depression, fibromyalgia, panic disorder and other phobias. In this way, disease 2,4,5 or health 2,4,5 is in Consciousness 1-3 from where the electromagnetic vibrations are transferred to the "psychic body" in the form of health or disease and finally to the physical body. Therefore, the Psychosoma is an “electrodynamic field”2-4,9 complex, living, perennial matrix consisting of all the quasi-material components that make up the human body, from the atom to the brain. It is undoubtedly similar to Sheldrake's [1981] "morphogenetic Field". It is important to highlight that it is a replicabl11 and immutable model that gives rise to human beings only. Here, our main representative is the primordial DNA14. Originally, it is a quasimaterial molecule that comes from the perennial matrix, the Psychosoma, governed by the intelligent impulse of Consciousness. In other words, DNA2,14 is a signaling molecule that transmits specific information through electromagnetic resonance originated in the Intelligent Principle. In this way, the DNA molecule could be seen as containing active information2,7,8,10 that guide self-replicating biological processes. Undoubtedly, the Psychosoma is the interface between Consciousness 15-17 and the body. It is a resonant electromagnetic field 2. In fact, here there is a transformation from quantum events to classic events 2,10, from a more fundamental underlying dimension 17 under the command of Consciousness 1-3,7,9,14. Although there is a transformation from quantum events 2 to classic events, there is in fact no loss in the speed of active information7,10,13. The mind, the “brain of consciousness”, with quantum information potential2,7,8,10 is coupled with the biological brain2 which is its correspondent in matter. In this ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 26 regard, information can be transported only by “quantum potential” or by the interaction of different fields2,8,17,18. Rudimentary mental states here refer to mental states in the evolutionary beginnings of the Intelligent Principle, when it leaves the animal realm to enter the human realm, as soon as it acquires its free will8,11,19. Here, Consciousness becomes aware of itself6,10,18. On the one hand, it should be noted that there are no "primitive" mental states attributed to human beings, except for the physiological functions common to lower animals, since man has a superior and animalized nature. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the lower animals have rudimentary “conscience” and “intelligence” 20. However, a "relatively primitive" state of mind is attributed only to beings that are still on lower evolutionary scales. For example, the dog becomes aware of itself only when it acquires its free will when entering the human realm. In this context, Consciousness is still an Intelligent Principle in formation, on the way to individualization until it evolves to the point of acquiring its free will18,20. Here, cause and effect are perennial, that is, Consciousness has to account for everything it does or does not do. 3. The Mind The Mind or non-local field is a quasi-material electromagnetic body 21. It is the brain 9,21 of Consciousness that works through its manifestation. The mind is an inconceivable structure for human beings. I presume that it is almost impossible for science to unravel the mysteries of the mind in the present century. In that regard, it implies discovering the Intelligent Principle. The mind, therefore, is at a vibratory level far beyond the biological brain18-24. It is important to note that this is just a perfect copy of the mind. This is the seat of memory 18. Here, there is no short or long term memory. It is just memory where omnipresent information is recorded. One day it will be remembered and revealed in the form of a memory containing new information. It is worth mentioning, however, that in memory an immeasurable intellect-affective collection of the Intelligent Being is stored, which is ultimately man. In this context, the mind is the interaction agent14,20-22,24 between Consciousness, the body and the environment25. Here, it has two aspects of the same underlying reality9,15,18. The physical and mental aspects 7,10,11,18,20,21. In fact, it is a singularity of the Intelligent Principle. Conscious memory is not in the brain, but in Consciousness17. In this sense, the command occurs at a higher level21 of organization17,24 and in this way the mind serves as a vehicle for the manifestation of thought. Thus, it is Consciousness who thinks. Therefore, the intelligent Being. In this respect, thought is the transmission of nonlocal information and, certainly, faster than the speed of light. Undoubtedly, man is the only Being that has continuous thinking, being conscious or unconscious. The biological brain does not generate the mind24, much less Consciousness24. It's impossible. On the contrary, it receives the flow of thoughts generated in Consciousness24. Undoubtedly, the brain under the effect of the “mind” acts according to the conscious intention9,19 generated in Consciousness18. Therefore, the biological brain is just a "brain" that reflects everything that comes from Consciousness, from your omnipresent brain. In this context, there is an electromagnetic coupling9,10 with interaction between the fluidic, electromagnetic brain and the biological brain19,24. Therefore, this is the organ of the mind. In fact, on the mental and physical ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 27 side there is a similarity of substance19. In fact, it is impossible to reduce Consciousness to the material functions of the brain. However, neuroscience will never succeed in discovering the intimate nature of Consciousness from the reality of the physical world. 4. Mind/matter duality In fact, everything in our world is dual. However, concretely there is no duality7,10,19,24. Thus, it is apparent, intuitive. In this sense, they are physical and mental aspects7 of the diversity that constitutes the unit. Here, science clings to the letter. Duality is undoubtedly due to the lack of understanding of materialistic and dogmatic science and the “myopic vision” of those who deal with it. In this context, there is an Intelligent Principle in the universe that acts on matter, whose laws of this action are still unknown to science. This Principle over the millennia of its existence, without end, created an “electromagnetic body / matrix”2,4 containing the matrix of all cells and organs in order to interact with matter. Each living being, animal or plant has its perennial matrix. For example, the seed of the "eucalyptus" tree contains in itself the majestic appearance of the future tree. After all, there is no “banana” originating from the apple tree. Undoubtedly, interacting with matter is one of the attributes of Consciousness9,10,24. Physical and mental aspects are inseparable17 from active information7,10,25,26, that is, it has functional correspondences27,28. It is a fundamental law. The Psychosoma, being governed by an Intelligent Being, reduces its vibrations and inserts itself into a fertilized egg. Therefore, the Psychosoma vibratory interaction with the physical body takes place molecule-by-molecule at the moment of fertilization of the egg by the sperm until the generation of the future being. Here, the Intelligent Principle, in order to condense itself into a biological structure, shapes its own physical body. It is in their energy intimacy that cells are added to finally shape their future body. Ultimately, Consciousness25-28 permeates the entire physical body, cell by cell giving life to the entire organic structure. Then, as the fetus grows, the Psychosoma expands already in the form of a human being. It's a model! Undoubtedly, the body cannot avoid experience. He's alive with her. In it the manifestations of life are expressed. Therefore, there is a similarity in the “underlying fundamental matter”2,3,6,16 that makes up the Psychosoma and mental matter24-28, as both have the same energetic constitution, that is, they have the same origin in the primitive or fundamental elementary matter . It is a vibratory correspondence. For example, the concept of receptor resembles the resonant correspondence invoked to characterize receptor-mediated responses to hormones and drugs. In this context, there is no mind / matter reductionism9-11,25,27. There is incomprehension! The human body, therefore, is almost perfect. In fact, we still don't know everything about him. Ready! Here the supposed mind / matter duality ends9,10,19,27-29. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 28 5. Neuronal Correlates of Consciousness Neuronal correlation of consciousness is electromagnetic information7,10,11,24 containing the guidelines of material life emitted by Consciousness, captured and decoded27 by neurons. Meaning is always linked to the encoding and decoding processes. Without a doubt, it is a vibrational correspondence. An electromagnetic resonance1,21. It is a conscious neuronal phenomenon. In this sense, it is the exchange of communication between Consciousness and the brain17,23,30. For each human action, the brain reacts with a specific response to that action, that is, with a neuronal correlate of consciousness11,17,21. Here, science can already detect “neuroimages” suggestive of a neuronal correlate. But that is not all. It is the processing of information with an instant response of that information15,23 to a peripheral action triggered in neural networks. On the other hand, “dendritic networks” are primary structures for perceiving wave function that initially resonate in specific receptive fields24. This implies much more capacity for storing and processing information10,17,23 of the holographic type1, which would be impossible to be generated in the brain. The latter, in its function as an instrument of action, reacts according to the “imperatives of the mind” through which the correlates are expressed. It is worth mentioning that the neural correlates of consciousness are infinitos16,27. In fact, during just one hour of human life, the neuronal correlates of Consciousness that appear during this period tend to the infinite. The “nuances” of this experience are incalculable. Ultimately, the brain is just a receiving and sending agent of information10,23 for Consciousness to make its decisions. In other words, the neuronal correlate is the "holographic signature", the "trademark" that the brain has consciously received and responded to a certain message that comes from Consciousness. Therefore, there is no way to identify a specific area of the brain or a certain substance “circulating in the blood” that corresponds exactly to the presence of a certain neuronal correlate. At the present time, it is impossible for Neuroscience to explain the intimate nature of Consciousness17,19,22,30,31, but it is possible to explain its neuronal correlates8,29 or the action of an intelligence on matter22. Today, neuronal correlates are only electromagnetic information, but in the future they will be revealed in the form of "molecules" that carry this information. It is possible that informational fields of ultra-weak photons are somehow related to biochemical processes, or perhaps related to all cellular physiology. These molecules are in the etheric state, that is, a type of condensed energy that is still quite subtle for science. They are on the threshold of the energetic world with the material world. It is very similar to what happened with neurotransmitters before they were categorized and revealed by the Austrian Otto Loewi in 1921. It is noteworthy that neurotransmitters were the first neuronal correlates systematized by science. The secretion of a given hormone is a type of neuronal correlate, even if the patient is unconscious. Who does the most efficient monitoring of a sleeping or unconscious patient? Of course, it is Consciousness. Undoubtedly, Consciousness is never unconscious9,13. And there's more. Now, everything is a matter of quantum chemistry and biology. After all, where are the neuronal correlates of Consciousness located? They resonate throughout the human body. In fact, to be more precise, using a metaphor, they are more present in the “mind”, in the men of science and in the “heart”, in the good and benevolent men. In the end, are ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 29 “neurotransmitters” located only in the brain? At first, it was thought so. The response in the release of neurotransmitters anywhere in the body can be affected by the mental field 24. In fact, they are not found exactly in images or in specific areas of the brain. Who is watching these action potentials, if not Consciousness? 6. Conclusion Neuroscience has difficulties in dealing with the only reality that is the “immaterial world” and in this way, existential conflicts arise. In that sense, quantum mechanics leaves no doubt. In fact, several structures of Consciousness have been proposed to reconcile mental and physical states and have not been successful. An impasse is reached that has to extrapolate paradigms. It is necessary to move forward. The difficult problem with science is breaking paradigms. It is necessary to challenge, dare and confront. The human being is afraid of the unknown, of the new, of replacing ancient habits in exchange for a new vision. You are afraid of losing privileges, notoriety and dominance. The difficult problem is that science does not understand how the immaterial interacts with the material. It is only to dive deep into the energetic world, which is the destination, the reality of Being, in search of its essence, instead of seeking answers in the world of condensed energy, as stated by Albert Einstein. Now, everything is a matter of transcendental physics. Consciousness is never unconscious, even when it is sleeping, in fact, precisely it never sleeps. She has redo periods. In fact, who sleeps is the physical body for rest, organization of mental files and redo. On the other hand, Consciousness is never absent. She is the throbbing life without interruption ever since. During sleep, it emancipates itself, that is, it moves away from the body and acquires maximum activity in its original world, interacting with the body through a practically immortal "fluidic cord" that gives it organic life. On the other hand, the physical body is only an instrument of work for Consciousness. It is through this cord that the nervous fluid circulates. The vital energy. It is also where the pain flows. Pain is in Consciousness32 and not in the brain. For example, it is anesthesia that drives Consciousness away from the body. Here begins the "principle" of general anesthesia we know24. Consciousness also stores all the information that occurred in the past, present and usually envisions the future. Received March 2, 2021; Accepted April 11, 2021 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 30 References 1. Curtis BD, Hurtak JJ. Consciousness and Quantum Information Processing: Uncovering the Foundation for a Medicine of Light. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 2004, 10(1): 27-39. 2. Bischof M. Introduction to Integrative Biophysics. Published in: Popp, Fritz-Albert / Beloussov, Lev V. (eds.): Integrative Biophysics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2003, pp. 1-115. ISBN 12040-1139-3. 3. Rubik B, Muehsam D, Hammerschlag R, Jain S. Biofield Science and Healing: History, Terminology, and Concepts. Global Adv Health med. 2015;4(suppl):8-14. DOI: 10.7453/gahmj.2015.038.suppl. 4. Liboff AR. Towards an Electromagnetic Paradigm for Biology and Medicine. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 2004; 10(1): 41-47 5. Rein Glen. Bioinformation within the Biofield: Beyond Bioelectromagnetics. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 2004;10(1): 59-68. 6. Bhaumik M. (2014). Is the Source of Awareness Present in the Quantum Vacuum? In: Menon S., Sinha A., Sreekantan B. (eds) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness and the Self. Springer, New Delhi. 7. Bohm, D. A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter. Philosophical Psychology, 3(2), 1990. 8. Bischof M. Field Concepts and the Emergence of a Holistic Biophysics. Published in: Beloussov, L.V., Popp, F.A., Voeikov, V.L., and Van Wijk, R., (eds.): Biophotonics and Coherent Systems. Moscow University Press, Moscow 2000, pp. 1-25. 9. Meijer, Dirk & Raggett, S. (2014). Quantum Physics in Consciousness Studies. The Quantum Mind Extended 10. Hiley, B.J. Quantum Theory, the Implicate Order and the Self. Theoretical Physics Research Unit, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London. 11. Stapp, HP. Attention, Intention, and Will in Quantum Physics. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1999; 6(8-9):143-64. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley. 12. Niggli HJ. Biophotons: Ultraweak Light Impulses Regulate Life Processes in Aging. J Gerontol Geriat Res. 2014, 3:143. doi: 10.41722/2167-7182.100014 13. Pylkkänen, Paavo. (2015). Is there room in quantum ontology for a genuine causal role of consciousness? 10.1314/RG.2.1.2069.3205 14. Gariaev PP et al. DNA as Basis for Quantum Biocomputer. DNA Decipher Journal, 2011; 1(1):25-46 15. Maleeh R, Amani, P. Bohm’s Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter Revisited. NeuroQuantology 2012; 10(2): 150-163 16. Pylkkänen, P. (2015). Quantum theory, active information and the mind-matter problem. In: E. Dzhafarov, S. Jordan, R. Zhang and V. Cervantes (ed.), Contextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology New Jersey: World Scientific. Advanced series on mathematical psychology. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 23-31 Camelo, L. G., Existential Conflicts of Neuroscience: A Brief Analysis of Consciousness 31 17. Kafatos MC, Chevalier G, Chopra D et al. Biofield Science: Current Physics Perspectives. Global Adv Health Med. 2015;4(suppl):25-34. DOI: 10.7453/gahmj.2015.01.suppl 18. Hu, Huping. (2009). Review of the Book “Quantum Enigma – Physics Encounters Consciousness. 19. Hari, SD. A Few Questions about Consciousness Suggested by Comparing the Brain and the Computer. 2012, 10(2):286-301. 20. M. Jamali et al. A proposed mechanism for mind-brain interaction using extended Bohmian quantum mechanics in Avicenna’s monotheistic perspective. Heliyon 5 (2019) e02130 21. Stapp, HP. Quantum Theory and the Role of Mind in Nature. Foundations of Physics 31, 1465-1499 (2001). https: //doi.org/10. 1023/A: 1012682413597 22. Kriegel, Uriah. Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. Latest version: 2(2018-0829). Available on PyilArchive: https:// philarchive.org/archive/KRIBTN 23. Oliver, A.J & Hari, S. Body-Independence of Consciousness & Retained Information. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 2017(8)8: 651-665 24. Hiley BJ, Pylkkänen P. Can Mind Affect Matter via Active Information? 2005 Mind & Matter 3(2): 7-27 25. Globus G. Mind, Matter and the Implicate Order by Paavo Pylkkänen. NeuroQuantology 2007; 5(4):396-399 – excellent 26. Atmanspacher, Harold. Quantum Approaches to Consciousness, The Stanford Encyclopedia (summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives /sum2020/entries/qtconsciousness/> 27. Hiley, B.J. (2001). Non–commutative Geometry, the Bohm Interpretation and the Mind-Matter Relationship. 573.10.1063/1.1388680 28. Thompson IJ. Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness: A Causal Correspondence Theory. Physics Department, University of Surrey, England, 1990 29. Atmanspacher, Harold. Quantum theory and consciousness: An overview with selected examples. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society. 2004. 10.1155/S102602260440106X. 30. Kafatos, MC & Keun-Hang, SY. The Participating Mind in the Quantum Universe. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 14(1), 2018 31. Kak S. The Universe, Quantum Physics, and Consciousness. Journal of Cosmology 2009, 3: 500-510 32. M.W. Jones. Avoiding Perennial Mind-Body Problems. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, No. 910, 2016, pp. 111-33 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 456 Article Events to Dualism Frank De Silva* Abstract Perception is a continuous experience that exists at every instant, across a set of simultaneous events in the brain. Special relativity physics states that there can be nothing physical, that connect simultaneous events. As such, perception cannot be physical but non-physical or dualistic. This argument is analysed further, and a new concept called Concept A is introduced. With the aid of Concept A, free will is explained. Keywords: Continuous experience, special relativity, event, dualism, concept, free will. Events to Dualism 1. Event The definition of an event from physics is a point in space-time. If we were to consider one dimension of space and one dimension of time, then an event will be a single point as shown in Fig 1. A given point in space, will correspond to a series of points or a line when taken over a period of time as shown in Fig 2. Thus in a given coordinate system an event will be defined completely by its coordinates (x, y z, t) where x,y,z are the coordinates in space and t corresponds to the instant of time. *Correspondence: Frank De Silva, Independent Researcher, Australia. E-mail: franknimal1@outlook.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 457 Space Event · Time Fig 1. Event Space A line of events created by a single point in space Time Fig 2. A single point in space over time will create a line of events 1.1 Passage of time Time passes from one instant to the next. This allows for a well-defined past, current and future instant of time. 1.2 Perception Consider the experience of watching an apple. If we close our eyes the apple cannot be perceived. From this observation we can conclude that the light from the apple stimulates the eyes which in turn stimulate the brain, which results in an apple appearing in the mind. From this experience we get the following axioms. Axiom A: Stimulating events in the eyes give rise to perception located within the brain at the current instant. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 458 Axiom B: Perception consists of two components: a. The observed or the object of perception (U), that is the apple. b. The perceiver (I) or the thing looking at the apple. 1.3 Events of perception Consider the distribution of events in the brain pertaining to perception. U, the apple or the first component at any given instant will correspond to a set of simultaneous events in the brain as given in Fig 3. Red dots represent events Fig 3. Simultaneous events of perception at the current instant I, the second component by the act of perception will connect this set of simultaneous brain events. 2. Special Relativity Physics and Simultaneous Events Special Relativity groups all events into two distinct groups: a. Time-like separated events b. Space-like separated events. 2.1 Time-like separated events These are events that are separated in space and time such that there is sufficient time for a beam of light from one event to have reached the second event. 2.2 Space-like separated events These are events that are separated in space and time such that light from any one event can never reach any of the other events. Thus, simultaneous events are space-like separated. That is, even two events occurring 0.0001 mm from each other in the same instant will be space-like separated. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 459 3. Pivotal Argument P1: Thus, the events of U at a given instant is space-like separated. P2: Perception connects these events. P3: Special relativity states that nothing physical (material) can connect space-like separated events. C1: Therefore, perception as it connects space-like separated events of U, cannot be physical. That is, it is non-physical or dualistic. The above conclusion can be false if one of the premises is false. P3 is accepted physics and as such will be taken as true without argument (Einstein, 2015). In the case of P1 and P2, it can be false if at any given instant U is not a set of events but instead is a single event or perception is not a singular process but a set of parallel processors somehow appearing to be one etc. Any such view is to deny the truth of the axioms, that is, the perception of the whole apple from instant to instant is not true. In this paper, we will take the axioms to be true and events to be distributed as stipulated by the axioms. Thus, taking the conclusion C1 as true, we will proceed to analyse where it may lead us. 4. Hearing Consider a note of music. A musical note is undefined in an instant of time. It exists over a period of time. Sound in general exists across time and not in an instant. From this observation we get the following axiom. Axiom C Hearing consist of two components. a. Sound a set of events distributed across time (U). b. The hearer or the thing hearing the sound (I). C2. From axiom B and C we can conclude that U is 4-Dimensional set of events that is perceived and heard (by I). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 460 5. The Geometrical Vantage Point of I a. In order to observe a 1-Dimensional object fully, you need to be in a 2nd Dimension (see Fig 4). Vantage point of observer in 2nd Dimension 2nd Dimension 1-Dimensional object Fig 4. 1-Dimensional object vantage point located in 2nd Dimension b. In order to observe a 2-Dimensional object, you need to be in a 3rd Dimension (see Fig 5). Observer in 3rd Dimension object 2-Dimensional surface Fig 5. 2-Dimensional object vantage point located in 3rd Dimension ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 461 c. In order to observe a 3-Dimensional object, you need to have access to the 4th Dimension of time to travel around it and observe (see Fig 6). Observer must travel around in 4-Dimensional of time to observe Observer must use 4th Dimension of time to travel around the object to observe it fully Fig 6. 3-Dimensional object vantage point located in 4th Dimension C3: In C2 above we concluded that the events of U are 4-Dimensionally distributed. Thus, the geometric vantage points for I would be in the 5th Dimension. C3 further straightens C1 where we noted perception is non-physical. 6. Introducing Concept A Consider changing the shape of a 4-Dimensional object as show in the Fig 7 below. Fig 7. Concept A – A change in shape ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 462 As the change is across time and space, from within the 4-Dimensional object such changes will not be observed. Further such changes as they act across space–time, will not violate conservation of energy as it changes not just the present and future but also the past. This type of change will be called Concept A. 6.1 Changing frequency of oscillations via Concept A Fig 8 below shows a particle oscillating over time. Concept A can contract time leading to an increase in the frequency of the oscillations. Fig 8. Concept A changes the frequency and amplitude of an oscillating particle 6.2 Concept A acting on interacting particles Consider a particle over time. It would be a 4-Dimensional string. Now consider the action of Concept A at a point of interaction between two such strings as shown in Fig 9. It can be seen as pulling on one string leading to changes in the path of both strings across past, present and future. Fig 9. Two particles over time will be like two strings entangled with each other. Concept A acting at a given point will change the future but also the past ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 463 7. Hypotheses A: the Mind-body Interaction and Concept A Consider moving one’s finger or hand. This ability to move does not feel to be constrained in any deterministic way by prior states of the mind. From this observation we get the following axiom. Axiom D Free will gives rise to movement and consist of two components: a. The part of the body that is moved (U), e.g. Finger, Hand etc. b. The thing (I) that initiates and controls movement. It is hypothesised that free will comes about by I acting on the events of U (located in the brain), via Concept A. Thus, acts of free will result in change not just in the present and future but also in the past. This hypothesis is in agreement with C3 that the vantage point of I is in the 5th Dimension, as such, it can change the observed 4 Dimensions of U. This interaction is as shown in Fig 10. Fig 10. The interaction between Mind and Brain via Concept A The interaction can be shown via the following four states as given in Fig 11. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 464 Fig 11. Four states in the mind-brain-body-world interaction Consider the events associated with asking a person to make a choice of clicking a button on the occurrence of an external event such as a light flashing or not flashing. This is shown in Fig 12. Fig 12. The corresponding change of states in the mind-brain-body-world interaction over three instants of time ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 465 The mind makes a choice at time T2 on observing events E1 or E2 (Flash of light or No flash of light). The choice the mind makes at time T2 will be either M2 or M3. This will lead to the mind going to state M4 or M5 respectively. In regards to the state of the mind prior to T2, that is at T1, it is M1, nothing has changed. The body has state B1 at T1 and at T2 the state B2. However, at T3 the body will have either state B3 or B4 depending on the choice made by the mind. That is B3 might be the state in which a button was pressed and B4 the button was not pressed. Now the interesting aspect of the hypothesised interaction can be seen in the brain states. The choice of the mind at T2 will not only alter the brain state to be A2 or P2 at T2 corresponding to M3 and M2 respectively, but also change the past brain state to be A1 or P1. The brain state A1 and P1 are both compatible with the single mind state M1. The future brain state will change to A3 or P3. It is this changes to the past that would be the hallmark of Concept A type changes. The physical changes in the brain states is shown in Fig 13: Fig 13. The brain state changes via Concept A as seen acting on two particles ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 466 8. Hypotheses A to Theory A We shall now explore potential evidence for Concept A to be the vehicle of interaction between mind and brain. At the onset it must be noted that C1, that is the observation that simultaneous events are connected by perception, by itself stands as strong evidence for I to be outside the 4 Dimensions U of space-time events. We shall explore two other sources of evidence. a. Circumstantial evidence provided by Electrical Potential studies of the brain b. The expanding universe or the Big Bang theory. 8.1 Libet's experiment on free will In the famous experiment carried out by Benjamin Libet (Libet et al., 1983), a person makes a choice to press a button or not to do so at a given time, that the person notes down. It was noted in this experiment that when a choice is made at say T2 as stated by the person, nevertheless prior to this time, proceeding by about 300ms, there can be detected an increase electrical potential in the brain. It was interpreted at the time as showing that free will choices are not free as prior to the person making the choice subconscious processes were already in operation, as seen by the increased electrical potential 300ms before the time of making the choice. However, this is exactly what would be expected if free will was brought about by Concept A type changes. Brain states at T1 prior to the time of making the choice at T2 will change as a result of the mind making a choice at T2 (see Fig 12). 8.2 Variation to Libet experiments Now if the observation from Libet experiments is due to Concept A, a further confirmation can be made by the following scenario. In Libet experiments the subject made a choice at a time of their choosing if to press the button or not to press. Consider the following variation. Suppose you tell a subject to decide to press or not press a button when they see a red-light flash. The light is flashed randomly at a time unknown to the subject. Now if the result shows that there is a change in electrical potential in the brain prior to every time they choose to press the button, this will be circumstantial evidence for Concept A. As the subject or the subjects brain could never have known when the light was going to flash. Such an experiment has been carried out by Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, Borghardt and Schmidt (2013). The results are as expected (Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, Borghardt, & Schmidt, 2013). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 467 8.3 Evidence from the Big Bang The Big Bang theory says that all of space-time started as a single event or point. That is the whole universe was the size of a single event and it is expanding. Thus, both space and time is created in this expansion. As such this would mean there is a continues change in shape of the universe. Expanding 4 Dimensionally means changing shape 4 Dimensionally. Thus, the universe does allow for 4-Dimensional shape changes. This is what is needed for Concept A to be possible ("Big Bang,"). 9. Concluding Argument: Minds and Events Following Rene Descartes meditation (Descartes, Tweyman, Haldane, & Ross, 1993), we shall now summarise the above findings: Category 1: Minds I exist, and I am a mind. Therefore, Minds exist. Category 2: Matter I have feelings. These feelings originate from sensors in what I call my body. The sensors are receptive to stimulation from events created from within my body and from events created from outside my body. The stuff that bring about these events I shall categorise as matter. Thus, my body is also made of matter. Therefore, Matter exists. Category 3: Space My body needs Space and Matter in general needs Space. Matter can exist only in Space. Therefore, Space must exist. Category 4: Time My body needs Time to change and Matter in general needs Time for change. Matter can change only in Time. Therefore, Time must exist. From the above observation I conclude that these four categories permeate each other and exist equally with none more abstract or less abstract than another. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 468 Now to the question of the origin of these categories Could it be that any one or more of these categories can be made from any one or more of the remaining categories? Could these categories transform from one to another? Matter needs Space and Time for its existence, therefore without Space and Time, Matter will not exist, as such Matter could not have been the origin of Space and Time. From physics it has been observed that Space and Time can give rise to Matter spontaneously. As such Matter maybe a result of a localized change to Space and Time. So then, could Space and Time be the origin of everything else? Again, from the theory of the Big Bang all Space, Time and Matter originated from this singular event. Therefore, Space and Time could not alone have brought about the other categories. Since the Big Bang was an event, could it be that all things are made from events? Where there is Space, Time and Matter there is always an event. There can be no Space, Time or Matter without events. In an instant all of Space and the Matter is nothing more or nothing less than a set of events. So then Space, Time and Matter is one and the same as a set of simultaneous events from one instant to the next. From this observation the four categories can be reduced to two categories Category 1: Minds Category 2: Events Now then, can Minds exist without events? We know that simultaneous events give rise to feelings in Minds. We know from special relativity simultaneous events cannot give rise to anything physical or material. Therefore, feelings cannot be physical or material. Now as feelings are a part of Minds, we must conclude Minds are not physical. Now can the Mind exist without feelings OR does feelings create the Mind, that is one and the same as the Mind? If feeling create the Mind then as feelings are created by events then Space, Time and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 469 Matter which we have concluded is the same as events, must also have feeling and thus be one and the same as a Mind. Thus, we would need to conclude a rock has a Mind or is part of a Mind to the same extent that my brain is a Mind or is part of a Mind. This conclusion is not palatable as such let’s consider the OTHER alternative. Now if a Mind can exist without feeling then we also know that the Mind can create events (e.g. throw a rock, move a finger). So then given that the mind can create events then the Big Bang (The Event) could have originated from The Mind in order to evoke feelings in other minds. These other minds may have also been created by The Mind. Received August 12, 2022; Accepted September 25,2022 References Big Bang. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110906105327424 Descartes, R., Tweyman, S., Haldane, E. S., & Ross, G. R. T. (1993). Meditations on first philosophy in focus. New York;London;: Routledge. Einstein, A. (2015). Relativity: Princeton University Press. Jo, H.-G., Hinterberger, T., Wittmann, M., Borghardt, T. L., & Schmidt, S. (2013). Spontaneous EEG fluctuations determine the readiness potential: is preconscious brain activation a preparation process to move? Experimental Brain Research, 231(4), pp. 495-500. doi:10.1007/s00221-013-3713-z Libet, B., Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., Wright, E. W., . . . Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106(3), pp. 623-642. doi:10.1093/brain/106.3.623 Appendix A The object of study in consciousness Acquisition of knowledge by humanity is dependent on the consciousness of the individual. When a person makes an observation, and comes to an understanding, this understanding is this person's subjective knowledge. If another person, on making a similar observation, arrives at a similar subjective understanding, this knowledge they share can be taken to be part of humanity's objective knowledge. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 470 Thus, all of humanity's objective knowledge is a subset of all of humanity's subjective knowledge; that is, there can be no objective knowledge that has not been some person's (dead or alive) subjective knowledge. Thus, an intrinsic assumption behind all of humanity's objective knowledge is the similarity of the axioms of consciousness of the individuals. With regard to the study of consciousness, the object of study must be once own consciousness. In the study of consciousness, if a person gives a description of consciousness that does not correspond to his/her subjective axioms of consciousness, then with it must also be given the transformation that reconstructs these axioms. If not, this description is but only a fairy tale. Seen in this light behaviourism is a mistake as it attempts to study consciousness via the behaviour of another person. This is like hoping to study mathematics by getting somebody else to study it. Appendix B Pinocchio Syndrome, the Turing Test and the Axioms of Consciousness From the very inception of one’s own consciousness, a human knows most perfectly well one’s own consciousness and its associated experiences. All its (humans) interactions with the universe is via its consciousness. Now consider a child, it will initially think everything is conscious like itself. A baby will smile at a toy. So the toy starts of having passed the Turing test. With more learning the child will start to pass and fail different objects as to if they are conscious or not. Thus, each person runs a Turing test on objects encountered all their life all the time. Now in the past people ran Turing test on the sun, stars, the weather, volcanoes and most of the time these things passed their Turing test. As such they were worshiped as gods. So, the definition of the Pinocchio syndrome is this: From childhood we have a tendency to assign consciousness to everything. Then we run a Turing test to assert if its correct or not. All of us suffer from this syndrome and we need to keep this syndrome in mind when it comes to Strong AI. If the Turing test is weak then Strong AI would be a worship of gods. Now, a better approach to this question would be: a. Each human knows very well what it is to be conscious. What constitutes a conscious experience. As such it would be possible to define a set of Axioms, the Axioms of consciousness. b. In regards to computers again, a computer is not a black box. Humans know exactly how they work. As such it would be possible to decide if the working of the computer can bring about the Axioms of consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 471 Foundation of all Axioms the Axioms of Consciousness Consider the experience of watching a live performance of music and dancing to the music. This experience has the following axioms Axiom 1 Consciousness consists of two components: a. The Observed (U) b. The Observer (I) Axiom of U a. The observed (U) is a 4-Dimensional (4D) object. (This is the totality of all sensations and actions. Consider music, it must span time as such the whole experience is 4D.) b. The 4D object observed has finite boundaries in Space and Time. c. U being a 4D object can be broken down into component 4D objects. a. b. c. d. Axioms of I Ability to observe U Feelings Free will Curiosity and playful behaviour Axioms resulting from the interaction between U and I Based on the type of interaction with I, U can be broken down into the following three components. a. Those which can evoke feelings in I (e.g. vision) referred to as Sensory objects. b. Those whose motion can be controlled by the free will of I (e.g. hand) referred to as Motor objects. c. Those which are model of past Sensory objects and Motor objects (e.g. Memory) referred to as Memory objects. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 472 Appendix C Distribution of brain activity and perception Fig 14. Distribution of brain activity and perception It is commonly held belief that nerve impulses and activity at nerve synapses alone can explain consciousness. However, it will now be demonstrated that the need for a connection between simultaneous become even more evident when the actual distribution of these events (nerve impulses and activity at nerve synapses) over space and time is considered. From a physics point of view a nerve impulse or the activity at nerve synapses is more than a single event. However, for this analysis a nerve impulse as well as a synaptic vesicle will be considered as single object (Objects of perception) that create a single event by its location in space and time. One of the fundamental properties of nerve impulses is that it must end before it can cause the next event. That is a nerve impulse dies by discharging at a synaptic cleft, which will then release a synaptic vesicle. Essentially, these objects are transient with a limited lifespan and distinct space between the object. Thus, if you were to consider all the nerve impulses and activity at synapses at an instant in time. The following would always be true: ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 456-473 De Silva, F., Events to Dualism 473 1. These objects are physically separate from each other; and 2. None of the objects that are present at an instant in time have been caused by any of the other objects that are present at that same instant. If you were to consider a set of balls on a pool table, when one ball hits another after this event of hitting, both balls remain on the table, this contrasts with what takes place in the brain as a nerve impulse must essentially end its life before its subsequent cause will arise by way of a synaptic vesicles. Thus, at any given instant all the objects present do not also contain the causative objects. All the causative objects must have essentially come to an end. Given observation 1 and 2 let the objects of perception at any given time be enclosed in the smallest possible virtual spherical globes. Then over any length of time these globes will never intersect. Thus, they are separate in space and time. These globes will form an ever-changing pattern. With none of the globes having been created by any of the other globes at any given instant (Fig 14). We know that the activity within these globes together gives rise to a single phenomenon such as perception. However, we know that distinct space and time cannot have any form of connections (special relativity). Yet phenomenon such as perception makes exactly such a connection as it is a singular result of all these transient objects. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

87 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness Exploration A Philosophy of Consciousness Alan J. Oliver* Abstract This essay completes my earlier essays on consciousness, and ranges from what I found in The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali1 by Swami Veda Bharati, and The Sankhya Karika2 by G Srinivasan, through to my conclusions. In the past I found modern philosophy requires any definition of consciousness to provide an explanation of its subjective aspects, and the author of the Yoga Sutras mentioned above provides a basis for my explanation which I believe can be understood by a layperson in general terms of philosophy and neuroscience. Leaving aside convention and limits I hope to present an understanding of consciousness, mind and memory based on practical experience in the state of Samapatti. I am very aware that the knowledge within the two books I cite originated at a time when people had a different way of understanding reality and verified their knowledge through direct perception. My learning process will seem tedious but the fact is that I find answers piece by piece and I write in much the same way. In citing these two authors I do not claim or infer any agreement or support from either of them for the conclusions I reached in this essay. Keywords: Nonlocal, Yoga diagram, composite sentience, memory, retained information, manifestation, manifestative cause, composite sentience, quantum potentials, entanglement, brain plasticity, manifestation. Introduction This discussion began in 1986 during a conversation with the late Dr Bevan Reid 5, a cancer researcher at the University of Sydney. Some years later I read Bohm and Hiley‟s Undivided Universe6 and found in that book a clear relationship with Bevan Reid‟s concept of information in space. I had been attending a class about The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, and early in 1987 I began my first experiences of Samapatti. The first Samapatti experience came about when I was asked to see what I could do about Zac, the anti-social cat. Inviting me to sit on a bean bag chair, his owner placed Zac on my lap saying “He doesn‟t miaow, he snarls; he won‟t let anyone hold him for more than a couple of minutes, we haven‟t seen him wash himself in a year or more and he smells awful, … can you do anything for him?” I held my hand over the cat and focused on the top of his head intending him to go to * Correspondence: Alan J. Oliver, Normanville, South Australia. E-mail: thinkerman1@dodo.com.au ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 88 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness sleep. I relaxed myself and Zac went to sleep immediately and I turned my focus on this smelly cat. Right away I had a cluster of simultaneous images in my mind; the chaotic lights and wavy lines were a surprise for me because I have never had any mental images in my life. There were many different pictures, and my first thought was they are like a few video games overlaid simultaneously on the screen. I was unable to hold any one image long enough to recognise a scene and focused on my own stillness; after about twenty minutes the chaos gave way to a tranquil garden scene. Everything I noticed about this garden seemed to be wrong; all the colours were autumn tones, no green and no blue. And there was something odd about the perspective too; the plants were recognisable, but everything seemed much larger and out of proportion. I realised I was seeing from Zac‟s eye level and colour spectrum. In fact I was seeing the garden as if I was Zac. I knew I had never seen this garden before and yet it felt both familiar and comfortable. I stayed with the garden scene for a further fifteen minutes and then came back to being me. I felt he would wake up and looked at his owner to tell her Zac would wake up now. Zac opened his eyes, yawned and immediately began to wash himself. He had been asleep on my lap for almost an hour. I knew this event was a significant landmark because I had not only seen what the subject was dreaming, I had experienced his experience of his dream as he would have dreamt it, and I had assumed that the flow of information between a healer and subject appeared to run in both directions because I had been aware of two simultaneous viewpoints. o0o This next experience involved a woman with a fractured leg which had been broken a year earlier. She told me a steel rod had been inserted into the bone to support the join as the bone knitted together. Unfortunately, it hadn‟t knitted successfully, and the rod had been removed. Her current option was to have a bone graft and an appointment to have an X-ray had been arranged for a week‟s time. The X-ray would give the surgeon the information needed for any further bone graft procedure. I sat down in front of her and looked at where she said the fracture was in her leg and wondered what I could do about it. I asked her to relax and close her eyes while I relaxed myself to focus on her leg. I closed my eyes and immediately thought the bone marrow looked like a dark mass in a distressed state. I thought I should remove the distress and fill the space with some bright energy. I opened my eyes, intending to ask her to open her eyes and saw they were already open and she was very excited. She told me she had seen me remove some dark stuff from her leg and replace it with bright golden light. She was obviously very excited, but not as much as I was; I recognised she had „seen‟ what I had only thought; moreover that thought manifested what I would have liked to ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 89 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness happen in her leg. In the following weeks she told me the subsequent X-ray showed some new bone growth at the fracture site. These are two examples of what I found in the Samapatti state, and I will interpret the Yoga diagram in a manner which I believe allows me to relate Swami Veda Bharati‟s description of consciousness and the Sankhya Karika to my experiences in terms of the quantum states present across the whole diagram in any one moment of this fundamental process. By doing this I hope to develop an explanation of what happens in that Samapatti state and how it can assist in gaining an understanding of what is consciousness, mind, memory and the unconscious or acognitive state. Later, in an email exchange with Professor Basil Hiley I asked how physics might describe this interaction between minds; he said the best explanation he could offer would be that of a quantum entanglement of the minds. With the benefit of hindsight I can put Hiley‟s explanation with what I know from my interpretation of the Sankhya Karika to build a coherent picture of the Yoga diagram as a narrative of interactions between selectively interactive quantum potentials as real information arising within a fundamental quantum process. I will do my best to develop that narrative throughout this essay. Hiley‟s email response, suggesting a quantum entanglement as an explanation of my experience with the cat, seemed to clarify David Bohm‟s Wholeness and the Implicate Order 7 in which Bohm talked about information infolding and unfolding in the nonlocal space. I had learned from my conversations with Dr Bevan Reid about information retained in space that we were all describing much the same sort of quantum event, and this kept me looking for a way to pull it all together. The description I found in the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, supported by Swami Veda Bharati‟s Yoga diagram, provided that way as a concept but I needed to find how to translate that spiritual concept into something based on my rudimentary physics. When I saw that my Samapatti experiences could be described in terms of the Yoga Sutras and Sankhya Karika I began writing. This present discussion is a continuation of those earlier conversations about my experiences and their explanation which I found in the Yoga Sutras. I will move between the descriptions given in The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali1 and The Sankhya Karika2; the former being an explanation of the Swami Veda Bharati‟s Yoga diagram from a spiritual perspective and the latter being essentially the same explanation from a scientific perspective. I support both viewpoints from my own experiences in the state of Samapatti because I can recognise each one is explaining the same phenomenon. Now we must take a look at the Yoga diagram itself. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 90 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness The Yoga Diagram prakriti 1. 2. mahat or buddhi, t he faculty of discrimination, intelligence or intellection, the first vehicle of purusha ahamkara, ego, the principle of self-identification sattvic tamasic rajasic ahamkara impelling both 3-13. mind 5 cognitive senses 5 active senses 14-18. tan-matras 5 subtle elements (tan-matras) 19-23. matter becoming atomic 5 gross elements (bhutas or tattvas) earth, water, fire, air and space. Fig.1. Fig. 1. is taken from the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, and I will use it as an aid to describe the concept of the descent of consciousness into matter as well as the creation of matter and will refer to it throughout this essay. Unlike Swami Veda Bharati‟s description of that concept, what follows will be an exploration of two of my experiences in the Samapatti state from the spiritual and the Yoga science perspectives. The Yoga Diagram ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 91 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness My description of Figure 1 begins with Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which are the three gunas/aspects of the oscillation which results from the descent of Pure Consciousness (Purusha) on prakriti, the undifferentiated potential in space. The final products are Mind as an aspect of Sattva, and Matter as an aspect of Tamas, with Rajas impelling both, which I understood to mean Mahat alternates between them. This „descent‟ of Pure Consciousness into matter is central to the whole of the spiritual interpretation of Patanjali‟s Yoga Sutras, in which, prior to the descent of Purusha, all three gunas are in a state of equilibrium. Patanjali tells us that when Purusha reflects on prakriti, the reflection provides a degree of consciousness at Mahat and causes the disequilibrium of the gunas. Mahat/buddhi is the first appearance of intelligence, discrimination and intellection in this moment of the process of creation. At the lower end of the Sattvic arrow we have the potential for the senses, both cognitive and active. At the lower end of the Tamasic arrow we have five subtle elements and the five gross elements which become matter. We should note here that in a spiritual context, this space has the title of Greatest Teacher, which co-incidentally is also the title attributed to Mahat. My interpretation of this conundrum is that the whole diagram represents information-in-potential in this nonlocal space (Akasha) at every point on what I see as a diagram of quantum potentials simultaneously available in any given quantum moment. My understanding of the word „space‟ as it is used in the Sankhya Karika is best described as mini black holes within an unmanifested substrate which is both perpetual and dynamic. Its dynamism relates to the unmanifested nature of this fundamental substrate, inferring energy with the form of a spherical standing wave. Its unmanifested state infers a quantum state which when considered as a hologram infers that the diagram represents every mini black hole which would be part of every point in that hologram. The process of manifestation is what we must consider in terms of the diagram as it relates to both of the two sources of my description. The whole of Figure 1 can be considered in terms of the fundamental process of matter becoming atomic, keeping in mind that I am also thinking about this diagram in terms of Srinivasan‟s translation of Sankhya Karika, which gives a clearer understanding of the gunas when he says that ‘all manifestation processes were defined by one type of event and that was an interaction in three modes which are represented by the gunas. The first interaction can axiomatically be only between the first two objects’. Please note that these two interacting objects are Mahat and any or all of the quantum potentials which are considered in the moment of an interaction. As a point which is „merely a point without mass‟, Srinivasan‟s description of space as „coherent, perpetual, dynamic but unmanifest‟ describes the Yoga diagram perfectly; it is a point which is a perpetually oscillating spherical standing wave in that unmanifested state. The same points exist in all of the matter which manifest, as well as the charges, fields and particles maintaining that matter. Srinivasan tells us that the gunas represent this oscillation, with Sattva being the expansive phase of the spherical wave and Tamas being its compressive phase. Rajas represents the tension between Sattva and Tamas, the stress within the wave itself. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 92 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness This oscillating standing wave is able to interfere with itself, producing every possible harmonic of that fundamental frequency. Looking at the final evolutes which produce matter, Srinivasan describes the harmonics of the fundamental waveform, one of which is a collapsing state as a potential for gravity; another is radiative, inferring the potential for the fields and charges required for the transformation of energy into matter. This is the fundamental process of creation, and when considered as the process of creating consciousness it has application in the tissue, momentary charge, and elements which perform specific functions within the neural network of the brain; indeed it operates throughout the whole body in every one of Srinivasan‟s mini black holes which drive the actual creation process according to the Sankhya version of the Yoga diagram, but we will need to approach that realisation gradually in the discussion. My interpretation of the Yoga Sutras in reference to the equilibrium between the gunas prior to Purusha‟s reflection on prakriti is in the context of creation, and when I consider this moment of equilibrium I believe it is the moment between the end of an oscillation of one spherical standing wave and the beginning of the next; the moment between the end of an expansion of the point and the beginning of its collapse. Considering Srinivasan‟s first interaction, I interpret his statement to mean that the two objects interacting are Mahat, (which represents the moment of equilibrium between Patanjali‟s gunas), and the existing potential information and context at Sattva or Tamas observed by Mahat in an interaction. The use of the term „observed‟ comes in part from the description of the process from a spiritual context where each moment or interaction would be observed by Purusha. Here we find the discrimination of the Buddhic component of Mahat, which Srinivasan has translated as a scientific context, such as making a comparison between each informational outcome of the interaction with the previous outcome. The second part of using the word observed relates to the relative absence of time in one quantum moment within the process, which in nonlocal terms provides for the retention of information in this space. I will get to the issue of the retention of information in space a little later. To explain these points which are an example of a quantum entity having the capacity to be in a number of states „at the same time‟ or „simultaneously‟, I provide a simple summary of what I have hypothesised about the process and the diagram at this point in real time and develop my explanation of the process and how quantum entanglement fits into the whole concept. Because Figure 1 is intended to illustrate the potential for matter present in a nonlocal state, and that matter manifests through a fundamental process within the diagram itself, it follows that the diagram represents the process by which Energy in potential becomes matter. 1. From Einstein‟s E = MC2 we can propose that M = E/C2 2. If we assume the unmanifested energy to be a quantum potential of energy in the context of the diagram, then it is possible to view the diagram as a representation of an interaction between these potentials, the assertion being that the only interactions will be ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 93 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness an expression of the stress in a waveform or harmonic and the null point or equilibrium between oscillations. 3. The narrative in the Yoga Sutras gives a description of those interactions in a context written with the intention of understanding the different levels of Samadhi and validating the spiritual model of creation as it was generally understood in the Vedic culture. 4. A narrative of the process from the Sankhya perspective leads to a quasi-modern understanding of the same process in the context of a quantum entanglement as suggested by Hiley in reference to my Samapatti experiences described earlier. The question of how one of an entangled pair of particles can „know‟ the state of its entangled partner has always intrigued me and I can only say how I think it fits within the Yoga diagram. From my reading of the spiritual perspective of Yoga the question suggests some form of selfhood at the level of a particle, most likely a common self, carried over from a moment before a particle which had been a single entity decayed to become an entangled pair. An alternative explanation could be that the prior state of the particle has retained information entangled with individual identity, which is what happens in simple cell division. To follow that thought we need to revisit the notion of self, or asmita as it is described in the Yoga Sutras. Swami Veda Bharati tells us this notional „self‟, asmita, can be „coloured by‟ Ahamkara, the retained experiences in mind which constitute the five ignorances given in the Yoga Sutras, namely: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Asmita I Amness Attraction Repulsion Fear of death of or what I believe myself to be. Retained information can best be understood to be the information relating to the who, how, what, when, where and why, arising from asmita and Ahamkara; a context in fact, and it is the information relating an experience together with its related contexts. Asmita represents the whole context of an interaction because it is the information which is entangled in any experience and I have assumed it will remain entangled in the samskara arising from that experience. Essentially, I believe every samskara of an individual is entangled with that individual‟s asmita, which means that all of an individual‟s experience is available to be „kept in the individual‟s mind‟ and is made available by the information retained from an interaction with Mahat; this is why one thought leads to the next, and why decision making can be difficult, at times uncomfortable and at other times revelatory. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 94 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness From Yoga we find that when Purusha (without distinguishing marks) reflects on the finest state of prakriti, that reflection retains the characteristics of Purusha, which are called Mahat/Buddhi, effectively a Samapatti in which Purusha is the seer and Mahat/buddhi is the subject because the whole diagram is entangled. Moreover, that entanglement between Purusha and Mahat/Buddhi is retained in this nonlocal state. These characteristics retained in Mahat/Buddhi are Satchitananda (existence, knowing and bliss); the first two being the finest matter and consciousness while the final attribute of Purusha to be realised is the universal Self. This Self, asmita, remains present throughout the subsequent evolutes simultaneously and is an aspect of the agency of consciousness inferred to be Purusha in the Yoga Sutras and is what gives Mahat its agency of consciousness. I believe this entanglement can give us another way to explain Mahat‟s agency of consciousness. From my perspective of the Sankhya Karika, the question of agency must derive from the first interaction (which can axiomatically be only between the first two objects) which is the moment or null between successive waveforms and the potential related to that moment. Swami Veda Bharati tells us that asmita (the reflection of Purusha on matter (prakriti) is described as a „composite sentience‟ involving Mahat/buddhi, with the composite being the combination of consciousness and the potential to exist (matter) and know (intelligence). Applying that notion of composite sentience to the diagram in the context of the first creation of matter prior to any living form, it becomes obvious there must be a deeper effect of Srinivasan‟s „first interaction between the first two objects‟ within the fundamental process. I believe this first interaction would relate to the beginning of a cycle of creation on the diagram, which suggests to me that the two objects would be Mahat and the retained information related to the last oscillation at the end of the previous cycle of creation. My reason for saying Mahat is the principal one of the first two objects is that in the spiritual interpretation of the Yoga Sutras Mahat represents the reflection of Purusha‟s consciousness, and in the Sankhya translation Mahat is the reference object for every interaction. In giving Mahat the role of reference object for every interaction I believe Srinivasan describes every cycle of the perpetual oscillation in terms of the interaction between the quantum potentials and Mahat in every quantum moment. From my point of view, this is the point at which we can begin to explain the diagram from a practical perspective. At this point in the discussion I recognised the need to include some of the process of consciousness in my discussion of the creation of matter because it is essentially the same process. My first thought about this point was to provide another diagram to illustrate the process but on reflection I decided to use the concept of a computer program instead because we are talking about retained memory and a process which has some similarity to a computer program. From that perspective, I am suggesting that consciousness is the product of process which is ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 95 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness analogous to the application software running on a computer while programmer is the author/agency of the fundamental process. I have been fortunate enough to have collaborated with Dr Syamala Hari in JCER essays on consciousness, and in explaining the analogy I used in the previous paragraph, Dr Hari used the example of a programmer writing software as a comparison for the need of a notional external agency or creator to produce consciousness from chemical and electrical activity in the brain. In my discussions with Dr Hari we realised that the consciousness we find in mind is the same consciousness present at the time of creating a memory of that item or experience. The identity of a specific memory item becomes part of the context related to the observation, the process and instrument of apprehension, the object remembered, together with its manifestative cause, which results in the simultaneous activation of every singularity/mini black hole in the observer‟s body and therefore the related momentary neural map which Patanjali calls a samskara. My view is that all of the quantum potential involving living forms is conscious information, not because consciousness is a fundamental of reality but because every experience is the result of these quantum interactions which produce its related samskara whose manifestative cause creates our conscious awareness. At this point we need to examine the process of memory, as given in YS 1.11., where we find that: A cognition is associated with and coloured by the object of an apprehension and resembles and manifests the features of both the object apprehended and the process and instrument of apprehension. Such cognition then produces an imprint (samskara) that is similar to them both. That samskara then manifests its identity with its own manifestative cause; it generates a memory. This memory is identical in form to the same manifested identity and manifestative cause. It consists of both the object apprehended and the process and instrument of apprehension. When the object of apprehension is primary, we call that memory. When the process and instrument of apprehension are primary, we call that intelligence. A „cognition‟ refers to something (the object) becoming known (in mind); the process and instrument of apprehension and an intellectual copy of the object creates an imprint that is similar to both, a samskara. We need to note here that the process and instrument of apprehension and the intellectual copy of the object are simultaneously present in that samskara. Initially, the instrument of apprehension is the senses while the process of apprehension is the knowing of what has been apprehended by Buddhi, the agent of apprehension which exists also as Mahat at evolute 1. It is presented to mind and thus „modifies‟ mind and is retained as a samskara. The „modification of the mind‟ comes from the manifestative cause or samskara ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 96 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness arising from that cognition and puts it into effect through the related functions within the neural network; this modifiable nature of the neural map is known as brain plasticity, which is the physical expression of a samskara. The samskara combines the identity of the object together with the manifestative cause as a memory; retained information. When the object of apprehension is primary we call that memory. The „manifestative cause‟ is the retained composite information which can reactivate the process and instrument of apprehension expressed as a whole of body memory through the neural system. The term „manifestative cause‟ is significant because here Patanjali is pointing out every detail of the process we must consider if we are to understand how it really works. In my Samapatti experiences I experienced the experience of the subject during that Siddhi state. I was able to know and experience a cat‟s dream, while in another experience the subject saw the change I thought I would like to have happen as it was happening. Given that I am unable to form any mental imagery, I was relieved to find that the subject could mentally see my thought through what must have been the same process when I watched the cat‟s dream. When the process and instrument of apprehension are primary we call that intelligence. This sentence explains the two different kinds of memory. The first kind is one in which we remember the object and experience of the observation as it was presented to the mind at the time and can relive the experience. All of this becomes the specific manifestative cause activated in any subsequent recall of that specific object and/or its context, and by that Patanjali means the object and the experience are what becomes present in our conscious awareness or mind, and we call that a memory. In the second kind of memory one only remembers the intelligence, which is „I saw this happening in a specific context‟ (I am aware of the initial experience in the mind and body; there is no manifestative cause, hence no re-manifestation of the experience). Swami Veda Bharati calls this intelligence acognitive knowing, indicating it is not something one knows with the mind. It is only a narrative because what was retained was the process and instrument of apprehension which only involves what Mahat/buddhi appears to retain in the actual experience and has no samskara/manifestative cause. This is the kind of memory I have; I do not re-manifest an experience; I only have a narrative of the experience. To add to this description I quote YS.1.41. which describes the coalescence of two minds which we find in the state Samapatti state. Patanjali tells us that: When one’s modifications have subsided, his (mind’s) stability on and coalescence with the apprehender, the process and instrument of apprehension and the objects of apprehension, like pure crystal (which takes on the reflection and colour of proximate objects), is called Samapatti. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 97 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness In his commentary on this Sutra, Swami Veda Bharati explains that the seer‟s causal cognition has set, which means her/his mind is empty because all samskaras have been brought under control and are inactive, evidence that the seer is in Asamprajnata Samadhi a state in which the self-identity (asmita) is minimised. What „the seer‟s causal cognition has set‟ really tells me that rather that having no samskaras, I do have samskaras but they are inactive. This is why the seer‟s mind is coloured by being in the presence of proximate objects, like the cat in my description of the first experience and the lady with the leg fracture in the second experience. This is where the notion of a common language emerged for me; the phrase, coalescence with the apprehender, is where Patanjali brings home his point of two minds merging. What that means is that both the seer and the subject have the two individual manifestative causes simultaneously in their awareness, and the Buddhi of each can distinguish between these two; the distinctions made by Buddhi is presented to Mahat; for the subject it will be only the information apprehended by the subject which is actually the seer‟s stillness; for the seer it will be only the information apprehended by the seer. However, the seer will know both sets of information are present and he/she is able to know which is which. I think this word coalesce explains the phrase „is coloured by‟ exactly, while the discrimination of Buddhi suggests that Buddhi knows both observations simultaneously (an entanglement), supporting the view that the process is in the quantum domain. Considering this Sutra, we must take into account the many functions at play in the seer‟s and the subject‟s body to manifest the experience simultaneously in each. This means that the same quantum information and related process works to manifest the momentary brain plasticity of the subject‟s neural network and to retain that experience of the seer‟s cognition as her/his experience. For the seer though, all that is retained is the intelligence of Mahat‟s observation, despite the fact that the seer has the experience of the subject‟s experience at the time, and therefore the subject‟s manifestative cause. Mahat‟s observation of the subject‟s experience does not contain the seer‟s asmita and therefore the seer does not create a samskara, which makes his memory of that event a simple narrative or statement. In Sankhya Karika, Srinivasan tells us that when harmonics of the fundamental standing wave synchronise, their properties such as radiation, charge and mass, combine to create specific matter. This is not too far removed from Patanjali‟s statement, „when there is a conjunction of a number of points without mass, a point with mass can appear‟. Such a conjunction at the beginning of a cycle of creation could combine a number of neutrons to create light; if it produced atoms of hydrogen it might have created a Big Bang. In the case of a seer and subject in Samapatti, what is produced are the changes needed to the brain‟s neural structure to implement the manifestative causes operating at the time. Here is another example of what I called a common language through which I knew that the cat‟s dream of a garden felt familiar, which I am inferring was how it felt for the cat. I make this inference supported by the fact that ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 98 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness this smelly cat which had not washed itself for more than a year woke up when I felt it would wake; it woke and began to wash itself as I knew it would. My notional common language is the activation of a specific manifestative cause to produce the brain changes which I infer gave the same subjective response in the cat and me in the first Samapatti experience given earlier. In that Samapatti state I was able to know the cat‟s experience and my own and was able to discriminate between each viewpoint. In the second experience the situation was reversed; the subject experienced what I had thought, which is what happens in Samapatti and is generally described as a coalescence of two minds, more of which we will come to a little later. At this point I need to explain the relationship of Mahat/Buddhi too, given that in the spiritual interpretation, Patanjali tells us that Mahat is „merely a mark‟ with no distinguishing features; it is simply a presence, the subtle energy which will produce objects. It is also the individual buddhi, the faculty of discrimination, intelligence and intellection in a sentient entity. Interpreting these attributes in terms of Sankhya Karika where Mahat is part of the fundamental process, it is evident to me that the attributes belong to the process itself, producing the specific manifestative cause of each attribute as it is known/presented by Mahat in both the seer and the subject. To explain this I turn to Bevan Reid‟s work as a cancer researcher 5 where he had found and recorded that the survival rate of his cell cultures of mouse fibroblasts was consistent over a number of years. In one of his experiments designed to reveal a structure for space he introduced a 10kg of lead into the laboratory space to find whether it would have any effect on the survival rate; he found the survival rate decreased markedly in the presence of the lead. Repeating the experiment with fresh cells he found that the effect of the introduced lead on the new fresh cell cultures resulted in the same decrease in survival rate. Then he removed the lead from the laboratory space and the decreased survival rate was maintained for some weeks, confirming that the effect of the lead remained in the space after its physical removal from the laboratory space. His conclusion was that the laboratory space retained the effect of the lead, which was the mouse fibroblasts‟ response to the presence of lead in that space and he said that what was retained was the information relating to the mouse cells‟ response to the lead, the manifestative cause. Now I will explain what I mean by retained information. The whole Yoga diagram represents quantum states of information as potentials which become flexibly entangled in a quantum moment within the fundamental process. I said earlier that the diagram represents every singularity point or mini black hole throughout the body. This includes the brain mass which is a flexible network of neural structures capable of reflecting that flexible entanglement of quantum potentials in the nonlocal state. The body‟s sensory system communicates with the neural network and vice versa to produce the effect we call conscious awareness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 99 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness In the Sankhya Karika Srinivasan tells us that “while laboratory instruments emulated all the five senses, they could not imitate natures' own instrument the brain, which was the core that maintained all forms of life. Sankhya proves that the two halves of the cerebral system were a sensory signal multiplexing instrument, Buddhi and Siddhi, based on the same interactive Guna qualities of space. It was indeed the most magnificent instrument to detect a null current or equipotential state. The brain, detecting the Moolaprakriti (singularity point) stress currents as an imbalance in the potential of the two cerebral lobes, transmitted its difference through the (eye of wisdom) pineal gland to the lower spinal plexus that magnified it. It was an experienceable signal, the much spoken about Kundalini current. On receiving a human query, the two unbalanced cerebral lobes went on a furious search till they reached the balancing point of a null Moolaprakriti current. On receiving that answer, the human gave a sigh of relief, demonstrating his utter satisfaction. That process signified the symbolic 'OM' state”. In the Yoga Sutras the needed external agency required for consciousness is Purusha which reflects on prakriti. Patanjali tells us that this reflection is Mahat and is „coloured by‟ Purusha‟s innate consciousness. My understanding of this external agency from the Sankhya perspective is quite different. When we consider creation in the first instance such as might exist at the end of a cycle of the universe, Patanjali tells us that Mahat/buddhi is „merely a mark‟, making the retained information the equivalent of a zero for the information related to any created matter at the end of a cycle of creation. Bearing in mind that we are discussing a fundamental process which creates matter and consciousness, the term used in the Yoga Sutras which relates to the potential to create is „manifestative cause‟. This retained information, as a potential to create, is the „second object‟ in the first interaction and provides me with a rudimentary idea of how the process operates in the quantum state prior to the manifestation of matter. What we need to remember here is that this manifestative cause represents both the object being remembered and the context of that moment, which will include the immediate space and circumstance. In 2005 I read a report in New Scientist 4 of Madeleine Ennis‟s experiment designed to debunk homeopathy. In her most recent paper, Ennis describes how her team looked at the effect of the ultra-dilute solution of histamine on human white blood cells involved in inflammation. These „basophils‟ release histamine when the cells are under attack. Once released, the histamine stops them releasing any more. The study, replicated in four different labs, found that diluted homeopathic solutions „worked just like histamine‟. Ennis might not be happy with the homeopaths‟ claims but admits that an effect cannot be ruled out. So how could it happen? Homeopaths prepare their remedies by dissolving things like charcoal, deadly nightshade or spider venom, in ethanol and then diluting this “mother tincture” in water again and again. No matter what the level of dilution, homeopaths claim, the original remedy leaves some kind of imprint on the water molecules. Thus, however the diluted solution becomes, it is still imbued with the properties of the remedy. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 100 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness You can understand why Ennis remains sceptical. And it remains true that no homeopathic remedy has ever been shown to work in large randomised placebo-controlled clinical trials. But the Belfast study (Inflammation Research, vol 53, p 181) suggests that something real is going on. “We are”, Ennis says in her paper, “unable to explain our findings and are reporting them to encourage others to investigate this phenomenon. If the results turn out to be real,” she says, “the implications are profound: we may have to rewrite physics and chemistry.” Reading this report again I can see in hindsight that space in this context, or specifically the singularities within the space within the water molecules, contained information relating to the „manifestative cause‟ or memory/samskara which resulted from the quantum interactions present when histamine was added to what became the original tincture prior to its dilution. Any subsequent examination of the diluted solution with the intention to assess any evidence of histamine would activate that memory of histamine in the water molecules, demonstrating the whole context of the original quantum interactions being retained within that context. It is the same kind of quantum information present across the Yoga diagram which I have described in relation to Srinivasan‟s interaction. The difficulty for science and philosophy is that the quantum interactions exist as retained evidence of the interaction when the original histamine was added to the original water. That interaction involved the histamine, the water and the space, in which the water and histamine interacted as a context, and any of that water plus the water added for dilution maintained the original context regardless of the quantity of water added. This same difficulty exists for anyone attempting to define how conscious and mind operate in the brain in terms of what is currently measurable. One attempting to define the retained information from a spirituality or science viewpoint would add that disciplinary asmita to the context, making any explanation invalid. Considering the Yoga diagram as a set of quantum information interacting within itself to create matter and taking the interaction to be the result of the perpetual oscillation, my view is that the process is something similar to Wheeler‟s3 quantum foam in that quantum information shuttles back and forth across the interface of the virtual and real states if that is what really happens. Alternatively one could say the process is a switching between moments of memory as quantum potential and at the end of the process we have a quantum manifestative cause of matter, living or inorganic. In his explanation of the Yoga diagram, Swami Veda Bharati makes it very clear that the phrase, „in the presence of‟ is fundamental to understanding the Yoga diagram. Applying this importance to every part of the diagram it becomes clear that every one of the singularities is in the presence of its adjacent singularities and will be interacting with them, creating the equivalent of what is a samskara, inferring that space itself creates its own memory. I think we can take that point further and say that space itself is cognitive and this would be another supportive element for the composite sentience of entangled particles before they have ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 101 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness participated in an event which would obviously be an interaction. I think Bohm and Hiley had already worked out this cognitive aspect of space before they talked about „hidden variables‟ in their book, The Undivided Universe6. Once again, we have reached a realisation which adds to our understanding of the fundamental process which we can expand to include life as a form of chemistry which is dependent on quantum interactions supported by retained information. I could take this point further but this is an essay, not a book, and I will leave it there. Suffice to say that as life and its replication became more complex, the information needed for sustainability of the form manifested possibly as RNA and DNA or earlier precursors; that is a story for someone well versed in those subjects. Using Srinivasan‟s brain model from Sankhya Karika I can attempt my explanation of the quantum interactions. I believe that Buddhi and Siddhi are representative of Mahat interacting on the Yoga diagram with the quantum states present during each step of the perpetual oscillation. When Mahat is „in the presence of‟ (observes) information related to a momentary context (a samskara) it knows all of the retained information related to that samskara. That information and context may relate to many experiences of that particular self or just the present moment. In the model above, it may arrive at a null point or not, depending on the outcome of the intelligence arising from Buddhi‟s discrimination and intellection. A null would have Buddhi indicate the information (samskara) regarding an outcome and manifest recognition of some relief to associate that relief and the information as a new samskara. If there is no null detected the process would continue to examine the samskaras related to the question, creating uncertainty, fear, depression, fight or flight depending on the number of samskaras and the related responses related to these samskaras. Now I will try to illustrate the process itself with words rather than a diagram. 1. Given that Mahat is „merely a mark‟, then in terms of the Yoga diagram, Mahat is a fundamental which I will call, i, an imaginary number. 2. I am assuming that any interaction will be made in terms of the relationship between i and any of the quantum states on the Yoga diagram representative of the retained information (memories) in a given moment. At the end of the previous cycle of creation there would be no matter present, so the first iteration of the next cycle will have i in the presence of no matter, which produces (i+0), the samskara for the creation of matter. This relates to Patanjali‟s statement that Mahat has no distinguishing mark, merely a mark, in this case a presence of nothing; I am sure a mathematician would have a name for this state. The next interaction is between i and (i+0), which produces the samskaras related to the manifestative causes (the gross elements for the creation of matter). Looking at the Yoga diagram in terms of Srinivasan‟s statement about the brain, I am inclined to relate this to Rajas ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 102 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness which represents the tension between Sattva and Tamas. When considered in terms of creation, (i+0) can be the manifestative cause for hydrogen or light depending on which creation story one might be considering in that moment. The point being that (i+0) is the quantum potential for manifesting an atom of hydrogen or photons of light. It would also produce the clumping together of the atoms produced, creating gravity as a force which would be present in this new context. Literally, we have a „manifestative cause‟ creating real matter from a quantum process in which (i+0) is the memory or retained information of an earlier iteration of creation from the earlier creation. This same process produces consciousness but rather than (i+0) we have i + the samskaras related to the electro-chemistry of life available to the senses, + the sensory experience which manifests as consciousness, + asmita/Ahamkara, + everything with a relationship to a specific living form (self or DNA or mind) as retained information in the quantum state which manifests its material self. All of the „+ …‟ information are contextual entangled potentials related to that moment and can include related and or all similar experiences which are relevant in that moment and space. And of course it is not quite that simple; to understand what is going on we must take into account that Mahat represents composite sentience of the unmanifested state. I would say that prior to the creation of the first matter, every singularity/Moolaprakriti in space is in the presence of the same zero and can be considered to be i. This suggests a possibly novel thought of relativity in which each singularity bears a relationship with every other singularity, a relationship which has been called asmita. In the context of a human this relationship can be the individual identity mentioned in YS. 1.11. and will be part of that individual‟s samskaras. This takes our consideration of the Yoga diagram to another level of complexity; it also provides some understanding of the paranormal event of bilocation. Two years ago I read an article in the Weekend Australian by journalist Nicholas Rothwell who quoted reports by the early anthropologists in outback Australia of such an event. In his article Rothwell described reports by two of these scientists in which each had documented a conversation he had with an indigenous elder. When they met up with each other weeks later and compared their notes they found they had the described exactly the same conversation with the same elder at the same time on the same day. Their records showed they was at least some hundred or miles apart at that time. I am suggesting that particular elder was able to perform Samapatti as an action at-adistance simultaneously with two subjects. The point I want to make here is that our individual identity as a context will always have a relativity component within the composite sentience of Mahat, and that relativity component will include a spatial configuration such as the one mentioned in Bevan Reid‟s experiment with the mouse fibroblasts in the present of a 10kg lump of lead. That spatial component will be part of the space in which Dr Ennis mixed her histamine solution prior to its dilution. Little wonder that sensitive people can be uncomfortable in a space where a massacre had taken place, often a ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 103 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness decade or century after the event; like Ennis, we all need to rethink about entangled information being retained in space because that retained information already has its place in the definition of quantum entanglement. At times a person can have a subliminal recognition of a place without any knowledge of the reason why that place feels like it had been known in the past; we call that feeling déjà vu. These intrusions of quantum information have been recognised by physicists in terms of a particle „choosing‟ a path in an experiment. John Wheeler 3 called the calculation of the choice which Richard Feynman had assumed to have been made by the particle a „sum over histories‟. My view is that it was the presence of the relativity of the information within the singularities of the whole location and its participants and the experimenter‟s desire to know which path would be taken and how it was chosen. I do not feel the need to expand the diagram of the fundamental process; instead I need only to relate that process to the same 5 subtle elements and 5 gross elements (bhutas or tattvas), earth, water, fire, air and space which can be understood to be the quantum manifestation of the charges, fields, particles present in manifesting an atom of matter or charge in the neuronal system, and is why I used the term brain plasticity earlier in the essay. In terms of consciousness, these quantum elements manifest as the network of connections in the neuronal structures of the brain; there and how it is that quantum potential as the manifestative cause becomes matter. The actual experience of our awareness of what is experienced as mind is the conscious content related to that experience. In other words, we remember the conscious experience „consciously‟ as now, based on what was spatially relative in that moment. We can use this model of consciousness to reconsider an experience in Samapatti; here the seer‟s mind is still, meaning she/he has no active asmita to provide a sense of self. In that state the seer‟s mind is „coloured by‟ whatever he/she is focused on to the extent is takes on the same manifestative cause present in the subject‟s mind, hence the seer „knows‟ what the subject is feeling in the same way that I knew the cat‟s dream. At the same time the subject „knows‟ the seer‟s stillness, and in the case of the lady with the leg fracture, was able to experience my thought from her own visual perspective (a samskara). This is why the Yoga student mentioned earlier from Srinivasan will re-experience the lesson given by her/his teacher when the lesson is recalled while the student is in the Siddhi state. Putting this Sankhya model into a general perspective of the cognitive mind, I think that Swami Veda Bharati‟s explanation of YS 1.11 can be interpreted as a description of the stream of conscious which we all experience. The process remains the same and Mahat will still be represented by i, what changes is the introduction of the term cognition. My view is that cognition is the composite sentience which we know as our conscious awareness. The sentience comes from Mahat, which we can regard as a seer in Samapatti with the body, or, as Swami Veda Bharati said, Mahat is in the present of the body, which means Mahat is coloured by the body‟s momentary experience. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 104 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness I know from my direct experience in Samapatti that the seer, Mahat, can have two simultaneous viewpoints; that of the subject and that of her/himself, with the Buddhic intelligence from each viewpoint known and the clear distinction of which is which. The subject in Samapatti will know Mahat‟s viewpoint without Buddhi and believe that as his/her own experience and this is what becomes the cognition, with a composite sentience based on the subject‟s asmita. From that point the subject‟s samskara of that cognition will evoke her/his own related experience or experiences and her/his Mahat will provide further cognitive moments which become a stream of consciousness. Of course, this stream does not run as fast as the creative process; its progress is limited to its own process of considering every related samskara and its effect of the body through the brain manifesting each memory as a manifestative cause. I would describe this process as samskara cognition samskara cognition samskara cognition samskara cognition …. I could have placed the words and arrows around a circle but that would be misleading; the fact is that each thought is observed by Mahat and recognised by Buddhi, whose cognition elicits any number of related samskaras, comparing each against the observation by Mahat. The most relevant elicits any number of its own related samskaras, and the process continues. The process described is what happens in the waking state. During sleep the samskaras presented to Mahat and the discrimination of Buddhi become less related to the current moment because the composite sentience is disrupted as each part of the body is responding to every local singularity. Think of the cat before Samapatti, when there was evidence of multiple samskaras all activated simultaneously to create the chaos I observed in Samapatti. When the cat finally responded to that state it had suspended its entrenched sense of self and was able to experience my stillness. It „slept‟ undisturbed in a physical sense for almost an hour; on waking it had reverted to a way of being related to an earlier time in its life. The last point to note in this discussion is about the unconscious state. In other discussions I had said this is about Mahat and Buddhi, and that the unconscious state is what is mentioned in the final statement in YS 1.11. The reason this state is regarded as being unconscious comes from the fact that Mahat is „merely a mark‟ which means that it does not create any samskaras. In practical terms, this leaves Mahat without any means of manifesting consciousness and may be a possibly valid demonstration of why there is a time lag between a brain signal to respond and the response itself. In my effort to understand this aspect of me I had thought I have an almost non-existent working memory, and obviously that is not the case. It is simply that since I do not create samskaras I do not remember the whole moment, only the intelligence arising from that moment. I have no stream of connected thoughts, which is why my answers to a question my seem lacking coherence; the thoughts do connect eventually, but the time of that connection is quite variable. The reason why we are not conscious of the acognitive aspect of Mahat is that this troubling ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 105 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness aspect relates to Buddhi. We become conscious of Mahat‟s cognition of Buddhi‟s discrimination used to extract the samskaras relevant to an interaction, question or observation, and this discrimination takes a finite amount of real time to manifest each moment of a memory in the body/brain while Buddhi discriminates to reach a final answer. Mahat‟s intelligence therefore becomes apparent after Buddhi has provided an answer to Mahat and the selected samskara or memory becomes known by Mahat as a conscious memory. This realisation about the unconscious Mahat might provide food for thought about mental states in general and I will leave that to the experts. For me, the whole question of consciousness is not quite as simple because I have become „established‟ in this Samapatti or Siddhi state or was simply „born that way‟. I certainly didn‟t acquire this state through meditation and study with an accredited teacher. What I can say from direct experience is that I don‟t have the first kind of memory; mine is of the second kind. This leaves me with this relatively empty mind which does have the normal visceral experiences when they are happening but lack any visceral component when I remember anything. Mostly I am in the same acognitive state or unconscious state of Mahat and have managed to get by with limited information at hand because there is no manifestative cause to inform me in the same way every normal person can operate. I am intrigued by the role of context as it plays through the common language. We all know what we can rely on so far as other people are concerned in a general sense. In this essay I have drawn from two different sources, one in a spiritual context and the other in a science context but each are translations of the same word. For example, the Yoga interpretation of (Sattvic) the expansive phase of the fundamental oscillation is one of illuminative, light and expansive; the Sankhya interpretation relates to the stress present in that singularity/mini black hole during that expansive phase. Both are descriptions of the information in the same quantum diagram. It reminds me of the Inuit having over seventy words to describe snow, but I think that is only how a western mind might understand it. More likely is the context of the snow being described; it can be snow falling, wind-blown, wind-shaped after settling, fresh snow, old compacted snow. The reason for many words for snow is really obvious if we realise each word represents a context. The same goes for samskaras as the manifestative cause related to a specific memory and its context. I think composite sentience is present in schools of fish, flocks of birds and wild animals collectively avoiding predators, but I think it goes further than that. A new-born infant has a brain, relatively but not quite, a blank slate. Until its birth the infant‟s brain was part of the mother‟s body and would have acquired samskaras and memories of the mother‟s experience during gestation through the same entanglement mentioned earlier in relation of cell division. After partition, the baby‟s brain would lack that built-in entanglement connection with its mother‟s asmita, and its now empty „mind‟ would place it in the same state as a seer in Samapatti. It now has a Samapatti connection to its mother‟s asmita because it „experiences‟ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 106 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 87-106 Oliver, A. J., A Philosophy of Consciousness mother as „me‟ and can be „coloured by‟ those minds around it in the same way its mother is coloured by them until its own asmita or a sense of self develops during the first two to three years. As I consider Srinivasan‟s brain model I can agree that the null between the two brain hemispheres would occur in the bliss state of Samadhi, but I believe things would be quite different in an everyday sense. Most people can be aware of their momentary mind state and the stream of consciousness which pours forth as each thought elicits the next thought. I can see how depression as a dominant samskara would be present in that stream in the same way that love and its associated thoughts can dominate our mind. But it is in the decision process where this model can inform us of the way making a decision can be both time consuming and difficult. This is because the issue at hand will have so many related memories, all aspects of asmita mentioned earlier. Each related memory can be felt in the body along with its associated pain or pleasure as we are drawn to a potentially negative or positive personal or collective outcome. From my own experience in Samapatti, especially that experience with the cat, I have come to the view that there is a common universal language manifesting as common manifestative causes. These causes would have been learned by the first forms of life and shared in the common memory before differentiation of the forms. We have seen how some mammals have become domesticated by humans, and in the case of Elsa the lioness in the Born Free story and movie even an animal as fierce as a lioness can express that same common language. What I do know from experience is that commonality is present in the Siddhi state of Samadhi. Received December 23, 2019; Accepted January 12, 2020 References 1. Samadhi Pada. Swami Veda Bharati, The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. Himalayan Institute Pennsylvania. USA. 2015. 2. G. Srinivasan, Kapilavastu, The Sankhya Karika. Online. 3. John Archibald Wheeler & Kenneth Ford, Geons, Black Holes and Quantum Foam. 4. New Scientist. March 19, 2005, p33. 5. B. L. Reid and K. J. Pryor., Medical Hypotheses. 1989. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 6. D. Bohm and B. J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe. Routledge London UK. 1993. 7. D. Bohm. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. Routledge Keegan Paul. UK. 1984. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 824 Review Article Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors Pierre A. Guertin* Dept. of Psychiatry & Neurosciences, Laval University, Canada ABSTRACT It is generally believed that voluntary movements are controlled by brain structures. Signals from cortical areas (e.g., primary motor cortex) are specifically considered to underlie the expression of volitional motor behaviors such as pointing finger or hand reaching for a bottle. However, there are also compelling evidence and breakthrough findings demonstrating that some motor behaviors, especially rhythmic and/or stereotyped, can also be unconsciously and/or involuntary controlled for the most part. For instance, the classical Ia reflex, a simple stereotyped, monosynaptic, and involuntary mediated motor response can be consciously felt in some circumstances whereas the Ib disynaptic reflex is always completely involuntary and unconscious. The pioneering work of Graham Brown in the early 1900s provided evidence of involuntary control mechanisms even for more complex stereotyped behaviors such as basic walking or running that can be mediated in complete absence of supraspinal inputs. In the 70s, Grillner and Zangger clearly showed that basic locomotor activities can indeed be induced without brain structures and sensory inputs in completely decerebrate and rhizotomized animals. Other findings showed subsequently comparable brainstem and/or spinal control mechanisms for many other complex rhythmic stereotyped motor behaviors such as mastication, deglutition, respiration, micturition, defecation, and ejaculation. The relevance of such findings for research on the neural control of movements as well as on the role of neural correlates of mindful (e.g., DMN, DAN, etc.) movements is discussed. Keywords: Consciousness, mindfulness, reflex, walking, motor cortex, brainstem, spinal cord. Brain centers and voluntary motor control in mammals It is a general belief that most movements are voluntarily and consciously initiated and, hence, essentially controlled by the brain – mental processes would be at the origin of movements purposefully executed (so-called volitional actions), as proposed by Descartes a few centuries ago (1). A pivotal role for the primary motor cortex in volitional movements has also been proposed by several neuroscientists more recently. Electrical stimulation of the primary motor cortex (i.e., located in the frontal lobe, anterior to the central sulcus) was shown to have the lowest threshold for inducing movements (2) – its activation was reported in cats and dogs to *Correspondence: Professor Pierre A. Guertin, Dept. of Psychiatry & Neurosciences, Faculty of Medicine, Laval University, Laval University Medical Center, Quebec City, Quebec, Canada, G1V 4G2. Email: pierre.guertin@crchudequebec.ulaval.ca ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 825 trigger per se the expression of specific movements. That led to the notion that the primary motor cortex is the main control center of most movements (3). In humans, Penfield and Jasper from McGill University were the firsts to report that stimulation of discrete motor cortex areas with an electrode can trigger site-specific, coordinated muscle responses (4) which led to a map of motor cortex functions better known as the motor homunculus. For instance, stimulation of the most caudal area of the motor cortex elicited a contraction of muscles controlling the fingers on the opposite side of the body (contralaterally). That homunculus contributed to show also that motor cortex areas are organized somatotopically in an orderly fashion so that adjacent muscles are controlled by adjacent regions of the primary motor cortex (1). Subsequently, it was shown that other regions of the brain such as the prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex, and supplementary motor cortex play also a significant role in voluntary motor control by planning, controlling, and executing so-called volitional movements (1). However, those breakthrough findings do not necessarily mean that simple or more complex motor behaviors can’t, in turn, be elicited and controlled involuntarily or in a total absence of consciousness. Does a boundary between conscious and unconscious movements exist? However, prior to further explore this question, another problem needs imperatively to be addressed. Those two words – consciousness and unconsciousness – have long been a subject of debate primarily for conceptual, metaphysical, philosophical, and semantic reasons. They have a considerably different meaning depending on the situation or the person (5). For some people, consciousness and specifically self-consciousness refer to being shy and worrying about what others think of ourself. In contrast, the Collins English dictionary defines consciousness simply as the state of being awake (3). Some researchers such as Dr Uriah Kriegel have proposed that consciousness includes self-consciousness or ‘intransitive self-consciousness’ since the latter can’t be expressed without the former (6). Descartes had proposed a long time ago that the pineal gland was the center of consciousness and consciously induced actions – i.e., volitional movements (7). Between the intention of moving and its execution, the pineal gland was imagined by Descartes as the ‘central command center’ from where the final decisive signal is sent to each specific muscle for its contraction. Nowadays, physicians use instead more clinically relevant definitions for practical and professional reasons. In some medical areas, consciousness is considered as a level of responsiveness either verbal, motor, or brain activity-related. It is thus perceived as a continuum of states ranging from full alertness and comprehension, through disorientation, delirium, loss of meaningful communication, and finally loss of reflexes (8). For anesthesiologists, unconsciousness is defined by a loss of alertness or full anesthesia (9) assessed with scales such as the Glasgow Coma Scale (10). All in all, one of the main problems when trying to understand voluntary, conscious, unconscious, reflex, and/or involuntary motor control mechanisms is not of scientific origin – it is instead essentially of conceptual and semantic origin. The word consciousness is ambiguous because it is a word used by everyone but with different meanings and for different purposes (11). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 826 The motor cortex can, in some circumstances, be accessory for the expression of relatively simple motor response An elegant study by Prof J. Martin in genetically engineered mice showed that corticospinal neurons originating from the primary motor cortex can be ‘deleted’ without detectable changes on locomotion (12). With the gene EphA4 removed unilaterally from the cerebral cortex, EphA4 KO mice remained capable of well-coordinated walking which, in turn, demonstrated that circuits in other parts of the central nervous system (e.g, brainstem and spinal cord), not affected by the gene manipulation, suffice to control conscious or at least volitional walking. In contrast, it has been shown also that nerve impulses from the primary motor cortex can generate movements even if someone is unaware of them. Indeed, the Alien hand syndrome (AHS) is a rare neurological disorder that leads to spontaneous hand movement expression when the person is not aware of them. A person with AHS may reach for objects or even manipulate with precision those objects without intentionally wanting to. It was shown using functional magnetic resonance imaging that their primary motor cortex was nonetheless activated during those unconscious, unintentional, and involuntary movements (13). The contrary is also possible. For instance, simple reflexes such as the stretch reflex (also known as the Ia reflex, tendon tap reflex, and knee jerk response) are examples of involuntary, simple, stereotyped responses and movements that don’t require the primary motor cortex for their expression although they can be conscious or at least consciously felt in some circumstances. That stretch reflex is elicited when a muscle and specifically its tendon is elongated suddenly. In response, the muscle from which the stimulation arises will contract ispilaterally. When performed by a medical doctor with a small hammer tapping the quadriceps tendon or patellar tendon, its activation causes a fast contraction of the quadriceps, and hence, an extension of the leg. Given the speed of the response (e.g., 20-50 ms), it has clearly been demonstrated that the corresponding circuits, comprising only one synapse (monosynaptic), are located exclusively in the spinal cord since brain structures can’t technically be involved (14). That is an example of an involuntary induced, but yet consciously felt movement. Another type of stereotyped motor behavior called the rapid eye movement (REM) may be expressed involuntary and unconsciously during sleep. Random and quick rhythmic movements of the eyes particularly during dreaming occur involuntarily (i.e., since sleeping) and thus unconsciously without a contribution of the primary motor cortex (15) although this has been recently challenged by researchers (16). Furthermore, REM can also be accompanied of violent movements of the limbs and other complex behaviors (17). Locomotion is a highly complex stereotyped and rhythmic motor behavior that does not necessarily require cortices Complex and very well-coordinated motor behaviors such as locomotion don’t necessarily require supraspinal structures to be expressed. Convincing evidence arises from studies in decebrate or spinal cord-transected animals as well as from in vitro isolated spinal cord preparations. Pioneers such as Flourens (1824), Philippson (1905), and Graham Brown (1911, 1914) reported spontaneous hindlimb rhythmic stepping movements after a complete lowISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 827 thoracic spinal cord transection (Tx) in cats and dogs with or without reduced afferent inputs using ether or chloroform (18-21). Grillner and Zangger (1974, 1979) have provided even more convincing evidence of a key role for spinal cord neurons in the control of locomotor rhythm and pattern generation in mammals. They showed fictive locomotor activity in hindlimb motor nerves induced by L-DOPA and nialamide i.v. in curarized Tx cats that had been completely deafferented surgically (22,23). Several years later, selective lesions, patch-clamp, KO models, and in vitro isolated preparations enabled the identification of spinal locomotor neuron candidates (called locomotor CPG neurons) in the lumbosacral areas with key rhythmogenic elements in L1 and L2 (24). In humans, stimulation epidurally (ES) or intraspinally near L1-L2 segments was shown to successfully trigger stepping-like movements in patients with complete spinal cord injuries (2528). More recently, buspirone/levodopa/carbidopa (SpinalonTM) administered to completely paraplegic mice was reported to enable the expression of involuntary full weight-bearing locomotor movements on a motorized treadmill (29). Locomotor-like activities in the muscles of patients with complete or motor-complete spinal cord injuries were also found after a single dose of SpinalonTM (30). Those results provide compelling evidence that complex involuntary motor behaviors such as locomotion can, at least in some circumstances, be controlled essentially by the spinal cord. Yet, those movements can remain consciously felt by patients since vision or proprioception can provide the corresponding signals (e.g, from upper body muscles in the case of paraplegic patients). Other highly complex stereotyped and rhythmic motor behaviors that are essentially unconscious and/or involuntary More recently, additional complex stereotyped behaviors have also been shown to be controlled essentially by non-cortical CPG networks (24). Several CPGs have indeed been identified in brainstem and spinal cord areas. Their role in controlling the expression of complex behaviors such as deglutition, mastication, respiration, defecation, micturition, and ejaculation is increasingly being understood. For ejaculation, the pivotal role of a CPG called the spinal generator for ejaculation (SGE) essentially composed of LSt cells was found when discovering that the corresponding muscle contractions failed to be inducible in LSt cell-lesioned animals (31, 32). LSt cells were identified nearby the central canal in the lamina X and medial portion of lamina VII of L3 and L4 spinal cord segments. The pivotal role of spinal SGE neurons in ejaculation was further supported by findings showing that microstimulation of L3-L4 segments can automatically elicit a stereotyped and wellcoordinated ejaculatory motor response even in thoracic Tx animals (33). For micturition, compelling evidence of a determinant role for another spinal CPG called the sacral micturition center (SMC) was provided with experiments showing that automatic or reflex-like, wellcoordinated voiding in Tx cats could be induced by intraspinal stimulation at the upper sacral level (34, 35). Specifically, using intraspinal electrodes, stimulation of the S2 segment produced bladder contractions insufficient for full voiding behavior, whereas stimulation of the S1 segment generated powerful rhythmic, well-coordinated bladder contraction and external urethral ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 828 sphincter relaxation, resulting in successful bladder voiding in thoracic spinal Tx animals (36). Other CPGs involved specifically in the involuntary control of chewing, swallowing, breathing, heart rate, and defecating were identified respectively in the medulla oblongata, nucleus tractus solitaris, ventrolateral medulla, and sacral spinal cord (24). The role of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in voluntary and unvoluntary movements Although cortical structures and networks can, in some circumstances, initiate, modulate, promote, or inhibit both rhythmic stereotyped movements and volitional movements, the role of neural networks and nuclei, generally believed to underlie consciousness and awareness, remains incompletely understood. As mentioned above, although the primary motor cortex is recognized as the cornerstone of volitional movement induction, it is not necessarily activated or involved in the control of several stereotyped motor responses and behaviors. Many other areas have been postulated to play a role either direct or indirect in the expression of consciousness or consciously controlled behaviors. The premotor cortex, if stimulated electrically, has recently been shown to shut down awareness of voluntary actions (37) much like for patients with AHS (13) or anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). Several other brain networks and nuclei such as the default mode network (DMN) comprising the medial prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, precuneus, angular gyrus, and amygdala have been associated with consciousness expression. Long-term meditation training was reported indeed to specifically stimulate NCC element such as the DMN (Rochat, 2010; Ziegler et al., 2019; Polak et al. 2018). Interestingly, increasing evidence suggest also that regular physical activity – e.g., walking and running – can stimulate those same regions (38). Another area called the dorsal attention network or DAN (comprising the intraparietal sulcus and frontal eye fields) was recently shown to have extensive functional interactions with the DMN (39) which may suggest also a role in mindful movements. All in all, it remains unclear the extent to which brain areas associated with conscious movement induction and consciousness/awareness expression are involved in the control of movement in everyday life. On one hand, several stereotyped behaviors (e.g, walking, chewing, defecating) are known not to absolutely require cortical activity for their control. On the other hand, several cognitive functions underlying consciousness expression such as memory, attention, focus, concentration, and executive function abilities can be improved by meditation approaches (e.g., Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy or MBCT and Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction or MBSR) (40-42) as well as by regular exercise (e.g., walking, running) suggesting neurofunctional links between movement and consciousness. Concluding remarks Obviously, further research is needed to reach consensual agreements about what conscious, unconscious and involuntary movements truly mean. NCC and corresponding patterns of global brain activity (e.g., perturbational complexity index or PCI, weighted symbolic mutual ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 829 information or wSMI, integrated information or Φ, etc) have recently been proposed as meaningful assessment values of consciousness levels. Other mechanisms such as the ‘holistic brain soup theory’, gamma loop theory, and recurrent thalamo-cortical resonance have also been proposed to contribute to consciousness expression (11, 43-45). Yet, their role in motor control remains poorly understood. Even if definitions are unclear and mechanisms are incompletely characterized, one thing is sure – volitional movements do not necessarily involve primary motor cortex activity whereas CPGmediated complex motor behaviors such as locomotion can be expressed without inputs from the brain. However, since elements and mechanisms associated with the NCC can be stimulated by training (e.g., meditation, physical activity (38)), it is not unreasonable to believe that we can over time voluntarily recruit them in order to bring increased awareness and consciousness to what we do either during yoga and pilates classes or in everyday duties and behaviors such as during breathing, walking, talking, eating, etc. Received October 29, 2020; Accepted December 17, 2020 References 1. Descartes (1647). Principes de la philosophie. Translated by Picot, Abbé Claude. Paris. Kandel, ER. Principles of neural science. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2013, pp.1709. 2. Eccles, John; Feindel, William (1978). "Wilder Graves Penfield 26 January 1891-5 April 1976". Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society. 24: 472–513. 3. Hepp-Reymond MC. 1988. Functional organization of motor cortex and its participation in voluntary movements. In Steklis HD, Irwin J (eds), Compara-tive Primate Biology. Alan R Liss, New York. 4. Blum A. 2011. A bedside conversation with Wilder Penfield. CMAJ 183 : 745-46. 5. Antony, MV. "Is consciousness ambiguous?". Journal of Consciousness Studies 2001; 8: 19–44. 6. Kriegel, U. Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2003; 33(1): 103-132. 7. "Descartes and the Pineal Gland". Stanford University. November 5, 2008. 8. Güven Güzeldere (1997). Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, Güven Güzeldere, eds. The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 1–67. 9. J. Fins, N. D. Schiff, and K. M. Foley (2007). "Late recovery from the minimally conscious state: ethical and policy implications". Neurology. 68 (4): 304–307 10. Teasdale G, Murray G, Parker L, Jennett B (1979). "Adding up the Glasgow Coma Score". Acta Neurochir Suppl (Wien). 28 (1): 13–6 11. Guertin, PA (2019). A novel concept introducing the idea of continuously changing levels of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research. 10(6): 600-606. 12. Serradj et al. (2014). EphA4-mediated ipsilateral corticospinal tract misprojections are necessary for bilateral voluntarymovements but not bilateral stereotypic locomotion. J Neurosci 34 : 5211-21. 13. Assal F et al. (2007). Moving with or without will: functional neural correlates of alien hand syndrome. Ann Neurol 62: 301-6. 14. Walkowski, Munakomi (2019). Monosynaptic reflex. StatPearls J, May 3rd. 15. Mallick and Inoué. 1999. Rapid eye movement sleep. New Delhi: Narosa Publishing House. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 830 16. Blumberg and Plumeau. 2016. A new view of ‘dream enactment’ in REM sleep behavior disorder. Sleep Med Rev 30: 34-42. 17. Hogl and Iranzo. 2017. Rapid eye movement behavior disorder and other rapid eve movement sleep parasomnias. Continuum 23: 1017h-34. 18. Flourens MJP, 1824. Recherches expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions du système nerveux, dans les animaux vertébrés (ed 1). Paris, Chez Crevot, vol 26, p 20. 19. Philippson, 1905. L'autonomie et la centralisation dans le système nerveux des animaux [Autonomy and centralization in the animal nervous system]. Trav. Lab. Physiol. Inst. Solvay (Bruxelles) 7, 1– 208. 20. Graham-Brown, T., 1911. "The intrinsic factors in the act of progression in the mammal". Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 84 (572): 308–319 21. Graham-Brown, T., 1914. On the nature of the fundamental activity of the nervous centres, together with an analysis of the conditioning of rhythmic activity in progression, and a theory of the evolution of function in the nervous system. J Physiol 48:18–46. 22. Grillner and Zangger, 1974. Locomotor movements generated by the deaffe-rented spinal cord. Acta Physiol Scand 91:38A-39A. 23. Grillner and Zangger, 1979. On the central generation of locomotion in the low spinal cat.Exp Brain Res. 15;34(2):241-61. 24. Steuer I, Guertin PA, 2019. Central pattern generators in the brainstem and spinal cord: an overview of basic principles, similarities, and differences. Rev Neurosci 30: 107-164. 25. Dimitrijevic et al., 1998; Evidence for a spinal central pattern generator in humans. Annals NY Academy of Sciences 860: 360-76. 26. Harkema S., et al., 2011. Effects of epidural stimulation of the lumbosacral spinal cord on voluntary movement, standing, and assisted stepping after motor-complete paraplegia : a case study. 27. Hollinski et al., 2011; Restoring stepping after spinal cord injury using intraspinal microstimulation and novel control strategies. Conf Proc IEEE Eng Med Biol Soc. 2011;2011:5798-801. 28. Moshonkina et al., 2012 Effects of spinal cord electrical stimulation in patients with vertebrospinal pathology.Bull Exp Biol Med. 2012 May;153(1):16-20. 29. Guertin PA, et al. 2010. Oral administration of a tritherapy for CPG activation in paraplegic mice: proof-of-cencept of efficacy. Biotechnol J 5: 421-6. 30. Radhakrishna M, Steuer I, Prince F, Robert M, Mongeon D, Kia M, Dyck M, Matte G, Vaillancourt M, Guertin, PA. 2017. Double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized phase I\IIa study with buspirone/levodopa/carbidopa (Spinalon) in subjects with complete AIS A or motor-complete AIS B SCI. Curr Pharm De 23: 1789-1804. 31. Truitt WA, Coolen LM (2002). Identification of a potential ejaculation generator in the spinal cord. Science 297: 1566-69. 32. Staudt MD et al. (2012). A pivotal role of lumbar spinothalamic cells in the regulation of ejacuation via intraspinal connections. J Sex Med 9: 2256-65. 33. Borgdorff AJ et al. (2008). Ejaculation elicited by microstimulation of lumbar spinothalamic neurons. Eur Urol 54: 449-456. 34. Nashold BSJ, Friedman H, Boyarshky S (1971). Electical stimulation of the conus medullaris to control the bladder in the paraplegic patient. A 10-year review. Applied Neurophysiol 44: 225-232. 35. Friedman H, Nashold BS, Senchal P (1972). Spinal cord stimulation and bladder function in normal and paraplegic animals. J Neurosurgery 36: 430-437. 36. Pikov V, Bullara L, McCreery DB (2007). Intraspinal stimulation for bladder voiding in cats before and after chronic spinal cord injury. J Neural Eng 4: 356-68. 37. Fornia L et al. (2020). Direct electrical stimulation of the premotor cortex shuts down awareness of voluntary actions. Nature communications 11. 4 February 2020. 38. Guertin PA (2020). The benefits of exercise on mental functions, consciousness, and mindfulness. Current Trends in Neurology (in press). 39. Kucyi A et al. (2020). Electrophysiological dynamics of antagonistic brain networks reflex attentional fluctuations. Nature communications, 16 January 2020. 40. Lao SA, Kissane D, Meadows G (2016) Conscious Cognitive effects of MBSR/MBCT: A systematic review of neuropsychological outcomes. Cogn 45 : 109-123. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 824-831 Guertin, P. A., Conscious, Unconscious & Involuntary Control of Locomotion & Comparable Stereotyped Motor Behaviors 831 41. Marciniak R et al. (2014) Effect of meditation on cognitive functions in context of aging and neurodegenerative diseases. Front Behav Neurosci 8: 17. 42. Upadhyay RK. (2015). Emerging risk biomarkers in cardiovascular diseases and disorders. J Lipids. 971453 43. Demertzi A et al. Human consciousness is supported by dynamic complex patterns of brain signal coordination. Science Advances 5: eaat7603. 44. Llinas, R. 2001. I of the vortex: from neurons to self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 45. Greenfield S. The human brain. A guided tour. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 1997. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 397 Article Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness Javier García-Castro* & Siva Prasad Kodukula Universidad Villanueva, Spain Abstract After almost four centuries of philosophical and scientific research concerning the study of consciousness, it seems that it is time to step forward. We cannot have a formal definition of consciousness mainly because we still do not have a complete theory of it. Theories about consciousness abound, but we are still not sure about its ontological and epistemological ground. Thus, a new hypothesis based on quantum mechanics is presented in this paper. This new hypothesis states that consciousness does exist, that it is not a fundamental property of the entire universe and that conscious experience emerges by transformation from mind (‘‘jeeton’’) to matter (‘graviton’), just like many other physical phenomena such as light, heat, sound or, color. Although this hypothesis is already based in empirical evidence, new experimental designs must be addressed to further increase our knowledge about consciousness and its relation to reality and subjective experience. Keywords: Consciousness, qualia, quantum mechanics, observer, relativity, film theory of the universe, jeeton, graviton, mind, matter. What is consciousness? Does anybody know? In fact, yes. Any person may be able to feel what it is like to be that person. Everybody has that private, subjective feeling of what is going on in the environment and the self. Nevertheless, as is often in the history of science, the problem may not be that simple. On the contrary, it seems to be far more complicated, including problems with its scientific definition, its ontological status, objective measurement, epistemology, and many others. We reject to offer a formal definition of consciousness, following the advice provided by Sommerhoff (1996). First, we need a comprehensive theory of consciousness, and then, we must be able to provide an exhaustive and operative definition of this term. In fact, many types of consciousness have been proposed, such as phenomenal/access consciousness (Block, 1995), primary versus secondary consciousness (Edelman & Tononi, 2000), core/extended consciousness (Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn, 2014), and so on, suggesting the provocative idea of a non-unitary construct of consciousness (Zeki, 2003). This obscures what already is extremely fuzzy. The study of consciousness poses so many queries which neither physics, nor neuroscience or philosophy have resolved satisfactorily yet. In principle, authors not only disagree in its Correspondence: Javier García-Castro, Universidad Villanueva, Spain. E-mail: jagcastro@villanueva.edu ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 398 definition, but also in its ontological status (from its non-existence to being fundamental). Furthermore, the extraordinary plethora of theories trying to explain consciousness allows us to suspect that this object of study is currently in an immature stage of science development (Wiese, 2018). On the other hand, dualism has been pointed out as a “dead end” for many authors, given that we cannot fill the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) to connect subjective experience with physical-deterministic entities. Therefore, this article focuses on a brief history of the concept of consciousness. Then, main problems of consciousness are discussed. Finally, a new hypothesis based on quantum mechanics is provided to interpret consciousness in terms of physics, which hopefully will leads us to develop a new whole approach to the unification of psychology and physics for experimental and theoretical purposes. 1. The birth of consciousness: from Philosophy to Psychology We can probably date the first attempts into the study of consciousness back to the earliest mystical adventures, thousands of years ago, in the context of magical and religious practices (Mithen, 1998). In fact, in terms of evolution, several authors propose that critical nervous system structures for consciousness could have arisen around 500 million years ago (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013) or, more recently, during the emergence of the mammalian brain, around 200 million years ago (Baars, 2012). However, and according to psychologist Julian Jaynes (1976), consciousness could be a more recent, learned cultural ability, since there are no words for ‘consciousness’ in the most remote and well preserved text of antiquity: the Iliad (~ 900-850 BC). In any case, the truth is that the concept of ‘consciousness’ has been documented in several historical sources since ancient times, although the terms and expressions have changed during that period (Monzavi et al., 2017). Given that it is highly controversial to establish a concrete period of time concerning the emergence of consciousness, we can date more accurately the interest in its philosophical and scientific study. A frequently cited milestone on this topic is the ‘dualism’ proposed by the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) in the 17th century(1641), which tried to articulate the relationship between the material part of human beings (res extensa) with its correlative, the immaterial mind (res cogitans). Subsequently, after a period of several philosophical speculations, the first laboratory of experimental psychology is founded in Leipzig by the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920). There, superior mental functions such as perception, memory, attention and consciousness are studied following a mixed methodology which combines introspection with mental chronometry. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 20th century, pessimism surrounding the scientific study of cognitive processes replaces these initial attempts in favor of behaviorism, and consciousness was relegated to ostracism for almost a century (Searle, 1992). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 399 2. Considering the dubious ontological status of consciousness: Dennett versus Chalmers In 1995 Australian philosopher David Chalmers (1995a) stated that there are two main problems when facing the study of consciousness: the easy and the hard problem. The easy problem of consciousness refers to the flow of information along the neural pathways in the brain. This is a tough task, but contemporary neuroscience is equipped with appropriate methodological and epistemological tools to face it (Kandel, 2013). The hard problem, for its part, tries to explain “how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience” (Chalmers, 1995b, p. 2). If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. Given that phenomenological experience could not be reducible to physical processes, and assuming that consciousness exists, then, a fundamental theory of consciousness is a logical consequence of this reasoning: consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, such as mass, space-time or charge, and because of that, it does not require explanation: it is (Travis, 2021). More recent versions of this ‘fundamental consciousness’ can be found elsewhere (Monzavi et al., 2017; Prentner, 2018). Leaving aside their differences, all of them agree in that consciousness is not explanandum, but explanans, the cornerstone of a real science of consciousness. And this idea is compatible with a scientific approach. In fact, Integrated Information Theory (Tononi & Koch, 2015) claims that consciousness is an intrinsic property of any physical system, determined by its causal properties. Following that, consciousness is everywhere in the universe, but distributed in different degrees depending on the complexity of any given system. Nevertheless, the ontological status of consciousness has been questioned by many authors. For example, philosopher Daniel Dennett (1991) supports that consciousness is an illusion; therefore, any attempt to explain consciousness as real falls into what he baptized the Cartesian theater, a neodualism in which there is always some homunculus at the end. In the same vein, other neuroscientists like Michael Graziano (2015) explain consciousness in terms of a brain trick, a product of awareness attribution process in the context of social perception. Once again, as we can see, consciousness swings from being fundamental to a residual epiphenomenon or even an unreal illusion arising from a brain’s mirrors game. Can we dare to provide a definition of something that we certainly still doubt is real? 3. The irruption of neuroscience: the signatures of consciousness An astonishing hypothesis was proposed at the very end of the 20th century: “you’re nothing but a pack of neurons” (Crick, 1994, p. 3). That claim was the trigger for a race towards the quest of the neurobiological basis of consciousness (Koch, 2004). Since then, many attempts have been made to explain the emergence of consciousness as a function of neuronal firing (Brogaard & Gatzia, 2016; Miller, 2005). At present, the efforts are gathered around the signature of consciousness, that is, what happens in the brain when a person, or animal, has a conscious experience. Using different cognitive paradigms, electrophysiological recordings and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 400 neuroimaging techniques, some findings can be obtained. For example, there is strong evidence that coordinated activity in the fronto-parietal areas is needed to achieve a conscious experience of ‘something’, whether visual, auditory or haptic (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Lamme, 2003; Laureys, 2005; Rohaut & Naccache, 2017). This cortical activation should be accompanied by an intense and massive activation of lay-distance areas involving thalamo-cortical networks and correlated with P300 wave recorded via evoked potentials (Bollini et al., 2017; Dehaene, 2014; García-Castro, 2021). Also, the synchronization of information must rely on a sudden burst of high frequency oscillations (~ 40 Hz) (Crick & Koch, 1990; Llinas & Ribary, 1993; Singer, 1995; Ward, 2011). For a deeper revision of the neurobiological correlates of consciousness, the reader is invited to consult Sattin et al. (2021). But it seems that neuroscience is trying to solve only one part of the problem, once again, the ‘easy’ problem of consciousness. Following Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and consciousness-access(Block, 1995), the former keeps always out of the picture, that is, the private and subjective experience, whereas all these neural correlates could be nothing but neural activity related to cognitive contents available as ‘consciousness-access’ to perform motor, language or perceptual actions. But the subjective experience (qualia) is not necessary to perform any of these functions(Chalmers, 1995a). In fact, there are plenty of cognitive activities, some of them as complex as mental arithmetic, decoding semantic meaning, attention or error detection, that can be performed in absence of conscious processing of information (Dehaene, 2014). Still, there is always something elusive to the realm of science. Also, these studies are correlative, and because of that, we cannot be sure of the directionality of causality, much less, conclude that brain activity is producing the phenomenal conscious experience(Chalmers, 2000; Noë & Thompson, 2004). In addition, consciousness is not a unitary phenomenon, but consists of different types of processes that may be linked to different neural networks distributed along cortical and subcortical regions within the brain (Sattin et al., 2021; Shanon, 2010; Zeki, 2003). For example, there is evidence of a primitive, degraded and unconscious form of consciousness related to N1/P2a evoked potential complex, in absence of its subsequent P300 wave (Bollini et al., 2017). It is probably located in primary sensory areas, far from cortical long-distance networks. Also, it might be very short and weak, and it may be responsible for some well-known psychological effects such as ‘phi phenomenon’, the ‘cutaneous rabbit’ or the ‘flash-lag’ illusion (Geldard & Sherrick, 1972; Herzog et al., 2016; Kolers & von Grünau, 1976). Conversely, the immediate conscious experience which can be separated from another is delayed at least 300 milliseconds, correlated with P300 potential (ERP) measured with different cognitive experimental paradigms, and associated to strong activation of fronto-parietal networks (fMRI) (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Grill-Spector et al., 2000). Finally, the sense of subjective present, which can be extended from past to future, rely on working memory, runs in periods of around 30-60 seconds and must be linked to memory systems (Pöppel, 1997). Although this is highly speculative, it is an example of the extraordinary complexity of the phenomenon we agree to call consciousness. Be that as it may, ‘it is something like to be that ‘something’’ (Nagel, 1974), whether it is real or an illusion, whether it is an epiphenomenon or a fundamental property of the universe, whether it is a unitary, brain-based product or a dualistic, metaphysical and interactionist entity. And it ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 401 should be explained by science, despite needing a new epistemological framework or scientific paradigm, as has happened so often in science history (Khun, 1962). 4. Unsolvable problems of consciousness The following is a detailed, although not exhaustive list of the main problems in the study of consciousness that remain not only unsolvable, but still very far from a satisfactory solution.   Consciousness versus reality. As René Descartes might have said, the only thing we ‘have’ is our subjective experience. From that, everything begins, but: what certainty do we have about that ‘experience’? There is a continuum from idealism to materialism that covers all possible solutions to this question. Unfortunately, neither is satisfactory yet. What we certainly know is that reality, taken as the ‘ultimate reality’ as in the concept of noumenon (Kant, 1999), is not what we perceive. In fact, studies on perception have shown that organisms have not been evolutionarily selected to perceive reality as it is, but to optimally record those stimulus configurations that are most advantageous for their adaptation to the environment and survival(Hoffman & Prakash, 2014). Also, lessons taken from quantum mechanics reveal that microphysics’ reality is far more complicated than we originally have thought (Bohm & Hiley, 1975; Heisenberg, 1963). The conundrum of dualism. ‘Dualism’ versus ‘monism’ is a complete ‘dead end’: there is no satisfactory proposal to disentangle the question; while dualism cannot satisfactorily explain the interaction between two substances of different nature, monism has not been able to complete successfully its reductionist project. How can we ever be able to reconcile a space-time physical object as the body with some ethereal non-physical entity such as ‘conscious experience’? If we could formulate the problem as follows: a) Ф = ψ b) Фψ c) Фψ d) Фψ beingФ = physical events; ψ = mental states, we have these four possibilities: a) identity (monism), b) physicalism, c) panpsychism or d) dualism. Current neuroscience and other disciplines are beginning to question the traditional directionality ‘brain-mind’ in favor of other, more exotic approaches. Then, if brain states produce conscious experiences, we must be able to explain a plausible mechanism of interaction within a causally closed system such as the brain (Georgiev, 2013). It seems that, after at least four hundred years of fruitless proposals to solve this antinomy, it is time to move on to some daring approaches. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness  402 Qualia or the scent of subjective experience. Finally, at the root of the problem of consciousness we always find the inner, private, subjective and personal experience of everyone, which independently of intersubjective judgment agreement, will always be like fingerprints: inalienable and unique. Also, inaccessible to science. Beyond the axon tracts, the exchange of neurotransmitters and the feedback/feedforward sweep mechanisms, the mysterious sensation of what it is to feel like(Nagel, 1974) will always remain in the air; it seems to escape, at least for the moment, the methods of modern science. What kind of neuro-computational theory could ever account for such a mysterious product, something which cannot be measured, extracted, put in a dish, analyzed or dissected? 5. A new whole approach In the following section we are going to provide some new insights into the study of consciousness from a new hypothesis recently proposed by Kodukula (2017, 2019, 2021b). 5.1. Consciousness as a fundamental property of the universe like mass, charge or space-time. Consciousness cannot be a physical entity like mass, charge, space, time or space-time. It is an emergent property (like smell, heat, etc.) while transforming the ‘information’ to ‘time’ to ‘space’ and to ‘space-time’ and ‘mass or charge’. The universe will not contain that property. It only contains ‘quantum information’. ‘Living thing’ or ‘conscious observer' will contain that property since it is the device that processes the information. By default it is inbuilt in this huge quantum system with a loop in the direction of the process. But it is countable after a critical limit which we have named consciousness. Below this limit it is a living thing with negligible consciousness. The flow of information process through a device (in this case, a neuro-center like the brain) goes in one direction and circulates within the body of living things and comes out (Figure 1). As long as the flow continues, the living thing will contain life, and when a loop disappears the living thing will become dead. And the process will be continued with other loops. Now the question is about qualia. Since there is no physical evidence of qualia involved in this process, it is proposed that during this process of passage of information and observation, consciousness in which qualia plays a role is an emergent property of this information process and is a fundamental property of time which always flows. Previous theories emphasize the role of information in the process of consciousness. While one of these theories says that information runs the activities of the universe (Shannon, 1948), the other says that consciousness emerges due to collective activities or information like a pattern (Tononi et al., 2016). This new theory of consciousness presented here (Kodukula, 2019, 2021b) synchronizes all and provides new vision to see further. It says that only processing of information runs this universe. Feelings or qualia – the other emerging property – are not due to this information process. There exists some sort of resistance to the process of information like ‘inertia’ to mass in physics. Inertia is an intrinsic property of mass due to its movement. In the same way, cognition is a resistance to the process of information passage to keep the object in a conscious state. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 403 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness Figure 1.Showing the relation between Universal Film and conscious observer. Adapted from: Kodukula (2019). This can be explained as: “A force ‘F’ is applied to mass ‘m’. The mass will get an acceleration ‘a’ if there is no rigid support attached to that mass in the opposite direction of force”. This is as per Newton’s second law of classical mechanics. If support exists, there will be a reactive force opposite to force applied. In this situation, mass will not move, but according to its structure, it will contain resistance. Actually, as per Newton’s first law, mass itself will have an intrinsic property called inertia. In general terms, it will have a tendency to resist its own movement. Now let us suppose that an external energy (E) is applied to mass instead of force. So the energy has to do some work (E=W) on that mass (W=FS) and pushes that mass with a force F to a distance S and F=ma is applied. In this situation, if the mass has not moved, it will have a resistance which is equally develops internal resistance equivalent to its acceleration ‘a’ as in the case of ‘F’ applied on ‘m’. If ‘E’ is more, more mass will be created and acceleration remains constant. It means that all energy is converting into mass and at the same time its resistance is also increasing. So resistance will be there and will not affect its acceleration (its movement will be constant). Applied to consciousness and cognition, a signal will be passed to a human brain, it encircles the body like a loop and passes to another conscious brain (Figure 1). It is explained that the signal contains information, but information is not energy. The information will be encoded to form space-time and objects on it, and moves according to the instruction of information. This flow is at a rate of 144 qubits1/sec (Kodukula, 2019, pp. 39–40) and one qubit contains a 1043 quantum states of information. Superposition of these quantum states is called a film of the universe. Each 1 unit of quantum information ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 404 such film contains information and converts into objects and instructions to move that objects as the process continuous. Therefore, all the activities in this universe are simply instruction to change films that are being considered as actions of living things. Actually, it is a mechanism only. Thus, all living things will have a specific property distinguished from non-living things called life. Its movement is dependent on other movement also. So it should be aware of its own environment and, thus, it is called as consciousness. Thus a universal film contains conscious observers only. All the non-living things or objects are manifestations of this process of information. The importance of a conscious observer is emphasized in Kodukula (2021b, p. 1649). For further clarity about the above description, let us consider the following example. Suppose that we have two similar conscious brains. Due to the passage of information and film change, same activities have to be done simultaneously by two conscious beings/living things. Now let us suppose one activity is a dramatic action, say the word ‘cry’, and another is a real situation (really cry). As per the above analysis, the first one is mechanical, that is, there will be no emotion in it. The other one is an emotion out of friction/resistance between consciousness and cognition. How can it be explained quantitatively? As explained above, consciousness will not contain emotion, but mechanical action exists. So the ‘dramatic cry’ will contain a certain amount of information only to run the activities mechanically. But for the presence of ‘emotion’, some more information has to be processed and it should create or raise the cognitive energy so as to produce an emotional cry for the same action associated to that concerned consciousness. It is just like the conversion of additional energy or force to acceleration and to internal energy even though there is no acceleration to mass as a whole (as explained above). Thus the emotions or even thoughts are emergent from interaction of consciousness and its resistance due to cognition. In a similar manner, qualia will contain additional ‘qubit’ information than the required to keep it alive. Different qualias, thoughts, emotions, etc., will have different quantum bits of information for comparison. Cry will have different number of qubits, smile will have different qubits, angry will have different and so on. Thus we can say that the interaction between consciousness and cognition gives rise to qualia and the interaction between ‘jeeton’ (proposed quantum particle of energy-mind from the fundamental force of nature) and ‘graviton’ (mass-matter particle) would give rise to consciousness. This is because ‘jeeton’, a quantum particle from the biological force present in all living things, is associated with ‘graviton’, a quantum particle from the relativity system, to form consciousness. So as explained in Figure 2, the ‘jeeton’ contains a point space-time in relativity and superpositioned states of films in quantum coordinates. Thus ‘jeeton’ is a superpositioned information which will be processed through the brain by entanglement with ‘graviton’, creating matter in 4-dimensional relativistic space-time. The continuous circulation of this information between ‘jeeton’ and ‘graviton’ within this living thing gives rise to consciousness, which in its interaction with cognition, results in qualia. If a ‘jeeton’ is cut from the loop of this process of information, it loses entanglement with ‘graviton’ and the living thing will be considered dead. The detached ‘jeeton’ contains the information and if it gets into any situation to form into a loop and regenerate the material to entangle, it will start from the beginning to feed its own living thing device (i.e., brain), which is connected to it. It is the life ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 405 and death cycle of living things or conscious beings (Kodukula, 2019, p. 42).This leads us to consider consciousness as a required ingredient for synchronizing quantum mechanics (discrete property of space-time) and general relativity, (continuous4-dimensional space-time), where objects are created. 5.2. Consciousness can be reduced to brain activity Consciousness is the property that differentiates between living and non-living things. Following our reasoning, as long as the flow continues, the living thing will contain life and when its loop disappears, the living thing will become dead. Here we propose that all living things must contain consciousness. In some cases conscious activity cannot be recognizable and will be treated as unconscious; that would be the vegetative or coma states (Laureys, 2005), or even being under anesthesia (Hameroff, 2018). But consciousness itself creates its own device by universal instructions and creates a structure (brain with several neuro-centers) to support or to keep information (memory) and integrate all these activities to sustain its state of consciousness. Thus, consciousness is the fundamental property by which any other events or activities will be perceived. Because of consciousness, information will become analog and will turn into collective reactions to keep up with the environment; this is what we call ‘cognition’, a resistance to the passing of information. This resistance or friction comes out as emotions, thoughts, perceptions, etc., which are identified as qualia by philosophers. For cognition, neural centers are to be formed and must be in a position to exchange the information collected by its environment. But consciousness is a property that will start to emerge while in a coherent state of information processing. Without consciousness, cognition cannot be sustained. But without cognition, consciousness can remain. Finally, the brain is like a projector, and consciousness acts through it. The information passage is from brain and forms the real objects on this 4-dimensional screen of space-time after transformation from a quantum mechanics system to a relativity system; thus, brain activity cannot produce consciousness. It is a process of transformation of quantum information and it is continuous process with the passage of time. 5.3. Consciousness can be segregated into periods of time After Einstein, the concept of time has been changed abruptly. His special theory of relativity along with Lorenz transformations clearly explained the principle of simultaneity. It is nothing but an explanation of time by making various reference frames with different time intervals into one single picture of space time. Further, his equivalence principle lead the concept of time to a much more profound understanding of time and concluded general relativity by the concept of space-time continuum. Then, time can be defined as quantum states of preserving information (Kodukula, 2019), where the difference between information and energy is clearly explained. Superposition of two universal films will originate time. This is explained on the basis of physics theories. The duration of these two films is equal to Planck time. Quantum code of information will be processed through the brain like an object. During this process of information, time will be originated. The flow of information instructs all the parts of the body (taken as a biological material) to move according to the information processed. This is called a living system and it will be connected to the entire universe. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 406 When a universal film changes, the biological system will get the information to change accordingly. Here the process is completely mechanical. Thus it will have a certain frequency. For human beings it is proposed as millions and millions of films per second (1.85488837 x 1043 universal film changes in one second). Depending upon this duration of universal film change, the loop within that system, which is a biological system, will process the information and reach back to the universal film. Based on this, the brain’s processing speed has been calculated (144 qubits/sec). This duration of film change denotes its frequency. Thus this frequency is in synchronization with biological systems frequency. This makes the difference between a living thing and a non-living thing. This is the only thing that can be called consciousness. Thus time is interpreted in two quantum states (future and past) and the superposition of these two states explains the present (Kodukula, 2021a, p. 1341). This time converts into space and forms space-time, which is the basic entity to form the physical or materialistic world. In this process, due to this change of quantum states within threshold time (without decoherence), consciousness will emerge and after this coherence process it will emerge as consciousness with qualia due to the interaction with cognition (physics explains it as the observation part of this process). Then, the information will become analogous on the surface of space-time. In this 4-dimensional world those impressions (information) are objects made up of space-time. 5.4. Consciousness and the nature of reality Observation by our senses is not real (Kodukula, 2021b). Reality is in the form of quantum information and can be interpreted by quantum coordinates. While making an observation, the same coordinate system will be transformed to relativistic or Minkowski coordinates and will be observed. Consciousness is an emergent property in the transformation of a quantum coordinate system to a relativistic coordinate system. So reality will be changed into observation. So consciousness is necessary for observation. Thus consciousness will exist before observation itself. But once it is observed, it will check its correctness. If there is any drawback with the observing senses, the difference will create illusion. Thus, if all the senses fail to observe, it will create illusion, but this won’t be an absence of consciousness. Consciousness still exists. And it is reality. In 4-dimensional space-time coordinates, space will be the X axis and time is the Y axis. So every point in this coordinate system will be specified by a time and corresponding space for that time. In a quantum coordinate system space will be in the X axis and information will be in the Y axis. Separate information will be there for separate space points. But, while in transformation from quantum to relativistic, different space points will have the same information. This is due to superposition of all these information states into one mixed state. This is defined as film of the universe; thus a film of the universe is a quantum state and contains all the points with same information (Figure 2). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 407 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness Figure 2.Transformation of quantum coordinate system to relativistic coordinate system in the process of observation. Adapted and modified from: Kodukula(2021b). Change from one film to another will transform information analogous to events in the space time continuum, transforming information into objects for observation. While in transformation, ‘double relativity’ will be applied. So the result in reality will be different in observation. Illusion is a defect in the observation process. 5.5. Consciousness cannot be explained as a physical entity As explained above, a physical body in the space-time continuum is analogous of quantum information and quantum information is an interpretation of time. Part of it will convert into a physical object which occupies space-time. But conscious experience will not be associated to it. Conscious experience emerges by this transformation, just like other phenomena such as light, heat, color or sound. So definitely, it can also be defined by some physical or chemical science ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 408 basics. Thus, we can exactly reconcile a space-time physical object in to an ethereal non-physical entity such as ‘conscious experience’. Regarding qualia, contemporary science is not able to calculate subjective experiences exactly. But this is due to lack of knowledge, awareness, supportive methodologies and technological developments. In fact, there is no such experience for the brain as subjective and objective. Reality is one for all and that is associated to consciousness. As explained above, it is not complete without observation by its sensory organs, so the loop that observes reality will be completed by observation. The phenomenal experience that arises in this process will vary from person to person due to the structure of its observing center which is made up of interacting frequencies, neurons and exchange of particles or chemicals. Thus, reality is objective and is same for all in a film or in an inertial frame of reference (IFR). For example, in quantum coordinates, a photon is a space zero super positioned quantum state. But in relativistic transformation, it will have space, a space between two divided quantum states. Thus a conscious observer observes it as super positioned quantum states, and this is the final observation that we called reality. Therefore, reality is the consequence of both ‘double relativity effect’ and ‘consciousness’ on the process of observation. Regarding this effect of consciousness over observation, consider that signal velocity is √2, but observed velocity is ∴vr= voγr, where (Kodukula, 2021b, pp. 1646–1648) γ= 1 √1 − ( √ ) It is not possible to observe these velocities without the involvement of consciousness. Thus, the result is a proof for consciousness also. 6. Discussion and conclusions “No problem can be solved from the level of consciousness that created it” (Gerbaulet & Henry, 2019, p. 114). It is arguable that philosophers studying consciousness have been dealing with similar paradoxes that physics found when they first started to study subatomic particles (Capra, 1974). Because of that, it is probably not a question of dualism versus monism, physicalism versus qualia or subjective versus objective, but to focus on a new whole perspective that allows us to overcome all these unsolvable antinomies. Here we have presented a non-exhaustive, though fundamental list of the main problems of consciousness. Afterwards, we have proposed new insights to overcome these difficulties from a new perspective, reconsidering the current starting points. This new proposal is more than a hypothesis. It is an analysis of a few fundamental queries of philosophy of physics which could help to answer many questions about consciousness and information processing. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 409 As we have previously stated, consciousness cannot be a fundamental property of the universe, given that only living things can be conscious. All living things must contain consciousness. Information flows by interconnecting all the living things forming a loop and with a device like a brain (or an equivalent neural network). The brain will perceive and experience the things around it. In this sense, consciousness is a property that will start to emerge while in a coherent state of information processing. Thus, consciousness is fundamental and can remain without cognition. This idea is also supported by other authors (Gerbaulet & Henry, 2019; Prentner, 2018; Travis, 2021). Concerning the time-scale processes of consciousness, most of the studies in cognitive science are from pre-Einstein’s time. Time is not a mental condition, but the same as space, where both can be transformed into each other. Here it is proposed that all the points in space of the universe are condensed into one event in terms of films. When we analyze the physical meaning of quantum states at the most fundamental level, we can see that a quantum state is a universal film in which time exists, but no flow of time will be present. Flow of time exists only when a film changes into another film, arguably by a mechanism of consciousness. Consciousness cannot be reducible to brain activity. Consciousness is prior to and can remain without cognition. Thus reality exists in transformation through the additional coordinate system called as “quantum coordinate system”, that is, the transformation from a quantum coordinate system into a relativistic frame by ‘double relativity effect’. Thus consciousness is needed to synchronize quantum mechanics (discrete property of space-time) and general relativity (smoothed continuous space-time). Regarding qualia, it is an emergent property of this information process and is a fundamental property of time which always flows. Like many other physical phenomena (i.e., heat, sound, color) qualia emerge as a result of resistance to information passage through a neurobiological device like the brain. Qualia are nothing but a byproduct of a mechanical process of information flow. Support for this statement can be found elsewhere (Jylkkä & Railo, 2019). This view based on quantum mechanics is supported by many researchers. For example, Hameroff and Penrose (2014) previously formulated the Orch-OR theory of consciousness, which proposes that consciousness consists of a sequence of discrete events, each being a moment of objective reduction (OR) of a quantum state, orchestrated in an appropriate way (Orch-OR) inside neuronal microtubules. In fact, the time for decoherence processing for quantum states could be compatible with conscious processes, given that they proceed in the millisecond scale in the brain (Tegmark, 2000). However, other authors such as McFadden (2007) criticizes the need to use quantum mechanics to explain consciousness, because the brain is not an optimal place for quantum coherence, considering the infinite amount of information that should be stored in a qubit. Also, many other authors have argued that the brain is not an appropriate device to carry on quantum coherence processes given the temperature, humidity, and other conditions that hinder quantum phenomena or that the strange phenomena involved in quantum processes do not, of themselves, explain why there is experience rather than not (Koch & Hepp, 2006; Prinz, 2003). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness 410 Obviously, other problems remain elusive and must be addressed by future research. For example, neurobiological basis of consciousness are still an important issue for the future. However, in this article we claim that no models or experiments on consciousness can be sustained without considering these basics at quantum level. That would be the same reasoning as if social sciences would refuse to study the neurobiological basis of behavior. They are not contraria, but complementa, and a comprehensive theory must go beyond any limits to be complete. Also, all these proposals have the following implications for the integration of physics and psychology: the involvement of consciousness could play a vital role in the synchronization of quantum mechanics with general relativity. Observer and observation have a deeper meaning involving the concept of consciousness. Because of that, the mechanism of consciousness could play a vital role in this synchronization. Therefore, we can finally conclude that: consciousness does exist, given that observed velocity (vr) needs consciousness, opposed to conventional signal velocity ‘c’. Two observers (or conscious states) are needed to create reality. Consciousness cannot be a fundamental property of the entire universe, but only in living things, and that will be the main constituent that shows the difference between living and non-living things. Conscious experience emerges by transformation from mind (‘jeeton’) to matter (‘graviton’), just like many other physical phenomena such as light, heat, sound, color, etc. Information is not equal to energy; information can be transferred without energy (in a system that prevents decoherence such as a brain with series of neurons). Cognition is a resistance to the process of information passage to keep the object in a conscious state. The brain is like a quantum processor’s projector, and we can calculate the processing speed of the brain to be conscious as 144 qubits/sec. Thus, consciousness is the hinge between quantum mechanics and relativity that allows having experiences of reality, based on universal films, which are quantum states that contain all the points with same information. Because of that, new experimental paradigms inspired by these or other proposals must be designed to prove or refute the main thesis presented here. Experimental results will increase our knowledge concerning the roots of consciousness and will open new paths to go further in its clarification. It seems that it is very important to synchronize the definitions of consciousness and cognition aimed at the unification of psychology and physics for experimental purposes. Humankind must give giants leaps into the exploration of the universe, but this should be accompanied by little steps into the more radical and intimate realms of conscious experience, the fountain where everything, including the observation of the smallest particle, abounds. Received August 01, 2022; Accepted September 25,2022 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 411 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 397-414 García-Castro, J., & Kodukula, S. P., Why We Need a New Whole Approach Into the Study of Consciousness References Baars, B. (2012). The biological cost of consciousness. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1038/npre.2012.6775.1 Nature Precedings. Berkovich-Ohana, A., & Glicksohn, J. (2014). The consciousness state space (CSS)-a unifying model for consciousness and self. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(341). https://doi.org/10.3389/FPSYG.2014.00341/BIBTEX Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227–247. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188 Bohm, D., & Hiley, B. (1975). On the intuitive understanding of nonlocality as implied by quantum theory. 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118 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves Perspective Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves Miroslaw Kozlowski* Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland Abstract In article, we discuss the plausibility that crop circles are the result of the interaction of Schumann waves with crops. Previously, we defined the Schumann waves and brain waves as the results of the interaction of Schumann waves with human drain which are parts of Schuman Consciousness field (SCF). The full spacetime between planets and Sun in reality is the SCF. Through spacetime, mathematical graph such as Julia Set is coded in SCF and transported to the surface of the Earth, that is, mathematical graph modulates the SCT. Keywords: Crop circle, Schumann Wave, consciousness, Julia set, Earth. 1. Historical overview In 1952, Winfried Otto Schumann, a professor at the Technische Hochschule Mü nchen, Germany, published several papers postulating the resonances of extremely low frequency (ELF) waves in the Earth-air-ionosphere waveguide excited by lightning discharges. His idea was composed of three topics: (1) the propagation of electromagnetic waves in a spherical cavity; (2) the Earth-air-ionosphere system acting as a waveguide; and (3) excitation by lightning discharges. During the last four years, a rather extensive literature search had been undertaken to unveil some historical facts related to the physics of the so-called ‗‗Schumann resonances.‘‘ Although the search led to a vast amount of literature on the topic starting in the middle of the 1960s, references predating Schumann‘s publications were rather scarce. Nevertheless, an even more profound search in wave propagation-related journals and books unearthed some interesting pieces of real and pretended precursors to Winfried Schumann. Although extensive, any literature search can never be entirely exhaustive, and in particular, the one performed for this study was limited mainly with respect to the Russian literature, and therefore, it cannot be ruled out that this synopsis misses some relevant pieces. If this is the case, the author would be deeply grateful to get notice from the reader. * Correspondence: Miroslaw Kozlowski, Prof. Emeritus, Warsaw University, Poland. Email: m.kozlowski934@upcpoczta.pl ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 119 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves The scope of this paper is limited to prime sources of the pre-Schumann era (before 1952) and to the main developments in the field during roughly the first decade after Schumann predicted the Earth-ionosphere cavity oscillations. Additionally, this report is not supposed to render earlier reviews on this physical topic obsolete; it should rather complement them. Any paper on ELF (or VLF) wave propagation, and certainly a historical review, should mention the ‗‗monumental‘‘ work of James R. Wait who published in sum over 800 papers and eight books on electromagnetics. He was an outstanding theoretician and contributed to all the different aspects of very low frequency (VLF) and ELF wave propagation. A full appreciation of Wait‘s work is outside the scope of this paper, and therefore the reader is referred to some recollections of Wait‘s colleagues, e.g., the paper by Smith (2000, and references therein). Schumann published only in German, and up to now only scarce information about his life and work has been available in the English scientific/technical literature. Therefore, a short biographical summary will be given in section 2. In sections 3 and 4 the historical development of the problem of propagation of electro- magnetic waves in a cavity between conducting spherical shells and the waveguide concept of the Earth-ionosphere system with examples from the scientific/technical literature will be outlined. A discussion about Schumann‘s work regarding the long wavelength oscillations in the Earth- ionosphere cavity will be carried out in section 5, followed by the final sections devoted to the reception of Schumann‘s work by his contemporaries and the early observational evidence for the existence of ‗‗Schumann resonances.‘‘ 2. Overview of Crop Circles Crop circles - strange patterns that appear mysteriously overnight in farmers' field - provoke puzzlement, delight and intrigue among the press and public alike ( Fig.1 and Fig.2). The Crop circles are mostly found in the United Kingdom, but have spread to dozens of countries around the world in past decades. The mystery has inspired countless books, blogs, fan groups, researchers (dubbed "cereologists") and even Hollywood films. Despite having been studied for decades, the question remains: Who — or what — is making them? Many people believe that crop circles have been reported for centuries, a claim repeated in many books and websites devoted to the mystery. Their primary piece of evidence is a woodcut from 1678 that appears to show a field of oat stalks laid out in a circle. Some take this to be a firsthand eyewitness account of a crop circle, but a little historical investigation shows otherwise. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 120 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves The woodcut actually illustrates what in folklore is called a "mowing devil" legend, in which an English farmer told a worker with whom he was feuding that he "would rather pay the Devil himself" to cut his oat field than pay the fee demanded. The source of the harvesting is not unknown or mysterious; it is indeed Satan himself, who — complete with signature horns and a tail — can be seen in the woodcut holding a scythe. Fig.1. Crop Circle ―Julia set‖ Fig.2 The fractal model of crop circles (Fatou and Julia calculations) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 121 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves Some claim that the first crop circles (though they were not called that at the time) appeared near the small town of Tully, Australia. In 1966, a farmer said he saw a flying saucer rise up from a swampy area and fly away; when he went to investigate he saw a roughly circular area of debris and apparently flattened reeds and grass, which he assumed had been made by the alien spacecraft (but which police investigators said was likely caused by a natural phenomenon such as a dust devil or waterspout). Referred in the press as "flying saucer nests," this story is more a UFO report than a crop circle report. As in the 1678 mowing devil legend, the case for it being linked to crop circles is especially weak when we consider that the impression or formation was not made in a crop of any kind but instead in ordinary grass. A round impression in a lawn or grassy area is not necessarily mysterious (as anyone with a kiddie pool in the back yard knows). Indeed, mysterious circles have appeared in grass throughout the world that are sometimes attributed to fairies but instead caused by disease. In fact, the first real crop circles didn't appear until the 1970s, when simple circles began appearing in the English countryside. The number and complexity of the circles increased dramatically, reaching a peak in the 1980s and 1990s when increasingly elaborate circles were produced, including those illustrating complex mathematical equations. In July 1996, one of the world's most complex and spectacular crop circles appeared in England, across a highway from the mysterious and world-famous Stonehenge monument in the Wiltshire countryside. It was astonishing fractal pattern called a Julia Set, and while some simple or rough circles might be explained away as the result of a strange weather phenomenon, this one unmistakably demonstrated intelligence. The only question was whether that intelligence was terrestrial or extra-terrestrial. Making the design all the more mysterious, it was claimed that the circle appeared in less than an hour and during the daytime — which, if true, would be virtually impossible for hoaxers to accomplish. The circle became one of the most famous and important crop circles in history. It was later revealed that the circle had in fact been made in about three hours (by three hoaxers) very early that morning. It simply hadn't been noticed until the following afternoon when spotted from an airplane overhead. Unlike other mysterious phenomenon such as psychic powers, ghosts, or Bigfoot, there is no doubt that crop circles are "real." The evidence that they exist is clear and overwhelming. The real question is instead what creates them — and there are ways to investigate that question. We can look at both internal and external evidence to evaluate crop circles. Internal information includes the content and meaning of the designs (is there anything that indicates that any information contained in the "messages" is of extraterrestrial origin?), and external information, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 122 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves including the physical construction of the crop designs themselves (is there anything that indicates that the designs were created by anything other than humans?) Crop circle enthusiasts have come up with many theories about what create the patterns, ranging from the plausible to the absurd. One explanation in vogue in the early 1980s was that the mysterious circle patterns were accidentally produced by the especially vigorous sexual activity of horny hedgehogs. Some people have suggested that the circles are somehow created by localized and precise wind patterns, or by scientifically undetectable Earth energy fields and meridians called ley lines. Others, such as molecular biologist Horace Drew, suggest that the answer lies instead in time travel or alien life. He theorizes that the patterns could be made by human time travelers from the distant future to help them navigate our planet. Drew, working on the assumption that the designs are intended as messages, believes he has decoded crop circle symbols and that they contain messages such as "Believe," "There is good out there," "Beware the bearers of false gifts and their broken promises," and "We oppose deception" (all, presumably, in English). However, these odd, pseudo-biblical messages undermine the credibility of the crop circles, or at least the meaning read into them. Of all the information that an extraterrestrial intelligence might choose to convey to humanity — ranging from how to contact them to engineering secrets of faster-than-light travel — these aliens chose to impart intentionally cryptic messages about false gifts, broken promises The crops circles or rather Field crops are in my opinion the result of Schumann field interaction with crops. In this paper we search the equation which can describe that interaction 3. The model In paper (Kozlowski, 2017), we showed that for particles with m<< M (Planck Mass) equation 1  2   2 0 c t 2 2 (1) describes the pilot wave equation. It is interesting to observe that the pilot wave equation is independent of mass of the particles. Let us look for the solution of the Eq. (1), , in the form (for 1D)   ( x  ct ) (2) where  is for example Julia set encoded in Schumann wave ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 123 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves For For finite Planck mass we obtain (Kozlowski, 2017)  2ic  ( x  ct )  exp ( x  ct )     (3) where the reduced μ mass equals  mi M p (4) mMp For m << Mp, i.e., for all elementary particles one obtains μ = mi (5) and formula (2) describes the wave function for free Schrödinger particles  2mic  ( x  ct )  exp ( x  ct )     (6)  2M p ic   ( x  ct )  exp ( x  ct )     (7) For m >> Mp, μ = Mp From formula (6) we conclude that ( x  ct ) is independent of m of particle, m. In the case m < Mp from formulae (6) and (7) one obtains    m1   m  M p  (8)  m  2mc 2mc 2    2imc     ( x  ct )  exp ( x  ct )  exp  i x t  M         p   In formula (8) we put 2mi c  2 mi c 2   k (9) and obtain  ( x  ct )  e ISSN: 2153-8212 i ( kxt ) i e m ( kxt ) Mp Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. (10) www.JCER.com 124 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves As can concluded from formula (10) the second term depends on the gravity   m 2G  2   mi  exp i (kx  t )  exp i i  (kx  t )   c    M p  1 (11) where G is the Newton gravity constant. It is interesting to observe that the new constant,  G , mi2 G G  c (12) is the gravitational constant. For mi = mN nucleon mass G  5.90421039 The equation ( 10) describes the the resutling ― picture ― of intial Schumann wave ( Julia set) 4. Conclusions In this article, the solution of the QM equation with memory term ( gravity dependent) was obtained. It is shown that for m < Mp , where Mp is the mass of Planck particle=neuron mass the wave function Ψ contains the component dependent on the structure constant for gravity G  mi2 G . c We argue that the Field crops are the results of interactions of Schumann waves with crops. Assuming the linearity of the wave equation formulated in our earlier papers we argue that the Field crops are the formulae encoded in Schumann waves. Due to the weakness of Schumann field the picture of formulae can be obtained only in crop (photographic plate) for Schumann photons. Received October 27, 2019; Accepted December 11, 2019 References M. Kozlowski, J. Marciak – Kozlowska, Wave phenomena in nano-bio-technosciences Lambert, 2017 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 125 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 1 | pp. 118-125 Kozlowski, M., Crop Circles & Schumann Consciousness Waves Appendix Winfried Otto Schumann (1888–1974) Winfried Otto Schumann was born on 20 May 1888 in Tübingen, Germany, the son of the physical chemist Ernst Otto Schumann (1852 – 1898) [Poggendorff, 1904]. Because of his father‘s several jobrelated relocations, he grew up in different places in German-speaking countries, among them Berndorf, southeast of Vienna (Austria), and Karolinental, near Prague (now Karlı́n, part of Praha, the capital of the Czech Republic). From 1905 to 1909, he studied electrical engineer- ing at the Technische Hochschule Karlsruhe (now named Universität Karlsruhe, the first German polytechnic, nowadays equivalent to a technical university) and worked subsequently as assistant to the founder of its Institute of Electrical Engineering, Engelbert Arnold (1856 – 1911) [Poggendorff, 1956; Killy, 1995]. During this time, Schumann prepared his doctoral thesis ‗‗On the torques of the damper winding of a multiphase synchronous machine at small pendulum oscillations in parallel operation‘‘ under Arnold‘s guidance (until his death in November 1911) and earned his doctorate degree ‗‗Dr.-Ing.‘‘ after his viva voce in 1912. After his final examination he started to work in industry as head of the High-Voltage Laboratory for the company Brown, Boveri & Cie at Baden, Switzerland, until 1914. During the First World War he served as a radio operator, and beginning in 1919 he worked as research assistant of the Robert-BoschStiftung (Robert Bosch Foundation) in the Institute of Electrical Engineering at the Technische Hochschule Stuttgart (now Universität Stuttgart). There he also qualified for university teaching (‗‗Habilitation‘‘) in 1920 with a thesis on ‗‗Electrical breakdown stress of gases.‘‘ In the same year he was appointed Associate Professor (‗‗Außerordentlicher Universitätsprofessor‘‘) of Techni- cal Physics at the University in Jena, Germany. In 1924, he was appointed full professor (‗‗Ordent- licher Universitätsprofessor‘‘) for theoretical electrical engineering at the newly founded Electro-Physical Laboratory at the Technische Hochschule Mü nchen (since 1970 named Technische Universität München), Germany. This laboratory was later upgraded and renamed Institute of Electrophysics. From September 1947 to October 1948 Schumann was on leave and worked at Wright Airfield (later renamed Wright-Pat- terson Air Force Base), Dayton, Ohio, for the United States Air Force (see Figure 1). In 1961 he was given the status of professor emeritus, but he remained active in research until his death on 24 September 1974. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

167 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation Article Role of Consciousness in Creation Satinder S. Malik* Abstract Science has made great breakthroughs in understanding of our universe. Science has some limitations. It has done lots of research in material dimensions of matter and energy and a small part in time. Science has not acknowledged the existence of the dimension of Consciousness. There are a number of phenomena apparently without explanation on earth and in the universe. Some of these can be explained incorporating this dimension. The limitation of modern day science is it doesn‘t have any laboratory support for this dimension. This is the controlling dimension for life and for universe and without knowing this aspect understanding of science is bound to be limited. Keywords: Consciousness, dimension, creation, science, matter, energy, universe, Aliens Formation of Milky Way Galaxy As the cognitive Black Hole pre Sagittarius A often termed as Golden Egg (Hiranyagarbha) containing dense matter was burst to form Milky Way galaxy. One side was used form eco system for Heavens and other side for Earth. The entire creation from the start of universe till present day is based on three principles. These are the following: (a) The principle of Mahat (b) The principle of creation (Serg) (c) The principle of evolution (Prati-Serg) The Principle of Mahat. This is the integral characteristics of the wave. As the quality and type of strand decide the further formation of rope, characteristic features of vibration decide types of resultant waveforms, quarks, sub-atomic particles, elements, compounds, mixtures, large objects, heavenly bodies and their interactions. Neptune has 14 moons. Recently discovered phenomenon is motion of Naiad which help it keep avoiding collision with Thalassa. It moves up and down, passing by Thalassa twice from above then twice from below, a cycle that repeats. It is not the only noteworthy orbital resonance in the solar system. The resonance between the Jovian moons of Io, Europa and Ganymede causes tides inside Io, creating friction, heat and the solar system‘s most active volcanic system. Jupiter itself is in resonance with the asteroid belt, with the gas giant‘s immense gravitational pull keeping lanes within the belt conspicuously free of asteroids. Neptune and Pluto are also in a resonance, with the dwarf planet completing two orbits of the sun for Neptune‘s three, a groove that keeps both orbits stable. * Correspondence author: Dr. Satinder S. Malik, Independent Researcher, India. E-mail: adventuressmalik@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 168 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation The existence of our Universe [2] is dependent upon interactions from the tiniest subatomic particles to the largest clusters of galaxies. At galactic scales, interactions can take millions of years to unfold, a process seen in this image of two galaxies released by the Gemini Observatory. The new image captures the slow and intimate dance of a pair of galaxies some 160 million light-years distant and reveals the sparkle of subsequent star formation fueled by the pair's interactions. There are many such events which keep happening in our universe, all of these are governed by the principle of Mahat. The Principle of Creation. The cognitive part of the matter and dimension beyond it is known as consciousness. The consciousness provided triggering action and controlling power for creation, its management and further evolution. We would discuss further about this principle in rest of the paper. Principle of Evolution. The principles of acclimtisation, adaptation and evolution are the short, medium and long term measures for life form to adjust to its surrounding ecosystem. [3] A theory of biological evolution was developed by the English naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–1882). It stated that all species of organisms arise and develop through the natural selection of small, inherited variations that increase the individual's ability to compete, survive, and reproduce. Darwin‘s theory was missing a mechanism for how beneficial traits could survive over generations. Darwin supposed that the life began [4] in the bubbling sea vents—but all this overlooks the fact that to turn monomers into polymers (which is to say, to begin to create proteins) involves what is known to biology as dehydration linkages. As one of the leading biology text puts it, with perhaps just a tiny hint of discomfort, “Researchers agree that such reactions would not have been energetically favorable in the primitive sea, or indeed in any aqueous medium, because of the mass action law.” It is a little like putting sugar in a glass of water and having it become a cube. It shouldn’t happen, but somehow in nature it does. If you make monomers wet [4] they don’t turn into polymers—except when creating life on Earth. How and why it happens then and not otherwise is one of biology’s great unanswered questions. For two billion years bacterial organisms were the only forms of life [4]. They lived, they reproduced, they swarmed, but they didn‘t show any particular inclination to move on to another, more challenging level of existence. At some point in the first billion years of life, cyanobacteria, or blue-green algae, learned to tap into a freely available resource—the hydrogen that exists in spectacular abundance in water. They absorbed water molecules, supped on the hydrogen, and released the oxygen as waste, and in so doing invented photosynthesis. As Margulis and Sagan note, photosynthesis is ―undoubtedly the most important single metabolic innovation in the history of life on the planet‖—and it was invented not by plants but by bacteria. As cyanobacteria proliferated the world began to fill with O 2to the consternation of those organisms that found it poisonous—which in those days was all of them. In an anaerobic (or a non-oxygen-using) world, oxygen is extremely poisonous. Our white cells actually use oxygen to kill invading bacteria. That oxygen is fundamentally toxic often comes as a surprise to those of us who find it so convivial to our well-being, but that is only because we have evolved to exploit it. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 169 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation In the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin argued that [11] with the natural variations that occur in populations, any trait that is beneficial would make that individual more likely to survive and pass on the trait to the next generation. If enough of these selections occurred on different beneficial traits you could end up with completely new species. He did not have a mechanism for how the traits could be preserved over the succeeding generations. At the time it was thought that the traits of the parents were blended in the offspring. Unfortunately, blending would dilute any beneficial trait out of a population within a few generations. This is because most of the blending over the next generations would be with individuals that did not have the trait. This is where the intelligent interference through action of the spirits or comes in. The principle of natural selection is indeed a bright observation by Darwin and his theory is mostly right except that selection is not made by the organisms themselves or it is not autonomous but interfered by the intelligent design. The evolution takes place naturally as an inbuilt principle or property of living beings, as a part of their design. However, evolution can be accelerated or decelerated or given desired direction from the dimension of consciousness. [11] The most famous of the early defenses of Darwinism was not by Darwin himself but by the famous biologist, Thomas Huxley and the social philosopher, Herbert Spencer. Darwin's ideas were adopted by supporters of laissez-faire capitalism. "Survival of the fittest" gave an ethical dimension to the no-holds barred capitalism of the late nineteenth century. Theory of Creation At the beginning of Big Bang about 216 billion Year ago (time is of a little relevance at this moment) from the center of our galaxy where presently lies the super massive black hole Sagittarius A. This black hole was even bigger and denser. Incidentally, all the energy and matter in the universe is made of initial vibration (first product of Pradhána) and therefore all energy and matter is sensible to Consciousness. This Big black hole containing the entire Milky Way was controlled by Vishnu (creator & controller of the dimension of time). Combination of matter and consciousness is necessary to renovate creation and time plays most important role in it. He put a part of his consciousness (Brahma) in it and controlled its expansion as per the principles of Mahat (cardinal principles for formation of energy, matter and their interaction). In his book The Intelligent Universe, the great astrophysicist Fred Hoyle admits that an intelligent principle has begotten the universe. Brahma has since then controlled the expansion of black hole in to the present Milky Way and chosen planets for creation to begin. In one part he chose a planet which we know as heaven and other ‗earth‘. The entire scheme of things is with a purpose. The purpose will emerge out of the pattern if we understand it carefully. Keeping the above example of creation, we also know that there are other older galaxies present in our universe and hence there will also be life with same purpose. Therefore, alien life is not only possible but it is also present in our universe. Earth is a well-chosen planet for human evolution. Here on earth, one solar year is equivalent to one day on Heaven- another planet in Milky Way. Apart from heaven there are other planets are there where life is presently in evolution. Eventually human race would also contribute to development of life on such planets. Though, it is pertinent to note that such contribution ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 170 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation will not be physical. [4] A trip of 240,000 miles to the Moon still represents a very big undertaking for us. A manned mission to Mars, called for by the first President Bush in a moment of passing giddiness, was quietly dropped when someone worked out that it would cost $450 billion and probably result in the deaths of all the crew (their DN Atom to tatters by highenergy solar particles from which they could not be shielded). Based on what we know now and can reasonably imagine, there is absolutely no prospect that any human being will ever visit the edge of our own solar system—ever. It is just too far. As it is, even with the Hubble telescope, we can‘t see even into the Oort cloud, so we don‘t actually know that it is there. Its existence is probable but entirely hypothetical. For a peak into modern scientific theories about solar system and life on Earth, I depend on [4] Bill Bryson- A short History of Nearly Everything heavily and I have largely quoted from his book. Martin Rees, Britain‘s astronomer royal [4], believes that there are many universes, possibly an infinite number, each with different attributes, in different combinations, and that we simply live in one that combines things in the way that allows us to exist. Rees maintains that six numbers in particular govern our universe, and that if any of these values were changed even very slightly things could not be as they are. For example, for the universe to exist as it does requires that hydrogen be converted to helium in a precise but comparatively stately manner—specifically, in a way that converts seven onethousandths of its mass to energy. Lower that value very slightly—from 0.007 percent to 0.006 percent, say—and no transformation could take place: the universe would consist of hydrogen and nothing else. Raise the value very slightly—to 0.008 percent—and bonding would be so wildly prolific that the hydrogen would long since have been exhausted. In either case, with the slightest tweaking of the numbers the universe as we know and need it would not be here. If gravity may turn out to be a little too strong, and one day it may halt the expansion of the universe and bring it collapsing in upon itself, till it crushes itself down into another singularity, possibly to start the whole process over again. On the other hand it may be too weak and the universe will keep racing away forever until everything is so far apart that there is no chance of material interactions, so that the universe becomes a place that is inert and dead, but very roomy. The third option is that gravity is just right—―critical density‖ is the cosmologists‘ term for it— and that it will hold the universe together at just the right dimensions to allow things to go on indefinitely. Cosmologists in their lighter moments sometimes call this the Goldilocks effect—that everything is just right [4]. Also, Bill Bryson brings out very precisely the apt location of earth in our solar system. [4] The right distance away from the right sort of star, one that is big enough to radiate lots of energy, but not too big as to burn itself out swiftly. Too much nearer and everything on Earth would have boiled away. Much farther away and everything would have frozen. Earth would have been uninhabitable had it been 5 percent nearer and 15 percent farther. Earth is the right kind of planet with a molten lively interior that created the out gassing that helped to build an atmosphere and provided us with the magnetic field that shields us from cosmic radiation. It also gave us plate ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 171 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation tectonics, which continually renews and rumples the surface. We also have the right elements in the correct proportions. There are ninety-two naturally occurring elements on Earth. Therefore, in entire combination and permutation of probability for creating suitable material life earth was a planet which was chosen and was allocated with the consciousness along with other planets in our solar system and our central star. This is to make sure that time on effort spent in creating life on earth is not wasted. All bodies in Milky way follow principles of Mahat for their evolution, change, motion and interaction with other bodies and a handful of them are with additional consciousness to be more responsible and integral in their act. All these heavenly bodies are endowed with Mahatattva (dark matter) – a medium through which these can be controlled. Brahma himself experimented with creation of life. It is the natural way of the independent consciousness that one it gets combined with various forms of matter it can start learning interactions with environment. The learning could be Sattvic (purea), Rajsic (controlling others) or tamsic (exploitative and indulgent). Brahma was not amused with the results of his creation, maybe it was the quantitative or qualitative properties of the fragments of consciousness which he used to create first beings. Therefore, after learning from his first experiment he created four Kumaras Sanaka, Sanatana, Sanandana, and Sanatkumara from different parts of his body to aid him. The Kumaras was the first such beings. They were created from his mind and appeared as infants. They were high on consciousness and were not interested in procreation; they were pursuing brahmacharya against the wishes of their father. They are said to wander throughout the materialistic and spiritualistic universe without any desire but with purpose to teach. Thereafter, Brahma created ten Manputras (his ideas in his own image) with the objective of increasing the population and their names were these Rishis, or Sages were also known as Prajapatis (creators of Milky Way population). According to the Bhagavata Purana, their names are Angiras (sage), Atri, Pulastya, Marichi, Pulaha, Kratu, Bhrigu, Vashistha, Daksha and Narada. We must understand that these were in form of consciousness (spirits). Wikipedia mentions that [5] Earth formed around 4.54 billion years ago, by accretion from the solar nebula. Volcanic out gassing probably created the primordial atmosphere and then the ocean, but the early atmosphere contained almost no oxygen. Much of the Earth was molten because of frequent collisions with other bodies which led to extreme volcanism. Brahma sent all Prajapatis to create life on Earth, however when they appeared on earth the found earth was beginning to have some form of life, however that was not as per their plan. They found the waters were mixed with harmful chemicals. So Brahma requested Vishnu‘s help and Vishnu created an ideal solution after assuming (Varaha Avtar). Their resulted in a planetsized body named Theia causing collision with Earth. This collision is thought to have formed the Moon as well as tilt in the rotational axis of earth. Since the earth was mostly molten and even after becoming in two parts such state acquires minimum surface area (spheroid), both became round objects in accordance with principles of Mahat. The tilt is what gave rise to seasons and created ideal conditions for life to start. Moon also helped to stabilize any oscillations in motions of earth while it went around Sun. Over time, the Earth cooled, causing ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 172 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation the formation of a solid crust, and allowing liquid water on the surface. This water was pure and favorable to creation of life. As far as the theory of creation goes it is based on intelligent principles, on intelligent design and with objectives. Brahma also stared creation of other worlds DuLoka (heavens), Bhuvar Loka and Suvar Loka. The development of life on earth was most important to all because of one factor faster time on earth. It was used as laboratory to quickly determine the results and learn lessons. Other options were much slower. The development of life on earth started with creation of favorable atmosphere with oxygen. [4] Atmosphere keeps the Earth warm. Earth would be a lifeless ball of ice with an average temperature of minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit without it. In addition, the atmosphere absorbs or deflects incoming swarms of cosmic rays, charged particles, ultraviolet rays etc. Altogether, the gaseous padding of the atmosphere is equivalent to a fifteen-foot thickness of protective concrete, and without it these invisible visitors from space would slice through us like tiny daggers. Wegener developed the theory that the world‘s continents had once come together in a single landmass he called Pangaea, where flora and fauna had been able to mingle, before the continents had split apart and floated off to their present positions. All this he put together in a book called Die Entstehung der Kontinente und Ozeane, or The Origin of Continents and Oceans. One reason life took so long [4] to grow complex was that the world had to wait until the simpler organisms had oxygenated the atmosphere sufficiently. It took about two billion years, roughly 40 percent of Earth‘s history, for oxygen levels to reach more or less modern levels of concentration in the atmosphere. But once the stage was set, and apparently quite suddenly, an entirely new type of cell arose—one with a nucleus and other little bodies collectively called organelles (from a Greek word meaning little tools). The process is thought to have started when some blundering or adventuresome bacterium either invaded or was captured by some other bacterium and it turned out that this suited them both. The captive bacterium became, it is thought, a mitochondrion. This mitochondrial invasion (or end symbiotic event, as biologists like to term it) made complex life possible. (In plants a similar invasion produced chloroplasts, which enable plants to photosynthesize.) Single-celled eukaryotes were once called protists. Compared with the bacteria that had gone before, these new protists were wonders of design and sophistication. The simple amoeba, just one cell big and without any ambitions but to exist, contains 400 million bits of genetic information in its DNA—enough, as Carl Sagan noted, to fill eighty books of five hundred pages. Eventually the eukaryotes learned an even more singular trick. It took a long time—a billion years or so. They learned to form together into complex multi-cellular beings. This was the beginning of first root race of life on earth. I tend to accept the theory of Helena P Blavatsky with some modifications. The reproduction was by budding. Francis Crick [4], co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, and his colleague Leslie Orgel have suggested that Earth was ―deliberately seeded with life by intelligent aliens, ‖an idea that Gribbin calls ―at the very fringe of scientific respectability‖—or, put another way, a notion that would be considered wildly lunatic if not voiced by a Nobel laureate. Fred Hoyle and his ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 173 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation colleague Chandra Wickramasinghe further eroded enthusiasm for panspermia by suggesting that outer space brought us not only life but also many diseases such as flu and bubonic plague, ideas that were easily disproved by biochemists. Hoyle—and it seems necessary to insert a reminder here that he was one of the great scientific minds of the twentieth century—also once suggested, as mentioned earlier, that our noses evolved with the nostrils underneath as a way of keeping cosmic pathogens from falling into them as they drifted down from space. The Hadean eon [5] represents the time before a reliable (fossil) record of life; it began with the formation of the planet and ended 4.0 billion years ago. The following Archean and Proterozoic eons produced the beginnings of life on Earth and its earliest evolution. The succeeding eon is the Phanerozoic, divided into three eras: the Palaeozoic, an era of arthropods, fishes, and the first life on land; the Mesozoic, which spanned the rise, reign, and climactic extinction of the nonavian dinosaurs; and the Cenozoic, which saw the rise of mammals. Life emerged so swiftly [4], in fact, that some authorities think it must have had help—perhaps a good deal of help. The idea that earthly life might have arrived from space has a surprisingly long and even occasionally distinguished history. The great Lord Kelvin himself raised the possibility as long ago as 1871 at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science when he suggested that ―the germs of life might have been brought to the earth by some meteorite. Since we are exploring formation of life on Earth we need to limit ourselves to the bigger picture and less on details. It is indeed a vast subject. We can explore it here only in principles. A biological species is a group of organisms that can reproduce with one another in nature and produce fertile offspring. Species are characterized by the fact that they are reproductively isolated from other groups. We will take species group as our subjects with their common methods of reproduction. The main methods of reproduction identified are through asexual, sexual with different methods of fertilization. Asexual reproduction [6] produces offspring that are genetically identical to the parent because the offspring are all clones of the original parent. Asexual reproduction in animals occurs through fission, budding, fragmentation, and parthenogenesis. There is an advantage that large numbers of offspring can be produced quickly and it is ideally suited to a stable or predictable environment. This was a design decision of the Prajapatis within the limitation imposed by the environment. Parthenogenesis [6] is a form of asexual reproduction in which an egg develops into an individual without being fertilized. The resulting offspring can be either haploid or diploid, depending on the process in the species. Parthenogenesis occurs in invertebrates such as water fleas, rotifers, aphids, stick insects, and ants, wasps, and bees. Ants, bees, and wasps use parthenogenesis to produce haploid males (drones). The diploid females (workers and queens) are the result of a fertilized egg. Some vertebrate animals such as certain reptiles, amphibians, and fish also reproduce through parthenogenesis. Incidentally, Parthenogenesis has been observed in species in which the sexes were separated in terrestrial or marine zoos. Two female Komodo dragons, a hammerhead shark, and a blacktop shark have produced parthenogenic young when the females have been isolated from males. It is ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 174 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation possible that the asexual reproduction observed occurred in response to unusual circumstances and would normally not occur. The species was at the borderline where a distinct change in separation of sexes occurred. These were the species what Helena P Blavatsky mentioned as sweat borne. This method offered fastest method of reproduction of complex organisms. In Sexual reproduction [6] the genetic material of two individuals is combined to produce genetically diverse offspring that differ from their parents. The genetic diversity of sexually produced offspring is thought to give sexually reproducing individuals greater fitness because more of their offspring may survive and reproduce in an unpredictable or changing environment. This was an important step to ensure diversification of species and to evolve them further. Hermaphroditism occurs in animals in which one individual has both male and female reproductive systems such as earthworms, slugs, tapeworms, and snails are often hermaphroditic. Hermaphrodites may self-fertilize, but typically they will mate with another of their species, fertilizing each other and both producing offspring. External fertilization usually occurs in aquatic environments where both eggs and sperm are released into the water. After the sperm reaches the egg, fertilization takes place. Most external fertilization happens during the process of spawning where one or several females release their eggs and the male(s) release sperm in the same area, at the same time. The spawning may be triggered by environmental signals, such as water temperature or the length of daylight. Nearly all fish spawn, as do crustaceans (such as crabs and shrimp), mollusks (such as oysters), squid, and echinoderms (such as sea urchins and sea cucumbers). Frogs, corals, mayflies, and mosquitoes also spawn. These species are known as egg born. Internal fertilization occurs most often in terrestrial animals, although some aquatic animals also use this method. Internal fertilization may occur by the male directly depositing sperm in the female during mating. It may also occur by the male depositing sperm in the environment, usually in a protective structure, which a female picks up to deposit the sperm in her reproductive tract. There are three ways that offspring are produced following internal fertilization. In oviparity, fertilized eggs are laid outside the female‘s body and develop there, receiving nourishment from the yolk that is a part of the egg. This occurs in some bony fish, some reptiles, a few cartilaginous fish, some amphibians, a few mammals, and all birds. Most non-avian reptiles and insects produce leathery eggs, while birds and some turtles produce eggs with high concentrations of calcium carbonate in the shell, making them hard. The eggs of the egg-laying mammals such as the platypus and echidna are leathery. In ovoviparity, fertilized eggs are retained in the female, and the embryo obtains its nourishment from the egg‘s yolk. The eggs are retained in the female‘s body until they hatch inside of her, or she lays the eggs right before they hatch. This process helps protect the eggs until hatching. This occurs in some bony fish (like the platyfish Xiphophorus maculatus, some sharks, lizards, some snakes (garter snake Thamnophis sirtalis), some vipers, and some invertebrate animals (Madagascar hissing cockroach Gromphadorhina portentosa). In viviparity the young are born alive. They obtain their nourishment from the female and are born in varying states of maturity. This occurs in most mammals some cartilaginous fish, and a few reptiles. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 175 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation There is a gradual development in method of reproduction depending on the factors such as rate of reproduction required, stability of external environment, complexity of organism being reproduced etc. Hermaphroditism was initially considered by Brahma as the top form for reproduction, however it was not found interesting enough by the subjects. Simultaneously with evolution of life on earth designs were being prepared in heavens. Having created Mansputras, Brahma designed Tanmatras as essence of sensors so that they can sense. These progenies of Brahma were Hermaphrodites. They were supposed to be reproducing from themselves. Sanat Kumars were devotes and didn‘t have any motivation to reproduce. Brahma found that all of them were free from worldly desires and extremely virtuous. Narad even told his father that he is not interested in procreating and will spend his life in universe being a devotee of Vishnu. Seeing dismal outcome of his efforts, Brahma had to think of alternative, as a result of which he manifested Rudra. Half of Rudra's body resembled like a male while the remaining half appeared like a female. He used one of the tanmatra as a motivation for procreation. Lord Brahma instructed Rudra to detach the female form from his body and commence copulative creation. Following his advice, Rudra detached the male part of his body and created eleven male entities. Similarly he created various female entities from the female part of his body. So the creator also learns and having done so similar design was also used for humans. This led to further part of creation in heavens. Daksha Prajapati begot sixty daughters from his wife Virini. In course of time ten of them were married to Dharma whose names were Arundhati, Vasu, Jami, Lamba, Bhanu, Marutvati, Sankalpa, Muhurta, Saadhya and Vishwa. Vishwa gave birth to Vishwadeva, while Saadhyaa was the mother of Saddhya. Marutvati gave birth to Marutvan. Vasu had eight sons who became famous as the Vasus. Bhanu Arundhati became the designer of all the creatures of this world. Prajapati Kashyap had thirteen wives Aditi, Diti, Danu, Arishta, Sursa, Surabhi, Vinta, Tamra, Krodhvasha, Ira, Kadru, Khasa and Muni. Kashyap had two sons from Diti. Kashyap had begotten one hundred sons from Danu, among whom Viprachitti was the most powerful. Kashyap had also begotten forty nine Marudganas from Diti. Those who were born of Diti were known as Daitya and born of Danu were known as Danavs and from born of Aditi were known as Adityas. These were the two main groups in heaven of Adityas on one side and Daityas and Danavs on the other who were competing against each other. Consciousness of Aditya makes the Grahas (planets) sentient. There have been set objectives for the reproduction of so many species. The objectives were the following. (a) Integration of plants and animals in to environmental cycles. Our earth is a living being with a soul which has been granted by Brahma and so are the Grahas (surrounding planets). Environment on Earth has various cycles such as water cycle, nitrogen cycle, oxygen cycle, carbon cycle etc. Whatever parameter in these cycles varies, it is able to maintain their designed value with sufficient margin. This is a comprehensive and intricate design. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 176 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation (b) Development of tissues and biological building material required for human body. Earlier organisms have been developed to prove individual system concepts of pneumatics system (lungs), Hydraulic system (blood), actuators (skeletal & muscle system) etc. For example tissues of tongue in mammal and tissues of octopus are similar. This could be true that one of the prime reason for existence of octopus is tissue culture for reptilian and mammalian tongue. (c) The Prajapatis needed genetic codes to design human life and they also needed genetic codes for themselves to start life in heavens (Alien life on another planet). The reason was development on earth was happening at fast pace due to lower gravity and faster time lapse. (d) Development of software (souls) from initial root program which goes in to unicellular cell, to multi-cellular and the up the species ladder for learning the environment and survival, procreation, team spirit etc. Software soul is essential requirement of living beings as it is the guiding factor for various functions which are executed consciously and subconsciously by the organism. Since creation is a process in which one has to design carefully and wait for the results patiently. Results needs to be evaluated and several such iterations may be required to perfect a design. During the entire process of creation, one important event took place in the oceans when entire heavenly creation descended on earth to collect genetic codes. Collection of genes was done around Mt Meru in erstwhile Pangea or Gondwana. Mt Meru was the first mountain that arose and may be now under the sea again. This event was called ‗Sagar Manthan‘ or churning of the oceans for the famed nectar. The nectar was essentially required for having a physical form. The gene pool and samples are collected and for further processing and design. Which tissue is required to be used where and how these will evolve in sequential fashion is highly complex task of highly intelligent cosmic civilization. They populated heaven as ideal planet with best of species of plants, animals and environment. They also designed species of plants and animals on earth as stated above. Having found the initial genetic code work began at fast pace. Prajapati Rishi Kashyap also had six daughters from Tamra. These were Shuki, Shyeni, Bhasi, Gridhi, Sugridhi and Shuchi. All six of them designed various species of birds. Shuki was the designer of Parrots and Owls. Shyeni designed hawks while Bhasi was the designer of ospreys (a large fish eating birds.) Gridhi gave birth to Vultures and Sugridhi was the mother of pigeons. Shuchi was the designer of cranes, Swans and other similar aquatic birds. Vinita was the designer of Garuda and Arun Supreme among birds. Arun was the designer of Sampati and Jatayu. Sursa was the designer of the serpents and had designed a thousand snakes. Surabhi, one of the thirteen wives of Kashyap had desgined cows, buffaloes as well as beautiful women. Muni was the mother of the celestial damsels Apsaras. Arishta designed Kinnars and Gandharvas. Ira was the designer of various ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 177 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation vegetations like grass, trees, creepers and bushes. Khasa gave birth to ten million Rakshashas and Yakshas. This period relates directly to Cambrian period. The seemingly rapid appearance of fossils in the Primordial Strata and it was noted by William Buckland in the 1840s. The Cambrian explosion occured approximately 541 million years ago when most major animal phyla appeared in the fossil record.[It lasted for about 13– 25 million years and resulted in the divergence of most modern metazoan phyla. The event was accompanied by major diversification of other organisms The early reptiles of various types such as Hylonomus lyelli (the first one). It is also the first animal known to have fully adapted to life on land. Hylonomus lived about 315 million years ago, during the time we call the Late Carboniferous Period. Most creatures were developing from the boneless to with bones. The reptiles were required to be controlled for further biological and higher souls couldn‘t incarnate in them. Brahma created special souls for these reptiles including huge dinosaurs and dragons, these were called Nagas. After their role finished they later got upgraded to incarnate in human forms and still they were known as Nagas. Nagas represent an important phase of biological development on earth. It is a matter of great curiosity in wondering about how many different types of species are there on earth. The most accurate census [20], conducted by the Hawaii's University, estimates that a total of 8.7 million species live on the planet. This is closest to the estimate of 8.4 million (84 Lakh) species mentioned in Vedic scriptures. The design of human body was made by seven different Prajapatis who collaborated and designed seven similar types of first humans put them slightly far apart on seven different islands of Pangea. Every prototype human was designed to be androgynous i.e having property of both male and the female, with activation of one gene prototype became a male and further activation of hormones other differences emerged. This concept was simple to execute because of similarity of everything except one function. Also one point which is of great importance here is that this method is principally the same as in majority of other mammals. Even the organs of procreation have same sub-parts and work on the same design. These organs are also special and develop most before the birth and are more prominent on a new born. The idea of progenration is for the survival of species. In the design for male mammals one would find some parts such as nipples which are dormant or not active. This is because initially all mammals start their growth as females and at appropriate time males genes get active and embryo develops as male. This also highlights the equality of both the sexes and their importance being in complimentary to each other. The word root of Man is derived from Sanskrit word Man- to think and hence the man is thinker. In Sanskrit, it is also called as Manav or manushya. This is true because man is an intelligent animal species. Also, the word Adam, Adami have root in Ad (first), meaning the ones who are ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 178 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation born from the first prototype, initial (man). The lead progenitor for every race is therefore called Manu. Prajapatis watched the growth and development of this species and even now all monitoring is done. In the initial part they used souls of higher beings (heavens) to incarnate in them. Even Prajapatis incarnated in them to check out these earliest humans for the design parameters, deficiencies etc. The first humans were the humans of third root race. According to Puranic cosmography [14], the world was initially divided into seven islands (sapta-dvipa vasumati) separated by the seven seas. The seven continents of the Puranas are stated as Jambudvipa, Plaksadvipa, Salmalidvipa, Kusadvipa, Krouncadvipa, Sakadvipa, and Pushkaradvipa. All seven islands are now major continents of the world. This is interesting because whatever has been mentioned in olden texts confirms to the modern findings. Many a times the meanings may have been lost due to lack of vocabulary or perspective in translation. In 1912, Alfred Wegener [11] proposed a theory that the continents had once been joined, and over time had drifted apart. Alfred Wegener proposed two different mechanisms for continental drift. One was based on the centrifugal force caused by the rotation of the earth and another a 'tidal argument' based on the tidal attraction of the sun and the moon. Apart from this one of the reason could be the movement of magnetic poles of earth leading to changes in magnetism and asymmetric pull of gravitations forces between sun, moon and earth. These forces become particularly asymmetric during the eclipses. (Image credit [10] & Google earth – current showing submerged lands that were once above water) Although Wegener's ‗continental drift‘ theory [12] was discarded, it did introduce the idea of moving continents to geosciences. And decades later, scientists confirmed some of Wegener's ideas, such as the past existence of a supercontinent joining all the world's landmasses as one. Pangaea was a supercontinent that formed roughly 200 to 250 million years ago, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and was responsible for the fossil and rock clues that led Wegener to his theory. Plate tectonics is now the widely accepted theory that Earth's crust is fractured into rigid, moving plates. In the 1960s, scientists discovered the plate edges through magnetic surveys of the ocean floor and through the seismic listening networks built to monitor nuclear testing, according to Encyclopedia Britannica. Alternating patterns of magnetic anomalies on the ocean floor indicated seafloor spreading, where new plate material is born. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 179 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation Magnetic minerals aligned in ancient rocks on continents also showed that the continents have shifted relative to one another. (Image credits [12] various tectonic plates and their movement over the millions of years) The Himalayan mountain range and Tibetan plateau have formed as a result of the collision between the Indian Plate [13] and Eurasian Plate which began 50 million years ago. As seen in the animation above not all of the Tethys Ocean floor was completely sub ducted; most of the thick sediments on the Indian margin of the ocean were scraped off and accreted onto the Eurasian continent in what is known as an accretionary wedge (link to glossary). These scrapedoff sediments are what now form the Himalayan mountain range. (Image Credits [13] movement of Jambu Dwipa) Prajapati Daksha typifies the early Third Race [9], holy and pure, still devoid of an individual Ego, and having merely the passive capacities. Brahmâ, therefore, commands him to create inferior and superior (avara and vara) bipeds and quadrupeds ; and by his will, gave birth to females . . . . to the gods, the Daityas, the snake-gods, animals, cattle and the Danavas and other beings. These early humans of third root race were the earliest ancestors of us humans. One more significant discovery about beginning of life on earth [15] is found from a 550 million-year-old fossilized digestive tract found in the Nevada desert one of the oldest known examples of fossilized internal anatomical structures. One must note that this period coincides with the Cambrian period indicating that human are as old as other species and not evolved from them whereas the Archaeologists previously thought Homo sapiens evolved in Africa around 200,000 years ago, but the story has become more complicated. Fossils discovered in Morocco have pushed that date back to 300,000 years ago, consistent with ancient DNA evidence. This raises ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 180 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation doubts that our species emerged in any single place. Anthropologists are realizing that our Homo sapiens ancestors had much more contact with other human species than previously thought. Although discovered in the 1990s, publication [8] of the 4.4 million year old skeleton nicknamed ‗Ardi‘ in 2009 changed scientists‘ views on how hominins began walking. Perspectives on our own species have also changed. Today, human evolution looks less like Darwin‘s tree and more like a muddy, braided stream. Our lineages split up to 800,000 years ago, modern humans and Neanderthals mated a number of times during the last Ice Age. This is why many people today possess some Neanderthal DNA. Ancient DNA is how researchers first identified the mysterious Denisovans, who interbred with us and Neanderthals. The early humans were of huge size nearly 30-50 feet and large variation in samples. Iguanodon of the Mesozoic ages was 100 feet long and now it is transformed into the small Iguana lizard of South America. The evolutionary series of the animal world is a warrant that the same thing took place within the human races. Lower still in the order of creation we find witnesses for the same in the flora going pari passu with the fauna in respect of size. The pretty ferns we collect and dry among the leaves of our favourite volumes are the descendants of the gigantic ferns which grew during the carboniferous period. Popular traditions about giants in days of old, and their mention in every mythology, including the Bible are for people who really existed. These were named as Cyclops, Medusa, Orphic Titan, the anguipedal monster known as Ephialtes. There were good giants in days of old jand the Rakshasas and Yakshas of Lanka. The Râkshasas are simply the primitive and ferocious giants, the Atlanteans, who were scattered on the face of the globe. The Giants of old are all buried under the Oceans[9], and hundreds of thousands of years of constant friction by water would reduce to dust and pulverize a brazen, far more a human skeleton. Most of the huge size mammals were the vehicles of cosmic spirits and they roamed around the earth without much effort. The survival was probably easy for the giants keeping in mind their physical strength and their high intelligence consciousness being belonging to races of Daityas, Danvas etc directly from the heavens. In secret doctrine one mythological text from puts it as the third and fourth races became tall with pride thinking they are the kings and they are the gods. They built big cities, cities laden with precious metals. They took wives fair to look at, Wives from the mindless, the narrow-headed. They bred monsters, wicked demons, male and female, also, Khado (Dakini) with little minds. They built temples for human body. Male and Female they worshipped. Then the third eye acted no longer. All such big cities of Asuras were in Mu, Lemuria and Atlantis. Science had reached its peak of development even at that time. Most of the souls or Monads of these people belonged to heavenly spirits and they were actively guided and aided in their building of huge cities and technological developments such as flying machines. Following images show the probable lands where the cultures evolved. Asuramâya, created astronomical works to have determined the duration of all the past geological and cosmical periods, and the length of the all the cycles to come, till the end of this life-cycle, or the end of the seventh Race. Having witnessed from heavens that creation is not moving in the desired direction Brahma must have asked for all such giant creatures be replaced with smaller ones because then they will come ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 181 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation under the force of nature and may evolve as thinkers in order to survive. This was major design decision by the creator. The Second Flood affected the Fourth Root Race (now conveniently regarded by theology as ‗the accursed race of giants, the Cainites, and the sons of Ham) is that flood which was first perceived by geology. If one carefully compares the accounts in the various legends of the Chaldees and other exoteric works of the nations, it will be found that all of them agree with the orthodox narratives given in the Brahmanical books. In the Satapatha Brâhmana, Manu finds that ―the Flood had swept away all living creatures, and he alone was left‖ — i.e., the seed of life alone remained from the previous Mahapralaya, and the Mahabhârata refers simply to the geological cataclysm which swept away nearly all the Fourth Race to make room for the Fifth. The sinking of continents and emergence of new lands was major event on earth. The current sea level is about 130 meters higher than the historical minimum. Historically [17] low levels were reached during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM), about 20,000 years ago. The last time the sea level was higher than today was during the Eemian, about 130,000 years ago. The time before which is known as antediluvian (before the he great flood) which is mentioned in books of many religions and cultures. As a result of rise of the oceans and pale movements many flourishing cities became the ocean beds and these people either perished or migrated to new lands. Many clans of Danavs and Daityas migrated to Patal Loka (Americas) where they again started their civilizations Such as Maya, Inca, Aztecs etc. Language plays a vital role in development of society. There are many different type of languages spoken in the world. Most of them have common roots. During the development of AI bots of Facebook were shut down after developers discovered that the AI had created its own unique language that humans can‘t understand. It is a natural capability of intelligence to make a language more convenient for its own usage. This is why we have diverse languages and accents in difference social groups. Oldest spoken language was Tamil in the lands connecting India to Australia. While Tamil was the language of masses and usual conversations Sanskrit was the language of literature. Sanskrit is the language of heavenly spirits, perfectly crafted and epitome of linguistic development. Sanskrit posed has two major advantages, one it is lyrical and secondly it can compress huge amount of information in small couplets. These qualities make it is easier to be remembered. The text is written in Devnagari script which literally mean the one used in city of Devas (Gods). Post antediluvian period saw the advent of fift root race of human beings. HP Blavatsky in ‗Secre Doctrine‘ describes about fifth root race Aryan race (Arya – means Shresta or Superior). They have emerged after the fourth root race) beginning about 100,000 years ago. Aryan root race was physically progenerated by the Vaivasvatu Manu. Manu is also known by different names such as Nuh, Nu, Noah etc. The subraces of the Aryan Fifth Root Race include the first subrace, the Vedic people which populated India in 60,000 BC; the second subrace, the Arabian, which migrated to Arabia in 40,000 BC; the third subrace, the Persian, which migrated to Persia in 30,000 BC; the fourth subrace, the Celts, which migrated to Western Europe beginning in 20,000 BC (the Mycenaean Greeks are regarded as an offshoot of the Celtic subrace that colonized Southeast Europe); and the fifth subrace, the Teutonic, which also migrated to what is now Germany beginning in 20,000 BC (the Slavs are regarded as an offshoot of the Teutonic ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 182 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation subrace that colonized Russia and surrounding areas. All these subraces migrated from a central location known as city of bridges – a place where lies Gobi desert. The location could even be the land of Mansrovar lake near Kailash Mountain in Tibbat. Sanskrit and Vedas were prevalent even before the arrival of Aryans in India. Vedas being the knowledge which is given by Brhama to Rishis. The culture of new comers was different. The Vedic Aryans were meditating, Yagya performing, eco-friendly people. The cities (Purs) built by these people were of material wood and mud. Beautiful cities, bustling with people who were rich on Dharma, lived happily in the pursuit of intellectual interests. ―आ नो भद्रा: क्रतवो यन्तु ववश्वत: Let noble thoughts come to us from every side. (Rigveda 1-89-1) A L Basham wrote his book ‗A wonder that was India‘ about ancient India. During these periods, the major development of Ayurveda, Siddha medicines, Vastu-shastra, Astronomy, Philosophy etc took place. The timings of Ramayana and Mahabharta have been carefully calculated by Nilesh Oak [19]. Period of Ramayana is from 12,240 BCE – 12,196 BCE and Mahabharata War happened in 5,561 BCE. Rest is history. The entire aim here is to present the larger scheme of things and build up our perspective. All humans have interbred earlier and also now. All beneficial genes have spread across the different human races. The human races are just like different models and types of biological machines with minor variations. The main driving software in all human biological hardware is the soul. This scheme goes to show that it wouldn‘t help to differentiate the humans just by their biological machines but they need to be graded with quality or version of the software (Soul). This signified by the variance of human behavior all across the races. There are criminals, people with animalistic tendencies, good people, erudite scholars, craftsmen, leaders all across the human races. No race is best, all are mixture. Purpose of Creation. One begins to wonder as to what is the purpose of creation. After all, science and philosophy give credence to logic and reason and nothing else. The purpose would be discussed in detail in next paper where we would talk about the nature of human body and its integration with consciousness. However at present, we will contend with the fact that purpose of creation is to create a mechanism for learning. The mechanism of learning is for software soul or monad which evolves from a binary spark, keeps on learning by integrating in various types of organism body vehicles or biological machines. Alien Interference. The life on earth has been designed by beings from another dimension. This dimension is dimension of consciousness. The various level of software souls which have been influencing us are 33 different types of heavenly beings with appropriate organisation in various planets. The same beings have born on earth as prototype humans and started human race with purpose given above. The same beings experimented with small insects like ants, white ants species like how the governance should take place and the society was divided into four social groups— Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. In the world today also these boundaries exist, one who are part of Government and military, the businessmen and associated workers, craftsmen and farmers and service industry. The heavenly beings have taken different ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 183 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation roles and incarnations in this world to lead people to knowledge. The human society is also monitored from the other dimension and some special ones of us humans may have souls that belong to different heavenly class. You would not be surprised to identify such humans of great intellect, leadership and ideal human values. Conclusion Creation follows three principles, the principle of Mahat, the principle of creation, the principle of evolution. The principles of acclimtisation, adaptation and evolution are the short, medium and long term measures for life form to adjust to its surrounding ecosystem. In the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin postulated principle of natural selection. The principle of natural selection is indeed a bright observation by Darwin and his theory is mostly right except that selection is not made by the organisms themselves or it is not autonomous but interfered by the intelligent design. The word natural itself signifies nature- an unseen force or entity. This entity can be called nature or divine or Prajapati, by whatever name. The evolution takes place naturally as an inbuilt principle or property of living beings, as a part of their design. Therefore, the scheme of world is not creation alone or not evolution alone but both can be seen as triggering and supplementing processes. This is the major role played by consciousness in creation. In the scheme of progressive complexity of life evolved on earth, it is the software soul or monad which is benefiting from the lives with organism bodies as its vehicles and keeps evolving (by learning). Human evolution started as different designs, correction, and improvements and remains a complex and intermingled species. The entire scheme highlights the equality of sexes and futility of comparisons across the human races. Received January 14, 2020; Accepted January 25, 2020 References [1] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/science/neptune-moons-orbit.html [2] https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-12/aouf-agd121219.php [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwinism [4] Bill Bryson- A short History of Nearly Everything [5] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Earth [6] https://opentextbc.ca/biology/chapter/13-1-how-animals-reproduce/ [7] https://tinyurl.com/sxx7vgs [8] https://theprint.in/science/teeth-to-dirt-archaeological-discoveries-are-happening-faster-than-everbefore/344248/ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 184 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 167-184 Malik, S. S., Role of Consciousness in Creation [9] The Secret Doctrine Vol II - H P Blavatsky [10] http://www.crystalwind.ca/mystical-magical/earth-enigmas/lemuria/the-lost-lands-of-mu-andlemuria [11] http://www.scientus.org/Wegener-Continental-Drift.html [12] https://www.livescience.com/37529-continental-drift.html [13] https://www.geolsoc.org.uk/Plate-Tectonics/Chap3-Plate-Margins/Convergent/Continental-Collision [14] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jambudv%C4%ABpa [15] https://scitechdaily.com/scientists-find-550-million-year-old-fossilized-digestive-tract-solving-amystery-of-primordial-evolution/ [16] http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.com/2012/07/maya-inca-aztec-civilizations-decoded.html?m=1 [17] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Past_sea_level [18] https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-artificial-intelligence-aichatbot-new-language-research-openai-google-a7869706.html [19] https://nileshoak.wordpress.com/2016/09/19/ancient-indian-history-chronology/ [20] https://allyouneedisbiology.wordpress.com/2018/05/20/biodiversity-species/ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 207 Article Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data Ulf Holmberg*+ Abstract I revisit the findings in Holmberg (2020) and address some of the concerns raised regarding the results. In particular, I analyze the distributional properties of the daily aggregate out of the Global Consciousness Projects data (Max[Z]), remove “bad data” due to malfunctioning random number generators and let global stock market returns interact with Max[Z] in a more tractable and transparent way. In practice, the "bad data" is removed by the means of truncation and a comparison between the truncated Max[Z] variable and computer simulated data reveals that Max[Z] deviates from the computer simulations in ways that seem consistent with the global consciousness projects hypothesis. It is also found that Max[Z] significantly correlates linearly with global stock market returns and that Max[Z]:s stochastic process itself is affected by market volatility. Since meaningful variations in Max[Z] suggest that the mind can stretch out of beyond the boundaries of our head, the results put doubt on the prevailing paradigm with regards to consciousness and highlights the need for much more research. Keywords: Mind, random number generator, Global Consciousness Project, stock market return. 1. Introduction In Holmberg (2020) it was found that stock market returns covary with variations in the random numbers produced by the Global Consciousness Project (GCP). The covariation was found by correlating the novel Max[Z] variable with several well-known stock market index return series and even though the results where strong and robust, concerns were raised with regards to the validity of the results. In this paper, I address these concerns. The hypothesis underlying the GCP is that events which elicit widespread emotion or draw the simultaneous attention of large numbers of people, may affect the output of the hardware generated random numbers in a statistically significant way. As such, the GCP data hypothesis suggests that the mind can affect matter at a distance. This is a not entirely uncontroversial hypothesis as the possibility that the mind can do so could challenge our current understanding of physics. Most scientists thus demand a very high standard of evidence and to date, published results that seem to validate the GCP data hypothesis are in general regarded as invalid and put to question (see, e.g., Scargle, 2002). 1 The results presented in Holmberg (2020) however appears to validate some of the claims made by the GCP and since the prevailing working hypothesis, in most sciences, is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain and a result *Correspondence: Ulf Holmberg, Independent Researcher, Sweden. Email: ulf.e.holmberg@me.com + The author thanks for the comments received by Dean Radin and Roger D. Nelson. 1 See, e.g., Radin (2002) and Nelson and Bancel (2011) for research supporting the GCP data hypotheses. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 208 of physical arrangements and information processing patters alone, the results suggested that the current paradigm with regards to consciousness needed to be discussed.2 After its publication however, the author received several comments and concerns pointing out the fact that the study had included observations affected by malfunctioning random number generators (RNG). Since such malfunctions may result in unreasonably large values on the daily GCP data aggregate studied, concerns were raised with regards to the validity of its results. Furthermore, since an unspecified data driven polynomial was used to link the GCP data aggregate to global stock market returns, criticism was put forward with regards to the complexity of the statistical models used as it made the results unnecessarily opaque. In this paper I seek to address these concerns as I redo part of the analysis after taking the comments received into consideration. To this end, I begin with analyzing the distributional characteristics of computer simulated data from a data generating process that mimics the process underlying the Max[Z] variable. The simulations, together with sound statistical reasoning, are used to find a reasonable truncation point such that the variable is cleansed from “bad data”. This truncated Max[Z] variable is then linked to global returns linearly such that the results are kept more tractable. The revised analysis using the truncated variable again shows that global stock market returns significantly correlates with Max[Z] (the daily aggregate out of the GCP data). As such, it is concluded that the qualitative implications of the findings in Holmberg (2020) are likely to hold true and in this paper, I also explore the nature of the found correlation. Here it is found that seems to be related to market volatility, a result that could be attributed the finding that the stochastic Max[Z] process itself is affected by market volatility. The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses consciousness, the GCP data and how and why it should be related to global stock market returns. This is followed by a section discussing the Max[Z] variable in Holmberg (2020) in more detail which is followed by a section linking the truncated Max[Z] to global stock market returns. The paper ends with a discussion on the results. 2. Consciousness, the GCP and Stock Market Returns Consciousness is perhaps one of our greatest mysteries as no one knows what it is, what it does or even how it has emerged. The prevailing working hypothesis, in most sciences, is however that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain and a result of physical arrangements and information processing patters (see, e.g., Güzeldere, 1997). This viewpoint rests on the existence of neural correlates (see, e.g., Cotterill, 2001; Llinás, 2002 and Koch, 2004 among others) but how the brain alone can produce our subjective experiences (such as the feeling of warmth, cold or pain) is not yet understood. It is even a philosophical mystery how unconsciousness matter can give rise to sentient beings and this unsolved philosophical conundrum is often referred to as the “hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers, 1995; 2003). 2 This especially if its results are seen together with the many results produced by the GCP. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 209 From the above it can be read that our understandings of consciousness are incomplete and that much more research is needed. It could also be understood that most studies on consciousness focus on explaining an individual’s consciousness experience and not the will of the many, which arguably is what determines the market price of a good or service (to be studied herein) even though one notable exemption exists namely, the collective consciousness concept within the field of sociology (Durkheim,1893).3 There does however exist several alternative theories on consciousness, theories that opens for the possibility of the mind stretching out beyond our heads. It could also be noted that physics allows for this possibility as the so called “observer effect” in quantum mechanics (a wellestablished physical property of matter) describes that the observation of a quantum phenomenon changes the phenomenon observed and studied. Even though this does not necessarily require a conscious observer, the observer effect seems to suggest that only the measurement of an object (or event) onsets the transition from the "possible" to the "actual" as the famous “wave function” collapses. A parsimonious interpretation of these results thus suggests that human measurement at a distance affects quantum systems at a distance and the question thus becomes if consciousness itself could be said to be an apparatus of measurement.4 That consciousness could have the ability to extend outside a human head and interact with matter has been studied within the research field of parapsychology (see, e.g., Nelson, Jahn and Dunne; 1986; Radin et. al., 2006 and Dunne and Jahn, 2007) and the results from these studies suggests that consciousness indeed has the ability to interact with matter as it was found to affect physical random number generators at a distance. Resting on such findings, Roger D. Nelson developed the Global Consciousness Project (GCP) to investigate if this human machine interaction could pick up the emotional response of a large number of human’s coherent attention. Up to date the GCP has produced remarkable results as the projects hardware generated random numbers indeed seem to be influenced by large global emotional events (Nelson and Bancel, 2011). The GCP is an international and multidisciplinary collaboration project that generates and collects random number data continuously from a network of physical random number generators at up to 70 locations around the world.5 The random numbers are generated using a quantum tunneling technique and the hypothesis underlying the GCP is that events which elicit widespread emotion or draw the simultaneous attention of large numbers of people, may affect the output of the hardware generated random numbers in a statistically significant way.6 The idea is thus that if the mind can stretch out beyond our heads and affect random number generators at a distance, it could be true that the mind could do so unconsciously and unintentionally such that large emotional events could affect hardware generated random numbers in a way that gets “picked up” and made visible in the numbers generated from it. 3 Perhaps the problem with explaining what consciousness originate from the problems faced in the definition of the concept. It could for instance be defined as the state of being aware of and responsive to one's surroundings but since such a definition (or similar versions of it) are imprecise, the term has also been defined in terms of sentience alone e.g. awareness, qualia and subjectivity. 4 It is noted that this interpretation of the observer effect is controversial within the field of physics. 5 The exact number of active physical random number generators tend to vary over time. 6 Please visit https://nooshere.princton.edu/reg for details on the physical RNGs. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 210 Even though the GCP, and the data generated from the project, are subject to much debate one thing is clear: the events that are claimed to be picked up by the GCPs data should also affect daily stock market returns. This since market sentiment affects market prices (Shiller, 2017) and since sentiment is likely to be affected by strong collective emotion and intent. Thus, the global events that are claimed to affect the GCPs data should also, in principal, to some degree covary with changes to global stock market valuations. This was studied for in Holmberg (2020) in which the daily returns from several global stock market indexes where correlated with an aggregate daily GCP data variable labeled Max[Z]. In the study, it was indeed found that they did covary. 3. The Max[Z] Variable: What It Is and What It Measures Max[Z] is derived out of the huge bulk of second-by-second data provided for and made publicly available by the GCP.7 The GCP is an international and multidisciplinary collaboration project that generates and collects random number data continuously from a network of physical random number generators (RNG:s). The random numbers are generated using quantum tunneling techniques and the hypothesis underlying the GCP is that events which elicit widespread emotion or draw the simultaneous attention of large numbers of people may affect the output of the hardware generated random numbers in a statistically significant way. As discussed above and as argued for in Holmberg (2020), such events should also affect investor and market sentiment and thus also daily stock market returns. Resting on this insight, the daily Max[Z] variable was constructed which made it possible to correlate unexpected GCP data changes with daily stock market returns. The Max[Z] variable is an aggregate measure of daily large and unexpected random values obtained from several RNGs spread out all over the world. In order to get a more precises understanding of it, denote a single random number from an individual RNG at time as , for = 1,2, … where is the total number of operating RNGs at that time. Also acknowledge that each individual RNG produces a random number between 0 and 200 every second and that the random numbers have an expected value of = 100 and a variance of = 50. From this, a standardized value can be calculated by simply subtracting the mean and dividing it with the square root of its variance (i.e., its standard deviation). 8 As such, the GCP produces standardized random numbers ( , ) every second ( ). Thus, a method is needed to aggregate the values over time and to this end, I do as the GCP and bundle the data into 15-minute data chunks and derive a 15-minute (900 seconds) non-negative aggregate using Stouffer's Z-score method (Stouffer, 1949): = 7 8 ∑ #$%% ∑" , ∗ !! . The data can be downloaded from http://noosphere.princeton.edu/. &'( )* More formally, the standardized random numbers are defined as , = + , . , ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 211 Since each individual standardized value ( , ) should be considered as a random draw from the standard normal distribution and since the aggregation of individual numbers is done using the square root of summed squared standardized values; can be viewed upon as the absolute value of a random draw from a standard normal distribution. 9 Measuring at the end of each 15minute interval, 96 intraday measurements are made daily such that the Max[Z] is the 24-hour maximum from 96 absolute valued random draws from a standard normal distribution.10 Understanding how Max[Z] is constructed is useful since knowledge on the data generating process can be used to computer simulate Max[Z]:s theoretical distributional properties. Such a distribution can then be used for both identifying unreasonably large observations (bad data) as well as for understanding in which ways, if any, Max[Z] deviates from computer simulated data. To this end, I use Excel to produce daily simulated values by simulating 96 random numbers from a standard normal distribution, on which I take the maximum value out of their absolute values. Table 1 presents descriptive data on 10 000 000 computer simulated such random draws (each draw being the maximum out of 96 individual draws) i.e. a random process constructed to mimic the data generating process underlying Max[Z] would be created solely due to chance. As can be seen, the computer simulations indeed suggest that the original Max[Z] variable includes very large values and since malfunctioning physical RNGs will produce unreasonably large numbers, such large values should probably be excluded. Why they should be excluded can also be understood from the fact that if the RNGs that produces the numbers malfunctions, they could produce “corner values” and deliver values close to 0 or 200. In such cases, the absolute value out of each standardized random value would be unreasonably large which in turn would influence the aggregate variable from which Max[Z] is derived. It is thus reasonable to truncate Max[Z] in order to cleanse the series from such “bad data”. Table 1. Descriptive data on the computer simulations and Max[Z] Average Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis Computer simulated data 2.73 2.68 0.40 1.00 6.06 0.70 0.90 Max[Z] Truncated Max[Z] 3.04 2.71 3.99 1.13 94.48 16.39 294.17 2.75 2.70 0.41 1.13 5.69 0.85 1.95 Note: The simulated data results rests on 10 000 000 computer simulated random draws from a process that mimics Max[Z]:s construction The Max[Z] data is derived out of 7936 daily observations and the truncated Max[Z] out of 7849 daily observations between 1999-01-04 and 202012-31. . Noting that a value of 6 is a six-sigma event for , , it is also acknowledged that obtaining values larger than so is unlikely unless they are the result of malfunctioning RNGs. Thus, 9 The statistically bewandered could recognise this as a chi distribution. In practice, the Z-scores are obtained from the column “All Egg Composite” from the Daily Tables section on the GCP webpage. 10 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 212 Max[Z] is truncated at this value and as can be seen in Table 1, the truncated Max[Z] variable has distributional properties that closely resembles its computer simulated counterpart even though its average and median values are slightly larger. As it is claimed that the random numbers produced by the GCP will be affected by events “outside” the data generating process discussed above and since such events most likely will result in larger Max[Z] values; these distributional characteristics can be said to be consistent with the GCP hypothesis. Note also that truncated Max[Z] is both more positively skewed and has a larger kurtosis than the computer simulated data which implies that values larger than the median materialize more often, also this in accordance with the GCP data hypothesis. Figure 1 depicts the truncated Max[Z] variable over time and from the figure it can be seen that the time series is stationary. 11 It is however also found that occasional large values remain but a more detailed analysis of data on the dates on which these observations are retrieved reveals that the RNG:s indeed did function properly during those dates. As such, the observations are regarded as valid and kept for the analysis below. Figure 1. The truncated Max[Z] process Note: The truncated Max[Z] represents 7849 daily values smaller than six between 1999-01-04 and 2020-12-31. In Figure 2 the truncated Max[Z] variables distribution is depicted and compared with the simulated data’s distribution. Here it can be seen that they are mostly distributed similarly. But, if the area around the distribution’s mode is more closely analyzed, a tendency towards larger values can be seen as distributional mass is “pushed” over from the left side over to the distributions right side. 12 Furthermore, anomalies can also be seen at the “edge” of the distribution and it seems like the truncated Max[Z] variable has a tendency to materialize larger 11 This is confirmed through the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test as the null hypothesis that Max[Z] has a unit root is strongly rejected (P-value<0.000). 12 The mode of a continuous probability distribution is the distributions local maximum value i.e. its peak. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 213 values more often than supported by the underlying data generating process; also this consistent with the GCP hypothesis. Figure 2. Distribution of the truncated Max[Z] and its simulated counterpart (a) Full distribution (b) Around the mode (c) At the edge Note: The distributions are approximated from histograms using bins between 1 and 6 in increments of 0.1. The simulated data results rests on 11 20 000 computer simulated random draws from a process that mimics Max[Z]:s construction. The truncated Max[Z] variables descriptive data is calculated out of the 7849 daily values between 1999-01-04 and 2020-12-31. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 214 Thus, some small differences between the truncated Max[Z] variable and its computer simulated counterpart is found, differences that correspond well with what one would expect if the hypothesis underlying the GCP data would be true. The question thus becomes if these differences are the result of coherent attention of a large number of people or if they are simply due to chance. As argued for in Holmberg (2020), market sentiment may also be affected by such events and thus also stock prices. 13 As such, stock market returns can be used for validating the GCP data hypothesis and I thus revisit this topic by analyzing the truncated daily Max[Z] variable and its covariation with two well-known global stock market indexes and their daily returns. 4. The Truncated Max[Z] and Global Stock Market Returns It is first acknowledged that no theoretical functional form that links Max[Z] with stock market returns yet exists. This can however be bypassed by simply acknowledging that any unknown functional form can be approximated using a polynomial function (Taylor, 1715).14 In Holmberg (2020), the data was allowed to determine the polynomial but as this resulted in somewhat opaque linkages, I in here keep the results tractable and use the following linear equation: -. = / + γ-.#2 + 3456[ . ] + 9(456[ . ] × - ,.#2 ) + ; ,. , (1) where -. is an indexes simple return, γ the autocorrelation coefficient, 3 returns dependence with the present dates truncated Max[Z], 9 the potential interaction effect and where ; ,. is a random error term subject to the usual assumptions. 15 Note that I in Equation (1) allow for autocorrelated returns, a likely outcome since market wide information tends to get incorporated gradually causing serial correlation in the short term (see, e.g., Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000, Sias and Starks; 1997; and Lo and MacKinlay, 1990 for a more detailed discussion). Note also that I study also a version in which the potential interaction effect ( 9) is ignored making the linkage completely linear. I study two global stock market indexes namely the S&P Global 1200 index and the Dow Jones Global index. Even though both these indexes capture the performance of stock markets globally, they are constructed differently and will display slightly different daily return values. The S&P Global 1200 index for instance seeks to capture about 70% of global market capitalization while the Dow Jones Global index focuses on stocks traded globally and targets a 95% coverage of markets open to foreign investment. Table 2 displays descriptive data on the daily returns from both these indexes and as can be seen, they exhibit the usual distributional properties as they both have positive daily averages, are slightly negatively skewed and exhibit large excess kurtosis. The small, yet positive daily average indicates that global equity prices have been subject to trend growth, the negative skewness that returns have been subject to 13 Shiller (2017) argued for the importance of sentiment as investors’ optimistic or pessimistic beliefs about the stock markets may directly influence prices 14 A Taylor series is a series expansion of a function about a point that allows for an approximation of functional dependence. 15 I let -. = (<. ⁄<.#2 ) − 1 where < is the stock market index value at time t i.e. I use simple returns. As such, the results are comparable with the findings in Holmberg (2020). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 215 frequent small gains and a few extreme losses while the excess kurtosis suggests that returns are leptokurtic with some extreme values. Table 2. Descriptive data on the global stock market indexes returns Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis S&P Global 1200 0.02% 0.06% 1.04% -9.49% 9.76% -0.37 10.40 Dow Jones Global 0.02% 0.04% 1.02% -9.49% 9.07% -0.47 10.20 Note: The number of observations for S&P Global is 5599 and 5539 for Dow jones Global Equation (1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and due to possibly of heteroskedastic and/or autocorrelated residuals, the HAC-Newey-West estimator (Newey and West; 1987) for standard errors is used. 16 Table 3 presents the results and as can be read from the table the results confirm the qualitative findings in Holmberg (2020) since also the truncated Max[Z] variable correlates significantly with global stock market returns. In fact, both the S&P Global 1200 and the Dow Jones Global index returns are positively and significantly affected by the present dates (truncated) Max[Z] value and by focusing on the “No interaction” model it can be read that a one-units increase in Max[Z] tends to increase global returns with between 0.05 and 0.06 percent. Note also that the autocorrelation coefficient is positive and significant and that if the interaction term (9 ) is included (“With interaction”), the size of the autocorrelation coefficient increases significantly. The increase is however severely dampened by large Max[Z] values since the interaction terms are negative and significant. That Max[Z] interacts with past stock markets returns makes the interpretation of the results less obvious and I thus proceed with deriving the marginal effects of the interacting variables. The marginal effects can be found by taking the partial derivative of Equation (1). By doing so it is found that the marginal effect on daily returns due to changes in past returns is C-. ⁄C-.#2 = γ + 9456[ . ] and that the marginal effect due to a change in Max[Z] is C-. ⁄C456[ . ] = 3 + 9-.#2 . Figure 3 illustrates these marginal effects and here it can be seen that past returns adds positively to today’s returns only if Max[Z] is lower than 3.5 (Figure 3a). As most anomalies found with regards to Max[Z] occurred for lesser values then so (Figure 2) it can be said that most events that elevate Max[Z] interacts with past returns in a way that results in a positive marginal effect in past yesterday’s returns. But if Max[Z] is larger than 3.5, a rarity as only about 6.2% of the observations has such large values, yesterday’s returns contribute negatively to today’s returns. Turning to the “With interaction” models’ marginal effect of Max[Z] (Figure 3b), it is noted that Max[Z] contributes positively to today’s returns only if yesterday’s returns 16 The Breush-Pagan Heteroskedasticity Test (Breush and Pagan 1979) strongly rejects that the returns series are homoscedastic. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 216 are negative. It thus seems like Max[Z] acts a bit as a “shock absorber” that stabilizes returns within a certain interval. 17 Table 3. Global stock market index returns and Max[Z] P-values in parenthesis D E F G HI S&P Global 1200 No interaction With interaction -0.0015 -0.0016 (0.0906) (0.0831) 0.0739 0.3655 (0.0141) (0.0057) 0.0006 0.0006 (0.0493) (0.0454) -0.1075 (0.0367) 0.61% 0.81% Dow Jones Global No interaction With interaction -0.0012 -0.0013 (0.1652) (0.1471) 0.0948 0.4299 (0.0008) (0.0009) 0.0005 0.0005 (0.1008) (0.0890) -0.1235 (0.0147) 0.95% 1.20% Note: P-values calculated from the t-distribution using HAC standard errors. Estimates based on 5599 (S&P Global) or 5539 (Dow Jones Global) covering the period 1999-01-04 to 2020-12-31 Furthermore, it is noted that the research hypothesis that Max[Z] has no effect on global stock returns (i.e. that 3 =0) is rejected on the ten percent significance level for the Dow Jones Global index (with interaction) and on the five percent level for the S&P Global 1200 (both models).18 Even though they clearly are significant, between one in ten or one in twenty hypothesis tests using the “No interaction” models can be expected to show a false positive and signal significance even though no true dependence exists. Thus, the results are not strong enough to rule out the possibility that the dependence found is due to chance alone. The practical and philosophical implications of these results thus call for a further investigation on the origins of the found significance. Keeping the results tractable, the nature of 3: s significance in Table 3 is investigated by focusing on the “No interaction” model and by redoing the analyses on chunks of one year data.19 Thus, the model in Equation (1) is re-estimated without the interaction term on the two global stock market indexes 24 times such that 48 annual estimates on 3 are retrieved. Figure 4 depicts the 3:s P-values together with the return’s annual standard deviations and by simply “eye bowling” the figure it can be understood that more estimates are significant than what is expected due to chance. In fact, almost 16 percent of the obtained estimates are significant at the 17 One way of thinking about it is that events that elevate Max[Z] also affects investor sentiment such that emotion driven daily valuations becomes less pronounced. 18 Note that the interaction effect (9) in general has a lower P-value than 3. Since lagged daily returns values already are included in both interaction models, also these P-value can be used for testing for the validity of the GCP data hypothesis. As such, the probability that the GCP data hypothesis is due to chance alone is found to be between 1.5 (Dow Jones Global) and 3.7 (S&P Global 1200) percent. 19 The annual sample periods always begin on the 1st of January and end on the 31st of December each year. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 217 ten percent level while 9 percent are significant at the five prevent level; results that adds weight to the finding that 3 L 0.20 Figure 3. Marginal effects on the model with interaction a) GMN ⁄GMN#O b) GMN ⁄GPQR[S]N Since the P-values seem to decrease when standard deviations increase, the results also suggest that Max[Z] interacts with global stock market returns only during turbulent times when daily stock market returns are volatile. A cluster analysis on the data in Figure 4 confirms this observation as such an analysis suggests that the estimates can be divide into two distinct clusters. Furthermore, it is found that none of the 3 estimates in the low standard deviation cluster (Cluster 1) have a low enough P-value for significance while 64 percent of the estimates in the cluster for volatile years (Cluster 2) are significant. It also looks like the year 2008 is an “odd fellow” and that this year possibly should be viewed upon as an outlier. This is thus investigated by redoing the regression analysis in Table 3 with the inclusion of an indicator variable on all 2008 observations and from the redone analysis it is found that the indicator variable is significant at the five percent and that all P-values decrease. This in turn results in that 3 becomes significant at the ten percent level for also the Dow Jones Global index for “No interaction” model. The results also seem to point towards that the year 2008 should be viewed as special and if it is excluded from the cluster comparison done above it is found that 78 percent of the estimates in Cluster 2 are significant. 20 A P-value of (say) 10 percent suggests that 10 percent of the hypothesis tests are significant only due to chance. The results in Table 3 are thus considered valid if more than 10 percent of the annual estimates in Figure 3 are significant at the 10 percent level. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 218 Figure 4. P-values are dependent on market volatility Note: Estimates are classified into clusters using the k-means cluster method (MacQueen; 1967) and the P-values are calculated from the t-distribution using HAC standard errors. The results suggest that volatility is an almost a necessary condition for significance and that the year 2008 should be treated as a special year.21 This opens up to questions with regards to the behavior of the Max[Z] process itself and I thus proceed with analyzing the stochastic Max[Z] process in more detail. 22 In the analysis of Max[Z]:s stochastic process, I acknowledge the need for a daily measure of market volatility if volatility is to be correlated with the Max[Z] process. To this end, I use the results in Pagan and Schwert (1990), Rogers et al. (1994) and Ghysels et al. (2006) and proxy daily volatility using squared daily returns. Furthermore, I note that Max[Z] is stationary and that its stochastic process can be described using one polynomial for the processes autoregression (AR) part and one for its moving average (MA) part (Shumway and Stroffer; 2010). Thus, the Max[Z] process is parsimoniously written as: 456[ . ] = T + ;. + ∑ U 456[ .# ] + ∑ V W.# + X .# , (2) where ; are white noise error terms, U parameters for the autoregressive component, V the moving average parameters and where X is a parameter linking Max[Z] to daily stock market volatility ( .# ). Table 4 presents Maximum Likelihood estimates on the parameters in Equation (2) and as can be seen, the Max[Z] variable can be described using its own values as a ARMA(1,1) process. The results in the table also confirm the findings in Figure 3 as it is found that market volatility plays a significant role in explaining Max[Z]:s stochastic process. In particular, it is found that Max[Z] is influenced by yesterday’s and tomorrow’s volatility but that it is unaffected by todays volatility. That the Max[Z] process is influenced by volatility can possibly be explained by acknowledging that financial markets tend to “pick up” the publics general mood (market sentiment) and adjust prices accordingly. Thus, what should affect Max[Z] should also affect market prices (the results in Table 3) which in turn also should affect daily market volatility. The result that the past and future but not the presents volatility affects the Max[Z] process does however require some additional explanation. To this end, assume that an event that results in 21 22 In September 2008 the bank Lehman Brothers unexpectedly collapsed which forced the onset of the global financial crisis. The analysis is done on the truncated Max[Z] variable. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 219 changes to coherent attention of a large number of people occurs at time t. Assume further that the event gets picked up by the GCP:s RNG:s which in turn results in a slight increase in Max[Z]. Recalling that a change in Max[Z] will affect global returns in time t (Table 3) the event will also affect squared returns which is what is used as a proxy for the present date’s volatility. But, as no significant correlation is found with regards to today’s volatility on the Max[Z] process (Table 4) these results point towards the direction of causality; Max[Z] affects market prices while the Max[Z] process is unaffected by changes in (squared) returns. Table 4. The Max[Z] process and its dependence with market volatility P values in parenthesis Y Z [ HI Y Z [ _` HI AR(1) 2.7471 (<0.01) 0.0273 (0.0163) - MA(1) 2.7471 (<0.01) 0.0264 (0.0206) - ARMA(1,1) 2.7471 (<0.01) 0.8761 (<0.01) -0.8514 (<0.01) 0.07% 0.07% 0.26% S&P Global 1200 Dow Jones Global ] IN ] IN ] IN^O \ ] IN#O ] IN^O \ ] IN#O \ \ \ \ 2.7501 2.7484 2.7498 2.7505 2.7490 2.7498 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 0.8709 0.8740 0.8809 0.8802 0.8724 0.8787 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) -0.8466 -0.8496 -0.8481 -0.8552 -0.8574 -0.8567 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) -28.327 -11.853 -23.537 -32.304 -16.837 -23.662 (0.0283) (0.5136) (0.0945) (0.0195) (0.3742) (0.1090) 0.33% 0.27% 0.31% 0.34% 0.28% 0.30% Note: ARMA Maximum Likelihood using the OPG – BHHH optimization method. Estimates based on 5599 (S&P Global) or 5539 (Dow Jones Global) covering the period 1999-01-04 to 2020-12-31 Since market price affecting information will be incorporated into the price gradually, the events impact on returns is also likely to be carried over to the next day, affecting tomorrow’s volatility through the autocorrelation coefficient (γ) in Equation (1). Thus, it is probable that the Max[Z] processes dependence on tomorrows volatility originate from the events impact on tomorrows returns. If so, the relative size of returns daily autocorrelation in Table 3 could be used to determine the relative size of the parameter determining the size of the impact of tomorrows volatility in Table 4. This is exactly what is found since a is 17 percent larger while X.^2 is 14 percent larger for Dow Jones Global compared with for S&P Global 1200. This found dependence could also be why yesterday’s returns correlate with today’s Max[Z] (9 in Table 3), a claim supported by the finding that the index with the lowest P-value on 9 in Table 3 (Dow Jones Global) also is the index on which tomorrow’s volatility interacts the strongest with the Max[Z] process ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 220 Taken together, the results suggest that it is reasonable to include measures of market volatility in models that seek to disentangle the Max[Z] variables effect on global stock market returns. I thus use the findings above and estimate a model that includes lagged squared returns as a proxy for volatility while also acknowledging that the year 2008 can be regarded as a special: - ,. = / + a- ,.#2 + 3 456[ . ]+ 9(456[ . ] × - ,.#2 ) + V-.#2 + bc %%d + ; ,. . (3) Table 5 presents estimates on Equation (3) using OLS with HAC standard errors and a comparison with Table 3 reveals that the P-values again decrease as the model’s coefficients of determination ( ) increases. The findings thus suggest that global stock market returns are affected by the present days Max[Z] and that this dependence is strengthened when Max[Z]:s dependence with market volatility is accounted for. Table 5. Global stock market index estimates with volatility measures P values in parenthesis D a 3 9 V b HI S&P, Global 1200 No interaction -0.0017 (0.0624) 0.0770 (0.0036) 0.0007 (0.0358) 1.5982 (0.0032) -0.0026 (0.0232) 1.11% Interaction -0.0017 (0.0606) 0.3330 (0.0093) 0.0007 (0.0341) -0.0946 (0.0499) 1.4587 (0.0041) -0.0026 (0.0230) 1.26% Dow Jones, Global No interaction Interaction -0.0014 -0.0014 (0.1107) (0.1041) 0.1005 0.3936 (0.0000) (0.0016) 0.0005 0.0006 (0.0750) (0.0683) -0.1083 (0.0210) 1.9469 1.7899 (0.0003) (0.0005) -0.0028 -0.0028 (0.0184) (0.0183) 1.58% 1.78% Note: P-values calculated from the t-distribution using HAC standard errors. Estimates based on 5599 (S&P Global) or 5539 (Dow Jones Global) covering the period 1999-01-04 to 2020-12-31 5. Concluding remarks This paper addresses some of the concerns made with regards to the results in Holmberg (2020). The results presented herein confirm its finding that global stock market returns correlate with Max[Z] and since the Max[Z] variable is derived out of hardware generated random numbers produced by the GCP, the results suggest that consciousness has the ability to stretch out beyond our heads and affect hardware generated random numbers at a distance. I begin with analyzing the distributional properties of computer simulated data derived from a data generating process that mimics the process underlying the Max[Z] variable. From the computer simulated data, a level at which Max[Z] should be truncated in order to remove potential “bad data” influenced by malfunctioning RNG:s is found. By comparing the truncated Max[Z] variable with its computer simulated counterpart it is found that the truncated Max[Z] ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 221 has both a slightly larger average and median value than it simulated counterpart, is more positively skewed an exhibits larger kurtosis. As the GCP hypothesis suggests that events of coherent attention of a large number of people at times will result in slightly larger Max[Z] values, these are statistical properties that resonate well with what could be expected if the hypothesis underlying the GCP would hold true. Given these results, I redo parts of the analysis in Holmberg (2020) and find that also the truncated Max[Z] variable correlates significantly with global stock market returns. Furthermore, the Max[Z]:s stochastic process is itself found to be affected by daily market volatility and by including a proxy measure of daily market volatility it is found that the models fit can be improved. This suggest that statistical models can be further developed by simply acknowledging that volatility interacts with Max[Z] while Max[Z] affects returns. Perhaps Max[Z]:s interaction with volatility can be more precisely accounted for using versions of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models; an interesting avenue for future research to explore. The findings in this paper thus confirms the qualitative results in Holmberg (2020) and adds evidence to the hypothesis underlying the GCP. As the GCP hypothesis suggests that the mind can affect matter at a distance, the results are not supported by our current understandings of consciousness. I am thus left with two unanswered fundamental questions: why and how? What is the mechanism underlying the mind-matter interaction and why does the mind have the ability to do so? The prevailing working hypothesis with regards to consciousness states that it is an epiphenomenon of the brain and a result of physical arrangements and information processing patters. This explanation does thus not allow for the possibility of mind-matter interaction of the sort suggested by the results in this paper. It is also unlikely that the results can be explained using electromagnetic theories of consciousness (see, e.g., Pocket, 2012 and McFadden, 2002) since the electromagnetic field produced by the brain is not strong enough to affect matter a distance. Thus, one needs to look elsewhere and begin exploring alternative ideas on the nature of consciousness. Perhaps coherent attention of a large number of people impacts some unexplored consciousness field of sorts and that ripples in this field has the ability to affect matter at a distance; or perhaps the mind projects a field of its own with the ability to affect matter at a distance. Whatever its cause, the results suggest that the prevailing paradigm with regards to consciousness needs to be discussed as the results cannot be understood using our current understanding of consciousness alone. Received June 15, 2021; Accepted June 26, 2021 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 222 References Cotterill, Rodney (2001). "Cooperation of the basal ganglia, cerebellum, sensory cerebrum and hippocampus: possible implications for cognition, consciousness, intelligence and creativity". Progress in Neurobiology. 64 (1): 1–33. Chalmers, David (1995). “Facing up to the problem of consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2(3): 200-219. Chalmers, David. (2003), “Consciousness and its place in nature”, in Stich, S. & Warfield, F. (eds.) Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Chordia, T. and Swaminathan, B. (2000), Trading Volume and Cross‐Autocorrelations in Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 55, pp. 913-935 Durkheim, Emile. (1893). The Division of Labour in Society. Trans. W. D. Halls, intro. Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press, 1997. Ghysels, E., Sinko, A. and Valkanov, R. (2006). MIDAS regression: Further results and new directions. Econometric Reviews, 26, pp.53-90. Güzeldere, G. (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 1–67. Holmberg, U. (2020). Stock Returns and the Mind: An Unlikely Result that Could Change Our Understanding of Consciousness, “Journal of Consciousness Studies”, 27 (7-8), pp. 31-49. Koch, Christof (2004). The Quest for Consciousness. Englewood, CO: Roberts & Company. Llinás, Rodolfo (2002). “I of the Vortex. From Neurons to Self.” MIT Press. Lo, A. W. and MacKinlay, A. C. (1990), “When Are Contrarian Profits Due to Stock Market Overreaction?”.The Review of Financial Studies, 3 (2), pp. 175–205 McFadden, Johnjoe (2002). "The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (Cemi) Field Theory: The Hard Problem Made Easy?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (8): 45–60. Nelson, R. and Bancel, P. (2011). ”Effects of Mass Consciousness in Random Data During Global Events”. Explore; 7, pp. 373-383. Newey, W. K and West, K. D. (1987). "A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix". Econometrica. 55 (3), pp. 703–708. Pagan, A.R., and Schwert, G.W. (1990). “Alternative models for conditional models for conditional stock volatility”, Journal of Econometrics, 45 (1-2), pp. 267-290. Pocket, Susan (2012). "The electromagnetic field theory of consciousness: a testable hypothesis about the characteristics of conscious as opposed to non-conscious fields". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 19 (11–12): 191–223. Radin, Dean (2002). "Exploring relationships Beween Random Physical Events and Mass Human Attention: Asking for Whom the Bell Tolls”. Journal of Scientific Exploration. 16 (4): 533-547. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 207-223 Holmberg, U., Revisiting Stock Returns and the Mind: Digging Deeper into the Data 223 Scargle, J. D. (2002). "Was there evidence of global consciousness on September 11, 2001?". Journal of Scientific Exploration. 16 (4): pp. 571–577. Sias, R. W and Starks, L. T. (1997). “Return autocorrelation and institutional investors”, Journal of Financial Economics, 46 (1), pp. 103-131 Shiller, Robert J. (2017). “Narrative Economics.” American Economic Review. 107(4): 967–1,004. Rogers, L., Satchell, S. and Yoon, Y. (1994). Estimating the Volatility of Stock Prices: A Comparison of Methods That Use High and Low Prices, Applied Financial Economics, 4(3), pp. 241-47 Shumway, Robert; Stroffer, David (2010). “Time series analysis and its applications: with R examples”. 3rd ed. Springer Taylor, Brook (1715). Methodus Incrementorum Directa et Inversa [Direct and Reverse Methods of Incrementation] (in Latin). London. p. 21–23 (Prop. VII, Thm. 3, Cor. 2). Translated into English in Struik, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 423 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Article Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Tariq Khan* Dept. of Computer Science, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE Abstract A constructor algorithm is presented that, after an initial bootstrap instantiation, may describe many aspects of our Universe. Memory is a foundational aspect of this short algorithm and is considered as a bridge between the physical Universe and intelligent minds. Nature is speculated to have copied the constructor algorithm for the benefit of intelligence in complex minds. The reoccurring presence of the Fibonacci Sequence and π are shown as derivative of the constructor algorithm. Human intelligence is described as arising from changes in working memory in the mind via cyclical serotonin levels in the brain. Keywords: Mind, Universe, Memory, constructor algorithm, bridge, intelligence. All that we see or seemIs but a dream within a dream. -- Edgar Allan Poe Time is but memory in the making -- Vladimir Nabokov The concept of the computing universe is still just a hypothesis; nothing has been proved. However, I am confident that this idea can help unveil the secrets of nature. -- Konrad Zuse, Rechnender Raum (Calculating Space) So how can a brain perform difficult tasks in one hundred steps that the largest parallel computer imaginable can’t solve in a million or a billion steps? The answer is that the brain doesn’t “compute” the answers to problems; it retrieves the answers from memory. …The entire cortex is a memory system. It isn’t a computer at all. -- Jeff Hawkins, On Intelligence Other, less abstract approaches to improving creativity center around the importance of serotonin. According to research... serotonin levels are tied to creativity... a gene pertaining to serotonin, known as TPH1, is associated with “figural” creativity — or creativity regarding shapes, diagrams, and drawings. -- Jandy Le and Michael Xiong, The Scientific Origin of Creativity *Correspondence: Tariq Khan, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA. E-mail: tariqkhanomaha@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 424 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds It is a great ball resting on the flat back of the world turtle.” “Ah yes, but what does the world turtle stand on?” “On the back of a still larger turtle.” “Yes, but what does he stand on?” “A very perceptive question. But it’s no use, mister; it’s turtles all the way down. -- Carl Sagan, Gott and the Turtles On the shoulders of giants, many a great mind has sought a Grand Unified Theory to explain our reality. Similar minds have also suspected that our Universe or reality had origins from a simple start e.g., a Big Bang or cellular automata rule set (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Figure 1. An initial dream of an origin to reality via binary mathematics: “2, 3, 4, 5, etc. 0. Omnibus ex nihilo ducendis sufficit unum.” (To make all things from nothing, unity suffices) from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s imago creationis [12 ]. Source: Mutalik, P. (November 24, 2021). Why e, the Transcendental Math Constant, Is Just the Best. Quanta Magazine. Retrieved from: https://www.quantamagazine.org/why-eulers-number-is-justthe-best-20211124 December 20, 2021. So perhaps there is a simple equation or algorithm that can explain features that we find in our reality. This work presents a model using very simple pseudo-code, and an initial intelligence (required to bootstrap initiate the repeating code), as another template in this same theoretical direction. Academic and scientific culture derides any mention of a primordial consciousness, mind, or God-like intelligence but, although tremendous progress has been made in terms of unifying forces in our Universe, the goal of a simple and primordial equation or theory has remained elusive, as has an explanation for human consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 425 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Figure 2. Cellular automata examples start with simple “a priori rules” (cuts or decisions) and then grow into complex patterns and structures; primordial rules determine the future evolution of structure. Source: Rule 30 Cellular Automata image retrieved from Wolfram Mathworld. Retrieved from: https://mathworld.wolfram.com/CellularAutomaton.html on December 20, 2021. This model imagines an initial intelligence that may inherently exist “a priori” or before the very creation of our Universe - akin to a mind in a Platonic dualist world. This intelligence could be ever-present but is required, at the very least, to bootstrap our algorithm “out of nothing” to begin the creation of our Universe, akin to the starting point of Set Theory. Echoing writings of Descartes, we can imagine a primordial awareness or intelligence that can identify and distinguish itself (SELF) from that-which-is-not-itself (NOT-SELF). This “primordial cut” is considered an instantiation act and would minimally require - simultaneously or beforehand - at least two “units of memory” - that may or may not be internal to our physical Universe. From this starting point, our simple algorithm can be used to explain a vast set of features present in our reality after this origin act. Consider a simple constructor algorithm. The term constructor borrowed from the JAVA “object oriented” programming language subroutine and from the name of theoretical work by Oxford quantum physicist David Deutsch. In the Biblical book of Genesis 1:3 we have the famous existential line of “Let there be light.” But note that various elements are involved in this statement. There is the mind of a God, which is aware and makes a decision to “cut” reality into two segments, one with light and one without light (darkness) in a workspace (mind or otherwise). We face an obvious challenge to attempt to describe origins from a realm that might be timeless or without any entities or consciousness or perhaps filled with both. But, if we assume that logic holds, even during our bootstrap start, then perhaps, following the beliefs of so many cultures in history and around the world, we must start with an initial awareness or intelligence. Consider the existence of a primordial mind with memory, awareness of a self, and a primordial “cut” decision, or segmenting of self from non-self, with these two concepts inherently stored in a ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 426 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds primordial memory of two units. These memory units may be all that is needed as a primordial workspace. Perhaps these are the very first units of a fundamental “unit” of spacetime in our Universe. One can imagine this since, as our algorithm continues to repeat, it basically resembles a Fibonacci Sequence and, thus, increases at a rate that approaches an exponential growth rate (Figure 3). Figure 3. After the bootstrap instantiation, repeating the constructor algorithm shows how the count of required memory units matches the ever-present Fibonacci Sequence we see in our reality. But as our reality becomes vast, we can see the growth rate of memory units increasing even more. This is of interest as it mirrors observations in our Universe that show our Universe growing at similar incredible expansion rates attributed to Dark Energy. To summarize, our proposed algorithm starts with a primordial awareness, cuts into self and nonself (vis a vis binary 0 and 1 or “something and nothing”) with the change in these relationships being equivalent to time i.e., progressing via each cut, and then the algorithm repeats - with our entire Universe of spacetime being inclusive to this primordial realm of non-self. Two units of memory are added (pseudo-code is used ease of discussion) and a one-dimensional point in the “non-self” portion of reality is “cut” creating point 1 and point 2, point 1 and 2 define Line1, and then Line 1 is cut to create Line 1 and Line 2. Line 1 and Line 2 are used to define a twodimensional circle and non-circle entities. This “add memory, cut, and repeat” process continues ad infinitum. Here we need to clarify the use of the word cut. The term perhaps is closer to the idea of a schism. The cut can be a mental or logical identification or segmentation e.g., one line into two lines or even the breakdown of molecule into its component elements then protons, neutrons, and quarks, electrons, photons etc. But the algorithm remains the same, even in a much later complex ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 427 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Universe, as every simple decision (go left or go right?), click of clock, or even as entropy itself where particles decay into foundational particles and quarks as if attempting to return to the foundational origins of structure versus randomness. The primordial cut being synonymous with “something from nothing” or structure versus randomness akin to the Chinese origin philosophy of Yin and Yang. After our two-dimensional reality is instantiated, the cut function thus leads to an aggregation function i.e., not-cut or “combine.” This is the basis for memory and an ideation hierarchy e.g., lines become letters, words, sentences, paragraphs, pages, chapters, books, and libraries. All subsequent opposing “strategies,” thus, mirror CUT vs NOT-CUT including hatred vs desire, attachment vs aversion, decay vs survive. A reality, after the primordial instantiating “cut,” now exists where, even if only in two physical dimensions along with time, we can repeat the same algorithm to produce a third dimension (if even needed) and a reality of immense complexity. University of California Irvine cognitive psychologist Donald Hoffman argues that the third dimension does not exist and is used only as informational redundancy to improve fidelity of two-dimensional data: This is exactly what Bekenstein and Hawking discovered about spacetime. It is redundant. Two dimensions contain all the information in any 3D space [1]. Hoffman’s theory is also possible in the framework of this model. This model does not necessarily require a third dimension to achieve its success in creating so much of what we observe in our reality. Note the appeal of an origin constructor algorithm is that it may be able to eliminate vastly dualist cosmological models that involve Laws of Physics that exist “a priori” or before the creation of our reality in a Platonic Universe of perfect circles, infinity, and ideas. Consider comments from philosopher Angus Menuge: If I am going to have an account that fully explains what’s going on when a scientist measures a system in quantum physics and deals with entanglement and all these other things, what if it turns out that that account must appeal to consciousness? Does consciousness then become part of physics? If it does, then — in a way — the debate between physicalists and dualists dissipates because the physical has just absorbed consciousness. But the dualists would have won in the sense that consciousness doesn’t reduce to any of these other things. That is what they’ve been claiming for a few centuries…[2]. Perhaps the ongoing challenges with unifying Gravity with the other fundamental forces or the Standard Model are because Gravity is a result of foundational cut events (minimization of surface areas) versus the existence of graviton force-carrying particles like those of the other fundamental forces in Nature. Note too how Quantum Mechanics, at a fundamental level, shows that our Universe is “cut” into identical minimal entities (photons, electrons, quarks, etc.…) and that when one attempts to determine an attribute of one of these entities with an increasing level of detail, the detail of the corresponding attribute is decreased (position vs momentum as the classic example of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle). This behavior echoes a reality that “prefers” cuts and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 428 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds segments i.e., one or the other, but not both! Note, too, the lack of an observed decay of a proton or quark or electron. Our simple constructor algorithm: 1) bootstrap initial intelligence, 2) add two units of memory, 3) cut, and 4) repeat (Figure 4), produces results that we see in our reality and becomes almost synonymous to entropy i.e., driving (cutting) entities toward disorder. Figure 4. Visual representation of the constructor algorithm. Where, or in what “mind,” lies the primordial memory units is the dualist assumption required in this proposal to bootstrap instantiate reality. The Principle of Least Action, so fundamental to our reality, becomes a logical outcome of this constructor algorithm. The appearance of π, present in so many aspects of our Universe, becomes a necessary result of our model as does the existence of so many shapes that resemble fundamental circles or spheres (Figure 5). With the assumption of an initial or foundational intelligence, perhaps Nature, which attempts to use all tools at her disposal to survive, has simply appropriated the boot code of the Universe and, with the complexity of evolved biological brains, is then able to reuse that code in minds, thus leading to consciousness? Nature wants fecundity and variety, and it wants these ultimately to ensure survival. Nature, thus, uses all tools at its disposal; consider how plant life uses aspects of Quantum Mechanics to optimize photosynthesis i.e., Quantum Biology. Thus, it is not a stretch to consider Nature appropriating boot code from an underlying reality. This could explain the existence of consciousness in human minds as Nature using the “bootstrap code” of the Universe for its own benefits to help ensure survival. Note how in this model numbers exist or originate as “labels of minimum memory size.” So now let us consider the origin of π. Upon the creation of a circle, following the cut of Line 1 into “Line 1 and Line 2,” we have an actual boundary between Circle and Non-Circle; the circumference of the circle (Figure 6). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 429 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Figure 5. Is the “reality” outside of our window – that is full of demonstrations of gravity, of the principle of least action, of Fibonacci Sequences, and of minds – just a vast repetition of “memory adds” and concept “cuts” or combines (“not-cuts”) scaling to the entire Universe? Source: https://www.indiewire.com/2017/10/the-matrix-code-digital-rainmeaning-1201891684/ and NASA\ESA\IPAC\Caltech\STScI\Arizona State University Figure 6. The minimal area of a two-dimensional “reality” encompassed using previously “cut” entities line 1 and line 2, is a circle; they remain independent and not crossing. The boundary of randomness vs structure (e.g., maximum randomness = minimal structure) is the circumference of the circle. The length of the circumference is, thus, measured as diameter (line 1) x π. The circumference, thus, defines the length required of line 2 in order to create a boundary between our new concepts of circle (yellow region) and non-circle (blue region). Π, thus, is a simultaneous minimum and maximum “cut” border and, thus, is ever-present in our reality. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 430 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds If we attempt to measure or calculate the length of the circumference of this unit circle (diameter of length 1) we begin to require a vast amount of memory units. Here, many assumptions are made but they lead to some interesting conclusions. In our model the length or digits of π do not exist “a priori” or in a Platonic realm of infinity but, rather, must be calculated using memory. But π is a very special number, and a special irrational number, indeed. As defined in Wikipedia: Being an irrational number, π cannot be expressed exactly as a fraction (equivalently, its decimal representation never ends and never settles into a permanent repeating pattern). Still, fractions such as 22/7 and other rational numbers are commonly used to approximate π. The digits appear to be randomly distributed; however, to date, no proof of this has been discovered [3]. Since π lies on the border between circle and non-circle it, literally, is the maximum amount of randomness and the minimum amount of structure possible, thus its presence in so many areas of reality. But in our model, to ensure a string has non-repeating and perfectly random digit placements, implies a need to not only have a memory unit for a given digit (a la an instantiation cut) but also a memory unit(s) for all of the possible permutations of every digit and digit string up to and then including the digit in question as well as the implied memory to compare them to ensure no pattern or eternal repetition exists. This idea is speculative, and resides in the field of metaphysics, but it still is simpler than a required Platonic Universe with “a priori” infinitely long numbers. In this model, the memory is added as digits in π are measured. Does this mean that measuring the digits in pi could be increasing the size of the Universe a la Dark Energy expansion - perhaps? With the above model in mind, let us now compose an updated “short history” of man's attempts to understand reality:  Plato - reality must be dualist - a world of ideas and a physical world of material (cave shadows).  Democritus – reductionist approach; Universe built from identical fundamental tiny atoms.  Rene’ Descartes - I and NOT-I is the starting point of understanding reality.  Isaac Newton - mathematical rules underly reality; predictive time functions (calculus) and "law" of gravitation pattern; spacetime as Absolute.  Gottfried Leibniz - reality from 0 and 1 - starts at two dimensions with the rest functions of relations (distances) between objects including time as the change of these. Calculus and spacetime as Relational.  Charles Darwin - Nature appears formulaic, evolution via fitness = optimization algorithm. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 431 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds  Albert Einstein - reality is a function, with space and time as a single operation! Gravity is derivative of this. Speed of light has max velocity but zero memory. No relative velocity = max memory = slowest clock time. General Relativity directly implies expanding universe and origin from single start Big Bang vs Cosmology.  Kurt Gödel – there can never exist a finite complete system without a higher order awareness!  John Von Neumann - set theory is only way to create math - requires a bootstrap into null set. Designs computer architecture based on memory!  Alan Turing - code for an operating system and for program or data are both able to be encoded into the same string of code! All we need is a single "Universal Turing Machine" to "read" (cut into memory) infinite tape of binary symbols.  Richard Feynman and John Wheeler – pursued the “why of quanta” (identical, long lasting, fundamental particles). IT from BIT. Reality is derivative and consistent with rules fundamental - delayed choice quantum eraser. "Sum of all histories" implies memory (if not awareness) with fundamental "which path" choices. Quantum mechanics is younger sister of computation  Jacob Bekenstein - Holographic paradigm from black hole thermodynamics - all info of reality coded into 2 dimensions!  Stephen Wolfram and Konrad Zuse - reality is a "cellular automata" at foundation starting with a simple rule deeper than physics Grand Unification theories.  Donald Hoffman - there is no 3rd dimension at all! Our reality is all two-dimensional. All of reality is a fitness algorithm.  David Deutsch - computation is THE foundation of reality. A "constructor" must exist like in Java code. Multiverse advocate. Multiverse = “dual” reality (mind or "realm of infinite" is separate from brain).  Lee Smolin - all realities (Universes) evolve from prior ones in eternal evolution toward complexity and fecundity (via more Black Holes after every big bang).  Various cosmologists – Inflationary (nested) multiverse and Black Hole event horizon as equivalent to cosmic horizon.  Various biologists - Nature appears to be algorithmic and a "distributed intelligence" using any tool it can (over billions of years) to ensure survival via variety, fecundity, complexity e.g., photosynthesis using path optimization aspects of Quantum Mechanics and slime model problem-solving. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 432 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Thus, in attempt to tie together all of these concepts, perhaps all of reality is an algorithm that requires at least an initial bootstrap of intelligence (a la a "toe dip" into a dual world). Reality is two- dimensional with time and THE simple function of "add at least two units of memory, cut or not-cut (combine), and repeat." In a manner, man might therefore actually be "created in the image of God" as Nature appropriates reality's bootstrap code that, used with a complex enough brain becomes what we call and experience as consciousness. The above model is obviously speculative so, perhaps, we can find additional supporting evidence in our world. The following observations attempt to bridge the gap between the self, in our minds, and the physical world, in our Universe, using memory. In terms of our human brains, serotonin becomes a key mechanism. We can envision a model of human behavior driven by changes in serotonin (from medicine, environmental histamine, or bodily bipolar cycles) that result in changes in the mind’s amount of working memory. These changes lead to variations in mental cut and combine (not-cut) operations that are the precursors to creativity and, thus, intelligence. When serotonin is low, there is reduced working memory. In this phase we see OCD, anxiety, and depression behaviors. When serotonin is high, there is hyperactivity and even mania. But, in the up and down slopes in between the peak and nadir, we have changes in the size of working memory (Figure 7). Figure 7. The human brain’s bipolar wavelength and intelligence (creativity) from changes in working memory via serotonin cycles. Humans will repeat a song over and over again when working memory is small and they will work to map out entire systems and find “associations across boundaries” when working memory in the mind is large. During the ebb and flow of working memory, we can envision the human mind making associations, pattern matches, or analogies i.e., intelligent behaviors. “Norepinephrine and serotonin have been consistently linked to psychiatric mood disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder” as noted on WebMD [4]. Thus, imagine a patient with a bipolar diagnosis whom, in a low serotonin phase, has a small window of working memory and thus ruminates over and over again on a negative outlook that leads to a suicide. In this phase, the patient is unable to conceive of longer term turns for the positive or of big picture outlooks or perspectives. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 433 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Serotonin is also linked to consciousness via anesthesia. Tiger et al. in their 2020 research Ketamine Acts by Boosting Serotonin 1B Receptors state that “researchers found that the therapeutic effects of ketamine were due to inhibition of serotonin action [5].” Wikipedia notes the “biochemical mechanism of action of general anesthetics is not well understood… Potential pharmacologic targets of general anesthetics are GABA, glutamate receptors, voltage-gated ion channels, and glycine and serotonin receptors [6].” Additional observations of anesthesia being linked to serotonin lead to a grand claim that consciousness is just (or is the experience of) changes in working memory size. This model may even lead to a different approach toward Artificial Intelligence noting that the discussed sizes of working memory, stored long term memory, and sensory inputs are large. Numerous studies have reinforced the role of serotonin in memory, anesthesia (consciousness), creativity, and bipolar disorders. PsychGuides.com states that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD): …is triggered by communication problems between the brain's deeper structures and the front part of the brain. These parts of the brain primarily use serotonin to communicate. This is why increasing the levels of serotonin in the brain can help to alleviate OCD symptoms [7]. Sadasivan Chinniah et al. in their 2008 research note: Serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, 5-HT) is a monoamine neurotransmitter… 5-HT is involved in a number of physiological systems of relevance to the anesthetist… [t]he exact sites and modes of action of 5-HT remain ill-defined and elusive. A CNS deficiency of serotonin is thought to be key to the etiology of depression, and selective 5-HT reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are the first-line pharmacological treatment. SSRIs augment 5-HT concentrations at the synaptic cleft [8]. Gwen Smith et al. note in their 2017 research note: Lower serotonin transporter binding was associated with worse performance in verbal and visual-spatial memory in mild cognitive impairment. … “Now that we have more evidence that serotonin is a chemical that appears affected early in cognitive decline, we suspect that increasing serotonin function in the brain could prevent memory loss from getting worse and slow disease progression.” … [R]esearchers found that people with mild cognitive impairment had up to 38 percent less SERT detected in their brains compared to each of their age-matched healthy controls. And not a single person with mild cognitive impairment had higher levels of SERT compared to their healthy control. … The researchers then compared the results from the brain imaging tests for the serotonin transporter to those two memory tests, and found that the lower serotonin transporters correlated with lower scores. For example, those people with mild cognitive impairment had 37 percent lower verbal memory scores and 18 percent lower levels of SERT in the brain’s hippocampus compared to healthy controls [9]. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 434 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds Svob et al. note in their 2016 paper that: The current evidence implies that reduced 5-HT neurotransmission negatively influences cognitive functions and that normalization of 5-HT activity may have beneficial effects, suggesting that 5-HT and 5-HTR represent important pharmacological targets for cognition enhancement and restoration of impaired cognitive performance in neuropsychiatric disorders [10]. Sasaki-Adams et al. note serotonin as having greater significance in brain functions than, and even controlling, dopamine: There is ample evidence for serotonergic influences on dopamine function. …For example, a number of in vivo microdialysis studies have clearly shown that exposure of the striatum or nucleus accumbens to serotonin results in increased release of dopamine (Benloucif and Galloway 1991; De Deurwaerdere et al. 1996; Hallbus et al. 1997; Parsons and Justice 1993; Yadid et al. 1994; Yoshimoto et al. 1996)… 5-HT1B and 5HT3 agonists tend to facilitate dopaminergic effects (De Deurwaerdere et al. 1998; Parsons et al. 1996) [11]. In summary, this model proposes that Nature copied the boot code constructor algorithm of the Universe to make intelligent minds. Human minds are, thus, by all measures, each essentially a unique universe. Recently cosmologists discovered the equivalence between Black Hole event horizons and the cosmic information horizon. Thus, perhaps, one day human minds will be found to be equivalent to a primordial “cosmic mind,” i.e., a dream within a dream indeed. Received July 09, 2022; Accepted August 03,2022 References 1. Hoffman, Donald D. (2019). The Case Against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0393254704, 9780393254709. 2. Marks, Robert J. (2021, May 23). Can a Materialist Consciousness Theory Survive Quantum Mechanics. Retrieved from: https://mindmatters.ai/2021/05/can-a-materialist-consciousness-theorysurvive-quantum-mechanics/ on July 3, 2022. 3. Wikipedia contributors. (2022, June 14). Pi. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 10:41, July 4, 2022, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pi&oldid=1093160119 4. Bhandari, Smitha (2021, March 8). Causes of Bipolar Disorder. Retrieved from: https://www.webmd.com/bipolar-disorder/guide/bipolar-disorder-causes on 7/3/2022 on July 3, 2022. 5. Tiger, M. et al. (2020). A Randomized Placebo Controlled PET Study of Ketamine's Effect on Serotonin 1B Receptor Binding in Patients with SSRI Resistant Depression. Translational Psychiatry. doi: 10.1038/s41398-020-0844-4, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41398-020-0844-4 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 423-435 435 Khan, T., Memory as a Bridge between Mind & Universe with Nature Copying a Constructor Algorithm of the Universe for Intelligent Minds 6. Wikipedia contributors. (2022, July 1). General anaesthesia. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:35, July 4, 2022, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=General_anaesthesia&oldid=1095979356 7. American Addiction Centers. (2022). PscyhGuides OCD (Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder). Retrieved from: https://tinyurl.com/466tya6u on July 3, 2022. 8. Sadasivan Chinniah, FRCA, James L.H. French, FRCA, David M. Levy, FRCA, Serotonin and anaesthesia, Continuing Education in Anaesthesia Critical Care & Pain, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2008, Pages 43–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaceaccp/mkn006 9. Gwenn S. Smith, Frederick S. Barrett, Jin Hui Joo, Najlla Nassery, Alena Savonenko, Devin J. Sodums, Christopher M. Marano, Cynthia A. Munro, Jason Brandt, Michael A. Kraut, Yun Zhou, Dean F. Wong, Clifford I. Workman, Molecular imaging of serotonin degeneration in mild cognitive impairment, Neurobiology of Disease, Volume 105, 2017, Pages 33-41, ISSN 0969-9961, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nbd.2017.05.007. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969996117301109). 10. Švob Štrac D, Pivac N, Mück-Šeler D. The serotonergic system and cognitive function. Transl Neurosci. 2016 May 9;7(1):35-49. doi: 10.1515/tnsci-2016-0007. PMID: 28123820; PMCID: PMC5017596. 11. Sasaki-Adams, D., Kelley, A. Serotonin-Dopamine Interactions in the Control of Conditioned Reinforcement and Motor Behavior. Neuropsychopharmacol 25, 440–452 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0893-133X(01)00240-8 12. Mutalik, P. (November 24, 2021). Why e, the Transcendental Math Constant, Is Just the Best. Quanta Magazine. Retrieved from: https://www.quantamagazine.org/why-eulers-number-is-just-the-best20211124 December 20, 2021. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 129 Article Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness Tina Lindhard* International University of Professional Studies (IUPS), Hawaii, USA ABSTRACT Consciousness has scientists baffled, and the search to understand it has been described as the Holy Grail of science. However, the hypothesis that different levels of Consciousness, which can be encountered through phenomenological introspection, might be correlated with different layers of our anatomical development, which unfolds in gradational degrees, offers a new way of looking at our body, our mind, our nature, and Consciousness. Here Pure Consciousness is considered a non-physical intelligence that gives rise to life, expresses itself through all forms, prompts our anatomical development, and in humans, manifests itself through a by-product called ‗mind‘ comprising of several levels. As we are part of this intelligence, we can explore the deeper levels of our consciousness using the cursor of our mind. The search for the deeper Self is consistent with the phenomenological perspective used by somatic heart-based meditation methods, as opposed to the modern Western phenomenological standpoint, which is the study of ‗phenomena‘. As our body unfolds in gradational degrees linked to layers, we suggest there might be a relationship between these layers and the levels of consciousness we can encounter in our search to know our deeper Self. These different aspects are addressed in this paper. Keywords: Consciousness, anatomy, correlate, levels, layers, mind, intelligence, self. 1. Introduction One of the enigmatic frontiers of science is understanding consciousness. Disciplines that study consciousness, especially those disciplines which are still based "on the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm of mechanistic science" (Grof, 1985, p. 65), are inclined to support a materialistic point of view. Western science has stripped the original view of Newton and Darwin of their belief in divine intelligence underpinning all of creation and replaced it with one of radical philosophical materialism. This has given rise to the belief that consciousness is a product of the brain, which is understandable, as clinical and experimental neurology demonstrate there are close connections between various aspects of consciousness and physiological or pathological processes in the brain, such as traumas, tumors, and infections. "However, they do not necessarily prove that consciousness is produced by the brain" (Grof, 1985, pp. 21–22). * Correspondence: Tina Lindhard, Ph.D., International University of Professional Studies (IUPS), Hawaii, USA Email: t.lindhard@iups.edu ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 130 This model of reality is now being supplemented: By quantum-relativistic physics [which] has transcended the concept of solid, indestructible matter and separate objects and shows the universe as a complex web of events and relations . . . However, the physicist has very little to say about the variety of the different forms the cosmic dance takes on various other levels of reality. The experimental insights from unusual states of consciousness suggest the existence of intangible and unfathomable creative intelligence aware of itself that permeates all realms of reality. This approach indicates that it is pure consciousness without any specific content the represents the supreme principle of existence and the ultimate reality. From it, everything in the cosmos is derived. (Grof, 1985, p. 72) In this paper, I look in more detail at the ‗cosmic dance‘ this creative intelligence takes in humans by suggesting there is a relationship between different levels of consciousness which we can encounter through phenomenological introspection and our anatomical development which unfolds in degrees. Whether we like it or not, and whether we acknowledge it or not, in Psychology whatever statement we make rests on our metaphysical perspective. Materialistic science has influenced our thinking, and the philosophy of Descartes still affects us by creating a mind-body split. In Transpersonal Psychology, the influence of Buddhism has always been strong (Berkhin, 2014) and some authors are investigating the transplantation of Buddhism in the West (Clasquin, 1999). However, we must remember that Buddhism and more particularly Theravada Buddhism, does not recognize the existence of the Self (Buddha, n.d.; Ruparell & Markham, 2001). The position I adopt here is that Pure Consciousness1 is a non-physical intelligence giving rise to life that is expressing itself through all forms. As such we are a fragment of that entity, and we participate in its nature, a position known as qualified monism. This intelligence also prompts our anatomical development, and in humans, it manifests itself through a by-product we call ‗mind‘ comprising of several levels (Arka, 2013). Here I look at how these levels might be correlated with the unfolding of our anatomical development which develops in layers in gradational degrees. Like material scientists, many biologists consider individual organisms as consisting of "separate systems‖ (Grof, 1985, p.22) where the whole is the sum of the parts. Here we take the view that the body of a living organism is an interconnected whole that develops in gradational degrees. It can be considered as a special type of container (Arka, 2003) with which we and the environment can interact, but it is also under creative cosmic influences. In Biology, we talk of anabolism, metabolism, and catabolism. It is these forces that are behind the development, maintenance and destruction of the material body of a living organism including cells (Bhakti Niskama Shanta, 2015), all of which are unfolding individually and collectively as a single unit in time. As this is a process, it makes the analysis of the body difficult as any investigation involving measurement collapses the wave of unfolding time and transforms the body into a 1 Consciousness, Self, Soul, and the Self of Nature, all similar concepts, are used here interchangeably and are written with capitals to distinguish them from soul and self which is a fragment of Consciousness. Pure Consciousness is also known as Spirit Consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 131 static entity. I do not negate the importance of genes but suggest that as identical genes are present in every cell, they cannot be the intelligence behind deciding how, when and where to activate what needs to be done in each moment in the organism. In this, I concur with Blechschmidt (2004), who also suggests the ―form of the organism differentiates under biodynamic forces, not chemical-genetic information‖ (p. 18). As background material, I also briefly outline some fundamental differences in approach to consciousness between the modern-day Western phenomenological perspective and the phenomenological perspective used by people in the search for the deeper Self or Pure Consciousness using somatic heart-based meditation methods. I then outline the Theory of the Six Main levels of Consciousness which is coherent with this latter approach. It was developed by Srinivas Arka (2009; 2013) and is based on explorations into the nature of his consciousness and the experiences of his pupils using a somatic heart-based method of meditation known at Intuitive Meditation. Although the inner experiences of each person are unique, according to this theory each level has an inherent characteristic, quality or commonality which can be accessed and experienced by the practitioner when investigating the nature of his or her deeper self. It is this commonality that I hypothesize is correlated with certain phases in our anatomical development. As the hypothesis regarding levels of consciousness and different layers of our anatomical development is linked to Arka‘s theory, it is important to also establish the validity of this theory. It is testable, at least in principle, by making his statement regarding consciousness as an entity that takes different forms and activates several levels in humans into various hypotheses where each level consists of a separate hypothesis. Among other corroborating evidence, I present scientific findings in support of the third level of this theory, insights from other approaches including analytic psychology, and information based on another heart-based meditation method known as Prayer of the Heart. Support for the anatomical correlates with the different levels comes from Arka‘s (2013) descriptions of the levels, and the reverse order of the distinct anatomical phases our body undergoes during our embryonic development. I therefore also describe this development and how our body unfolds in gradational degrees linked to layers; a process referred to as gastrulation, so we can better understand the suggested correlates between our anatomical development and different levels of Consciousness I am suggesting here. These different aspects are addressed in more detail in this paper, as are the many implications of this approach, theory, and hypothesis. 2. Background The nature of consciousness can be looked at from various lenses. India has a long history of investigating consciousness and its nature using the ―inside out approach‖ (Lindhard, 2019). This involves meditating on the Self and contemplating its nature. The people who were successful in their search became known as philosophers, rishis, seers, and yogis and to help others undertake this inner inquiry, they developed methods, known as meditation. However today most methods of meditation have little to do with this original intention (Arka, 2013; Lindhard, 2016). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 132 One thing that these early methods have in common, is the withdrawal of the senses from their objects in the outside world. This is one of the fundamental differences between the modern-day Western phenomenological approach and that of India. In the Indian tradition, the aim is to know one‘s deeper nature or Self and the object of ones‘ inquiry is ―the origin of consciousness expressing itself through the human body‖ (Arka in Lindhard, 2016, p. 147). This approach was not only undertaken in India but was also used by other people in the ancient world such as Egyptians, Persians, Jews, people in the Mediterranean area, the Desert Fathers in the Christian tradition and later by the Sufis (Louchakova 2004). As many of these people practiced a somatic heart-based method known as Prayer of the Heart to discover through "experimental phenomenological introspection, the living topological construct of the Self " (Louchakova, 2007, p. 82), I prefer to use the term ‘Yogic tradition’ rather than Eastern to collectively refer to all the traditions which meditate on the Self. Yogic traditions stem from the root of the Sanskrit word yoga, meaning to Yoke by ―uniting the individual spirit with the Universal Spirit‖ (Ayush, n.d.para. 1). The experiences that arise as one progresses with one‘s investigation into one‘s inner nature, are unique to each individual. However, Arka (2009; 2013) maintains that certain levels are common when a person goes below his or her (thinking) mind using a heart-based method. He identifies the part of the individual that undertakes this inner journey, as the "I awareness," "I ego conscious awareness," or "I ego awareness". This part of us is the pivot of our memories which make up our personality (Arka, 2009). Human awareness is a fragment of Consciousness, and it is the part of us that, like a cursor, we can direct at any activity or object we want, including exploring the deeper nature of our own consciousness or Self. In the journey to Self-realization, Arka (2013) talks about the need of the person to reverse all that has happened to him or her whereas other heart-based meditation approaches that meditate on the Self, talk of ego transcendence (Louchakova, 2006; 2007; Louchakova & Warner, 2003; Louchakova-Schwarz, 2014). In the West, modern-day phenomenology is considered the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, it‘s being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object …. literally, phenomenology is the study of ‗phenomena‘: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience …. phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called ―intentionality‖, that is, the directedness of experience towards — represents or ―intends‖— things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. (Smith, 2018) Philosophers refer to phenomenal introspectively accessible raw, direct subjective aspects of our mental lives as qualia (singular quale) (Tye, 2017). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 133 In comparing the modern-day Western and Yogic phenomenological approaches to consciousness, we can see they are essentially two different undertakings both involving inner inquiry but where each has a different intention. The Western phenomenological approach involves the study of the appearances of things or things as they appear in our awareness, whereas in the yogic approach, one has to withdraw one‘s senses from objects in the outside world to go below or above one‘s surface (thinking) mind consciousness to discover one‘s true nature or Self through experience. This is achieved by rewinding our surface consciousness. Figure 1. Outline of the Principle differences between the Western and the Yogic approach to Phenomenology 3. The Theory the Six Main Levels of Consciousness, Definition of Consciousness, our Anatomical Development and Possible Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels The following sections involve different facets of the Self and Self-inquiry using Arka‘s theory of the Main levels of Consciousness as a starting point. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 3.1. 134 The Theory the Six Main Levels of Consciousness This first section deals with the main levels the practitioner will discover when going below the mind using a heart-based method such as the Intuitive Meditation method. It is consistent with the Yogic approach which involves the search for the Self. The main levels Arka outlines in his theory are: M (Mind) – Consciousness: Mind is the first layer, which manifests on the surface of the cerebral region. As it becomes sharpened by the cultivation of learning, it evolves into a faculty called intellect. SM (Subliminal-Mind) – Consciousness: The second level, which is below the surface mind, is the subliminal or subconscious mind. We are unaware of its potential and capabilities, which may seem incredible to the surface mind. Many daily activities are governed by the subconscious mind. F (Feeling-Mind) – Consciousness: The third level is the feeling mind. This feeling-consciousness generally prevails in the heart area and can thus be called the Heart of Heart-Consciousness. It includes an emotional faculty called intuition. Almost all mothers have this faculty naturally available and readily accessible to help them understand the intense needs of their children and the people they care about. H (Emotional-Heart) – Consciousness: The fourth layer is the deeper heart where you feel emotions with even greater intensity. This can be called the spiritual heart, or your inner consciousness. The presence of the surface mind is reduced and the presence of subliminal or subconscious mind is enhanced. It is formed by impressions gathered through what you have learned and experienced along with the memory of your personality. HS (Heart-Soul) – Consciousness: The fifth level is between the deeper heart and the ultimate essential being (Soul). Here you experience inner-space and the Mystical Universe, where the laws of physics start reversing and lead you to experience many alternative realities and possibilities that give access to your soul. Here you become more connected with Nature and the forces of the Universe. PS (Pure-Self) – Consciousness: The sixth layer is Core-Consciousness. This is the very essence of your whole presence and of everything that you feel, think and do. It is addressed as Soul or Self. (Arka, 2013, pp. 37–38) 3.2. Arka’s Definition of Consciousness Fundamental to Arka‘s theory is his definition of Consciousness. Consciousness manifests itself through physical matter. Similar to bacteria that are able to survive with a complete lack of oxygen and in high temperatures, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 135 consciousness lacks boundaries, can take any form or shape and can emerge under challenging life conditions. In spirituality, consciousness is mainly a non-physical yet powerful entity that is the pivotal point of all life and activates the senses in every living being. It is highly responsive and expressive and activates many levels, especially in humans. (Arka, 2013, p. 37) This definition is consistent with those based on the Vedic tradition of India but Arka amplifies it by adding the notion of levels. In the Vedantic tradition, life and Consciousness are interrelated. ―Life is essentially cognitive and conscious. And consciousness, which is fundamental, manifests itself in the gradational forms of all sentient and insentient nature‖ (Bhakti Niskama Shanta, 2015, abstract). Clarifying it further, Arka says ―Consciousness is a highly resourceful non-matter-based intelligence with the capacity to create and dissolve any form and body according to certain laws and principles. To reduce itself to material existence Consciousness creates a by-product of itself which we call mind. The extension of consciousness from the heart center is mainly brain-based‖ (private correspondence 10.9.2019). 3.3. Our Anatomical Development To follow the suggestion that levels of consciousness might be related to different layers of our anatomical unfolding, we first have to have a clear idea of the phases we undergo during our embryonic development and how our body develops in gradational degrees linked to layers; a process referred to as gastrulation. 3.3.1. The Anatomical Phases In this section, we look at the development of the heart system and the CNS. However, we must remember the body is a single growing unit and it is only our analysis that separates the various systems when we collapse the wave of time at specific moments to study the different aspects in more detail. 3.3.1.1. Development of the Heart System The outer body: After fertilization, the developing zygote goes through various phases where the outer body, also known as the ectocyst (outer egg), or placenta, develops first. This lays the ground for the development of the endocyst, inner egg or inner body which gives rise to our physical body, including the brain. The development of the inner body is linked to blood and the formation of blood islands and blood vessels (capillaries) that originate within extra-embryonic meso-(derm) in the outer body. Van der Wal (2003/2014) reminds us that meso-(derm) is not a derm, but an inner layer which "creates space and connects at the same time" (p. 42) and for this reason, he prefers to write ―meso-(derm)” (p. 42); a convention I follow here. Blood: Blood is the first functional differentiation of the meso-(derm) in the ectocyst and can be considered as a form of ―liquid connective tissue‖ (Hill, 2019a, Introduction) which links the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 136 meso–(derm) of the ectocyst with the meso–(derm) of the endocyst during embryonic development. Even though the embryo‘s blood and the blood of the mother do not directly touch, blood can be seen as our direct link with our mother via the placenta, and also with our mother, father, and ancestors via genes. Although in the adult, red blood cells have no nucleus, fetal blood does (Hill, 2019a). In the embryo, red blood cells can be seen as transporters of our lineal history and also carries of life in the form of oxygen and nutrients. As such, in the embryo blood forms a bridge between the outer and inner environment and the development of the new being with their ancestral past. Blood flow: In the developing embryo, blood flows from the metabolic periphery of the trophoblast, or extra-embryonic meso-(derm) to the body stalk, which is at the caudal end of the germinal disc. It then proceeds toward the cranial end of the embryo, running alongside the ―flanks‖ of the bi-laminar germinal disk, then dorsally along the amniotic cavity (only very little) and ventrally along the yolk sac (some more). At the central point, which van der Wal calls the "centripetal junction of blood vessels," it comes to a halt and then flows back to the periphery through other capillaries. "This point of reversal, where the flow comes to a standstill, turns about, and takes on a rhythmical character, is the first indication of the origin of the heart" (van der Wal, 2003/2014, p. 44). It must also be noted that "the movement of blood flow is primary; the emergence of the heart is secondary. First, there is flow, and where this comes to a standstill, the form arises" (van der Wal, 2003/2014, p. 44). Pulsation, a new phase: When the heart begins to pulsate on about day 17, it heralds a new phase, as through the pulsating heart the wave of life becomes tangible. Pulsation is ―the underlying core principle and property of universal existence, cosmic existence, and local existence‖ (Arka in Lindhard, 2016, p. 87). This is in accordance with the quantum physicist de Broglie who held ―a particle at rest not only possessed a localized heartbeat but was also accompanied by a widespread pulsation forever in step with it and extending all over the universe‖ (Hoffman,1959, p. 75). Pulsation seems to be the commonality between the material world consisting of particles and the human world including animals for ―at the core‖ all pulsate (Arka in Lindhard, 2016, p. 87). This is in keeping with some spiritual traditions which recognize ―the essential nature of the Lord (non-physical intelligence) is perpetual spanda (creative pulsation). He is never without spanda. Some hold that the Highest Reality is without any activity whatsoever. But in such a case the Highest Reality being devoid of activity, all this (i.e. the universe) will be without a lord or Creative Power (Singh, 1992, p. 10). Planck too assumed that there was "a conscious and intelligent mind" behind the force that brings "an atom to vibration (pulsation) and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together" (Planck, 1944, p. 47). Looked at from this perspective, the heart takes on new relevance, for, through pulsation, it is the representation of the highest creative force behind the Universe. ―God‖ made manifest. As G-OD is also an acronym standing for Generation, Organization and Destruction, we get back to the biological forces of anabolism, metabolism, and catabolism. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 137 Descent of the heart: During the next phase, the heart begins its descent to its final position in humans at the center-left in the upper chest. This phase takes many days where the morphology of the human embryo undergoes numerous changes. During this descent, cardiac morphology repeats a pattern of development that "occurred in millions of years from worms to mammals" (Corno, Kocica, & Torrent-Guasp, 2006, p. 562). At the same time, the initial tube-like nature of the heart at the cranial end of the germinal disc begins to form itself into a double helix. That the mature heart consists of a band known as the helical ventricular myocardial band which folds itself into a helix, was established by Torrent-Guasp (1973) after spending many years of literally unraveling the heart through blunt dissection (2011) Gastrulation: A helix means a curve in space and to fully grasp the importance of descent of the heart from its position at the top of the bilaminar germinal disc, requires comprehending a process known as gastrulation, which involves the development of different layers. Although the body is a single unit or interrelated whole, understanding the layers may help us unravel some of its mystery and how the development of our body is prompted or propelled by Consciousness through biodynamic forces to develop in a certain way. In the human embryo and most animals, gastrulation follows the blastula phase and corresponds with the ―formation of the three primary germ layers – ectoderm, endoderm and mesoderm‖ (Lim & Thiery, 2012, p. 3472). Gastrulation is followed by organogenesis, which is when individual organs develop within the newly formed germ layers. Each layer comprises certain elements, for example, the outer germ layer or ectoderm includes skin, hair, nails and the nervous system. The interior endoderm includes all of the cell systems which line our organs and vessels. The layer in between, known as the mesoderm, includes ―the great muscle masses, both the voluntary muscles which underlie all of our work, actions and behavior, and the involuntary muscles which make up the walls of all of our organs such as heart and blood vessels, respiratory and gastrointestinal systems, and our bones‖ (Course Hero, n.d., Early Brain Development). As stated earlier, meso-(derm) is not a derm but ―creates space and connects at the same time" (van der Wal, 2003/2014, p.42). Essentially during gastrulation, the rudimentary body of the bilaminar two-dimensional germinal disc transforms into a three-dimensional body with an inner space where the first organ is the pulsating heart. The heart system can also be considered as extending throughout the body for the ―heart‖ is not only the organ but consists of the whole circulatory system, the involuntary muscles that make up the walls of the heart and blood vessels and blood. Where the heart as organ stops and starts is a decision; does the artery when it leaves the heart as organ no longer form part of the heart? Although the heart as ‗organ‘ can be considered the center of the heart system, the formation of blood in the extra-embryonic meso-(derm), is the precursor of this system. 3.3.1.2. Development of the CNS The midline of the organism which forms into the backbone unfolds in parallel with the looping of the heart. The notochord starts to form on the same day the heart primordium starts pulsating (Moscoso, 2009). ―One of the first tasks of the primitive meso-(derm) is coming together to form a long cylindrical structure. In doing this, they are recapitulating the earliest event in the transition from invertebrates to vertebrate forms, a transition which occurred at least six hundred million years ago‖ (Braintour, n.d., Early Brain Development). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 138 Delamination: Delamination or folding takes place over several days starting day 18/19 (Moscoso, 2009) and consists of two main stages: longitudinal folding and transverse folding during which the flat tri-laminar disk is slowly changed into a three-dimensional cylinder. CNS: In the trilaminar embryo, the notochord consisting of meso-(derm) tissue, initially lies ventral to the ectoderm, out of which the neural plate and finally the neural tube form. The notochord is ―a transient embryonic anatomy structure, not existing in the adult, required for patterning the surrounding tissues‖ (Hill, 2019b, Introduction) The neural tube is a visible dorsal line that curves inwards giving rise to the neural fold, the sides of which finally meet to form the neural tube that lies beneath the ectoderm layer. The anterior end of the neural tube will develop into the brain, starting on about day 25, and the posterior portion will become the spinal cord (Rice University, n.d.) This basic arrangement of tissue structure will eventually develop into the CNS and the brain comprising of neural ectoderm. Electrical Potential: These midline structures are probably related to the inherent electrical potential discovered by Burr discovered in unfertilized eggs or ovules of various species. In chicks, his studies seemed ―to indicate that the potential gradients also are associated with the development and differentiation of the nervous system" (Burr & Hovland, 1937, p. 255). Main Division of the Brain: The three main divisions of the brain at the anterior end of the neural tube can be distinguished while the neural groove is still completely open (The Virtual Human Embryo, 2011) These are primarily just bulges but by day 29 ―three brain vesicles or neuromeres can be clearly identified on close examination: the prosencephalon (forebrain), the mesencephalon (midbrain) and the rhombencephalon (hindbrain)" (Moscoso, 2009, p. 15), although strictly speaking the word rhombencephalon translates as four-sided-figure-brain. At this stage, the head has become larger than the cardiac loop and these structures continue to develop throughout the rest of embryonic development and into adolescence. The brain vesicles are the basis of the structure of the fully developed adult brain. The primary vesicles differentiate into five secondary vesicles with the prosencephalon (forebrain) differentiating into the telencephalon and the diencephalon; the mesencephalon (midbrain) stays the same, and the rhombencephalon develops into the metencephalon and myelencephalon. The telencephalon becomes the cerebrum and the diencephalon gives rise to further structures such as the into the thalamus and hypothalamus. The metencephalon gives rise to the pons and cerebellum and the myelencephalon corresponds to the adult structure known as the medulla oblongata. Except for the cerebellum, these latter structures make up the brain stem. Human Neuroaxis. As the human being is two-legged, the neuroaxis has a bend between the brain stem and the diencephalon, along with a bend in the neck, so that the eyes and the face are oriented forward. The Cranial Nerves: The cranial nerves are paired and can be mixed (motor/sensory), The trigeminal nerve (CNV) develops first and is connected with touch, and as such, is the ‗mother sense‘. Whether sensor or motor, most of the cranial nerves are related to our sense system through which we receive information about objects in the exterior world or orientates us to act or react to these objects. The cranial nerves are the brain equivalent of the spinal cord spinal nerves. (Hill, 2019c), ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 139 While the brain is developing from the anterior neural tube, the spinal cord is developing from the posterior neural tube. The basic structure of the neural tube remains long and straight. In addition to being defined as anterior and posterior, ―it also has a dorsal-ventral dimension‖ with dorsal being the side closest to the surface and ventral being the deeper side (Rice University, n.d.). The former is to do with sensory functions, and the latter with motor functions. The spinal cord retains its tube-like structure which has a hollow center becoming a very small central canal through the cord which connects with the rest of the hollow open neural tube spaces within the brain called the ventricles, where cerebrospinal fluid is found. Bioenergetic and environmental forces: Neural development is a ―protracted development that begins in the third gestational week‖ (Stiles & Jernigan, 2010) and the last system to be completed after birth. Because of the long-time period, in-utero insult during pregnancy such as adverse environmental factors can later give rise to later anomalies in the fetus. But beyond environmental factors, the synchronicity in development between the morphology of the heart, which repeats a pattern of development that "occurred in millions of years from worms to mammals‖ (Corno, Kocica, & Torrent-Guasp, 2006, p. 562) and midline development, which ―recapitulate the transition from invertebrates to vertebrate forms‖ (Course Hero, n.d. ) suggests an intelligence which manifests itself through bioenergetic forces where the pulsating heart plays a role in changing a static system into a dynamic system occurring in waves which unfold in time. 3.3.2. Our ontological development Ontologically, the heart is primary with the CNS including the brain developing later. The heart system is also the deeper system that exists below the surface neural ectoderm system of the brain and is separated from this deeper layer by the blood-brain barrier. From this perspective, the ‗brain‘ is another division, for below the neurons of the brain (neuroectoderm), lie the whole of the heart system which extends throughout the body as well as other components which make up the meso-(derm) layer. Although it is not directly relevant to the topic presented here, some parts of the brain do not have a blood-brain barrier: the area postrema, the median eminence, the pineal gland, the neurohypophysis of the posterior pituitary gland, and the choroid plexus. 3.4. Relationship between the Anatomical Layers and the Main levels of Consciousness Arka‘s theory and comments lend themselves to speculation about possible anatomical correlates with the main levels of consciousness he mentions in his theory. When we start to explore the nature of our consciousness to discover our true Self, we start from where we are at the moment, and this is the reverse order of that of our anatomic development which develops over time and involves different layers. The suggestion that there might be a relationship between levels and layers is in keeping with Arka (2013) statement that discovering our true Self requires rewinding our surface consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 140 3.4.1. The First Two Levels The first two levels he mentions can be seen as being associated with the reverse order of the development of the neural system which as we have seen, began its development from the neural tube with the anterior neural tube developing into the brain and the posterior neural tube into the spinal column. Mind – Consciousness: Arka links the first level with the surface of the cerebral region. The cerebral region consists of the frontal lobes, parietal lobes, occipital lobes, and temporal lobes. The frontal lobes are the last to develop in young adulthood and the most recently evolved part of the brain. The cerebral region is associated with higher brain functions such as thought, speech, and action. Mind – Consciousness is most important as it enables us to communicate with the world and with others. Thinking with training as we grow up, develops into intellect, a topic which is of great interest to neuroscientists. Although no single region in the brain has a dominant effect on intelligence, the parietal frontal interaction theory offers a solution that has been supported by various neuroimaging studies. Recent studies suggest ―each core region for intelligence works in concert with other regions‖ (Yoon, Shin, Lee, et al. 2017). Through the senses, the cranial nerves enable us to obtain information about the world outside of us. Characteristic: awareness of the thinking mind Subliminal-Mind – Consciousness: If we descend from this outer cerebral layer related to thinking, we get to more primal layers of the CNS which make up the cerebellum and the brainstem. The functions of the cerebellum are to coordinate muscle movements, maintain posture, and balance. The brain stem ―acts as a relay center connecting the cerebrum and cerebellum to the spinal cord. It performs many automatic functions such as breathing, heart rate, body temperature, wake, and sleep cycles, digestion, sneezing, coughing, vomiting, and swallowing‖ (Mayfield Brain and Spine, 2018, Brain). Both these areas can be associated with the subliminal mind which performs many actions that are normally beyond or beneath our conscious awareness. Some meditation methods direct attention to the breath, bringing this activity into conscious awareness. Characteristic: awareness of automatic functions not normally under our control 3.4.2. Levels Connected with the Heart To access the next levels which are related to the mind of the heart, we have to withdraw our senses from the outer world and go below the neural layer to contact with the heart. This requires entering into the inner or meso-(derm) layer, which joins and creates space (van der Wal, 2003/2014). We can divide the phase involving the formation of the heart system into three phases or waves, pre tangible pulsation, tangible pulsation and the development of the whole heart system which is linked to the formation of the body. The order of these phases is reversed as we descend from our thinking mind in our phenomenological quest to discover our true Self. Feeling-Mind – Consciousness: This level can be associated with the whole of the heart system including the heart as an organ and the circulatory system made up of the involuntary muscles ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 141 which make up the walls of the heart and blood vessels and the oscillating heart. The level of consciousness is to do with feeling, hence its name. The feeling-consciousness that generally prevails in the heart area can be ―called the Heart of Heart-Consciousness‖ and includes ―an emotional faculty called intuition‖ (Arka, 2013, p. 37).To tune into this level, we need to go below our thinking minds which enables us to open to intuition. The pulsating heart is an oscillatory or vibratory system intrinsic to the mesoderm layer and it seems that through the heart, we may become sensitive to other vibrating fields. The heart‘s electromagnetic field is the biggest in the body, changes under different circumstances. This system can be considered a sensory guiding system that we can access by tuning into these fine changes through feeling and intuition. Mothers understand the need of their children and loved ones using this faculty (Arka, 2013). Armour (1991; 2007; 2008) has shown that the heart has an intrinsic nervous system of its own and McCraty (2009) found that the heart sends more signals to the brain than vice versa. Characteristic: awareness of feelings giving rise to intuition Emotional-Heart – Consciousness: This level is somewhat similar to the previous level but more intense. It can be seen as being made up of the pulsating heart. Pulsation, we will recall, is the underlying core principle and property of universal existence, cosmic existence, and local existence. Arka (2013) refers to this level as ―the spiritual heart‖, or one‘s ―inner consciousness‖. One is more aware of inner space and one feels emotions which are like ―waves in the sea of consciousness‖, with even greater intensity. According to Arka (2003) "feeling is like water, emotion is like waves in the lake of consciousness" (p. 18). At this level, ―the presence of the surface mind is reduced and the presence of subliminal or subconscious mind is enhanced and that ―this level is ―formed by impressions gathered through what you have learned and experienced along with the memory of your personality‖(Arka, 2013, pp. 37–38), which suggests that this system is to do with memory. The fact that between 5 and 10 percent of the people who receive a transplanted heart report changes in their tastes, personalities, and most extraordinary, in their memories (Skofield, 2012) may support this assertion. During this fourth level, the practitioner also starts to become aware of the connection of their heart with the highest creative force behind the Universe. By tapping into this source, one receives guidance through intuition (Arka, 2013) Characteristic: awareness of inner space, intensity of emotions, memory of one‘s personality and impressions of what one has learned as well as the ability to receive guidance. Heart-Soul – Consciousness: I connect the next level ―between the deeper heart and the ultimate essential being (Soul)‖ (Arka, 2013, p.38), with blood. Blood, as we have seen, first developed in the ectocyst and can be considered as a form of ―liquid connective tissue‖ (Hill, 2019a, Introduction) which links the meso–(derm) of the ectocyst with the meso–(derm) of the endocyst during embryonic development. Blood can be seen as our direct link with our mother via the placenta, and also with our mother, father, and ancestors via genes. Blood also forms a bridge between the outer and inner environment and the development of the new being with their ancestral past. We can say through blood we are connected with our parents, the environment, life, nature, our ancestors, and the Universe. When accessing this level ―you experience inner-space and the Mystical Universe, where the laws of physics start reversing and lead you to experience many ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 142 alternative realities and possibilities that give access to your soul. Here you become more connected with Nature and the forces of the Universe‖ (Arka, 2013, p. 38). Characteristic: awareness of one‘s connection with Life, Nature and the Universe and its various dimensions. 3.4.3. Pure-Self – Consciousness Consciousness is present throughout the body and beyond. Here you first realize your ‗self‘– as a unique being living in a time-bound body which is part of Consciousness. The soul/self is the ―is the very essence of your whole presence and of everything that you feel, think and do‖ (Arka, 2013, p. 38). When this level is reached many different possibilities and choices open up such as the mystical union of awareness with Consciousness or the Self of Nature permanently or temporarily by choosing to return to inspire others on their path to self-realization. During this experience, the practitioner goes beyond his or her ego identity and mystically merges with the consciousness of the Universe. This has some parallels with near-death experiences (Moody, 1975; van Lommel, 2010; Sleutjes, Moreira-Almeida, Greyson, 2014). Another option is to choose to explore different dimensions of reality. It seems ―Nature is infinitely compassionate in giving us freedom of choice in our unfolding and destiny‖ (Arka, personal correspondence, 2.9.2019). Characteristic: awareness of oneself as a soul, a unique being which at the same time is a fragment of Consciousness expressing Itself as Life which is manifesting itself through the body. This can lead to the mystical union between the individual self and the Self of Nature or Pure Consciousness which pervades everything. Figure 2. Outline of the Main Levels of Consciousness and Possible Anatomical Correlates ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 143 4. Discussion The discussion is divided into two sections: support for the theory and the implications of the possible anatomical correlates of the main levels of Consciousness. 4.1 Support for the Theory, Conundrums, and Suggestions 4.1.1 Support based on Research: Using a repeated measures design to test the third level of Arka‘s theory, Lindhard (2016; 2017; 2018) found a significant difference in scores of participants as measured on the Feeling Consciousness Scale (FCS) after receiving five Intuitive Meditation training sessions spread over six weeks (a total of 13.5 hours). The scale items were based on Arka‘s theory, the literature, and descriptions by people who had practiced the Intuitive Meditation for about 2 years. Qualitative comments of the participants supported the test results. Although this study needs to be repeated using a bigger sample size, it does indicate it is possible to explore the different levels through quantitative and qualitative means. In her study Lindhard (2016) suggests that Feeling-Mind Consciousness might be related to the consciousness of the very young and the very old when they return to a more heart level of functioning. It would also be interesting to establish if there is any connection between the levels and the brain waves like alpha, beta, theta, and even delta. Adding technologies like the MCG, ECG, EMG, EEG, MRI or the SQUID to investigations into the different levels using a qualitative and quantitative approach, might give us interesting insights into the levels. Like with dream research, instruments do not tell us about what the person is experiencing or the characteristic of their experiencing consciousness, but they can tell us more about corresponding brain waves or heart rates. Combining an ‗outside-in‘ and ‗inside-out‘ approach can give us a bigger and more complete picture. 4.1.2 HeartMath: HeartMath‘s scientific investigations into the heart have done much to dispel the notion that the heart is just a pump. Largely what goes on in the area of our Feeling Heart is below our awareness. Nevertheless, the heart has been found to send more signals to the brain than vice versa (McCraty, 2009). Research investigating the role of physiological coherence and intuition has shown the heart is involved in the processing and decoding of intuitive information (McCraty, Atkinson, & Bradley, 1998). Although the HeartMath technique does not involve the contemplation of the Self but ―self-induced positive emotions‖ (McCraty & Zayas, 2014, Abstract), positive thinking and creative positive scenes, they have done extensive research into the different ways the heart communicates with the brain. According to them, there are four communication pathways: neurological, chemical, biophysical, and energetic (HeartMath Institute, 2016, Heart Brain Communication section, para. 1). 4.1.3 Heart Sounds: The hearts ubiquitous sound provides a continuum of sound and vibrational energy for the whole body throughout the entire lifespan‖ (Burleson & Swartz, 2004, p. 1112). The rhythm the heart emits can also be changed through changing our respiratory rate as in meditation and this can affect cognitive states and abilities (Peng, Mietus, Khalsa, et al., 1999). Vibrational heart sounds also seem to have a role in maintaining bodily function in the adult (Burleson & Swartz 2004). The Intuitive Meditation method rests on three pillars: touch, one‘s own vibratory sound, and breath but how these collectively affect heart rhythms still needs to be researched. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 144 4.1.4 Prayer of the Heart: The oldest well-known heart-based method of meditation is known as Prayer of the Heart. It was practiced by many ancient traditions (Louchakova, 2004, p. 35). Prayer of the Heart is said to uncover ―the inner structure of consciousness within this 'mind of the Heart' as opposed to 'mind of the head'" (Louchakova, 2005, p. 295). Based on data from focus groups, Louchakova (2005) distinguished between intentional consciousness associated with the head which usually consists of self-reflective, analytic/synthetic, logic-based constructs as opposed to the lived experience of 'mind of the Heart' in the chest which is gnostic or knowing (p. 295). This distinction is similar to the differences between the first and third levels of Arka‘s theory. Prayer of the Heart also increases intuition and is said to open practitioners to their emotional layer and feeling level of experience where silence leading to insights starts prevailing (Louchakova, 2005; 2007). However as little scientific research has been done on Prayer of the Heart, one does not know if this method opens the practitioner to all the levels outlined in Arka‘s theory. 4.1.5 Hydranencephaly Although some of these children might have a more enlarged head at birth, many are of normal appearance and exhibit typical spontaneous reflexes such as sucking, crying, and movement of the arms and legs. But after a few weeks, symptoms like seizures, impaired vision and/or hearing, lack of growth, spastic quadriparesis (paralysis), and intellectual deficits appear. It is a developmental malady where the cerebral hemispheres in the cortex region of the brain, are completely or partially filled with a membranous sac filled with cerebrospinal fluid (Global Hydranencephaly Foundation, 2019). Considered as a cephalic disorder either of genetic or environmental origin, it occurs early in pregnancy. Neuroscientists describe the behaviors of these children as ‗vegetative‘, but 69% indicate that, like normal children, they are interested in their mother‘s voice, music, bells, and stories, 81% show awareness of their surroundings, and 96% were observed to feel pain (Rays of Sunshine survey, n.d.). Although these children do not develop their cognitive abilities, they are conscious and aware, which raises questions regarding the theory that consciousness is a product of the brain. Pereira (2016) suggests that consciousness is beyond the brain and applies a quantum model where ―alternative or capability transfers through quantum computation of consciousness as a means of survival‖ (p.614). For him, consciousness needs to reside in ―every inch and cell of the body‖ (p. 616) for these individuals to survive. Although we agree that consciousness is present throughout the body, Pereira‘s model does not help understand or explain the experiencing consciousness of these children. On the other hand, the model we present suggests children with hydranencephaly possess an emotional-heart and feeling-based consciousness as well as subliminal-mind consciousness, but the extent of the latter depends on the severity of their handicap. For a variety of reasons which still need to be clarified, they do not develop thinking-mind consciousness linked with the cortex. This model is also able to throw light on the type of experiencing a consciousness of individuals not only with hydranencephaly but who have other types of cephalic disorders. 4.1.6 Heart-Transplant Patients: Between 5 to 10 percent of heart transplant patients can tap into memories of their donors and even adopt some of their habits (Pearsall, Schwartz, & Russek, 2005; Skofield, 2012). This seems to lend some support for the fourth level, which is said to be also related to memories of our personality. Observations concerning patients with other organ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 145 transplants such as kidney and liver, also manifest changes in sense of smell, food preference, and emotional factors, but these seem to be transitory and could be associated with medications and other factors of transplantation (Pearsall, 1998). These observations need to be verified as they imply the heart has a special role regarding memory (Pearsall, Schwartz, & Russek, 2005). Reports from some heart transplant patients lead to many questions concerning memory and its storage. Is it stored in the heart circulatory system below the neural ectoderm layer of the brain, the whole of the mesoderm layer, the heart as an organ, or even outside of the system where the heart plays a role in its recovery? It is also possible that there are different places for long and short-term memory. For Oschman (2000) the heart plays a modulating, perhaps even coordinating, role in the body's electromagnetic, potential and quantum fields acting through the living matrix. For Maret (n.d.) biological systems, including the heart, exhibit non-local, global properties, which are consistent with their ability to function at the quantum level (Maret, n.d., para. 3). Living systems are dynamic organizations of intelligent information expressed in energy and matter (Swartz & Russek, 1997; 1998). When modern systems theory is applied to biophysical energy, known as the ‗dynamical energy systems approach‘, the biophysical consequences of organized energy have far-reaching implications for the role of the heart. Whereas living systems theory posits that all living cells possess "memory" and "decide" functional subsystems within them (Miller, 1978), the dynamical energy systems approach posits that all dynamic systems store information and energy to various degrees (Swartz & Russek, 1997; 1998). It seems that many aspects might be involved in the storage of memory and I am not going to venture an answer to this conundrum in this article except to say Arka‘s theory and its possible anatomic correlates provides a new way of looking at our bodies which are comprised of various systems and where the heart as organ and as a sensory vibratory or oscillating system probably plays a much bigger and more important role than is realized by science at present. Although these theories talk about how memory might be stored, they do not tell us how the heart recipient retrieves the information, although the sensitivity of the person seems to be a needed quality. Another mystery that needs to be addressed. 4.1.7 The Unconscious Mind of Freud and the Collective Unconscious of Jung: Although the term ‗unconscious‘ was first coined in 1896 by the German philosopher Schelling, Freud popularized it in his psychoanalytic theory. It seems that it might have a relation to the above topic about heart transplants as the unconscious (mind) is said to consist of processes that are not normally available to our surface consciousness and include thought processes, forgotten memories, interests, motivations and repressed desires (Western, 1999). For Freud (1963) these past experiences direct our feelings and are the primary source of human behavior. As such, the heart as a sensory vibratory system that lies below the neural system might be related to Freud‘s unconscious with memories being held in the mesoderm layer which includes all major muscles, both those under our control and those that are not. These muscles especially those of the heart, could form into fixed patterns depending on our habitual way of doing and reacting to the world. Nummenaa, Glerean and Hietman‘s (2013) investigation into emotions could be related to this, as are the effects of our emotional thoughts on our bodies (Lindhard, 2015). Indirectly these investigations give support for the third and fourth level of Arka‘s theory, as well as suggesting they might provide a possible location for the unconscious of Freud. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 146 Jung recognized the personal unconscious of Freud but claimed there is another level which he referred to as the Collective Unconsciousness where a person could tap into archetypes and memories of a collective nature (Jung, 1969). This could be related to the fifth level of consciousness where blood as a carrier of our past via genes, plays a major role in forming the body and is the early connection between the outer and inner world. Unraveling all the implications of these suggestions is a challenge that is beyond the objective of this article. 4.2 Implications of the possible anatomical correlates of the main levels of Consciousness Although many of the implications of Arka‘s theory and the possible anatomical correlates of the main levels of Consciousness have already been touched on indirectly in this paper, below we consider several of them from a biological, neuroscientific, cognitive, socio-cultural, scientific, and philosophical perspective. 4.2.1 Biological perspective: Correlating levels of Consciousness with anatomical layers invites one to contemplate the creation and maintenance of the body and how it functions. During our embryological development, the descent of the heart possibly plays a role in creating the inner space or dimension between the ectoderm and endoderm layers and the oscillating heart probably has a dynamic function in creating the wave of time (Lindhard 2016). Through the pulsating heart, it seems Pure intelligent Consciousness plays a major role in creating and maintaining the body. This does not exclude the role of DNA and RNA, and the environment in this undertaking; instead it invites exploration into how these different factors interact to form and maintain a body that is unique to each individual. Looking at the possible relation of different levels of Consciousness to different layers of our anatomical development opens science to a new way of looking at the human being. This relationship also permits speculation about the levels of the experiencing consciousness of animals and other living beings. 4.2.2 Neuroscientific perspective: The approach presented here does not distract from the research already done on the brain and the correlates between structure and function. However, it indicates that below the neural layer is another layer and network which is predominately made up of the heart system that extends throughout the body. This division opens new avenues of exploration regarding how the various parts of the brain are influenced and possibly coordinated by this underlying layer. 4.2.3 Cognitive perspective: It seems as though we have two main epistemological ways of knowing, one to do with the thinking mind and one to do with deeper feeling-heart mind which gives rise to intuition. This suggested separation brings clarity to an area that has long fascinated philosophers and psychologists alike. The next step is researching how one can access and develop intuition consciously and the possible role of heart-based methods like Intuitive Meditation in this ability. The role of bringing our unconscious memories and suppressed emotions to the light as a possible necessary prerequisite in not only fine-tuning our intuitive abilities but also accessing even deeper levels of consciousness also needs to be clarified and investigated. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 147 4.2.4 Sociocultural perspective: The Intuitive Meditation method is said to be a natural way of investigating one‘s inner world and undertaking the search for one‘s deeper Essence, Self or Soul. This has wide implications. One does not have to be religious to undertake this inner journey, however one needs to want to know the truth and experience it. It is not an easy journey as one has to re-wind one‘s history however for those who want to do this, there is a theory that gives clear guidelines about some of the levels one will experience that can be tested by the person undertaking the journey. Many modern-day meditation methods claim to be secular and are often directed at transforming the practitioner but are not focused on knowing one‘s true self or soul. When comparing meditation methods, these differences need to be taken into account and also investigated. 4.2.5 Scientific perspective: Although it is not possible to scientifically prove that Consciousness is primary and is an entity taking different forms, Arka‘s suggestion that it activates different levels in humans, enables the levels to be researched through quantitative and qualitative investigations of people undertaking the inner journey and by using technology from the outside-in position. This theory, and the possible anatomical correlates, is also open to investigation by various disciplines through which we might be able to obtain a more complete understanding of the human being as a self or soul living in a time-bound body, how the body is formed, the role of memory and how and where it is stored, and also how to retrieve our past. 4.2.6 Philosophical perspective: In Eastern philosophy, Buddha removed the soul as an entity experiencing life by claiming all states are impermanent and the idea of a self or soul is an illusion (Buddha, n.d.; Ruparell & Markham, 2001). In the West, Descartes‘s cogito ergo sum, ‗I think therefore I am‘, created a mind-body duality which associated the soul only with thinking. As such, for him, animals have no souls. Descartes‘s thoughts still influence us today and the neurological search to find consciousness in the brain seems to be a reflection of this. Arka‘s theory admits to a personal self or soul, which is seen as a part of Consciousness, also known as Self, Soul, or the Self of Nature. Here consciousness is considered as being omnipresent throughout the body, as well as promoting its development in gradational degrees linked to layers. As suggested, these layers might be related to the different levels of Consciousness outlined in Arka‘s theory and where each level shares a certain commonality. We cannot be sure if the experiences of practitioners who undertake the inner quest are the same as when they were embryos. However, experiences during Holotropic Breathwork, indicate that there might be a relationship between experiences in therapy and what occurred to the person during his or her embryonic past (Grof & Grof, 2010). After discovering our personal self as a fragment of Consciousness manifesting through our body and beyond, this approach admits to the possibility of the mystical union of our individual self with Consciousness or the Self of Nature, either permanently or temporarily. Arka‘s philosophical stance is suggestive of a position known as qualified monism. He also seems to hold a soul-body duality where the incarnated soul interacts with the body but is not the body which is seen as a special kind of container (Arka, 2003). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 148 5. Conclusions Arka‘s (2013) theory brings back the concept of Self and soul to a secular world where these concepts are often ignored. The idea that Consciousness is a nonphysical intelligent entity manifesting through all forms which actives different levels of consciousness in humans, makes Consciousness primary, rather than just a product of the brain. Being a fragment of consciousness, we can discover our true Self by using our surface awareness or cursor of the mind, to explore our inner world. We can undertake this investigation as a personal inner quest, but, as suggested here, it can also be investigated through the scientific study of others engaged in the search for the topographical nature of their inner Self. The hypothesis that the main levels of Consciousness mentioned by Arka might be correlated with our anatomical development opens science to a new perspective, which may lead to novel insights about the interconnection between consciousness and the development of the body. It also might clarify the origin of some of our abilities, such as intuition, and point to a location related to the unconscious of Freud. The approach highlights the relationship between the heart and feeling and, therefore, presents the possibility that embryos, babies, young children, infants with hydranencephaly, and even other species, have different levels of experiencing consciousness to people who have developed their intellectual abilities linked to their thinking mind. There is much to explore, and this article is only an introduction to this new way of looking at our body, our mind, our nature, and Consciousness. Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Acknowledgments: I am very grateful to the many people who have helped me understand this topic, especially the philosopher and yogi Srinivas Arka who inspired and encouraged me to think, feel, and see things in their true perspective, through science, logic, and intuitive experience. I also thank him for sharing his insights about the nature of Consciousness and mind. In addition, I thank Dr. van der Wal for helping me see our embryonic past through various lenses. Received January 11, 2020; Accepted January 29, 2020 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 129-153 Lindhard, T., Anatomical Correlates of the Main Levels of Consciousness 149 References Arka, S. (2003). Becoming inspired. London: Coppersun Books. Arka, S. (2009). Arka Dhyana. An adventure of Self-discovery through the practice of intuitive meditation. 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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 850 Statement The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America Huping Hu* ABSTRACT In the spirit of Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., we call all Americans to rise up in the pursuit of the American Dream of the 21st Century under the Laws of GOD – equality, liberty, justice and civic duty in all aspects of American life, guaranty of basic necessities of food, medicine and shelter, and the pursuit of happiness and World Peace. It is noted that these sacred pursuits are hindered by excessive capitalism and individualism and the state of our own consciousness. Thus, the transformation of the consciousness of all Americans from the rich to the poor is the key to accomplish these sacred pursuits and transform America. By transforming our consciousness and transcending ourselves, we shall transform greed to compassion, hate to love, wealth possession to wealth sharing and war to peace. GOD Bless America! Key Words: American Dream, 21st Century, transformation, declaration. [Post-election America in 2020 is at A critical and historical moment, So let the healing begin and let the "American Dream of the 21st Century" Begin!] Preamble Over 230 years ago, our founding fathers brought forth on America, a new nation conceived in liberty, civic duty and the pursuit of happiness and dedicated to the ideal of equality under the Laws of GOD. Today we hold these rights, duties and their extensions to be applicable to all Americans in all aspects of our lives - spiritually, physically, financially, environmentally, scientifically and politically - that to secure, advance and perform these rights and duties and thus perfect our Union, our Constitution may be amended time to time, if necessary, and successive governmental, social and corporate structures and institutions shall be established, deriving their just political, social and economical powers and duties from the consent of the people - that whenever any structure or institution becomes inadequate of these ends, it is our duties to modernized it or to abolish it, and to establish new ones, laying the foundation on such principles and organizing the structures in such forms, as to us shall seem most likely to reflect our understanding and knowledge of the evolving Nature and Life under the Laws of GOD. * Correspondence: Huping Hu, PhD, JD, Scientific GOD, Inc., P.O. Box 267, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA E-mail: editor@scigod.com Note: This Statement as a Proposed Declaration of American Dream was first published in Scientific God Journal 2(7): 638-645 (2011). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 851 The Critical Moment in American History As a country, we are now facing the greatest challenge both domestically and internationally, testing whether our public and private institutions can be transformed and work in harmony for the benefit of all Americans and whether we can still be a Great Nation on Earth and lead the World. As a people, we are now engaged in a great struggle, testing whether our rights and duties so conceived and dedicated at the birth of our Nation, so implemented, protected and extended through out our history as a Nation can be sustained and be further advanced. Some of us are also engaged in a silent struggle in our hearts testing whether our yearning for love and compassions for fellow Americans and mankind at large can conquer our own shortcomings – selfishness, arrogance, hypocrisy, intolerance, or excessive capitalism, individualism, rivalry and commercialism. Reflection on American History So, at this critical moment, it is appropriate that we Americans from all walks of life – the rich and the poor, the executives and the workers, the professionals and the laymen, the religious and the non-religious, Americans by birth and new immigrants– and indeed all who loves America and Her people - reflect on the status of our Nation and our own moralities and conducts as individuals with the great hope of achieving the American Dream of the 21st Century and usher Americans and the mankind at large into a new era of unprecedented progress, prosperity and enlightenment. Before the advent of our Nation, our people were under the colonial rule and tyranny of a European monarch. Oppressed and exploited by a tyrant, early Americans rebelled. The Declaration of Independent drafted by Thomas Jefferson became the great beacon of light to early Americans, who under the leaderships of George Washington and his generals, bravely fought the Revolutionary War and gave birth to our Republic. However, a great injustice, slavery, remained and divided our people almost a century later as South and North. Again, as a people we fought and overcame slavery through Civil War and saved our Union under the leaderships of Abraham Lincoln and his generals. Our people then ushered in the great Industrial, Scientific and Economical Revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries together with the remaining World which brought us and rest of the World unprecedented materials wealth, scientific knowledge and technologies and thrust our Nation to the World Stage as a Great Power and Leader. As a Nation and a People, we have fought in World Wars and defeated evil powers, endured and overcome the Great Depression, endured and overcome racial segregation and injustice under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., won the Cold War and oversaw the collapse of Godless Communism around the World. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 852 Since September 11, 2001 terrorists attack on our Nation, we are again at a critical moment in our history. The Aftermath of Excessive Capitalism and Individualism No doubt that it has been the creativity, productivity and entrepreneurship of our people and the advances of sciences and technologies fueled by capitalism and individualism that brought our Nation unprecedented material wealth, prosperity and a world-influencing pop culture. But, the very wealth is now concentrated in the hands of so a few wealthy individuals and big banks and corporations and has displaced many among us into poverty and despair. The very wealth has created a deep gulf between the rich and the poor and among the political parties as reflected by increased hostilities and seemingly irreconcilable differences among Americans and in our Congress. The very wealth and prosperity have not stopped hunger and disease in the World and might have produced our arrogance and intolerance in the eyes of the rest of the World along with our Nation’s positive image. The very pop culture might have both positively and negatively influenced the young generations worldwide. On the other hand, many Americans are unable to cope with or adapt to the new environments. Thus, after all the recent revolutions, many of today’s Americans are not better of than the Americans of yesterday. After all these revolutions, young generations of Americans are at peril of not being able to realizing their American Dream as their parents did. After all these revolutions, the spiritual lives of many among us are sadly crippled by the manacles of mechanical view and the prisons of random chance and chaos. After all these revolutions, some among us including some children still go hungry daily and without shelters at night in the midst of mountains of food and vacant homes. After all these revolutions, many among us cannot afford medical cares in the midst of a vast ocean of medical advances and modern medicine. After all these revolutions, many of our educated people cannot find a decent job and is suffocating under the piles of educational debts. Indeed, after all these revolutions, the moralities of many among us are degenerating, many among us become selfish, mean-spirited, non-collaborative and too commercial, and some among us even become hypocritical, untruthful and are solely driven by money, power and fame. As a People, many among us are unemployed, our homes and investments have drastically decreased in values, our bank accounts have dried up, our individual and family debts are overburdening us. As a Nation, our financial system almost collapsed, we are still at war abroad and facing ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 853 unprecedented economical crisis, national debts and economical inequality at home in the backdrop of a World foreshadowed by the turbulence in the Middle East and the rise of China, India and other countries. So, at this critical moment, we dramatize these depressing and shameful conditions. Sacred Pledges In a sense, it is high time that each American makes a pledge to our fellow Americans – A pledge that each of us shall rise above ourselves and shall work and struggle together with fellow Americans for equality in all aspects of our lives, guaranties of food, medicine and shelter to all Americans and opportunities of cost-effective education and employment afterword through our Constitution, legislations or other meanings. Each American shall further promises to do his/her best to contribute to American Society. The rich may pay more taxes, if necessary, and shall pledge more of their wealth to help and assist the less fortunate. The less fortunate shall work hard to realize their American Dream. Each American corporation shall promise to be a moral corporation to American Society. The executives shall strive for common good instead of excessive profit at the costs of the workers and the society and the workers shall strive to contribute their best productivity to the corporation. Each American educational institution shall promise to be the best American Dream making institution. The administrators and teachers shall strive for producing the best students instead of collecting excessive tuitions and endowments and the students shall strive be the best students and future American Dream makers. The three respective branches of our Federal and State Government shall promises to all Americans and their respective State Citizens that they will work in harmony for the prosperity and common good of all Americans and the advancement of this cherished Nation and Republic under GOD, not the interests of a few or self-interests. The executives, representatives and judges shall strive to carry out the businesses of our Nation and the respective States in their best abilities and the supporting staff shall strive to provide the supporting services to their best abilities. Let us remember that our Government is of the people, by the people and for the people as Lincoln declared. It may be said that today some among us in America would have defaulted on these Sacred Pledges if made earlier. Instead of honoring these obligations, some among us would have given Americans bad checks, checks which would have come back marked "insufficient funds." But we refuse to believe that the banks of this Great Nation would be bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there would be insufficient funds in the great vaults of America. So all American Citizens, corporations, institutions and Governmental units should make good on these Sacred Pledges — Pledges that will in the long run give our people the security of basic necessities of food, medicine and shelter, riches of the economy and the fulfillment of happiness under GOD. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 854 Finally, as a Nation and a People, we pledge to the World that we shall always work for World Peace, eliminations of hunger and diseases, economical stability and prosperity and mutual benefits of all nations on Earth. Fierce Urgency, Warning & Precaution As Martin Luther King, Jr. once did, let us remind ourselves the fierce urgency of now. This is no time to keep our silence or hope others to take action. Now is the time to make transformational changes in America. Now is the time to rise from the darkness and despair of an excessively capitalistic and individualistic society to a compassionate and morally just society. Now is the time to lift America from the quick sands of corporate greed and personal financial gains at all costs to the solid rock of glorious path under GOD to prosperity and happiness for all Americans. Now is the time to make equality in all aspects of American life a reality for all our people. As Martin Luther King, Jr. would warn, it would be fatal for American corporations, the financial and educational systems, other social and economic establishments and the wealthy individuals to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering heat of many Americans’ discontents will not pass until there is an invigorating atmosphere of transformational changes, economical equalities and job opportunities in America. This is not an end, but a beginning. Those who hope that we needed to release our angers and will soon be content will have a rude awakening if the establishments of America return to their businesses as usual. There will be neither silence nor rest in America until all Americans have regained their hopes of American Dream. The whirlwinds of protests and non-violent struggles will come to shake the establishments and current status quo of America until the bright day of transformational changes, economical equalities and job opportunities emerges. There is something else that we must say to all Americans who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the glorious path to American Dream of the 21st Century. In the process of gaining our rightful place we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for transformational changes, economical equalities and job opportunities by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our protest and struggle on the high ground of dignity and discipline as Martin Luther King, Jr. did. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence or worse. Again and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting economical inequality and other injustice of excessive capitalism and individualism with positive forces. The marvelous new struggle which may engulf the establishments of America and the World must not lead us to a distrust of all the wealthy individuals, corporate executives and representatives in the establishments, for many of them, as evidenced by their sympathy or silence, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny. They have come to realize that their yearning for love and compassion to fellow Americans is inextricably bound to our struggles. We cannot walk alone. At this critical moment, we must also ask ourselves the soul searching question: Are we really ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 855 fighting the benefit of all Americans or our own self-interests? And do we want to go down in history as hypocrites or equality-seeking men and women? And so, as John F. Kennedy would urge: My fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you but what can you do for your country. Marching Ahead As we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always march ahead as King would do. We cannot turn back. There are those who ask, "When will you be satisfied?" We can never be satisfied as long as the majority of Americans are short-changed by the minority and disadvantaged by the establishments of America. We can never be satisfied, as long as our hard work cannot feed our families nor provide them with medicine or shelter. We can never be satisfied as long as young generations of Americans, loaded with heavy burden of educational debts, cannot find decent jobs and robbed of their American Dream by signs stating "for the rich only." We cannot be satisfied as long as an American wanting to work cannot find a job and another American who has a job feels insecure and is in despair. No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until economical equalities roll down like waters and job opportunities rain like a mighty stream. We are not unmindful that some among us have suffered great trials of unemployment and financial difficulties. Some among us are still in the suffocating environment of hopelessness and despair. Some among us have been battered by the storms of corporate greed and staggered by the winds of layoffs. Some of us have been the veterans of unearned suffering. Continue to hope with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive. Go back to your work, go back to your study, go back to your business, go back to your place of worship, go back to the backwaters of undesirable jobs, go back to the forgotten paths of entrepreneurship knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the valley of despair but turn to our family to help each other and pray to GOD for comfort, inner strength and salvation. We Have a Dream We say to you today, fellow Americans, so even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, we still have a dream in the spirit of Martin Luther King, Jr. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American Dream of the 21st Century and the struggle for the advancement of our Republic and the mankind at large under the Laws of GOD. We have a dream that one day all Americans will be better off than today, secure in basic necessities of food, medicine and shelter, prosperous in all aspects and happy in our lives. We have a dream that one day all wealthy Americans will be compassionate and giving, sharing their wealth with the less fortunate and the Nation. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 856 We have a dream that one day all American corporations will rise up and live out the true meaning of an ideal corporation: morality before profit, employment before dividend, collaboration before monopoly and cooperation before competition. We have a dream that one day Wall Street will not be a “greed” street but a “moral” street: orderly market, honest investment banking, transparency in financial reporting and no manipulation of market and no insider trading. We have a dream that one day all educational institutions will provide educations to their students at reasonable costs, use their endowment generously and ensure their students employment opportunities after graduation. We have a dream that one day even a bigot, sweltering with the heat of anti-immigrants, sweltering with the heat of racism, will be transformed into an oasis pursuing equality for all. We have a dream that one day, the three respective branches of our Federal and State Government will always work in harmony for the prosperity, common good and advancement of all Americans and this Great Nation under GOD. We have a dream today. We have a dream as that of Martin Luther King, Jr. “that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of [GOD] shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.” So, we have a dream today. We have a dream that one day we will be live in a Paradise on Earth and a peaceful World under GOD for a thousand years to come. This is our hope. This is the faith that we go on in the pursuit of the American Dream of 21st Century. With this faith as that of Martin Luther King, Jr. “we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of [American economy and finance] into a beautiful symphony of [harmony and prosperity].” With this faith we will be able to work together, to struggle together, to pray together, to stand up for America’s future together, knowing that we will be truly happy one day. This will be the day when everyone will be able to sing as Rumi “I am so tipsy here in this world, I have no tale to tell but tipsiness and rapture." Let Transformation of Consciousness Begin No doubt that our pursuit of American Dream of the 21st Century is hindered by the state of our own consciousness from the rich to the poor. Thus, the transformation of our consciousness under GOD is the key to accomplish this sacred pursuit and transform America. By transforming our consciousness and transcending ourselves from the rich to the poor, we shall transform greed into compassion, hate to love, wealth possession to wealth sharing and war to peace. So, let transformation of consciousness begin in each of us from the rich to the poor! Let ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| December 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 8 | pp. 850-857 Hu, H., The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America 857 transformation of consciousness begin in corporate America! Let transformation of consciousness begin on Wall Street! Let transformation of consciousness begin in all places of business, schools, churches and all institutions! But not only that, let transformation of consciousness begin in the respective three branches of our Federal and State Government! Let transformation of consciousness begin in the corporations, businesses and government of every nation! From every corner of Earth, let transformation of consciousness begin! When this happens, when we allow transformation of consciousness to begin, when we let it to ring from every individual, every corporation, every business and every governmental unit, we will be able to speed up that day when American Dream of the 21st Century shall be realized under the Laws of GOD. Tribute and Resolve Let us now pay tribute to those who have greatly contributed towards the birth, endurance and advancement of our cherished Nation and Republic. But, as Abraham Lincoln would declare, in a larger sense we cannot compose anything proper to honor those heroes. The brave men and women of America, living and dead, who struggled, have already done so, far above one’s poor power to add or detract. The World may be little notice what we say here, but it can never forget what they have done. It is for rest of us, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us, that from these honored we take increased devotion to the cause for which they have given their full measure of devotion, that we here highly resolve that these dedicated shall not have fought in vain, that our Nation shall have a new birth, and that American Dream shall endure and advance and shall not vanish in the 21st Century. GOD Bless America from Sea to Shining Sea! Acknowledgements: The layout of this Essay “The American Dream of the 21st Century: A Call for Transformation of America” is based on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech “I have a Dream.” The Essay is also fused with languages from the Declaration of Independence the chief drafter of which was Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. It also contains a quote from John F. Kennedy and a verse from “GOD Bless America.” ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 156 Article From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind Francisco Di Biase* Dept. of Neurosurgery-Neurology, Clínica Di Biase & Santa Casa Hospital, Rio, Brazil Abstract We are living a special moment in the scientific evolution of our civilization, with the emergence of a fantastic integral holoinformational quantum-holographic cosmovision [3]. The foundation of this new paradigmatic transformation connecting all levels of the universe is the phenomenon of non-local information [1] interconnecting all self-organizing universal systems in this cosmos. This holoinformational intelligent self-organizing field is continuously emerging from a plenum (not a vacuum) that permeates all the cosmos, full of quantum information and energy popping out of nothing every billion of trillionth of a second. This quantum field plenum is a kind of cosmic DNA scattering “in-formation” (active information with meaning that forms the reality) through all the universe, creating galaxies and supernovas with thermonuclear furnaces generating atoms of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen the basis of all life forms. The fine-tuned biosignature of this non-local informational field is so fundamental for the cosmic evolution and the emergence of life that it must be seen as a cosmic organizational principle with a “status” equal to matter, energy and space-time, and as we shall see, also consciousness. Keywords: Unified field, consciousness, universe, quantum field, holoinformation, cosmovision, non-local, quantum information, DNA. 1. Introduction We are living a special moment in human history of emergence of a fantastic integral quantumholographic cosmovision [3], developing a “magic” world, as Arthur Clark said, where we will not differentiate technology from magic. Our civilization is discovering and making reverse engineering from everything that evolved in this Cosmos. We will be creators not only of stemcells and nanobots but also of stars and galaxies. This new integral cosmovision is more wide than the quantum-relativistic paradigm that emerged in the beginning of the XX century. The foundation of this new paradigmatic transformation connecting all levels of the universe is the phenomenon of non-local information [1] interconnecting all self-organizing universal systems in this cosmos. The Quantum Field Theory developed by Umesawa [1] with its concept of non-local information connecting everything in the universe from quantum physics-chemistry, quantum biology and * Correspondence: Francisco Di Biase, Professor, Post-Graduation Dept., UGB Universidade Geraldo Di Biase - Volta Redonda, Rio, Brazil; Department of Neurosurgery-Neurology, Clínica Di Biase and Santa Casa Hospital, Rio, Brazil; Full Professor, Grand PhD, World Information Distributed University, Belgium; & Honorary Professor, Albert Schweitzer International University, Switzerland. E-mail: dibiase@terra.com.br ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 157 quantum mind, through quantum consciousness and quantum cosmology fine-tuned [2] for the emergence of life show us that human evolution and the emergence of mind and consciousness are the inevitable consequence of a intelligent informational universe. This holoinformational intelligent self-organizing field is continuously emerging from a plenum (not a vacuum) that permeates all the cosmos, full of quantum information and energy popping out of nothing every billion of trillionth of a second. This quantum field plenum is a kind of cosmic DNA scattering “in-formation” (active information with meaning that forms the reality)) through all the universe, creating galaxies and supernovas with thermonuclear furnaces generating atoms of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen the basis of all life forms. The fine-tuned biosignature of this non-local informational field is so fundamental for the cosmic evolution and the emergence of life that it must be seen as a cosmic organizational principle with a “status” equal to matter, energy and space-time, and as we shall see, also consciousness. 2. Information Self-Organization and Negentropy Chalmers [4] states that information is an essential property of reality, as matter and energy, and that “conscious experience must be considered a fundamental feature, irreducible to anything more basic”. He argues that each informational state has two different aspects, one as conscious experience, and the other as a physical process in the brain, that is, one internal/intentional and the other external/physical. This view finds support in the present developments of the so-called “Information Physics”, developed by the physicist Wojciech Zurek [5] and others. This Information Physics developed in the first years of the 90’s have demonstrated that beyond the Law of Conservation of Energy there is a more fundamental Law of Conservation of Information. In the process of developing a new Quantum Information Theory, Zureck propose that the physical entropy would be a combination of two magnitudes that compensate each other: the observer’s ignorance, measured by Shannon’s statistical entropy, and the disorder degree of the observed system, measured by the algorithmic entropy which is the smallest number of bits needed to register it in the memory. During the measurement, the observer’s ignorance is reduced, as a result of the increase in bit numbers in its memory, remaining, however, constant the sum of these two magnitudes, that is, the physical entropy. In this context the equivalence/identity between order, negentropy and information, is the way that allows us to build upon and understand the whole irreducible and natural flow of order transmission in the universe, organized in a meaningful and intelligent informational mode. In the classical thermodynamic theory, the definition of order is probabilistic and dependent on the entropy concept, which measures the degree of disorder of a system, reducing to uncertainty the immense dimension of natural meanings. For Atlan [6,7], and for us, Di Biase [8,9,10,11,12], “entropy shouldn’t be understood as a disorder measure, but much more as a measure of complexity”. To make this, it is necessary to consider that information implies a certain ambiguity, meaning the bit capacity of a physical system as Shannon [13 ] put it, or the semantic content (meaning) conducted by the bits during a communication. In the information theory, the organization, the order expressed by the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 158 amount of information in the system (Shannon’s H function) is the information measure that is missing to us, the uncertainty about the system. Relating this uncertainty, this ambiguity to the variety and the non-homogeneity of the system, Atlan [7] could solve certain logical paradoxes of self-organization and complexity, widening Shannon’s theory and defining organization in a quantitatively formal mode. Atlan showed that the system’s order corresponds to a commitment between the maximum informational content (i.e. the maximum variety) and the maximum redundancy, and showed also that the ambiguity can be described as a noise function, or even a time one, if we consider the time effects as related to the random factors accumulated by the environment’s action. Such ambiguity, peculiar to biological self-organizing systems, can be manifested in a negative way (“destructive ambiguity”) with the classical meaning of disorganizing effect, or in a positive way (“autonomy producer ambiguity”) that acts by increasing the relative autonomy of a part of the system in relation to the others, reducing the system’s natural redundancy and increasing its informational content. Atlan developed this self-organizing theory of complexity for biological systems. Jantsch [14] has show that cosmological evolution is also a self-organizing process, with the microevolution of the individual systems (holons) co-evolving towards macrosystemic collective structures better organized, with a big reduction in the amount of these collective systems. This whole self-organizing process represents, actually, a universal expression of a bigger acquisition of variety or informational content that is a consequence of a reduction of redundancy in the totality of the system. Seager [15] states that consciousness, self-organization and information are connected at the level of semantic significance, not at the level of bit capacity, and that “as the classical theory of information is situated at the level of “bit capacity” it would seen unable to provide the proper connection to consciousness”...and “we can begin to move towards a more radical view of the fundamental nature of consciousness with a move towards a more radical view of information”. Seager still reminds us that in the famous two-slit experiment, and in the quantum eraser experiment, what is at stake is not the bit capacity, but the semantically significant correlation of information laden distinct physical systems, in a non-causal mode. 3. Linking quantum information to consciousness and physics Wheeler [16] realized how important information is in such context. With his genius, Wheeler describes an elegant information-participatory universe that is the most brilliant and fundamental model of interaction brain-mind and Cosmos ever described in the science of consciousness. With his famous “the it from bit” concept he unite quantum information theory to consciousness and physics: ...every it - every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself - derives its function, its very existence, entirely - even if in some contexts, indirectly - from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits”. “It from bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom – at a very deep bottom, in most instances – an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no question and the registering of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 159 equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe. In the same paper Wheeler [16] gives the example of a photon being detected by a photodetector under watch, when we ask the yes-or-no question: Did the counter register a click during the specified second?”. If yes, we often say “a photon did it”. We know perfectly well that the photon existed neither before the emission nor after the detection. However, we also have to recognize that any talk of the photon “existing” during the intermediate period is only a blown-up version of the raw fact, a count. The yes or no that is recorded constitutes an unsplitable bit of information. There is a cosmological version of Wheeler’s experiment with photons emitted by a distant double quasar that shows that photons interfere with each other not only when observed in the laboratory but also when emitted in the cosmos at huge intervals of time. A double quasar with its light-image deflected due to a gravitational lens made by a galaxy situated about one fourth of the distance from Earth was observed. The additional distance travelled by the photons deflected by this intervening galaxy was fifty thousand light years longer than those that came by the direct way. Although originating billions of years ago and arriving with an interval of fifty thousand years, the photons interfere with each other just as if they had been emitted seconds apart in the lab. Wheeler developed this it from bit perspective studying the unification of quantum gravity theories in black holes and telling that we must understand quantum information as being more fundamental than energy, matter and space-time. This has relevance for consciousness studies as we see consciousness primarily as an informational system. As Doug Matzke [17] states: [I]t requires the adoption of an energy/information duality for anything within accessible states, such as quantum states and consciousness. The seemingly paradoxical aspects of consciousness will become more understandable adopting this energy/information duality just as early in this century the particle/wave duality was insightful in understanding physics” … “By understanding quantum states as an information system, the energy/information duality is exposed. The corresponding nature of quantum spacetime supports non-local behaviors. Quantum information laws form a consistency network that creates all fields, particles and even spacetime itself. Even Einstein was wrong about the thinking of quantum mechanics as mere energy mechanics. Correctly labeling phenomena as information vs. energy will lead to clarity about paradoxical aspects of consciousness. 4. The Cosmic Informational Code What self-organizes significantly the cosmic evolution is the relationship between the physical entropy and the universe’s non-local quantum-holographic informational content, through a process in which the complexity using the pre-existing informational content reaches each time higher organizational ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 160 levels and variety. The concept of quantum information as being more fundamental than energy, matter and space-time, is the foundation of a transdisciplinary holoinformational unified field theory of consciousness that connects “all that is above to all that is below”. Complexity in the universe grows gradually, from gravity and nuclear powers in the cosmosphere, with information stored in atomic-nuclear structures. Intensifies with the emergence of the selforganizing macromolecular systems of the biosphere, with information stored in the DNA molecules code. And reaches an almost infinite antientropic state of complexity, variety and informational content with the emergence of the noosphere and the mind code with information stored in neural networks, and the consciousphere the consciousness-universe interconnection code with information stored in quantum-holographic networks. This universal distributed nonlocal quantum holographic information network connects our consciousness to the quantumholographic cosmos. It is a non-local quantum informational unfolding, that self-organizes matter, life mind and consciousness in a meaningful way as we can see in the conceptual framework of the quantum holographic theory of the universe of David Bohm. Such informational codes, this order that is transmitted in a meaningful and intelligent way through all levels of complexity of the universe, is the negentropic self-organization nature of the informationconsciousness, an irreducible physical dimension of the cosmos as energy and matter. 5. Consciousness and Non-Locality Adding to its equations a Quantum Potential that satisfies Schrödinger’s equation, that depends on the form but not on the amplitude of the wave function, David Bohm [18,19,20] developed a model in which the quantum potential, carries “active information” that “guides” the particle along its way. The quantum potential has inedited characteristics unknown up to then, because differently from the other nature’s forces, it is subtle in its form, and does not decay with the distance. Such interpretation allows communication between this “pilot wave” and the particle, to be processed in a higher speed than the light, unveiling the quantum paradox of non-locality [20], i.e., of the instantaneous causality, fundamental in our holoinformational view of consciousness. For Bohm, differently from Bohr, the elementary particles do not have dual nature wave/particle but are particles all the time, and not only when observed. Actually, the particle originates from a global quantum field fluctuation, being its behavior determined by the quantum potential “that carries information about the environment of the quantum particle and thus informs and affects its motion. Since the information in the potential is very detailed, the resulting trajectory is so extremely complex that it appears chaotic or indeterminist” [21]. Any attempt of measuring particles properties, changes the quantum potential, destroing its information. As John Bell [22] observed, “ the De Broglie-Bohm’s idea seems... so natural and simple, to resolve the wave-particle, dilemma in such a clear and ordinary way, that it is a great mystery... that it was so generally ignored”. In the quantum-holographic theory, as Bohm [23] put it: [T]he implicate order is a wave function, and the superimplicate order or superior informational field, is a function of the wave function, i.e. a superwave function that makes the implicate order non-linear organizing it in complex and relatively stable structures. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 161 Besides that, the holographic model as a way of organization of the implicate order was dependent upon the quantum informational potential field, that did not have capacity for selforganization and transmission of the information, essential for the understanding of the genesis and development of matter, life and consciousness. The superimplicate order fills this need, allowing the understanding of consciousness, energy and matter as expression varieties of a same informational order. As a result consciousness would already have been present since the beginning of creation in the various levels of nature’s unfolding and enfolding. 6. Organisms and Brains are Macroscopic Quantum Systems In the living world non-local coherence is just present as in the quantum and in the cosmos scale. In living organisms the coordination of functions inside the organisms is ensured by quantum coherence as we can see in the instantaneous correlation between parts and molecules and also between the organism and the external milieu. This instantaneous quantum information transfer are observed in organic molecules in entangled quantum states, in quantum tunneling , in BoseEinstein condensates, and in superradiance states occurring in brain structures as microtubules, synapses and the cerebrospinal fluid. According to Erwin Schrödinger in his seminal book What is Life? [24] , in living organisms we must replace the concept of mechanical order that make order from disorder, by the notion of dynamic order, that produces order from order, from complex organization and information. This difference between mechanical and dynamical order, according to Schrödinger was first proposed by Max Planck that already made this distinction in a little paper named The Dynamical and Statistical type of Law, as I show in Di Biase, Auto-Organização em Sistemas Biológicos [8]. That type of non-local informational order explains the living matter and is not based on mechanical molecular chance collisions and interactions, but in a system-wide correlations involving even distant parts that could not have time for mix in a mechanical process. This organic coherence is only possible through the mobilization of non-local information and energy far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Mae-Wan Ho[25] suggests the organism maintain itself in a negentropic state through the superposition of a non-dissipative cyclic process with entropy balance out of zero, and a dissipative irreversible process with entropy production greater than zero. The cyclic non-dissipative loop coupling with the irreversible energy loop frees the living organism from immediate thermodynamic constraints. But how a self-organizing quantum mind can overlap quantum decoherence and maintain a persistent coherent state for a long time, at room temperature. Ho [25] has been demonstrating that: Highly polarized multiple layers of liquid crystalline water molecules form dynamically coherent units with the macromolecules, enabling them to function as quantum molecular energy machines that transform and transfer energy with close to 100 percent efficiency. This liquid crystalline continuum of intimately associated polarized water and macromolecules extends throughout the extracellular matrix into the interior of every single cell, enabling each cell, ultimately each molecule, to intercommunicate with every other. Dejan Rakovic [26], points out that: ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 162 Quantum-Holographic and Classically-Reduced Neural Networks can model psychosomatic functions: “The prevailing scientific paradigm considers information processing within the central nervous system as occurring through hierarchically organized and interconnected neural networks. However, it seems that this hierarchy of biological neural networks is going down sub-cellular cytoskeleton level, being according to some scientists a kind of interface between neural and quantum levels. At the same time it appeared, within the Feynman propagator version of the Schrödinger equation, that the quantum level is described by analogous mathematical formalism as Hopfield-like quantumholographic associative neural network. The mentioned analogy opens additional fundamental question as to how the quantum parallel processing level gives rise to classical parallel processing level, which is a general problem of the relationship between quantum and classical levels within the quantum decoherence theory as well. The same question is closely related to the fundamental nature of consciousness, whose in-deterministic manifestations of free will and other holistic manifestations of consciousness like transitional states of consciousness, altered states of consciousness, and consciousness pervading body – necessarily imply that some manifestations of consciousness must have deeper quantum origin, with significant psychosomatic implications. 7. Quantum-holographic neuronal dynamics and classical neuronal computer network interconnection It is very well stablished experimentally today that the molecules of chlorophyll responsables for the photosynthesis process that transforms light photons in chemical energy in plants, can do this with extraordinary efficiency, for about 750 femtoseconds, compared with 1 to 1.5 femtoseconds frequency of chemical-bond vibrations. This is due to the action of a protein called antenna protein that holds the chlorophyll molecule sustaining the quantum coherence state and suppressing decoherence, by reinducing coherence in decohering parts of the chlorophyll molecule [27]. This show us that the capability to suppress decoherence at environment temperature is a common process in nature. So the capability to suppress quantum decoherence must be seen as a natural process in the wet brain, and we must work with the possibility that neurons and glia can sustain a quantum coherent state for milliseconds in the organized cellular complex molecular system full of proteins macromolecules, small molecules, ions and water. It is well known that in the vicinity of these macromolecules there is ordered water, and that proteins with a cavity in its 3 D structure can hold one or a few water molecules by means of hydrogen bonds. Quantum chemical computation shows that these ordered water molecules within and between two proteins separated by 12 to 16 ångstrons permits the occurrence of quantum coherent electron transfer [28]. This quantum coherence can propagate through non-local information transfer in the nervous system and in the body by quantum entanglement and superradiance. As biological self-organized systems these molecular systems have a huge structural and functional redundance that facilitates the non-local interconnection of all parts. 8. In-formation in Self-Organizing Dissipative Structures ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 163 Ilya Prigogine [29,30] Nobel Prize winner, developed an extension of thermodynamics that shows how the second law can also allow the emergence of novel structures, and indicates the ways in which order can emerge from chaos. This type of self-organization generates dissipative structures that are created and maintained through the energy’s exchanges with the environment in non-equilibrium conditions. These dissipative structures are dependent upon a new order, called by Prigogine “order from fluctuations”, which corresponds to a “giant fluctuation” stabilized by the exchanges with the environment. In these self-organizing processes the structure is maintained through an energyinformation dissipation that displaces itself, simultaneously generating (in-formating) the structure through a continuous process. The more complex the dissipative structure, the more information is needed to keep its interconnections, making it consequently more vulnerable to the internal fluctuations, which means a higher instability potential and higher reorganization possibilities. If fluctuations are small, the system accommodate them and does not change its organizational structure. If the fluctuations reach a critical size, however, they cause disequilibrium in the system, generating new intra-systemic interactions and reorganization. “The old patterns interact between themselves in new ways, and establish new connections. The parts reorganize themselves in a new whole. The system reaches a higher order” [29]. The brain is a dissipative self-organizing conscious quantum computer. 9. Consciousness Self-Organization and In-formation Pribram [31,39-42] has demonstrated an analogy between the fields of distributed neural activity in the brain and the wave patterns in holograms. His neural network equation is similar to Schrödinger’s wave equation of quantum physics with the adition of Bohm’s quantum potential that guides by means of active information the particle alongside its course. As any elementary particle is united to the whole cosmos by means of a quantum active non-local information potential, capable of change the structure of the universe, information then can be understood as nature’s fundamental process, as Stonier [32,33] put it. This “active” (Bohm) non-local in-formation that organizes the particle’s world reveal that the whole nature is informational, organized in a meaningful way. In the brain, this informational process is non-local quantum holistic based in quantum-holographic neural network fields, and at the same time local classical Newtonian and mechanistic, based in classical neural networks. So, as Di Biase [11] has been demonstrating in the last years it is a holoinformational field (nonlocal and local). This view is crucial to understand the holoinformational nature of consciousness and intelligence in the universe [12]. Matter, life and consciousness are meaningful activities, intelligent quantuminformational processes, order transmitted through the cosmic evolution, originated from a generating non-local informational field beyond our perception limits. A universe plenum of non-local quantum potential in-formation with meaning (active information) is an intelligent universe functioning like a mind, as Sir James Jeans already had observed. So, as consciousness has always been present in all nature’s levels of organization, matter, life and consciousness cannot be considered as separated entities, capable of being analyzed under a fragmentary Cartesian-Newtonian framework. Actually, consciousness must be considered a fundamental property of the universe [12] like information, energy, matter, and space-time and must be seen as an irreducible quantum non-local information distributed in a holistic cosmic way, and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 164 simultaneously by local Newtonian mechanistic relationships, generating self-organization, complexity, intelligence and evolution. Such view of a holoinformational intelligent “continuum”, a fundamental generating order with a quantum-holographic informational creative flow permeating the whole cosmos, permits to understand the basic nature of the universe as an intelligent self-organizing unbroken wholeness. A kind of cosmic consciousness unfolding in an infinite holoarchy. As a quantum-holographic system this universal consciousness is distributed in every part of the cosmosphere, and our quantum-holographic mind as part of this holographically distributed system contains the active in-formation of the whole indivisible cosmos [Di Biase, 9,10]. 10. Eccles Interactive Dualism and Pribram’s Monism Sir John Eccles [35-38] described in the brain fine fibers structures he called dendrons composed of pre-synaptic teledendrons, synapses and post-synaptic dendrites connections, that he postulated could interact with the mind side of the interaction by way of units he called psychons. He proposed that these psychons could operate on synapses through quantum processes, and with Beck [34] developed a beautiful and logical quantum interpretation of the synaptic function. Pribram [31,39,40] demonstrated that Eccles' dendrons make up receptive fields in cortical sensory units, that: [A]s sensory receptive fields they can be mapped in terms of wavelets, or wavelet-like patterns such as Gabor Elementary Functions. Dennis Gabor (1946) called these units Quanta of Information. The reason for this name is that Gabor used the same mathematics to describe his units as had Heisenberg in describing the units of quantum microphysics. Here they define the unity structure of processes occurring in the material brain. However, Gabor invented his function, not to describe brain processes, but to find the maximum compressibility of a telephone message that could be sent over the Atlantic Cable without destroying its intelligibility. The Gabor function thus describes both a unit of brain processing and a unit of communication. Brain is material, communication is mental. The same mathematical formulation describes both. The elementary structure of processing in Eccles' material dendron is identical to the elementary structure of processing of a mental (communication) psychon. There is a structural identity to the dual interactive process. Pribram [43,44,45] proposes a monistic basis for Eccles dualism, showing that “there is a interactive mind/matter duality that is a “ground” from which both matter and mind are “formed“ and the “dual” emerges. That ground functions as a potential reality similar to Heisenberg potential world. “This flux provides the ontological roots from which our experience regarding matter as well as mind (psychological processing) itself become actualized in spacetime”. To illuminate this claim, Pribram relates the following story: Once, Eugene Wigner remarked that in quantum physics we no longer have observables (invariants) but only observations. Tongue in cheek I asked whether that meant that quantum physics is really psychology, expecting a gruff reply to my sassiness. Instead, Wigner beamed a happy smile of understanding and replied, “yes, yes, that's exactly correct”. If indeed one wants to take the reductive path, one ends up with psychology, not particles. In fact, it is a psychological process, mathematics, that describes the relationships that organize matter. In ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 165 a non-trivial sense current physics is rooted in both matter and mind. Communication depends on being embodied, instantiated in some sort of material medium. This convergence of matter on mind, and of mind on matter, gives credence to their common ontological root. My claim is that this root, though constrained by measures in spacetime, needs a more fundamental order, a potential order that underlies and transcends spacetime. The spectral basis of both matter and communication portrayed by the Fourier relationship delineate this claim. As the brain has the capacity of function in the holographic non-local mode as in the space-temporal local mode, we think that we are dealing here with Bohr’s concept of complementarity in the quantum functioning of the central nervous system. The holonomic brain theory of Pribram [31] and the holographic quantum theory of Bohm, added with Laszlo’s akashic field [2], shows that we are part of something much more wider than our individual mind. Our mind is a subsystem of a universal hologram, accessing and interpreting this holographic universe. We are fractal-like holographic harmonic systems interacting continuously with this unbroken self-organizing wholeness. We are this holoinformational field of consciousness, and not observers external to it. The external observer’s perspective made us lose the sense and the feeling of unity or supreme identity, generating the immense difficulties we have in understanding that we are one with the whole and not part of it. In this holoinformational model of consciousness the non-local quantum-informational flow in a continuous holomovement of expansion and enfoldment between the brain and the implicate order, is the universal consciousness self-organizing itself as human mind. This non-local quantum-holographic Cosmic Consciousness manifest itself through our mind, seeing itself through our eyes and our consciousness, interconnecting in a participatory holistic and indivisible way the human brain to all levels of the self-organizing multiverse[45]. 11. Quantum Brain Dynamics Experimental research developed by Pribram [31] and other consciousness researchers like Hameroff [46] and Penrose [47] , Jibu and Yassue [48,49], and Ho [25] confirm the existence of a Quantum Brain Dynamics in neural microtubules, in synapses and in the molecular organization of the cerebrospinal fluid, and in the intracellular medium matrix. This Quantum Brain Dynamics can generate Bose-Einstein condensates and the Fröhlich effect. Bose-Einstein condensates consist of atomic particles, or in the case of the Fröhlich effect of biological molecules, that can assume a high level of coherent alignment, functioning as a highly ordered and unified informational state, as seen in lasers and superconductivity. Also Sir John Eccles’s psychons [38] operate on synapses by way of quantum coherence processes. These quantum dynamics show us that the interaction process between what Eccles calls dendrons ( the brain side) and psychons ( the mind side) are not limited to the synaptic cleft, as stated by him, but have a much wider embodiment throughout the whole brain. Pribram [31,44] demonstrates good evidence that Eccle’s dendrons make up receptive fields in cortical sensory units. Dendrons are composed of pre-synaptic teledendrons, synapses and post-synaptic dendrites, and they compose the fine fiber structure wherein brain processing occurs. As Pribram states [44]: ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 166 [A]s sensory generated receptive fields they can be mapped in terms of wavelets, or waveletlike patterns such as Gabor Elementary Functions. Dennis Gabor (1946) called these units Quanta of Information. The reason for this name is that Gabor used the same mathematics to describe his units as had Heisenberg in describing the units of quantum microphysics. Here they define the unit structure of processes occurring in the material brain”. I see the quantum holographic interactions between brain and cosmos as a natural extension [10,11,12] of Eccles ideas of an interactionism between dendrons and psychons. Jibu and Yasue [49] studies on quantum brain dynamics with Umesawa also shows that: [B]rain dynamics consists of quantum brain dynamics (i.e. quantum mode) and classical brain dynamics (i.e. classical mode), and that “quantum brain dynamics is the fundamental process of the brain given by quantum field dynamics of the molecular vibrational fields of water molecules and biomolecules. According to Jibu and Yasue [49], Umesawa introduced in quantum brain dynamics the notion that “the quanta of the molecular vibrational field of biomolecules are corticons, and the quanta of the molecular vibrational field of water molecules are exchange bosons.” Quantum coherence can propagate through these vibrational fields of biomolecules and water molecules by non-local information transfer, quantum entanglement and superradiance. The dissipative quantum model in the brain is the extension to the dissipative dynamics of the many-body model proposed in 1967 by Ricciardi and Umezawa[50,51]. The extended patterns of neuronal excitations may be described by the spontaneous breakdown of symmetry formalism of Quantum Field Theory. Umezawa states that “In any material in condensed matter physics any particular information is carried by certain ordered pattern maintained by certain long range correlation mediated by massless quanta. It looked to me that this is the only way to memorize some information; memory is a printed pattern of order supported by long range correlations..." As these biomolecular systems are self-organized systems, they have a huge structural and functional redundance, and this creates a quasi-cristaline medium that facilitates the interconnection of the molecular quantum computer networks dynamics with the neuronal classical computer network, i.e. a holoinformational field. 12. The Quantization of Mind Amoroso [52,53,54] in his Noetic Field Theory, an extension of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory, has managed to solve the mind-body problem in a comprehensive and empirically testable manner. While ‘qualia’ has remained a philosophical construct in cognitive theory, Amoroso’s Noetic Field Theory: The Quantization of Mind (NFT) has actually physicalized the basis of qualia breaking down the 1st person-3rd person barrier. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 167 Being able to physically quantify qualia led him to develop a formal model of Eccles’ psychon, in a similar fashion of the creation of the unit of measure called ‘the Einstein’ signifying a mole or Avogadro’s number of photons used in photosynthesis. Amoroso has created a unit of measure called ‘the Psychon’ in honor of Nobelist Sir John C. Eccles that quantifies the energy of qualia or measures the energy of awareness . In this NFT a unified field theory of mind-body interaction, Amoroso says that: [L]ife is based on the unified field of physics and is a physical real aspect of the unified field. This removes the main stigma of Cartesian dualism that res cogitans violates the laws of thermodynamics and the conservation of energy. In NFT the ordering principle of the Unified Field is not a 5th fundamental force of physics; rather it is a ‘force of coherence’ applied ontologically (rather than phenomenologically which requires the exchange of energy by quanta transfer) by what is called topological switching. Amoroso proposes the existence of three regimes to reality: Classical, Quantum and Unified, and states that: [I]t is in this new 3rd regime that access to the principles of the mind resides. Just as Quantum Mechanics was invisible to the tools of Newtonian Mechanics, so until now has the regime of the unified field been invisible to the tools of quantum mechanics [53]. For him in this 3rd physical regime exists a ‘life principle’ that interacts with the brain/body forming a self-organized living system. The developing of of the Noetic Field Theory required a whole new Holographic Anthropic Multiverse Cosmology, title of a Amoroso book coauthored with Elizabeth Rauscher [52] to introduce this essential component absent from Big Bang cosmology: Essentially NFT’s description of the ‘mind gate’ requires violation of the quantum uncertainty principle [54]. Uncertainty is saw as being the shield ‘hiding’ the 3rd regime. Related to the uncertainty principle is the zero-point field (ZPF) where virtual quantum particles wink in and out of existence momentarily for a duration of the Planck time (as governed by the uncertainty principle). The 1st component of the gate he developed is called an ‘exciplex’, short for excited complex - meaning it stays excited and never returns to zero as the ZPF does in terms of the exclusion principle of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory. Operation of the exciplex gate requires Large-Scale Extra Dimensions that includes an oscillating form of Planck’s constant, fluctuating from the continuous-state asymptotic virtual Planck scale (never reached) of the usual theory to the Larmor radius of the hydrogen atom. This is part of the process in which the exciplex gating mechanism violates the quantum uncertainty principle [54] utilizing Large-Scale Extra Dimensions in a continuous-state process such that the gate is only periodically open - cycling like a holophote or lighthouse beacon into each point and atom in spacetime. For Amoroso, the Unified Field, UF is not a 5th force per se, and is also not phenomenological as: ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 168 [F]orces are mediated by the exchange of energy transferred by quanta, i.e. the EM field is mediated by the photon[;] [t]he UF does imply force, however it is an ontological or energyless ‘force of coherence. I see Amoroso’s Unified Field as in-formation with a status like energy, matter and spacetime, I described elsewhere in this paper. Amoroso says that this in-formation “is transferred by a process called ‘topological switching’, and that “this is what occurs when staring at a Necker cube and the vertices change position”. In Amoroso’s theory, There is a super quantum potential’ of the unified field, that arises from NFT use of Large-Scale Extra Dimensions extension of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory. Recall that in their theory quantum evolution is continuous and guided. Thus in terms of NFT one would say that the quantum potential/pilot wave are a subset of the action of the unified field Observed (virtual) 3D reality arises from the infinite potentia of 12D space, as a ‘standingwave-like’ (advanced-retarded future-past) mirror symmetric model. Realize that the standingwave of reality is hyperdimensional. NFT is related to a unique M-Theoretic model of ‘Continuous-State' UF dynamics, and its putative exchange quanta of the UF is called the noeon”. Amoroso proposes as an essential part of this “continuous-state anthropic multiverse cosmology” that “our observed reality is closed and finite in time as a ‘Poincare-Dodecahedral Space’ at the cosmological scale and as a ‘virtual Euclidean cube’ at the microscopic”. 13. Nature, Information and Consciousness In my conjecture the interconnectedness between brain and cosmos is an instantaneous holistic nonlocal quantum connection and I proposed the concept of a holoinformational flux, from which both mind and matter are in-formed, that resembles Bohm’s holomovement. But in this new concept, the quantum holographic brain dynamic patterns are conceived as an active part of the universal quantumholographic informational field, and capable of generating an informational interconnection that is simultaneously nonlocal quantum-holistic (mind-cosmos holographic connection), and local Newtonian-mechanistic (brain-mind neural networks connections), i.e., holoinformational. Taking in consideration the basic mathematical property of holographic systems in which the information of the whole system is distributed in each part of the system, plus Bohm’s holographic quantum physics data, and the experimental data of the holonomic theory of Pribram, we propose that this universal interconnectedness could permit us to access all the information coded in the wave interference patterns existing in all the universe since its origin. Each part of the universe, each brain-mind-consciousness, interconnects with all the quantum information stored in the holographic patterns distributed in the whole cosmos, in an indivisible irreducible informational cosmic unity. The beautiful buddhist metaphor of Indra’s Net of the Avatamsaka Sutra, reflects in its poetry this holoinformational nature of the universe: ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 169 Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net which has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out indefinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificier has hung a single glittering jewel at the net’s every node, and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewel, so that the process of reflection is infinite. According to Francis Cook [55] this metaphor “show a Cosmos with an infinite interrelation between all parts, every one defining and maintaining all others. The Cosmos is a self-referent self-maintaining and self-creator organism. It’s also non-teleological, because don’t exist a beginning of time, nor a concept of creator, nor a questioning about the purpose of all. The universe is conceived as a gift, without hierarchy: It has not a center, or maybe if exists one, it is in every place.” Received January 17, 2023; Accepted April 02, 2023 References 1. H. Umezawa, Advanced Field Theory, AIP Press, New York, 1993. 2. Laszlo, Ervin, The Connectivity Hypothesis , SUNY Press, 2003 3. F. Di Biase, R. L. Amoroso (eds.) A Revolução da Consciência. Novas Descobertas sobre a Mente no Século XXI. Editora Vozes, Rio, Brasil, 2005. 4. D. J. Chalmers, The puzzle of conscious experience, Scientific American, Dec. 1995. 5. W. H. Zurek (ed.), Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information, Santa Fé Institute, Studies in the Science of Complexity, Vol. 8, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA, 1990. 6. H. Atlan, L’Organization Biologique et la Théorie de L’Information, Hermann, Paris, 1972. 7. H. Atlan, Entre le Cristal et la Fumée, Essai sur L’Organization du Vivant, Seuil, Paris 1979. 8. F. Di Biase, Auto-organização nos sistemas biológicos, Ciência e Cult. 33(9) (1981) 1155-1159, Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência, Brazil. 9. F. Di Biase, M. S. F. Rocha, Information, self- organization and consciousness: Toward a holoinformational theory of consciousness, In Amoroso R.L. (ed.) Science and the Primacy of Consciousness: Intimation of a 21st Century Revolution, Noetic Press, Oakland, 2000; Also published in The Noetic Journal 2(3), July 1999, Noetic Press. 10. F. Di Biase, R. L. Amoroso, Holoinformational consciousness: An extension of interactive dualism with anticipatory parameters, International Journal of Computing Anticipatory Systems 22 (2008), D.M. Dubois (ed.), CHAOS, Liège, Belgium. 11. F. Di Biase, A holoinformational model of consciousness, Quantum Biosystems 3 (2009) 207-220, Italy. 12. F. Di Biase, Quantum-holographic informational consciousness, NeuroQuantology 7(4) ( 2009) 657-664. 13. C. E. Shannon, W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, III, 1949. 14. E. Jantsch, The Self-Organizing Universe, Pergamon Press, New York, 1980. 15. W. Seager, Conciousness, information and panpsychism, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3) (1995) 272-288. 16. J. Wheeler, Information, physics, quantum: The search for links”, in Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information, W. H. Zurek (ed.), Addison-Wesley, Reading MA, 1990. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 170 17. D. Matzke, "Consciousness: a new computational paradigm", Toward a Science of Consciousness, 1994, MIT Press. 18. D. Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Routledge, New York, 1983. 19. D. Bohm, Unfolding Meaning, a weekend of dialogue with David Bohm, ARK Paperbacks, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1987. 20. D. Bohm, F. D. Peat, Science Order, and Creativity. A dramatic New Look at the Creative Roots of Science and Life, Bantam Books, New York, 1987 21. D. Bohm, B. J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe, Routledge, London, 1993. 22. J. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 23. R. Weber, The enfolding unfolding universe: A conversation with David Bohm, in The Holographic Paradigm, (ed.) K. Wilber, New Science Library, Boulder CO, 1982. 24. Erwin Schrödinger, What is Life?, Cambridge University Press, 1944-1974. 25. M-W. Ho, The Rainbow and the Worm, The Physics of Organisms, 3rd ed., World Scientific, Singapore, 2008. 26. D. Raković, Integrative Biophysics, Quantum Medicine, and Quantum-Holographic Informatics: PsychosomaticCognitive Implications, IASC & IEPSP, Belgrade, 2009; cf. www.dejanrakovic.com 27. H. Lee, Y. C. Cheng, G. R. Fleming, Coherence Dynamics in Photosynthesis: Protein Protection of Excitonic Coherence, Science 316 (2007): 1462-5. 28. D. Beratan, J.Lin, I.A.Balabin, D.N.Beratan, The Nature of Aqueous Tunneling Pathways Between Electron-Transfer proteins, Science 310 (2005) : 1311-3. 29. I. Prigogine, I. Stengers, La Nouvelle Alliance, Editions Gallimard, Paris, France, 1979. 30. I. Prigogine, I. Stengers, Entre le Temps et L’Eternité, Fayard, Paris, France, 1988. 31. K. Pribram, Brain and Perception: Holonomy and Structure in Figural Processing, Erlbaum, Hilsdale NJ, 1991. 32. T. Stonier, Information and the Internal Structure of the Universe. Springer Verlag, New Addison-Wesley, Reading MA, 1990. 33. T. Stonier, Information and Meaning. An Evolutionary Perspective, Springer, U.K., 1997. 34. J. C. Eccles, A unitary hypothesis of mind-brain interaction in the cerebral cortex, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 240 (1989) 433451. 35. Beck, F. , Eccles, J.C., Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 89 (1992). 36. J. C. Eccles, Evolution of complexity of the brain with the emergence of consciousness, In Pribram, K. (ed.) Rethinking Neural Networks: Quantum Fields and Biological Data, Lawrence Erlbaum, Manwah, 1993. 37. J. C. Eccles, Evolution du Cerveau et Création de la Conscience, ch. 8.8 Une nouvelle hypothèse sur l’interaction esprit/cerveau à partir de la physique quantique: l’hypothèse des micro-sites, Flammarion, Paris, 1994. 38. J. C. Eccles, Do mental events cause neural events analogously to the probability fields of quantum mechanics? Proc R Soc Lond [Biol] 227 (1998) 411-428. 39. K. Pribram, Languages of the Brain, Wadsworth Publishing, Monterey CA, 1977. 40. K. Pribram, Esprit, cerveau et conscience, in Science et Conscience, Les Deux Lectures de L’Univers. Éditions Stock et France-Culture, Paris, 1980. 41. K. Pribram (ed.), Rethinking Neural Networks: Quantum Fields and Biological Data, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1993. 42. K. Pribram, In memoriam: Nobel laureate Sir John Eccles, The Noetic Journal 1, June 1997, pp 2-5. Noetic Press, Orinda CA. 43. K.Pribram, Além do Dualismo Cérebro-Mente, In Di Biase, F. (ed), Pribram, K., Amoroso, R., Fronteiras da Consciência, Homenagem ao Centenário de Sir John Eccles, 2011, Editora CRV, Paraná, Brasil 44. K. Pribram, O Substrato Neural da Consciência, In Di Biase, F. (ed), Pribram, K., Amoroso, R., Fronteiras da Consciência, Homenagem ao Centenário de Sir John Eccles, 2011, Editora CRV, Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil 45. Di Biase, F. (ed), Pribram, K., Amoroso, R., Fronteiras da Consciência, Homenagem ao Centenário de Sir John Eccles, 2011, Editora CRV, Curitiba, Paraná, Brasil 46. S. R. Hameroff, Quantum coherence in microtubules: A neural basis for emergent consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 1(1) (1994) 91-118. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 156-171 Biase, F. D., From Quantum Universe to Holographic Brain: The Spiritual Nature of Mankind 171 47. S. R. Hameroff, R. Penrose, Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: A model for consciousness. In Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates, S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, A. C. Scott (eds.), MIT Press Cambridge MA, 1996. 48. Jibu, M. and Yassue, K., Quantum Brain Dynamics and Consciousness, Advances in Consciousness Reasearch, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdan/Philadelphia, 1995 49. Jibu, M. and Yasue, K., The Basics of Quantum Brain Dynamics, In Pribram, K. (ed.) Rethinking Neural Networks: Quantum Fields and Biological Data, Lawrence Erlbaum, Manwah, 1993. 50. L. M. Ricciardi and H. Umezawa, Kibernetik 4, 44 (1967). 51. C. I. J. Stuart, Y. Takahashi and H. Umezawa, J.Theor. Biol. 71, 605 (1978). 52. Amoroso, R.L., & Rauscher, E. (2009). The Holographic Anthropic Multiverse, Singapore: World Scientific. 53. Amoroso, R.L. (ed) (2010) Complementarity of mind and body: Realizing the dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles, New York: Nova Science. 54. Amoroso, R.L. (2013) “Shut The Front Door!”:Obviating the Challenge of Large-Scale Extra Dimensions and Psychophysical Bridging, in R.L. Amoroso, L.H.Kauffman, & P. Rowlands (eds.) The Physics of Reality: Space, Time, Matter, Cosmos, Singapore: World Scientific. 55. Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra , The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 198-200 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Depression between Biology & Mathematics: Does the Word Play a Role? 198 Essay Depression between Biology & Mathematics: Does the Word Play a Role? Massimo Cocchi*, Fabio Gabrielli & Grazia Gulino Research Institute for Quantitative & Quantum Dynamics of Living Organisms, Center for Medicine, Mathematics & Philosophy Studies, Italy Abstract This essay is intended to be a reflection on the meaning and intervention of the “right word” in the adjuvant treatment of psychopathology. The authors identify a logic which, starting from the etymological meaning and phenomenology of the "word", enters into the possibility of using the "word" as a modulator of the mental state of the person. Keywords: Depression, word, biology, mathematics, psychopathology, phenomenology. Many millions of people suffer from "depression" and misdiagnosis of this devastating disease. This allows the drug to invade the brains of these people, violating their balance and, not least, creating dangerous drifts that aggravate the pathological state. The incorrect diagnosis ranges between 40% (Bowden, 2001) and 70% (Tenth World Day for the Prevention of Suicide, Rome, 2012) and favors a consequently inaccurate therapy, often a harbinger of suicidal thought. In this dramatic scenario that day by day recruits subjects who take drugs, based on rigorous scientific evidence, the conviction is emerging that a possible effective and widespread use of the "right word" can be combined with the "right drug". In this regard, one cannot but refer to the etymology of the term “word”: from the Latin "parabola", which in the church's language indicates the allegorical narrative, and more specifically it refers to the parables of the Gospel, becoming the "word" for excellence, and again in Greek "parabolè" from "paraballo" that is comparison, it manifests the intent to illustrate a moral truth. Same goes for the term "drug", from the Greek "pharmacon" with its ambivalence of meaning: "remedy" and "poison". Strong biochemical evidence, together with the use of a higher mathematical function, have allowed the creation of an effective and precise diagnostic system that allows to frame the psychopathology from the onset, where the psychopathological aspects of "major depression" and "bipolar disorder" fade into each other (Cocchi et al. 2008; Cocchi and Tonello, 2010; Benedetti et al. 2014; Cocchi et al. 2017). Correspondence: Prof. Massimo Cocchi, Research Institute for Quantitative & Quantum Dynamics of Living Organisms, Center for Medicine, Mathematics & Philosophy Studies. Department of Veterinary Medical Sciences, University of Bologna, Italy. E-mail: massimo.cocchi@unibo.it * ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 198-200 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Depression between Biology & Mathematics: Does the Word Play a Role? 199 Although this solution, surprisingly, can allow to better target the therapy, the belief remains that the word intervenes with a mechanism still unknown from the biological aspect, however, probably attributable to mechanisms, even if difficult to measure, which could influence the temperature centrally. And how can we not think in this regard of the anthropological value of the Sicilian dialectal expression "na parola conza e na parola sconza" (a word corrects and a word destroys). Is it not a "misplaced word" that in the course of a diatribe makes you lose your emotional control, sometimes leading the individual to make unconscionable gesture for a temporary, sudden, clouding of the psyche? This is what happens in the tragedy of Medea, for example. In the same way, a "just word" can be a harbinger of peace, and in this sense the use of the word is interpreted as a gift from God. A reflection is required on the theme that sees word and drug in concert for the best success of the treatment and the relationship between doctor and patient. In this sense, the word must have above all a tactile and discrete nature: - Tactile, to the extent that touching, experiencing skin on skin, surface on surface, refers to that original self, expressive of the first moments of life, which is, in fact, linked to the skin (skin and brain are formed both in the ectoderm). Here, feeling welcomed thanks to a touch that is deeply, entirely bodily, suggests how feeling is at the origin of the relationship (between mother and baby, and then in future intersubjective dynamics). - Discreet, since the word, especially in human practices of extreme fragility, as in the case of major depression, must never be invasive, overflowing, hegemonic, under penalty of its unproductivity, its absolute non-listening, even more so in depressive manifestations. If anything, it must be a welcoming verb, a womb imbued with body tenderness and gestures, a fruitful practice of pauses and caresses. The caress, in fact, by its nature: “[…]. It consists in not seizing anything […]. It ‹search›, rummages. It is not an intentionality of disclosure, but of research: a path in the invisible. In a certain sense ‹expresses› love but suffers from an inability to say it. He is hungry for this expression itself, in a continuous increase of hunger (Levinas, 2006). Received January 19, 2020; Accepted January 29, 2020 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 198-200 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Depression between Biology & Mathematics: Does the Word Play a Role? 200 References Benedetti, S., Bucciarelli, S., Canestrari, F., Catalani, S., Mandolini, S., Marconi, V., Mastrogiacomo, A., Silvestri, R., Tagliamonte, M., Venanzini, R., Caramia, G., Gabrielli, F., Tonello, L., and Cocchi, M. (2014). Platelet‟s Fatty Acids and Differential Diagnosis of Major Depression and Bipolar Disorder through the Use of an Unsupervised Competitive-Learning Network Algorithm (SOM). Open Journal of Depression, 3, 52-73. Bowden, C.L. (2001). Strategies to reduce misdiagnosis of bipolar depression. Psychiatr. Ser., , 52, 5155. Cocchi, M., Minuto, C., Tonello, L., Gabrielli, F., Bernroider, G., Tuszynski, J. A., Cappello, F. and Rasenick, M. (2017). Linoleic acid: Is this the key that unlocks the quantum brain? Insights linking broken symmetries in molecular biology, mood disorders and personalistic emergentism. BMC Neurosci 18:38. Cocchi, M., Tonello, L. (2010). “Bio molecular considerations in Major Depression and Ischemic Cardiovascular Disease”. Central Nervous System Agents in Medicinal Chemistry. 9: 2-11. Cocchi, M., Tonello, L., Tsaluchidu, S., Puri, B. K. (2008). “The use of artificial neural networks to study fatty acids in neuropsychiatric disorders”, BMC Psychiatry, 8(Suppl 1): S3. Lévinas, E. (2006). Totalità e infinito. Saggio sull‟esteriorità, introduzione di Silvano Petrosino, trad. di Adriano Dell‟Asta, Sezione quarta „Al di là del volto‟, B. „Fenomenologia dell‟eros‟, Jaca Book, Milano. Tenth World Day for the Prevention of Suicide, Rome, (2012). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

55 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy Exploration Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy Siddharth Sharma* Abstract In this paper, I present a mathematical theory of Integrated Information Theory, using entropy as measure of information and hence, as the information distance function. Also, we will consider a set, whose open subsets are mechanisms and topology is the system, we use these two modification in the structure of Integrated Information Theory and Quantum Integrated Information theory, to define Entropic Integrated Information Theory, we will also justify our claims to use why entropy should be use as a measure of cause/effect information and as information distance function using [1]. We will also see the relationship of entanglement with concept and conceptual information. This paper is an attempt to binds consciousness, quantum information, entanglement and quantum mechanics together. Keywords: Information theory, entropy, consciousness, integration, quantum information. 1. Introduction In this paper we will use the structure of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) [2], Quantum Integrated Information theory (QIIT) [3], and taking the cause/effect information distance function as relative entropy to redefine the structure of IIT and QIIT, like cause/effect integrated information, core causes/effects, integrated information of Mechanism,, we a set whose topology would be the system and elements of topology would be mechanisms, this will help use to redefine, concept, conceptual structure, conceptual space, conceptual information and integrated information of system or conceptual integrated information, the degree of consciousness. Following is the methology. Also will will observe the relationship between entaglement and consioness. 2. Structures of Entropic Integrated Information Theory The basic structure of Entropic IIT are as follows:  * Structure I: Let Λ be a set with cardinality |Λ| < ∞ and topology . Here elements of the topology is mechenisms and topology itself is the system For each ∈ Λ there is an Correspondence author: Siddharth Sharma, Independent Researcher, India. E-mail: wise.plant.sid@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 56 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy −dimensional quantum system with Hilbert space ℍ ≅ ℂ . Given any associated Ω∈    ⊂ we define ℍΩ ≔ ∈Ω ℍ , with dimension ℍ . Structure III: One has that ℍ ≔ ℍΩ ⨂ℍΩ , where Ω denotes the complement of Ω∈ ⊂ . Structure IV: Let the dynamics be described by a unitary completely positive-map : ℍ → ! " #≔ ! "+% ℍ , such that Structure V: Given Ω ∈ () :  . Structure II: The state-space is the associated operator algebra denoted by identity of operator ℍ .  |Ω| ℍ → ⊂ & = & , where & with is we define the noising completely positive-map () by & , ℍ , such that () ! ≔ tr) ! ⨂ |Ω| Structure VI: let -, / be density matrices, then 01-, /2 is the information distance function and defined as 01-, /2 ≔ |3 -||/ | the modulus of relative entropy (e.g. relative von neumann entropy, renyi entropy), which is obvious as entropy is measure of information.[5] We know that the relative entropy is not symmetric function but Johannes Kleiner and Sean Tull , clearly mention in the paper 112 that “.. the distance function does not necessarily have to satisfy the axioms of a metric. While ……natural axioms…..might hold, they are not necessary for the IIT algorithm.” Further structures require a detained information and hence are explained in their own sections below. 3. Cause/Effect Repertoires  Definition: Given the unitary , the state Ψ ∈ ℍ , Ψ ≥ 0, tr Ψ = 1 and the mechanisms 8, 9 ∈ ⊂ we define the effect (ℯ) and cause ;) repertoire of 8 over the purview 9, by: -< Where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E. Let ISSN: 2153-8212 ℯ = < 9|8 ∶= tr> ? then ; = ⋇ ∘ (A Ψ B , the dual of Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. . www.JCER.com 57 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy   The set of density matrices - ℯ 9|8 - ; 9|8 # encode how the dynamics constrain the future (past) of 9, given that the system is initialized in ΨG and noised over 8′ . Note, - ℯ ∅|8 = & = - ; ∅|8 , ∀8 by trace normalization 4. Cause/Effect Information  Definition: The cause/effect information, ℐ< 9|8 of 8 over 9 is given by ℐ< 9|8 ≔ 0L- < 9|8 , - < where it is easy to evaluate - < 9 |∅ ≔  9|∅ M &N |O| distance monotonicity under partial traces and unitary invariance follows P ∈ ℐ< P|8 ≤ ℐ< 9|8 , where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E. > ⇒ 5. Cause/Effect Integrated Information   Given the mechanism 8 and the purview 9 we consider all possible bi-partitions of them D8 , 8 E and D9 , 9 E, where ! ⋂ ! = ∅, ! ⋃! = ! and ! , ! ∈ U . Where U is sub topology of ! and ! ∈ D8, 9E. Definition: cause/effect integrated information of 8 over 9 by V < 9|8 ≔ min 0L- < 9|8 , - < 9 |8 ⨂- < 9 |8 M where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E. In this definition the minimum is taken over all the 2 |> |_|A|`a − 1 possible pairings 9 , 8 different from the trivial one ∅, ∅ , 9, 8 , which would make any repertoire factorizable.  < The e relative entropy of entanglement, bcd 9|8 which is the measure of entanglement in the density matrix - < 9|8 is the lower bound of the cause/effect integrated information and it’s upper bound is cause/effect information. < bcd 9|8 ≤ V < 9|8 ≤ ℐ< 9|8 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 58 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy where < bcd 9|8 ≔ mine3 - < 9|8 ||/#: / ≔ / ⊗ / ′ g Also, / ∈ ℍ , / ′ ∈ ℍ ′ and ℍ ⨂ℍ = ℍ> 6. Core Causes/Effects  Definition: The purview < 9hi< ≔ e9 | max>∈ V < 9|8 g, is defined a core effect/cause of 8, where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E.  The corresponding value of V < is denoted by < V < 8 ≔ max>∈ V < 9|8 = V < ?9hi< l8B where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E.  The associated repertoires are called global given by < -m < < l8B ⊗ 8 ≔ - < ?9hi< < < &n q opq q |nopq | < Where rhi< complement 9hi< , i.e. rhi< ≔ Λ\9hi< , where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E  < The corresponding value of bcd is denoted by < < < < l8B bcd 8 ≔ max>∈ bcd 9|8 = bcd ?9hi<  where C ∈ Dℯ, ;E 7. Integrated Information of Mechanism  The integrated information of 8 is defined as ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 59 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy V 8 ≔ mineV ℯ 8 , V ; 8 g  If V 8 = 0 then either V ℯ 9|8 = 0, ∀9 or V ; 9|8 = 0, ∀9. If, V 8 > 0 then it creates a concept.  We will define integrated entanglement information as ℯ ; bcd 8 ≔ minubcd 8 , bcd 8 v  It is interesting to note that since, entanglement entropy is the lower bound, hence if there is entanglement in quantum system then that would lead to a concept 8. Conceptual Structure  For any mechanism 8 ∈ ℯ ; the triple ?V 8 ; -m 8 , -m 8 B with V 8 > 0 is called a concept associated with V 8 , denoted by x 8 . The conceptual structure, y is defined as follows i.e. y ≔ x 8 | V 8 z "ℎ| }"|~•€"| Where ⊂ is the subset of topology, }•‚•ƒ€" ‚} ‚• 8 A∈ of set Λ. 9. Integrated Information of System  Conceptual space is metric space of conceptual structure. metric Δ defined as, given two conceptual structures y and yℛ , where , ℛ ⊂ Δ y† , yℛ ≔ |‖y ‖ − ‖yℛ ‖| where ‖y ‖ ≔ ˆ V 8 l3 ?-m< 8 Bl <∈Dℯ,;E A∈ < is the conceptual information and 3 ?-m ISSN: 2153-8212 < 8 B is entropy of density matrix -m Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. 8 . www.JCER.com 60 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy  It is again interesting two see that if we replace bcd 8 in place of V it serves as a lower bound to conceptual information, hence we define conceptual entanglement information as, ‖y ‖d‰Š ≔ ˆ bcd 8 l3 ?-m< 8 Bl <∈Dℯ,;E A∈ Which serves as the lower bound to conceptual information   Giulio Tononi defines Integrated conceptual information Φ in his final paper on IIT as “Conceptual information that is generated by a system above and beyond the conceptual information generated by its (minimal) parts…...” Considering system as topology we define Φ ≔ min ⊂ Δ y , y Œ The measure of consciousness due to entropoy. We can’t certainly about the relation of Φ and etegalment but to certain extent entegelment can cause consciousness. 10. Disscusion and Conslusion This theory helps to understand the relationship between entropy and consciousness, it also suggests that entanglement can cause cansioness. This explains the breakdown of wave function due to entanglement. This theory can help us to understand how quantum phenomena leads to classical reality at large scale and why quantum phenomena are not generally observed at large scale thereby generating a relationship between classical and quantum physics. Received December 14, 2020; Accepted February 7, 2021 References 1. Johannes Kleiner, Sean Tull (2202), The Mathematical Structure of Integrated Information Theory. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.07655 2. Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014), From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0. PLoS Computational Biology, 10(5). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 61 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 55-61 Sharma, S., Entropic Integrated Information Theory: Theory of Consciousness due to Entropy 3. Zanardi, Paolo & Tomka, Michael & Campos Venuti, Lorenzo. (2018). Quantum Integrated Information Theory. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.01421 4. Petz D. (2008), Prerequisites from Quantum Mechanics. In: Quantum Information Theory and Quantum Statistics. Theoretical and Mathematical Physics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74636-2_2 5. Petz D. (2008), Information and its Measures. In: Quantum Information Theory and Quantum Statistics. Theoretical and Mathematical Physics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74636-2_3 6. Petz D. (2008), Entanglement. In: Quantum Information Theory and Quantum Statistics. Theoretical and Mathematical Physics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74636-2_4 7. Sharma, S. (2020). Quantum Information, Entanglement and Entropy. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/a3whf 8. Kleiner, J. (2020), Mathematical Models of Consciousness. Entropy 2020, 22, 609. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

505 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes Research Essay The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes Satinder S. Malik* Abstract Knowledge rides on words. If the names do not correctly represent the knowledge then it is bound to create hurdles in conceptualization, intuition and further enhancement of knowledge. The languages evolved through deep meditations and intelligent thought processes. The words need to be correct to the context and should not be used as if they are part of a trend or fashion. Keywords: Universe, gravity, mass, Rig Veda, dark matter, dark energy, Big Bang, Galaxy, intergalactic space. 1. Introduction The language is considered as old as the cosmos. Language is connected to the origin of the cosmos. It is known as Nadbrahma (expansive vibrations of musical notes). If you follow #nasahubble page on Instagram then you can hear the music of the universe. The Hubble telescope can pick up the radio, optical and other frequencies from distant stars and galaxies, and these are given equivalent sound notes and the music is assembled. The frequencies are also like mathematical infinite series and they can be compared to the sound spectrum to make it compatible with human reception. Some of the basic laws of waves whether machinal or electromagnetic or cosmic rays are the same for all. This indicates that the basic intelligent structure of the Cosmos is simple, repetitive and layered. Speech emanates from Para. Developing in Pashyanti, its two branches grow. In Madhyama it is laden with flowers and in Vaikhari it bears fruit. The order in which it develops is reversed to that rhythm as well. The vowels and consonants have their origin in primordial cosmic sounds. As per Sankhya Philosophy, the ego and the mind originate from nature. When the galaxies form, the communication between conscient beings (higher intelligence) takes place at the highest level ‘Para’. Depending on the medium of communication of the Jeeva in various bodies, Prajapati creates the speech from his mind. He gives it to Devas and then to the mortals. बृह ते थमं वाचो अ ं य ैरत नामधे यं दधानाः । यदे षां े ं यद र मासी ेणा तदे षां िनिहतं गुहािवः ॥(ऋ. 10.71.12) O lord of Infinite Speech, Brihaspati, the first and original form of eternal speech, which is the integration of name, word, and factual reality, which the sages receive and bear in mind and articulate at the dawn of human creation, lies immanent in the universal mind. It is borne in the best and immaculate minds of the sages who make it manifest from there by divine inspiration in a state of grace. * Correspondence author: Dr. Satinder S. Malik, Independent Researcher, India. E-mail: adventuressmalik@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 506 2. The Universe and its Origin The word universe (uni-verse or one verse or a stanza) etymologically refers to one galaxy but today it is being used s a substitute for the word cosmos. The verse may contain many words and words are made of consonants and vowels which may point to different wave strings and fundamental particles of existence. The one verse may, therefore, point to a galaxy and many different verses mean different galaxies. The theory of the Big Bang is the theory of the creation of our galaxy and similar is the process for other galaxies and the cycle of collapse and creation for individual galaxies. The theory of the creation of the cosmos is different, it will entail the history of the formation of five basic dimensions of the universe viz consciousness, time, space, energy, and matter. The Big Bang Theory is about the evolution of the universe. The idea of Hirayangarbha (Golden Womb) has been referred to in Puranas in many places. The description is also the same. The word universe (uni-verse or one verse or a stanza) etymologically refers to one galaxy but today it is being used s a substitute for the word cosmos. The theory of the Big Bang is the theory of the creation of our galaxy and similar is the process for other galaxies and the cycle of collapse and creation for individual galaxies. The theory of the creation of the cosmos is different, it will entail the history of the formation of five basic dimensions of the universe viz consciousness, time, space, energy, and matter. The timelines for the Big Bangi are 10-43 seconds in which the Universe took shape in 10-6 seconds, the formation of basic elements happened in 3 seconds, the radiation Era that lasted 10,000 years, and so on. The interpretation of these timelines by the scientists lacks a perspective when they decide the age of the universe. The primaeval atom from where the big bang happened was containing all the compressed matter in whichever form and therefore had a tremendous amount of gravity. This aspect has not been catered to by scientists. These timelines when applied to such a time system (of a Black Hole) will give nonlinear timelines. Sagittarius A* is a supermassive black hole (400 million times the mass of the Sun) at the centre of our galaxy. It is 26,000 light-years from the Solar System. Emma Osborne, an astrophysicist at the University of Southampton told an audience at New Scientist Live, “Anything mass will stretch space-time. And the heavier something is, or the more mass it has, the more it will stretch space-time. “If you were to stand just outside the event horizon of Sagittarius A*, and you stood there for one minute, 700 years would pass because time passes so much slower in the gravitational field there than it does on Earth.” The phenomenon of different speeds of time has also been described in Puranas. The book, ‘Beyond Common Sense’ narrates the story of King Kakudumi and his daughter Revathi visiting the galactic centre. If we apply this kind of nonlinear timeline to the age of the Milky Way, the preset timeline of the universe being 14-18 billion years old would stretch to great lengths. It may come close to 432 billion yearsii. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 507 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 3. Gravity Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) was an English mathematician and physicist. In 1687, he presented the inverse square law of gravitation in "Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica. The legend goes that Newton discovered Gravity when he saw a falling apple while thinking about the forces of nature. He termed it as spooky action at a distance. The words, sometimes, act as authentications seals and point to the source of knowledge. The word ‘gravity’ has a similar case. Our word gravity and its more precise derivative gravitation come from the Latin word gravitas, from ‘gravis’ (heavy), which in turn comes from a still more ancient root word thought to have existed because of numerous cognates in related languages. From ‘gwerh’ and ‘gwrhu’ comes the Latin ‘gravis’ and ‘gravitas’ meaning ‘heavy’ ‘weighty’ ‘important’ and the Latin ‘gravity’iii. The Sanskrit cognate is Gurutva (weighty, venerable), These words have common meanings of heaviness, importance, seriousness, dignity, grimness, etc. It is believed that the modern, physical sense of a field of attraction did not appear until Newton's time. Indeed, for Galileo, Newton, and scientists up to the beginning of the twentieth century, gravity was no more than an empty name for the phenomenon, a fact that they were well aware of. Newton's law of universal gravitation states the following. F=G m1 m2 / r2. Whereas F is proportional to M1M2 / r2, (directly proportional to both masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them). The proportionality becomes equal by inserting a value, a constant G. Value of G balances the equation with unknown factors which seem to affect the equation. It would not be wise to discard G despite all its theoretical limitations because it’s a practical constant. It represents the forces that balance out at a distance. The equation for Gravitational force was a theoretical deduction and Newton only solved the proportionality aspect by inserting G, he did not assign any numerical value to G. The universal constant G was calculated by observation (practical empirical experiments) and not theoretically. The practical values of G vary slightly during different measurements. 5. Ancient References to Gravity Rishi Kanad (pre-Mahabharta, 4000-6000 BC) propounded Visheshika Sutras (special knowledge or science) about the throwing of an object. He mentions gravity (Gurutva) and its effects in Visheshika Sutras about throwing an object…. गु य संयोगानामु ेपणम् ॥ १ ॥ १ ॥ २६ ॥ The motion of throwing upwards is due to the conjunction (resultant) of force and gravity. Falling of that object संयोगाभावे गु ISSN: 2153-8212 ात् पतनम् ॥ ५ ॥ १ ॥ ७॥ Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 508 In the absence of conjunction, falling is due to gravity. In the section where he describes forces acting on the launch of an arrow, he explains how the arrow falls. सं ाराभावे गु ात् पतनम् ॥ ५। १ । १८ ॥ In the absence of the efficacy of previous resultant actions, the arrow falls due to the effect of gravity. In the section where he describes forces acting on the flow of water, he explains how water falls. अपां संयोगाभावे गु ात् पतनम् ॥५॥२॥३॥ In the absence of conjunction, the water falls due to gravity. 5th-century scholar Aryabhata also mentioned gravitational force. He referred to spherical earth drawing things to it on all sides. He did it poetically by likening the earth to the florets of the spherical Kadamba flower. Brahmagupta, a 7th-century astronomer, was another mathematician who knew about the effects of Gurutva. Brahmagupta postulated correctly that there is an attraction towards the centre of Earth. Brahmagupta did not say anything about the inverse square law. He had not used gravity to predict the orbits of planets. “[Indian astronomers] used this argument to justify the concept of a self-sustaining spherical earth which did not need to be supported from the 'bottom' by Sesha or elephants or any other cosmological underpinnings, and which also would not be subject to beings falling off the ‘bottom’ of it,” said Kim Plofkeriv, assistant professor of mathematics at Union College in New York, in an email to Scrollv. Plofker has researched Sanskrit texts, including Aryabhata’s work, for the origins of mathematics in India. The equivalence principle states that two fundamentally different quantities, inertia, and passive gravitational mass, always be exactly proportional to one another. Inertia comes from the Latin word ‘iners’ meaning idle, sluggishvi Inertia is one of the primary manifestations of mass, which is a quantitative property of physical systems. Vis Insita- The innate force of matter; another name for vis inertiæ. It is that by which a vessel "keeps her way. The word ‘vis insita’ means an innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by which everybody, as much as in it lies, endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a right line. The word gravity reflected common meanings of heaviness, importance, seriousness, dignity, and grimness whereas mass comes directly from Latin massa meaning "kneaded dough, lump, that which adheres together like dough, "probably from Greek maza "barley cake, lump, mass, ball," which is related to masse in "to knead," from PIE root *mag- "to knead, fashion, fit”. vii The modern sense of the word mass in English was extended in the 1580s to "a large quantity, amount, or number". Meaning "bulk" in general is from c. 1600. As "the bulk or greater part of anything" from the 1620s. The strict sense in physics, "quantity of a portion of matter expressed in pounds or grams" is from 1704. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 509 The important fact is that both Gurutva (gravity) and Mahatva (mass) have been described quite well in Vedas and ancient works. The word Mahatva is used most commonly today in a sense of importance. The root word for Mahatva is Mahat. The Cosmos has been created in the principle of Mahat. The order of evolution of the universe according to Sānkhya and the evolution of Prakṛti (Nature) in its Vikaras (special attributes). Mahat contains all individual buddhis and all potential matter of the gross universe in its cosmic extent as the first manifest principle (tattva). Mahat in turn produces ahaṃkāra, the ego principle. That is how it comes to meaning as importance and ego of matter as to stay where it wants. The Anutva is subtle and subtler and Mahatava is gross and grosser. The entire creation is manifested in smaller existence (Bhuta) combined with different permutations and combinations under influence of different forces and making it bigger, stage by stage. At every stage, so combined smaller existence forms bigger existence and so on. The Gurutva is considered the opposite of the Mahtva. In the traditional sense, it is a quality that makes the mass behave with certain intelligent attributes. Jupiter is known as endowed with high Gurutva and has been granted as Guru of all Devas. Gurutva may reflect the intelligence (Buddhi) of a heavenly body. Earth is also conscious and follows astronomical laws and maintains balance. The movement of magma, plate tectonics, magnetic field, winds, ocean currents, and cyclic activities of various elements and occurrences indicate that Earth is conscious in a unique way. Recently papers were published showing water has memory, the dunes communicate with Earth other so do the star systems, but we may not know it yet. The interaction of a satellite to a planet system, their effects, and mutual dependence could be some of the intelligent features. The ability of the Moon to affect life on Earth and the stabilization it provides to the Earth’s orbit are well known. Io (a satellite of Jupiter) and Jupiter constitute a moon-planet system. Io influences Jupiter by supplying heavy ions to its magnetosphere, which dominates its energy and dynamics. Jupiter influences Io by tidally heating its interior, which in turn drives the volcanic activity on Io. The role of Io and Jupiter in their mutual interaction and the nature of their coupling have been studied by scientists. Savita- a Controlling Force of the Milky Way. The flow of spacetime has been described as Savita (with special attributes). Savita is the force of universal firmament that has been described in Rig Veda. The difference is spacetime as proposed by Einstien is without any intelligent attributes whereas Savita is with intelligent attributes. This is merely a change of perspective on whether we can call matter having unique intelligence as it can follow Padarth Dharma (properties of matter). This intelligence is not interpretative as in the case of humans but more like passive intelligence as a property of their design as reflected in mathematics and science in their creation and behaviour. Rig Veda 1.35.9 िहर%पािणः सिवता िवचष)िण भे *ावापृिथवी अंतरीयते । अपामीवां बाधते वेित सूय)मिभ कृ2ेन रजसा *ामृ णोित ॥ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 510 The gold-handed, all-beholding, Savitā is spread between the two regions of heaven and earth, dispels pain brings the sun, and overspreads the sky with control and radiance destroying darkness. Rig Veda 10.149.1 सिवता य4ैः पृिथवीमर6णाद 8ने सिवता *ाम9ंहत् । अ:िमवाधु ;द् धु िनम<=र;मतूत> ब?ं सिवता समु @म् ॥ Savitā has fixed the earth with fetters; Savitā has made the heaven firm in a plural place where there was no support; Savitā has milked the cloud of the firmament bound to the indestructible (ether) like a trembling horse. It is now evident that it may not be gravity alone that is responsible for making the earth go around the Sun. The ancient scriptures such as the Veda and Vaishesika Sutra of Kanad give an insight into a continuously controlled Cosmos based on Nature’s laws and also by intelligent interference of universal force. In many places, the translation of the word ‘Savitur’ is referred to Sun but that may not be proper. Savitur and Savita are found in many places in Veda (Knowledge). Savitur also cognates with Sagitur which could be a root word for Sagittarius. The same is also related to sagacious, sage, and also Sagitaviii. Sagita means arrow in Latin. Sagittariusix is usually depicted as a centaur holding a bow and arrow. The constellation’s symbol is ♐. It represents the archer. It is also associated with Crotus, the satyr who kept the company of the Muses on Mount Helicon. Sagittarius is one of the largest southern constellations. Sagittarius is the 15th largest constellation in the sky. It is easy to find because it lies in the centre of the Milky Way and its brightest stars form an asterism known as the Teapot. Sagittarius is known as Dhanu (in the Indian zodiac) and that also represents a bow. Karl Jansky, considered a father of radio astronomy, discovered in August 1931 that a radio signal was coming from a location in the direction of the constellation of Sagittarius, towards the centre of the Milky Way. The radio source later became known as Sagittarius Ax. Sagittarius or Savitur is considered the seat of Brahma. This is also the origin point which is described as Hiranyagarbha (golden womb) or golden egg as is in the theory of the Big bang. All radio signals, gravitational waves, and time-base signals (spacetime fabric) are controlled by Sagittarius. Sagittarius is the provider of intelligence as indicated by the most important and powerful hymn of Rigveda known as ‘Gayatri Mantra’. Ushas- a Controlling Force of the Sun. Usha is considered the daughter of the Sun representative of the Dawn, Usha is said to travel in a shining chariot drawn by ruddy horses or cows. Like a beautiful maiden dressed by her mother and covered with jewels. She is young, being born every day; and yet she is old, being immortal, wearing out the lives of successive generations, which disappear one after another, whilst she continues undying. She is young, being born every day; and yet she is old, being immortal, wearing out the lives of successive ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 511 generations, which disappear one after another, whilst she continues undying. The souls of the departed are said to go to her and to the sun. Rigveda 6.64.1 उदु श=रय उषसो रोचमाना अCथु रपां नोम) यो श<ः | कणEित िव:ा सुपथा सुगाFभू दु वGी दि;णामघोनी || The radiant Dawns have risen up for glory, in their white splendour like the waves of waters. She makes paths all easy, fair to travel, and, rich, hath shown herself benign and friendly. It is no wonder that the Sun’s rays fly to interact with the Heliosphere- the region surrounding the Sun and the solar system that is filled with the solar magnetic field and the protons and electrons of the solar wind. The heliosphere acts as a shield that protects the planets from interstellar radiation. This is not just a random protection shield that enables life in the solar system. Bhaga- a Controlling Force of the Cosmos. In Hindu philosophy, it is Bhagwan who is the preserver of the cosmos. He runs a show in which he influences his mechanism through other divine beings. The word ‘Bhaga’ means movement of light. Therefore the Bhagawan is who controls the movement of light and in that essence the one who controls time. In the cosmological sequence of evolution, the unseen energy reaches a state where it becomes forever (in both ways space and time). Control of this energy essentially enables control in the cosmos. The force in between the intergalactic space is Bhaga, in the galaxies, it is Savita, in the solar system it is Usha and on a planet it is Gurutva. Therefore, any being on any planet or anywhere in the cosmos is affected by the result of these forces. The interplay of these forces is the root cause of vacuum energy which is underlying background energy that exists in space throughout the cosmos. Vacuum energy is a special case of zero-point energy that relates to the quantum vacuum. Though it may appear that the force of ‘Bhaga’ moving the galaxies would be stronger its otherwise, ‘Savita’ is stronger than ‘Bhaga’ and ‘Ushas’ is stronger than ‘Savita’, only then they can make the difference within the galaxy and the Solar system respectively. 4. Black Hole or Dark Star The first real evidence for dark matter came in 1933 when Caltech’s Fritz Zwickyxi used the Mount Wilson Observatory to measure the visible mass of a cluster of galaxies and found that it was much too small to prevent the galaxies from escaping the gravitational pull of the cluster. Something else, concluded Zwicky, was acting like glue to hold clusters of galaxies together. He named the substance Dunkle Materie in German, or dark matter. Matter can be invisible only if it does not interact with light in terms of emission, reflection, refraction etc. The photons hold zero mass and anything that holds mass less than zero would not qualify as matter in a classical sense. Dark matter is a substance that is pre-matter. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 512 Only 4.6% of the universe's energy comprises the visible baryonic matter that constitutes stars, planets, and living beings. The rest is thought to be made up of dark energy (68%) and dark matter (27%). Hydrogen is the most abundant element (73-74%) in the cosmos followed by Helium (23-25%), Oxygen, Carbon, Neon, Iron and Nitrogen. It is the first stable element and acts as fuel for the stars. The stars convert the lighter matter into heavier matter and the remaining matter of the fused nuclei may be responsible for the emission of energy. In 1895, Rowland, studied the intensities of 39 elemental signatures in the solar spectrum. Leaving hydrogen and helium, the rest of the seen matter comprises less than 0.5% of the total cosmos. The Standard Model of Physics talks about fundamental particles The nucleus (protons and neutrons) contains almost all the mass of the atom, while the electrons are responsible for the chemical properties of the atom. These are further made up of 6 types of quarks, 6 types of leptons and 5 categories of many different types of Bosons (force interaction particles). Neutrinos are likely the most abundant particles in the universe and may be more common than photons, the basic unit of light. Neutrinos are a type of leptons, which are also fermions, and together with quarks make up matter. The difference between leptons and quarks is that leptons exist on their own, whereas quarks combine to form baryons. A neutrino is an exponentially small particle with no electrical charge. As other particles traverse galactic and extra-galactic distances, they can become deflected, scattered, or even stopped altogether by matter, gravitational and magnetic fields. Neutrinos can pass through all of these uninhibited, which makes them excellent sources of information from the far reaches of the galaxy. These subatomic particles are not stable and particles such as leptons and baryons decay by either the strong force or weak force (except for the proton). Neutrons have a mean life of approx 881 seconds. The life of Proton is {16.7 billion yottayears (1034 yr)}. The μ and τ muons, as well as their antiparticles, decay by the weak force. Neutrinos (and antineutrinos) do not decay, but a related phenomenon of neutrino oscillations is thought to exist even in vacuums. The electron {66,000 yottayears (6.6 × 1028 yr)} and its antiparticle, the positron, are theoretically stable due to charge conservation. These particles are made up of energy and they come to life depending on wave interaction. These are caused essentially by a collapsed wave function or a quantum excitation of a field or just an entangled vibrating string. Vyasa Muni in his teachings to Rama tells about many types of wave structures as ‘Pata’ (2D fabric-like cloth) made up of threads (energy channels), ‘Ghata’ (3 D spherical Structures), and ‘Kunda’ (hollow wells). The presence of a black hole can be inferred through its interaction with other matter and with electromagnetic radiation such as visible light. Black holes are considered objects whose gravitational fields are too strong for light to escape. This understanding is bound to change with the correct understanding of the force of gravity. Every formation of the cosmos has a definite objective. The nucleus of an atom is about 10-15 m in size, this means it is about 10-5 (or 1/100,000) of the size of the whole atom. A good comparison of the nucleus to the atom is like an apple where the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 513 nearest electron will be approx. 3 km away. This is what explains the density of the Black holes, that they cannot be made up of normal matter with electrons orbiting around but are made up of solid nuclear particles and their pre-matter forms kept together by the stronger nuclear force. The pre-matter is a product of the Black Holes as the matter is produced by Stars. The force which may attract and attach photons may be a different kind of fundamental force other than gravity. The Black holes are not holes but essentially Dark stars or black stars. The Black holes may churn out the fundamental particles such as protons and neutrinos, which after interaction with other particles or wave functions may lead to the creation of the basic element hydrogen. The external accretion disk forming quasars may be the input-output mechanism. The galaxies have originated from their central Black Holes which may act in cycles of expansion and contraction over huge time scales. These black holes also exert forces which are natural but which may also contain intelligent control mechanisms. More about the central black holes of the milky way is discussed in the last section. 5. Dark Energy The cosmological constant is a homogeneous energy density that causes the expansion of the universe to accelerate. The cosmological constant is the simplest realization of dark energy, which is the more generic name given to the unknown cause of the acceleration of the universexii. There was a difference in the observed and predicted value. If the value of the constant is different then the cause is referred to as ‘Dark Energy’. We know how much dark energy there is because we know how it affects the universe's expansion. It turns out that roughly 68% of the universe is dark energy. xiii Intergalactic spacetime and spacetime inside a galaxy may have different formatting leading to the difference in values. This would come into perspective if we consider different space-time fabrics for every galaxy which arises out of the central black hole. Incidentally, in Hindu philosophy, this energy is depicted as Kali Shakti, the principal goddess, another form of Shiva, and (dark) energy of the Cosmos. For matter to appear, there is a state which is pre-matter and in a similar way for energy to appear there is a state called pre-energy. This state is of energy which is unseen or not capable of being attributed to and therefore known as Dark Energy. The forces in the Cosmos are resultant of the interplay of energy. These are referred to as ‘Bhava’ (affinity) and are the result of wave characteristics like coherence, spin or polarity of the wave function which continuously forms and decays and may become a stable structure spanning across the cosmos forever. These Bhava (forces) may have a disposition from the strongest to the weakest. That is integral to the structure of the universe and these forces are applied to similar types of interactive participants. For example, there is a strong nuclear force inside an atom but it doesn’t affect other things. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 514 6. Conclusion Philosophy paves the way for theories and theories combined with mathematics and/or experimental proof pave the way for science. The human mind carries out interactions with nature to understand and evolve. These interactions take place not only through the human sense organs or scientifically extended sensors but also through human perception. Human perception contains higher algorithms for receiving knowledge through the higher languages of Para and Pashyanti. The human mind needs to have correct conceptualisation with correct words for it to have better abstract imaging (pictographic processing by the brain, Pashyanti) of concepts and hence the concepts may be represented by the appropriate and correct words. Received August 02, 2022; Accepted November 6, 2022 References i http://patrickgrant.com/BBTL.htm The Big Bang - 10-43 seconds: The universe begins with a cataclysm that generates space and time, as well as all the matter and energy the universe will ever hold. For an incomprehensibly small fraction of a second, the universe is an infinitely dense, hot fireball. The prevailing theory describes a particular form of energy that can suddenly push out the fabric of space. At 10-35 to 10-33 seconds a runaway process called "Inflation" causes a vast expansion of space filled with this energy. The inflationary period is stopped only when this energy is transformed into matter and energy as we know it. The Universe Takes Shape - 10-6 seconds, after inflation, one-millionth of a second after the Big Bang, the universe continues to expand but not nearly so quickly. As it expands, it becomes less dense and cools. The most basic forces in nature become distinct. The particles smash together to form protons and neutrons. Formation of Basic Elements- 3 seconds: Protons and neutrons come together to form the nuclei of simple elements: hydrogen, helium, and lithium. It will take another 300,000 years for electrons to be captured into orbits around these nuclei to form stable atoms. The Radiation Era- 10,000 years: The first major era in the history of the universe is one in which most of the energy is in the form of radiation -- different wavelengths of light, X rays, radio waves, and ultraviolet rays. This energy is the remnant of the primordial fireball, and as the universe expands, the waves of radiation are stretched and diluted until today, they make up the faint glow of microwaves which bathe the entire universe. ii Beyond Common sense- dr Satinder Singh Malik (Author) Kindle Present Kalpa 5.784 Million Years represents restart of life on the Earth, Elapsed time in Present Manvantara 0.3 Million Years or 3,36,000 Years (Modern human origins). These timelines may vary due to faulty interpretation of ancient texts. iii https://stanford.io/3KvmumH iv iv v https://iks.iitgn.ac.in/kim-plofker-2020/ https://scroll.in/article/709070/newton-discovered-gravity-even-if-he-stood ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 4 | pp. 505-515 Malik, S. S., The Misnomers of Universe, Gravity and Black Holes 515 vi https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=mass https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=mass viii Southern constellation; ninth sign of the zodiac, late Old English, from Latin, literally "archer," properly "pertaining to arrows," from sagitta "arrow," which probably is from a pre-Latin Mediterranean language. https://www.etymonline.com/word/Sagittarius#etymonline_v_22603 sage (adj.) "wise, judicious, prudent," c. 1300 (late 12c. as a surname), from Old French sage "wise, knowledgeable, learned; shrewd, skillful" (11c.), from Gallo-Roman *sabius, from Vulgar Latin *sapius (also in Hindi- Sadhu) with -ous + stem of Latin sagax "of quick perception" (see sagacity). The sense of "skilled at discovering truths," especially as regards human natures, vii ix https://www.constellation-guide.com/constellation-list/sagittarius-constellation/ x https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sagittarius_A* xi https://bit.ly/3vQnnRK xii http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Cosmological_constant https://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focus-areas/what-is-dark-energy xiii ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| Februay 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 236-239 Kozlowski, M., On Empty Space 236 Opinion On Empty Space Miroslaw Kozlowski* Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland Abstract In this essay, we present fact well known to scientists that matter is empty with very small percentage of elementary particles and nuclei. We argue that one cannot develop special relativity, the notion of the spacetime and localization of consciousness in empty space. Keywords: Void, spacetime, atom, elementary particle, consciousness. In some sense man is a microcosmos of the Universe therefore what man is, is a clue to the Universe. We are enfolded in the Universe. David Bohm Electrical phenomena have been known for thousands of years, but the mysteries of the magnetic compass needle, the sparks of lightning, and the nature of electricity remained well into the nineteenth century. The situation towards the end of that century was summarized in a book that I bought as a child in a jumble sale for one penny. Entitled Questions and Answers in Science it had been published in 1898 and in answer to the question ‘What is electricity?’ it opined with Victorian melodrama that ‘Electricity is an imponderable fluid whose like is a mystery to man.’ What a difference a hundred years makes. Modern electronic Communications and whole industries are the result of Thomson’s discovery of the electron in 1897, answering the above question a full year before that book was published; news travels faster these days. Electrons flow through wires as current and power industrial society; they travel through the labyrinths of our central nervous system and maintain our consciousness; they are fundamental constituents of the atoms of matter and their motions from one atom to another underpin chemistry, biology, and life. The electron is a basic particle of all matter. It is the lightest particle with electric charge, stable and ubiquitous. The shapes of all solid structures are dictated by the electrons gyrating at the periphery of atoms. Electrons are in everything, so it is ironic that the discovery of this basic constituent of matter was a result of the ability developed in the nineteenth century to get rid of matter, to make a void. * Correspondence: Miroslaw Kozlowski, Prof. Emeritus, Warsaw University, Poland. Email: m.kozlowski934@upcpoczta.pl ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| Februay 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 236-239 Kozlowski, M., On Empty Space 237 For a long time, there had been a growing awareness that matter has mysterious properties, although initially it did not directly touch on the question of the void. The ancient Greeks had already been aware of some of these, such as the unusual ability of amber (electron is the Greek for amber) to attract and pick up pieces of paper when rubbed with fur. In more modern imagery, brush your hair rapidly with a comb and on a dry day you might even cause sparks to fly. Glass and gems also have this magical ability to cling to things after rubbing. By the Middle Ages the courts of Europe knew that this weird attraction is shared by many substances but only after rubbing. This led William Gilbert, court physician to Elizabeth I, to propose that matter contained an ‘electric virtue’ and that electricity is some ‘imponderable fluid’ (as in my 1898 book) that can be transferred from one substance to another by rubbing. Gaining or losing this electric virtue was akin to the body being positively or negatively ‘charged’. Benjamin Franklin in America, taking time off from flaming the constitution of what would become the USA, was fascinated by electrical phenomena, notably lightning. A thunder cloud is a natural electrostatic generator, capable of creating millions of volts and sparks that can kill. Franklin’s insight was that bodies contain latent electrical power, which can be transferred from one body to another. But what this imponderable fluid was, no one knew. Today, we know that it is due to electrons, which contribute less than 1 part in 2,000 of the mass of a typical atom, and as only a small percentage of them are involved in electric current anyway, the change in mass of a body when electrically charged is so trifling as to be undetectable. How then was this imponderable fluid to be isolated, catalogued, and studied? Electricity normally flows through things, such as wires, and as it was impossible to look inside wires, the idea developed of getting rid of the wires and looking at the sparks. Lightning showed that electric current can pass through the air and from this grew the idea that the flow of electric current might be revealed ‘out away from the metal wires that more usually conduct it and hide it. So scientists set about making sparks in gases contained in glass tubes. Air at atmospheric pressure transmitted current but obscured the flow of electrons. By gradually removing more and more of the gas, it was hoped that eventually only the electric current would remain. It was following the industrial revolution and the development of better vacuum pumps that bizarre apparitions appeared as scientists electrified the thin gas in vacuum tubes. As a result of this, electricity gradually revealed its secrets. At one fiftieth of atmospheric pressure, the current produced luminous clouds floating in the air, which convinced the English physicist William Crookes that he was producing ectoplasm, much beloved of Victorian seances, and he turned to spiritualism. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| Februay 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 236-239 Kozlowski, M., On Empty Space 238 The colours of the light in these wispy apparitions depended on the gas, such as the yellow light of sodium and green of mercury familiar in modern illuminations. They are caused by the current of electrons bumping into the atoms of the gas and liberating energy from them as light. As the gas pressure dropped further the lights eventually disappeared but a subtle shimmering green colour developed on the glass surface near to the source of the current. In 1869, came the critical discovery that objects inside the tube cast shadows in the green glow, proving that there were rays in motion coming from the source of electric current and hitting the glass except when things were in the way. Crookes discovered that magnets would deflect the rays, showing that they were electrically charged, and in 1897 J. J. Thomson using both magnets and electric forces (by connecting the terminals of a battery to two metal plates inside the tube) was able to move the beam around (in effect a prototype of a television set). By adjusting the magnetic and electric forces he was able to work out the properties of the constituents of the electric current. Thus did he discover the electron, whose mass is trifling even compared to that of an atom of the lightest element, hydrogen. From ’the generality of his results, which cared naught for the nature of any gas left in the tube or the metal wires that brought the electric current into the vacuum tube, he inferred that electrons are electrically charged constituents of all atoms. Once it was realized that electrons are at least 2,000 times lighter than the smallest atom, scientists understood the enigma of how electricity would flow so easily through copper wires. The existence of the electron overthrew forever the age-old picture of atoms as the ultimate particles and revealed that atoms have a complex inner structure, electrons encircling a compact central nucleus. Phillipe Lenard bombarded atoms with beams of electrons and found that the electrons passed through as if nothing was in their way. This almost paradoxical situation—matter that feels solid is nonetheless transparent on the atomic scale—was encapsulated by Lenard with the remark, ‘the space occupied by a cubic meter of solid platinum is as empty as the space of stars beyond the Earth’. Look at the dot at the end of this sentence. Its ink contains some 100 billion atoms of carbon. To see one of these with the naked eye, you would need to magnify the dot to be 100 metres across. While huge, this is still imaginable. But to see the atomic nucleus you would need that dot to be enlarged to 10,000 kilometres: as big as the earth from pole to pole. The simplest atom of hydrogen can give an idea of the scales and emptiness involved. The central nucleus is a single positively charged particle known as a proton. It is the path of the electron, remote from the central proton, that defines the outer limit of the atom. Journeying out from the centre of the atom, by the time we reach the edge of the proton we have only completed ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| Februay 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 236-239 Kozlowski, M., On Empty Space 239 one ten thousandth of the journey. Eventually we reach the remote electron, whose size also is trifling, being less than one thousandth the size of the proton, or a ten millionth that of the atom. So having made a near perfect vacuum, which led to the discovery that atomic matter contains electrons, we appear to have come full circle in finding that an atom is apparently a perfect void: 99.9999999999999 per cent empty space. Lenard’s comparison hardly does the atoms emptiness justice: the density of hydrogen atoms in outer space is huge compared to the density of particulate matter within each of those atoms! The atomic nucleus also is an ephemeral, wispy thing. Magnify a neutron or proton a thousand times and you would find that they too have a rich internal structure. Like a swarm of bees, which seen from afar appears as a dark spot whereas a close up view shows the cloud buzzing with energy, so it is with the neutron or proton. To a low-powered image they appear like simple spots, but when viewed at high resolution they are found to be clusters of smaller particles called quarks. To reveal the quarks we would need to expand the dot out to the Moon, and then keep on going another twenty times more distance. A quark is as small compared to a proton or neutron as either of those is relative to an atom. Between the compact central nucleus and the remote whirling electrons, atoms in practice terms are mostly empty space, and the same can be said of the innards of the atomic nucleus. In summary, the fundamental structure of the atom is beyond real imagination, and its emptiness is profound. Now, let us formulate the SR postulates: 1. There exists inertial reference frames; and 2. In each inertial reference frames the Law of Nature are the same. Now how the inertial reference frame are defined, for example, in 3D? The axes of inertial reference frames are defined by the motion of solid body with constant velocity. But in void there are no solid body, so inertial reference frame does not exist. So one cannot develop special relativity, the notion of the spacetime and localization of consciousness in empty space. Received December 30, 2019; Accepted January 29, 2020 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

81 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts Perspective Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts Sarma N. Gullapalli* Abstract Wave-particle duality, inseparability of the observed from the observer, and the role of observation in Niels Bohr’s complementarity principle, have been central to most discussions in the quantum mechanical context of consciousness and monistic Advaita Vedanta philosophy. With regard to wave-particle duality and complementarity, recently it has been shown that the physical particle always remains particle and the mathematical wave function associated with it always remains a wave defining probabilities. This impacts viewpoints not only of wave-particle duality, but also of wave function collapse, entanglement, action-at-a-distance and others, often cited in context of consciousness. We discuss these new developments, improve objective clarity and reduce subjective vagueness regarding quantum mechanical phenomena. Additionally, we show that when probability is quantified, claims made about consciousness influencing physical outcomes through observation have such low probability (< 10-10) that for all practical purposes they can be regarded as speculations. Keywords: Consciousness, quantum mechanics, duality, monism, observer, observed, Vedanta. Introduction We first elaborate and discuss some important terms. Wherever possible the source is indicated, such as (oxford) for Oxford Languages. Consciousness (oxford) “The awareness or perception of something by a person. The fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world”. Swami Chinmayananda (1969 Kindle Life, p58) “The core of the human personality is the Consciousness, which is the ‘Life Center’ around which all the activities of the body, mind and intellect revolve”. Niels Bohr (1961 Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, 92-93) “In the account of psychical experiences, we meet conditions of observation and corresponding means of expression still further removed from the terminology of physics. Quite apart from the extent to which the use of words like instinct and reason in the description of animal behavior is necessary and justifiable, the word consciousness, applied to oneself as well as to others, is indispensable when describing human situation … In deeds the use of words like thought and feeling does not refer to a firmly connected causal chain, but to experiences which exclude each other because of different distinctions between the conscious content and the background which we loosely term ourselves”. *Correspondence: Sarma N. Gullapalli, Independent Researcher. Email: sngullapalli@hotmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 82 Von Neumann (1955 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Chapter IV) proves that the quantum mechanical measurement (when an observer is involved in the measurement) must include the observer’s eyes, optic nerves ending in an area of brain - which we may call consciousness. Extensions of this by Stapp (1993) include ‘feeling’, and by Wigner (1967) include the reverse process, the impact of consciousness on the physical state of the measured system. Consciousness, regarded as associated with brain which is fundamentally made up of particles of matter and energy which is the domain of quantum mechanics, can therefore be investigated in terms of quantum mechanics, a field of active research by neuroscientists, biologists and others. Early on, Niels Bohr (1934, cited by Bohm 1951 p170) “had suggested that thought involves such small amounts of energy that quantum theoretical limitations play an essential role in determining its character” in the functioning of the brain”. But did not mention consciousness. A comprehensive review of research on quantum physical functioning of the brain can be found in Betony Adams and Francesco Petuccione (2020) which briefly touches upon consciousness also. A detailed review of quantum approaches to consciousness can be found in H. Atmanspacher (2020) which discusses three main approaches: “(1) consciousness is a manifestation of quantum processes in the brain (2) quantum concepts are used to understand consciousness without referring to brain activity, and (3) matter and consciousness are regarded as dual aspects of one underlying reality”. The first approach is closest to quantum physical reality with its wave functions defining probabilities in the physical brain, the second one is a model fashioned on the lines of quantum physics but is not quantum physics, and the third can be entertained without any reference to quantum physics, as a general philosophy that has been around for centuries long before quantum physics. We are primarily concerned with approach (1) which is based physical quantum mechanics, while commenting on meta-physical (2) and (3) also. In contrast to these efforts to explain consciousness in terms of quantum mechanics, there have also been efforts to explain quantum mechanics in terms of consciousness. For example Manousakis (2006 ‘Founding quantum theory on the basis of consciousness’), Goswami (1993 ‘The Self-Aware Universe, how consciousness creates the material world’) along the lines of Vedantic spiritual philosophy. From the above, we can regard consciousness, which is essentially subjective, in two fundamentally different perspectives: (a) physical consciousness as pertaining to a zone of physical brain along with its electromagnetic signals that may extend into space outside the brain, and (b) meta-physical consciousness as pertaining to strictly non-physical meta-physical projections of the brain that may extend into the realm of spirituality. Objective (oxford) “Not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts”. Subjective (oxford) “Based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions”. Heisenberg (1958 Physics and Philosophy pp 44 - 58) regards subjectivity as pertaining to the statistical variation from person to person in the matter of how the experiment is set up and how the results are observed, similar to the statistical errors inherent in the measuring equipment, all of which can be made practically small, limited only by the uncertainty principle, which limit in ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 83 most cases is exceedingly small : “The probability function combines objective and subjective elements … In the ideal case the subjective element may be practically zero”. He does not mention consciousness. Observer (oxford) “A person who watches or notices something”. Observation (oxford) “The action or process of observing something or someone carefully or in order to gain information”. Epistemology (oxford) “The theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion”. Scientists justify their belief in quantum mechanics based on evidence of experiments which can be verified by others within the margins of (sufficiently small) instrument errors and (sufficiently small) errors in observation of instrument readings by persons conducting the experiments, and so such evidence-based belief is essentially objective. In contrast, opinions are weak in evidence and are mostly subjective. Niels Bohr (1984) ‘Discussion with Einstein on epistemological problem in atomic physics’ is informative about his views which are essentially objective and not subjective, observation essentially meaning measurement using instruments. Quantum Mechanics: Oxford: “The branch of mechanics that deals with the mathematical description of the motion and interaction of subatomic particles, incorporating the concepts of quantization of energy, wave-particle duality, the uncertainty principle, and the correspondence principle”. We emphasize the basis on physical particles of matter and energy, not merely a mathematical edifice. For example, in Schrodinger’s wave equation (i∙ℏ)(∂/∂t) = H defining the wave function , Hamiltonian function H is physical energy, involving physical parameters of the particle such as mass and momentum. Physical parameters result in finite velocity of propagation of wave function, less than speed of light for mass particles such as electron, and equal to speed of light for energy particles such as photon. Schrodinger’s wave equation is grounded in physical reality, is not merely a mathematical construct. Probability is not unique to quantum mechanics, was extensively used in classical physics long before quantum mechanics (Goodman 2000 Statistical Optics; Statistical Mechanics; Boltzmann’s statistical formulation of effects of temperature foundational to thermodynamics). But what is unique in quantum mechanics is that probability, a non-negative quantity, is expressed as magnitude squared of probability amplitude function (the wave function) which is sinusoidal with both positive and negative excursions that is characteristic of wave propagation (non-negative classical probability does not result in wave propagation – herein lies the genius of Schrodinger). The occurrence of “imaginary” number i (= √(-1)) in Schrodinger’s wave equation (and also elsewhere in quantum mechanics) has evoked the view of unreality in quantum mechanics. But there is nothing “imaginary” (an unfortunate misleading terminology used in mathematics) about √(-1). The algebra of complex numbers (x + iy) where x and y are real numbers, can be just as rigorously developed without i, by using pair of real numbers (x, y), defined as follows: addition: (x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x1 + x2, y1 + y2); multiplication: (x1, y1)∙(x2, y2) = (x1∙x2 – y1∙y2, x1∙y1 + x2∙y2). It is readily verified that (0, 1)∙(0, 1) = (-1, 0), that is, (0, 1) = √(-1, 0), which is i. In this formulation, both x and y axes are real, y is not “imaginary”. But this algebra is messy to keep track of, while (x + iy) permits the use of ordinary algebra which is very ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 84 convenient. Complex algebra is widely used in classical physics also, for convenience, especially in the analyses of wave propagation, and classical physics is all about real physical quantities. There is nothing unreal about quantum mechanics. A fundamental postulate of quantum mechanics is Heisenberg’s uncertainly principle (which can be derived from the Fourier transform relationship between conjugate pair of variables such as position p and momentum q, see Papoulis 1962, p 62-63) says that for a complementary pair of physical quantities, such as position p and momentum q of a particle, if p is uncertainty in p and q is uncertainty in q, then p∙q ≥ h/4 where h is Planck’s constant (6.63∙10-34 kg∙m2/s). That is, both cannot be simultaneously defined to arbitrarily high accuracy. In classical mechanics there is no such limit. Some scholars cite this to claim that everything in the world is uncertain, “Maya”, illusory. Note that h is an extremely small quantity, and so in the macro world, like a stone, pot or our body, p and q can be practically extremely small and still satisfy the uncertainty constraint. Errors in our yard sticks, speedometers and even laser gages are orders of magnitude higher. World is not illusory. Application of the mathematical framework of quantum mechanics to meta-physics can lead to unnecessary difficulties due to the finite velocity of propagation of wave function as defined by Schrodinger’s wave equation, whereas meta-physical thought processes and meta-physical consciousness can instantly reach the far corners of the universe. Telepathy (oxford) “The supposed communication of thoughts or ideas by means other than the known senses”. Fact (oxford) “A thing that is known or proved to be true”. Speculation (oxford) “The forming of a theory or conjecture without firm evidence”. In the context of quantum mechanics which is fundamentally probabilistic, wherein, to quote a leading physicist in a TV documentary (NOVA, Einstein’s Quantum Riddle), “everything is possible”, how does one separate fact from speculation? The answer lies in “with what probability?” In the range of all possible potentialities with total probability of 1, an event with probability of 10-10 may be regarded as lacking evidence and hence speculative as compared to an event with probability of 0.99 which may be regarded as fact. Brian Greene (2020, p 297-299) estimates that long after our world, solar system and all galaxies have dissipated into swarms of wandering particles, there is a non-zero probability that a subset of them would coalesce into what constitutes a human brain (called Boltzmann brain, named after the scientist who first studied molecular random motions in the context of thermodynamics), if we wait for 1000000000068 (that is 1 followed by 680000000000 zeros) years! Without doubt, we can call occurrence of such an event speculation. Moreover, such a Boltzmann brain will exist only for a fleeting moment before dispersing, a dead brain without blood circulation even for a fleeting moment. This goes to show to what unrealistic lengths probability theory can be stretched. Quantum mechanical “everything is possible” is highly misleading if the associated probability is not quantified. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 85 Part 1. Quantum Mechanics We begin with a summary of a recent key new development (--- 2018, 2019) that is foundational to what follows, which explains wave-particle duality, which Richard Feynman (1965 Lectures on Physics volume 3 p 1-1) had called “the only mystery of quantum mechanics”, without Bohr’s complementarity principle that has been like a doorway through which have passed many a claim that consciousness influences the duality experiments. 1.1 Wave-particle duality: Particle always remains particle, wave always remains wave. Particle such as an electron or a photon occupies non-zero volume in space, both due to inherent physical nature, and also due to (Heisenberg’s) uncertainty principle. Wave function (r, t) associated with the particle is a mathematical probability amplitude complex number that defines the probability |(r, t)|2 of the particle being at spatial point r, at time t, symbol |∙| denoting the magnitude of complex number. Thus we need to represent the physical particle by a mathematical point. Without loss of generality we can choose the centroid (similar to center of gravity) of the blob that is the physical particle including (Heisenberg’s) uncertainty spread, as shown in Figure 1 (a). In general, |(r, t)|2 can be non-zero over a region of space larger than the particle, because the particle can possibly be at any one of the many points over the larger region. When the particle is in motion, and there are multiple possible paths, such as a photon hitting a beam splitter with two possible paths: reflected and transmitted, or a photon reaching the two slits in Young’s double slit experiment (discussed later) with two possible paths, one through each slit, then its wave function necessarily explores all paths and define corresponding probabilities, total probability always being equal to 1, as the particle is there somewhere in space. (a) Mathematical wave function spans larger volume than physical particle (b) Divisible wave function explores multiple paths while indivisible particle follows only one path Figure 1. Particle always remains particle and its wave function always remains wave This means that, as shown in Figure 1 (b), the mathematical wave function is divisible among the multiple paths, while the physical particle (quantum – electron or photon) is indivisible by definition of “quantum” in quantum mechanics. Thus, based on the very fundamental precepts of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 86 quantum mechanics, namely that (a) the particle’s divisible wave function defines the mathematical probability of its position (it also defines other physical aspects of the particle, but that is beyond the scope of our discussion) along multiple paths and (b) the physical particle is indivisible, we see that (a) the indivisible particle always remains particle, and (b) its divisible wave function always remains wave. As we shall see, this dispels most misconceptions about quantum mechanics and replaces subjective vagueness with objective clarity. The prevailing view of wave-particle duality, namely that the particle somehow changes to wave, or wave somehow changes to particle, has a history, a short review of which helps dispel this misconception. Early on, pondering about the wave function of a photon, Albert Einstein had suggested interpreting the electromagnetic wave (which in classical physics is a physical entity) as the probability amplitude (wave function) for the photon. Max Born then generalized this to apply to any particle such as an electron (Max Born, Nobel Lecture 1954 “The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics”); the wave nature of electron was also experimentally confirmed. Classical electromagnetic wave being a physical wave, and electron being a physical particle, it was initially (wrongly) thought that the associated wave function is also a physical wave. Because wave function spatially covers a much larger space than the particle at any given time, it was initially (wrongly) thought that a particle could be at more than one place at the same time. The fallacy here is that the wave function is not a physical entity. Probability amplitude is purely a mathematical construct, nothing physical. When we draw a graph of a probability density function (a bar graph or bell shaped graph) there is no physical entity with that shape. This fact is now recognized by most quantum physicists, but the old notion of wave function as a physical aspect of the particle still persists among some scientists. According to quantum mechanics, the physical particle can be observed to be at only one place at any given time. As an analogy, consider a fugitive escaped from prison, and is expected to be in one of ten neighboring towns T1 to T10, for which we assign probabilities P1 to P10, total being 1. This does not mean that the fugitive is in all ten towns at the same time. At any given time, there is probability that he is in respective towns. 1.2 Niels Bohr’s complementarity principle, and consciousness dark screen with slits white screen with interference pattern Source of light dark room Figure 2. Young’s double slit experiment ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 87 In 1803 Thomas Young demonstrated the wave nature of light by performing an elegant simple experiment shown in Figure 2. In a dark room, on one side of a dark screen is a point source of light, and on the other side is a white screen. In the dark screen there are two narrow parallel slits close together. On the white screen, instead of just two adjacent bright patches of light with darkness between the two on the center line as would be expected if light rays were made up of particles, one sees several alternating bright and dark bands of light with the main bright band peaking on the center line where it should have been dark. The only way this can happen is if light behaves like a wave. The two wavelets, one from each slit, reinforce each other (in phase) on the center line, and cancel each other (out of phase) at the dark bands, forming an interference pattern, like waves on water passing through two narrow nearby gaps. In 1864, based on equations developed by himself, James Clerk Maxwell predicted electromagnetic wave propagation exactly at the speed of light, suggesting that light is an electromagnetic wave. During 1880s Heinrich Hertz experimentally generated electromagnetic radio waves, confirming Maxwell’s predictions. Thus, by the end of 19th century the wave nature of light was firmly established. Then, when particle nature of light was required by quantum mechanics, Young’s double slit experiment took center stage for re-examination. A particle of light (photon) can go through one or the other slit, not both. But observed interference pattern requires that the photon go through both slits like a wave! Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr discussed this at great length (J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek, 1984, pp 9-31; Niels Bohr, 1984 ‘Discussion with Einstein on epistemological problem in atomic physics’), with Young’s experimental set up visualized with hypothetical modifications to detect particle nature of light at the slits by cooking up elaborate schemes, and came to the conclusion that if particle nature is detected, then the interference pattern must disappear (decades later, experiments with single photon detectors at the slits confirmed this). Whether light behaves like a particle or wave depends on experimental setup! How is this possible? To answer this, Bohr postulated Complementarity Principle that almost begs the question: If experimental set up is to observe particle nature of light, then light will behave like a particle; if experimental set up is to observe wave nature of light, then light will behave like a wave. It appears that Bohr got his idea of complementarity during discussions with psychologist Edgar Rubin about bi-stable human perception of an object, such as the shape in Figure 3 which is seen either as a vase or human face but not both at the same time. This has induced some scholars to include the experimenter’s subjective perception, consciousness, in Bohr’s complementarity principle. But in all his papers on complementarity Bohr makes it clear that by observation he means the experimental setup, and makes no reference to consciousness (Bohr 1949 ‘Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics’; Holton, 1970. The Roots of Complementarity; Pauli 1948 Dialectica special issue). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 88 Figure 3. Edgar Rubin’s bi-stable perception: vase or human face, not both at same time (source: https://qbism.art) Albert Einstein vehemently disagreed, in effect saying how can an inanimate particle know what the experimental set up is about? Decades later, when fast single photon detectors became available, highly sophisticated experiments were conducted, which confirmed Bohr’s complementarity principle (Kim et al, 2000; Jaques et al, 2006). The implications of Bohr’s complementarity principle are huge for most technologies that rely on quantum mechanical behavior of single photons, such as quantum communications and quantum computers, where beam splitters and beam combiners are used in various interferometric configurations (the basic principle is same as Young’s double slit experiment), wherein any knowledge of “which way” the particle went, in effect detecting particle nature, would destroy the crucial interference phenomenon! This “which way” criterion has been widely applied in designing and analyzing quantum systems, with rapidly increasing difficulty as the complexity of systems increases. Here again, experimental knowledge of which way has been extended by some scholars to include the consciousness of the experimenter. Recently it has been shown (Sarma 2018, 2019) that the results of the highly sophisticated experiments that confirmed Bohr’s complementarity principle can all be explained on the basis of coherence and alignment considerations of the (mathematical) wave functions which depend only on the experimental setup, without using Bohr’s Complementary Principle, which, though true, is thus redundant. That is, the role of observation in particle or wave behavior of photon can be entirely dispensed with, and consequently, the inclusion of consciousness in Bohr’s complementarity (he did not mention it) is not justified. This redeems Albert Einstein’s view that the inanimate photon does not know that it is being observed. 1.3 Joint wave function of measurement and consciousness: As proved by von Neumann, in quantum measurement all components (the measured object, the measuring instrument, eyes of the observer reading the instrument, his or her brain, and a terminating area of brain called consciousness) must be included in a joint wave function, and not independently. The state of a component is a projection of the joint state for that component. This is illustrated in Figure 4 for the case of Young’s double slit experiment discussed earlier, with detectors at the slits to detect (observe) particle nature, extending observation to consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 89 Figure 4. Joint wave function of measurement system from light source to consciousness Scholars who claim that consciousness influences the experiment point to the joint wave function as the link through which this effect takes place. What they omit is the crucial with what probability, especially as probability is fundamental to quantum mechanics. We shall show that the probability of consciousness influencing the experiment is practically zero, and so the claim is not true for all practical purposes. For clarity of discussion, let us simplify by first considering the joint wave function of orbital electron in the atom of light source and orbital electron of the atom in detector, say 0.3 meter from the light source, as shown in Figure 5. The amplitude of wave function of source orbital electron decreases exponentially with distance r as e-r/(n∙a0) (see Zweibach MIT Open Courseware) where n is the orbital number (less than 6 for most atoms) and a0 is first Bohr radius which is 0.053 nanometer (1 nanometer is one-billionth of a meter). At a distance of just 6 nanometers the amplitude is 2∙10-9 and probability is 4∙10-18, an extremely small number, practically zero. At t = 0 the source orbital electron drops to a lower energy level and emits a photon, whose wave function, traveling at speed of light, reaches the detector atom in 1 nanosecond (not instantaneously), where it interacts with the detector orbital electron, imparting to it energy which releases it to be amplified by the detector’s amplifier circuitry. The amplitude of the wave function (wave packet) of a photon of wavelength say 800 nanometers (visible light) is localized to within about 600 femtosecond duration (Brian J. Smith Figure 1) which at the speed of light is 180 microns, less than two tenths of a millimeter Experimentally, single photon detectors time stamp detection to this level of resolution, which shows the highly localized nature of photon. The small size of photon’s wave packet should not be confused with its coherence length, which is the space-time distance over which phase of the wave packet remains stable with respect to another (earlier) space-time point, and it depends on the source, and can be very large for lasers due to the nature of laser source. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 90 Figure 5. Joint wave function of source orbital electron, photon and detector orbital electron Thus, until the photon is in the atomic neighborhood of the detector orbital electron, the projection of its state on the state of orbital electron via the joint wave function is practically zero, though theoretically non-zero. The point of this discussion is that until the time of detection there is practically no influence of detector orbital electron on the photon, which in turn has practically no influence on the source orbital electron after the photon leaves the atomic neighborhood of source orbital electron. Thus, the theoretical influence of detector atom on the source atom via photon in joint wave function has practically zero probability. Extending this reasoning to LED, eyes, retina, brain and the consciousness point in the brain, we conclude that effect of brain’s consciousness on the source or detector in the experiment by observation route via joint wave function has practically zero probability. In contrast, an action by the observer through his or her limbs such as hand controlling the experiment will have a significant probability. In the above scenario, the involvement of the observer’s consciousness is through photons reaching the retina of the eye. If, however, we consider a scenario involving not light photons (whose wavelength and hence wave packet is extremely small), but microwave and radio wave photons which have much longer wavelength and wave packets (microwave ~ a few centimeters; radio waves ~ tens of meters, longer all the way down to electrostatics) in which case there can be non-trivial interaction between the source and detector, and, if the observer’s brain has the ability to interact directly with such longer wavelength electromagnetic waves or electrostatics (not through the eyes), then one can make the case for brain / consciousness interacting with the experiment. This falls under telepathy and telekinesis, a nebulous subject that has been around for a long time. If confirmed through repeatable predictable experiments, it will be a major advancement for neuroscience. Some scholars (Goswami) have tried to explain some reported telepathy experimental results on the basis of quantum mechanical non-local-action-at-adistance. We shall show later (in the section on non-local-action-at-a-distance) that this is not quite true. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 91 1.4 Wave function collapse: At the instant a particle is detected (observed in a detector), its wave function instantly vanishes everywhere else, localizing it (collapsing it) to just the detector. For example, when a photon interacts with an electron in the detector, the electron gains energy and (its wave packet) moves to the amplifier, while the photon (and its wave packet) disappears. This is called wave function collapse. This apparent violation of physical laws (instantly vanishing everywhere, faster than relativistic limit of speed of light) has been cited by some scholars to regard wave function as supernatural. But the wave function is non-physical mathematical probability amplitude, and so it can vanish instantly everywhere without violating any physical laws. In the earlier analogy of a fugitive on the run, when he is captured in a particular town, probabilities for all other towns instantly drop to zero. There is nothing supernatural in this. Sometimes particle is not absorbed, and continues on with modified energy or momentum. Then a correspondingly modified wave function defines its probabilities from that point on. In the analogy of fugitive on the run, if he is spotted in a town but not captured, the probabilities for the other towns get redefined, and some new towns may enter the picture with their own probabilities. 1.5 Observation in quantum mechanics: Given a cause – effect relationship of an event, wherein the cause can have one of several values, in an ensemble of random probabilistic cause (at time t1) – effect (at time t2 > t1) events, in classical physics the randomness is resolved (which is the actual event out of the many probable events) at time t1, the effect of which is observed at time t2. In sharp contrast, in quantum mechanics the randomness is resolved only at the time of observation, till which time it all remains probabilistic. To the question “What is the actual event before the time of observation?” the quantum mechanical answer is “The question is ill-posed, we can talk only about probabilities till the time of observation”. One can argue that it makes no difference because for each observed effect there is a corresponding value of cause, in a one-to-one cause-effect relationship. But it makes a huge difference when two or more entangled particles are involved, which we shall discuss shortly in the context of non-local action at a distance, for which there is no parallel in classical physics. Thus, in quantum mechanics observation plays a fundamental role, and opens the door to involving consciousness. An example is Schrodinger’s cat. 1.6 Superposition of states and Schrodinger’s cat: Depending on the system, Schrodinger’s wave equation can have multiple solutions (like the many modes of acoustic vibration of a string), each defining a distinct probability profile in space-time, the sum total of all probabilities must always equal 1 because the particle exists somewhere there in space-time. Each such probabilistic profile is called a quantum mechanical “state” of the system, and as each is a valid solution to Schrodinger’s wave equation (which is a mathematically linear partial differential equation), a linear combination (a weighted sum) of these states is also a solution to Schrodinger’s equation, and so is a valid (generalized) state. This is called superposition of states. All are still only probabilities. Clearly, this does not mean that the particle exists in all the states at the same time. While all states remain probabilistic until ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 92 observation, the observed particle is only in one state. For someone rooted in classical mechanics this answer may not be convincing, and so the incorrect notion evolved that “the particle is in all states at the same time until the time of observation” which should actually read “the particle is probabilistically in all states at any given time until the time of observation”. To explain the fundamental role of observation in quantum mechanics, Schrodinger visualized the following hypothetical experiment: A cat is placed in a box, along with a mechanism that can release poisonous gas at some random instant of time in future, and the lid is closed. The question at some time in future is: Is the cat dead or alive? We will not know the answer to this question until we open the box and observe the cat, till which time the state of the cat is a superposition of two probabilistic states (dead, alive). Note that it is not actually being alive and dead at the same time. Some scholars include the consciousness of the observer in the observation, claiming to influence whether the cat is dead or alive. A test to verify this claim is to have the observer consciously decide whether the cat is dead or alive before opening the box and record the decision, and then open the box. Repeating this experiment many times, one would find that there is no correlation between conscious decision and the outcome. Furthermore, if no observation is ever made, after a long time, say a century, the cat would be definitely dead, no question of still being both alive and dead. Note that observation defines a particular state of the object out of many potential states, but does not create the object. The object is in existence throughout, only its state is unknown till observation. It is wrong to say that observation creates the object. Material universe functions even if no intellect ever observes it, as it has done for more than 14 billion years, even if no human beings ever existed to formulate the Big Bang theory. In nature, “observation” = inter-particle interaction. 1.7 Entanglement, non-local action at a distance and the EPR Paradox: “Action at a distance” means cause and effect are separated by empty space. Examples are gravitational, electric and magnetic fields which act on a body at a distance across empty space, well known in classical physics. These fields propagate in free space at the speed of light which is about 3∙108 meters per second. According to Einstein’s special theory of relativity, nothing can travel faster than speed of light. That is, effect at time t1 of a cause at time t0 cannot happen at a place farther than c∙(t1 – t0) where c is speed of light in free space. If the effect happens at a distance greater than this, it is called non-local action at a distance, “locality” being c∙(t1 – t0). Photons have the property of polarization, with two components: horizontal and vertical (familiar example is Polaroid eye glass which cuts off glare which is horizontal polarization component in scattered light). Sometimes when two photons are created together at the same space-time point, their polarizations can become correlated (for electron pair it is spin, plus or minus). That is, the state of one has a fixed relationship to the state of the other, the two states are not independent. Then the two particles are said to be entangled. The state can be random, but with a given fixed relationship between the two. In the classical picture, the actual value of random state is defined at the time of creation of the pair. In quantum mechanics where probability is fundamental, only the joint probability of the pair is defined at the time of creation, and (as Schrodinger pointed out ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 93 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts in his cat experiment) the actual state is known only at the time of observation (measurement). This makes a huge difference. Albert Einstein, who was uncomfortable with the fundamentally probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics (famously saying “God does not play dice”, but, nevertheless, as a true objective scientist accepted all objective evidence that led to quantum mechanics, he himself being one of its founding fathers) set out to cook up a thought experiment that he hoped would show the inadequacy of quantum mechanics, described in a paper with co-authors Podolsky and Rosen titled “Is quantum mechanics complete?” (1935 Physics Review 47) – The now famous “EPR Paradox”. In this thought experiment, a pair of entangled particles are created and sent along in opposite directions in space. When the spatial separation of the two is significant, the state of one particle is measured, at which time the state of the other particle, which until that instant remained probabilistic according to quantum mechanics, must be fixed instantly, thus acting at a distance instantly, violating the relativistic speed limit of velocity of light! Therefore, quantum mechanics must be missing something! Schrodinger immediately responded (1935 Mathematical Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical Society 31-4) saying that this prediction of quantum mechanics is correct, and coined the term entanglement for this incredible classically unbelievable phenomenon. t0 S   AY tA AX B1 A axis a tA ALICE tB B axis b by BY BX Figure 6. Experiment with polarization-entangled photons proving non-local-action-at-a-distance Decades later, when technology was available for sending single photons uncorrupted over sufficiently long distances (fiber optics) and fast single photon detectors became available to detect/timestamp for determining correlation between the entangled photons with sufficient resolution and accuracy, non-local action at a distance has been confirmed, through numerous ingenious experiments, pioneering proposal by Aspect (1976) followed by many, including a notable one by Zeilinger (2015) over distance of kilometers. A typical setup is shown in Figure 6. Source S at time t0 emits a pair of polarization entangled photons,  to station Alice where its polarization state is measured at time tA and  to station Bob where its polarization is measured at time tB = tA + t (distance between Alice and Bob being greater than c∙ t, and so non-local) and found to be correlated to that of . ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 94 Does this mean there is something supernatural going on? No. Because what we are measuring for the entangled pair is the correlation of their states and not individual states, the measurement (observation) is not complete until both are measured. It is a question of correlation of the two, not a question of one being the cause and the other being the effect. In fact, if Bob’s measurement at tB is taken to be the cause (until which time we would not know there is correlation), the effect at tA happens earlier than the cause, “retro-causality”! But the divisible joint wave function of the two travels from S along respective paths at a speed less than or equal to speed of light in free space. It can be argued that if the act of entanglement at S is taken to be the cause, as it should be, there is truly no non-local action at a distance, correlation requiring both measurements, not one cause and the other effect. This does not, however, diminish the astonishing nature of this phenomenon, so accurately predicted by Schrodinger and verified decades later – objectively, no subjective mysticism. It may be noted that it is a challenge to measure the correlation, because (a) not all particles created are entangled, and not all particles received are entangled, constituting a noise background and (b) a particle must be correlated to its companion particle, not to a particle of another pair, which requires extremely high temporal resolution of the detections, requiring single photon (one photon at a time) regime of operation. It is a testament to the experimental genius and perseverance of the researchers. In quantum physical reality (fact, not fiction or speculation), cause-effect relationships are thus far more complicated, fundamentally probabilistic even in plurality of particles through joint probabilities, than the simple minded one cause - one effect relationships lined up neatly along the arrow of time from past to future, foundational in classical mechanics, and also in religious concepts tracing back to God as the unique original cause without a cause. 1.8 Quantum jump: In the quantum mechanical model of the atom, orbital electrons surrounding the nucleus are in different discrete levels of energy. When the energy of a photon is absorbed by an orbital electron, the electron “jumps” to a state of correspondingly higher energy. Likewise, when an orbital electron drops from a higher energy level to a lower energy level, a photon is emitted with the difference energy. These jumps are called quantum jumps. Believing the jump to be instantaneous, some scholars say that at the instant of the jump the electron exists in both orbits at the same time, being at two places at the same time, discussed and dismissed earlier in the context of wave function of the particle. It is worth noting that the jump is not instantaneous, and has been measured recently, Max Planck Institute (2016), to be about a hundred attoseconds (1 attosecond = 10-18 second). Even for an instant the orbital electron is not at two different energy levels. Nothing supernatural. 1.9 Uncertainty principle: Heisenberg’s uncertainly principle says that for a complementary pair of physical quantities, such as position p and momentum q of a particle, if p is uncertainty in p and q is uncertainty in q, then p∙q ≥ h/4 where h is Planck’s constant (6.63∙10-34 kg∙m2/s). That is, both cannot be defined to arbitrarily high accuracy. In classical mechanics there is no such limit. Some scholars ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 95 cite this to claim that everything in the world is uncertain, an illusory perception by one’s consciousness. Note that h is an extremely small quantity, and so in the macro world, for a stone, pot or our body, p and q can be practically extremely small and still satisfy the uncertainty constraint. Errors in our yard sticks, speedometers and even laser gages are orders of magnitude higher. World is not illusory, not a figment of imagination by one’s consciousness. 1.10 Telepathy: Reported experiments involving telepathy (assuming that they have been conducted scientifically and repeatability verified by others) involve a person communicating with another person across space, with no electromagnetic neuro signals detected. Scholars who suggest explaining such a phenomenon of telepathy as quantum mechanical non-local action at a distance (Goswamy 1993 p 130-133) overlook a key fact: In the time interval between cause (sending person initiating signal transmission) and effect (receiving person receiving the transmission) the distance covered at speed of light far exceeds the distance between sender and receiver, so it cannot be non-local. If neuro electromagnetic signals are not involved, as claimed, this would open up a new fertile ground for further research in physical sciences, to send and receive non-neural telepathic signals. Part 2. Vedantic Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics Quantum mechanics, in which wave function defines all probable (not yet realized) outcomes for physical event, out of which one is observed (realized) at the time of measurement, has naturally invited philosophical comparisons of quantum mechanics with Vedanta which says that the physical universe is unreal and that the only Reality is Paramatma the omnipresent highest level of consciousness (Parama: highest, Atma: consciousness) that also resides in all living beings at a lower level as Jivatma (Jiva: living being, Atma: consciousness) through which instantiations of physical objects are observed (as if real). Such philosophical discussions are indeed very enlightening in the search for some underlying common truth. There are strong arguments both for and against similarities between quantum mechanics and Vedanta. To cite a few, review paper by Jonathan Duquette (2011) ‘Quantum Physics and Vedanta: A perspective from Bernard d’Espagnat’s Scientific Realism’; Goswami (1995) ‘The Self-Aware Universe, how consciousness creates the material world’. Krishnamoorthy (2017) ‘Quantum Physics came from Vedas: Schrodinger and Einstein read Vedas’; ISKCON (2009) ‘Vedic Knowledge and Quantum Mechanics’. But, certain important fundamental aspects must be considered, for completeness in such comparisons: (1) Quantum mechanics quantizes energy, which is also conserved. In Vedanta, the energy behind physical universe is Paramatma, any attempt at quantization of which is not only meaningless, it would degrade the very concept of Paramatma. Moreover, energy of Paramatma is limitless, so conservation of energy is meaningless. (2) Quantum mechanics deals entirely with physical reality, nothing unreal. All objects exist in physical reality at all times, only their state (out of all possible states) is undefined till measurement (observation). In Vedanta, physical ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 96 existence itself is regarded as unreal, the only Reality is meta-physical Paramatma. (3) Applying physical quantum mechanics to meta-physical Vedanta invites the problem of finiteness of velocity of propagation of wave function as defined by Schrodinger’s wave equation which includes physical parameters such as mass and momentum, whereas meta-physical consciousness can span the entire universe in an instant. Until now, all scholarly discussions of quantum mechanics and Vedanta have been based on the prevailing view of wave-particle duality, namely that depending on observation the particle somehow mysteriously changes to wave or from wave to particle. New development discussed in Part 1 resolves this mystery and adds much desired clarity: Physical particle always remains particle and mathematical wave always remains wave, there is no role of consciousness. Other aspects of wave function such as wave function collapse, superposition of states, non-local action at a distance and quantum jump have also been shown not to involve consciousness or metaphysical mysticism. For example, with reference to Goswamy (1995), the following statements, which may be valid per prevailing view, are not true per the new development: p45 “in order to understand the behavior of quantum mechanics, however, we seem to need to inject consciousness – our ability to choose – according to the complementarity principle and subject – object mixing”; p48 “The antithesis of material realism is monistic idealism. In this philosophy, consciousness, not matter, is fundamental”; p85 “As soon as a conscious being observes, the material reality becomes manifest in a unique state”; p107 “The idealist resolution of the Schrodinger’s cat demands that the consciousness of observing subject choose one facet from the multifaceted dead-and-alive coherent superposition of the cat and thus seal its fate. The subject is the chooser”. The claim that the material world is created by one’s conscious observation, is not justified either by quantum mechanics (as shown in part 1), or by Vedanta: Jivatma is same as Paramatma (Self), but diluted by ignorance. (Swami Chinmayananda SelfUnfoldment p 41 “An individual is the Self as though degraded by ignorance, which finds expression in the world as thoughts and actions”). Paramatma does not directly interact with one’s senses (Radhakrishnan p 581-4 Kena Upanishad verses 1.2 to 1.9). That interaction occurs through Jivatma. Thus, Jivatma does not create the physical objects in the world through observation. Furthermore, Vedanta talks about cyclical nature of creation, without a beginning or an end, not a particular time in the distant past when the universe was “created”. In the Creation Hymn (Rg Veda hymn 10-129), Vedic sages pose to themselves difficult questions about how the universe came to be, followed by suggestive answers, followed finally by honest “who knows?”, kindling further inquiry, guiding one towards the truth. This hymn hints at nothingness, neither existence nor non-existence, neither air nor space, neither death nor immortality, neither darkness nor light, then the ONE enclosed in nothing breathed, the calmness of nothingness perturbed by ripples leading to the universe we see. Nothingness without beginning or end, cyclical creation is but like ripples disturbing the eternal nothingness. Such deeply inquiring knowledge was transmitted from teacher (guru) to student (sishya) in a strictly oral tradition over thousands of years, to this very day, long after writing, books and notebooks became available. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 97 The import of this is that Vedanta is all in the mind, the field of thoughts, requiring mental discipline and memory power, the central role of consciousness. This remarkable oral tradition that has survived to this day has been studied and documented by Professor David M. Knipe (2015 Vedic Voices – Intimate Narratives of a Living Andhra Tradition) who spent thirty years with Vedic families in the Godavari river delta region of Andhra Pradesh, India. To summarize, the essence of Vedanta is illustrated in Figure 7, which for completeness includes also the Hindu concept of cycle of rebirths before (by doing good and not evil) Jivatma merges with Paramatma which is salvation terminating the cycle of rebirths. Figure 7. Vedanta Consciousness: Higher Paramatma and Lower Jivatma Also shown is the distinction between monist (Advaita) and dualist (Dvaita) interpretations of Vedanta. Note that in Vedanta, consciousness is entirely meta-physical, as compared with physical treatments of consciousness as a zone in the brain. Scholars who claim that the concepts of quantum mechanics came from Vedanta (Krishnamurthy, ISKCON) base their claims in part on the high praise for Vedanta by some founding fathers of quantum mechanics like Erwin Schrodinger (wave equation), Werner Heisenberg (uncertainty principle), Niels Bohr (quantized atomic structure) and Von Neumann (mathematical frame work), and also Robert Oppenheimer (atomic bomb). This, naturally demands clarification. None of the scientists Erwin Schrodinger, Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, Von Neumann and Robert Oppenheimer based their scientific work on Vedanta. Their high praise for Vedanta was strictly their subjective philosophical opinions. Their objective scientific work was entirely based on hard experimental evidence verifiable by any scientist, nothing subjective. Rooted in classical physics which had explained by late nineteenth century most of what physicists had thought was to be known, by the dawn of twentieth century they were confronted with formidable fundamental discrepancies (anomalies) which classical physics just could not explain. It is a testament to their collective genius that they, along with other eminent scientists like Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Max Born and Paul Dirac, painstakingly came up with quantum physics which resolved the anomalies. But, unlike classical mechanics which made intuitive sense, quantum mechanics is totally counter-intuitive and weird, which puzzled them and troubled ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 98 them. It was in this context, namely that what is true at atomic level (quantum mechanics) was not what seemed to be true at macro level (classical mechanics) - for example a particle can also behave like a wave – that Erwin Schrodinger, Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, Von Neumann and Robert Oppenheimer found comfort in Vedanta which teaches that the world we observe is not what it seems to be, the truth that drives the world is far more subtle. Erwin Schrodinger (1944 ‘What is Life?’): “From the early great Upanishads the recognition Atman = Brahman (the personal self equals the omnipresent, all-comprehending eternal self) was in Indian thought considered, far from being blasphemous, to represent the quintessence of deepest insight into the happenings of the world. The striving of all the scholars of Vedanta was, after having learnt to pronounce with their lips, really to assimilate in their minds this grandest of all thoughts.” This shows his high regard for Vedantic philosophy. His remark “The unity and continuity of Vedanta are reflected in the unity and continuity of wave mechanics. This is entirely consistent with the Vedanta concept of All in One” shows how he felt comfort in the unifying wisdom of Vedanta in the context of his wave equation that unified the particle and wave nature of light. But his development of quantum mechanical wave equation in 1925 was entirely and strictly based on objective facts of physical experimental evidence and related theories, not Vedanta. The fact that Schrodinger read Vedas does not mean he based his wave equation on Vedas, to which he makes no reference in postulating his wave equation. When Robert Oppenheimer saw the explosion of his prototype atomic bomb at White Sands test range in 1945, he was reminded of Lord Krishna’s revelation of Vishwarupam described in Bhagavat Gita verse 9-12: If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendor of the mighty one. It is said that he later recounted that another Bhagavat Gita verse 11-32 had also entered his mind at that time: "kālo'smi lokakṣayakṛtpravṛddho lokānsamāhartumiha pravṛttaḥ" ("I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds”). Because of this we cannot claim that Oppenheimer based his design of atom bomb on Bhagavat Gita. He based it entirely on objective experimental facts and theories of atomic physics. Note that the other founding fathers of quantum mechanics like Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Max Born and Paul Dirac had not sought Vedanta for comfort. In fact, Paul Dirac was atheist. Scientists are also human beings, and they are entitled to their own subjective personal opinions about religions and spirituality. But their scientific work was never based on religion or spirituality. To say so would be unfair to them. Isaac Newton believed in the Biblical notion of the Last Day when the world would end, and he even predicted the date of the Last Day (that date passed without the world ending) but he never based his scientific work on his religious beliefs. In fact, Newton’s laws of motion and his law of gravitation explained and supported Kepler’s heliocentric model of planetary motions which was at that time vehemently opposed by the Church which believed in geocentric model (a short time before Newton, natural philosopher Bruno Giordano was brutally burnt alive at the stake by the Church for his belief in Kepler’s heliocentric model, and seventy year old Galileo had barely escaped death by recanting his belief in heliocentric model on his knees before the Church). When science and religion are mixed, terrible things can happen: religion can lose its spirituality, and science can lose its objectivity. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 99 Discussion We have presented the implications of a new development in quantum mechanics that clears the century old mystery of wave-particle duality and other aspects of wave function, with particular reference to consciousness. We have shown that consciousness plays no statistically significant role in influencing the objective world through observation; it influences only through one’s limbs or robot hooked up to one’s brain. The notion that the essentially objective physical quantum mechanics implies a subjective role of physical (brain) or meta-physical (non-brain) consciousness in physicality has led to speculations that belie the facts. Properly understood, there is nothing vague, mysterious or mystic about quantum mechanics, the most accurate physical science to date whose predictions have all been verified to be true. The fact that its predictions have been revolutionary compared to prior views of physical universe is no different from the fact that Newton’s laws and his law of gravitation were revolutionary compared to prior views in explaining the “mystery” of motions of heavenly bodies. Both are accepted only because their predictions are found to be true, Newton’s in the macroscopic world, and quantum mechanics in the atomic world. Once we accept the (more general than deterministic) fundamental probability amplitude wave function concept of quantum mechanics, everything, including the non-local action at a distance correlations of entangled particles, all make perfect sense. No ambiguity, mystery or mysticism whatsoever. It is really a case of mindset. The magnificent edifice of Vedanta, rationally and logically inquiring into the nature of the universe, both physical and meta-physical, the genius of Vedic sages who were so humbled by the knowledge they uncovered that they did not claim authorship, saying it must be of divine origin, the knowledge that has survived intact for thousands of years entirely through oral tradition passed from generation to generation of gurus and students to this day, stands to lose its greatness through infusing of quantum mechanical concepts of today that will certainly be replaced in future by other scientific theories. Vedanta should not be diluted by quantum mechanics or any other physical science, all of which are transients compared to the permanence of Vedic knowledge. Received February 22, 2021; Accepted April 11, 2021 References 1. Adams Betony (2020) ‘Quantum effects in the brain: A Review’, AVS Quantum Science 2, 022901 2. Alain Aspect (1976) ‘Proposed experiment to test the non-separability of quantum mechanics’ Physics Review D 14 October 1976 3. Bohr, Niels (1935) ‘Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?’, Physical Review 48 p 696 – 702 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 100 4. Bohr, Niels (1949) ‘Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics’ Library of Living Philosophers, VII pp 201-241 (Reprinted in The World of Atom, volume 2, edited by Henry A. Boorse and Lloyd Motz, Basic Books Inc, New York, 1966, pp 1229 – 1258) 5. Bohr, Niels (1961, 2020) ‘Atomic physics and human knowledge, New York, Dover publications 6. Bohr, Niels (1984) ‘Discussion with Einstein on epistemological problem in atomic physics’ Quantum theory and measurement, 9-31, Princeton University Press 7. Born, Max (1954) ‘The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics’ Nobel Lecture 8. Chinmayananda (1969) ‘Kindle Life’, Chinmaya Publications West 9. Chinmayananda (1976) ‘Self Unfoldment’, Chinmaya Publications West 10. Duquette Jonathan (2011) ‘Quantum Physics and Vedanta: A perspective from Bernard D’Espagnat’s Scientific Realism’ Zygon vol 46, no 3 p 620 - 638 11. Einstein A, Podolsky B, Rosen N (1935) ‘Can quantum mechanical description of physical Reality be considered complete?’ Physics Review 47 p 777 – 780 12. Feynman, Richard (1965) ‘Lectures on Physics’ vol. 3 Addison Wesley 13. Gandhi M.K. (1927) ‘An autobiography or the story of my experiments with truth’ Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad, India. 14. Goodman J.W. (2000) ‘Statistical Optics’ John Wiley & Sons 15. Goswamy, Amit (1993) ‘The Self-Aware Universe – how consciousness creates the material world’ New York, Penguin Putnam 16. Greene, Brian (2020) ‘Until the End of Time – mind, matter, and our search for meaning in an evolving universe’ Alfred A. Knopf, New York 17. Sarma, G. N. (2018) ‘Explaining duality, the “only mystery” of quantum mechanics, without complementarity or “which way” (welcher-weg)’ International Conference on Quantum Mechanics and Applications, July 20-21 Atlanta, USA 18. Sarma, G. N. (2019) ‘A new perspective on causality, locality, duality in entangled quantum nano systems’ SPIE Photonics West Conference, San Francisco, February, OE115-9 19. Sarma, G. N. (2019) ‘Wave-particle duality theorem solves mystery without Bohr’s complementarity principle, with examples to interaction-free measurement, counterfactual communication, duality computer’ International Journal of Pure and Applied Physics 15-1, 15-10 20. Heisenberg (1958) ‘The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory’ Physics and Philosophy, Harper, New York, pp 44-58 (Reprinted in The World of Atom, volume 2, edited by Henry A. Boorse and Lloyd Motz, Basic Books Inc, New York, 1966, pp 1229 – 1258) 21. Holton, Gerald. 1970. The Roots of Complementarity. Daedalus 99 (4), The Making of Modern Science: Biographical Studies (Fall, 1970): 1015-1055. 22. ISKCON Desire Tree 2009 ‘Vedic Knowledge and Quantum Mechanics – Part-1’ 23. Ishikawa Shiro (2017) ‘A final solution to the mind-body Problem by quantum language’ Journal of Quantum Information Science, 7, 48-56 24. Knipe, David M. (2015) ‘Vedic Voices: Intimate Narratives of a Living Andhra Tradition’ Oxford University Press ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 1 | pp. 81-101 Gullapalli, S. N., Consciousness, Quantum Mechanics, Duality, Monism and Vedanta: Speculations and Facts 101 25. Krishnamoorty R (2017) ‘Quantum Physics came from Vedas: Schrodinger and Einstein read Vedas’ http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/archives 26. Kafatos Menas C (2015) ‘Fundamental mathematics of consciousness’ Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol 11, no 2 27. Lower Barry ‘Consciousness and Quantum Theory: Strange Bedfellows’ School of Arts and Sciences Rutgers University 28. Manousakis Efstratios (2006) ‘Founding quantum theory on the basis of consciousness’ arXiv:quantph/0604100v1 29. Max Planck Institute of Quantum Optics and Munich-Centre for Advanced Photonics (2016) ‘Sluggish electrons caught in action’, press release. 30. Narasimhan A, et al (2016) ‘Wave particle duality, the observer and retro-causality’ API Conference Proceedings 31-4-1935 31. Papoulis, Athanasios (1962) ‘Fourier Integral and its Applications’, Mc Graw Hill, New York 32. Pauli, Wolfgang (1948) Editor Journal Dialectica vol 2, issue 3-4 November 1948 – compilation of seminal papers on complementarity by eminent physicists including Niels Bohr. 33. Radhakrishnan S. ‘The Principal Upanishads’ Harper Collins Publishers 1953 – 2015 34. Rajaram N S ‘Reality without geometry: Vedanta and Quantum Mechanics 35. Rg Veda 10-129, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasadiya_Sukta 36. Schrodinger, Erwin (1935) ‘Discussion of probability relations between separated systems’ 31-4 Mathematical Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical Society 37. Schrodinger, Erwin (2000) ‘What is Life?’ Cambridge University Press 38. Sisir Roy (2014) ‘An inquiry into the concepts of Quantum Vacuum in Modern Physics and in Advaita Vedanta’ 39. Smith B.J., M.G. Raymar “Photon wave functions, wave-packet quantization of light and coherence theory” https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0708/0708.0831.pdf 40. Song Daegene (2008) ‘Incompatibility between quantum theory and consciousness’ NeuroQuantology, vol 6, issue 1, p 46-52 41. Stapp H.P. (1993) ‘A quantum theory of mind-brain interface’, Mind Matter and Quantum Mechanics, Berlin Springer pp 145 - 172 42. Theise Neil D, Menas C. Kafatos (2016) ‘Fundamental awareness: A framework and integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics’ Communicative and Integrative Biology, vol 9, no 3 43. Wigner, E.P. (1967) ‘Remarks on the mind-body question’ Symmetries and Reflections, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp 171 - 184 44. Zeilinger Anton et al 2015 ‘Teleportation of entanglement over 143 km’ PNAS Nov 17, 2015 112 (46) 14202 – 14205 45. Zweibach B. (2016) MIT Open Courseware “Hydrogen Atom, Hydrogen Atom Spectra” ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 1 Article How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) Karl Sipfle* Abstract We present the principles of operation by which a brain makes a mind, at all scales necessary to cover the whole problem. We inventory the necessary capabilities for a mind. We divide conscious mind into four layers of increasing elaboration. For the principles of operations of the lower two layers, we provide the STFC theory. For the upper two, we provide the STHC theory. We survey the evolutionary progression from first twinge of experience to human capacities. We explain the types of memory and problem-solving we carry and by what structures they are made to happen. We compare to prior works and review the philosophical implications and stance. All of this is done with minimal incoming assumptions, and those made are declared. Part I of this four-part article includes: 1. Introduction; 2. All the Elements of Mind; 3. A Multiscale Problem; 4. Definitions; 5. Important Assumptions; 6. Levels of Consciousness; 7. The Four-Layer Architecture: The Gross Architecture of Consciousness; 8. Consciousness Architecture Layer 1: Fundamental Consciousness; 9. Sites of Fundamental Consciousness in the Brain; 10. The Nature of Sentience; and 11. Consciousness Architecture Layer 2: Sentience. Keywords: Consciousness, physics, evolution, feeling, qualia, mind, cognitive, affective, sensation, memory, learning, attention, perception, recognition, decision-making, problemsolving, coordination, self, symbol manipulation, language. 1. Introduction This paper comprises a Concept of Operations and Architecture Description Document for a mindful brain, plus rationale and process notes on their derivations. The term “consciousness” has been used to address everything from the smallest fundamental capacities enabling sentience to the internal world of a human mind. In this paper, we address all of it. We refer to an Architecture with which a mind is built. It is a layered architecture, cognizant of the building process of evolution. The architecture we populate with theory. The theories are expected to see more revision over time than the architecture. * Correspondence author: Karl Sipfle, Independent Researcher (also working independently at NASA GSFC). E-mail: ksipfle@umich.edu ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 2 By the time we get up to vertebrate brains (appearing in Layer 3) we start to have a great deal of extant data on how lower mechanisms are exploited and can use it here. The paper’s scope is of natural brains rather than artificial ones, though it is relevant to the latter. The most elementary facts of brain anatomy and operations we don’t belabor and are widely available (Kandel, 2021). 2. All the Elements of Mind This is the complete list of ingredients for mind: Reflex (underpinning mind) Regulation Sensation Memory, of half a dozen different types, enabling Learning Feeling Prioritization Attention, bottom-up and top-down Perception, Recognition Prediction Action Planning Imagination Decision-Making Problem-Solving Coordination Unity Making sense Differentiating the real from the recalled or the imagined Self Symbol manipulation Language A theory that describes how all of these things work is a complete theory of mind. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 3 3. A Multiscale Problem The biggest issue of the consciousness mystery is not self-reference and certainly not cognition, but the existence of feeling. This topic has been rightly called the Hard Problem (Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness, 1995). There is the matter of why and how we can feel at all, what is “subjective experience.” And there is why given the useful valuation that the feeling phenomenon provides, we should also actually feel. The answer to the Whys appears to be that any value mechanism would do, and real pain and pleasure are usable natural phenomena that are here in this universe for evolution to employ. There is also the What and the How. What is feeling, scientifically? We address that. The next puzzle is as to how minds are woven from basic mechanisms. While our knowledge is not complete, much of this puzzle is easier. Multiscale models (what Rolls (Rolls, 2016) calls “levels of explanation”) of less complicated systems have been employed for decades. To understand the whole of consciousness (or even just some important parts) it is necessary to examine it at multiple scales. 4. Definitions Feeling: Experience. That which makes the Hard Problem (Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness, 1995). Raw feeling: The concept of basal, indivisible feeling. Qualia: The allegedly rawest feelings discernible to a mind, discovered through introspection. Consciousness: Feeling and, typically, information processing affecting each other in organized fashion to make action decisions in the interests of a species. Levels of Consciousness: A progression of Fundamental Consciousness, Sentience, Animal Consciousness, Human Consciousness (Sipfle K. , 2018), see below. Fundamental Consciousness (FC): The smallest element of what distinguishes consciousness; the actual smallest bit of feeling. Pure pain or pure pleasure. Somewhat similar concepts have been called pre-consciousness, protoconsciousness (Penrose & Hameroff, Consciousness in the Universe, 2017), microfeels (Poznanski & Brandas, Panexperiential materialism: A physical exploration of qualitativeness in the brain, 2020), and fundamental feelings. Mind: An island of Animal or Human Consciousness. On Earth, each requires and belongs to at most one brain. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 4 Cognitive: Related to thought and/or information processing and not to feeling (though in practice feelings typically accompany the cognitive). Cognition: Thought, as opposed to feelings. Perception: Informational understanding (not emotional). Affective: Related to feeling, not cognitive. Valence: Goodness/positivity or badness/negativity. Emergence: A consequent complex whole arising from the interactions within a system, that takes on its own characteristics not describable/expected in terms of just the individual elements of the system. 5. Important Assumptions This paper makes a few assumptions, which are out of its scope to justify (instead see (Sipfle K. , The Nature of Fundamental Consciousness (preprint), 2018)). Postulate 1: Physicalism is necessary and information- and computation-based theories cannot provide for the source of conscious experience. Postulate 2: Consciousness functions within the same basic rules (including mathematics) as all other phenomena that also exist in Nature. 6. Levels of Consciousness We start by conceptually sectioning the vast scope of what is called “consciousness” into a few large categories of increasing capability (adapted from (Sipfle K. , 2018)). Level 1 Consciousness a.k.a. Fundamental Consciousness a.k.a. Base Consciousness This consists of the smallest elements that represent experience. (This is where freestanding experience occurs, without an observer.) Level 2 Consciousness a.k.a. Sentience Consists of everything that must be added to level 1 to make the sentience of the simplest sentient organism. (This is where “subjective experience” occurs- it introduces the concept of an observer.) Level 3 Consciousness a.k.a. Mind Contains everything above level 2 that enables the behaviors and experiences up to the most complex of nonverbal organisms (by adding cognitive componentry). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 5 Level 4 Consciousness a.k.a. Human Consciousness That which has been attained by humans (by adding the symbolic manipulation that is used for language) (Edelman, 1993) (Rolls, 2016). Level 1 Consciousness plus Level 2 Consciousness are the foundation beneath the entirety of “consciousness” defined as “a bubble of experience” if that bubble “consists of colours, sounds, smells, tastes, etc.” (Gamez, 2018). Level 1 Consciousness has its own elemental bubbles of experience, which we may call “psybits (as Eccles did),” but the experience is more primitive and not in all occurrences integrated into any kind of mind or substantial piece thereof. We will see that Level 1 is the root of actual experience, rather like Layer 1 of a computer network, the Physical Layer, moving around real individual electrons. In both cases, all the rest sits on top and is connected assemblies and software built on Level 1. If we simulate Consciousness Level 1 and Level 2 and then put all the same algorithms atop them as we find in natural brains, we can get all the same behaviors, but that “mind” will not actually feel. Level 1 Consciousness is the fundamental consciousness that is the physics manifestation of what is needed to build, from it, consciousness as we know it. The nature of this low level and the connection from it upward answers Chalmers’s Hard Problem: feeling is a phenomenon of our universe that preceded minds and was discovered and exploited by evolution to build minds. Once we put the horse before the cart, the Hard Problem evaporates. IV Verbal Mind. Abstracting More wiring and “Algorithms” Cognitive III Mind. Wiring and “Algorithms” Cognitive II Sentience. Qualia STFC Affective + Cog I Fundamental Consciousness. STFC: Particles, Fields Affective Figure 1: Levels of Consciousness 7. The Four-Layer Architecture: The Gross Architecture of Consciousness Next, we move from conceptual and abstract observations to the question of how brains and minds are actually built. We construct as Nature did, in layers whereby each earlier layer provides a platform for the next and new things become possible. Our identification and classification of Levels of consciousness corresponds well, it turns out, with layers of architecture of real minds. These are shown in Figure 2: The Four Architectural Layers of Consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 6 Figure 2: The Four Architectural Layers of Consciousness These architectural layers of mind include, from the top down: Language, integrated into thought. Cognition, integrated with feeling. Higher manipulations Manipulation of base objects Qualia, simple and complex. Fundamental physics, whence come base feeling and objects that can be used to record information. This we call the Four-Layer Architecture or FLA (colloquially the “Florida Architecture”). Now that we have specified the architectural concept of this evolved layering of consciousness, we shall discuss each of Layer 1, Layer 2, Layer 3, and Layer 4 Consciousness. In the process we also present our full-sweep ToC (Theory of Consciousness), comprising two sub-theories. The compliant and motivating theory described for Layer 1 and Layer 2 is the Sentonic Theory of Fundamental Consciousness, STFC. Strictly speaking, STFC is a metatheory, as it is agnostic on some specific aspects for which there are multiple candidates. The compliant theory described for Layer 3 and Layer 4 is the Systems Theory of Higher Consciousness, STHC. STHC is a synthesis drawing on the latest and best insights from neuroscience and theoretical and experimental psychology. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 7 8. Consciousness Architecture Layer 1: Fundamental Consciousness All phenomena we humans have identified have been seen to emerge from things that appear at the fundamental particle level through, maximally, the molecular scale. Though we are not yet certain of the exact mechanism in Layer 1, we can characterize necessary key properties of it (and thus also speculate on actual mechanisms). This allows us to describe, without impediment because it is supposed to be more abstract, the nature of Layer 2. Problems that will be faced in getting up to qualia (Layer 2) include 1. Qualia are not all of the same character. 2. Qualia are multitudinous. 3. A feeling is fused into a whole, and more intense feeling is a stronger whole. This is the “combination problem” first identified by William James, with many prior attempts to answer it (Harris, 2020) (Chalmers, The Combination Problem for Panpsychism, 2016). 4. At the bottom there are no Observers (in the mind sense), only observers (in the physics interactions sense) (Sipfle K. , The Nature of Fundamental Consciousness (preprint), 2018). 5. There must be a way- a path- for our minds to have evolved We now discuss Layer 1 from the standpoint of what it must be like in order to support an explainable Layer 2. Layer 1’s province is the true indivisible, smallest feeling that can occur in the universe. Pursuing that leads us to some important (and non-traditional) conclusions. First of all is the problem: for a feeling, who is feeling it? The process of drilling down to physics reveals that the question itself is essentially a meaningless assumption when we get to physical fundamentals rather than psychological concepts. When two electrons collide, which one is the observer? Feeling in its simplest form does not happen to an observer, it simply happens, as a freestanding event. The whole notion of a subject to experience something is a much higher development (and a true emergent phenomenon). The Observer as we know it comes late in the upward progression. The Observer amounts to one clot of feeling and computation taking as input another clot of computation (and often, feeling). The Observer is a swelling in the unified corpus of mind and is not even 100% separated from the (internally) observed or 100% the same thing from one moment to the next. At the bottom there is no observer, at least not one that is somehow fundamentally separate from the observed. Electrostatic interactions are not Observations, in a mental sense, they just happen. Fundamental feeling is the same way. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 8 Secondly, our physics describes very well nearly everything in the so-called “physical” world, from the tiny to the immense and everything in between, while not at all describing such things as pain or pleasure. This tells us that Postulate 3: Something basic is missing from, and must be added to, our physics, which is our description of reality. Our feelings are real. Any Theory of Everything that really is that must include feeling or a way to make it. That the problem may be hard to solve does not make it invalid or meaningless as a problem. (Ironically, the only reason people study and develop physics in the first place is that they want to.) The missing simplest physical feeling event we call Fundamental Consciousness. These are “psybits”; each functions as a “microquale” ( (Poznanski, Theorising How the Brain Encodes Consciousness Based on Negentropic Entanglement, 2019) refers to somewhat similar “preconscious microfeels”). Notice that there is not necessarily anything especially quantum about this. But because the fundamental level of Nature, which is the quantum level, extends up to the molecular scale, the exact process of feeling may conceivably occur up at this scale (at the maximum) rather than the particle scale. The Architecture, which is a framework or meta-solution, makes no demand that precludes that. 8.1. The Quale Garden The first thing we should note as to the emergence of qualia from physical fundamental consciousness is whether there is any difference between the two. The answer is Yes, and this is terribly important to understanding of mind. In fact, there is also a large difference in nature between the different qualia. If a quale for Red really were fundamental in the universe, then there would have to be hundreds or more of qualia for all the other cited experiences- the taste of wine, the sound from a musical instrument and so on. Quite obviously this is literally unnatural. The grand “plan” in every case to date has been found to be a few simple fundamental elements, then placed in combination. This means the typical quale is actually a composite structure, that is, the “atoms” of feelings of the mind are not the “atoms” of feeling of the universe. So, we do need something smaller than a quale, or alternatively, some of the qualia are more elementary than others. At bottom will be the smallest experiences in the universe (the psybits). The usually cited qualia include a cast that are deeply dissimilar, not peers. Of special note are the differences between, for example, Red and Pain. First of all, there are a great many qualia (especially in principle) just as “elementary” as Red, which immediately suggests it is not a truly elementary feel. Second, there is nothing special about Red from the standpoint of the universe; again, it is just one arbitrary spot in a large field of characteristics ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 9 (even though as it happens our nervous systems are specifically sensitive to red light). Third and most saliently, Red has no intrinsic valence; Red is not intrinsically a painful thing or a bad thing or a good thing, it is just a factual condition. Pain is entirely different in all three of these ways. There is pain and there is pleasure and there is nothing else in that family. Pain (or pleasure) is a very special occurrence in the universe, different from others. It has valence, and furthermore no factual content, only valence. The view that pain and Red are atomic siblings is false. Red and Blue and Shrill and Motivated are all of them more complicated than Pain and have internal structure. To a mind, or particular minds, they may be the simplest and most individual things detectable at the bottom, but that does not mean they are not made from simpler things (and they are). In fact, the only clearly elemental qualia are pain and pleasure, the “emotional” ones (Sipfle K. , The Nature of Fundamental Consciousness (preprint), 2018). It turns out this is a profound observation and an important clue. Pain and pleasure are must-haves in the base feeling repertoire; no others are, they are constructed. The key categories of qualia, then, are Valent or Not, and Level of Complexity. If a quale is a feel, then the simplest quale is the simplest feel. The simplest feel contains nothing other than feeling. This means a simplest quale cannot be about something, for then you have the feeling plus the thing about, and so here we encounter a difference in structural levels (levels of complexity). To a mind, Red may seem as elemental as pain, because inside a mind you are sitting on top of everything needed to begin making one. This does not mean Red is as simple as pain inside the fabric of that platform. Indeed, this has been one of the primary confusions historically in understanding consciousness. Even at the lowest level, one can’t get from an ”Is” (information) to any kind of “Ought” (which regards value and therefore feeling); the two different elements must become associated. The connection of feeling to information flows is ultimately what makes ideas “register.” The idea is cognitive, the registration is feeling. 8.2. Necessary Qualities of Fundamental Consciousness Qualia are the molecules of the mind, but not its quarks. And since qualia must be constructed of something similar (for workable emergence (Sipfle K. , The Primary Pitfalls on the Road to Understanding Consciousness, 2021)), this constructability becomes an essential feature of a successful architecture. The answer is provided by the physical field, the mechanism that addresses another key problem, the fusion of feeling. This may be either an actual physical field (the “sentonic” field), which we presume is the simplest explanation, or in principle another mechanism that is different but very similar in character. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 10 We address first the build-up from fundamental pain to quale-level (mind-level) pain. Note that by pain we mean “the painfulness of pain.” Pure pain is the dysphoric (“emotional”) aspect, the negative experience that is the end result of everything that causes pain. If you are in slight pain and it gets much worse, we know that you will be experiencing the effect of more neurons activating, not just one or two becoming tremendously more active. At a physics level, the effect is many more psybits (fundamental feeling events) occurring, generally in close quarters. But what you feel at the mind level is not 1,000 individual small dots of pain. Your mind experiences the same, unified thing, greatly amplified. This means there must be a mechanism adding and joining these psybits into the whole pain. Note that simply interconnecting these feeling spots with neural information signals is not enough- that would still be separate little feelings, possibly now synchronized in time but still isolated as feelings and linked only by informational bridges. An additional mechanism is needed. Physical interactions are all the behavior of forces. In a force field, every spot is subjected to the influence of every other spot in the same field. What results is a three-dimensional (four, including time) intensity cloud of a specific compositional shape. With this fusion, the otherwise freestanding feels join into a larger cloud of feeling. This is why you feel one big pain instead of a thousand little ones. Pain is special as a feel/quale because pain is pain, on a small scale or a larger scale. Pain flows up from Layer 1 to Layer 2 in a rather direct and simple fashion. 8.3. Hypotheses Contained in STFC STFC Hypothesis 1: Fundamental feeling is freestanding and requires no separate feeler. At most there is a physical interaction between fundamental elements. STFC Hypothesis 2: There is a physical process that is fundamental feeling. STFC Hypothesis 3: The fundamental feelings are pain and pleasure. STCF Hypothesis 4: There exist pain and pleasure in minimal discrete bits independent of any brain, at the particle scale. These are discussed in (Sipfle K. , The Nature of Fundamental Consciousness (preprint), 2018). Re layer 2 we will discuss the informational qualia, which are very different. For example our Pain that is distinctly located also activates primary and secondary somatosensory cortex. But the same mechanism we have been discussing still underlies these pains. A field mechanism is needed in the consciousness architecture. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 11 9. Sites of Fundamental Consciousness in the Brain Let us now drill down on the matter of the most likely sites of action for consciousness in the brain. This question is actually three: which neurons hold the sites of action, which regions of the brain contain these neurons, and where in the neurons is the site of action. For the first two questionsthe macroscopic world of the cortical region and the cell- the evidence is stronger. For the thirdthe sub-neural, molecular scale (where physics lives), we are further away from knowing. Macroscopically and microscopically, some areas of the brain show no signs of consciousness. This suggests that certain neurons and not others have evolved conscious (feeling) capability, directly causing pain or pleasure. This means the former have evolved nontrivial, nonchaotic access to the sentonic field. 9.1. Macroscopic Scale It is medically known that human consciousness requires only 1. Cerebral cortex (“for awareness”) 2. The Reticular Activating System of the brainstem (“for arousal”) The RAS projects to all cortex but mainly to prefrontal cortex. If we look at limbic brain tissue as pain/pleasure-related, we find that it omits the stellate cells of cognitive tissue. This suggests that the feeling neurons ae pyramidal. Throughout the cortex pyramidal cells are the “workhorse” cells, the primary (and evolutionarily long-standing) units of the cortex, while the others provide regulation, lateral inhibition, relay, and pattern preprocessing to the deciding and publishing cells, the pyramidals. Closely associated with pyramidal cells, however, are chandelier neurons, whose axons always synapse exclusively on the axon initial segment of pyramidal cells. Therefore, chandelier cells may play a role in consciousness. Pyramidals appear especially in cortical layers III and V so one (or both) of these is probably the most conscious layer(s). The III pyramidals and V pyramidals differ, with the latter being larger, and as we shall see, are used for different processing. Layers II and IV of neocortex contain many stellate interneurons which are evolutionary newer, added once consciousness was in place. Pain (dysphoria) centers can be found in the anterior insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (discussed later). The ACC is unique in its abundance of spindle cell neurons, which are connected to the anterior insular cortex and which are only found in very intelligent mammals. The spindle cells may not be themselves a site of consciousness, and do exist in other places, but their high density here may highlight the special importance of this area for very smart, very aware animals and the importance of pain to successful mentation. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 12 In pleasure (euphoria), the insular cortex and orbitofrontal cortex are probably involved. 9.2. Molecular Scale Anesthetic experiments and pathology and injury studies (e.g., (Hemmings, 2019)) indicate that it is not receptors directly and it is firing sequences that cause consciousness (and also that some neurons make consciousness and others do not). Most likely, spike generation or transmission is related to consciousness by a very short causal path. Consciousness appears to occur in axons. The charge travel pattern of a neural spike is complex, unusual, and dimensionally precise. Here we have a toroid of deluges of ions across the axonal membrane, itself traveling along the considerable length of the fixed-diameter axon. This means the ion rush through these channels (Fain, 2014) may be the site of consciousness. While dendrites often taper, axons maintain a constant radius. The exact diameter varies by neuron type. It is typically about one micron. No neuron ever has more than one axon (though it may branch extensively). The axon initial segment consists of a specialized complex of protein molecules. Note that the physics of axonal spikes might be replicated by a constructible apparatus for experimental purposes. This would allow for more intense examination than is readily possible in a brain or even brain slice. (Effects discovered could then be sought in real brain tissue.) Microtubules have been suspected in consciousness theories (Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind, 1989). Much like axons but at a smaller scale, they are of even more constant and small radius and run the length of the axon and whole neuron. They experience the toroidal voltage pulse running down the axon that possibly induces something in or on the microtubule. These precisely dimensioned microtubules might function as resonators of some kind. In our model they would produce resonances in the sentonic field, or of a causative agent. Subsequent spikes would regenerate a decaying resonance. Also worth noting is that many differing molecules bind to microtubules. It is not clear yet what the exact mechanism is, but it is clear that there are several possible pathways for what is needed, which is ion control of sentonic events and vice versa. At a slightly higher level knowing that is all we need, and we can await the elucidation of the details. The sentonic field provides another means, requiring no direct cabling, for points in the brain to communicate with each other (“ephaptically”) (Sipfle K. , Support for the Sentonic Theory of Fundamental Consciousness (STFC), 2019). While cycling (and resonance) of signaling in the recurrent connections in neural networks may provide a regenerative effect that fortifies consciousness (and provide computation and correlation), it is not the base mechanism (cycling is a base mechanism of short-term memory, however). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 13 10. The Nature of Sentience Layer 2 takes us from individual glints of minimum feeling to our first unitary body of larger feeling. It provides the combining and fusing. It is the weaving of the elementary and separate into whole cloth. This layer provides fusion, minimum awareness, and discernability between individual fused configurations. This layer exists in physics, possibly chemistry, and brain biology to provide the needed surrounding conditions and location in the real world. In keeping with Layer 1, there are two conceivable mechanisms providing this. The first is the field. The nature of fields is such that each point is influenced by all neighbor points. Electrons for example form a summary, mutually owned electric charge profile owing to their relative locations. Sentonic charge and its local interactions would presumably have similar field effects. The second possible contributor at this scale is quantum entanglement at maximum scales up to perhaps a millimeter. A problem with this mechanism, though, is that it is unlikely to serve at brain-size scales, as the brain is a messy, hot environment that would not support any large-scale entanglement. It could be speculated that while large scale, stable entanglements are infeasible, brief chains might repeatedly appear. The earliest actualizations of this layer could conceivably rely on entanglement across macroscopic scales, for example on the order of a neuron. This layer is the first in which we now have a feeling object larger than elementary ones, that can then be impinged upon by external elementary ones or others like itself. Now we have something we can call sentient- a unitary blob responding to impingement with macroscale feeling. In other words, at this level something resembling a Feeler occurs, a Subject, whereas before there were only equal minimal partners in mutual physics interactions. Feeling is fundamental to the large-scale operation of vertebrates and not necessary to the behavior of other life forms, so this layer probably organized a bit before vertebrates but not greatly before. So far, we have no evidence that a single-celled organism or an ant has any reason to feel. In addition to fusion this layer likely contributes or sets up for persistence. Important and subtle things happen in this layer. A composite feeling and sub pieces thereof must be not only fused but individually distinguishable (Sipfle K. , The Solvability of The Hard Problem of Consciousness and its Relation to Fundamental Consciousness and Human Consciousness, 2019). This layer provides “molecules” of feeling from which real qualia can be built. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 14 Note also here that you can have an awareness of something without it capturing attention. As humans we would call such things “at the periphery” (because our actual or minds’ foveas have not been fixed on them). 10.1. Hypotheses Contained in STFC STFC Hypothesis 5: Some biological brains have evolved to organize and exploit pain and pleasure. STFC Hypothesis 6: The fusion of feeling across the brain occurs in a force field. 11. Consciousness Architecture Layer 2: Sentience Unification of information can occur in one way by the interconnected firing of informational components, but that does not explain a feeling of Red that is both unitary and different from a feeling of Blue. One will come to know a feeling of Red through very long experience with it, but as has been oft-cited, exactly what red is like to me may not be identical to what it is like for you. What is important in the fabric of mind is that it feels like something, and it feels different from Blue, and from early on we then take these things (feelings) for granted as our minds continue to build. Separate occurrences are not enough. Both for feeling and for informational meaning (which suggests the same mechanism is at play), we must have both the individual sub-aspects and unification of those into a whole. Assuming that there is only one level- qualia- is one of the fundamental errors in traditional thought on the topic, even before we get to the assumption that these individual qualia are the same thing as physics acts rather than compositions of physics acts. We are provided an excellent clue toward the solution of the problem with pain (and pleasure). Pain is all the same, at all scales. It contains no information; it is purely valent. Once we understand the necessary nature of fundamental consciousness, and that this is not the same as qualia, the next question presenting itself is how do we get from the former to the latter? 11.1. Meta-Symbols To make thinking requires unique “symbols,” things we can manipulate that represent other things. Even a symbol is divisible, and that is even before we deal with a symbol having both a name and an appearance. What is needed to start are unique identifiers- tags (meta-symbols)- to associate with large clouds of meaning. The tags, which are themselves each feeling clouds, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 15 become associated with yet more clouds, for its name, for its written visual representation if any, plus possible explicit association with net feelings of goodness or badness. This assemblage provides two things: feeling and unique pattern of real things in space. One such blob “feels different” from another, both in the sense of the blob doing its own feeling and of interacting blobs “experiencing” it (which is the underpinnings of mind, and which is two peers- being feeling- affected by each other). The little clouds feel different. This, ultimately, is why Red is different from Blue and a hundred other “raw” feels. Red and blue must feel different, and we must have a means by which this can be so. This issue is right at the nexus between the cognitive and the emotional mental realms. It is not enough to be different informationally. Different patterns of feeling in the clouds allow for the existence, recognizability, and reference of tags that are different. By themselves, they (the tags) have no meaning or clear symbolic identity, the purpose is simply to be different and distinguishable- unique identifiers. Precise visual or aural symbols can then exist- which themselves have some complexity- and then be attached to these tags, just as the many specific experiences that make up the meaning are attached to them. What does “attached” mean? The attachment to both the symbolic detail and the meaning detail can be just cognitive- neural links that don’t, themselves, have to feel. This is the connection between the what-it-is-like for the remembered meaning (and similarly for the visualization of the symbol) to the what-it-is-like of the tag. These three identifiable clouds of experience (generic tag as a handle, symbolic name/description, and situational experience) will bump up against each other in the overall continuous train of feeling being created in the lower brain, while the higher has the parallel cognitive conversations, to whatever relative degrees the content has high cognitive content vs. high impact. Each part of each cloud is being stimulated by a cognitive circuit (possibly by way of an additional connected neuron whose only function is to tweak the field), and then unified by the natural field(s). Cognition evolves to where the differentiated and distinguishable tags become persistently associated with much larger “clouds” of cognitive activity. With these handles, entire ideas can be effectively referenced and manipulated. This is what “meaning” is to us. “Meaning” as a term in common use means: 1) a collection of informational associations and 2) subjective experience of it. This is the blossoming of “what it is like.” Information is patterns of things, as with an abacus, and in full reduction the only things needed are the feelings. Anything else is intermediary, inert in the sense of importance to the abstract theory and architecture, other than to help arrange the patterns (which is where the wiring of the brain and physical shapes of neurons themselves come into play). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 16 Random variability in the structure of neural nets and neurons yields unique, distinguishable signatures of the clouds of psybits mutually influencing across space where these activations are happening in the brain. Red feels like something and Blue feels like something and they are different. The full picture of this is feeling stimulated in the field by informational circuits and a return path (otherwise feelings would have no effect), and this occurs both very far down and at multiple levels, ascending with the size and sophistication of thoughts (bigger concepts will literally be larger than tiny concepts). There is a very intimate and deep back and forth of feeling what is known and happening and knowing what is being felt that forms the stuff of our minds (so much so that it has been difficult for us to tease these two strands apart). It is necessary to have physics at work up to the point of constructing qualia. Qualia are the link from the actual to the abstract. Qualia are a conceptualization of the reality of feelings. With the “hardware” realization in place, we can manipulate and trade in the constructs conceptually, and the rest of the stack becomes “software” (and connective wiring). An important transition is made at this point: feeling is absolutely critical to how our minds work and this must be understood. Once it is, though, feeling can be considered a known aspect and discussed and used in an abstract way in recognizing a working architecture that relies upon it. We note that feeling provides “information” of a sort, but with important difference from ordinary information. Feeling enables a key portion of the control section that guides the operation of the data paths and computation, and this is going on at all levels of the mind (though not in all portions). The difference can be understood in terms of implications. Knowing of either kind can be encoded in information, which is then read so as to know what is in the message. The knowing elicited may be of a fact or of a direct pain/pleasure experience. The two are different, even though both may be represented and, in that way transported, by information (and even if information is the patterning of feelings). Another way to see the distinction is: Given enough book knowledge to read and enough mental ability and time you might understand any fact presented. However, to know what an experience was actually like can only be successfully transmitted to someone who has had the same experience or similar experiences. Otherwise, one must resort to knowing factual features about the experience and cogitating about a described experience instead of being able to emulate personally the experience of the sender, to sympathize. The top two layers of the architecture presented do not discuss physics, they discuss the structure of our minds. The bottom two layers explain what the fundamentals are for the top two layers to work with, and make the connection up to the bottom of what we can introspect to, and call for specific explanation to ultimately prove those things at that bottom are the atoms of mind, validating the assumptions made by the higher two layers. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 17 Note that stratification into layers correlates nicely with the different disciplines; neuroanatomists’ findings, for example, are especially useful throughout Layer 3, and harder to use in explanation beneath or above. We have seen that cognition manipulates information and so is not of necessity related to the stuff that encodes it. Feeling is not about information and has everything to do with actual physical process. This means in its simplest form, mind needs nothing more for the stuff than the feeling, and the wiring that helps pattern the occurrences of the feeling; no other stuff is strictly required other than to maintain life and the mechanics and housekeeping of biological functioning. While we are here in the discussion, we can point out that this leads (distantly) to a subbranch of the present thinking that is (much) more speculative but not devoid of merit, involving the belief by some that life itself involves the fundamental consciousness force. The primary rational support for this notion, which probably originates from a “transcendent” suspicion (as did also that we are related to animals and stars), derives from the realization that feeling had to be discoverable by evolution. One possibility, then, is that the feeling necessary for our world was discovered quite early by evolution and has been used to enable life processes that speak little (at least, obviously) to its experiential nature, just as electromagnetism and gravity have been used early and often. Note that base consciousness is expected by this paper to be variations in a field present everywhere. From the other direction, it is also possible that our particular region of space was particularly seeded not only with proto-life elements but with proto-consciousness elements. 11.2. Primitive Self There is a self- the one- before awareness of self. When do things enter one’s consciousness? When the chief, large, dominating (though shifting) cloud of feeling with embedded cognition that we call Me is affected by other clouds- when they come into effective contact because of out of a background of feeling noise there is a local strengthening that bridges into the primary Me. The Me is already a large cloud of assembled feelings, that has a (fuzzy) perimeter- a cloud that hangs together with only thin “mist” of disorganized consciousness between it and other little clouds. To enter your conscious mind, you must feel what is entering. Not to feel is not to be conscious of. To be conscious of is not the same as the core mechanism of attention, which is a cognitive (that is, unfeeling) mechanism. What you feel will in large part (the other part being cognitive things like difference) determine what the attention circuits bring into focus, and the cognitive things (and feelings, too, as objects of attention) then amplified rather than suppressed will in turn result in feelings, which will then affect attention, but the attention proper is a cognitive device. Feeling occurs in its usual independent and passive way yet determines and thus drives the direction of thought. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 18 Split-brain studies show one self in each hemisphere of the brain (even when still connected, the informationally linked but separated hemispheres may have distinct emotional lives). This suggests a prediction about the field strength formula of the consciousness (sentonic) force: it should feature high influence in the micron-millimeter scale and poor influence at the centimeter-meter scale. That would also make sense from an operational utility standpoint: Goodness v. badness values are most useful when they summarize each of subsets of everything that is going on. 11.3. Qualia Qualia are the essence of the Hard Problem. Qualia are at the bottom edge of human mind (which is a whole represented by intense interconnections both mentally and physically). The bottom of the mind is well above the physical level making it possible, that is, fundamental consciousness. In analyzing this layer, pain and pleasure are interesting as subjective experiences that are included as basic experiences to every human mind, but that do not demand a substantial range of possibles, as qualia (such as colors), in general, do. Suffering and pleasure are distillable in pure form from the human mind, and there is only one essential member of each of those two experience classes (or just two of one class if you prefer), not a spectrum or family. In contrast, Red is not a single raw feel. Red, and anything else we calmly notice, has impact, a feel shared by many other “raw” feels. Furthermore, it is a visual (possibly envisioned) experience, and additionally to those two facts, it is also red. Impact is like pain and pleasure without the sign. Impact is neutral oomph. (Impact may simply be a composite of negative and positive.) Minimum awareness is naked impact. While this quale- red- may be among the least at once that the mind can do, and in that way this supposedly elemental thing may be atomic to the mind, it is already clearly made of multiple things. Commonly mentioned qualia are not the rawest of raw feels; they are more complex. Such a minimal, actual experience for us is likely to be an assemblage of some kind of that which applies at the elementary physical level. How do we feel red and blue? A little piece of your brain will light, consciously, when blue light comes in. However, this piece in isolation would not influence the connected whole of consciousness that we call the mind; it would be an outlier. This piece of brain is connected closely with a piece of brain that activates for any such visual color input (these connections are either direct or effectively so). Now we have a mob operating in concert, the experiencer of blue, and the experiencer of visual color upon which other color experiencers converge. This explains both the specific and the more general experience which are happening together. Yet higher convergence is to vision as a whole (fusion). These elements of experience are integrated into a whole, yet with introspection we can detect that both a common visual awareness and a specific blueness are occurring. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 1-19 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part I) 19 What then makes the activity of the red brain patch different from the activity of the blue brain patch? One can say they are separate and so can hold separate information but that is only half the answer. Furthermore, there is nothing at bottom to us that feels special about red or blue, yet they feel different. The two patches of brain tissue will have different microdetails physically, which could cause differing blobs of fundamental consciousness actions (psybits) in space (with these psybits in contact with one another by virtue of their field). It is not important on this point what the exact arrangement within these blobs is, just that they differ. The degree of difference is yet more pronounced with fundamental consciousness coming in positive and negative flavors, because there is not only an amplitude shape in space but also a pattern of +/- psybits within the blob. What is happening is that the detailed tapestry of individual spots (psybits) has different detailed composition, so the feeling of the little mob is different. This effectively gives differentiating identities to each particular feeling; the experience of each is a little different (these then become associated in groups at higher levels of the mind, into richer experiences). In a signed theory, a typical glob will have impact but not pain or pleasure because the plus and minus psybits cancel each other out overall, but each pattern made of the individual psybits exists and is different. (Continued on Part II) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 224-226 224 Pitkänen, M., The Emergence of Brain-Like Functions in Neuromorphic Metallic Nanowire Network Exploration The Emergence of Brain-Like Functions in Neuromorphic Metallic Nanowire Network Matti Pitkänen 1 Abstract The article by Diaz-Alvarez et al published in Nature reports rather interesting findings suggesting that human brain-like functions emerge in neuromorphic metallic nanowire networks. There are also other findings suggesting that simple systems such as plastic balls can exhibit life-like properties. In this article the TGD inspired model for the latter findings is applied to neuromorphic networks. 1 Introduction The popular article ”Human Brain-Like Functions Emerge in Neuromorphic Metallic Nanowire Network” published in Scitechdaily ( http://tinyurl.com/v8a2pqg) represents findings, which are very interesting from TGD point of view. The original article ”Emergent dynamics of neuromorphic networks” by DiazAlvarez et al is published in Nature [1] (http://tinyurl.com/v44rc62). There are also other findings suggesting that simple systems such as plastic balls can exhibit life-like properties. In this article the TGD inspired model [4, 8] for these findings is applied to neuromorphic networks. Consider first the findings. 1. One can say that the self-organization process corresponds to the system ”struggling” to find optimal current pathways. This process involves fluctuations akin to those found in memorization, learning and forgetting processes of brain. The temporal flutuations also resemble the processes by which brain becomes alert or returns to calm. 2. The metallic Ag nanowires become coated with a polymer (PVP)( http://tinyurl.com/tnmu4y9) insulating layer with about 1 nm thickness. Also metallic junctions between two nanowires acting as a resistive elements analogous to synapse are formed. The average diameter and length of nanowires was measured to be 360 ± 110 nm and 14 ± 5 µm, respectively. Remark: These scales correspond to biological length scales (p-adic length scales L(161) and L(172)). 3. There are suggestive connections with biology. PVP polymer is an organic compound with repetive active part which consist of two parts: CH2 and aromatic Carbon 5-cycle with one C replaced with N and one CH2 replaced with C=O. In TGD framework this could be relevant for the selforganization - maybe the magnetic bodies of PVP polymers are in an essential role. I have proposed that valence bonds correspond to flux tubes with effetive Planck constant he f f = n × h0 > h = 6h0 [3] (http://tinyurl.com/ycg94xpl). 4. The formation of low resistance pathways between probes contacting the networks induces a transition from low conductance state to high-conductance state at given voltage threshold usually below 10 V. This occurs even for millimeter distance between probes. The weak independence on voltage suggests that the current flow is almost dissipation free - could dark supra currents at magnetic flux tubes be involved? 1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.com/. Address: Rinnekatu 2-4 A8, 03620, Karkkila, Finland. Email: matpitka6@gmail.com. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 224-226 225 Pitkänen, M., The Emergence of Brain-Like Functions in Neuromorphic Metallic Nanowire Network 2 TGD based model TGD predicts several a lot of new physics possibly relevant to the findings [10, 9] (http://tinyurl.com/ wd7sszo) and http://tinyurl.com/y3xbkokb). 1. Magnetic flux tubes (magnetic body, MB) carrying dark matter as phases with effective Planck constant hef f = n × h0 . 2. Zero energy ontology (ZEO) allows to formulate quantum measurement theory without paradoxes. The possibility of time reversal is one dramatic prediction. Basic mental functions like memory would be completely universal phenomena and possessed in principle even by elementary particles. Both memory recall and motor action would involve ”big” (ordinary) state function reduction (BSFR) changing the arrow of time. Biological death would correspond to BSFR. Sensory perception assignable to ”small” state function reductions (SSFRs) identifable as correlates of ”weak” measurements would not involve change of the arrow of time: the increase of distance between tips of causal diamon (CD) in each SSFR following unitary evolution would give rise to the experienced flow of time and correspondence between subjective time as sequences of SSFRs and geometric time as temporal distance between the tips of CD. 3. Universality of cognition described in terms of p-adic (adelic physics) is predicted [5, 6, 7] (http: //tinyurl.com/ycbhse5c and (http://tinyurl.com/yyyk6fu8)). Number theoretic vision realized as adelic physics predicts evolution as increase of the dimension of extension of rationals characterizing basic building bricks of space-time as surface. Self-organization involves generation of coherence and requires energy feed [9] (http://tinyurl. com/y3xbkokb). Same applies to life. Self-organization would be also universal: the self-assembly aspect of self organization would be simply due dissipation at reverse time direction at the level of dark matter at magnetic body controlling the dynamics at the level of ordinary matter as master. 4. Quantum criticality is essential element of self-organization and the observed 1/f fuctuations could be interpreted as their signature. Note that 1/f fluctuations are observed also in the ordinary electric circuits and since also these involve self-organization aspects, dark matter in TGD sense might be involved. At quantum criticality long range fluctuations take place and correspond to the creation of phases with large hef f and having therefore long quantum coherence length. Energy feed is however required and serves as analog of metabolic energy. Freezing of water could a good example about quantum criticality at the level of MB inducing ordinary criticality and leading to generation of complex structures at the level of ordinary matter. Snowflakes (http://tinyurl.com/wg8fyth) and the patterns observed by Emoto [12] (http://tinyurl.com/ycdywctw) as a response to stimuli like emotional voices provide examples of this. The TGD based interpretation relies on the same ideas as the model for other findings about simple systems possessing lifelike properties [4]. 1. The voltage feeds metabolic energy to the system by making current flow possible. The transition to high conductance state above critical voltage could correspond to minimal metablic energy feed needed to induce a phase transition generating Cooper pairs of electrons or even dark Ag ions with hef f > h at magnetic flux tubes so that current would become partially dark and conductance would increase. The preservation of dark phase requires energy feed but the reduction of dissipation for supracurrents makes this possible. 2. Ag+ have cyclotron frequency of 2.8 Hz in ”endogenous” magnetic field Bend = .2 Gauss assigned with living systems tentatively identified as the dark monopole flux carrying part of the Earth’s ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | February 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | pp. 224-226 226 Pitkänen, M., The Emergence of Brain-Like Functions in Neuromorphic Metallic Nanowire Network magnetic field with nominal value BE = .5 Gauss. Are the Cooper pairs of these ions involved? What about electronic Cooper pairs with cyclotron frequency about .6 MHz? Could the Coulomb energy Ec = ZeV for Cooper pair in critical voltage correspond to the cyclotron energy of the dark Ag+ Cooper pair or of electronic Cooper pairs? Nottale hypothesis hef f = hgr = GM m/v0 [2] is an essential part of the TGD based model of quantum biology [11] (http://tinyurl.com/rw58zaz) and would predict that cyclotron energies would not depend on the mass of the charged particle. 3. EEG is basic aspect of brain function of vertebrates. Could it be that Ag+ ions and also the possible ionization of the aromatic cycles make possible analog of EEG around 2.8 Hz? In this framework the findings discussed in the article could be assigned with system which are very simple life forms. To gain improved understanding a model for the magnetic body of the system would be needed. Received February 21, 2020; Accepted February 29, 2020 References [1] Diaz-Alvarez A et al. Emergent dynamics of neuromorphic nanowire networks. Nature. Scientific reports. Available at:http://tinyurl.com/v44rc62, 9(14920), 2019. [2] Nottale L Da Rocha D. Gravitational Structure Formation in Scale Relativity. Available at: http: //arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0310036, 2003. [3] Pitkänen M. Does valence bond theory relate to the hierarchy of Planck constants? Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/valenceheff.pdf, 2017. [4] Pitkänen M. Life-like properties observed in a very simple system. Available at: http://tgdtheory. fi/public_html/articles/plasticballs.pdf, 2017. [5] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/ articles/adelephysics.pdf, 2017. [6] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. In Trends and Mathematical Methods in Interdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences, pages 241–319. Springer.Available at: https://link.springer. com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-55612-3_11, 2017. [7] Pitkänen M. Getting philosophical: some comments about the problems of physics, neuroscience, and biology. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/philosophic.pdf, 2018. [8] Pitkänen M. Do hydrogels learn in presence of irradiation and heating? //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/gellearns.pdf, 2019. Available at: http: [9] Pitkänen M. Quantum self-organization by hef f changing phase transitions. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/heffselforg.pdf, 2019. [10] Pitkänen M. Some comments related to Zero Energy Ontology (ZEO). Available at: http:// tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/zeoquestions.pdf, 2019. [11] Pitkänen M. TGD inspired model for magneto-reception and circadian rhythm. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/RPMshort.pdf, 2019. [12] M. Pitkänen. On Masaru Emoto’s Experiments with Emotional Imprinting of Water. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research, 9(6), 2018. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 240 Article A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life Spencer M. Robinson* Center for Applied Social Neuroscience (CASN), Fukui, Japan ABSTRACT Using Judaism as an explanatory model, this study demonstrates how consciousness is a construction of spirituality, spirituality forming the very foundation of our evolutionarily defined core behavior. This core behavior is integral to mental health while simultaneously susceptible to suppression and even distortion by socioenvironmental pressure. In this study, a neuropsychologist introduces the neuroscience-informed modality of Cognitive Neuroeducation (CNE) for the prevention of and recovery from mental disorder through the renewal of core human behavior, exploring the spiritual qualities embodied within mental health and well-being, tightly coupling spirituality and science toward understanding how we define and achieve a whole, self-actualized, meaningful life. Keywords: Cognitive neuroeducation, neuroplasticity, synaptic strength modulation, long-term potentiation, long-tern depression, enriched environment, core behavior, self-renewal, wellbeing, Judaism. Core human behavior as defined in Judaism and science In his 2018 lecture entitled, Can we ask about the ‘whys’ and the ‘hows’ of Torah (the Five Books of Moses – the first five books of the Hebrew Bible) and mitzvos (the sacred duties of righteousness), or do we have to accept it all without questions? Rabbi Simon Jacobson states: “Questioning is a part of faith. It goes hand-in-hand – faith and reason – reason as a complement of faith.” The balance between the Jewish tradition of faith and the natural human inclination to question and to strive for knowledge and enlightenment has long been, and continues to be, a topic of discussion among Jewish thinkers (e.g., Bronfman, 2013; Horowitz, 2005; Sacks, n.d.; Leener, 2017). Putting this into a scientific, evolutionary perspective, both faith and reason are inherent components of the uniquely human social brain that directs our interpretive process in interacting with our environment (for studies on the uniquely human social brain, see, for example: Adolphs, 2009; Bhanji & Delgado, 2014; Blakemore, 2008 and 2010; Brüne, Ribbert, & Schiefenhövel, * Correspondence: Spencer M. Robinson, PhD, Executive Director and Chief of Research and Development, Center for Applied Social Neuroscience (CASN), Fukui, Japan. Email: casn@brain-mind-behavior.org ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 241 2003; Cozolino, 2006; U. Frith & Frith, 2010; Grossman & Johnson, 2007; Insel & Fernald, 2004; Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012; Lieberman, 2013; Saxe, 2006). Insufficiently equipped to compete with other animal taxa (kinds) for survival on an individual basis, humans evolved to rely on the competitive edge of cooperative behavior in groups. This cooperative behavior is the driving force constituting the Jewish principle of b’tzelem Elohim, literally meaning „in the image of HaShem‟ (HaShem, literally, „The Name,‟ a traditional Jewish convention honoring the ineffable name of the Unimaginable Majesty) – the expression b’tzelem Elohim referring to the commitment to the conception that humankind was created in the image of HaShem [as proclaimed in Bere’shit (Genesis) 1:27], and that every human being should be treated with the reverence and dignity honoring the sacredness of that image. B’tzelem Elohim further dictates that, as we are all created from a sacred image of humankind, we were all created to live and work together in harmony and cooperation to perpetuate humankind, and in this regard, a number of basic Jewish values and principles of life emerged: chesed – generally translated as „mercy,‟ referring to compassion and caring for others; g’milut chasadim – acts of kindness, assistance and charity to others; sh’lemut – literally, „wholeness‟ or „completeness,‟ referring to the pursuit of wholeness through honorable actions; amcha – literally, „your people,‟ referring to our sense of Jewishness that, though we are scattered across the globe, connects us together as one people from one generation to the next; derech eretz – literally, „the way of the land,‟ referring to the inheritance of our shared Jewish tradition in the honoring of mutual respect of our fellow humankind and acceptance of responsibility in our daily actions in dealing honestly and with forbearance with others and following the secular laws and rules of the greater society in which we live; tzedakah – literally, „righteousness,‟ referring to the obligation of the Jewish community to set an example of justice in the world; and tikun olam – literally, „repair of the world,‟ referring to our obligation, collectively as a Jewish people and individually as Jews, to engage in activities directed toward righting the wrongs of the world (i.e., to take action against injustices and corruption, including the moral duty of engaging in conscientious and responsible social activism). These maxims are universal throughout the various denominations of Judaism. From an evolutionary perspective all of these Jewish values are in fact inherent qualities that define us as human; i.e., behavioral dispositions of group unity and solidarity that evolved to give competitive advantages that enabled our taxon (Homo sapiens sapiens) to survive (b’tzelem Elohim – in the image of HaShem for the sake of humankind). These core behavioral dispositions evolved as pseudo-fixed action patterns defined as engrained behavioral tendencies, that, rather than fixed action patterns of nonhuman animals – i.e., hardwired, preprogrammed automatic responses (as first described by Lorenz, 1970, pp. 316350) – are, in humans, more prone to mediation by genotype (genetic composition) and phenotype (the interaction between genetic composition and environmental and experiential factors), and may even be entirely overridden by experience (as learning outcomes), stressing the flexibility of human behavioral response, with its dependency on learning [the cognitive imprinting in the codifying of all experience from sense-given impressions of external stimuli and the interpretation thereof in ideational constructions of meaning through internally configured associations (see Wood, 1942)] and, consequently, the susceptibility of human behavior to molding by environmental influence. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 242 As an evolutionary biological determinant of survival, the uniquely human social brain evolved highly flexible behavior through pseudo-fixed action patterns – including the acute stress response (fight-or-flight response), attachment/bonding response, mating (procreative) response, tend-and-befriend response, etc. – to adjust to changing environmental conditions and to allow adaptation to the widest variety of habitats, overcoming the limitations of the fixed action patterns that regulate behavior in nonhuman animal taxa. Fixed action patterns regulating behavior in nonhuman animals, while eliciting behavior finely tuned to adaptation to a very specific habitat, are unresponsive to environmental changes, whereby the preset behavioral patterns may become ineffective or maladaptive in the changed environment such that even small environmental changes may lead to taxon extinction. Rather than a fixed preadaptation to a specific habitat, humans evolved to learn to adapt to the widest variety of habitats by the creative use and manipulation of the resources available within and in the vicinity of their habitat through curiosity, inquisitiveness, imagination, creativity and reasoning. With a critical dependence on 1) learning as the mechanism for adaptation to the widest variety of habitats, and 2) cooperation as the key to human survival, the neurophysiological system of the uniquely human social brain became organized for the optimization of the facility and flexibility of learning and the orientation towards social behavior and structures of community. By cooperative behavior facilitated by language, which led to both higher-order reasoning and tool-making flexibility to manipulate their environment, humans were able to out-strategize, outplan, out-maneuver, and simply out-think their taxonomic rivals for survival. Humans organized in groups such as bands or tribes also competed against each other – group against group – in a particular habitat or region, so that social cohesiveness as well as role and skill diversification and skill expertise within a group leading to more specialized supportive social structures became the keys to group survival that pushed evolutionary determinants toward the human tendency for more sophisticated, intricate and complex social organization. So-called „morality‟ evolved as a condition of group survivability. Such so-called human „virtues‟ as courage, love, compassion, forgiveness, charity, mercy, consideration, honesty, honor, selflessness, steadfastness, loyalty, self-sacrifice, etc., that though became instituted in codes of behavior in the formulation of social order and sacred ideals of religious conviction, stem from natural tendencies embedded within the pseudo-fixed action patterns and cognitive constructions of the uniquely human social brain that are designed to solidify group cohesiveness and effectiveness in maximization of the competitiveness of a group. The greater these qualities among its members the stronger the group; conversely, the degree to which they are lacking among the members of a group (be it a mating pair, a family, a band, etc.), the less a group is able to work together effectively and benefit from the interrelationships of its members. For basic human survival: 1) learning became the central operating principle of the uniquely human social brain; 2) curiosity or inquisitiveness in response to novelty became the driving force of learning; 3) logic and reason became the principal method of understanding; 4) and affective state (emotive response) became the mechanism mediating the balance between understanding and action. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 243 Affective (emotive) qualities constitute essential components of pseudo-fixed action patterns, such as fear, anger, rage, hate, aggression and violence in the acute stress response and love, compassion, empathy, concern, and selfless, protective loyalty in the attachment/bonding response and the tend-and-befriend response, etc. While the predisposition of affect is an innate biological determinant of human behavior, the individual capacity for and/or particular nature of affective reaction is mediated by genotype and phenotype to the extent that each individual possesses a unique basic affective profile. Individual affective reaction is highly malleable, and is learned or modified through experience such that highly indoctrinated societies can skew mass behavioral tendencies. Cognitive and behavioral disorder In human pseudo-fixed action patterns behavioral flexibility and inventiveness can respond as group action while maintaining basic individual core principles of social cohesiveness and harmony in meeting changing environmental demands, but, on the other hand, such behavioral flexibility is equally responsive to pressures of conformity and pervasive social indoctrination that can mold individual characteristics to such extent that basic natural or core dispositions are altered, subverted or completely overridden, skewing the very nature of individuals, of groups, and even of entire societies, toward mindsets and behavior antithetical to core values, leading to cognitive and behavioral disorder (i.e., so-called „mental disorder‟) in individuals and/or „sick‟ (i.e., dystopic, dysfunctional or nonsustainable) societies. The brain of the anatomically modern human is a biologically evolved social brain, whereby all voluntary (consciously directed) human behavior, including social interaction, is learned. In the human social brain all learning is grounded in and constructed from a social context (the very basis of self-identity) and all positive learning – i.e., learning consistent with core values and cognitive growth – occurs in a normative positively stimulating environment or, in negative learning – i.e., learning inconsistent with core values and/or cognitive growth – in an impoverished environment („impoverished environment‟ referring to a dearth of positive stimuli as experienced in a corrosive, threatening, confined, isolating or otherwise psychosocially inhospitable or deprived, barren environment). Impoverished environments as well as different forms of diseases or organic disorders resulting in cognitive neurophysiological disturbance can lead to cognitive and behavioral disorder; i.e., so-called “mental disorder.” Since our behavior is defined by our learning experiences, in addition to effective treatment for any organic pathology, recovery from cognitive and behavioral disorder requires relearning and more intensive positive stimulation than in normative learning in order to trigger a stronger neurophysiological response to rebuild stagnant cognitive neurocircuitry and/or rewire cognitive connections from negative (i.e., maladaptive or distorted) cognitive constructs to positive cognitive constructs (cognitive constructs = conceptual orientations) and override and transform negative behavioral patterns set through the previous negative experience. The design, content and application of such a more intensive positive stimulation or positive learning environment, is referred to as the „enriched environment‟ (for studies on the enriched environment and its efficacy in recovery from cognitive and behavioral disorder, see, for example: Alwis & Rajan, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 244 2014; Hannan, 2014; Kleim & Jones, 2008; Kleim, 2011; Sampedro-Piquero & Begega, 2017; Nithianantharajah & Hannan, 2006 and 2009; van Praag, Kempermann, & Gage, 2000; Hebb, 1947; Taubert, Villringer, & Ragert, 2012; Draganski & May, 2008; May, 2011; Pascual-Leone, Amedi, Fregni, & Merabet, 2005; Woo, Donnelly, Steinberg-Epstein, & Leon, 2015; Sweatt, 2016). An enriched environment is the primary foundation of Cognitive Neuroeducation (CNE), a rigorously researched cutting-edge, neuroscience-informed modality for the prevention of and recovery from cognitive and behavioral disorder. The CNE enriched environment is one that has constancy, creates a bonding group dynamic, provides fun, engaging and challenging eclectic learning experiences and is positive, reinforcing, stimulating, rewarding, encouraging, supportive, and full of possibilities. In the CNE program we explore together conceptualizations, beliefs, modes of social interaction and interpersonal relationships, reactions to situations, emotive contours, flights of imagination, aesthetic visions, creative artistry and nuance, duty, purpose, loyalty, love, spirituality, sense of destiny and myriad other products of the mind that define the true essence of being human in understanding others and discovering or rediscovering ourselves through games, stories, group outings, music, skits and drama, motion picture films and dance, study sessions and discussion, debates, etc. We are normally born with a pseudo-fixed action pattern of curiosity about our environment and the world we live in. This curiosity or inquisitiveness, this fascination for the answers to the mysterious and the unknown, this striving to know and understand, this questioning and great wonder and delight of discovery is an inherent part of being human manifest from infancy, becoming the dominant preoccupation of early childhood. This innate curiosity was the spark that ignited exploration, discovery and creative manipulation of natural resources that enabled humankind to adapt to diverse habitats, an essential feature of our evolutionary survival. In the modern formula-driven, staid curriculum of education reinforcing the artificiality of the modal socialization of mass consumerism, our innate curiosity is suppressed and largely overridden by force-fed narrow concepts, empty sound bites, dissociated „facts‟ and rote stereotyped surface role-playing by the time we reach adulthood in the impersonal, hype-infused, small-minded, electronic-media-inundated anonymity of modern urbanized daily life. If, however, our natural curiosity and questioning is nurtured it may be maintained throughout life, and through CNE can be regenerated in adulthood, fostering creativity; an open, receptive mind; critical thinking; and an ongoing love of learning. The Jewish tradition of learning as mirrored in CNE In the Jewish tradition, learning and education, questioning, the continual seeking of more definitive answers, and the honing of the intellect, are revered and assimilated into the religious practice itself as exemplified in consideration of the Talmud (the collection of the commentaries of the noted rabbis of the ages in the interpretation of the Scriptures) as a process, not a product, as summed up in the phrase „turn and turn the Torah.‟ In the study of the Talmud, when an answer to a question is developed, it is not the end, but only the beginning of a new question using the principles and techniques of hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle in the deep ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 245 analysis of the Talmudic text in the questioning and revisiting of the meaning underlying grammatical construction and every term, expression, generalization or exception and all the interrelationships thereof. The Talmudic way of thinking is the seeking of ever-new ways to see. This thinking is paralleled in the CNE curriculum based on learning as the mechanism for the remediation of and recovery from cognitive and behavioral disorder and sees the accumulation of learning, that is, knowledge itself, as composed of relative truths, as all things may be understood from many different starting points, frames of reference and personal perspectives. Being relative does not make these „truths‟ any less real to the frames of reference in which they reside. The full recognition of this relativity leads to the undeniable, stirring realization that there are so many more, endless things to discover, so many more, endless ways by which to view all phenomena, so many more, endless ways to think about life and all its mysteries and so many more, endless contributions to knowledge waiting for eager, imaginative, curious, probing, questioning minds to reveal. The CNE activities, related materials and group dialog explore the different realms of understanding and knowledge from the widest possible perspectives, stimulating each of the group members with the awe of the vast potentials of discovery, of endless paths on the journey through life, and the eager anticipation of the possibilities waiting beyond the bend in the road on the great adventure of being. While invisible to the CNE participants, this exploration seamlessly blends hermeneutic techniques and exegetic principles in the group dialogs and interchanges between the CNE participants in questioning, probing and debating in the quest for understanding the various scenarios, situations and responses encountered in the CNE activities, thus realizing the many considerations, nuances and different sides that may reside in any question. We live within our mind and the journey of life continues on in elderhood and even in infirmity of body through a healthy, active mind and an environment arousing our innate curiosity and deep human need to communicate, share experiences, exchange ideas, work through challenges and involve ourselves with others. Faith and the scientific method Faith is the very cornerstone of this journey through life. Quite contrary to the common myth that faith is antithetical to reason and the anathema of science, faith is the very foundation of science and the thread of life that ties together the binary constructs of reason (rationality) and spirituality, intellect and emotion, practicality and idealism, common sense and imagination – the paradoxes that form the very essence of being human. Let us consider science then in understanding this critical role of faith. According to a rigorous interpretation of the scientific method, science is defined as possessing the following qualities: 1) it is empirical: based on actual experience 2) it is rational: following the rules of logic and consistent with known facts, subject to change as new evidence dictates ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 246 3) it is testable: verifiable by experimentation – it is possible to imagine ways that scientific theories and hypotheses prove invalid 4) it is parsimonious: the explanations must be simple in that they involve few assumptions; i.e., solutions must be tightly constructed in which all facts are accounted for in a seamless logical progression of cause and effect, and considered invalid if any elemental facts do not fit in and/or fundamental questions remain unanswered 5) it is general: theories work for a relatively wide range of phenomena 6) it is tentative: theories are readily abandoned when confronted by new, refuting evidence 7) it is rigorously evaluated: hypotheses are continuously subject to testing, retesting and modification The rigorously logico-deductive scientific model of hypothesis testing is constructed as follows: Figure 1. The Scientific Method: The Steps of Hypothesis Testing As the diagram above shows, hypotheses testing, and therefore, scientific results, are never finalized or proven, they are simply approximations of the rules governing observed phenomena that represent our current understanding of the mechanisms of physical properties. Testing, probing and questioning are ongoing processes of experimentation in 1) either the revision of hypotheses in the event of unexpected results, or 2) in new predictions in the event of expected results, digging deeper into ever more detailed understanding of a phenomenon and its relationship with other phenomena. There is no end to the accumulation of knowledge or learning, and within scientific study, no absolutes, only different ways of understanding and new relationships and new concepts to be discovered. This comports with the tentative nature of science that, in point 6 above, maintains that theories are readily abandoned when confronted by new, refuting evidence, and in point 2 maintains that scientific understanding is subject to change as new evidence dictates. This never-ending cycle of testing also follows the tenets of science in points 1, 3, and 7, that all scientific statements are testable, based on actual experience (i.e., experimentation) and are continuously subject to testing, retesting and modification in a restless dialectic. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 247 However, in science, as well as in all efforts of understanding, every problem, idea or observation is seen in light of some intrinsic basic assumptions stemming from an adopted worldview. Every scientific endeavor, every experimental design, must start with some basic assumptions. Basic assumptions include underlying tenets concerning questions of primary concepts. In science, for example, we must make some assumptions regarding such questions as: 1) is there an outside intelligence operating, or is the system closed, depending only on internal known laws? 2) are the laws of nature constant everywhere? 3) were the laws of nature in the past the same as they are now? 4) what initial conditions are assumed as base phenomena? Science does not, and cannot, take place in a vacuum – an underlying worldview, i.e., belief system, a faith in some view of the basic agent or agencies which regulate the world, is presupposed. The belief system upon which modern logico-deductive science rests is known as naturalism and is based on the faith that 1) the entire universe can be explained entirely on the basis of physical realities plus time plus chance and 2) that the laws of physics have never changed since the beginning, so that the evidence revealed by experimentation in the modern natural world can be applied to explain past conditions as reliably as today‟s conditions. This faith, however, is being challenged by new evidence that suggests that perhaps the laws of physics have indeed changed over time and that some so-called mathematical constants are actually fluctuating values (Moscovitch, 2013). While this new evidence challenges some basic scientific concepts and implies how we might need to rethink some of the tenets of science and some of the processes of the scientific method, scientific thinking and the fundamental philosophy of the scientific method, when rigorously applied, offer the most systematic, credible, rational and precise way to explore and unravel the mysteries of the physical world, as science demands, first and foremost, that all results must be able to be repeated without fail and therefore, be fully verifiable to others, and that a problem and its experimental design be constructed around a phenomenon in which large amounts of data are available, as the results from small amounts of data are inconclusive since small sampling populations are statistically meaningless. Science, then, by its own rigorous mandates, is, by definition, limited. Although qualitative research as a model of enquiry is gaining traction among the social sciences, it is still largely dismissed by the more quantitatively oriented scientific disciplines due to the lack of rigor in theoretical grounding, analysis, replicability and intersubjective verification in much of the corpus of qualitative research studies. However, qualitative research rigorously following the hermeneutic triad of claims, evidence and warrants and the hermeneutic circle (see Robinson, 2012, pp. 1-2 and pp. 9-10) not only incorporates many of the principles of the scientific method, but can even exceed its rigor, and, freeing research results from dependence on statistical evaluation, opens up a much wider field for scientific investigation. Such a wider field of exploration may embrace such areas as 1) deeper and more experiential explorations of the mind, behavior, and theology; 2) cognitive interpretation of history, art, music, dance and literature; 3) mysticism, metaphysics and the essence of being, and spirituality (as inclusive of but a broader phenomenon than religion per se); and 3) semantics and the meaning of meaning and other areas of fundamental critical and compelling concern and interest beyond the material arena of the physical world (see Robinson, 2012 and 2008/2010, respectively, for 1) a description of an exclusively hermeneutic, scientifically rigorous qualitative research model; and 2) a comprehensive study rigorously employing that exegetic model). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 248 From the above, we see how faith anchors science – the most rational, evidence-based process of thinking and understanding. Without faith, there can be no science, as reason itself is the principal method of the uniquely human social brain in understanding the world in which we live, and faith is an intricate component of reason as faith establishes a world-view, the essential platform upon which rational explanation may begin – the fundamental concept of order: the starting point of speculation, questioning and exploration – the belief and trust in some order and agency by which phenomena may be explained and understood. This vital aspect of faith molds our cognitive constructions such that understanding is founded on the unquestioned (faith-based) acceptance that there is some order or plan, that is, governing principles, that constitute the arrangement of our world – not only the order that we find in nature, but equally the order that we inherently generate from the constructs of our socially oriented brain in molding our social structures. The agency by which this order is established becomes the central question of faith. Is this order 1) the result of the laws of nature as discovered and explained by science, though many things remain unexplained and perhaps unexplainable by science? 2) the result of the laws of nature that can be explained by science, but also extend beyond the reaches of science, with the laws themselves originating from and governed by a Being – a Deity, unfathomable, omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, the Creator of all? 3) the sole result of the will of the Creator? 4) the result of some essence that surrounds us and resides within us all and which we are an integral part of – an ethereal or incorporeal thread connecting all things and from which life and all matter emerges – an agency that we might simply refer to as Nature, constituting the interconnection of all things?; 5) or is it some combination of the above or something else entirely, or perhaps all the same seen from different viewpoints? The phenomenon of faith and its relation to intellect and understanding is put into a Jewish perspective by the former Chief Rabbi of Britain, Lord Jonathan Sacks, as follows: The historian Paul Johnson once wrote that rabbinic Judaism was “an ancient and highly efficient social machine for the production of intellectuals.” Much of that had, and still has, to do with the absolute priority Jews have always placed on education, [secular] schools and the bet midrash [a bet midrash is a Jewish study hall located in a synagogue or specialized school of Jewish religious study] – religious study seen as an act even higher than prayer, learning as a lifelong engagement, and teaching as the highest vocation of the religious life. (Sacks, n.d. – insertions in brackets mine) “But much too has to do with how one studies and how we teach our children. The Torah [refers to] the most powerful and poignant juncture in Jewish history – just as the Israelites are about to leave Egypt and begin their life as a free people under the sovereignty of God;” Moses entreats the Israelites to “Hand on the memory of this moment to your children,” – but not in an authoritarian way – rather in the encouragement of our children “to ask, question, probe, investigate, analyze [and] explore. Liberty means freedom of the mind, not just of the body. Those who are confident of their faith need fear no question. It is only those who lack confidence [i.e., real faith], who have secret and suppressed doubts, who are afraid [to question]” (Sacks, n.d. – insertions in brackets mine). Note: I have inserted explanations for clarification in certain quotations, and, because of the difference of expression used in liturgy and Scripture as opposed to theology, and the common conflation of liturgy and Scripture with theology in religious writings, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 249 to maintain consistency with the language of the central theological theme presented herein, that of the nameless indefinability of the Great Absolute, I have substituted or added words in certain quotations, preserving the meaning, and hopefully balancing the „flavor‟ of the original text, with that of the prevailing theological theme in each instance. As Rabbi Sacks (n.d.) states, it is important to recognize, and to teach our children, “that not every question has an answer we can immediately understand. There are ideas that we will only fully comprehend through age and experience, others that take great intellectual preparation, yet others that may be beyond our collective comprehension at this stage of the human quest. . . In teaching its children to ask and keep asking, Judaism honored what Maimonides [Rabbi Moses ben Maimon] called the „active intellect‟ and saw it as the gift of God [the „active intellect‟ is discussed by Maimonides in Part 2, Chapters 36-37 of his circa 1190 tome The Guide for the Perplexed – a very accessible English translation of which may be found in Friedländer, 1904, pp. 225-229 – in Scripture, the gift of the intellect is included in the „seven gifts of the spirit of HaShem‟ in Nevi’im (Isaiah) 11:2-3, in which four of the seven, i.e.; wisdom, insight, counsel and sense of truth (the latter two consisting of prudence and the perspicacity of inference and penetrating judgement), are all manifestations of the intellect (see Jewish Publication Society (JPS), 1999/2000, p. 870)]. No faith has honored human intelligence more” (insertions in brackets mine). Judaism itself then is a religion based on intelligence, reason and faith, equally valued. In honoring the „active intellect‟ as the gift of HaShem, understanding becomes the avenue by which we exercise our faith – coming closer to HaShem and embracing existence itself by striving to ever more deeply discern the mysteries of HaShem, the meanings and appropriateness of the Tanakh (the complete 24 books of the Hebrew Bible), the Halacha (the collective body of Jewish religious laws), the Musar literature (the didactic Jewish ethical literature which describes virtues and vices and the path towards perfection) and our duties and responsibilities, not only as Jews but as citizens of a society and as members of the human race. Our faith is based on our belief that, as Rabbi Sacks (n.d.) states, “. . . intelligence is [HaShem‟s] greatest gift to humanity” and “Judaism a faith that is centered on asking questions, sometimes deep and difficult ones that seem to shake the very foundations of faith itself. . . Rashi [Rabbi Shlomo Itzhaki] understands the phrase that [HaShem] made man „in His image, after His likeness,‟ to mean that [HaShem] gave us the ability „to understand and discern.‟ The very first of our requests in the weekday Amidah [Tefilat HaAmidah, „The Standing Prayer,‟ the central prayer of the Jewish liturgy] is for „knowledge, understanding and discernment. . .‟” There is no word in Biblical Hebrew that means „to obey‟ [that is, in the sensu stricto of a forced act of absolute, unquestioning compliance]. “When Hebrew was revived as a living language in the nineteenth century and there was need for a word meaning „to obey,‟ it had to be borrowed from the Aramaic le-tsayet. Instead of a word meaning „to obey,‟ the Torah uses the verb shema, untranslatable into English because it means 1) to listen, 2) to hear, 3) to understand, 4) to internalize, and 5) to respond. Written into the very structure of Hebraic consciousness is the idea that our highest duty is to seek to understand the will of [HaShem] [i.e., to delve into the mysteries of the principles, construction and metaphysics of the order of The Great Design], not just to obey blindly” (insertions and substitutions in brackets mine). Note that Maimonides ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 250 discusses more nuanced meanings of „obey‟ and the Hebrew word „shema‟ in The Guide for the Perplexed, Part 1, Chapter 45 (see Friedländer, 1904, pp. 58-59). Simply because we use the masculine personal pronoun to refer to HaShem does not mean that HaShem is male or can be identified with any attributes that we can define within the limitations of language constructed by mortal man, it only means that we have no non-gendered pronouns that we can use to refer to HaShem, as the neuter pronoun „it,‟ redolent of the insentient, would be disrespectful, even blasphemous, so, traditionally, from the ancient patricentric Near Eastern culture of the Biblical Lands, the male personal pronoun was adopted in early Judaism to refer to HaShem. But though HaShem may be defined as a mysterious absolute beyond human contemplation, we certainly must try to understand HaShem up to the very boundaries of human limitation, as understanding is a form of connecting, adoration and respect; the striving for understanding then the path to internalize as much of the absolute of HaShem as our human intellect allows. The more we know about that Absolute and understand it, the more we can engage the essence of all things, of which we ourselves are a part, and merge its connection with us into our perspectives of life. The ‘absolute’ in Jewish mysticism and in science The question of what constitutes an „absolute‟ is highly contentious and lies outside the purview of the quantitative scientific method and outside of the capacity of comprehension of mortal man, like „infinity‟ or „nothingness‟ – though such words themselves are understood as superficial concepts, their reality is beyond human contemplation (to illustrate, try to visualize what the concrete reality of nothingness or infinity would be like; a condition without time? without cause and effect relationships? without beginning or end? without boundaries or development or growth? a condition without conditions?). While HaShem is an example of an absolute beyond human contemplation, we may still gleam important, vital concepts by carefully probing aspects of The Elemental Vitality such as defined by Maimonides in Part 1, Chapter 50 of The Guide for the Perplexed (as translated in Friedländer, 1904, p. 67), where Maimonides states: “Those who believe that [HaShem] is One [and has] many attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts” (substitutions in brackets mine). Since HaShem is thus described in contradictory terms, Maimonides concludes that one cannot describe or define HaShem in terms of positive (that is, definitive) attributes, but can only consider HaShem in terms of negative attributes, that is, what HaShem is not, such as not corporeal but an Absoluteness of One, a Singularity, having no parts, no arms, no legs, no back, no front, no end or beginning – an Essential Impetus that does not occupy space, has neither generation nor corruption (i.e., is everlasting – never born, never aging, fading, or deteriorating – an Eternalness). The nature of HaShem is so far beyond the realm of human existence that it is unimaginable, unfathomable, incomprehensible to human conception, and therefore utterly beyond description, as HaShem is revealed to Moses as Nameless, related in Shemot (Exodus) 3:13-14, as follows: 13“Moses said to [HaShem], when I come to the Israelites and say to them, „The [Guiding Light] of your fathers has sent me to you,‟ and they ask me, „What is His name? what shall I say to them?‟” 14“And [HaShem] said to Moses, „Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh.‟ He continued, “This you will say to the Israelites: „Ehyeh sent me to you‟” (Jewish Publication ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 251 Society [JPS], 1999/2000, p. 117; – substitutions in brackets mine – JPS notes that the meaning of Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh in Hebrew is uncertain, but is conventionally translated variously as “I Am That I Am,” “I Am Who I Am,” or “I Will Be What I Will Be,” with Ehyeh variously translated as “I Am” or “I Will Be”). Furthermore, in regard to the indescribable nature of HaShem, HaShem‟s very attributes are proclaimed in Kethuvim (Psalms) 145:3 and 147:5 as unthinkable, as follows: 145:3, “Great is [HaShem] and much acclaimed; His greatness cannot be fathomed” (JPS, 1999/2000, p. 1592 – substitution in brackets mine); 147:5, “Great is our [HaShem] and full of power; His wisdom is beyond reckoning” (JPS, 1999/2000., p. 1594 – substitution in brackets mine). As regards „faith‟ in the Jewish tradition, Maimonides writes, “All we understand is the fact that [HaShem] exists, that [HaShem] is a Being to Whom none of [HaShem’s] creatures is similar, Who has nothing in common with them, Who does not include plurality, Who is never too feeble to produce other beings, and Whose relation to the universe is that of a steersman to a boat: and even this is not a real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea that [HaShem] rules the universe: that is, that [HaShem] gives it duration, and preserves its necessary arrangement” (The Guide for the Perplexed, Part 1, Chapter 58, as translated in Friedländer, 1904, p. 83 – substitutions in brackets mine). Faith is an essential component of spirituality and an inherent component of emotion, intellect and reason. This may be understood from an evolutionary perspective in the recognition that spirituality evolved as the vehicle driving the uniquely human social brain‟s orientation towards cooperative behavior through the dual impulse of 1) commonality, community, connectedness – the basic urge of transcendence, to go beyond the confines of self to connect with others, to bond, identify with and feel part of a group and of a larger wholeness, to connect with all that there is; and 2) curiosity and reason – the striving to know and to understand, to delve into the deeper mysteries of life, to get closer to the truth of existence and the origin of all things. These dual impulses of transcendence, that combine connectedness and inquisitiveness working together in the yearning of belonging, of sharing, of purpose, of meaning – propel the quest of the intellect and reason to understand what it means to be alive, to be human. Spirituality and its essential component of faith constitute that core of being that defines us as both human and each of us as a distinct, individual psyche that belongs to and is part of the very fabric of the world in which all life and all manifestations of nature are interwoven while simultaneously constituting our individual uniqueness and the need to define our individual, unique, special place within the universality of existence. Jewish mysticism delves deeper into the very fabric of existence through the Kabbalah and other metaphysical texts, opening the door to a process of discovery in learning and knowing the revelations of HaShem and the mysteries of the universe in deep, intense study through the channels of inner contemplation and intellectual abstraction. This journey of discovery begins with the concept of the Nothingness of the Prime Force (Ayin) and its emanation into levels of knowing as revealed through the Sefirot (the finite receptors of the emanations of Ayin). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 252 Figure 2. The Sefirot of the Kabbalah Source: Dubov, Nissan Dovid. (n.d.). The Sefirot. https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/361885/jewish/The-Sefirot.htm Because the Great Absolute is so distant in reality from everything else, all else being only finite emanations of the Great Absolute, the Great Absolute, far beyond the frame of reference of human knowing, has been referred to in Hebrew by the Jewish mystics as Ayin (nothingness), meaning the Great Absolute is so far beyond anything that one could imagine, that the Great Absolute is like no thing, no other – nothing can compare with this absoluteness. Ayin has also been conceived as a nonbeing, and even a nonentity; i.e., an existent nonexistence, the Great Paradox of Paradoxes [as Plotinus states, The One surpasses our most basic and cherished categories such that “even being cannot be there” (as cited in Matt, 1988, p. 43) – a concept echoed by the Byzantine theologian Gregory Palamas, who wrote that “the One is not being if that which is not the One is being” (as translated in Sinkewicz, 1988, Chapter 78)] – a closed, sealed, unknowable Absolute, closely associated with the Ein Sof (without an end – infinity), a single infinite unity beyond any description or limitation. The Keter (crown) bridges the process of the unfolding of the Ayin with the Sefirot (the repository in the finite world of the emanations from the unfolding). The process of the unfolding is referred to as Yesh me-Ayin [something from nothing – beginning with a contraction (tzimtzum) providing an empty space for the unfolding leading to the Creation (creatio ex nihilo), the Big Bang)]. The Keter is intermediary between the Ein Sof and Chochma (wisdom), the first of the Sefirot. As a supreme revelation of the Ohr Ein ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 253 Sof (Infinite Light – the infinite “dispersion” of the emanations of Ayin), the Keter is deemed to transcend the manifest Sefirot (the finite receptors of the emanations of Ayin) and is therefore considered distinct from the Sefirot in some interpretations and interchangeable with Daat (knowledge) in others. Though each of the Sefirot is identified by a specific number and position on the Kabbalah Tree of Life and by specific names that constitute particular literal meanings, they assume different nuances of meaning in multiple planes of manifestation both individually and in different interconnections between them. The Jewish mystical modal of the creation of the universe accepts, from both a spiritual and intellectual epiphany through a transcendental connection, that both the pre-creation condition representing the Singularity of an unknowable Nothingness, and the unfolding of the emanations of Ayin out of nothing (i.e., the creation of the universe) are mysteries and processes beyond human knowing. While the scientific concept of the Big Bang seeks to unravel the mystery of the creation of the universe, it nevertheless postulates the creation of the universe from an unknown state followed by a hot and dense condition preceding the Big Bang (see Lincoln & Wasser, 2013). Like the Jewish mystical model, the initial condition in the scientific model of the creation, then, is an undefinable state in the Big Bang theory or, in the case of the CEN theory, a condition of nonexistence (CEN referring to Creatio Ex Nihilo – creation out of nothing). Figure 3. A schematic route map of the Big-Bang theory and the CEN theory in Lincoln & Wasser, 2013 “The Big Bang theory has been extremely successful in correlating the observable properties of the universe with the known underlying physical laws. Yet, this theory cannot describe what came before the Big Bang event and also what happened during the first miniscule time fraction after the initial Big Bang (Planck time)” [Lincoln & Wasser, 2013]. The Big Bang event itself is comparable to the series of transitions comprising tzimtzum/Yesh me-Ayin/Ohr Ein Sof/Keter/Chochma. Both the Big Bang and Creatio Ex Nihilo (CEN) scientific theories of the creation of the universe hinge on the assumptions of “a preliminary state prior to creation. Nevertheless, theories that require initial conditions are not considered complete since they lack an explanation of what created such conditions” (Lincoln & Wasser, 2013). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 254 Both the CEN and Big Bang theories assume a nebulous precondition (an Unknown in the case of the Big Bang theory and a Nothingness in the CEN theory) and provide no explanation or cause for the transition from a preexisting state to the state providing the conditions leading to the state of creation, suggesting a correspondence with the Jewish mystical model in the proposition of the creation of something out of Nothing – the Creation emanating out of some undefinable, transcendental Great Void. While there are no definitive intersubjective criteria for equating metaphysical phenomena with purely physical events, especially in the consideration of a pre-physical void wherein neither time itself nor cause and effect exists under the same laws as the physical world, there are however plausible parallels that can be rationally conceived in correlating the Kabbalistic conception of the creation of the universe with that of the two prevailing scientific theories. Referring to Figure 3 above of the parallels and divergences of the streams of the two scientific theories of the creation of the universe, „SSB‟ on the CEN line refers to Spontaneous Symmetry Break – cosmological phase transitions in the early universe produced by the spontaneous breaking of a fundamental symmetry. It is plausible to consider that the point of SSB on this line corresponds to the tzimtzum, whereas the „Big Crunch‟ on the Big Bang line would correspond to the combination of tzimtzum, Yesh me-Ayin, and Ohr Ein Sof, with the „Creation of Information‟ on the CEN line corresponding to the combination of Yesh me-Ayin and Ohr Ein Sof, and the „Creation of Forces & Dynamicity‟ on the CEN line and the „Burst of Energy‟ („Big Bang‟) on the Big Bang line corresponding to the Keter, with point A representing the second or final phase of unfolding leading to the Big Bang or moment of creation, and point B representing the manifestation of the Sefirot, the transference of the emanations of Ayin thereto, and the coalescing of the finite world – critical points of the Kabbalistic model of the creation of the universe paralleling that of both the Big Bang and the Creatio Ex Nihilo scientific theories. In the Ayin, the Ein Sof, the Ohr Ein Sof, and the Keter, the Kabbalah explores the Infinite. From out of the infinite the Sefirot and the world of humankind arises. Referring to Figure 2 of the chart of the Sefirot of the Kabbalah, the Kabbalah represents the ethical properties in the different aspects that comprise righteousness. Loving kindness in Chesed, and justice in Gevurah (strength) are both mediated by compassion and mercy (rachamim). These nurturing affective (emotive) states are embedded within the attachment/bonding response and the tend-and-befriend response, pseudo-fixed action patterns that evolved in the anatomically modern human to foster social connection and cooperative behavior in the construction of well-knit social groups – the key to the survival of the human taxon. These pseudo-fixed action patterns form an integral part of an individual‟s natural or core disposition developed through nurturing and multifaceted experience (learning) and maturation in the context of positive social interaction. The Sefirot and the CNE enriched environment When cognitive growth is forestalled or one‟s core disposition is threatened and compromised past a cognitive/neurophysiological threshold by a negative environment, or distorted by organic pathology, cognitive and behavioral disorder emerges. To restart stagnant cognitive processes or reconfigure deleterious cognitive constructs in rewiring cognitive connections from negative (i.e., ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 255 deficient or distorted) to positive cognitive constructs in cognitive and behavioral disorder requires a more intensive stimulation than the normal incidental experiences of pure chance and life choices. This dedicated, more stimulating learning environment is referred to as the enriched environment. In recovery from cognitive and behavioral disorder, the modality of Cognitive Neuroeducation (CNE) restores the individual‟s core disposition through an enriched environment of learning framed within an engaged group dynamic revolving around a central theme of perspective taking. Humankind has been evolutionarily directed to live in a social environment, with a principal tendency toward complex social structures consisting of societies composed of a hierarchy of overlapping nested groups, each containing specific cultural and social norms under the umbrella of the general cultural and social norms of the encapsulating society. Not only pure survival, but basic psychological needs and the well-being and quality of life of the individual depend on the cognitive skills to effectively negotiate social interaction in meeting the demands of the individual‟s social environments. The regulation of affect is pivotal to the formation and maintenance of social relationships. Affect not only informs and directs reasoning, but may also block it. This is reflected in the Kabbalah, which warns that even the pillars of morality embodied within the Sefirot become immoral and destructive once they become extremes, such that, loving kindness taken to mindless obsession can lead to both sexual depravity and lack of justice in failing to properly punish wrongdoing and thereby insufficiently protecting the innocent, and, when justice itself becomes overzealous, it can lead to unfair punishment and even to torture and the murder of innocents. With this understanding, „emotional intelligence‟ – the maintenance of balance between emotion, rationality and morality – has now been recognized as an integral component of social integration in the fields of psychology and psychiatry (see, for example: Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Izard, Fine, Schultz, Mostow, Ackerman, & Youngstrom, 2001; Lopes, Brackett, Nezlek, Schütz, Sellin, & Salovey, 2004; Keefer, Parker, & Saklofske, 2009; Lopes, Grewal, Kadis, Gall, & Salovey, 2006; Lam & Kirby, 2002; Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002; Emmerling, Shanwal, & Mandal, 2008; Di Fabio, 2015; Payne, 1986; Zeidner & Matthews, 2016; Schutte, Malouff, Bobik, Coston, Greeson, Jedlicka, Rhodes, & Wendorf, 2001; Sánchez-Álvarez, Extremera, & Fernández-Berrocal, 2015). Although normatively conforming to the general rules and behavioral expectations of the larger umbrellas of civilization, culture, society, nation, state, city and community, social relations are actually experienced more directly, intensely, consistently and personally in small group settings, as outside of small groups person-to-person encounters are more random, fleeting and superficial, hence social rules and regulations are more directly defined and reinforced in interpersonal interactions within the group dynamic in small group settings. Since social relations are defined by groups, social integration is developed through the individual‟s interaction within each distinct group to which the individual belongs, particularly through the formulation of a shared understanding regarding common themes. It is the group dynamic in the participation of social/learning activities in small groups that forms the vehicle by which both social integration and learning is enhanced in CNE with its emphasis on perspective taking. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 256 Perspective taking is an essential component of bonding and genuine, meaningful connection with another, consisting of the ability and custom to go beyond spontaneous, initial surface impressions and apply a thoughtful appraisal and a honed proficiency in recognizing and interpreting social cues that explain another person‟s thinking, feeling and behavior from that person‟s perception of her or his own situation in a particular social encounter. Perspective taking involves the development of respect for, understanding of, and empathy with, other individuals by putting oneself in the other person‟s place and reflecting how one would feel and act in that place (b’tzelem Elohim applied on an individual basis). An important process of perspective taking is social context appraisal – the balanced assessment of social contexts and circumstances which account for an individual‟s behavior in a particular social encounter (the application of an aspect of both derech eretz that guides behavior in accordance with a particular society‟s rules and expectations and that of chesed in selfless concern for, and true empathy with another). While the context of the individual is always essential for understanding individual behavior, in the CNE group dynamic social context appraisal transcends individual behavior, extending to the culturally transmitted „norms‟ of the group (an application of an aspect of amcha in conjunction with derech eretz in one‟s identification with the group and its shared values, concerns and rules of conduct). In the CNE group dynamic, perspective taking integrates both the personal context and the social context defined by the group „norms.‟ An essential element of perspective taking is affective engagement. It is precisely one‟s own emotional state that influences one‟s perception of another‟s emotional state and determines the selection and processing of individually relevant social information that determines the degree to which one effectively picks out the essentials of a situation relevant to the individual or individuals concerned and the implications thereof within the particular social encounter. However, it is impossible to understand the affective state of another unless one‟s own affective response is appropriately well harmonized with one‟s own personal situation relative to the context of any particular experience. In order to correctly understand another‟s feelings, one has to consistently experience one‟s own appropriate emotional reactions. A major part of perspective taking then, is the realization of one‟s own emotional capacity by learning to engage experiences deeply through commitment and the full giving of oneself to the experience with introspection, reflection, sharing and attachment. By putting oneself totally into the experience as an integral part of the experience, the individual learns involvement and concern; and learns to fully relate to the experience and to others – to feel, to empathize, and to bond. Though functioning as a powerful modality for the prevention of and recovery from cognitive and behavioral disorder, effective in even profound cognitive dysfunction, CNE is presented as a fun, engaging program of activities conducted through a group dynamic emphasizing shared engagement through teamwork, problem solving challenges, discussion, dialog, debate, critical thinking, and personal reflection. CNE participants experience the program as a recreational, social and educational curriculum promoting health and well-being for mind and body through exercise, social relations, and learning activities. There are no references of any kind to the stigma and negative connotations of therapy, pathology, disability, mental abnormality or diagnostic labels. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 257 As new thought patterns and cognitive constructs emerge from engaged, affirmative, selffulfilling learning experiences within the enriched environment, both the depth and breadth of the individual‟s cognitive core is exercised, strengthened and continually expanded through the introduction of new ideas, ways of thinking, frameworks of knowledge and understanding that open up ever-multiplying doors of possibilities. The richness of experience of bonding with and developing respect for and appreciation of others, the joy of belonging and acceptance in group identity, and sharing of discoveries and feelings opens up the individual‟s self-conceptualization and the possibilities of being. Through the CNE program the participants internalize chesed and assimilate the harmony of the Sefirot in righteous actions (achieving emotional and behavioral balance and well-being in involving themselves with, and caring about, others). As the Kabbalah states, if there were no righteous humans, the blessings (emanations of Ayin) would become completely hidden, and creation would cease to exist [as only humans evolved pseudo-fixed action patterns embedded with emotions and morality, all other organisms driven by fixed action patterns of behavior – i.e., automated responses neither moral nor otherwise – therefore, without humans, especially those that act in righteous ways, there can be no morality, and consequently no Sefirot and no finite world (creation); as, without receptacles (Sefirot), the emanations of Ayin, though radiating in the nebulous Infinite (the Ohr Ein Sof), would be hidden, unrealized through finite righteous actions, and without realization – the ultimate purpose of the emanations – and, thereby, without purpose, there would be no impulsion or transcendent impetus for the unfolding of Ayin, and hence, no creation]. Human actions are the „Foundation‟ (Yesod) of the finite world of the earth [Malchut (kingship)] – referring to the dominion (responsibility of stewardship) of humankind over the earth, as the Torah [Bere’shit (Genesis) 1:26-28] relates: 26“And [HaShem] said, ‟Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. They shall rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, the cattle, the whole earth, and all the creeping things that creep on earth.‟ 27And [Hashem] created man in His image, in the image of [HaShem] He created him; male and female He created them. 28[HaShem] blessed them and [HaShem] said to them, „Be fertile and increase, fill the earth and master it; and rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, and all the living things that creep on earth‟” (Jewish Publication Society, 1999/2000, p. 2 – substitutions in brackets and emphases mine). But this so-called „dominion‟ of humankind is not meant to be a domination or ascendancy over the earth, but that of a loving caretaker, which, through HaShem’s gift of the „active intellect‟ [Binah (understanding), Daat (knowledge) and Chochmah (wisdom)] endows humankind with the capability and the responsibility to oversee and maintain the balance and harmony within the ecosytems of the habitats in which humankind resides. Such action must accompany the conscious intention of compassion, not only for all humankind but equally extending to all lifeforms and all HaShem’s creations. Compassionate actions are often impossible without faith (emunah), meaning to trust that The Ultimate and Undefinable always supports compassionate actions even when the evidence for such seems hidden in the mundane and vacuous priorities of unenlightened society. Ultimately, it is necessary to show compassion toward oneself too in order to extend compassion toward others. This „selfish‟ enjoyment of the blessings (the appreciation of the majesty, beauty, bounty and awe of nature, and the pleasures in camaraderie and in satisfying the appetites of one‟s own senses, good health and vigor) – but only in order to empower oneself to assist others [the Sefirah of Netzach (victory)] – is an important aspect of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 258 „Restriction‟ (avoidance of excess), and is considered a kind of golden mean (a perfection of balance or homeostasis) in Kabbalah, corresponding to the Sefirah of Tiferet (beauty or adornment). The CNE enriched environment in a scientific context Putting this into a scientific context, we define the neurophysiological correlates of the processes at work in the CNE curriculum through the agency of neuroplasticity, fundamentally understood as constantly changing patterns of neuronal interconnectivity („neuronal‟ referring to neurons, herein defined as nerve cells of the brain) through 1] the modulation of channels of neuronal connectivity by a) synaptogenesis (the generation of new synapses; a synapse = the connective medium between one neuron and another) and b) pruning (the elimination of superfluous or ineffective synapses); and through 2] synaptic strength modulation involving the mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD). LTP is defined as the development of a long-lasting synaptic strength between a presynaptic-postsynaptic neuron pair as a product of the interactivity (reverberatory interaction) of the pair and LTD is defined as the long-term persistence of the depression of synaptic action (i.e., inhibition of connection) between a presynaptic-postsynaptic neuron pair. The CNE enriched environment contains strong, affirmative, stimulating, deep, constantly expanding learning experiences that trigger persistent reverberatory interaction in neuronal connections, and through such continual associative action effecting a change of thought patterns, weakens – in the lack of excitatory (connective) synaptic action – both the reverberatory interaction of neuronal interconnections representing previous faulty learning from negative experiences and the attendant ineffectual or detrimental cognitive constructs, as excitatory action is dominated by the new, affirmative learning and newly configured thought patterns constantly deepened and broadened by the positive-directed learning. The cognitive constructs formed from the new learning within the CNE enriched environment are continually strengthened by LTP and become dominant cognitive constructs undermining the relevance of the previously formed detrimental or negative cognitive constructs, whereby the presynaptic-postsynaptic connection between neuron pairs comprising the pattern of neuronal interconnections representing a negative cognitive construct are less activated as the negative cognitive construct more and more fades from ongoing thought patterns, the related less active synaptic connections continually weakening to a threshold point triggering LTD that, in turn, triggers the elimination of the synaptic connection between the neuron pairs comprising the pattern of neuronal interconnections representing the negative cognitive construct, purging it from the behavioral repertoire of the individual‟s cognitive schema („cognitive schema‟ refers to the continuously interacting „combinations‟ and „permutations‟ of the individual components of the full complement of one‟s cognitive constructs and the behavior induced therefrom). These neurophysiological processes stimulated through CNE promote growth of mind and spirit, casting off negative traits in the revamping of deficient, dysfunctional or dormant cognitive constructs whereby the individual reaches higher planes of cognitive proficiency (animating the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life 259 „active intellect‟) and absorbs the harmony and ethical qualities of the Sefirot in communion with the emanations of Ayin on the road of righteousness (tzedakah), becoming whole (sh’lemut), reengaging with oneself, with others and with life itself in awakening to a new and meaningful life [Hod (splendor)]. While using Judaism as an example of the deep connection between spirituality, evolutionarily determined human values, mental health, religious quest and the enterprise of science, it should be borne in mind that spirituality is a universal condition of humankind, and most religions share basic principles of spirituality. Despite the surface differences in custom, ritual, liturgical texts, and forms of observance, in digging beneath the surface one can find that the fundamental spiritual quest is markedly consistent across a wide span of religious traditions, sharing the same basic affinities between faith, human values and science as demonstrated in this study. Received February 27, 2020; Revised March 9, 2020; Accepted March 28, 2020 References Adolphs, R. (2009). The social brain: Neural basis of social knowledge. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 693-716. Alwis, D. S., & Rajan, R. (2014). 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Annual Review of Neuroscience, 28, 377-401. Payne, W. L. (1986). A study of emotion – developing emotional intelligence: Selfintegration; relating to fear, pain and desire. (Theory, Structure of Reality, Problem-Solving, Contraction/Expansion, Tuning In/Coming Out/Letting Go). (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Robinson, S. M. [2008] (2010). Archaeology, texts and history: A study in anthropological hermeneutics and the archaeology of ancient texts. (Rev.). (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. ____. (2012). A constructivist model of the mind. (Rev.). (Research Report No. COGREHABSMR100412, 10-4-2012). Retrieved from ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277957392_A_CONSTRUCTIVIST_MODEL_OF_TH E_MIND. Sacks, J. (n.d.). The necessity of asking questions. Orthodox Union. Retrieved from https://www.ou.org/torah/parsha/rabbi-sacks-on-parsha/the_necessity_of_asking_questions/. Sampedro-Piquero, P., & Begega, A. (2017). Environmental enrichment as a positive behavioral intervention across the lifespan. Current Neuropharmacology, 15(4), 459-470. Sánchez-Álvarez, N., Extremera, N., & Fernández-Berrocal, P. (2015). The relation between emotional intelligence and subjective well-being: A meta-analytic investigation. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 11(3), 276-285. Saxe, R. (2006). Uniquely human social cognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16(2), 235-239. Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Bobik, C., Coston, T. D., Greeson, C., Jedlicka, C., Rhodes, E., & Wendorf, G. (2001). Emotional intelligence and interpersonal relations. The Journal of Social Psychology, 141(4), 523-536. Sinekewicz, R. E. (Ed. and Trans.). (1988). Saint Gregory Palamas: The one hundred and fifty chapters – A critical edition, translation and study. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. Sweatt, J. D. (2016). Neural plasticity and behavior – sixty years of conceptual advances. [Special issue]. Journal of Neurochemistry, 139(52), 179-199. Taubert, M., Villringer, A., & Ragert, P. (2012). Learning-related gray and white matter changes in humans: An update. The Neuroscientist, 18(4), 320-325. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 240-262 Robinson, S. M., A Scientific Study of Spirituality as the Foundation of Consciousness & the Core Component of Mental Health & a Meaningful Life van Praag, H., Kempermann, G., & Gage, F. H. (2000). Neural consequences of environmental enrichment. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 1(3), 191-198. Woo, C. C., Donnelly, J. H., Steinberg-Epstein, R., & Leon, M. (2015). Environmental enrichment as a therapy for autism: A clinical trial replication and extension. Behavioral Neuroscience, 129(4), 412-422. Wood, L. (1942). Apperception (b). In D. D. Runes, (Ed.). Dictionary of Philosophy (p. 15). New York: Philosophical Library. Zeidner, M, & Matthews, G. (2016). Ability emotional intelligence and mental health: Social support as mediator. Personality and Individual Differences, 99, 196-199. * WIREs = Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 262

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 102 Article Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration Poh Foong Lee*, Sharannaya, A. P. N. Karthiyeyan, Kok Suen Cheng, William M. Y. Cheung & Bryan Kok ABSTRACT Can a single cell response to auditory stimuli and contribute to the cell decision? Here, we aimed to investigate the response of prokaryotic cell to single tone frequency and Pali chant in a time series. Cell metabolism rate was measured to determine the response of the cells after sound treatment. Two groups of specimens in which one batch was fresh for each sound treatment time, whereas another group was a continuous batch of specimens in which the sound treatment was performed to the same cells for the whole series of time duration. We found that the continuous batch specimen responded significantly to Pali chant through the increased in metabolism rate (10 min to 30 min) which indicates the potential of studying cell cognition and memory with prokaryotic cell as a model to gain behavioral information without stereotype feedback. The outcome from this investigation suggests that the unicellular cell consciousness might potentially be used for preliminary study of signaling pathway in consciousness and cognition before study with multi-cell organisms. Keywords: Prokaryotic cell, cell cognition, single tone frequency, Pali chant. metabolism rate. Introduction Consciousness is elucidated as the dualism concept involving the body and mind in material and immaterial objects that is nonphysical in nature (Schweizer 2013). Consciousness is expanded to the awareness of one’s existence, sensations, and thoughts, surrounding with an awake and aware mind which spring into the exuberant neural correlate and empirical analysis of cognition and affection on human decision making. This give rises to meta-cognition studies on one’s awareness and the capability to regulate their own thinking (Wokke et al. 2020). Consciousness is a polymorphic feature involving different levels of biological organisms that stem from a complex nervous system (Lau and Lau 2020). However, the complex study seems to derive from a reaction evaluation stemming from consciousness responding to a stimulus by a human being consisting of multi trillion cells. Therefore, a human decision making on an event or a response to stimuli is unidentifiable to *Correspondence: Poh Foong Lee, Lee Kong Chien Faculty Engineering & Science, University Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malasia. Email: pfleej@gmail.com, leepf@utar.edu.my ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 103 which cells have involved in the action or decision. Furthermore, the duration to response to the stimuli is definite an important parameter on consciousness. Florian Klapproth (Klapproth 2008) had reviewed on the relationship between time and decision making in humans with respect to the evaluation process, which the delay were owing to realizing the options and time available for making that decision. Besides, prediction ability in decision making is also part of the fundamental for all living system. The decision-making system even extended into animal collection observation(Arganda et al. 2012). Moreover, living microorganism on making decision has been reported which the growth speed of microbiology in different chemicals conditions(Ashino et al. 2019). In addition, surface charge changes with electrophoretic mobility measurement of living and dead microorganism on different chemical conditions and temperatures were also observed its changes which indicated the unicellular decision making experiment(Poh Foong 2009). Microbial behavior has linked to cell cognition where the understanding of the cognitive evolution either unicellular or multicellular organisms is yet to reach a conclusive outcome(Lyon 2015). The effect of sound on consciousness in neural observation suggested the neural correlates consciousness was dependent on stimulus features, higher cortical levels and different aspects of a single perceptual scene might not be processed simultaneously(Brancucci et al. 2011). Sounds is an essential stimulus for living organism to survive and detect the surrounding necessitates. However, sounds form multiple perceptual bias which dominates the majority studies in psychoacoustic(Moore 2007),(Li et al. 2010). Neural with auditory paradigm studies is growing rapidly in these recent years(Smith et al. 2013; Hettich et al. 2016; Norman-Haignere and McDermott 2018; Wöstmann et al. 2019). Conscious processing with auditory paradigm response was inferred from neurophysiological measurement suggested that the presence of the global effect might be a signature for conscious processing(Bekinschtein et al. 2009). However, different perception, attention and many minds interpretation(Zeh 1970) to conclude the particular sound effect on multicellular system is remained challenging. On the other hand, animal consciousness study was reported to be more challenging than human studies although animal are speculated to have a simpler mindset in responding towards stimuli. This is due to the animal has lacking human language to explain their thinking but only can inferred from their reaction to the experimental manipulation(Hoy 2005). A report even highlighted that the animal hearing evaluation depends on few aspects, including anatomical, physiological, economic, spatial and psychosocial factors and evaluation objective(Reis et al. 2017). Therefore, consciousness of multicellular organism in responding to a stimulus required multiple conditions of investigation and measurement but have yet to identify the fundamental study of the exact signaling pathway of a cell on an auditory stimuli response. A novel method to brim the curiosity in studying a simple cell response to sound stimuli within the human hearing range is inviting. Prokaryotic cell is a classic model for this approach as it recaptures precedent of the pre-Cambrian explosion where the Earth begun with simple cells ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 104 organism and latter evolved to vertebrate organism which was estimated to begin 551 million years ago(Condon et al. 2005). Mechanical response to single-tone and two-tone stimuli was inspected on Chinchilla cochlea with Mossbauer spectroscopy measurement(Robles et al. 1986). However, applying the human sound range stimulus on prokaryotic cell has yet to be reported. In this work, single tone harmonic sound at frequency of 500 Hz and 1000 Hz, added a natural Buddhist Pali from monks hymning sound without music instruments background were employed in this experiment as auditory stimuli onto Escherichia coli (E.coli). The response from the cells was measured with UV spectroscopy on instantaneous metabolism rate. For sing tone frequency auditory stimuli, both 500 Hz and 1000 Hz were clustered as single tone harmonic sound(Persinger 2014). Meanwhile, the single tone frequency at 1000 Hz was proclaimed as high frequency sound or loud(Smyth 2019). A research shows that the auditory frequency range from 500 to 2000 Hz were able to stimulate a profound immediate effects on the lower limb motor function of the healthy people(Yu et al. 2016), this indicated the exist impact of auditory effect on the brain connection with motor muscle. Another interesting work shows that the auditory stimuli within the range of 200 Hz to 1000 Hz on deaf participants reported experienced dizziness, pain and vibration, suggested the sound experiences can occur without functional hearing(Persinger 2014). These are among reports which encourages the work on how the auditory give impacts on the body and mind, in term of cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, Pali chant from the monk’s natural human hymning voice was adopted in the experiment. A review shows that the prayer related to spirituality and religion has increased in healthcare area and being suggested as a non-pharmacological intervention on resources to be included in the nursing holistic care(Simão et al. 2016). A report shows that the neurophysiological correlates of religious chanting are likely different from those of meditation and prayer, suggested that the chanting would possibly induce distinctive psychotherapeutic effects(Gao et al. 2019). Consciousness study on religious chanting or repetitive mantra commonly elicits unequivocal multiple interpretations and perceptions on human response(Zeh 1970), therefore E.coli k-12 was expected to provide stereotypic feedback to religious chant. Consequently, this study has incorporated the Buddhist Pali chant to measure the response of the unicellular cell together with single tone harmonic frequency sounds in this experiment. For resolving the ambivalent effective durations of the sound stimulus, a series of time was tested for the range of 5 to 30 min. The cells were groups into two different categories for their metabolism rate measurement - continuous batch of specimen (CS) for the whole series of sounds treatment and a new batch of specimen (NS) for each different duration. Both batches of specimen would indicate the accumulation effect for the same bacteria for progressive treatment. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 105 Materials and Methods Specimen preparation Lysogeny media (LB media) is a nutritionally rich medium primarily used for the growth of bacteria. First, 100 ml of LB media and 2g of the LB media powder was measured and diluted with 100 ml of distilled water. Once it had been thoroughly mixed without any visible powder clumps, the media solution was then transferred to a conical flask and covered with an aluminium foil and cotton pad. The prepared LB media in the conical flask was autoclaved at 120℃ for 15 minutes. Once the autoclave had been completed the LB media solution was left to completely cool down for the inoculation of bacteria. When the LB media culture medium was fully cooled down, the sterile inoculation loop was used to transfer the E.coli k-12 into the culture medium. The inoculation loop is a small and lengthy metal instrument made up of a looped wire at one end that is attached to a handle at the other end. The looped wire end is usually used in capturing bacterial samples from a liquid type of reagent as the loop wired end is designed to hold a drop of liquid. The inoculation loop was sterilized on a Bunsen burner before further used in cell culture. After sterilization, the inoculation loop with the wired end was slowly and gently dipped into the bacterial source plate and then dipped back into the conical flask containing LB media. It was followed by a gently mixing of the sample with the prepared LB media culture medium. The next step was to immerse the conical flask containing the bacteria in the culture medium and incubating at 37°C for 12-18 hr in a shaking incubator. After incubation, the growth of the bacteria was characterized by a cloudy haze in the media. The preparation of the new batch of specimen (NS) was started by taking out the inoculated bacterial culture medium from the shaking incubator and placed the medium in the fume hood. The specimen was taken out from the culture medium by using a sterile pipette tip. 0.4 ml of the bacteria was pipetted out and added into one well on the 96 Greiner well plate. This step was then repeated for another 10 times under the same condition. After the treatment had been performed, the well plate was removed from the Styrofoam box and placed into the microplate reader to measure the absorbance rate. For the continuous batch of specimen (CS), once the absorbance rate was measured, the well plate was removed from the microplate reader and again being placed back to the Styrofoam box for the next time duration of sound treatment and so forth. The steps were repeated for 10 min, 15 min, 20 min, 25 min and 30 min and also subsequently the same experimental steps for 1000 Hz single tone frequency and Pali chanting. For new batch of specimen on sound treatment, the new fresh group of specimens exposed to the same type of sound stimuli but was discarded after every single time duration metabolism rate measurement. Microplate reader OD600 assay Quantification on bacterial growth by measuring the optical density at 600 nm (OD600) (Infinite M200 series, Tecan) is a well-established method in giving the value on the turbidity outcome ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 106 that results from light scattering by the bacteria in the well plate. It is a fast and cost-effective method in monitoring the instantaneous metabolism rate of the bacteria in LB media(Stevenson et al. 2016). Auditory stimuli The sound treatment was performed at six different time durations which included 5 min, 10 min, 15 min, 20 min, 25 min and 30 min using three different types of sounds. Two of them were single frequency sounds at 500 Hz and 1000 Hz, as well as a Pali chanting natural sounds by monks without instrumental music (https://www.peacebeyondsuffering.org/audio-chanting04.html). The frequency ranges between 200 Hz to 900 Hz for the Pali chanting. (See appendix) Experiment setup protocol The complete experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. These three music frequencies were played through a Bluetooth speaker that was placed directly on the Greinier 96 well plate placed within a Styrofoam box. A Styrofoam box was used because it provided good insulation for the sound without taking up much noise and avoiding the sound escaping out to the surrounding. An empirical study was done on using recycle Styrofoam as porous sound absorption(Rey et al. 2012). The Bluetooth speaker was controlled by a handphone where the sounds were selected and played using a repeat player. Furthermore, the audio length for the 500 Hz and 1000 Hz were only 30 seconds long in a file, hence these two tracks were set to play on loop continuously to fit the time frames set at 5 min, 10 min, 15 min, 20 min, 25 min and 30 min. The length of the Pali chanting is 18 min 11 seconds which was also controlled using the repeat player to the expected prepared time frames of sounds treatment to the bacteria. Fig. 1. The experiment setup for the sound treatment on new and continuous batch of specimen in the Styroform box where the speaker with Bluetooth was allocated on top of the 96 well plate which the time series of sound treatment was controlled with smartphone. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 107 Data analysis For the new batch of specimen, we used 4 x 7 ANOVA with 4 being the between subject Frequency (Control, 500 Hz, 1000 Hz and Pali Chanting) and 7 being the within subject variable Time (0 until 30 min). For the continuous batch of specimen (CS), we used 4 x 6 ANCOVA with the same explanation as above except for the absorbance rate at 0 min being the covariate. For the comparison between the new batch (NS) and continuous batch of specimen (CS), we used 4 x 2 two-way ANOVA with 4 being the Frequency and 2 being the Group (New Specimen and Continuous). Results Comparison of the metabolism rate on new batch of specimen (NS) for the sound treatment There was a significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 266) = 57.652, p < 0.001, significant Time main effect (F(6, 266) = 15.633, p < 0.001, = 0.394), a = 0.261) and a significant Frequency × Time interaction (F(18, 266) = 10.888, p < 0.001, = 0.424). Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction stratifying for the Frequency (Table 1) revealed that for the 500 Hz frequency, the absorbance rate at 0 min was significantly smaller than both 10 min and 25 min (p < 0.001 and p = 0.006, respectively). Table 1: Post-hoc analysis for the new specimen group showing the p values of the different times for different frequencies (Control, 500 Hz, 1000 Hz and Pali chanting). Significant p values are bolded. Control 0 min 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 500 Hz 0 min 5 min 10 min ISSN: 2153-8212 0 min 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 0 min 1.000 < 0.001 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 0.024 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 1000 Hz 0 min 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min Pali chanting 0 min 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 1.000 1.000 0.006 0.231 1.000 0.095 1.000 1.000 0.002 < 0.001 1.000 0.208 0.702 0.256 1.000 < 0.001 0.010 1.000 - 0 min 1.000 0.060 0.043 1.000 0.337 1.000 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 0.087 0.063 1.000 0.245 1.000 1.000 0.004 < 0.001 1.000 0.003 < 0.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.914 - 0 min 1.000 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.126 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.001 0.069 1.000 1.000 0.056 1.000 0.634 < 0.001 1.000 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 108 The absorbance rate at 5 min was significantly smaller than 10 min (p = 0.024) whereas the result at 10 min was significantly larger than 15 min and 20 min (p = 0.002 and p < 0.001, respectively). For the result at 20 min, it was significantly larger than that of at 25 min and 30 min with p values of 0.001 and 0.010, respectively. For the 1000 Hz frequency, the absorbance rate at baseline was significantly smaller than 15 min (p = 0.043), however, results at 10 and 15 min was both significantly larger than 20 min and 25 min (p = 0.004, p < 0.001, p = 0.003 and p < 0.001, respectively). Similarly, the result at 30 min was significantly larger than that of 25 min with p = 0.006. Meanwhile, the absorbance rate at 0 and 5 min for the Pali chant was all significantly smaller than 10 to 30 min (all p < 0.001) whereas the results at 15 to 25 min was all significantly larger than 30 min (p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p = 0.004, respectively). The post-hoc comparisons for each Time are shown in Fig.2A. At baseline, the absorbance rate for the 500 Hz frequency was significantly smaller than Control and 1000 Hz frequency (p < 0.001 and p = 0.005, respectively). At 5 min, the Control frequency result was significantly larger than both 500 Hz and Pali chanting (p = 0.048 and p = 0.004, respectively). For 15 to 30 min, the same trend of Pali chant resulting in significantly larger absorbance rate as compared to all other 3 frequencies was observed (all p < 0.001), with the exception of 30 min being only significantly larger than 500 Hz (p = 0.034). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 109 Fig. 2. Comparisons of the absorbance rate when the bacteria E. Coli was subjected to different frequency vibrations at different times for the (A) new specimen group and (B) continuous group. * - p < 0.050; ** - p < 0.010; *** - p < 0.001. Comparison of the metabolism rate on continuous batch of specimen (CS) for the sound treatment There was a significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 37) = 309.452, p < 0.001, = 0.962), a significant Time main effect (F(3.558, 37) = 130.876, p < 0.001, = 0.775) and a significant Frequency × Time interaction (F(10.659, 37) = 49.515, p < 0.001, = 0.801). In terms of the Time difference (Table 2), post-hoc analysis revealed that the absorbance rate at 10 min for the 500 Hz frequency was significantly larger than all other 5 times (all p < 0.001). For the 1000 Hz frequency, the result at 10 min was significantly larger than that of 25 min (p = 0.009) whereas at 15 min the absorbance rate was also significantly larger than both 20 min and 25 min (p = 0.007 and p = 0.003, respectively). Besides that, both 20 min and 25 min had an absorbance rate that is significantly smaller than that of 30 min, respectively, with p = 0.002 and p = 0.001. As for the Pali chant frequency, the result for 5 min was significantly smaller than all other 5 times (all p < ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 110 0.001). Further, the absorbance rate at 25 min was also significantly larger than that of 20 min (p = 0.049). Table 2: Post-hoc analysis for the continuous group showing the p values of the different times for different frequencies (Control, 500 Hz, 1000 Hz and Pali chanting). Significant p values are bolded. Control 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 500 Hz 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 1000 Hz 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 5 min 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 5 min < 0.001 0.743 1.000 0.270 1.000 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.484 - 5 min 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.246 1.000 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 1.000 0.119 0.009 1.000 0.007 0.003 1.000 0.449 0.002 0.001 - 5 min < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min 0.568 0.106 1.000 0.966 1.000 0.348 1.000 0.049 1.000 0.381 - Pali chanting 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 30 min ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 111 Fig. 2B shows the post-hoc analysis for each Time for the continuous treatment (CS) and generally two trends can be observed. For 10, 20 and 25 min time, the absorbance rate for the 500 Hz frequency was significantly larger than 1000 Hz (p < 0.001, p = 0.019 and p = 0.005, respectively). The second trend involved all time series from 5 min to 30 min such that the result for Pali chant was significantly larger than all other 3 groups (all p < 0.001). The only exception is at 10 min with the absorbance rate of Pali chant being only significantly larger than Control and 1000 Hz (both p < 0.001). The impact of different time duration on the new and continuous batch of specimen To compare the difference between the new specimen (NS) and continuous specimen (CS), the measurements for each Time were analyzed separately for the Group and Frequency factors (Fig. 3 and Table 3). Fig. 3 Comparison between the new specimen and continuous group at different times at (A) 0 min, (B) 5 min, (C) 10 min, (D) 15 min, (E) 20 min, (F) 25 min and (G) 30 min. *** - p < 0.001. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 112 Table 3: Post-hoc comparisons of the frequencies at different times for the new specimen and continuous group. The values are the p values and significant p values are bolded. New Specimen 5 min Control 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 10 min Control 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 15 min Control 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 20 min Control 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 25 min Control 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali Continuous 5 min Control 0.017 1.000 < 0.001 500 Hz 1000 Hz 0.374 1.000 0.044 - Control 1.000 1.000 0.016 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 1.000 0.044 0.566 - Control 0.006 0.296 < 0.001 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali Control < 0.001 0.074 < 0.001 Control 1.000 0.008 0.011 Pali < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 0.251 < 0.001 < 0.001 500 Hz 1000 Hz - 30 min Control ISSN: 2153-8212 Control - Pali Control 0.075 1.000 < 0.001 10 min Control < 0.001 1.000 < 0.001 15 min Control 1.000 1.000 < 0.001 20 min Control 0.682 0.032 < 0.001 25 min Control 1.000 0.010 < 0.001 30 min Control - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 0.374 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali < 0.001 1.000 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 1.000 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 1.000 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 0.016 < 0.001 < 0.001 - 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 500 Hz 1000 Hz Pali 0.047 1.000 1.000 0.317 0.062 1.000 - 0.257 1.000 < 0.001 0.847 < 0.001 < 0.001 113 - 0 min There was a significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 43.242, p < 0.001, = 0.631). Posthoc analysis revealed that the absorbance rate of the Control was significantly larger than all other 3 frequencies (p < 0.001, p = 0.002 and p < 0.001, respectively). Besides that, the result for the 500 Hz frequency was found to be significantly smaller than 1000 Hz and Pali chant as well (both p < 0.001) (Table 3). 5 min There was a significant Group main effect (F(1, 76) = 17.509, p < 0.001, = 0.187), a significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 9.036, p < 0.001, = 0.263) and a significant Group × Frequency interaction (F(3, 76) = 20.107, p < 0.001, = 0.442). In terms of the frequencies, the results showed that the New Specimen’s (NS) absorbance rate when no frequency was applied, i.e. Control, was significantly larger than both 500 Hz and Pali chanting (p = 0.017 and p = 0.001, respectively). Further, the absorbance rate for the 1000 Hz frequency was also significantly larger than that of Pali chant with p = 0.044. For the Continuous group (CS), it was found that the result for Pali chanting was significantly larger than all other 3 frequencies (all p < 0.001). In terms of the groups, the continuous treatment (CS) produced an absorbance rate significantly larger than that of the new specimen (NS) (p < 0.001; Fig. 3B). 10 min There was a significant Group main effect (F(1, 76) = 235.119, p < 0.001, = 0.756), a significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 129.616, p < 0.001, = 0.837) and a significant Group × Frequency interaction (F(3, 76) = 104.281, p < 0.001, = 0.805). As shown in Table 3, the Pali chanting produced an absorbance rate significantly larger than both Control and 500 Hz (p = 0.016 and p = 0.044, respectively) for the New Specimen group (NS) . As for the Continuous group CS), the result for the Control was significantly smaller than 500 Hz and Pali (both p < 0.001). Other than that, the result for the 1000 Hz frequency was significantly larger and smaller, respectively, than 500 Hz and Pali chanting (both p < 0.001). In terms of the group difference at fixed frequencies, at both 500 Hz and Pali frequencies, the continuous treatment produced an absorbance rate that was significantly larger (both p < 0.001) (Fig. 3C). 15 min There was a significant Group main effect (F(1, 76) = 42.907, p < 0.001, significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 171.067, p < 0.001, Group × Frequency interaction (F(3, 76) = 39.883, p < 0.001, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. = 0.361), a = 0.871) and a significant = 0.612). The New Specimen www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 114 group (NS) , the absorbance rate of the 500 Hz was significantly smaller than all other 3 auditory stimuli (p = 0.006, p < 0.001 and p < 0.001, respectively) whereas the Pali chant produced an absorbance rate that was significantly larger than others (all p < 0.001) (Table 3). As for the Continuous specimen group (CS), the result for the Pali chant was also significantly larger than all stimuli (all p < 0.001). Like the results at 10 min, the absorbance rate for the continuous treatment group (CS) was significantly larger than the New specimen group (NS) for both 500 Hz and Pali frequency (both p < 0.001). However, the new specimen (NS) result was significantly larger than the continuous treatment (CS) instead at 1000 Hz frequency (p = 0.027) as shown in Fig. 3D. 20 min There was a significant Group main effect (F(1, 76) = 117.765, p < 0.001, significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 262.233, p < 0.001, = 0.608), a = 0.912) and a significant Group × Frequency interaction (F(3, 76) = 56.011, p < 0.001, = 0.689). Similar to 15 min, the new specimen group at 500 Hz frequency was observed to have a significantly smaller absorbance rate than the other 3 frequencies (all p < 0.001) and the result for Pali chanting being significantly larger than all other 3 frequencies (all p < 0.001) (Table 3). On the other hand, for the continuous group (CS), the Pali chanting resulted in a significantly larger absorbance rate than all other frequencies (all p < 0.001) with the addition of the Control group also being significantly larger that of 1000 Hz as well (p = 0.032). As shown in Fig.3E, at 500 Hz and Pali frequencies, the Continuous group (CS) had a significantly larger absorbance rate than the New Specimen group (NS) (both p < 0.001). 25 min There was a significant Group main effect (F(1, 76) = 44.669, p < 0.001, significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 124.428, p < 0.001, = 0.370), a = 0.831) and a significant Group × Frequency interaction (F(3, 76) = 40.202, p < 0.001, = 0.613). Post-hoc analysis comparing the frequencies revealed that for the new specimen group, the Pali chanting resulted in an absorbance rate significantly larger than all other 3 frequencies (p = 0.011, p < 0.001 and p < 0.001, respectively). Further, it was also observed that the result for the Control was significantly larger than that of the 1000 Hz frequency (p = 0.008). As for the Continuous group (CS), the absorbance rate for the 1000 Hz was significantly smaller than all other 3 frequencies (p = 0.010, p = 0.016 and p < 0.001, respectively) whereas the result for the Pali chant was significantly larger than all other 3 frequencies (all p < 0.001) (Table 3). In terms of post-hoc comparisons across the groups, the Pali frequency was the only frequency that produced a significantly larger absorbance rate (p < 0.001) when comparing the continuous group (CS) to the new specimen group (NS) (Fig.3F). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 115 30 min There was a significant Group main effect (F(1, 76) = 80.423, p < 0.001, significant Frequency main effect (F(3, 76) = 97.902, p < 0.001, = 0.514), a = 0.794) and a significant Group × Frequency interaction (F(3, 76) = 74.815, p < 0.001, = 0.747). Post-hoc analysis stratifying according to Group revealed that for the New Specimen group (NS), the Control frequency had a significantly larger absorbance rate than 500 Hz (p = 0.047). For the continuous group, the result for the Pali chant was significantly larger than all 3 other frequencies (all p < 0.001) (Table 3). Similar to 10 - 25 min, post-hoc analysis stratified for Frequency revealed that the Continuous treatment (CS) produced an absorbance rate that was significantly larger than the New Specimen group (NS) (p < 0.001) as shown in Fig.3G. Discussion The study was aimed to provide a quantitative study on cell consciousness investigation by providing a new insight into the effect of sound using single tone frequencies at 500 Hz, 1000 Hz and Pali chant on the cell metabolism rate for different treatment time durations ranging from 5 min to 30 min (5 min interval). Further, the effect of the same settings on the new batch of specimen (NS) and continuous batch of specimen (CS) were observed as well. The profound finding shows that the absorbance rate which indicated the metabolism rate for continuous batch of specimen was significantly increased as compared to the new batch of specimen (NS) for Pali chant for all the time durations for sound treatment. Besides that, 10 min of sound treatment at 500 Hz displayed an equally significant modulation on the metabolism rate of the specimen for the continuous batch (CS). It is worth to take a tour on the speculation for a deeper study on the mechanism of the cell to propagate in a profound manner when stimuli are given. Of note, prior study suggested that the cell membranes on cytoskeletal models with G-protein dynamics is a promising starting point to link psychiatry to quantum models of mind, brain and consciousness (Tonello and Cocchi 2010). A review has reported that lipid rafts, a type of G proteins, exist in the nervous system and these proteins were mostly studied for the regulatory and trafficking of signal transduction(Brady et al. 2012),(Chini and Parenti 2004) and membrane interactions between G proteins and other related proteins was reported(Vögler et al. 2008). The fundamental study on this cytoskeletal element in animals are believed to function in orchestrating the neurotransmitter signalling and the characterization of the element is associated to the area of neurological or psychiatric diseases in human being(Allen et al. 2007). For instance, to clarify neural factors that contribute to depression and to allow a deeper understanding of the neural trafficking causality which leads to depression at the molecular level is highly demanded as this can increase the efficacy of antidepressants(Senese et al. 2018). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 116 Furthermore, the biomolecular pathway related to cell membrane viscosity through Gsα protein and tubulin was hypothesized to enable the measurement of conscious state using electroencephalography on the brain's γ wave synchrony(Cocchi et al. 2010). When sample subject on lipid raft is down-sized to microorganism, eukaryotic cells were studied as a fundamental step to understand the evolution of cellular complexity(Bramkamp and Lopez 2015). In contrast, membrane of single cell without nucleus, i.e. prokaryotic cells have been used to elucidate the effect of FtsZ in regulating cell division(Margolin 2000). The close approach of prior study in association with this is found from a study investigating the lipid raft-mediated transcytotic pathways of E.coli k-12 to cross the intestinal epithelium indicated that the poor invasive enteric of bacteria to gut epithelial cell during inflammatory stress(Clark et al. 2005). Lipid rafts enriches in cholesterol and sphingolipids that are involved in the lateral compartmentalization of molecules at the cell surface is getting great interest as part of a cellular element that enable cell signalling study. However, association between the metabolism rate of prokaryotic cell relating to lipid raft has yet to be found. In this study, E.coli k-12 in the prokaryotic cell group has been studied for its response based on the metabolism rate affected by different sound stimuli. Prior study showed the glucose effect on catabolite repression to induce a positive control of transcription whereby glucose repressed the inducible enzymes(Clark et al. 2005) as well as temperature effect on the metabolism rate of bacteria with optical density measurement (OD)(Membré et al. 2005). Another report was found to obtain an increase in linear vibrational effect on the metabolism rate of bacteria included E.coli k-12 whom had employed the optical density measurement as metabolism rate monitoring system(College et al. 2001). On the other hand, vibration through ultrasound was adopted to monitor the metabolism rate of the bacterial cells that were adhered to polymer rods revealed that the bacteria growth increased after 30 min of low frequency, low acoustical intensity ultrasound treatment as compared to without ultrasound and this lead to the hypothesis of ultrasound elevating the rate of oxygen and nutrients to and out from the cells which propagated the metabolism rate(Pitt and Ross 2003). E.coli k-12 was selected as the specimen for this study as a similar strain of specimen was used on different acoustical treatments. These studies had reported an agreeable result of increased E.coli k-12 metabolism rate with audible sound stimuli compared to control group and this indicated that E.coli k-12 responded rapidly to sound stress through promoting the synthesis of intracellular RNA(Gu et al. 2016). One of the prior study which possess a similar aim with our work here had reported that the significant effect on growth promotion at 100 dB and 5000 Hz at multiple variation of the audible sound frequencies for E.coli k-12 indicated that their activity of antioxidant enzymes increased in which they speculated the audible sound may trigger a secondary oxidative stress(Gu et al. 2013). Similarly, another research had experimented on mono frequency at 300 Hz with different loudness and had found the most significant effect on Chromobacterium violaceum was at the sound level of 13 dB(Kothari et al.). Most of the studies had aimed on understand better the environment audible effect on the growth of the E.coli k-12 and other ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 117 prokaryotic bacteria where variable range of frequencies had been set as parameter. Nevertheless, the use of single tone frequency at 500 Hz and 1000 Hz including different time duration treatments has limited reporting in literature. In our study, the metabolism rate of E.coli k-12 decreased profoundly at 500 Hz for 15 min and 20 min of sound treatment as compared to the single tone of 1000 Hz whereas after 15 min the result showed a decrease in growth for specimen for the new batch of specimen group. At 25 min, the sound treatment at 1000 Hz showed a decrease in the growth as compared to the control group. Besides single frequency sound to stimulate the growth of bacteria, Indian classical music consists a range of frequencies from 41 – 645 Hz had been reported bacteria exhibiting antibiotic susceptibility under the influence of music suggesting that the production of cell was linked with the quorum sensing(Sarvaiya and Kothari 2017). There is no similar research studying bacteria response in human hymning sound and moreover for a series of treatment time. In this study, the E.coli k-12 obtained profound metabolism rate from 5 min to 30 min under the stimulation of Buddhist Pali chant as the natural human hymning sound for both new and continuous batch of specimen in the whole range of treatment time series. For new batch of specimen on each time treatment, the metabolism rate shows significant results at 15 min, 20 min and 25 min in Pali chant sound treatment. However, the appalling finding from this research is the metabolism rate of the continuous batch specimen experienced a great increased surpassing other sound treatment and this trend was the same from 5 min to 30 min. The dominant finding from the Pali chant effects on the metabolism rate in the continuous batch of specimen lead to a new insight on cell memory. Does cell or bacteria have memory? Chih et at published a very recent work reporting on the memory encoding for bacteria which mimics the neurons whereby the stimuli were based on light and measured on the response of potassium channels in a biofilm and the modelling results predicted from Hodgkin-Huxley model explained that the memory is athletic to ionic perturbations(Yang et al. 2020). Another robust finding on cell memory was studied with single bacterial cells through repeated exposure to salt stress and had discovered that the resiliency of the past exposure cells displayed a memory-like behaviour at the population level(Mathis and Ackermann 2016). Repetitive religious chanting has been reported to be able to pacify the negative mind of first timer involved in Buddhist chanting and this chanting was able to modulate the brain responses during the late-stage cognitive processing as revealed by event related potential study (Gao et al. 2017), consistent to another report that highlighted the benefit of the repetitive “OM” sound which worked as a brain stabilizer through frequency spectrum analysis(Gurjar et al.). On the other hand, repetitive chant brought significant effect to hypothermia induced stress on cognitive abilities(Pereira 2016). The decision making of human being or animal is defined as the process of selecting an action in which the action stems from memory which is defined as the physical change that carries information about the historical past happening between neurons and wrap into cognition(Del Missier et al. 2013). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 102-121 Lee, P. F., Karthiyeyan, S. A. P. N., Cheng, K. S., Cheung, W, M. Y., & Kok, B., Cell Consciousness Study with Prokaryotic Cell Metabolism Rate Measurement in Response to Acoustical Vibration 118 The accumulation effect is speculated in this study given that Pali chanting cause the metabolism rate of both the new batch and continuous batch of specimen to have a profound increase in the metabolism rate from 5 min till 30 min with the most significant results happening at 5 min. The metabolism rate has surpassed the duplication rate of the normal metabolism rate of E.coli k-12 which is about ~20 min. This has enabled the analogy of the cognition of a human participating in this experiment who has received three different stimuli and one’s physical response is measured. Similarly, the E.coli k-12 in this experiment had decided to grow more under Pali chant sound treatment from 5 min till 25 min of treatment durations as compared to single tone frequency. The limitation of this work is the variety of measurement tools to further observe the changes on the cells. Further investigation is great to include compartments of the unicellular cells, for example, lipid rafts on the cell membranes, RNA, quorum sensing, ion channels and more protein composition changes measurement. These measurements can provide a more in-depth information on the cell propagation mechanism in responding to the auditory stimuli. More religion or healing music can be used as stimuli to measure the metabolism rate of similar specimens. Thus far, the clue on why Pali chant has triggered a great response from this strain of bacteria has gone unknown but enigmatical. In this study, both new batch specimen and continuous batch specimen of the prokaryotic E.coli k-12 cells responded with significant metabolism rate in Pali chant as compared to single tone frequency sounds in a short durations of sound treatment, moreover the profound increased in metabolism rate in the continuous batch of specimen. The outcome has indicated its potential in using prokaryotic cells as a simple complex unicellular model on behavioural study which lessen the bias in interpreting the stimuli can contribute to the area of mind and body studies, neuropsychiatry area, experimental quantum mind and neuropharmacology. 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Eur J Neurosci 49:94–105. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.14226 Yang CY, Bialecka-Fornal M, Weatherwax C, et al (2020) Encoding Membrane-Potential-Based Memory within a Microbial Community. Cell Syst 10:417-423.e3. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2020.04.002 Yu L, Huang Q, Hu C, Ye M (2016) Immediate effects of different frequencies of auditory stimulation on lower limb motor function of healthy people. J Phys Ther Sci 28:2178–2180. https://doi.org/10.1589/jpts.28.2178 Zeh HD (1970) On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory. Found Phys 1:69–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00708656 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 530 Article Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) Wolfgang NMN Baer* Nascent Systems Inc. & Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA Abstract In this five-part article, known scientific principles are used to prove that conscious systems maintain a permanent physical soul beyond the existence of a material body. We will demonstrate that the fundamental material form which conscious physical structures are built occupy their own space and change in their own time according to their own laws of behavior. These changes are controlled by forces within each soul but also are a result of interaction forces connected with external events. It has become customary to treat the behavior of our bodies as the sum of behavior attributed to dead material and the sum attributed to the desires of our soul as evidence of living material.[1] Because we assume the soul occupies its own space and time, the property of life as exhibited by a body lasts as long as the communications channels supplying the interactions between body and soul are maintained. Temporary interruptions of communication are associated with a loss of consciousness. A permanent break is recognized as death. Mainstream science has failed to identify the material basis of consciousness in living organisms let alone dead matter[2] while most religious traditions assume consciousness as a fundamental postulate that relies upon faith without the need for scientific evidence. Both approaches are incomplete. Recent developments in physics addressing the necessity of including the conscious observer in any complete theory of our own existence have emerged. Progress has been achieved, not by advancing ontological interpretations or refinements of quantum theory, but by eliminating the assumption that we live in an objective world independent of our own existence. In Conscious Action Theory[3] (CAT), we recognize that our objective world is a phase of a selfmeasurement, explanatory activity that includes both our conscious experience and the physical material producing the experience. We adopt the assumption that elementary events, not elementary particles, are the building blocks of both ourselves and the universe we believe that we live in. Such a change to the foundations of physics allows us to conceive of ourselves as interacting lifetimes instead of the cosmologies found in classic or quantum physics. Life and death are then conceived as the difference between interacting and isolated events. Living bodies are evidence of interaction while non-interacting lifetimes, like non-interacting atoms, cannot be seen. You and I are events containing each other’s bodies as memories of our interactions. Consciousness has always been part of existence, both before our bodies are grown and after they are abandoned. This article will show that CAT is a viable theory of physics that contains consciousness in cyclic events. These events grow, maintain, and abandon material bodies along * Correspondence: c/o Steven Mitchell. Email: smitc1@brockport.edu Note: This article was written by Prof. Wolfgang NMN Baer and is published posthumously. Wolfgang NMN Baer, Ph.D. (in Physics) was an Associate Professor of Information Sciences (Ret), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, & Research Director, Nascent Systems Inc., Carmel Valley, CA, USA. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 531 their own evolutionary trajectories. Evidence of human consciousness beyond an individual body’s life is generally available when a belief system such as CAT is adopted that includes the subjective element and gives us a logical explanation for the available evidence. Keywords: Conscious life, beyond death, material body, physical soul, consciousness, quantum physics, existence, conscious action. Part I of this Article contains the following Sections: Prolog 1. Introduction to the Multiverse of Conscious Beings 1.1. Development of Event-Oriented Physics 1.2. The Action-Flow Diagram of a Conscious Being 1.3. The Multiverse Cosmology of Conscious Systems ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 532 Prolog Lying on a balmy beach in Mexico last winter, I looked up to see the moon and stars glittering in the dark sky above. As my head rested on the warm sand, I wondered, as I often did as a kid, how far away are the stars? I remembered hitchhiking a ride from the University of Michigan to Detroit, listening to an old man in a pickup truck who assured me that stars were many miles up in the sky. “They are as big as houses,” I recall him saying. “They only look small because they are so far away.” I remember chuckling at this sweet old man’s colossal ignorance and did not want to embarrass him with a correction. I studied physics at University of Michigan to learn what the world and my life in it was all about. In my youth, the moon and stars were clearly out there. Way out there. Alpha Centauri is four light years away, the other stars and galaxies thousands of light years beyond that. In my youth, the night sky stretched out before me whenever I looked up. It was obvious. The vastness of outer space was where we all lived and where I wanted to go. Exploring this world was my dream, and eventually I got a job as mission analyst, planning and flying satellites at Goddard Space Flight Center. It was obvious. Up there is space, in it are stars; some of them have planets that could sustain life, and all we needed to do was to develop the technology to get there. Today things look different. I’m no longer so sure of my world. The old man’s colossal ignorance may have more truth than my own arrogant calculations. I recognize the difference between the mental sensations I experience and the ‘reality’, which I believed caused those sensations to happen. Certainly the mental sensations of Alpha Centauri are not four light years away. But where are they? If I shut my eyes the sensations disappear altogether. So, what is it that is four light years away? Where do my momentary experiences of the raw sensations, termed ‘qualia’ by some psychologists, happen? Are those qualia inside or outside of me? Where do the ‘qualia’ of my raw sensations, as some psychologists call the spots and streaks of brightness in front of my nose that balmy night, happen? How far away are they? And what is it that I believed I lived in when I pursued my studies and career to explore and eventually colonize this universe? Still resting on the beach, I closed my eyes and imagined myself lying on the ball of the earth with my back pressed against its surface. In a split second the images of the moon, sun and planets flashed upward. The long distance beyond the solar system passed in my mind’s eye as I imagined a ‘star’ of burning gasses in front of me. It was a familiar image; one I had often imagined in my youth. When I opened my eyes, this ‘star’ vision immediately registered with a point of light in the Centauries constellation. But where was reality amongst all my feelings? While repeating this exercise, of concentrating on the ‘qualia’ and imagining their causes, something new became obvious. I could feel the processing from qualia-sensations to their explanatory cause. It is something I do every day, all day long. I live work and play in the registered and fused experience of a world I create. Both the raw sensations and the explanations of their cause are processed so quickly that they appear to represent reality. Neither of these sensations is the real star we call Alpha Centauri, and today as I look around at the palm trees and listen to the guests eating dinner behind me, I realize that everything I experience in front of my nose, including that nose, is created inside a larger mechanism I now call my real ‘Self’. If someone had told me when I was younger that I live in a world of my own creation, I would have classified them as a lost nut case. Now I understand that someone espousing that ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 533 perspective believed their mental experiences to be foundational, while I believed the properties of the material that I see in front of my nose is the ultimate explanation for everything, and neither of us had the complete story. I cannot deny the feeling of creating the operational reality I use to guide my life, neither can I deny the reality of the rock in the sand I can kick, because it kicks back.[4] Both idealists and materialists are right and wrong. We create the operational world we live in, and once we have found a world that works, we run our lives with it until that world fails us. Secular science is the most successful theory we have, and the objective world it allows us to build dominates our culture. However, it cannot account for the conscious living experience, even in principle, and fails completely at the point of death.[2] Science vigorously defends its failure by insisting that nothing can be experienced beyond the life of the body. It has developed both a vocabulary in colloquial and mathematical languages that makes the expression of any alternative to this nihilistic conclusion difficult if not impossible to communicate. The topic we are about to embark on involves the construction of a scientifically verifiable system that includes the subjective and objective aspect of our existence within a physically real framework. The framework will be used to identify the location of subjective conscious experiences at places beyond the living material body. To efficiently discuss this topic, we must describe its ideas and concepts in the English language, with some notation adoption. As shown in the previous seaside anecdote, the word ‘star’ when used in conventional conversation collapses several meanings of nouns. This collapse hides the critical changes that implement the conscious experience and the life in which it resides. We will not be able to clearly describe the processes involved in our conscious existence unless we use terminology that separates the functions that we use to build the reality in which we live. To expand our terminology, I have defined a noun code (CAT-code in Appendix A1), which I will use to identify the phases in the process that create the objects we see and feel in front of our noses. In my experience on a balmy beach, I used the word ‘star’ to refer to the unidentified external sensation display and the word ‘star’ to refer to our internally explanatory observable, which are registered with each other to produce the explained observable objects we see every day. Examples Description You, I, Star, U – First letter capitalized: references an event-in-itself, replaces Kant’s thing itself, the name of action structures, the entity that exists. Such words are operational symbols defined by their use not their referential meaning. you, i, star, u – First letter lowercase: references a directly observable experience, the entities that are experienced–sensations, thoughts, pains, etc. directly felt, a qualia. You, I, Star, U – First letter capitalized and boldface: references the causes of directly observable experiences. These are the working symbols that make up our Model of Reality (MoR), i.e., the physical memory that explains one’s observable experience. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) you, i, star, u 534 – First letter lowercase and boldface: references a vector of observable experiences that visualize the semantic meaning of the physical memory defined by You, I, Apple; names explanatory experiences projected onto sensations. . In the main text we will use standard English interpretation, unless we place coded nouns in singe quotations only when referring to Conscious Action Theory symbols. For example, applying this CAT-code to pronouns separates ‘You’ – the real reader of this essay – from ‘you’ the 1st-person sensations of yourself, from ‘you’ the explanatory 3rd-person visualization of what you believe you really are, from ‘You’ the physical model of yourself built into ‘You’ from infancy. Thus, the three terms ‘you, you, and You’ refer to internal physical components in the larger system that ‘You’ really are. You are a Kantian-unknowable to yourself because any physical mechanism is what it is, and nothing can get outside itself to experience a god’s eye view of itself. The main hindrance to adopting an integrated self-regenerating subject-objective view of our existence is the absence of a viable and practical scientific theory that includes both. What you are about to read eliminates this difficulty and gives us the scientific basis for answering the conscious life-after-bodily- death question. 1. Introduction to the Multiverse of Conscious Beings Whether looking through one’s biological eye, a large optical telescope, or something as sophisticated as a tunneling electron microscope, the first time we look, we see pure sensations: colors, sounds, dots and streaks without any understanding of what they are. Whether we are a baby or a Nobel Laureate, a learning process ensues that produces a theory involving a continuous feed-forward loop that in turn produces predictions that when compared with pure sensations generate an error signal. The number of iterations required to reduce the error to “small enough” can be very large, but once established, the feed-forward process executes automatically, and the meaning of the symbols is registered with the (now equivalent) pure and predicted sensations to produce the actionable reality we see in front of our noses every day. The model of reality we are introducing is somewhat analogous to a little man or woman in the control room of a large machine that neither he nor she can get outside of. The reader must take this “cannot get out” very seriously. It is of no use for you – the reader – to imagine seeing, touching, or smelling the machine from the outside because you, dear reader, are one of the little men or women who cannot get out of your own machine. What you can do, however, is build a model of what you believe is outside based upon the information presented on your control-room display screen. What you build might look something like a dynamic multi-team chess game that executes automatically unless you intervene by modifying a move one of your colored pieces makes. The difference between this version and the standard game is that capturing an opponent’s piece does not eliminate the piece but absorbs it into one’s own team. The game board is registered like a touch screen over the pure sensation layer to provide both an explanation but also a control layer for you to direct your team. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 535 The applicability of this analogy to the life of a human being can be made clearer by referring to the night sky experience of a primitive man without any instruments. As he looks up, he sees light and streaks. He might first imagine gods and goddesses and project their images into the firmament. His belief might be so strong that he pays for his funeral fire, which he believes will carry his soul in the smoke to become a permanent star. The bigger the fire, the higher and brighter the star. It makes perfect sense to take a few loved ones along. The “good enough” feedforward loop explanation began to crumple with the invention of the telescope. But the processing architecture has not changed. Only the beliefs being processed have been modernized. The pure sensations are still processed into an internal mental display, and their explanation is still the registered meaning overlay of the symbols implemented in the remainder of your machine. With the continued invention of sensing equipment, the size and age of the universe we believe we see has grown. But the experience is still physically presented on the display screen that still happens inside our machine, and both what is really outside the machine and what the machine really is are still as unknowable as they were millennia ago. Our belief is that raw sensations simply happen, and our theoretical explanations are constantly being updated. The machine that you and I are is more like an activity being executed than an object being seen from the outside. An activity by this machine can be described as a physical flow action behaving like an incompressible fluid that makes its own space and proceeds at its own rate. An isolated actionflow cycle in the ‘Nothing’ surrounding our machine is a self-regeneration activity that can only be experienced by our machine if an interaction occurs. We are not simply objective bodies that live between birth and death but rather we are these larger event cycles that execute an endless existence activity within its own material and in its own space and time. The structure of this event is governed by the dual desires to: 1) maximize material growth in forms; and 2) minimize internal stress and strain of unbalanced forces. The cosmology of this theory is that of a multiverse of beings in the ‘Nothingness’ of beings that may or may not be interacting with each other. Some of these beings are so convinced that their reality belief is reality itself; they are living in a universe that we know now is of their own making, but they do not know it. Therefore, they falsely believe that their own and other people’s bodies must live and die. The remainder of this essay will produce evidence that the multiverse of ‘Conscious Beings’ forms the next revolutionary improvement in our knowledge of ‘Reality’. It is the only scientifically testable theory that addresses the consciousness question with something other than denial. 1.1 Development of Event-Oriented Physics Whether conscious life after death is scientifically provable depends upon what science we believe most closely describes the reality in which our bodies live and die. The foundations of our mainstream Natural Science and in particular the Laws of Physics effectively limit acceptable evidence for the survival of human consciousness to signals emanating from one’s body. This version of science teaches that the world of objects we see in front of our noses is the one and only true reality, and it will exist as a world of objects whether we are alive or not. If ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 536 true, then this version of science rightly claims conscious life after death is impossible. One can hardly expect to receive signals from a mechanism whose signal-production capacity has, by definition, been irreversibly destroyed. However, our mainstream science is only a partial and incomplete description of what is actually happening. How the undeniable existence of the conscious experience can emerge from material that is subject to the current physical laws of science has never been explained and is logically impossible[1]. Thus, developing a more complete science that includes the subjective experience and accurately describes the bigger life-and-death picture is a prerequisite before we can answer the consciousness-after-death question. In search of such completeness, the foundations of Natural Science have been examined to determine where the Laws of Physics are deficient and thereby impose limits on human knowledge that prevent us from understanding the larger reality in which we are embedded. Such investigations have led to the development of a line of theoretical physics starting with Schrödinger, Madelung, DeBroglie, Bohm, Everett, Penrose, Stapp, Vitiello, Rovelli, Tegmark, and most recently, the works called Conscious Action Theory (CAT) by the author of this essay.[2] Classic Reality is an objective space with objects Quantum Reality is a probability of seeing objects Measure Explain ψ ψ Event Reality is a selfcontained process that experiences objects Measuring tion R Explaining time space Fig. 1.1 Paradigm shift from objective, quantum, and cyclic event reality (Ref. CAT Fig-1.1-3). Figure 1 summarizes this development by depicting a series of icons that are cartoon versions of more detailed visualizations of the meaning the symbols that model ‘Reality’ in each of the scientific theories considered in this essay. The objective world view on the left treats ‘Reality’ as an a priori empty space and time containing objects that move each other by forces. By including the man holding an apple on the Earth we include an icon of one’s own material body, which according to the classic version of science, eats material from the rest of the universe and grows, lives, and dies, thereby returning its material back to the rest of the universe. That this dust-to-dust scenario is either wrong or at best incomplete has been proven by the success of quantum theory. This theory introduces the important distinction between what one believes ‘Reality’ to be and what one perceives it to be. In the quantum version of science, what ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 537 we perceive is the directly seen in measurement reports, and what is believed is a probability amplitude of getting a specific result from a measurement operation on what quantum physicists believe is a sort of wave-based ‘Reality’. If the human sensory apparatus is treated as the measurement instrument, then any report is displayed as the multimedia display we experience every day. The logical conclusion that the quantum wave, identified as “pilot waves” by De Broglie and Bohm, represents an individual’s thoughts was unfortunately rejected by the mainstream science community because it is holding onto the wrong assumptions. As D’Espagnat wrote in Scientific America[3]: The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is independent of human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum mechanics and with facts established by experiment. Eliminating this doctrine and accepting the probabilistic wave picture of quantum theory leads to the explanatory-measurement event of Conscious Action Theory (CAT). This theory represented by the right panel in the figure above does the following: 1) It expands the quantum concept of reality with an icon representing a snapshot of our material body and the Universe as it might exist in a Now instant in the lower phase of a self-regenerating activity and, 2) It replaces what was objective reality with an icon that represents what it consciously feels like to be that material in its symmetric mental upper phase. The small upper icon, which we have identified as the 1st-person perspective, shows an apple, an arm holding it, and the nose of the observer in his/her optical field of view superimposed over the phenomenological dark space surrounding us when we close our eyes[4]. Event reality is not represented by any particular icon shown in Figure 1. Rather, reality is the entire content in each panel. For our purposes, what we really are is an action flow through our own time that closes on itself and thereby exists forever. A fusion of the measured result shown in the upper icon and its explanation in the lower icon, which we have identified as the 3rd-person perspective, provides a permanent self-updating conscious experience. These icons are cross sections of the action flow. The drawings of the man holding an apple are first, his phenomenological view of himself and second, his explanation of what he actually is. Views and explanations of reality are realities in themselves but not equal to the realities they are portraying. In other words, nothing shown in the action cycle depicting the event reality shown in Figure 1.1 has the properties of what the secular population would identify as our material body. In order to show what our material body actually is and how it relates to the cyclic action flow shown here as the core activity of a conscious being, we will first present a more detailed description of a conscious being. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 538 1.2. The Action-Flow Diagram of a Conscious Being The diagram of a simple action network from a Reader’s perspective, looking down on the Model of an interacting Conscious Being[1], is shown in Figure 1.1 as a simple action-flow cycle. Here the 1st- and 3rd-person perspectives, representing what a human might experience in its here and now, are connected by action flows labeled ‘Measuring’ and ‘eXplaining’. Important features of a system that grows living beings have been deliberately hidden. Under the 3rd-person perspective lies the ‘Model of Reality’ (MoR) this being has built to explain and control the raw sensations that are experienced. The 1st-person perspective shows a merging of external and internal sensations whose independent production must be explained in detail. Lastly, the entire model is held together in a black background signifying nothing. An artist’s drawing of such an expanded model of a conscious being is shown in Figure 1.2. This division exposes the Model of Reality and three overlaid spatial cross sections of sensations observable in the 1st-person’s here and now. The action types flowing through these spaces – labeled ‘ax ’, ‘a’ or ‘ai’, and ‘a’ throughout this essay – are graphically placed top to bottom in the action flows implementing a conscious observer in Figure 1.2a. The internal ‘ai’ and external ‘ax’ flows interact with each other to generate their difference. This encodes the model-of-reality updates signal back into the Model or Reality update branch as well as adds commands as desired into the external actuator branch. When these two perspectives differ by small enough amounts of energy flowing through every space point in the ‘ax’ and ‘ai’ observable cross sections, the conscious being feels the comfort of feeling its MoR is accurate enough to be trusted. Above Figure 1.2b on the top bar, the merging of interaction between the two action flows produces a merged experience of an everyday human,. We now recognize this icon as a merging of qualia color blobs and the outline of objects imposed by the pattern recognition of our objective theory of reality. In other words, the explanatory 3rd-person perspective of the man standing on the earth holding an apple is an accurate enough representation of reality to act as the conscious being’s actionable reality, a kind of generalized keyboard. Also shown in Figure 1.2a are classic physics symbols that operate in the conscious system’s Model of Reality. The mathematical physics of a conscious system is presented in Appendix A1. Here we only show the top level parameters. The momentum (P) and quantity vectors (Q) of classic physics are transformed into the next Time (T’) and quantity (Q’) values by the time function (Z). The action flow can also be experienced by the 1st-person perspective parameters Energy (E) and Time (T) shown on the output side of the MoR. The energy field at a time point ‘T’, location ‘Q’, are the correlates of consciousness in that they determine what an individual thinks he sees. NOTE: dQ/dT =Vc the velocity of consciousness. Figure 1.2a correctly summarizes the actual activity executed by a living conscious being who is aware of his reality projection and understands that his MoR is an evolutionary work in progress that in its current objective formulation seems to function quite well. The parameters introduced in this paragraph are fundamental and pertain to all scales. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) + 539 = ax ai ai + ax = 2 • a Sensor Processing__ _ a Mental Action Physical Action E MoR P P’ Q' = Z Q T Fig. 1.2 Symbolic god’s eye view of the basic model of an interacting and an isolated Conscious Being. Note, the display ‘a-type’ meaning symbols are a trusted actionable display. This allows a self-stimulating action loop that never ends. In the body of the text, we are examining the situation centered on the human scale. The entire color medium rotates through the cross sections or function boxes. Action is the material of change, and in the text, we will use incompressible fluids as an analogy for visualizing action flows. Consider the circular water rides in parks that carry one around a circuit of the park. You float along with the current, laughing with your friends. Pretty soon you float into a tunnel. A single light accompanies your group as you move along. You lose reference, and your group, possibly others nearby, and including the water itself, form our stationary here and now. The tunnel opens up. You realize the channel curves back on itself, closing a flow cycle of change. You float through the tunnel, around in your here-and-now bubble, and pass the open section in which you are reminded of the bigger world, before you pass through the tunnel again. Being curious, you leave your friends behind and decide to find the control room where a bored park operations monitor happily answers your questions about the design of the park. He even gives you a diagram of the water-flow mechanism. Not surprisingly, it looks a lot like Figure 1.2a. Like a clock pointer stationary against a rotating clock face, the here and now in which your friends are enjoying themselves remains stationary at 12 o’clock in the park’s version of Figure 1.2a. You remember thinking what it felt like to forget about the bigger world outside ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 540 while you were riding along. Looking ahead at 9 o’clock from the unknowable input ‘ ’ body sensors, action flows in. You remember the warmth of new water coming in. Like action is absorbed into the permanent momentum of the circulating water. If the water were action, it would be processed to appear as blobs of meaningless warmth ‘ax’ type sensation in the conscious being’s here and now. At this juncture the action flow is mixed with the internally generated expected sensations and our friends quickly feel comfortable that the warm blobs of sensations are actually warm water. Stepping outside the metaphor, observables are implemented by action flowing in the mental phase of the processing cycles. The inner red dotted line is the mental side of the charge whose cross section is primarily responsible for displaying predictions. This, along with the external sensor processing path, is now brought inside the periwinkle action volume. The chance of ‘You’ being the man with the red apple is minuscule. To be pertinent, you need to find and register a pair of 3rd-and 1st-person sensations of the type encountered in your own everyday experience. Once this has been accomplished, the interactions with objects of interest can be verified in Reader’s here and now. When measurement and prediction coincide, there is a very good chance that the theory behind the prediction is correct. As we become more complex we grow a more comprehensive network, more proficient in its use, and the dependence of well-established truths becomes obvious and expedient. In the extreme case, the conscious being is in such a deep conviction of the truth expressed by its ‘a’-type sensations that it is no longer connected to the outside world. Figure 1.2b represents a flow diagram of a conscious action model of a selfcontained action flow in nothing. 1.3 The Multiverse Cosmology of Conscious Systems Figures 1.2a and 1.2b properly use the objective world view as a mechanism for understanding and running a trusted MoR but leaves the question of ‘Reality’ unanswered. The unknowable blackness is again unknowable and thereby freed from a priori objective reality assumptions. This allows us to ask anew, “What could this Unknowable be?” To answer this question, we must first recognize that our working MoR based upon classic terminology has been upgraded to quantum theory during the last 100 years and therefore our objective world view no longer correctly reflects what well proven quantum models would suggest. Unfortunately, the ontological interpretation of quantum terminology is far from settled and no clear picture of what Reality we are now dealing with has emerged.[1] That an action model of conscious beings can provide a context for the quantum model, suggests that an explanatorymeasurement activity into which alternative Models of Reality can be inserted and operated is more fundamental than any MoR it may contain. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that whatever is out there beyond our external sensors is not represented by any MoR we can come up with, but rather is an interacting action structure that exists for the same reasons and is guided by the same principles as ours. The simplest example of what the Unknowable could be is a duplicate of what we think we are. Figure1.3 shows two symmetric copies of two conscious systems imbedded in the Unknowable nothing. They have been given the reality names ‘I’ for the conscious being modeled by this ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 541 action flow and ‘U’ for the rest of Reality. Together ‘U’ and ‘I’ then make up the whole of ‘Reality’. Of course, it is ludicrous to think that both ‘I’ and ‘U’ would come to model reality with the same 1st-person image, especially one that shows an exaggeratedly large man holding an apple. But a man holding an apple is just a pedagogical example to show how interacting conscious systems function. What is important to remember is that the MoR is designed to model reality as a ‘Whole’ but built with material belonging to each part. eXplain I Measure tion AII AIU AII AUI AUU AUU Measure U eXplain Fig. 1.3 Action flow of Reality with two parts explicitly shown In the past, theories of physics modeled a single objective universe. Since there was only one real reality, all legitimate physical theories should describe one and the same thing. The requirement that all theories should have the same form when formulated by two observers is called the principle of covariance. It is much like asking two people to draw a picture of an object as it is, not as it is seen. Then also asking both parties to draw what one of them perceives from their point of view. We would end up with two separate drawings on two separate pieces of paper filled with two separate patterns of ink. If both parties have an accurate concept of the object in question and the person looking at it, then they should get the same drawing on two pieces of paper. ISSN: 2153-8212 A Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 542 This is what we have drawn in Figure 1.3.[2] The object in question is reality as a ‘Whole’, which includes ‘U’ and ‘I’. If their theory of the ‘Whole’ is correct, they will have the same model mechanisms in both their MoRs, and the same 1st-person experience will be calculated for ‘I’ by both parties. The difference between Conscious Action Theory and our old classic objective concept is that here we are looking at a reality whose independent parts are events not objects. Objects are created within each part as interpretations of sensory stimulation. The action sent out by ‘U’ is labeled ‘AUI’ and if ‘I’s’ model is accurate, it will generate an exact prediction of the 1st-person observable so ‘ax’ equals ‘ai’ and ‘I’s’ output signal will be equal to the action flow ‘AIU’ from ‘U’ to ‘I’. If ‘U’s’ model is also accurate, it will predict its 1st-person observable, and both systems will conclude they know what the Unknowable is and act on that knowledge. By first defining ‘I’ and then ‘U’ as whatever is not ‘I’, we have logically defined the ‘Whole’ of ‘Reality’ as ‘U’ plus ‘I’. This means that Figure 1.3 depicts the ‘Whole’. We simply drew a more detailed breakout of the action flow in the ‘Whole’ in order to apply CAT to the problem at hand. U AYU AUI AYI AIU AUY Y Fig. 1.4 Three part ‘Whole’ of our observable Universe, here separated by Nothing. Most contemporary physicists assume that if they cannot interact with events they do not exist. However, if we expand definition of ‘U’ as the context-dependent ‘Rest of Reality’ or the ‘Rest of the Universe’, whichever fits one’s world view, then it is the failure to acknowledge the inner subjective aspect of the material from which we are built that has limited our current science AIY The problem at hand is the question of conscious life beyond death. An action labeled ‘AIU’ in the form of this essay is sending a message to ‘You’. The message claims that ‘You’ and ‘I’ are self-contained cycles of change that can be modeled by an action stream that flows through our individual here and now. Your personal experience right now is explained in the objective model by the fact that your body is on the Earth reading this essay. In the CAT-model, ‘You’ along with all your interactions have been identified within the rest of the Unknowable to show a three-part reality in Figure 1.4. This means ‘We’ are connected by a half-duplex communication channel. For some time now I have been building a model of ‘You’ in my memories, and it makes sense that ‘You’ have built one of me, so on your end as well, but only in this instance, do the two become aware of each ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 543 other and, at least in principle, could connect. For however long it lasts, the each of our memories are being updated for the purpose of exchanging actions between our own structures in forms that minimize our own stress and strain. Describing what is happening this instant from physical first principles starts with Figure 1.4 interactions: AIU) ‘I’ sends essay to ‘U’, AUY) essay sent to ‘You’, AYU) evaluation returned to ‘U’, AUI) result of contest returned to ‘I’. We are now in a state of updated memories with no direct interaction but a rather large infusion of inferred information that is stored in each of our internal action rings. Can those action rings interact with each other? What if you found them truthful and more practical than what you now believe? Then would You adopt this cosmology? For me there are limits. I cannot believe that when You read these words in your here and now, and I read these words in my here and now, a transfer of meaning by some direct book-to-book communication ray of knowledge is happening. No, the direct communication between some book in my world and a similar one in yours is not possible. There are more ways to communicate – perhaps more like a lens transforms a signal. or like a resonant antenna pulls in ideas from noise. Fig. 1.5 Three-part interacting I, Y, and the rest of the Universe as a cluster of observable interacting systems placed in a multiverse of unobservable events It is because we have an innate desire to grow in comfortable forms that we bother to maintain our interaction links in the first place. However, a three-part ‘Whole’ is too simplistic for all but the most intimate interactions between individuals. For further practical applications, the interaction diagrams or, alternatively, the details of the interaction matrix must be expanded. Without showing interaction details among ourselves and all the relationships that might have grown and faded in our lifetimes, Figure 1.5 shows a background of action cycles. All of these action forms can be separated from the ‘U’ thus distributing the interactions in a network of interconnections. These permeate through the Nothing like a spidery tapestry of fibers that flow themselves through invisible channels. The instant snapshot shown here begins to move as the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 530-544 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part I) 544 ‘We’ turn around on our individual axes. The connecting interactions, like drive belts on a cosmic engine, keep the entire configuration of parts in synchronization so that each of souls continue to experience their lifetimes. We are not objects with a single material body but selfregenerating activities that evolve models of themselves and their environment. The internal activity that maintains each part, may or may not find any one interacting appendage too costly to hold. The interaction stops, and a part will disappear in isolation. That concludes our introduction to the Multiverse of Conscious Beings. By now you should understand that flow diagrams can formulate detailed physical models in which human conscious experiences are produced. Further details of the machinery of a conscious being is provided in the Appendices. Appendix A1 provides a detailed map of functions that are carried out by a typical conscious being in order to be conscious. The further appendices provide connections between action-diagram features and standard quantum and classic physics. Returning to the problem at hand, we focus on the basic two states in which such systems can exist. They are either interacting or they are isolated. (Continued in Part II) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

281 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence Research Essay Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence Bradley Y. Bartholomew* Abstract A paper entitled ―The unreasonable effectiveness of deep learning in artificial intelligence‖ argues that the way forward towards achieving general AI, that is to say a human level intelligence, is to copy how an organic brain does if for humans. The paper argues that AI has to move from a very limited 2D-space which is referred to as Flatland to a tera-dimensional space that represents the million billion synapses between the neurons in the cortex of the human brain. It is pointed out that the move from 2-D AI to tera-dimensional AI is actually a move in the wrong direction if they ever hope to achieve general AI. The fact is that although there are a million billion synapses between the neurons in the cortex, human consciousness is one dimensional or holistic. In order to achieve general AI the machine will have to do everything a human can do where there are no gaps or seams in the output. A model of the human brain is offered where different sections of the cortex are specialized for different functions and these disparate regions communicate with each other electronically at the speed of light via brainwaves and this is how the brain generates a global holistic 1-dimensional consciousness in us. Also as numbers don‘t exist in Nature an organic brain, unlike deep learning, generates intelligent output without the aid of numerical programs or statistics. Keywords: Deep learning, AI, statistics, neural networks, mathematics, Singularity, transhumanism. This paper is a reply to a recent paper entitled ―The unreasonable effectiveness of deep learning in artificial intelligence‖ which recalls the celebrated paper by Eugene Wigner ―The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences‖. 1,2 The author says: In his essay ―The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,‖ Eugene Wigner marveled that the mathematical structure of a physical theory often reveals deep insights into that theory that lead to empirical predictions. Also remarkable is that there are so few parameters in the equations, called physical constants. The title of this article mirrors Wigner‘s. However, unlike the laws of physics, there is an abundance of parameters in deep learning networks and they are variable. We are just beginning to explore representation and optimization in veryhigh-dimensional spaces * Correspondence: Bradley Y. Bartholomew, Independent Researcher, France. Email: brad.bartholomew2@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 282 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence The remarkable thing is that although the title to the paper under reply mirrors Eugene Wigner‘s paper, the theme or tone of the two papers are strikingly different. Whereas Wigner was marveling at how effective mathematics has been to describe physical processes and predict physical outcomes, in this paper the author seems to be arguing that deep learning in artificial intelligence systems has hit some sort of ceiling in the pursuit of making a machine that can match human intelligence. His argument is that further advancement towards general artificial intelligence can only be achieved by studying and mimicking actual brain processes. If AI is ever to become truly conscious and have a general intelligence to equal or surpass humans then it will have to mimic the way the brain generates consciousness and intelligence in us. On its face this of course is an eminently reasonable and valid argument, but it has a hidden irony much like the ‗hidden‘ layers in the deep learning networks themselves, that deep learning and AI in general relies heavily, one might say almost exclusively, on statistical mathematics in order to generate output, whether this be recognizing a physical object in an image, or a word or a sound, or answering any question that may be put to it. Essentially it makes five guesses and gives you an answer that is ‗probably‘ the best answer. If that output happens to be wrong then the ‗hidden layers‘ in the system will update the statistical analysis accordingly, and the next time around it will be less likely to make that mistake. This is where the ‗deep learning‘ comes in. The statistical analysis of the data is gradually improving with every iteration of the system. This has proved to be remarkably effective in certain limited areas that involve human intelligence, which gets us back to this word ‗unreasonable‘ in the title of Eugene Wigner‘s article. Essentially we have to consider the true relationship between human mathematics and natural processes. AI and the Age of Spiritual Machines The ideas that led to the first programmable computers came out of mathematicians‘ attempts to understand human thought—particularly logic—as a mechanical process of ―symbol manipulation.‖ Digital computers are essentially symbol manipulators, pushing around combinations of the symbols 0 and 1. To pioneers of computing like Alan Turing and John von Neumann, there were strong analogies between computers and the human brain, and it seemed obvious to them that human intelligence could be replicated in computer programs. 3 This notion that computers and human intelligence are in some way related or involve the same operations has permeated the information technology community ever since its inception and has led to the wildest and most extravagant, dare one say absurd, claims by leading lights in the tech industry as to what computers will ultimately be capable of. Notwithstanding that computer output is to a 2D screen it has been seriously predicted that eventually computers will be simulating whole universes, will be bringing cryonically suspended cadavers (and severed heads) back to life whereupon they will live forever as cyborgs, terminally sick and aged people will have eternal life by having their brain uploaded with their personal consciousness of self remaining intact, machines will not only surpass human intelligence in specific domains and generally, but will have humanlike consciousness, aspirations and emotions. Picture if you will ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 283 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence an evil paperclip machine that ‗decides‘ to turn the whole universe into paperclips, or a pious machine who stops into a church to pray. The hype for AI has become a religion known as transhumanism. Notwithstanding the fact that these machines have no mental life apart from crunching numbers, they will look upon us as lesser beings. They will be ‗conscious‘ of being superior to us, just as we are conscious of being superior to an intelligent animal such as a dog. God is not dead; in the religion of Transhumanism, god is a Machine. What is mathematics All this hype that has turned AI into a religion is largely due to the fact that the speed of computers for many years now has been increasing exponentially, as has memory storage capacity. For the AI community the fact that computers can process exponentially growing data at exponentially increasing speeds means that computers are becoming exponentially more intelligent. Surely this is consistent with the initial inspiration of Turing and other mathematicians that because computational ‗symbol manipulation‘ is exponentially improving then the computer‘s ability to ‗replicate‘ human thought is exponentially increasing as well. The sticking point is this word ‗replicate‘. Can machines crunching numbers replicate or simulate living conscious human beings in such a way that they will actually surpass the human beings intellectually, creatively and spiritually. Can enhanced number crunching create beings with a ‗higher‘ consciousness? This certainly resonates with the enigmatic assertion of Pythagoras that ―all things are number‖ which surely embraces our soul, our intellect, our psyche, our mind and our consciousness. A subtitle to this paper could be: Solving the ‗hard problem‘: Consciousness is a numerical phenomenon. The only problem with all this euphoria surrounding numbers which has evidently been going on for two and half millennia is that numbers don‘t actually exist in Nature. In earlier papers I quoted the philosopher Oswald Spengler who to my mind stated this fact most emphatically. 4 He also points out that the crown jewel of mathematics in the physical sciences, differential calculus introduced independently by Leibniz and Newton, is mere statistics. As Spengler points out even the fundamental premise in Physics that space consists of three dimensions, the xyz axes in Cartesian coordinates, is a mathematical fiction. We feel — and the feeling is what constitutes the state of all-round awareness in us — that we are in an extension that encircles us; and it is only necessary to follow out this original impression that we have of the worldly to see that in reality there is only one true "dimension " of space, which is direction from one's self outwards into the distance, the "there" and the future, and that the abstract system of three dimensions is a mechanical representation and not a fact of life. 4 It is not necessary to name any particular mathematical functions as an example of something that cannot exist in Nature. The fact is mathematics is about the properties of idealized concepts ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 284 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence such as numbers, right angle triangles and circles that don‘t actually exist in Nature. If you take all these idealized concepts out of mathematics then there is nothing left. All of the mathematics in the physical sciences is a fiction invented by humans which enables them to observe, explain and predict natural processes on a statistical basis. Take the march of time for example. Mathematicians count the passage of time in seconds, minutes etc and put a t for time into their equations but obviously that is not what is actually occurring in Nature. The much touted Laws of Physics are merely descriptive; not dynamic. So deep learning in AI is not being intelligent in its own right, it is not even artificial intelligence, it is merely statistical manipulation of symbols that simulates processes in a human brain. The unreasonable effectiveness of AI The paper under reply presents a very reasonable and balanced argument as to what AI has to do to move to the next level. The author is essentially saying that AI has already achieved astounding successes but the way forward is to go back and study how the brain actually does it. In fact the astounding successes the author is referring to are still examples of what is called ―narrow‖ or ―weak‖ AI. The terms narrow and weak are used to contrast with strong, humanlevel, general, or full-blown AI (sometimes called AGI, or artificial general intelligence)—that is, the AI that we see in movies, that can do most everything we humans can do, and possibly much more. General AI might have been the original goal of the field, but achieving it has turned out to be much harder than expected. 3 Ever since its inception the development of AI has seen several seen several cycles where further advancement seemed bleak. These are the AI winters. And then a new idea pops up, or in the case of deep learning an old idea that was dead and buried comes to life again, and there is an AI spring. Like every AI spring before it, our current one features experts predicting that ―general AI‖—AI that equals or surpasses humans in most ways—will be here soon. ―Human level AI will be passed in the mid-2020s,‖ predicted Shane Legg, cofounder of Google DeepMind, in 2016. A year earlier, Facebook‘s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, declared, ―One of our goals for the next five to 10 years is to basically get better than human level at all of the primary human senses: vision, hearing, language, general cognition.‖ The AI philosophers Vincent Müller and Nick Bostrom published a 2013 poll of AI researchers in which many assigned a 50 percent chance of human-level AI by the year 2040. Much of this optimism is based on the recent successes of deep learning programs.3 Interestingly the high priest of the Transhumanism religion, Ray Kurzweil, who wrote the Transhumanism bible ―The Age of Spiritual Machines‖ made the following prediction in 2002: ―A careful analysis of the requisite trends shows that we will understand the principles of operation of the human brain and be in a position to recreate its powers in synthetic substances well within thirty years.‖ Kurzweil is vague on how all this will happen but assures us that to achieve human-level AI, ―we will not program human intelligence link by link as in some massive expert system. Rather, we will set up an intricate hierarchy of self-organizing systems, based largely on the reverse engineering of the human brain, and then provide for its ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 285 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence education … hundreds if not thousands of times faster than the comparable process for humans.‖ Reverse engineering the brain means understanding enough about its workings in order to duplicate it, or at least to use the brain‘s underlying principles to replicate its intelligence in a computer.3 The paper under reply commences with the following statement: In 1884, Edwin Abbott wrote Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions. This book was written as a satire on Victorian society, but it has endured because of its exploration of how dimensionality can change our intuitions about space. Flatland was a 2-dimensional (2D) world inhabited by geometrical creatures. The mathematics of 2 dimensions was fully understood by these creatures, with circles being more perfect than triangles. In it a gentleman square has a dream about a sphere and wakes up to the possibility that his universe might be much larger than he or anyone in Flatland could imagine. He was not able to convince anyone that this was possible and in the end he was imprisoned. We can easily imagine adding another spatial dimension when going from a 1-dimensional to a 2D world and from a 2D to a 3-dimensional (3D) world. Lines can intersect themselves in 2 dimensions and sheets can fold back onto themselves in 3 dimensions, but imagining how a 3D object can fold back on itself in a 4-dimensional space is a stretch that was achieved by Charles Howard Hinton in the 19th century. What are the properties of spaces having even higher dimensions? What is it like to live in a space with 100 dimensions, or a million dimensions, or a space like our brain that has a million billion dimensions (the number of synapses between neurons)? The author doesn‘t enlighten us as to why he thinks the solution for the advancement of AI is to increase the number of dimensions that AI is capable of processing. It is an interesting analogy between AI and Flatland because the output of AI is in fact 2-dimensional. The output invariably appears on a 2-D computer screen. So AI literally does exist in a 2-D space that could be aptly named Flatland. The author then suggests that in order to upgrade from narrow AI to general AI it will have to ‗learn‘ to do processing in a space that has a million billion dimensions (the number of synapses between neurons). The author makes this suggestion in the form of a question where he doesn‘t actually know the answer which can be found by simply ‗reverse engineering‘ his question. Instead of increasing the number of dimensions in the AI space, the secret is to decrease the number of dimensions to a 1-D space. The output of a human brain is not 2-dimensional or 3-dimensional or tera-dimensional. As Oswald Spengler observes above, our consciousness is one dimensional, that is to say it is holistic. The issue is how does a million billion neurons combine to generate in us a perfectly unified and seamless consciousness. This question has been around for a long time. Erwin Schrödinger alluded to ―The Arithmetical Paradox: The Oneness of Mind‖ in a series of lectures on Mind and Matter at Cambridge University in 1956. Schrödinger ponders the question why every living cell in an organism (say a human being) contains a complete copy of the DNA for that organism. He quotes Sir Charles Sherrington: ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 286 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence The cell as a component of the body is not only a visibly demarcated unit but a unit-life centered on itself. It leads its own life … The cell is a unit-life, and our life which in its turn is a unitary life consists utterly of the cell-lives. This paradox is particularly striking in relation to the brain, where the cortex is made up of a sheet of trillions of individual cells, each containing a complete copy of the human DNA in the nucleus, so each cell appears to be an autonomous unit; yet somehow this ―commonwealth of cells‖ produces in us the impression of having a unified mind. ―Matter and energy seem granular in structure, and so does ‗life‘, but not so mind.‖ Here we have one mind based ostensibly on many cell-lives; the only explanation Schrödinger could offer is that there must be a ―sub-mind‖ associated with the individual cells that enables them to act perfectly in concert to produce a unified effect. He immediately dismisses this notion of a sub-mind in every living cell as an ―absurd monstrosity.‖ However, it is for every living cell, not just those of the brain, that this paradox arises. All living creatures consist of individual autonomous cells, whether one or millions or trillions, which act in concert to produce a unified effect. 5 This is the essential problem for the AI community if they ever want to ‗supersize‘ from narrow to general AI. The intelligence or consciousness that they generate has to be 1-dimensional. The irony of course being in order to ‗supersize‘ they will have to decrease the number of dimensions of the AI generated space, not increase them. The author seems to suggest that with the ‗unreasonable effectiveness‘ of mathematics they should be able to increase the number of dimensions of the AI space to an infinitely large number, and that is probably the case. 3-D printing is an example of moving from 2-D Flatland to 3-D at least. The problem is the more dimensions they introduce mathematically into the AI space the further away they are actually becoming to achieve general AI. It‘s probably bad form to introduce anything so frivolous into an academic discussion about consciousness, but I would like to refer you to a video on YouTube that has the world champion Boogie-Woogie dancers for the years 1991-2011.6 Consider, if you will, what the brain is actually doing to generate a 1-dimensional and seamless consciousness in these dancers of dancing the boogie-woogie. In addition to heightened general input-output for their autonomic nervous system, their brain is simultaneously merging streaming input from all five of their senses, and merging that with the parts of their brain responsible for proprioception, balance, body schema, intelligence, emotion, language, memory and musical appreciation and producing a unified consciousness on the cortex of their brain as well as simultaneously sending instructions via motor regions to literally every muscle in their body. Their 1-dimensional consciousness of dancing the boogie-woogie is simultaneously infinitely dimensional. And it is for this reason I contend that AI will never achieve general AI, let alone actually surpass human intelligence. There will be those who might deny that a champion boogie-woogie dancer is displaying intelligence. To them I say that the essential talent of a good dancer is their ability to ‗interpret‘ the music. These are world champion boogie-woogie dancers which of course AI will never ever come close to matching let alone surpass, for if it were to do so, deep learning would display ‗unreasonable effectiveness‘ indeed. The examples of ‗unreasonable effectiveness‘ of deep ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 287 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence learning that the author speaks of are considerably more modest although they do indeed involve beating human champions at their particular game of expertise. AI has beaten a world champion chess player at the game of chess, a world champion Go player at the game of Go, and there are several other specific games that AI can play at somewhere near human levels of skill. These are all classic examples of narrow AI. There is an AI that can play a specific game, and none other. The other area where narrow AI has been ‗unreasonably effective‘ is in the area of language recognition. The author says: Natural language applications often start not with symbols but with word embeddings in deep learning networks trained to predict the next word in a sentence, which are semantically deep and represent relationships between words as well as associations. Once regarded as ―just statistics,‖ deep recurrent networks are high-dimensional dynamical systems through which information flows much as electrical activity flows through brains. One might question whether statistically predicting what word is most likely to follow a particular word in a sentence actually represents a flow of ‗information‘ where any ‗intelligence‘ is involved, but it is true that narrow AI has achieved somewhere near 90% effectiveness in transcribing spoken language into text. If the spoken language is a question where a human is seeking ‗information‘ then this request is submitted to a massive database that virtually encompasses the ‗information highway‘ – the internet. In this way AI has managed to achieve a summit in narrow AI – it was able to beat a champion at the popular television game of Jeopardy. Here I must take issue with the author. The effectiveness of AI at playing the game of Jeopardy is not ‗unreasonable‘ considering that the AI had in its database all the questions that have ever been asked in the game, and in fact the text of the question was submitted to the AI although it was made to appear as if the AI was recognizing the spoken question. Also the fact that the AI was simply quicker than the human at pressing the buzzer would have given the AI a ‗superhuman‘ ability but I doubt if that really counts as ‗intelligence‘. Having said that, any output of an AI or an organic brain may be called ‗intelligence‘ in the widest sense of the word. Deep learning vs neural networks The paper under reply sets out what AI needs to learn from the neural networks in the brain in order to achieve general AI. You will see that he is stating the problem correctly if AI is ever to match the brain, however he doesn‘t seem to realize the enormity of the problem. Imagine if they were to develop narrow AI for every single human skill, talent, emotion, creative activity, area of knowledge and expertise and then have that network of narrow AI modules simultaneously communicate with each other to create in the machine a holistic intellectual consciousness. (Bearing in mind that for each of those broad categories of human endeavor there will be hundreds of specific processes that the narrow AI would have to individually master; for instance a human can learn to play hundreds of different games within the ‗skills‘ category). In order to ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 288 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence have general AI they would first have to have narrow AI at advanced level for everything that a human can do, and then have those thousands of modules of narrow AI instantaneously communicate with each other to produce a seamless holistic output. This is what our brain does and the author clearly recognizes this, but what he doesn‘t seem to recognize is that such a deep learning neural network would be so ‗unreasonably effective‘ as to be impossible. He writes: Features of neurons are likely to be important for their computational function, some of which have not yet been exploited in model networks. These features include a diversity of cell types, optimized for specific functions; short-term synaptic plasticity, which can be either facilitating or depressing on a time scales of seconds; a cascade of biochemical reactions underlying plasticity inside synapses controlled by the history of inputs that extends from seconds to hours; sleep states during which a brain goes offline to restructure itself; and communication networks that control traffic between brain areas. Synergies between brains and AI may now be possible that could benefit both biology and engineering. The neocortex appeared in mammals 200 million years ago. It is a folded sheet of neurons on the outer surface of the brain, called the gray matter, which in humans is about 30 cm in diameter and 5 mm thick when flattened. There are about 30 billion cortical neurons forming 6 layers that are highly interconnected with each other in a local stereotyped pattern. The cortex greatly expanded in size relative the central core of the brain during evolution, especially in humans, where it constitutes 80% of the brain volume. This expansion suggests that the cortical architecture is scalable— more is better—unlike most brain areas, which have not expanded relative to body size. Interestingly, there are many fewer long-range connections than local connections, which form the white matter of the cortex, but its volume scales as the 5/4power of the gray matter volume and becomes larger than the volume of the gray matter in large brains. Scaling laws for brain structures can provide insights into important computational principles. Cortical architecture including cell types and their connectivity is similar throughout the cortex, with specialized regions for different cognitive systems. For example, the visual cortex has evolved specialized circuits for vision, which have been exploited in convolutional neural networks, the most successful deep learning architecture. Having evolved a general purpose learning architecture, the neocortex greatly enhances the performance of many special-purpose subcortical structures. Brains have 11 orders of magnitude of spatially structured computing components. At the level of synapses, each cubic millimeter of the cerebral cortex, about the size of a rice grain, contains a billion synapses. The largest deep learning networks today are reaching a billion weights. The cortex has the equivalent power of hundreds of thousands of deep learning networks, each specialized for solving specific problems. How are all these expert networks organized? The levels of investigation above the network level organize the flow of information between different cortical areas, a system-level communications problem. There is much to be learned about how to organize thousands of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 289 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence specialized networks by studying how the global flow of information in the cortex is managed. Long-range connections within the cortex are sparse because they are expensive, both because of the energy demand needed to send information over a long distance and also because they occupy a large volume of space. A switching network routes information between sensory and motor areas that can be rapidly reconfigured to meet on going cognitive demands. As it happens there is a model of the brain that does indeed purport to supply all the information the author is seeking which will enable him to build his general AI. It is the model of the brain as an electronic device.7,8 According to this model consciousness is generated by electronics, and the brains of all living creatures are connected electronic devices. It has now been found that the action potentials of the neurons specifically in the cortex of the brain are not an ‗all-or-nothing‘ event as was previously thought, but in fact they generate a waveform that is capable of communicating information to other neurons in the cortex via brainwaves (ELF radio waves). That is to say that neurons in disparate parts of the cortex that are ‗hard wired‘ to perform specific functions are able to communicate with each other at the speed of light. This means that input from an infinite number of terminals in the brain and body (including the senses) are able to merge into a single holistic experience of consciousness at the level of the cortex at the speed of light. In neuroscience this is referred to as the ‗binding problem‘ and this is exactly what the author refers to in the passage above. ―The cortex has the equivalent power of hundreds of thousands of deep learning networks, each specialized for solving specific problems. How are all these expert networks organized?‖ Conclusion The author has written a paper arguing that if AI is to ever achieve general AI they must pay more attention to the way the brain does it. While his argument is perfectly sound, unfortunately it demonstrates at the same time the impossibility of this goal of general AI that the AI community has set itself. Essentially they will have to develop hundreds of thousands of narrow AI modules and have them all communicate with each other at the speed of light in order to simulate a global or holistic consciousness; no perceptible gaps or seams anywhere. But although it has demonstrated the impossibility of ever achieving general AI, his article has at least given the AI community a roadmap for the next five millennia at least. It‘s conceivable in the very distant future that conventional computing will take place at the speed of light, and so it‘s conceivable in the very far distant future that there will be something very closely approximating human intelligence. The only thing that will remain impossible is for general AI to surpass human intelligence. That would involve a programming that did not involve numbers, and an AI where ‗intelligent‘ decisions are made that didn‘t involve mathematics and statistics. That will only occur when and if humans can actually create living human beings by means other than natural procreation. But the intelligence of these creatures would no longer be ‗artificial‘. Behold the ‗singularity‘. Received March 12, 2020; Accepted March 28, 2020 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 290 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 281-290 Bartholomew, B. Y., Why AI Will Never Surpass Human Intelligence References 1 Sejnowski, T.J. ―The unreasonable effectiveness of deep learning in artificial intelligence‖. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (2020) https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1907373117 2 Wigner, E., ―The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences‖. Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 13.1 (1960) New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 3 Mitchell, Melanie. ―Artificial Intelligence‖. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kindle Edition. 4 Spengler, Oswald. ―The decline of the West.‖ London Allen & Unwin. Kindle Edition. 5 Schrodinger, E., ―What Is Life?‖ (1945) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6 World Champion Boogie-Woogie 1991-2011 https://youtu.be/Svcs5jTsTaA 7 Bartholomew, B.Y. ―Solving the ‗Hard Problem‘: Consciousness is an Electronic Phenomenon.‘ Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research. (2020) 11:46-60 https://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/862 8 Bartholomew, B.Y. ―The Electronic Waveform of Action Potentials in the Brain.‖ Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research. (2020) 11:185-197 https://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/871 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 271 Research Essay Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing Raul Valverde*1 & Chet Swanson2 1 Concordia University, Canada Independent Researcher, United States 2 Abstract The Survival Hypothesis states that a person’s personality and consciousness survive the physical death of the body. Ontology is a well-established theoretical domain within philosophy dealing with models of reality. This report proporses the use of computer natural language processing and classification of perceived objects in Near Death Experience (NDE) stories for the validation of a Quantum Ontology based on the Quantum Hologram Theory of Physics and Consciousness. This proposes Quantum Ontology to represent the unintelligible aspects of near-death experiences. The research proposes a validation of ontology constructs within a Quantum Ontology to show the potential of this methodology in NDE research. Keywords: Near death experience, quantum ontology, data mining, natural language processing. 1. Introduction The near-death experiences (NDEs) are very short stories of people who have been clinically dead and then are resurrected or revived spontaneously after a brief interval with the memory of what they experienced during that period. According to Greyson (2010), many people with near death experiences reported vivid mental clarity exceptional sensory imagery and a clear memory of the experience and an experience that is more real, then in their daily lives. Many people experience NDEs and there seems to be a consistency across NDE experiences for their main characteristics, this presents an opportunity to develop an ontology that can help NDE researchers to map the different experiences into an ontology that can help researchers with the establishment of the representation of the reality that is perceived in NDE experiences. * Correspondence: Raul Valverde, Concordia University, Canada. E-mail: raul.valverde@concordia.ca ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 272 2. Ontology In philosophy, ontology is the branch of metaphysics which studies what is existing, including the relations that may exist between objects, their categorization, their structure, their properties, their similarities, their states or their changes. Ontology is a well-established theoretical domain within philosophy dealing with models of reality. Over the years, many different ontologies have emerged. Mylopoulos (1998) suggests that ontologism can be classified into four categories: static, dynamic, intentional, and social. Each of these categories focuses on different concepts in the real world. Ontologies that fall into the static category focus on things and their properties. Dynamic ontologies extend static ontologies to focus on such concepts as events and processes, that is, how concepts in the realworld change over time. Intentional ontologies attempt to explain abstract concepts such as goals and objectives while social ontologies emphasize the concepts of values and beliefs. An example of an ontology used to describe a reality is the ADL ontology (Min et al., 2017). The ADL ontology for example can predict performance of Activities of Daily Living of cancer patients by applying the ontology-guided machine learning method. Today however, interest in, and applicability of ontologies, extends to areas far beyond metaphysics. In the case NDEs, there has been different efforts to establish an ontology that can serve as a reference to describe the reality experienced by NDE people. Rominger (2010), made an effort to use art to describe an ontology for NDE experiences, he suggested the use of art as a methodology for NDE ontology research. 3. Unintelligibility Approach and Quantum Ontology Philosophers accurately identified the central, essential barriers to legitimate rational examination of life after death. This section discusses a unique new rational method proposed by Moody (2020) and Valverde & Swanson (2020) that builds on the arguments of both David Hume and more recent analytic philosophers. Moody (2020) introduces the concept of unintelligibility. He proposes the possibility that the universe is unintelligible. If we imagine the universe as going on and on and on in space infinitely, that does not make sense either. Either way, it ends up in unintelligibility. According to Moody (2020), the main obstacle to the rational study of life after death can be removed through a logic of unintelligibility. Linguists describe language on a continuum of intelligibility. The continuum ranges from highly literal language through less intelligible figurative language to the meaningless and unintelligible. Unintelligible language can also induce profound alternate states of consciousness, including seemingly transcendent ecstasies ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 273 Physicists complain that a third value of logic—neither true nor false—is needed to describe the bizarre results of quantum theory. Quantum theory is unintelligible and has been used to attempt to explain life reviews in NDEs. Near-death life reviews pose a challenge to current memory research in terms of the sheer amount of instantaneous and empathetic information recall. Advances in quantum physics and consciousness studies support for the first time a fully realizable quantum biomechanical basis for near-death life reviews (Beck & Colli, 2003). The quantum consciousness paradigm can be used to represent the unintelligible nature of NDE experiences, in particular the timeless and spaceless nature of these experiences and the sense of oneness with the universe. NDE experiences express the realization of the interconnectedness of everything, with the quantum principle of ‘entanglement’ suggesting that differentiation between ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ is an artificial one. Instead, there is a meaningful relationship between experiences of consciousness in inner and outer worlds, with neither existing independently of the other (Walton 2017). Tyler (2015) for example proposes a set of constructs that could be used to describe NDE stories by using a Quantum ontology that includes constructs for unity, complex interconnectivity and Extinguishability. Quantum consciousness paradigms can be used to explain consciousness (Valverde 2018) and can provide the unintelligible aspect required to describe NDE experiences and map them into a unified model of quantum consciousness. 4. Quantum Matrix Type Reality Ontology Hernandez et. al. (2018) proposed an ontology for a Matrix-type reality that is similar to an NDE, they argue that one of the keys to understanding “Consciousness” is the understanding of contact with Non-Human Intelligence (NHI) using what they call the “Contact Modalities”. They define the different contact modalities of Non-Human Intelligence as: • • • • • • • NDE contact Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon (UAP) contact Out of Body Experience (OBE) contact Shamanic Hallucinogenic contact Channeling of Non-Human Intelligence Spirit/Ghost communications Remote Viewing contact Hernandez et. al. (2018) hypothesize that all of these Contact Modalities are interconnected through what is commonly called Consciousness and that advanced physics, in particular, the Quantum Hologram Theory of Physics and Consciousness (QHTC) can begin to provide a rudimentary understanding of the relationships between diverse paranormal “Contact Modalities."(Mitchell 1999). Certain features of these contact modalities appear to have quantum-like holographic properties that correspond with some of the basic principles from ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 274 quantum theory. This includes: 1) Non-locality, coherence, and instantaneous information exchange in a timeless and placeless dimension; and 2) Experiments which demonstrate that “telepathy” is not affected by distance (outside space), and “precognition” which provides information of future events (outside time). Many authors have proposed using Quantum ontology to represent consciousness. Quantum ontology has been proposed to represent not only objective but subjective worlds (Ruyant 2010). According to Ruyant (2010), quantum ontology can be used to represent consciousness, and accounts for the existence of a continuum between conscious and unconscious states. Quantum ontology has been used in the study of consciousness in the field of psychology. Valadas Ponte & Schäfer (2013), describe similarities in the ontology of quantum physics and of Carl Gustav Jung’s psychology. They argue that the empirical world is an emanation of a cosmic realm of potentiality whose forms can appear as physical structures in the external world and as archetypal concepts in our mind. Quantum ontology already has been used in near death studies research. Tyler (2015), for example, describes NDE stories using a Quantum ontology that includes constructs for unity, complex interconnectivity, and extinguishability. In regard to cases of life review in near death experiences, reviews pose a challenge to current memory research in terms of the sheer amount of instantaneous and empathetic information recall. 5. Research Methodology An NDE database was generated based on the research of Dr. Jeffrey Long’s Near Death Experience Research Foundation (https://www.nderf.org/). This database contains a collection of 4267 records of NDE experiences collected for research purposes. Dr. Jeffrey Long is an American author and researcher into the phenomenon of near-death experiences (NDEs). A physician by training, Long practices radiation oncology at a hospital in Louisiana. Long is the author of Evidence of the Afterlife (Long & Perry 2010). He founded the Near Death Experience Research Foundation, which is concerned with documenting and researching NDEs. The research uses a multi-step methodology as indicated in Figure 1 based on the Culmone et al. (2014) framework, which uses a MySQL DB to collect data that is then mapped to potential ontology constructs of the Quantum Ontology. The Quantum Matrix-type reality of Hernandez et. al (2018) would be used as a starting point for this research. The mapping will be done with the help of SQL statements that retrieve data that is meant to match the meaning of the ontological construct that is being tested. Human recognition is required to validate that the data retrieved indeed represents the ontological construct being tested. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 275 Figure 1. Taken from Culmone et al.,2004 In order to analyze the large number of records, natural language processing (NLP) approach guided by the work of Siddiqi and Sharan (2015). NLP is applicable in various problems such as language translation, and text analysis (Navlani, 2019). The objective of this analysis is to use N-gram word frequency analysis to link words with ontology constructs. For example, the construct sense of unity can be linked with emotions captured in words such as connected, one, calm, wholeness, etc. By connecting words to constructs, we can measure the level of connection by calculating metrics such as F-measure (Kasteren et al., 2011) that can identify the level of precision that an ontological construct can represent. A set of constructs would be then identified and validated with the data collected and presented as an ontological grammar that can be used to map any NDE experience. The main objective would be to have a better understanding of the reality of the afterlife. 5. Conclusions The approach discussed in this article opens new avenues for serious rational inquiry into mysteries of consciousness and the after life. This method effectively reformats the mind to reason logically about some previously intractable questions of science and religion, including questions of life after death. Additionally, learning this approach gives people useful new means of describing profound transcendent states of Consciousness. For instance, learning this method can influence how people recount Near-death experiences they have subsequently. Specifically, the method overcomes the main problem of ineffability. That is, people who report such experiences invariability tell us that there are no words to give an adequate description. The quantum consciousness paradigm is proposed as the main ontology to describe the unintelligible aspects of NDE. Eventually, describing near-death experiences and other transcendent states of consciousness can be standardized, using this unitelligable method. Received June 28, 2021; Accepted September 19, 2021 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 276 References Beck, T. E., & Colli, J. E. (2003). A quantum biomechanical basis for near-death life reviews. Journal of Near-Death Studies, 21(3), 169-189. Culmone, R., Falcioni, M., Giuliodori, P., Merelli, E., Orru, A., Quadrini, M., ... & Matrella, G. (2014, September). AAL domain ontology for event-based human activity recognition. In 2014 IEEE/ASME 10th International Conference on Mechatronic and Embedded Systems and Applications (MESA) (pp. 1-6). IEEE. Greyson, B. (2010) Implications of near-death experiences for a postmaterialist psychology. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 2(1), 37. Hernandez, R., Davis, R., & Schild, R. (2018). A Study on Reported Contact with Non-Human Intelligence Associated with Unidentified Aerial Phenomena. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 32(2). Kasteren, T., Alemdar, H. Ö., & Ersoy, C. (2011, February). Effective Performance Metrics for Evaluating Activity Recognition Methods. In ARCS Workshops. Long, M. D., & Perry, P. (2010). Evidence of the Afterlife. Harper Collins Publishers. Moody, R. 2020. Making Sense of Nonsense: The Logical Bridge Between Science & Spirituality. Llewellyn Publications Min, H., Mobahi, H., Irvin, K., Avramovic, S., & Wojtusiak, J. (2017). Predicting activities of daily living for cancer patients using an ontology-guided machine learning methodology. Journal of biomedical semantics, 8(1), 39. Mylopoulos, J. (1998). Information Modeling in the Time of the Revolution. Information systems, 23(3-4), 127-155. Mitchell, E. (1999). Nature’s mind: The quantum hologram. National Institute for Discovery Science, Las Vegas, NV, http://www. nidsci. org/articles/naturesmind-qh. html. Navlani, A. (2019). Text Analytics for Beginners using NLTK. [WWW Document]. URL https://www.datacamp.com/community/tutorials/text-analytics-beginners-nltk (accessed 14.06.2020). Rominger R. (2010). Postcards From Heaven and Hell:Understanding the Near-Death Experience Through Art, Art Therapy, 27:1 Ruyant, Q. 2010. 'Quantum Physics and the Ontology of Mind'. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 1(8), pp. 1027-1047. Siddiqi, S., & Sharan, A. (2015). Keyword and keyphrase extraction techniques: a literature review. International Journal of Computer Applications, 109(2). Valverde, R. (2018). Quantum Theory, Consciousness, God & the Theology of the Urantia Book. Scientific GOD Journal, 9(6). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 271-277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C., Development of a Quantum-based Ontology for Describing NDE by Using Computerized Natural Language Processing 277 Valverde, R., & Swanson, C. (2020). The Unintelligibility Approach to Near Death Research. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 11(3). Watson, D. E., & Williams, B. O. (2007). Eccles' Model of the Self Controlling Its Brain: The Irrelevance of Dualist Interactionism. NeuroQuantology, 1(1). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 552 Article Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) Wolfgang NMN Baer* Nascent Systems Inc. & Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA Abstract Part III of this Article contains the following Section: 3. Action Theory Proofs 3.1. Philosophical Evidence 3.2. Physical Evidence 3.3. Psychological Evidence * Correspondence: c/o Steven Mitchell. Email: smitc1@brockport.edu Note: This article was written by Prof. Wolfgang NMN Baer and is published posthumously. Wolfgang NMN Baer, Ph.D. (in Physics) was an Associate Professor of Information Sciences (Ret), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, & Research Director, Nascent Systems Inc., Carmel Valley, CA, USA. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 553 3. Action Theory Proofs 3.1. Philosophical Evidence Is what we see in front of our eyes the external real thing out there or are these things our own processed projections of signals from whatever is out there? The differing opinions regarding the answer to this question goes back at least 2000 years. Aristotle thought we are looking directly at reality through the windows of our senses and is credited for initiating Natural Philosophy, the precursor of science.[1] Plato on the other hand offered his cave analogy to explain that we were actually seeing the shadows made by external reality, and we ourselves were prisoners chained to look only at the reflections on the wall that appear as signals from the cave entrance projector in the opposite wall. What Aristotle thinks is reality itself, Plato assumes is a process flowing through the cave that shows us one snapshot at a time. Conscious Action Theory assumes Plato is right and has built a physically based model that processes the signals required to implement Plato’s analogy. Proof that Plato’s answer to the “What is my here and now?” question is correct, and its adoption allows for the integration mind and body offered in this section. 3.1.1. Philosophical Explanations for Eyewitness Here and Now? The central undeniable observation of a typical conscious human being is represented by the 1stperson eyewitness experience depicted in Figure 3.1 below. The meaning of this Figure is the eyewitness stage in which evidence of any claim must be presented. This eyewitness report of what was experienced is legal evidence that may contribute to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also the entry point to understanding the operation of Conscious Action Theory and the physical framework in which the existence and properties of consciousness can be addressed. Figure 3-1 shows an individual sitting in an armchair looking out through his left eye into the living room of an apartment. He sees his nose on the right side, and his left hand is holding a book. The sketch was inspired by a drawing by Ernest Mach (1867)[2] and updated by J. Gibson (1950)[3] for the purpose of investigating human perception. The notepad in the 1st-person’s hand was added to include an externalization of the 1st-person’s memory (Baer 1972)[4]. This was necessary because the meanings held in these memories can only be seen symbolically within the eyewitness stage. Without resorting to symbols, we can look directly at the brain inside our skull from the outside 3rd-person vantage point and get a fairly detailed map of physical activity happening in there. We can also just look around and get a 1st-person sensory experience of our here and now. What we have not been able to do is find any direct correlations between any physical activity and the sensory world we experience around us using 3rd-person reductionist techniques.[5] ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 554 Fig. 3.1 Prisoners in Plato’s Cave looking at a projection from the external world 3-2 The central question of this section is, “What is this thing, this body, and objects a conscious being sees in front of its nose?” The two main answers to this question in Western thought traditions can be designated as Platonic or Aristotelian. My intent is not to endorse all the philosophical beliefs of these greats, but only to label the answers to our central question as Aristotelian when we believe that we are looking through the windows of our senses at ‘Reality’ itself, and Platonic when we believe we are like prisoners in a cave and are bound to see only the shadows in the signals emanating through from the reality outside and displayed on the cave walls. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 555 The Aristotelian natural science is still the most practical interpretation of the eyewitness experience. Most of us never question the actionable reality of the scene portrayed in front of our eyes. Nor is such questioning necessary to successfully run our lives. We trust that what we see is real, and we run downstairs or drive our cars accordingly. The first hint that we are not seeing the real world directly comes from the many examples of optical illusions such as shown in Figure 3.3. Our mental processing system attempts to present a simple flat scene drawn on a piece of paper as a three-dimensional object but is frustrated by the conflicting hints. Depending upon where we look, different corners come to the foreground, and staring at the picture will produce a changing sequence of alternative three-dimensional renderings. One can literally feel the behind-the- scenes processing take place, and neither the picture on the page or the light transporting its information to the eyes has changed. Whether the scene keeps jumping or settles down to a stable 3D object, it is clear that what we experience is a processed interpretation of our external sensor stimulation. 3.1.2. Signal Interference Experiment The central assumption of natural science is that we see objects because an objective reality exists out there, in front of our noses, whether we are looking at them or not. Eliminating this assumption is the first step toward expanding the scientific method to include the 1st-person experiences of a standard observer. We can demonstrate the error in natural science’s central assumption with the apparatus most any reader is endowed with. Consider the experiment described in Figure 3.4. Here the 1st-person has closed his right eye and with his left is looking at the cat under the lamp in Figure 3.4. The cat appears to be a real object. The reader can substitute any object in his environment and convince him or herself that the thing out there is as real as anything he sees in his daily life. Next take a finger and gently push on the open eye. Do it gently. Just touch your eyelid where you can feel your bone socket. It may take a little practice but soon you will notice the cat move slightly with your push. That real thing out there, which you convinced yourself was the real thing a moment ago, moves without you touching it. This proves that you are not seeing the real thing itself but rather the down- stream, processing, mental display shown above. Many people and respected philosophers[6], will insist that our mental image is proof that a real objective cat is actually out there. The point, however, is that what you experience and normally live in is a mental display you create to explain sensory stimulation. It is not objective reality itself. Whether our mental display is a true description of reality is a legitimate scientific question. Quantum theorists for example believe that reality is a probability disturbance, and the object is created through the measurement process in your retina and brain. Whatever explanations one’s belief system tells one to project into the sensations one experiences, the truth is that the central assumption of Natural Science, originally attributed to Aristotle, is demonstrably incorrect. Plato’s assumption that what we see in our here and now is a phase in a process is correct, and the action-flow physics introduced in Section 1 more correctly describes what we do to see what we see than classic or quantum formulations. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 556 Fig 3.4. Experiment that proves we experience our own mental display not a real-object world 3.1.3. Experiments in Alternative Action-Flow Processing A dramatic and potentially useful demonstration of our internal processing capability is observable in a phenomenon called “binocular rivalry”. The brain is stimulated with different images in each eye. The brain selects one of the eye’s input as the source of the 3D-world visualization while suppressing the opposite eye stimulation. It then flips back and forth between image sources and alternatively selects one and then the other image as the source for visualization. As in the visual illusion case, the mental process cannot decide which reality of the two possible interpretations of its visual stimulation is correct, but rather than a small Figure 3.3 flipping back and forth, the entire visual field is here involved. After once experiencing the entire world, like the one I use to drive my car, change dramatically because of sensory processing that may be going on inside my head, there is no question that Plato was right in this matter. As a practical application for binocular rivalry consider the use of a surveillance mission pilot’s need for detailed narrow focus and wide-angle context image to be looked at simultaneously. Rather than use two monitors, Figure 3.5 shows the setup to stimulate the pilot with two separate fields of view and allow his brain processing to select which view to work with.[7] ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 557 Fig. 3.5. Dual-eye UAV image exploitation system setup The evidence presented in this section: – illusions – processing path interference – demonstration in real-world application proves that the “world” we experience around us is physically an internally generated phenomenon. It is happening is implemented in material we, or in this experiment, the pilot, inhabits. That Plato’s Cave analogy correctly describes our situation makes it much more likely that Conscious Action Theory provides a better answer to the life-after-death question than theories built on Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy. 3.2. Physical Evidence Proof that the outline of CAT physics summarized in Section 1 is correct enough to build models that can scientifically answer the consciousness-beyond- body-death question will be given in this section. A sufficient proof that CAT physics provides accurate predictions when physics is expanded to include living material will first rest on its ability to predict experimental results when the conscious human is involved in experiments. This category of proofs will be presented in Section 3.3. In this section, we first prove that the event-oriented world view and the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 558 Conscious Action Theory’s physical formulation duplicate what has already been proven for dead material. This grounds CAT in the physical sciences and the many practical predictions produced by available theories. Compatibility with existing physical sciences is a necessary condition for trusting CAT physics. We will then show how a logical expansion of known formulas and equations can incorporate the subjective phase. Compatibility Proof Conscious Action Theory is compatible with both standard quantum and classical physics because we can reduce its formulation to quantum theory by limiting the amplitude of masscharge displacements utilized in CAT to small amplitudes, where linear restoring forces allow wave forms of action to be used as descriptors of what is happening. Once compatibility with quantum theory is established, the classic physics approximation is evoked by reducing Plank’s action constant to zero ‘h => 0’ in quantum formulas. The byproduct of this reduction eliminates any mental activity in the conscious system, which is then described by the classic physics of a robot. The basic CAT existence event (Figure 1.1 consists of a cycle of activity divided into objective and subjective phases. The gravito-electric forces in the objective phase involve the standard charge and mass properties of material.[1] Classic physics utilizes particles as the units of material aggregation. Elementary particles such as electrons or protons have their charge and mass values concentrated at a single particle center. CAT duplicates this situation by increasing the forces between charge and mass, which decreases any displacement amplitude and increases the speed with which signals are transmitted. In this limit, the separate charge and mass properties act like classic particles. Compatibility is achieved when eliminating the subjective phase from CAT. Compatibility with Quantum Theory Here we make the claim that the action-flow model of Conscious Action Theory is identical to quantum-wave description of Reality, in the limit that the amplitude of ‘ψ’ oscillation is small enough to avoid breaching the containment of the flow. Much like a spring bouncing back unchanged to its original condition, any system will oscillate around its undisturbed state trajectory so that a wave description of Reality is appropriate. This means the CAT model working symbolic operator for the total action in Reality ‘AR’ can be replaced with quantum equivalent expressions of action. This means all of quantum theory is the small amplitude approximation to the CAT formulation. Further detailed derivations are provided in Appendix A4 and Chapter 6 of the CAT book.[2] A second category of proof involves showing that the expansion of physics to include the subjective domain is based on logical consistency and inferences that minimize and even reduce the number of ad hoc assumptions or singularities, called miracles in non-scientific belief systems. To follow this strategy, we will list a series of facts that can be demonstrably proven to happen but have no explanation in current science. If such phenomena can be explained by a logical expansion of standard physics, it greatly adds to their plausibility. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 559 The observer’s here-and-now experience happens internally to the observer That the actionable reality of our daily here and now can be physically associated with phenomena happening inside the observer’s material was proven in Section 3 above. In the vision channels we showed that the explanatory action path from the ‘apple’ to the ‘retina’ represents what we believe happens outside, but the physical implementation of such representations happens in the observer’s material. The process of absorbing action within the ‘retina’ transforms the action from an electromagnetically hosted activity that moves charges to one that also moves the masses in the ‘retina’. The action is now hosted inside the retinal material involving interactions between charges and masses. It is the action pattern between charge and mass inside the observer’s material that produces an observable ‘apple’. This action is not necessarily observed in the detector cell of the ‘retina’ because the action flow can be processed and merged to other parts of the brain. But it is critical to understand that whatever material supports the here-and-now experience, it is its internal mass-charge configuration that physically produces the conscious experience. The illusions, signal distortion and evidence presented in Section 3 proves. that the world of color and light we see in front of our faces, as well as the explanatory sensations that interpret such colors as the world of trees, sky and stars we believe to live in, is physically happening inside our own material. This means we look out, in any direction, and logically know, feel, or otherwise impute that there is something beyond the firmament, beyond the big Bang, beyond whatever we can imagine somewhere out there … out there where we will eventually find our own real Skull,[3] and that everything we treated as reality out there a few moments ago is actually our phenomenal world, now understood to be contained within our larger Brain inside our larger unknowable Skull. There we have it, an entire universe, suddenly becomes an operating component of our MoR It is worth commenting that the retina passes or transforms an amount of action. Here our mental framework changes. The objective model of reality is removed, and a CAT action-flow model is inserted. These models are shown in many figures in his essay. An isolated conscious being exists in its own time and space Proof of this claim is provided in Appendix A3 “Physics of an isolated System”. The argument rests on the assumption that action seeks to exist in its most comfortable form. It identifies comfort in the subjective with the balance of forces in the objective phase. It seeks to increase comfort by reducing any imbalance in the forces encountered throughout its existence. If left to its own, it will transform itself to a more and more comfortable lifetimes. In such isolated states the material only interacts with itself and transforms itself through its lifetime more or less deterministically. The trajectory is determined by all material. There is no external Newtonian clock dictating progress or for that matter an external meter stick dividing up volumes and shapes. Things happen in their own space and time. Proof that action flow really happens The equivalence of Newtonian physics and the action-flow formulation in solving physical problems is derived in Appendix A2. To summarize the argument, we note that Newton’s 3rd Law – for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction – actually refers to forces not ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 560 action. Appendix A2 shows that when action flows between one degree of freedom to another, the flow is accompanied by two equal and opposite forces. For example, when action is sent from one atom to another, the sending atom experiences a reaction force while the receiving atom experiences a direct force. The wave packet moving between the two atoms executes an activity in which the electric field produces a magnetic field that produces an electric field. This activity takes one Planks constant (h= 6.6x10-34 Joul seconds) of action, happens in a wavelength ‘λ= ΔQ’, and a period ‘τ=ΔT’. The action in the space-time square is ‘h’, and this action moves along at the speed of light ‘c= λ/τ = ΔQ/ΔT’ We conclude this section by listing the claims and summarizing the connection to known anchor points from which derivations and proofs start: The physical proof that the observer’s here-and-now experience happens internally to the observer is by direct demonstration. The physical proof that 1st- and 3rd- person observables actually happen is that we can interpret classic physics as two ways of looking at things. The physical proof that an isolated conscious being exists in its own time and space is the availability of stable minimum or zero entropy states of perfect equilibrium. The physical proof that action flow actually happens is that it can be tied directly to the energy momentum picture of classic physics. 3.3. Psychological Evidence CAT implements a conscious system as a physically self-contained action core that has grown interaction capabilities in the form of a ‘body’ built in the rest of the material in ‘U’. It is the ‘body’ in ‘U’ as shown in Figure 2.3 that I wake up inside of every morning. It is this piece of ‘U’s’ material that ‘I’ have evolved, grown, lived and let die that provides the reports of what it feels like to experience the life-and-death cycle. That a large number of reported psychic phenomena can be properly identified with the phases of an action model is submitted as further evidence that the action-model approach is correct. How different categories of psychic phenomena are explained in CAT will be described in the following paragraphs. Anecdotal reports When we listen to reports of people’s 1st-person experiences we encounter strange tales that do not fit into the objective world model. We find their explanation in mental processing states that produce content, utilizing the same here-and-now mental display hardware in which actionable information is normally presented, but which is not classified as accurate representations of what is really happening. Hallucinations usually happen in the context of trusted reality displays that show up as individual people or sounds. These can be identified as hallucinations because one can ask whether people whom we trust to be real – meaning people who are also connected to external sensor disturbances – also see them. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 561 In lucid dreams, trances, or deep meditation, the entire here and now displays a fantasy that is disconnected from external reality. In this case the fantasy can become the reality because there is nothing more real to compare it with. The danger lurking in this disconnect is that body commands may be sent that can damage the body, and for this reason the sensor/effecter processing path is usually disconnected during such states. We have already demonstrated in Section 3 that one’s here-and-now experience of the world in front of one’s nose is an internal phenomenon happening inside the observer’s material. Our CAT model also claims that under normal operation the conscious system also generates expected sensations that are registered with the external sensor display content in a feed-forward correction loop that updates our model and the expectation it generates. This correction happens so quickly that all we experience is the comfort of knowing that our sensations are understood, our expectations are accurately calculated and that our model and the theories it is built upon can be trusted. That such data processing actually happens would require observable evidence that will be presented below. Conscious beings generate expected sensor measurement displays When traveling on a highway at high speed for a long period of time one gets used to seeing the road features such as trees, signs, and overpasses passing by. The physical location of a feature is systematically displaced each moment as the car speeds on and one becomes comfortable with the constant change. Next one pulls off the highway reducing one’s speed and coming to a stop sign at the end of the ramp, noticing that it feels like one is going slower or even going backwards. The trees should be a little closer than where one’s optical sensors put them. The adjustment of the expected location of the trees, signs, etc., is a processing change. To some it may feel like a flow of time. Whatever metaphor is used to describe what is happening, the conscious being described by an action flow is predicted to experience an expected optic scene. That expectation can be observed when one closes one’s eyes and experiences one’s perceptive space. Do such experiments verify that the CAT-predicted observation actually happens? Not by itself. We can add the observable reality to the list of evidence that proves CAT describes what a conscious system does. The additional evidence we could extract from this experiment is that indeed behind the 1st-person display is some mechanism that does the predicting in the feedforward loop. We have called this function the Model of Reality, and its existence is an indirect inference. To get further insight let’s consider the stability mechanism behind the perceptive space. We strap a conscious being into a swivel chair and spin it around until the being is good and dizzy. Most of us have experienced the observable effect. The room and the walls feel like they are spinning, and one puts out a foot to brace against the rotation. But one’s open eyes show the room has not moved. Quickly the expectation is updated. The corrective foot maneuver was wrong in the reality of a stationary room, and the being takes an awkward step regain his footing. By that time the walls have moved some more, and the action repeats itself leaving the being staggering until the dizziness settles down. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 562 The semicircular canals in the middle ear are built as gravito-inertial field detectors with the movement of crystals against hair-like cilia protruding from the walls. The turn of the head can be calculated from the crystal movement coded into the orientation parameters of the perceptive space. From this data, the expected location of all the objects is calculated and compared with the optic eye- open field of view. If the two agree, we have the comfortable feeling of everyday life. We move our head, and the world remains stationary because we calculate it to be so. If the two disagree by a small amount, we may stagger from a light case of dizziness but will be able to recover quickly. The motions encountered have oscillating wave forms and are amenable to linear algebra encountered in quantum theory. When inertial expectations and optical reality do not match at higher amplitudes, the linear corrections provided by quantum theory maybe insufficient, and we may see the body of the being slammed to the ground or experience dangerous collisions. We are now describing phenomena that require CAT to explain. Memory call-back sensations Demonstration proof the that the time cross section of the action flow labeled with ‘a’ or ‘ai’ type in our CAT model are, in fact, internal memory recall phenomena is easily demonstrated when the Conscious Being closes its eyes. When conducting this experiment, it is important to choose a quiet room because it is difficult to close one’s ears without adding external apparatus and the presence of external-sensory interpretations labeled ‘ax’-type action flow will automatically update the Being’s model of reality. Several species of animals, such as bats, navigate by sound input. By closing one’s eyes in a quiet room one eliminates external updates. The close-eye signal has already updated the Being’s model, which now expects to receive an empty space ‘ai’ pattern, which is what is receives, and therefore no MoR update is needed, and the location-expected objects can only be calculated from data available in the MoR that is stored in the ‘A’ or ‘Ai’ action patterns executing in the material from which the Being’s memory is built. At this point the Being, with eyes still closed, is asked to navigate to retrieve an object across some distance across the black environment. To do so, the being can no longer rely on the information contained in the ‘ax’ and ‘ai’ display since their equivalent ‘Null’ only indicates the MOR can be trusted to be in the best state as dictated by empirical available input. If a command output action is ‘ao’ to be inserted, the best option to do it in the vocabulary of objects identified as the 3rd-person ‘a’ type display. When looking carefully, a normal awake individual with eyes closed will notice a pattern in the black space. It is usually described as a ghostly white effect that tells the individual where the tables, chairs, walls and even where other people would be seen in the here and now if the Being’s eyes were suddenly open. If they stay closed, the Being will be forced to navigate by memory-recall information stored in its MoR and interpreted as the content of its 3rd-person imagination. Many versions of this experiment can be performed. For example, one can frustrate the memory accuracy by having a participant move objects very quietly, or perhaps asking a Being, who is born blind, to establish the room’s geographic environment by feel and touch modality, storing the information in its memory and then retrieving the information as a 3rd-person view map. In all cases we will conclude that the signals are internal memory recall implemented within the material owned by the Being. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 563 The strength of internal memory recall signals is not always small or subtle. If the mixing of internal ‘ai’ and external ‘ax’ action flow, which CAT assigns to the tri-partite synapses that implement the interface between the neuronal and gial network, is out of balance, mental disorders such as schizophrenia, manic-depression, and epilepsy can ensue.[1] Out-of-body experience The out-of-body experience (OBE) is a well reported phenomenon that involves moving one’s 1st-person perspective from its behind-the-eye position to some other position in the actionable reality space that the 1st-person currently uses. The current objective belief assumes that objects and the empty black space between them are independently real. Such visualizations are internally generated phenomena that are derived from paying attention to some aspect of one’s MoR. Under normal everyday operations, supporting activities, such as driving a car, playing an athletic game or fixing a dripping faucet, requires us to pay attention to where one’s model hereand-now interactions take place. This requirement is mentioned in Plato’s Cave analogy as the chained beings who view only the immediate projections from the external world as reflected on the cave wall. The CAT proposition is to eliminate the chains shackling Plato’s prisoners and prove that a Being has the capacity to view one’s MoR from many different directions and at many time instances. In normal eye-open operation, one remains in one’s standard behind-the-eyes position and only experiences such 3rd-person views as fleeting thoughts or daydreams but remains firmly grounded in one’s standard reality belief. However, extreme stress or pain can force a being into a position of looking down on one’s body from the corner of the room one is in or another disembodied location. One thereby avoids the pain but also loses control. At this point we must remind the reader that CAT makes a distinction between the physical ‘Entities’ that exist in themselves and their modeled ‘Entities’. Due to the tremendous practical control function provided by the standard 3rd-person viewpoint, it is easy to understand why this view seen from an OBE perspective is taken for ‘Reality’ itself, especially when the mental display system has impressive 3D capabilities unmatched by the best computer graphics we have been able to build to date. In this OBE state of mind, one’s personal ‘Body’ is taken to be one’s real ‘Body’ in one’s real ‘Space’. Unfortunately, the training required to execute and instrument reliable and repeatable experiments is not easy. It takes effort away from our standard achieving objective goals. Most people have enough to do in driving their bodies on the road of life rather than to have to stop to figure out how the body works. Experiments that involve the level of pain and danger that evokes OBEs are illegal. The only legal situation I found that induces the stress levels of OBEs is fighter pilot training.[2] This means unlike the memory recall, we can only expect random results from OBE experiments. This adds to the likelihood that our model inferences using CAT is more inclusive than the standard scientific model and therefore more likely to give accurate answers to the consciousness-beyond- life problems. A second phenomena that involves an OBE experience comes to us from early childhood experiences studied by Mahler.[3] It is as though the proper development of the human psyche requires a separation of one’s body from the rest of the environment. This separation takes place ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 564 in the first years of infancy and is described by Mahler as a kind of inverse OBE experience. I can personally testify that in 1946 when I was about 15 months old, and heat was scarce in Germany, whatever the world was felt extremely cold. That’s all, just cold. There was no ‘I’, just cold. Suddenly ‘I’ found myself on the ceiling of my grandfather’s living room and saw below me a baby getting a bath in cold water. As soon as ‘I’ realized that that baby was me, ‘I’ was in that baby and found myself able to shiver, which caused my aunt and mother to come running with a blanket. I’ve been in that body ever since, and every once in a while, I think about the meaning of this memory. Was this proof that OBEs happen, and my internal MoR had evolved to separate ‘I’ from the rest of the Universe? What we have proven with OBE demonstrations is that CAT has a physically based explanation for them while current science eliminates any existence of consciousness outside of an operational body, and therefore when that body dies so does its capability to generate conscious thoughts. CAT claims that the body other people see as well as the hands and arms of one’s own body seen from the outside have been captured by one’s own Soul. That Soul is in communication with the captured material, and when the communicated signals ‘ax’ become too painful, or even when the expected ‘ai’ predicts pain, the Soul abandons its control position, and we appear unconscious or dead to the rest of us. Near-death experience The near-death experience (NDE) differs from the OBE because the situation no longer safe. No longer can the conscious Being happily wander through its ‘Reality’ with the knowledge in its back pocket that its real ‘Body’ is lying comfortably in bed in some realer ‘Reality’, which one can always wake up in from the current one. In the NDE experience, the threat of discomfort is real in itself. The ladder slips, the car skids, the cardiovascular surgeon’s knife cuts, and suddenly the normal stream of 1st-person experience, through which memory updates, stops and only the 3rd-person map becomes available. The best reference on this topic is Van Lommel’s analysis of NDEs. As head of the Cardiovascular Department at the Rijnstate Hospital, Arnhem, the Netherlands, he has a particularly strategic observation point on NDE phenomena.[4,5] His findings reveal that a small number of clinically dead patients who are revived report phenomenal experiences from a dramatically different reality model than the objective world they left behind and which they are given a choice to return to. The only information available to make such a decision is the 3rd-person map that continues to predict the current state of ‘Reality’ from its last update. The last freeze-frame in front of the Being in the car-accident case was now predicted to show the left headlight of a large semi-truck headed straight toward the driver’s left side a few feet away. What would you the Reader do in this situation? The next re-entry into the body would very likely show an astronomically excruciating array of pains as every smashed, muscle, bone, and organ attempts report its extreme material distortions from its pre-crash near equilibrium state. Do you want experience all that? You run the 3rd-person isolated prognosis forward only to realize experiencing a mess of rotting meat through the signal interpretation function your body executes had better remain un-experienced. This is the logical end point of the near-death scenario using the objective model of reality. When the body is smashed at the moment of impact, any conscious activity happening inside that body is smashed as well. Whether or not ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | December 2022 | Volume 13 | Issue 5 | pp. 552-556 Baer, W. NMN, Conscious Life Beyond Death (Part III) 565 anything I’ve described in this paragraph actually happens is unprovable in the objective model because, by definition, destruction of the human body is also destruction of any physical correlates of consciousness that the body may have developed. We have never experienced a physical message from a smashed human corpse and by definition never will. What we have experienced are reports from clinically dead patients who have been rescued by outside intervention or internal change-of-mind state and reconnected to their bodies with the memories to tell about their impressions leading to waking up. The reports are quite consistent. They range from ho hum to mind changing. One of the most interesting phenomena reported is the ability to see objectively real information that is physically beyond the patient’s sensor range. This would imply that the patient’s consciousness has the ability to change its viewpoint not only to observe its own MoR but the real reality in which the doctor inadvertently left his street glasses in the wrong drawer in the scrub room. After the surgery the doctor had forgotten where the glasses were, but the patient knew the room number and drawer location in which the glasses were actually found. Such and similar experiences have been reported often enough to justify its inclusion in the growing unexplained facts piling up around the question of life and death. The logical explanation that addresses the issue centers upon the fact that in CAT the decision was based upon the predictions produced by the patient’s MoR. Unfortunately, it involves non-linear and usually non-repairable destruction of often valuable memories, but it is in fact only a part of the real ‘Patient’s’ existence cycle, a part that continues to operate and may have already opened up new connections to a living state. I submit the demonstrably observable by reliable witnesses of NDE phenomena as proof that the CAT formulation of action physics provides a more accurate answer to what actually happens outside the boundaries of a physical bodies’ growth, maturation, and decline. (Continued in Part IV) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 302-305 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Man, Virus, & Bacteria: Conscious or Unconscious Invasion? 302 Essay Man, Virus, & Bacteria: Conscious or Unconscious Invasion? Massimo Cocchi*, Fabio Gabrielli & Grazia Gulino Research Institute for Quantitative & Quantum Dynamics of Living Organisms, Center for Medicine, Mathematics & Philosophy Studies, Italy Abstract In this essay, we discuss a comparison between humans and microorganisms in the similarities that unite them as a result of a conscious and proto conscious condition. A reflection on the essential rules of nature in the survival of the species and in the eternal conflict of good and evil, of the desire for supremacy or in the fate of succumbing. Keywords: Man, virus, bacteria, invasion, unconscious, conscious. About three to four billion years ago, individual cells begin to organize themselves to form a real community: they grow, multiply, cooperate with each other. The modern man who was born about 200,000 years ago will do the same thing by organizing, building tools and moving all over the earth: an impressive similarity. We all understand human organization, less we understand bacterial and viral organization. The human population consists of some billion people who commit their intelligence by directing it towards good or evil, in the multitude the individuals who exercise evil seem numerically inferior, as well as among the microorganisms, which are many billion more than the representatives of the human species, those who exercise "evil" are inferior. A parallel story that leads us to make some reflections. Also from the socio-economic point of view, men and bacteria are similar. In danger, they both start aggregations and develop strategies for a dominant target, that of defending themselves. It is precisely in relation to this purpose that the concept of consciousness emerges, at least of proto consciousness. Bacteria and Viruses - different in their vital attitude, the former, in fact, multiply on their own, the latter, however, live feeding on the material inside the cells - are constantly on alert, ready to "disembark" or attack ", just as sadly happens in situations of war among humans. Here both good and evil, both in the microscopic world and in the human world, exchange, contaminate each other, spread themselves according to articulated defensive strategies. Also in this case consciousness comes into play, oriented, in fact, to good or evil. Correspondence: Prof. Massimo Cocchi, Research Institute for Quantitative & Quantum Dynamics of Living Organisms, Center for Medicine, Mathematics & Philosophy Studies. Department of Veterinary Medical Sciences, University of Bologna, Italy. E-mail: massimo.cocchi@unibo.it * ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 302-305 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Man, Virus, & Bacteria: Conscious or Unconscious Invasion? 303 In other words, to the legitimate conservation or usurpation of the conservation principle of others. Let's not forget that a few centuries ago, Spinoza affirmed that "existing" is equivalent to "power to exist", that is, living beings are pushed to exist by a conatus, a tension/effort, a vital energy, a power that increases itself, but as finite power, energy limited by other similar forms. These brief considerations, however, do not want to enter into the rhetoric of good feelings, even less in a debate of a purely ethical nature, but aim to address the concept of the relationship between man and that bacterial multitude that inhabits our intestine, at least in its essential lines. Billions of years will pass before man is fully aware that other organisms exist besides him - it was Van Leeuwenhoek who, in 1676, had the first perception of the existence of bacteria. From that moment, the scientific history of bacteria and viruses begins, on which much has been debated and written. A story, however, that begins with man's lack of awareness of their existence, directing his rudimentary knowledge towards a perception of "individuals" who can harm and cause disgust, precisely because they live in the animal organ considered the container of the most execrable material, where waste is produced. It will still take many years, in practice until very recently, a microscopic time compared to the billions of years in which bacteria and viruses have organized themselves, to hypothesize and demonstrate that bacteria, even in that space, are well organized, are divided into "good" and "bad" and regulate functions essential to life, such as immunity and others, such as brain function, just the brain with which they, constantly, communicate. It will also be understood how it is largely dependent on the human being that the army that lives in the intestine can attack us or not: for example, stress and anxiety can create alterations in the microbial organization of the intestine itself. Just like wars: they depend on us! Here, therefore, changes the perception that humans have of bacteria and viruses. The problem that arises is anthropological: Are we sure we have well understood the function of microorganisms in humans? Can we venture that bacteria and viruses are provided with forms of proto consciousness? Reddy & Pereira (Reddy & Pereira, 2017) write on microbial consciousness: ...Consciousness as proto-consciousness or sentience computed via primitive cytoskeletal structures substantiates as a driver for the intelligence observed in the microbial world during this period ranging from single-cellular to collective intelligence as a means to adapt and survive. The growth in complexity of intelligence, cytoskeletal system and adaptive behaviours are key to evolution, and thus supports the progression of the Lamarckian theory of evolution driven by quantum mediated proto-consciousness to consciousness… ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 302-305 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Man, Virus, & Bacteria: Conscious or Unconscious Invasion? 304 The Cambridge Declaration on Conscience states: …The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that nonhuman animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviours. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates… Reiterates the Trapani document on animal consciousness and the quantum function of the brain (Cocchi et al. 2017): A potential for generating consciousness can be expressed by any cell containing a cytoskeletal network, in any animal species, and this could represent the biological interface between physical and mental phenomena. A hidden animal consciousness probably uses tubulin and microtubules as substrates for the cognitive processes in order to self-determine a state of consciousness, limited to what is required to exist, without emotional expressions and with the development of a critical mass relationship between tubulin, synapses, cortex, and serotonin. Thus, we start leaning towards a growing neuro-correlated consciousness event (classic information) with expressions of a more complex and differentiated emotional consciousness. It is assumed that consciousness survives even with basic conditions and this assumption is proven, at the bio-molecular level, by the hypothesis according to which a Schrodinger protein (e.g. tubulin but possibly other proteins as well, especially ion channels) is the biological interface from quantum physics to classic computation, the basis of quantum/classic consciousness processes. It can also position itself at the crossroad of memory and learning skills. Now, the problem that arises is that of understanding well the human-bacteria relationship in the completeness of their biochemical-physiological functions. To understand, whether the principle of essentiality, as well as for human life, depends on certain fatty acids and certain amino acids, depends also by bacteria. Would it be possible for man to live in the absence of that bacterial patrimony with which he is endowed? Many studies show that it is not possible, because the completeness of the immune process would be lost and the cognitive process could not fully express the state of consciousness, each for its own species. Let us read these lucid statements (Margulis &. Sagan, 1989): From the first current bacteria, myriads of organisms formed by symbiosis have lived and died. But the common microbial denominator remains essentially unchanged. Our DNA derives, along an uninterrupted sequence, from the same molecules that were present in the primordial cells, formed at the edges of the first warm and shallow ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 302-305 Cocchi, M., Gabrielli, F., & Gulino, G., Man, Virus, & Bacteria: Conscious or Unconscious Invasion? 305 oceans. Our bodies, like those of all living beings, retain within themselves the environment of a past Earth. We coexist with today's bacteria and host in us vestiges of other bacteria, symbiotically included in our cells. In this way, the microcosm lives in us and we in it. In short, our wonderful epic, the anthropological elegance that connotes us, the majestic bulk of our frontal lobes, everything is of bacterial nature. We are children of proto ancestors of about three and a half billion years ago! The most radical question then arises (Margulis, L, Sagan): Why humans must be considered more singular than elephants, penguins, beavers, camels, rattlesnakes, talking birds, moray eels that give the electric shock, insects that camouflage themselves on the leaves of giant sequoias, religious mantises, bats or deep fish that have a fluorescent lantern on their heads? The answer: for its symbolic ability, causal reasoning, cooperation/relationship with other human beings: in a word, language. But bacteria and viruses also organize themselves, organize themselves into groups, cooperate with each other. And all this, isn't it cooperation, communication, language? A bacterial and viral language that speaks within us, outside us, with us, with our organs, with the blood, tissues, muscles, flesh of which we are made. In fact, the microcosm lives in us and we live in it. Received March 19, 2020; Accepted April 7, 2020 References Cocchi, M., Bernroider, G., Rasenick M., Tonello, L., Gabrielli F., and. Tuszynski, J. A. (2017): Document of Trapani on animal consciousness and quantum brain function: A hypothesis. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 16 S99–S103. Margulis, L, Sagan, D. (1989): Microcosmo. Dagli organismi primordiali all’uomo, un’evoluzione di quattro miliardi di anni, tr. it. Mondadori, Milano. Pinker S. (1998) L’istinto del linguaggio. Come la mente crea il linguaggio, tr. it. Mondadori, Milano. Reddy, J. S. K., & Pereira C. (2017): Understanding the emergence of microbial consciousness: From a perspective of the Subject–Object Model (SOM). Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 16 S27–S36. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, (2012) (The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness was written by Philip Low and edited by Jaak Panksepp, Diana Reiss, David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, Philip Low and Christof Koch. The Declaration was publicly proclaimed in Cambridge, UK, on July 7, 2012, at the Francis Crick Memorial Conference on Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals, at Churchill College, University of Cambridge, by Low, Edelman and Koch. The Declaration was signed by the conference participants that very evening, in the presence of Stephen Hawking, in the Balfour Room at the Hotel du Vin in Cambridge, UK. The signing ceremony was memorialized by CBS 60 Minutes). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 161 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere Research Essay EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere Matti Pitkänen 1 Abstract Roughly 15 years ago I proposed the idea that Earth’s magnetosphere (MS) could serve as a sensory canvas in the sense that biological systems, in particular the vertebrate brain, could have sensory representations realized at the ”personal” magnetic body (MB) closely associated with the MS of the Earth. EEG would make communications to and control by MB possible. At that time I did not yet have the idea about number theoretical realization of the hierarchy of Planck constants hef f = nh0 in the framework of adelic physics fusing the physics of sensory experience and cognition. This hierarchy is crucial for understanding the basic aspects of living matter such as metabolism, coherence in long scales, correlates of cognition, and even evolution. Also the concept of zero energy ontology (ZEO) forming now the basis of the quantum TGD was missing although there was already the about communication to past using negative energy signals. ZEO is now in a central role in the understanding of self-organization - not only the biological one. The new view about time predicting that time reversal occurs in ordinary state function reductions (SFRs) allows to understand homeostasis as self-organized quantum criticality. For these reasons it is interesting to consider the notion of sensory canvas from the new perspective. This article discusses besides the earlier ideas about the MS also the proposal that it is possible to associate EEG bands to the regions of MS via the correspondence between EEG frequency with the distance of the region from Earth. Also the idea that the structure of MS could be a fractal analog of the vertebrate body is tested quantitatively by comparing various scales involved. 1 Introduction Roughly 15 years ago I proposed the idea that Earth’s magnetosphere could serve as a sensory canvas in the sense that biological systems, in particular the vertebrate brain, could have sensory representations realized at the ”personal” magnetic body (MB) closely associated with the magnetosphere of the Earth [17, 16]. EEG would make communications to and control by MB possible [15, 19]. During fifteen years a considerable progress has occurred. At that time I did not have yet the idea about the number theoretical realization of hierarchy of Planck constants hef f = nh0 in the framework of adelic physics fusing the physics of sensory experience and cognition [28, 29]. This hierarchy is crucial for understanding the basic aspects of living matter such as metabolism, coherence in long scales, correlates of cognition, and even evolution. Also the concept of zero energy ontology (ZEO) [32] forming now the basis of the quantum TGD was missing although there was already the about communication to past using negative energy signals. ZEO is now central role in the understanding of self-organization [31] - not only the biological one. The new view about time predicting that time reversal occurs in ordinary state function reductions (SFRs) allows to understand homeostasis as self-organized quantum criticality [36]. For these reasons it is interesting to consider the notion of sensory canvas from the new perspective. 1.1 Some basic ideas of TGD inspired quantum biology The following list gives the basic elements of TGD inspired quantum biology. 1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.fi/. Address: Rinnekatu 2-4 8A, 03620, Karkkila, Finland. Email: matpitka6@gmail.com. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 162 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere 1. Many-sheeted space-time allows the interpretation of the structures of macroscopic world around us in terms of space-time topology. Magnetic-/field body (MB) acts as intentional agent using biological body (BB) as a sensory receptor and motor instrument and controlling the BB and inheriting its hierarchical fractal structure. The quantum coherence of MB in turn induces the coherence of biomatter. That MB receives sensory input motivates the idea that MB serves as a kind of sensory canvas [17, 16]. This idea generalizes: the information received can be also more abstract information and the layers of the MB could define a hierarchy of increasingly abstract representations of the sensory data [33, 37]. Fractal hierarchy of EEGs and its variants can be seen as communication and control tools of MB. Also collective levels of consciousness have a natural interpretation in terms of MB. MB makes also possible entanglement in macroscopic length scales. The braiding of magnetic flux tubes makes possible topological quantum computations and provides a universal mechanism of memory. One can also undersand the real function of various information molecules and corresponding receptors by interpreting the receptors as addresses in quantum computer memory and information molecules as ends of flux tubes which attach to these receptors to form a connection in quantum web. 2. MB carrying dark matter as hef f = nh0 > h phases of the ordinary matter and forming an onionlike structure with layers characterized by large values of Planck constant is the key concept of TGD inspired view about Quantum Mind to biology. MB is identified as intentional agent using biological body as sensory receptor and motor instrument [22, 21]. EEG and its fractal variants are identified as a communication and control tool of the MB and a fractal hierarchy of analogs of EEG is predicted. Living system is identified as a kind of Indra’s net with biomolecules representing the nodes of the net and magnetic flux tubes connections between then. The reconnection of magnetic flux tubes and phase transitions changing Planck constant and therefore the lengths of the magnetic flux tubes are identified as basic mechanisms behind DNA replication and analogous processes and also behind the phase transitions associated with the gel phase in cell interior. The braiding of magnetic flux makes possible universal memory representation recording the motions of the basic units connected by flux tubes. Braiding also defines topological quantum computer programs updated continually by the flows of the basic units [23, 24, 25]. The model of DNA as topological quantum computer is one application. In ZEO the braiding actually generalize to 2-braiding for string world sheets in 4-D space-time and brings in new elements. 3. ZEO makes possible a p-adic description of intentions and cognitions and their transformations to action. Time mirror mechanism (see Fig. https://cutt.ly/DcDKyTj) based on sending of negative energy signal to geometric past would apply to both long term memory recall, remote metabolism, and realization of intentional acting as an activity beginning in the geometric past in accordance with the findings of Libet. ZEO gives a precise content to the notion of negative energy signal in terms of zero energy state for which the arrow of geometric time is opposite to the standard one. The associated notion of causal diamond (CD) is essential element and assigns to elementary particles new fundamental time scales which are macroscopic: for electron the time scale is.1 seconds, the fundamental biorhythm. An essentially new element is time-like entanglement which allows to understand among other things the quantum counterparts of Boolean functions in terms of time-like entanglement in fermionic degrees of freedom. 4. The assignment of dark matter with a hierarchy of Planck constants gives rise to a hierarchy of macroscopic quantum phases making possible macroscopic and macrotemporal quantum coherence and allowing to understand evolution as a gradual increase of Planck constant. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 163 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere 5. One can also understand genetic code. The model for dark nucleons leads to a surprising conclusion: the states of nucleons correspond to DNA, RNA, tRNA, and amino-acids in a natural manner and vertebrate genetic code as correspondence between DNA and amino-acids emerges naturally [27, 30]. This suggests that genetic code is realized at the level of dark nuclear physics. The chemical realization would provide only a secondary representation of the code. The recent findings support the view that the genetic code is actually universal and realized at the fundamental level in quantum TGD. Hitherto unknown realizations in living matterare suggestive [35]. Second realization of the genetic code would be associated with communications using dark photons. It would be in terms of dark photon triplets defining 3-chords of light and realized in terms of icosahedral and tetrahedral Hamiltomnian cycles giving rise to a set of bio-harmonies having interpretation as correlates of emotions at the molecular level [26, 34, 35] 1.2 Some questions MB has roles as both sensory canvas and controller of the ordinary matter with standard value hef f 0nh0 = h using EEG and its fractally scaled variants for these purposes. This raises some questions. 1.2.1 Could magnetosphere be a living and metabolizing organism? hef f is a measure for algebraic complexity and analogous to IQ. hef f tends to be reduced spontaneously. Metabolic energy is needed to preserve the distribution of hef f and also to drive self-organization. Could one think that MB is a higher level organism utilizing energy arriving from the Sun. Could solar radiation and solar wind provide metabolic energy to the Earth’s magnetosphere (MS) accompanied by ”personal” MBs. Could MB also receive metabolic energy produced by photosynthesis at the surface of the Earth? Could the rotating inner MS transfer energy from solar radiation and transfer it to the night-side of the Earth. Could also solar wind provide energy to magnetopause, plasma pause, plasma sheet and neural sheet which are self-organizing highly dynamical structures? Could these regions of the MS serve as a sensory canvas? 1.2.2 Could the anatomy of the magnetosphere be regarded as a scaled variant of the anatomy of a vertebrate? The anatomy of the MS (see the illustrations of https://cutt.ly/kcDKzqL) resembles that of a vertebrate. The TGD Universe is fractal and this inspires the question whether there is something deeper behind this resemblance: could the anatomy of the MS be scaled up anatomy of the organism? This would be natural if the ”big” part of the personal MB assignable to the MS serves as a sensory canvas. The correspondence need not be a strict scaling. Conformal transformations define a more general correspondence and the correspondence respecting only topology is even more general correspondence. Could one gain useful insights by formulating this idea quantitatively? Could the scales of the body parts of the vertebrate(say human)body and MS correspond to each other at the order of magnitude level? Could the ratios of scales for the corresponding parts of the MS and human body be nearly the same? The sensory canvas idea is discussed earlier at the level of the brain in [17, 16] but restricting the consideration to the cyclotron frequencies for magnetic fields involved with various parts of the MS. The distance of the part of the MS gives an upper bound for the frequencies involved with the communications between it and the biological body. Could one associate EEG bands with the parts of the MS? The frequency scale correspondence indeed predicts frequencies in EEG range and it is possible to assign EEG bands to the parts of the MS. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 164 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere 2 The structure of the magnetosphere of Earth It is interesting to try to relate the model for sensory representations to the structure of Earth’s MS. To achieve this, I will provide a brief novice’s overview about the structure of MS. I will use partially TGD based language in which magnetic field lines are replaced by magnetic flux tubes and the formation of the plasma corresponds to the leakage of the supra currents from the magnetic flux tubes. I will also briefly consider TGD based qualitative models for the phenomena, many of which are not well understood in Maxwellian theory. Examples of such phenomena are Alfven waves which are not proven to result from Maxwellian theory, and magnetic dynamo of Earth whose working mechanism is not really understood. Also the mechanism of auroras becomes very concrete when field lines are replaced with flux tubes [14]. 2.1 Magnetosphere Solar wind [4, 8, 7] determines the large scale structure of the magnetic field of Earth to a high extent. The basic structural components are transition regions and regions between them. 1. At the bow shock the solar wind arriving at a supersonic velocity of 500 km/s encounters Earth’s magnetic field and is transformed to a subsonic flow and dissipates energy inside magnetosheath where the plasma is denser and hotter than in the solar wind. The distance of the bow shock is roughly 12-14 R (R denotes Earth’s radius). 2. The shocked solar wind cannot penetrate Earth’s magnetic field and a cavity called MS is formed. Interplanetary magnetic field and MS is separated by a transition region called magneto-pause, which is accompanied by a plasma mantle. At the day-side magneto-pause is at a distance of about 10 R but when the solar wind is particularly strong, it can move down to 6-7 R. At the night side MS is stretched into long cylindrical magneto-tail of length about 1000 R and radius about 20 R. MS consists of clearly separated regions with widely different densities and temperatures. The main division is into the inner and outer MSs. In the inner MS (also known as plasma sphere) magnetic field lines are co-rotating with the Earth: in the outer MS they are stationary. Boundaries are the regions at which self-organization typically occurs. 1. Magneto-pause contains an ionic current determined by the discontinuity of the magnetic field and orthogonal to it. This region is highly dynamic. 2. The boundary between inner and outer MSs is known as plasmapause. Also this region is dynamical and its shape and size varies as response to solar wind. The analog is liquid is the boundary between two compressible liquid flows: other flow is rotating and other flow stationary. 3. Outer MS consists of a plasma sheet, which is between magnetic lobes carrying magnetic fluxes, which have opposite directions and are bounded by the magnetopause. In the plasma sheet the magnetic flux flows between the northern and southern lobes to give rise to closed field lines. Neutral sheet is in the equatorial region and starts at 10 ± 3RE . Also this region is dynamic. Both magnetopause, plasma pause and neutral sheet are expected to be highly dynamical selforganizing regions and are especially interesting from the point of view of magnetospheric consciousness. 2.2 Outer magnetosphere 2.2.1 Magnetic lobes The outer MS at the night side, magneto-tail, consist of northern and southern magnetic lobes which are cavities having very low ionic density of about.01 ions per cubic cm. The low density can be understood ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 165 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere as resulting from the absence of the solar wind in this region. By Maxwell’s equations the magnetic field is approximately constant in the region where the flow lines are parallel (if sources can be neglected). According to [3] the value of the magnetic field is about 30 nT in the interior of the lobes. The relatively strong magnetic field inside lobes serves as a magnetic energy battery feeding energy to the plasma sheet. Magneto-tail is a cylindrical structure with radius of order Rm = 20R. Magnetic lobes extend up to r ∼ 1000R. The magnetic field lines remain actually closed. In the TGD framework this means the existence of a closed supra-current circuitry formed by the magnetic flux tubes. 2.2.2 Plasma sheet and magneto-pause Magnetic lobes are separated by a plasma sheet in the equitorial plane consisting of hot (5 × 106 K), low density plasma (.3-.5 ions/cm3 as opposed to.01 ions/cm3 inside lobes) with magnetic field ∼ 10 nT. Plasma sheet extends from 8R to about 60R and has thickness of order few R, and gets thinner with increasing distance. Plasma sheet disappears at the so called neutral point, where the magnetic field vanishes. In the plasma sheet the magnetic flux from the southern lobe flows to the northern lobe. Near the Earth plasma sheet reaches the high latitude auroral ionosphere. The value of the magnetic field immediately above the magnetic sheet is 20 nT. In the TGD framework the plasma sheet can be seen as resulting from the leakage of the supra currents from the magnetic flux tubes of Earth’s magnetic field to a larger space-time sheet. This supra-current leakage would be caused by the inertia of the ions and electrons in the region where the magnetic flux tubes are highly curved. The leakage occurs also in the magneto-pause, where the tangential component of the magnetic field is discontinuous and a surface current orthogonal to B generating the discontinuity flows. In the magneto-pause the magnetic flux tubes of the inner and outer region are parallel. The reconnection of the parallel flux tubes of the magnetic fields of Earth and Sun allows the transfer of the ions of the solar wind to the MS. Magneto-pause is accompanied by a plasma mantle, which could be partially due to the leakage of ions to a larger space-time sheet accompanying the reconnection process. There is a convective flow of ions towards the plasma sphere along the plasma sheet. In the TGD framework this motion must take place at a larger space-time sheet or involves a hopping between magnetic flux tubes: in both cases a breaking of the propposed super-conductivity is implied. Plasma sheet also has a boundary layer in which the tangential component of the magnetic field is discontinuous. This requires a surface current orthogonal to the axis of the sheet. This current would result as the ions from the magnetic flux tubes leak out from flux tubes to a larger space-time sheet by their inertia in the highly curved portion of the flux tube caused by the tangential discontinuity. 2.2.3 Cusps Southern and northern cusps are funnel-shaped regions which on the day side consist of closed highly compressed flux tubes of dipole field and on the night side of almost open flux tubes stretched deep into the magnetospheric tail. In this funnel magnetic field is orthogonal to the magneto-pause and the magnetic flux tubes of the solar magnetic field can penetrate the MS. This implies that solar plasma contained in the solar magnetic field lines penetrates deeply into the magneto-tail by reconnecting with the field lines of Earth’s magnetic field near poles. This gives rise to auroras [9]. Reconnection can be seen as resulting from the penetration of the solar magnetic flux tubes at the upper boundary of the magneto-pause along the plasma sheet to highly stretched flux tubes along the boundary of the plasma sheet. The transformation to open flux tubes can happen only if the solar flux tubes reconnect with the flux tubes of the solar magnetic field penetrated into the plasma sphere. Thus auroras can be seen as a phenomenon involved with the boundary between plasma sheet and lobes. Cusps, and to some extent also plasma mantle, serve as a channel along which the solar wind feeds ”magnetometabolic” energy to the MS needed to run the geodynamo system [1] (the notion of superconducting geodynamo will be introduced later). The dipole field generated solely by the convective ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 166 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere currents in Earth interior would die out in a few thousands of years. The field inside lobes serves as a storage of magnetic energy and is recharged by the energy of the solar ions leaking into the magnetic tail in the reconnection process. One could see the cusps also as a communication channel between solar and Earth’s magnetic structures, kind of magnetic ”ears” of magnetic Mother Gaia. 2.3 Basic structure of the inner magnetosphere Inner MS is a toruslike structure whose extension varies between 4R (day side) and 8R (night side). In the inner MS the typical density is about 1 ion per cubic centimeter. Inner MS is bounded by a transition layer of thickness of ∼ R (magneto-pause). In this region the density of the ions drops rapidly. Inner MS contains plasma sphere whose radius varies in the range 2R-4R at day side and 2R-6R at night side. Plasma has an ionospheric origin. The density of the cold plasma consisting mainly of protons ( T ∼ 1 eV) sphere varies in the range 10 − 103 ions/cm3 , whereas the temperature is ∼ 5 × 103 K. The cold, dense plasma of the plasma sphere is frozen around magnetic flux lines which co-rotate with Earth. In the TGD framework this means that flux tubes co-rotate and thus change shape. In the equatorial plane the density of the plasma sphere drops sharply down to ∼ 1 ions/cm3 at r = 4R. This transition region is known as a plasma pause. During magnetic storms the outer radius decreases since the pressure of the solar wind compresses the plasma sphere. The day-night variation of the shape of the plasma sphere is rather small. Within this region the magnetic field in a reasonable approximation has dipole shape with radiation belts forming an exception. 2.4 Radiation belts and ring currents Plasma sphere (i.e. inner magnetosphere) contains the inner and outer van Allen radiation belts [2] (extending from 2R to 4R at the day side and from 2R to 9R at the night side).Inner radiation belt extends from distance .2RE to 2RE . Outer radiation belt extends from distance 3RE to 10RE and is regarded as part of non-rotating outer MS. Both the inner and outer belts extend up to latitude of 60 degrees. The boundaries of the belts follow magnetic field lines except at the Northern and Southern tips. This region contains ring currents. One of the functions of the radiation belts is to prevent the penetration of the biologically harmful high energy cosmic rays to the ionosphere. In fact, the inner protonic belt results from the decay of the cosmic ray neutrons to protons. Second function (in TGD universe!) is to act as a part of a controlled dynamo system giving rise to the MS of Earth (for the standard theory of geodynamo see [1] ). It has been found that the energies of the ions in the radiation belts are much higher than one might expect [5]. This might be understood if part of the ions runs as supra currents along the magnetic flux tubes. Super-conductivity is broken only by the leakage of the supra currents from the magnetic flux tubes. This could explain the success of magnetohydrodynamics based on the assumption of effective super conductivity. 2.4.1 Inner radiation belts There are actually two separate inner radiation belts: the one containing protons and the one containing electrons. Protons in the inner belt have energies at 10-100 MeV range and readily penetrate space crafts. The inner radiation belts are concentrated around the equator in the range (1.1 − −3.3)R (these numbers depend on the conventions used and should not be taken too literally). In the protonic belt the maximum of the flux density is at 2R: in the electronic belt the maximum flux density is at about 1.4R. The inner belts are relatively stable and there is no night-day difference. The inner belts feel magnetic storms and vary with the 11 year period of solar activity. What is interesting is that the inner belts are also sensitive to human technology. The inner belt has lowered above the East Coast of US from 300 km to 10 km [13]: this process is associated with power ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 167 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere transmission along magnetic field line and the usage of the ionosphere-resonance frequency 60 Hz as the frequency of household current. During the last decade two new belts have formed inside inner belts [4], [13]. The new electronic belt has maximum electron flux at r ∼ 2R (earlier flux maximum was at r ∼ 1.4R). The second newcomer consists mostly of O+ ions but contains also He+ . This process has been seen as a part of magnetic reself-organization process occurring in the scale of the entire helio-magnetosphere implying rapid changes of planetary MSs [13]. 2.4.2 Outer radiation belt Outer belt contains mainly electrons with energies up to 10 MeV and is produced by the injection of charged particles during geomagnetic storms. This makes the outer belt much more dynamical than the inner one. The cross section of the outer radiation belt is banana shaped. The outer belt ranges from 3R to 6R (at night side). The maximum for the density of electrons above MeV energy occurs at 4R. 2.4.3 Ring currents Radiation belts contain ring currents. Electronic ring current rotates in the same direction as Earth whereas protonic current runs to the opposite direction. In the outer belt only electronic current is present. Quiet time ring current in the inner electronic resp. protonic belts consist mainly of hydrogen ions resp. electrons but during magnetic storms also O+ ions are present (note however the presence of the new O+ belt). Ring current has the effect that the magnetic field gets stronger at the outer side of a given belt and weaker at the inner side. 3 Frequency scales associated with the magnetosphere 3.1 Cyclotron frequencies in magnetic lobes and plasma sheet The values of important magnetic transitions frequencies in various regions of the MS are crucial if one wants to construct a general vision about sensory and motor representations at the magnetic sensory canvas. In the inner MS dipole approximation allows to estimate the spatial dependence magnetic transition frequencies. In magnetosheath and magnetolobes the average values of the magnetic field are 10 nT and 30 nT respectively. Immediately above the magnetosheath the value of the magnetic field is 20 nT. Magnetosheath could thus allow place coding by the magnetic transition frequency scale whereas magnetolobes are not taylor made for this purpose. Note that the thickness of the magnetic flux tubes in the field of 10 nT = 2−9 BE , BE = 5 × 104 nT is from the quantization of magnetic flux equal to about 55 µm and thus corresponds to a biological length scale. This length scale corresponds to the p-adic length scale L(11, 16) (Lp (n) = p(n−1)/2 Lp ). Already this encourages to think that plasma sheet might be involved with bio-control. The strength of the interplanetary magnetic field depends on the intensity of solar wind and varies between .2 − 80 nT and has average of 6 nT. Interestingly, the maximum value 80 nT corresponds to the p-adic length scale L(173) = 20 µm. 1. Proton In the case of proton there are three especially interesting frequencies to be considered: cyclotron frequency fc = eB/2πmp , spin flip frequency and the frequency of combined spin flip and ∆n = 1 transitions. The frequencies of these transitions in magnetic field of .5 × 10−4 T are fc = 300 Hz, ff lip = 838 Hz, f1 = 532 Hz and f2 = 1138 Hz. In a field of 10 nT the values of the transition periods T = 1/f are Tc = 16.7 sec, Tf lip = 6 sec, τ1 = 9.3 sec, and τ2 = 4.4 sec. For a field of 30 nT the values are obtained by dividing by three. Plasma sheet contains also He++ and He+ ions and for these the cyclotron ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 168 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere times are 2τ and 4τ . For O+ ion which is also present cyclotron time varies between 1 min 20 s and 4 minutes. All these time scales are typical time scales of human consciousness. For the interplanetary magnetic field protonic cyclotron times are 13.9 min, 27.8 sec, and 2.1 sec for the minimum, average, and maximum respectively. 2. Electron For electrons the cyclotron frequency is 282 Hz for 10 nT so that electronic cyclotron transitions cannot represent ionic cyclotron transitions in brain (if they occur at the flux tubes of Earth’s magnetic field!). Spin flip combined with cyclotron transition represents however an important exception. In this case the non-vanishing transition frequency is due to the anomalous magnetic moment of electron and the frequency in the reference field of .5 × 10−4 T is 2255 Hz. This gives T (e) = 2.24 sec. Note that also n = 3 protonic cyclotron transition gives rise to nearly the same period. It is interesting to notice that these time scales are important time scales of human consciousness and that both protonic spin flip time scale and T (e) nearly half of the 5 second time scale associated with the Comorosan effect [10, 11] discussed in [20]. If Earth’s magnetic field is accompanied by dark flux sheets in entire MS carrying field Bend = 2BE /5, then the value of T (e) would become T (e) = 5 seconds for BE = 11.2 nT. To sum up: 1. The average magnetic field in plasma sheet corresponds to a definite p-adic length scale. 2. The mysterious time scale of the Comorosan effect pops up as a basic magnetic transition time in magnetic lobes and plasma sheet and is related to bio-control by enhancing catalytic rates: it is however essential that the ”dark” counterpart Bend = 2BE /5 of BE associated with living matter is in question. 3. Plasma sheet is found to be a complex self-organizing system with the velocity distribution of ions representing complex features (such as ”eyes” and ”wings”!) [6]. These findings force to seriously consider the possibility that plasma sheet and magneto-pause and perhaps even magnetic lobes might perform high level bio-control utilizing MEs and supra-currents along magnetic flux tubes forming the extension of the endogenous magnetic circulation to the entire MS. 3.2 Estimates for the natural frequency scales assignable to various parts of the magnetosphere The part of MS having distance R from the center of Earth corresponds naturally to frequency scale f = 1/R. This allows a rough estimate for the frequencies needed for the communications between various parts of MS. What is highly non-trivial is that these scales are in EEG range and that one can even assign EEG bands to the regions of MS. The basic correspondence is given by the formula f = 1/R: favored frequencies are harmonics of this fundamental frequency. Takin the Schuman resonance frequency 7.8 Hz as reference and Earth radius as length unit, one has RE RE f = 2π × 7.8 × = 49.0 × Hz R R (3.1) Table 1 summarizes the frequency scales assignable to the size scales of various regions of the MS. Some remarks are in order. 1. Plasmapause corresponds to frequency range 10-12.5 Hz containing alpha band and also frequencies often included in theta band. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 169 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere Region plasma sheath inner MS plasmapause inner van Allen belt outer van Allen belt day-side magnetopause night-side magnetopause plasma sheet neutral sheet R/RE range ...-1000 1-10 4.0-5.0 .2-2.0 3.0-10.0 8.0-10.0 10.0-200.0 10.0-60.0 7.0-13.0 f /Hz range ...-0.049 (20 s) 49.0-4.9 12.5-10.0 75.0-7.5 5.1-1.5 6.25-4.9 4.9-.2 (5 s) 4.9-.82 7.0-3.8 EEG bands θ, α, β, γ θ, α θ, β, γ δ θ δ δ δ Table 1: The frequency scales f assignable to the size scales R of various regions of the MS (MS) 2. Neutral sheet corresponds to the range 3.8-7.0 Hz above delta band. 3. The outer van Allen belt corresponds to delta band in EEG. Therefore also the delta band of EEG dominating during deep sleep appears naturally also at the day-side. Note that outer van Allen belt belongs to the non-rotating outer magnetosphere. 4. Night-side magnetopause and plasma sheet contain frequencies in delta band which dominates during deep sleep. 5. The lower bound for frequencies from the size of magnetopause at night-side corresponds to the period 5 s assignable to the Comorosan effect [10, 11] [20]. 6. Day-side regions of the MS correspond to θ, α, β and γ bands. These findings encourage to ask whether the communications between the brain (and possibly also other parts of body, at least central nervous system) and MS could be in terms of EEG. 3.3 Could one regard magnetosphere as a scaled variant of biological body? Sensory canvas hypothesis allows two options. MS could be the sensory canvas for the brain or for the entire nervous system and body. The structure of the MS suggests that it could correspond to a sensory map of the entire body. 1. Inner MS could be the sensory canvas for the brain or part of it and Earth perhaps to some nucleus, say pineal gland. 2. Magnetopause would correspond to skin and magnetic lobes would correspond to to the interior of the body. Plasma sheet would correspond to the interior of the body and the neutral sheet at which the direction of magnetic field changes to the spine. 3. Left and right body parts would correspond to northern and southern magnetic lobes. 4. The inner MS could correspond to the part of the nervous system assignable to the head and neck and involve cranial nerves associated with vision, hearing, and smell. Outer MS could correspond to tactile senses. 5. The neutral sheet at the night side of the outer MS could correspond to the spinal cord, which has dorsal and ventral parts which could correspond to flux tubes with opposite fluxes. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 170 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere Region Earth plasmapause inner van Allen belt outer van Allen belt day-side magnetopause night-side magnetopause plasma sheet length plasma sheet thickness neutral sheet y = R/RE r 1.0 4.0-5.0 0.2-2.0 3.0-10.0 8.0-10.0 10.0-200.0 10.0-60.0 5.0-10.0 7.0-13.0 r 3.5 mm 1.4-1.7 cm .84-7.4 mm 1.3-4.2 cm 2.8-3.6 cm 3.6-80.0 cm 3.6 cm-21.5 cm 1.8 cm-3.6 cm 2.4-4.6 cm Table 2: The scaled down radii r = .5 × 10−9 R = y × 3.5 mm for various regions of the MS (MS) with radius R = yRE 6. Plasma sheet would contain the spinal nerves leading to the magnetopause as the counterpart of the skin. The frequency-distance correspondence suggests a rather detailed correspondence between EEG bands and magnetospheric regions. Delta band dominating during deep sleep should correspond to the magnetopause, plasma sheet, and neutral sheet. A quantitative formulation for this hypothesis is in terms of fractality. The scales of the body and corresponding parts of the MS should be in constant proportion and the ratios of the corresponding scales should be the same for body and MS. Magnetopause has thickness D ' 1000 km. Magnetopause corresponds to skin and the first guess is that the ratio of smallest and largest length L = 200RE associated with the MS has same value as the corresponding ratio for human body. One has D/L = 1340. The ratio the human body length l ∼ 1 m of the human skin thickness d ' .5 mm is l/d = 2 × 103 . The order of magnitude is same. D/L = 2 × 103 would give a perfect fit. RE = 6.37D and the ratio x = d/D = .5×10−9 allows to scale down various scales L = yRE = 6.37yD of MS to xL = y × 3.5 mm to see whether they are consistent with the corresponding scales of body suggested by the above intuitive considerations. Table 2 summarizes the scaled down length scales for various regions of the MS. Using these scaled down estimates one can try to identify the correspondence between body parts of human body and parts of MS. 1. Pineal gland has radius 3.7 mm which is not far from the size scales 3.5 cm assigned to Earth. 2. Most scales correspond to the scales of brain nuclei which have diameter of 5 cm. Apart from pineal gland these structures of MS are expected to appear as pairs associated with Northern and Souther magnetic lobes. 3. Night-time magnetopause would correspond to a structure with radius .76 m and could correspond to the entire body. Plasma sheet corresponds to size scales in the range 3.6 − 21.5 cm, perhaps the upper limit corresponds to brain size scale. One can also ask whether the length scales of DNA and proteins, cell membrane thickness, size scale of cell nucleus, and the range of size scales for cells and neurons could have counterparts at the level of MS and whether one might identify possible candidates for the counterparts for these structures. Given the size scale d of the molecular or cellular structure the scaled up system should have size scale R = .29 × 109 d. System with size 1 nm - roughly the size scale of the DNA codon - corresponds to a ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 171 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere Region DNA codon lipid layer cell membrane tubulin cell nucleus cell neuron d 1.0 nm 2.5-5.0 nm 10.0 nm 1.0 µm 2.5-25.0 µm 2.5-100.0 µm R 29 cm .73-1.45 m 2.9 m 290 m .73-7.3 km .73-29.2 km Table 3: The scaled up size scales R = .29 × 109 d = y × 29 cm for basic biomolecules, cells, and neurons with size scale d = y nm system with a size scale 29 cm not far from the size of the brain hemisphere. DNA letter with size scale .33 nm corresponds to scale 9-7 cm. Could the interpretation of the counterpart of the DNA codon as brain hemisphere make sense? Could the brain consisting of three parts be seen as a counterpart of the genetic codon with 3 letters? The assignment of genetic codon with the brain does not seem to make sense but here an old idea about a hierarchy of codes is suggestive. Ordinary genetic code would correspond to Mersenne prime M7 = 27 − 1 and have 26 codons. Memetic code assignable to Mersenne prime MM7 = M127 = 2127 − 1 would have 2126 codons representable also as sequences of 21 ordinary genetic codons. One could say that one has an abstraction hierarchy in which genetic code corresponds to 64 statements and memetic codons to statements about these statements. Individual brains do not certainly give rise to analogs of DNA sequences. Here however the notion of magnetic body (MB) providing an abstracted representation of the brain and the biological body is suggestive. The images of neurons at MB near to each other at MB need not be near to each other at the brain level: it is enough that they are functionally similar. This would realize the analog of RAM. Pietch [12] found that the shuffling of the neurons of the salamander brain does not lead to the loss of its functionality. This supports the view about the brain as an analog ofRAM. In an analogous way human and perhaps also other than human brains could serve as analogs for the codons of memetic code mapped to the MB to form linear or even higher-dimensional analogs of the genome. Cultural evolution could mean the emergence of the memetic code. One can also consider other size scales. Table 3 summarizes the scaled up size scales for basic biomolecules, cells, and neurons. From the table one finds that the lipids of the lipid layers of cell membrane still correspond to human size scales. This inspires the crazy idea that perhaps humans and possibly other higher animals correspond at the level of MB to analogs of lipids for cell membrane like structures. Larger structures - such as cell and neuron - could correspond to social structures reponsible for collective consciousness generated in the cultural evolution. 4 The model for hef f preserving communications based on variable value of β0 Nottale’s gravitational Planck constant ~gr = GM m/v0 contains the velocity parameter v0 as the only parameter. In the perturbative expansion of the scattering amplitudes β0 = v0 /c appears in the role of fine structure constant. There is however a problem. 1. The model for the effects of ELF radiation on vertebrate brain inspired by a generalization of Nottale’s hypothesis by replacing the total mass M in the case of Earth by MD ∼ 10−4 ME suggests ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 172 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere that in this case the dark particles involved couple only to a part of mass identifiable as dark mass MD . 2. Since only GM appears in the basic formulas, the alternative option is that the value of G is reduced to GD . This conforms with the fact that in the TGD framework CP2 length is the fundamental parameter G is a prediction of the theory and therefore can vary. 3. A further option is that the parameter β0 = v0 /c ≤ 1 is variable and equals to β0 = 1 or to a value not much smaller than 1, say β0 = 1/2. These three options are discussed in [38]. The cautious conclusion is that the the third option is the most plausible one. In the sequel I will develop a model for the communications between dark matter phases with hef f = nh0 satisfying hef f = hgr based on the third option. One can consider two options for the communications depending on whether the value of hef f changes as (for instance) in the communications between dark and ordinary matter or whether it is preserved. 1. If the value of hef f can change, energy conservation for E = hef f f allows energy resonance whereas the frequency changes. The simplest option is that the dark photon transforms to say ordinary photon with the same amplitude 2. If the value hef f is preserved, one has both energy and frequency resonance. In the case of cyclotron radiation, the simultaneous occurrence of energy and frequency resonances poses strong conditions on the values of the magnetic fields, the values of charged particle masses, and the parameter β0 at the ends of the communication line. 4.1 Conditions for frequency - and energy resonance The condition that the frequency is the same at both ends implies for cyclotron frequencies fc = ZeB/2πm the condition Z 2 B2 Z1 B1 = . m1 m2 (4.1) For hef f = hgr the condition that the cyclotron energy Ec = GM ZeB/v0 at both ends is same implies Z1 B1 Z 2 B2 = . v0,1 v0,2 (4.2) Z 1 B1 β0,1 m1 = = . m2 Z 2 B2 β0,2 (4.3) Together these conditions give For instance, if the two particles are proton and electron, one obtains me β0,1 ' . β0,2 mp This ratio is is consistent with the values β0,2 = 1 and β0,1 = 2−11 in the accuracy considered. Is this a mere accident? ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 173 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere 4.2 Resonance conditions for communications from the Earth’s surface to the magnetosphere? The simplest option is that the interacting particles have the same values of mass and β0 and magnetic fields are identical. This is achieved if the flux tubes have constant thickness. Whether this is the case is not clear. However, the idea that the flux tube picture about magnetic fields is locally consistent with the Maxwellian view inspires the question whether also the magnetic field strength at the flux tubes of Bend behaves like Bend ∝ 1/r3 as BE in dipole approximation behaves. Bend is by flux conservation proportional to 1/S, where S is the area of the flux tube. sOne would have S ∝ r3 . The constancy of Bend /m would suggest m ∝ 1/r3 . If the charged particles are ions characterized by the A/Z ratio. This would suggest that the regions of tubes/sheets in frequency resonance are at distances Z A0 r = ( )−1/3 ( )−1/3 r0 Z0 A for ions Z0 , A0 at the surface of the Earth. The heaviest ions would be nearest to the surface of Earth. Energy resonance condition Bend (r)/β0,2 = Bend (RE )/v0,1 would give the additional condition Z RE 3 A0 β0,2 ) = . =( × β0,1 r Z0 A β0 would be quantized and would decrease with the distance. 4.3 Magnetosphere as sensory canvas TGD leads to a model of the ”personal” magnetic body (MB) as being associated with the Earth’s MS. Different regions of the body and brain would be mapped to regions of the MS, which would give rise to sensory representations at the personal MB [17, 16]. Personal MB, which would have size scale of at least of the Earth’s MS, would also control biological body. 1. An interesting finding relates to the values of the magnetic field Bend ' 2BE /5 (perhaps identifiable as the monopole flux part of BE ) and the value of B ∼ 10 nT in the magnetotail at the night-side of the Earth. One has B/Bend ∼ 2−11 so that for dark proton-dark electron communications between the Earth’s surface and this region of outer MS the resonance conditions would be satisfied for β0 = x and β0 = 2−11 x, where x < 1 not far from unity. 2. Could the parameter β0 characterize particles and act as a tunable control parameter allowing to achieve energy resonance? Also the values of B are tunable by changing the thickness of the flux tubes as a kind of motor action of MB. This idea can be applied to the hef f preserving communications between biological body and the MS of the Earth. 1. The quantum coherence condition suggests that the communications are optimal when the wavelength of dark photon is larger than the distance considered: λ > r or equivalently the frequency satisfies f ≤ c/r (one has c = 1 in the units used). If the structure of the MS has distances from the Earth’s surface below rmax then the frequencies f ≤ 1/rmax are optimal. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 174 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere 2. Given the distance rmax and assuming B = Bend at the surface of Earth, one obtains for the cyclotron frequencies the condition fc = ZeBend 1 ≤ . 2πm rmax For instance, EEG frequency 10 Hz corresponds to 3 × 107 m. The cyclotron frequency of DNA sequence does not depend on its length and composition since DNA has constant charge per unit length. One has fc ' 1 Hz so that the corresponding distance is r = 3 × 108 m, that is r = 46.9RE . Remark: Bend probably has a spectrum. Music experiences relies on frequency scale and if the audible frequencies correspond to cyclotron frequencies then eBend /m is variable. This suggests that the spectrum of Bend covers at least the range of the audible frequencies spanning roughly 10 octaves [18]. 5 Further observations making bells ringing 5.1 Magnetosphere as self-organizing system The view that MS is a self-organizing system is supported by the observations accumulated about the magnetic self-organization of the solar system during the last decades reviewed in [13]. According to this report we are living a period of transition basically due to a penetration of highly charged material from the interstellar space into the interplanetary space from an interstellar plasma structure containing various kinds of magnetic structures. This energy feed is inducing various kinds of processes affecting not only the atmo-, iono-, and MSs of Earth but also solar and other planetary MSs. Also interplanetary transmitting properties are affected. The Schumacher-Levy comet, which for few years ago collided with Jupiter and among other things a induced plasmoid train and had dramatic effects on Jupiter’s MS, is referred to as a Comet SL-9 in [13]. I am not sure whether ”Comet” was meant to suggest that SL-9 was actually a plasma magnetic structure from the interstellar space. There is also evidence that we are moving to a similar temperature instability that occurred about 10.000 years ago and which might have initiated the development of the bicameral society in turn leading to the modern society much later. This process could be also seen as a re-self-organization and evolution of consciousness in solar length scale as a reaction to the encounter of heliospheric and interstellar magnetic intelligences. The penetration of interstellar plasmoid like structures to the interplanetary space through the solar magneto-pause could be interpreted as a failure of the magneto-immune system of the helio- MS. The interaction of the planetary MSs with these intelligent (benevolent?) plasmoid like structures would in turn induce the re-self-organization. Needless to say, the interaction of the two intelligences might have far-reaching consequences for the evolution of ordinary life. 5.2 Connection with the Comorosan effect Comorosan effect means that the irradiation of living manner by visible light over a period which is a multiple of τC = 5 seconds implies enhanced catalytic activity [10, 11]. According to private communication, this effect is not restricted to living or even organic matter. TGD explains the effect [20] but the deeper explanation of the time scale of τC = 5 seconds has remained a longstanding challenge. The 5 second time scale associated with Comorosan effect is the spin flip time scale associated with proton’s ∆n = 1 cyclotron transition in the field of Bend = 13.32 nT (which could correspond to the value of BE = 5Bend /2 = 33.3 nT in magnetic lobes). τC is also associated with proton’s ∆n = 3 cyclotron transition and the electronic cyclotron spin flip in the field of Bend = 2/5BE = 11.2 nT (plasma sheet). Lungs contain magnetic particles giving rise to ∼ 10 nT magnetic field and thus for Bend = 2BE /5 to ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 175 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere n = 3 protonic cyclotron transitions and electronic cyclotron spin flips in 5.5 second scale, which is very near to τC . Perhaps the Comorosan effect is used by the outer MS to affect the behavior of living matter and lungs are involved with this process. 5.3 Plasma sheet as a ”microchip” Plasma sheet should be a seat for magnetospheric sensory representations in theta and delta bands and among other things provide a model of magnetospheric self. If the plasma sheet has this kind of role, it should manifest itself in its properties. The plasma sheet should be self-organizing, complex structure rather than a system near thermal equilibrium. In the TGD framework, the plasma sheet could also perform bio-control. There is a fascinating finding about the ”memory chip” character of the organization of the ionic velocity distribution in the plasma sheet [6]. The belief was that the distribution is a Maxwellian thermal distribution but a complex organization of the number of ions as a function of speed and direction relative to the direction of the local magnetic field has been detected [6]. By coloring the bins representing small volumes of the velocity space, one finds that 3-dimensional features like ”eyes” and ”wings” appear! The proposed interpretation is that these features code for the history of ionic currents. One cannot exclude the possibility that these ionic currents could reflect even our sensory experiences. The prediction is that also other transition regions (in particular magneto-pause) should exhibit similar complex self-organization patterns. The simplest possibility is that the velocity patterns of ordinary electrons reflect the underlying pattern of dark matter at the dark magnetic flux tubes forming perhaps some kind of sensory representations. Received April 16, 2021; Accepted July 15, 2021 References [1] Geodynamo. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geodynamo. [2] Radiation around the Earth to a radial distance of 107,400 km. Nature, 183:1959. [3] Space Physics handout 2: The Earth’s magnetosphere and ionosphere. Available at: http://www. sp.ph.ic.ac.uk/~mkd/Handout2.PDF. [4] Space Physics textbook. Available at: http://www.oulu.fi/~spaceweb/textbook/. [5] Radiation belts around Earth adversely affecting satellites, 1998. Available at: http://tinyurl. com/ol2ujer. [6] Frank LA et al. Plasma velocity distributions in the near-Earth plasma sheet: A first look with the Geotail spacecraft. J Geophys Res, 101:10627–10637, 1996. Available at: http://www-pi.physics. uiowa.edu/www/cpi/cpi-nuggets.html. [7] Coles WA Rickett BJ. Evolution fo the solar wind structure over a solar cycle: Interplanetary scintillation velocity measurements compared with coronal observations. J Geophys Res, 96, 1991. [8] Peredo M Stern DP. The Exploration of the Earth’s Magnetosphere. //www-spof.gsfc.nasa.gov/Education/, 2000. Available at: http: [9] Hansen TL. The northern lights-what are they?, 2001. Available at: http://geo.phys.uit.no/ articl/theaurora.html. [10] Comorosan S. On a possible biological spectroscopy. Bull Math Biol, page 419, 1975. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 176 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere [11] Murogoki P Comorosan S, Hristea M. On a new symmetry in biological systems. Bull Math Biol, page 107, 1980. [12] Pietch P. Shuffle Brain: the The Quest for Hologramic Mind, 1972. Available at: http://www. indiana.edu/~pietsch/shufflebrain-book00.html. [13] Dmitriev AM. Planetophysical state of the earth and life. IICA Transact, 1997. Available at: http://www.tmgnow.com/repository/global/planetophysical.html. [14] Pitkänen M. Bio-Systems as Super-Conductors: part II. In Quantum Hardware of Living Matter. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/superc2.pdf, 2006. [15] Pitkänen M. Dark Matter Hierarchy and Hierarchy of EEGs. In TGD and EEG. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/eegdark.pdf, 2006. [16] Pitkänen M. Magnetic Sensory Canvas Hypothesis. In TGD and EEG. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/mec.pdf, 2006. [17] Pitkänen M. Magnetospheric Sensory Representations. In Magnetospheric Consciousness. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/srepres.pdf, 2006. [18] Pitkänen M. Quantum Model for Hearing. In TGD and EEG. Available at: http://tgdtheory. fi/pdfpool/hearing.pdf, 2006. [19] Pitkänen M. Quantum Model of EEG. In TGD and EEG. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/ pdfpool/eegII.pdf, 2006. [20] Pitkänen M. Wormhole Magnetic Fields. In Quantum Hardware of Living Matter. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/wormc.pdf, 2006. [21] Pitkänen M. Quantum Mind and Neuroscience. In TGD based view about living matter and remote mental interactions. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/lianPN.pdf, 2012. [22] Pitkänen M. Quantum Mind, Magnetic Body, and Biological Body. In TGD based view about living matter and remote mental interactions. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/lianPB.pdf, 2012. [23] Pitkänen M. Topological Quantum Computation in TGD Universe. In Genes and Memes: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/tqc.pdf, 2015. [24] Pitkänen M. DNA as Topological Quantum Computer. In Genes and Memes: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/dnatqc.pdf, 2019. [25] Pitkänen M. Three new physics realizations of the genetic code and the role of dark matter in bio-systems. In Genes and Memes: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/ dnatqccodes.pdf, 2019. [26] Pitkänen M. Geometric theory of harmony. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/ articles/harmonytheory.pdf., 2014. [27] Pitkänen M. About Physical Representations of Genetic Code in Terms of Dark Nuclear Strings. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/genecodemodels.pdf., 2016. [28] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. In Trends and Mathematical Methods in Interdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences, pages 241–319. Springer.Available at: https://link.springer. com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-55612-3_11, 2017. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 161-177 177 Pitkänen, M., EEG and the Structure of Magnetosphere [29] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/ articles/adelephysics.pdf., 2017. [30] Pitkänen M. An overall view about models of genetic code and bio-harmony. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/gcharm.pdf., 2019. [31] Pitkänen M. Quantum self-organization by hef f changing phase transitions. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/heffselforg.pdf., 2019. [32] Pitkänen M. Some comments related to Zero Energy Ontology (ZEO). Available at: http:// tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/zeoquestions.pdf., 2019. [33] Pitkänen M. Could brain be represented as a hyperbolic geometry? //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/hyperbolicbrain.pdf., 2020. Available at: http: [34] Pitkänen M. How to compose beautiful music of light in bio-harmony? https://tgdtheory.fi/ public_html/articles/bioharmony2020.pdf., 2020. [35] Pitkänen M. Is genetic code part of fundamental physics in TGD framework? https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/TIH.pdf., 2021. Available at: [36] Pitkänen M and Rastmanesh R. Homeostasis as self-organized quantum criticality. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/SP.pdf., 2020. [37] Pitkänen M and Rastmanesh R. Why the outcome of an event would be more predictable if it is known to occur? https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/scavhunt.pdf., 2021. [38] Pitkänen M. Three alternative generalizations of Nottale’s hypothesis in TGD framework. https: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/MDMdistance.pdf., 2021. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 127-130 Roy, A., Space time, Consciousness & Creation of Universe 127 Essay Space time, Consciousness & Creation of Universe Arup Roy* Scottish Church College, Kolkata, India Abstract Careful consideration of the modern cosmological studies in connection with the origin of the universe reveals some open questions. Answers to some of those are sought in this article in terms of the ‘consciousness field’ which, in some recent publications, has been elaborated upon. Keywords: Spacetime, black holes, wormholes, consciousness, entanglement. 1. Introduction There is a hypothesis which states that the world basically consists of space-time, matter and consciousness, with their own degrees of freedom (Smythies, 2003). For further investigation along this line, with regard to the creation of the universe, information about developments in cosmological investigations are collated here. Correlation and analyses of theoretical predictions and experimental observations, however, indicate certain gaps in understanding the cosmological model(s) of the universe. To address these an idea of a conscious universe is suggested in this article. 2. Existing theories and experimental results Space and Time: Einstein's general theory of relativity (Tillman et al, 2022) holds that space and time are soft, malleable entities; but space is expanding or contracting over time. The important postulate of this theory is that gravity is a feature of spacetime itself. According to John Wheeler (Taylor & Wheeler, 1992) ‘Spacetime grips mass, telling it how to move... Mass grips spacetime, telling it how to curve ‘. On the basis of a great deal of compelling evidences, astronomers have confirmed that our universe starting from a point is currently expanding. So, if one could set the cosmic history run backwards in time then all the galaxies or their forebears would have come together into a single point called a singularity (breakdown in spacetime) beyond which cosmic ancestry cannot extend. The situation would be analogous to matter descending into a black hole (Curiel, 2021); time line would end at that singularity and spacetime would cease to exist (Penrose, 1965; Schoen and Yau, 1983; Wald, 1984). This singularity becomes obviously a point of infinite density and temperature and of infinite spacetime curvature. The Big Bang and expanding universe: Modern cosmology delves in understanding the genesis of the universe. In the last seventy to eighty years, there has been enormous progress in * Correspondence author: Arup Roy, Retired Associate Professor, Scottish Church College, Kolkata, India. E-mail: aryscottish@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 127-130 Roy, A., Space time, Consciousness & Creation of Universe 128 technology and mathematical theory in this connection. Light emitted from galaxies billions of light-years away are detected and analysed by modern telescopes; using Hubble telescope and techniques like ‘gravitational lensing’ photographic images of quasars are taken. There are clear evidences that galaxies are actually moving apart. Hubble (1929), using a pool of experimental data, showed that the rate at which a galaxy is moving away from us is roughly proportional to its distance from us. However, the theory that survived all tests to date is the Big Bang cosmology according to which at a particular instant, roughly 13.7 billion years ago, all the matter and energy, concentrated in a point-like region, began to cool at an incredibly rapid rate following huge explosion and expansion. The major claim of the theory is that the universe starting from an extremely dense early state is expanding at accelerating rate (Wall, 2022). The idea of inflationary universe was put forward by Guth (1984) who suggested that ‘inflaton’ field was responsible for a hyper-accelerated expansion in the first instant after Big Bang and only after that very brief period of acceleration the universe flattened out. Numerous experimental observations support Guth’s theory that strengthened the idea that the early universe contained fields that drive inflation. Although scientists are unclear about its source, the ‘dark energy’ is claimed to be the prime driver of the accelerating universe; the quantum fluctuations in the ‘vacuum’ of space have been speculated as the source of the dark energy. Again, the enigmatic ‘dark matter’ (Blumental et al., 1984; Bertone and Hooper, 2018) that governs the formation of galaxies is accepted as an essential element of the standard cosmological model. In spite of being about six times the total mass of the ‘normal matter’ of the universe, there is no clue to how it came into existence and why it is only gravity and nothing else that interacts with them. Black holes & wormholes: Black holes are regions of curved spacetime; in its exterior, spacetime is curved but objects and messages can escape while the interior lies beyond the point of no return. The interior and exterior of a black hole are separated by a surface known as ‘event horizon’. Two black hole horizons separate rapidly in case they are extremely close. It was Hawking (1974) who showed that quantum effects would cause black holes to emit radiation, which goes to imply that they have temperature. Therefore, looking at a black hole from the exterior, one should find a quantum system with many microstates. Wormholes are the outcome of the general theory of relativity, which according to Maldecena (2016), is understood to connect two distant regions of spacetime and hence can serve as a link between two black holes; these are curved spacetime only, containing no matter. A wormhole elongates and become thinner as time progresses. Quantum Entanglement: As in the case of two entangled particles one can conceive of an entangled pair of two microstates. According to ‘string theory’ (Maldecena, 2016), a pair of black holes with their microstates entangled would result in a wormhole, linking the interior of both the black holes. This would suggest that spacetime itself could have emerged from the entanglement of many microscopic constituents of the universe. In this sense wormholes and quantum entanglements are equivalent. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 127-130 Roy, A., Space time, Consciousness & Creation of Universe 129 3. Analysis and the role of consciousness field The Big Bang did not expand through anything because there was no space to expand through at the beginning of time. It is believed that the Big Bang created and stretched space itself, expanding the universe (Origin, CERN, IDEAS). Space needs to be created even for the ‘dark energy’ in order to facilitate quantum fluctuations. If one goes back in cosmological history of time that is, in other words, if one thinks of contraction of the universe, then spacetime will allow entangled black holes to come closer before their horizons touch each other. In the process the wormholes connecting them will become thicker and condition will be created for the black holes to move away from each other. For this to happen spacetime should exist or should be created in the exterior of the so-called singularity. At this juncture the cause for creation of spacetime in the exterior and interior of the black holes can be postulated to be due to the existence of the hypothetical consciousness field [(Roy and Roy (2015, 2019)]. As time progresses the entangled black holes would move away from each other and the wormholes connecting them would elongate. The consciousness field, being always associated with spacetime, would use wormholes as conduits to send information from one point of spacetime to the other. Since this field is devoid of any matter, the wormholes associated intimately with the field, would convey the information. It is to be noted that Roy and Roy (2021) discussed about the consciousness field as the possible source of communication between entangled pairs and proposed ‘bit’ as one parameter defining consciousness. Since space was needed to be created for expansion at Big Bang, the omnipresent consciousness field can possibly serve as its source. Similarly, for the ‘dark energy’ to drive the accelerating expansion of the universe, space bereft of real matter should owe its existence to the consciousness field. According to Musser (2018), not all phenomena neatly fit within spacetime and some new foundational structure might be needed to complete the revolution that began with Einstein. Therefore, if following the hypothesis by Roy and Roy (2015, 2019), consciousness is accepted as the result of interactions with the consciousness field, then one can interpret dark matter as being differently conscious due to interaction with this hypothetical field. As an alternative to Guth’s idea of inflationary cosmology, Steinhardt and his colleagues (2011) proposed the ‘cyclic’ theory; they suggest that the Big Bang is not the beginning of space and time. According to them, expansion followed contraction and smoothing of universe took place before the bang. If this be the case, then one does not need to go back in time to speculate the origin of the universe; the contraction would take care of the creation of spacetime with the help of the consciousness field for the universe to expand. It therefore follows that, irrespective of the speculated origin, at every stage of evolution of the universe the ubiquitous consciousness field ensures that the journey is basically a conscious one. Received November 19, 2022; Accepted December 26, 2022 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 127-130 Roy, A., Space time, Consciousness & Creation of Universe 130 References 1. Bertone G, Hooper D, History of dark matter, Rev. Mod. Phys., 90 (2018) 045002 1-32 2. Blumenthal G R, Faber S M, Primack J R, Rees M J, Formation of galaxies and large-scale structure with cold dark matter, Nature, 311 (1984) 517-525 3. Curiel Erik, "Singularities and Black Holes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/spacetimesingularities 4. Guth A H, Steinhardt P J, The Inflationary Universe, Scientific American, (May 1984) – JSTOR 5. Hawking S W, Black hole explosions?, Nature, 248 (1974) 30–31 6. Hubble E. "A relation between distance and radial velocity among extra-galactic nebulae". PNAS. 15 (3) (1929) 168–173. 7. Maldecena J, Black holes, Wormholes and the Secrets of Quantum Spacetime, Scientific American, 315 (5) (2016) 26-31 8. Musser G, Nature, 557, (2018) S3-S6. doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-05095-z 9. Origins: CERN: Ideas: The Big Bang, https://bit.ly/3WrmMkA 10. Penrose R, Gravitational Collapse and Space - Time Singularities, Physical Review Letters, 14 (3) (1965) 57-59 11. Roy A, Roy A, Evolution is a conscious process – a perspective in metaphysics, IJTP, 63 (2015) 5366. http://www.citphy.org/volume-63-nos-12-2015/; https://bit.ly/3DbpuUq 12. Roy A, Roy A, Properties and State of Consciousness, International Journal of Science and Consciousness, 5(4) (2019) 32-40. http://ijsc.net/docs/issue17/properties-and-state-ofconsciousness; https://bit.ly/3WxRkBj 13. Roy A, Roy A, Reality Resides in The Realm of Consciousness, International Journal of Science and Consciousness, 7 (2) (2021) 34-39, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354687009 14. Schoen R and Yau S T, The Existence of a Black Hole Due to Condensation of Matter, Commun. Math. Phys, 90 (1983) 575-579 15. Smythies J, Space, Time and Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies,10 (3) (2003) 47-56 16. Steinhardt P J, The Inflation Debate, Scientific American, April (2011), 38-43 17. Taylor E F, Wheeler J A, Spacetime Physics, (W. H. Freeman and Company, New York), (1992) pp 275 18. Tillman N T , Bartels M, Einstein’s theory of general relativity, Space.com, published January 05, (2022), https://www.space.com/17661-theory-general-relativity.html 19. Wald R M, Black holes, singularities and predictability in Astrophysics, Cosmology and Astronomy (Adam Hilger Limited; Bristol, UK), (1984) pp.160-168 20. Wall M, (2022), https://www.space.com/13347-big-bang-origins-universe-birth.html ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 318-320 Hu, H., & Wu, M., Fight against the 2020 Pandemic & the Rise of a New World under God (新世界歌) 318 Poem Fight against the 2020 Pandemic & the Rise of a New World under God (新世界歌) Huping Hu* & Maoxin Wu ABSTRACT This poem/lyrics1 in both English and Chinese calls for united efforts against the 2020 pandemic and promotes the transformation of the Present World to a peaceful, sustainable & prospering New World under GOD post 2020. Keywords: Fight, 2020, pandemic, God, Present World, New World, Earth, transformation, sustainable, green, peace, post 2020. Rise, people all over the world, (起来，全世界所有人們,) Rise, all governments of all nations, (起来，全世界所有政府,) An invisible enemy is attacking the mankind, (一個看不見的敵人正在攻擊人類,) A New World will be born, (一個新的世界正在誕生,) The Present World will be transformed, (當今時代将会更新換面,) Rise, Rise people all over the world. (全世界所有人們起來, 起來.) Mankind’s survival requires efforts from all, (人類生存需要所有人來努力,) Be the heroes to save the sick & vulnerable. (讓我們拯救病者弱者.) This is a critical time (for mankind), (這是人類關鍵的時刻,) Let’s unite and struggle together, (讓我們團結一起奮鬥,) The New World under GOD, (神引導的新世界,) Shall be realized. * Correspondence: Huping Hu, PhD, JD, Scientific GOD, Inc., P.O. Box 267, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA E-mail: editor@scigod.com 1 It is adapted from Eugène E. Pottier’s L'Internationale written in 1871. Please don’t use in countries where its use is prohi bited due to copyright restrictions and/or other regulation(s). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 318-320 Hu, H., & Wu, M., Fight against the 2020 Pandemic & the Rise of a New World under God (新世界歌) 319 (就一定能實現.) This is a critical time (for mankind), (這是人類關鍵的時刻,) Let’s unite and struggle together, (讓我們團結一起奮鬥,) The New World under GOD, (神引導的新世界,) Shall be realized. (就一定能實現.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mother Earth has been ravaged for too long, (地球母親已被踐踏太久,) Please wake up from the material pursuit, (請从物質追求中醒來,) Mankind’s survival depends on a healthy Earth, (人類生存依賴健康的地球,) Courageous actions are called for, (勇敢的行動是必要的,) Protect Mother Earth & other lives on Her, (保護地球母親和別的生命.) Together let’s conquer the adversity. (讓我們共同克服逆境.) Be the forces of change in the Present World, (做改變當今時代的動力,) March on the path to the New World. (前進在去新世界路上.) This is a critical time (for mankind), (這是人類關鍵的時刻,) Let’s unite and struggle together, (讓我們團結一起奮鬥,) The New World under GOD, (神引導的新世界,) Shall be realized. (就一定能實現.) This is a critical time (for mankind), (這是人類關鍵的時刻,) Let’s unite and struggle together, (讓我們團結一起奮鬥,) The New World under GOD, (神引導的新世界,) Shall be realized. (就一定能實現.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | pp. 318-320 Hu, H., & Wu, M., Fight against the 2020 Pandemic & the Rise of a New World under God (新世界歌) 320 Who set the foundation of the world? (是誰為世界奠定了基礎,) It is no other than Scientific GOD, (是科学的造世主,) Our Souls need new nourishment, (我們的精神世界需新營養,) GOD’s Scientific Truth is the new nutrient, (主的科學真理就是新食物,) Everything in the World belongs to GOD, (所有一切歸造世主所有,) We shall use each justly and equitably. (我們要正確合理使用.) The New World under GOD is approaching, (一個大同世界已接近,) Let’s take a quantum leap from the Present World. (讓我們飛躍地跳出當今時代.) This is a critical time (for mankind), (這是人類關鍵的時刻,) Let’s unite and struggle together, (讓我們團結一起奮鬥,) The New World under GOD, (神引導的新世界,) Shall be realized. (就一定能實現.) This is a critical time (for mankind), (這是人類關鍵的時刻,) Let’s unite and struggle together, (讓我們團結一起奮鬥,) The New World under GOD, (神引導的新世界,) Shall be realized. (就一定能實現.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (Released March 31, 2020) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-149 139 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change Research Essay The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change Chris H. Hardy* Abstract The point of this paper is to explore the dynamics of the thinking process, especially the nonrational, analogical, and systemic aspects of natural thinking that create an interdependence between our thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors. There is an extreme diversity in the way humans think, despite the existence of patterns of thought or Logical Fields, that feed individual and collective mental models. The Logical Fields Model based on systems theory, provides an evolutionary and dynamical formalization that accounts for both the patterns of thought and their exquisite diversity. It is applied here to the understanding and strategic resolution of the spiral of Hate-Violence in ethno-political conflicts. The model proposes that a deadlocked conflict can only be broken by creating a conceptual model and organization at a higher, more encompassing level: in brief, by creating a meta-logfield. Then the democratic vision, as a shared planetary cooperation for the well-being of the variegated peoples of Earth and the planet (as opposed to special interests groups and lobbies) and the problem of accountability will be discussed. Keywords: Systems theory, logical field, thought-process, group-thinking, ethno-political conflict, conflict resolution, semantic fields theory, democracy and accountability, governance. 1. A Plurality of Logics: Logical Fields From the Greek philosophers onward, logic has been traditionally defined as the strict application of rules of inference and deduction. It has been equated with pure reason (Aristotle, Kant, Descartes, etc.), while the principle of reason was itself equated with the principle of causality (Leibniz, Heidegger). Both Leibniz in his Monadology and Heidegger (1992) have clearly stated that causality is only one type of link between concepts or events – among many other types of links (Hardy, 2001). Thus, if I use the basic rule: If A = B and B = C, then A = C, to explore the problem at hand, I get: If logic = reason, If reason = causality, If causality IS only one type of link, then logic IS only one type of link. In brief, the logic (that is defined as reason and causality) is only one type of link between concepts/events, among many other possible linkages. Logic can now be redefined thus: [A] Logic is a qualitative connection between semantic elements where „semantic elements‟ refer to any concepts, events and processes happening in a mind or cognitive system and concurring to the generation of meaning. Logic, in other words, is how our * Chris Hardy, Ph.D., Eco-Mind Systems Science, Seguret, France. Email: chris.saya@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 140 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change mind connects cognitive events or concepts and makes sense of the world. Therefore: [B] Logic is the process of connecting semantic elements, in its qualitative singularity Thus, while logic in a classical sense is a fixated formalization (or matrix) used to structure thought, it is, in a wider sense, a connective dynamic making use of a variety of specified (or qualitative) links. Inference is only one of these specified links, other ones being the very diversified semantic linkages found in connective logic – such as analogy, metaphor, symbolism, and the like (Bertalanffy, 1967; Beer, 1966; Hardy, 1998) – which are spontaneous and nonrational processes of natural thinking (Reber, 1995). Hence the need for a concept describing a pattern of logical links, which I call Logical Field. In this sense, Quantum Mechanics (QM) is a specific logical field (as is any sub-domain of science) in which the organization of links and concepts (e.g. in equations) is quite different from, say, relativity theory. Similarly, systems sciences show an interesting logfield shift from Beer‟s cybernetic model to Checkland‟s Soft Systems methodology. Logical fields describe the particular organization of concepts and the thought-process not only in scientific subdomains, but also in natural thinking. If we remain in the domain of abstraction and mathematics, the term logical field becomes redundant with „formalism‟ or „framework‟. Now, if we use the Semantic Fields Theory, which poses that the basic and underlying thought-process is a spontaneous connective dynamic, then we are looking for different types of (natural) logics participating in the personal and collective creation of meaning and concepts. Let me define the concept of logical field: [C] A Logical Field is a natural self-organizing system of the thought-process that instantiates a specific, more or less flexible, organization of links between concepts, events, and objects, and thus triggers a particular patterning of thought, hence of feeling and behavior. Logical fields (or logfields) are thus akin to Piaget‟s schemata, Beer‟s thought-blocks, and generally to the concept of mental models (Senge, 1990; Argyris, 1991); however, whereas mental models are viewed as fixated, logfields are continuously being created, reinforced, or else modified. They are nearer to Checkland‟s concept of Weltanschauung (W) or worldview, in Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), about which he says (1999, p.219) “The methodology emerges as a learning system in which underlying Ws are exposed and debated alongside alternatives.” The flexible versus fixated ratio in logical fields Since they are the natural ways our minds operate, logfields tend to show flexibility and enormous adaptability, so that they may be used in many different situations. They reflect how the mind conjointly extracts patterns from the environment and creates its own thought-patterns to make sense of itself and the world. Confronted with a new situation, already existing logfields in the mind will be matched against the patterns emerging (or extracted) in the ongoing creative cognitive process, and will be made to adjust to them, thus enabling recognition and the generation of meaning. In the process, logfields may undergo subtle or drastic changes – such as adaptation, merging, recombining, or even the creation of a new logfield. The flexible vs. fixated ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 141 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change ratio will be a way to assess both creativity/health and fixation/pathology in a given mind or group-mind. Too extreme a flexibility, insofar as it precludes the healthy creation of patterns, will not allow for a meaningful world. On the other end of the scale, extreme fixation is a sign of a traumatic, pathological, despotic, or fanatic thought-process. This is reminiscent of the concept of requisite variety in Viable Systems Model – which state that organizations must develop sufficient internal variety to be able to understand, adjust to and cope with a complex changing sociocultural environment that itself exhibits high variety (Beer, 1979). Organizational variables Sorting out the organizational variables of logfields means finding what, in a mind, is able to steer (or modulate, or modify) the natural connective dynamic. The four main variables informing logfields (and thus the thought-process itself), are Value-Purpose (mind), FeelingRelational style (psyche), Behavior-Action (body), and Interaction with the (social and natural) environment. Any of these variables can be given predominance, however they keep interacting and co-creating the logfield in a systemic way. Thus, in order to describe, and eventually predict, the thought-process of individuals or groups, parameters quite foreign to rational thinking and goals must be taken into account. Natural thinking is not a chess game and the priorities are not always “one‟s own best interest” as game theory would have it. On the contrary, the global development of thought, as well as congruent decisions and behaviors, will have everything to do with deeper moteurs of semantic processes – meaning, feeling, community (Husemoen and Zhang, 1999) – those very forces through which we create meaning for ourselves, our community, our sociopolitical and philosophical networks, and the world. 2. Group-mind and Collective Logfields A group (or network), when constituted around some core concepts and/or socio-political actions, creates a collective logfield. The gathering of people around shared values form the basic system-organization of most scientific, humanitarian, green, socio-political, and religious, associations. To values are attached connective-logic propositions (expressing procedures and know-how) and an underlying paradigm. Three other variables interact in a logfield: behavior, affect, and the environment. Values and connective-logic propositions The values shared by a group are generally spelled out clearly (as for example a political agenda, religious beliefs, or basic concepts in a theory). However, these values show an underlying coherency grounded in a paradigm (a scientific, sociopolitical worldview; Kuhn, 1970) that often is not recognized consciously because its blind assumptions are not even disentangled from what constitutes “reality” or “truth”. Additionally, the logfield contains basic connective-logic propositions (Hardy, 1998) used regularly by members that reflect the heuristic knowledge accumulated by the group-mind. They may for example be judgments such as “It‟s better to do X than Y”, “A often means B in this context”, and the like. They are for the most part rules-ofthumb about meaning and procedures, about the topological organization of patterns, transformative processes, contiguity, and the internal (albeit not causal) evolution of patterns. While such loose propositions may sometimes resemble rules of formal logic, they remain ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 142 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change fundamentally different from them. First, they are not strictly causal or deterministic (Hardy, 2001); second, they convey a global (as opposed to detailed) understanding of patterns; and three, far from being invariant and two-dimensional (either true or false), they allow for selforganization and adaptation to changing contexts. The extreme usefulness of connective-logic propositions in real-life situations is precisely stemming from their enormous flexibility, which keeps them widely open to possible partial misfits with real patterns-in-context – what constitutes the feedback from the environment. In case of a partial misfit, these propositions allow for on-the-spot tinkering, divergent or plural interpretation (“It could be this or that”), adaptation, modification or even total restructuring of the connective proposition. Behavioral codes A group may endorse very stringent behavioral rules, such as in the military, a specific sport, or else in extremist groups. Strict behavioral codes generally go hand-to-hand with fixated values being enforced on members, since they will be derived from these values. An example is religious fundamentalism, in which a set of broad “truths” and concepts constituting a religion is, as Stengers (1987) explains it concerning science, stolen from a context carrying high credibility and used to give more weight to a less credible context – here a fundamentalist credo and extreme behavioral codes. The resulting particular enacted-dogma will then be imposed on individuals, while sold to them as the „pure‟ form of the religion. Of specific interest is the fact that people may be attracted by any single part of the dogmasystem – that is, antique truths and root-philosophy (thus confusing conservative minds), the fundamentalist credo itself (with its clear racist and despotic connotation), or worse, the very extremist behaviors themselves. Only in some cases will strict behavioral codes exist while no immutable values are set forth, such as in sport. Most social groups show loose behavioral codes, coherent with the group values (e.g. a member of a green association will tend to respect nature). Members of a group will tend to be more and more influenced in their behavior by the values they have adopted. And vice versa, a member attracted by a specific activity (e.g. watching dolphins at sea) will progressively tend to adopt the values inherent to the group he has joined. Shared feelings In any given set of values, there is a range of feelings deeply intertwined with it. For example, the way an ecologist understands the deep interconnection of natural systems will lead her to have a keen grasp of human relationships and subtle inter-influences, and to develop a sense of dialogue and negotiation (in contrast to an authoritarian style). Feelings are also closely interconnected with behaviors, the one feeding into the other. Thus, a profound respect for natural systems will generate protective behaviors and lead to developing respectful interactions with fellow humans. The complex organization of logfields in society If all professions, sciences, and constituted groups can be represented as logfields – expressing a particular way to think and interpret events – then how does this large variety of logfields coexist in a given society, or in our mind for that matter, since we get to use more than one logfield? We may view the various logfields‟ organization as similar to that of networks of neurons in our brain. On its boundary, each logfield interfaces with logfields specifically related to it, more or less deeply, and it also interfaces with basic social logfields (such as the political system, the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 143 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change law, etc.). There exists in a society a consensual worldview at any given time (the Zeitgeist) that includes values and behaviors. However, and fortunately so, there are a number of competing worldviews stemming from diverse philosophical, scientific, and religious, perspectives – especially in periods of great social change, as is the case now. The logfield of the business world, for example, is undergoing a deep transformation from a focus on profits toward valuing collaborative networks of responsible individuals and a “shared vision” as in Senge‟s (1990) “learning organization‟. This business-logfield will undergo an even greater transformation when shifting its short-sighted profits-based logfield to one addressing the climate crisis and adjusting to the necessary strategies to reduce green house gases emissions – one we could call a greenprofit logfield. Summary Logfields expressing various knowledge-systems influence the thought-process of individuals and groups (their natural connective logic), as well as their values, behaviors, and feelings. The complexity of the Logical Fields Model (weaving several levels of a cognitive system) allows for interesting insights. First, reason is neither controlling thinking, nor the main factor in behavior. Second, each variable is in deep interaction with other variables at other levels, that is, all mental and psychological forces are deeply intertwined in a Mind-Body-Psyche system (individual or collective). Finally, any theory, dogma, or knowledge-system, while appearing to have a mentalonly reality, in fact implies specific values (the underlying paradigm), as well as specific behaviors, feelings, and relational styles. This is how, for example, adhering to a seemingly „reasonable‟ discourse may lead to unknowingly adhere to, and perform or act out behaviors one would never have endorsed consciously. 3. Hate-Violence Logfield Let us now see how the Logical Fields Model may shed some light on ethno-political interactions, namely the spiral of hate-violence. Any political analyst knows that using aggression and violence in a conflict can only bring more hate and violence in return, ad infinitum, in a mounting spiral of aggression. What is surprising, then, is the total blindness of both fighting sides to this simple fact, and how each insists on being the sole victim of aggression, while it memorizes only its own losses and damages. After doing so, it feels obligated, and „rightly so’, to „retaliate‟. The Hate-Violence Logfield, being quasi similar in the two opponents, creates the sadly well-known „deadlock‟ of ethnic hate. ENNEMY X: Values: Ethnic identity, religious identity, land ownership (usual healthy values for a country); however, here, these values are thought in opposition to the „enemy‟. Affect: Feeling threatened and being on the defensive  engenders fear  leads to imagine worse-case scenarios of enemy‟s actions. Pressure  leads to believing these worse-case scenarios. Actions/behaviors: Believing worse-case scenarios  leads to „defensive measures‟ (as if responding to, or averting the scenarios) and  imposing losses and damages to the enemy. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 144 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change FACTS: many wounded and dead. ENNEMY Y: In the enemy camp (after the felt „aggression‟): Affect: horror, shock, and grief. Amplification of grief through the medias. Grief  triggers anger  triggers rage  leads to wishing and projecting retaliation. Actions/behaviors: Planning retaliation  retaliation. FACTS: many wounded and dead. ENNEMY X: In the enemy camp (after the felt „aggression‟): Affect: horror, shock, grief …  The population on each side is fed information nearly exclusively at the „affect‟ level (and using the worst possible images) – so as to impact with enormous force on the psyche of people, thus fueling more hate and building up support toward the „necessary retaliation‟.  The level of affect turmoil in everybody (including army, police, militants) is such that all thinking and discussions are mostly restricted to this level and to angry-desperate or else angry-punitive forms of „retaliation‟. At the thinking level, any event is processed through the logfield, i.e. through basic axioms (The enemy IS the aggressor, cruel, projecting our end as a people, etc.). As we have said, the logfields of both opponents are nearly similar (even if the means of „retaliation‟ and aggression differ): there is only one Hate-Violence Logfield, mirrored in the two sides. The basic constitutive values of a people (or a sub-culture), the fundamental rights of a country (such as ethnic and religious identity, and land ownership) are progressively denied to the „enemy‟ deemed less than human. Soon, only the negative Affect-Violence cluster remains. In a grassroot, spontaneous uprising of a people striving to be granted basic human rights, the purpose will never be lost, rendering high-level political manipulation useless; only finding a long-term settlement – that grants them these basic human rights and social justice – will do. Events’ interpretation within a logfield A useful feature of the Logical Fields Model is the way it may highlight the interpretation of events within a given logfield. The logfield of each side is a self-contained, encysted, interpretation-engine, in which the enemy‟s acts and all events touching on the issue – whatever they are – are not only systematically understood through the biases of the logfield, but more to the point, are all forecasted and pre-interpreted. EX predicts EY will do action N for such and such reason, thus when event N do occur, the interpretation is already at hand, even if the said event needed, for its occurring, a specific prior action M enacted by EX (who made the prediction). This seminal action M precipitating the event will be totally blacked out from EX‟s reports on the current events, while in contrast, EY will report having „retaliated‟ to the enemy‟s horrendous act M. This is reminiscent of the „self-fulfilling prophecy‟ phenomenon; however the present framework may help us analyze it in more depth. Semantic Fields Theory poses that events are brought about by a slow-building semantic constellation of forces consisting not only of the usual hard constraints (physical, economical, biological, etc.) but of semantic and psychic forces as well – whether collective or personal ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 145 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change (Hardy, 1998, 2003). In such a perspective, the attribution of worse intentions to the other side is in itself a semantic force contributing in reality to the in-forming of more dire events. As the two sides engage in a similar attribution of worse intentions, it raises the sheer intensity of the mistrust between them, consequently empowering their radical wings and further cementing the deadlock. Deadlock situation A deadlock conflict between two countries (or ethnies) has devastating consequences on both of their populations, such as: highly negative affects (exacerbated hate, anger, fears, anguish) and losing sight of positively balanced values (such as human rights for all, or any country‟s or ethnie‟s rights). Its effect on the civil population, especially the youth, is devastating: the loss of humanistic values together with negative affects plus a growing sense of helplessness, all this creates a feeling of desperation, of meaninglessness, of being robbed of one‟s own future, of being expendable, one‟s life being useless, etc.). It creates a mix of vengefulness and acute helplessness, a condition psychologically extremely dangerous and bordering on the pathological. One of its most appalling consequences is the seeding of hate-violence in a new generation, rendering the possibility of normalization and the befriending between the two people even more remote in time. 4. How to Disentangle a Deadlock Situation Concerning the logfield‟s organization, given that Affect is both the fuel of violence and the main target of manipulation, the soundest way to de-escalation, détente, and normalization is to shift the weight out of Affect and back into Values. Purpose-driven rebellious or terrorist acts, if it is what they are, must definitely get to a stop when the core goal (in Value) is achieved. (Of course, in practice, it has to be clearly expected and accepted, that the heat of hatred will keep producing dramatic acts of violence for some time afterwards, but they should nevertheless show a clear decline.) The overall purpose (or goal) is in the mind dimension, something that can be discussed, bargained for, trade off; something lending itself to rational talks, collective discussion, and brainstorming toward a bipartisan solution. The African art of palabre teaches us that a small group of wise, authoritative and above-theconflict coordinators – in our ethnic conflict case, at the regional and international level – has the ability and the power to command a reasonable settlement and to make it happen. It will then be the task of responsible governments in the two countries/ethnies to reinstall a value-oriented focus in all political and public debates, which would then be naturally reflected in the media „coverage‟. Political manipulation, if pursued, will then stick out of the background by its attempts at wrecking the normalization by lingering on Affect and opponent‟s demonization. This is why peace-talks at the political level have to be pursued at all costs whatever the situation on the terrain, and if dodged by one or both sides, a settlement reached within the UN, or backed-up by the UN, has to be imposed, because achieving a political settlement is the only means of ending the conflict. It seems obvious then that the only way out of the spiraling violence is to install a neutral, UN-type, peacekeeping force that will single out the perpetrators of violence and confront them with the new law and worldview (the new logfield of peaceful cohabitation and cooperation). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 146 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change The quickest solution to a deadlocked conflict is a leap to a more global level, to a metalogfield How can a deadlock situation be disentangled, whatever the kind of logfield implied? One would be wise to say that a thorough systemic reorganization has to occur... but how? Given the encysted interlocked logfields (which can only lead to more tension and more hate-violence), it appears the deadlock can only be broken by creating a conceptual model and organization at a higher, more encompassing level: in brief, by creating a meta-logfield. As Peter Checkland advises: “Lift the thinking [out of] models which map existing structures,” (1999, p.A22). In other words, this meta-logfield should stand above, and circumvent, the paradigmatic assumptions of the two contending logfields. This meta-logic was absolutely necessary in science, and provided for example a royal exit out of the gridlock of the light-as-particles versus light-as-waves schools of thought; Louis de Broglie leapt to a higher logic: Not only photons, but all particles, were both waves and particles; the meta-logfield was that all particles had associated waves. Furthermore, the higher-level logic proved the two schools to be correct (something their equally successful yet competing experiments over the decades of the conflict had already shown). Similarly, a conflict at the state level can be resolved by organizations at the federal level, and conflicts that are ethno-religious or between countries should be resolved at the Global Earth, systemic, level, by international organizations representing the will of all nations in a kind of meta-level cooperative and conversational network, based on exchanges and the democratic participation of all members. Yet, let me also point that to deny to a weak-end of a conflict the participation as a full member to these global organizations – thus denying them the right to be uplifted out of the conflict in a just, supportive, and comprehensive way – displays an appalling cruelty toward this community, and it reveals only a grave lack of insight and sense of justice from the part of the superpowers. Let‟s now take the perspective of our actual zeitgeist, which has been uplifted by the Black Lives Matter movement in 2020 in the US and the world (Hardy, 2020). Our collective intelligence has suddenly made a leap and developed an acute awareness of, and empathy vis-à-vis, any social injustice – especially racist, gender-based, ethnic and community-based – and it steered us to nurture a focused and shared goal of atoning for, and redressing these injustices, right now, as we become intensely aware of them. We are now a different people, citizens of Earth, experiencing a shared consciousness of how our governance systems (at all levels) impact on the people, communities, and the planet itself; and there is no going back to accepting any tone-deaf and self-interested plutocracy or autocracy. And with this new zeitgeist, we shall assume that ethno-religious conflicts, generally triggered and intentionally sustained by autocrats, are not only severely outdated and obsolete, but exceedingly counter-productive, since they do not respect human rights and cultural differences and are contrary to achieving a multi-ethnic, multi-racial, mosaic in the world, respectful of the planet and of our shared life-sustaining resources. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 147 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change 5. Democracy & Accountability Democracy, says Linda Dennard (1997) is a process still in evolution that “exists in the dynamics of society itself as it adjusts to accommodate difference”. Thus the essence of democracy does not lie in the voting procedure per se, nor in the representative system – all too often flawed themselves. Rather it lies in the dialogue about governance and in the political options allowed by a multiparty organization. It points to the possibility of achieving a constructive debate and multi-partisan governance, that is, a cooperative network striving to represent the will of all the people (in the way Holland allocates TV time to all political parties, as a direct percentage of their number of adherents). In this respect, democracy is about accountability, and breaking a linear, quasi-dictatorial, chain of command. It is about an administration being accountable vis-à-vis not only its own laws and Constitution, but also international law and human rights – the latter standing above any government, even an elected one. Classical Military Logfield Let us analyze in this light the outmoded Classical Military Logfield. Its values are a strict hierarchical chain of command, unquestioned, and harshly imposed. Behaviors: the top brass issues orders to which lower-rank officers can only obey. Actions: unaccountable violence and inflicting inefficient, heavy, casualties, without so much as sparing the civilian population. Affect: loyalty to one‟s own country, fear of disobeying. The Vietnam War has shown the horrendous perverse effects of this logfield. Officers are now considered accountable for their actions in regard to international law and human rights violations. This accountability notion runs contrary to both the blunt use of power by the top brass, and the blind following of orders by lower rank soldiers. The result of this value shift is exemplified by the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), standing above governments and leaders too much inclined to seize dictatorial power, even in democracies. Emerging Military Logfield Let us now analyze the Emerging Military Logfield. Its values, in a true democratic vision, are: accountability at all levels, respect of international law and human rights, protection of all civilian populations, minimum casualties. Affect: humanitarian vision, cooperation, and responsibility. Behaviors: peace-serving behaviors, respectful of environment; use of force strictly limited to law-enforcement. Let‟s keep in mind that, just as democracy, this Emerging Military Logfield is an ongoing evolutionary process as well. Thinking within this logfield leads to interesting new insights: First, our current preeminent and guiding worldview is now to attribute to (1) being human, and (2) on planet Earth, a higher value than one‟s own sense of belonging, or appartenance, to a country, race, religion, party or clan. That means putting the respect of human life and the viability of natural systems above particular interests – whether the latter are those of an interest group or a superpower. The congruent value is to give priority to international law and human rights, and solving the climate emergency, over any sub-system laws. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 148 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change A second insight (and it is quite sad that it needs advocating) is to give added value to the coming generations, especially in terms of avoiding war-inflicted traumas, whether in the aggressor or the victim role – both roles being damaging to the psyche – and that calls for waractions to become peace-keeping actions and to be solely a profession and not a patriotic duty. (This becomes self-evident when the military endorses a peace-keeping, and planet-saving, cooperative mission.). 6. Conclusion Clearly, it is essential for all nations to give proper decisive power and responsibility to international organizations representing the will of all nations in a kind of meta-level democracy. The unavoidability of globalization (as planetary systems become more and more intertwined) should not lead us to assume that it is bound to be a homogenous order enforced by some superpowers, and the playground of special interests groups and lobbies. We should instead strive for envisioning and in-forming several multinational organizations endowed with specific tasks. And lastly, the decisive paradigm shift is to be able to raise our concern about a viable future toward creating a humanistic and multi-cultural world-society, welcoming difference, divergence, and sub-cultures‟ richness. The democratic vision takes us more and more to creating a shared consciousness that becomes an active and generative collective intelligence, and to the launching of a planetary cooperation for the well-being of the variegated peoples of Earth and the planet. Let us soar with it. Received May 22, 2021; Accepted June 26, 2021 References Argyris, C. (1991). Teaching smart people how to learn. Harvard Business Review. May-June 1991. Beer, S. (1979). The Heart of the Enterprise. NY: Wiley. Beer, S. (1966). Decision and control. NY: Wiley. Checkland, P. (1999). Systems thinking, systems practice. NY: Wiley. Hardy, C. (1998). Networks of meaning: A bridge between mind and matter. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hardy, C. (2001). Self-organization, self-reference and inter-influences in multilevel webs: Beyond causality and determinism. Journal of Cybernetics and Human Knowing. UK: Imprint Academic. 8(3): 35-59. Hardy, C. 2003. Multilevel Webs Stretched across Time: Retroactive and Proactive Inter-Influences. Systems Research And Behavioral Science, vol 20, N° 2 (pp 201-215). (Special Issue on: Systems Thinking for Social Responsibility.) Hardy, C.H. 2020. Black Lives Matter: Why This Tidal Protest Movement will Prod Us to Save the Planet. The Edge Magazine (Oct.1). https://independent.academia.edu/ChrisHHardy/Papers ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| July 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 2 | pp. 139-140 149 Hardy, C. H., The Solution to a Deadlocked Conflict Is a Leap to a More Global Level – Logical Fields and the Dynamics of Change Dennard, L. (1997). “The democratic potential in the transition of postmodernism,” American Behavioral Scientist, 41(1): 148-162. Heidegger, M. (1992). The principle of reason. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Husemoen, M. and Will Zhang, C. (1999). “The nature of living knowledge,” Trondheim, Norway: SINTEF Industrial Management. Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago press. Reber, A.S. (1993). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. Senge, P. (1990). The fifth discipline. New York: DoubleDay. Stengers, I. (Ed.), (1987). D'une science à l'autre; des concepts nomades. Paris: Seuil. Von Bertalanffy, L. (1967). Robots, men and mind. New York: George Braziller. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 39 Article How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) Karl Sipfle* Abstract We present the principles of operation by which a brain makes a mind, at all scales necessary to cover the whole problem. We inventory the necessary capabilities for a mind. We divide conscious mind into four layers of increasing elaboration. For the principles of operations of the lower two layers, we provide the STFC theory. For the upper two, we provide the STHC theory. We survey the evolutionary progression from first twinge of experience to human capacities. We explain the types of memory and problem-solving we carry and by what structures they are made to happen. We compare to prior works and review the philosophical implications and stance. All of this is done with minimal incoming assumptions, and those made are declared. Part III of this four-part article includes: 15. What It is Like to Be a Human; 16. Consciousness Architecture Layer 4: Language-Enabled Mind; 17. Evolution; and 18. Conclusions. Keywords: Consciousness, physics, evolution, feeling, qualia, mind, cognitive, affective, sensation, memory, learning, attention, perception, recognition, decision-making, problemsolving, coordination, self, symbol manipulation, language. 15. What It is Like to Be a Human As higher consciousness emerged there came the experience and recognition of time, as a consequence of the differences it sees between its world at times t and t0 (where t and t0 keep increasing). Effectively, consciousness moves along time. At a low level there are linked stimulations of conscious events, and the propagation times and stimulus persistence of the brain. These cause the continuous flow of high consciousness time, enabling our “now.” Some opine that consciousness causes time (Deutsch, 1998), in the sense of the experience of a physical dimension that would otherwise just be another physical dimension. One might say that time is the progression toward increased entropy, or one might say that time is the experience of progression toward increased entropy; this contrast is just a matter of definition. The idea that the consciousness of beings such as ourselves specifically and literally causes physical time, however, we reject. There is insufficient evidence and plausibility to accept that possibility. It remains possible that the sentonic field and time have a very close relationship. * Correspondence author: Karl Sipfle, Independent Researcher (also working independently at NASA GSFC). E-mail: ksipfle@umich.edu ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 40 Time might be a sequence of quantum collapse events, but space might, also. Humans are action-oriented. The brain exists to decide what to do. The frontal lobe is the motor lobe. Impulses for action are suppressed and analyzed and selected and organized for submission to execution areas. Unlike other animals that go to sleep whenever they can, humans are curious and exploratory and chatty and get bored, stir-crazy, and lonesome. This keeps us active and learning. The human brain features high-level, complex connections: understanding is pleasurable, novelty is pleasurable. These make curiosity and enhance creativity, itself a mix of compliance and variance. Things bubble up into human consciousness from “subconscious” areas. Only some parts of the brain are organized to be part of the human-conscious. It is the unity of feeling and the unity of the cognitive and the fusion into a greater unity of these two (plus language) that form the experience of what we call our minds. For the base feeling this fusion is done in and by the sentonic field. For the cognitive, this is done by networking of neurons. The final fusion is done by the connection of cognitive (information-processing) neurons with feeling neurons, which connects cognition to feeling. This creates both complex deep emotions with a cognitive component, and rich thought embroidered with, encouraged by, discouraged by, and steered by emotion. The two things that make all this possible are the information processing and communication ability of all neurons, and the (strong) connection to the sentonic field of some neurons. To “make sense” is a pleasurable condition related to high discovered recognition and correlation, and low ambiguity, as seen in strong standing signals against a relatively quiet background of alternatives. It brings comfort and is sought. Confusion and unsureness are negative, and we seek to eliminate or avoid these. The neural circuits for this are imaginable. The human mind loves order in all things. It has grown through evolution to where it is possible for it to see a whole big picture (and even to describe that to another), wherefrom flows its great power. Organized mind appears when awake, as opposed to when dreaming. One possibility is that the mind would be organized when we sleep were it not for interference caused by signals that are generated (or removed) during sleep (Sipfle K. , A Neurobiological Theory to Explain the Lack of Rationality in Dreams, 2021). Another possibility is that the operation of perceptual regions close to the senses, which are inoperative during sleep, ordinarily organize the flow through the rest of the brain, to restrict what is thought to what “makes sense.” Both factors could well be significantly contributing. A third possibility is that prefrontal centers that impose a critical evaluation upon earlier cortex are disconnected during sleep; this is supported by EEG studies (Sipfle K. , A Neurobiological Theory to Explain the Lack of Rationality in Dreams, 2021). We note also that emotions are quite in their normal form and understandable even during sleep; it is the cognitive, which is intrinsically of structured nature and of high continuous relatedness to many patterns we know, that loses good form and becomes disjointed. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 41 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) A related possibility is that our simulation centers- our imaginations- are only constructed to run coherently for seconds at a time, because that’s what is needed. In sleep we also don’t playback our memories verbatim in long sequences; memory centers are executing a consolidation process and bubbling and burping as a result when they are active at all. Thus, disconnected splotches of memories start up short sequences of reconstructions and predictive simulations with no sensory perception or memory circuits activation to police for order. Human-level consciousness occurs from adding to lower animals a) Full language, with its ability to precisely manipulate symbols and abstract objects b) A strong sense of what “makes sense” c) Much increased short-term working memory and richer interconnections (b) is what is not acting as much when we are dreaming. We may say that a scene or utterance is “incomprehensible,” which means it does not comprehensively hang together (make connections) that result mostly in recognitions of things and relationships deeply honed over the years, rather than confusion resulting from a lack of this. Things make sense when there is high recognition and sharp inhibition, connected to feeling. In sleep the contrast is lost, and things bleed over into each other. Humans are so advanced that they are aware of concepts as high as feeling confused and feeling sure they have “got it” (which are indeed feelings and may even be misplaced ones). Knowledge is not feeling. But feeling convinced of knowing something is a feeling (and generally a positive one). “I feel that X” means that X is coupled with a feeling of some certainty. The mechanics of a working mind run on Recognition and Value. Direct pain and pleasure served as the first source of Value, allowing bootstrapping. Now, many local inter-neuronal circuits have likely generalized Value informationally, and no longer feel pain and pleasure, there being no evolutionary need to maintain them. At the micro level of large networks, the original pain and pleasure are too crude to serve- at least, globalized pain and pleasure are too crude. Mouse consciousness is surely emotional and very action-oriented. It lives in a world of smells and touch and motor movement. In contrast, a grown chimpanzee has the intelligence of a 2.5year-old human, and probably his emotional life as well. Such a human is no longer an infant but a toddler, with rudimentary language ability. Human consciousness is visual and analytic. Humans inhibit action until selected and initiated after analysis of the world. Returning to time, consciousness has duration, necessarily. The actual “remembered present,” as Edelman called it (Edelman, 1993), gives a more global (across space) and constant (across time) existence to an object than the millisecond/millimeter world of neural-neighborhood-scale operations. This very short-term memory is very useful to sophisticated cognition, a sort of object cohesion and permanence enabler. Coupled with the connections that compare between different parts of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 42 this time snippet and those that react to it and supply it with emotion, to a first approximation this is low-level, higher-animal consciousness. It is the now in which all thought and feeling occurs, about three seconds long. Consciousness has a smidgeon of usefulness even without net emotional affect. Change and novelty and distinct form cause this impact (which on repetition fades, both as it happens and from (nonmotor) memory). But consciousness without net emotional affect, which supplies positive and negative values, is very limited in what it can do. The emotions we feel affix value to things, including objects to study and courses of action to choose. In principle in another universe another mechanism could have been used to supply value but feeling is what evolution discovered in our universe that could be used. And why did evolution use this means? What is helpful about feeling, is that it has its own intrinsic value- positive or negative. That means evolution did not have to manage to use valueless connections in a consistent way to emulate the same thing, or invent centers as assigned positive and negative places that must be connected to. Consistently labeled positive and negative things were available in nature to happen upon, and then use again and again. This made it easier, and thus more likely, and thus the way, that summary value is implemented in the brain. We don’t call it thinking unless we can feel it happening. There are also underlying processes to our thinking which we can’t see (e.g., associating). Crossing the boundary is what happens when things “pop into my mind.” We are able to deliberately reflect to encourage these unconscious processes to happen, and to deliberately turn down our attention and fixations to allow broader and freer flow of proto-thoughts and metathoughts. We can feel the thinking process partly because cogitating kicks feeling parts (rather like feeling limb motion), and probably because of the changes in blood vessels (which we can see in imaging). It is probably even important to our thought processes that we can feel our thoughts and where we are paying attention, and probably there is specific sensation of that because the sense-ability has utility. General “awareness” may include arousal (which increases intensity of attention behavior) more than emotional response, which gives value to things. A high level of arousal can be pleasurable or stressful; it is an intensifier. Our emotions are different from an awareness of things. We can just feel sad or fearful, then start thinking or noticing or inventing supposedly why. Sad can be purely dysphoric, without knowing “why,” which is cognitive (in contrast, the more complex dread is also dysphoric, but refers to something). People use the word “feeling” to refer both to emotions and to intuitional judgements. This is natural, because our processing circuitry includes a bed of elaborate, general recognition circuits effectively much-interwoven with feeling circuits so as to develop finely detailed value ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 43 processing of things under consideration, resulting in a net high-level score, and the distinction between emotion and cool judgement can be difficult for us to tease apart. It is possible both to have a “feeling” (observationally) of a large object in front of your face without net caring, and also possible to feel positive or negative for no apparent reason. As to the former- impact- it is the shapeless glob of feeling that is doing the reacting to factual stimuli. You still hear emotional white noise even though it doesn’t settle on organized tones. The white noise activity is impact. Everything noticed makes "you" feel something- even if only a unified agitation. Concentrating of pain or pleasure is relatively unusual in the universe (rather like the very big molecular machinery of life being unusual). Thus, it is a specific achievement of evolution that is useful. Pain and pleasure allow advanced minds. By the Anthropic Principle, that is why it’s here. Physical consciousness was exploited in vertebrates just as the laws of mechanics and chemistry were. It serves the functions of learning and assigning general goodness and badness to large and complicated and long-lasting experiences and plans, and in bonding social groups. Higher consciousness is like multicellularity, something that emerged as a complex system incorporating many points of occurrence of base consciousness, allowing novel survival niches by supporting highly elaborate, flexible, and effective structures. While our consciousness is observable and organized, this does not mean that simple consciousness does not happen all around us. The organization of fundamental consciousness into high-level consciousness was done with our brains by evolution (or preceding mind to whom we are the artificial intelligence). As one of the available forces, fundamental consciousness probably has been exploited elsewhere, and elsewhere there will be pain and pleasure (and therefore perhaps good and evil). Is consciousness “just” an epiphenomenon? Yes, in the sense that it was not necessary that we actually feel, only that the same values be attached to things as feelings allow. No, in that the values consciousness provides form a key part of what our minds are and how they work. Value is needed for how we think. It is what steers the cognitive centers to make decisions. The cognitive centers can recognize things and recall candidate action sequences, but it is the emotional input that determines the selections- the “voluntary” behavior. Volition equals emotion. The nature of our human-level consciousness is that we react emotionally to (and perceive) our thinking, and we cognitively notice our feeling, and we talk to ourselves about all of this in a chorus of stream of consciousness (James, 1890). Our words then evoke feelings and more thoughts and around it goes. We talk to ourselves like a friend (or enemy), and our real friends’ words are in there, incorporated. I feel. What is I? An assemblage of interlinked cognitive and feeling events. I am intellectually aware that I am feeling, and I can feel and have feelings about my thinking. The human mind is ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 44 everything it is because it contains not only thought and feeling but can think about feeling and feel about thinking, and do so under the organizing and evocative presence of language. Higher consciousness is the interaction of knowing and feeling, and each of each other. The deep mutual interplay of feeling and thought, and of these with language, comprise the mind. 16. Consciousness Architecture Layer 4: Language-Enabled Mind There are two major elements added to make a human level mind beyond just scale. These require new brain tissue. One is a refined sense of what “makes sense” (that which is lost when dreaming). One might call this our reality detector. The other is language. Language organizes all the little fits of proto thought, and one's own assembled phrases stimulate those same fitful centers to recognize and remember and churn out new proto thoughts. Language crisply organizes associations and spatial, motor, and intuitive thought. This is done using the new language centers of our brain (notably Brodmann 22, 44, and 45). The appearance (“hearing”) of the sentences to our non-language-centric brain centers evokes in them the unstructured thought that is then organized into language again. This cycle, along with emotion, is the fundamental stuff of our highest-level consciousness (mind), as we talk to ourselves about our thoughts and feelings and react to what we have heard from ourselves. We have coined many words for various kinds of feeling (and thinking), which attest to the richness and complexity of human-level minds. 16.1. Human Evolution of the Prefrontal Cortex While 99% of human DNA is the same as a chimpanzee’s, 80% of the proteins differ between the two species (Passingham R. , 2021), which diverged 7 Mya. By about 2 Mya humans (Homo Erectus) had evolved, left Africa, and made it to China. In another wave, by about 0.6 Mya archaic Homo Sapiens appeared and made it to Germany. Modern Homo Sapiens appeared by 0.3 Mya in Africa, 0.2 Mya in Greece. The frontal cortex- particularly the granular prefrontal cortex- and medial parietal cortex, was expanded in Homo Sapiens. During the evolution of the anthropoids (monkeys through humans), there was an expansion of association cortex within each lobe, and not just within the frontal lobe. The human prefrontal cortex, though, expanded more than the middle and inferior temporal cortex, the premotor, and the motor cortex. This means there is more human prefrontal cortex for re-representing visual information from the ventral visual stream and for generating goals as opposed to just directing the actions that achieve them (Passingham R. , 2021). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 45 16.2. Goal and Feature Memory of Humans via Parietal-Prefrontal Network, Temporal Area, and Prefrontal Adaptations Parietal-Prefrontal capability advanced from representing relational metrics to supporting generalized relational reasoning. Temporal areas advanced from representing the signs of resources to supporting semantic generalizations. Prefrontal cortex adapted its top-down biasing function to memory retrieval. (Murray, 2017). 16.3. Social-Subjective Memory of Humans via New Granular Prefrontal Cortex New and higher levels of hierarchy emerged courtesy additional prefrontal areas. Representations of self and others developed in these areas. These came to influence existing medial and lateral networks (Murray, 2017). The medial network came to support perspective-taking, recognition of situational contexts, mental simulation of past and future events, and knowledge of self and others from participatory experience. The lateral network came to represent social goals, norms, and concepts, categories, groups and roles of individuals, and generalizations about self and others. 16.4. Explicit Memory of Humans Explicit memory emerges from interactions between the forms of memory, each having evolved at different times. The hippocampal memory system learns about what happened at a particular time and place while granular prefrontal areas learn about what happens in relation to behavioral goals. With the appearance of humans, these came to work together (Murray, 2017). High order, human-specific representations of self-contribute to both the perception of participating in attended events, and the perception of knowing attended facts. These selfrepresentations become a part of conjunctive representations that are explicit memories. When individuals retrieve memories containing this part they re-experience the participating in events and knowing of facts (Murray, 2017). 16.5. Language-Enabled Mind On Earth, only humans operate at this level. Other species have not achieved true grammatical language. Universal capacity for grammar is literally wired into humans (Pinker, 2009). As we have noted, observation of the experiential parts of the mind by the verbal parts results in the spontaneous forming of sentences that crystallize precise statements of observation. This ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 46 evokes responses of meaning in the experiential parts of the mind, forming our loop of realizeand-comment that operates continuously in our waking hours. These mental abilities enable long-chain serial thought and precision and abstract languages such as mathematical notation. (None of this capability has anything to do with Goedel. Recognizing mathematical truths is a combination of learned discernment skill and natural machinations of our evolved brains that live in a naturally patterned world. Also, many people cannot make these recognitions so it cannot be fundamental to the human mind.) Language is long, sequential chains of symbols, especially with the advent of writing, which provides external memory much as the real world of objects is itself persistent. 16.6. Hypothesis Contained in STHC Hypothesis STHC-2: Cyclically, language organizes thought and stimulates new thought to organize as language centers interact with earlier non-language centers (Sipfle K. , 2018). 16.7. Problem Solving 6: Reasoning, Imagination, and Planning and Generating Goals from Instructions and Imagination via Enlarged Polar Prefrontal Cortex of Humans Polar prefrontal cortex is Brodmann area 10, located right behind the forehead. Brodmann 10 is now the largest Brodmann area. Through human-level general intelligence exploiting human capacity for instruction, imitation, and mental trial and error in internal re-representations of the world, humans are able to reduce errors in action choices- which are dangerous in the wild- to nearly zero. The imaginative abilities, even of actions planned but not executed, that emerged to reduce errors in specialized situations, created the internal world that provides modern insight (Passingham R. E., 2012). 16.8. Problem Solving 7: Language via Areas 44 and 45 and Culture and Social Rules via Medial and Orbital Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala Functional brain imaging studies and meta-analyses thereof have revealed the following knowledge (Passingham R. , 2021). There is cerebral dominance in the left for speech, but also for performing skilled actions other than speech, regardless of hand used. The same precision manipulation mechanisms are used. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 47 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) The prefrontal area Brodmann 44 is active when words and sentences are being assembled (but not when speaking them). Left areas 44 and 45B support generating verbs appropriate for nouns (that is, verbs that make sense for nouns) , with 44 generating sentences by hierarchical rules. 45A supports learning association pairs and names associated with things (tagging with words). Names can evoke visual imagery (elsewhere in the cortex) of the named objects. Left 44, 45B, and 45A plus the middle frontal gyrus are critical for the semantic system. Observing demonstrations activate 44 and 45B. Verbal instructions can be acted on immediately without first learning. Instruction activates prefrontal cortex linked to cortical areas specific to the requested tasks. The interconnected medial and orbital prefrontal cortex and amygdala are activated in anticipating punishment, feeling empathy, and feeling guilt. 17. Evolution We have presented an architecture, which itself stands for study irrespective of the specific explanation as to how it is “implemented” by Nature. But as evidence of its truth, it must be a plausible destination of evolution. Here we summarize that journey. We can recapitulate the evolutionary development sequence because the needs and difficulties are obvious, and because we have the animals around us as evidence. First needed would be basic stimulus/response. This could be viewed as the degenerate case of the cognitive. Then would come totally dispassionate ability for slightly complicated perception and actions. In other words, calculating ability- pure, passive cognitive- would appear first, and still exists in primitive animals. Feeling provides for the first operant (reinforcement) learning opportunity, and certainly for more complicated organisms. It offers a broad whatever-you’re-doing-is-bad (or good) signal for learning, and it provides the second needed, broadly distributed system- Value- which determines what action impulses are let through, the first system being Activation. Third is Attention, targeting and focusing the cognitive portions. Even before well-developed learning appears, feeling allows for generalized real-time changes in decisions in creatures with some neural complexity, and serves Attention. The wholesale march into feeling began with the evolutionary outgrowth of the allocortex- the olfactory system and the hippocampus. The paleocortical piriform cortex, a.k.a. posterior orbitofrontal cortex (posterior OFC), is heavily correlated with the cingulate gyrus and the septal area, which is part of the basal forebrain. The OFC mediates the expectation of reward/punishment in response to stimuli. The paleocortical olfactory tubercle plays a role in transmitting positive signals to reward sensors. Once all of these lower mechanisms were in place, the neocortex burst forth into high growth. Warmer/colder is a powerful concept (complementing recognition and association). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 48 The older and deeper parts of mammalian cortex form the connections to pain and pleasure that guide the cognitive circuits (literally) above. With this basic plan in place, the stage was set to scale up- with the same basic brain architecture- to more and more, and more refined, cognitive mass. Summary good/bad/pain/pleasure/warmer/colder is key to advanced brains and simplifies genetics in that action selection circuits can be built to pursue summary “good” and avoid “bad,” while other independent ones connect perceptions and relationships to those values, rather than trying to wire together myriad situational aspects to individual acts of plans. As the ability to manipulate objects became more abstract, true language first emerged and then became not just a communication feature but integral to human thought; communication itself became internalized and reflective. Metalanguage (grammar, new notations, compound constructed words, and descriptive theories) emerged and itself became introspectively manipulable. Pain and pleasure have been discovered and harvested by evolution. (There are likely other worlds in which pain and pleasure don’t exist to organisms, even complicated ones.) Pain and pleasure might not actually be the same force. And there might be animals that feel pain but no pleasure. Use of one may have come first in bio-evolution. Intensity of experience increases by way of more spots in the field, and so indirectly, by more related brain interconnections. Harvesting fundamental consciousness by evolution would mean “crafting” the shapes and/or construction and constituents of neurons, and possibly sets of neurons. Feeling continues to guide cognition at all levels. This allows three-pound brains to handle situations usually well enough that would be impossible to handle with combinatoric perfection, and provides an edge to conquer, in evolution, competitors and challenging niches. With bacteria and others optimized for the easier (in terms of complexity) niches, we populate the harder ones, requiring large-scale sophistication. If not already on Earth, comets or asteroids could have provided batches of particles rich in sentonic charge. They could have come from anywhere or anyone. They are the seeds of advanced minds. 18. Conclusions We have presented an Architecture (FLA) and compliant theory for every major constituent of mind from nothing but the existence of this universe up through human minds. The STFC metatheory does not presume that human-level consciousness is everywhere. It does assert that primitive fundamental consciousness is distributed throughout the universe and the field carrying it is everywhere. The universe does not understand things or feel as a whole in a unitary fashion. It does contain such “flecks.” ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 1 | pp. 39-49 Karl, S., How Brain Makes Mind: The Principles of Operation (Part III) 49 The STHC theory of animal-level consciousness assumes that it is probably the result of activity of networks of physical neurons that calculate and harness feeling. The nature of our human-level consciousness is that we react emotionally to (and perceive) our thinking, and we cognitively notice our feeling, and we talk to ourselves about all of this in a chorus of stream of consciousness. Our words then evoke feelings and more thoughts. On the way to our solution, we have laid down some postulates and presented hypotheses, to wit: Postulate 1: Physicalism is necessary and information - and computation-based theories cannot provide for the source of conscious experience. Postulate 2: Consciousness functions within the same basic rules (including mathematics) as all other phenomena that also exist in Nature. Postulate 3: Something basic is missing from, and must be added to, our physics. STFC Hypothesis 1: Fundamental feeling is freestanding and requires no separate feeler. At most there is a physical interaction between two fundamental elements. STFC Hypothesis 2: There is a physical process that is fundamental feeling. STFC Hypothesis 3: The fundamental feelings are pain and pleasure. STCF Hypothesis 4: There exist pain and pleasure in minimal discrete bits independent of any brain, at the sub-molecular scale. STFC Hypothesis 5: Some biological brains have evolved to organize and exploit pain and pleasure. STFC Hypothesis 6: The fusion of feeling across the brain occurs in a force field. STHC Hypothesis 1: It is by way of feeling and information processing that aware and intelligent minds have developed that can solve problems and set goals. STHC Hypothesis 2: Cyclically, language organizes thought and stimulates new thought to organize as language centers interact with earlier non-language centers. (Continued on Part IV) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 321 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis (Part I) Article Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis (Part I) Serge Merlin* California Institute of Integral Studies, CA Abstract Evidence from survival research has been supported by verified report data from reincarnation studies. Based on this collected evidence, supporters claim the survival hypothesis provides a better explanation for apparent post-mortem survival than the rival living agent psi hypothesis. There is no consensus on this issue, and many believe that efforts to bring empirical evidence to bear on survival debates have reached an impasse. An alternative psychic reservoir hypothesis proposes that information about the sentient experiences of intelligent organisms may be available to living and discarnate individuals with a certain level of psychic functioning. Studies analyzing mediumistic communications and psychic readings suggest that the source of psi cannot be unequivocally identified. A novel multiple sources of psi (MSoP) hypothesis is advanced, suggesting that aggregating diverse explanatory hypotheses with differing advantages may point the way toward some future solution in which current shortcomings may be overcome. This approach resolves the impasse between survival and living agent psi hypotheses, and has the advantage of compatibility with both reincarnation and psychic reservoir hypotheses. Part I of this two-part article includes: Introduction, The Survival Hypothesis, Survival and Reincarnation, Survival and Mediumship, Survival and NDEs, Survival and Apparitions of the Dead, The LAP Hypothesis, and The Psychic Reservoir Hypothesis. Keywords: Survival hypothesis, reincarnation hypothesis, living agent, psychic reservoir hypothesis, multiple sources, psi hypothesis. Introduction For over a century research has produced significant volume of intriguing empirical data supporting the survival hypothesis, which posits the unceasing post-mortem existence of a person‟s ante-mortem nonphysical essence in alleged disembodied form (Sudduth, 2016). According to the reincarnation hypothesis, a particular version of the survival hypothesis, some personality properties not only survive the death of a person but may join another physical body (Irwin & Watt, 2007; Matlock, 1990, 2019; cf. Stevenson, 1960a, 1960b; Shweder, 1986). Fifty years‟ systematic studies have produced compelling evidence for the reincarnation hypothesis, a parsimonious and relatively exhaustive theory accounting for reincarnation phenomena (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Beloff, 1993; Slavoutski [Merlin], 2012). Correspondence: Serge Merlin, California Institute of Integral Studies, CA. E-mail: smerlin@mymail.ciis.edu ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 322 Since these hypotheses share conceptual ground, the reincarnation hypothesis has reinforced the survival hypothesis (e.g., Braude, 2003; Stevenson, 1982a; Sudduth, 2016). Both have been used to address controversy surrounding survival evidence from parapsychological research, including mediumship (paranormal communication between a living agent and some discarnate entity), reincarnation, apparitions of the dead (visual, auditory, or tactile manifestations or perceptions that defy conventional objective explanation; e.g., Irwin & Watt, 2007; MacKenzie, 1982; Melton, 2001b), poltergeists (recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis; movement of objects, noise, fires, water inundations, and other physical effects of unknown causal agency; e.g., Gauld & Cornell, 1979; Maher, 2015; Roll, 1977, 2003, 2014), and psychokinesis or PK (the mind‟s ability to affect physical systems without intervention from any recognized physical or energetic forces; Braude, 2002a; 2015; May & Marwaha, 2014, 2015b; Varvoglis & Bancel, 2015). The main evidence for survival, however, comes from mediumship and cases of the reincarnation type (CORTs). Mental mediumship refers to communication by a deceased‟s discarnate spirit (called a discarnate or communicator) through the agency of the mind and/or body of a living person (called a medium or living agent) and may involve dramatic impersonations of the deceased (e.g., Braude, 2003; Gauld, 1983, 2005; Sudduth, 2016). Physical mediumship involves communications from the deceased, manifesting in apparently paranormally facilitated actions, such as raps, table tilting, object movements, and “materializations” with the direct involvement of the medium (e.g., Beischel & Zingrone, 2015; Gauld, 1977; Kelly & Arcangel, 2011). Survivalists (e.g. Becker, 1993, 1995; Habermas & Moreland, 1992, 2004; Rivas, 2003) regard evidence from certain near-death experiences (NDEs), incidents reported by people who have demonstrated characteristics of death yet regain consciousness afterwards (e.g., Greyson, 2014; Ring, 2006; Van Lommel, 2010; Holden, 2009), especially those featuring veridical out-of-body experiences (OBEs), as supporting survival. OBE refers to a mental state in which consciousness and perception seem to come from an extrasomatic location (e.g., Braude, 2001; Griffin, 1997; Sudduth, 2016), and while OBEs occur under numerous conditions, they are frequent in NDEs. The most significant rival of the survival hypothesis has been the living agent psi (LAP) hypothesis (Braude, 2003, 2009a, 2014; Griffin, 1997; Sudduth, 2009, 2014; 2016), formerly called the super-psi or super-ESP hypothesis, referring to an arguably unlimited “acquisition of information about, or response to, an external event, object, or influence (mental or physical; past, present, or future) in a way other than through any of the known sensory channels” (May & Marwaha, 2015a, p. 8; the term LAP will be used throughout this paper). According to the LAP hypothesis survival evidence can be explained exclusively “in terms of psychological and paranormal resources of living agents” (Sudduth, 2009, p. 167), psychic functioning involving the information exchange with discarnate and/or living persons (e.g., mental mediumship, psychic readings) and mentally facilitated physical influencing of objects (e.g., physical mediumship, poltergeists, PK). If a dying person‟s brain in NDEs with an OBE-component (NDEs/OBE) can sustain conscious experience, the anomalous acquisition of information in these instances may involve LAP. Survivalists (e.g., Almeder, 1992, 1997; Lund, 2009, 2012; Fontana, 2006, 2010) oppose the LAP hypothesis, arguing that satisfactory explanations of mediumship, reincarnation, and NDEs/OBE would require psi of limitless power, or at least more potent than that demonstrated ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 323 in spontaneous cases or controlled conditions. However, real-life psychic functioning could be significantly more wide-ranging and manageable than experimental demonstrations indicate (e.g., Braude, 2009a, 2014, 2016; Sudduth, 2013, 2014, 2016). Since the nature and the limits of psi are unknown, it is unwarranted to impose confines on psi in survival cases. It has been established that LAP cannot be refuted on theoretical grounds (Braude, 2002b, 2003; Gauld, 1983; Sudduth, 2014, 2016). Moreover, LAP is grounded in paranormal phenomena, such as ESP and PK, backed by substantial empirical research. Neither hypothesis, however, has ascendency in explaining post-mortem survival for different but compelling reasons (e.g., Braude, 2014; Sudduth, 2009, 2014). A third hypothesis, the psychic or cosmic reservoir hypothesis postulates an implicit source of anomalous information used by the living or discarnates in mediumship, CORTs, ESP studies, and psychic readings. At its root, is the conjecture that all sentient experiences of intelligent organisms are in some way accessible by an appropriate level of psychic functioning (e.g., Berger & Berger, 1991b; Fontana, 2010; Melton, 2001c). Recent mediumship research has presented a quintessential source-of-psi (SoP) problem. Both quantitative (e.g., Beischel, et al., 2017; Rock & Beischel, 2008) and qualitative (e.g. Beischel et al., 2017; Rock, et al., 2009) findings indicate that mediums‟ experiences during mediumistic communications and telepathic psychic readings with the living have qualitative differences (cf. Beischel & Rock, 2009; Jamieson & Rock, 2014; Rock & Storm, 2015). Some mediums claim they can distinguish between a) communicating with discarnates and living persons, and b) obtaining information from discarnates and a psychic reservoir, which may involve different sources of psi. The presence in mediumistic communications of discarnate psi, a psychic functioning attributed to discarnates involving ESP and/or PK, is commonly acknowledged (Sudduth, 2009, 2016). Studies also revealed that during psychic readings mediums contact what they described as “friendly” ethereal entities such as angelic beings, familiar communicators, and spirit guides. However, along with differences, the studies also found similarities in medium‟s experiences during discarnate communications and psychic readings. While these mixed results indicate that the source of psi cannot be definitively identified, they suggest a multiple sources of psi (MSoP) hypothesis, which would involve the co-functioning of LAP and psi-based processes that mediate different cognitive and/or physical manifestations of discarnates. Essentially, the MSoP hypothesis postulates the coexistence of multiple sources of psi: discarnates, living persons, and a psychic reservoir. By including the explanatory virtues, such as “simplicity, consilience, conservatism, and coherence” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 42) and compensating for the deficiencies of other hypotheses, a novel MSoP hypothesis demonstrates the potential for enhanced explanatory power and the promise of providing the most comprehensive explanation for mediumship data, anomalous processes behind psychic readings, transfer of personality aspects from a deceased to a newly born person in CORTs, psi functioning in NDEs/OBE, acquisition of anomalous information in remote viewing, and paranormal activity in poltergeists. Moreover, the MSoP hypothesis resolves the theoretical impasse between the survival and LAP hypotheses, is compatible with both reincarnation and psychic reservoir hypotheses, and enhances the prospects for future research of a broad variety of paranormal phenomena. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 324 The Survival Hypothesis In Western and Eastern spiritual traditions, beliefs in an afterlife, reincarnation, and eternal existence have been grounded in sacred teachings and practices, whereas Western philosophies support or oppose the idea of personal survival on theoretical and empirical grounds. Survivalists claim their hypothesis is superlative to rivals in explaining evidential data (Sudduth, 2014). Some critics (e.g., Geach, 1987; Flew 1996, 1997; Edwards, 1997a, 1997b; Rosenberg, 1998) question the validity of the evidence, maintaining that the empirical world rejects the idea or, at the very least, the plausibility of survival. Others (e.g., Braude, 2009a, 2014; Sudduth, 2014, 2016), while not denying survival, contend that the interpretation of data does not render the survival hypothesis the best explanation. Since the end of the 19th century a number of authors (e.g., Ducasse, 1961; Murphy, 1945a, 1945b; Myers, 1903; Price 1953) systematically examined survival evidence. Empirical data supporting the survival hypothesis primarily come from mediumship, CORTs, and possibly NDEs/OBE and post-mortem apparitions (Sudduth, 2009). Common explanations for survival phenomena fall into three general categories. The first includes ordinary causes, in which information is obtained by natural means, such as cryptomnesia (unconscious recall of covertly existing forgotten memories); intentional or unintentional fraud; and human errors (e.g., faulty documenting, misperception, misinterpretation of facts, and illusions, delusions, or conscious fantasies). Although the history of paranormal research is not short of such incidents, such explanations cannot account for all thoroughly investigated cases (Gauld, 2005, 2007). Another naturalistic interpretation implies manifestations of multiple personalities caused by the dissociative functioning typical for trance-like states (e.g., Braude, 1995, 2009b; Krippner, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Roxburgh & Roe, 2011). The second category includes explanations grounded in the belief that some significant memories and/or aspects of personality survive death. Strong evidence comes from mental mediumship, such as mediums‟ displaying the alleged authentic behaviors of a discarnate personality (Almeder, 1992, 1996; Ducasse, 1961; Gauld, 2007; Lund, 2009), or from children in CORTs (e.g., Pasricha, 2019; Stevenson, 1990, 2000a, 2000b; Tucker, 2005, 2007, 2013). Survivalists (e.g., Almeder, 1996, 1997; Kelly, 2007b; Lund, 2009) have argued that such factually verifiable information cannot be obtained by normal or psi-based means. The explanations in the third category suggest that information in mediumship and CORTs is communicated on a psi basis, involving the living and the deceased. Since the limits of psi are unknown and some of its forms, such as ESP and PK have been validated experimentally, survivalist opponents (e.g., Braude, 2003, 2014; Sudduth, 2014, 2016) have argued that a psi-based interpretation is equally plausible, namely that information can be communicated by a discarnate to the medium (discarnate psi) or acquired from and conveyed by living agents (LAP), including children in CORTs using ESP or PK (Gauld, 2005; cf. Irwin & Watt, 2007). According to Gauld, all paranormal explanations involve persistent philosophical, empirical, and scientific problems, discussed below. Some (e.g., Fontana, 2006, 2010) find survival evidence convincing and believe that its abundance renders post-mortem survival empirically feasible; it is resisted on biological and philosophical grounds (Murphy, 1961; cf. Braude, 2014). The main difficulty, though, is lack of clarity or consensus about what constitutes acceptable evidence for survival (Gauld, 2005). Lund ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 325 (2009) claimed that different areas of survival research provide “a cumulative evidential weight sufficient to conclude that the survival hypothesis is probably true” (p. 217), and further, that its explanatory advantages combined with the shortcomings of the LAP hypothesis, render the survival hypothesis superior. Sudduth (2013) challenged this claim on two counts: 1) the data the survival hypothesis explains are no less implausible than those the LAP hypothesis expounds, rendering criticisms of LAP “significantly defective” (p. 283); and 2) the survival hypothesis is not “an antecedently credible hypothesis that leads us to expect observational data that are otherwise improbable” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 42). Having examined the arguments for survival based on known properties of the empirical world, Sudduth (2016; cf. Hart, 1959; Tyrrell, 1961) determined they lacked good evidence for survival. The survival hypothesis aims to explain data for a discarnate‟s continuing purpose-driven, goaloriented, and memory-based mental processes responsive to the demand conditions in a manner characteristic of the ante-mortem personality. It presumes discarnate interactionism, a causal interface between discarnates and the physical world involving discarnates‟ acquisition and communication of empirical knowledge about events in the material world, as well as creating physical effects (Sudduth, 2009). Even if discarnates inhabit a reality consistent with their needs, wants, and recollections of prior life, discarnate interactionism may not happen: discarnates may remain unaware of conventional physical reality and have no interaction with the living or other discarnates. Data for the survival hypothesis, however, relies fully on discarnate interactionism. A scientific hypothesis is only as good as its predictive power, required for testability, and the survival hypothesis faces an essential problem: discarnate survival does not inherently lead to a rational conclusion that discarnates have effectual mental capacity to purposefully produce evidence of survival, such that any of the following may be true: 1) discarnates survive death but lack the mental abilities to causally affect material reality; 2) they retain consciousness and willing to communicate, but lack the power to do so; 3) they posses sufficient power, but do not wish to do so; or 4) they lack the power, will, and interest to communicate (Sudduth, 2014). Simply put, the mere survival of consciousness does not provide grounds for manifestation of post-mortem survival. Although a simple survival hypothesis postulating continuity of the self after bodily death does not have predictive significance, if supplemented by adequate auxiliary hypotheses, it can potentially gain predictive power (Sudduth, 2014). According to discarnate interactionism, discarnates are intelligent beings possessing psychological properties, such as beliefs, needs, and intentions, and capable of manifesting phenomena suggestive of survival, leading Sudduth to propose the first auxiliary hypothesis that “at least some discarnate persons possess the power, desire, and intention to communicate with the living” (p. 47). Veracious data suggests that they have knowledge about the minds of living and other deceased beings, as well as of events in the physical world, Sudduth‟s second auxiliary hypothesis. The paranormal nature of discarnate interactionism necessitates the discarnate psi hypothesis (Sudduth, 2009), the third auxiliary hypothesis that some discarnates demonstrate potent psi functioning allowing them to communicate with the living (cf. Braude, 2003, 2014; Broad, 1962; Gauld, 1983). All four combined represent a more robust survival hypothesis that satisfies the requirements for expecting manifestations of survival phenomena as a result of discarnate interactionism and suggests the existence of evidence for post-mortem survival in the physical world. Nevertheless, even this strengthened survival hypothesis lacks predictability ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 326 (Sudduth, 2014). Even in the best mediumship cases, it is impossible to predict whether any discarnate will interact with the living agent, who that discarnate will be, and any particulars of discarnate communication, such as its time, form, or context. The same applies to the reincarnation hypothesis; evidential data in CORTs does not allow predictions. Strong theoretical differences exist in the interpretation and assessment of survival evidence, as well as the analysis of essential properties of the survival hypothesis. This remains the focus of controversy. While even strengthened survival hypothesis is not sufficiently robust, it is supported by experimental studies of various paranormal phenomena. Survival and Reincarnation Reincarnation, “the notion that a nonphysical element of human existence not only survives but subsequently is reborn in another body” (Irwin & Watt, 2007, p. 208), has ancient and deep roots, but not until the second half of the 20th century did empirical evidence for reincarnation began to attract serious researchers (Carter, 2012; Kuhlmann-Wilsdorf, 2008; Mills, 2008). Accidental investigation of spontaneous reincarnation experiences occurred in India in the 1920s (Pasricha & Stevenson, 1987; Sahay, 1927; Sunderlal, 1924), but systematic study of CORTs only began in the early 1960s with Stevenson‟s (1960a, 1960b) examining the accounts of young children who reported ostensible memories of previous lives. Stevenson introduced the reincarnation hypothesis, “not a matter of belief, but an empirical issue, based on very specific experiences and observations” (Grof, 2000, p. 235), aiming to explain them, irrespective of cultural or social background, or belief in reincarnation. Reincarnation phenomena are usually associated with past-life memories or experiences, “impressions that individuals report in which they have experienced themselves as a particular person with an identity (other than their current life identity) in a previous time or life span” (Mills & Tucker, 2014, p. 305). Objective verification of past-life experiences has become the focus of CORT research (e.g., Irwin & Watt, 2007; Kelly, 2013; Mills & Tucker, 2014, 2015). In strong cases, children revealed specific, intimate details about the environment and life events of their previous personality, including the circumstances of their death (e.g., Stevenson, 1974, 1977c; 1987, 1997b, 2000a; Haraldsson, 2003; Tucker, 2007) and past relationships with their current or a totally different family (Tucker, 2008). The child did not simply exhibit knowledge, but claimed “to remember having lived a past life as some particular formerly living person” (Sudduth, 2016, p. 107, italics in original). Such memories appeared to be integral part of the child‟s current personality, revealed as autobiographical narrative. In most CORTs (e.g., Haraldsson, 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Pasricha, 2008a, 2008b, 2019; Stevenson, 1974, 1977c, 1983, 1987, 2000a, 2003; Tucker, 2007, 2013), the previous personality continuously manifested for a prolonged period, to the point that the current identity was overtaken by the previous personality, rather like a long-term possession (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Stevenson 1974; Stevenson, Pasricha, & McLean-Rice, 1989) in contrast to the transient possession of mediumship (Gauld, 2005). Ex hypothesi, reincarnation represents an ostensible embodied survival, circumventing some personal identity issues raised by disembodied survival (e.g., Helm, 1978; Penelhum, 1971; Purtill, 1973; cf. Broad, 1976; Braude, 2005). At the same time, the reincarnation hypothesis ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 327 does not address the physical permanence of previous personality (Beloff, 1977; Braude, 1992a), but only psychological continuity, although in some cases, discrete physical elements, such as bodily marks or birth defects, persist (e.g., Pasricha, 1998; Pasricha et al., 2005; Stevenson, 1997a). Whereas “none of this compels us to postulate a numerical identity” (Beloff, 1977, p. 764), subjectively, the link to one‟s past self is memory. Thus, when in reincarnation the same mind might enliven different bodies, continuity is not an issue, and memory should be a decisive factor (Beloff, 1993). Despite an enormous body of empirical evidence, Gardner Murphy (1973) argued that children more likely possessed implicit psychic powers sufficient to utilize any form of ESP to obtain knowledge of their previous personalities. Stevenson (1977a, 1987, 1997b, 2000a, 2003) also considered the plausibility of other interpretations. Some CORTs could involve LAP rather than explanations based on the survival hypothesis (1977b), though LAP does not provide a comprehensive explanation for such cases (Rivas, 1993). Furthermore, CORTs and mediumship cases with a drop-in communicator share some strong and weak explanatory elements, as both can be interpreted on the basis of the LAP hypothesis. However, both raise a legitimate question why the medium or child using exceptional psychic abilities to paranormally acquire information chooses (consciously or unconsciously) to imitate the cognitive patterns of one specific individual. The LAP hypothesis does not offer simple and direct answer. Moreover, whereas mediums were known on numerous occasions outside sittings to demonstrate extraordinary psychic powers (Barrington, Stevenson, & Weaver, 2005; Crabtree, 2007; Gauld, 1983; Stevenson, 1977b), children in CORTs (with few exceptions) did not do so in their daily lives (cf. Lund, 2009). Besides the cognitive aspects, many CORTs provided evidence for post-mortem survival involving manifestations of specific behavioral patterns and emotional longings (e.g., Haraldsson, 1997, 2003; Pasricha, 1996, 2019; Stevenson, 1990, 2000b; Tucker, 2005, 2007), not easily explained by LAP (Stevenson, 1977b; Matlock, 2019). Analysis suggests that the reincarnation explanation for CORTs‟ data is logical and consistent (Matlock, 1990, 2019) and that the reincarnation hypothesis provides the most parsimonious interpretation of the evidence (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Beloff, 1993; Rivas, 1993; Slavoutski [Merlin], 2012). Survival and Mediumship At the end of the 19th century, mediumship produced a large volume of high quality data, a “historically important component of survival research” (Irwin & Watt, 2007, p. 139), but by the mid-20th century, interest declined, probably attributable to the deadlock between the survival and LAP hypotheses (Kelly, 2010). Neither mental nor physical mediumship provides direct support for the survival hypothesis. “Evidence of survival (if any) comes from the content of the communications – the memories, personal characteristics, intellectual skills, etc., apparently displayed” (Gauld, 2005, p. 216). The medium‟s involvement can range from a fully waking state, to light trance, to a deep dissociative state (trance mediumship), in which their usual personalities are seemingly replaced by that of the discarnate spirit. Along with demonstrating behaviors recognized as typical of the deceased (e.g., mannerisms, wording, articulation, humor, etc.), some forms of mediumship, such as proxy sittings, drop-in communicator, and crosscorrespondences are considered strong evidence for the survival hypothesis by some (e.g., Almeder, 1992, 1996, 1997; Kelly, 2007b; Lund, 2009) but not others (e.g., Braude, 1996, 1997, 2003, 2014; Griffin, 1997; Sudduth, 2014, 2016). In proxy sitting, the sitter or séance participant ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 328 and the medium intend to receive messages for a non-present, living third party whose personal circumstances, concerns, or wishes are unknown. In drop-in communicator cases, no one among the sitters, including the medium, expects or requests the presence of a particular discarnate whose previous life identity may or may not be recognized. Cross-correspondences were reported in a few cases, in which the identity of the communicator was verified, and goals and intentions were apparent but did not coincide with any of the sitters or medium (Richmond, 1938). After analyzing all three types, Kelly (2010) recommended that survival investigations focus on proxy sittings to overcome the rival hypotheses impasse. Some (e.g., Braude 2003; Gauld 1983; Stevenson 1970) held that drop-in communicator cases provide the most plausible interpretation of data since sitters and medium do not expect the communicator, know nothing about their identity, and thus cannot willingly or involuntarily engage an ostensible discarnate, such that a more probable reason for contact might be a presumed need of the communicator rather than of the living (Sudduth, 2016). On the other hand, cross-correspondences may demonstrate the superiority of the survival hypothesis owing to two factors. First, the communications are intentionally structured based on intelligent design with a consistent, goal-driven source of information (Gauld 1983; Griffin 1997). Since multiple mediums, unknown to each other, receive separate messages, their meaning becomes clear only when individual messages are analyzed together. Second, this type of communication is allegedly initiated and maintained based on motivation of a deceased individual and not of living agents, individually or collectively (Kelly, 2010). Sudduth (2016), however, questioned the latter, noting that the most famous cross-correspondence communications involved three deceased members of the Society for Psychical Research, whose survivalist bias during life “arguably would have had an overriding interest in producing evidence that would be better explained by survival than by the alternatives” (p. 91). Since the content of cross-correspondence messages is extremely complex, rendering analysis difficult, their value as evidence for the survival hypothesis cannot be easily appraised (Irwin & Watt, 2007). Survival evidence from mediums in part comes from discarnates‟ veridical reports of real-world facts, including their experiences related to such data. Since discarnates lack bodies, survivalists must explain how such information is obtained without normal sensory apparatus. Disembodied persons lack the corporeal perceptual capacity allowing for the localization or spatial orientation of sensory experience, i.e., “perspectival awareness” of “things that normally can only be observed or experienced from certain points of view in space” (Braude, 2009a, p. 197). In Braude‟s view, the only way survivalists can meet the challenge of discarnate interactionism in the absence of perspectival awareness is via routine clairvoyance. Studies on clairvoyance and remote viewing have demonstrated that a concrete observational locale during normal sensory processing is not necessary for an authentic awareness of material-world events. Such “nonperspectival awareness” (p. 202) is possible logically as well as empirically. A discarnate‟s “awareness of physical states unmediated by the physical and sensory mechanisms” is “a paradigm instance” (p. 208) of clairvoyance that allows for either perspectival or nonperspectival awareness. So, it is reasonable that post-mortem awareness as well as discarnate psi would also be an instance of ESP. Braude proposed that “the survival hypothesis presupposes the operation of refined or frequent clairvoyance and telepathy between the deceased and the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 329 physical world” (p. 208), thus providing explanatory merits for the survival hypothesis. Besides, including ESP in discarnate psi grounds the survival hypothesis in a sizable body of experimental and case ESP evidence – “empirical footing” (p. 206), however limited and contentious. To qualify as acceptable evidence, mediumistic information must be specific and veridical – that is, sufficiently abundant, intimate, and exclusive, as well as independently verifiable that it has not been obtained through chance or interpreted on the basis of open-source data (Braude, 2003, 2014; Sudduth, 2016). However, even after meeting these criteria, clear-cut interpretation of survival evidence is paradoxically challenging. Uniformly, the best cases contain a vexing blend of data suggestive of survival, LAP, and evident gobbledygook (Braude, 2003, Broad, 1962), complicating accurate analysis (Kelly, 2017). Descriptions of events and activities of the living, as well as their thoughts and feelings, suggest LAP and/or discarnate psi (cf. Sudduth, 2009). In LAP, the sourcing of information may not even be conscious and can involve an involuntary extrasensory contact with a living source (Anonymous, 1923; Dallas, 1924). Not surprisingly after over a century of meticulous investigations, scholars have not agreed on the superiority of any paranormal explanation for mediumistic communications. Survival and NDEs Especially since Moody‟s (1975) publication of Life After Life, NDEs became the subject of intense debates (Agrillo, 2011). In a large number of clinical death cases, individuals reported realistic experiences of “leaving their body, entering other realms of existence, meeting deceased relatives, and having a review of their life” (Sudduth, 2016, p. 58; cf. Fenwick, 2012; Greyson, 2014; Parnia, 2013; Van Lommel, 2011b; Zingrone & Alvarado, 2009). Encounters with deceased individuals during an NDE are common (e.g., Fenwick & Fenwick, 2008, 2012; Greyson, 2010a; Kelly et al., 2007). Often the identity of the deceased or fact of their death unknown to the NDEr was later verified (Greyson, 2010a; cf. Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019; Kelly, 2001; Rousseau, 2012), refuting the “expectation hypothesis” (that the visions are hallucinations triggered by the NDErs‟ expectation). Many eminent scholars (e.g., Alexander, 2012; Beauregard, 2012; Greyson et.al, 2009; Holden, 2009; Parnia, 2013; Van Lommel, 2010, 2011a) claimed that NDEs provide strong evidence of survival. Critics (e.g., Blackmore, 1993, 2007; Braithwaite, 2008; Craffert, 2015a; Mobbs & Watt, 2011; Nelson, 2017; Woerlee, 2005) have argued on a physicalist basis that death-state neurophysiology can account for these subjective experiences, lending no support for the survival hypothesis, though notably none of their arguments can account for all of the data. A number of studies analyzed NDEs to support the survival hypothesis (Cook [Kelly] et al., 1998; Kelly et al., 1999-2000; Kelly, 2001), specifically that three commonly reported characteristics present in the same experience would be necessary and sufficient to provide evidence for survival: 1) enhanced mentation, such as clarity and lucidity of cognition and heightened perceptual vividness when mental and physiological functioning are significantly compromised; 2) OBEs; and 3) paranormal perceptions allowing access to phenomena beyond the reach of normal senses, typically inaccessible in normal consciousness. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 330 Brain functioning during an NDE might vary from considerably reduced cognition to no measurable activity (Sudduth, 2016). Nevertheless, many NDErs have reported full and even enhanced cognitive operations while clinically dead (Kelly et al., 2007; Van Lommel, 2010). Clinical death is characterized by body-wide circulatory insufficiency, respiratory failure, and lack of electrical brain activity and brainstem reflexes, caused by cessation of effective heart function (e.g., Greyson 2010b; Quigley, 2011). While people experiencing clinical death may still be reanimated (e.g., Engmann, 2014), unsuccessful resuscitation results in brain or biological (irreversible) death (Craffert, 2015a; Engmann, 2014). Even flat EEG readings during NDEs do not necessarily indicate total cessation of brain functioning (Braithwaite, 2008); consequently, it is impossible to affirm that during NDE “there is no residual activity going on in the brain that could be the locus for the experiences” (Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019, para 4; cf. Borjigin et al., 2013; Chawla et al., 2009). The brain showing no measurable neurophysiological activity can still acquire and retain meaningful information, indicating that consciousness may continue during clinical death. Based on that, critics question whether “temporary” death is relevant to the survival hypothesis. Considering the experient‟s moribund physical condition, NDEs/OBE are deemed essential as they often involve unexpected and unusual psycho-emotional experiences, during which some people demonstrated veridical knowledge about distant places and events unattainable through normal senses (e.g., Braude, 2001; Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019; Kelly et al., 2007). Verified reports of incidents happening to or around the clinically dead NDEr are frequent (e.g., Bellg, 2015; Greyson, 2007a, 2009, 2010b; Holden, 2009, 2017; Rivas et al., 2016) and defy conventional explanation (e.g., Hasker & Taliaferro, 2019; Sartori et al., 2006; Sharp, 1995). “Apparently non-physical veridical perception” (Holden, 2017, p. 79, italics in original) while the brain is incapacitated challenge physicalist NDE hypotheses. An OBEr‟s impression that their consciousness has separated from their body can be so convincing, they may truly believe that it can survive death (Gauld, 2005). However, even in conjunction with NDEs, OBEs are not direct evidence for survival (Griffin, 1997), and no consensus exists (e.g., Almeder, 1992; Alvarado, 2001; Paterson, 1995; Woodhouse, 1994). Thus, Braude (2001) asserted that the survival argument in “its most careful and plausible form” (p. 87) still renders the connection between OBE and survival questionable. From the neuroscientific perspective, OBEs are seen as brain phenomena possibly “caused by a functional disintegration in lower-level multisensory processing (vestibular, proprioceptive, tactile, and visual information)” (Bünning & Blanke, 2005, p. 346; Blanke & Arzy, 2005). The neurophysiological mechanisms in some altered states of consciousness may produce the “undercontrol of the usual sensory and perceptual processes” (Gabbard & Twemlow, 1984, p. 238; cf. Saavedra-Aguilar & Gómez-Jeria, 1989), resulting in unexpected OBE imagery. Some (e.g., Gauld, 2005; Braude, 2003; cf. Cheyne & Girard, 2009; De Ridder et al., 2007; Mobbs & Watt, 2011) considered OBEs merely extensive hallucinations, imaginative productions of creative mind, suggesting that expanded paranormal awareness during OBEs may not be a result of consciousness separating from the body, but rather hallucinatory experience for acquiring information by ESP (cf. Krishnan, 1985). Hasker and Taliaferro (2019) concurred. Hallucinations mediating psi-based information acquisition may manifest similar to dreams, visions, spontaneous imagery, and altered states of consciousness. Anecdotal and experimental ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 331 evidence indicates that some non-ordinary states are psi-conducive (e.g., Braud, 1975, 1978, 2002b; Carpenter, 2015; Rock et al., 2013; Tressoldi et al., 2010). OBEs are also believed to provide evidence of psychic functioning, such as clairvoyance and remote viewing. The assessment of veridical perception in NDEs/OBE has been complicated by reliance on retrospective studies without appropriate control procedures, and a few prospective studies with visual targets hidden in projected locations failed to produce any evidence (Greyson, 2014; cf. Craffert, 2015a; Parnia et al. 2014; Trent-von Haesler & Beauregard, 2013), perhaps attributable to the dying person‟s lack of incentive to examine and remember targets designed by researchers. Proponents of non-local consciousness (e.g., Kelly, 2007a, 2015; Kelly, 2007; Weiss, 2015) believe that the mind, personality, or self may not be dependent on the body‟s limitations in any case, an argument too complex for treatment here. Suffice to say, substantial theoretical and empirical data (e.g., Beauregard, 2012; Fenwick, 2012; Greyson, 2010b; Holden 2009, 2017; Parnia, 2014; Trent-von Haesler & Beauregard, 2013; Van Lommel, 2006, 2011a, 2013) suggests “ontological autonomy of consciousness” (Sudduth, 2016, p. 47). Since there are sufficient grounds to suppose that NDEs/OBE are genuine and veridical, it is rational to assume that they represent post-mortem continuity of consciousness (Dell‟Olio, 2010). Current methodologies do not confirm neurophysiological hypotheses accounting for NDEs (Greyson, 2014), certainly not that NDEs are dependent on such mechanisms (Greyson, 2013; Kelly et al., 2007). Moreover, important data incongruent with the mainstream physicalist paradigm have been frequently ignored, and brain-related psychopathology is qualitatively different from NDE phenomenology (Greyson, 2007b), rendering neurobiological explanations of NDEs speculative at best (Facco & Agrillo, 2012; Fracasso & Friedman, 2011). At the same time, evidence for mind-body separateness essentially is nonexistent or at the very least inconclusive (e.g., Braithwait, 2008; Long & Perry, 2010; Laws & Perry, 2010). Due to the extremely short time during which NDEs are believed to occur, hypothetically the mind could become dissociated from the brain, “but cannot survive for long in the absence of neuroanatomical structures” (Agrillo, 2011, p. 8). No matter how compelling the claim of nonlocality of consciousness, it does not lead to or warrant the assumption that the mind can survive biological death (e.g., Engmann, 2014; Greyson, 2014; Potts, 2002; Craffert, 2015a, 2019). An argument that NDEs/OBE at most can identify only unconventional or paranormal methods of information access and retrieval is concurrent with the supposition that consciousness relies on the functioning of active brain (Ducasse, 1961; cf. Borjigin et al., 2013; Craffert, 2015a; Irwin, 2014). It is still not improbable that veridical NDEs/OBE could indirectly support the survival hypothesis (Braude, 2003; Sudduth, 2016) or offer supplemental support in conjunction with evidence from mediumship and CORTs (Braude, 2003; Kelly et al., 1999-2000). Survival and Apparitions of the Dead Apparitions of the dead, a focus of early survival research, have been considered “second in importance only to the best medium-produced material as proof of survival” (Moore, 1981, p. 127; cf. Fontana, 2010). Traditionally, the so-called spirit hypothesis suggested that apparitions represent an essential aspect of post-mortem existence, involving principles (e.g. Hart, 1956, 1959, 1967; Crookall, 1970) similar to those behind the NDEs/OBE, further inferring unceasing post-mortem existence of the ecsomatic (out-of-body) aspect (Irwin & Watt, 2007). However, ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 332 commonly reported descriptions of fully clothed apparitional figures have challenged the spirit hypothesis (e.g., Ducasse, 1961, 1969; Griffin, 1997; Moore, 1981), as have the unconvincing results of experimental studies employing apparition-detecting equipment (e.g., Maher & Hansen, 1992, 1995). Today most parapsychologists have rejected the spirit hypothesis (Irwin & Watt, 2007; Maher, 2015). According to Paterson (1995), post-mortem apparitions represent transitory manifesting figures that strongly resemble the ante-mortem deceased, demonstrating their survived minds‟ continuity. Some scholars (e.g., Gauld, 2005; Paterson, 1995; Stokes, 2007; cf. Lester, 2005) believed that the image of the deceased, as well as the conveyed information, and intent behind such communications to be the conscious or unconscious mental productions of the observer. Even when multiple observers share the same experience, the possibility of “collective” hallucination cannot be ruled out (West, 1948; cf. Moore, 1981): an acceptable account of collective cases has not yet been established (Irwin & Watt, 2007). Providing accurate information initially unknown to the witness points to involvement of some form of paranormal process (Griffin, 1997, Lund, 2012), suggesting two probable explanations: 1) apparitions show evidence for post-mortem manifestations of the deceased, and 2) they denote LAP functioning, involving some form of ESP (Fontana, 2010). Stevenson (1982b) concluded that collective cases (more than one person concurrently witnessing the same apparition at the same place) and reciprocal cases (when a living person is perceived as an apparition and the latter confirms afterwards that it saw the observer at the same place; Lester, 2005) along with apparitional characteristics, such as reflections in mirrors and gesticulation, are less likely to be explained by ESP. He also argued that ESP is not probable in manifestations showing “the purposiveness of the deceased” (Lester, 2005, p. 172) because when such purpose is representative of the apparent person rather than of the observer or other living individuals, it suggests the survival hypothesis, not the overcomplicated and perplexing explanations offered by LAP (Lund, 2009). Both the survival and LAP hypotheses would involve a high level of psychic functioning, namely, discarnate psi (Lund, 2009; Sudduth, 2016). If veridical cases can be explained by discarnate psi, then the sufficiently credible apparitional theory must include the interactive performance of the deceased (Griffin, 1997) that may entail some form of ESP-based input from them (e.g., Becker, 1993; Griffin, 1997; Paterson, 1995), a proposal that can neither be empirically corroborated nor refuted (Lester, 2005). If on the other hand, some aspect of the apparition happens to have such input, “the stream of consciousness of the deceased person persists after death” (p. 168). Some survivalists (e.g., Lund, 2009; Myers, 1892) claimed that apparitional phenomena involve post-mortem psychological continuity of an ante-mortem mind, implying discarnate consciousness (Irwin & Watt, 2007). Paterson (1995) proposed a mechanism behind the discarnate psi functioning in apparitional cases: an imaginary construct or hallucinatory representation of an apparitional figure is sourced from the deceased‟s mind and telepathically transmitted to the observer‟s mind. This could account for explicitly or implicitly passing on factual information to the living, as well as for the manifestation of identifiable figure of the deceased, the essential feature of the experience. It is not unreasonable to expect that a psychologically healthy individual‟s mind would construct and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 333 retain, not necessarily consciously, their ante-mortem body image. If, based on the survival hypothesis, a significant aspect of deceased‟s consciousness containing just basic psychological structures survives, then their body image also survives, although in some discarnate form. Similar to that of the living, this body image would comprise mentally reconstructed memory of physical, psychological, and behavioral characteristics. Since in the post-mortem state “its ontological status, as in life, would be mental” (p. 48), it can be projected telepathically to the minds of the living, with the same effort as any other essential aspects of the deceased‟s mind. Historically, some apparition theories were congruent with the survival hypothesis (e.g., Crookall, 1970; Gurney et al., 1918/1962; Hart, 1956, 1959; Myers, 1889-1890, 1892). Recently, opinions have been more cautious or even strongly critical. Survivalists (e.g., Carter, 2012; Laszlo, 2014; Paterson, 1995) have argued that evidence suggests the reality of post-mortem apparitional functioning and presents “obvious proof of an apparition of a dead person being „real‟” (Lester, 2005, p. 170, author‟s emphasis). Paterson (1995) considered apparitional experiences of the dead authentic, and from the survival hypothesis perspective, veridical, proposing their significance for post-mortem survival based on: 1) number of sightings; 2) dependability and overdetermination of witness statements; 3) environmental awareness exhibited by apparitions; 4) demonstrated purposeful behavior; and 5) the truth of communicated information unknown to the observer at sighting but later verified. Since reciprocal apparitions have much in common with apparitions of the dead, they may also provide a reasonable support for survival (Lund, 2009). Stevenson (1982b) suggested that collective cases, post-mortem apparitions with evidence of purpose, and reciprocal cases provide stronger support for the survival hypothesis, though relatively scarce. According to Paterson (1995), the evidence from apparitions is definitely stronger than mediumship evidence of discarnates. On the other hand, apparition reports as evidence of survival are problematic: the majority are outdated; many are based on earlier memories, which could be inaccurate and distorted; and the vast majority come from ordinary people, lacking skills and experience in experimental research (Lester, 2005). Besides inadequate specificity and veracity, the investigations based on these reports are statistically insignificant due to their small sample. The hypothesis of post-mortem mind continuity, allegedly demonstrated by apparitional phenomena, lacks robust empirical evidence and, compared to other sources, apparitions offer the weakest evidence for survival. The LAP Hypothesis Early psychical researchers were aware of the problems with evidence for survival (e.g., Crabtree, 2007; Braude, 2003, 2014; Krippner et al., 2013; Sudduth, 2009, 2014, 2016). For example, Flournoy (1900, 1911/2007) deemed mediums capable of creating imaginative personalities and dramatizing their narratives via automatisms. Later he believed telepathy was significantly involved in mediumistic communications and ultimately introduced the LAP hypothesis (Crabtree, 2007; cf. Braude, 2003, 2014; Sudduth, 2009; 2014, 2016). Mediums‟ exceptional psychic abilities, including telepathy and clairvoyance, beyond séance settings, contributed to its advancement (Crabtree, 2007; cf. Barrington et al., 2005; Gauld, 1983; Stevenson, 1977b). According to the LAP hypothesis, mediumistic communications include a “Super-ESP Component,” mediums‟ sufficient ESP powers to access and retrieve any information related to ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 334 the deceased, and a “Superplasticity Component,” their unconscious ability to embody and dramatize this paranormal information to realistically portray the deceased (Crabtree, 2007, p. 360, italics in original). Braude (1989, 1992b, 2003) made “the most empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated” effort to advance a robust LAP hypothesis (Sudduth, 2016, p. 271) whose explanatory power is enhanced by some psychological expounding component (cf. Ducasse 1961; Hart 1959; Lund 2009; Stevenson 1974), which can account for a broader scope of evidence, including impersonations. Survivalists nevertheless argue that LAP has little or no explanatory power concerning the variety of abilities demonstrated by mediums and some children in CORTS: First, LAP is limited to propositional knowledge, “the articulation of facts or items of information (often called „knowledge-that‟)” and unable to account for applied knowledge, “the manifestation of abilities and skills (usually considered a type of „knowledge-how‟)” (Braude, 2003, p. 9, italics in original); Second, the development of skills that mediums or children do not originally possess would normally require extensive learning and practicing (Sudduth, 2014; cf. Braude, 1992a, 1992b, 2003; Stevenson, 1977c, 1987, 1992, 2000a). However outside survival, dissociative experiences, such as dissociative identity disorder, commonly involve the spontaneous exhibition of previously unknown cognitive patterns and behaviors, such as extraordinary language skills, artistic abilities, and musical talents (e.g., Moline, 2013; Putnam, 1989; Ross, 1997). This does not imply that mediums or children in CORTs attained those abilities through LAP. There is no indication that those skills “have been transferred or acquired, only that novel skills are suddenly manifested without any obvious antecedents,” which studies in abnormal psychology confirm (Sudduth, 2014, p. 55, italics in original). According to Braude (2003, 2014) and Sudduth (2014), the robust LAP hypothesis involves the “motivated-psi” hypothesis, “the operation of psychic abilities in the services of some agent's genuine or perceived needs and interests” (Braude, 2003, p. 13, italics in original). In this enhanced hypothesis, psi offers an alternative source of autobiographical information about the deceased. Motivation or psychodynamic function of psi can explain both why living agents seek such information and the impression that the deceased is the source of this information. The robust LAP hypothesis endorses the semblance of survival, allowing this function of psi to stimulate conscious or unconscious dominant drives within living individuals. When the motivated-psi hypothesis includes “motivational and dissociative psychodynamics” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 56), it becomes a robust LAP hypothesis. In the best cases, mediums possess factual, exhaustive, and personal knowledge about the anteand post-mortem existence of the deceased, “a composite of information the individual elements of which are located in independent sources (persons or documents)” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 58). Survivalists argue that, if LAP accounts for the medium‟s knowledge from multiple sources, it must be of super-psi magnitude. Though nothing is known about the actual ability of psi to handle multiple sources of information, experimental studies (Kennedy, 1980; Schmidt, 1987; cf. Schmidt, 1975, 1984) have shown that psi appears to be immune to task complexity. Thus, “psychically accessing multiple sources . . . [is] no more imposing than accessing one” (Braude, 2014, p. 29). Besides, the assumption that LAP functioning is similar to conventional sequential information processing is entirely speculative (Sudduth, 2014). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 335 Assuming psi overcomes task complexity and its functioning based exclusively on effective wish fulfillment, the streamlined agent‟s psychic activity Braude (2003) called the “magic wand hypothesis” (p. 11), it still would not escape an “argument from crippling complexity” (p. 86, italics in original; cf. Sudduth, 2014). Because psi is presumed to function in an environment of interconnected wide-ranging psi and non-psi activities, its operations are believed to be affected by a variety of explicit, implicit, local, and global interferences. To surpass these hindrances, psi must continuously demonstrate exceptional strength. Effectively functioning psi, regardless of its power is involved in multiple activities, which may cause its operations occurring elsewhere to be compromised. Therefore, besides needing to be isolated from external non-psi noise, psi requires sufficient power to overcome its own diminishing psychic effects. The excessive power, however, can obstruct its various manifestations, and thus, the overly powerful psi could become self-sabotaging. The argument of crippling complexity implies that ultimately, LAP “may not be unlimited and indeed may not even have the required degree of potency and refinement” (Sudduth, 2014, p. 60, italics in original; cf. Braude 2003) to acquire detailed, veridical information about the ante- and post-mortem existence of the deceased. Although crippling complexity challenges the explanatory power of the LAP hypothesis, it does not indicate the superiority of the survival hypothesis. The scope and sophistication of psi functioning involved in discarnate psi, which the survival hypothesis requires, is no different from what LAP needs to account for the same data (Braude, 2003, 2009a; Sudduth, 2009, 2014, 2016). If the argument of crippling complexity imposes confines on psi in an attempt to eliminate its self-sabotaging behavior, then it would also limit discarnate psi, which would reduce the explanatory power of the survival hypothesis for mediumship evidence. While maintaining that certain data might better support the survival hypothesis, Braude (2003) believed that the robust LAP hypothesis retains considerable merit. The Psychic Reservoir Hypothesis The plausibility of the LAP hypothesis suggests that psi may be involved in psychic functioning posited by both the survival and psychic reservoir hypotheses (Rock, 2014). The latter is based on the premise that information about all sentient experiences of intelligent organisms is retained in some putative implicit depository of unknown nature and location. When applied to sourcing paranormal information (e.g., in mediumship, CORTs, ESP studies, or psychic readings), this hypothesis considered an alternative to the survival and LAP hypotheses (e.g., Beischel, 2014; Fontana, 2010; Rock & Storm, 2015). Since it cannot be tested, it cannot be falsified; and having no supporting empirical evidence, it has less explanatory power than other two hypotheses. The first reference to a cosmic data repository in the context of mediumship is attributed to William James who, among other possibilities, considered “access to some cosmic reservoir, where the memory of all mundane facts is stored and grouped around personal centers of association” (1909, as cited in Leuba, 1915, p. 412; cf. Tymn, 2011). However, a concept of a collective memory store known as the Akashic Record has existed for millennia (Chaney, 1996; Krippner, 2006). Akasha is often translated as space or ether and in Hindu philosophy represents one of the two fundamental entities of the universe, the subtle substance from which all creation emerged (Vivekananda, 1996; cf. Krippner, 2006; Laszlo, 2014). In Indian tradition, the Akashic ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 321-336 Merlin, S., Beyond Survival Debates: Addressing the Source-of-Psi Problem with the Multiple Sources of Psi Hypothesis 336 Record is also called Mahat, or cosmic mind and is said to contain records of all events, thoughts, and actions happening everywhere in the universe through all time. It may be accessed by yogis in an advanced meditative state, by rishis or Vedic seers, and descriptively similar experiences have been reported by psychics in altered states of consciousness (e.g., Laszlo, 2014; Melton, 2001a; Panda, 2013; Rao, 2011). Although it is believed that recordkeeping is effected by the permanent impression of information upon akasha, the actual mechanisms are unknown. No theory claiming to offer scientific basis for such a construct was known until the late 20th century when Laszlo (2007, 2008, 2012, 2016; cf. Chaney, 1996; Grof, 2006) expanded it into “an interconnecting, information-conveying, and conserving cosmic field” (Szabo, 2017, p. 95), “augmented continuously by quantum holographic information” (Mitchell, 2009, p. 229); however, such theories remain speculative. The Akashic field is believed by some to possess indelible memory of the universe with unlimited capacity (Szabo, 2017). Information obtained by various forms of ESP have been theorized to be an integral part of this cosmic data field (Berger & Berger, 1991a, 1991b; Krippner, 2006). The psychic reservoir hypothesis, however, lacks two important explanatory virtues, conservatism and consilience (Sudduth, 2014). It arguably is based on the incomprehensible – at least from the Western scientific perspective – idea that essential data are “stored in a structure, independent of any context” (Rock & Storm, 2015, p. 571). At the same time, compared to the survival and LAP hypotheses, it offers a single, direct, and universal source of information; does not require the existence of an afterlife; does not necessitate explaining what exactly survives bodily death, including survival and reincarnation mechanisms; avoids LAP‟s needing super-psi quality; and circumvents the issue of crippling complexity in LAP functioning. Jamieson and Rock (2014) found this hypothesis helpful in demonstrating the qualitative difference between agentive and non-agentive sources of psi. (Continued on Part II) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 358 Article Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe Stephen P. Smith* Abstract Every song that carries a melody can be pitch inverted to uncover a dual song that is different to the original song and where the pitch-inverted melody also relates to our emotions. This is creating music for the minor cost of pitch inversion, and without a lot of creativity beyond technical skills. The principle is demonstrated on 50 songs, with 100% success. As a general principle this implicates a reflective property that is necessarily part of human psychology. Moreover, this discovery affirms the belief in panpsychism where the reflexive property is active as part of a broader mirror universe. Keywords: Song, pitch inversion, panpsychism, mirror universe, reflective property. 1. Introduction Panpsychism is a philosophical theory of consciousness that is gaining acceptance today (Skrbina 2017). This theory stipulates that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter. Because matter cannot be disconnected from the entire universe, panpsychism also asserts that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe. Smith (2018, 2019) described a panpsychism that relates to a fundamental symmetry described by physics, the charge-parity-time symmetry (or CPT symmetry), and also connects it to a mirror universe theory described as a two-sided CPT inversion. As a logical necessity for a comprehensible universe, it must be that the universe holds a reflective properly that permits comprehension, otherwise the world would not be comprehendible (Langan 2017). This logical necessity resembles photographic prints that are made from negative film, where the negative film equates to the reflective property in the universe as an analogy. Moreover, while the negative film is found necessary, there remains an undeclared middle-term that takes the negatives and does the work of making the prints, agreeing with Trinitarian philosophy (Smith 2008). Therefore, evidence that supports the belief in such a mirror universe comes in the form of discovering the negative film, or reflections, that are found after looking for them. This paper entertains the theoretical possibility that songs also carry a negative, or dual song, and these songs are represented by pitch-inversion. To the extent that every song that has ever been composed comes with such a dual song, that is also recognized to carry a distinct melody that evokes an emotional response to some degree, then this would constitute evidence of a mirror universe that encapsulates the emotive source. The theory predicts a 100% success rate in finding a dual song that carries a melody, not that all such melodies will be found pleasing. This is a Correspondence: Stephen P. Smith, Ph.D., Independent Researcher. E-mail: hucklebird@aol.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 359 testable prediction that is reported in this paper on 50 different attempts to create dual songs. Section 2 describes pitch inversion in music, and how to pitch-invert songs. Appendix A provides more details on how to pitch-invert sheet music by hand. These instructions were used to pitch invert 50 popular songs, using a music note editor (Cresceno, made by NCH Software). Section 3 describes the information content in songs, and how songs carry a relativity that makes them invariant to transposition. Section 4 explains how the relative information contained in a song pertains to panpsychism and the mirror universe. Section 5 summarizes the results for 50 songs, including links to YouTube videos where the songs can be heard. All 50 attempts were found successful in generating a distinct melody, most being very different from the initial song, and these findings support the belief in the mirror universe. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 2. Pitch Inversion The pitch inversion of musical notes have been studied in musical set theory (Forte 1977). Pitch inversion is defined as the flipping, or reflecting, of a note around a second note that represents the center note. The center note is selected once 1 but can be selected anywhere, but various keys have natural center notes that do not complicate the notation. For example, using the note D as the center note returns notation in C major given that the original song is in C major, where the pitch-inverted notes will have accidentals only when the original notes have accidentals. Like the transposition of notes, pitch inversion maps a song into a class without changing the tempo while making a second song. In the case of transposition, which is the raising or lowering of notes a specified number of chromatic steps, the same melody is returned. That is, melody is found invariant to transposition, even as the tone changes. Pitch inversion changes the melody, but not necessarily to an extreme extent even as extreme changes are found in particular examples. Therefore, the pitch-inverted song represents a dual song that shadows the original melody, and only when the melody and its dual are defined equivalent is a broader equivalence or invariance (representing a class) meaningful. When working with an audio file, it is possible to use software (e.g., Patrick Feaster‟s software described on griffonagedotcom.wordpress.com) to pitch-invert a song around a selected pitch (if not a note). The evolution of sound from notes played by a musical instrument are impacted by time creating a waveform signature that‟s asymmetrical in its presentation (changes in amplitude), and in any regard, pitch-inverting sound is not as pristine as pitch-inverting notes before they are played. The bigger challenge is that the chromatic scale is exponentially spaced, where frequency must be log transformed to make a linear scale for direct pitch inversion of sound. Its more straightforward to invert notes before they are turned into sound, using the natural exponential chromatic spacing. C++ Software (Craig Stuart‟s MIDI file parsing library, part of GitHub) is available for pitch-inverting a midi file around a center note. If not careful, however, reflecting midi files can lock the process into making all notes on the bass clef high notes and while making all notes on the treble clef low notes, and this creates an inflexible 1. When inverting notes in one staff. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 360 method that is not desirable. It is preferable to break a song into multiple staffs (which is tantamount to making multiple midi files), pitch-invert each staff individually using a center note that‟s natural for the key but in the middle of the staff (more or less), then transpose each staff up or down one octave to present the most desired arrangement for all the staffs together. Therefore, pitch-inversion of a song does not necessarily lock the process into a single center note. The added flexibility is actually preferred with a process that is otherwise highly automatic, and the process can now be done by hand using a good music note editor (See Appendix A). The disadvantage of doing the inversion by hand with a note editor is that the operation can introduce errors. 3. Information Contained in a Song and Relativity The exponential spacing (given by the factor 12√2) that typifies the chromatic scale is remarkable. The implication is that the human ear not only can distinguish among these notes, but actually prefers this arrangement when notes are set to music. Because the normal scale with seven notes represent a subsequence of the 12 chromatic notes, the same preference given to exponentially spaced notes is again realized. Its unclear how this preference can be explained in mathematical terms, but there is a vague hint that this preference connects to the probabilistic concept of entropy, or to the scale invariant prior and utility function of Bayesian statistics, all of which incriminate multiplicative transitions. The fact that this preference connects to consciousness makes the spacing very mysterious. Nevertheless, pitch inversion will be taken to pertain to this unusual spacing, which is not linear in pitch, it is multiplicative. The fact that a transposition of notes in a song leaves the melody intact while changing the tone, implies that the information that is recognized as a melody is contained in the relative changes of notes as time unfolds according to the tempo. Only the tempo and transitions between notes define the melody, not the absolute frequency that defines any particular note. This represents a type of relativity given by the representation of melody as the transitions given in the exponential scale. This is not saying that the melody is relative, only the representation of melody is relative. The representation does not stand in isolation to its reception in mind, i.e., something must receive the representation, and something must hold the representation to its reception. The strict application of relativity only applies to the song‟s representation, and perhaps the song‟s reception, but not to the undeclared middle-term that holds the representation to its reception. Imposing relativity on the middle-term is to imply that everything is relative, which is to confuse the thing-in-itself with appearance and is a mistake that Kant recognized in the Critique of Pure Reason. The observation that representation is relative, as is the representation‟s reception, is presumably a condition of consciousness. Information showing the middle-term gets left out of appearance by necessity, and must be apprehended by something other than simple appearance. We cannot see the middle-term for the same reason that our eyes cannot see the back of our head without the aid of a mirror; i.e., the blind spot is caused by self-referral. A mirror, or frame of reference, must always be provided in order to detect something closer to the middle-term. Likewise, a popular science turned folk philosophy might leap to the false conclusion that everything is relative (radical relativism) based on the findings of special and general relativity (if not postmodernism), but clear thinking shows that something fundamental and non-relative may go unnoticed in the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 361 possible eather that never finds experimental detection. It is not accidental that Einstein‟s theories postulated a frame of reference as a first step in his thought experiments. However, a frame of reference (even those described in physics) implies a self-referral that carries its own blind spots. 4. Panpsychism and the Mirror Universe Information of any kind presupposes the existence of consciousness. Or if consciousness is to be taken for granted, attempts to turn information into a one-sided measure (such as Shannon‟s information given the thermodynamic quantity called entropy) pushes consciousness out of the window of appearance and into a metaphysics that may get completely ignored. In the worst case this is to confuse appearance with the thing-in-itself again, as Kant warned. Nevertheless, the push of consciousness out of the one-sided appearance leaves it fully in reality as the other side of appearance, consciousness carries the appearance that is reflected off the other side, and carries an undeclared middle-term again. Consciousness becomes a fundamental substance in reality, something that is not a derivative of one-sided causation, and even if it is not admitted by those confused by appearances. This view of consciousness that connects to a fundamental is the definition of panpsychism, and because this view also carries a realty that is two-sided with an undeclared middle-term this view indicates a rediscovery of the Logos that makes a particular type of panpsychism and implies a mirror universe. The Logos that represents the absolute mover 2 of the universe acts now as a strange attactor, and forms a fractal pattern in evolution by leaving behind a reflection of itself on all levels. The mirror universe leaves behind lesser mirrors that may serve as evidence for the theory of the mirror universe. Information that represents a melody, given as tempo and the relative spacing of notes, must somehow meet the representation‟s reception (the reflection). The hypothesis of this paper is that the organic reception, or the song‟s reflection, is none other than the pitch inversion of the melody. This is not to say that there are not deeper reflections, perhaps going all the way to CPTinversion that‟s described in physics. However, its very ambitious to dig this deep, and a deeper reflection may be unintelligible to the human mind. The deeper search is unnecessary, however, as the proof in the mirror universe is the finding of lesser mirrors that are all necessary; we are permitted to make incremental discoveries. So finding ourselves sitting at a piano we may also find our self-looking into a near-by mirror. Playing the piano while looking into the mirror we discover that the right hand is playing on the low-pitched keys while the left hand is playing on the high-pitched keys, the complete reverse of what normally happens, but matching perfectly the operation of pitch-inversion using the chromatic scale with its exponential spacing. The pitch-inverted song matches perfectly the mirror reflection of ourselves playing the piano that‟s unified through the unspecified middleterm. Could this be the organic mirror we are looking for, a lesser mirror that‟s found necessary? Songs carry a remarkable connection to emotion, and less so to intellect. A possible panpsychism 2. As in motivation and the source of all that is emotive. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 362 is better described as a vitalism because its emotion that we look for, not so much consciousness. To seek is to be motivated, and that‟s an emotional requirement. To seek is futile if there was no awareness of fulfilment, and so consciousness in some degree is also required and therefore goes hand in hand with emotion. A song is like a language that connects with emotion and takes us somewhere with a motivated direction. The mirror image of the song should also take us somewhere as it necessarily does if the original song is faithful to a direction representing the melody. Therefore, all pitch-inverted songs should carry a hidden melody, the dual song, provided pitch-inversion is the actual organic mirror, a lesser mirror, that is necessary for the mirror universe where the middle-term represents the source of all that is emotive. This is a testable prediction, 100% of the inverted songs should carry a melody if the hypothesis is true. Finding one song that is little more than random noise would indicated that the organic mirror is not yet discovered. 5. Fifty Pitch-Inverted Songs All the songs were pitch-inverted following the method in Appendix A, for the present investigation, and are identified in Table 1. The 50 remade songs are presented in a YouTube play-list and are found with this internet link: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLdHv1duZhJ8-NhMv2wxEVVUHPi-56Bp5q Simply match the video named in Table 1 to the video in the play-list. Table 1. List of pitch-inverted songs. Video Original Song Composers 1. Beautiful Dreamer Beautiful Dreamer Stephen Foster 2. Southern Swamps Bonnie Blue Flag Harry McCarthy 3. Swan Lake and its Echo Swan Lake Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky 4. Abducted by the Mirror Man in the Mirror Glen Ballard and Siedah Garrett 5. Wanderlust America Paul Simon 6. Broken Ties Castles in the Air Don McLean 7. Once Upon a Time in the Mirror Once Upon a Time in the West Ennio Morricone 8.Brothers in Repose Brothers in Arms Mark Knopfler 9. The Big Mirror The Big Country Jerome Moross 10. Polished Corn Popcorn Gershon Kingsley 11. The Magnificent Mimic The Magnificent Seven Elmer Bernstein 12. Do You Know the Way? Do You Know the Way to San Jose Burt Bacharach 13. The Reflection of Love The Look of Love Burt Bacharach ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 363 14. Don‟t Wake in a Dream Don‟t Sleep in the Subway Tony Hatch and Jackie Trent 15. Burning Daylight The Hustle Van McCoy 16. Hot Death Valley Hot Hot Hot Alphonsus Cassell 17. Ride the Train Locomotive Breath Ian Anderson 18. Ode to Joy and its Echo Ode to Joy Ludwig Van Beethoven 19. Ipanema The Girl from Ipanema Antonio Garlos Jobim 20. Gun Fighters The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance Burt Bacharach 21. Sailor‟s Dream Daydream Believer John Stewart 22. Painted Desert This Guy‟s in Love with You Burt Bacharach 23. Internet Killed the Shopping Mall Video Killed the Radio Star Bruce Woolley, Trevor Horn and Geoff Downes 24. Cover of Darkness The Sun Ain‟t Gonna Shine Anymore Bob Crewe and Bob Gaudio 25. Saturday‟s Travel Come Saturday Morning Fred Karlin 26. Everybody‟s Leavin‟ Town Good Time Charlie‟s Got the Blues Danny O‟Keefe 27. New Beginnings Goodbye John Lennon and Paul McCartney 28. Empty Places Brandy Elliot Lurie 29. Dancing in the Garden Dancin‟ in the Moonlight Sherman Kelly 30. Baja California Come Monday Jimmy Buffett 31. God‟s Will be Done God Only Knows Brian Wilson and Tony Asher 32. Empty Streets Downtown Tony Hatch 33. Sweeter Song than the Birds My Girl William “Smokey” Robinson and Ronald White 34. Wabash Cannonball and its Echo Wabash Cannonball A.P. Carter 35. Armidale by Afternoon Amarillo by Morning Terry Stafford and Paul Frasier 36. The Master‟s Tapestry Coat of Many Colors Dolly Parton 37. God‟s Sanctuary Amazing Grace John Newton 38. Where Have They Gone Abraham, Martin and John Richard Holler 39. On Straight and Narrow The Only Daddy that Will Walk the Line Ivy J. Bryant 40. The Fast Track Lost Highway Leon Payne 41. Is Anybody Goin‟ to Shangrila Is Anybody Goin‟ to San Antone Dave Kirby and Glenn Martin 42. How „Bout them Memories How „Bout them Cowgirls Casey Beathard and Ed Hill ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 364 43. Time Reversal Time Passages Al Stewart and Peter White 44. Waiting for a Sign Waiting on a Friend Mick Jagger and Keith Richards 45. My Front Pages My Back Pages Bob Dylan 46. Ghost Returning from other Side Wuthering Heights Kate Bush 47. Megaliths and Geoglyphs No One to Depend On Gregg Rolie, Michael Carabello and Thomas Escovedo 48. Music from the Other Side Both Sides Now Joni Mitchell 40. Pyroclastic Flow Landslide Stevie Nicks 50. From Flower to Seed From Hank to Hendrix Neil Young All 50 remakes produced melodies, supporting the belief that pitch-inversion is more than just an interesting generation of musical notes. By comparison, playing notes backward can create interesting sounds sometimes, but these are unlikely to generate interesting melodies; playing notes backward may only generate uninteresting sounds. What has been demonstrated here is more of a general principle, a demonstration that all songs that have a defined melody also carry a hidden song by necessity, a dual song that can be recovered by pitch-inversion. This is not to say that the pitch-inverted songs are necessarily beautiful, or as beautiful as the originating song. Its only that an emotion connecting melody is guaranteed by the principle that‟s now found validating the hypothesis of a mirror universe, as described. Some of the pitch-inverted songs are quite beautiful, however. The author finds the songs (5, 21, 25, 27, 30, 41, 42, 48 and 50) very beautiful, and quite striking. Other songs (4, 5, 8, 10, 15, 16, 20, 38, 39 and 46) are very interesting, and beautiful in an unconventional way. Most of the pitch-inverted melodies bear little resemblance to the originals, but there are dual songs (9, 10, 12, 15, 19, 28, 30, 34, 46 and 47) that hold some minor similarities with the original song. These appraisals are likely to show subjective variation. When first investigating pitch-inversion, very simple songs were considered, limited to one staff showing mostly single notes, with few or no chords. But to avoid the selection bias of only showing interesting examples, these few simple songs (Videos 1 and 2) have a listing in Table 1. Video 1 plays the original song followed by the pitch inversion, followed again by an improvisation that has little to do with pitch-inversion. Video 2 also plays the original melody followed by the pitch inversion, but it also experiments with overlaying a two melodies which actually worked for that particular song. Overlaying the song with its pitch-inversion, however, was in general found to generate dissonant sounding notes and was abandoned in the later productions. Videos 3 and 34 also plays the original song and its pitch inversion. The remaining videos only play the pitch-inverted songs, but versions of the original melodies can easily be found on YouTube if a comparison is needed. It was found that the method of Appendix A was very robust, and worked best for more complicated songs that had several staffs. The staffs for a more complicated song can all be inverted independently, then transposed up or down to make a harmonious synthesis of all the inverted staffs. Most of the 50 songs listed in Table 1 came with four staffs: for a guitar; the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 365 chords, and the piano‟s bass and treble clef. These staffs were then borrowed by different musical instruments (by the computer synthesizer) to create more interesting productions. Something must be strangely said about the very unusual experience of hearing a pitch-inverted song for the very first time. In some cases the music comes out as not sounding right, confusing, and more like a failure showing less than the expected 100% success rate now reported. Some of this is due to small errors that end up getting corrected, and doing the inversion by hand can introduce errors. However, this can‟t be the only reason for the initial confusion. Its like looking at the Figure 1 below, and getting confused about seeing a vase or two opposing faces. Figure 1. Optical Illusion. Having recognized the melody for the very first time, then the confusion goes away like magic! The melody becomes a rote that‟s first learned, but this is where the experience becomes inexplicable because I doubt that any of my YouTube viewers find an initial confusion while listening to these 50 songs! The implication is that the learned rote becomes part of the collective memory, a sort of Mandela effect that rewrites history, or a type of morphic resonance that becomes available to the collective. Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence, and no one should adopt this speculation as certain. Something unusual happened when listening to some (not all, but including 8, 13, 31, 40, 43, 45 and 46) of the pitch-inverted songs for the first time, that‟s all that is being claimed. Fortunately, the experience can be repeated if its real. If any investigator wants to pitch invert different songs in the future, be looking for this experience. There is no shortage of songs that can be inverted, and so its possible to bring clarity to this issue. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 366 6. Conclusion The attempts to make melodies by pitch inverting 50 songs was 100% successful. Interesting songs of all types were generated using the robust method presented in Appendix A, and most of the remade songs showed little resemblance to the originating song even when the tempo was maintained. This strongly implies the validity of a general principle, that all songs that carry an identifiable melody can be pitch inverted to make new melodies with 100% success. This conclusion is firm because the results are highly reproducible. Doubters will find the identical melodies reported here following independent attempts at pitch inversion with any of the same 50 songs. Moreover, new songs can be inverted to further test the general principle, but it is now doubtful that the conclusion will change. The only possible controversy is with what these findings mean, including the general principle that‟s now uncovered. As argued in this paper, these results affirm the belief that we live in a mirror universe that is a necessary adjunct of panpsychism of a sort that endorses Trinitarian philosophy. The proof of the mirror universe is in the lesser mirrors that are discovered, and one such lesser mirror is the pitch-inverted song that equally brings the listener on an emotion laden journey like all songs. Moreover, the middle-term that holds the song to its reflection is the emotive source that connects to the absolute mover or motivator for the entire universe. Such a system act as a strange attractor that generates the lesser mirrors out of necessity and on all levels of a fractal pattern, and so finding these mirrors constitutes evidence that affirms this speculation. Yes, this last paragraph is speculation, but it now falls into testable science because there are many kinds of mirrors beyond music that can be gathered as evidence. Appendix: Robust Method to Pitch Invert Songs with Multiple Staffs A.1 General Protocol 1. Rewrite the sheet music using C major notation. An attempt might be made to pitch invert a song directly in the key its written in (sheet music notation) by following the instructions given under Section A.3. But this will lead to unwanted complexity for those notes that come with accidentals. Therefore, its better to rewrite the sheet music into the key of C major (or A minor). Music note editors may provide this operation as part of software, and a transposition of notes is also needed to minimize the creation of accidentals when going into C major. Those required transpositions are presented in Section A.2. 2. Identify and separate out all the staffs, and transpose all the notes down making bass clefs. Songs come with multiple staffs, and these will all have to be treated separately. In addition to the staffs that are explicitly represented with the sheet music, it is sometimes recommended to break a staff into sub-staffs when notes are found running over a few octave levels. These sub-staffs can all be inverted separately (jumping ahead to Step 3), and brought back together after inversion by resetting them on preferred octave levels (jumping ahead to Step 4) and this need not mimic pitch inversion of the originating staff and had the staff not been broken up. This lets the composer stir the process better based on preference rather than being locked into an automatic protocol. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 367 More generally, all the notes and staffs (and possible sub-staffs) will be in the key C major, where the note D is the reflective center as found in Section A.3. The note D is right in the center of the bass clef, running longitudinally down the middle, making an ideal platform to pitch invert by hand. Therefore, its preferable to transpose all staffs down by octave steps and express them as bass clefs. 3. Pitch invert all the staffs around the note D that‟s in the middle of each bass clef. The precise instructions for pitch inversion are given in Section A.3, with reference to music in the key of C major notation. However, it is now very easy to see pitch inversion in Figure 2. Figure 2. Showing two staffs in C major notation, where the top staff is the pitch inversion of the bottom staff, and visa versa. The note D that serves as the center note, is indicated by the red line that runs through the middle of each staff. The notes are flipped around the red line making the pitch inversion. Sharps are turned into flats, and flats into sharps, and the natural accidental is carried without adjustment. 4. Transpose up and re-express the preferred key. Transpose all the pitch-inverted staffs up by octave steps to reestablish treble clefs, perhaps leaving only one bass clef for the piano. By following Section A.2, its also possible to change the music key (for all the staffs) into something other than C major, noting the further transpositions in Table 2 that may be preferred. One uses preference to determine the octave levels for each staff, and the overall key for all staffs, and this is different than using a single center note across all staffs where a literal pitch inversion is found unnecessarily restricted. The recommended inversion described here provides for multiple center notes 3 that permit a harmonious union over all the staffs. A.2 Instructions for Changing Sheet Music Notation Rewrite the notation into the new notation; either C Major or one of the other keys if starting from C Major. This may introduce many accidentals. Then transpose the notes up or down the prescribed steps as given by Table 2. The transposition will remove all of the newly introduced accidentals. Table 2. Transposition steps needed to change sheet music notation from a given key into C Major (or A 3. That‟s suitable for the key. As an example, the note D can be found in several places and is suitable for the key of C major. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 368 Minor), or from C Major into the key. Transposition Steps #‟s → C Major ♭‟s → C Major Key in Sharps C Major → ♭‟s C Major → #‟s Key in Flats # -7 or +5 +7 or -5 ♭ ## -2 or +10 +2 or -10 ♭♭ ### -9 or +3 +9 or -3 ♭♭♭ #### -4 or +8 +4 or -8 ♭♭♭♭ ##### -11 or +1 +11 or -1 ♭♭♭♭♭ ###### -6 or +6 +6 or -6 ♭♭♭♭♭♭ ####### -1 or +11 +1 or -11 ♭♭♭♭♭♭♭ A.3 Instructions for Manual Pitch Reflection of Musical Notes Identify the key that the music is written in, thus finding the note representing the reflective center in Table 3. Locate one note position on the staff corresponding to the reflective center, selecting from suitable choices merely by preference. Reflect all the notes in a measure around the reflective center, as if this center note represents a mirror going down the length of the measure. Notes that happen to equal the reflective center are left unreflected. Special treatment is given to notes that may rarely come with accidentals. First observe that if sharps (#) always increased the impacted note by one semitone, and if flats (♭) always decreased the impacted note by one semitone, and if the natural accidental (♮) always reset the impacted note to the default for the selected key, then pitch reflection would be an easy extension. However, these conditions are only satisfied for C major (or A minor) notation. These conditions are not stickily enforced for the other keys, a fact that is sometimes missing off introductory accounts of sheet music notation pertaining to accidentals. Fortunately, Table 2 permits a transformation of music into C major that‟s followed by the specified transposition to minimize accidentals, and this transformation can be made for music written in any of the keys. Its in C major that pitch inversion is made following these straightforward instructions: first, it is recommended simplifying the notation by removing multiple expressions of enharmonic equivalence, so that each note inside one measure is represented only by one of the variants that come as the natural accidental (♮), sharp (#), flat (♭), or an adjacent scale note, making sure any ties are correctly indicated; accidentals are reflected like regular notes, but in the reflection show a flat if starting from a sharp, or show a sharp if starting from a flat, or show a natural accidental if starting from a natural accidental; ties are transferred automatically. This pitch reflection is made around a central note D that is well positioned in the staff. Once this is completed for all the measures, the entire staff can be transposed up or down one octave to improve appearance. Table 2 is also used to return the reflected notes back into the originating notation or key. Table 3. Center note that permits pitch reflection while maintaining the notation (without the need of accidentals) within a key. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 358-369 Smith, S. P., Pitch Inverted Songs as Affirmation of Panpsychism Based on a Theoretical Mirror Universe 369 Key Sheet Music Notation Reflective Center C Major or A Minor Default D G Major or E Minor # A D Major or B Minor 2 #‟s E A Major or F# Minor 3 #‟s B E Major or C# Minor 4 #‟s F B Major of G# Minor 5 #‟s C F# Major or D# Minor 6 #‟s G C# Major or A# Minor 7 #‟s C F Major or D Minor b G Bb Major or G Minor 2 b‟s C Eb Major or C Minor 3 b‟s F Ab Major or F Minor 4 b‟s B Db Major or Bb Minor 5 b‟s E Gb Major or Eb Minor 6 b‟s A Cb Major or Ab Minor 7 b‟s E Received April 7, 2020; Accepted April 26, 2020 References Forte, A., 1977, The Structure of Atonal Music, Yale University Press. Langan, C., 2017, An Introduction to Mathematical Metaphysics, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 13 (2), 313-330. Skrbina, D., 2017, Panpsychism in the West, 2nd Edition, The MIT Press. Smith, S.P., 2008, Trinity: The Scientific Basis of Vitalism and Transcendentalism, i-Universe, Inc. Smith, S.P., 2018, Time, Life & the Emotive Source, Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 9 (8), 707-721. Smith, S.P., 2019, A Possible Holarchy Representing Morphic Resonance as One Side of the Poised Realm, Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 10 (5), 371-379. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 287 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology Exploration Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology M. Pitkänen1 1 Independent researcher. 1 Abstract Zero energy ontology (ZEO) gives rise to quantum measurement theory and theory of consciousness. There are several questions without a ”final” answer related to ZEO. At least the following questions are still waiting for a precise answer. 1. How uniquely does the preferred extremal property of the space-time surface fix the space-time surface inside a given CD? The simplest situation is that the data at the intersection of the space-time surface at either boundary of CD fix it completely. Space-time surface would be an analog of Bohr orbit. However, both the dynamics of soap films and M 8 − H duality suggest that it need not be quite so. 2. How unique is the interpretation of zero energy ontology (ZEO)? Here actually 3 options suggest themselves corresponding to western, eastern interpretation and their hybrid. 3. Sub-CDs of CD are correlates of subselves mental images. What is the precise definition of sub-CD and of subself? How subselves, that is sub-CDs, are created? 1 Introduction Zero energy ontology (ZEO) [26] gives rise to quantum measurement theory, which naturally extends to a theory of consciousness. There are several open questions related to ZEO and TGD inspired theory of consciousness and the existing view involves several working hypothesis which should be reduced to deeper principles or shown to be wrong. At least the following questions about ZEO are still waiting fora detailed answer. 1. Preferred extremal property of space-time surfaces is central for quantum TGD [29]. It follows from holography forced by general coordinate invariance (GCI). How uniquely does the preferred extremal (PE) property of the space-time surface fix the space-time surface inside a given CD? The simplest situation is that the data at the end of the space-time surface at either boundary of the CD,fixes it completely. Space-time surface would be an analog of Bohr orbit. Full determinism would imply that WCW for CD effectively reduces to the space of 3-surfaces assignable to either end of CD. The dynamics of SSFRs would reduces to that in fermionic degrees of freedom assignable to Boolean cognition since WCW degrees of freedom assignable to sensory percetion would be fixed. However, the dynamics of soap films spanned by frames suggests that this is not the case. The 3-D ends of the space-time surface define a frame and also dynamically generated portions of frame are allowed by the variational principle defined by the sum of a volume term and Kähler action as an analog of Maxwell action. The coefficient of the volume term has an interpretation in terms of a length scale dependent cosmological constant Λ. Outside the frame space-time surface would be an analog of complex surface and therefore minimal surface [24]and also extremal of Kähler action. At the frames only the equations for the entire 1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.com/. Address: Rinnekatu 2-4 A8, 03620, Karkkila, Finland. Email: matpitka6@gmail.com. Email: matpitka6@gmail.com. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 288 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology action (sum of volume term and Kähler action) would be satisfied. The divergences of the conserved isometry currents for the volume term and Kähler action would have delta function type singularities but they would cancel each other. The portions of the frame could be analogous to singularities of analytic functions such as cuts and poles. 2. How unique is the definition of zero energy ontology (ZEO) [26]? Here 3 options suggest themselves corresponding to western and eastern world views and their hybrid. For the western option the space-time surface continues outside any CD as external world, in particular sub-CD and sub-CD is a correlate for the perceptive field of self. For the eastern option, space-time ends at the boundary of any CD and sub-CD is not a correlate for the perceptive field of self and there is no constraint from the external world at boundaries of CD. For the hybrid of these two options, conscious entity corresponds to a hierarchy of CD for which the highest level corresponds to CD for which space-time does not continue outside the CD. The highest level represents a God-like entity. 3. One can also challenge the definition of CD as an intersection of future and past directed light-cones. The study of a simplest cosmological minimal surfaces (see Appendix) leads to ask whether CD could be replaced with a piece of light-cone bounded by light-cone boundary and proper light-cone time= constant hyperboloid. The new picture about sub-CDs at WCW level raises questions related to the TGD inspired theory of consciousness. This view involves several ad hoc assumptions related to the notions such as attention, mental image, memory, volition and intentions. Do these assumptions follow from more general assumptions or can some of them be simply wrong. 1. Sub-CDs of CD are correlates of subselves mental images. What is the precise definition of sub-CD? How subselves, that is sub-CDs, are created? The sub-CD as a correlate of sub-self is defined by the restriction of zero energy state associated with sub-CDs so that they are induced by CD. This freezes WCW degrees of freedom of sub-CD at the passive boundary (PB) but the failure of determinism leaves discrete degrees of freedom at the active boundary (AB) so that the dynamics of SSFRs is restricted to these sub-WCW degrees of freedom and fermionic degrees of freedom. 2. Where sub-CDs and subselves are located? The natural location for a minimal sub-CD and mental images is around 3-surface at which the classical non-determinism fails. 3. How sub-selves (sub-CDs) are created? Can they disappear? The notion of attention as generation of sub-CD achieved by a location of WCW spinor field at spacetime surfaces having their intersection with the PB of CD in a fixed set of 3-surfaces defining sub-WCW is highly suggestive. This also affects the WCW spinor field of CD. The attention can be directed in several manners. Redirection of attention means a movementof the region defining the content of mental images, in the interior of CD. Entanglement and classical communications would be naturally associated with attention defined in this manner. If minimal subselves are associated with the loci of classical non-determinism, the set of targets of attention is discrete and finite. This view about attention makes it possible to see also memory, anticipation, and intentions as special cases of attention. 4. The time evolution of CD itself would correspond to a scaling of CD (rather than translation), which by the failure of strict determinism brings new discrete degrees of freedom at the AB . In the new picture sub-WCW property does not allow the earlier picture about the development of CD. The idea about silent wisdom as mental images preserved from the previous life after BSFR is not lost but is considerably modified. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 289 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology Clearly, classical non-determinism would be an absolutely essential element in that it makes possible a non-trivial theory of consciousness at the level of CD and at space-time level. Otherwise would have only fermionic degrees of freedom forgiven sub-CD. 2 Some background In the sequel, some understanding of the basic ideas and notions of TGD proper [29] is needed. Also ZEO as the target of critical discussion is briefly summarized. 2.1 TGD view briefly Very concisely, TGD emerges as fusion of special and general relativities and has Poincare invariance of special relativity and General Coordinate Invariance (GCI) and Equivalence Principle (EP) as basic principles. Also the interpretation as a generalization of string models is possible: point-like particles are replaced by 3-surfaces instead of strings and world lines become space-time surfaces. The notion of induction makesit possible to eliminate classical boson fields as primary dynamical variables and reduce them to the sub-manifold geometry of the space-time surface. Free second quantized quark fields of the imbedding space H = M 4 × CP2 induced to the space-time surface remain as fundamental fermion fields and quarks serve as basic building bricks of both bosons and fermions as elementary particles. Some understanding of notions such as the ”world of classical worlds” (WCW) [5], preferred extremal [6], and various variants of holography [27, 28] implied by general coordinate invariance (GCI) in TGD framework is assumed. Inclusions of hyperfinite factors of type II1 (HFFs) [17, 16] are central elements of quantum TGD proper. Adelic physics [20, 21] replacing real number based with number theoretical universal physics based on the hierarchy of adeles defined by extensions of rationals (EQs) and M 8 − H duality allowing number theoretic and geometric views about physics dual to each other is also assumed as the background. Hierarchy of Planck constants hef f = n × h0 , with n identified as dimension of EQ, is the basic implication of adelic physics and central for quantum TGD. The phases labelled by hef f behave like dark matter [7, 8, 9, 10]. This hierarchy serves as a correlate for quantum criticality in arbitrarily long length scales. Cognitive representations identified as points of space-time surface for which preferred coordinates of imbedding space are in an extension of rationals are also central for the construction of the theory using M 8 − H duality [27, 28].Galois group of EQ becomes number theoretical symmetry and is central in the description of quantum variants of cognitive representations [18, 30]. Zero energy ontology (ZEO) [26] is a key notion of quantum measurement theory. The basic prediction is that time reversal occurs in the ordinary state function reduction (SFR). This has profound implications for the interpretation of the quantum measurement theory [22]. TGD inspired theory of consciousness can be seen as an extension of quantum measurement theory and relies on Negentropy Maximization Principle (NMP) as a basic dynamical principle [4] [32] implying second law for ordinary entanglement entropy. 2.2 ZEO The TGD based view of consciousness relies on ZEO solving the basic paradox of quantum measurement theory. First, a brief summary of the recent view of ZEO [26] is required. Some aspects of this view will be challenged in the sequel for sub-CDs. 1. The notion of a causal diamond (CD) is a central concept. Its little cousin ”cd” can be identified as a union of two half-cones of M 4 glued together along their bottoms (3-D balls). The half-cones are mirror images of each other. CD=cd×CP2 is the Cartesian product of cd with CP2 and obtained by ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 290 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology replacing the points of cd with CP2 . The notion of CD emerges naturally in the number theoretic vision of TGD (adelic physics [21])via the M 8 − H duality [25, 27, 28]. 2. In the ZEO, quantum states are not 3-dimensional, but superpositions of 4-dimensional deterministic time evolutions connecting ordinary 3-dimensional states. By holography time evolutions are equivalent to pairs of ordinary 3-D states identified as initial and final states of time evolution. Quantum jumps replace this state with a new one: a superposition of deterministic time evolutions is replaced by a new superposition. The classical determinism of individual time evolution is not violated. This solves the basic paradox of quantum measurement theory. There are two kinds of SFRs: BSFRs (counterparts of ordinary SFRs) changing the arrow of time (AT) and SSFRs (analogs of ”weak” measurements) preserving arrow of time that give rise to an analog of the Zeno effect (https://cutt.ly/yl7oIUy) [26]. The findings of Minev et al [3] provide strong support for ZEO [22]. To avoid confusion, one may emphasize some aspects of ZEO. 1. ZEO does not mean that the physical states identified in standard quantum theory as 3-D time= constant snapshots - and assigned in ZEO to the opposite boundaries of a causal diamond (CD) - would have zero energy. Rather, these 3-D states have the same conserved quantities, such as energy. Conservation laws allow us to adopt the convention that the values of conserved quantities are opposite for these states so that their sum vanishes. This is not new: in quantum field theories (QFTs), one speaks, instead of incoming and outgoing particles, external particles arriving from the geometric past and future and having opposite signs of energy. That conserved quantities vanish in the 4-D sense, expresses only the content of conservation laws. A weaker form of this condition [31] states that the total conserved Poincare charges are opposite only at the limit of infinitely large CD. CD would be an analog of quantization volume in QFTs, whose finiteness implies a small conservation of momentum. 2. ZEO implies two times: subjective time as a sequence of quantum jumps and geometric time as a space-time coordinate: for instance, the proper time of the observer. Since subjective time does not correspond to a real continuum, these times are not identifiable but are strongly correlated. This correlation has led to their identification although they are different. 3 How uniquely PE property fixes the space-time surface? How uniquely the PE property fixes the space-time surface if its 3-D intersections with the boundaries of CD are given? This is the key question in this section. 3.1 Various variants of holography General coordinate invariance (GCI) forces holography in the TGD framework. One can however consider several variants of holography [27, 28, 32]. 1. Holography in the standard sense would fix the space-time surface from the data of its intersection with either boundary of CD or the data associated with the light-like 3-surfaces at which the signature of the induced metric changes. 2. Strong form of holography (SH) states that 2-D data at the intersections of the light-like 3-surfaces and boundary of CD are enough to determine the space-time surface. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 291 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 3. The strongest form of holography inspired by M 8 − H duality states that space-time region is determined by a rational value coefficients of a real polynomial extended to an octonionic polynomials, whose ”root” is the space-time surface in M 8 . The n real roots of a real polynomial would determine the space-time region and its image in H = M 4 × CP2 . 4. There is a variant of holography, which gives up the full determinism of classical field equations and gives rise to what look like classical topological analogs of Feynman diagrams. (a) Consider first the particle level. Particle lines generalized to 4-D orbits of 3-D surfaces representing particles. Particles as 4-D orbits of 3-surfaces contain light-line 3- D orbits of partonic 2-surfaces. (b) Partons as building bricks of particles in the information theoretic sense, and correspon to partonic 2-surfaces at which the orbits of partonic 2-surfaces meet. Their orbits are 3-D lightlike surfaces at which the signature of the induced metric of the space-time surface changes. The partonic 2-D surfaces defining topological vertices belong to the 3-D sections of spacetime surface with a constant value of M 4 time coordinate t to which one can assign 6-D branes predicted by M 8 − H duality [27, 28]. In M 8 -picture, tn correspond to the roots of a real polynomial and can be complex since M 8 is complexified to Mc8 . The real space-time surface is defined as a real projection of complex 8-D space-time surfaces in Mc8 . In TGD inspired theory of consciousness, these time values tn correspond to ”very special moments in the life of self” [23]. This picture suggests that, besides the data at the boundaries of CD, also the data at the partonic 2-surfaces in the interior of CD are needed. This failure of clasical determinism brings in the failure of the strongest form of holography. There would be a large number of PEs connecting the 3-surfaces at the ends of CD and they would correspond to the analogs of Feynman diagrams. Zero energy state as a scattering amplitude would be a superposition over these diagrams. This superposition would not be however pre-determined as in the path integral but the zero energy state would define the superposition of paths in question. 3.2 Is the failure of classical determinism possible? The possibility of classical non-determinism is suggested by the interpretation of space-time surfaces as generalized Feynman diagrams. These Feynman diagram entities would not however define an analog of path integral in TGD framework. Classical non-determinis would be a space-time correlate for the non-nondetermism at quantum level. In this framework partonic 2-surfaces or equivalently the 3-D sections of the space-time surfaces with constant value of M 4 time would act as 3-surfaces at which the deterministic time evolution as a minimal surface would fail. Another option is that light-like 3-surfaces containing the partonic 2-surfaces at very special moments of M 4 time define frames. These special values t = tn of M 4 time would be associated with 6-D branes predicted by M 8 picture as universal special solutions and would define ”very special moments in the life of self” defined by the sequences of SSFRs defining the self. 1. The first hint comes from the dynamics of soap films. Soap films are minimal surfaces. The soap films spanned by 1-D frames consist of minimal surfaces glued together at the frames and this dynamics is non-deterministic in the sense that it allows several soap film configurations due to the different branchings at frames. At frames the minimal surface equations fail. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 292 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 2. In TGD framework space-time surfaces as PEs are both minimal surfaces and extremals of Kähler action. In this case the 3-surfaces associated with ”very special moments of time” t = tn could define an analog of a dynamically generated frame defining a 4-D soap film. The 3-surfaces at the ends of the CD would be fixed frames like those for soap films. This realizes quantum criticality in the sense that the field equations outside frame do not involve the parameters of the action which sum of volume term and Kähler action. The interpretation as a non-linear analog of massless free field theory outside the frame conforms with the basic spirit of quantum field theory. These solutions of field equations rely on a a generalization of holomorphy to 4-D situation so that field equations reduce to purely algebraic conditions involving only the first derivatives of imbedding space coordinates. The analogy is defined by the solution of 2-D Laplacian equation in terms of real or imaginary part of an analytic function. Field equations consist of two terms, which are divergences for the conserved currents (4-momentum currents plus color currents) defined by the induced metric in the case of volume term. In the interior of the space-time surface these divergences vanish separately for the volume term and Kähler action but not at the frame. 3. The field equations must hold true also at the 3-D frame but this need not be true for both volume term and Kähler action separately. The coupling parameters of the theory make themselves visible only via the frame. For the volume action the divergences of the conserved currents are orthogonal to the space-time surface. For K ”ahler action, the divergences of the conserved currents contain to terms. The first term is proportional to the energy momentum tensor of Kähler action and orthogonal to the space-time surface. Second term is not orthogonal to the space-time surface. For twistor lift the Kähler also has an M 4 part with a similar decomposition. The sums of the parts of divergences orthogonal to the space-time surface and parallel to it must sum up to zero separately. This gives 8 conditions altogether so that the number of field equations is doubled at the frame. 4. Could it happen that the divergences of these two isometry currents are singular and proportional to 3-D delta function but that their sum vanishes and conservation laws are respected? The part of the frame in the space-time interior would be dynamically generated whereas the part of the frame at the ends of CD would be fixed. 5. The restriction to 3-D frames is not the most general option. The delta function singularities could be located also at 2-D partonic 2-surfaces, at light-like 3-surfaces at which the induced metric changes its signature, and at string world sheets which connect these light-like 3-surfaces and have 1-D light-like boundaries at them. The light-like 3-D surfaces would be analogs of the cuts for analytic functions. Partonic 2-surfaces at the ends of light-like 3-surfaces could be analogs for the ends of the cuts. String world sheets could serve as analogs of poles. 6. The non-determinism associated with the soap films and with frames suggests that there is a large number of 4-D ”soap films with a given frame”, which is fixed at the boundaries of CD but not in the interior of CD. 4 Questions related to the theory of consciousness At the level of TGD inspired theory of consciousness theory, causal diamond (CD) defines a correlate of self or of its perceptive field. CD has sub-CDs which correspond to subselves experienced by self as mental images [26]. Concerning the evolution of self, the basic notions of ”small” state function reduction (SSFR) as an analog of ”weak measurement” and ”big” SFR (BSFR) as an analog of ordinary SFR. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 293 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 1. The first deviation from the standard ontology is that BSFR changes the arrow of time defined by the selection of PB of CD at which 3-D part of zero energy states remains unchaged during SSFRs. 2. The second deviation is that either boundary of CD and states at it remain unaffected in SSFRs whose sequence defines self as a conscious entity. This is the TGD counterpart for the Zeno effect of ordinary quantum theory in which repeated measurements of the same observable leave the state unaffected. The details of the evolution of self are not fully understood and the proposed general view can be criticized. 1. How the constraint that sub-CD serves as a correlate for a classical perceptive field can be taken into account? 2. What is the precise definition of mental images as subselves? Are they at some special positions inside space-time surface? 3. What are the precise definitions of memories and conscious memory recall? The same question applies to the notions of intention, anticipation and attention. 4. Can the mental images be destroyed or do they only experience BSFR and continue to live with an opposite arrow of time and become unconscious to self? If a mental image can completely disappear, what could be the physical mechanism leading to its disappearance? 5. One can challenge the detailed picture of the notion of time evolution by SSFRs. The assumption about the drift of mental images towards future in the second half-cone of CD is ad hoc and should be replaced with a deeper assumption. 4.1 Three ontological options The basic problem of ZEO is whether the causal diamond (CD) represents a perceptive field in the sense that the space-time surface continues outside the CD or whether CD is an independent entity in the sense that space-time surfaces do not continue outside CD. Conservation laws do not exclude either option. ZEO allows 3 ontological options which might be called easter, western, and intermediate views. Option I: Space-time surfaces are restricted inside CDs. Quantum universe is a collection of CDs containing space-time surfaces, which have ends at the boundaries of CD. In this framework, space-time in cosmological scales is an idealization and could be perhaps explained in terms of the correlations between CDs. CDs do not form a fractal atlas of something unless one says that the atlas is the territory. CD is an independent entity rather than a perceptive field of sub-self. One can argue that for sub-CDs this picture is problematic since it seems that one loses totally the notion of objective reality as something existing outside CD. There are no sensory perceptions. Could the overlaps with other CDs create the experience about the existence of the external world? Cosmology would be a mental construct and correspond to a very large CD. One would have a multiverse but only at the level of conscious experience. Option I is consistent with the eastern view that only subjective experience exists but not with the western view. Option II: Space-time surface continues always outside all CDs and CDs can be interpreted always as perceptive fields. Option II conforms with the westerm option and implies that cosmology is something real. Option III: Self is a hierarchy of CDs such that for sub-CDs the space-time surfaces continue outside the CD but for the largest CD this would not be the case. Sub-CDs would represent perceptive fields but the largest CD would be a God-like entity experiencing itself as the entire cosmos. Meditators report altered states of consciousness in which the separation to self and external world ceases and the mind is empty. Also the experience of timelessness is mentioned. Could these states correspond to experiences without mental images (sub-CDs) created by SFRs at this highest level? ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 294 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology Option III is roughly consistent with both western and eastern views about consciousness. If one requires the notion of the external world as objective reality and accepts the proposed explanation of altered states of consciousness, option III remains the only possible option. 4.2 A general picture about the dynamics of sub-CDs The ZEO based view of quantum measurement theory and the theory of consciousness inspired by it have not been precisely formulated for sub-CDs. In particular, the question of how sub-CDs as mental images are created, has remained unanswered. The following proposal provides such a formulation and is consistent with Options I and III. 1. CDs form a fractal atlas of conscious maps but the map would be the territory since in general the space-time surfaces need not continue outside the CD. There would be no external particles as 4-D lines for generalized Feynman diagrams outside CD. 2. Sub-CDs correspond to mental images of CD as a conscious entity. From the point of view of consciousness theory, there are only experiencers (CDs) which can have experiences as mental images (have sub-CDs), be mental images of experiencers (be sub-CDs) and share mental images (intersecting CDs with common sub-CDs). 3. Consistency conditions for the quantum dynamics of CDs and sub-CDs and for the overlapping CDs give rise to correlations between the regions of the map. The shared regions are geometrically analogs for the intersections of the intersections of a covering of a manifold by open sets. 4. For sub-CD the interpretation of sub-CD as a perceptive field would be natural. The first question is what does one really mean with sub-CD at the level of space-time surfaces. 1. Do the space-time surfaces of sub-CD continue outside sub-CD as space-time surfaces of CD? Does this imply that the quantum dynamics of sub-CDs in ZEO is completely dictated by that of CD? This is certainly not the case. Fermionic zero energy states associated with the sub-CD are possible and are analogous to quantum fluctuations. Note that in the TGD framework all elementary particles can be constructed from fundamental fermions (quarks). 2. If the PE (PE) property fixes completely the space-time surface, its intersections with the boundary of CD, this seems to be the case. If the classical dynamics is not completely deterministic, as suggested by the analogy with minimal surfaces spanned by frames, the situation changes. Sub-CD defines a subsystem of CD with boundary conditions at the boundary of CD which do not completely fix the quantum dynamics of sub-CD. Quantum states as WCW spinor fields inside sub-CD could change in SFRs of sub-CD. The tensor product of sub-CD with CD would not be ordinary tensor product but much more restricted one and Connes tensor product, related to inclusions of HFFs, would be a possible identification. A sub-system would be like an included hyper-finite factor of type II1 (HFF). Suppose that the classical dynamics is indeed non-deterministic and sub-CDs are defined in the proposed manner. How the view about WCW spinor fields changes as one restricts the consideration to sub-WCW. 1. The failure of the classical determinism forces to replace each 3-surface at PB with a discrete treelike structure consisting of all PEs connecting it to AB. Sub-WCW as the space of PEs is larger than the space of 3-surfaces X 3 at PB. Zero energy states are defined in this sub-WCW and assign to a given X 3 a wave function in this discrete set allowing interpretation as wave function in a set of paths of the tree. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 295 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology One cannot avoid the association with cognitive representations of adelic physics involving the number theoretic degrees of freedom characterized by Galois group of the extension of rationals associated with the polynomial defining the space-time region [19, 30]. 2. The activation of sub-WCW would mean an SFR selecting in WCW of CD such sub-WCW for which the space-time surfaces are such that their ends at sub-CD are fixed. This would correspond to SFR creating a sub-CD and corresponding mental image. This would answer the long standing question whether and how mental images can appear as if from scratch. This SFR would also represent a third kind of SFR having interpretation as a partial localization in WCW associated with CD. This also suggest that mental images could disappear suddenly. This ”activation” could be seen as a directed attention. 3. WCW degrees of freedom at the boundaries of sub-CD are fixed. Also sub-WCW spinor fields make sense. One can allow the tensor product of Fock spaces of many-fermion states associated with the boundaries of CD. One would have a QFT like picture with sub-WCW degrees of freedom fixed at boundaries of sub-CD. 4. The tensor product of fermionic state spaces at the boundaries of sub-WCW makes sense and one can define zero energy states in the same manner as proposed hitherto. The only difference is that WCW degrees of freedom are frozen at the boundaries of sub-CD. At the level of conscious experience this means that the subself experiences the external world as fixed. This would be by definition the meaning of being subself. The fermionic Fock state basis has an interpretation as a Boolean algebra so that fermionic zero energy states have an interpretation as Boolean statements of form A → B. This would mean that consciousness of the subself would be Boolean, cognitive consciousness, thinking. This conforms with the Eastern view that ordinary consciousness is essentially thinking and that the higher level of consciousness as that associated with the highest level of the CD hierarchy of self is pure consciousness. Thinking assignable to the fermionic degrees of freedom would be seen as an endless generation of illusions. ”Reality” in this interpretation would correspond to WCW degrees of freedom. What restrictions must one pose on the quantum dynamics of CDs in the case of sub-CDs? Does the subjective evolution of sub-CD states by SSFRs and BSFRs make sense for sub-CDs? 1. The increase of the size of sub-CD makes sense and the proposed subjective evolution by scalings and SSFRs makes sense. The time evolution is also now induced by the increase of the perceptive field of a subself defined by the WCW associated with increasing sub-CD bringing in new 4-surfaces due to the classical non-determinism. 2. What about the interaction between CD and sub-CDs. Does this time evolution respect the condition that the space-time surfaces meet the fixed 3-surfaces at boundaries of sub-CD or is it possible that the SSFRs of CD destroy the subself by delocalization so that sub-CD as a mental images must be regenerated by localization in WCW. 3. Also the interaction between overlapping CDs and the sharing of mental images can be understood in this framework. 5 Comparison of the revised view of self with the earlier one The revised view about TGD inspired theory of consciousness relies on the definition of subself at the level of WCW unlike the older view. In the following the new view is compared with the old view. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 296 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 5.1 The view about SSFRs 5.1.1 Earlier picture The earlier view about SSFRs was inspired by the M 8 picture. 1. The surfaces inside CD (or sub-CD) were assumed to be mirror symmetric with respect to the middle plane of CD. This assumption does not conform with the assumption that these surfaces define a perceptive field in the sense that they are parts of large space-times and continue outside CD. 2. The dynamics was assumed to involve both scaling of CD with respect to either tip of CD. The lower half-cone was only scaled whereas the upper half-cone was also shifted as required by the reflection symmetry. Dynamics was passive in the sense that only a portion of the space-time surface became visible in the sequence of SSFRs. The idea about scaling leads to a rather concrete proposal for the S-matrix characterizing the scalings of CD. 3. The old view had several ad hoc features. (a) The creation of mental images was implicitly assumed without specifying what this could mean mathematically. These mental images were assumed to be created in the upper half-cone just above the t = T mid-plane of CD and shift to the geometric future with the upper half-cone of CD. The asymmetry between upper and half-cone could be seen as reflecting geometrically the future-past asymmetry but was ad hoc. (b) One can criticize the assumption that the memories about the events of the subjective past are located in the geometric future with respect to the mid-plane of CD. (c) Whether mental images can disappear or only die and reincarnate by BSFR, was not specified. 5.1.2 New picture In the new picture the situation is the following. 1. Also in the new picture, the time evolution by SSFRs would be a sequence of scalings of CD. The assumption about reflection symmetry of space-time surfaces is given up since it is inconsistent with the identification of sub-CD as a perceptive field. There would be no shifting for the upper halfcone. Also now the time evolution is passive in the sense that only a new portion of the space-time surface extending outside sub-CD is revealed at each step. 2. As in the previous picture, new discrete WCW degrees of freedom appear during the sequence of SSFRs and complexity increases. For both options only fermionic degrees of freedom remain if full determinism is assumed. 3. In the new view both directed attention, memory, and intention correspond to a generation of subCD by a localization in WCW fixing a subset of 3-surfaces at the PB of CD. Redirecting of attention would allow apparent movement of the sub-CD in the interior of CD and as a special case shifting the mental images in the time direction assumed in the earlier picture. 4. In the new view the loci of mental images are naturally associated with the loci of classical nondeterminism that is 3-surfaces at the 4-D minimal surface branches. M 8 − H duality suggests that the branchings occur at t = tn planes identified as ”very special moments in the life of self” emerging naturally in M 8 picture. The targets of attention would therefore form a discrete set. Note however that each 3-surface X 3 in the superposition defining the WCW spinor field at the PB of CD has its own discrete set loci of non-determinism. BSFRs can change the superposition of these 3-surfaces. The selection between branches is possible in BSFR but not in SSFRs. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 297 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 5. An attractive idea is that volitional action could be interpreted in the new view as an SFR selecting one path at the node of a tree. Inthe M 8 picture, the very special moments t = rn in the life of self correspond to the roots of a real polynomial. What happens when all roots have been experienced? Does NMP force BSFR occur since nothing new can be learned? 5.2 Comparison of the views about BSFR Those aspects of BSFR in which old and new views differ are of special interest. 5.2.1 Earlier view The fact that the notion of sub-CD and mental image were not properly formulated led to several ad hoc assumptions. 1. The possible failure of complete determinism was realized. The failure of strict determinism was assigned to ”very special moments in the life of self” associated with M 4 time t = constant planes at which the partonic vertices as loci of non-determinism were assigned. 2. The mental images of previous life near the AB of CD were assumed to be inherited as ”silent wisdom”. Their contents was from the early period of life and one can of course ask whether they were really ”wisdom”. 3. There were also assumptions about the change of the size scale of CD in BSFR. The idea that the reduction of the size scale guarantees that re-incarnate has childhood was considered. This assumption also prevents unlimited increase of the size scale of sub-CD. 5.2.2 New view The new view makesit possible to develop a more detailed picture of what happens in BSFR. 1. The WCW localization at the AB of CD selects one of the branches of the space-time surface beginning at the PB . This selection of the branch happens to each 3-surface in the superposition of 3-surfaces at the PB defined by the WCW spinor field before BSFR. 2. The future directed tree becomes a past directed tree beginning from one particular branch at the AB . The initial and final space-time surface share a common space-time surface connecting the roots of the old and new trees. This is essential for having a non-trivial transition amplitude for BSFR at WCW level. In the earlier view, the mental images interpreted as memory mental images and located near the boundary of CD were assumed to be inherited as ”silent wisdom” by the time-reversed reincarnate. What happens now? The notion of ”silent wisdom” as inherited information makes sense. 1. The new space-time surfaces originate from 3-surface which was selected by WCW localization in BSFR. Therefore the new space-time surfaces carry classical information about previous life. 2. The space-time surfaces originating from the new root are near to the space-time surface connecting the old and new roots. The WCW spinor field before and after BSFR musthave a strong overlap in order to make the transition amplitude large. This implies that information about previous life is transferred to the new life. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 298 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 3. The nearness property could imply that they are easily re-created as perceptions by directed attention so that they would indeed be ”silent” wisdom. These mental images are from the later part of the life cycle rather than from the early life as in the earlier picture. If aging means getting wisdom, then silent wisdom would be in question. Does the notion of ”silent wisdom” as mental images make sense? 1. Mental images - this includes both sensory and memory mental images and intentions) are naturally assignable to the loci of classical non-determinism at the planes t = tn of the branched space-time surfaces associated with the new root (”very special moments in the life of self”). For the special space-time surface connecting the roots of old and new space-time surface, the preferred moments of timet = tn would not change and the mental images would carry information about previous life. Could one talk about potentially conscious ”silent wisdom”. 2. What happens to the mental images of self in BSFR? Can they be preserved or do they disappear or do they reincarmate by BSFR? The idea about preservation makes sense only for space-time surfaces connecting the roots. 3. What can happen to the size scale of CD in BSFR? The extreme option that CD decreases in size by shift of the formerly PB such that the time evolutions are fully determinimistic in the superposition of 3-surfaces. There would be no inherited silent wisdom and the self would start from scratch, live a chilhood. Otherwise these loci would define candidate for inherited silent wistom. In the earlier picture the mental images corresponding to sub-CD could not disappear although it could die by BSFR and reincarnate with a reversed arrow of time. Can the mental image disappear now? Creation of mental image require metabolic energy feed: this explains 7 ± 2rule for the number of simultaneous mental images. Could this happen when attention is redirected? Therefore one could argue that mental image must totally disappear when the attention is redirected. On the other hand, time reversed mental image apparently feeds energy to the environment in the original arrow of time, i.e. apparently dissipates. Could this dissipation be interpreted as an energy feed for its time reversal. Note that the total disappearance of the mental image means delocalization at the level of WCW and seems possible. The new view clearly challenges the idea about the Karma’s cycle of self. This cycle appears in many applications of BSFR. 6 Conclusions Also the article Some comments related to Zero Energy Ontology (ZEO)” [26] written for few years ago challenged the basic assumptions of ZEO. One tends to forget the unpleasant questions but now it was clear that it is better to face the fear that there might be something badly wrong. ZEO however survived and several ad hoc assumptions were eliminated. 6.1 Progress at the level of basic TGD The basic goal is to improve the understanding about quantum-classical correspondence. The dynamics of soap films serves as an intuitive starting point. 1. In TGD frame 3-surfaces at the boundaries of CD define the analog of frame for a 4-D soap film as a minimal surface outside frame. This minimal surface would be an analog of a holomorphic minimal surface and simultaneous exremal of Kähler action except at the frame where one would have delta function singularities analogous to sources for massless d’Alembert equation. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 299 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 2. There is also a dynamically generated part of the frame since the action contains also Kähler action. The dynamically generated parts of the frame would mean a failure of mimimal surface property at frame and also the failure of complete determinism localized at these frames. 3. At frame only the equations for the entire action containing both volume term and Kähler term would be satisfied. This guarantees conservation laws and gives very strong constraints to what can happen at frames. The frame portions with various dimensions are analogous to the singularities of analytic functions at which the analyticity fails: cuts and poles are replaced with 3-, 2-, and 1-D singularities acting effectively as sources for volume term or equvavelently Kähler term. The sum of volume and Kähler singularities vanish by field equations. This gives rise to the interaction between volume and Kähler term at the loci of non-determinism. 4. H-picture suggests that the frames as singularities correspond to 1-D core for the deformations of CP2 type extremals with light-like geodesic as M 4 projection, at partonic 2-surfaces and string world sheets, and at 3-D t = tn balls of CD as ”very special moments in the life of self” which integrate to an analog of catastrophe. Deformations of Euclidian CP2 type extremals, the light-like 3-surfaces as partonic orbits at which the signature of the induced metric changes, string world sheets, and partonic 2-surfaces at r = tn balls taking the role of vertices give rise to an analog of Feynman (or twistor -) diagram. The external particles arriving the vertex correspond to different roots of the polynomial in M 8 picture co-inciding at the vertex. The proposed picture at the level of H = M 4 × CP2 has dual at the level of (complexified) M 8 identifiable as complexified octonions. The parts of frame correspond to loci at which the space-time as a covering space with sheet defined by the roots of a polynomial becomes degenerate, i.e. touch each other. There is a nice analogy with the catastrophe theory of Thom [2, 1]. The catastrophe graph for cusp catastrophe serves as an intuitive guide line. Imbedding space coordinates serve as behaviour variables and space-time coordinates as control variables. One obtains a decomposition of space-time surface to regions of various dimension characterized by the degeneracy of the root. 6.2 Progress in the understanding of TGD inspired theory of consciousness The improved view about ZEO makes it possible to define the basic notions like self, sub-self, BSFR and SSFR at the level of WCW. Also the WCW correlates for various aspects of consciousness like attention, volition, memory, memory recall, anticipation are proposed. Attention is the basic process: attention creates sub-CD and subself by a localization in WCW and projects WCW spinor field to a subset of WCW. This process is completely analogous to position measurement at the level of H. At the level of M 8 it is analogous to momentum measurement. One can distinguish between the Boolean aspects of cognition assignable to WCW spinors as fermionic Fock states (WCW spinor field restricted to given 3-surface). Fermionic consciousness is present even in absence of non-determinism. The non-determinism makes possible sensory perceptions and spatial consciousness. A precise definition of sub-CD as a correlate of perceptive field at WCW level implies that the spacetime surfaces associated with sub-CDs continue outside it. This gives powerful boundary conditions on the dynamics. For the largest CD in the hierarchy of CDs of a given self, this constraint is absent, and it is a God-like entity in ZEO. This leads to a connection between the western and eastern views about consciousness. A connection with the minimal surface dynamics emerges. The sub-CDs to which mental image as subselves are assigned would be naturally associated with portions of dynamically generated frames as loci of non-determinism. If one identifies partonic 2-surfaces as vertices, one can interpret the collection ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 300 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology of possible space-time surfaces for a fixed 3-surface at PB as a tree. All paths along the tree are possible time-evolutions of subself. The dynamics of consciousness for fixed 3-surface at PB becomes discrete and provides discrete correlate for a volitional action as selection of a path or a subset of paths in the tree. The reduction of dynamics of mental imagines to discrete dynamics would mean a huge simplification and conforms with the discreteness of cognitive representations. 6.3 Challenges There are many challenges to be faced. The discreteness dynamics of sub-self consciousness certainly correlates with the notion of cognitive representation based on adelic physics [20, 21] and implying a discretization at both space-time level and WCW level. The Galois group for the extension of rationals acting on the roots of the polynomial plays a key role in this dynamics [30]. One teaser question remains. Localization requires energy quite generally and this conforms with the fact that mental images demand metabolic energy feed. It is possible to redirect attention and remain unclear whether the mental image disappears totally or suffers BSFR. 7 Appendix: M 8 - and H views about classical non-determinism and particle reactions 7.1 M 8 picture and M 8 − H duality In M 8 picture, space-time surfaces correspond to real projections of 4-D complex ”roots” of octonionic polynomials obtained from real polynomials with rational coefficients by algebraic continuation, i.e. by replacing real coordinate by complexified octonion coordinate [11, 12, 13] [27, 28]. M 8 −H duality maps the point of M 4 ×E 4 to a point of M 4 ×CP2 such that the point of M 4 ⊂ M 4 ×E 4 is mapped to some point of M 4 ⊂ M 4 × CP2 . M 8 − H duality is not a local map. Rather, the normal space of a x ∈ X 4 ⊂ M 8 goes to a point of CP2 characterizing its quaternionic normal space. 1. To be a 4-D ”root” in the complex sense means that the real part of a complexified octonionic polynomial determining the space-time surfaces vanishes. The number theoretic content of this condition is that the normal space of the space-time surface is quaternionic and therefore associative. The second option would be that the tangent space is associative but this gives only M 4 as a solution. 2. At a given point there are n roots and some of them can coincide in some regions of the space-time surface. These regions correspond to the branchings of the space-time surface at which particle-like entities identified as space-time surfaces meet and interact. The quaternionic normal plane at this intersection is not unique so that several CP2 points of X 4 ⊂ H correspond to a single point of X 4 ⊂ M 8 . The extreme situation is encountered in a point-like singularity when the normal plane at a given point of M 4 is a sub-manifold of CP2 . The interpretation is as particle vertices. The intuitive expectation is that they correspond to partonic 2-surfaces and perhaps also string world sheets. These surfaces are mapped to those in M 4 × CP2 by M 8 − H correspondence. 3. Also 6-D brane like entities are predicted as universal ”roots” they correspond to 6-spheres in M 8 with M 4 projection which is a 3-ball with constant value t = tn of the Minkowski time coordinate such that tn is the roots of the real polynomial defining the octonionic polynomial. These time values are interpreted as ”very special moments of time in the life of self”. To these moments the failure of classical determinism giving rise to one particular kind of quantum non-determinism is concentrated. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 301 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 4. The intersections of 4-D ”roots” with 6-D brane-like entities are 2-D and itis natural to interpret them as either partonic 2-surfaces or string world sheets at which several roots become degenerate of octonionic polynomial co-incide. Outside the singularity, the roots do not coincide and define separate space-time sheets and it is natural to interpret them as external particles of a particle reaction. 5. At the light-like orbits of partonic 2-surfaces the induced metric for the H-image of the space-time surface becomes degenerate since its signature changes. Could one say that the Minkowskian and Euclidian roots coincide at the partonic orbits? One can also wonder what the M 8 interpretation of wormhole contacts having two throats could be. Do the two throats correspond to two coincing roots at the level of M 8 having different normal spaces and mapped to separate 2-surfaces in H? 7.2 Catastrophe theoretic analogy Consider the analogy with the catastrophe theory of Thom [2] in more detail. 1. Catastrophe map is the graph of solutions for the vanishing of the gradient of a potential function as a function of control parameters. One considers only real roots as function of variable control parameters and the number of real roots varies as a function of parameters and one obtains lowerdimensional regions at which the number of roots to catastrophe polynomial changes as roots become degenerate. Cusp catastrophe serves as the school example. 2. In the recent case, space-time surfaces correspond to roots of complexified octonionic polynomials and the coefficients of the polynomial appear as control parameters. Also complex roots are allowed and real 4-D space-time surface is obtained as a real projection and mapped to H by M 8 −H duality and conjectured to correspond to a preferred extremal of an action determined by the twistor lift of TGD. 3. The basic motivations for this assumption are quantum criticality requiring preferred extremal property, which requires at the level of H the independence of the dynamics on coupling parameters of the twistor lift of Kähler action outside the loci of non-determinism demanded by M 8 level. 7.3 Connection between singularities and preferred extremals of various types The above picture suggests the characterization of the space-time surfaces in terms of their singularities as surfaces of M 8 . At the level of H one can consider 4 kinds of very simple preferred extremals, which give rise to prototype singularities. 1. Einsteinian spacetime X 4 ⊂ M 8 with a 4-D M 4 projection and a unique normal space as a point of CP2 . X 4 = M 4 defines a prototype. 2. Cosmic string extremal X 2 × Y 2 with Y 2 a complex surface in CP2 and defining a set of normal spaces assignable to a point of X 2 . M 2 × S 2 , S 2 a geodesic sphere defines a proto type. S 2 can be either homological trivial or non-trivial. 3. X 3 × S 1 ⊂ M 4 × CP2 , where S 1 is a geodesic circle of CP2 , is a candidate for a preferred extremal and singular surface. Both M 3 × S 1 and E 3 × S 1 are minimal surfaces and vacuum extremals of Kähler action. For the Euclidian signature, X 3 could be space-like and define a 3-ball compactifying to S 3 as a sub-manifold of the S 6 brane. The very special moments tn would be singular in the sense that the normal space at a given point of X 3 ⊂ M 4 ⊂ M 8 would not be unique and would give rise S 1 singularity. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 302 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 4. CP2 type extremal with light-like geodesic as M 4 ⊂ H projection and corresponding to a light-like geodesic in M 8 with normal spaces forming a 3-D surface in CP2 . Also M 1 × Y 3 ⊂ M 4 × CP2 can be considered but is probably not a preferred extremal. The intuitive picture is that these 4 types of preferred extremals correspond to singularities of the normal space of X 4 ⊂ M 8 of dimension d = 0, 1, 2, 4 and codimension dc = 4 − d. 7.4 Analogy with knot theory In knot theory a knot in 3-D space is projected to 2-plane where one obtains a diagram containing crossings. Knot invariants can be constructed in terms of this diagram. A knot theory inspired intuition is that space-time surfaces near to these special cases are projected to these special surfaces to get the toy model. 1. Canonically imbedded M 4 ⊂ M 8 (or M 4 ⊂ M 4 × CP2 ) is an analog of the plane to which the knot is projected. One can project the space-time regions with 4-D M 4 projection to M 4 . In particular, those with a Minkowskian signature of the induced metric. 2. The M 4 projection of CP2 type extremal is 1-D light-like geodesic. One must project the deformations of CP2 type extermals to CP2 type extremal at the level of H. At the level of H, CP2 type extremal could correspond to a light-like geodesic of M 8 such that each point of the geodesic is singular point such that the union of quaternionic normal spaces defines a 3-D quaternionic surface in CP2 . A puncture in E 3 as an infinitesimal hole serves as an analogy. At the puncture, one can say that all normal spaces labelled by points of S 2 are realized. At the given point of the light-like geodesic, the quaternionic normal space of point is not unique but a 3-D union of normal spaces and defines a 3-D subset CP2 . 3. For the X 2 × Y 2 ⊂ M 4 × CP2 type cosmic string extremals and their small deformations, one must project to M 2 × S 2 ⊂ CP2 . For a point of X 2 the normal spaces define Y 2 ⊂ CP2 so that the singularity is milder. For X 3 × S 1 ⊂ M 4 × CP2 the normal spaces at a point of X 3 would define S 1 ⊂ CP2 . If X 3 is Euclidian, these 3-D singularities could correspond to the t = tn planes associated with the branes. The small deformations of these surfaces would project to M 3 × S 1 . This picture would integrate all 3 kinds of singularities and various types of preferred extremals to a single unified picture. 7.5 A toy model for the singularities The following toy model for the singularities in the case of CP2 type extremals generalizes also to other singularities. 1. A rather general class of CP2 type extremals can be represented as a map M 4 → CP2 given by mk = pk f (r) , where pk is light-like momentum and r is radial U (2) invariant CP2 coordinate labelling 3-spheres of CP2 such that r = ∞ gives homologically non-trivial geodesic 2-sphere instead of 3-sphere. If f (r) approaches constant value for r → ∞, one can say that M 4 time stops at this limit, and one obtains a homologically non-trivial geodesic sphere instead of 3-D surface identifiable as an intersection with 6-D brane. Various external particles of the vertex would correspondto mk = pk fi (r) such that their values at r = ∞ co-incide. It is not possible to obtain homologically trivial 2-sphere in this manner. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 303 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology 2. Outside the vertex, the CP2 type space-time sheets have distinct light-like geodesics as M 4 projections and they can be continued to distinct regions of M 4 in the toy model. The analog of the knot diagram would be a set of M 4 :s with different constant values of CP2 coordinates. The CP2 type extremals would be glued along light-like geodesics to various M 4 s. The CP2 points of M 4 :s meeting at the same geodesic sphere must belong to the same geodesic sphere S 2 . The S 2 :s associated with different vertices are different. Note that any two geodesic spheres must have common points. 3. In the toy model for the string world sheets X 2 × Y 2 would be projected to a piece of M 2 × S 2 connecting two partonic vertices with the same S 2 . S 2 :s would be at the ends of the string, whose orbit is a piece of M 2 . B 3 × S 1 could be interpreted as a subset of 6-D brane with B 3 identified as the t = tn cross section of M 4 light-cone. This picture would suggest that the singularities could be indeed located to t = tn planes and integrated together to form a rough analog of catastrophe map. 7.6 Some examples of minimal surfaces with 1-D CP2 projection This subsection is not directly relevant to the basic topic and is added to give idea about the possible role of volume term. The original proposal was that preferred extremals are extremals of Kähler action but the twistor lift introduced the volume term as an additional term. This removed the huge vacuum degeneracy of Kähler action meaning that any 4-surface for which CP2 projection was so called Lagrange manifold with the property that induced Kähler form vanishes, was a solution of field equations. For these surface induced Kähler potential is pure gauge. The addition of the volume term removes this degeneracy and only minimal surfaces of this kind are possible as extremals. It is however not clear whether they are preferred extremals (are they analogs of complex surfaces?). These solutions have not been studied previously [6]. Space-time surfaces representing a warped imbedding of M 4 with a flat metric represent the simplest example. 1. Denoting the angle coordinate of the geodesic sphere S 1 byΦ and the metric of S 1 by ds2 = −R2 dΦ2 the ansatz reads in linear Minkowski coordinates as Φ = k · m, where k is analog of four-momentum. The induced metric is flat and the second fundamental form vanishes by the linearity of Φ in m so that the field equations are satisfied. Boundary conditions require the vanishing of the normal components of momentum currents and give (η αβ − R2 pα pβ )nβ = 0 .This condition cannot be satisfied so that these solutions should have infinite size, which looks unphysical. The presence of the volume term in the action implies that the induced metric appears in the boundary conditions and this represents a problem quite generally. The only way to overcome the problem is that there are no boundaries. The many-sheetedness indeed makes this possible. The warped extremals could represent a reasonable approximation of the space-time surface in the regions which are almost empty. 4 2. The light p velocity defined in terms of time taken to get from the M position A to B, is reduced to c1 = 1 − |k · k|. If k is light-like this does not happen. Although the analog of gravitational force is vanishing in warped metric, the deviation the flat metric from M 4 metric given by |k · k| in flat case could it be interpreted as gravitational potential and the gravitational potential energy of test mass would be given by by Egr = −m|k · k|. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 304 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology Could Nature provide a kind of cognitive representation or toy model of a gravitational field as a piecewise constant function in terms of CDs with which warped vacuum extremals would be associated? The representation would contain length scale dependent Λ as second parameter assigning momentum 4-momentum proportional to Λpk to the CD. The volume energy would include its gravitational potential energy represented in terms of warping? For warped solutions the space-time light cone - to be distinguished from its imbedding space counterpart - would defined by c21 t2 − r2 = 0 and space-time CD would be modified accordingly. Only single extremal - canonically imbedded M 4 - remains from the spectrum of cosmological vacuum extremals for Kählerp action defined by Φ = f (a), where f is an arbitrary function of light-cone proper 2 . time coordinate a = t2 − rM At QFT-GRT limit, the many-sheeted space-time is approximated with Einsteinian cosmology with the deviation of the induced metric from M 4 metric defined by the sum of the corresponding deviations for the sheets. Since the value of Λ becomes large in short p-adic length scales, a cosmology resembling GRT type cosmology could emerge and Einstein’s equations would be a remnant of Poincare symmetry. The induced metric for the solutions has very little to do with the metric appearing at the Einsteininian limit. The models of cosmology as space-time surfaces based on Kähler action with vanishing Λ could however make sense in very long scales for which Λ approaches zero. For string dominated cosmology, the comoving mass is proportional to a [15, 6, 14]. One has a silent whisper amplified to a Big bang in GRT sense. Also critical cosmology[6] as an analog of inflationary cosmology for which curvature scalar as dimensional quantity vanishes can be regarded as a silent whisper amplified to a Big Bang and also it becomes Euclidian for a critical value a = a0 of cosmic time. Received June 28, 2021; Accepted October 16, 2021 References [1] Zeeman EC. Catastrophe Theory. Addison-Wessley Publishing Company, 1977. [2] Thom R. Comm Math Helvet, 28, 1954. [3] Minev ZK et al. To catch and reverse a quantum jump mid-flight, 2019. Available at: https: //arxiv.org/abs/1803.00545. [4] Pitkänen M. Negentropy Maximization Principle. In TGD Inspired Theory of Consciousness. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/nmpc.pdf, 2006. [5] Pitkänen M. Recent View about Kähler Geometry and Spin Structure of WCW . In Quantum Physics as Infinite-Dimensional Geometry. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/wcwnew. pdf, 2014. [6] Pitkänen M. About Preferred Extremals of Kähler Action. In Physics in Many-Sheeted Space-Time: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/prext.pdf, 2019. [7] Pitkänen M. Criticality and dark matter: part I. In Hyper-finite Factors and Dark Matter Hierarchy: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/qcritdark1.pdf, 2019. [8] Pitkänen M. Criticality and dark matter: part II. In Hyper-finite Factors and Dark Matter Hierarchy: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/qcritdark2.pdf, 2019. [9] Pitkänen M. Criticality and dark matter: part III. In Hyper-finite Factors and Dark Matter Hierarchy: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/qcritdark3.pdf, 2019. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 305 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology [10] Pitkänen M. Criticality and dark matter: part IV. In Hyper-finite Factors and Dark Matter Hierarchy: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/qcritdark4.pdf, 2019. [11] Pitkänen M. Does M 8 − H duality reduce classical TGD to octonionic algebraic geometry? In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/ ratpoints1II.pdf, 2019. [12] Pitkänen M. Does M 8 − H duality reduce classical TGD to octonionic algebraic geometry?: Part II. In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/ ratpoints2II.pdf, 2019. [13] Pitkänen M. Does M 8 − H duality reduce classical TGD to octonionic algebraic geometry?: Part III. In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/ ratpoints3II.pdf, 2019. [14] Pitkänen M. More about TGD Inspired Cosmology. In Physics in Many-Sheeted Space-Time: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/cosmomore.pdf, 2019. [15] Pitkänen M. TGD and Cosmology. In Physics in Many-Sheeted Space-Time: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/cosmo.pdf, 2019. [16] Pitkänen M. Evolution of Ideas about Hyper-finite Factors in TGD. In Hyper-finite Factors and Dark Matter Hierarchy: Part II. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/vNeumannnew.pdf, 2019. [17] Pitkänen M. Was von Neumann Right After All? In Hyper-finite Factors and Dark Matter Hierarchy: Part I. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/vNeumann.pdf, 2019. [18] Pitkänen M. Quantum Adeles. galois.pdf., 2012. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/ [19] Pitkänen M. About hef f /h = n as the number of sheets of space-time surface as Galois covering. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/Galoisext.pdf., 2017. [20] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. In Trends and Mathematical Methods in Interdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences, pages 241–319. Springer.Available at: https://link.springer. com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-55612-3_11, 2017. [21] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/ articles/adelephysics.pdf., 2017. [22] Pitkänen M. Copenhagen interpretation dead: long live ZEO based quantum measurement theory! Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/Bohrdead.pdf., 2019. [23] Pitkänen M. M 8 − H duality and consciousness. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_ html/articles/M8Hconsc.pdf., 2019. [24] Pitkänen M. Minimal surfaces: comparison of the perspectives of mathematician and physicist. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/minimalsurfaces.pdf., 2019. [25] Pitkänen M. New results related to M 8 − H duality. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_ html/articles/M8Hduality.pdf., 2019. [26] Pitkänen M. Some comments related to Zero Energy Ontology (ZEO). Available at: http:// tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/zeoquestions.pdf., 2019. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Sept. 2021 | Vol. 12 | Issue 3 | pp. 287-306 306 Pitkänen, M., Some Questions Concerning Zero Energy Ontology [27] Pitkänen M. A critical re-examination of M 8 − H duality hypothesis: part I. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/M8H1.pdf., 2020. [28] Pitkänen M. A critical re-examination of M 8 − H duality hypothesis: part II. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/M8H2.pdf., 2020. [29] Pitkänen M. Summary of Topological Geometrodynamics. https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/ articles/tgdarticle.pdf., 2020. [30] Pitkänen M. The dynamics of SSFRs as quantum measurement cascades in the group algebra of Galois group. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/SSFRGalois.pdf., 2020. [31] Pitkänen M. Is M 8 − H duality consistent with Fourier analysis at the level of M 4 × CP2 ? https: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/M8Hperiodic.pdf., 2021. [32] Pitkänen M. Negentropy Maximization Principle and Second Law. tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/nmpsecondlaw.pdf., 2021. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. Available at: https:// www.JCER.com

83 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations Article Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations Satinder S. Malik* Abstract The standard model in physics, explains reality only to a certain level. Even after all the subatomic particles and waves are catered for, space has quantum wave fluctuation. The paper attempts to describe the source and structure of these wave fluctuations It seems that the Cosmos may have evolved from one cascading principle of mass. This gradual process is called the principle of Mahat (Mass). The Cosmos is built to perfection without wastage in which all system act in harmony. Time consciousness helped by energy directs the motion in this cosmos from smaller to bigger formations. The Vaidik view of time and space, cosmic intent and intelligence, as an observer in quantum uncertainty and a source of quantum vacuum fluctuations. Keywords: Big Bang, galaxy, age of universe, philosophy, ancient wisdom, Vedas, Rig Veda, gravity, dark matter, dark energy, cosmology, quantum physics. 1. Introduction Is space completely empty? or does it contain something? The space was known to be containing ether by the ancients. Ether was an element of the Greeks, as Aksha was of Vaidik philosophers. It was believed to be existent by Descartes, Newton, and nearly everyone. Ether held a position of absolute centrality in nineteenth-century physics as a way of explaining how light travelled across the emptiness of space. In 1909, J. J. Thomson1 said, “The ether is not a fantastic creation of the speculative philosopher; it is as essential to us as the air we breathe”. Michelson and Morley attempted to determine ether, a stable, invisible, weightless, frictionless medium that was thought to permeate the universe. They aimed to measure the ether drift - a kind of headwind thought to be encountered by moving objects as they ploughed through space. The speed of light could vary as it pushed through the ether with respect to an observer depending on whether the observer was moving toward the source of light or away from it, but no one had figured out a way to measure this. It occurred to Michelson that for half the year the Earth is travelling toward the Sun and for half the year it is moving away from it, and he reasoned that if you took careful enough measurements at opposite seasons and compared light’s travel time between the two, will provide an answer. Michelson’s interferometer could measure the difference in the velocity of light with great precision. In 1887 they had negative results. Caltech astrophysicist Kip S. Thorne said, “The * Correspondence author: Dr. Satinder S. Malik, Independent Researcher, India. E-mail: adventuressmalik@gmail.com 1 A short History of Nearly Everything- Bill Bryson ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations 84 speed of light turned out to be the same in all directions and at all seasons.” 20 years later, Michelson became the first American to be awarded a Nobel Prize in physics. The experiment failed to detect ether and ether is now non-existent but it is known by another name now, the fabric of space-time. The ether drift was probably an incorrect conception as it may be a disturbance caused in space-time by the massivity (gravity for the non-familiar) of an object. Following is the high-precision test of general relativity by the Cassini space probe, radio signals sent between the Earth and the probe (green wave) are delayed by the warping of spacetime (blue lines) due to the Sun's mass2. Experiments show that Einstein's description of gravitation accounts for several effects such as minute anomalies in the orbits of Mercury and other planets. General relativity also predicts novel effects of mass (or gravity), such as gravitational waves, gravitational lensing and an effect of gravity on time known as gravitational time dilation. Many of these predictions have been confirmed by experiment or observation, most recently gravitational waves. What MM experiment couldn’t detect the effect of either at small distances and within the Earth’s space-time disturbance, this could be detected by the Cassini space probe, in form of gravitational time dilation (disturbance of space-time affecting the speed of radio waves). 2. Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations Empty space not only contains the fabric of space (as format) and time (the flow of energy) but also some other energy fluctuations. This so-called empty space is still not empty enough, we have just reached the deepest level of detection of such energy by any experimental methods and inference. Even if everything, every known particle or wave is catered for in space which is zero point space there is still some energy that can be attributed to space itself. This energy form may be termed quantum vacuum fluctuations3 and they represent the temporary random change in the amount of energy at a point in space, as prescribed by Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. These fluctuations are minute random fluctuations in the values of the fields which represent elementary particles, such as electric and magnetic fields which represent the electromagnetic force carried by photons, W and Z fields which carry the weak force, and gluon fields which carry the strong force. Quantum Vacuum fluctuations appear as virtual particles, which are always created in particle-antiparticle pairs. Since they are created spontaneously without a source of energy, vacuum fluctuations and virtual particles are said to violate the conservation of energy. This is theoretically allowable because the particles annihilate each other within a time limit determined by the uncertainty principle and therefore, they are not directly observable. Wave mechanics uses mathematics to describe various characteristics of the complex wave patterns and probabilities of wave function collapse, having a background perspective that these waves are random natural phenomena and by deciphering their source and characteristics we may arrive at ‘A Theory of Everything’. This kind of perspective is leading us in direction of 2 3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introduction_to_general_relativity#Cosmology https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_fluctuation ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations 85 ideological hallucination as we have employed mathematical tools for something that may have been interfered with or modulated by intelligence or '‘will’. It may be easier to describe and predict a simple geometrical pattern on a screen mathematically but not a live show simply because that latter has intelligence interference. 3. The Construct of Energy-Time-Space Quantum mechanics implies inherent randomness to nature. This randomness caters to the construct to accommodate the free will of the atomists. It has moved a level deeper since science has progressed deeper into energy fields going deeper through the atoms. Einstein addressed this in a letter to Max Born, one of the fathers of Quantum Mechanics. The full phrase is, “Quantum theory yields much, but it hardly brings us close to the Old One’s secrets. I, in any case, am convinced He does not play dice with the universe4.” This doesn’t mean Einstein was deterministic or he rejected the idea of free will, but he simply rejected the wither this way or that way uncertainty of quantum mechanics. For example, even if we are watching or not, a top quark becomes a top quark not by one of the choices but maybe there is some unknown factor that helps it (and also many others) to make that choice. As Albert Einstein quotes about imagination, “I am enough of an artist to draw freely upon my imagination. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world.” Treating this issue like a mathematics problem, we may use a supposition or assumption Method a Math problem-solving technique where we assume an extreme situation to solve a question. This method is often seen as a faster alternative as compared to the Guess and Check method. Almost all scientists would concur with the fact that there is a perfect brain behind the Cosmos and this thought is reflected in their statements. Let them be not sure about god but the laws of nature, what governs the sciences, laws of mathematics and logic, there is some superintelligent source for them. So let's assume that such a source exists and it doesn’t need any manifest mechanism of energy or matter, it could be some different dimension or realm that we are not privy to, or aware of but we are certain. Such a perfect source of superintelligence beyond the known dimensions is conscious and has its issues, so much of superintelligence and nothing to do except run into ideological hallucinations. Such ideological hallucinations are described as Asat. To create Sat – intelligence, truth, reality, and feasibility of those ideas there is a need for action to exercise the will of the superintelligence. ॐ अस व ु सतोऽनु पप ेः ॐ ॥ २.३.९॥ The Sat does not originate from the impossible. This superintelligent power creates a plan, earmarks the resources (its processing power) and creates a thought force of will that is instantaneous. Let us assume time and space as absolutes without any measurement that we know of. Time is a manner of sequencing causality in the 4 https://www.zmescience.com/other/feature-post/einstein-christian-15102017/ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations 86 thinking process as to what leads to what. Space may be thought of as the extant of land available to a single farmer on the earth and he making use of the arable cultivable patch of land as per his capacity. The superintelligent being (Prime Consciousness) dedicates the parts of his capacity to creating the thought force of will (software to subtle hardware transition) and uses another part of his processing capability to sequence and regulate the spread. All action is achieved by the thought force and all controlling is regulated by processing power. The Venn diagram below will show this better. There is a reason why the above assumption is made in this particular way. It is because is also described in Upanishads in this particular way. So instead of re-inventing the wheel, we can examine a pre-existing concept. The willpower is called Moolaprakriti or root nature. This is primal vibration, substratum or hardware of the cosmos. It is also known to be having three attributes of Sat (intelligence), Rajas (control, action) and Tamas (energy). This energy which is the base mortar is controlled and directed by its own energy sub-streams which are embedded by other conscious subparts which act as the controlling software. The Sat is responsible for the universal mind and it rides on the digital (measured) energy streams and resided in the complete universe, formatting it the way a field is prepared. The action energy is responsible for movement and directing the root energy streams in the formation of further higher-density streams. these vibrations in such a way produce harmonic interference patterns leading to attributes like frequency, wavelength, polarisation etc. The process of formation of dense energy layers and matter etc is from the same cascading pattern of one root nature substratum and it is named Mahat. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations 87 4. Cosmic Intelligence as part of QVF The formatted space has a particular way the energy flow takes, and it is further grouped as Akshar (unchanging) and Kshar (changeable). Akshar is the root of intelligence, mind, and self and it helps passively in shaping the Mahat. The form, sound and colour (Varna) and its alphabet are not only the Akshar (letters) but also contain the numbers. The space is one manifestation of Kshar Shabda (word) and the other is of Akshar Shabda as the universal mind. Moolaprakriti thought force is associated with numbers. The integers denote various forms and combinations of Moolaprakriti. An infinite series of repetitive patterns in nature exists (presently incorrectly known as the Fibonacci Sequence) of the addition of the previous two forming the next number. The alphabets represent modifications of the primal energy (Moolaprakriti) with consciousness and their resultant words and language. This force translates into the vibrations of a certain frequency and carries that significance in shaping the root sub-atomic particles which are the building blocks of matter. The influence of thought vibrations can be illustrated. Such cosmic language is known as Para. Para means remote or beyond and this belongs to Paramesvara. It contains Ashar and Kshar (non-continuous, discreet, measures, consonants and Kshar, Svar, changeable, vowels). Like that in language, these vowels bind the consonants in a word. This language ridden with intelligence may represent the coding of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations. The frequency and complexity of quantum vacuum fluctuations display how much processing of such energy has taken place before it reached this subtle level. As the waveform becomes laden with attributes of frequency, beats, amplitude, phase etc the speed may get reduced. ॐ अ रम रा धृ तेः ॥ १.३.१०॥ The akshara (consonants) are basis of space. ॐ सा च शासनात् ॥ १.३.११॥ And that from the command (of Akshar). ॐ अ"भाव$ावृ े% ॥ १.३.१२॥ Other forces make up vrittis (wave spirals) The idea of creation from nothingness to expanding spheroid (Brahman) starts from the integration of initial vibration Aum (Pranav Shabda) with time, forming space and nonmanifesting wavelet strings. These wavelet strings further integrate into time and space using many combinations and permutations of conjunctions and disjunctions creating forces and the wavelets, strings, waves, rays, unstable elementary particles, quarks and so on. आकाशात् तु िवकुवा)णात् सव) ग,वहः शुिचः । बलवाञ् जायते वायुः स वै 5श)-गुणो मतः ॥ १-७६ But from the ether (space), changing itself, springs the pure, powerful wavelets, the vehicle of all perfumes; that is held to possess the quality of touch (exertion of force, a cause). वायोर् अिप िवकुवा)णाद् िवरोिच9ु तमोनु दम्। :ोितर् उ<=ते भा>त् तद् ?प-गुणम् उ@ते ॥ १-७७ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations 88 Next from wavelets modifying (by combining in various permutations and combinations), proceeds the brilliant light, which illuminates and dispels darkness; is declared to possess the quality of colour (visibility). ॐ :ोितिष भावाB ॥ १.३.३२॥ and the light has a force. ॐ कCनात् ॥ १.३.३९॥ Vibrations ॐ :ोितद) श)नात् ॥ १.३.४०॥ It is seen by light. ॐ आकाशोऽथा) रFािद$पदे शात् ॥ १.३.४१॥ The space is described different by the way of manifestation. The formation of matter (heavier from lighter) is according to that one cascading principle of Mahat. Brahman becomes the playground of both intelligent and intelligence-driven energies. Mathematics is a play of energy, numeral 0 indicates the root i.e. consciousness and 1-9 are Shaktis with each digit representing a different potential or amplitude. 5. Time Consciousness (Theos) affecting the Quantum Uncertainty Tie consciousness is often compared to or referred to as a person for ease of understanding by the philosophers as a cosmic person, Theos or Vaishwanar. ॐ वै Gानरः साधारणशHिवशेषात् ॥ १.२.२४॥ Vaisvanara (the Cosmic Person) is also manifested by the same words arranged in a special way. ॐ शHादे व िमतः ॐ ॥ १.३.२४॥ These words are measured (digital). ॐ दे वािदवदिप लोके ॐ ॥ २।१।२५॥ The world too is like the Deva (Vishavanara). Quantum mechanics states that energy, momentum, angular momentum, and other quantities of a bound system are restricted to discrete values (quantization), and objects have characteristics of both particles and waves (wave-particle duality). Space channel and their shapes may be the reason for the quantisation. The electron acting as a wave or particle or a quark becoming a top quark, down quark or a charm quark etc, has an uncertainty which can be affected by an observer. But how the observer affects that and which way the event will turn up is uncertain. The Copenhagen interpretation consisting of views of Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and other physicists states the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature but is instead a final renunciation of the classical idea of "causality". The logic of causality is perennial and axiomatic. The permanent observer of the event here is intelligence contained in space and time energy shaping up the motion. Braham Sutras state the following. ॐ अ रा िवJानमनसी Lमेण तMNOािदित चेPािवशेषात् ॐ ॥ २.३.१५॥ ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| January 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 2 | pp. 83-89 Malik, S. S., Source of Quantum Vacuum Fluctuations 89 Iintervening mind and science (knowing in special way) in particular order that is mark of general consciousness. ॐ चराचर$पाQय ु Rात् तSपदे शो भाTः तUावभािवFात् ॐ ॥ २.३.१६॥ It is spread in conscious and non-conscious, depending on the forces, the expression of light transforms. The aphorism talks about the intelligence spread in space which may be part of the quantum vacuum fluctuations and the unified field. Therefore, in the famous cat experiment by Schrodinger, the cat will live or die as per the action of the cosmic observer. 6. Conclusion Philosophy paves the way for theories and theories combined with mathematics and/or experimental proof pave the way for science. The human mind carries out interactions with nature to understand and evolve. These interactions take place not only through the human sense organs or scientifically extended sensors but also through direct and indirect human perception. Human perception contains higher algorithms for receiving knowledge through the higher language of Para. If the assumption can explain the riddle of life in the cosmos then the hypothesis is proved. Quantum uncertainty can be solved and the mathematical solution to quantum wave fluctuation can be understood as to why it may not exist. In the quest to know humanity moved a step closer and evolves. Science helps us evolve in a much more organised way. Received December 20, 2022; Accepted December 30, 2022 References Brahm Sutra- By Rishi Vyasa/ Badrayna and translated by Shankaracharya. A Short History of Nearly Every Thing- by Bill Bryson ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 385 Essay Images, Mathematics & Consciousness Miroslaw Kozlowski* Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland Abstract In this essay, I discuss structural relation among concepts (images) that creates the sense of physical reality we experience in everyday life. As an example, I describe the connection between the image of cardioids on the mosaic in Isfahan Mosque, Iran, and the formula for cardioids discovered by Europeans much later. Keywords: Art, image, science, mathematics, concept, consciousness. Science may not give us a complete picture of life because it does not deal with experience beyond its own realm of study. Many scientists admit that there is no way to understand subjective phenomena in any scientific manner. What we actually experience within our own consciousness will never be experienced by others in any objective manner, remaining permanently beyond the bounds of science. Scientists try very hard, in fact, to keep the scope of their inquiry clear of subjective phenomena in order to avoid the taint of opinion or prejudice. What do we do, then, with the very real yet untestable part of reality to which we cannot point? Must we admit that there is one reality for what “we” see, and another for what “I” see? Are we forced to conclude that there are separate and distinct realities that meet only at the surface between brain and mind? From a philosophical, theological, or psychological standpoint, this is entirely unsatisfactory. But it is just what we have been doing for the last three and a half centuries. Within the last century it has become unsatisfactory from the scientific point of view as well. In physics, there is no longer a strict separation between subjective and objective. In each of the enigmas mentioned in the introduction and discussed later in this book, the “role of the observer” must be taken into account in order to understand the physics involved. In relativity theory for instance, an observer sees a rapidly moving object become shorter, gain in mass, and move through time more slowly only because his “frame of reference” is moving relative to the object. An observer moving with the object (in the same frame of reference) does not experience these dilations in space, time, and mass. In quantum mechanics, it is the act of observation itself that determines the outcome of an experiment. Extremely small particles pop into existence at indeterminate locations in space and time only when they are observed; where they are (or if they are) in between observations cannot be determined. In modem physics things do not just happen in an empty, dead universe—there has to be somebody, or something, observing an event for it to * Correspondence: Miroslaw Kozlowski, Prof. Emeritus, Warsaw University, Poland. Email: m.kozlowski934@upcpoczta.pl ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 386 have physical meaning. This comes as a big surprise to physicists, who, until these effects were discovered, assumed that consciousness was an unnecessary appendage to the material world. A clue to the relationship between consciousness and physics is that the enigmas mentioned above are not noticed in everyday life. They occur only at dimensional extremes: at extreme velocities, with extremely small particles, or in extremely strong gravitational fields. They happen where a space dimension is extremely large in relation to time (near light velocity), where space and time are extremely small (quantum mechanics), or, interestingly, where mass is extremely large (general relativity) or extremely small (quantum mechanics). Also, each of these effects involves distortions, discontinuities, or interconnections of space, time, or mass. (It is impossible, for instance, to know at the same time a subatomic particle’s location in space and its momentum, or mass x space / time.) There is something fundamental, therefore, about the relationship between consciousness and the dimensions, something that we miss in the middle latitudes of space and time. We will make a suggestion now as to what it is that we have missed. We assume that consciousness is inside of space and time. We think of it as a complexity of neural processes somewhere in our heads. If we turn this around and think instead of dimensions within consciousness, a continuity develops between what we call subjective and objective phenomena. Dimensions of space and time contain what we call “objective” phenomena: objective experience is dimensional, subjective experience is not. There are problems with this, of course, not the least of which is that it does not make sense after a lifetime of assuming its opposite. But I will try to prove in this essay that this is a better and simpler way to understand what we experience in modern physics, and in everyday life. But what is experience, and what are dimensions? In this essay I will try to show that experience consists entirely of what I call “images,” and that dimensions are “potentials” corresponding to “realms” of consciousness. An image is a thought, a thing, a concept, a feeling, or an object; in fact, it is things, physical and non-physical. It is the sound of a raindrop falling on the roof, or of an airplane in the distance. It is the picture of a place never seen, the memory of a taste experienced long ago, the touch of warm fur, and the pain of standing too long in one position. It is anger and Inst. It is the Andromeda Galaxy, a moon of Jupiter, or a photon. It is a ball rolling down a hill. It is a cloud moving slowly across the sky that puffs up into large white billows, until raked by the wind, and combed smooth into thin wispy strands of smoke. It is an idea that ripples the mind. Images are slippery and hard to catch. They are like fish in a river: if you reach down and catch one, it squirms and wiggles while you hold it, and slips back into the water. Everything is an image, and some things that are not things are images. Images are the sole content of consciousness, and constitute, for our purposes, ultimate reality. Reality consists entirely of images in their various forms. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 387 Most scientists feel that images, while real in some sense, are no more than unreliable approximations of the physical world. For them our definition of image may be difficult to accept. We defend it only by saying that what they call the physical world consists of dimensionally-structured images. Some philosophers, on the other hand, particularly those of eastern religious traditions, may feel that ultimate reality lies beyond what we call images. They are right in a sense that we not dealing with here. While we believe that the further progress of science depends upon a transcendence of the material world, we do not, in this presentation, attempt a transcendence of the normal consciousness through which we experience the material world. Eastern thought and practice present a fresh approach to the inner workings of thought, sensory information, and imagination, and an entirely new look at the western scientific tradition. I have found it extremely useful in understanding modem physics. The use of this approach is all we attempt here. We should admit at this point that defining “image” as ultimate reality does away with the problem of saying what it really is. If it is ultimately real, and there is nothing else, what more can be said? This is exactly my purpose I do not want to know what an image really is, nor how ultimate it may be, at least right now. What I am interested in here is the structural relation among images that creates the sense of physical reality we experience in everyday life. I want to know why, when I experience a visual image and a tactile image at the same time and in the same place, I think of something “out there,” and why this sense of reality is distorted at dimensional extremes. This theory, then, is an attempt to explain everything in terms of images without saying what an image is. The word itself is one we have had to select and weigh down with meanings, only some of which it can carry on its own. For rhetorical purposes, I have had to stretch and shape it, hopefully not too far beyond recognition. Also, as words are themselves images, none, including “image,” is other than that which I wish to describe. My definition, therefore, is a tautology: We must use an image to impart an image of what 1 mean by “image.” In any case, the word is the best available for my purposes in that it implies that all things, physical and mental, are essentially fleeting and ephemeral, and that imagination, while fundamentally identical with material substance, is in some sense more fundamental. Objects are composed of images. You can touch an object because you experience a tactile image where and when you experience a visual image. The “object” is an intersection of images in space and time. It is this particular structure of consciousness, then, that creates the apparent existence of matter within objects. There are images that are “real” and those that are purely “imaginary.” The difference is that those we call “real” are experienced within a dimensional structure. Their dimensional context means that they are potentially experienced through any of the senses and also by any other observer. Images experienced subjectively are non-dimensional. The difference between “real” and “imaginary” is, We will try to show, the structure of the universe. Mental concepts differ from physical objects only by the context in which they are experienced, a context that we know as space, time, and mass. That they are both images, and therefore composed of the same ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 388 primordial substance, I shall have to show. Or, we should say, we shall suggest that modern science has already shown. But why has it been left to modern physics to discover a fundamental structure of consciousness when physics is not even interested in the structure of consciousness? Like Columbus on his way to India for gold and spices, physics has tripped over something it was not looking for in its search for grand unified theories and ultimate “building blocks” of matter. It has expanded the scope of human experience beyond its own conception of what is real. Before it began its voyages into relativity theory and quantum mechanics in the present century, the human mind was confined entirely to macroscopic dimensions. It is only with explorations inside the atom and beyond the galaxy that we have begun to peer around the edges of the dimensional world. An image is never complete unto itself, but always relates to other images in some way. A particular image is similar to another in that there is a greater image that contains them both. A red house, for instance, bears some similarity to a green one in that there is such a thing as “house” that contains them both. The larger image serves as a means to locate and identify smaller ones within it. A pain in the jaw can be identified as a "toothache” because it is similar to other such experiences. The United States is a “nation” in that there are other nations like it. We know what an "automobile” is when we see one because we have seen so many others Wore. Conversely, every image consists of smaller, more fundamental images. A toothache is a combination of many separate “painful sensations,” the United States is fifty “states,” and an automobile is a particular arrangement of “bolts,” “carburetors,” and “seat covers.” Conscious activity is a constant arrangement and rearrangement of images into other images, hopefully better, simpler, or more efficient ones. It is always a mind process, and there is no perfect image or system of images containing all the experience. What I offer here, for instance, can be no more than a less imperfect arrangement than that I wish to replace. One image that contains many others is what I call a “realm.” A realm is a structured part of consciousness, containing a specific form of information. The “perceptual” realms are taste, touch, smell, hearing, and vision. There is also an “observational” realm of consciousness, or of chromosomes in the cells of a particular species. The number of realms is, however, related to our experience as humans (as opposed to plants or animals) at a particular stage of evolution. Plants experience two realms and animals anywhere from two to six. This has to do with the development of specialized sensory organs among higher animals, and of symbolic language among humans and some animals. Realms are interrelated on the macroscopic level by coordinated dimensions. Three of these dimensions are spatial, and a fourth temporal (as demonstrated by Einstein in special relativity). We will make a case for mass, removed from the concept of matter, as an additional dimension. These first five dimensions are macroscopically distinct and measurable. The sixth dimension, that indicated by non-uniform acceleration, is less easily defined, but experienced in everyday life nonetheless. The perceptual realms are also interrelated on the quantum level. The visual and auditory realms, for instance, consist of information that is reducible to tactile sensation, and thus to the tactile ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 389 realm. Light is visual consciousness on the macroscopic level but at the same time tactile consciousness on the quantum level: each photon “touches” the retina as it becomes part of visual consciousness. The visual realm is, therefore, an outgrowth of the tactile realm. Extremely small images (objects approaching the energy of photons) are not exclusively visual or tactile (wave or particle) because the dimensional context within which they are experienced begins to disintegrate at this level. This is why we experience enigmas at dimensional extremes. It is interesting that we notice the dimensional structure of consciousness only where it begins to unravel. We do not notice it in everyday life because it is everywhere. Fig. 1. Mosaic of Shiite Mosque , Isfahan, Iran [1] In Fig.1, we present the photo of Mosaic from Mosque in Isfahan, Iran. First of all it is beautiful image which consist a lot of geometric form, cardioids. The name cardioid was first used by de Castillon in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society in 1741. Its arc length was found by La Hire in 1708. There are exactly three parallel tangents to the cardioid with any given gradient. Also, the tangents at the ends of any chord through the cusp point are at right angles. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 390 The curve given by the polar equation (1) sometimes also written (2) where . The cardioid has Cartesian equation (3) and the parametric equations (4) (5) It is quite astonishing that artists perform the mosaics full of cardioids without the knowledge of its formula. In this essay, I discussed the structural relation among concepts (images) that creates the sense of physical reality we experience in everyday life. As an example, I describe the connection between the image of cardioids on the mosaic in Isfahan Mosque, Iran, and the formula for cardioids discovered by Europeans much later. Received May 29, 2020; Accepted June 13, 2020 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 385-391 Kozlowski, M., Images, Mathematics & Consciousness 391 References Yates, R. C. (1952). "Cardioid". A Handbook on Curves and Their Properties. Ann Arbor, MI: J. W. Edwards. pp. 4 ff. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

345 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life Research Essay The Realization of Self in Everyday Life Ken Levi* Abstract This article is about the role of “self” in understanding consciousness. From a symbolic interactionist perspective, we can see how qualia emerge from “frames” of experience. These frames progress from the natural frame to the social frame to the focus frame to the holographic frame. In the natural frame stimuli from external sources are reflected on the surface of our body. These stimuli are parsed and consolidated, and ultimately projected onto a holographic frame. At that point not only do we reflect the outside world, but we know we are doing so. Such knowledge comes from what philosopher Henri Bergson calls the “principle of actionrelatability.” That principle relates the raw stimuli to how we might respond to them, which, in turn, tells us who we are. Consciousness is about self, and the process of self-definition underlies how we become aware. Keywords: Consciousness, self-concept, symbolic interaction, frame analysis, holograms, holographic principle, sentient self, holographic mind. 1. Introduction Most studies of consciousness focus on the “image” of the object of our attention. Representationalists argue that such an image occurs inside our heads (Pribram, 1971; Dretske; 1995; Block, 1996; Tye, 2000; Coates & Coleman, 2015). Supposedly, we experience our world through a filter of intentionality, or “aboutness.” We view items of interest as intentional objects. The image of intentional objects that forms inside our heads represents what our perception is about. That image is projected onto a kind of internal movie screen (Bailey, 2006). The problem for Representationalists, however, is two-fold: where exactly is this image, and what is it made of? Neuroscience, so far, has not detected any such image inside our heads. As Bergson (1896) notes, “No photograph of the external world is found in the brain.” Moreover, electrical impulses, jumping from neuron to neuron, form the equivalent of digital 0’s and 1’s. How do these digital impulses result in images and sensations? Even more problematic is the question of the viewer. If there really is an image projected inside our heads, then who views it? Is there, as Robbins (2016b) jokingly proposes, a “homunculus” inside of us? Is there a tiny person inside our heads watching the movie screen of the image? * Correspondence: Ken Levi, Independent Researcher. Email: levik2016@yahoo.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 346 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life But if so, how does the homunculus see the screen? Does he have a homunculus inside of him? And then, does the homunculus’s homunculus have a homunculus inside of him? Et cetera. It leads to an infinite regress, and therefore doesn’t solve the problem. This article presents an answer to both enigmas. The answer is based not on neuroscience, not on quantum mechanics, not on spiritualism, and not on panpsychism. It’s based largely on a combination of symbolic interactionism and physics. It’s based on frame analysis, the Holographic Principle, and, ultimately the concept of the self. 2. What Is Consciousness? The dictionary defines consciousness as awareness, and awareness as consciousness. Other definitions include wakefulness, sentience, alertness, realization. Philosophers define consciousness as “qualia” (Tye, 2021). This is the intangible quality of an experience. It is a subjective quality, because only the person who has it can attest to it. For example, if you say, “I am running,” other people can observe you doing it. But if you say, “I am hearing,” only you can know that as a fact. In Knowing (Levi, 2019), I define consciousness as the five senses: seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling. These are the ways - the only ways - we have of knowing what’s going on. Absent any one of these senses, the others compensate. But absent all, we are either dead or in a coma. We are “unconscious.” The five senses have particular properties. For one thing, they aren’t actually activities. They are states of being. The activities are what we do to achieve those states. The activities include: looking, listening, eating, inhaling, and touching. Looking results in seeing; listening results in hearing; touching results in feeling; eating results in tasting; inhaling results in smelling. As already noted, the five senses are intangible and unobservable to outsiders. They are also holistic, in the sense that they form a singular impact on us - a smell, a sound, a touch - and cannot be broken down into component parts. For that reason, they are analog, rather than digital. But the main feature is one that’s often overlooked. All of the senses require a “self.” We don’t say, “smelling the roses,” or “feeling the heat.” We say “I” am smelling, “I” am feeling, “I” am hearing, and so on. The “I” designation is integral to the aforementioned properties of subjectivity, states of being, and knowing. All of these properties require a self, as the central and essential ingredient for consciousness to exist. Consciousness, then, is an intangible and subjective state of being for a “self.” It involves not only the reflection of information from the environment, but knowing that reflection has occurred. This, for example, is what distinguishes minds from mirrors. The mirror can reflect images. But it cannot know that it has done so. A tape recorder can reflect sounds. But it cannot ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 347 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life know it. Neither mirrors nor tape recorders have - or ever can have - a self. In sum, consciousness is a knowing reflection. It is a knowing reflection had by a self. 3. Frame Analysis Now, let’s take a look at what we mean by “knowing reflection.” In his brilliant and pathbreaking volume Frame Analysis (1974), sociologist Erving Goffman defines a frame as how we perceive particular events. He distinguishes between two classes of “primary frameworks.” These include the “natural frame” and the “social frame” (22). Natural frames are “purely physical,” and require no interpretation. For example, a photograph of a table, a chair, and a person sitting on the chair would be a natural frame. Social frames, however, “provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence” (22). How that understanding occurs depends on how the events are “framed.” Goffman distinguishes several “tracks” of information that inform that framing. These include the main track, the directional track, the overlay track, the concealment track, and the disattend track (247-300). For example, suppose you are attending a play. The main track would be the plot unfolding on the stage. The directional track might include scary music intended to shape how you feel about the plot. The overlay track might be other audience members coughing. The concealment track might include what the actors are doing behind the scenes. And the disattend track could be the ushers cleaning up the aisles. The point here is we rarely, if ever, encounter a situation raw. We selectively interpret those situations. For example, while for you, the theater-goer, the main track is the play. For the usher, at that same performance, the main track is the audience. So, as Goffman instructs us, the “knowing reflection” in any given situation is usually not the raw event, but rather our particular take on that event. Indeed, the subtitle of Goffman’s great work is An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Of course, he’s not just talking about any old experience. He’s talking about your experience. And this is made explicit in one of Goffman’s earlier works, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). The interpretation of any frame you enter into tells you what kind of self you need to be, and what kind of self you are. 4. The Natural Frame, the Social Frame, and the Focus Frame For any given event, the natural frame is our starting point. It’s equivalent to what the mirror captures. By the same token, it’s what our eyes capture on our retinas. The social frame then includes how the brain pairs that natural frame with associations and memories, fears and desires. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 348 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life The focus frame refers to cerebral “binding”. Every 1/40th of a second, a high-frequency gamma wave passes through our brains and consolidates all of the sensory inputs - all the sights, smells, sounds, etc. - and all of the associations that our brains have captured during a moment in time (Pinker, 1997; Blakeslee, 1998). Electroencephalography studies tell us, “When many neurons interact in this way at the same time, this activity is strong enough to be detected even outside the brain” (Muse, 2018). Moreover, investigators have also confirmed that these brainwaves convey information. Researchers have demonstrated, “. . . the ability to nonintrusively record neural signals outside the skull and decode them into information that can be used to move a prosthetic” (Moisse, 2010). This information in our focus frame is encoded, because our brains operate digitally, like computers. In effect, the on-off switches activated by electronic and chemical signals passing from neuron to neuron in our brains produce something like a set of “0’s” and “1’s.” 5. The Dream Frame “We are such stuff as dreams are made on,” Shakespeare mused (1611). Indeed, much of what occurs in dreaming can give us perspective on what happens when we’re awake. In both cases - awake and asleep - we are the central characters in our narrative. But, we don’t see ourselves. We don’t picture ourselves in our dreams, as if we were a third person. Instead, we see the world through our eyes, just like we do in “real” life. And that world is a contrivance. That is, we aren’t seeing the “natural frame.” In the case of dreams, there is no natural frame before us. Instead, we are framing a composite of events, reflecting our fears and desires. If we are capable of making composites of the real world when we’re asleep, may we not be doing something similar when we’re awake? If we differentiate between the dreamer and the dream-self, what the dream-self sees, hears, and feels, is like what the dreamer sees, hears and feels. For example, if my dream-self falls off a cliff, I feel like I’m falling as well. In that regard, the dreamer and the dream-self are one in the same. Of course, in dreams there is no actual “seeing.” Our eyes are moving - especially during REM sleep (Cherry, 2021). But there is no actual scene for them to take in. The dream, then, is a made-up story about ourselves. And it is told through feelings - through sights, sounds, and sensations. Rationally, these stories often don’t make sense. But emotionally, the stories are clear. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 349 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life 6. The Holographic Frame The Holographic Principle Physicist Gerard ‘t Hooft, winner of the 1999 Nobel Prize in physics, conceived the theory of the Holographic Principle. That theory states that for any given region of space, the three dimensional (3D) information that exists within that region is encoded on its two-dimensional (2D) surface (Robbins, 2019; PBS, 2019; Susskind, 2019). Experimental evidence for the Holographic Principle has been reported in the literature (Chown, 2009; DeWet, 2012; Skenderis, 2017). If the theory is true, what this means is that wherever we go, we are virtually swimming in a sea of information. ‘t Hooft’s theory is based on discoveries by Jacob Bekenstein and Stephen Hawking about Black Holes (Smolin, 2001). They concluded that none of the information that falls behind a Black Hole’s Event Horizon ever disappears. To do so would violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Instead, all the information that passes through the Event Horizon is encoded in 2D on the Event Horizon surface. It was ‘t Hooft’s genius that led him to realize such a finding also applies to space in general. The Holographic Mind Almost a hundred years earlier, French Philosopher Henri Bergson (1896) proposed a strikingly similar theory for human perception. Based on Bergson’s writings, contemporary cognitive scientist Stephen Robbins has created a series of lectures entitled Bergson’s Holographic Theory (2016a, 2016b, 2019). Like ‘t Hooft, Bergson believed that all 3D information is encoded in a 2D format throughout the Universe. The way this works is akin to how we create holograms. In ordinary holography, a set of laser beams create light waves which overlap in something called an “interference pattern.” That pattern is what converts the image of a 3D object into a 2D code (Robbins, 2019). Once that 2D code is created on a surface, later on another laser beam can aim a “reconstructive wave” at the code. The ensuing laser wave decodes the information and renders a 3D image. To Bergson, perception works in a similar way. The Universe is packed with interference patterns, formed by electro-magnetic waves emitted by objects (Bergson, 1986; Matthews, et al, 2017; Verma, 2021). Citing Faraday’s “centers of force.” Bergson notes: “The lines of force emitted in every direction from every center bring to bear upon each the influence of the whole material world” (p. 31, cited in Robbins, 2016a). Those interference patterns create 2D codes. Our brains, Bergson contends, supply the reconstructive wave. That reconstructive brain wave is “modulated” according to the “principle of action relatability.” What this means, in contemporary terms, is that the focus frame in our brain sends out a wave. That wave reconstructs objects and events in terms of our particular perspective. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 350 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life The resulting reconstructed image, according to Bergson and Robbins, includes all aspects of the target objects, meaning their look, sound, smell, taste, and feel (Dyslexic Artist, 2017). The end result, they claim, “IS” perception (Robbins, 2016a). The Holographic Self At it’s core the hologram is creating something much more than our image of the outside world. It is creating a self. As I wrote in an earlier article (Levi, 2021), “The resulting holo-frame includes not only the objects of our attention, but, significantly, ourselves as the subjects of that attention. In that way we experience a self. We experience a self referentially from our environment. We experience a self in terms of our action-relatability to that environment. What the hologram does is connect us to that environment through the eyes of a subject, and that subject happens to be us” (p. 249). Consider the example of the hunter and the deer. His focus is hunting a prey. And for him the reconstructed image of the deer isn’t “Bambi.” For him, the reconstructed image is “target.” And the ultimate meaning of that image must be that he himself is a “targetter.” Hence, the object speaks to the subject. And that’s how the hunter comes to know himself. In general, how we relate to our environment tells us who we are. We might take Descartes’ famous dictum, “I think, therefore I am,” to mean: my perceptions of the world tell me my place in it. The Sentient Self In a prior article (Levi, 2020a), I distinguished between two different kinds of experience: thought and sensation. Evidence for their difference comes partly from the observation that the more of one, the less of the other. The more thinking, the less feeling. The more feeling, the less thinking. Two different kinds of experience logically imply two different kinds of experiencer, even if both kinds reside in the same person. I referred to these two kinds of experiencer as the “thinking self” and the “sentient self.” The holographic self is the sentient self. It consists entirely of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling in general. These are the sensations that underlie consciousness. Some of the contrasts between the thinking self and the holographic self-include: a. The holographic self is older and more primitive. Dogs, for example, have a fantastic sense of smell, but probably none of them can do calculus. Frogs can reflect a large, dark, moving figure, and immediately sense “enemy image.” And they have that image as a feeling, rather than an articulation. b. The holographic image is holistic, rather than composed of parts. In that sense, it is analog versus digital. For example, you smell the perfume first, then you think about it afterwards. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 351 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life c. The holographic experience is outward oriented. Thinking - cogitation - and logic seem to occur entirely inside our heads. But, for the most part, sensations originate from outside of us. The dog’s smell, the frog’s menace, the connoisseur’s taste all emanate from something outside of them. d. The more we put aside our thoughts, and concentrate just on the sensation, the more we seem to be captivated by the external source. e. In such cases of external captivation, we often say that we “lose a sense of self” (Harding, 1986). But, as I noted above, the object tells us about the subject. So, what I think is happening is that we are finding ourselves outside ourselves. The reason the hunter may be captivated by the deer-as-target, or the racist may be captivated by his image of the “inferior” outsider is because that image reflects back on themselves and who they think they are. f. The connection, then, between object and subject is what gives the object meaning. You don’t really know what something is, until you know how it relates to you. As Bergson (1896) states, the principle of holographic modulation is “action relatability” to the subject. g. Once the connection between the object and the subject occurs, the image becomes a “knowing image.” That knowing image is a realization of self. That realization of self is consciousness. The Realization of Self So far, we have described a progression from natural frame, to social frame, to focus frame, to holographic frame. In this way our world comes into greater and greater focus. The natural frame refers to raw impacts of external stimuli on the surfaces of our body. These stimuli are captured on our retinas, eardrums, nasal passages, tongues, and skin. At this stage, we are having sensations, but we don’t know it yet. For example, our tongues may be capturing bitter, sweet, salty, sour, and savory, but consciousness of those tastes has yet to occur. Next, stimuli from the natural frame are parsed in our brain and combined with associations and memories, fears and desires (Lu, et al, 2016). Through these personal linkages, the natural frame is converted into what Goffman calls a social frame. Supposedly, this process happens digitally, like the way it works in computers. Digitized data from all areas of our brain are consolidated into a focus frame. This happens every 1/40th of a second. Electro-magnetic waves from the focus frame reconstruct the objects and events of our attention into a holographic frame. According to the Holographic Principle, those objects are encoded in space in a 2D format. Our focus frame converts 2D codes into 3D experiences. In effect, the digitized information in the focus frame is converted into analog sensations. Digitized images become real images. Digitized smells become real smells, and so forth. The 2D codes are selectively reconstructed, as Bergson contends, according to the principle of “action-relatability.” ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 352 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life So, now we have a 3D holographic frame. It consists of the look, sound, smell, taste and feel of objects and events in our immediate world (I, 2020b; Dyslexic Artist, 2017). But how do we become “conscious” of all this? How is the holistic information received? Remember the focus frame contains digitized instructions. The instructions are to reconstruct not merely the scene before us, but, critically, ourselves experiencing that scene. What is depicted is the self-having an experience in which the elements of the frame are presented in terms of their action-relatability to the self. So, unlike the raw, natural frame, the holographic frame engenders three kinds of knowing. First, we are made aware that we are seeing, smelling, tasting, etc. The holographic frame transforms the natural frame, reflected on the surfaces of our body. For example, in the natural frame we may be smelling perfume, but we aren’t conscious of it yet. The holographic frame makes us conscious of it by linking the raw smell to us having that smell. Second, we know what it means. The hunter doesn’t just see a deer, he sees a target for him to shoot at. The dog doesn’t just smell drug odor, he smells something that will get him a reward once he uncovers it. So, objects and events become “known,” once the observer grasps how to place them in his personal world of action. This “knowing” need not be elaborate. For instance, when I enter a familiar room, what it tells me is: it’s a place where I can do familiar things. Third, the objects and events depicted in the holographic frame reflect back on the self and tell him what kind of person (or dog) he is. The racist, for example, encounters an “inferior” outsider, so he, by contrast, must be “superior.” The big difference between the natural frame and the holographic frame is this: the image now includes a self. Instead of a raw reflection of the scene before us, we now have a self-referential collection of objects and events. That’s how we come to know them. Ultimately, that’s what consciousness is all about. It’s about the realization of self. Our awareness of the world is about who we are in that world. No encounter is ever simply “raw.” Consciousness In the end consciousness consists of three parts: the body, the holographic frame, and the self. Our bodies are impacted by stimuli, and those impacts are analog, much like the grooves on a vinyl record. The holographic frame “interprets” those grooves. The look, sound, smell, taste, and feel of objects and events in our frame make the impacts on our bodies meaningful. So, a reflection of deer on our retinas becomes an apparition of deer as target. The resonance of sonic waves on our eardrums becomes the sound of bells summoning us to morning prayer. The objects and events in the holographic frame derive their meaning from their relation to a self. The sight of the hunted evokes a hunter. The sound of the bells evokes one who is ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 353 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life summoned. The knowledge of self, that the holographic frame provides, completes the circle of awareness. Once we relate objects and events to ourselves and our place in the world, we know them. And that knowing satisfies Goffman’s essential question - “What’s going on here?” 7. Conclusion The theory of the holographic mind presented above addresses the two knotty questions of the image and the viewer, referenced in the introduction. The image is the holographic frame. The viewer is the self. Unlike the notion of an inner “homunculus,” requiring an infinite regress of homunculi, however, the self-depicted in the holographic frame is different. By experiencing the world in terms of what it means to your self and your place in it, you achieve the state of “knowing.” You have created a knowing reflection. In so doing, you have “completed the circle of awareness.” Consciousness is like a dream. Both states contain an unseen protagonist - ourselves. In both states we view the world through our eyes, even though we don’t actually see ourselves. In both states we are the subjects, not the objects, of the experience. The scene that unfolds before our dreamer’s eyes is a compilation of bits and pieces of our waking life that come together to form a story. That story is told primarily through sights and sounds that ultimately reflect the associations and memories, the fears and desires of the central character - the protagonist - for whom it’s all about. If that is the experience we have when we dream, why should it be surprising that we have a similar experience when we’re awake? The dream frame supports the concept of the holographic frame. Throughout the ages, people have distinguished between body and soul; matter and mind. It was thought that while the one was tangible and solid, the other was invisible and ephemeral, belonging to an entirely different class of reality. This article, however, proposes that the elements of the conscious mind are very much part of the material world. But their ephemeral nature comes ultimately from the magic of the Holographic Principle. If that theory is correct, then we are surrounded by information. We are swimming in it. It exists in the form of 2D codes, which we and other living creatures have the unique ability to access by virtue of the focus frames formed within our brain. Received November 8, 2021; Accepted November 30, 2021 References ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 354 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life Bailey, A. (2006). Representation and a Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 15 July. Bergson, H. (1896). Mattier et Memoire. Transl. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (Matter and Memory, 1990). New York: Zone Books. Blakeslee, S. (1998). How the Brain Might Work: A New Theory of Consciousness, (232-237). In Wade, N., (ed.), The Science Times Book of the Brain. New York: Lyons Press. Cherry, K. (2021). The 4 Stages of Sleep. Verywell Health. The 4 Stages of Sleep (NREM and REM Sleep Cycles) (verywellhealth.com). Chown, M. (2009). Our World May Be a Giant Hologram. NewScientist. Jan. 14. Our world may be a giant hologram | New Scientist [Accessed 3 November, 2021]. Coates, p. and Coleman, S. (eds,) (2015). Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. DeWet, A. (2012). Experimental Evidence for the Holographic Principle. ResearchGate. Jan. (PDF) Experimental evidence for the holographic principle (researchgate.net) [Accessed 3 November, 2021]. Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. Dyslexic Artist. (2017). 3D Physics on a 2D boundary: the holographic principle. YouTube. https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=holographic+principle&docid=608017032555139031&mid=6 2174208AF6FDAB3722E62174208AF6FDAB3722E&view=detail&FORM=VIRE [Accessed 7 October 2020]. Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Harding, D. E. (1986). On Having No Head: Zen and the Rediscovery of the Obvious. London, England: Arkana. Levi, K. (2019). Knowing: Consciousness and the Universal Mind. Smashwords, https://Smashwords.com/books/view/956829. Levi, K. (2020a). Consciousness and the Duality of Self. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research, Vol. 11, Issue 7, 700-708. Levi, K. (2020b). The Holographic Mind. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research, Vol. 11, Issue 8, 784-795. Levi, K. (2021). Is It All in Your Mind? Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 242-251. Lu, C., Yang, T., Zhao, H., Zhang, M., Fancheng, M., Fu, H., Xu, H. (2016). Insular Cortex Is Critical for the Perception, Modulation, and Chronification of Pain. Springer Neuroscience Bulletin. April 32 (2): 191-201. Insular Cortex is Critical for the Perception, Modulation, and Chronification of Pain PubMed (nih.gov) [Accessed 13 May, 2021]. Matthews, E., Sandy, N. Michael Faraday’s “Lines of Force” and the Role of Heuristic Models in Early Electromagnetic Field Theory (2017). Senior Projects Spring 2017. 278. https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2017/278 [Accessed 29 October 2020]. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 355 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 4 | pp. 345-355 Levi, K., The Realization of Self in Everyday Life Moisse, K. (2010). No Implants Needed: Movement Generating Brain Waves Detected and Decoded Outside the Head. Scientific American. March 2. No Implants Needed: Movement-Generating Brain Waves Detected and Decoded Outside the Head - Scientific American [Accessed 9 November, 2021]. Muse. (2018). A Deep Dive into Brainwaves: Brainwave Frequencies Explained. Muse. A Deep Dive Into Brainwaves: Brainwave Frequencies Explained (choosemuse.com) [Accessed 6 November 2021]. PBS Spacetime. (2019). The Holographic Universe Explained, Part 39. YouTube, April 10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=klpDHn8viX8&t=74s [Accessed 7 October 2020]. Pinker, S. (1997). How the Mind Works. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Pribram, K.H. (1971). Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles in Neuropsychology. Prentice Hall/Brandon House, N.Y. Robbins, S. (2016a). Bergson and the Holographic Theory of Mind, Part 1. YouTube, Dec. 27. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtuxTXEhj3A [Accessed 9 October 2020]. Robbins, S. (2016b). Bergson and the Holographic Theory of Mind, Part 3. YouTube, Dec. 27. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtuxTXEhj3A [Accessed 11 October 2020]. Robbins, S. (2019). Bergson and the Holographic Theory of Mind, Part 39. YouTube, May 30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtuxTXEhj3A [Accessed 7 October 2020]. Shakespeare, W. (1611). The Tempest. Reprinted in The Comedies of Shakespeare, pp. 1-63. New York: Random House. Skenderis, K. (2017). Study Reveals Substantial Evidence of Holographic Universe. University of Southampton. Jan. 13. Study reveals substantial evidence of holographic universe | University of Southampton [Accessed 3 November 2021]. Smolin, L. (2001). Three Roads to Quantum Gravity. New York: Basic Books. Susskind, L. (2019). Black Holes and the Holographic Principle. YouTube. Feb. 1. Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge: MIT Press. Tye, M. (2021). Qualia. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Verma, S. (2020). Putting Electronics of Brain Waves to Use. Electronicsforu.com. Putting Electronics Of Brain Waves To Use | Must Read (electronicsforu.com) [Accessed Nov. 1, 2021]. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 200 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? Essay Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? Matti Pitkänen 1 Abstract I have proposed Negentropy Maximization Principle (NMP) as a variational principle for the evolution of conscious experience. Mathematically, NMP is very similar to the second law although it states something completely opposite. Second law follows from statistical physics and is not an independent physical law. Is the situation the same with the NMP? Is NMP needed at all as a fundamental principle or does it follow from number theoretic physics? Two additional aspects are involved. Evolution can in adelic physics be seen as an unavoidable increase in the algebraic complexity characterized by the dimension n = hef f /h0 of extension of rationals associated with the polynomial defining the space-time region at the fundamental level by socalled M 8 − H duality. There is also the possibility to identify a quantum correlate for ethics in terms of quantum coherence: the good deed corresponds to a creation of quantum coherence and the evil deed to its destruction. How do these two aspects relate to the NMP? Is NMP an independent dynamical principle or a consequence of number theoretic (adelic) quantum physics? If the reduction of quantum coherence in state function reduction serves as a correlate for evil deed, how does the conscious entity, self, know or learn this? 1 Introduction Discussions in the Zoom group led once again me to worry about the Negentropy Maximization Principle (NMP) [2, 14, 8], which I have proposed as a variational principle for the evolution of conscious experience. Mathematically, NMP is very similar to the second law although it states something completely opposite. Second law follows from statistical physics and is not an independent physical law. Is the situation the same with the NMP? Is NMP needed at all as a fundamental principle or does it follow from number theoretic physics? Two additional aspects are involved. Evolution can in adelic physics [9] be seen as an unavoidable increase in the algebraic complexity characterized by the dimension n = hef f /h0 of extension of rationals associated with the polynomial defining the space-time surface at the fundamental level by socalled M 8 −H duality [11, 12]. There is also the possibility of identifying a quantum correlate for ethics in terms of quantum coherence: a good deed would correspond to a creation of quantum coherence and the evil deed to its destruction. How do these two aspects relate to the NMP? Is NMP an independent dynamical principle or a consequence of number theoretic (adelic) quantum physics implied by the unavoidable increase of the algebraic complexity? If the reduction of quantum coherence in state function reduction serves as a correlate for evil, how does the conscious entity, self, know or learn this? In the sequel, the notion of number theoretic evolution, the possible connection between quantum coherence and ethics, and p-adic negentropy as a measure for the information content of conscious experience, allowing to resolve the apparent conflict of NMP with the second law, are discussed. Two options for the NMP are discussed and the conclusion that, in analogy with the second law, NMP is a consequence of number theoretic quantum physics. Also the question how zero energy ontology (ZEO) makes it possible for a conscious entity, self, to learn the distinction between good and evil, is considered. In the case that the deed affects the self, this means learning what deeds are threats for the existence of self. 1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.com/. Address: Rinnekatu 2-4 A8, 03620, Karkkila, Finland. Email: matpitka6@gamail.com. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 201 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? 2 Background notions and ideas behind NMP It is good to discuss first the basic concepts and ideas behind NMP [2, 14, 8] . 2.1 Number theoretic evolution M 8 − H duality is the cornerstone of number theoretical (or adelic) physics [10, 9]. M 8 or rather its complexification is interpreted as complexified octonions and one has H = M 4 × CP2 . M 8 is analogous to momentum space and M 8 − H duality becomes the analog of momentum-position duality when a point-like particle is replaced with 3-surface. 1. The roots of a polynomial P with rational coefficients (they can be chosen to be integers by a suitable scaling) define a set of 3-D hyperbolic spaces H 3 having interpretation as mass shells in M 4. 2. The 3-surfaces associated with these mass shells define 4-surfaces by the holography in H forced by general coordinate invariance. In M 8 the holography is defined by the condition that the normal space of the 4-surface is associative (quaternionic). Therefore associativity becomes the number theoretic variational principle. 3. A stronger condition would be that the 3-surfaces correspond to unions of 3-D hyperbolic manifolds as sub-manifolds of H 3 [17]. The 4-surface in M 8 defines by M 8 − H duality a space-time surface in H. Physical intuition suggests additional conditions on the integer coefficients of the polynomials P . 1. In [18] the possibility that the integer coefficients of the polynomial P are smaller than the degree k(P ) of the polynomial, is discussed. The assumption that the integers are smaller than n has strong intuitive physical motivations and has deep mathematical and physical implications. The number of these kinds of polynomials of a given degree k is finite as is also the number of corresponding space-time surfaces as points of the ”world of classical worlds” (WCW). Also the number of the points of 4-surface is finite in the unique discretization of the 4-surface of M 4 by points in the extension of rationals defined. As a consequence, quantum TGD becomes computable in a rather strong sense. One can also say that the physical system itself defines its approximation. The algebraic complexity of the space-time surface dictates the maximal information content of the associated quantum states. The second implication is that finite fields become a fundamental structures of the number theoretic physics besides other number fields (classical number fields, rationals and their extensions, and padic number fields and their extensions). These number fields combine to adeles and also infinite primes, integers and possibly also rationals are involved [5, 6, 4]. A given polynomial defines an algebraic extension of rationals, which makes its manifest in numbertheoretic physics via Galois confinement. 2. The higher the degree k of the polynomial, the higher the dimension n and complexity of the extension can be. n = hef f /h0 serves as a measure for the complexity of the system, a kind of IQ, and for the scale of quantum coherence. 3. Since there are many more polynomials of degree k higher than the given degree k0 than those of lower degree, the degree of polynomial P defining the space-time surface and the dimension n of corresponding extension of rationals n tend to grow in the series of quantum jumps. The world is getting smarter, and this fact seems to follow only from basic number theory. This motivates the question whether also NMP follows from number theory and quantum theory in the same way as the Second Law follows from the nondeterminism of state function reduction. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 202 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? 2.2 Quantum coherence and ethics According to the TGD inspired theory of consciousness [3] any system can be conscious and the distinction between electron and human is only due to the different degree of the complexity of the systems involved. Quantum coherence means something positive intuitively. This suggests that the creation of quantum coherence could be seen as a good deed at the fundamental fundamental level. The notions of good and evil would be universal. 1. Free will makes it possible also the destruction of quantum coherence. This would be the physical correlate of violence at the fundamental level. Good deeds create quantum coherence and evil deeds destroy it. This formulation of quantum ethics does not seem to relate in any obvious way to NMP or number-theoretic evolution. 2. The selection between good and evil is made in each BSFR as the partition of the system into a subsystem and complement is selected. NMP tells if BSFR can happen for this particular partition or not. If BSFR happens, a bad deed has been done, otherwise the deed is good since quantum coherence does not decrease. 2.3 What does one mean with p-adic negentropy? To define p-adic entropy and negentropy, one must define p-adic counterparts of probabilities. This definition is possible if the probabilities are in an extension of rationals so that they make sense both as p-adic and real numbers. This poses conditions on entanglement coefficients. If the entanglement coefficients for the pair of systems defined by subsystem and its complement are in the extension of rationals defined by the polynomial P , the probabilities are in an extension of this extensions since they are eigenvalues of the density matrix and defined by a polynomial whose degree is the dimension D of the state space defined by the entangled states. This suggests a criterion for whether the SFR can take place. 1. The definition of p-adic entropy is given by the Shannon formula by replacing the logarithms of probabilities with the logarithms of their p-adic norms: they are well-defined for any extension of rationals. Note that the entropy is a real number so that ”p-adic” might be somewhat misleading. The p-adic entropy satisfies the same additivity formula as the ordinary Shannon entropy. Unlike the ordinary entropy, the p-adic entropy can be negative, and this motivates the identification of p-adic negentropy as a measure of information. The total p-adic negentropy can be defined as a sum over the p-adic negentropies for various primes p. 2. The interpretation of p-adic negentropy is as a measure of negentropy of quantum entanglement associated with the partition of a system to a subsystem and complement. One could also consider all possible partitions of the system to subsystem and complement and assign to them the sum of p-adic entanglement negentropies identified as the total p-adic negentropy. 3. The total p-adic negentropy could be interpreted as a measure of the content of the system’s conscious information. Ordinary entropy is in turn a measure of the external observer’s ignorance of the state of the system (Schrödinger cat). Therefore the apparent conflict between NMP and the second law disappears. 4. A large p-adic negentropy is accompanied with a large standard entropy, and this could perhaps be interpreted so that the creation of conscious information produces entropy at the level of matter [14]. The difference of the p-adic negentropy and the ordinary entropy is non-negative and is guaranteed by NMP and the basic properties of p-adic negentropy. The difference between negentropy and entropy increases even though entropy is created at the level of matter. Number theoretic evolution implies the increase of the total p-adic negentropy. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 203 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? 5. A possible concrete biology inspired interpretation is that the system tries to extract as much information as possible from the incoming organized energy (metabolic energy) and in an ideal situation only completely unorganized thermal energy remains, what is produced by dissipation. What we call energy saving is exactly this efficient extraction of information. Conscious informationproducing systems that use metabolic energy to increase hbar dissipate. This is what Jeremy England discovered [1, 7]. 2.4 Zero energy ontology very briefly The key notions of zero energy ontology (ZEO) are zero energy states defined as pairs of quantum states at the 3-D boundaries of the space-time surface at the opposite boundaries of a causal diamond (CD= cd × CP2 , where c is causal diamond of M 4 ) having interpretation as a 4-D perceptive field. For how the space of CDs forms the backbone of the ”world of classical worlds” (WCW) see [20]. Geometrically, the zero energy states are superpositions of space-time surfaces connecting the opposite boundaries of CD. The space-time surfaces satisfy holography and are analogous to Bohr orbits. Twistor lift leads to a proposal that they correspond as extremals of 6-D Kähler action to 4-D minimal surfaces which are simultaneously extremals of 4-D Kähler action. An intriguing fact is however that since the field equations reduce to a 4-D generalization of 2-D holomorphy, they are also extremals for a very large class of actions. The possible implications of this are discussed in [20]. There are two kinds of state function reductions (SFRs). 1. One can assign to CD a passive boundary, which is only scaled during ”small” SFRs (SSFRs) and the states at it are unaffected: this is the counterpart for Zeno effect. SSFRs correspond to repeated measurement of the same observables at the passive boundary. The additional observables measured at the active boundary of CD must commute with these observables. The states at the active boundary are affected in SSFRs and the geometry of the future light-one implies that the active boundary drifts farther away from the passive boundary in the statistical sense at least. Therefore the temporal distance between the tips of the CD increases. This corresponds to the flow of geometric time correlating with the sequence of SSFRs defining subjective time. 2. When the measured observables are changed to new ones, not commuting with the original ones, the state at the passive boundary changes and BSFR takes place. Passive boundary of the CD becomes active and vice versa and the arrow of time changes. CD begins to increase in the opposite direction of geometric time. The implications are discussed from the point of view of consciousness and quantum biology in [20]. It took a long time to become convinced that quantum jump can involve the creation of an entirely new CD. Birth would be a universal quantum phenomenon. The minimal interpretation is that a new perceptive field is created. ZEO also allows the ”Eastern view” in which a new Universe would be created. 3 Negentropy Maximization Principle revisited NMP is mathematically analogous to the second law of thermodynamics and the proposal has been that it serves as the basic variation principle of the dynamics of conscious experience. NMP says that the information related to the contents of consciousness increases for the whole system even though it can decrease for the subsystem. The number theoretic evolution is such a powerful principle that one must ask whether NMP is needed as a separate principle or whether it is a consequence of number theoretical quantum physics, just like the second law. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 204 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? Consider in the sequel BSFR as the counterpart of the ordinary state function reduction. I’m not completely sure whether the following arguments can be also applied to SSFRs for which the arrow of time does not change. One can consider two alternative formulations for NMP. 3.1 Option I Option I is the simpler and physically more plausible option. 1. BSFR divides the quantum entangled system at the active boundary of CD into two parts, which are analogous to the measurement apparatus and the measured system. The selection of this partition is completely free and decided by the system. This choice corresponds to an act of free will. Depending on conditions to be discussed, the action of the measurement to this pair can be trivial in which case the entanglement is not reduced. The measurement can also reduce the entanglement partially or completely and the p-adic entanglement negentropy and entropy decreases or becomes zero. 2. If the partition into two parts is completely free and if the choice is such that NMP, or whatever the principle in question is, allows BSFR, the quantum coherence decreases. Number theoretic evolution suggests that the principle telling when BSFR can occur is number theoretic. There is a cascade of BSFRs since BSFRs are also possible for the emerging untangled subsystem and its complement. The cascade stops when the entanglement becomes stable. 3. What condition could determine whether the reduction of the entanglement takes place? What could make the entanglement stable against BSFR? Number theoretical vision suggests an answer. Physical intuition suggests that bound states represent a typical example of stable quantum entanglement. Bound states correspond to Galois confined states [19, 13, 15, 16] for which the momenta of fermions are algebraic integers in an extension of rationals but total momentum has integer valued components. This mechanism for the formation of the bound states would be universal. A natural number theoretical proposal is that the entanglement is stable if the entanglement probabilities obtained by diagonalizing the density matrix characterizing the entanglement belong to an extension of rational, which is larger than the extension, call it E, defined by the polynomial P defining the space-time surface. An even stronger condition, inspired by the fact that cognition is based on rational numbers, is that BSFR can take place only if they are rational. This kind of entanglement would be outside the number system used and one can argue that this forces the stability of the entanglement. A weaker statement is that the reduction is possible to a subspace of the state space for which the entanglement probabilities belong to E (or are rational). 4. This option could replace NMP as a criterion with a purely number theoretical principle. This does not however mean that NMP would not be preserved as a principle analogous to the second law and implied by the number theoretic evolution in turn implied by the hierarchy of extensions of rationals. Could free will as the ability to do evil or good deeds reduce to number theory that is to the choice of a partition, which leads to either increase or decrease of entanglement negentropy and therefore of quantum coherence? The basic objection can be formulated as a question. How can the conscious entity know whether a given choice of partition leads to BSFR or not? Memory must be involved. Only by making this kind of choices, a system with a memory can learn the outcome of a given choice. How could the self learn, which deeds are good and which are evil? The answer is suggested by the biologically motivated view of survival instinct and origin of ego [21] based on SSFRs as a generalization of Zeno effect. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 205 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? 1. Conscious entity has a self characterized by the set of observables measured in the sequence of SSFRs. BSFR as a reduction of entanglement occurs when a new set of observables not commuting with the original set are measured. In BSFR self ”dies” (loses consciousness). Second BSFR means reincarnation with the original arrow of time. 2. The perturbations of the system at both boundaries of CD are expected to induce BSFRs and to occur continually. Therefore the arrow of time is fixed only in the sense that it dominates over the opposite arrow. 3. Self preserves its identity (in particular memories defining it) if the second BSFR leads to a set of observables, which does not differ too much from the original one. The notions of survival instinct and ego would reduce to an approximate Zeno effect. 4. This mechanism would allow the self to learn the distinction between good and evil and also what is dangerous and what is not. A BSFR inducing only a brief period of life with a reversed arrow of time could teach the system when the BSFR leads to a reduction of entanglement and loss of coherence. The harmless BSFRs could provide a mechanism of imagination making survival possible. Intelligent systems could do this experimentation at the level of a self representation of a system rather than in real life and the development of complex self representations would distinguish higher life forms from those at a lower evolutionary level. 3.2 Option II Option II is stronger than Option I but looks rather complex. I have considered it already before. NMP would select a partition for which the negentropy gain is maximal in BSFR or at least, the decrease of the negentropy is minimal. One must however define what one means with negentropy gain. Before considering whether this condition can be precise, it is good to list some objections. 1. Is the selection of this kind of optimal partition possible? How can the system know which partition is optimal without trying all alternatives? Doing this would reduce the situation to the first option. 2. Free will as ability do also evil deeds seems to be eliminated as a possibility to either increase or decrease entanglement negentropy and therefore quantum coherence by choosing the partition of the system so that it reduces negentropy. 3. If the BSFR cascade would lead to a total loss of quantum entanglement, the entanglement negentropy would always be zero and NMP would not say anything interesting. On the other hand, if the selection of the partition is optimal and the number theoretic criterion for the occurrence of the reduction holds true, it could imply that nothing happens for the entanglement. Again the NMP would be trivial. 4. What does one mean with the maximal negentropy gain? 3.3 What does one mean with a maximal negentropy gain? Option II for NMP says that for a given partition BSFR occurs if the entanglement negentropy increases maximally. What does one mean with entanglement negentropy gain? This notion is also useful for Option I although it is not involved with the criterion. 1. Entanglement negentropy refers to the negentropy related to the passive edge of the CD (Zeno effect). Passive boundary involves negentropic entanglement because NMP does not allow a complete elimination of quantum entanglement (bound state entanglement is stable). The new passive boundary of CD emerging in the BSFR corresponds to the previously active boundary of CD. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 206 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? 2. For option I for which the concept of good/bad is meaningful, the number theoretical criterion could prevent BSFR and stop the BSFR cascade. There is however no guarantee that the total entanglement negentropy would increase in the entire BSFR cascade. This would make the term ”NMP” obsolete unless NMP follows in a statistical sense from number theoretic evolution: this looks however plausible. The unavoidable increase of the number theoretical complexity would force the increase of p-adic entanglement negentropy and NMP as an analog of the second law would follow from the hierarchy of extensions of rationals. Received February 25, 2023; Accepted May 19, 2023 References [1] England J Perunov N, Marsland R. Statistical Physics of Adaptation, 2014. Available at: https: //arxiv.org/pdf/1412.1875v1.pdf. [2] Pitkänen M. Negentropy Maximization Principle. In TGD Inspired Theory of Consciousness. Available at: https:/tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/nmpc.pdf, 2006. [3] Pitkänen M. TGD Inspired Theory of Consciousness. Online book. Available at: https://www. tgdtheory.fi/tgdhtml/tgdconsc.html., 2006. [4] Pitkänen M. TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Infinite Primes. In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Part I. Available at: https:/tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/visionc.pdf, 2019. [5] Pitkänen M. TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: p-Adicization Program. In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Part I. Available at: https:/tgdtheory.fi/pdfpool/visiona.pdf, 2019. [6] Pitkänen M. TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Quaternions, Octonions, and their Hyper Counterparts. In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory: Part I. Available at: https:/tgdtheory. fi/pdfpool/visionb.pdf, 2019. [7] Pitkänen M. Jeremy England’s vision about life and evolution: comparison with TGD approach . Available at: https:/tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/englandtgd.pdf., 2015. [8] Pitkänen M. About number theoretic aspects of NMP. Available at: https:/tgdtheory.fi/public_ html/articles/nmpagain.pdf., 2017. [9] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. Available at: https:/tgdtheory.fi/public_html/ articles/adelephysics.pdf., 2017. [10] Pitkänen M. Philosophy of Adelic Physics. In Trends and Mathematical Methods in Interdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences, pages 241–319. Springer.Available at: https://link.springer. com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-55612-3_11, 2017. [11] Pitkänen M. A critical re-examination of M 8 − H duality hypothesis: part I. Available at: https: /tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/M8H1.pdf., 2020. [12] Pitkänen M. A critical re-examination of M 8 − H duality hypothesis: part II. Available at: https: /tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/M8H2.pdf., 2020. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | May 2023 | Vol. 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 200-207 207 Pitkänen, M., Is Negentropy Maximization Principle Needed as an Independent Principle? [13] Pitkänen M. Galois code and genes. https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/Galoiscode. pdf., 2021. [14] Pitkänen M. Negentropy Maximization Principle and Second Law. tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/nmpsecondlaw.pdf., 2021. Available at: https:// [15] Pitkänen M. About TGD counterparts of twistor amplitudes: part I. https://tgdtheory.fi/ public_html/articles/twisttgd1.pdf., 2022. [16] Pitkänen M. About TGD counterparts of twistor amplitudes: part II. https://tgdtheory.fi/ public_html/articles/twisttgd2.pdf., 2022. [17] Pitkänen M. About the TGD based notions of mass, of twistors and hyperbolic counterpart of Fermi torus. https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/hyperbFermi.pdf., 2022. [18] Pitkänen M. Finite Fields and TGD. finitefieldsTGD.pdf., 2022. https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/ [19] Pitkänen M. The realization of genetic code in terms of dark nucleon and dark photon triplets. https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/darkcode.pdf., 2022. [20] Pitkänen M. New result about causal diamonds from the TGD view point of view. https:// tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/CDconformal.pdf., 2023. [21] Pitkänen M. TGD view of Michael Levins work. https://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/ Levin.pdf., 2023. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

409 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Exploration Evolution of Consciousness Satinder S. Malik* Abstract In this article, I explore the evolution of consciousness and the state of Samadhi. When a Yogi withdraws all senses, he doesn‟t smell, taste, see, hear or feel the touch and he knows nothing but the self (Atma), then the yogi is Samadhi and he is a liberated one. Thus, the Yogi so settled in Samadhi achieves a control over his sensors but also gains telepathy, wisdom of Sat and ability to see past present and future, he truly goes beyond the bandwidth of normal human being‟s senses and becomes an adept (Siddha). This is surest path for evolution of Consciousness. Keywords: Evolution, consciousness, Samadhi, Yogi, Atman, Siddha. There are approximately 7.8 billion people live on this earth in 2020 [11]. The population was 6.92 biilion in year 2010. Out of these people the religion wise distribution is given in following table [13]. The religiously unaffiliated number 1.1 billion, accounting for about one-in-six (16%) people worldwide [14]. The religiously unaffiliated include atheists, agnostics and people who do not identify with any particular religion in surveys. However, many of the religiously unaffiliated have some religious beliefs. Religion Christians %age Population 31% 2,173,180,00 0 Muslims 23% 1,598,510,00 0 No Religion 16% 1,126,500,00 affiliation 0 Hindus 15% Buddhists Folk Religionists Other Religions 7% 6% 1,033,080,00 0 487,540,000 405,120,000 1%): 58,110,000 Jews 0.2% 13,850,000 Remarks 50% are Catholic, 37% Protestant, 12% Orthodox, and 1% other 87-90% are Sunnis, 10-13% Shia Agnostics and people who do not identify with any particular religion. One-in-five people (20%) in the United States are religiously unaffiliated. 94% of which live in India 50% live in China Faiths that are closely associated with a particular group of people, ethnicity or tribe Baha‟i faith, Taoism, Jainism, Shintoism, Sikhism, Tenrikyo, Wicca, Zoroastrianism and many others. Four-fifths of which live in two countries: United States (41%) and Israel (41%) * Correspondence author: Dr. Satinder S. Malik, Independent Researcher, India. E-mail: adventuressmalik@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 410 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness A total of approximately 84% population on planet earth believes in some form of supernatural power or super consciousness. There are also local beliefs in paranormal activity, ghosts, magic, sorcery etc some sort extra dimensional experiences which are unexplained by science and rejected as imagination or some freak activity of mind due to mental stress. While Hinduism is mentioned as a religion above, it is the name given to the people who live beyond river Indus (Sindhu) and to the east of it. The accurate name of India is Bharat meaning in pursuit of light. The most ancient name is JambuDwipa (Island with trees of Jambu) as mentioned in scriptures. The supercontinent Pangea began to break up approximately around 200 Ma (million years ago) and India started a northward drift towards Asia. 80 Ma India was 6,400 km south of the Asian continent but moving towards it at a rate of between 9 and 16 cm per year [12]. The Himalayan mountain range and Tibetan plateau have formed as a result of the collision between the Indian Plate and Eurasian Plate which began 50 million years ago and continues today. It would be difficult to classify Hinduism as religion because it is a way of life or more importantly a culture. The real name of what is inferred as Hinduism is „Sanatan Dharma‟. Sanatan means „since the beginning‟. Therefore, there is no single propounder of the SanatanDharma. Dharma is set of principles which are applied to thinking and action to cater to environment & nature, animals, other humans, society and for evolution of consciousness. The ancient wisdom flows from Brahma who is originator of Vedas (Vid is to know). These are the manual for the humanity to live on theEarth. These were brought to earth by Rishis (higher conscious forms) who were researchers doing research on how the designed human and animal life is proceeding on earth and also experience of nature of human body and environment of earth. More scripture about historical treatises (Purana), Upanishads, Vedanta, Brahmana, Aranyakasetcdescribed various aspects and all were in verbal form. You could well imagine the mental capacity of those people who could remember thousands of couplets in Sanskrit language. Sanskrit is a language based on scientific principles and also rhythmic.It known as DevBhasha (language of the Gods). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 411 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness The world is spending billions for search of life in the universe. This knowledge has been available to world‟s most ancient civilization from the beginning of human life. There have been frequent contacts with what we call as „Alienlife‟ today. People have visited other planets along with Gods. The space races have also been identified and named. The planet has been a ground for competition between various alien life-forms. The aliens have also lived on earth settled, ruled and married human and also had children.Other than them higher consciousness beings have taken birth in human body shells and guided humans by setting examples on how to life of dharma. Reality Versus Maya Reality is the quality or state of being actual or true. We know that all animate and inanimate beings are built of atoms and their various combinations. If you enlarge an atom so see its nucleus of the size of tennis ball, the nearest electron would be nearly three kilometers away. Therefore 99% of us are actually made up of what we call as space. It is difficult to perceive the reality in this world which is under various layers of illusion or mystery. The Sanskrit term for supreme consciousness is Prabrahamha (Beyond Universe). The same term is used for Parameshvara (Ultimate God, Purush) who is Nirgun (Beyond the ambit of three gunas of Sat, Rajas and Tamas), Nirakar (no shape) and ultimate truth. Universe is sprung out as Sankalpa (resolution) of God. Ultimate God is represented in Sakar Brahma (Consciousness with shape) as Trinity (Shiva, Vishnu and Brahma). The idea of creation from Nothingness to expanding spheroid (Brahmand) starts from integration of initial vibration Om (Aum) with time, forming space and non-manifesting wavelet strings. These wavelet strings further integrate in time and space using many combinations and permutations of conjunctions and disjunction creating forces and the waves, rays, unstable elementary particles and quarks. The entire process is formation of universe is autonomous barring some intelligent interference and follows principles of Mahat (great principle or a principle which leads from small, un-manifested things to great things). Mahat is the mathematics behind the magic numbers and wave geometry for formation of space, energy and matter forms. As the formation of universe progresses from step zero to one and further, at each step whatever new forms up, appears completely different than the original ingredients. This is known as Maya (illusion). For example, hydrogen is a flammable gas and oxygen is a gas which aids combustion and their combination is water which helps douse fire. At the next level from elements to compound, the nature of matter has changed to a completely differ set of characteristics. Thechanged characteristics completely different than original is an illusion which is described in Vedas asmaya. Leading from small to big in various permutations and combinations can still be understood, how something whatever small and un-manifested came out of nothingness is great mystery (mahamaya). Creation of first vibration from Shunya is known as Mahamaya. No one has been able to decipher as to what is Mahamaya. It is the source code of the first re-iterating equation. The initial vibration was manifested with three gunas (Sat, Rajas and Tamas). At the moment Sat can be understood as knowledge and purity, rajas as control and tamas as binding forces. Therefore, Sat (also known as truth) is the intelligence riding in every corner of space, wavelets and particles and their future heavier and larger outcomes. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 412 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Let‟s consider this world at reality level one. The physical world is unreal because the truth of body is atoms, truth of atoms is particles, truth of particles is quarks, truth of quarks is waves and truth of waves and even if do not go any deeper in reality the entire thing can be explained very well be mathematical equations which helps unravel the reality from the clutches of maya. The mathematics is Sat (truth) and humans and to some extent animals can perceive it because of inherent consciousness. In the Lemurian and Atlantean periods,Asuras, Danavas and Daityas were experts in maya (they themselves had origins in space) and had built exceeding great civilizations, palaces which were full of gems and gold.Vimanaswere at their disposal. They were intoxicated with ego and considered no one equal to them. Indus valley civilization is some of their doing when their powers had decayed and still these were the best designed cities in the world. Maya has the capability to deceive us away from reality. Technology also impacts reality and fools our senses and the mind. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad reflects on theory of dreams, positing that human beings see dreams entirely unto themselves because the mind draws in itself, the powers of sensory organs, which it releases in the waking state. It then asserts that this empirical fact about dreams suggests that human mind has the power to perceive the world as it is, as well as fabricate the world as it wants to perceive it. Mind is a means, prone to flaws. The struggle man faces, is in his attempt to realize the "true reality behind perceived reality". The world at reality level one is also perceived differently by different humans. Therefore, as many numbers of worlds exist as there are preceptors. Perception of the world by a scientist, a rich man, a poor man, a person living in big city or small place would be different. Why maya is dangerous in spite of giving humans beautiful, tasteful, musical, sensuous experiences and dreams is an enquiry every educated person must seek. Psychology as Nature of Subtle Body Psychology is the scientific study of the human mind and its functions, especially those affecting behaviour in a given context. In India, psychology was never a subject because nature of human psyche was not only well known but also well controlled. The human perception is generated by five senses and interpreted by mind. The subtle body in man has the cognitive complex consisting of Chitta (Consciousness), Buddhi (intellect), Ahankara (ego/ identity) and Man (mind). We are aware that there are chiefly five main senses in the human body which help build perception; these are sight, sound, smell, touch and taste. These five senses give their inputs to mind and mind stores this information in memory. Mind acts like pre programmed or hard wired firmware responsible for management of the body.The mind is connected to the senses through the information superhighways of naadis which are as much as 300,000 but mainly considered 72000 as important and 10 of them are chief because then connect mind with nine portals (openings) of human body. These are a pair each of eyes, ears and nose, a mouth, a genital and an anus. Intellect accesses all the information from memory simultaneously or later for drawing inferences and make decisions.Chitta is source code for deploying software for generating intelligence (buddhi). It is like arithmetic & logic unit (ALU) to the central processing unit (CPU) of a computer. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 413 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness इन्द्रियाणाम् , हि, चरताम् , यत् , मनः, अनु, हिधीयते , तत् , अस्य, िरहत, प्रज्ञाम् , िायु ः, नािम् , इि, अम्भहि।।2.67।। Geeta (Chapter 2 verse 67) mentions when the mind follows the senses experiencing their interests, his understanding is taken over by them like an unanchored sailboat which gets drifted due to the wind blowing from any side.Like the wind is a natural force, senses are also hardwired to sense the inputs and send them to mind, mind is the interpreter and it can dwell longer in areas which of more interest. Sensors also have local muscle memory but it is the mind needs to be kept on leash by the intellect. Priority of needs As far as the priority of needs, wants and desires of human body are concerned, these can be inferredlocation of the chakras. Strength and balancing of chakras is important for wellbeing and health of mind and body. Meditation of chakras can ensure natural healing. Fear (Immediate Survival). Survival is first priority of any organism. For the purpose of survival of the organism, a protective sense of fear has been programmed. This is characterized by Muladhar Chakra located on the base of perineum. If this Chakra is not balanced then a person would be extremely security conscious. In extreme cases, due to exposure to a fearful situation loss of bowl control is because of this reason. Fight or flight syndrome is also a characteristic of this. Procreation (Survival of the Species). Below the navel, there is small congregation of nerves known as Kanda, it controls procreation. The entire system is designed for ensuring survival of the species. The pleasure in procreational activity is due to a large number of sensors located on genital of both male and female. This is a clever mechanism and acts as incentive for ensuring survival of the species. It also helps in selection of better genes. The liking for particular partners is also driven by the genetics driven agenda. A woman would like to select a partner who could give her most talented offspring. A man would like to select a woman who could be most charming, lovable and could provide better nourishment to his future offspring. Various other types of unions such LGBT are not for pro-creational cause and therefore considered as vikaras (faults) due to unbalanced chakra. Energy (Hunger, Survival). In the navel center is Manipur Chakra taking care of digestion and ensuring calorific values from food for energy generation and body maintenance. From here, most of the physical strength is generated. Hunger is an indication for requirement of food and pleasure of taste is a motivation for eating food as well as mechanism for identifying suitable food. Love and Friendship. Man is a social animal. The society would be incomplete without sense of love and friendship; these are the necessary ingredients of loving and caring social units such as family, clan and higher social systems. Man has advantage of power of expression through speech and hence able to evolve language for communicating. These higher centers are not so developed in Animals. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 414 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Speech and Expression. No other life form has such ability of speech as it is endowed in humans. As humans decide to say something, air passes throughairway passage following constrictions in throat and mouth, it is modulated by tongue and instantly a stream sound energy starts flowing. Vishuddhi Chakra controlability of expression by speech and vocal music. Sahsrar Intuition, Consciousness Agya Intellect, Perception Vishudhi Speech, Expression Anahata Love, Friendship, Emotional strength Manipur Physical Strength Swadhistan a Mooladhara Cognition. Procreation, Survival of the Species Fear, Survival, Anger Agya chakra controls learning, intelligence, memory and intuition. Consciousness. Sahsrara Chakra control union with universal consciousness. Higher Chakras enable intelligence and intuition, connect with dimension of consciousness. Causes of suffering The universal experience of suffering compels an enquiry for its removal and ultimately leads to realisation of the truth (about Soul). The suffering appears to be applicable to all rich and poor, strong and weak, old and young irrespective of caste, creed, sex or race. The mind attaches to what it considers as a comfort causing experience and tends to stay away from sorrow and painful experiences. Maharishi Patanjali described working of mind in PatanjaliYogsutras. He also describes the factors which cause inflictions on mind. अहिद्यान्द्रितारागद्वे षाहिहनिे शाःक्ले शाः॥२.३॥ Avidya – ignorance, Asmita – egoism, Raga – attachment, Dvesha – aversion (Hatred, Jealousy), Abhiniveshah - clinging to life, Kleshaah - causes of suffering. A lack of insight (avidya) is the source of most obstacles and can be latent, incipient, full-fledged or overwhelming [13]. Avidya (ignorance) is of two types „Sanskara‟ born and sense born. Sanskara born is due to past life learnings& actions and sense borne is due to inputs of the sensors in human body. Therefore, it is first and foremost duty of a human being to remove ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 415 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness avidya by seeking knowledge and drawing inferences to gain vidya by reasoning and logical thought process. All human beingsexist based on same principles. Small differences may exist, however, these are miniscule and can hardly be considered as ground for feeling different. It is thinking and action what makes human superior or inferior. Ego is a process of identity and differentiation and it is an important trait. If a person can stay grounded despite success, doesn‟t take credit of his success and doesn‟t take oneself too seriously, he can keep his ego in check.Ego can inflate very fast in gratifying conditions. False ego is generated when one starts associating himself with body and environment which needs to be avoided. Association with objects which are ephemeral, temporary and notunder one‟s control would cause inflictions on mind during their separation. The presumption that happiness depends on external circumstances is referred to as desire (raga). The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad states that all love is for the sake of one's Self. A child loves his mother for his own sake and not for the sake of mother. The notion that pain and suffering are caused by external circumstances is referred to as aversion (dvesha). Abhinivesha can cause anxiety. Anxiety canarise spontaneously in particular conditions and can even dominate individual existence. Suppose a cosmopolitan city dweller that is in thick of action, office or work gossip, party animal and always looking for next excitement and addicted to social media and Smartphone. If such a person is left in a remote village without phone or electricity and no modern amenities, his favourite brands or entertainment around would become unhappy. All the above causes of suffering need to be nipped in the bud. There are some misconceptions that can arise due toVriitis. Vrittis are whirlpools of thoughts in peaceful lake of human mind. Undisturbed mind is like a calm and peaceful lake. Inputs from senses create waves of disturbance upon its surface. If the indulgence is repeated or prolonged they develop in stronger waves also affecting the deep layers. When the strong waves persist they become whirlpools or Vrittis affecting deeper intellect and also causing sanskara (long term habit). Falling in love with an object or a person is a vritti. Similarly, depression is also a vritti. Combined impact of Maya and Avidya due to incorrect application of modern scientific knowledge in our Present Environment Due to lack of understanding in causes of suffering and attachment to comforts, human beings are pursuing accumulation of material resources to ensure lasting happiness which has largely been elusive. World is busy consuming resources of the earth to in order to maximize the physical comforts for the body. Some of the recent developments of science have lowered human beings perception increase risks of degenerative vrittis on his mind. Some of these are due to impact of current system of economics which is known as capitalism. It is a system which in fact has become areligion as most people are unable to follow their religions. Since many people in cities are busy working living away from families. Their identity becomes what they project without being judged by the traditional value system. It is a kind of freedom since they are not completely influenced by their old social system. The new system allows them to take decisions which may not have been seen in good light by traditional system. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 416 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Modern food habits are shaped by the extraordinary science of addictive junk food [15]. Even if you avoid the junk food, you will end up buying from a departmental store. That food too is packages with intention of a longer shelf life. Food is being produced in farms with lots of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Large corporations are deciding what you eat. This is mainly because of rise of industrialization and near collapse of agrarian system. Governments find themselves in weaker position to control this due to corrupt officials, ignorance of public and profit hungry capitalistic system. Due to advent of recording which permitted preservation of effort of the artist is basically, entertainment is suddenly available to all. Entertainment which found in sports, wildlife, social gatherings etc has been shifted to theaters, bars and also invaded the family and personal space. Just imagine that human need air, water, food, clothing and dwelling in that order. Out of these air may be polluted but free and water is starting to cost. The man who produces food is the least priority and main who is an entertainer, who is not even figuring out in the chain above, has become the highest grosser. The purpose of procreation is for the survival of the species. It is a gift and absolutely not a sin. It does not need be an education, however, wrong usage of this system can cause harmful results and that needs to be educated. Look at the animals and see how their life is regulated. Human life was also regulated in same manner in when there was requirement of long hours of physical work, healthy pastimes and a joint family system. The act of procreation is deceivingly well marketed through movies, TV series and portrayed as a new found freedom which is facilitated by harmful world of contraceptives. Availability of porn magazines and audio visual media engage attention of the mind and cause vrittis. Sexual tools are being sold to singles in the name of sexual health. Mental vritti is like a love affair, a depression which clings human to the act. This causes addiction limiting the free mental space time and hence the mental capacity to launch one in various higher intellectual pursuits. A perfectly well thought out and well design system of human procreation has become a red herring for human race. The Book of Genesis records circumcision as part of the Abrahamic covenant with Yahweh [16]. The angel of Moses and Mohammed was Gabriel who dictated this practice as means to reduce sexual urge in humans. He was well aware about the potential dangers of uncontrolled addiction to this urge. In some cultures, it is still practiced in males as well as females. Genital mutilation is an external fix for controlling human urge for sex. This method has not as proven successful. This is because of the fact that sensor is just a tool, mind is the master. This wisdom was well received by people following natural Dharma. In ancient India life was divided in four ashrams. These were Brahmcharya, Grahstha, Vanprastha and Sanyas. Up to 25 years practice of Brahmacharya was encouraged which was mainly study, yoga, homa, service of the teacher and a celibate life. Brahmcharis used the yogic kriya of holding the mind to the bindu. Bindu is located beneath the cowlick that most people have at the back of their head. Anatomically, it is located where the bones of the back and sides of the skull meet (the occiput and the parietal). The direction of the stream of cosmic energy flowing into the Chakra can be seen quite clearly at this point. Apart from danger of addiction caused by pornography, the main danger is its ability to be passed as karma for the next birth also because vrittis dig deep in mind. The thinking process affect individuals aura and that causes an effect similar to mutual induction to other nearby human beings. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 417 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Patanjali has also described a solution to overcome vrittis. ध्यानिे याःतद् िृ त्तयः॥११॥ Meditation on overcoming the vritti eliminates such misconceptions that arise from the vritti. Objectives of Life One has always wondered as to what are the objectives of human life. A term for this is known in Sanskrit as Purusharth. Purushartha can be translated as the “purpose/ meaning of man (what does he mean to do)” and also as "pursuit of Consciousness” becausePurushaalso means "Consciousness," [6]. The objectives of human life are Dharma, Artha, Kam and Moksha. Dharma is what one ought to think as a code of the conduct, a duty, set of morals& ethics by which one should think and act to achieve the aim of Purushartha. Artha is accumulation of required material resources to fulfill ones worldly obligations. Kama is satiation of one‟s desires and Moksha is ultimate aim of spiritual liberation. The planning for life is by keeping the objectives of the soul in mind and not the objective of the body. As we eat food to nourish our body, exercise body to gain strength, study to build up mental faculties in the same manner we need to contemplate on evolving consciousness which is the objective of the soul. Nature of Soul In Geeta (Chapter 15 Verse 16 above) it is also mentioned that Purush (Consciousness) is of two types in universe, Kshar and Akhshar. Kshar (decay-able, changeable) is in every substance and Akshar (Unchangeable, undecaying) is extremely well hidden (secret). The above fact is indicative that everything in the universe is conscious. The Akshar is type of consciousness which is pervading in living beings. It is everlasting continuous and continues to evolve. Consciousness has three attributes of Sat, Rajas and Tamas. Higher manifested AksharPurusha are Shiva (Progenitor of Initial vibration from Shivalinga), Vishnu (Time) and Brahma (Creator of every local universe). AksharPurush in man is known as Atma which is integrated in physical body using six stages layering of subtle energies. It is coded in as akin to software. These layers are explained in earlier paper with the title „Human body as Cradle of Consciousness‟.These layers are known as Suksham, Karan, Mahakaran, Hansa (Ham Sa),Param-Hansa (Ham Sa), KaivalyaSharir (body). It is also known as seat of the soul is pineal gland. Tibetan scriptures mentioned that in the day time soul resides behind the eyes and in the night time in heart (or some also mention liver). Maharishi Kanad reflects light on nature of soul in Visheshaka Sutra. He described the nature of the Soul in the journey through time, the suffering Soul revolving on the wheel of births and deaths and re-births under the Law of Karma. Process of Evolution of Soul Evolution of consciousness is by knowing self (soul) and then soul is able to interact with dimension of consciousness which is sat. Thus by knowing Soul all is known. Sat (Knowledge) ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 418 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness is already integrated in universe; a soul has to perceive it to receive it. By receiving the knowledge, it is illuminated. In AtmaUpanishadGargi says to Yagvalkya…that a man is sterile is he not able to does not realise the Atma which is in his heart and the Atma is image of the Purusha (Ultimate God), self illuminated, blissful and it is un-manifested. [8] In the diagram above, two approaches to truth are shown. One approach is internal. In internal approach, consciousness is evolved to seek the knowledge of the universe.Second approach is external. External approach is by knowing the external matter using sense organs and scientific apparatus which widens the spectrum of our sense inputs. For example, the scientists are looking for a „God‟ particle using Large Hadron Collider. The enquiry into detailed nature of things is also known as Sankhya. In Geeta, two ways have been described best to reach supreme consciousness one is Yoga and other is Sankhya.Sankhya is also referred as Gyan yoga and is followed via internal route. In my earlier papers titled „Nature of Dimensions‟ and „Role of Consciousness in Origin of Universe‟sankhya is described and here in this paper Yoga is described. Yoga Yoga means union, union of jeeva (soul) with purusha (dimension of consciousness). The yoga is achieved by one simple step of ChittaVriitiNirodha (stopping of thought whirlpools). The state of thoughtlessness can be achieved by a human being using various means. These include Samadhi, Bhakti (devotion), Kirtan (Dance and Music), Mantra, temporarily due to certain hallucinogenic drugs, certain medical condition, sleep withdreams and permanently at the time of the death.Mantra Chanting of certain syllables is powerful enough to invoke vibrations in mind. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 419 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Meditation leading to Samadhi is a confirmed path for yoga. This path has been in practice since the Prajapatis and Manus and other higher beings descended on earth. Early humans Rishis, Daitya and Asuras have also been using this sure shot path. Performance Yagya (offerings to Devtas) and meditation was the mainstay of Vedic culture. This path, therefore,is a gift straight from the higher beings and not invented or conjured up by any human being. Maharishi Patajali lays down foundation of Yoga in is Yoga Sutras. The path to Samadhi is eight fold. It includes Yam, Niyam, Asan, Paranayam, Pratyahar, Dharna, Dhyan and Samadhi. Hatha Yoga Tradition lays down six fold path to yoga without the first two stages of Yam and Niyam. However, they emphasize on body purification prior to commencement of Yoga. Also, they ask to follow Raj Yoga after Agya Chakra is realized and Sahsrara Chakra is to be achieved. Raj Yoga is a form of yoga which was given to line of kings so that their consciousness is developed so high that they can rule as per Raj Dharma (duties of the King). Without such high level of consciousness when human beings reach position of power, they become corrupt, arrogant, cling to power and cause atrocities. Yoga builds up character of person who practices it. Practice of Yoga is a complete lifestyle not one of the activities. Yamas are codes of restraint, abstinences and self-regulations. These include Non-violence, Truthfulness, No stealing, Brahmacharya (dwelling in universe and celibacy) and Nonpossessiveness.Niyamas are to do with self-discipline and spiritual observances that need to be cultivated. These includePurity of body and mind, Feeling of contentment in all circumstances, Self-discipline, Self study of the sacred scriptures and Isvarapranidhana(devotion to God). Asanas arethe correct postures for exercises for the all parts of body, internal as well as external. The Gorakṣa-shataka states that there are as many asanas as the species 8,400,000 and that 84 of these are recommended. For meditation,siddhasana and padmasana are the best. Pranayama is exercises of prana, the subtle energy in the body. It is often misunderstood as exercise of the breath. Prana are considered as Vayu (air) by most practitioners. Prana is subtle energy on which the information system of the body rides and information flow is maintained. Prana is the science behind the concept of Kundalini Yoga, Hatha Yoga, Chakra meditation, Kriya Yoga and Raj yoga. Pratyahara is withdrawal of the senses from external objects. Dharana is focused concentration. Dhyana is meditation (absorption in the vast perception of God). Samadhi is experience of union of the individual‟s soul with dimension of consciousness. These are to be studied in detail by Yogi. GorakshShatakamlays downhundred sutras in easy language for yogis by nath Yogi ShriGorakhNath who is considered a part of Shiva himself. These sutras describe the nature of Prana, naadis, human physiology a yogi must know and process of Samadhi. Prana (breathing system and heart), Apana (below the diaphragm), Samana (digestive, parallal), Udana(throat), Vyana(through the body), Naga (eructation), karma (blinking), krkara (sneezing), ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 420 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness devadatta (yawning) and dhananjaya (pervading the entire body that does not leave even the dead body. Naga etc are subtle energies which are discrete and Pranaetc are continuous and these are pervading the thousands of channels in a person‟s body. The prana is continuously flowing through Ida, Pingla and Sushumna, three channels of information and energy flow. They are represented as Sun, Moon and Fire channels.Normally the prana flows thru Ida and Pingla alternatively every 1.5 Muhurta (72 minutes), this helps regulate the temperature of body as Ida is cold channel and pingla is hot channel. (30 Muhurta in a 24 Hrday, 1 Muhurta = 48 Minutes). Sushumna is active only for short duration when both channels are equalized. How to equalize both channels using the following Bandhas (stoppages). In yoga flow of air or its stoppage controls Prana and Prana rises up the sushumna and energizes certain parts of the brain. The yogi who knows the mudras (postures) such as Jalandhar Bandh (Throat lock), UddiyanaBandh (Stomach pulled in), MoolaBandha (Rectum pulled up), Nabho Mudra (Khechari Mudra) and Mahamudra, that one is authorized to proceed on path of liberation. The Paran is energized and it flows upwards through sushumna from where it rises up to Pineal gland which is also known as the third eye. As the air moves in body, everything is active. As the breath stills everything stills. Therefore a yogi must do pranayam to still the breath and hence mind. During the pranayam focusing is different Chakras strengthens them and also gives different beneficial results. Duration of Dharna is five naadis duration (one naadi is 24 minutes), and Dhayan (meditation) is for 60 naadis(one day) and Samadi is for 12 days. When the yogi withdraws all senses, he doesn‟t smell, taste, see, hear or feel the touch and he knows nothing but the self (Atma), then the yogi is Samadhi and he is a liberated one. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 421 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness Types of Samadhi Science of Samadhi is highly developed and Samadhi mainly described as of two kinds, with and without support of an object of meditation. These are known as Sampragyat Samadhi and Asampragyat Samadhi [14]. In Sampragyat Samadhi or Savikalpasamadhi or Sabija Samadhi, meditation is dome with support of an object. Sampragyatsamadhi is associated with deliberation, reflection, bliss, and Iam-ness.Savitarka is deliberative and in this the intellect is concentrated upon a physical object which is perceptible to our senses e.g. flame of a lamp, the tip of the nose or the image of a deity. Awareness of word or object of meditation remains but disappears at certain stage, when the deliberation ends, this changes to Nirvitarkasamadhi. Savichara is reflective and in this chitta is concentrated upon a subtle object of meditation which is not perceptible to the senses, but arrived at through an inference from the senses, mind, I-am-ness, chakras or prana flow. The stilling of reflection is called nirvicharasamapatti. Sananda Samadhi, ananda, bliss: this state emphasizes the still subtler state of bliss in meditation. In Sasmita, the intellect is concentrated upon the sense or feeling of I-am-ness (asmita). Asampragyat Samadhi, also called NirvikalpaSamadhiand or Nirbija Samadhi meditation without an object, which leads to knowledge of purusha or super consciousness. Heinrich Zimmer explains nirvikalpasamādhi as a merging of the mental activity (cittavṛtti) in the Self in such a way that distinction of knower, knowing, and known is dissolved. As waves vanish in water, and as foam vanishes into the sea same manner atma merges in Parma atma. Samadhi can also give yogi various super powers. These super powers are the following eight classical siddhis (Ashta Siddhi) [11] (i) Aṇimā: reducing one's body to the size of an atom (ii) Mahimā: expanding one's body to an infinitely large size (iii) Laghimā: becoming almost weightless (iv) Prāpti: ability to be anywhere at will (v) Prākāmya: realizing whatever one desires (vi) Īśiṭva: supremacy over nature (vii) Vaśiṭva: control of natural forces Thus a Yogi so settled in Samadhi achieves a control over his sensors but also gains telepathy, wisdom of Sat and ability to see past present and future, he truly goes beyond the bandwidth of normal human being‟s senses and becomes an adept (Siddha). This is surest path for evolution of Consciousness. Received April 23, 2020; Accepted April 27, 2020 References [1]https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_religious_groups [3] https://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-unaffiliated/ [4]https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/#religions ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 422 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 409-422 Malik, S. S., Evolution of Consciousness [5]Geeta [6]https://www.yogapedia.com/definition/5586/purushartha [7]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puru%E1%B9%A3%C4%81rtha [8]Geeta by Swami Argarnandreferrred [9]https://patanjaliyogasutra.in/ [10]GorakshShatakam- Motilal Khaddar Shashtri (Master Ji) [11]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siddhi [12] https://www.geolsoc.org.uk/Plate-Tectonics/Chap3-Plate-Margins/Convergent/Continental-Collision [13] https://www.ashtangayoga.info/philosophy/source-texts-and-mantra/yoga-sutra/chapter-2/ [14] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoga_Sutras_of_Patanjali [15] https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/magazine/the-extraordinary-science-of-junk-food.html [16] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_circumcision [17] https://www.chakras.net/energy-centers/bindu ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 431 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? Exploration When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? Matti Pitkänen 1 Abstract In ZEO based view about quantum measurement theory as theory of consciousness one has two kinds of state function reductions (SFRs). The ordinary ”Big” SFRs (BSFRs) and ”small” SFRs (SSFRs) . BSFR changes the arrow of geometric time and is identified as death of self identified as a sequence of SSFRs, which do not change arrow of time but increase the size of self by keeping passive boundary in place and states at it unaffected but increasing the size of CD by shifting the upper boundary towards future. Both boundaries increase in size. The 3-surfaces at the active boundary form a kind of log file about events in the life of self and - contrary to expectations - the memories are stored to geometric future. In this article the question under what conditions BSFR takes place is considered using biological death as a starting point. It is found that metabolic conditions dictate its occurrence. The condition that the decay of biomolecules and larger structures in biological death corresponds to their generation for time-reversed re-incarnate gives testable predictions. 1 Introduction In ZEO based view about quantum measurement theory as theory of consciousness one has two kinds of state function reductions (SFRs) [2, 7]. The ordinary ”Big” SFRs (BSFRs) and ”small” SFRs (SSFRs) [9]. BSFR changes the arrow of geometric time and is identified as death of self identified as a sequence of SSFRs, which do not change arrow of time but increase the size of self by keeping passive boundary in place and states at it unaffected but increasing the size of CD by shifting the upper boundary towards future. Both boundaries increase in size. The 3-surfaces at the active boundary form a kind of log file about events in the life of self and - contrary to expectations - the memories are stored to geometric future. Under what conditions does ”Big” state function reduction (BSFR) changing the arrow of time take place? I have proposed several ad hoc guesses about this. One example is following. If the hef f = n × h0 assignable to the CD or its active boundary does not change in SSFRs, the entanglement can become such that the diagonalized density matrices does not have eigenvalues in the extension of rationals considered and one can argue that BSFR is forced to occur. The proposal for how the sequence of SSFR could in special case correspond to a sequence of iterations for a polynomial of degree n [8] is however in conflict with the constancy of n. The hypothesis is that BSFR corresponds to the death of self followed by re-incarnation with opposite arrow of geometric time in universal sense. This suggests that one should look what one can learn from what happens in the death and birth of biological organism, which should now take in opposite arrow of time. It is found that metabolic conditions dictate its occurrence. The condition that the decay of biomolecules and larger structures in biological death corresponds to their generation for time-reversed re-incarnate gives testable predictions. In the following the question under what conditions ”Big” state function reduction (BSFR) takes place and what happens in it. 1.1 Two kinds of state function reductions The discussion however requires the basic ideas of ZEO as background. 1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.com/. Address: Rinnekatu 2-4 A8, 03620, Karkkila, Finland. Email: matpitka6@gmail.com. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 432 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? 1.1.1 ”Small” state function reductions (SSFRs) ”Small state function reductions” (SSFRs) are counterparts of so called ”weak measurements”, which are rather near to classical measurements in the sense that nothing drastic happens. 1. The passive boundary of CD does not shift but changes in size because active boundary shifts and this induces change of size. For state pairs defining zero energy states the members at passive boundary do not change and the coefficients of possibly time-entangled state defined as their superposition do not change. The members of state pairs at active boundary change and this change is induced by unitary time evolution between too SSFRs. This time evolution could be regarded as a generalization of adiabatic time evolution. 2. In statistical sense the active boundary shifts towards future and the size of CD increases. The temporal distance between the tips defines clock time in one-one correspondence with SSFRs. Note that the unitary evolution forms a superposition of CDs with different sizes and SSFR means localization to single CD size. 3. The moment ”Now” of self would naturally correspond to the M 4 hyper-plane dividing CD into two pieces of identical size. The radius of this 3-ball would be r = T /2, where T is the temporal distance between the tips of CD. At this hyperplane expansion of 3-ball with light-velocity would transform to contraction. 4. The mental images of self would correspond sub-CDs and also they would shifts towards geometric future in the sequence SSFRs. They would form a kind of log file about the life history of self such that geometric time order would be opposite to subjective time order. Self could remember these experiences by sending signals to geometric future reflecting back in time direction - seeing in time direction would be in question. What is in sharp conflict with natural expectation is that the memories would be stored in geometric future and part of them would become un-changing permanent part for the time reversed re-incarnation of self- kind of Karma. Note however that self might have also mental images represented as sub-CDs in geometric past. M 8 − H-duality suggests space-time picture about the ”log files”. 1. 4-D space-time surfaces in complexified M 8 having interpretation as complexified octonions are 4-D roots for octonion valued polynomial obtained as an algebraic continuation of a real polynomial with rational or even algebraic coefficients. M 8 − H correspondence maps thee surfaces to minimal surfaces with 2-D singularities in H [5, 4]. 2. Besides this one obtains for any polynomial also special solutions as analogs of branes in M-theory. They have topology of 6-D ball and their projection to M 4 is t = rn hyperplane intersecting CD and with topology of 3-ball. rn is a root of P and thus an algebraic number. I have called t = rn ”very special moments in the life of self”. Generalized vertices for particle reactions would correspond to partonic 2-surfaces localized at these 6-surfaces. At these surfaces incoming and outgoing partonic orbits would be glued together along their ends. The roots define positions of external particles at the boundaries of CD. 3. In SSFRs these balls at the active half of CD would shift towards future and new roots would emerge. These roots wold define a geometric representation of the memories of CD as ”log file” increasing in size. If there are sub-CDs associate with them, one would have mental images shifting towards future. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 433 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? 1.1.2 ”Big” state function reductions (BSFRs) ”Big” state function reductions (BSFRs) correspond to ordinary state function reductions (SFRs) in ZEO. In BSFR the roles of active and passive boundaries of CD are changed and the arrow of geometric time changes since the formerly passive boundary starts to shift to opposite time direction. State function reduction not commuting with the observables defining states at passive boundary as their eigenstates would takes place and the state at passive boundary would be changed. It would be however fixed by quantum dynamics. The findings of Minev et al provide support for the change of the arrow of time in ordinary SFR [3]. The passive boundary can be shifted towards future so that the size of CD would decrease. One can say that the re-incarnate would be experience childhood. Note that also part of the ”log file” about often personal experiences of self towards end of its life defining the permanent part of self-hood of the re-incarnate would disappear. The interpretation in terms of Karma is suggestive. Remark: During a discussion with Marko Manninen, Marko noticed that people who have had near death experience often report that they experienced their entire life like a film during these moments. Could the ”log file” representing stored mental images give rise to this experience at the moment of death? 1.2 What happens in biological death from TGD perspective? What happens in biological death can be taken as a guideline in attempts to understand what happens in BSFR. 1. Death certainly occurs if there is no metabolic energy feed to the system. Metabolic energy feed is guaranteed by nutrition using basic molecules as metabolites. Since the increase of hef f quite generally requires energy if other parameters are kept constant and since the reduction of hef f can take spontaneously, the metabolic energy is needed to keep the distribution of values of hef f stationary or even increase it - at least during the growth of organism and perhaps also during the mature age when it would go to increase of hef f at MB. If the size of CD for at least MB correlates with the maximum value of hef f or its average, the size of CD cannot grow and can be even reduced if the metabolic energy feed is too low. The starving organism withers and its mental abilities are reduced. This could correspond to the reduction of maximum/average value of hef f and also size of CD. One can argue that if the organism loses metabolic energy feed or is not able to utilize the metabolic energy death and therefore also BSFR must take place. 2. In ZEO self-organization reduces to the second law in reversed direction of geometric time at the level of MB inducing effective change of arrow of time at the level of biological body [6]. The necessary energy feed correspond to dissipation of energy in opposite time direction. In biological matter energy feed means its extraction from the metabolites fed to the system. One could say that system sends negative energy to the systems able to receive it. A more precise statement is that time reversed subs-system dissipates and metabolites receive the energy but in reversed time direction. In living matter sub-systems with non-standard arrow of time are necessary since their dissipation is needed to extract metabolic energy. The highest level dissipates in standard time direction and there must be a transfer of energy between different levels. This hierarchy of levels with opposite arrows of geometric time would be realized at the level of MB. 1.3 Death as a re-incarnation with opposite arrow of time These observations suggest that one should consider the reincarnation with opposite arrow of time with wisdom coming from the death of biological systems. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 434 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? 1. We know what happens in death and birth in biological systems. What happens in biological death should have analogy at general level. In particular, in death the decay of the system to components should occur. Also the opposite of this process with reversed arrow of time should take place and lead at molecular level to the replication of DNA and RNA and build-up of basic biomolecules and at the cell level to cell replications and development of organs. How these processes could correspond to each other? 2. The perceived time corresponds to the hyperplane t = T /2 dividing CD to parts of same size. Here T is the distance between the tips of CD and therefore to maximal diameter of temporal slice of cd, which is 3-ball. The part of CD above it shifts towards future in SSFRs. In BSFR parts of the boundary of space-time surfaces at the active boundary of CD become unchanging permanent parts of the re-incarnate - kind of log file about the previous life. One can say that the law of Karma is realized. If CD decreases in size in BSFR the former active boundary keeps its position but its size as distance between its tips is scaled down: T → T1 ≤ T . The re-incarnate would start from childhood at T −T1 /2 and would get partially rid of the permanent part of unchanging self-hood corresponding to interval [T −T1 /2, T /2] so that the permanent part of reincarnate would correspond to [T −T1 /2, T ]. Reincarnate would start almost from scratch, so to say. The part between T − T1 /2 and T would be preserved as analog of what was called BIOS in personal computers. 3. At the moment of birth CD possibly would thus decrease in size and the former passive boundary now in the range [T − T1 /2, T − T1 ] and lower tip of new CD at T − T1 would become active and the seat of sensory experience. Arrow of time would change. Where the analog of biological decay is located? The region of CD in the range [T /2, T − T1 /2] disappearing from ”log file” is the natural candidate. This region is also the place, where the events related to birth in opposite time direction should take place. 4. The decay of the organism should therefore correspond to the development and birth of re-incarnated organism at the level of MB (it must be also remembered that genuine time reversal takes place at the level of MB and induces only effective time reversal at the level of ordinary bio-matter). The decay of organism dissipates energy in standard time direction: this energy could used by the reincarnate as metabolic energy. How long lasting biochemical processes have effective time reversals depends on the quantum coherence scale determined by the size scale of corresponding CD. 1.4 Could the re-incarnations with opposite arrow of time be seen in biochemistry? The possible occurrence of effective time reversals at the level of bio-chemistry could be perhaps tested experimentally. 1. Could the replication of DNA and RNA and build-up of various bio-molecules be effective timereversals for their decays. Could the same apply to the replication of cells and generation of organs. Replication of DNA is self-organization process in which second DNA strand serves as a template for a new one. The decay of DNA should therefore involve two DNA strands such that the second DNA strand serves as a template for the effectively time reversed replication. The double strand structure indeed makes possible for the other strand to decay first. Cell replication should use another cell as replicate and same would happen in the cell decay. 2. An interesting mental exercise is to imagine the time reversals of various basic processes like transcription and translation. In the time reversal of translation of mRNA to amino-acid sequence the amino-acid sequence and mRNA would return to ribosome machinery, and amino-acid and tRNA ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 435 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? codon associated with tRNA would return to form tRNA. mRNA strand would shift one step backwards and the process would repeat itself and finally mRNA strand would return to open DNA strand. In the time reversal of transcription of DNA to mRNA, mRNA strand would return to open part of DNA strand, decay to RNA codons and eventually DNA strand would close. It should be easy to check whether these processes really occur in the decay process. 3. The formation of stem cells involves de-differentiation. Could it mean time reversal of the entire process leading to a differentiated cell? Also this idea could be tested. In biology pairs of various structures often occur. Could they correspond in some sense to effective time reversals of each other whereas at the level of magnetic body one would have genuine time reversals 1. Could the opposite inherent chiralities of MBs of DNA strands correspond to opposite arrows of time at the level of MB of DNA realizing dark genetic code [1]? Could this be seen as a kind of explanation for the double strand structure of DNA. Could the passivity of DNA strand with respect to transcription correspond to opposite arrow of time at the level of MB? Could the passive strand become active in time reversal? 2. Even brain has this kind of pairing. Right brain hemisphere is passive in the sense that it does not seem to contribute to wake-up intelligence (presumably identified as analytic intelligence). Could either hemisphere serve as a template in the development of brain or could this happen only at the level of MB of brain? Could different time arrows at the level of MB be used to understand the strange passive character of right brain and could one one understand the holism of right brain viz. analytic reductionism of left brain as reflection of the fact that dissipation as decay corresponds to time reversal for self-organization generating structures at the level of MB. 1.5 What about ordinary re-incarnation? A couple of comments relating to the notion of re-incarnation in standard sense are in order. 1. Eastern philosophies talk about the possibility of liberation from Karma’s cycle. Can one imagine something like this? The above picture would suggest that in this kind of process the reduction of the size of CD does not occur at all and therefore there would be no decay process equivalent to the growth of time reversed organism. This would serve as an empirical signature for the liberation - if possible at all. CD would continue to increase in size or perhaps keep its size. It would seem that a new kind of non-biological source of metabolic energy would be needed. 2. Reincarnation is a basic notion in Eastern philosophies. In ordinary reincarnation person has memories about life of a person, who lived earlier. There is evidence for this. This cannot be understood in terms of time reversed re-incarnation. Recall that there would be a hierarchy of selves and corresponding CDs within CDs. It has remained an open question whether CDs could also overlap? Could re-incarnation in ordinary sense be explained in terms of this kind of overlap? Suppose that one has two overlapping CDs: CD1 and CD2 and that CD2 extends farther to the future of CD1 . The sub-CDs of CD1 shift to future as the active part of CD1 shifts to future and increases in size giving rise to a kind of log file defining the personal memories of CD1 . In this kind of situation the mental images of CD1 can enter to CD2 and become mental images of CD2 . This would be sharing of mental images but in different sense as compared to the fusion of mental images by entanglement, which could also require intersection of sub-CDs of mental images. Could one imagine that the cosmos is full of selves serving as counterparts of memes wandering around and finding for selves hosting them by providing metabolic energy? Note that ZEO means that CD center of mass degrees of freedom do not carry any conserved quantum numbers so that the motion of these lonely CDs would not be restricted by conservation laws! ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 436 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? 3. This picture suggests that CD:s form a conscious fractal atlas consisting of charts with various resolutions analogous to the atlas defining a covering of manifold by open sets. The earlier proposal was that in biological death MB redirects its attention to a new system. This picture would be modified: the MB of of CD1 would still attend the time-reversed system and experience timereversed life. Some sub-CDs of CD1 would however belong to a new CD in its geometric future CD2 . This conforms with the intuitive expectation that space-time surfaces continue outside CD and only the perceptive field of conscious entity is restricted to CD. 4. Mental images should correspond to sub-selves and therefore sub-CDs of CD. Contrary to what I have proposed earlier, it seems that after images cannot correspond to BSFR type re-incarnations of mental images nor re-incarnations in standard sense. Mental images would shift towards the future together with active part of CD and form a kind of log file. Could after images be memories of previous mental images involving a signal time reflect from the the mental image in log file and creating the after image as a sensory memory of the earlier visual mental image? Or could one understand after images in terms of propagation of dark photon signals along closed magnetic loops giving rise to periodically occurring mental images. While writing this article I learned about a highly interesting claim (https://tinyurl.com/yap8ss4p) made by the research group led by Harold Katcher. The claim is that the epigenetic age (there are several measures for it such as methylation level of DNA) of rats has been reduced up to 50 percent. The theory goes that epigenetic age of molecules would be controllable by hormonal signalling globally. BSFR would mean death of conscious entity and its reincarnation with opposite arrow of time. The system would rejuvenate in the transition starting a new life in opposite time direction from childhood so to say - rejuvenation would be in question. Doing this twice would lead to life with original arrow of time but starting in rejuvenated state. The claim of the group suggests that living matter could do this systematically using hormonal control. Received May 6, 2020; Revised May 13,2020; Accepted June 29, 2020 References [1] Pitkänen M. About Physical Representations of Genetic Code in Terms of Dark Nuclear Strings. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/genecodemodels.pdf, 2016. [2] Pitkänen M. Getting philosophical: some comments about the problems of physics, neuroscience, and biology. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/philosophic.pdf, 2018. [3] Pitkänen M. Copenhagen interpretation dead: long live ZEO based quantum measurement theory! Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/Bohrdead.pdf, 2019. [4] Pitkänen M. M 8 − H duality and consciousness. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_ html/articles/M8Hconsc.pdf, 2019. [5] Pitkänen M. New results related to M 8 − H duality. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_ html/articles/M8Hduality.pdf, 2019. [6] Pitkänen M. Quantum self-organization by hef f changing phase transitions. Available at: http: //tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/heffselforg.pdf, 2019. [7] Pitkänen M. Some comments related to Zero Energy Ontology (ZEO). Available at: http:// tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/zeoquestions.pdf, 2019. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2020 | Volume 11 | Issue 4 | pp. 431-437 437 Pitkänen, M., When Does ”Big” State Function Reduction & Reversed Arrow of Time Take Place? [8] Pitkänen M. Could quantum randomness have something to do with classical chaos? Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/chaostgd.pdf, 2020. [9] Pitkänen M. The dynamics of SSFRs as quantum measurement cascades in the group algebra of Galois group. Available at: http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/articles/SSFRGalois.pdf, 2020. ISBN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp 312-313 Hu, H. & Wu, M., Iona Miller (1949 - 2021): Multitalented Writer, Artist & Visionary 312 In Memoriam Iona Miller (1949 - 2021): Multitalented Writer, Artist & Visionary Huping Hu* & Maoxin Wu ABSTRACT Iona Miller (1949 - 2021) was a multitalented writer, artist and visionary. She was an inspirational and compassionate human being and a member of the Advisory Board of this journal. She also published twenty-nine (29) articles here. She will be missed by us, our readers/patrons and many others who knew her – Good journey on the other side, Iona, and may your legacy live on! Keywords: Iona Miller, artist, writer, visionary, nonfiction, multimedia, legacy, compassionate, inspirational. Iona Miller journeyed to the other side quite unexpectedly on March 26, 2021 [1]. She last communicated on March 4, 2021 with the first author on a scientific topic through Facebook Messinger. She was “a nonfiction writer for the academic and popular press, clinical hypnotherapist (ACHE) and multimedia artist[;] [h]er work is an omni-sensory fusion of intelligence, science-art, new physics, symbolism, source mysticism, futuring, and emergent paradigm shift, creating a unique viewpoint[;] [she was] interested in extraordinary human potential and experience, and the EFFECTS of doctrines of religion, science, psychology, and the arts[;] [she served] on the Advisory Boards of Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, DNA Decipher Journal, and Scientific God Journal....” [2]. She was an inspirational and compassionate human being and a truth seeker. She pondered and explored the meanings of life and death through numerous writings and artworks [2]. In an essay/statement entitled “The Mask of Eternity: The Quest for Immortality and the Afterlife” and published in a Special Issue of JCER “Theories of Consciousness and Death” edited by Gregory M. Nixon, Ph.D., she shared the following with the readers [3]: Correspondence: Huping Hu, Ph.D., J.D., QuantumDream Inc., P. O. Box 267, Stony Brook,, NY 11790. E-mail: editor@jcer.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2021 | Volume 12 | Issue 3 | pp 312-313 Hu, H. & Wu, M., Iona Miller (1949 - 2021): Multitalented Writer, Artist & Visionary 313 When we are gone, only the ultimate question remains. Evidence that consciousness survives death remains elusive. With or without warm, welcoming smiles from relatives we may have loathed in life, it remains our obsession to know what happens when our screen-reality stops, and fades to black. Conscious immortality remains questionable. This writer remains firmly agnostic but enjoys entertaining wishful thinking. Death is the greatest mystery of life. Buddha rejected the question as useless, according to Jung. Throughout history, it remains a source of wonder, fear, hopefulness, and puzzlement. We seek compassionate ways of dealing with this uncertainty that no discussion of entanglement or holographic memory can assuage. There is little wonder we tend to fall back on traditional attitudes informed by simplicity, meaningful ceremony, and acceptance. It is something we cannot grasp at all, despite our conceptions of time and space and what might lie beyond them, even if some of our psychic experience seems unbound by spacetime. There is NoWhere to go and we are all going to get there. We at JCER celebrate her life and thank her for her advisory services to the journal. She will be missed by us, our readers/patrons and many others who knew her – Good journey on the other side, Iona, and may your legacy live on! References 1. https://www.facebook.com/iona.miller 2. https://ionamiller.weebly.com/ 3. Miller, I. (2016), The Mask of Eternity: The Quest for Immortality and the Afterlife, Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 7(11): pp. 1218-1228. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 225 Perspective Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications Domadala Pramod* R&D, Malla Reddy University, Hyderabad, India Abstract India is a land of temples and pilgrimage centres. It is ruled by many kings of different people and constructed by many religious places and temples and education centres for the betterment of their life and to understand purpose of life so that they upgrade them self and to the higher levels by following the Vedic scriptures and visiting the divine places. Thus, the Hindus have staunch believers of spirituality. They follow traditions and customs, based on Santan Dharma, which are derived from the Vedic scriptures and two great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata. They are meant for a prosperous, healthy, and spiritual environment in the society which would be free from the infections and crimes. The individual or society who follows systematically experience peace and harmony. In this materialistic world, people have either neglected or have forgotten to adhere to traditions and cultural values, may be due to the lack of understanding of their importance in everyday life. The sudden outbreak of pandemic COVID-19 has compelled them to realize and understand their importance, how our forefathers and sages designed without any flaws, and passed from one generation to another for the wellbeing of people and to protect from unforeseen incidents and epidemic diseases. Modern studies show that there is a strong relationship between spirituality and medicine. There are a large number of traditions and customs in Hindu scriptures. Some of the prominent traditions (such as hygienic and satvik food, eating habits, isolation, cleanliness, healing prayers, healthy children, yagnas, etc.) are systematically analyzed and presented in this paper. All the Vedic traditions are scientifically based and they need to be explored further for understanding the science behind them. Keywords: COVID19, Hindu traditions, spirituality in medicine, lighting lamp, namaste, masks, cleanliness, healing prayers, vegetarian diet, eating habits, yagnas, cremation. 1. Introduction India is a resource centre of spirituality in the world. Indian Rishies or Sages received the wisdom through “Divya Drishti or Farsight”. The Hindu way of life is based upon the teachings of the Vedic scriptures. The two great epics the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, and holy scriptures the Bhagvad gita1 and the Srimad Bhagvatam2 are sources of inspiration and direction to establish proper civilized society. They led to the formulation of proper rituals and traditions, and cultural and moral values for human society. They are based on the concepts of Dharma, Ahimsa, and Karma. The customs and rituals are eternal and their culture is very rich. They have *Correspondence: Prof. D Pramod, Dean, R&D, Malla Reddy University, Hyderabad, Telangana, India. E-mail:dpramod61@gmail.com ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 226 been framed by our great ancestors by considering all aspects of cosmic elements for the welfare of all living entities on this earth planet. These are challenges and eye-openers for scientists to explore Vedic science. As per the scriptures, the birth and death cycle continue as per the law of Karma.3,4 The human form is very rare to get it and that should be utilized for liberation from this materialistic world and to go back to Godhead. These beliefs have made them follow and practice traditional and cultural values, which together give a proper direction to act in a particular way to lead a happy life in harmony with nature and other living entities. The studies have shown that the science of spirituality has a psychological influence on the behaviour and self-confidence of patients and the relation between spirituality and medicine cannot be ruled out. 5 For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The natural calamities, droughts, floods; and cyclones environment pollution, water crisis, and the regular epidemic diseases are consequences of the ruthless activities of humans in the name of civilization and industrialization of a country. The drunken people can enjoy themselves, but excessive drinking is harmful to self and others. Because of one drunken driver may kill innocent passengers and outside standing vehicles and other people and their properties. Professor Robin Room, Director, Centre for Alcohol Policy Research, University of Melbourne writes in a given year 367 people Australians die because of another’s drinking and 13,600 are hospitalized etc. 39 It is believed the regular epidemic diseases such as Ebola virus, Zika virus, Chikungunya, Plague, H1N1, Swine flu, and the present Coronavirus were caused due to the merciless activities killing of animals for consumption of unhealthy meat, beef, pork, and chicken, etc. These diseases are mostly originated from slaughter centres and unhygienic places from different parts of the world. The present dreadful Coronavirus which was originated from the Wet market, Wuhan, China, spread globally and cause pandemic diseases and claimed millions of lives of innocent people. 6,7 To save people from the deadly COVID1, the most of the world leaders-imposed lockdown in their countries to avoid gathering of people and prevent the virus, it is suggested to maintain social distance, cleaning hands regularly with sanitizer or soap water, and use a mask to cover mouth and nose, whenever one goes outside and the infected people are put in quarantine (Isolation) for 14 days. These types of precautionary measurements saved and cured a lot of people from COVID positive patients. The impact of lockdown is so powerful that it has touched the hearts of many people in the world and cautioned them to follow ancient traditional values which were forgotten or neglected intentionally or unintentionally in the name of human civilization and the development of society. The basic concepts of moral and ethical values such as neatness and cleanliness; respect all living and non-living bodies are taught to all children right from primary schools too, apart ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 227 from the values they learn from their families. But people have either forgotten or not understood the basic fundamental laws and concepts taught in our schools, colleges, or may be our education system has failed to inculcate these values through texts and curriculum. Some believe the Hindu cultural values are too complicated to perform and to understand its procedures, and implications may not be scientifically proved. They are perfect and intact. No one can find out any flaws and shortcomings. During ancient period people were following Vedic culture and rituals relentlessly and passed from one generation to other, which yielded peace and harmony in the Hindu families thus the Vedic culture was rich in the world. Western people used to come to India to learn in Takahashila and Nalanda Universities. But the present generation people are unable to understand or might not have reached that level of consciousness to realize what is written in the literature. As a result, the people are materialistically oriented and following unethical values for corrupt practices and lust for power that is prevailing in the present society causing violence and unrest in the world. Now we can see during this pandemic COVID19 the Government authorities of all countries are educating people, the basic principles of cleanliness, washing hands and feet periodically, social distances, stay at home and quarantine for COVID positive patients, etc, which are basics and common practices in Hinduism. Some of the Hindu traditions and customs and practices in daily life are studied and presented below. 2. Traditions & Customs (a) Greetings - Namaste Namaste or Namaskar is a special type gesture to greet each other when two people meet each other. Every living entity has a soul and a super soul. It implies "I bow to the Supreme Lord in you". It means “The Supreme Lord in me recognizes the Supreme Lord in you”. In other words, two souls are coming to unite for fruitful discussions. Namaste is usually spoken with a pleasant voice by slightly bending and hands pressed together, palms touching and fingers pointing upwards, thumbs close to the chest. This mode of greetings avoids physical contact of persons and stop spreading infections. It is being followed by most people in the world after the outbreak of Coronavirus. (2) Hands & Feet The well-known concept is “Cleanliness is next to Godliness”. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 228 One needs to be pure internally and externally. Purity needs to be in the heart as well as on the surface of the human body. The yoga and meditation yield internal purity whereas the cleaning hands and feet regularly with soap water or sanitizer leads to external purity. One needs both moral purity and personal hygiene. Cleaning your hands (Fig.2) and feet with regular soap and with water is a highly effective way to stop the spread of germs and bacteria; and removes fungal infections if any. (3) Shoes & Socks One must remove shoes and socks before entering the house and temples. (Fig.3) One must be pure of the purest form to enter into the sanctity place at religious places. The Supreme Lord in Bhagavad-gita says one out of one million will reach Me. Thus one must be pure internally as well as extremally. The basic thing bringing shoes and socks odor inside means allowing soiled things and bacteria into the house or temples. It is a courteous way in respecting the house and temple to keep floor free from fungus and harmful substances come along with shoes. It is a strict custom in Hindu families to clean your hands and wash your feet and legs before entering in to the house (Fig.3) and clean hands before taking food. One must wash hands and feet after coming from toilets. Rest room shoes or slippers must be avoided to use in the houses. In some of the of the orthodox families, outside cleaners and maid servants are also discouraged. One can see these customs in some of traditional Brahmin houses that they clean their houses, utensils and wash their clothes by themselves. The way one cleanses one’s own body, one can clean one’s own rest rooms. If the anatomy of human body parts is not secret, humans could have appointed maid servants to clean those parts also. Visitors are not allowed into ICU of hospitals with their own shoes. As per the reports, the during the Coronavirus period in Italy, most of the patients in the hospitals are infected by the doctors, nurses and other medical staff, they were carrying the contagious Coronavirus through shoes13. These small values could have saved people from death. Keeping your hands and feet clean and dry is an effective way to prevent these health issues. (3) Rangloi ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 229 It is the general practice in Hindu families that everyday morning, the front portion of the house, the open place is swept and cleaned with water; and especially in rural areas, they use even cow dung to wipe out dirt and insects. Before performing morning and evening prayers, it is mandatory in Hindu families to clean and mop the houses every day, using detergents to remove dirt, dust, and insects for a hygienic atmosphere in the house. The way one cleanses one’s own body, one should clean one’s restrooms. If the anatomy of human body segments is not concealed, humans could have appointed maidservants to clean those parts also. (4) Lighting Lamp We are in a world of darkness. The light leads us from darkness to enlightenment. It symbolizes the presence of goddess Laxmi and goddess Sarswathi.8 a) Lighting lamp is a symbol of truth and wisdom and increases the worship b) Lighting lamp in the morning and evening before the deities in the house gives peace, happiness, and positiveness in the house. c) In any organization, a program starts with lighting a lamp. d) Diyas are lit in during dusk and place in front of the door to purify the house and air to welcome goddess Laxmi in the evening and prevent insects and reptiles entering the house. e) According to the Science of Spirituality lighting lamps with pure ghee is more satvic (mode of goodness) when compared to oil. The pure ghee produces more satvic vibrations and it spreads longer distance, the satvic effect is more predominant on the atmosphere when it stops burning than the oil used lamps.9 When ghee comes in contact with fire, the atmosphere becomes a more sacred and pleasant smell, and it removes diseases from the place. A house without a lamp is considered to be a ghost place. (5) Early to bed and early to rise This is a well-renowned thought.10 Early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy and wealthy. One should sleep early and wake up early. The early morning period is considered to be an auspicious time known as Braham Murtha nearly one and a half-hour time before the Sunrise.11 During this time the environment is very clean and birds are cheerful for waiting to see ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 230 the rising Sun. It will have a considerable effect on the body and mind when one practices Meditation and Yoga. The early morning sun radiations will keep the body fit and healthy. These are basic principles in Gurukuls and Vedic schools to learn scriptures and chanting Vedic hymns during Braham Murtha time. The power of retentivity is very high; and students would be sharp and bright if one utilizes this golden period for studies. Another advantage is, that one feels the day is longer. The human body requires at least four to five hours of sleep so that body is not overburdened with conscious activities and concentrates on unconscious activities to rejuvenate for the next day’s work. The regular night shift jobs in present MNCs may not be advisable for employees in regards to health issues. (6) Bath The human body temperature varies from 36.10C to 38.30C (under extreme situation it may go up to 400 C). Under these conditions dynamics of various parts of the body release sticky oil through oil and sweat pores of the skin which accumulate bacteria and other microorganisms with dirty smell. It gives irritation and suffocation to the self and unpleasant to others who are standing nearby. To keep a healthy body and hygienic one must take bath with soap preferably using hot water that removes the dust particles and bacteria. As per the scriptures: 2 a) One must take bath at least twice a day i.e. morning and evening. It is mandatory to take bath before preparing the food and worshiping God. b) Once taken bath you should not touch others who did not take bath. c) After coming from a barbershop and funeral, one must take bath. d) One should not touch anything or anybody in a home without taking bath e) Once should touch others who are in isolation. These are further discussed in detail in sections 13 and14. (7) Clothes – Decency Fresh or new clothes make you feel pure and happy. The used clothes generally will have dust particles or dirty oil layer due to one’s sweating and bacteria from our own body, and from outside. The body oil and sweat, other junk generated from glands reach out through the oil and sweat pores of the skin. They cause skin infections and unpleasant smell to self as well as to nearby people. Once the unwashed clothes and bed sheets especially pillow covers are used, again and again, the sweat rubs off the bacteria and it gets multiplied which can cause a stinky ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 231 smell and potentially skin irritations or cause fungal infections. Thus, it is suggested to have a bath at least twice in a day i.e., morning and evening. The conservative families avoid giving dirty clothes to washer men, thinking they mix and boil with other’s infectious clothes. Either they were calling washer men to homes or washing clothes by themselves only. Washing machines are better to avoid spreading outside infections. One should generally avoid giving clothes to laundrymen or dry cleaners unless there is an emergency of important dresses.12 The old clothes must be periodically disposed of to avoid the growth of germs. In the past, people used to have a lot of manual work in the fields and outside, thus new clothes were generally preferred to purchase during festivals and other occasions. The trend still is going on to wear on important festivals. Turmeric powder is sprinkled or few dots are placed on new clothes to kill bacteria. Special woollen or silk clothes kept separately are used for devotional activities. The types of new clothes or dresses we wear affect our behaviour, attitude, personality, mood and confidence, and even the way we interact with each other. In Hindu rituals, the dress code is the most important attribute for both males and females. Specific dresses are meant to wear on specific functions during rituals and marriages. To have proper decency, dress codes are also observed in some of the educational institutions and organizations. The indecency or sexy dresses will put her self-others in problems. Most of the crime rates are alarming problems in the world because of dresses of women clothes. The difference between the human and animal is that we wear clothes they do not wear, because we are intelligent. Those who do not wear clothes they are worse than animals. (9) Tilak Tilak or Tika is a religious mark on the forehead that represents as Hindus. The location on the forehead is of immense significance for both males and females. Applying Tilak is mandatory for females and especially for married people. Human bodies are energy possessing bodies, where energy continuously flows within the body; and between the body and surroundings and vice verse. This energy flows through Nadis (Astral nerves)13 distributed through the body. All these Nadis will meet at a divine point on the forehead between two eyebrows and above the nose or in other words the whole body is controlled from this point. The point is also known as Ajna Chakra (it is one of the seven chakras).14 This symbolic location is very sensitive and more powerful for two reasons - 1) negative energy directed at this point, passes through the body and cause damage to the body and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 232 imbalance to take place within in the body, 2) positive energy flows out the body from this point to protect as well as destroy harmful incidents. It is believed that the Lord Shiva’s third eve or sixth sense is located at this point12. The scriptures say when Lord Shiva opens the third eye; mahapralayam or disastrous events may take place in the world. The wrinkles on the forehead imply a person’s facial expressions. Applying a tilak, ensures happiness, comfortable and peaceful, and gives self-confidence and appears to be a pure Hindu devotee. (10) Bangles The bangles and earrings are God gifted ornaments for ladies. The wrists are always in regular movements. The bangles on the wrists are in constant friction with each other which increases the blood circulation in the body. They control high blood pressure and recharge the energy levels of the body. The circular-shaped bangles revert the electricity which is passing through them. 32 A function called “Seemantham” is arranged during the 7th month of pregnancy. The mother is gifted with various types of Bangles and Sarees. The tinkling sound of bangles of a mother, helps the child to develop the baby’s audibility during the pregnancy period (more details in section18). The various types and colours of bangles have different significances. Gold bangles yield fortune Red colour gives energy, etc. The sound vibrations of bangles protect the ladies from negative energy sources. Thus, Hindu girls are mandatory to wear bangles. The colourful of bangles and tilak on the forehead represent they are married and respectable women and mothers in a society. Those representations reduce the crime rate in society. The western culture of ladies which is more luring to opposite gender causing more crime rates in the world. (11) Healthy Children Keeping in view of the healthy children and safety of pregnant ladies, the Indian government has generously sanctioned six months of maternity leave for employees so that they get proper rest in the home, and to be away from infections and virus-like COVID19 in offices and at other places ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 233 and a risk factor for child and mother for daily commuting, thus country will be free from birth defective or special needs children.33 Proper care and service to the pregnant lady and providing nutritious food daily, the happy joyful environment in the house will have a great impact on the mother as well as the child in the womb. Music is divine. In traditional families, classical music, divine slokas, and moral stories are recited and audiotapes are played before pregnant ladies. The rhythmic sound vibrations would give pleasure to the mother as well as pass on to the child which stimulates auditory senses and improves the reflexes of the child. It is believed, the type of music she listens during pregnancy would formulate the personality of the child when she or he grows up. The soft music develops calm and quite whereas loud music leads to an aggressive child. The loudness of sound also affects the sense organs, it is recommended to keep the volume around 50-60 decibels as other sound vibrations such as heartbeats, the gurgling of the tummy.34 The alarming sound vibration due to the regular movement of trains and excessive labour work or activities for pregnant ladies may have adverse effects on the child and sometimes she may have a deformed child. (12) Pure Devotees The scriptures reveal, the human form is very rare to get it and its purpose is for self-realization and to go back to Godhead.1 To achieve this realization, one has to be a pure devotee. The conditions for a pure devotee are: one should in the mode of goodness (Satvic) and should follow four regulative principles1,2 -1) No eating meat, fish, or eggs. 2) No gambling, 3) No use of intoxicants and 4) No illicit sex. They are said to be satvic pure devotees. (discussed in detail in section 21) If such saintly people are admitted to the hospital, they may be termed as Ideal Spiritual Patients (ISP). It is believed that their health conditions are better than others as they are satvic people. They are physically as well as mentally strong and always be in a transcendental state irrespective of any happiness or sorrowfulness.5 They realize the physical pain is due to their law of karma and they accept it as per the Lord’s wish. 3. Prayers - Healthy Environment Prayers and deity worships are two divine activities of their daily schedule during the Sunrise and the Sunset periods. Their payers are for the welfare of all living entities, for self as well as for family members. They worship Trimurti, Four vedas, Five cosmic elements, Six seasons, Seven rivers, Eight directions and Navagrahas and Dashvathaaras (Sanskruthi Song)15 for providing optimum conditions for the liveable, healthy and prosperous environment on the Earth for living entities and some other prayers for Lord Shiva to destroy evils and curb diseases and ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 234 negative energy prevailing in the premises. The deities radiate positive energy and make free from miscreants. A house without a God’s portrait, daily prayers, and lighting lamps are considered to be non-inhabitant or ghost house. These prayers will bestow happiness and make them psychologically strong. (1) Healing Mantras - Spirituality and Medicine As per Hindu traditions, when people are under a critical situation in fighting for health and illness, or fear of threat and death or to protect from epidemic diseases or no hope on medicines, the final remedy for them is to plead the God of medicine “Dhanwantari” and the God of Destroyer “Lord Shiva” through a recitation of powerful mantras :16  Maha Mrityunjava, Mantra Om tryambakam yajāmahe sugandhim puṣṭi vardhanam ; urvā rukamiv bandhanān mṛtyor mukṣīya mā'mṛtāt .  Hare Krishna Mantra Hare Krishna Hare Krishna Krishna Krishna Hare Hare . Hare Rama Hare Rama Rama Rama Hare Hare.  Vishnu Sahasranama Stohram. They may get survived as per their Law of karma. In order to give the importance of Indian medicines, the Indian Government has declared that Dhanwantari Trayodashi every year would be celebrated as "National Ayurveda Day” 17 “Spirituality and medicine are closely associated and they are indelible; the quality of life of spiritual patients is overall better than non-spiritual patients; the need for the medical community to support the spiritual lives of patients. Do Spirituality and Medicine Go Together?” as reported by Michel Balboni and Tracy Balboni in their article.5 (2) Navagrahas- Effects on Human health and Peace Hindus firmly believe astrology, the study of nine planets (Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, Saturn, Rahu, and Ketu) forecast the effectiveness of planets on the earth atmosphere and the lives of individual people.18 The interplanetary motion reflects some rays on the earth which influences the lives of people. The body derives energy from the Sun, any small changes affect the energy levels of the human body. It controls digestion and health, and healing process; Moon controls the mind and emotions; Mars(Mangal) controls blood circulation and diseases; Mercury(Budh) influences intelligence and grasping abilities; Jupiter (Brihaspathi, Guru) is a ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 235 powerful symbol of spirituality, fortune and causes hurdles and diseases when it comes to different positions; Venus (Shukra) is benevolent, brings wealth, honor and fame; Saturn (Shani, son of Sun) creates most of the problems in life, fear, sorrow and diseases, sometimes he gives happiness also; Rahu and Ketu are shadow planets, they are also like Shani cause problems. Thus together all these planets control entire living bodies on the earth. Shani Shingnapur is a famous place in Maharashtra , India, where no house has doors but only door frames are found in the house. Still no theft takes place and no crime rate since centuries. The Shnai temple known as Jagrut temple , meaning the Shani god resides alive and He punishes anyone who attempts to theft from houses. The place is peace full and villagers are happy. (3) Panchanga Shravanam As per the tradition, kings in the ancient period and the present government authorities would request astrologers to recite Panchanga Shravanam (recitation of the yearly calendar) on the day of the new year festival, Ugadi (which occurs during the last week of March or the first week of April every year), to know the predictions, the effects of planetary motion on the earth particularly seasonal rains for agriculture, human health, diseases natural calamities, the safety of the people and security of the country, etc. Based on those predictions they take precautionary measures and allocate budget accordingly for the coming financial year. The astrological effects are mainly due to the gravitational fields of various planets which are moving around the sun in our solar system. The impacts are prominent when they approach and deviate from the earth and when they lie on the same line. The Moon’s gravitational pull on the earth is the main cause of the rise and fall of ocean tides. On no Moon day (Amavasya) is considered to be as inauspicious19, causes negative effects whereas on full Moon day (Poornima) is considered to be as auspicious, yield positive effects, these are visible human body and human behaviour. The solar flares of sun, electric and magnetic field of planets have also critical influences on the earth’s atmosphere, climatic and seasonal changes.20 People worship regularly, especially on every Saturday, would visit the temples and perform prayers to minimize the effects of Planets (Nava Graha). Thus considering these effects on the human body and mind, people give offerings to them before any auspicious or religious ceremony. (4) Yagnas A Yagna is a powerful ancient method of ritual to satisfy Supreme Lord Vishnu by reciting sacred Vedic verses through the fire of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 236 God (Agni) as a medium.21 It is a fire pit in which different materials like, pure ghee, cereals, navratnas, camphor are added such that they all get merged with cosmic elements. a) Yagnas yield bliss and benediction for the welfare of the members and remove bad karmas of individuals and society. b) Oaths are taken before the Fire God (Agni) are authentic and He stands as witness. Such rituals are mandatory during marriage functions. c) Maha yagam (large number of yagans together) are performed for the welfare people and to minimize the effects caused by natural calamities such as drought, cyclones, and foods, etc. d) The significance of yagans is studied by a team of research scientists under CPCB(Central Pollution Control Board) conducted several experiments to observe the effect of yagnas.22 It is noticed that Particulate Matters 2.5 and 10 in the environment are found to be reduced the PM level after the yagna or hawan is performed. The results have shown that these yagnas reduced indoor microbes, bacteria, fungi, and pathogens (viruses or microorganisms that cause diseases). Thus Yagnas purify the environment of the place and drive away infections and negative energy from that place. 4. Vegetarian Diet Hindus perform several rituals that are based on the mode of goodness (satvic nature). To be in a mode of goodness one has to follow vegetarian food (plant-based food includes dairy products and honey). It is one of the basic conditions of four regulative principles of a pure devotee who are eligible to perform rituals and go back to Godhead. They are termed as pure devote. The Bhagvad Gita (BG17. 8-10)1 says, there are three types of foods based on three types of modes of material nature (Gunas): a) Foods prepared in the mode of goodness (Satvaguna) are pure and sweet and increases the duration of life, increase strength, happiness, and satisfaction. b) Foods that are bitter, too sour, salty, pungent, hot belong to the people of the mode of Passion ( Rajoguna). c) Foods cooked more than three hours before taking food is tasteless, decomposed and unclean, such people are mode of ignorance(Tamoguna). The three types of material nature determine the behaviour, nature, and health conditions of people. The scriptures say the soul carries good and bad deeds to the next birth. To progress in the next birth, one should not do any misdeeds. As per the law of karma3, slaughtering and consuming ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 237 animal meat are considered to be bad activities. Despite this, some people who are in the mode of passion and mode of ignorance do take animal meat as a regular diet, however, they undergo austerities as per their karma either in this birth or next birth. The satvic vegetarian food has many merits than that of a non-vegetarian diet, in terms of human behaviour, ethical and moral values, and health problems in everyday life. To maintain good health, proper regular diet, and to have good health habits, and to be away from epidemic diseases and infections and environmental effects people are shifting towards vegetarian diet.23-24 Sometimes medical doctors also advise patients to take a vegetarian diet to avoid complications. Dr. N Gopal krishan (CSIR) scientist and Dr. T P Sethu Madhvan, Physician in an article in Mathribhumi Daily (April 25, 1999) pointed out that the daily requirement of energy for a normal human being is 2400 calories. The vegetarian food contains carbohydrates fats and proteins and the variety of minerals such as calcium, phosphorus, iron, zinc, etc are plenty available in grains, dal, vegetables, and fruits, which form healthier food. These are sufficient to produce the required energy for humans. One may avoid animal food which causes contagious diseases to human beings.25 Ayurveda recommends to respect eating habits, timings, avoid overeating, processed packaged foods, and reduce fried items cold foods, and cold drinks, Thus traditional Vedic diets improve the immunity and make them as satvic people. 26 (1) Eating Habits a) Sitting on floor Earlier days, people were comfortably taking food by sitting on the floor. They were feeling healthy and maintaining a good physique. There are many benefits such as digestion, blood circulation and reduces muscle and joint pains. They sit on the floor with crossed legs (Sukhasana) before the meal plate (Leaf plate) and move the body front and back to take food. These repeated movements will activate abdominal muscles, which increase the secretion of stomach acids and allow food to digest faster. It is said that Sukhasan increases blood circulation and evenly distributed in the body. This posture reduces the muscle and joint pains in the legs and gives flexibility in the body and feel you feel comfortable. 27 This is still prevailing in traditional families. It is not advisable to have meals always on the dining table. It may not add any benefit to the body except giving comfortable and adding richness to your home. b) Leaf Plates ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 238 The general practice in India, people generally take food on leaf plates such as on banana, dhaka, betel palm and teak plant leaves by sitting on the floor. They are called “Pattal or Vistarlu”. They are hygienic and biodegradable. In some rituals it is mandatory to offer food on leaf plates for Brahmins. The conventional leaf plates are superior to plastic plates. WHO says plastic papers are made of chemical substances like Melmine, Polypropylene, Bisphenol A(BPA), when hot food comes in contact with plastics, chemicals are leached into the food. These chemicals are absorbed by human body and gradually results in diseases, like breast cancer and heart diseases and others. 28 The most preferable plates are Gold, Silver or Copper. But they are unaffordable to middle class people, one can choose stainless steel plates which are less expensive as well as less harmful. However, the conventional leaf plates are superior to plastic plates.29 One can manufacture leaf plates and leaf cups. c) Chitrahuti It is considered that whatever is getting to us because of God’s Grace and our Karma, be it food or clothes or anything. In some regions especially Brahmins sprinkle water around the food plates before taking the food by chanting Vedic mantras offering to the Supreme God, who is a fire of digestion residing in living beings, requesting for proper digestion of food with upward and downward of energy (BG 15.14)1. This process is known as Chitrahuti. Another reason is that sprinkling of water around the plate does not allow insects or germs to enter and mix with food that gets impure and infectious. d) Buffet System In the present days, we come across another type known as the Buffet system. The eating habits are neither recommended nor preferred anywhere in Hindu scriptures. This western culture is prevailing in the society for the past four to five decades. It is not advisable for a health-conscious point of view, and in more philosophically the rich man becomes a beggar with a bowl in front of a caterer. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 239 (2) Cremation He who takes birth must take death also. In Hindu rituals, it is customary to do the last rites by consigning the body to fire. The human body is composed of five cosmic elements earth, fire, water air, and sky. The Hindu cremations are directed towards returning the body to these elements by burning it. It is the method for the final disposition of a dead body through fire.30 The dead body is kept on a pyre (wooden structure or electric cremator) and then it is set on fire with rituals so that all parts of the body get burnt and no pathogens survive at that high temperature of the fire and ensure that all remnants are wiped out and preventing it from being a source of spread of any infections and diseases. To offer the dead body to fire (Agni) with earnest prayers signifies to purify and lead the individual soul for better and brighter life, and release of spirit that gives a feeling of detachment from the loved ones. In general, cremation is preferred over burial for space constraints, and the gradual decomposition of the whole body is not seen clearly, and the possibility of infections and insects around the place. The ancestors have meticulously planned, the cremation of one body takes nearly one tree, it seems in the past one Hindu person used to plant at least three trees during one’s whole life span on special occasions. On the third day, the ashes and bones are collected and mixed any one of the Indian holy rivers, preferably the Ganges river. The family members are allowed to enter the house after taking bath to prevent in spreading of bacteria or viruses if any on their bodies or clothes. Even the sons of the deceased will cut hairs and go for a bald head as per rituals. This cremation procedure is being followed in foreign countries also, especially recently the USA government allowed the cremation procedure for dead bodies of innocent people who lost their lives during the COVID 19 crisis due to the space constraints and spreading of infections. (3) Isolation Isolation means Sutak (Sutakam), in other words, it is a type of untouchability. In Hinduism, sutak is aimed towards the purification of Atma (Soul). At heart, humans are uncleaned. One must be pure both physically and spiritually. The family member must stay for 10 days in isolation at the time of the birth of a child as well as at the death of a person in the house. If parents are departed, the children stay in isolation for 12 days whereas wives are in isolation for 10 days. These details are well narrated in Sri Garudapuran31 which is generally recited during the isolation period if a person is demised in the house. In orthodox families, four days of ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 240 isolation is observed for ladies during the menstruation period. They come to normal and will be allowed to interact with family members after taking a head bath. Thus, the concept of isolation was introduced in Vedic literature. It is nothing but, what we are calling now as the social distance to avoid shaking hands, staying, and sleeping together which would prevent in spreading deadly Coronavirus. (4) Masks It is an etiquette to use masks or put a hand before the nose and mouth while speaking with someone so that droplets will not fall and cause infections to others. The main traditional reason is the concept of Ahimsa, one should neither kill nor eat and inhale the air which contains germs or insects. This is still strictly followed in Jainism and orthodox families. They wear masks, especially during the Sunset period. (5) Neem Leaves The Neem trees are abundantly seen in India. It is a medicinal plant, known as the divine tree and Village Pharmacy tree. They increase the fertility of the soil, the neem oil, or neem water is used as a pesticide. The twigs are used for cleaning teeth, the leaves reduce the boils, rashes, and wounds, they are placed near and under the patient as insect repellent who is suffering from chickenpox. The leaves are placed at the entrance of a door to protect harmful insects, viruses, and bacteria. (6) Killing of Animals All living creatures are part and parcel of supreme Lord. Even they have equal rights to survive on this earth. There is no theory, no law and no prayer to kill other living entities. Killing animals and selling their meat products for consumption is one of the easiest and lucrative businesses in the world. No proper scrutiny on their products It is strong belief in Hinduism, killing animal is a misdeed activity and it is a curse which leads to bad karma. As per the Newton’s 3rd law , one day there would be a revolt they chase humans for retaliation; and as per the law of Karma he ( Killer) has to face the situation either in this ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 241 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications present birth or next births. We find many examples in the literature how people are affected by the curse (7) Eating Meat As per Hindu customs killing animals is a crime and eating meat is a double crime. The designated place for dead bodies of humans and animals is graveyard. But people are buying meat (pork , beef etc.) from unhygienic slaughter centres, keeping in houses that too in refrigerators , then frying them as mouth –watering dishes and finally eating and storing in human body for digestion . In this context lot of questions arise: a) Is human body a graveyard? b) Does the anatomy of human body adjust with foreign material? c) Does it not create risk to human health? d) Why doctors do not recommend non vegetarian food to patients and old age people? e) Why non vegetarian food is not served in the temples? . f) Why don’t they eat agro products which also give same amount of energy? “If you eat meat, that animal of that meat will eat you” 14. As per the law of karma eating animal food is bad deed. To overcome this one has to do lot of positive deeds either in this birth or next births.9, 14 The first basic condition in spirituality is violence (Himsa), is not allowed and the meat eaters are not eligible to become pure devotees (8) Carpets Carpets beautify the houses and palaces that illustrate richness. Despite the glaring appearances, the carpets are generally avoided in traditional houses for health hazards associated with allergic, coughing, wheezing and skin infections due to i) accumulation of dirt, dust, mites, particle pollutants ii) growth of bacteria due to the shoes, and pets paws iii) falling of eatable items when taking food over the carpet. iv) infants and children get easily infected especially due to the chemicals and adhesive used in color combinations are made with volatile organic compounds v) these pollutants may become airborne while walking and cleaning, may cause allergic vi) they are not easily washable. The houses and hotels appear to be multi-colored with carpets and curtains but a lot of risk factors in terms of health.35,36 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 242 (9) Bats The bats are blood suckling or harmless wild creatures but they are important to our ecosystem because they pollinate the crops otherwise they get ruined. They eat mosquitoes. They generate a deadly virus once if they are infected. There are a lot of myths about bats, if a bat enters the house, it is considered to be an omen and saddening news in a family and the house has to be vacated and one can return after performing rituals.37 One can see the repercussions and chaotic situations, spreading of Coronavirus for eating the meat of bat at Wuhan, China. (10) Alcohol Taking alcohol is injurious to health is a well-known noble thought, but difficult to make alcohol free country. Everyone knows regular drinking causes health problems. The consumption of alcohol and non-vegetarian food does not give any environment in society. In spirituality, they are called impure devotees. They neither go to temples nor attend religious functions, on the day when they drink and eat meat. In order to avoid the problems faced by the people during the lockdown period of Covid19, the government authorities had relaxed some of the rules for the benefit of the business people and daily labours so that they get employment. The permission to open the liquor shops had a negative impact and the purpose of lockdown, social distance to curb the virus are futile, which have been strictly monitored by the emergency service providers and security guards, that efforts are null and void. There were a lot of questions in minds of people like it is not necessary that the revenue would be generated only from wine shops. There are many other avenues also. Do they not survive without liquor at least in the lockdown period? The long queues in front of the wine shops led a bad impression as “Are they Starving or Feasting?” The excessive drinking of alcohol adversely affects health conditions such as cancer of mouth throat, liver, heart failure, and brain damage, etc. and affects the immune system.38 While some people may have multiple visible effects like slurred speech, vision impairment lack of coordination, etc. Professor Robin Room, Director, Centre for Alcohol Policy Research, University of Melbourne writes in his article titled “ My drinking, your problem: alcohol hurts non-drinkers too.” It is not only harmful self but it badly affects others such as family life, bad moments or may lead to diverse, financial loses, violence in the family and friends in the society or offices, a risk factor for co-passengers while driving and in some occasions, it causes a nuisance in the street. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 243 The article says in a given year 367 people Australians die because of another’s drinking and 13,600 are hospitalized etc. This report attracted internationally; the World Health organization decided to measure alcohol’s harm to others as a major strand in its Global Strategy to reduce harmful alcohol consumption. 39 5. Conclusion Ancestors were methodically practicing the traditions and customs for a healthy environment for the family and to the society. Unfortunately, those who do not understand their inherent meanings insulted and laughed at the followers and used to make counter-arguments. As a result, the rituals are being disrespected, decreasing, and discarding one by one for the fear of being isolated and forced to sit blindly in one place for a few days. Some others are tending towards simple rituals of the western culture. The procedures of rituals laid down in Hinduism are appropriate and authentic to the society till today. In the present scenario of Covid19, some of these traditions are being implemented and educating people through social media as precautionary steps to wipe out the Coronavirus. The industrialization and solid wastage, usage of plastic materials, global warming unhygienic food items, clean water, slaughter centers, killing of animals and viral infections, terrorism, nuclear as well as chemical weapons, and human values and healing of the earth, etc are some of the global challenges in 21st century for all countries. The Coronavirus has exposed the success of science and technology as no medicine or vaccine is yet available to cure the patients, but it manifested the Indian traditional values social distances (isolation), cleaning hands, and healing prayers saved a lot of people from death. Thus to preserve harmony with nature, a healthy environment in society, adaptability to a vegetarian diet; and to reduce infections, one should not abandon to practice Vedic traditions and customs which are eternal in the nature and incorporation of spirituality in medicine improves the psychological status of patients. Thus, there is a need for the scientific exploration for Vedic traditions. Acknowledgement: This research work is carried out under the research project titled “Study of metaphysical analysis of Bhagavad Gita and Srimadha Bhagavatam: Laws of Karma, Soul and Purpose of life.” sanctioned by Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR) Ministry of Education, Government of India vide letter No F.No.4-39/22-23/P&R/ICPR dated March 26,2023. I am thankful to ICPR for sanctioning the research grant. Received April 4, 2023; Revised April 6, 2023; Accepted May 18, 2023 ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 244 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications References 1) Bhagavad Gita As It Is : A. C Bhakti Vedanta Swami Prabhupada. The Macmillian Company , New York. 2) Srtmad Bhagavatam :A. C Bhakti Vedanta Swami Prabhupada, The Bhaktivedanta Book TrustJuhu, Mumbai, India 3) https://www.livescience.com/28634-indian-culture.html 4) Karma: the unknown factor in life: D Pramod, Scientific GOD Journal |December, 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | pp. 676-686 http://scigod.com/index.php/sgj/article/view/431/482 5) https://bioethicsjournal.hms.harvard.edu/summer-2019/do-spirituality-and-medicine-go-together 6) The claim: The Coronavirus pandemic resulted from human consumption of animals. https://bit.ly/3ocuSm6 7) Humans, animals and zoonotic diseases. https://bit.ly/3OnhaaC 8) https://www.hindujagruti.org/hinduism/knowledge/article/why-do-we-light-lamp-in-front-of-deitiesin-the-evening.html 9) https://www.hindujagruti.org/hinduism/knowledge/article/why-is-ghee-lamp-preferred-to-oil-lampduring-puja-ritual.html 10) http://rvenglishthree.weebly.com/unit-3-early-to-bed-early-to-rise.html 11) https://www.speakingtree.in/allslides/the-secret-potential-of-brahmamuhurta 12) https://www.brit.co/heres-why-you-shouldnt-wear-dirty-workout-clothes/ 13) https://toistudent.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/leadership/what-s-the-significance-of-tilakamong-hindus/38593.html 14) http://www.rudraksha-ratna.com/blog/ajna-chakra/ 15) Sanskruthi – Unity in Diversity : Dr D Pramod, Sanskruthi Magazine , Canada, Dec , 26,2014;http://www.sanskritimagazine.com/culture/sanskruthi-unity-diversity/ 16) https://mahakatha.com/best-shiva-mantras-for-healing 17) http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/varanasi/Dhanteras-to-be-observed-as-NationalAyurveda-Day/articleshow/54599037.cms 18) https://www.lpi.usra.edu/education/explore/marvelMoon/background/moon-influence/ 19) https://sites.google.com/view/astrologyupdates/why-is-amavasya-considered-inauspicious 20) https://astrotalk.com/astrology-blog/origin-of-disease-depends-on-planets/ 21) https://www.yogiapproved.com/health-wellness/yagna-ancient-purification-practice-modernyogi/uhurta-504006 22) https://bit.ly/432qwwC 23) Health biggest motivation for following veggie diet. https://epaper.timesgroup.com/olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/Default.aspx 24) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_vegetarianism 25) Vegetarian Food a Scientific Analysis , Dr N Gopalkrishnan , Scientist CSIR, Indian Institute of Scientific Heritage, Thiruvananthapuram, 695018, Heritage Publication Series-68. 26) https://www.speakingtree.in/article/traditional-vedic-insights-to-boost-your-immunity ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com 245 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2023 | Volume 14 | Issue 3 | pp. 225-245 Pramod, D., Vedic Traditions & Scientific Applications 27) https://www.aimsindia.com/blog/benefits-of-sitting-on-the-floor-while-eating/ 28) https://www.superfoodly.com/is-plastic-food-packaging-safe/ 29) http://theyogivegetarian.blogspot.com/2012/01/health-benefits-of-eating-and-drinking.html 30) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cremation#Ancient_history 31) https://www.hinduwebsite.com/sacredscripts/puranas/gp/gp.asp 32) http://themodernvedic.com/science-vedas/wear-bangles-indan-women 33) https://www.verywellfamily.com/what-are-special-needs-3106002 34) https://bit.ly/3BxTsAS 35) https://www.fivestepcarpetcarenc.net/2018/02/23/health-hazards-hiding-carpet/ 36) https://bit.ly/3BBj2VJ 37) www.modernpest.com/blog/bats-menacing-misunderstood 38) https://bit.ly/3WfzZyh 39) https://bit.ly/3pKJo4R ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com

Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog The role of edge-based and surface-based information in natural scene categorization: Evidence from behavior and event-related potentials Qiufang Fu a,⇑, Yong-Jin Liu b, Zoltan Dienes c, Jianhui Wu a, Wenfeng Chen a, Xiaolan Fu a a State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China Tsinghua National Laboratory for Information Science and Technology, Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China c Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and School of Psychology, University of Sussex, BN1 9QH Brighton, United Kingdom b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 15 January 2016 Revised 6 June 2016 Accepted 7 June 2016 Keywords: Natural scene categorization Edge-based theory Surface-based theory SOA ERPs a b s t r a c t A fundamental question in vision research is whether visual recognition is determined by edge-based information (e.g., edge, line, and conjunction) or surface-based information (e.g., color, brightness, and texture). To investigate this question, we manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the scene and the mask in a backward masking task of natural scene categorization. The behavioral results showed that correct classification was higher for line-drawings than for color photographs when the SOA was 13 ms, but lower when the SOA was longer. The ERP results revealed that most latencies of early components were shorter for the line-drawings than for the color photographs, and the latencies gradually increased with the SOA for the color photographs but not for the line-drawings. The results provide new evidence that edge-based information is the primary determinant of natural scene categorization, receiving priority processing; by contrast, surface information takes longer to facilitate natural scene categorization. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Humans have a remarkable ability to categorize natural scenes quickly and accurately. The human brain needs only approximately 150 ms to decide whether a color photograph, flashed for 20 ms, contains animals or vehicles (Rousselet, Fabre-Thorpe, & Thorpe, 2002; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001), even with little or no attention applied to the task (Feifei, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2005; Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2007; Rousselet et al., 2002). The challenge is to explain how rapid natural scene categorization takes place in the human brain. A recent fMRI study found that line-drawings generated similar neural activation as color photographs in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and the retrosplenial cortex (RSC), which suggests that the human visual system uses schematic representations with content that is analogous to simple line-drawings, to encode and process statistical regularities in a scene (Walther, Chai, Caddigan, Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2011). This finding has provided new evidence for an edge-based theory that assumes that edge-based representations are sufficient for object recognition and that surface characteristics such as color, ⇑ Corresponding author at: Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 16 Lincui Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100101, China. E-mail address: fuqf@psych.ac.cn (Q. Fu). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.06.008 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 153 brightness, and texture are less efficient routes for accessing the memorial representation (Biederman, 1987; Biederman & Ju, 1988). Indeed, some studies have found that surface gradients such as color changes had little influence on object classification and identification (e.g., Biederman & Ju, 1988; Cave, Bost, & Cobb, 1996; Joseph & Proffitt, 1996) or even impaired object classification (e.g., Gagnier & Intraub, 2012). For example, Biederman and Ju (1988) demonstrated that the reaction times and error rates were virtually identical for the common objects of color photographs and line-drawings when the images were briefly (50–100 ms) presented. Thus, although scene recognition and object recognition are technically different, the same perceptual processes might be involved. However, due to poor temporal resolution, on the order of one to several seconds (Rossion, Kung, & Tarr, 2004), the above fMRI study cannot discriminate differences in the time course of categorizing color photographs and line-drawings. The role of surface properties in object or scene recognition remains controversial (e.g., Gagnier & Intraub, 2012; Parron & Washburn, 2010; Wichmann, Sharpe, & Genenfurtner, 2002). In contrast with the edge-based theory, the alternative surfacebased theory assumes that surface gradients are central for object recognition and that both contour and surface information provide simultaneous routes for basic-level categorization. This perspective has received support from other studies (e.g., Tanaka, Weiskopf, & Williams, 2001; Wichmann et al., 2002; Wurm, Legge, Isenberg, & Luebker, 1993). For example, color improved object recognition of common food items when there was no time limit on the stimulus presentation (Wurm et al., 1993). Interestingly, Laws and Hunter (2006) did not find a significant difference in the accuracy between the objects in color photographs and line-drawings with a 20-ms presentation of each image, which is consistent with the findings of Biederman and Ju (1988), but a marginally significant advantage for color photographs over line-drawings was found (p = 0.07) with a 1000-ms presentation of each image, which is principally consistent with the findings of Wurm et al. (1993). A comparison of the above studies also reveals that most of the studies in support of the edge-based theory limited the presentation times or processing duration to a very short time, while there was no time limit or a long processing time in the study that supported the surface-based theory. Thus, we predict that the stimulus presentation or processing duration could modulate the role of the surface information in scene perception. Specifically, if the processing duration is long enough, then the surface information should facilitate the recognition; however, if the processing duration is extremely short, then surface information could even impair recognition performance if edge-based information is thereby harder to extract. If the latter occurs, then the result will provide new evidence for edge-based information receiving priority processing. The purpose of the present study was to address this issue by adopting event-related potentials (ERPs) in a backward masking task of categorizing natural scenes. To manipulate the processing duration, a backward masking paradigm was adopted in the present ERP study, in which the stimulus duration was constant but the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the image and mask was varied. Backward masking is useful in investigating the time course of information processing in the visual system in that it allows processing to be interrupted at different times (Bacon-Macé, Macé, FabreThorpe, & Thorpe, 2005; Hansen & Loschky, 2013; Holcomb & Grainger, 2006; Kovács, Vogels, & Orban, 1995; Loschky, Hansen, Sethi, & Pydimarri, 2010; Loschky et al., 2007; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998; Rieger, Braun, Bülthoff, & Gegenfurtner, 2005; Rolls, Tovée, & Panzeri, 1999; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). Usually, when the SOA becomes longer, the behavioral performance and neural activation recorded by fMRI increase and so does the ERP differential activity, roughly between 150 and 250 ms on the targets and distracters (Bacon-Macé et al., 2005; Holcomb & Grainger, 2006). Because accuracy increases significantly with SOAs below 44 ms (i.e., 6.25, 12.50, 18.75, 25, 31.25, 43.75 ms, see Bacon-Macé et al., 2005), the SOA was set at 13, 27, 40 and 213 ms in the present study. Moreover, to explore the role of edge-based and surface-based information in natural scene categorization, we adopted color photographs and line-drawings as stimuli because the color photographs include both edge-based information (e.g., edge, line, and conjunction) and surface properties (e.g., color, brightness, and texture), whereas line-drawings include only edge-based information, as established in a previous study (Walther et al., 2011). Previous ERP studies have shown that natural scene categorization involves two stages: a perception stage that extracts information about different features of the visual input and a decision stage that evaluates the relevance of the information in making a decision (Bacon-Macé et al., 2005; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Early ERP components such as P1 and N1 are associated with feature detection or integration (Hillyard & Münte, 1984) and are sensitive to elemental features of stimuli (e.g., Holcomb & Grainger, 2006; Itier, Latinus, & Taylor, 2006). Given that color photographs involve both edge-based and surfacebased information while line-drawings include only edge-based information, differences in the components at the perceptual stage could be elicited by color photographs versus line-drawings. Specifically, if surface-based information is processed simultaneously with edge-based information such that both facilitate categorization, then the latencies of the early components should be at least as fast for the color photographs as for the line-drawings. Conversely, if the latencies of early components are faster for the line-drawings than the color photographs, then it indicates the importance of edge-based information, with surface information analyzed as a secondary route for visual cognition which does not facilitate early on. Indeed, Walther et al. (2011) found that there was only a low correlation between the neural activity that was generated by color photographs and the neural activity that was generated by line-drawings in early visual areas, which suggests that the feature analysis in early visual processing differs between color photographs and line-drawings. The later ERP components, such as N2 and P3, are related to decision making (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). If only an edge-based representation is sufficient in the decision-making process, then there will be no difference in the pattern of later components of color photographs and line-drawings, as suggested by Walther et al. Conversely, if 154 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 an edge-based representation is not sufficient in the decision-making process, then there will be differences in the pattern of later components between color photographs and line-drawings. To the best of our knowledge, although a considerable number of studies have investigated the role of surface information in scene and object recognition (Biederman & Ju, 1988; Delorme, Richard, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2000; Gagnier & Intraub, 2012; Walther et al., 2011), few studies have adopted ERP techniques to address this question. Goffaux et al. (2005), using a go/ no-go paradigm, measured ERPs when people categorized normally colored, grayscale and abnormally colored scenes with a 100-ms presentation. They found that the reaction times and accuracy were optimal for the normal version, followed by the grayscale and then the abnormal version; the onset of the early ERP component at the frontal sites mirrored these effects. Thus, color contributes to rapid natural scene categorization, which is consistent with the surface-based account. However, although the stimulus presentation in this study was 100 ms, they used a long variable SOA of 1500–1800 ms. Because no masks were used to interrupt the processing, there was sufficient time to process the image fully. Moreover, their concern was the role of color in natural scene categorization, and thus, they did not answer how edge-based and surface-based information contributes to natural scene categorization. The role of edge-based and surface-based information and its interaction with the processing duration in scene recognition remains an open question. In addition, all of the above ERP studies used a go/no-go paradigm, during which people first made a decision about whether the image contained animals or vehicles and then performed the go or no-go reaction. Because the targets and distracters belonged to different categories, the differential activity between the targets and distracters might have reflected a difference in either a high-level property such as the category or a low-level property such as the contrast (Rousselet & Pernet, 2011). To avoid this ambiguity, we used a forced-choice rather than go/no-go task and compared the differential activity between incorrect and correct trials. Because there were incorrect and correct trials for each category, the analysis of the differential activity according to the correctness should reflect how people correctly categorize scenes. Second, because the targets and distracters require different responses in the go/no-go task, the differential activity between the targets and distracters could result from either different decision-making processes or different preparations for reactions. To dissociate the reaction preparations from the decision-making processes, the locations of six category names were randomly assigned on each trial, and a blank was displayed for 500 ms before the presentation of the category names (see Fig. 1). 2. Methods 2.1. Participants Twenty-two undergraduate and graduate students (11 male, 11 female), aged 19–29 years (M = 21.82, SD = 2.34), voluntarily took part in this experiment and were paid for their attendance. All of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave the written informed consent. None of them had any history of neurological or psychiatric diseases. This experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the committee for the protection of subjects at the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. 2.2. Materials Color photographs and line-drawings of six natural scene categories (beaches, city streets, forests, highways, mountains and offices) were adopted as stimuli, which were first used by Walther et al. (2011).1 Each category had 76–80 different images, for a total of 475. Each image had two versions: one was a color photograph, and the other was a line-drawing. The line-drawings were produced by trained artists by tracing the contours in the color photographs (see Walther et al., 2011). All of the images were resized to 320 ⁄ 240 pixels. Two white noise images at two different spatial scales were generated as masks: one was generated at the resolutions of 320 ⁄ 240, and the other was generated at the resolutions of 20 ⁄ 15 and then resized to 320 ⁄ 240 pixels. Each mask also had two versions: one in color, the other in grayscale. The experiment was carried out on a CRT monitor with a resolution of 1280 ⁄ 768 pixels, a mean luminance of 50.6 cd/m2, and a refresh rate of 75 Hz. The images of six natural scene categories were presented on a silver gray background with a mean luminance of 27.4 cd/m2. 2.3. Procedure The participants were seated in an electrically shielded, dimly lit and sound-attenuated room. The distance from the participants’ eyes to the center of the screen was approximately 60 cm when they sat straight in the chair, and no chinrest was used. Each image was approximately 8.70 deg wide and 8.19 deg high. The participants were tested for 10 blocks, for a total of 950 trials. At the beginning of each trial, a black fixation cross was presented on a silver gray background in the center of the screen for 500–950 ms at random (see Fig. 1). Then, an image was flashed for 13 ms, which was followed by two masks.2 Each mask was shown for 50 ms, for a total of 100 ms. The sequence of the two masks was randomly assigned on each trial. 1 We got all of the images from Dr. Walther. In a preliminary experiment, we found that the mask with a high resolution masked color photographs (non-significantly) more than line-drawings, while a mask with a low resolution masked line-drawings (non-significantly) more than color photographs. To balance possibly different masking effects on color photographs and line-drawings, we used the two masks. 2 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 155 Fig. 1. Materials and experimental procedure. (A) Examples of six categories of color photographs and line-drawings. (B) Experimental setup and design. (C) Masks for color photographs. (D) Masks for line-drawings. After the masks, there was a blank of 500 ms. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the image and the mask was 13, 27, 40 or 213 ms, at random. After the blank, six category names appeared on the screen from left to right, for which the locations corresponded to the keys D, F, G, H, J, and K on the keyboard. On each trial, the locations of the six category names were randomly assigned, and thus, the participants would not prepare their response before its appearance and no response bias toward a favored location would contaminate the results3 (Loschky, Ringer, Ellis, & Hansen, 2015). The participants were forced to make a choice among the six categories by pressing the corresponding key, and there was no time limit for them to make the choice. There was no feedback about the correctness of their response. After their response, they were further asked to report ‘‘how clearly did you see the image” with four possible responses from left to right on a perceptual awareness scale (PAS), by pressing the corresponding key. Then, the participants were asked to press the space key to begin the next trial when they were ready. In each block, half of the images were color photographs, and half were line-drawings, with equal trials in each category and each SOA. There was at least a 30-s rest between any two blocks. 2.4. EEG recording and analysis The EEG was recorded from 64 scalp sites using Ag-AgCl electrodes in an elastic cap according to the International 10–20 system. The vertical and horizontal EOG were recorded with two pairs of electrodes placed 1 cm above and below one eye and 1 cm lateral from the outer canthi of both eyes. The left mastoid was used as an on-line reference, and the algebraic average of the left and right mastoids was used as an off-line re-reference. The EEG and EOG signals were amplified by a NeuroScan Synamps amplifier with a band pass of 0.05–100 Hz and digitized at 500 Hz. The impedance of the electrodes was maintained below 5 kX. EEG data were low-pass filtered with a cutoff frequency at 30 Hz and averaged offline for epochs of 800 ms, starting 100 ms prior to the stimulus onset and ending 700 ms afterward. A baseline correction was performed for each epoch using the 100 ms before the presentation of each image. Trials with artifacts that were determined by a criterion of 80 lV were rejected offline, which amounted to only 2.6% of the trials. The ERPs were first averaged separately across correct and incorrect trials for each type of image and SOA for each subject. The SOA of 213 ms was not included because of having an insufficient number of incorrect trials for the ERP average. In the 3 However, as participants need first search the target category name on each trial, thus the reaction time was inflated and the accuracy rather than RT was used as a dependent variable. 156 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 statistical analysis of the ERP data, we focused on the peak latencies and amplitudes of the posterior P1 (80–160 ms) and N1 (130–210 ms) and anterior P2 (140–240 ms) and the mean amplitudes of the posterior P2 (210–260 ms) and anterior N2 (220–320 ms), P3 (370–420 ms), and N4 (420–520 ms). The time windows were chosen because they best captured the differences among the different conditions and were relatively free from overlap with adjacent ERPs. Based on previous studies (e.g., Bacon-Macé et al., 2005; Melloni et al., 2011) and the topography of each component in the present study, a group of occipital electrodes (CB1, O1, Oz, O2, and CB2) was selected for the posterior P1, N1, and P2 (see Fig. 3C and E); a group of fronto-central electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, and C4) was selected for the anterior P2, N2, P3, and N4 (see Fig. 5C and E). The latencies and amplitudes were computed as the means over groups of electrodes that were representative of the topography of each component for each subject. The mean and standard error for each component were computed across subjects. Each was subjected to a repeated measures three-way ANOVA with the factors of type of image (color photographs vs. line-drawings), SOA (13 ms vs. 27 ms vs. 40 ms), and correctness (correct vs. incorrect). Key non-significant results were interpreted with Bayes factors. P-values by themselves cannot discriminate insensitive data from support for the null hypothesis, whereas Bayes factors make that distinction. More specifically, when using the Bayes factor, B, to compare an alternative hypothesis (H1) against the null hypothesis (H0), if B is greater than 3, then there is substantial evidence for H1 over H0; if B is less than 1/3, then there is substantial evidence for H0 over H1; and if B is between 3 and 1/3, then the data do not discriminate H0 from H1 (Dienes, 2011). Bayes factors were determined using the free online software associated with Dienes (2014), which is located at http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_ Dienes/inference/bayes_factor.swf, with the Matlab and R code provided at http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_ Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm. Dienes (2014) provides a tutorial. 3. Results 3.1. Behavioral results Fig. 2A shows the accuracy rate for color photographs and line-drawings for each SOA. Because the task was to make a choice among the six categories, the chance probability is 0.17. The accuracy for the color photograph trials was significantly better than chance for each SOA [SOA = 13 ms: t(21) = 11.08, p < 0.001, dz = 2.36; SOA = 27 ms: t(21) = 14.51, p < 0.001, dz = 3.09; SOA = 40 ms: t(21) = 20.52, p < 0.001, dz = 4.38; SOA = 213 ms: t(21) = 75.99, p < 0.001, dz = 16.20], as was the accuracy for the line-drawing trials for each SOA [SOA = 13 ms: t(21) = 10.66, p < 0.001, dz = 2.27; SOA = 27 ms: t(21) = 12.96, p < 0.001, dz = 2.76; SOA = 40 ms: t(21) = 16.31, p < 0.001, dz = 3.47; SOA = 213 ms: t(21) = 51.09, p < 0.001, dz = 10.89]. The results suggested that people could correctly classify natural scenes for each SOA. A repeated ANOVA with the type of image and SOA as within-subject factors revealed that overall, the accuracy rate was higher for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials [0.66 ± 0.02 vs. 0.62 ± 0.02, F(1, 21) = 18.87, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.47], which increased with SOA [F(1.95, 41.00) = 261.20, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.93, using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction], and the increase with the SOA was influenced by the type of image [F(3, 63) = 14.42, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.41]. Further analysis revealed that the accuracy rate was significantly higher for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials when the SOAs were 27, 40 and 213 ms [SOA = 27 ms: 0.61 ± 0.03 vs. 0.55 ± 0.03, t(21) = 3.62, p < 0.01, dz = 0.77; SOA = 40 ms: 0.72 ± 0.03 vs. 0.64 ± 0.03, t(21) = 4.81, p < 0.001, dz = 0.96; SOA = 213 ms: 0.90 ± 0.01 vs. 0.84 ± 0.01, t(21) = 5.57, p < 0.001, dz = 1.19], but was lower for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials when the SOA was 13 ms [0.41 ± 0.02 vs. 0.44 ± 0.03, t(21) = 2.16, p < 0.05, dz = 0.46]. The results indicated that the facilitatory role of surface information in natural scene categorization is modulated by the processing duration. A lower performance for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials when SOA was 13 ms revealed that surface-based information could impair recognition performance Fig. 2. Accuracy rates. (A) Accuracy rates for color photograph trials and line-drawing trials in each SOA, in which the dotted line was the chance level; (B) accuracy rates contributed by surface-based information, calculated by accuracy rate for color photographs minus accuracy rate for line-drawings in each SOA, and accuracy rates contributed by edge-based information, calculated by accuracy rate for line-drawings minus the chance level in each SOA; (C) awareness scores for color photograph trials and line-drawing trials in each SOA. The error bars depict standard errors. Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 157 when the processing time was extremely limited, providing evidence for edge-based information receiving priority processing. To further examine the contribution of surface-based and edge-based information to accuracy, we took the accuracy difference between the color photograph trials and the line-drawing trials as the accuracy contributed by surface properties and took the accuracy difference between the line-drawing trials and chance level (i.e., 0.17) as the accuracy contributed by edge-based features (see Fig. 2B). A repeated ANOVA with the contribution of different types of information and SOA as within-subject factors revealed that overall the accuracy contributed by edge-based information was much larger than that contributed by surface-based information [0.04 ± 0.01 vs. 0.45 ± 0.02, F(1, 21) = 191.36, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.90], the accuracy contributed by edge-based and surface-based information increased with SOA [F(1, 21) = 212.77, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.91], and the increase with SOA was influenced by the contribution type [F(1, 21) = 34.93, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.63]. Further analysis revealed that the accuracy contributed by the edge-based information was much larger than that contributed by the surfacebased information for each SOA [SOA = 13 ms: 0.04 ± 0.02 vs. 0.27 ± 0.03, t(21) = 8.01, p < 0.001, dz = 1.71; SOA = 27 ms: 0.06 ± 0.02 vs. 0.38 ± 0.03, t(21) = 8.24, p < 0.001, dz = 1.76; SOA = 40 ms: 0.08 ± 0.02 vs. 0.47 ± 0.03, t(21) = 9.81, p < 0.001, dz = 2.09; SOA = 213 ms: 0.07 ± 0.01 vs. 0.67 ± 0.01, t(21) = 25.39, p < 0.001, dz = 5.41]. Interestingly, the contribution of edge-based information gradually and significantly increased with SOA (all ps < 0.001), whereas the contribution of surface-based information increased from SOA of 13 ms to SOA of 27 ms [ 0.04 ± 0.02 vs. 0.06 ± 0.02, t(21) = 5.17, p < 0.001, dz = 1.10], but there were no significant difference among SOAs of 27, 40, and 213 ms (all ps > 0.34). The results indicated that the edge-based information plays a primary role and the surface-based information a secondary role in natural scene categorization. Finally, we calculated the average awareness score for each SOA of color photographs and line-drawings (see Fig. 2C). When SOA was 13 ms, the awareness scores were significantly above 1 (no experience) for both types of images [color photographs: t(21) = 8.97, p < 0.001, dz = 1.91; line-drawings: t(21) = 9.14, p < 0.001, dz = 1.95], but were not significantly different from 2 (brief glimpse) [color photographs: t(21) = 0.61, p = 0.55; line-drawings: t(21) = 0.21, p = 0.83]. When SOA was 27 ms, the awareness score for color photographs was significantly above 2 (weak glimpse) [t(21) = 3.38, p < 0.01, dz = 0.72], but significantly below 3 (almost clear experience) [t(21) = 5.45, p < 0.001, dz = 1.12]; the awareness score for linedrawings was not significantly above 2 (weak glimpse) [t(21) = 1.70, p = 0.10], and significantly below 3 (almost clear experience) [t(21) = 7.32, p < 0.001]. When the SOA was 40 ms, the awareness score for both types of images were significantly above 2 (weak glimpse) [color photographs: t(21) = 5.68, p < 0.001, dz = 1.21; line-drawings: t(21) = 3.71, p = 0.001, dz = 0.79], but significantly below 3 (almost clear experience) [color photographs: t(21) = 2.62, p < 0.05, dz = 0.56; linedrawings: t(21) = 4.88, p < 0.001, dz = 1.04]. When the SOA was 213 ms, the awareness score for color photographs was significantly above 3 (almost clear experience) [t(21) = 4.29, p < 0.001, dz = 0.91], but significantly below 4 (clear experience) [t (21) = 6.48, p < 0.001, dz = 1.38]; the awareness score for line-drawings was not significantly above 3 (almost clear experience) [t(21) = 0.85, p = 0.40], and significantly below 4 (clear experience) [t(21) = 9.23, p < 0.001, dz = 1.97]. That is, participants reported having experience below ‘‘almost clear experience” for both types of images when SOA were 13, 27, and 40 ms, and having mainly ‘‘almost clear experience” only when SOA was 213 ms. 3.2. ERP results The ERP data of the color photographs and line-drawings in both the correct and incorrect trials at the occipital sites (CB1, O1, Oz, O2, and CB2) and fronto-central sites (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, and C4) were analyzed when the SOA was 13, 27, and 40 ms. The SOA of 213 ms was not included because of having an insufficient number of incorrect trials for the ERP average. We first consider how the type of image, SOA, and correctness influenced the posterior P1, N1, and P2 at the occipital sites. Then, we show how the factors modulated the anterior P2, N2, P3, and N4 at the fronto-central sites. Three-way repeated ANOVAs with the type of image, SOA, and correctness as within-subject factors were performed over the latencies or amplitudes of each component. To demonstrate the different time courses of the natural scene categorization of the color photographs and line-drawings, we reported only two-way interactions between the type of image and the SOA and between the type of image and the correctness. Finally, we will explore the relationship between the behavioral accuracy and ERP effects by using regression analysis. 3.2.1. Posterior P1, N1, and P2 effects Fig. 3 shows ERP data at the occipital electrode sites, in which the ERP waveforms were computed over the group of occipital electrodes (CB1, O1, Oz, O2, and CB2), which was representative of the topography of each component. Fig. 4 shows the latencies or amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2 under each condition. Table 1 summarizes the significant results of the three-way repeated ANOVAs that were performed over the latencies or amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2. 3.2.1.1. Peak latencies of the posterior P1 and N1. For the P1 peak latencies, there was only a significant SOA by the type of image interaction. As shown in Fig. 4, consistent with the edge-based theory, the P1 peak latency was significantly shorter for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials when SOA was 40 ms [122.61 ± 3.43 ms vs. 115.19 ± 3.30 ms, t (21) = 2.39, p < 0.05, dz = 0.51]; but inconsistent with the edge-based theory, the P1 peak latency was significantly shorter for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials when SOA was 13 ms [110.61 ± 2.19 ms vs. 116.29 ± 2.67 ms, t (21) = 2.22, p < 0.05, dz = 0.47], and there were no significant differences between the color photograph trials and the 158 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 Fig. 3. ERP data at the occipital electrodes. (A) Grand-average ERPs of correct and incorrect trials for color photographs and line-drawings in each SOA, averaged across five occipital electrodes CB1, O1, Oz, O2, and CB2. (B) ERP differences of incorrect minus correct trials for color photographs and linedrawings in each SOA. (C) The scalp topography of the posterior P1, N1, and P2, incorrect minus correct trials separately for color photographs and linedrawings. (D) ERP differences of color photograph trials minus line-drawing trials for correct and incorrect ones in each SOA. (E) The scalp topography of the posterior P1, N1, and P2, color photograph trials minus line-drawing trials separately for correct and incorrect ones. 159 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 Fig. 4. Latencies or amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2. (A) Latencies or amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2 for the correct trials under each condition. (B) Latencies or amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2 for the incorrect trials under each condition. The error bars depict the standard errors. Table 1 Significant results of the three-way repeated ANOVAs performed over the latencies or amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2, considering the type of image, SOA, and correctness. Posterior P1 latency Posterior P1 amplitude Posterior N1 amplitude Posterior P2 amplitude gp 2 F gp2 F gp2 F gp2 F gp2 10.23⁄⁄ 0.33 31.90⁄⁄⁄ 6.42⁄⁄ 0.60 0.23 0.67 0.17 0.41 0.35 7.34⁄⁄ 15.42⁄⁄ 4.77⁄ 0.26 0.42 0.19 0.58 0.51 0.17 0.48 0.43 0.42 43.37⁄⁄⁄ 4.38⁄ 14.62⁄⁄ 11.32⁄⁄⁄ 28.39⁄⁄⁄ 21.88⁄⁄⁄ 4.43⁄ 19.28⁄⁄⁄ 15.99⁄⁄ 15.31⁄⁄⁄ 17.10⁄⁄⁄ 11.67⁄⁄⁄ 0.45 0.36 202.57⁄⁄⁄ 105.74⁄⁄⁄ 7.00⁄ 16.31⁄⁄⁄ 19.22⁄⁄⁄ 0.91 0.83 0.25 0.44 0.48 F Typ SOA Acc Typ ⁄ SOA Typ ⁄ Acc Acc ⁄ SOA Posterior N1 latency Note: In each ANOVA, we report F (and df) values with significance. ⁄ p < .05; ⁄⁄ p < .01; ⁄⁄⁄ p < .001. line-drawing trials when SOA was 27 ms [118.43 ± 2.57 ms vs. 118.45 ± 3.07 ms, t(21) = 0.01, p = 0.99]. However, more importantly, the P1 peak latency significantly increased with the SOA only for the color photograph trials (ps < 0.05) but not for the line-drawing trials (ps > 0.12). To interpret the latter non-significant results, Bayes factors were used (Dienes, 2011). Nothing at all follows from a non-significant result in itself, but a Bayes factor (B) can indicate substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (B < 1/3), that the data are insensitive (1/3 < B < 3), or substantial evidence for the alternative (B > 3). Because the linear trend was significantly greater for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials, the alternative hypothesis for the line-drawing trials can be represented as being uniform between 0 and the maximum provided by the linear trend estimated for the color photograph trials. For the P1 latencies, the linear trend for the line-drawing trials was 1 ms (SE = 2 ms); using the uniform range [0, 12] to represent the alternative (where 12 was the linear trend for color photographs) yields B = 0.15. In other words, there is substantial evidence for the null hypothesis of no linear trend in the P1 latencies for the line-drawing trials over the alternative. Thus, the results indicated that shorter SOA was sufficient for extracting information from line-drawings rather than color photographs, which was principally consistent with the hypothesis of the edge-based theory. For the N1 peak latencies, there was a significant type of image by SOA interaction. As shown in Fig. 4, consistent with the edge-based theory, there was significantly shorter N1 peak latency for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials when SOA was 27 and 40 ms [SOA = 27 ms: 172.39 ± 1.87 ms vs. 162.20 ± 2.20 ms, t(21) = 5.37, p < 0.001, dz = 1.15; SOA = 40 ms: 180.49 ± 1.85 ms vs. 161.21 ± 3.46 ms, t(21) = 5.70, p < 0.001, dz = 1.21], but there were no significant differences on the N1 peak latency between color photograph trials and line-drawing trials when SOA was 13 ms [162.93 ± 1.78 ms vs. 159.74 ± 2.54 ms, t(21) = 1.55, p = 0.14]. However, more importantly, the N1 peak latency significantly 160 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 increased with SOA for the color photograph trials (ps < 0.05) but not for the line-drawing trials (ps > 0.17). Similarly, the linear trend was 1 ms (SE = 3.5 ms) for the line-drawing trials; using the uniform [0, 18] to represent the alternative (where 18 was the linear trend for the color photographs) yields B = 0.31, which is also substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. The results confirmed that shorter SOA was sufficient for extracting information from line-drawings rather than color photographs, which was substantially consistent with the edge-based theory. In addition, the type of image by correctness interaction was also significant. The N1 peak latency was significantly shorter for the incorrect than correct trials for the color photograph trials [168.87 ± 1.64 ms vs. 175.01 ± 2.03 ms, t(21) = 4.10, p = 0.001, dz = 0.87], but not for the line-drawing trials [162.19 ± 2.41 ms vs. 159.91 ± 2.59 ms, t(21) = 1.77, p = 0.09]. That is, the N1 peak latency was related to correct classification for color photographs. 3.2.1.2. Amplitudes of the posterior P1, N1, and P2. For the posterior P1 peak amplitudes, there was a significant type of image by SOA interaction. For both types of images, the P1 amplitude significantly increased from a SOA of 13 to a SOA of 27 [color photographs: 2.77 ± 0.39 lV vs. 3.58 ± 0.45 lV, t(21) = 2.90, p < 0.01, dz = 0.62; line-drawings: 1.65 ± 0.40 lV vs. 2.28 ± 0.51 lV, t(21) = 2.56, p < 0.05, dz = 0.55], but not from a SOA of 27 to a SOA of 40 (ps > 0.29). The interaction of the type of image by correctness also reached significance. For the color photographs, the P1 amplitude was significantly larger for correct than incorrect trials for the color photographs [3.54 ± 0.41 lV vs. 3.22 ± 0.44 lV, t(21) = 3.51, p < 0.01, dz = 0.75], but the P1 amplitude was marginally significantly smaller for the correct than the incorrect trials for the linedrawings [1.73 ± 0.49 lV vs. 2.08 ± 0.44 lV, t(21) = 2.04, p = 0.054, dz = 0.43]. That is, incorrect classification was related to different P1 effects for color photographs and line-drawings. For the posterior N1 peak amplitudes, there was a significant type of image by correctness interaction. The N1 effect was significantly larger for the incorrect than correct trials for the color photographs [ 5.71 ± 0.48 lV vs. 4.64 ± 0.52 lV, t(21) = 4.51, p < 0.001, dz = 0.96] but not for the line-drawings [ 3.03 ± 0.45 lV vs. 3.02 ± 0.46 lV, t(21) = 0.08, p = 0.94]. Furthermore, for color photographs, the comparison between incorrect and correct trials for each SOA revealed that the N1 effect was significantly larger for the incorrect than correct trials when the SOA was 27 and 40 ms [SOA = 27 ms: 5.86 ± 0.59 lV vs. 4.54 ± 0.53 lV, t(21) = 4.35, p < 0.001, dz = 0.93; SOA = 40 ms: 5.89 ± 0.57 lV vs. 4.03 ± 0.58 lV, t(21) = 4.54, p < 0.001, dz = 0.97, respectively], but not when the SOA was 13 ms [ 5.37 ± 0.42 lV vs. 5.34 ± 0.53 lV, t(21) = 0.08, p = 0.94]. The difference for SOA of 13 ms was 0.03 lV (SE = 0.37), using the uniform [ 1.86, 0] to represent the alternative (where 1.86 was the difference for SOA of 40) yields B = 0.27, which is substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. Thus, the results suggested that N1 was related to correct classification of color photographs when SOA was longer than 13 ms. For the posterior P2 amplitudes, there was a significant type of image by SOA interaction. The posterior P2 amplitude was significantly larger for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials for each SOA (ps < 0.001), while the P2 amplitude significantly decreased with the SOA for both types of images (ps < 0.001). The interaction of the type of image and correctness was also significant. For color photographs, the P2 amplitude was significantly larger for incorrect than correct trials [2.68 ± 0.41 lV vs. 1.82 ± 0.36 lV, t(21) = 3.96, p = 0.001, dz = 0.84] but not for the line-drawings [4.15 ± 0.36 lV vs. 4.33 ± 0.35 lV, t(21) = 1.55, p = 0.14]. That is, the posterior P2 amplitude was related to correct classification for color photographs. 3.2.2. Anterior P2, N2, P3 and N4 effects Fig. 5 shows the ERP data at the fronto-central electrode sites, at which the ERP waveforms were computed over the group of fronto-central electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, and C4), which were representative of the topography of each component. Fig. 6 shows the latencies or amplitudes of the anterior P2, N2, P3 and N4 under each condition. Table 2 summarizes the significant results of the three-way repeated ANOVAs that were performed over the latencies or amplitudes of the anterior P2, N2, P3 and N4. 3.2.2.1. Peak latencies of the anterior P2. For the anterior P2 peak latencies, there was a significant type of image by SOA interaction. As shown in Fig. 6, consistent with the edge-based theory, there was significantly shorter anterior P2 peak latency for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials for all SOAs [SOA = 13 ms: 176.39 ± 3.72 ms vs. 171.19 ± 4.44 ms, t (21) = 2.13, p < 0.05, dz = 0.45; SOA = 27 ms: 181.97 ± 3.40 ms vs. 171.81 ± 4.45 ms, t(21) = 3.02, p < 0.01, dz = 0.64; SOA = 40 ms: 193.01 ± 3.93 ms vs. 171.25 ± 4.46 ms, t(21) = 6.02, p < 0.001, dz = 1.28]. Importantly, the P2 peak latency significantly increased with the SOA for the color photograph trials (ps < 0.05) but not for the line-drawing trials (ps > 0.84). Similarly, the linear trend was 0 ms (SE = 3.8 ms) for the line-drawings; using the uniform [0, 17] to represent the alternative (where 17 was the linear trend for the color photographs) yields B = 0.28, which is also substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. Thus, consistent with the results of posterior P1 and N1 latencies, the results of anterior P2 latencies provided strong evidence for the edge-based theory. In addition, the type of image by correctness interaction was significant. The P2 peak latency was significantly shorter in incorrect than correct trials for the color photographs [176.62 ± 2.57 ms vs. 190.95 ± 4.85 ms, t(21) = 4.16, p < 0.001, dz = 0.89], but not for the line-drawings [172.07 ± 3.93 ms vs. 170.76 ± 4.53 ms, t(21) = 0.51, p = 0.62]. The anterior P2 latency difference between the color photograph trials and line-drawing trials was similar to the posterior N1 peak latency. Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 161 Fig. 5. ERP data at the fronto-central electrodes. (A) Grand-average ERPs of correct and incorrect trials for color photographs and line-drawings in each SOA, averaged across nine fronto-central electrodes F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz, and C4. (B) ERP differences of incorrect minus correct trials for color photographs and line-drawings in each SOA. (C) The scalp topography of the anterior P2, N2, P3 and N4, incorrect minus correct trials separately for color photographs and line-drawings. (D) ERP differences of color photograph trials minus line-drawing trials for correct and incorrect ones in each SOA. (E) The scalp topography of the anterior P2, N2, P3 and N4, color photograph trials minus line-drawing trials separately for correct and incorrect ones. 162 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 Fig. 6. Latencies or amplitudes of the anterior P2, N2, P3, and N4. (A) Latencies or amplitudes of the anterior P2, N2, P3, and N4 for the correct trials under each condition. (B) Latencies or amplitudes of the fronto-central components for the incorrect trials under each condition. The error bars depict the standard errors. Table 2 Significant results of the three-way repeated ANOVAs performed over the latencies or amplitudes of the anterior P2, N2, P3, and N4, considering the type of image, SOA, and correctness. Anterior P2 latency gp2 F Typ SOA Acc Typ ⁄ SOA Typ ⁄ Acc Acc ⁄ SOA ⁄⁄⁄ 27.66 8.95⁄⁄ 8.21⁄⁄ 10.53⁄⁄⁄ 15.00⁄⁄ 3.35⁄ 0.57 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.14 Anterior P2 amplitude Anterior N2 amplitude gp2 F ⁄⁄⁄ 26.07 3.30⁄ 5.80⁄ 0.55 0.14 0.22 4.37⁄ 0.17 Anterior P3 amplitude gp2 F ⁄⁄ 11.57 5.79⁄⁄ 24.35⁄⁄⁄ 0.36 0.22 0.54 Anterior N4 amplitude gp2 F ⁄⁄⁄ 40.35 6.39⁄⁄ 0.66 0.23 gp2 F ⁄⁄ 11.77 14.98⁄⁄⁄ 7.26⁄ 0.36 0.42 0.26 Note: In each ANOVA, we report F (and df) values with significance. ⁄ p < .05; ⁄⁄ p < .01; ⁄⁄⁄ p < .001. 3.2.2.2. Peak amplitudes of the anterior P2. For the anterior P2 peak amplitudes, there was a significant type of image by correctness interaction. The anterior P2 peak amplitude was significantly larger for incorrect than correct trials only for the color photographs [6.53 ± 0.80 lV vs. 5.62 ± 0.68 lV, t(21) = 2.87, p < 0.01, dz = 0.61] but not for the line-drawings [4.45 ± 0.72 lV vs. 4.29 ± 0.73 lV, t(21) = 0.65, p = 0.53]. Moreover, for both correct and incorrect trials, the anterior P2 amplitude was significantly larger for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials (ps < 0.01). That is, the anterior P2 amplitude difference between the incorrect and correct trials was similar to the posterior P2, while the anterior P2 amplitude difference between the color photographs and line-drawings was opposite to the posterior P2. 3.2.2.3. Amplitudes of N2, P3, and N4. As shown in Fig. 6, consistent with our prediction, the three-way ANOVA on N2, P3, and N4 revealed only significant main effects. The amplitudes of N2, P3, and N4 were all significantly larger for the color photograph trials than for the line-drawing trials (all ps < 0.001). However, for both types of images, a longer SOA led to significantly decreased effects of N2, P3, and N4 (all ps < 0.05), while incorrect trials of both types of images elicited significantly greater N2 but smaller N4 effects (both ps < 0.05). The results indicated that the later components varied with the SOA and correctness similarly for the two types of images. 3.2.3. The relationship between the behavioral accuracy and ERP effects To further explore the relationship between the accuracy rates and latencies or the amplitudes of the ERP components, the accuracy rates were stepwise regressed on the incorrect-correct difference for the latencies or amplitudes of all of the components (i.e., incorrect minus correct latency or amplitude of each component averaged over the SOAs) separately for Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 163 the color photographs and line-drawings. For the color photographs, this step revealed a relationship between the accuracy rates and peak latencies of the anterior P2 which reached only marginal significance, F(1, 20) = 4.04, p = 0.058, R2 = 0.17. For the line-drawings, this step revealed two significant models: (1) the amplitude differences of the anterior N2 significantly predicted the accuracy rates, F(1, 20) = 5.78, p = 0.026, R2 = 0.22; (2) the amplitude differences of the anterior N2 and P2 significantly predicted the accuracy rates, F(2, 19) = 7.99, p = 0.003, R2 = 0.46. Thus, the anterior P2 latency appears to be an indicator of the accuracy for the color photographs, while the anterior N2 and P2 amplitudes appear to be indicators of the accuracy for the line-drawings. 4. Discussion Our behavioral results showed that the correct classification was higher for the color photograph trials than for the linedrawing trials when the SOA was longer than 13 ms, but crucially, it was lower when the SOA was 13 ms. These results reconcile the apparently contradictory empirical findings of Biederman and Ju (1988) with those of Wurm et al. (1993) and Goffaux et al. (2005), and are consistent with our prediction that the role of surface information is modulated by the processing duration. Specifically, when the processing time was extremely limited, the color and other surface properties impaired rather than improved the performance on the color photograph trials; even when the processing time was longer, the contribution of the surface-based information to accuracy was very limited and much smaller than that of the edgebased information. The results provided new behavioral evidence for the edge-based theory which assumes that the edge-based information determines primarily performance in visual recognition and gets priority processing. Importantly, if edge-based information receives the first analysis and the surface-based information is analyzed as the second route for recognition, then we predict that the latencies of early components that are sensitive to elemental features of stimuli would be faster for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials. Previous studies revealed that the posterior P1 is the first component that indicates the spatial selective attention and the posterior N1 and the anterior P2 are associated with feature detection or integration (Hillyard & Münte, 1984; Luck & Hillyard, 1994). Thus, we analyzed the peak latencies of the posterior P1, N1, and the anterior P2 components. Consistent with the prediction, our ERP results revealed that most latencies of the posterior P1, N1, and the anterior P2 were faster for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials. Specifically, the results showed that the posterior P1 peak latency was faster for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials when SOA was 40 ms, the posterior N1 peak latency was faster for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials when SOA was 27 and 40 ms, and the anterior P2 peak latency was faster for the line-drawing trials than for the color photograph trials when SOA was 13, 27, and 40 ms. Nonetheless, there was a slower P1 peak latency and a similar N1 peak latency for the line-drawing trials compared to the color photograph trials when SOA was 13 ms, and a similar P1 peak latency when SOA was 27 ms. Crucially, an increase in the SOA produced an linear increase in the latencies of all the three components for the color photograph trials but not for the line-drawing trials. The absolute increase value of the latency for the color photograph trials tended to rise up as one from the posterior P1 (12.00 ms) to N1 (17.56 ms) or the anterior P2 (16.62 ms). Thus, the results indicated that the shorter SOA was sufficient for extracting usable information from linedrawings, whereas more usable information continued to be extracted from color photographs as the SOA increased, which was consistent with the edge-based theory. Moreover, incorrect trials elicited shorter latencies of the posterior N1 and the anterior P2 compared to correct trials for color photographs but not for line-drawings, indicating that incorrect categorization of color photographs may arise from insufficient processing time of extracting relevant information from color photographs. Coincidently, the regression results revealed that the accuracy rates for the color photograph trials instead of line-drawing trials could be predicted by the anterior P2 latency, suggesting that a longer anterior P2 latency is related to the higher accuracy rate for color photographs. That is, the results confirmed that sufficient processing time was crucial for extracting useful information from color photographs. This also explains why people performed worse on the color photograph trials than on the line-drawing trials when the processing time was extremely limited, i.e., when the SOA was 13 ms. As there was such a short variable SOA (i.e., 13, 27, and 40 ms) and long-duration mask (100 ms), it is possible that the latencies of the early components reflected the processing of the target plus the mask with different onset time. Nevertheless, previous neurophysiologic studies in monkeys, using line segments as stimuli, have demonstrated that backward masking typically does not have significant effect on the latencies of the early components in early visual areas (see Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002). Consistently, our results revealed that the latencies of the early components did not change with the SOA for the line-drawings. But we also found that the latencies of the early components gradually increasing with the SOA for the color photographs. As the mask onset time is identical for line-drawings and color photographs, the different latency patterns between the two conditions could not be due to the processing of the mask but the processing of the target image. That is, surface-based information involved in color photographs is not processed simultaneously with edge-based information, which is consistent with the edge-based theory. Then, why would the edge-based information of the color photographs not be processed in the same way as that of the line-drawings, especially when SOA was 13 ms? There are at least two possible explanations: either because the edge-based information in the color photographs was not present to the same degree in the line-drawings (due to lower contrast for example), or the presence of surface information influenced the processing of edge-based information. The former explanation is consistent with the edge-base theory, while the later one is in favor of an early mechanism for surface detection, 164 Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 which seems inconsistent with the edge-based theory. However, it should be noted that the lower performance for color photographs than for line-drawings when SOA was 13 ms indicated that this possible early detection of surface properties did not lead to early facilitation effects. That is, although there is possibly an early mechanism for surface detection, surface properties are still less efficient routes for accessing the memorial representation in natural scene categorization, which is consistent with the edge-base theory. Previous studies have shown that the magnocellular (M) pathway (which is sensitive to the luminance contrast) is faster than the parvocellular (P) pathway (which is sensitive to the chromatic contrast and generally less sensitive to the luminance contrast) (Baseler & Sutter, 1997). The color photographs contained both luminance and chromatic information, while the line-drawings contained only luminance information; thus, our findings are consistent with the previous findings. Moreover, in Bar’s model, it is argued that low spatial frequencies (i.e., the global features of the image) conveyed by the M pathway are perceived earlier than high spatial frequencies (i.e., the fine properties of the image) (Bar, 2003; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). This relationship has been supported by a number of studies. For example, it is found that the inferior temporal cortex responded to low spatial frequencies 51 ms earlier than when it received high spatial frequencies (Sugase, Yamane, Ueno, & Kawano, 1999). Low spatial frequency information represents global information about the shape (Bar, 2003) or reveals salient information about the global scene structure (Schyns & Oliva, 1994). Although line-drawings are famous for conveying high spatial frequency information while blurry blobs are known to convey lower spatial frequency information, the global structure in the line-drawings produced by trained artists tracing the outlines was more salient than that in the color photographs. Thus, our findings are also partially consistent with Bar’s model (Bar, 2003). Nonetheless, our findings appear to be inconsistent with the finding that color can be perceived earlier than form (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997). In this previous study, colors were presented on the right half of the screen and oriented lines on the left half of the screen. Both the colors and lines switched with a square-wave oscillation, and the participants were asked to report what the color was when the bars tilted to the right or left. The perception in their study was conscious. In our study, the stimulus was presented for 13 ms with a variable SOA of 13, 27, 40 ms between the image and the mask. Due to the limited processing time, the perception in our study was mainly unconscious subjectively. It has been argued that form or contour processing proceeds faster than surface processing at the unconscious level such as V1 and, by contrast, surface processing proceeds faster than form or contour processing at the conscious level (Breitmeyer & Tapia, 2011). Crucially, the early peak latencies that are within 200 ms after the stimulus onset reflect unconscious processing as a precursor to conscious perception and not a separate pathway. In other words, although the contour usually receives priority processing in early scene analysis, this circumstance need not imply that the reaction time is faster for the contours than for color in conscious perception. Surprisingly, although the anterior P2 amplitude was greater for the color photographs than for the line-drawings, the posterior P2 amplitude was larger for the line-drawings than for the color photographs. Enhanced anterior P2 has been found when people attend to a specific color (Hillyard & Münte, 1984) or when only one of several simultaneously presented objects contains the target feature (Luck & Hillyard, 1994), which indicates that the anterior P2 reflects the detection of a specific feature with feature-based attention (Luck, 2012, pp. 331–332) or top-down matching processes (Evans & Federmeier, 2007). Increased posterior P2 has been found when the targets are preceded by non-informative cues rather than valid and invalid cues, which suggests that the posterior P2 reflects relatively late processing of the stimuli in the visual areas (Talsma, Slagter, Nieuwenhuis, Hage, & Kok, 2005). Because the posterior P2 amplitude gradually decreased with the SOA for both types of images and it was greater for incorrect than correct trials for the color photographs, the posterior P2 amplitude might reflect a top-down redetection or filling-in of features (Komatsu, 2006; Paradiso et al., 2006) in the early visual areas. Unlike the above components, for both types of images, the effects of N2, P3, and N4 at the frontocentral sites gradually decreased with the SOA, despite the effects being larger for color photographs than for line-drawings. Because the N2 reflects an actively attended mismatch between a stimulus and a mental template while the P3 appears to reflect top-down monitoring by frontal attention mechanisms that are engaged in evaluating incoming stimuli (see Folstein & Van Petten, 2008 for review; Polich, 2007), the results were consistent with decision-making becoming easier with longer SOAs. Moreover, incorrect trials of both types of images elicited greater N2 and smaller N4 effects. The later components varied with SOA and correctness similarly for color photographs and line-drawings, which is in agreement with the prediction that edge-based representation is sufficient for decision making. Finally, we should note that there were some limitations in the present study. First, we did not include grayscale images in the study, and thus, we could not differentiate the roles of color and other surface properties such as brightness and texture in rapid natural scene categorization. Future research should explore this arrangement by comparing the grayscales with color photographs and line-drawings separately. Second, we did not manipulate the luminance contrasts and spatial frequencies of the color photographs and line-drawings in the study. Further studies should investigate this type of scenario by keeping the color photographs and line-drawings at similar luminance contrasts or spatial frequencies. Third, to compare the ERPs elicited by edge-based information and surface-based information, we used color masks for color photographs and gray masks for line-drawings. Further research should examine the role of different type of masks in ERPs for color photographs and line-drawings. To summarize, our behavioral and ERP results provide converging evidence that edge-based information receives priority processing and plays a crucial role in natural scene categorization, whereas surface information can help to improve judgment only when the processing duration is sufficient. These results reconcile the apparently contradictory empirical findings Q. Fu et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 152–166 165 and theoretical predictions by the edge-based and surface-based theories and help us to understand the role of edge-based and surface-based information in rapid scene categorization and how the human brain categorizes different visual stimuli in natural scene categorization. Author contributions QF, YJL, WC, and XF designed the experiment, QF, YJL, and WC prepared materials and performed the experiment, QF, ZD, and JW analyzed the data, and QF, ZD, JW, and XF wrote the paper. Acknowledgments The authors thank Prof. Dirk B. Walther in the Department of Psychology, the Ohio State University, for providing us the color photographs and line-drawings that were first used in Walther et al. (2011). The authors thank Kaiyun Li and Tinting Li for running the experiment, and we thank Prof. Kan Zhang at the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, for allowing us to use the NeuroScan equipment of his lab. 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Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog More questions for mirror neurons Emma Borg Philosophy Department, University of Reading, Reading RG6 6AA, UK a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online xxxx Keywords: Mirror neurons Mindreading Intentions Intentionality a b s t r a c t The mirror neuron system is widely held to provide direct access to the motor goals of others. This paper critically investigates this idea, focusing on the so-called ‘intentional worry’. I explore two answers to the intentional worry: first that the worry is premised on too limited an understanding of mirror neuron behaviour (Sections 2 and 3), second that the appeal made to mirror neurons can be refined in such a way as to avoid the worry (Section 4). I argue that the first response requires an account of the mechanism by which small-scale gestures are supposedly mapped to larger chains of actions but that none of the extant accounts of this mechanism are plausible. Section 4 then briefly examines refinements of the mirror neuron-mindreading hypothesis which avoid the intentional worry. I conclude that these refinements may well be plausible but that they undermine many of the claims standardly made for mirror neurons. Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction As is by now very well-known, both the monkey brain and (apparently) the human brain contain a special category of neurons which respond in two distinct conditions – neurons which fire both when a subject performs a given motor action and when a subject witnesses the same motor act being performed by a target.1 So, for instance, one and the same pattern of neuronal stimulation can be observed both when a subject undertakes a precision grip of a cup and when they merely see a target performing that action. These dual-acting neurons – the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ (MNs) – have given rise to a great deal of interest and a fair amount of speculation since being first reported by Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti (1996). Much of this interest has stemmed from the idea that mirror neurons might play a fundamental role in social cognition, providing the neurological basis for our understanding of the minds of others.2 The suggestion has been (e.g. see Gallese & Goldman, 1998) that if self-generated MN activity (i.e. the firing of an agent’s MNs during the performance of an action by the agent) forms the neurological basis of the subject’s plan to carry out that action, then externally-generated MN activity (i.e. the firing of an agent’s MNs during observation of the same action performed by another) might still form the basis of plan formation, but in the latter case the plan is in some way taken ‘off-line’, not resulting in motor-action by the agent but instead being somehow ‘tagged’ as belonging to the target. Such externally-generated MN activity would then provide direct access to the action plans (or motor goals) of others, providing at least a first-step on the road to full social cognition. In what follows, I will term this idea the ‘MN-mindreading hypothesis’. As Hickok (2008) points out, one immediate worry for the MN-mindreading hypothesis is that terms like ‘goal’ and ‘action’ are ambiguous and can be read in either non-intentional or intentional ways (e.g. ‘the goal’ of an action might, on the one hand, be simply the object to which it is directed or, on a more intentional reading, it might be what the action E-mail address: e.g.n.borg@reading.ac.uk See Chong, Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, and Mattingley (2008) and Dinstein (2008) for some questions about the evidence for the existence of mirror neurons in humans (as opposed to monkeys). What is involved in ‘witnessing a target perform the same motor act’ will be explored below. 2 For instance, see the NY Times article on 10th January 2006 entitled ‘Cells that read minds’. 1 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 2 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx is designed to bring about).3 Clearly, if MN activity is to provide a route to an intentional explanation of the behaviour of others, descriptions of MN activity must either deploy notions like ‘goal’ in non-intentional ways or proponents of the hypothesis must explain how intentional readings are made possible. However MN enthusiasts are confident that such an explanation can be given and that MNs can provide the bridge between physical actions and intentional attributions. So, for instance, we find Ramachandran (2000) suggesting that MNs provided ‘‘the driving force behind the ‘great leap forward’ in human evolution’’ and that their discovery will ‘do for mindreading what the discovery of DNA did for biology’ (2006). Other authors have been rather more circumspect, but still we find Iacoboni et al. (2005) arguing that MNs should be understood not merely as capturing the what of an action but its why, i.e. the intention with which a given motor act was performed, and it now seems commonplace to hold (as, e.g., do Buccino et al., 2007: T119) that ‘‘the MNS [mirror neuron system] appears [also] to underlie the coding of intentions behind the actions of others’’. Furthermore, the scope of issues to which MNs may contribute an answer is often held to range widely, as for instance in Oberman et al. (2005): 190–1 ‘‘Mirror neurons are primarily thought to be involved in perception and comprehension of motor actions, but they may also play a critical role in higher order cognitive processes such as imitation, theory of mind, language, and empathy’’.4 In Borg (2007) I raised some questions for the MN-mindreading hypothesis and expressed some scepticism about the claim that MNs can provide the key to intentional understanding (see also Csibra (2007) and Jacob (2008a, 2008b) for sceptical stances in this area). The aim of this paper is to revisit the argument against the MN-mindreading hypothesis given in Borg, 2007, exploring further some of the possible solutions to it and assessing whether scepticism about the MN-mindreading hypothesis is still warranted. My conclusion will be that it is. The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 I will re-introduce the challenge I raised in Borg (2007) (here labelled ‘the intentional worry’) and explore the responses that can be made to it. As we will see, there are, I think, two main lines of response to the initial worry: the first (introduced in Section 2 and explored in Section 3) is to claim that it rests on a misunderstanding of MNs (a route pursued, I take it, by Sinigaglia (2008)). The second, more concessive response, is to claim that it rests on a misunderstanding of the MN-mindreading hypothesis. This kind of refinement of the MN-mindreading hypothesis can be found in recent work by both Gallese and Goldman and the move will be examined further in Section 4.5 The conclusion of Section 3 will be that the problem does remain for strong accounts which take MNs as the key to at least some attributions of intentional mental states. Furthermore, while the weaker reading of the role of MNs to be examined in Section 4 may yet be vindicated, I will argue that it does alter the MN-mindreading hypothesis in certain crucial ways. Thus, I will contend, at this stage of the debate, it remains completely unclear whether or not MNs do provide a critical first-step on the path to social comprehension. 2. Mirror neurons and the intentional worry The intentional worry for the claim that MNs provide the key to attributing (at least some) mental states to others is, at its simplest, that MN activity is just too closely tied to behaviour to make it (at least unaided) a route to the attribution of intentional mental states. If MNs respond to gestures and simple motor acts (e.g. firing differentially in response to a precision grip versus a whole-hand pick up) it would seem that they operate at the wrong level to underpin intentional attribution, since, on the one hand, a single gesture can map to a multitude of intentions, while, on the other, multiple gestures can map to a single intention. So, for instance, I can grasp a cup because I want to drink from it or because I want to examine it. Yet if MN activity responds merely to the grasping act itself it will underdetermine the intention. Or again, a range of different specific motor acts can all be realisations of a single intention (e.g. an intention to have a drink being realised through grasping a cup with a precision grip or grasping a cup with the whole hand, etc.). So, again, if MNs are sensitive just to brute kinematics they will underdetermine the intentions which accompany our gestures. The most robust response to this worry (see, e.g., Sinigaglia’s thought-provoking 2008 paper) is to reject it entirely, arguing that it is premised on far too simplistic an understanding of MN activity – given a proper understanding of how MNs behave and their sensitivity to the motor goals of the target, we will see that the intentional worry simply dissolves away. To get a proper understanding of the behaviour of MNs we need to appreciate that, while some MNs do respond simply to brute kinematics, others seem sensitive not to mere bodily movements but rather to the sequence of actions within which a given motor act is embedded and thus to the goal which a sequence of actions is designed to realise. So, for instance, the MN sequence for the grasp of an object can be triggered by seeing a conspecific reach behind a screen, so long as the observing subject knows that there is a graspable object behind the screen (so grasping MNs fire even when the brute kinematics of the grasp are unobserved). Furthermore, as Fogassi et al. (2005) demonstrated, one and the same precision grip of a piece of food results in different patterns of MN stimulation in macaque monkeys depending on whether the movement is embedded in a larger act of grasping food to eat or grasping food to place in a container (notably even if the container is located near the monkey’s mouth, thus making the brute kinematics of the two action sequences extremely similar). On the other hand, very 3 See also Goldman (2009): 239: ‘‘The Parma team often stress that motor MNs code for the goals of observed actions. This may be uncontroversial if ‘goal’ means ‘goal object’, which might refer either to a physical object (e.g. a cup) or a physical event or outcome (e.g. a cup being moved to one’s mouth). But the same term ‘goal’ can be used to refer to a mental state, a state of desire with a certain intentional object or relation of ‘aboutness’’’. 4 See also Arbib, Oztop, and Zuckow-Goldring (2005) and elsewhere for claims relating MNs and language understanding. 5 Though we should also note that in their original Gallese and Goldman (1998), the authors were careful (and perhaps more careful than some of those who came after them) to stress both the modesty and the potentially tendentious nature of their claims about MNs. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 3 different actions in terms of brute kinematics can result in identical patterns of MN stimulation if the actions are embedded in the same overall goal-directed action. For instance, Umiltà et al. (2008) revealed a single pattern of MN activity when a monkey cracked a nut using pliers and when it cracked a nut using reverse pliers (i.e. using a tool requiring exactly the opposite kinematic actions to standard pliers); see also Bonini et al. (2010). Finally, Rizzolatti and others report a single pattern of MN firing for monkeys when cracking a nut or when merely hearing the noise of a nut being cracked. These findings – that, on the one hand, single kinematically-described gestures can map to multiple MN patterns, while, on the other, multiple kinematically-described gestures can map to a single MN pattern – are taken to show that (at least some) MNs are responsive not to the mere kinematics of an action (the what of the act) but rather to the overall goal of the act, thus that MN activity allows ‘‘an observer to distinguish between an agent’s ultimate intentions’’ (Ocampo & Kritikos, 2011: 262).6 The way in which MNs are supposed to embed this sensitivity to the larger goal to which a single kinematically described motor act (e.g. a precision grip of a cup – what I will term below a ‘small-scale motor act’) is subservient is via the embedding of the small-scale act within a larger hierarchy of motor-goals. As Fogassi et al. (2005): 665 suggest, single motor acts ‘‘are not related one to another independently of the global aim of the action, but appear to form pre-wired intentional chains in which each motor act is facilitated by the previously executed one’’. In a similar vein, Iacoboni et al. (2005) have stressed the role of ‘functionally related mirror neurons’ which fire not in response to a witnessed small-scale motor act (e.g. precision grip versus whole hand pick up of cup) but to the action most likely to follow the small-scale act given the particular context in which it takes place. Thus, in an interesting set of experiments, Iacoboni et al. recorded different patterns of MN stimulation given one and the same small-scale kinematic act (e.g. the precision grip of the cup) but embedded in different background contexts, where one context was designed to suggest ‘before tea’ (promoting an assignment of the intention of graspto-drink to the target), while the other was designed to suggest ‘after tea’ (promoting an assignment of the intention to grasp-to-tidy-away); see Borg (2007) for further discussion. On this model then, what underpins assignment of an intention to another is not the witnessing of a single, small-scale action in isolation but rather a response across the whole MN system, which involves logically related neurons and is modulated by contextual features. As Sinigaglia (2008): 84 stresses: Whether [MN] activation reflects the goal-relatedness of an individual motor-act or is modulated by the overall goal that identifies the action of which the individual motor act is a part, depends on [MNs] motor properties, more than on their mirror properties, on whether they are organised in motor chains in which each single act is coded within a specific hierarchy of goals. In other words, it is due to this motor chain organisation that grasping is not just grasping for grasping’s sake, but is grasping to carry food to the mouth and eat, or grasping-to-move X from A to B, etc.. . ..It is [rather] a question of recognising the role of chains of motor goals, and the fact that they shape the motor expertise which is at the base both of the agent’s capacity to act and to represent his/her actions and his/her ability to understand the immediate significance of the actions and intentions of others. Here then is the way in which the advocate of MNs seeks to avoid the simplest version of the intentional worry: MNs are sensitive to small-scale kinematically-described gestures but these are themselves framed in terms of a hierarchy of motorgoals, and it is sensitivity to these chains of motor-goals, mirrored by differences in the patterns of MN activity, which underpins intentional attribution. There is a chain of motor-actions which carries out the intention to grasp-to-eat and a chain of motor actions which carries out the intention to grasp-to-place and MNs help us to identify the motor goals of others by responding to small-scale acts together with a sensitivity to the larger scale motor chains to which those small-scale acts belong.7 As Fogassi et al. (2005): 666 note: IPL mirror neurons, in addition to recognising the goal of the observed motor act, discriminate identical motor acts according to the action in which these acts are embedded. Because the discriminated motor act is part of a chain leading to the final goal of the action, this neuronal property allows the monkey to predict the goal of the observed action and, thus, to ‘read’ the intention of the acting individual.8 Given this model of how the MN system works (akin to what I called ‘the revised MN hypothesis’ in Borg (2007)) I think there are two questions that arise: first, does the appeal to motor chains really avoid the intentional worry? Second: if not, is there a better move for the advocate of a MN-based form of mindreading to pursue? These questions respectively are pursued in the next two sections. 6 Sinigaglia (2008) also appeals in this respect to an experiment by Cattaneo et al. which showed (in normal subjects) an increase in the activity of the mouth-opening mylohyoid muscle (MH) both when a subject instigated a grasp-to-eat of a piece of food and when observing a conspecific instigate a similar action, whereas no MH increase was observed either when the subject instigated a grasp-to-place of a piece of paper nor when observing a conspecific instigate a similar action. (Cattaneo et al. also found no increase in MH activity in ASD subjects in either condition.) However, for this experiment to bear weight here it seems that the object-type would need to be held constant across the two conditions. As it stands, it seems the lack of MH activity in the second condition could be attributed simply to the different affordances of the object involved (i.e. that it was not edible) rather than to any direct recognition of the target’s intention. 7 Note that these chains of motor actions must be operating at a sufficiently high-level to overarch a number of more specific chains of motor actions – the motor chain which realises the intention to crack a nut must generalise over more fine-grained chains which include the movements of an agent cracking a nut with paws, with fingers, with common tools and with novel tools (see below). 8 This passage may be thought to trade on the ambiguity in the term ‘goal’ noted at the start. As Goldman (2009): 239 writes ‘‘From the fact that a goal-event – a non-mental event – is predicted it does not follow that a mental event such as an intention is predicted’’. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 4 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 3. What is the mechanism behind motor chain embeddings? An immediate and pressing question for someone who seeks to avoid the intentional worry via an appeal to motor chains is ‘how does the MN system succeed in embedding an observed small-scale action within the right larger-scale motor chain (i.e. the motor chain which does in fact realise the target’s motor intention)?’ I think there are four options to be found in the current literature for answering this question. First, it might be claimed that two tokens of a small-scale motor action, embedded in two different motor chains, while superficially highly similar, in fact differ in almost imperceptible ways (depending on the hierarchy of motor goals within which the act is embedded). On this view, then, the MN system can embed superficially identical kinematic acts in different motor chains because the system is sensitive to more covert kinematics (which reveal the acts as non-identical). Second, it may be held that the small-scale actions themselves are identical from a kinematic point of view across different contexts but that the MN system is nonetheless able to embed them in different chains reflecting different intentions since contextual cues enable the triggering of one prewired motor chain (amongst many such available ones). Third, it might be argued that MN activity is a learned response, so witnessing an action which is sufficiently similar to an initial stimuli (which occurred in a learning phase) will be sufficient to trigger the conditioned response (perhaps given the presence of contextual cues). Finally, it might be suggested that the embedding process is simply a fundamental neurophysiological fact. Turning first to the idea that the kinematics of a small-scale act differ depending on why it is being undertaken: this position might be suggested by reflecting on research about the pre-contact phases of action, where it seems clear that the end goal of an action can affect the way in which a small-scale action is itself performed. For instance, commenting on the work of Armbruster and Spijkers (2006) and Ocampo and Kritikos (2011): 262 note (without necessarily endorsing the specific MN proposal under consideration here) that ‘‘[t]he end goal of the action differentially modulated reach-to-grasp kinematics in the pre-contact phase, suggesting that motor planning depends not only on the affordances that are visible on an object, but more importantly, on what one intends to do with it’’. They conclude (2011: 263) ‘‘the motor control literature provides a strong case for goal-specificity in action planning and execution. It seems that ‘post-grasp’ intentions can shape the way in which particular movement parameters are programmed and carried out’’.9 So, while at a superficial or consciously accessible level, two movements might look kinematically identical, according to this proposal there will be subtle differences in their execution which reveals them as manifestations of one intention or another: a grasp in one context (where it is, say, part of a grasp-to-eat) might look at first glance just like a grasp in another context (where it is, say, part of a grasp-to-place), but in reality, on this view, their kinematics will differ, each having been delicately shaped by the overall motor-plan to which it belongs. Clearly there are two empirical hypotheses in play here, both of which it should be possible to test experimentally: first, there is the idea that there are very subtle kinematic changes in actions which are the result of the different motor intentions with which those actions are performed. Second, there is the idea that the MN system of an observer is capable of registering these differences and using them as the basis of an attribution of a motor intention. On the first point, there is evidence that at least some motor intentions do result in genuine but subtle kinematic differences (e.g. see Naish et al., in press). However there remains a significant question as to how extensive we can expect these kinematic differences to be. For, while (as far as I know) it remains an open experimental question, it seems prima facie implausible to expect genuine kinematic differences between actions intended to carry out a range of even quite basic motor intentions.10 For instance, we might wonder whether there are really robust kinematic differences (which generalise across a population) to be found between moves to pick up food and eat it versus moves to pick up food and merely taste it? 11 Or between picking up an object to feel its weight versus picking it up to feel its texture versus picking it up to assess it as a weapon? Although it is a little hard to know what metric of ‘basicness’ we should deploy when talking of ‘the basic motor intentions which MNs recover for us’, all of these seem relatively simple and evolutionarily ancient kinds of intention, and thus the kind of thing one might (at least initially) have thought a MN account of motor intentions would yield. However it seems we would need much further evidence before accepting that all such motor intentions genuinely do resolve into subtly different small-scale kinematic gestures and thus could be registered by MNs which are genuinely sensitive only to kinematic properties. Yet if the MN system is limited just to differences like graspto-eat and grasp-to-place, with some other system needed to capture grasp-to-taste, grasp-to-give and grasp-to-examine, this would seem significantly to undermine the explanatory value of the MN-mindreading hypothesis and might make us wonder whether a single, unitary explanation, capable of capturing a wider range of motor intentions, might not be preferable. 9 It may be that this is also the view Sinigaglia has in mind when he talks in the quote above of chains of motor goals shaping a subject’s expertise, or again ‘‘As motor knowledge grows, the intentional chains that shape it become more articulate and the ability to discriminate the sensorial information received becomes sharper, embedding the observed motor act in an increasingly rich intentional framework’’ (Sinigaglia, 2008: 86) 10 Of course, as a reviewer for this paper pointed out, one might query whether any of the intentions in play here should be counted as genuinely ‘motor’ intentions at all – one might think that the motor intentions here concern simply the grasp per se, with information about the reason for the grasp being some kind of ‘prior intention’. I’m sympathetic to this point but note that it doesn’t seem to help the advocate of the MN-mindreading hypothesis, whose claim precisely was that MNs are sensitive to the ‘why’ not merely the ‘what’ of an action and thus that the MN system is capable of holding apart intentions like the intention to grasp-to-eat versus the intention to grasp-to-place or grasp-to-taste. 11 Furthermore, note that the supposed differences in play here must be differences in the small-scale acts themselves and not merely in the motor chain as a whole – crudely, it can’t just be that one grasp ends up with food in the mouth and the other with food in the container – since MNs are supposed to underpin prediction of action on the basis of attributed intentions, not merely retrodictive intentional explanation of action; one should be able to say, as the small-scale act itself is underway ‘the target will put the food in her mouth because she intends to eat it’. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 5 Turning to the second empirical point above – the idea that the brains’ of subjects are capable of registering and utilising existing subtle kinematic cues – this also seems problematic. For even in cases where kinematic differences have in fact been discovered, as in Naish et al’s work on reach-to-eat versus reach-to-place, it is far from clear that these differences are registered by observers. For instance, Naish et al. found that subjects exposed to isolated small-scale acts which contained subtle kinematic differences (e.g. witnessing just the grasp portion of a movement which was in fact either a grasp-to-eat or a grasp-to-place) were in fact unable to predict correctly the motor-goal hierarchy to which the small-scale act belonged. So, even though kinematic differences were found, it seems that subjects were unable to utilise these differences to assign the small-scale act to the right overarching motor chain (i.e. either the MN system itself does not register the differences or they are simply not available to be used in an attribution of intention). Finally, we might note that this proposal raises again the Behaviourist-type worries which some opponents have levelled at the MN-mindreading hypothesis before.12 For this approach embraces the standard Behaviourist idea that behaviour recognition is sufficient for intentional attribution. The only change is to the notion of behaviour in play, making it more fine-grained than envisaged in standard Behaviourism. Thus to the extent that one does not like Behaviourism, one is likely not to like this proposal. So, on the first answer to the question of how a movement gets embedded in the correct overarching motor chain there is a clear answer to the question of the mechanism by which such an attribution is made (namely, MNs are sensitive to very subtle kinematic differences inherent in the small-scale acts and not available to first-person consciousness). However I think much more evidence would be needed to show that such a claim can really do the work required. First, we would need to know that the posited kinematic differences really do exist (i) for the range of motor goals we might expect the MN system to capture, (ii) within the small-scale acts themselves and (iii) generalising across a population. Second, we would need to show that subjects really are capable of utilising these differences to predict the motor chain to which the small-scale action belongs. None of this has been shown. Let us turn instead, then, to the second suggestion above, which avoids the straightforward identification of intentions and kinematically-described behaviour involved in the first move. On this model, two small-scale grasping actions which belong to different motor chains may be kinematically identical, yet still the MN system as a whole is capable of differentiating them. So, how does the MN system perform this feat? How does it assign kinematically identical acts to different overarching motor chains – how does it know that in one context a precision grip of a cup is part of a grasp-to-drink while in another it is part of a grasp-to-place? One option (the focus of Borg (2007)) would be to appeal to prewired neuronal chains which are selected or impeded via observation of the small-scale action in its contextual setting. In this way background conditions, together with the affordances of the object acted upon, would serve to allow the MN system to identify the intention with which the action was performed by helping to trigger the appropriate prewired pattern of activity. This kind of appeal to prewired chains (and thus presumably the view of the MN system as an evolutionary adaptation) can be found in Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998), Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) and Fogassi et al. (2005). Also, recall that in Iacoboni et al.’s (2005) study the difference in MN activity apparently came entirely from the background condition against which the small-scale action was perceived (i.e. with a difference emerging from the same kinematic action set against different background contexts, when no difference occurred when the backgrounds were perceived alone). Thus the suggestion would be that there are prewired motor chains embedded in the MN system and the combination of witnessing a target perform a small-scale action together with the context in which it occurs triggers the activation of one or other of these prewired chains. It is that activation which constitutes activation of (in the subject’s own case) or attribution of (in the observation of a target) a plan to grasp-to-drink, or a plan to grasp-to-place, etc. However I think there are questions to be asked of this kind of appeal to prewired, evolved motor chains working in tandem with contextual cues. A first question (stressed in Borg (2007)) for the appeal to prewired chains is whether there are any such chains which can be individuated without appeal to the intentional states of the target (i.e. whether or not the account can be saved from circularity). Moving a cup to one’s lips might be the natural or typical next move in a ‘before tea’ context, but only if the context is one in which the target does not also believe that their tea has been poisoned, etc. For prewired chains to provide the first step towards the attribution of mental states to others it would seem that they cannot appeal to the mental states of the other in their construction, yet without such an appeal it is not clear that we can isolate natural behaviour or functionally-related movements in the first place. In a related worry, we might also wonder exactly how the MN system selects the right level of grain for the prewired chain into which an action is to be embedded. For instance, thinking about the motor chain which realises the intention to crack a nut: this needs to operate at a higher level than the brute kinematics of small-scale gestures, for it needs to overarch the smaller-scale acts of cracking a nut using a precision grip with fingers, cracking a nut with pliers and cracking a nut with reverse pliers (and an indefinite number of other small-scale acts). Clearly, on at least one level of description, the action following any one of these smaller-scale acts will be different (the kinematics of a small-scale movement following the grasp of a nut with fingers will differ from the kinematics following the grasp of a nut with pliers, even though both may be instances of nut cracking), 12 See also Csibra (2007) for a discussion of the apparent tension between the idea that the MN system tracks subtle kinematic cues and the idea that it attributes intentions. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 6 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx thus the motor chain we are after for nut cracking must be at least one step away from brute kinematics. But how many steps exactly? Should the triggered motor chain overarch a group of more specific acts each of which would realise peanut cracking, or peanut-or-brazil nut cracking, or nut-cracking in general, or the cracking of any external shell or container to reveal a foodstuff, or the undertaking of any action which reveals the prowess of the agent? Each of these would, it seems, constitute a different motor intention and would include greater or fewer smaller-scale gestures within its scope, but which one of these motor chains is triggered? On observing a small-scale gesture in a given context how does the MN system succeed in selecting a motor chain which lies at the right point between one which is so general as to be satisfied by any old action leading to nut cracking (e.g. where nut cracking occurs simply as an accidental by-product of the intended action, as in a move to strike a rival which accidentally leads to the striking of a nut) and one which is so particular as to be tied to the brute kinematics of just this particular instance of nut cracking? The concern here is that, if there is nothing intentional in our arsenal to start with (i.e. if the MN system is our route to mental state attribution and therefore cannot itself appeal to the intentional states of the target) just how do we (or how do our MN systems) find a way of sifting through the deafening noise of kinematic gestures in order to assign an observed small-scale gesture to a motor-chain which, say, groups together all and only those actions which would suffice to satisfy the intention to crack a nut (as opposed to a chain which groups together actions sufficient to crack a peanut or actions sufficient to crack any food container or actions sufficient to impress a mate, etc.)?13 Finally, we need to ask whether the idea of prewired chains really fits with experimental evidence about the behaviour of the MN system. For instance, work by Catmur, Walsh, and Heyes (2007) (amongst others) appears to show that MN activity is malleable and can be induced via sensory-motor association. Yet if this is right it would seem to run counter to the idea of a fixed, prewired neuronal structure. As an alternative to the idea of prewired chains, then, we might instead turn to the view of patterns of MN firing as a learned activity with a habituated outcome being triggered by contextual cues.14 For instance, the view of the MN system as an associative one has been argued for at length by Heyes, who suggests (2010: 578) that MN effects occur due to ‘‘stimulus generalisation – the tendency of conditioned responses (mirror neuron firing) to be proportional in magnitude to the physical similarity between the current stimulus (the action sequence observed in [an] experiment) and the learning stimuli (the action sequence observed before [an] experiment, while the neurons were acquiring their properties through associative learning)’’; see also Heyes (2001, 2005) and Heyes and Ray (2000). In this way, we would not need a pre-programmed motor chain which somehow embraces, say, all possible forms of nut cracking. Rather we would have specific actions which lead to nut cracking during a learning phase and habituation to these actions (in context) would lead to anticipation of the habitual outcome when later exposed to stimuli similar to that encountered in the learning phase, perhaps in the presence of conditioned cues (as Heyes (2010): 578 notes, a container was always present in trials involving grasping-before-placing but never in trials involving grasping-before-eating, thus the presence or absence of a container could become a conditional cue for activating different MN chains). However if this is the right way to think about the MN system, then I would suggest it makes MN activity less like a genuine form of intention–recognition and more like recognition of mere statistical regularity: in most contexts like the before-tea one (at least in the learning phase), when someone has picked up a cup they have gone on to drink from it, while in most contexts like the after-tea one they have gone on to place the cup to one side.15 If this is what MNs are registering then it seems they are registering nothing specifically to do with the mind of the agent carrying out the act but just what kind of things people in the past have tended to do in these kinds of situations.16 On this understanding MN activity is entirely consistent with what Hickok (2008): 1231 calls ‘the null hypothesis’: ‘‘namely that F5 is fundamentally a motor area that is capable of supporting sensory-motor associations’’. If MN activity is understood as tracking some kind of sensory-motor regularity, this is entirely consistent with thinking of MNs as specialised behaviour trackers instead of the much richer picture of MNs as underpinning social cognition. We could explain the shared properties of MNs – the fact that they fire both when I exercise a precision grip of a cup as part of a grasp-to-drink and when you do the same – simply in terms of the motor properties of 13 The objection here is, I think, an instance of more general rule-following considerations. The worry, as Kripke (1982) stressed, is that any account which tries to extract rules from behaviour (or dispositions to behave) alone faces the problem that any given piece of behaviour can be made to accord with an indefinite number of rules. 14 It might also be argued that these two views – the prewired, adaptive, evolutionary model of the MN system and the associative one – might be able to coexist, with selection of the right motor chain (i.e. the one which would realise the target’s intention) being fixed by contextual cues, but these cues then selecting either prewired neuronal chains (which would encode what are, in some sense, the ‘natural’ actions for the target in a given situation) or associative chains (chains of actions one has regularly instantiated or witnessed instantiated) as appropriate. 15 Note this objection does not hold for the pre-wired view: there could be an evolutionary advantage to embedding witnessed small-scale acts in motor chain M1 even if the majority of small-scale acts witnessed had not in fact resulted in the chain of actions predicted by M1. So, for instance, watching someone repeatedly move an object towards a shelf but then letting it drop just prior to reaching the shelf might nevertheless trigger a motor chain which would eventuate in placing rather than dropping (see Meltzoff, 1995). 16 If this were right, perhaps what MNs should really be thought to do for us is underpin something like Hume’s natural grounding of induction – our brains are so structured as to expect regularity, at least as far as the actions of others are concerned. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 7 F5, e.g. that the region encodes the motor vocabulary ‘grasp’, together with a sensitivity to behavioural regularities involving such grasping acts.17 So, if the MN system succeeds in embedding a small-scale motor act in a larger hierarchy of motor-acts (capable of realising an overarching motor intention – a grasp-to-eat versus a grasp-to-place) by relying on regularities, I think there are serious questions to be asked about whether this should be understood as a variety of (motor-goal) mindreading at all since tracking of regularities simply does not seem to be the same thing as genuine tracking of intentions. As Hurley (2006): 222–3 notes, any move in the opposite direction, where we treat intention recognition as very closely aligned to behaviour tracking, threatens to obscure the genuine difference between the two abilities: ‘‘Psychologists ask: what is the functional difference between genuine mind-reading and smart behaviour reading? Many of the social problems animals face can be solved merely in terms of behaviour-circumstance correlations and corresponding behavioural predictions, without the need to postulate mediating mental states. . .However, mind-readers do not merely keep track of the behaviour of other agents, but also understand other agents in terms of their mental states. Mind-readers can attribute intentions to others even when their actions do not carry out their intentions; they can attribute beliefs to others even when those beliefs are false’’. Given this, it would seem question-begging to treat a system which merely registers behavioural regularities as the starting point for genuine intentional attribution. We have been in search of a mechanism by which the MN system assigns small-scale acts to larger motor chains and the answers we have looked at have appealed first to subtle kinematic differences, second to prewired motor chains together with contextual triggers, and third to associative mechanisms together with contextual cues. However I have argued that none of these moves look particularly plausible (at least as current research stands). However, perhaps there is a fourth and final option here: perhaps we should resist the idea that there is any further story to tell about how the MN system comes to attribute a small-scale act to a specific motor-goal hierarchy. For instance, Sinigaglia (2008): 87 argues that the regularity route is indeed the wrong way to understand these motor chains, writing that it is ‘‘a mistake to reduce motor goal hierarchy [coded by the inferior parietal MNs] to a juxtaposition of single motor acts characterised by the fact that typically one follows another’’, and he points to the reverse pliers experiment of Umiltà et al. (2008) as evidence that mere statistical regularity cannot be what the MN system is tracking. So perhaps the right thing to say here is just that the MN system simply does, somehow or other, succeed in mapping a single small-scale act to the overarching motor-goal hierarchy which matches the one the target is in fact going to enact: a subject witnesses a precision grip of a piece of food by a target and somehow the subject’s MN system just knows that this precision grip on this occasion is part of a grasp-to-eat and not part of a grasp-to-place. But if this is the right thing to say, I would suggest that we do not have an explanation of the mechanisms of mindreading here so much as a simple restatement of the mystery. We all know that somehow a subject manages to predict a target’s behaviour on the basis of an attribution of an intention to them and it is not clear that we have got any further down the explanatory road by saying that, as it were, it is not the subject that does this (nothing inferential or higher-level in the process) but their mirror neuron system that does it, though there is no story to tell about how the MNs manage the feat. If this is what the MN-mindreading hypothesis amounts to, then it seems to me that the attempt to make a complex human skill explicable has dissolved into an appeal to some kind of neurological magic. It seems to me then that the intentional worry raised in Borg (2007) does still hold good against the MN-mindreading hypothesis as stated above, for what is required for the MN account to work is not just an appeal to motor chains but some story about how the MN system maps a single small-scale act (a precision grip of a cup, say) to the larger chain of motor acts which could realise the target’s intention (an intention to grasp-to-eat, say, versus grasp-to-place or grasp-to-examine). Yet none of the obvious candidates for this mechanism seem particularly plausible. First, it might be thought that different intentions or overarching motor-goals subtly shape the small-scale acts which realise them (so that a precision-grip of a piece of food is subtly different if it is part of a grasp-to-eat rather than a grasp-to-place), yet much further experimental evidence would be needed to show that (across a range of cases) this was really the case, i.e. that our gestures really do (at some very fine-grained level of description) map one-to-one to our motor intentions. Furthermore, even if this were (somewhat remarkably) to turn out to be the case, further evidence would be needed that subjects truly are able to make use of this information in the way suggested. Alternatively, then, it might be thought that the MN system achieves the mapping of small-scale acts via a system of prewired motor chains which can be triggered or inhibited via contextual cues. Yet, on the one hand, it is not clear that such prewired chains exist (just what is the ‘natural’ series of actions for cracking a nut?) nor that contextual cues could be sufficient for selecting the appropriate chain (could context serve to choose between a motor chain appropriate for cracking a peanut, cracking a peanut or brazil nut, cracking any food container, etc.?). Furthermore, this approach does not seem to fit with evidence concerning the malleability of the MN system – the fact that patterns 17 If what we have with MN activity is some kind of regularity tracking and anticipation of a likely sequence of actions then the MN system could be taken to be part of a more general predictive coding model of the mind. In this case the MN system itself need not be encoding the overarching goal of a motor act but would instead be responding to the state anticipated for systems down-stream from the MN system. As Hickok (2008): 1233 again notes: ‘‘The predictive coding in the motor system is now going to be different for the grasping-to-eat versus the grasping-to-place actions. For eating, there may be anticipatory opening of the mouth, salivation, and perhaps anticipatory activity associated with the expected somatosensory consequences of the action. For placing there will be no mouth-related coding, but there may be other kinds of coding such as expectations about the size, shape or feel of the container, or the sound that will result if the object is placed in it. If cells in the IPL differ in their sensitivity to feedback from these different systems, then it may look like the cells are coding different goals, when in fact they are just getting differential feedback input from the forward model’’. On this picture, systems outside the MN system would be responsible for determining the anticipatory state of the MN system (i.e. what intention is taken to lie behind the witnessed action), with the MN system itself just registering these anticipatory differences. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 8 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx of MN activity can be learned rather than being innately given.18 As a third option, then, one might argue that the MN system depends on associative learning and is thus a system for recognising statistical regularities. However, in this case, it is not clear that the system need be taken to concern attribution of intentions at all, since sensory-motor associations are possible without any attribution of mental states to agents. The fourth and final suggestion above is that there is no explanation needed for how the MN system moves from the small-scale act to the larger motor-goal hierarchy within which it is to be embedded: although there is no kinematic difference between a precision grip of a cup in two different contexts, and although the MN system is not relying on prewired chains or statistically likely actions, still the MN system somehow manages to embed the small-scale act in the right overarching motor chain, reading the action as a grasp-to-place in one context but a grasp-to-eat in the other. Yet in this case it is not clear that we have a genuine explanation of mindreading so much as a neurological-level restatement of the thing to be explained: we have replaced a person-level mystery with a brain-level one and this cannot, I think, constitute a genuine explanation. Thus, unless the advocate of the MN-mindreading hypothesis can provide an alternative mechanism for the embedding process, I suggest that the intentional worry remains a challenge here.19 If the concerns raised in this section are on the right lines, then, it seems an advocate of the MN-mindreading hypothesis might be well advised to explore a more concessive response, seeking to refine the claim made by the MN-mindreading hypothesis in such a way that it avoids the worry. It is to this option that I turn now. 4. Refining the MN-mindreading hypothesis One response to the intentional worry is to accept that it does hold against the construal of the relationship between MNs and mindreading given at the start of this paper, but then to object that the construal given at the start of this paper is not in fact the right way to model the relationship between MNs and mindreading. MNs do, on this revised approach, have a key role to play in the recognition and attribution of mental states to others, but not because MN activity constitutes direct access to the motor-goals of others. On the one hand, it may be argued that MN activity does not constitute but merely causes or otherwise makes possible instances of such mindreading. On the other, it may be thought that MN activity constitutes direct access not to the intentional mental states of others but rather it underpins the sharing of phenomenal content, such as emotional or sensational content. Both of these refinements of the MN-mindreading hypothesis can be found in recent work by Goldman (2009, 2010). For instance, on the first refinement, Goldman suggests (2010: 314–5): An act of mindreading consists of a belief or judgment about a mental state. So if a mirroring process in itself were to constitute mindreading (as opposed to merely cause it) the ‘‘receiving’’ mirroring event would itself have to be or include a judgement or attribution of a mental state. In particular, it would have to be an attribution to a third person, presumably the originator of the mirroring process. . ..Now if the ‘‘receiving’’ mirror events are tokens of the same event types (i.e. they co-instantiate the same event types) then they [too] will be units like ‘‘planning to grasp an object’’, ‘‘planning to tear an object’’, ‘‘feeling touch in bodily area X’’ and so forth. They won’t also be beliefs, judgements, or attributions to the effect that the observed agent is planning to grasp an object, planning to tear an object, feeling touch in bodily area X, and so forth. If they were beliefs, judgements, or attributions of these sorts. . .then, since they are mirroring events, the original endogenous occurrences would also have to be beliefs, judgements or attributions with the same contents. But nobody has ever proposed that the sending mirror events are, or include, beliefs, judgements or attributions. These are strong considerations in favour of [the thesis that MN activity causes but does not constitute acts of mindreading]. While on the second possible refinement, reflecting on lesion studies involving attribution of emotions like disgust, he notes ‘‘It is a reasonable inference that when normal individuals recognise disgust when viewing the facial expression of disgust, this recognition is causally based on the production in the viewer of a (mirrored) experience of disgust’’ (2010: 318). Goldman concludes ‘‘I would argue that the most important and extensive chunks of evidence for the [mirroring-mindreading thesis] are found I studies of non-motoric mirroring domains’’ (2009: 244). It seems to me that these dual moves to refine the MN-mindreading hypothesis are indeed promising: if MN activity helps cause but does not constitute the attribution of an intention to another, then there is much more space available for the advocate of the MN-mindreading hypothesis to try and locate the elements needed to take us from sensitivity to behaviour to sensitivity to intentions. For instance, it could be that MN activity provides a necessary input to the processes by which we attribute intention, but that in the end such attribution still involves a (usually sub-personal) act of inference (on the basis of perception of behaviour, contextual cues and background information) to the intentional state to be ascribed to the target. However if the story is one of causation not constitution then it is no longer clear that MNs deserve quite the reputation they have acquired in terms of providing a key to mindreading. After all lots of neural states might contribute to a complete causal account of how mental state attribution comes about, and, again, this kind of explanation could be entirely consistent with 18 We might also wonder how the model of prewired chains fits with evidence that there is an F5 motor resonance for meaningless actions (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizolatti, 1995; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 2002), where presumably there should be no prewired circuit to call into operation. 19 We might also wonder how the MN-mindreading hypothesis fits with the findings from Buccino et al. (2007) that the MN system is activated both by intentional actions and by unintentional, accidental actions. Although noted in a positive respect by Sinigaglia (2008), this finding looks prima facie problematic for the idea that MN activity reveals the why not merely the what of an action, since in the accidental case there is no why to be discovered, thus one would expect an MN system devoted to mindreading to remain silent in this case. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx 9 the idea that there are no special representational properties to be ascribed to the MN system. MNs could play the causal role in question even if the correct way to understand MN activity was not in terms of the attribution of mental states to others, but instead, say, as the neurological store for our motor vocabulary. There is also a worry with redirecting attention away from the role of MNs in ascribing motor intentions and towards something more like paradigm cases of empathy (the sharing of emotions and sensations). For although, as Goldman points out, this kind of mindreading has been much less to the fore in discussions about mindreading (which have focused on paradigmatic belief/desire attribution) and while it is clearly right to say that the sharing of emotions and sensations stands in need of explanation every bit as much as belief/desire attribution and the prediction and explanation of action, unless we have a good reason to think there must or should be a unitary explanation of both abilities, showing that mirroring has a key role to play in the former as yet tells us little or nothing about the appropriate explanation in the latter.20 Thus, again, it seems to me that on this approach we might save the MN-mindreading hypothesis but at the risk of making it considerably less relevant to core debates about cognitive architecture (e.g. between theory–theory and simulation theory accounts of intentional explanation) than was originally thought. To conclude then: despite arguments to the contrary (e.g. Sinigaglia, 2008) it seems to me that the intentional worry raised in Borg (2007) (and articulated in a similar form elsewhere, e.g. Csibra, 2007; Jacob, 2008b) remains a genuine challenge to standard versions of the MN-mindreading hypothesis. For even if we take into account the idea that MNs track intentions via sensitivity not to brute kinematically described actions but to chains of motor actions which can be thought to realise a target’s motor intentions (an intention to grasp-to-eat, say), we still stand in need of a story about how such small-scale acts get to be embedded within larger ones. As noted at the close of Section 3, all of the obvious candidates for this mechanism (subtle kinematic differences, an appeal to prewired chains selected via contextual cues, or an appeal to associative learning and statistical regularities) seem to face significant problems. On the other hand, if the advocate of the MN-mindreading hypothesis simply goes quiet at this point and suggests there is no further story to tell it is, I think, quite unclear how much the appeal to MNs really furthers the explanatory endeavour. As suggested in this section, then, it seems to me that a better move for the proponent of a role for MNs in mindreading to make would be to weaken the claims made by the MN-mindreading hypothesis, allowing that MNs cause but do not constitute attribution of mental states to others and that the primary area of activity in which MNs facilitate a grip on another’s mind is in the realm of emotional resonance and the sharing of sensorial information. While no doubt the MN system and its role in this kind of sharing of phenomenal states deserves much further exploration, still such a conclusion seems to undermine the dominant view of MNs in the recent literature (as giving us the why not merely the what of motor-actions). If right, it reveals that establishing the question to which MNs might be the answer is a task which still requires significant further work. Acknowledgments Thanks are due to Katherine Naish and her co-authors for making their draft work available when writing this paper. Research leading to this work has been partially supported by the Spanish Government, research project FFI2011-30074-C0202. References Arbib, M., Oztop, E., & Zuckow-Goldring, P. (2005). Language and the Mirror System: A perception/action based approach to communicative development. Cognition, Brain, Behaviour, 3, 239–272. Armbruster, C., & Spijkers, W. (2006). Movement planning in prehension: Do intended actions influence the initial reach and grasp movement? Motor Control, 10, 311–329. Bonini, L., Rozzi, S., Serveni, F., Simone, L., Ferrari, P., & Fogassi, L. (2010). Ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortices make distinct contribution to action organisation and intention understanding. 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Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G., & Rizolatti, G. (1995). Motor facilitation during action observation: A magnetic stimulation study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 73, 2608–2611. Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal lobe: From action organisation to intention understanding. Science, 308, 662–667. 20 Notice in addition that this move also constitutes a pretty radical move away from the MN-mindreading hypothesis as explicitly stated at the start and, it would seem, as it is standardly conceived of in most of the literature. The mindreading at issue in standard versions of the MN-mindreading hypothesis concerns the attribution of an intention to someone else. On this view, it is not enough that I and another merely share a mental state, rather what matters is the move to attribute the state to the other – the tagging of my MN plan of action as your plan. However, in moving to this notion of ‘emotional resonance’ it seems that the notion of sharing, as opposed to attributing, comes to the fore. Noting this difference might well serve to reinforce the idea (introduced above) that we have no good reason to assume that a single mechanism must underpin both kinds of access to the minds of others. I’m grateful to a reviewer for this paper for stressing this point. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013 10 E. Borg / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593–609. Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading. Trends in Cognitive Science, 2, 493–501. Goldman, A. (2009). Mirroring, simulating and mindreading. Mind and Language, 24, 235–252. Goldman, A. (2010). Mirroring, mindreading and simulation. In J. Pineda (Ed.), Mirror neuron systems: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition (pp. 311–330). NY: Humana Press. Heyes, C. (2001). Causes and consequences of imitation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 245–261. Heyes, C. (2010). Where do mirror neurons come from? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 575–583. Heyes, C. (2005). Imitation by association. In S. Hurley & N. Chater (Eds.), Perspectives on imitation: From mirror neurons to memes. MIT Press. Heyes, C., & Ray, E. (2000). What is the significance of imitation in animals? Advances in the Study of Behaviour, 29, 215–245. Hickok, G. (2008). Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding in monkeys and humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, 1229–1243. Hurley, S. (2006). Active perception and perceiving action: The shared circuits model. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 205–259). New York: Oxford University Press. Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J., Rizzolatti, G., 2005. Grasping the intentions of others with one’s own mirror neuron system. PLoS Biology 3, e79: 0001–0007. Jacob, P. (2008a). The tuning-fork model of social cognition: A critique. Consciousness and Cognition. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.05.002. Jacob, P. (2008b). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language, 23, 190–223. Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Harvard University Press. Maeda, F., Kleiner-Fisman, G., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2002). Motor facilitation while observing hand actions: Specificity of the effect and role of observer’s orientation. Journal of Neurophysiology, 87, 1329–1335. Meltzoff, A. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 838–850. Naish, K., Reader, A., Houston-Price, C., Bremner, A., & Holmes, N. (in press). To eat or not to eat? Kinematics and muscle activity of reach to grasp movements are influenced by the action goal, but observers do not detect these differences. Experimental Brain Research. Oberman, L., Hubbar, E., McCleery, J., Altschuler, E., Ramachandran, V., & Pineday, J. (2005). EEG evidence for mirror neuron dysfunction in autism spectrum disorders. Cognitive Brain Research, 24, 190–198. Ocampo, B., & Kritikos, A. (2011). Interpreting actions: The goal behind mirror neuron function. Brain Research Reviews, 67, 260–267. Ramachandran, V. S. (2000). Mirror neurons and imitation learning as the driving force behind ‘the great leap forward’ in human evolution. Edge 69. Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, M. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in Neuroscience, 21, 188–194. Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 169–192. Sinigaglia, C. (2008). Mirror neurons: This is the question. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, 70–92. Umiltà, M., Escola, L., Intskirveli, I., Grammont, F., Rochat, M., Caruana, F., et al (2008). How pliers become fingers in the monkey motor system. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 2209–2213. Please cite this article in press as: Borg, E. More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition (2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.013

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 280 Article Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks Ian Webb* Abstract Consciousness defines our awareness of the world. Many theories of consciousness exist, yet its nature remains elusive. This article explores the assumption that only one type of conscious awareness of experiencing reality exists. We discuss Einstein’s reference frameworks and examine evidence from parapsychology. I put forward a framework to investigate whether there are two potential types of awareness of reality; (1) everyday awareness and (2) cross-reference experiences, such as Out of Body Experiences. In addition, we make a case for classical models of the brain being incomplete using examples from general anaesthesia, mental health and consciousness research. Furthermore, we make a case for quantum mechanics principles influencing our conscious experiences. If cross-reference experiences can be proven, it supports the scientific reductivism argument that the true nature of physical reality is quantum in nature. Keyword: Consciousness, reference frameworks, quantum mechanics, paranormal. 1. Introduction Philosophers have investigated consciousness for thousands of years, yet there remains a great deal of mystery around the nature of consciousness. Currently, many consciousness theories exist. Therefore, no accepted theory exists (Doerig et al., 2020). Nevertheless, many unknowns remain about its nature, such as its relationship with the brain and whether the brain solely generates consciousness or whether there is a degree separate from the brain (Searle, 1998). At the heart of consciousness is how we experience the world. It is common for many academic papers to describe consciousness without exploring the full consciousness experience. For example, in the psychological literature, topics are often described as alternative consciousness. There are five considered causes of alternative consciousness; spontaneously, physically or physiologically induced, pharmacologically, psychologically induced, and diseased (Vaiti et al., 2005). One fundamental assumption in the psychological and scientific literature is that alternative consciousness has no basis in physical reality, i.e., a product of the mind or a hallucination. The assumption that alternative states of consciousness have no basis in reality, has been questioned by people’s experiences close to death (Osis & Haraldsson, 1972; Moody, 1975). Furthermore, Stevenson (1983) distinguished between hallucinations and idiophany (all unshared * Ian Webb, Independent Researcher, UK. Email: ianwebb_78734@hotmail.co.uk ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 281 experiences). Therefore, it is natural to ask whether these alternative states of consciousness are accessing another mechanism of observing reality or just hallucinations generated by the brain. This paper provides a theoretical and practical framework to explore whether more than one perception of reality is open to humans. Traditionally, there is a distinction between public and private consciousness. In public awareness, there is often an agreement about whether two events occurred, i.e., two people can agree if a table is in a room. In this article, we call these co-existence frameworks. In this case, there is an agreement on the reality of a table. The other type is a private experience in that if a person thinks about a table in a room, there is no way a second person can confirm that the table exists. We can call these single reference frameworks. It is assumed that only public consciousness is related to physical reality. The theoretical basis of the argument lies in the famous debate between Bohr (1935) and Einstein et al. (1935) on the nature of physical reality. Classical/Newton physics is observing the behavior of objects in space-time and is often underpinned by how we perceive the world. These often underpin empirical science but assume that human perception accurately reflects reality. However, quantum mechanics experimental evidence that defies classical physics logic, such as entanglement, quantum tunneling, and interference pattern (Hey & Walters, 2003; Horodecki et al., 2009). Both classical and quantum mechanics physics are incredibly successful at predicting experiments but have different theoretical principles. How quantum mechanics and classical theories treat space-time are fundamentally different. For example, classical physics treats space-time as fundamental, whilst quantum mechanics has the concept of nonlocality (Fiscaletti & Sorli, 2008; Gallego et al., 2012; Hiley, 2001; Popescu, 2014). Therefore, we argue that if consciousness is fundamentally classical/biological driven, there should not be any experiences outside the human body. However, if physical reality and consciousness are fundamental quantum mechanics, there is the potential to experience another type of reality. In this article, we explore our conscious awareness of space-time via Einstein’s concept of reference framework. We put forward a framework to explore whether private experiences, such as Out of Body Experiences (OBEs), can validate the perception of another location to their physical body. If these experiences can be validated, it suggests at least two types of conscious awareness of reality rather than the assumption that what we perceive is the only reality. Therefore, suggesting that the nature of physical reality and consciousness are quantum in nature. 2. Exploring consciousness perception of Space-time via reference frameworks We start with Einstein’s (1916) thought experiment to explore our perception of space and motion. Person A is on a train, and Person B is on a station platform. As the train passes through the station, person A drops an item and asks to describe the object’s path to the floor. Person A would say the object would fall straight to the ground. However, Person B would explain that the item fell in a curve due to the train’s momentum. This thought experiment is that observing a ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 282 point depends on the person’s reference framework, and there is no ‘true’ universal view of the world. By further expanding on the thought experiment, we can hypothesize that evolutionary principles can explain discrepancies in the above thought experiment. The earth is moving through space and spinning on its axis. Nevertheless, consciousness remains stable, and we cannot perceive the earth’s motion directly. It appears the Sun and Stars are moving, but we remain stable. Consciousness awareness has evolved to make life easier for functioning rather than a true reflection of reality. There is only a minor discrepancy when motion is involved in conscious perception. Only in recent human history can two observers perceive motion differently, demonstrating the illusion of perceiving space. Russell (1915) argued that two concepts of time are required to describe time: mental and physical time. The distinction can be related to the feeling of now. Mental time is a shared consciousness experience with two concepts of tensed (past, now, future) and tensless concepts (earlier than, simultaneous, later than; see Primas, 2003). McTaggart (1908) suggested that no complete, consistent account of time is possible, and our experience of time is unreal. However, there is a consistent perception of time that appears to be an illusion, for example, time appears quicker as we get older, but in reality, it is constant (James, 1886). Furthermore, the concept of now is absent in classical and quantum mathematical formulations (Primas, 2003). We further explore time in Einstein’s (1916) thought experiment about simultaneously. A train travels through a station when both ends of the train are hit by lighting simultaneously. Person A sits on the train while Person B is on the station platform. Both are asked which part of the train was struck first. Person A said the front of the train, while Person B said both hits simultaneously. Both are correct despite the different viewpoints. Einstein used this to demonstrate general relativity principles that the world needs to be viewed as individual reference frameworks rather than an absolute reality. Therefore, Einstein’s thought example suggests that how we perceive time differs from the reality of time. The principle of general relativity suggests that a mass of an object will influence time. This can be demonstrated with atomic clocks at different heights from the earth’s surface (Chou et al., 2010). The further away from the surface, the quicker the clock will run. This is not a faulty clock but a demonstration of Einstein’s thought experiment that time measurement is based on reference frameworks. Unfortunately, there is no universal definition of time across the three different physics genres. Here, Einstein sums up his thoughts on space-time towards the end of his life. “A human being is a part of the whole, called by us’ Universe,’ a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts, and feelings as something separated from the rest, a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but the striving ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 283 for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner security (Einstein, 1950, cited by Schwartz, 2015, page 254). A concept of how mammals observe space-time is called the specious present. The concept of the specious present was developed by Clay and reported by William James (James, 1886). The specious present is related to our experience of the present and can vary in length. Perhaps the best example is a moving spot is moving in a circle. The eye will only notice the spot’s motion if it goes around slowly enough. At a certain point, if the spot goes around faster enough, it will appear as a circle. At the heart of the concept is that different species will have different concepts of observing space and time. Therefore, Einstein’s thought experience suggests that the concept of universal perception of space-time does not exist. We can explore the concept from Einstein’s general relativity principles of a person’s reference framework. Traditionally, consciousness is thought of as an awareness of the world (physical world) and an inner world (thoughts of a person). We suggest three types of reference frameworks to explore consciousness. These are (1) Co-existence Frameworks, (2) Single Reference Frameworks, and (3) Cross Reference frameworks. Co-existence frameworks describe our conscious awareness of the physical environment and represent our everyday awareness experiences. In this state, consciousness represents the physical environment, and a shared experience often corresponds to another person’s physical reality. For example, if you physically throw water on a fire, it will affect the fire. This materialistic reality is the basis for classical science, i.e., you can observe and validate theories with the physical environment. However, we explore Einstein’s thought experiment of distance and simultaneously that there are disagreements with observations in the physical environment, which are generally irrelevant in the everyday experience. However, this explores the question of perception of the world to the hypothetical true reality. This is related to the collective consciousness. Single reference framework- These are consciousness awareness of real experiences to the person but cannot be witnessed by another person or validated, i.e., thoughts, dreams, or hallucinations. The moment they are observed, they are real consciousness experiences but have no physical reality. For example, if you imagine throwing water on a fire, it will not affect the physical environment, nor will anyone witness or validate the person’s experience. In addition to everyday thoughts, a single reference framework can be considered alternative states of consciousness (See Vaiti et al., 2005). All these experiences cannot be observed by another person, which defines the single reference framework, i.e., a person cannot observe another person’s dreams. There are two hypotheses for alternative states of consciousness experience. The first is that the brain generates them and are not considered to have a basis in reality, i.e., they are independently generated and, therefore, not linked to any physical reality. The second hypothesis is that they can be verified experiences outside the experiencer’s physical body location. These can be identified in the third type of reference framework. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 284 Cross-reference framework- These are single reference frameworks that evidence exists of a reality different from the person’s physical location. It is best demonstrated in an example of a Near-Death Experience. Cook, et. al. (1998) gives an example of a cross-reference framework: “I was standing there in the middle of the room and distinctly saw my dead body lying upon the bed... I started to leave the room and met one of the physicians, and was surprised that he said nothing to me, but since he made no effort to stop me, I walked out into the street where I met an acquaintance of mine, Mr. Milton Blose. I tried to greet Mr. Blose by hitting him on the back, but my arm went through him... It was impossible for me to attract his attention... I saw that he went across the street and looked into a shop window where a miniature Ferris wheel was on display”. Mr. Blose confirmed that he was looking at a Ferris wheel at the time. (Cook et al., 1998, page 385). Cross-reference frameworks are rare but are theoretically important in studying consciousness. It challenges the assumption that co-existence awareness is the only access to the physical environment. In the above example, it is difficult to explain this experience within a classical model of the mind. However, applying general principles of quantum mechanics of nonlocality and the principle of consciousness gives a framework to understand such concepts. 3. Exceptional Experiences We explore parapsychology evidence for cross-reference framework experiences. Generally, parapsychology is often considered controversial due to its nature. However, various scholars have argued that there are similarities between quantum mechanics and parapsychology (Walach et al., 2014; Walach et al., 2016). In this context, it gives a starting point in our framework for exploring consciousness and the nature of physical reality. Einstein famously quoted quantum mechanics as “spooky action.” Alan Turing (1950) described extrasensory perception as the main difference between the mind and the machine. A group of scientists and scholars set up paranormal societies in the 1880s to explore phenomena that did not fit into the materialistic view of science at the time. For over 140 years, books have been written documenting paranormal evidence, including; Phantasms of the Living (Gurney et al., 1886), Human Personality and its Bodily Death (Myers, 1903). Noble prize winner Richet (1929) published Thirty Years of Psychic Research. More recently, Real Magic by Dean Radin (2018). However, the field has its critics (Alcock, 2003). We have divided this section into four sections; (1) perception of space, (2) perception of time, (3) consciousness as a field, and (4) communications. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 285 3.1 Perception of Space An important consideration is the human experience of space and time. In human cognition, we perceive them as two independent concepts. However, Einstein’s general relativity has linked both space and time together. In theoretical physics, models exist for existing dimensions, such as string theory (Gross et al., 1985; Witten, 1995) or nonlocality with quantum entanglement (Brookes, 2017; Gauger et al., 2011). There are two hypotheses to explore in the consciousness experience; (1) our cognitive perception is a true reflection of reality, and (2) our cognitive illusion in which cross-references experiences can exist. In this section, we explore three areas of parapsychology related to cross-reference frameworks. First, we consider evidence from three topics of cross-reference frameworks, such as remote viewing, Out of Body Experiences (OBE), and Near-Death Experiences (NDE), that can provide evidence to discuss cross-reference frameworks. If these topics are to be proven, it will provide evidence of an extension of human perception beyond the classical model and suggestive of the nature of physical reality being quantum in nature. 3.1.1 Remote Viewing Remote viewing is the alleged ability of an observer to perceive points of space and time different from the physical body’s location. Therefore, giving an evidence base to the coexistence framework. The most extensive remote viewing research program came from a US government research program. The Stargate program ran from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. The first successful experiments were published in mainstream scientific journals (see Puthoff & Targ, 1976; Targ & Puthoff, 1974). Both described statistically significant results. Although, they have been criticized for methodological flaws in the early studies (Wiseman & Milton, 1998). The Stargate remote viewing research program was evaluated by two research groups, Mumford et al. (1995) and Utts (1996). Both came to different conclusions about remote viewing, but both agreed on statistical evidence that cannot be accounted for by methodological flaws. Other researchers associated with the review suggested that the program demonstrated success in experimental and twenty years of field research (see May 1995; May 1996, May 2014). In addition to the freedom of information act in the United States of America, thousands of operational results of remote viewing of intelligent targets are known (see Marwaha, 2021). Other remote viewing experiments have investigated remote viewing outside the government environment, such as archaeology and financial markets. For example, Schwartz (1980) examined the use of remote viewing against techniques used by archaeologists at the time. Remote viewing provided more accurate information than archaeological techniques (Schwartz, 1980). Kolodziejzyk (2012) tested associated remote viewing in financial markets, found small but significant effects, and the project made just under $150,000. The estimated proportion of people who can successfully perform remote reviewing is 1.5% (Lantz & May, 1988). Within the Stargate program, a training program developed potential ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 286 remote viewers’ skills (see Hubbard & Langford, 1986). A central technique of good remote viewing practice is reducing or managing conscious thoughts that could affect remote viewing sessions (see Schwartz, 1980). The training of remote viewers is suggestive that the focus is to reduce co-existence information and enter into another type of consciousness. One of the leading remote viewers on the Stargate Project was subject to neurophysiological monitoring during remote viewing sessions. As a result, Persinger et al. (2002) found an unusual 7hz spike and slow-wave activity over the occipital lobes. This research further evidences remote viewing accuracy and neurological measures within the brain. Also, there is a potential to enhance remote viewing with magnetic fields (Persinger et al., 2002). Some evidence exists for remote viewing in intelligence services, archaeology, and financial markets. However, remote viewing is not 100% accurate. The debate focuses on whether there is enough evidence to suggest there is evidence for remote viewing (Mumford et al., 1995; Utts, 1996; Putoff, 1996). However, a widely cited piece of evidence comes from former President Carter, who described an operation to recover a Soviet Union crashed plane via remote viewing as the strangest thing he encountered as the President (see Targ, 2019). It is difficult to ignore if operational results are successful. If remote viewing is accepted as a genuine phenomenon, it strongly suggests a type of cross-references framework experience. 3.1.2 Out-of-Body Experiences (OBE) An OBE is an experience in which a person perceives the world from a location outside of the physical body (Alvarado, 1989). Unlike remote viewing, OBE generally occurs spontaneously and not deliberately. The estimated prevalence rate for OBEs is around 12% of the population (Blackmore, 1984). Below is an example of an OBE. “The 59-year-old female respondent suffered a stroke three years previously and was left with hemianopia. She reported once feeling very frustrated while watching television and then suddenly seeming to be walking on the window ledge”. (Irwin, 1989, page 56). A common theme of OBE is that it reports more vivid than a dream and is generally more likely to occur when the person feels physically relaxed and mentally calm (Twemlow et al., 1982). However, we have also seen in our example cases in stressful situations. Therefore, we cannot conclude anything definitive based on a person’s state of mind. Nevertheless, most OBEs (70%) have some visual content (Terhune, 2009). There are strong neurological and psychological associations with OBEs, such as higher somatoform dissociation, self-consciousness, lower confidence in the physical self, and temporal lobe instability (Braithwaite, et al., 2010; Bünning & Blanke, 2005; Murray & Fox, 2005). Therefore, the debate between biological and quantum states might be false. In that, both might be part of the processes influencing one another. Furthermore, people who experience an OBE observe the world from another perspective outside of the body, suggesting a cross-reference framework experience. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 287 3.1.3 Near-Death Experiences (NDE) An NDE is when a person survives a close-to-death experience, sometimes involving a cardiac arrest. There are nine common experiences; (1) hearing the news of their death, (2) feeling of peace and quiet, (3) a noise, (4) a dark tunnel, (5) being out of the body, (6) meeting others who have passed away, (7) a bright light, (8) coming back and (9) telling others (see Moody, 1975; Parnia et al., 2014; Schwaninger et al., 2002). Despite the common features, there are cultural differences, and every person’s experience is unique (see Groth-Marnet, 1994). The prevalence rate for NDE is between 4% of the general population and 33% of hospital samples (Greyson, 2003; Knoblauch et al., 2001; Parnia et al., 2014). NDE does provide evidence for cross-reference frameworks. We provide two examples. The first is described by Morris and Knafl (2003), demonstrating awareness of the physical environment despite being in a comma. “There was a penny on top of one of the cabinets, but you have to climb up to see it,” And happened to mention to the other nurse who talks about things like I do. And she actually looked up there and found it”. (Morris & Knafl, 2003, p 155) Von Vommel (2004) gave another example of NDE where information was obtained supporting co-existence reference frameworks. “During my cardiac arrest I had an extensive experience (...), and later I saw, apart from my deceased grandmother, a man who had looked at me lovingly, but whom I did not know. More than 10 years later, at my mother’s deathbed, she confessed to me that I had been born out of an extramarital relationship, my father being a Jewish man who had been reported and killed during the Second World War, and my mother showed me his picture. The unknown man that I had seen more than ten years before during my NDE turned out to be my biological father.” Von Vommel, 2004, p 120). Two general theories explain NDE, spiritualism or hallucination (Seigel, 1980: Blackmore, 1996). However, a strong argument against the hallucination hypothesis is the existence of a coexistence reference. Besides, NDE is not affected by the type of medication intervention (van Lommel et al., 2001). Therefore, by describing NDE within a co-existence framework, cannot be explained by any biological/cognitive theories thus leaving us with a quantum mechanics system. NDE is not the only phenomenon related to death. These can include deathbed visions, where the person close to death experiences seeing deceased loved ones just before they die (See Osis & Haraldsson, 1972; Gibbs, 2010; Morita et al., 2016). In addition, terminal lucidity is when a person with limited mental or language capacity becomes more articulate/ aware of their surroundings before they die (see Nahm, 2009; Nahm et al., 2012). Finally, as a person becomes closer to death, the rate of dreaming of deceased relatives increases, which provides comfort for the experiencer (Fenwick et al., 2009; Kerr et al., 2014). All of the experiences described around dying people suggest potential cross-dimensional communication and evidence to investigate cross-reference framework experiences. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 288 The three types of research described in this section (remote viewing, OBE, and NDE) are evidence of cross-reference framework experiences. We argue that studying these phenomena from purely a cross-reference point of view can provide evidence of consciousness and physical reality being quantum in nature. Speculating on the nature of these phenomena suggests that reducing biological input into consciousness allows consciousness to operate at a purely quantum level, such as biological death in NDEs, a meditative state in remote viewing, and feeling relaxed in spontaneous OBEs. 3.2 Perception of time First, dealing with mental time, we argue with reference frameworks that there is no universal perception of time. Therefore, each individual will have their experience of “now”. These thought experiments are suggestive that “now” is a cognitive illusion. The first experimental research around the perception of time found a neurological signal a second before the person reports the feeling of ‘now’ (Libet et al., 1983). There appears to be strong evidence to support neurological response about 500ms before a conscious experience (Libet, 2002). So, the “now” we experience is not a physiological event within the brain. No standard theories of present-day physics explicitly reference the “Present” (Filk & von Muller, 2009). Experimental tests have explored the concept of perception of time. Bem (2011) tested the perception of time in four types of experiments; (1) precognition detection of erotic stimuli, (2) participants avoiding negative stimuli, (3) retroactive priming, and (4) retroactive habituation. Overall, only one of the nine experiments investigating precognition was not successful (Bem, 2011). A followed up meta-analysis of 90 experiments since the original study found a similar effect size of .20 (Bem et al., 2016). This is aligned with our thoughts on mental time that there is no universal time and differences between physiological and consciousness experience of now. There are some real-life examples of so-called precognition. Some famous examples include people predicting the Titanic sinking (Stevenson, 1960) and identifying a body washed up on the beach (Hasting, 1983). An estimated of the prevalence of precognitive dreams is 21.7% in the general population (Para, 2013). Despite the famous cases, most precognitive dreams are about trivial matters (Para, 2013). There are two interesting areas to explore with precognitive dreams. Firstly, the person can distinguish between normal or precognitive dreams and the accuracy of precognitive dreams. The experience reports that precognitive experiences are different from ordinary dreams. Describing precognitive experiences as usually clearer, more vivid and more emotionally intense (Para, 2013). Perhaps the word ‘dream’ is misleading, considering the self-report measures clearly distinguish experiences. Nevertheless, if people can distinguish between dreams and precognitive dreams, it indicates a different type of consciousness awareness. The second area worth exploring is the accuracy of the dreams. There are no studies that can accurately assess self-report precognitive dreams. There are two main issues. One time frame we expect the precognition to come true is not accurately defined. Secondly, it assumes that the ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 289 future is fixed rather than probabilistic. However, this can only be confirmed if the accuracy of the dreams can be accurately assessed. But, evidence from self-report accounts are that people are also more likely to recall precognitive dreams that come true than those that do not, making self-report measures problematic (Watt et al., 2014). Despite the limitations of self-report measures of precognition, some experimental evidence for precognition exists (see Rauscher & Targ, 2001). Theoretically, no accepted definition of space and time combines classical and quantum physics. However, there is experimental evidence from Bem (2011; 2016), and self-reported precognition suggests a cross-reference framework experience. Furthermore, humans experience a general flow of time in one direction (see Stapp, 2004). Therefore, the argument is that the flow of time is a cognitive illusion, and the true nature of time is how it is treated within quantum theory. For example, we perceive time to move faster as we age (James, 1886). 3.3 Consciousness as a field The two previous sections discussed cross-reference experiences. In this section, we discuss evidence of consciousness as a field, as its relationship with quantum mechanics and parapsychology. One of the foundations of quantum mechanics is interference experiment that is suggestive of consciousness’s influence on photons. In the experiment, a single electron is fired from a gun, it will go through one of the slits and form a pattern on a back screen. If the electron is observed, the pattern forms as predicted by a solid object. However, if the electron is not observed, it behaves like a wave pattern. The interference effect has been widely observed (see Eichmann et al., 1993). Research into individual differences in performance in the interference experiment has received mixed results (Radin et al., 2012; Wallezek & von Stillfried, 2019) There have been other experimental studies in parapsychology that support the concept of consciousness as a field. Therefore, suggestive of quantum mechanics as the foundation of physical reality. Three areas have been tested within the paranormal literature to offer support to consciousness being a field that can influence its environment, which includes; (1) staring phenomena, i.e., you think someone is watching you, and then you turn around, and someone is looking at you, (2) influencing a person’s attention and (3) poltergeist phenomena. All of these, if confirmed, can demonstrate evidence of a conscious field, sometimes known as PSI. An estimated 70-97% believe they had an experience of sensing someone watching them and, when turning around, noticing someone looking at them (Sheldrake, 2001). A meta-analysis of laboratory experiments into staring demonstrated a statistically significant effect but with a small magnitude (Schmidt et al., 2004). Interestingly, whether the researchers were skeptics or believers influenced the results despite having the same protocol (Schlitz et al., 2006). Demonstrating statistical effects can rule out coincidences accounting for these experiences, but others have questioned the methodology behind PSI experiments (Alcock, 1991; 2003). Variation to the staring experiments is researched to investigate whether a nonlocal person influences another person’s attention. In a typical experiment, a sitter would be asked to ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 290 concentrate on a task while a helper in another location would try to support the sitter via thoughts. Most research find a small but statistically significant effect (Braud et al.,1995). Most experimental research on mental influence on the environment comes from Russia. An overview of Russian research by May & Vilenskaya (1992) reported that people’s thoughts/fields could affect both animals, self-report effects, and physiological measures in humans. The third type of real-world case of a human field affecting the surrounding environment are poltergeist cases. Traditional poltergeists can have many phenomena, including electromagnetic interferences, moving objects, and unexplained sounds. Thousands of poltergeist cases have been documented across time and cultures (Gauld & Cornell, 1979: Roll, 2004). There are two types of poltergeist phenomena: haunting locations and person-centered poltergeist phenomena. Our focus is on the person-centered poltergeist cases as it directly links a person’s neurological and psychological profile and the phenomena. In person-centered poltergeist activity cases, there are similarities in psychological and neurological profiles (Roll, 2003). The person at the center of the poltergeist has neurological abnormalities, including epilepsy (Persinger, 1985). Recent cases have strongly linked psychological and neurological profiles to poltergeist behavior and the role of counseling in reducing poltergeist activity (Kruth & Joines, 2016; Roll et al., 2012). Electromagnetic forces appear to have a role in poltergeist activity, but its function remains unclear (Kruth & Joines, 2016; Kokubo et al., 2004; Roll, 2003). Two personal-centered poltergeist case examples have demonstrated that they could be treated to reduce the side effects of poltergeist activity (Kruth & Joines, 2016; Roll et al., 2012). In these cases, the person at the center of the phenomena wanted to stop and had some neurological issue. It is unknown why a particular profile causes poltergeist phenomena in one person but not another. However, the interaction between electromagnetic fields and the prominent person’s neurological and psychological profiles is central to these cases. Conceptually, it seems an extension of the interference experiment. These cases suggest that consciousness operates as a field outside the body. Evidence exists for electromagnetic fields (ultraweak photon emission) emitted from the living systems (see Dotta & Persinger, 2012; Schwabl & Klima, 2005). In addition, electromagnetic fields from a person can influence cells and are related to photon emissions (Dotta & Persinger, 2011; Karbowski et al., 2012; Persinger & Lavallee, 2010). Persinger et al. (2013) asked volunteers to imagine a white light or not in a dark room. When the participants imagined the white light, the person emitted photons and magnetic energy. This supported Hu and Wu’s (2006) hypotheses of quantum spin consciousness theory (see Persinger et al., 2013). Persinger et al. (2008) tested the role of magnetic fields and physiological response. Before the experiments began, four pairs of strangers met and remained within one meter of each other for one hour, twice per week, and for four weeks. After this period, participants were tested in a closed chamber and were exposed to 6 (five minutes) different complex magnetic fields. Participants were asked to imagine walking to and being near the other person. The researchers ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 291 found that the person monitored sensed the person who also received changes in magnetic fields and had significantly elevated scores for anger, sexual arousal, and emotional states. Other follow-up research focused more on nonlocal communication in living cells. For example, Dotta et al. (2011) conducted two experiments. The first experiment had one set of aggregate cells occasionally receiving flashing lights while another group was placed in a dark room. The aggregate cells receiving flashing lights evoked photon emissions in cells in the darkroom, but only if both groups of cells shared the same magnetic field configuration. Perhaps the most substantial research came from the former Soviet Union around mental interactions with the environment (Karnbach, 2013; May & Vilenskaya, 1992). For example, there are over 4,000 references on the biological effects of magnetic fields, with over 2000 around the nervous system (see Kernbach, 2013). In addition, in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, a commission to investigate psychic phenomena found sufficient evidence to conclude that the phenomenon existed (Kernbach, 2013). There appears to be evidence supporting the consciousness field outside the human body. We present evidence from the interference experiment, self-report of staring, meta-analysis of laboratory experiments demonstrating small but significant effects, and person-centered poltergeist cases with individuals with similar neurological and psychological profiles. A speculative argument can be made that most individuals can influence photons, but as the objects increase in size, only people with similar neurological and psychological profiles can influence the objects. 3.4 Cross-reference framework communication The final area of parapsychology we explore is nonlocal communication, particularly telepathy. The first systematic evidence for telepathy occurred in the 1930s (Rhine, 1934). A typical experiment would ask a sitter to guess what card will appear next. Out of 90,000 trials, they found significant effects that could not be explained by chance. Further observations showed that the longer the tests went on, performance declined in some people, fatigue, lack of sleep, and illness all affected performance, and significant variations across people who could produce the phenomenon consistently (Rhine, 1934). The most extensive research program investigating telepathy was the Ganzfeld experiments, with over a hundred experiments. The design protocol would involve the sitter being asked to go into a mediative state and report what a sender was communicating in a different room. A metaanalysis by Bem and Honorton (1994) found a hit rate of 32% in forced-choice experiments compared to a chance level of 25%. Follow-up meta-analyses have found statistically significant results (Bem et al., 2001; Williams, 2011). However, telepathy is not without its critics (see Milton and Wiseman, 1999). There are individual differences in performance on telepathy tasks, such as psychological profile or whether a person is known to the person (Goulding, et al., 2004; Watt, 2006). A meta-analysis of Ganzfeld studies between 1992 and 2008 found that selecting participants performed better ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 292 than non-selected participants (Storm et al., 2010). The individual differences reported suggest a real phenomenon rather than an experimental artifact. Further development of telepathy protocols is the measuring of brain activity during telepathy. Some experiments have shown a physiological response in the receiver’s brain during telepathy (see Kernbach, 2013; Standish, et al., 2003; Persinger, et al., 2003; Hinterberger, 2008). Demonstrating the physiological, biological effect, and quantum principles suggest consciousness operating across both systems. There is some evidence for telepathy in everyday experiences, such as (1) predicting who calls had positive results (Sheldrake & Smart, 2003), (2) twins can have a telepathic link (Brusewitz et al., 2013), and (3) pets can read their owner's mind (Sheldrake & Smart; 1997). In addition, there is experimental evidence for telepathy in everyday life (see Sheldrake & Smart, 2000; Sheldrake & Smart, 2003; Sheldrake & Avraamides, 2009; Sheldrake et al., 2009). The research often shows a small but significant effect, but other researchers have failed to replicate everyday telepathy experiences (Schmidt et al., 2009). There is a body of evidence to support the concept of telepathy. Research has demonstrated significant effects and categorized personal differences on performance in telepathy experiments. The impact of physiological measures and phenomena that biological/cognitive theories cannot account is suggestive of consciousness in a biological/quantum model. In the paranormal literature, numerous self-report and experimental procedures can only be explained if consciousness has elements of quantum mechanics influencing its behavior. Therefore, suggestive of further evidence of cross-reference framework experiences. Alan Turing, in 1950 wrote, “These disturbing phenomena seem to deny all our usual scientific ideas. How we should like to discredit them! Unfortunately, the statistical evidence, at least for telepathy, is overwhelming. It is very difficult to rearrange one’s ideas to fit these new facts in. Once one has accepted them, it does not seem a very big step to believe in ghosts and bogies. The idea that our bodies move simply according to physics’ known laws, together with some others not yet discovered but somewhat similar, would be one of the first to go. This argument is to my mind quite a strong one. One can say in reply that many scientific theories seem to remain workable in practice, in spite of clashing with ESP; that in fact, one can get along very nicely if one forgets about it. This is rather cold comfort, and one fears that thinking is just the kind of phenomenon where ESP may be especially relevant.” (Turing, 1950, p 450). The question is, how should scientists and philosophers treat exceptional experiences? In this section, we presented evidence of the existence of cross-reference experiences. Treating evidence at face value supports cross reference framework and at least another type of perception of reality. At worse, the evidence presented questions the assumption that only one perception of reality should not be assumed. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 293 4. Are classical models complete? In this section, we examine three topics whether classical/biological theories can explain the brain. First, we can test whether classical physics models of the brain are adequate using proxy measuring to explain general anesthesia and mental health. General Anaesthesia is the most successful methodology for turning on and off consciousness awareness. Secondly, Mental Health is predominately a conscious experience, with poor mental health significantly impacting the person and with the extensive literature on treatments. Thirdly, is whether classical-based theories can explain consciousness. If current biological/cognitive models are sufficient to explain these three areas, it goes some way to suggest that the concept for biological/cognitive models of consciousness is correct. On the other hand, if there are gaps in these indicators might mean something is missing from the current approach to explaining the brain and mind. 4.1 The Mental Health Experience Problem An underexplored area of consciousness theory is the role of mental states. Using the treatment for depression as a proxy indicator for treatments in mental health, we can explore the effectiveness of theories. A recent study researching the effectiveness of pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatments for mental illness ranged from 42% to 55% (see Dunlop et al., 2017). Also, treatments appear to be slightly more effective if combined rather than on their own (Arnow & Constantino, 2003). The type of therapy seems less important than the person engaged in an active therapeutic program (Khan et al., 2012). There is a lack of understanding of why some work for some and not others (see Cohen & DeRubeis, 2018; Khan et al., 2012). A criticism of the drug treatments for mental health disorders is the drug lag problem, i.e., the abnormalities in chemicals in the brain are normal after a short period of time, but the user only reports improvement 2-3 weeks later (see Machado-Vieira et al., 2010; Wickens, 2000). Therefore, it is suggestive that drug treatments indirectly impact the mental state. Kirsch (2019) has argued that drug treatments are less effective than psychotherapy and result in more relapses. Many scholars have argued that a new theoretical approach to mental health is needed (see Machado-Vieira et al., 2010; Malinauskas & Malinauskiene, 2019; Schaumberg et al., 2017; Rocca et al., 2014; Tanner-Smith et al., 2013). Perhaps one of the most interesting findings is that there is little difference between biological and cognitive therapies in mental health treatment rates. An argument that has existed since William James and was further developed by Sperry is that conscious thought can influence neurobiology (See Sperry, 1969; 1987 & 1991). In addition, evidence supports biofeedback and the placebo effect (Velmans, 2002). This can be seen in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, which has the same impact as pharmacological treatments. Therefore, the assumption that consciousness is just a by-product of neurons does not fit with the evidence from mental health treatments, parapsychology, and cross reference framework. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 294 4.2 General Anaesthesia For over 150 years, general anesthesia has been at the center of the medical world, enabling lifeenhancement interventions. The process involves giving a person some drugs, which would make the person unconscious, and then awakening a person by controlling chemicals induced into the brain. This is suggestive that the drugs involved can control a person's consciousness awareness. It is estimated that 1-2 per 1,000 have awareness during general anesthesia, irrespective of the general anesthesia techniques (Sebel et al., 2004). As expected, common reactions to these experiences are a feeling of helplessness, terror, pain, and an inability to communicate, all of which can lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (Osterman et al., 2001). Unfortunately, no theory can explain why some individuals will have conscious awareness during the procedure. This small error rate raises two outcomes; (1) the approach is correct, but further work is needed for general anesthesia to reduce error rates, or (2) conceptually, there is a missing piece of the jigsaw regarding theories of consciousness. At the start of the 20th Century, Meyer and Overton correlated the potency of general anesthesia drugs with solubility in a non-polar hydrophobic medium similar to olive oil (see Craddock et al., 2015: Franks & Leib, 1990). However, a problem existed for the lipid hypotheses that the potency and lipid solubility is correct for specific compounds, but there are exceptions to the rule (see Krasowski, 2003). Furthermore, other researchers found that proteins mapped onto anesthetic target sites in animals better than Lipids (Franks & Leib, 1990). Despite the effectiveness of general anesthesia in its application, it is unclear how different drugs create the aesthetic state (See Craddock et al., 2015). Many chemicals are involved in many different types, and there is no requirement for specific chemical groupings (Franks & Leib, 1990). Modern-day general anesthesia uses various drugs to create an aesthetic state (Brown et al., 2018). One of the latest theories of general anesthesia is the involvement of quantum mobility theory. It suggests that consciousness is derived from quantum channels, which involve microtubules, which we discuss more in quantum theory (see Craddock et al., 2015). In addition, Emerson et al. (2013) research with tadpoles indicates the role of microtubules in general anesthetics. The theory suggests that actions inhibit quantum dipoles, energy transfer, and electron mobility, producing an aesthetic state. In a study of Xenon, isotopes on consciousness awareness without nuclear spin are less potent than those with nuclear spin (Li et al., 2018). The authors conclude that nuclear spins are a quantum property, therefore, are consistent with theories that implicate quantum mechanics in consciousness (Li et al., 2018). However, it is to be determined whether quantum mechanics will provide a better theoretical understanding and better treatments in the future. Anesthesia is an accepted medical intervention, but a complete theory is still allusive due to; (1) theories of general anesthetic being driven by explaining how drugs work rather than being ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 295 driven by an accepted theory, (2) many chemicals can produce the same loss of conscious awareness, which is suggestive chemicals only indirectly affects consciousness, and (3) it is estimated that 1-2 per 1,000 a person has conscious awareness during general anesthesia drugs, but there is no theory to understand why these people become consciously aware. Nevertheless, the research is suggestive of a gap in classical theories. 4.3 Biological/ Cognitive theories of consciousness In this section, we explore biological and cognitive theories of consciousness. Perhaps one of the most important questions is why humans evolved consciousness. The first theory we explore is based on Darwin's theory of evolution (Darwin, 1871). The Neural Darwinism theory (NDT) is a theoretical framework to connect biology and psychology within evolutionary mechanisms. NDT implies that selection, reproduction, and mutation generate organisms' adaptive behavior (McDowell, 2009). Central to NDT is the brain is an organism that can adapt to its environment. It is often debated whether adapting to the environment is random or non-random (see Cairns & Foster, 1991; Hall, 1990; McFadden & Al-Khalili, 1999). If non-random is suggestive of more a field theory of the environment. NDT suggests that the brain did not evolve as a set of instructions but from a selection process upon variation. The world becomes labeled as two interactive variations (see Edelman, 1993). The first is at the embryonic and postnatal stages of neural groups. Secondly, alternations in synaptic strengths during animal activity yields adaptive behavior. According to some NDT supporters, the variation within the brain structure would exceed a machine that could perform to produce the same function (Edelman, 1993). Seth and Barrs (2005) evaluated the NDT across 16 recognized findings of consciousness research. The NDT could account for 6 out of 16, moderately for 6 out of 16, and needs development in four areas (Seth & Barrs, 2005). Despite not being a complete model of consciousness, it does provide helpful information that a complete theory needs to include; (1) why the brain and consciousness evolved to produce what we have today and (2) the variation within the brain structure may exceed machine performance, then the computer/ machine analogy would be incorrect. A successful approach to consciousness research is the neurological correlates of consciousness (NCC). This framework has successfully established the relationship between neural activity, brain zones, and consciousness (see Tsuchiya et al., 2015). One of the most consistent findings with consciousness research is the accuracy of the relationship between the state of consciousness and EEG recordings. During awake consciousness, it is a higher state. Furthermore, the EEG patterns can distinguish between awake and non-awake consciousness (see Niedermeyer, 1999). In addition, there is a slow wave high amplitude pattern in states such as deep sleep and general anesthesia (Baars et al., 2003). Therefore, providing reliable evidence of an interaction between the brain and consciousness. The second consistent findings in NCC are the association between consciousness within the brain structure. Baars (2005) suggests that the frontoparietal could have a relationship with ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 296 consciousness based on three results; (1) in the awakened state, Conscious stimulation leads to frontoparietal activation, but unconsciousness doesn't, (2) in an unconscious state, sensory stimulation is associated in the sensory cortex, but not frontoparietal regions, and (3) consciousness resting states show high frontoparietal metabolism. It is suggested that neural correlates of consciousness are primarily localized to a posterior cortical hot zone (Koch et al., 2016). The underlying mechanics of EEG measurements do not rule out quantum mechanics. An analysis of EEG signals using the Hilbert transforms provided evidence of intermittent spatial patterns of amplitude and phase modulations of carrier waves that repeatedly resynchronize at near-zero time lags over long distances (Freeman & Vitiello 2008). If neural interactions are by axodendritic synaptic transmission should impose a distance-dependent delay on EEG oscillations, but it does not (Freeman & Vitiello 2008). The rise of the neurological correlates of consciousness approach leads to the development of the thalamocortical system theory of consciousness (Baev et al., 2002; Ching et al., 2010; Llinä et al., 1998; Ward, 2011). The theory suggests that the thalamus is the central hub in the cortex that can communicate with one another (Llinä et al., 1998). It is also linked to alpha waves related to the unconscious state (Ching et al., 2010). This brings together the observations about brain wave patterns to the structures within the brain, which might be fundamental in a complete model of consciousness. Other theories, such as Global Workspace Theory (GWT), describe neurons' architecture and the brain's structure in explaining consciousness (Baars, 2005). GWT predicts various mainstream cognitive and neurological areas based on associations between consciousness and brain functions. For example, Shanahan (2006) developed an architecture to control a simulated robot based on information flow from GWT. At the heart of distinguishing between NDT and GWT is that cognitive architecture can describe consciousness accurately. Another theory of consciousness is the Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART). ART is a cognitive/ neural theoretical approach to describe how the brain categorizes, recognizes, and predicts objects (Grossberg, 2013). ART has been developed over the last 20-30 years to predict human and animal perception and cognition (Grossberg, 2013). It has similarities with NDT in that the brain is adapting to the environment but built upon the NCC approach. However, at its foundation is the assumption that biology and algorithms can explain conscious experiences. The electromagnetic field theory proposes that conscious experiences are identical to specific electromagnetic frequencies generated by neural activity in the brain without quantum mechanics (Pockett, 2012). The correlation between consciousness experience and monitoring of brain activity with EEGs supports it. In addition, there are often correlations between awareness and magnetic fields generated by the brain (McFadden, 2002). This consciousness theory suggests that certain fields can distinguish between conscious and non-conscious magnetic fields (Pockett, 2012). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 297 One of the problems for biological/cognitive theories of consciousness is explaining the discrepancy between the quality of input from the environment and the richness of consciousness experience (see O'Regan & Noe 2001). The sensorimotor adaptation theory suggests visual filling-in occurs within the brain (see Degenaar & O'Regan, 2015; O'Regan & Noe, 2001). There is strong evidence for this 'filling in' based on evidence of illusory visual contours (see Eysenck & Keane, 2000). Therefore, implying that there is a discrepancy between perception and the representation of the environment. Any theory needs to account for the quality and stability of consciousness despite insufficient quality information and selective experiences, i.e., you do not notice yourself blinking until someone points this out. One of the difficulties generated is the problem of the poor environment input and a consistently rich conscious experience. In order to address the problem. The Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOT) suggests two levels of processes within the brain. The first-order states view consciousness as determined by the environmental input. The HOT theory is suggestive that this is not enough to produce conscious awareness, and a higher order of process is needed (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). LeDoux and Brown (2011) have argued that HOT can be applied to emotional states. At the core of the hypotheses is that cognitive/biological associations with consciousness can explain consciousness. Another alternative suggesting extra processing within the brain to produce consciousness is the recurrent processing theory (RPT). In RPT, the unconsciousness functions of feature extraction and categorizations are mediated by feedforward sweep, while conscious processes related to perceptual organizations are meditated by recurrent feedback (see Lamme, 2020). Several experiments have tested the recurrent processing theory. For example, Auksztulewicz et al. (2012) used somatosensory detection tasks that monitored the brain. In this section, we argued that classical models of consciousnesses, mental health, and general anesthesia are incomplete. In the next section, we explore whether quantum mechanics offers any solution. 5. The case for quantum mechanics within the brain So far, we have made a case for classical models being incomplete and an evidence base for cross-reference frameworks. In this section, we make a positive case for quantum mechanics supporting the central thesis of quantum mechanics influencing the brain. We know that classical mechanics fails at the atomic level and is superseded by quantum mechanics (see Stapp, 2004). The argument is that thoughts, mental health, and consciousness cannot be perceived from a materialistic perspective, so quantum mechanics should be explored (see Schwartz et al., 2005, Stapp, 1999; Walker, 1970). This naturally leads to the logical argument that, if they exist, it would be at the quantum level. At the simplest level, we know consciousness exists, and if it operates below the atomic level, there is an argument that quantum mechanics should govern the rules of its behavior (see Stapp, 1999, 2004). Quantum mechanics fundamentally differs from our perceptions of the world and classical theories. Thus, making quantum mechanics counterintuitive. One is the treatment of spacetime. In quantum mechanics, there is the concept of nonlocality. This is demonstrated by ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 298 entanglement, where one system can influence another but at a distance (Gühne & Tóth, 2009; Horodecki et al., 2009). Classical theory assumes that spacetime is fundamental, but quantum theory does not (Hiley, 2001). Therefore, we should not assume that our perception equals an actual reality. It could equally be quantum mechanics as the true nature of reality, which is supported by a cross-reference framework. Due to the nature of quantum mechanics, not being intuitive has led to many interpretations. The most accepted interpretation is Copenhagen, which Bohr and Heisenberg developed. Other interpretations include the many worlds theory (Everett (1957), Bohm's Implicit Order (Bohm, 1990), and Transactional interpretations (see Crammer, 1986; 1988). This paper does not seek to solve the debate but to make readers of non-quantum mechanics background that the nature of quantum mechanics has different interpretations. Therefore, it is unsurprising that quantum mechanics has been proposed as the most likely scientific explanation to explain parapsychology. The Generalised Quantum Theory (GQT) suggests relaxing some definitions and restrictions can keep core elements of quantum theory while applying it to other systems (see Walach & Schmidt,2005; Walach et al., 2016; Walach et al., 2014; Walach & von Stillfried, 2011). Its basis is that a Weak Quantum Theory could apply quantum mechanics less restrictedly but with equal precision (see Atmanspacher et al., 2002). Furthermore, the evidence of cross-reference framework experiences suggests that physical nature is quantum in nature. 5.1 Evidence for quantum mechanics in biological systems Despite the range of interpretations of quantum mechanics, there is emerging evidence of quantum mechanics in biological systems. In the early 21st Century, a new division of research around quantum biology emerged (see Al-Khalili & McFadden 2014). Evidence has been found of quantum mechanics having a meaningful effect on photosynthesis (see Sarovar et al., 2010; Scholak et al., 2011; Panitchayangkoon et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2011). Also, quantum mechanics have been demonstrated in migratory birds (see Hogben, et al., 2012, Hiscock et al., 2012; Gauger et al., 2011). There is increasing evidence of quantum mechanics in animals and plants (Craddock et al., 2014). A growing body of evidence suggests quantum states operate in the biological temperature range (Mavromatos, et al., 2002; Sahu et al., 2013). In a review, Brookes (2017) highlighted four living processes that might be considered quantum: a reaction mechanism, a sensory signal, a transfer of energy, and an information encoding. The review highlights the potential that a protein motion may support coherent oscillations (Brookes, 2017). In addition, the quantum mechanics effects observed range from tunneling, quantum coherent superpositions, and entanglement (Brookes, 20017). 5.2 Theories of quantum mechanics within the brain One of the great difficulties of classical models of the brain is a failure to match our experience to the neurological functions (Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Noë & Thompson, 2004; Vitiello, 2015). ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 299 Numerous arguments suggest that classical approaches to the brain/consciousness are incomplete and quantum mechanics are needed (see Beck & Eccles, 1992; Penrose, 1995; Stapp, 1995). One of the first proposed quantum coherence in biological systems was Fröhlich's (1968) and (1970). The papers demonstrate that under appropriate conditions, a concept similar to BoseEinstein condensate involves communicating between cells at a distance. The role of quantum coherence would involve bringing all neural activity so that the brain acts like one. The BoseEinstein condensate is the fifth state alongside solids, liquids, gasses, and plasma. However, in the Bose-Einstein Condensate, particles will act like one close to absolute zero temperature. Therefore, if these states exist in nature, they must demonstrate that they can operate in the biological temperature range. Arguments have been made that the Bose-Einstein condensate is involved in the learning and memory process. Ricciardi & Umezawa (1967) suggest that information from outside is coded within the brain, and since the requirement for memory stability, the code should be later transferred to the group state of the system. The suggestion is that this is achieved via condensation to the ground state (Ricciardi & Umezawa, 1967). The function of this state is to regulate brain dynamics. (Ricciardi & Umezawa, 1967). One of the proposed Quantum mechanics that influences brain functions is quantum tunneling. It is argued that neither chemical, electric, nor magnetic fields are too weak to trigger collective neuronal activity (Freeman & Vitiello, 2008). A theory of operation of synapses of the brain is proposed that involves quantum mechanical tunneling at the synaptic cleft (Walker, 1970). An argument put forward of quantum tunneling in the process of exocytosis (Beck and Eccles, 1992). The Quantum model of the brain can account for neuronal synchronized oscillations and their rapid sequencing (Freeman & Vitiello, 2008). Another theory that is attracting attention is the quantum spin theory of consciousness. The model proposes quantum entanglement in which spin processes in non-spatial and non-temporal pre-spacetime imply interconnectedness and play an important role in biology and consciousness (Hu & Wu, 2006). Centered in the theory of quantum processes is phosphorus, which serves as a qubit during quantum entanglement (Fisher, 2015). Perhaps the biggest debate of quantum mechanics is whether entanglement can happen at higher temperatures (Hartmann, Dür, & Briegel, 2006). The question of mind/matter remains a fundamental question that remains unanswered. However, if quantum mechanics is the underlying process, then neuroactivity could be the outward material manifestation (Atmanspacher, 2012; Atmanspacher & Fach, 2013; Hiley, 2001). Alternatively, there is the dualism argument that the mind/matter are separate systems interacting (Atmanspacher, 2012; Primas, 2003). There are many interpretations of dualism, including neural monism, holistic dualism by Pauli & Jung, Russell's neutral monism, Bohm's implicate order, and naturalistic dualism (see Atmaspacher, 2014). One of the most debated theories of consciousness is The ORCH theory of consciousness (Hameroff, 1994; Hameroff & Penrose, 2003; Hameroff & Penrose, 2014). ORCH theory that ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 300 consciousness depends upon the biologically orchestrated coherent quantum process in microtubules. Consciousness occurs in the objective reduction of the quantum state (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014). Central to ORCH theory describes the physical nature of Einstein's general theory of relativity and the fundamental theory of matter by quantum theory (Hameroff & Penrose, 2003). ORCH suggests conscious experience occurs due to the self-collapse of the wave function based on quantum states having their own spacetime geometries (Hameroff & Penrose, 2003; Penrose, 1996). Hameroff (2014) describes ORCH theory as regulating neuronal membrane and synaptic activity and connecting brain processes to fundamental spacetime geometry. In addition, there is an element of microtubule decoherence interacting with neurophysiology (Hagan et al., 2002). Central to brain function is the receiving information from the environment to form a plan of action to respond to the environment (Schwartz et al., 2005). The basis of quantum theory is information (Stapp, 1999). The integrated information theory starts with personal experience and is central to the theory (Tononi & Koch 2015). It begins with essential priorities of an experience from which it derives physical properties rather than the brain (Tononi et al., 2016). It starts from the experience with five phenomenological axioms; (1) intrinsic existence, (2) composition, (3) information, (4) integration, and (5) exclusion. However, like most theories, it does not explore consciousness operating outside of the traditional view of science. The newly emerging theory that consciousness is quantum in nature still has three major technical problems (Stapp, 2004). The first quantum theory is primarily a theory of atomic processes, whereas consciousness is connected with brain activity. The second problem is that quantum mechanics is the study of atomic processes and is not designed to describe a biological system. Finally, the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory for a set of rules for calculating expectations and not a description or picture of reality (Stapp, 2004). The challenge for dual aspects remains how consciousness, mind, and phenomenal experience are related to the brain and physical world (see Atmaspacher, 2014). Perhaps the biggest challenge for quantum theory is to provide evidence of how it arises or functions (Chalmers, 1995). 5.3 Quantum Mechanics in Human Cognition. It is argued that quantum theories such as quantum probability, entanglement, and nonlocality better describe human cognition than classical theories (Pylkkänen, 2015). These include decision-making, ambiguous perception, probability judgments, order effects, and memory (Pylkkänen, 2015). There are two distinct differences between classical and quantum mechanics principles. Complementarity (some psychological measures are sequential and are influential by order) and superposition (some psychological states cannot be measured with definitive values, but all values have the potential to be expressed (Busemeyer et al., 2015). One of the main differences between classic and quantum cognitions is in probability judgments. In classical theories, a person is in a solid state and assigns a probability to a particular judgment and cognition at that time. In contrast, the quantum account allows a person to be in an indefinite state called a superposition state at each moment (Wang et al., 2013). As a ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 301 result, human probability judgments often conflict with classical logical theory P (A&B) and cannot exceed the probability of its constituents. Often in research, this is found in personality judgment, medical prognosis, and political forecasting (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). However, the quantum theory fits better with research into probability judgment (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Khrennikov, 2015, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Wang et al., 2013). In addition to human probability judgment, quantum principles have been applied to explain order effects (Atmanspacher & Römer, 2012). It is argued that how the information presented affects the probability judgment is a type of interference experiment (see Busemeyer, et al., 2009). Also, human perception and cognition of ambiguous figures follow quantum rather than classical rules (see Conte et al. 2009). "The presence of quantum-like interference indicates that quantum mechanics has a role in the dynamics of mental state" page 99 (Conte et al., 2009). The two-stage gambling game and the Prisoner's dilemma game demonstrated quantum probability over classical theories and provided a better framework for modeling human decision-making (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009). In addition, bistable perception has been suggested to be quantum in nature, producing the quantum Zeno effect (Atmanspacher et al., 2008; Atmanspacher et al., 2004). Finally, there is evidence for quantum effects in human cognition, such as contextuality, interference, entanglement, and emergence (see Aerts et al., 2013). The functioning of the whole brain appears not to be significantly affected by the functioning of the single neuron (Vitiello, 1995). This further supports the Libet (1983) experiment that the physiological and actual experience of "now" are separate. In addition, this can be applied to general observations about the human experience. For example, when talking to older adults, They often say that they feel like I am 21, but their body feels old. Therefore, we could speculate that consciousness experience is timeliness that is often out of step with the body's condition. Nevertheless, we are talking about the discrepancy between our experience and reality. Enough evidence suggests that neuropsychological research into brain mechanics is incomplete (see Schwartz, et al., 2005). 6. Conclusions At the heart of this paper is the profound question of whether how we perceive the world is an illusion or an actual reality of nature. We have argued that how we sense the world can be viewed by our everyday experience, on which classical theories are based. In addition, we have argued that cross-reference experiences provide an alternative awareness of physical reality based on the quantum world. A key question for science is how to treat evidence from crossreference experiences. If we dismiss these experiences, there is a real risk of never understanding the nature of reality or consciousness. Using a reference framework, allows scientists can explore these questions by rejecting or accepting cross-reference experiences. We have argued a positive case for quantum mechanics influencing the brain. In addition, we created an opposing argument that materialism/classic physics cannot fully explain the brain with ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 302 topics for general anesthesia and mental health. Therefore, we argue that parapsychology experiences are a manifestation of physical reality and consciousness being quantum in nature. Although, it should be stressed that it is a framework rather than having an exact theory of the mechanics behind the phenomena. At its heart, cross reference framework experiences, if proven, suggest the physical nature being quantum. Speculating on the nature of cross-reference framework experiences such as remote viewing and NDE, we can suggest that spacetime is also a field that is not fundamental. These experiences should not be seen as sitting outside of science but can be used to understand the brain's nature further. Cross-reference framework experiences suggest consciousness moving outside of the perception of spacetime into another field in which quantum mechanics can be used as a framework for understanding the experience. Therefore, suggesting the classical view of spacetime is just a representation of consciousness experience and not an accurate fundamental representation of reality, which is quantum in nature. It is not the first time this has been proposed, such as quantum hologram (Michell. 1999). Naturally, consciousness fits into quantum in nature because it does not fit into the traditional four states of matter, and there is evidence of quantum mechanics influencing biological processes. Implications for accepting Quantum Mechanics in Psychology The acceptance of quantum mechanics within consciousness will have implications for models of the mind and psychology. Despite a large body of evidence in psychology and neuroscience, how the brain works remains primarily unresolved (Allefeld et al., 2009). McDowell (2009) has argued, "Psychology, encouraged in modern times at least in part by the Kuhnian misprision of revolution in science, has lurched from paradigm to paradigm in search of solid footing, but each foothold has proved disappointingly precarious." (McDowell, 2009, p 365). Theories of both biological/cognitive do not necessarily describe what is happening within the brain but only build upon a description of the classical physics research paradigm. A new theoretical psychology framework might be able to explain observations, such as the drug lag problem, a complete theory of general anesthesia, a new perspective of interpreting the socalled paranormal phenomena, and a theory of why combined treatments for mental health work better rather than a single framework. In addition, it will provide a theoretical basis for why some spiritualist practice forms a basis for preventative mental health such as mediation and mindfulness. If proven correct of cross-reference framework experiences and quantum mechanics within the brain, the principles outlined in this essay will create a new psychology paradigm. First, it would suggest that no abstract concepts exist in psychology models, and everything would have a classical or quantum physics explanation. Second, it would explain why cognitive experiences are an illusion, a model to explain nearly all paranormal phenomena and explanations for mental health treatments are similar despite being completely different, i.e., they all indirectly affect the quantum mental state. Third, it would explain the observation that older adults feel the same as they were 21, despite the biological aging process. ISSN: 2153-8212 Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research Published by QuantumDream, Inc. www.JCER.com Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2023 | Volume 14| Issue 4 | pp. 280-317 Webb, I., Exploring Consciousness Perception within Reference Frameworks 303 The case is made that any theory of consciousness needs to include biological and quantum levels. Cognitive and neuroscience have shaped most biological theories without exploring potential evidence for quantum principles. If accepted, the consciousness experience may follow quantum mechanics rather than classical logic. However, a range of research rarely cited in cognitive/biological models supports the role of quantum mechanics principles in consciousness research. Received May 17, 2023; Accepted June 18, 2023 References Aerts, D., Gabora, L., & Sozzo, S. (2013) Concepts and their dynamics: A quantum‐theoretic modellng of human thought. 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Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Bruce Bridgeman University of California, Santa Cruz ASSOCIATE EDITORS Talis Bachmann University of Tartu Axel Cleeremans Université Libre de Bruxelles Georg Northoff University of Ottawa Antti Revonsuo University of Turku Michael Graziano Princeton University EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade University of Plymouth J. Allan Hobson Harvard Medical School Alan Baddeley MRC Applied Psychology Unit Larry L. Jacoby Washington University St. Louis, MO John Bargh New York University Arthur L. Blumenthal The New School University Gordon H. Bower Stanford University Deborah Burke Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of California Santa Barbara David Chalmers University of Arizona, Tucson Antonio Damasio University of Southern California Meredyth Daneman University of Toronto Richard Davidson University of Wisconsin Daniel C. Dennett Tufts University Andreas K. Engel Hamburg University Matthew Erdelyi Brooklyn College of CUNY Owen Flanagan Duke University David Galin Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco Michael S. Gazzaniga University of California at Santa Barbara Anthony G. Greenwald University of Washington Henk J. Haarman University of Maryland Stevan Harnad University of Southampton Steven A. Hillyard University of California, San Diego Steven Palmer University of California Berkeley John Pani University of Louisville E. Roy John New York University Medical Center Ernst Pçppel Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversitt, Mnchen John F. Kihlstrom University of California Berkeley William Prinzmetal University of California Berkeley Christof Koch California Institute of Technology Arthur Reber Brooklyn College of CUNY Stephen M. Kosslyn Harvard University Eyal Reingold University of Toronto Alfred B. Kristofferson Ontario, Canada David Rosenthal Graduate School of CUNY David LaBerge University of California, Irvine Daniel Schacter Harvard University Stephen LaBerge Simons Rock College of Bard Donald G. MacKay University of California Los Angeles George Mandler University of California, San Diego Bruce Mangan University of California, Berkeley Anthony Marcel MRC Applied Psychology Unit Hazel R. Markus University of Michigan Philip M. Merikle University of Waterloo Thomas Metzinger Johannes GutenbergUniversitt Mainz Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles Jonathan W. Schooler University of California at Santa Barbara Tim Shallice University College, London Jerome L. Singer Yale University David Spiegel Stanford University School of Medicine Petra Stoerig Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Giulio Tononi The Neurosciences Institute Jeff Miller University of Otago Geoffrey Underwood University of Nottingham Michael C. Mozer University of Colorado Daniel M. Wegner Harvard University W. Trammell Neill University at Albany Charles Yingling Standford University Keith Oatley Ontario Institute for Studies in Education FOUNDING EDITORS Bernard J. Baars The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego William P. Banks Pomona College

Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog The imagination: Cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects Kieron P. OÕConnor*, Frederick Aardema Centre de recherche Fernand-Seguin, 7331 Hochelaga St., Montréal, Que., Canada H1N 3V2 Received 22 October 2003 Available online 2 November 2004 Abstract This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. In fact, both imagination and perception define sense of reality jointly according to what is possible and not possible. Absorption in a possible world depends on the strengths of alternative possibilities, and the relationship between core and marginal consciousness. The model may offer a parsimonious account of different states and levels of imaginal consciousness, and of how ‘‘believed-in imaginings’’ develop and become under some circumstances ‘‘lived-in experiences.’’ Ó 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Consciousness; Cognition; Imagination; Possibility; Absorption; Meta-cognition You canÕt depend on your eyes if your imagination is out of focus Mark Twain * Corresponding author. Fax: +1 514 251 2617. E-mail address: kieron.oconnor@crfs.umontreal.ca (K.P. OÕConnor). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.005 234 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 1. Theories of the imagination and imagery 1.1. Historical overview Philosophers can generally be divided into those who have attributed imagination a subordinate role such as Sartre, Plato, or Hobbes and those for whom it took on a super-ordinate, almost mystical role as with Kant, Coleridge, and Schelling (Brann, 1991). Aristotle can be placed in between these opposite positions as he primarily viewed imagination as a distinct faculty operating in a wide variety of cognitive processes. In particular, for Aristotle imagination referred to the process by which an image is presented to us, and may have been part of the same faculty associated with perception, the only difference being whether the image occurs in the presence or absence of sensory input. This link between sensory perception, imagery, and imagination has persisted. Table 1 gives a summary of the history of ideas up to 1900 when imagination effectively dropped off the philosophical map. The current status of the philosophy of the imagination, or lack thereof, is traced back by Thomas (1997, 1999) to the linguistic turn in philosophy with its emphasis on the association between thought and language. In psychological theorizing, the behaviorist turn in psychology, denied the experience of mental images all together. Freud (1900) compounded the death of imagination by relegating it as a surrogate satisfaction of basic instincts along with fantasizing and hallucinations. Subsequently, in recent times, however, the phenomenological–existential tradition has addressed imagination as a separate and parallel faculty to perception. In SartreÕs (1940) terms, imagination concerns itself with Ôabsence,Õ perception with ‘‘presence.’’ Sartre and in particular Merleau-Ponty Table 1 Conceptions of the imagination Imagination as a faculty Imagination as memory and or a picture in the mind Imagination as originality, creativity, and transcendence Imageless imagination Aristotle: The process by which an image is presented to us, and present in all cognition Hobbes: Imagination as a decaying sense Bacon: Imagination influenced from above serving creativity, religion, and poetry Ryle: Imagination as a form of pretending Sartre: Imagination situates Aquinas: Storehouse of forms the unseen in time and received through senses place Kant: Representation of an object without its presence Furlong: Mental imagery is quasi-perceptual experience Descartes: Imagination connects mind and body Shelley: Seeing similarity in difference Gibson: Imagery as perceptual anticipation Hume: Imagination as the lost vivacity of sense impressions Kant: Imagination as the White: Imagination power to gain (transcendental) is to think of knowledge something as possibly being so Fichte: Imagination transcends Wittgenstein: the ÔIÕ to produce non ÔIÕ Imagination is in the service of intention and is an echo of a thought in sight K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 235 (1945) seemed to assume that imagination would essentially take a visual form to enable the imagination to physically situate the ‘‘unseen’’ in both time and place. 1.2. Imagination as imagery Image theories resurfaced in the wake of the cognitive revolution, but without any explicit link between images and imagination. Current image theories generally do not claim to be theories of the imagination (Thomas, 1999) although in practice confusion between imagery and imagination still reigns (see Kosslyn, 1980). According to Thomas (1999), theories of mental imagery fail to accommodate the much broader concept of the imagination, in particular the creative aspect of the imagination. Picture theory for example, where visual imagery involves having inner pictures composed of copies or remnants from earlier sense impressions, fails to account for the association between imagination and creativity, because imagination involves more than just recombining copies from former sense impressions. Whereas picture and descriptive theory, cannot accommodate the association between imagination and creativity, active perception theory or seeing as could provide the missing link between imagination, imagery, and creative imagination in the arts and sciences (Thomas, 1999). Gurswitch (1964) talks of imagination as a necessary extension of perception to give continuity to seeing as. This active perception theory holds that the perceptual processes involved in imagery are the same processes active in perception enabling us to see things as they are or might be by discovering defining features. In this model there is no finished product, but an ongoing exploration of the environment. The notion of ‘‘seeing as’’ of course implies that we know what ‘‘seeing’’ is. One legacy of the equation of imagination with imagery is the assumption that imagery and perception use the same psychological and physiological apparatus. Visual images and imagined imagery are hence mutually exclusive to the extent that conscious construction of visual imagery interferes with visual thinking or ‘‘imageless thought’’ (Kunzendorf, Young, Beecy, & Beals, 2000). Thus, the leading cognitive model of visual mental imagery holds that visual perception and visual imagery share a number of mental operations, and rely upon common neural structures. Recent reports of patients showing double dissociations between perception and imagery abilities have however challenged the perception-imagery equivalence hypothesis from the functional point of view (Kaski, 2002). But, the notion that imagination must take a visual form has persisted even if it is recognized that smell, taste, sound, and words may elicit the imagery (Baars, 1993). In the clinical literature also there is increasing recognition that imagined fears can be script or verbally driven rather than take a visual form (Borkovec, 1985). 1.3. Seeing and ‘‘seeing as’’ The processes supposed to produce imagination have reflected the quasi-perceptual nature of its content. Since the early days of perceptual theory, there was a tendency to consider that imagination was accounted for by perceptual theories. Sensory realist theories of perception do not need imagination, since perception is entirely accounted for by sensory input. As the mind was an epiphenomenon to behaviorism, so to sensory realism, imagination is an epiphenomenon to sensation. The imagination is not a faculty or a stored image even, it is, like perception, a response to the circumstances of external events. The person does the same in imagining as in seeing, except 236 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 in the former the stimulus is absent and so the reception of the stimulus is less clear (Rachlin, 1980). The image like a neural trace will slowly decay without further stimulus input. Sensory realism implies by default the tacit acceptance that perception deals with reality, but imagination with the unreal, or what does not exist. Since our five senses can account for all thatÕs there, any other functions are superfluous and are not dealing directly with reality. Likewise, historically, there has been a tendency to apply a sensory model to oneÕs sense of thought, feeling, and imagination, which seemingly can only be understood in reference to images or quasi-perceptual experience. Such an inner sense model, however, does not give an adequate account of the other meanings of the imagination that do not involve images. Rather, a coherent theory of the imagination needs to go beyond image and perceptual theories of the imagination and offer an account for imagination that does not rely on sensory models alone. Early cognitive information processing theories built on the sensory realist model but interposed a cognitive ‘‘black box’’ mediation of events. In this model of perception the role of the imagination was unproblematically grouped with pictorial and other cognitive representations. However, in newer models of active perception, the world is viewed as constructed actively by the person. The Gibsonian approach, for example, does away with cognitive representation, and sees perception ‘‘afforded’’ directly by the parameters in the environment, so that in an existential sense, seeing (and being) become doing. Imagery in ecological psychology is tied to action. It is anticipation of action. Images are not pictures in the head but plans for obtaining information from potential environments (Neisser, 1976). In motor theories of mind (Weimer, 1977), action, specifically muscle action, gates and determines sensory conduction tying image to action, harking back to earlier ideomotor notions of thought control (Festinger, Burnham, Ono, & Bamber, 1967; Munsterberg, 1899). This close connection between reality, intention, action, and meaning leaves even less space for an independent role of imagination than with the pictoral theories of the cognitive representation models. In an extreme direct perceptual view, there is no function which is not tied directly to relating and adapting to the environment. Imagination then either becomes an extension of the perception-action cycle, its precursor or its by-product. In more post-modern ecology and social constructionism, any reference to an internal world is suspect, or is a language game (Wittgenstein, 1953). In such post-modern accounts, although the imaginary may have a status, imagination does not. The imaginary is anyway a rhetorical, perhaps machiavellian, device to create illusions, as figures of speech. What is not real becomes simply a shadow cast by what is real, and is always in the service of reality and real goals. In post-modernism then conceptions of the imagination flip inside out and complete an historic shift in location from an inaccessible place inside the person to the public domain outside. At the other end of the spectrum, many literary writers would still consider imagination the epitomy of an inaccessible subjective process (Kearney, 1993). The mechanism producing perceptual construction may be cognitive, ecological or motor as in the motor theory of mind. In all cases however, imagination is not well addressed in itself. In cognitive constructivist terms, if reality is what I impose and interpret, then non-reality must equally be my construction. It must serve a real purpose or it would make nonsense to construct it. But, of course, the idea that imagination fulfills a role other than imaginal representation or preparation for action, raises questions as to its adaptive utility. In particular, the creative role of imagination. Conjuring up representations of reality might be useful in order to address them at a distance or to K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 237 anticipate them. But what could be the use of a process devoted to creating and thinking about things we know do not and perhaps can never exist! In any case the neat distinction between perception and imagination or reality and non-reality implied in both sensory, perceptual, and social constructionist theories does not conform with everyday experience where such realms are continually blurred and overlapping in a non-pathological way. The relationship between imagination and reality is far too ambivalent for either a realist or constructionist account. We can have a felt inarticulate sense of the real in the absence of perceptual input. We can experience inexplicable shifts in reality under normal perceptual circumstances. The imagined can appear very real and elicit real reactions even when intellectually we know we are imagining (e.g., mime illusion). In the following sections we will outline a phenomenological account of the imagination which suggests divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by pre-cognitive factors of ‘‘sense of reality’’ and ‘‘sense of non-reality’’ where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. It is proposed that sense of reality and unreality informs both perception and imagination, so imagination and perception always operate in conjunction, and predominance of one over the other is a function of intention and level of absorption in reality. Finally, we argue that this synergy between imagination and perception supports a possibilistic model of consciousness. In the possibilistic model, consciousness only ever presents the world in different degrees of possibility never as certainty, consequently, perception and imagination must at all times work together to form any kind of awareness. 2. Perception, imagination, and sense of reality 2.1. Reality and non-reality Reality as we know it, is essentially defined by a consensus (Rorty, 1979) although physicality and ÔtherenessÕ are part of the implicit criteria for recognizing reality, the feeling of ÔrealnessÕ is built up by rhetoric and persuasion rather than through appeal to objective criteria (Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995). As Havel (1997) points out clear indications between real and conceivable worlds are not self-evident. We know reality through the attitude we adopt to it, and by a convincing discourse which builds up the real through use of culture bound signs not just through phenomenal experience. All cultures make reference to unseen forces which have a reality value or what de Rivera and Sarbin (1998) term Ôbelieved in imaginings,Õ whether these be X-rays or demons, and the cultural consensus on visible or undetectable reality can change over time (Feyerabend, 1988). One approach to understanding how sense of reality is constituted is to see what happens when it is not present. If we look at people who experience the loss of sense of reality, a condition also known as derealization or depersonalization (Fewtrell & OÕConnor, 1995), we see that sense of reality is intricately wound up with sense of identity. Losing one puts the other in question. In a recent study looking at appraisals of those suffering from derealization, key worries were: fear of not regaining sense of reality, and fear of losing self (Charbonneau & OÕConnor, 1999). Triggers for derealization tend to be discontinuities in normal experience, a trauma, an accident or a sudden change in arousal or even perceptual incoherencies in the world (seeing something out of 238 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 place) or dysfunctional self-awareness. Sometimes disruptions of the normal balance orientation system linked to dizziness can lead to derealization experiences (Fewtrell & OÕConnor, 1988). People most likely to suffer distress from disorientation are those with a rigid and inflexible mode of perception, about what should or not constitute reality or normality (OÕConnor, Chambers, & Hinchcliffe, 1989). Obviously, as in other psychological disturbance, secondary appraisals of the experience (IÕm going crazy) can exacerbate distress, but the lack of ability to tolerate shifts to alternative forms of reality organization could make the person react Ôas ifÕ reality has disappeared (perhaps forever). In fact, one way to overcome derealization is to engage in whatever reality arises. In other words, drop the attitude of dysfunctional self-focus and focus awareness on external detail. In this way, acting ‘‘as if’’ the self is distanced from reality is counteracted by acting ‘‘as if’’ immersed in reality. Both ‘‘as if’’s are meta-cognitive exercises which may draw on the imagination, so paradoxically, imagining specific interactions with reality can help the person engage in perceived reality and lose the abnormal sense of self-awareness. A shift into derealization always represents a defensive option and indicates a positioning of self regarding engagement in reality. In some sense, removing the self from reality can be used to secure the self-world relation and safeguard sense of self over sense of reality. For example, a client begins to experience derealization after a period of intense self-questioning. She asks: ‘‘Do I appear strange?’’ ‘‘Are people looking at me?’’ ‘‘Am I talking properly?’’ She feels the intense need to continuously observe and monitor herself. Ironically, it is this hyperfocus on reality which is inducing derealization. She begins to see herself as acting strangely and oddly and acts ‘‘as if’’ she is divorced from her body. Conversely imagining that she is in reality and acting normally with her friends reduces the derealizing experience. So imagination can help reduce a sense of unreality by bringing the experience within the bounds of the conceivable. It does so either because the real is not perceptually available, or needs elaborating on, or the inconceivable needs to be established as a counterpoint to reality. However, this implies that a sense of reality and unreality informs both perception and imagination in self-world relations. Whether imagination or perception predominates may be a function of degree of sense of reality rather than a result of a cognitive choice made on the basis, for example, of content of material to be processed (e.g., visible versus invisible). We pursue this point in the next section. 2.2. Co-existence of imagination and perception The common distinction between imagination and perception with the former signifying something that is not there and the latter signifying what is there is, by itself, not especially helpful in determining the ‘‘realness’’ or ‘‘thereness’’ of a mental experience. In waking life, images rarely occur in the total absence of stimulus input from outside reality and in situations where this is the case, for example dreaming, the difficulty distinguishing between what is real and not real is evident in sleep disordered states of parasomnia or dissociation. Perhaps even more salient is the fact that perception does not always have ‘‘thereness’’ or ‘‘vivacity’’ either, especially during times when we ‘‘imagine.’’ Yet, this is often considered less significant than any lack of vividness during imaging, because the reappearance of physical reality when we stop imagining is never doubted. Imaginal disturbance often accompanies perceptual disturbance, and as noted earlier, in derealization, imagination can help in re-establishing sense of reality. In anxiety disorders, imagined fears can lead directly to perceptual difficulties. Anticipation of threat can cloud vision K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 239 and impair attention. Conversely, a perceptual shock can be followed by subsequent haunting imaginary fears, as in post-traumatic stress disorder. An important aspect about the boundary dispute between perception and the imagination, is that both can exist simultaneously, and this rather upsets the notion that one concerns non-reality and the other external reality. The ‘‘perky effect’’ originally showed the equivalent effect of perception and imagination on behavior, and that one cannot imagine and perceive the same object at the same time (Perky, 1910). But people can easily slide off into dream like states without losing contact with reality, occupying both imaginary and real space at the same time. A lady imagines clearly her fatherÕs face in the window, whilst aware she is physically grounded in a therapistÕs office. I imagine myself on a beach in Florida, whilst driving to work in Montreal in the here and now. The person can function whilst not completely in reality nor in the imagination but somewhere in between. The degree of this ‘‘in-betweenness’’ can clearly be modified by context. Deprived of clear evidence of reality, imagination comes to the rescue and there is an ability to shift between imagination and perception in the same stimulus context, without losing sense of reality in order to function. In case of ambiguity, the potential symbiotic relation between perception and imagination is evident, since imagination enables me to draw on experiences from different times and places to try to ‘‘fit’’ with present reality. Seeing a half formed image in the dark, I consciously generate different shapes from my memory (Casey, 1970, 1976), going back and forth between perception and imagination to both imagine and see how they fit. On the other hand, when current reality is not in question, the imagination can be evoked to conjure up experiences or objects which have never existed. As Casey (1976) points out, imagination can serve to enrich perception and when we return to perception it is enhanced. ItÕs use here is precisely that it is able to elicit powerful reactions to enhance the effect of a real physical context. 2.3. Imagination and intentional context However, one fundamental difference between imagination and perception is that perception apparently responds less well to intent, manipulation, and expectations than the imagination. This rather self-evident observation is given its rightful importance in dream research as a difference between the perceptual dream environment and the conative aspects of the dreamer (DeGracia, 1999). This may tie in directly with sense of realness in that the consequence of the ability to direct our mental content, although providing us with a sense of control, gives mental experience the quality of impermanence as opposed to perception. When we open our eyes a perceptual environment will spontaneously appear while when we close our eyes our mental content follows our intent, volition, and expectations. However, much can be said for the idea that imagination would take on qualities normally ascribed to the perception of objects in the outside world if we would not use our volition so continuously, and if images and thoughts would not be so quickly replaced by another. Exercising oneÕs intent and volition may tie in directly with our sense of identity and the boundary between perception and imagination, with the latter signifying something we have and the former signifying something that happens to us. If we would imagine a tree without exercising any type of volition and thus not distract ourselves from the image of the tree, the tree would appear to happen before our eyes, or in other words, not be experientially distinct from seeing a tree in physical reality. In other words, interacting with the imagination can be identical to interacting with the environment. I can adopt different intentional stances. Either I can be the 240 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 spectator of an imagined scene and remain distant from it, or I can be absorbed and engaged in the scene actively and be manipulating the imaginary environment around me. As in real interaction when I have skilled involvement in the imagination, I may lose sense of ego in the flow of the engaging activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Novelists report how imaginary characters and plots take on a life of their own. In anxious patients, imagined scenarios take off seemingly out of control and exert a pull stronger than the person. A crucial determinant of my intent towards either an imaginary or a perceived object is its context. The imagination, like perception, always occurs in a context. It is not possible, in the imagination as in reality, to imagine people, events or even have meaningful thought unsurrounded by an implicit context (Ahsen, 1984; OÕConnor & Gareau, 1991). In other words, in the same way that when I see a tree, it is seen in the context of, say, a field and from an observer position, so when I conjure up a person or a scenario in my imagination, there is a surrounding context and I am positioned in respect to the person or scene. For example, I imagine my friend Geoffrey, in Hong Kong, but the image is a Geoffrey dressed according to a specific past context or perhaps a composite of contexts, but nonetheless linkable to specific past times and places. This context and positioning embodies my way of seeing or imagining and hence guides my intent towards the image. Changing implicit context may change intentional options. For example, I see a familiar face at a party and I struggle to place it in a context, finally settling on a person working in the local library. I am not in the library now, but this implicit context directs my immediate intentional interaction with the person. On approaching more closely, I may realize that I was wrong and that the face fits better within the context of the local hairdresser. Again my intended interaction and perhaps entire project towards and way of approaching the person could change. Neither the person nor the explicit context (the party) has changed, rather a series of implicit contexts have redirected my intentional focus. The existence of an accompanying background ‘‘wordly’’ context to any image or percept of course confirms that all consciousness is relational. I am always in the world and, in some way, relating to the world when I see or do anything. IÕm never in a vacuum. But this context has, at the same time, a geographical and a dialectical aspect. Geographically, the context takes the form of a distribution peaking at the immediate focus and tapering off into the margins of consciousness (see Figs. 1A and B). The gradient is defined by diminishing clarity and accessibility and necessarily so, since as Stephen Brown (2000) notes, the lack of clarity at the margins is essential to contrast with the vividness of the figure, and this contrast completes the sense of being ‘‘here’’ rather than ‘‘there.’’ What is unclear and out of view is an essential ground to give the figure clarity. Bruce Mangan (1993) has spoken eloquently of the margins of consciousness, and how inattentiveness and inarticulateness does not diminish the phenomenological intensity and importance of vague feelings arising from the margins, such as ‘‘tip of the tongue’’ phenomena. In the same way that I may just vaguely detect features of an object on the periphery of vision, so I may have a vague sense of knowing a fact on the margins of my thinking focus. The last point leads up to the inevitable dialectical logic of consciousness; what is clear is qualified by what is unclear, what is seen by what is not seen (Fig. 1C). This basic dialectical limitation of consciousness is simply a pre-cognitive fact of human existence, it does not need a psychological or other explanation. However, the dialectical opposition between what is there and not there creates a space between the two, in which we as human beings psychologically position ourselves. In psychological terms, what is unseen or unclear or vaguely on the horizon ‘‘out K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 241 Fig. 1. (A) Vertical view of cognitive focus situated against an unseen background. Dotted circles represent competing cognitive domains within the field of consciousness and the metacognitive ability to consider several competing possibilities at the same time. (B) Horizontal view of cognitive focus sharing competing possibility distributions which determine the geographical dimensions of the core and margins of consciousness. (C) Lateral view illustrating the dialectical relationship between reality and non-reality as a separate but supporting dimension to the geographical dimension (B). Intentionality determines the exact form and nature of the tension between what is there and what could be there, thereby creating a concrete and identifiable possibility space for any one project. of view’’ is never merely ‘‘not there,’’ it has a relationship to me and my projects, since the underlying dialectic of consciousness dictates it as essential to define the vivid real spot-lit workspace (Baars, 1988) where my conscious projects are focussed. For example, if I am writing a letter, I am not just not doing another activity. I am specifically and perhaps consciously not writing a cheque or a report, and this comparative knowledge guides how I write the letter. In addition, future possibilities are continually opening up as I carry out a task. A possibility is perhaps temporally or permanently ‘‘out of sight’’ or seeable later conditional on evolution of my project. The most coherent way in which such a dialectical space can be ‘‘inhabited’’ by a relational consciousness and its future directed projects, is by itself becoming a possibility space affording me and my projects, future possibilities. 242 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 3. The possibilistic model of consciousness 3.1. Possibility and perception Possibility as an epistemological category is hardly new to philosophy. Leibnitz (1682) was one of the earliest thinkers to introduce the importance of considering ‘‘things that are possible but yet not necessary and which do not really exist’’ in defining reality. More recently, artificial intelligence has also employed mathematical models of possible worlds as a way of reasoning about changes in expected actions (e.g., Ginsberg & Smith, 1988). But the richness of possibility as a psychological counterpart to the dialectical nature of consciousness merits further exploration. It is argued here that possibility is a key defining psychological characteristic of consciousness and that to be aware is be aware of possibility. Possibility covers very well the relationship of all aspects of a ground ‘‘not yet in view’’ to my projects. It covers what might be, what might come later, what might constitute a tolerable variation of what already exists, how my changing position might modify my perception. However, the notion of possibility does not just apply to what might be, it applies also to what is here now. In the same way that what is not yet seen has a meaning as a possibility, so what is ‘‘seen’’ is still equally a possibility. The nature of my projects in the world is that they are directed into the future, ahead of themselves, in other words their possibility defines them. Since everything I see, I see inside a project, so the ‘‘seen’’ too is defined by its possibility for my project. What I see about a telephone or a lamp or a door depends very much on what I intend to do. We can always detect new physical attributes in familiar objects which we never noticed before, but notice now because our project dictates a possible relevance. Equally, potential physical attributes of a visible object are never exhausted, and objects are frequently seen as complete objects despite the absence of their complete physicalness (e.g., the corner of the chair 1 cannot see but whose absence from view does not deter my belief in the chairÕs solidity). Clearly, however, the leg of a chair 1 cannot see momentarily due to the perspectival limitations of my position has a different ontological and possibilistic status to the object not yet at all in view, or the scene around the next corner I have not yet turned, or the future possible use for an object not yet conceived. Although there are many qualitatively distinct types of possibility, and probably as many possible uses for an object as there are projects, it seems nonetheless feasible to construct a distribution of possibility with a maximum and a minimum for any one project. Such a maximum likelihood distribution conforms with the proposed distribution of consciousness with a figure ground gradient descending from core to margins (Mangan, 1993). The knowledge that possibility is a key defining psychological dimension of consciousness, makes the co-existence of imagination and perception not only understandable but mandatory for an adaptive functioning. If the seen is partially defined by the surrounding unseen then the act of perception itself is defined by the background context of the imagination and, as such, imagination helps form the perceived event and is part of it. Continuing the figure-ground analogy, perception then explores the figure whereas the surrounding not-seen is a latent, if defining, characteristic of what is there. Imagination is the active exploration of this latent possible space in the same way that perception is the active exploration of the visible space. We are now in a position to try to resolve previous incoherences in the cognitive distinctions between perception and imagination through appealing to a possibilistic model. Classically, per- K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 243 ception is outward, and concerned with what is there, whilst imagination is inward looking and concerned with what is not there. But we can consciously switch from one to the other world, and we can substitute one for the other. Also we can at the same time, sometimes within the same stimulus context be seeing some aspects and imagining others. It is clear that within the structure of consciousness itself, there must always be aspects of the real which we assume are there, but which present themselves by their absence (the back of a chair I cannot see) and the object of perception is always embedded in the larger context of a world beyond it, of which I have only marginal awareness. The same appears to apply to mental experience not directly related to physical reality such as thoughts, ideas, concepts or images, themselves being defined by the context surrounding it, which not only leads to the self-evident conclusion that we cannot imagine without imagination but may also indicate that we cannot have meaningful thought without it. Thus imagination can operate both inward and outward, but is ever present within all mental experience, regardless whether its causal history lies in the outside world or the one within. It then seems difficult to consider anything as entirely ‘‘definitely all there,’’ rather both perception and imagination are in different ways part of the same dialectical context. In both imagination and perception, the common structure of consciousness dictates that to be aware is always to be aware that I am aware of some things but not others. In other words, at the margins of consciousness are always possibilities (e.g., future possible outcomes). An integral part of perception is inferring what is not there, hence both, reality and possibility are part of perception. It may seem then more reasonable to see imagination and perception not as distinct cognitive functions but rather to as dual modes of consciousness operating together. In the following section, we expand on the role of imagination within a possibilistic model of consciousness. 3.2. The possibilistic model and imagination The possibilistic model of the imagination grows naturally out of the foregoing observations on the structure of consciousness and the perspective limitation of consciousness—what is seen is necessarily defined by what is not seen but in particular it is defined by what could be. Possibility as a defining dimension of consciousness brings forth the important role of conceiving the possible through the imagination. Three separate claims of the model implicate the role of the imagination in sensing reality: (a) What I am doing exists alongside what I am intending to do—my projects in the world have a future, (b) Imagination creates the future and this creative aspect of seeing, fills up the space between what is and what is not, and (c) Living in reality is a matter of degree, and I exist in a gradient of awareness where different possibilities are associated with distinct senses of reality. 3.2.1. Imagining and doing Heidegger (1962) emphasized the primordial importance of time in defining human existence and consciousness. I am always ahead of myself since I am constantly in a state of becoming. An object, a scene or a person is defined by what they promise to become. In HeideggerÕs opinion, the past comes towards the present from the future. As Heidegger (1988) also pointed out, key emotions spring from the potential unfulfillment of the ‘‘about to be’’ (e.g., disappointment, grief, and anguish). On the one hand, everything which is real in the here and now must, in order to be so real, be independent from me with its history before and beyond me. But it only has this real 244 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 property independent of me in the first instance because it has a future, and this future primarily determines its existence for me as real. This future for the object always ties in closely with my projects for my future. So, for example, if my intention is to make a cup of coffee, everything I see fits into my coffee making enterprise, and is ordered in the center or on the margins of consciousness on the basis of relevance to my coffee making. Of course, I want to make my coffee in a ‘‘real’’ mug, not one IÔm just imagining. A real mug is one that stands before me, beyond me, with its own ‘‘factual history’’ as a mug capable of holding scalding hot water and brewing a good coffee. If my project changes to clearing out old mugs, a whole new structure of past and future possibilities of the same mugs comes into being. The real mug now becomes an ‘‘old-out-of-data-stained-to-be-thrown-out-mug’’, whereas previously it was a ‘‘solid-capable-ofholding-hot-coffee-mug’’. The realist argument might be that even though I may not notice all attributes of an object at one time, they nonetheless exist independent of my project. But if I go back to view attributes of objects I had not previously noticed, my seeing is still intricately tied up with my being and projects (in this case a ‘‘going-back-to-see-missed-attributes’’-project). What I see depends on what I do. I can of course vividly recall an activity at a different place and time. But memory access depends nonetheless on my current project. Elements of the past become important if they relate to future projects. 3.2.2. Imagination as the art of the possible Some objects and events always exist on the margins of consciousness—as potential events, or objects that cannot yet be seen. They emerge into full consciousness as I switch my head to a different position or my intention to a different project. Gibson (1979), in his direct realist approach, locates these emergent properties invariantly within the objects themselves. So the use of an object is reflected in its about-to-be used attributes. My intented use affords its existence to me for my project. But the Gibsonian account cannot apply to all possible uses of an object. Many possibilities do not concern, not physical attributes but can be triggered by meta-suggestion. There is a creative aspect to seeing, which is embodied in imaginal possibility. I may use a shoe as a wedge or a hammer or for other uses not dictated by its singular attributes. In other words, imagination can be concerned with possibilities which are not uniquely physically afforded by an object. At the same time that I can be creative with worldly attributes, I am also living in a world beyond me that I can only partially predict and control. Such a condition is an existential given, and trying to separate me from an ‘‘external’’ world is to destroy the essential pre-cognitive self-world functional unit, where my sense of me and of reality is always partly defined by what is beyond me. As the relational self is located in the space created by me and the world, so possibility is always situated between the person and the object in an intentional space filling the dialectical gap in-between the two. It is not located discretely in either one. So intentional space between me and the world needs always to be filled up creatively, it is never just there. 3.2.3. Absorption in degrees of reality According to the possibilistic model, what defines our sense of reality is not an ‘‘out there’’ capturing our senses but our level of relative absorption in what is most possible. Such a degree of absorption implies a comparable lack of absorption in a range of alternative possibilities. What is seen arises against a background of what is not seen, what was there, or what can never be there, or what might be there, or what is yet to come into view, all on the margins of consciousness. K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 245 Psychologically, there is a clear distinction between ÔsupposingÕ and ÔimaginingÕ. Imagining always takes place in a lived-in context, just as perception, otherwise we are supposing and not imagining. So although I may suppose a possibility as an abstract idea, it is absorption in this possibility which gives me the sense of reality in which I live, and so conditions what I know is there and what I know is not there. Conceiving possible worlds then in no way compromises my absorption in a real world. Indeed, cognitive focus is predicated on a pre-cognitive world always there. But a gradient of absorption covarying with degrees of possibility accommodates smoothly our sporadic changes in consciousness whilst maintaining our sense of reality. In other words, our focus of consciousness changes seemlessly only because such focus takes the form of a possibility distribution where the next focus is already imminent on the margins and appears or disappears from view according to its likelihood value in the possibility distribution rather like successive ripples on a water surface. So, in fact, conceiving possibilities actually sharpens degree of absorption in reality. The possibilistic model would be in broad agreement with the cognitive model of perception, concerning the immediate perception of empirical detail under a normal sense of reality. So the validity of the model is best explored though how it accounts for the role of absorption in setting up a sense of reality in altered states of consciousness, including dreaming, where the person becomes absorbed and reacts realistically to an unreal world. 3.3. Dreaming and altered states of consciousness Sense of reality does not suddenly collapse in the absence of sense information. One of the differences noted earlier between perception based on sensory information and imagery occurring inside of us is that the former is often regarded as something that happens to us, while the latter is wound up with our sense of identity and hence are qualified as experiences that we have. It appears the degree of absorption is directly related to these qualifiers, which in turn may be the result of exercising our volition in the case of inner imagery, while perception with its causal history in physical reality does not respond very well to any mental manipulation. Controlling the imagery and exercising volition implies a meta-cognitive stance towards such imagery, which leads to holding a particular image or sequence of images static instead of letting the imagery present itself on its own terms without any conscious intervention of the observer. Let us say a person would be asked to close the eyes and imagine a pile of foods on a dish. At several points during such an imaginary exercise the person will exercise his/her volition either by deciding he/she wants to see a particular type of food displayed on the dish and retrieving the proper information from memory. During that time, the focal point of awareness is not the imagined dish. Instead, the person has removed attention away from the image with the intent to return later once the proper information has been retrieved and decided upon. In such circumstances, the image remains static, because the person beforehand decides what will be seen, and will remain largely in a context generated by him/herself instead of the context surrounding the dish. However, if less volition is exercised, but attentional focus remains on the dish then with no other thoughts to divert the persons attention, the focus of awareness continues to be the particular type of dish. The personÕs focus may however drift to the vegetables on the side. The person did not intend to pay any particular attention to the vegetables on the side, and their colors, but 246 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 was drawn to them automatically. The colors may stand out far more than before, and the whole perception of the dish increases in vivacity. Then suddenly, again without conscious volition, the person may suddenly become aware of something in the periphery of the dish and see a white table cloth on which the dish is placed, all the while however no conscious decision has been made to widen the imagined scenario. At this point, the image can hardly be distinguished from seeing a dish on a table cloth in reality. The dish is vivid, very much ‘‘there’’ and appears to happen instead of being something he/she has. The person is immersed in an imaginary scenario, which led to actively participating in an imaginary world. Here we see the importance of intentional context which may bring about a complete shift in object-subject where what was previously subject becomes object. As hard as the above thought experiment may be to perform on demand, it occurs every night as we go to sleep and become absorbed in hypnagogic imagery that appear to form the nucleus around which a dream scenario appears. Regrettably, as the context which frames our waking experience retreats to the background it often leaves our waking self in its wake with little memory to report on such incidents. According to DeGracia (1999) such perceptual environments are the result of a disengagement of the sensory ‘‘gear’’ leaving the perceptual and cognitive ‘‘gear’’ in operation, which continue to produce a world that one is immersed in. When perception based on sense information retreats to the background it leaves a vacuum. This vacuum is poised with ambiguity on the verge of what could or might be there, which by degree of immersion will be perceived as really there. LaBerge and DeGracia (2000) propose that global transient contexts and the cooperation and the competition among them frame the dreaming experience, and this idea is not so conceptually far from the possibilistic notion of competing possibilities of what could be there operating at the background of any perceptual environment, poised ready to become part of the scenery as ‘‘about-to-be-seen.’’ For instance, the dreamer watches a dark doorway looking to see if something is there, and not surprisingly, a figure appears not much later, or, the dreamer imagines flying up from the ground and soon after finds her/himself shooting up in the sky. It then appears that the unfolding story of the dream is the result of continuous shifts in possibilities of what could be there and which by virtue of degree of absorption introduce themselves and fade out of the perceptual environment. Lack of involvement and absorption in the dream would most likely result in a sudden collapse of the possibility distribution resulting in the disappearance of the perceptual environment with alternate possibility distributions coming to the rescue to fill up the vacuum. Or alternatively, a lack of competing possibilities may result in the perceptual environment becoming static and fading away, because the dream is unable to shift into alternate events to continue the storyline. Both experiences are reported by lucid dreamers as a ‘‘blinking on and off’’ of the visual field. This is more likely to occur with novice lucid dreamers perhaps because the possibilities operating on the margins of the events in the lucid dream are less well developed, and this may emphasize again the importance of possibilistic context. Rightfully, LaBerge and DeGracia (2000) emphasize the importance of dream context in the ongoing flow of the dream story and such a conceptualization enables a better understanding of that special variety of dreams (lucid dreams) where one is aware that one is dreaming. The importance of context for explaining this phenomenon is that the particular context affords a continuity with accessible memory so that the person while still dreaming is able to retrieve memories from the waking self unrelated to the activities being performed in the dream. Such a Ôlucid dream- K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 247 ing contextÕ consists of (LaBerge & DeGracia, 2000): (1) a reference to state (a meta-cognitive awareness that one is dreaming) (2); a semantic framework (a framework of knowledge to conceptualize and give meaning to the experiences); and (3) a goal-options context (a range of behaviors expressed in the dream). In phenomenological terms, this context allows the waking self to position itself in relation to events in the dream resulting in the formation of a functional waking self-dream world unit that would otherwise not be feasible. Of course, such a context is a delicate one creating a competing possibilistic context that normally operates while awake (for instance, the realization that one is actually lying in bed). If the latter was fully activated it would lead the person to wake up, or conversely, lead the dreamer to become absorbed with events in the dream not part of the lucid dream context, and so revert back to a non-lucid dreaming. Experienced lucid dreamers are often quite aware of the waking self-dream world unit where thoughts and expectations manifest themselves in their corresponding dream environment. Lucid dreamers regulate their thoughts and expectations accordingly, since a free floating stance towards the dream world may quickly result in an undesired and likely non-lucid story line. Another aspect of lucid dreaming is the reliance on ambiguity to develop a dream scenario, whereby that which is as yet unseen can often provide an excellent doorway to develop a dream in the desired direction. For instance: Around that corner of the building there will be a magic door transporting me to X, or in a few moments, a figure will appear from that dark spot in the room. Failure or success in moving the dream environment in the desired direction often depends on a persuasive plot line, and the availability of alternative possibilities to emerge in the story line. A persuasive narrative does not necessarily need to borrow upon elements in the dream environment, but can be completely bypassed by a reliance on well-functioning waking self-dream world unit. It seems then perceptually normal in lucid dreaming to be in a both real and possible world at the same time. Whenever I see an object, I see its possibilities, and reality itself is established by my absorption in a most likely world rather than a certain one. Hence, I must necessarily maintain some flexibility about the maximum possibility to permit for future developments and future adaptation to projects. This meta-cognitive aspect of the imagination, entertaining competing maximal possibilities, also plays a crucial role in both normal and pathological absorption in waking reality. 3.4. The possibility distribution The idea of a personalized possibility distribution may be heuristically compared to a likelihood distribution where the maximum possibility is a maximum likelihood (Edwards, 1972) (see Fig. 2). In its simplest form the possibilistic model proposes that what we take as our reality is arrived at as the most possible world in the context of other possible worlds. So this world is never a stand alone reality, rather it is only ever constructed as maximum possibility relative to other possibilities. Hence, it forms the maximum of a special distribution of alternative possibilities, some likely, some remote, given the maximum. The possibility distribution may be skewed, it may be irregular, it may be sharp or flat. If flat, this would mean that in the face of certain alternatives, the person would be more vulnerable to transition from one reality to another. The person might tolerate more deviation in one direction or another. The maximum possibility may then easily shift amongst closely competing possibilities and may be constantly modified or updated in con- 248 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 Fig. 2. (A) Possibility distributon with high absorption. (B) Possibility distribution with low absorption. tinuity with minor adaptation on the basis of interactive experience with the world. Choosing between the possibility that a roaring noise outside my apartment door represents a pack of wild wolves, or the caretaker hoovering the hall floor, may not be difficult; everything about my current horizons, history, and projects support the caretaker as maximum possibility. There are other likely possibilities, it may not be the caretaker who is hoovering, but his assistant, or someone else. These possibilities are likewise well tolerated by my distribution and do not require re-orienting my projects to which both the noise and the caretaker were in any case on the margins. Of course if my current project involved the caretaker and hoovering, the possibility distribution would be more focused on the nuances of hoovering and could be sharpened by resolving these possibilities, through opening the door, updating experience, and gaining perceptual fit. This is the normal way for pursing perceptual fit and refining a possibility distribution by testing the extent to which possibilities thrown up by my project in the world coincide with the figure ground relationships of preexisting self-world horizons; my pre-cognitive sense of reality. The more remote the possibilities from my current intended project, the more they form the tail end of the possibility distribution and the flatness of the tail end of the possibility distribution means I have more tolerance for a variety of possible outcomes. But the maximum can also be modified by changing the personal context of comparable alternative possibilities, forming around the margins of the distribution. In other words, a change in the conception of what could be there (but is not) could change perception of what is there. A good example, here, is waking up the first night in a strange hotel room, forgetting you are not in your own bedroom at home, and being disoriented by your perception of objects in apparently strange places; a perception rapidly normalized by contextualizing the space as a hotel room. The margins and the peak of the distribution are inter-dependent. Obviously change in one will affect the form of the other. A bad perceptual fit will shift the peak possibility of the distribution as may a change in the alternatives on the margins. However, the point is that according to the model, both are at the mercy of the possibilistic distribution. We see an object and a possibility distribution immediately forms around it, which defines my perceptual field, but imagining other forms of possibility can easily change the perceptual field. Suppose, for example, I am looking at a K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 249 photograph of a man standing on a bridge. I know nothing of the context of the photo. But in my imagination I conjure up different contexts. If I imagine that he is about to be shot and the photograph is taken by one of his executioners, the way I ÔseeÕ him will be distinct from if I imagine he is a tourist ambling by a historic bridge. Of course perception could be influenced by information about say, age of the man or his achievements which might guide also my attentional focus. But the point here is that even without such cognitive information, the imaginal context can also change perceptual focus. Technically, to be absorbed in possibility X implies not being absorbed in possibility Y yet the level of absorption in Y may affect the level of absorption in X. Thus, absorption always exists in relation to other possibilities where the degree of absorption in a particular scenario would be viewed as the result of the relative degree of absorption in possibility X given the degree of absorption into competing possibilities Y1, Y2, Y3, etc. If there is a displacement from what is possible to what is not possible, then this could likely be due to perceptual error, but also due to shifts in the imagined context. So the reality value of possibility X is defined by the reality value of alternative possibilities. Such a conception of absorption allows level of absorption to be schematically represented in Fig. 2. Notice, in Fig. 2, that while the specific value of possibility X (shaded bar) can be similar in both conditions (A and B) yet the level of absorption may differ from situation to situation. The shape of the possibility distribution differs, with a high absorption scenario the distribution being far sharper than in a low absorption scenario. Thus, the particular shape of a specific possibility distribution corresponds directly to the degree of absorption. Assuming that the comparison of alternative possibilities can be represented as a likelihood ratio, degree of absorption could be defined mathematically as degree of support for one possibility against the others. Support then could range from zero to an indefinitely large amount; greater values denoting greater degree of support/absorption. The scale is arbitrary but subjectively meaningful. support/absorption PThe s function for a multinomial distribution would take the form: SðqÞ ¼ i¼1 ai ln pi ðqÞ where S is support function, a the number of possibilities, p(q) the probability value for the ith of s classes (Edwards, 1972). 3.5. Meta-cognitive absorption in different realities Sense of reality at any moment for any project then is defined by the maximum possibility distribution. It follows that one could be absorbed in two maximum possibilities while still perceiving only one reality, since an absorption in a maximum possibility is a combination of available alternative possibilities and my current project in the world. My project is always in the process of becoming and so the object(s) or event(s) toward which it is directed are also in the process of becoming. Since, at any one time an object may have two or more alternative equally likely possibilities, so I could be equally absorbed in the possibilities. Also, a maximum possibility distribution, and a sense of reality can exist for something totally unrelated to information coming through the senses, because an imminent attribute could have a possibility value even though it is not real. A possibility distribution could for instance involve a sense of reality towards the idea of invisible contaminants on a hand, which might be unrelated to actual perception. A visibly clean object could become dirty if touched or knocked over in the dust, but these possibilities can also relate to the past. It could also have been dirty, or dirty and not washed properly 250 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 even whilst not appearing so. The fact that I do not see any dirt does not invalidate the sense of reality that it could be dirty. As we noted physical ‘‘thereness’’ is not a criteria for sense of reality and anyway our complete physical scene is always partly inferred. So it would be feasible for me to, at the same time, know that a door is locked but at the same time entertain the possibility that it might not be and accord both a ‘‘sense of reality.’’ Or to feel on the one hand I have my hat and gloves in my hand, but to feel a strong sense on the other hand that they could not be there but left behind in a café. Entertaining competing possible worlds at the same time is entirely possible and even in some situations desirable. The problem is the degree of absorption in possible worlds. Although there are several possible worlds, there is only one pre-cognitive reality for any given project. But the same reality can spawn distinct and contrasting possibility distributions. Absorption in this case is not a question of perceptual fit, but of how my project, by my self-world relation, maintains a remotely possible world in preference to a more possible world with better perceptual fit. Although we can be conscious of the imaginary part of a possibility and consciously know that we are living Ôas ifÕ or seeing Ôas ifÕ something is there, in a more absorbed state, the metaphorical stance may be forgotten and we become confused as to the reality value of the imaginal possibilities. We can consider three distinct degrees of absorption: (1) detachment—an attitude of intellectual curiosity; (2) a metaphorical stance—acting ‘‘as if’’; (3) living ‘‘as if’’—complete absorption. In my current writing project, I may consider the lamp in front of me has several possibilities. It could change angle, go off, flutter, perhaps change colour slightly, it could even perhaps explode, in all of which it would maintain its perceptual fit as a lamp. However, if it started flying around the room, my perception ofÔ it, as a lamp, would be very disrupted. As a consequence, I would likely in the process revise my projects towards it and my other self-world horizons would change dramatically. Supposing, however, I felt that the lamp which performed all the normal functions of a lamp, could at the same time also be a latent bird. So that the light bulb was its eye, the stem its neck, the position its perch. In this circumstance, all the normal features of the lamp would stay intact but with the additional possibility that they might develop into bird features. Now in some sense my attitude towards the lamp and its operation would retain the possibilities and perceptual fit of the lamp and I would treat the lamp as a lamp. If its bulb fails, I replace it, I change its height or position for better light, but at the same time I would act towards it as a bird, occasionally stroking it, talking to it, making it more comfortable. I am not at all surprised if the lamp squawks or flies around the room, as well as shining light on the table. Am I treating a lamp ‘‘as if’’ it were a bird, or am I treating a bird ‘‘as if’’ it were a lamp? Both positions could be supported by appeal to the same real features. I could point to the switch or the metal cover of the lamp and without denying anything about their perceived properties, I could consider them bird-like. Saying in the cognitive sense that I have attributed bird features to what is really a lamp, is to add in an unhelpful layer of cognitive process which does not reflect the seemless way in which I alternate and integrate the two possible forms of the lamp (one near, the other remote) within the same reality. In fact, ‘‘seeing’’ the same physical reality is at the root of the two distinct (bird/lamp) possibilities, and only because they both ‘‘fit’’ real ‘‘seen’’ features could they be held simultaneously to both be possibilities. Producing facts for example about birds is more likely to fuel my lamp-as-bird possibilities since the reality of birds or lamps is not in question and perceived reality, as noted, is the starting point for both competing distributions. If the lamp were to physically mutate into a chair, the chair would no longer be seen either as a lamp or a bird. It is only, in this instance, by chang- K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 251 ing my degree of absorption in imagined possibilities that I am likely to change my lamp-as-bird possibility. 3.6. Pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains and the imagination There is then a pre-cognitive, meta-cognitive, and a cognitive aspect to consciousness. At a precognitive level I need a taken for granted sense of background possibility and reality in order to even think further. But in a cognitive sense the work is never finished. In my further inspection and seeing of real objects I am always consciously jostling local possibilities. Is it this form, is it that form? The pre-cognitive aspects of consciousness are the givens by which I know I am conscious and through which I consciously realize my projects. The world is always there, in front of me, and beyond me. There is space and time, distance, and other than me which in turn defines me and my relational unit with the world. Senses obviously function as senses, once sense of reality is established. Details are seen empirically and reported on, and clearly may reflect back to cognitive decision making. At a meta-cognitive level, I may be able to consciously detach myself from one sense of reality by creating imaginary possibilities and meta-cognitively jostling these possibilities to create several senses of reality at the same time. Hence a person could legitimately be absorbed in two possible worlds at the same time, as for example, in states of dissociation, or flip alternately from one to the other, with a very small perceived change in context. However, if there is a pathological dissociation from reality, it may not be a problem of perception but of absorption. So why would people construct and absorb themselves in different competing possibility distributions? It seems compelling, personal and cultural narratives may fuel the necessity to find alternatives, and fill up a self-created possibility space. 3.7. How ‘‘believed-in’’ imaginings become ‘‘lived-in’’ A good case illustration of the process of lived-in imagination is hypnosis. In hypnotic suggestion, the person is led up to believe in a story line and to respond and feel appropriately. The induction techniques restrict the senses, and direct attentional and sensory focus to internal experience, and then guide exploration of this internal experience from beyond the personÕs experience, so positioning the person as a passive recipient of possible experience. Several authors have reported that a hypnotically induced image can be as vivid as a real one (e.g., Bryant & Mallard, 2003) and invoke similar physiological reactions (e.g., Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, Alpert, & Spiegel, 2000). In hypnosis, sense of reality is enhanced by the participantÕs ability to impose familiar and personally meaningful attributes on suggestions. Elevated hypnotizability is associated with increased levels of absorption, and other traits and cognitive styles (Bryant & Mallard, 2003). Heaps and Nash (1999) found a close association between imagination inflation and hypnotic suggestibility and dissociativity. Lynn, Kirsch, and Rhue (1996) note that hypnosis depends more on clientsÕ ability to absorb themselves in suggestions and personalize suggestions through imaginative and dissociative abilities than on induction technique or trance-like states. The inductive narrative and procedure works best however if it is familiar and culturally credible in order to be trusted and believed-in. McGuire, Adams, Junginger, Burright, and Donovick (2001), for example, reported that in a sample of people with delusional beliefs, cultural familiarity with the context of delusional narratives mediated estimates of 252 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 their probability. Green and Brock (2000) highlight the importance of the transportation quality of a narrative to influence belief. Transportation requires imagery, affect and attention, and is unaffected by whether a story is labeled as fact or fiction. As several authors have pointed out, the absorption in hypnosis loses its metaphorical Ôas ifÕ qualities and becomes a lived-in experience. But people under hypnosis often report a metacognitive aspect as part of the experience. They may be able to observe and report on their sensory state (e.g., hidden observer technique). There can also be an awareness of the environment and of the hypnotic illusion/delusion. The experience of hypnosis then does not change perception and can be most parsimoniously explained as a way of modifying degrees of absorption in imagined possibilities. This experience is not far removed from mime or magical illusion where a magicianÕs patter and mis-direction or a mimeÕs actions lead us to believe that what is not there is real, since the actions or patter leave us no alternative but to believe so, even in the absence of proof. In the words of Kay (2001), the expert magician seeks to deceive the mind rather than the eye. In both mime and magic, however, the spectator can be aware of the environment and of the illusion and may be aware that they are aware of an illusion but content to be absorbed in it since the metaphorical Ôas ifÕ is maintained. Imaginary beliefs in order to be lived-in as well as believed in must somehow be convincingly placed in the world. de Rivera and Sarbin (1998) have suggested that the background for such beliefs must be a cultural framework. The lived-in world must have a familiar past and a future, and an ecologically coherent history which creates a current environment and a future horizon. If we go back to self-perception itself, part of knowing I am in the here and now in my current environment is a knowledge of how I got here, what is beyond here, what is inside, outside, what is me/not me. Without all these bearings, I would not feel comfortably here. By and large I can give a credible account of myself and my surroundings, how I arrived, my intentions, how I intend to carry out my projects and what at least some of the consequences of my acting in the current environment would be. It is when this narrative about our immediate environment is temporarily supplemented with a more remote but convincing one that we ÔknowinglyÕ see illusions. We act ‘‘as if’’ they were real, even though we may know differently because to question the reality of an illusion puts in question our normal way of arriving at the real, and so it becomes normal to accept two competing narratives with a meta-cognitive over-rider that our sense of reality has been tricked. Sense of reality can change then not only due to problems of perceptual ‘‘fit’’ in either stimuli or consequences but also to absorption in a possible world through transportation by an imaginary narrative. Furthermore, such absorption is a logical consequence of being led up to see competing alternatives as less likely either by experience or narrative. It follows then, in the evaluation and understanding, of altered states of consciousness that the background distribution of other possible states should also be explored. The cognitive tendency has been to assume that in states of delusion or hallucination, data gathering or perceptual processing is biased (e.g., Garety & Freeman, 1999), whereas, as we have seen, it may be an imaginary possibility not perception which maintains a distorted sense of reality. In this case what might be required is a therapy to change parameters of the imagination. This would include operationalizing a possibility distribution, and manipulating alternatives on the margins of consciousness in order to shift absorption through proposing a narrative context to introduce new credible alternatives. Meta-cognitively the imagination can challenge sense of reality providing it can give a coherent and detailed story of the historical, spatial, biographic, material context necessary for an alternative possibility to K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 253 generate a sense of reality. For example, if I just stated that the pen IÕm holding is really a microphone, there would probably be little shift in the distribution centered around the maximum possibility that the pen is simply an instrument for writing. If, however, I embellished the story with details of its past, present and future life as a microphone accompanied by my acting towards it as a microphone, the possibility shift might be more marked. The story would require spatial and temporal depth plus a repositioning of my project towards the pen in order to for me to be better absorbed in the pen-as-microphone sense of reality. The clinical message here is simply that when people enter states of dissociation and appear absorbed in unreality, they may not be suffering from distortions of reality but from a meta-cognitive absorption in imagined possibilities. In this case, attempting perceptual ‘‘fit’’ through encouraging reality testing or information seeking is inappropriate. As an example, people with obsessional contamination fears can be convinced of the existence of ‘‘unseen’’ dirt, despite the presence of an intact and accurate perceptual system which ‘‘sees’’ no dirt. Further exploration reveals absorption on the basis of a personally convincing narrative in the possibility of what might be there despite proof to the contrary. The therapeutic approach proposed here is to work with the client constructing alternative imaginary scenarios in an attempt to dislodge the maximum possibility from the bottom (i.e., margins) upwards (OÕConnor & Robillard, 1999). A cognitive focus on improving perception of reality testing will not be helpful if reality is not the problem. 4. Conclusion The current article has drawn on previous philosophical and psychological accounts of the structure of consciousness, plus clinical observation to construct a possibilistic model of the imagination. In this model, the defining characteristic of perception is possibility, possible use, possible form, and possible events. Sense of reality results from absorption in a maximum possibility above other alternative possibilities. The shape of the possibilistic distribution depends on intentional context and projects towards the world. But the possibilistic space is always creatively constructed in between what is and what could be. The maximum focus requires the margins of consciousness to give it focus. The dynamic between core and margins is not dissimilar to Baars (1997) notion of the tension between conscious and unconscious cognitive processes, with both forming a ‘‘contrastive’’ context with the same content. Baars (1997) notes how discrepancies between conscious and unconscious can lead the unconscious to become the focus of the global theatre workspace (GWS). The margins can change the focus, but the notion of a possibility distribution makes such dynamic change a key property of the workspace not just a product of a discontinuity. Indeed the possibility distribution ensures by its nature a fluid uneventful transition of conscious focus, which is so not apparent in Baars conception of the GWS. The perceptual ‘‘fit’’ of the maximum possibility with sense information is the normal way that maximum possibility is confirmed and follows the hierarchical cognitive processes present in the GWS. However, in order to function, cognitive explanations require the pre-cognitive architecture of a world-as-given. One where there are ‘‘real’’ objects, distances, things, and events beyond me and around me, and which afford me a real self-world relation. The pre-cognitive architecture is a relational consciousness which always takes the form of a gradient from conscious core to unconscious margins. This context has a geographical and dialectical dimension. Geographically, every 254 K.P. OÕConnor, F. Aardema / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 233–256 sharp focus is surrounded by a field of consciousness and this focus becomes less and less acute towards the margins (see Figs. 1A and B). But dialectically, what is seen is seen in a context of what is not there. More specifically, the space between the seen and unseen becomes a possibility space of what is about to be (Fig. 1C). Hence the need for imagination as a creative faculty which fills up the possibility space by ‘‘imagining’’ what is not there. Perception has no such creativity. It is this meta-cognitive possibility gap which provides the leeway for detachment and absorption in reality. Although there is only one world or ‘‘reality structure,’’ our meta-cognitive ability permits us to be absorbed in several possible worlds at the same time, and experience a sense of reality in relation to worlds which do not (and which we sometimes know) do not exist but which nonetheless by their non-existence inform perception. The same perceived attributes may be seen inside distinct and possibly opposing intentional contexts and projects so feeding distinct senses of reality. Intricately wound up with absorption is the intent of the person as personified by projects, positioning and doings in the world. This link is inescapable and nothing can be seen or imagined unless the person acts towards it to bring out its promise and possibility. Hence change in intentional context can change possibilistic context and vice versa. The possibilistic model then proposes that sense of reality can be changed from the margins upwards, as well as by perceptual ‘‘fit’’ downwards, and that this explains the easy co-existence of perception and imagination, and indeed the very ability to shift continuously over discontinuous environmental structures. Perceptual and imaginal illusions can lead us to see conflicting or paradoxical information because narrative cues create a compelling competing context to perception. It is normal on such occasions to ÔseeÕ imaginary events and hence meta-cognitively experience conflicting senses of reality, whilst however ‘‘knowing’’ there is only one pre-cognitive reality. It may even be desirable on occasion to be metaphorically absorbed in two senses of reality, for example as a spectator of a magicianÕs or a mimeÕs illusion. We ‘‘suspend our disbelief’’ in reality on such occasions. But, we may be transported by a convincing visual or verbal narrative to construct a maximum possibility distribution and believe in it accordingly, without in any way compromising our wider perceptual sense of what is ‘‘really’’ there. Meta-cognitively the person can adopt one of three degrees of absorption with respect to possibility: detached; metaphorical; or living-as. The problem, clinically speaking, occurs when the metaphorical stance is dropped and the temporarily ‘‘believed-in’’ becomes permanently ‘‘livedin.’’ Psychopathological distortions of reality where the person experiences a state of dissociation, and appears absorbed in unreality, may not signal cognitive distortions, but rather a meta-cognitive shift of the imagination. Absorption occurs on the basis of a credible story line which promotes remote possibilities not as alternatives to, but as extensions of factual reality. Facts are unlikely to influence absorption. 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Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Examining the role of emotional valence of mind wandering: All mind wandering is not equal Jonathan B. Banks a,⇑, Matthew S. Welhaf a, Audrey V.B. Hood a, Adriel Boals b, Jaime L. Tartar a a b Nova Southeastern University, United States University of North Texas, United States a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 1 September 2015 Revised 20 May 2016 Accepted 3 June 2016 Keywords: Mind wandering Emotional valence Working memory Sustained attention a b s t r a c t To evaluate the role of emotional valence on the impact of mind wandering on working memory (WM) and sustained attention, we reanalyzed data from three independently conducted studies that examined the impact of stress on WM (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks, Welhaf, & Srour, 2015) and sustained attention (Banks, Tartar, & Welhaf, 2014). Across all studies, participants reported the content of their thoughts at random intervals during the WM or sustained attention task. Thought probes in all studies included a core set of response options for task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) that were negatively, positively, or neutrally emotionally valenced. In line with theories of emotional valenced stimuli on capture of attention, results suggest negatively valenced TUTs, but not positively valenced TUTs, were related to poorer WM and sustained attention in two studies. Neutral TUTs were related to poorer WM but not sustained attention performance. Implications for models of mind wandering are discussed. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Despite the growing body of research on mind wandering and the ubiquitous nature of the phenomenon in everyday life, our understanding on the phenomenon remains unclear. Mind wandering can be conceptualized as any thought related to personal concerns or goals but unrelated to the current task (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) consume as much as 50% of our waking hours and occur during almost every type of behavior (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Two dominant accounts of mind wandering differ in their view of the role of working memory in explaining mind wandering, but these models explain different components to mind wandering. The Executive Control Failures  Personal Concerns model (McVay & Kane, 2010) suggests mind wandering occurs due to a failure of working memory to control mind wandering and a priming of personal concerns. As such, this model can be used to explain why mind wandering occurs. The Decoupling model (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) suggests instances of mind wandering reflect a decoupling of attention from an ongoing task toward an internal train of thought. Attentional resources then support this internal train of thought so the internal thought can be continued (Smallwood, Brown, Baird, & Schooler, 2012). As such, the decoupling model suggests that working memory resources are required to support mind wandering. Given the critical differences between these models in terms of the role of working memory in mind wandering, an alternative view has suggested that the two models are not mutually exclusive but rather explain differing aspects of mind wandering. The Process-Occurrence framework suggests ⇑ Corresponding author at: College of Psychology, Nova Southeastern University, 3301 College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314, United States. E-mail address: jonathan.banks@nova.edu (J.B. Banks). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.06.003 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 168 J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 that the role of working memory may be two-fold, first to prevent mind wandering on tasks demanding external focus of attention and second to support mind wandering once it occurs (Smallwood, 2013). Impairment in primary task performance is often observed during mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), possibly due to mind wandering competing for working memory resources that would otherwise be directed toward the ongoing task (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). A recent meta-analysis examining the causes and consequences of mind wandering supported the view that mind wandering results in impairments in ongoing task performance (Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014). However, task performance impairments do not always occur as a result of mind wandering (Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003). One explanation for the discrepancy between studies investigating the impact of mind wandering on task performance has to do with the attentional demands of the primary task (Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2015). Tasks that require less attentional resources may be less likely to be impaired by mind wandering than tasks that require greater attentional resources. Thomson et al. (2015) recently proposed a resource control account of sustained attention that blends the decoupling and executive control failure models of mind wandering. The resource control model suggests that the resources devoted to a primary task may be less than the resources available to the individual and as such, additional resources (above and beyond those required by the task) may be directed toward mind wandering. By this account, then, mind wandering may occur simultaneously with the primary task, without impairment in the primary task. However, when the resources devoted to the task are less than the resources required to complete the task, performance on the primary task will be impaired, as could be the case when mind wandering occurs (Seli et al., 2014). This model helps to explain prior findings that individuals with higher working memory capacity mind wander more when engaged in a task with few attentional demands but mind wander less on tasks with greater attentional demands (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012) and when individuals report lower levels of concentration (Kane et al., 2007). The impact of mind wandering on primary task performance should differ based on the amount of available resources to complete the primary task. The availability of resources may be altered by the demands of the primary task, individual differences in working memory, and resources directed toward continuing mind wandering. The degree to which attentional resources are directed toward mind wandering alters the impact on primary task performance, such that greater disengagement from the primary task toward mind wandering results in the greatest performance deficits (Seli et al., 2014). 1.1. Examining the content of mind wandering Examining the content of mind wandering may be critical for understanding the impact of mind wandering on primary task performance, as not all content is likely to consume similar amounts of attentional resources. A few recent studies have attempted to examine different dimensions of mind wandering, including temporal orientation. Temporal orientation of mind wandering refers to the focus of the subjects’ thoughts in time (e.g. thinking about the past, present, or future). The temporal orientation of mind wandering may alter the demands placed on attentional resources, with future oriented thoughts consuming more resources than present or past thoughts (Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). The nature of the prime used to increase mind wandering may impact the temporal orientation of mind wandering that is induced. Specifically, when participants are primed with personal priorities, increases in future-oriented mind wandering have been demonstrated (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011). Future-oriented mind wandering is related to increases in negative affect for individuals anticipating a stressful speech task (Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D’Argembeau, 2013). However, individuals primed with negative moods demonstrate a shift to a more retrospective orientation of mind wandering (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Although a prime to increase negative mood resulted in increases in mind wandering about the distant past, increasing positive mood did not result in increases in mind wandering about the past or future (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). The differences in temporal orientation of mind wandering may be moderated by individual differences in working memory, such that higher working memory individuals experience more future oriented mind wandering (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011), reflecting an increase in focus on individuals’ ongoing concerns, problems, or goals (Smallwood et al., 2009). However, other work has demonstrated that not only do higher working memory individuals experience less mind wandering but also less future oriented mind wandering than lower working memory individuals (McVay, Unsworth, McMillan, & Kane, 2013). 1.2. Emotional valence The emotional valence of the content of mind wandering may be a critical moderator for the impact of mind wandering on primary task performance. Recent work has demonstrated a congruence between mood and the content of the mind wandering, such that sadness prior to mind wandering predicted mind wandering with sad content, and anxiety prior to the mind wandering measurement predicted mind wandering with anxious but not sad content (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013). Likewise, mind wandering with positively valenced content predicts subsequent positive mood (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013). However, the impact of emotional valence of mind wandering on future mood may be altered by the temporal orientation of the thought, such that past and ‘‘other-related” thoughts are predictive of decreases in mood, even when the emotional valence of the thought is positive. Mind wandering focused on the future or self is related to increases in positive affect, even when the emotional valence of the thought is negative (Ruby et al., 2013). Response patterns in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) to affective stimuli can be used to successfully predict affective valence J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 169 of mind wandering during a later task-free period (Tusche, Smallwood, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2014). This suggests that the mOFC plays an important role in determining the affective valence of mind wandering. Based on the role of mind wandering in determining future affect (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby et al., 2013), understanding the sources of affective valence of mind wandering may be important. The affective valence of mind wandering content is not always related to current mood or altered by stress manipulations (Vinski & Watter, 2013). Vinski and Watter (2013) found that overall rates of mind wandering appear to be greatest following stress manipulations for individuals reporting high levels of negative affect prior to the stressor. Interestingly, negatively valenced mind wandering did not occur more often than neutral valenced mind wandering. Vinski and Watter (2013) did not examine possible differences in the impact of negative and neutral mind wandering on task performance. The primary concern for the current study is to understand the impact of mind wandering on current cognitive task performance. Although several prior studies have examined the emotional valence of mind wandering as it relates to mood, the authors are unaware of any work that has examined emotional valence of mind wandering as a moderator for the impact of mind wandering on primary task performance. As mentioned previously, mind wandering is presumed to lead to deficits in primary task performance (McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), especially when the sufficient resources are not available to support mind wandering and primary task performance (Thomson et al., 2015). Impaired task performance may occur either from TUTs consuming executive attentional resources (Seli et al., 2014; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Thomson et al., 2015) or due to resources being used to redirect attention and suppress off task thoughts (Wegner, 1994; see Hertel & Hayes, 2015; Klein & Bratton, 2007). Although the role of emotional valence of TUTs in determining the impact on primary task performance has not been explored in the mind wandering literature, it is possible to draw inferences from related literature. Klein and Boals (2001) argued that stress related TUTs require effortful suppression and that stress related TUTs are not likely to dissipate as ongoing task demands increase, as may occur for neutral TUTs (Teasdale et al., 1995). In support of this view, the number of negative life events is related to poorer working memory performance but the number of positive life events is unrelated to working memory performance (Klein & Boals, 2001, Study 2). Klein and Boals (2001) demonstrated that negative and positive events did not differ in terms of rates of TUTs, specifically intrusive thoughts as measured by the Impact of Events Scale. However, negative and positive events differed in terms of participants attempts to avoid event related TUTs. These findings suggest that a critical difference between positively and negatively valenced TUTs has to do with the attempt to inhibit them. The process of inhibition may result in impaired task performance because of the resources required to suppress the thought (Wegner, 1994). Emotional stimuli capture attentional resources due to their intrinsic evolutionary or motivational relevance. The perspective of natural selective attention emphasizes that emotional stimuli, particularly emotionally negative stimuli, innately capture attentional resources and command priority processing due to their high motivational relevance (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006; Yiend, 2010). This view supports the idea that emotionally-valenced TUTs would be more likely to consume attentional resources than neutral TUTs. Negatively valenced emotional stimuli, such as angry faces, capture attention faster than neutral or positive stimuli (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001). Negative words in an emotional Stroop task produce longer response times than positive words (Pratto & John, 1991), suggesting a greater redirection of attention to negatively valenced stimuli relative to positively valenced stimuli. The degree of redirection of attention to emotional stimuli may be altered by level of arousal (Pratto, 1994). However, negative stimuli typically generate greater levels of arousal than other stimuli (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Thus, negatively valenced TUTs may capture attention at a greater intensity or at greater frequency. Further, attempts to suppress negatively valenced TUTs will consume additional attentional resources, reducing the availability of resources for primary task performance. Following the resource-control model (Thomson et al., 2015), when mind wandering consumes more resources than are left available by the primary task, decrements in the primary task should occur. If negatively valenced TUTs capture attention at higher rates, thus consuming more resources than positive TUTs, negative TUTs should be more likely to result in performance decrements than positive or neutral TUTs. The current study examined the role of the emotional valence of the TUT to determine the impact on current task performance. Specifically, we analyzed here, for the first time, the content of the mind wandering based on the emotional valence, in three previously published studies (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks, Tartar, & Welhaf, 2014; Banks, Welhaf, & Srour, 2015), that examined the relationship between working memory, sustained attention, mind wandering, and stress. In all prior analyses, reports of any instance of mind wandering had been collapsed into a percentage of total off task thoughts. The current analyses examined the impact of negative, neutral, and positive TUTs on working memory (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks et al., 2015) and sustained attention (Banks et al., 2014). Participants in all studies were asked to categorize the emotional valence of the off-task thought, thus one strength of the current study is that it does not rely on external raters to code the emotional valence of the thought report. Additionally, together these studies examined the impact of the emotionally valenced TUTs on multiple measures of working memory and a sustained attention measure to demonstrate that any relationships observed are not limited to a single task or even a single attentional control function. We hypothesized that the three categories of TUTs would not all serve as predictors of performance on either working memory or sustained attention task performance. Specifically, we suggest that negatively valenced TUTs would be the strongest predictors of poorer task performance, due to their increased likelihood to capture attention (Eastwood et al., 2001; Lang et al., 1997; Olofsson et al., 2008; Schupp et al., 2006; Yiend, 2010) and the increased likelihood to suppress negative 170 J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 thoughts (Klein & Boals, 2001). We hypothesized that positively valenced TUTs would not predict poorer task performance, consistent with prior findings that although positive events result in similar levels of intrusive thoughts as negative events, they result in lower levels of suppression attempts than negative events (Klein & Boals, 2001). Additionally, prior findings suggest that rates of positive events were not associated with impaired WM task performance (Klein & Boals, 2001). As neutral TUTs represent a middle point between the positively and negatively valenced TUTs, we hypothesized that neutral TUTs would be less likely to impact task performance than negative TUTs. Finally, we were also interested in examining the frequency of positive, negative, or neutral TUTs to determine if the relationship between impaired task performance and TUT category was due to the frequency of that category of TUT. No specific hypothesis was made concerning the frequency of each type of TUT. 2. Method Below, we present the methodological details from Banks and Boals (2016) and Banks et al. (2014, 2015) that are necessary to evaluative the current reanalysis. For further information, particularly regarding additional measures subjects completed, the reader may consult the original publications. Two of the three studies examined the impact of stress on cognitive performance (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks et al., 2014). Banks and Boals (2016) examined a psychological stress manipulation on mind wandering and working memory. Participants in the Banks and Boals (2016) study were assigned to write about either a future negative, positive, or neutral event. All measures reported in the current manuscript occurred as part of an initial session prior to a stress manipulation. The Banks et al. (2014) study examined the impact of a physical stress manipulation on mind wandering and sustained attention. Participants were assigned to complete either the cold pressor task (CPT) or a control version of the task involving warm water. All measures reported in the current study were completed immediately following the CPT or control CPT. As reported in Banks et al. (2014), no differences were observed on any measure immediately following the stress manipulation. The third study examined the impact of a mindfulness meditation on working memory (Banks et al., 2015). Participants were assigned to either a mindfulness or relaxation condition. All measures reported in the current study were collected as baseline measures prior to delivery of either intervention. 2.1. Participants Banks et al. (2015) tested 80 undergraduates from Nova Southeastern University (48 Females; Mage = 20.97 years, SD = 6.53). Banks and Boals (2016) tested 150 undergraduates (84 Females; Mage = 21.28 years, SD = 4.93) from the University of North Texas. Banks et al. (2014) tested 53 undergraduates (38 Females, Mage = 22.19 years, SD = 6.28) from Nova Southeastern University. Sample sizes for each study were determined by conducting a power analyses to provide sufficient power for the desired effects in each study. 2.2. Measures 2.2.1. Tasks including thought probes 2.2.1.1. Working memory tasks. Banks et al. (2015) assessed working memory with the Automated Operation Span Task (AOSPAN, Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). Banks and Boals (2016) assessed working memory with the AOSPAN, and the Automated Reading Span Task (RSPAN, Unsworth et al., 2005; see Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). During both the AOSPAN and the RSPAN, participants engage in a processing task followed by the presentation of to be remembered letters. During the RSPAN, participants verify the meaningfulness of sentences (‘‘The ship sailed across the dishwasher”). During the AOSPAN, participants verify the accuracy of a solution to a math problem (e.g. (2 ⁄ 5) + 3 = ?; 7). Following the verification of either sentence or math operation a capital letter (out of a list of 12 possible letters) appears for 250 ms. Following a set of between three and seven verification-letter pairs a grid containing all 12 possible letters appears on the screen. The participant is instructed to indicate all of the letters from that set in the order presented by entering the number corresponding to the order in which the letter was presented. Participants are presented with each set length (three to seven times) three times for a total of 15 sets per task. The AOSPAN and RSPAN are scored by summing the total number of items recalled in the correct serial position, as recommended by Conway and colleagues (Conway et al., 2005). For the Banks and Boals (2016) study, the AOSPAN and RSPAN scores were converted to z-scores and the z-scores were averaged to create a composite WM score. 2.2.1.2. Sustained attention task. Banks et al. (2014) measured sustained attention with the SART. The SART is a go/no-go task in which participants must respond quickly to all frequent GO stimuli and withhold a response to the infrequent NOGO stimuli (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). In this version of the SART, the frequently GO stimuli was any number from 1 through 9, except for the number 3, which served as the infrequent NOGO stimuli. Consistent with Robertson et al. (1997), GO and NOGO stimuli were presented for 250 ms, followed by a mask presented for 900 ms. The SART consisted of a total of 225 trials, made of 200 GO trials and 25 NOGO trials. The NOGO trials were inserted into the task at random. Accuracy on the task was measured as the percentage of correct responses to the GO stimuli or GO accuracy. J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 171 The percentage of trials in which the participants correctly withheld a response to the NOGO stimuli was defined as NOGO accuracy. Participants were instructed to complete the task as accurately and quickly as possible. The SART took approximately 5 min to complete. Response times (RT) for the GO trials were also collected. One participant (male) failed to complete the SART as instructed (responding on NOGO trials and not GO trials) and their data were removed from all SART analyses. 2.2.2. Thought probes For the Banks et al. (2015) and the Banks and Boals (2016) studies, 15 thought probes were inserted into the working memory tasks following letter recall grids to measure task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). For Banks et al. (2014), 12 thought probes were inserted at random intervals during the SART task. The thought probes of interest to the current study were consistent across all studies. Additional probes varied in the studies to include task evaluative thoughts either as one probe (Banks & Boals, 2016) or evaluative thoughts by emotional valence (Banks et al., 2015). Additionally, Banks et al. (2014, 2015) include a probe specific to the stress manipulation used in the study. For all studies participants responded to the prompt, ‘‘What were you just thinking about?” Response options for all studies can be found in Table 1. In all prior analyses TUTs were calculated by summing all off task response options selected, then dividing by the number of probes presented, and multiplying by 100 to calculate a percentage of off task thoughts (Banks et al., 2015: Options: D-G; Banks & Boals, 2016: Options: C-E; and Banks et al., 2014: Options: C-F). For all current analyses we will examine the percentage of TUTs by probe for Negative, Positive, or Neutral valence. The percentage of each TUT category was calculated by summing all responses for the category, dividing by the number of probes presented in the task, and multiplying by 100. Calculating a percentage of TUTs in each category is optimal as the number of probes presented in each study varied. 2.3. Procedures For the Banks and Boals (2016) study, participants completed the AOSPAN and RSPAN in a counterbalanced order prior to completing additional measures in a larger study, including several measures of life stress, the Daily Inventory of Stressful Events (Almeida, Wethington, & Kessler, 2002), the Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978), the Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) and a measure of thought control, the White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). In the Banks et al. (2015) study, participants completed the AOSPAN as part of a baseline measurement following several questionnaires on mindfulness and affect, including the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (Bond et al., 2011), Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). Participants in the Banks et al. (2014) study completed the SART following either a socially evaluative cold-pressor stress manipulation (Schwabe, Haddad, & Schachinger, 2008) or a control water task. No differences were found between the two conditions on SART performance or overall TUTs in the prior analyses. To ensure the conditions did not differ on items for the current study, t-tests were conducted. No significant differences were found, p > 0.05. 3. Results 3.1. Impact of TUT valence on WM performance To test the primary hypothesis that negative emotional TUTs will have a stronger impact on ongoing task performance than neutral or positive emotional TUTs, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses. As seen in Table 2, a significant regression model was found when predicting AOSPAN performance in the Banks et al. (2015) data set, with only Table 1 Thought probes presented in each study. Probe category Banks and Boals (2016) Banks et al. (2015) Banks et al. (2014) On-task Task evaluative Task-related thoughts Task-related evaluative thoughts – positive Task-related evaluative thoughts – negative Task-unrelated thoughts, negative content Task-unrelated thoughts, positive content Task-unrelated thoughts, neutral content – Task-related thoughts Task-related evaluative thoughts – positive Task-related evaluative thoughts – negative Task-unrelated thoughts, negative content Task-unrelated thoughts, positive content Task-unrelated thoughts, neutral content Task-unrelated thoughts, about the writing task Task-related thought, that is, thinking about the task Task performance, that is, thoughts about your performance on the task Negative TUT Positive TUT Neutral TUT Other Note: Bold text indicates the thought probes used in the current study. Negative thoughts, that is, thoughts that are unrelated to the task but are negative in nature Positive thoughts, that is, thoughts that are unrelated to the task but are positive in nature Other TUTs, that is, any other TUTs The water task, that is, thinking about the immersion of your hand in water 172 J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 Table 2 Regression analyses predicting working memory task performance. B b SE t p F df p Adjusted R2 Banks et al. (2015) Predicting AOSPAN performance Neutral TUTs % 0.26 Negative TUTs % 0.22 Positive TUTs % 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.04 2.05 1.36 0.39 0.044 0.177 0.697 3.06 3, 75 0.033 0.07 Banks and Boals (2016) Predicting WM composite Neutral TUTs % 0.02 Negative TUTs % 0.03 Positive TUTs % 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.34 0.46 0.01 4.94 6.82 0.21 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.836 24.74 3, 143 <0.0001 0.33 Predicting AOSPAN performance Neutral TUTs % 0.23 Negative TUTs % 0.27 Positive TUTs % 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.32 0.33 0.07 4.40 4.54 0.99 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.326 15.34 3, 144 <0.0001 0.23 Predicting RSPAN performance Neutral TUTs % 0.22 Negative TUTs % 0.36 Positive TUTs % 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.29 0.53 0.01 4.33 7.79 0.11 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.910 25.33 3, 145 <0.0001 0.33 Note: Neutral TUTs % = percentage of neutral task-unrelated thoughts, Negative TUTs % = percentage of negative task-unrelated thoughts, Positive TUTs % = percentage of positive task-unrelated thoughts. the percentage of Neutral TUTs serving as a significant predictor. Although the percentage of Negative TUTs was correlated with AOSPAN task performance, r(78) = 0.24, p = 0.032, the percentage of Negative TUTs was also correlated with the percentage of neutral TUTs, r(78) = 0.36, p = 0.001. The regression analyses suggests that when controlling for shared variance, only Neutral TUTs predict poorer AOSPAN performance. We next examined the impact of TUTs on WM performance in the Banks and Boals (2016) data set. As seen in Table 2, a significant regression model was found predicting the WM composite, with both the percentage of Neutral TUTs and the percentage of Negative TUTs serving as significant predictors. When we examined both the RSPAN and AOSPAN independently, the same pattern of results was observed. A significant model was observed for the AOSPAN task, with both the percentage of Neutral TUTs and the percentage of Negative TUTs serving as significant predictors. A significant model was observed for the RSPAN task, with both the percentage of Neutral TUTs and the percentage of Negative TUTs serving as significant predictors. We next examined the impact of TUTs on SART performance in the Banks et al. (2014) data set. To control for possible speed-accuracy trade-offs that could occur during the SART (Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012; Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) we conducted a series of regression analyses examining the impact of TUTs on NOGO and GO accuracy, controlling for GO trial response time. As seen in Table 3, a significant model was found predicting NOGO trial accuracy, with both the percentage of Negative TUTs and GO trial response time serving as significant predictors. No significant model was found for predicting GO trial accuracy. Finally, we conducted a regression analysis predicting GO response time from the three TUT categories, but no significant overall model was found, R2 = 0.10, Adjusted R2 = 0.04, F(3, 45) = 1.67, p = 0.188. 3.2. TUT valence frequency To examine the frequency of negative, neutral, or positive TUTs we conducted a series of repeated measures ANOVAs for each of the studies. As shown in Table 4, neutral TUTs were more frequent in Banks and Boals (2016) and Banks et al. (2014). Table 3 Regression analyses predicting SART performance (data from Banks et al., 2014). B SE b p F df p Adjusted R2 4.32 0.52 2.10 0.30 <0.0001 0.607 0.041 0.766 8.47 4, 44 <0.0001 0.38 1.21 0.93 0.04 0.34 0.231 0.355 0.967 0.734 0.72 4, 44 0.581 0.02 t Predicting SART NOGO accuracy GO RT 0.03 Neutral TUTs % 1.87 Negative TUTs % 13.84 Positive TUTs % 2.12 0.01 3.60 6.58 7.08 0.52 0.06 0.27 0.04 Predicting SART GO accuracy GO RT 0.02 Neutral TUTs % 7.29 Negative TUTs % 0.59 Positive TUTs % 5.25 0.02 7.80 14.25 15.34 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.05 Note: Neutral TUTs % = percentage of neutral task-unrelated thoughts, Negative TUTs % = percentage of negative task-unrelated thoughts, Positive TUTs % = percentage of positive task-unrelated thoughts, SART NOGO = percentage of NOGO trial accuracy, SART GO = percentage of GO trial accuracy, GO RT = response time for SART GO trials in ms. 173 J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 Table 4 Descriptive statistics for cognitive tasks and mean percentage of negative, neutral, and positive TUTs from Banks and Boals (2016), Banks et al. (2014, 2015) Study Task Cognitive task Mean (SD) Negative TUTs Mean (SD) Neutral TUTs Mean (SD) Positive TUTs Mean (SD) F df p g2 Banks and Boals WM composite AOSPAN RSPAN 0.00 (0.92) 62.57 (12.52) 58.87 (13.48) 8.62 (15.33)A 7.79 (15.09)A 9.40 (19.79)A 15.46 (15.29)B 15.00 (17.66) B 16.06 (17.93) B 6.73 (11.18)A 6.58 (11.89)A 6.94 (13.29)A 16.77 14.37 11.30 2, 292 2, 294 2, 296 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.11 0.10 0.08 Banks, Welhaf, and Srour AOSPAN 56.58 (11.03) 2.87 (7.89)A 3.97 (10.10)A 1.77 (8.45)A 1.44 2, 156 0.241 0.02 4.01 (8.81)C 7.00 2, 102 0.001 0.14 Banks, Tartar, and Welhaf SART NOGO SART GO SART NOGO RT 44.00 (20.78) 76.15 (4.37) 176.83 (84.88) 7.21 (9.90) A 13.98 (16.45) B Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses, superscripts that differ indicate significant differences between TUT categories, p’s < 0.05. SART NOGO = percentage of NOGO trial accuracy, SART GO = percentage of GO trial accuracy, SART NOGO RT = response time for NOGO trials in ms. When examining TUTs collapsed across both WM tasks, a significant difference between rates of negative, neutral, and positive TUTs was found in the Banks and Boals (2016) data. Neutral TUTs were more frequent than either negative, t(146) = 3.89, p = 0.0002, d = 0.45, or positive TUTs, t(146) = 6.16, p < 0.0001, d = 0.65, but no difference between negative and positive TUTs were observed, p = 0.230. Similar results were observed when examining TUTs during the AOSPAN and RSPAN task separately. A significant difference between rates of negative, neutral, and positive TUTs was observed during the AOSPAN task and during the RSPAN task. Consistent with the overall findings, neutral TUTs were more frequent than negative TUTs in the AOSPAN, t(147) = 3.97, p < 0.0001, d = 0.44, and in the RSPAN, t(148) = 2.96, p = 0.004, d = 0.35. Neutral TUTs were more frequent than positive TUTs in the AOSPAN, t(147) = 5.04, p < 0.0001, d = 0.56, and the RSPAN, t(148) = 5.29, p < 0.0001, d = 0.58. No differences were observed between negative and positive TUTs in either the AOSPAN or RSPAN. A significant difference in the percentage of negative, neutral, and positive TUTs was found in the Banks et al. (2014) data. Consistent with the findings in the Banks and Boals (2016) data, neutral TUTs were more frequent than either negative, t(51) = 2.07, p = 0.044, d = 0.42, or positive TUTs, t(51) = 3.23, p = 0.002, d = 0.68. However, difference between negative and positive TUTs were also observed such that negative TUTs were more frequent than positive TUTs, t(51) = 2.16, p = 0.036, d = 0.34. No significant differences in the percentage of negative, neutral, or positive TUTs was observed in the Banks et al. (2015) data. 4. Discussion The current study examined the role of emotional valence of mind wandering on working memory and sustained attention. We reanalyzed data from three independent studies that examined the relationship between mind wandering and working memory. We hypothesized that negatively valenced TUTs would be more likely to predict poorer task performance than positively valenced TUTS. This hypothesis was partially supported in both sustained attention and WM tasks, such that negative TUTs, but not positive TUTs, predicted poorer performance in the ongoing tasks, in two data sets (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks et al., 2014). Against our initial prediction that neutral TUTs would be less likely to predict task impairments, neutral TUTs predicted poorer performance on WM tasks in the Banks and Boals (2016) and the Banks et al. (2015) data, but not to performance on the SART task in the Banks et al. (2014) data. Although negative TUTs did not serve as unique predictors of AOSPAN performance in the Banks et al. (2015) data, the direction of the impact on AOSPAN task performance was in the same (negative) direction as observed in the other data sets. The differences between negative and positive TUTs, as predictors of current task performance, are not likely due to differences in frequencies of their occurrence. Differences between frequencies of negative and positive TUTs were only observed in the Banks et al. (2014) data. No differences between negative and positive TUTs were observed in the other two studies. Although neutral TUTs were reported at a significantly higher frequency than either negative or positive TUTs in two studies (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks et al., 2014), negative TUTs predicted poorer performance, on WM tasks and SART NOGO trials, in both of these studies and neutral TUTs was only a significant predictor in one of those studies (Banks & Boals, 2016). Finally, no differences in frequency were observed between positive, negative, and neutral TUTs in the Banks et al. (2015) data but only neutral TUTs were significant predictors of AOSPAN performance. Counter to our initial hypothesis, negative TUTs did not predict AOSPAN performance in the Banks et al. (2015) data. One possible reason has to do with the low rate of TUTs overall (9%) in this data set. Given the low rate of TUTs it is possible that there were not enough negative TUTs overall to impact AOSPAN performance. The lack of a consistent relationship between neutrally valenced TUTs and task performance is of importance to understanding the impact of mind wandering. These findings may help to explain prior work that has demonstrated variability in the impact of mind wandering on ongoing task performance (McVay & Kane, 2013). The differences we observed may be due to differing levels of primary task demand. Specifically, neutral TUTs were related to performance on the higher demand tasks, WM task performance, but not on a task with lower levels of demand, SART performance. This finding is inline with the resource control account (Thomson et al., 2015), such that at lower levels of task demand, sufficient executive resources are available to support mind wandering and task performance. Specifically, mind wandering about a neutral topic may not 174 J.B. Banks et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 167–176 draw sufficient resources away from the primary task to result in impairments in performance on tasks requiring lower amounts of attentional resources. Further examination of the SART provides additional support for this argument. Performance on the least demanding of the SART components, the GO trials, was not impaired by rates of neutral, negative, or positively valenced TUTs. However, performance on the NOGO trials, which are more demanding than the GO trials, was impaired by negative TUTs. Negative TUTs should be more likely to impair performance on higher than lower demand tasks, as they are likely to draw greater attentional resources from the primary task (Eastwood et al., 2001; Lang et al., 1997; Olofsson et al., 2008; Schupp et al., 2006; Yiend, 2010). According to the resource control account (Thomson et al., 2015), the likelihood of impairment as a result of mind wandering should vary as a function of resources required by the task, resources consumed by mind wandering, and any individual differences in available resources. As such, when the task required few resources, such as GO trials, mind wandering should be unlikely to impair performance. However, on moderately demanding tasks, such as on NOGO trials, when mind wandering consumes more resources, as would be the case with negatively valenced but not neutrally valenced mind wandering, performance impairments should be expected. When task demands are greater, such as on a working memory task, neutrally valenced mind wandering, consumes sufficient attentional resources as to result in impaired task performance as has been suggested previously (Baddeley, 1993). Our findings are consistent with more recent models of mind wandering (Smallwood, 2013; Thomson et al., 2015) and with a large body of work demonstrating the privileged nature of emotional stimuli in capturing attention (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Pratto, 1994; Pratto & John, 1991). Indeed, the increased ability for emotionally negative stimuli to capture attention has been demonstrated at the behavioral level (Eastwood et al., 2001; Pratto & John, 1991) and at the neurophysiological level (Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand, 2003). An alternative explanation is that the negative TUTs resulted in greater levels of arousal in the participants. Relative to emotionally positive stimuli, emotionally negative stimuli are typically associated with higher arousal levels (Lang et al., 1993). Since increased physiological arousal creates widespread activation across emotional memory networks (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999; Cahill, Gorski, & Le, 2003), it is possible that the negative TUTs resulted in greater network activation relative to emotionally positive TUTs or neutral TUTs (Mickley Steinmetz, Addis, & Kensinger, 2010). Greater activation of the emotional memory network would then have increased the load on attentional resources, potentially increasing the cognitive resources required to suppress the negative TUTs, thus resulting in greater ongoing task impairment. As negative TUTs, but not positive TUTs, served as predictors of task performance in two of the data sets (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks et al., 2015), this appears to suggest that negative thoughts results in greater activation of the emotional networks (Mickley Steinmetz et al., 2010) resulting in greater impairment in ongoing task performance. Although the current analyses do appear to provide a demonstration of the importance of the emotional valence of the TUT in determining the impact of mind wandering on task performance, several important limitations exists in the current set of analyses. In order to provide sufficient evidence that positive and negative affect differ in their impact on ongoing task performance, it would be critical to be able to manipulate levels of positive and negative TUTs and examine the subsequent changes in task performance. Despite this limitation, the results are consistent with findings of manipulations designed to alter working memory by increasing negative affect (Curci, Lanciano, Soleti, & Rime, 2013) or positive affect (Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2013). A second limitation in the current set of studies has to do with the nature of the tasks used to assess the impact of TUTs on task performance. Given the artificial nature of the laboratory tasks, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that participants across all studies were not sufficiently motivated to achieve their best performance. On real world tasks requiring higher levels of attentional resources, such as writing a manuscript or delivering an important speech, it is possible that all TUTs would result in impaired performance either due to the TUT consuming attentional resources (Baddeley, 1993) or due to attempts to suppress the TUT (Wegner, 1994). Finally, the current set of studies differs in several important domains, including the cognitive task examined and initial purpose of the study. However, despite any methodological differences between the studies, the findings are relatively consistent. The consistencies across the studies suggest that combining the data from these studies is a strength rather than limitation, as the findings are robust enough to be found on different cognitive tasks. In summary, the current study is the first to reveal differences in the impact of TUTs on task performance based on emotional valence of the TUT. These findings are consistent with the most recent models of mind wandering (Thomson et al., 2015) and are in contrast to recent work examining consequences of mind wandering (Randall et al., 2014), as they demonstrate that all types of mind wandering are not harmful to performance. 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Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Automatic and controlled semantic processing: A masked prime-task effect B. Valdésa,*, A. Catenab, P. Marı́-Beffaa a University of Wales, Bangor, Adeilad Brigantia, Penrallt Road, Gwynedd LL57 2AS, UK b University of Granada, Spain Received 5 February 2004 Available online 26 October 2004 Abstract A classical definition of automaticity establishes that automatic processing occurs without attention or consciousness, and cannot be controlled. Previous studies have demonstrated that semantic priming can be reduced if attention is directed to a low-level of analysis. This finding suggests that semantic processing is not automatic since it can be controlled. In this paper, we present two experiments that demonstrate that semantic processing may occur in the absence of attention and consciousness. A negative semantic priming effect was found when a low-level prime-task was required and when a masked lexical decision prime-task was performed (Experiment 1). This paper also discusses the limitations of the inhibitory mechanism involved in negative semantic priming effect.
2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Automaticity; Consciousness; Attention; Semantic priming; Negative Priming; Word processing 1. Introduction When confronted with printed words, skilled readers have the subjective impression that reading is an automatic process that does not requires attentional control or effort. For decades this * Corresponding author. Fax: +44 1248 38 2599. E-mail address: b.valdes@bangor.ac.uk (B. Valdés). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter
2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.08.001 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 279 idea has guided the research on word recognition (see Rayner, Foorman, Perfetti, Pesetsky, & Seidenberg, 2001, for a recent review) and has served to explain some experimental phenomena such as Stroop interference (Stroop, 1935; see also MacLeod, 1991, for a review) and semantic priming (Neely, 1991). There is evidence that words are processed up to semantic levels even though participants are not instructed to attend to them (Fuentes, Carmona, Agis, & Catena, 1994), or after attending to a non-semantic, physical dimension of the word (i.e., the ink colour) instead of the meaning (MacLeod, 1991, 1992). Processing of words is assumed to proceed without explicit intention but also without consciousness. Merely presenting words either under a subjective conscious threshold (Marcel, 1983) or under an objective one (Dehaene et al., 1998; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001) triggers a processing stream that cannot be prevented. The complete processing of words involves the processing of multiple dimensions or levels (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989): a letter level, at which features are integrated to form the letters that compose a particular word; an orthographic level, at which letters are integrated to form orthographic patterns; a lexical level, at which the orthography of the word is activated; and a semantic level, at which the meaning of the word is accessed (Bentin, Mouchetant-Rostaing, Giard, Echallier, & Pernier, 1999). Event-related potentials and cerebral blood flow studies (Posner, Abdullaev, McCandliss, & Sereno, 1999; Posner & Petersen, 1990) have suggested that these levels are reached following a clear sequence. These stages of processing are commonly believed to occur in a bottom-up manner that proceeds automatically (Neely, 1991). Despite such automaticity, recent studies have suggested that both unattended and unconscious information can be controlled (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dagenbach, Carr, & Wilhelmsen, 1989; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992). To test the automaticity of word processing, several researchers have modified the traditional procedure of semantic priming by manipulating the level of representation at which attention is directed to during the prime display. The effect obtained with this procedure is known as Prime-Task Effect (Marı́-Beffa, Fuentes, Catena, & Houghton, 2000). In traditional semantic priming experiments, pairs of semantically related and unrelated words are presented in a sequential manner. Participants are instructed to perform a task that demands explicit awareness of the meaning of the word (i.e., lexical decision, categorization, naming; see Neely, 1991 for a review). This task can be performed, or not, in the first word (prime) and the effect is measured in the reaction time to the second word (probe) task. It is assumed that the presentation of the first word produces the activation of its internal representation in memory, sending also activation to the representations of those words that are more closely associated with it. Thus, when an associated word appears as a probe stimulus, the previous activation of its representation due to the presence of the prime related word facilitates any response to it. In Prime-Task effect experiments the most common procedure is to compare the semantic priming effect, when participants are instructed to perform a lower level task on prime display (i.e. letter search), with another condition in which a higher or deeper level task is required (e.g. naming, lexical decision, categorisation, etc.). In both cases, participants generally perform a lexical decision task on the probe word. It has been shown that if the prime-task requires attention to be allocated to a lower level of analysis, like in a letter search task, then the semantic priming effect is reduced (Chiappe, Smith, & Besner, 1996; Henik, Friedrich, & Kellogg, 1983; Henik, Friedrich, Tzelgov, & Tramer, 1994; Kaye & Brown, 1985; Parkin, 1979; Smith, 1979; Smith, Theodor, & Franklin, 1983; Stolz & Besner, 1996). These results seem to challenge the idea of automaticity 280 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 of word processing since they may suggest that the orientation of attention to a deep level of representation is necessary for the processing of meaning. Although there are some disagreements in the theoretical explanation of this effect, most authors assume that the allocation of attention to a low level feature impairs or interrupts the flow of processing to further stages. For example, Henik et al. (1994) suggested that dedicating all the processing resources to the low level features could exert this kind of attentional control. As a result, there are not enough resources left to activate semantic properties, and semantic priming is reduced or eliminated. Alternatively, the lack of semantic processing could also be modelled by blocking the feedback loops between lexical and semantic levels in a neural network, as attention is oriented to lower levels (Stolz & Besner, 1996). In addition, Duscherer and Holender (2002) claim that semantic processing requires the awareness of the meaning of the prime word. Thus, the reduction of semantic priming when attention is oriented to low level features would be the logical consequence of deploying awareness away from the semantic level. In any case, all these theoretical accounts assume that semantic processing can be interrupted before it is completed if attention is not directed to a semantic level. However, using this basic paradigm, the results are not always consistent. One of the patterns of results most problematic, for the ‘‘lack of semantic processing’’ accounts, is that some studies have shown a negative semantic priming effect when a letter search task is performed on the prime display. If semantic processing was never completed, then no semantic effect at all, positive or negative, would be expected. The presence of a negative semantic priming effect suggests that the control mechanism responsible for the reduction of positive semantic priming may act once the semantic representations have been already processed, bringing down their level of activation, even below resting levels, in order to better control the goal of the task (Catena, Fuentes, & Tudela, 2002; Hoffman & MacMillan, 1985; Marı́-Beffa et al., 2000; Tipper, Weaver, & Houghton, 1994). Orienting attention to a low level of processing probably does not block the further processing of the semantic attributes of the prime. Rather, the prime word is automatically fully processed, but those dimensions that are not relevant for the task have to be inhibited to prevent them from reaching the control of the response (Marı́-Beffa et al., 2000). Interestingly, most models incorporating an inhibitory mechanism (see Tipper, 2001 for a review) assume that the development of inhibition requires certain time to be effective. Supporting this idea, Yee (1991) has found positive priming when prime-probe onset asynchrony (SOA) was 500 ms, but negative semantic priming when the SOA was increased to 600 ms. Indeed, some models (Houghton & Tipper, 1994; Houghton, Tipper, Weaver, & Shore, 1996) assume that inhibition cannot develop until the offset of the stimuli. Here, we addressed this issue in two experiments displaying words for a very short time (25 ms), and increasing the prime-response to probe interval in order to allow the development of inhibition of the prime words. A second line of evidence favouring the automaticity of semantic processing from words comes from masking experiments where the prime display is presented under the conscious threshold. In these experiments the prime stimuli were presented during a brief period of time. To avoid participants becoming aware of them, prime stimuli were followed and/or preceded by a pattern mask. The probe was presented after a blank interval. Typically, the response to a word that is preceded by another semantically related word is facilitated in comparison to an unrelated word condition (Marcel, 1983). There is now abundant evidence supporting the idea that the prime word does not need to be consciously processed to obtain semantic priming effects (Abrams, Klinger, & Greenwald, 2002; B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 281 Brown & Hagoort, 1993; Dehaene et al., 1998; DellÕAcqua & Grainger, 1999; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1992; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). It seems, at this point in our review of the literature, that neither attention nor consciousness is necessary for the complete processing of words. But can this unconscious or unattended information be controlled? Previous studies investigating this question suggest that unconscious and unattended information are affected by the same underlying mechanisms (Merikle & Joordens, 1997). Furthermore, Dagenbach et al. (1989) have demonstrated that the effect of an unconsciously processed word on a subsequent related target is affected also by the goals of the task. Then, if a word is presented under a conscious threshold and performance demands a superficial analysis of its characteristics, a reduced or absent semantic priming effect is observed on a related target. Nevertheless, if a high level of analysis is required negative semantic priming can be observed. Contrary to those effects occurring with consciously processed words, Dagenbach et al. (1989) obtained the opposite pattern of results. The authors explained this effect as evidence of a ‘‘centre-surround’’ attentional mechanism that needs to suppress those active representations that may compete for the response in order to highlight the properties of the stimulus that are relevant for the task. In this case, due to the automatic spreading of activation, active and competing related words have to be inhibited. As a result, negative semantic priming is observed on a subsequent task on those words. The existence of unconscious negative semantic priming may suggest that, similarly to what happens with unattended information, unconscious information can also be controlled. Nevertheless, the question remains, is it the same control mechanism underlying all of these effects? Our rationale for the current study is that a stronger test of non-automaticity of word processing can be obtained in conditions where neither attention nor consciousness are expected to be devoted to word meaning. Thus, stronger evidence favouring the automaticity principle will be obtained if non-attended and non-conscious words are found to prime the processing of related probes. In this paper, we compare semantic priming effects produced by attended conscious information, unattended conscious information, attended unconscious information, and unattended unconscious information. We assume that even when the prime words are masked, attention can be directed to them because we warned participants that a word should be displayed before the mask. Our prediction is that, if attention and consciousness have a common underlying mechanism, then unconscious and unattended information will be controlled in the same way depending on the goal of the task. 2. Experiment 1 In this experiment, we manipulated the nature of the prime task and the awareness of the prime stimuli. Participants were presented with a prime display composed of a single stimulus followed by a probe display containing a single stimulus. In one block of trials participants had to indicate whether a pre-designated target letter was a component of the prime word or not (Letter search task). As in previous prime-task studies we assume that the completion of this task requires attention to be allocated to a low level of analysis (letter level). In another block of trials participants had to indicate if the prime stimulus was a word or not (a lexical decision task). We assumed that 282 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 the lexical decision demanded a deep (lexical-semantic) level of processing. Any effects on the processing of related probes in the letter search block would support the idea of automaticity of semantic processing. Furthermore, the direction of this effect may indicate the action of a control mechanism upon it. To facilitate the action of a possible mechanism of control we simply allowed some preparation for the prime-task by presenting the target letter in advance. If this control mechanism blocks the higher processing of words, a reduction of positive priming will be observed. But, if meaning has been fully processed and causes any interference with the task, we expect to find evidence of its inhibition in the related probes task. When primes are displayed below the conscious threshold, the predicted pattern of priming is rather imprecise, as no references were found in the literature regarding the effect of allocating attention to a low-level of processing with masked presentations. In any case, any inhibitory action would depend on the level of interference of semantic properties with the task. On the other hand, it could be predicted that the level of activation reached by masked words might not be strong enough to interfere with the task, and therefore neither negative nor positive priming would be observed. 2.1. Method 2.1.1. Participants Twenty-two students of the University of Granada, aged between 18 and 45-years-old, participated in the experiment and received course credit for their participation. All of them were native Spanish speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 2.1.2. Stimuli and materials Stimuli consisted of 180 (4–8 letter, 1–3 syllabi) Spanish word-pairs (Mean Associative Strength: 28.28), extracted from the Spanish word database of Soto, Sebastian, Garcı́a, and Del Amo (1982). The 180 pairs of related words were divided in to three different lists (A–C) of 60 related pairs of words in each. The word-pairs of each list were then mixed to construct three different sets of stimuli with three conditions in each one: related (60 trials), unrelated (60 trials), and non-word (60 trials). The resulting sets were counterbalanced across subjects. In this way, all the word-pairs were presented in all conditions across subjects. For example, if BOCA (mouth) and LENGUA (tongue) appeared related in one set, they were separated to appear as unrelated in another set (MESA-LENGUA, table-tongue). The non-word condition was created by changing one letter in order to make it orthographically correct, but with no meaning in Spanish, for example, MESA (table) was changed to MEPA (tatle). For masked conditions, the mask consisted of an array of capital letters of the same length as its respective prime word (i.e., GTRD). Stimuli were displayed in white on a black background. For the visual search task, the target letter was presented at the centre of the display at fixation. In half of trials the letter was present in the prime array (for positive visual search), and the other half absent (for negative visual search). In masked trials, the letter was contained in the mask in the same position as in the masked prime-word. For probe displays a ‘‘+’’ was used as a fixation point and a lexical decision was required. Thus, in visual search trials, participants had to switch between a letter search task (to the prime) and a lexical decision task (to the probe). An IBM compatible personal computer was used to display the stimuli (via a S-VGA monitor 800 · 600), and to record responses using a custom written program. The monitor was located B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 283 60 cm in front of the participant. All participants were required to use one hand to respond to the prime task and the other hand for the probe task. Hand responses were counterbalanced across subjects. The ‘‘C’’ and ‘‘V’’ keys from the keyboard were assigned to the left hand and the ‘‘N’’ and ‘‘M’’ keys were assigned to the right hand. The ‘‘YES’’ or ‘‘NO’’ mapping of the response keys were counterbalanced across subjects. 2.1.3. Design and procedure A 2 (Task: letter search, lexical decision) · 2 (Masking: masked, unmasked) · 2 (Relatedness: related, unrelated) within subjects factorial design was used. The factor Task was manipulated between blocks while the other two factors were manipulated within blocks. Within the visual search block, half of the trials contained a positive search and the other half a negative search. In the Visual Search literature it has being proposed that negative and positive trials could be completed using different strategies (Chun & Wolfe, 1996). Therefore, for the analysis of results, Positive and Negative trials were treated as separate levels of the Task factor. It is important to indicate that the non-word condition was used only to induce the lexical decision task and was not included in the analysis. The prime task was counterbalanced across subjects: half of the subjects performed first the Visual Search task and then the Lexical decision, and the other half, the reverse order. Each pair of words was presented masked and unmasked in a random order making a total of 360 trials per block, (180 masked and 180 unmasked: 60 related, 60 unrelated, and 60 non-words for each mask condition). Each block was preceded by a practice block of 48 trials. To obtain masked presentations with an objective threshold criterion, the parameters employed were based on a previous pilot experiment with a different group of participants from those who participated in the current study (Catena, Valdes, & Fuentes, submitted). In this experiment, each trial started with a fixation point presented at the centre of the visual display for 500 ms. This was followed by a sequence of two stimuli presented at the centre of the display: a word (BARBA, beard) or a non-word (BARTA, beald) was followed by a 70 ms pattern mask. The interval between stimuli and mask onsets (SOA) was randomly selected in each trial from one of the following pool: 13.39, 26.78, 40.17, 53.56, 107.12, and 187.6 ms. Each stimulus (words and pseudowords) was presented once in each SOA condition. Participants were asked to press a key if the stimulus was a word and another key if was a non-word (lexical decision task). Analysis of discrimination signal detection theory index (d 0 ) showed that under a 40.17 ms SOA d 0 was not different from zero (see Table 1), indicating that subjects were unable to discriminate between words and non-words when the two shortest SOAs were used. Therefore, for all the masking conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 a SOA of 25ms was employed. In Experiment 1, each trial started with a letter presented in the centre of the visual display, and displayed for 250 ms, that served as fixation (lexical decision block) or indicated the target to Table 1 Experimental measure of word awareness Prime duration (ms) 0 d SD 13.36 26.78 40.17 53.56 66.95 107.12 0.042 0.293 0.317 0.574 1.033* 0.699 1.692* 0.698 2.605* 0.766 2.769* 0.808 Asterisks indicate that discrimination performance began to deviate significantly from zero (p < 0.025). 284 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 search for in the prime display (visual search block). After a blank interval of 10 ms the prime display was presented for 25 ms. In masked trials (M), immediately after the prime word, a pattern mask was presented for 70 ms. The same interval was blank in unmasked trials (UM). The first response (prime task) was required within 1500 ms. Participants had to indicate whether the target letter was in the prime display (letter search) or whether a word was presented in the prime display (lexical decision), depending on the block of trials. An inter response-stimuli interval was fixed on 250 ms. After this period, a ‘‘+’’ sign was presented, in the centre of the display for 250 ms, which acted as a fixation point for the probe stimuli. After a further 10 ms, the probe display appeared for 25 ms. Participants were required to respond within 1500 ms of the presentation of the probe by indicating whether the probe was a word or not (see Fig. 1). There were separate sets of written instructions for each block (visual search and lexical decision). Participants sat in front of the computer monitor and the experimenter provided further explanations after the participants fully read the instructions. Participants were told that a mask could follow some words, though the response should be based on the conscious stimulus. This meant that in masked conditions the response should be based on the mask. With this procedure it is guarantied that accuracy would be similar in both masked and unmasked conditions. In both blocks a lexical decision was required for probe displays. In the continuous presentation of trials, participants could distinguish between prime and probe displays because of the different cues presented at fixation. In the case of prime displays, the letter appearing at fixation served both as a fixation point and as a cue indicating the letter to search for next. For probe displays the cross ‘‘+’’ was used for all the trials and served both as a fixation point and as a reminder for the lexical decision task happening next. This arrangement was especially informative for the Visual Search block because in the Lexical Decision block only lexical decisions were required for both prime Fig. 1. Stimuli sequence in masked and unmasked conditions of Experiment 1. B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 285 and probe displays. At the beginning of each block the participants performed 48 practice trials under the supervision of the researcher. At the end of the first block, the researcher explained the instructions for the second block, highlighting the new task to perform with the prime. The response keys were identical for both blocks. After every 120 trials there was a short rest period in each block 2.2. Results Separate analyses were performed for the RT and errors data for prime and probe tasks responses. Two subjects were discarded due to the corruption of their data files. 2.2.1. Prime task Mean reaction times of correct responses were submitted to a two way 3 · 2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the factors Task (PVS, NVS, and LD) and Masking (M and UM). The analysis showed a significant effect for the Task · Masking interaction, F (2, 38) = 27.78, MSE = 958.55, p < .01, and also a main effect of Task F (2, 38) = 23.84, MSE = 5382.93, p < .01 (See Table 2). The simple effects analysis of the two-way interaction showed significant effects of Task in both masked, F (2, 38) = 36.98, MSE = 3535.34, p < .01, and unmasked trials, F (2, 38) = 8.62, MSE = 2806.13, p < .01, but no effect of Masking factor on any task. Post-hoc LSD analysis indicated that in unmasked conditions Negative Visual Table 2 Mean reaction time (in milliseconds) and error rates (%) for prime responses at masked and unmasked trials of Experiments 1 and 2 Task Experiment 1 PVS RT % Error NVS RT % Error LD RT % Error Experiment 2 PVS RT % Error NVS RT % Error LD RT % Error Unmasked Masked 821 14.4 844 14.7 862 15.7 857 14.2 789 19.0 761 19 939 28.5 969 29.3 1029 28.8 1012 26.7 895 19.3 730 19.2 Note. PVS, Positive Visual Search; NVS, Negative Visual Search; LD, Lexical Decision. 286 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 Search responses were significantly slower that in the other two tasks, and that Lexical Decision responses were faster than Positive Visual Search responses. On the other hand, in masked trials, Lexical Decision responses were significantly faster than in the other two tasks (See Table 2). The same 3 · 2 (Task · Masking) repeated measures analysis of variance on percentage of errors showed only a significant main effect of Task F (2, 38) = 14.36, MSE = 17.00, p < .01. Post hoc LSD test showed that there were more errors in Lexical Decision than in Positive and Negative Visual Search. 2.2.2. Probe task: Prime-task effect Mean correct probe reaction times greater than 200 ms and less than 1500 ms were computed for each participant and condition. Less than a 1% of trials were removed using this cut-off. Trials with a wrong response to the prime were excluded from analysis. Table 3 shows the mean reaction times and percentage of errors for lexical decisions at 18 target conditions. Data were submitted to a 3 · 2 · 2 within subjects ANOVA, for the factors Task (Positive Search, Negative Search, and Lexical Decision), Masking (Masked and Unmasked) and Relatedness (Related and Unrelated). The analysis showed a reliable Task by Masking interaction, F (2, 38) = 5.09, MSE = 1232.25, p < .01, and Task by Masking by Relatedness interaction, F (2, 38) = 8.52, MSE = 1004.97, p < .01. The simple effects analysis of the three-way interaction showed significant effects of Table 3 Mean reaction time (in milliseconds) and error rates (%) for target responses at all experimental conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 Task Experiment 1 PVS RT % Error NVS RT % Error LD RT % Error Experiment 2 PVS RT % Error NVS RT % Error LD RT % Error Unmasked Masked R UR NW UR-R R UR NW UR-R 699 2.8 681 4.4 870 22
18* +1.6 671 3.7 691 5.1 850 21.6 +20* +1.4 713 6.9 716 9.9 880 18.9 +3 +3 703 6.3 690 7 885 21.4
13 +.7 663 7.5 690 7.7 883 24.8 +27* +.2 701 8.7 685 10.8 903 24
16* +2.1 687 2.4 690 3.2 911 23.2 +3 +.8 685 3.2 720 3.5 913 20.6 +35* +.3 728 7.2 727 9.6 950 18.3
1 +2.4 708 6.6 710 9.8 927 19.9 +2 +3.2 648 1.9 669 2.9 906 32 +21* +1 674 4.2 675 10.5 934 27.7 +1 +6.3 Note. PVS, positive visual search; NVS, negative visual search; LD, lexical decision; R, related; UR, unrelated; NW, non-word; UR-R, amount of priming. Asterisk indicates p < .05 significance level. B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 287 relatedness both in Positive Visual Search Unmasked, F (1, 19) = 7.27, MSE = 448.03, p < .05 (the Related condition was slower than the unrelated one), and in Lexical Decision, for both masked [F (1, 19) = 9.03, MSE = 843.38, p < .05] (the Related condition was slower than the Unrelated one) and unmasked conditions, F (1, 19) = 4.65, MSE = 543.42, p < .05 (the Related condition was faster than the Unrelated one) (see Table 3). No reliable effects were found on Negative Visual Search conditions. Despite no significant effect being found for the Positive Visual Search Masked condition (when using a specific error term for the analysis, p < .08) a positive priming effect was observed and clearly contrasts with the significant negative priming obtained in the unmasked condition. However, when we considered the global error from the appropriate interaction as the error term for that contrast, this positive priming effect of 20 ms reached significance (F (1, 19) = 7.77, MSE = 506.71, p < .05). A 3 · 2 · 2 ANOVA (Task · Masking · Relatedness) of error percentages showed no significant effects of Task · Masking · Relatedness interaction, but did for the Task by Masking interaction, F (2, 38) = 5.76, MSE = 20.63, p < .05, and the main effect of Task, F (2, 38) = 5.02, MSE = 81.50, p < .05. Simple effects analysis of the Task by Masking interaction showed that more errors were committed in the masked than in the unmasked condition in Negative Visual Search, F (1, 19) = 5.60, MSE = 10.62, p < .05, and in Lexical Decision, F (1, 19) = 6.26, MSE = 31.67, p < .05. Also, more errors were found in Negative Visual Search than in Positive Visual Search both in the unmasked, F (1, 19) = 13.33, MSE = 34.20, p < .05, and the masked condition, F (1, 19) = 6.19, MSE = 16.35, p < .05. Finally, more errors were committed in the Lexical Decision than in the Positive Visual Search in the masked condition, F (1, 19) = 8.72, MSE = 66.86, p < .05. 2.3. Discussion The present results show that the magnitude and direction of semantic priming may depend on both, consciousness and the level of processing where attention is allocated. We have introduced an extreme test of the non-automaticity of meaning processing, in order to determine whether attention and/or consciousness are necessary to fully process a word. Regarding the standard unmasked conditions, we replicated the classical positive semantic priming effect when a lexical decision is performed both in prime and probe displays (Henik et al., 1994; Neely, 1991). However, when a visual letter search is performed and attention is directed to a low level analysis, this facilitation is inverted obtaining a negative semantic priming effect instead of the typical reduction of positive priming observed in the standard prime task effect (Henik et al., 1994; Marı́-Beffa et al., 2000). The occurrence of negative priming supports the automaticity of semantic processing and the idea of an inhibitory mechanism that suppresses, or inhibits, those activations that interfere with the goal of the task (Houghton et al., 1996). In this case, as attention is allocated to the letter level, any semantic activation has to occur automatically and, as it interferes with the low level task, has to be inhibited. To fully understand the present pattern of results, mainly in the lexical decision conditions, it is important to acknowledge that the high error rates can be due, first, to the very small presentation time (25 ms), and, second, to the fact that subjects can be still processing the search letter when the prime display is presented. Although semantic priming did not reach significance following negative search, the opposite pattern deserves some consideration. The positive search is self-terminated, because it finishes 288 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 when the participant finds the target letter. In the negative search, however, the participant needs to exhaust all the possibilities before reaching the ‘‘no’’ response as can be confirmed by the slower reaction times upon the prime task. According with The Activation Threshold Mechanism, proposed by Chun and Wolfe ‘‘Unsuccessful searches are terminated when no remaining items have probabilities above a termination threshold’’ (Chun & Wolfe, 1996, p. 71). Possibly, in this experiment, due to the high error rates the activation threshold is low and search is terminated after using the word representation as a secondary source of information about the presence of a letter. Thus, the pattern of results resembles more the pattern showed in a high level prime task, such as lexical decision. In any case only positive search trials could be unambiguously used to claim that a low level of representation is used to complete the prime task. Considering the results obtained in the masked conditions, where prime words were presented below the conscious threshold, first, the masked priming effects are clearly opposite to the unmasked ones. When a lexical decision task is performed on prime displays, instead of a typical positive semantic priming effect (Marcel, 1983) we found a robust negative one (
28 ms.) As suggested by Dagenbach et al. (1989) we interpret this data as the result of a ‘‘centre-surround’’ mechanism that according with the task-goal is trying to enhance the semantic properties of the prime display. Once, the prime display is present, this mechanism acts inhibiting the activation of semantic associates of the prime in order to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the attended stimuli. On the other hand, and very interestingly, when a letter search task is performed upon the mask, the identification of the word is not required and no inhibition is observed. Then, we obtained automatic semantic priming in the absence of attention and consciousness. In summary, the results obtained in this experiment confirm the automaticity of semantic processing. Our results also support the idea of a control mechanism that may inhibit all the information that is interfering with the task-goal. 3. Experiment 2 The main aim of the second experiment was to determine if the lack of preparation for a task could influence the control mechanisms that are responsible for the negative priming observed in Experiment 1. The main idea was that the preparation for a task allows the development of the inhibitory processing because this requires some time to work efficiently (Houghton et al., 1996). In the present experiment both the letter to be searched for and the prime word were presented simultaneously. Thus, participants did not know in advance the target letter. If inhibition has no time to develop, then it is expected that negative priming will disappear in those conditions were it was obtained in Experiment 1. 3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants Twenty two undergraduate students at the University of Granada, aged between 18 and 45 years, participated in the experiment and received course credit for their participation. All of them were native Spanish speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 289 Fig. 2. Stimuli sequence for Experiment 2. 3.1.2. Stimuli design and procedure The stimuli and visual parameters were identical to those employed in Experiment 1, except that the target letter of the letter search task was displayed simultaneously with the prime word, just above it. A cross (+) was now presented at fixation before each display. The experimental design and temporal parameters used in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 1. As previously mentioned, the only modification affected the prime display, where the letter to search for was presented simultaneously with the prime word but slightly above (0.5 cm) and was always visible. The trial sequence in this case was as follows: Each trail started with a ‘‘+’’ at fixation for 250 ms. Then, the prime display appeared after a 10 ms blank interval, (see Fig. 2). The prime display consisted of a single letter and a word below, both displayed at the centre of the screen. All other procedural details were as in Experiment 1. 3.2. Results As in Experiment 1, two separate analyses on the RT data and on the error data were performed for prime and probe tasks responses. Two subjects were discarded due to the corruption of their data files. 290 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 3.2.1. Prime task Mean reaction times of correct responses were submitted to a two way 3 · 2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the factors Task (PVS, NVS, and LD) and Masking (M and UM). The analysis showed a significant effect for Task · Masking interaction, F (2, 38) = 8.09, MSE = 2806.13, p < .01, and a main effect of the factor Task F (2, 38) = 90.07, MSE = 7965.80, p < .01 (see Table 2). These differences across tasks were found for both unmasked F (2, 38) = 55.18, MSE = 5060.46, p < .01, and masked F (2, 38) = 80.70, MSE = 5711.46, p < .01, trials. Post hoc LSD analysis indicates that once again, in Lexical Decision task responses were significantly faster than in the other two tasks both in unmasked and masked trials. Also, Positive Visual Search responses were faster than negative ones. Responses to the masks were slower than to unmasked words in Positive Visual Search, but faster in Lexical Decision. The 3 · 2 (Task · Masking) repeated measures analysis of variance on percentage of errors showed significant effects of Task only, F (2, 38) = 28.49, MSE = 38.09, p < .01. Post hoc LSD test indicated that there were more errors in Positive and Negative visual search than in Lexical Decision. 3.2.2. Probe task: The prime-task effect Mean reaction times of correct responses longer than 200 ms and shorter than 1500 ms (see Table 3) were submitted to a three-way 3 · 2 · 2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the factors Task (PVS, NVS, and LD) Masking (M and UM) and Relatedness (R, Related; UR, Unrelated). Only trials with a correct response to the prime were included in the analysis. The analysis showed a significant Task by Masking, F (2, 38) = 4.82, MSE = 1605.63, p < .05, and Task · Masking · Relatedness interaction, F (2, 38) = 3.17, MSE = 1045.42, p = .053. Also the main effects of Task and Relatedness reached significance, F (2, 38) = 4.88, MSE = 11077.64, and F (1, 19) = 7.18, MSE = 894.89, respectively. Detailed analysis of the three-way interaction demonstrated a significant positive priming effect in the unmasked lexical decision (21 ms, F (1, 19) = 8.12, MSE = 524.86, p < .05) and the masked positive visual search conditions (35 ms, F (1, 19) = 7.14, MSE = 1754.02, p < .05). No significant priming effects were found in the other conditions (all FÕs < 1). The 3 · 2 · 2 (Task · Masking · Relatedness) repeated measures analysis of variance on percentage of errors showed reliable main effects of Task, F (2, 38) = 26.05, MSE = 21.12, p < .01 (percentages were 3.1, 7.9, and 3.5, respectively for Positive Visual Search, Negative Visual Search, and Lexical Decision), and Masking, F (1, 19) = 4,86, MSE = 9.09, p < .05 (percentages were 4.4 and 5.2, respectively for Unmasked and Masked condition). Also the Task by Masking interaction reached significance, F (2, 38) = 3.78, MSE = 7.94, p < .05. Simple effects analysis of this interaction showed that the percentage of errors was greater in masked than in unmasked conditions only in the Lexical Decision task, F (1, 19) = 18.54, MSE = 5.22, p < .01. Also, a greater percentage of errors was found in Negative Visual Search than in Lexical Decision and Positive Visual Search, both in unmasked and masked conditions (min F = 17.74, p < .01). 3.3. Discussion In this experiment, we have obtained three important results. First, consistent with previous work described in prime-task effect literature, we have replicated the reduction of semantic priming in unmasked visual search trials: the traditional prime-task effect. Second, in spite of the dif- B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 291 ference between Experiment 1 and 2, the magnitude of the positive semantic priming found in masked positive letter search trials is consistent. Once again, as in Experiment 1 we observed semantic priming independent of consciousness and attention. And finally, negative priming effects present in experiment 1 completely disappeared. These results show that the prime task effect can be modulated by the pre-cueing of the search letter. Reduction of semantic priming is mainly observed when there is no time to prepare for the letter search. When this time is available, negative priming emerges. This pattern of results cannot be fully predicted by a theory that solely assumes that semantic processing can be interrupted at early stages of word processing. If the interruption of semantic processing is still a plausible control mechanism, it seems to work only when the letter to search appears simultaneously with the target. When there is more time to prepare for the letter search, inhibition can be observed (see Section 4). As we indicated in the discussion section of Experiment 1, the high error rates to the prime in lexical decision can be explained considering the amount of time the prime is displayed, and also, that attention can be captured by the letter above the prime. To summarize, there are two main conclusions to be drawn from this experiment. Lack of time to prepare for the next task affects inhibitory mechanisms of control, while excitatory mechanisms remain intact. And second, this mechanism of control can operate upon unattended and unconscious representations. In the next section, we will further discuss the parallelism between attention and consciousness in the context of the prime task effect. 4. General discussion The study presented here has extremely tested the automaticity theory of word processing. To ensure this, it was necessary to obtain evidence of semantic processing in three circumstances. First, when attention was allocated to a low level of processing (word letters instead of meaning). Second, when words were presented below an objective conscious threshold, and third, and even stricter, a condition in which the previous two conditions were combined, resulting in no consciousness and no attention directed to word meaning. In order to achieve these goals we used a Prime-task paradigm in combination with masking procedures. Comparison between Experiment 1 and 2 helps clarify some inconsistencies across Prime-task studies and also to explain some aspects about the cognitive control in word processing. The pattern of results obtained in the present study contributes in several ways to the debate about the automaticity of semantic processing. First, regarding the Unmasked Letter Search Conditions, in Experiment 2 we replicate previous studies (Chiappe et al., 1996; Henik et al., 1983; Henik et al., 1994; Kaye & Brown, 1985; Parkin, 1979; Smith, 1979; Smith et al., 1983; Stolz & Besner, 1996) which have shown a reduction of semantic priming effect when a letter search task is performed on the prime display. However, in Experiment 1, when the target letter was presented 250 ms before the prime word, we found significant negative priming. This result indicates that allocation of attention to the letter levels does not prevent the processing of word meaning, and instead, is completed automatically. Two main explanations of the prime-task effect have been put forward. First, it has been proposed that attention interrupts the higher processing of a word if it is directed to a low level of 292 B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 processing (Henik et al., 1983; Henik et al., 1994; Stolz & Besner, 1996). Second, it has been also proposed that semantic representation of a word must be inhibited depending on its level of interference with the goal task (Marı́-Beffa et al., 2000). The present study supports the second idea. If semantic processing were interrupted at the letter level, no priming at all should be observed. Rather, it appears that meaning has been processed, but it interferes with the goal of the task, and therefore it has to be inhibited. Comparisons between Experiment 1 and 2 indicate that preparation time is a relevant factor for obtaining negative priming. The lack of negative priming frequently observed in the literature may be accounted for this factor. We assume that the presentation of the letter in advance helps to establish an attentional task-set which includes excitatory and inhibitory control mechanisms (Marı́-Beffa et al., 2000; Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, & Seiffert, 1998; Tipper et al., 1994). Therefore, by increasing the time participants had to prepare for the task, we allowed a more effective inhibition of those properties of the word that could interfere with the task-goal (Tipper, 2001; Tipper et al., 1994). We are not assuming that inhibition starts before the onset of the stimulus, but that it is more effective if enough time is given for the mechanism of control to prepare. The results of the present study do not allow us to discern the way this preparation proceeds. However, it can be assumed, for example, that some kind of orientation to the processing level where inhibition has to operate can be done in advance. Positive semantic priming obtained in masked letter search trials confirmed the automaticity of semantic processing even in these extreme conditions (no attention to meaning plus no word consciousness). It appears that the meaning of the masked word is automatically activated but does not interfere with the task. We assume that interference occurs when activation levels of a distracter are strong enough to compete for the response. In contrast with the positive priming observed when subjects searched for a letter in the primetask, when a lexical decision was required, negative priming (Experiment 1) and no priming at all (Experiment 2) was observed. This pattern of results can be explained by assuming the idea of a ‘‘center-surround’’ mechanism that, in order to pop-out the relevant properties for the task needs to inhibit those active representations that may compete for the response (Dagenbach et al., 1989) even if they are unconsciously activated. In Experiment 1 of the current study, the letter at fixation indicated that a prime (not probe) would be presented next. Although a lexical decision was performed in both cases, this discrimination is important because primes were either words or nonwords (mask), while probes were either words or pseudo-words. Therefore, the completion of a lexical decision may ask for different strategies in prime versus probe displays. While it is clear how pre-cueing the letter search task can influence the emergence of negative semantic priming, it might be less clear how this pre-cueing can affect semantic priming from the Lexical Decision prime-task. In Experiment 1, there were different cues for the prime and the probe displays. A letter always signalled that a prime trial (containing probably a mask) would come next, and the probe display (that was always unmasked) was cued by a plus sign. In Experiment 2, all the displays were cued with a plus sign (‘‘+’’). The differential cueing from Experiment 1 not only affected the way participants performed the letter search prime-task, but also seems to have affected the execution of the lexical decision prime-task for masked trials. With differential cueing (Experiment 1), participants clearly know whether a mask might appear in the next display. This will help to prepare the operations of the ‘‘centre-sourround’’ mechanism, which is believed to be responsible for negative semantic priming in masked situations (Dagenbach et al., 1989). In Experiment 2, as the cue was the same for prime and probe displays, it was not possible B. Valdés et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 278–295 293 for the participants to predict whether a possible masked display was coming next, therefore making it more difficult for attention to be ready for a masked trial. This lack of prediction is reflected in the longer reaction times in the second experiment.1 And, because the control mechanisms have more time to prepare, more efficient inhibition (and negative priming) would be expected in the first experiment than in the second experiment. In summary, our results indicate that semantic properties of a word can be processed when words are presented under an objective threshold of awareness, and also when attention is not allocated to semantic but to low-level features of the word. We conclude that word processing is fully automatic. However, automatism should not imply that no control mechanism can operate. Our results indicate that a putative inhibitory like control mechanism (Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998; Posner & Snyder, 1975) is operating even when neither attention nor consciousness is directed to meaning. Therefore, we support the idea of a redefinition of automaticity as a process that occurs without intention or without conscious monitoring (see Tzelgov, 1997 for an extensive theoretical discussion). However, in no-attention and no-consciousness situations, inhibitory control mechanisms are working, as in attended and conscious situations, in order to allow participants to fulfil the task requirements. Words are processed automatically, but the destiny of their mental representations will depend on subjectÕs task-goals. Acknowledgments This study was supported by a Ph.D. grant from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologı́a (CONACyT), México (National Council of Science and Technology) to Berenice Valdés Conroy, No.:110866/110994. This research was also partially supported by a project grant from Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) to Dr. Paloma Marı́-Beffa (5/S16740) and by BBSRC Underwood Fund to Dr. Andrés Catena and Dr. Paloma Marı́-Beffa. 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Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog The ontology of neglect Cristina Becchioa,*, Cesare Bertoneb a b Centre for Cognitive Science, Department of Psychology, via Po 14, 10123 Torino, Italy CTAO, Centre for Theoretical and Applied Ontology, via S. Ottavio 20, 10124 Torino, Italy Received 5 June 2004 Available online 22 January 2005 Abstract As shown by neuroscientific evidence, neglect may occur without elementary sensorimotor impairments. The deficit is to be found at a higher, more abstract level of representation, which prevents the patient not only from seeing, but from conceiving the contralesional space. By analysing a series of neuropsychological results, in this paper we suggest a crucial role of time for the construction of a world: on this basis, we try to explain how it is possible that half the ontology gets lost. The analysis of the ontological implication of neglect will allow us to shed light on manifestations of the pathology apparently disconnected. Ó 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Unilateral neglect; Ontology; Time; Temporal features; Allochiria . . .it might be the case that we find certain aspects of neglect puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of neglect puzzling enough. Bisiach and Rusconi (1990) 1. Unilateral spatial neglect Unilateral neglect is a condition which has generated a great deal of interest in the past decade, as it reveals a vast amount of often bewildering behavioural manifestations. Patients suffering * Corresponding author. Fax: +11 8159039. E-mail address: becchio@psych.unito.it (C. Becchio). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.12.001 484 C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 from unilateral spatial neglect fail to respond to stimuli, objects and even people located on their contralesional side—more frequently, the left hemispace. Depending on the severity of the pathology, neglect may be noticed merely by observing the patientsÕ spontaneous behaviour: patients with neglect may not notice objects on the left of a scene, may not eat food on the left side of the plate, may ignore the left part of words. If the examiner approaches them from the left side, they may address their responses to the opposite side, even if nobody is there (De Renzi, Colombo, Faglioni, & Gilbertoni, 1982). They may bump into walls, doorways, and objects on the left side. Even in absence of dressing apraxia, they may forget to put on the left sleeve of their jacket or the left shoe. Other behavioural signs of left neglect include shaving or applying make-up only to the right side of the face. An endless list of examples could be given. Some of these behaviours may seem similar to those performed by subjects affected by homonymous hemianopia, a visual field disorder frequently observed after postchiasmatic brain damage. Similarly to neglect patients, patients with left hemianopia may show difficulties in detecting stimuli and finding objects in the left visual space. They may not avoid obstacles on the left side, bumping into people approaching them from that side, and may have difficulties with reading. Given these similarities, which may render the diagnosis of neglect problematic (Walker, Findlay, Young, & Welch, 1991), one might conceive that patients show left neglect just because, as hemianoptic patients, they do not see the left side of the visual world. This hypothesis is nevertheless falsified both at the anatomical level and at the functional level (see Kerkhoff, 2001). In hemianopia, no visual information can be detected in the contralateral visual field. The spatial representation of both hemispaces is nevertheless intact and hence it is sufficient that the patient turns his head to process information from the left side of space. In neglect, as we will see, the deficit is to be found at a higher, more abstract level of representation, preventing the patient not only from seeing, but from conceiving the contralesional space. 2. The hemiontology1 of neglect Unlike subjects affected by hemianopia, neglect patients not only do not see stimuli presented in the contralateral half of space, but behave as if that half of space did not exist and never had existed. Indeed, the most astonishing aspect of neglect is perhaps this: patients suffering from it, not only are unable to perceive the left side of space, but are not even able to conceive it (Bisiach, 1993). If unlike the hemianoptic patient, the patient suffering from neglect does not turn his head towards the left, this is because there is no left side of the world on which to shift his gaze. The neglect patient is unable to conceive the part of the world that the hemianoptic patient simply does not see. The difference is not marginal (see Table 1 for two contrasting case examples). 1 In philosophy the term ontology is used with different meanings. In this paper the term indicates ‘‘what there is,’’ i.e., the real world, the whole of existing things. C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 485 Table 1 Case examples of a patient with left-side, homonymous hemianopia (HH), and a patient with left-side neglect (N) Left hemianoptic patient without neglect (HH) E: Did you experience any significant changes in vision since your illness (brain infarction)? HH: Yes, I have problems perceiving things on my left; and reading is a problem. E: Why is reading a problem? HH: It is slower than before my illness and more exhausting. Sometimes I omit words on my very left. . .or I omit a whole line. I only realize it at the end of a sentence when it does not make sense. . . E: Do you have any other visual impairment? HH: Yes, sometimes I bump into things or persons on my left, or detect them rather late. . . E: What about your orientation outside the clinic, can you find your way? HH: ItÕs difficult, especially when many people are around, on places. . .or when I have to find one particular thing, i.e., in a supermarket. . .when it is on the left. . . Left hemineglect patient without hemianopia (N) E: Did you experience any significant changes in vision since tour illness (brain infarction)? N: No, I havenÕt realized any changes. Except. . .the spectacles do not fit. E: Do you have problems with reading? N: No, not really. E: Do you omit words or syllables on your left side? N: no, I donÕt think so. E: Have you noticed that your vision is impaired on your left side? N: The left eye is fine, no problem. E: Do you sometimes bump into things or persons on your left side? N: Rarely. Well, sometimes it occurs, but that is because there are so many people in this hospital, and they donÕt care. . . E: Can you find your way inside the clinic, and outside? N: I find everything that I want to find. E, examiner. Both patients had objective difficulties in reading as well as in visual exploration of the environment. From Kerkhoff (1999). The world that the neglect patient perceives is also the world that he conceives: he misses nothing. In this sense, the perceived world is not half the world, but the whole world, all the world that the neglect patient is able to conceive. We do not see the world behind us but nevertheless know a world exists behind us: the world stretches beyond the boundaries of the visual field. For a subject with neglect, the world does not stretch beyond the boundaries of the right hemifield (see Fig. 1). In neglect the left side of the world does not exist: or rather, there is no half side of the world, since there is no world stretching beyond the ipsilesional space.2 Similar considerations can be proposed for object-centred neglect, where that being neglected is not the half side of space but the half side of each object (Driver & Halligan, 1991; Driver, Baylis, Goodrich, & Rafal, 1994; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996). One might think that the left-hand side of 2 By positing that the neglect results in a disruption of the reality of the contralateral hemispace, we do not mean to deny that the stimuli presented in the contralateral hemispace may influence the processing of other data. Depending on the relevance of the stimuli, pre-attentive processing up to the level of meaning can take place in the neglect field without awareness (Berti & Rizzolatti, 1992). What we suggest is that those same stimuli do not gain access to existence. 486 C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 Fig. 1. Highly schematic representation of the relationship between world (ontology) and perception in normal, hemianoptic, and neglect subjects. In normal conditions the world stretches beyond the perceptive field. In hemianopia the world ontology is intact: the subject does not perceive the left hemifield, but he knows that there must be a left hemifield. In unilateral neglect, not only the perception but the ontology is cut in half: the contralateral hemifield does not exist. The (half) world perceived is all that exists. the object is as if occluded: the subject with neglect does not perceive it, but knows that it is there. This interpretation is nevertheless ruled out by empirical evidence: patients affected by neglect not only fail to respond to the left hand-side of the object, but behave as if the contralateral half of the object had never existed. 3. Nothing to neglect Although not always explicitly stated, the common assumption is that this occurs because the patient with neglect is, in general, not aware of his deficit, but, as Halligan and Marshall (1998) note, this is often just not true: many patients with neglect have considerable conceptual and experiential insight into their deficit and its consequences3 The example reported by the authors is that of PP, a woman affected by visual neglect, showing a good insight into her neglect. In an interview recorded by the authors, PP provides a detailed account of how neglect affects the day-to-day running of her life: she reports problems with dressing and grooming, difficulties in finding things in peripersonal space (‘‘It takes a long time to find things if they are on the left hand side. . .’’), and in navigating in extrapersonal space (‘‘I kept turning to the right. . .’’). PP begins then to expound her own phenomenology of neglect: . . .I knew the word ‘‘neglect’’ was a sort of medical term for whatever was wrong but the word bothered me because you only neglect something that is actually there, donÕt you? If it is not there, how can you neglect it? It does not seem right to me that the word neglect should be used to describe it. I think they thought I was definitely, deliberately not looking 3 For more details see Marcel, Tegnér, and Nimmo-Smith (2004). C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 487 to the left. I wasnÕt really. It was painful looking to the left. . . People think you are not looking. . . you are neglecting to look but itÕs not there. If it is not there you are not neglecting it. As it can be seen, PP has taken issue with the term ‘‘neglect,’’ but from her perspective, there is nothing to neglect: it is rather that the left space and the contents thereof are simply not there. 4. A break-down of spatial awareness The world that the neglect patient perceives, we argued, is also the world that he conceives. Stating this we intend to mark the difference between neglect and non-cognitive disorders, like hemianopia. The case of PP forces us however to investigate more precisely the sense of this statement. That the neglect patient does not conceive half the world is in fact true in a sense, but false in another. Patients like PP know perfectly well that people have two eyes, two arms and two legs, nevertheless, when asked to sketch a person, reliably they draw only one eye, one arm or one leg to the right of the frontal configuration. A similar dissociation is evident in clock drawing tasks: patients who clearly know how many numbers there are on a standard clock will nonetheless only reproduce numbers from 12 to 6, insisting that their drawing is finished and complete. Rode, Rossetti, Perenin, and Boisson (2004) asked a patient with unilateral neglect to evoke mentally the map of France in two different conditions. In the first condition, he was asked to imagine the map of France and to list all the towns that he could Ôsee.Õ In the second condition, he had to remember and name as many French towns as possible, without being instructed to form a mental image. Left neglect was observed in the first condition, but not in the second. When explicitly asked to imagine the map of France, the patient systematically omitted towns located on the western part of the map. However, that part of geographical knowledge could be recalled from a linguistic description, clearly indicating that the representational neglect shown by the patient did not result from a memory disturbance but was rather due to a disturbance in the analogical representation.4 The patient knows that in France there is town called Bordeaux, but Bordeaux disappears from his conception when the task requires him to form a spatial representation. These and other observations enlighten the spatial character of neglect: as Berti (2000) notes, what is impaired in neglect is not the representation and the awareness of the stimuli per se, but the representation of the left space. In this paper, we do not intend to challenge the view that neglect is a spatial disorder. What we do want to insist upon, however, is that the unilateral loss observed in neglect cannot be attributed to a disorder of spatial representation only. It must necessarily involve another dimension. This dimension, we suggest, is time. 4 It has been proposed that representational neglect could be due to a defective spatial working memory (Beschin, Cocchini, Della Sala, & Logie, 1997). Although a role for mnemonic impairment cannot be ruled out in some cases, it is nevertheless difficult to see how it could account for Rode et al.Õs findings, especially as the patient of Rode et al. tend to follow a proximity criterion in naming towns. 488 C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 5. Beyond space The notion that neglect patients suffer from a Ôrepresentational map reduced to one halfÕ was explicitly and definitively presented to the scientific community by Bisiach and Luzzati (1978). The authors asked two patients with right brain lesions to imagine themselves at one end of a well-known square (Piazza del Duomo in Milan) and describe all the business places around the square. As one would expect in the hypothesis of a defect of space representation, both patients failed to recall shops, cafes, etc., on the left. The next step in the experiment was for subjects to imagine themselves looking at the cathedral from the opposite end of the square. Remarkably, in this latter condition, patients named the previously neglected places but omitted those recalled just a few moments before. Even more astonishing is the fact that subjects did not show any dismay. It should be noted that the subjects in question did not present any mnemonic impairment and that they probably would have been surprised—at least as anyone of us would have been—if they had seen an object disappearing instantaneously on their right (the countercheck had not been done). How is it possible, when they take the second perspective, for them not to be aware of the contents of their own output when they reported the view from the opposite end of the piazza? What is striking with respect to other examples of dissociated performance is that here the dissociation originates from a mere shift in perspective. In the Rode et al. (2004) study, the dissociation could be interpreted as dissociation between propositional representation (intact) and analogical representation (impaired). In the experiment of Piazza del Duomo the dissociation affects two images of the same square. 6. Ontological implications Imagining themselves standing with their back turned to the cathedral, patients recalled half the square. Imagining themselves standing at the opposite end, patients recalled the other half of the imagined scene. Even though they remembered both halves, they were nevertheless unable to recall the whole square at any one time. Why? Why didnÕt they stick the two halves together? Berti and Rizzolatti (1992) propose that the encoding of space is a necessary prerequisite for conscious perception. If spatial encoding is prevented or impaired, as it is in neglect, the presence of the stimulus does not enter consciousness. With respect to Bisiach and LuzzatiÕs (1978) experiment, a lack of spatial awareness per se does not however, seem to constitute a sufficient explanation: a spatially constrained disorder of awareness (Berti, 2000) might explain why, at any one moment, the patient is unable to represent the whole scene, not why the two halves do not form a whole. The lack of awareness must concern not only the left side of space, but its absence. The contralesional space is not merely neglected: its absence is indeed lacking. The mere absence implies that something is missed: something that has been, is no longer present. In neglect the left side of space is not merely not present: it is this Ônot presentÕ that is lacking. This absence of what is lacking reveals a fracture which is not only spatial, but temporal. Whilst the mere absence simply implies that the object is not present, the absence of what is lacking requires in fact not only that the object does not exist in the present, but that it had never existed and never would exist. C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 489 7. Time and ontology: Abnormal temporal dynamics in neglect5 Time is an indispensable attribute for external realities (see Becchio & Bertone, 2003): objects exist before their apparition (permanence of anteriority) and continue to exist even when they ceased to be visible (permanence of posteriority). Despite our impression of a full and coherent world as immediate and instantaneous, ÔseeingÕ is itself a temporal fact, requiring an integration over time (Humphreys, 1997). Since visual information is sampled at high resolution over only a few degrees of visual angle at the fovea, a complete representation of a scene requires the contents of individual eye fixations to be integrated over space and time (Resink, 2000). In the primary visual cortex, the retinal image is constructed anew at each eye fixation, overwriting all information previously encoded. Without re-mapping to maintain and relocate neural activity corresponding to these inputs, this general overwriting phenomenon would lead to the disappearance of relevant information across ocular shifts: the world would appear as a sequence of non-integrated visual snapshots, at different spatial scale (Pisella & Mattingley, 2004). Re-mapping deficits in neglect are suggested by studies requiring patients to make two successive saccades in order to fixate two sequentially flashed targets (double-step paradigm). If the two targets (A and B) are extinguished during the execution of the first saccade, then the generation of a spatially accurate second saccade requires re-mapping for updating the spatial representation of the extinguished target B. In a study by Duhamel, Goldberg, Fitzgibbon, Sirigu, and Grafman (1992), the patient, showing neglect in consequence of a frontoparietal damage, performed well with targets flashed first into the right field and then into the left field. When she was asked to do the same task with a target flashed first in the left field and then in the right field, she completed the first saccade correctly, but never acquired the second target, even though this required her to make a saccade in the ipsilesional direction. Examining patients with unilateral lesions of various structures, Heide, Blankenburg, Zimmermann, and Kömpf (1995) found that both right and left lesions of the parietal posterior cortex (PPC) caused errors in double-step saccades. Each pair of targets was located either in the same hemifield (within-hemifield condition) or in different hemifields (between-hemifields condition). Both patients with right and left PPC lesions showed an elevated percentage of errors when in double-step saccades that involved crossing the midline (between-hemifields condition). In addition, patients with right PCC—all of whom showed initially neglect—showed significant errors under conditions in which double-step saccades had to be performed entirely within the left visual field. From these results, a remapping deficit would be demonstrated in neglect patients within the left visual hemifield. As a consequence, updating and maintenance of spatial representation over time (persistence) may result impaired. An additional deficit may arise in the stage of selection. Individuals without any neurological abnormality experience a significant loss of attention after engaging a target for purpose of identification (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1994). This loss of temporal attention, known as Ôattentional blinkÕ lasts about 400 ms and is usually attributed to an inability to retain usable representation of a second target while completing attentive processing of a first target. 5 A review of the temporal deficits in neglect is beyond the scopes of this work. Our analysis will be thus limited to those temporal aspects that—this is our suggestion—contribute to the unilateral of reality. 490 C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 Using standard procedure, which consists in presenting a rapid serial visual sequence (RSVP) of letters presented successively at the same location, Husain, Shapiro, Martin, and Kennard (1997) showed that neglect patients have an abnormally severe and protracted attentional blink, lasting nearly three times as long as for healthy observers. Husain et al. (1997) examined the attentional blink at one central location. In a recent singlecase study Hillstrom, Husain, Shapiro, and Rorden (2004) varied the location of the second target: whereas the first target was always presented at fixation, the second target appeared either at fixation or peripherally to the left or the right. This variation led to an interesting finding: the patient with left-side neglect showed a prolonged attentional blink in identifying the second stimulus when the second stimulus appeared contralesionally, an attentional blink of normal duration when the stimulus appeared at fixation and no significant attentional blink when the second stimulus appeared ipsilesionally. This result suggests that the temporal dynamics of attentional processing may be enhanced compared to normal performance for ipsilesional stimuli, whereas it is significantly prolonged for stimuli appearing to the left. When two objects are simultaneously presented, this abnormal temporal dynamic may lead to neglecting contralesional objects (Humphreys, 1997): if selection of ipsilesional stimuli is speeded up and there is also a spatial bias towards ipsilesional locations, then contralesional stimuli may be missed. The temporal distortion results thus in an ontological landslide, sweeping away the left side of the world. 8. Two halves: not a whole We started from the experiment by Bisiach and Luzzati (1978) to introduce the hypothesis that the disorder that underlies neglect is not confined to space but also involves time. The neglect patient remembers both halves of the square, but is still unable to remember the whole square at anyone time. If this occurs, we reasoned, this must be because the two halves of the square do not co-exist at the same time (see Fig. 2). Fig. 2. In normal conditions, the features of the square, independently from the order in which they have been mentioned, form a unitary spatio-temporal structure, in which they simultaneously exist. In neglect, the features that from time to time fall within the ipsilesional space are bound together in an independent structure. The relation of simultaneousness is preserved within each aggregate, but not between the features of different aggregates. (t, time). C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 491 Experimental evidence presented in the previous section supports this conclusion. In normal conditions, re-mapping mechanisms allow the integration of successive perception in a world of temporally enduring entities. Items successively selected co-exist within a continuous space-time. Disrupting the temporal continuity between one side of the space and the other, neglect not only prevents the representation of half the space, but renders impossible a spatial continuity between successively represented hemi-spaces. Changing point of view, as requested in the experiment of Piazza del Duomo, has thus a twofold ontological effect: one side of the space ceases to exist, the other side explodes into existence. The result is a sequence of hemi-structures independent in both time and ontology. 9. Conclusive considerations Previous research on neglect has above all been concerned with what patients with neglect can do despite their apparent lack of awareness. The lack of awareness per se, its nature, the paradoxes it raises, have attracted comparatively little interest (Halligan & Marshall, 1998). The idea proposed in this paper is that neglect leads to an absence, which is not a simple absence but a lack of absence. This lack of absence originates from a disruption of the conditions of existence which involves both space and time. One of the advantages of describing neglect both in its spatial and temporal features is that it allows one to see the relation between deficits that at different levels of analysis may appear as merely concomitant symptoms. The example that we analyse in this concluding section is that of allochiria and prior entry. 9.1. Allochiria The term allochiria indicates the spatial transposition, usually symmetrically, of a stimulus from one side of the space to the opposite side. Neglect patients may show allochiria in several tasks, such as completion of geographical maps (Battersby, Bender, Pollack, & Kahn, 1954; Benton, Levin, & Van Allen, 1974), verbal description (Bisiach, Capitani, Luzzati, & Perani, 1981; Guariglia, Padovani, Pantano, & Pizzamiglio, 1993), manual pointing of visual targets (Joanette & Brouchon, 1984), drawing from memory (Halligan, Marshall, & Wade, 1992a; Riddoch & Humphryes, 1983), copying drawings (Halligan, Marshall, & Wade, 1992b). Halligan et al. (1992b) described a patient who, in copying a butterfly, omitted the left wing. However, he drew some of the left-side details on the right wing (see Fig. 3). As Berti (2002) notes, the phenomenon is obviously related to the capacity of processing leftside-neglected stimuli. What is striking is the dissociation between the ‘‘what’’ and the ‘‘where’’ in the patientÕs experience: the ‘‘what,’’ which is preserved, is mislocated, being transposed in the opposed side of space. 9.2. Prior entry A similar transposition, though in the temporal dimension, exists, we suggest, with the phenomenon of prior entry. 492 C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 Fig. 3. Stimulus for copying (full butterfly) and patientÕs copy. From Halligan et al. (1992b). Table 2 Features of allochiria and prior entry Allochiria Prior entry Transposition in space Dissociation between what and where Transposition in time Dissociation between what and when Fig. 4. Schematic representation of the destiny of the contralesional stimulus in neglect, allochiria, and prior entry (t, time). The phenomenon, found both in the visual modality (Rorden, Mattingley, Karnath, & Driver, 1997) and the auditory modality (Karnath, Zimmer, & Lewald, 2002), consists in the fact that an ipsilesional event is perceived as occurring earlier than physically synchronous contralesional stimulus. In Rorden et al. (1997) study, two patients with left-sided visual extinction after right parietal damage were each presented with two unconnected bars, one in each visual field. The patientsÕ task was to judge which appeared sooner. Both patients reported that the right bar pre- C. Becchio, C. Bertone / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 483–494 493 ceded the left unless the latter led by over 200 ms, suggesting a severe bias to the right, affecting the time-course of visual awareness. The phenomenon, we propose, may be described as a transposition in time: separate events, physically synchronous, are relocated in time so that the left-side event appears as happening later. As in the case of allochiria, the transposition entails a dissociation: in prior entry, this dissociation takes place between the ‘‘what’’ and the ‘‘when’’ (see Table 2). The interpretation here proposed of neglect suggests that both in allochiria and in prior entry the mislocation of the stimuli does not result from a defective mapping of the spatial/temporal relations between the different elements sampled. Indeed, the stimuli are not mislocated at all, but re-located to avoid the ontological landslide that neglect brings about. In allochiria the contralesional stimulus escapes from neglect by moving into another space, in the phenomenon of prior entry the transposition occurs in another time. In both cases the contralesional stimulus gains an access to existence, but this access is transposed into the hemifield in which the spatio-temporal conditions of existence are preserved (see Fig. 4). Acknowledgments This research was supported by the Ministero Italiano dellÕIstruzione dellÕUniversitaÕ e della Ricerca (Firb Project, ‘‘Assessment dei disturbi della comunicazione in unÕottica riabilitativa’’ research code no. RBAU01JEYW_001). The authors thanks Anna Berti and Lorenzo Pia for comments. References Battersby, W. S., Bender, M. B., Pollack, M., & Kahn, R. L. (1954). Unilateral spatial agnosia (inattention) in patients with cerebral lesion. Brain, 79, 68–93. Becchio, C., & Bertone, C. (2003). Object temporal connotation. Brain and Cognition, 52, 192–196. Benton, A. L., Levin, H. S., & Van Allen, M. W. (1974). Geographic orientation in patients with unilateral cerebral disease. Neuropsychologia, 12, 183–191. Berti A. (2000). Neuropsychological syndromes and the structure of conscious processes. In The emerge of the mind. Proceedings of the 9th international symposium. Fondazione Carlo Erba. Berti, A. (2002). Unconscious processing in neglect. In H. O. Karnath, D. A. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Short Communication Are delusional contents replayed during dreams? Armando D’Agostino a,b,⇑, Giacomo Aletti c, Martina Carboni a,b, Simone Cavallotti a,b, Ivan Limosani a, Marialaura Manzone a, Silvio Scarone a,b a Department of Mental Health, San Paolo Hospital, Milan, Italy Department of Health Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy c Department of Mathematics ‘‘Federigo Enriques’’, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 20 June 2012 Available online 21 May 2013 Keywords: Sleep Dreaming Memory consolidation Psychosis Delusions Continuity a b s t r a c t The relationship between dream content and waking life experiences remains difficult to decipher. However, some neurobiological findings suggest that dreaming can, at least in part, be considered epiphenomenal to ongoing memory consolidation processes in sleep. Both abnormalities in sleep architecture and impairment in memory consolidation mechanisms are thought to be involved in the development of psychosis. The objective of this study was to assess the continuity between delusional contents and dreams in acutely psychotic patients. Ten patients with a single fixed and recurring delusional content were asked to report their dreams during an acute psychotic break. Sixteen judges with four different levels of acquaintance to the specific content of the patients’ delusions were asked to group the dreams, expecting that fragments of the delusional thought would guide the task. A mathematical index (f, t) was developed in order to compare correct groupings between the four groups of judges. Most judges grouped the dreams slightly above chance level and no relevant differences could be found between the four groups [F(3, 12) = 1.297; p = n.s.]. Scoring of dreams for specific delusional themes suggested a continuity in terms of dream and waking mentation for two contents (Grandiosity and Religion). These findings seem to suggest that at least some delusional contents recur within patients’ dreams. Future studies will need to determine whether such continuity reflects ongoing consolidation processes that are relevant to current theories of delusion formation and stabilization. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction 1.1. Sleep-dependent memory consolidation in the healthy brain/mind Dream content is thought to reflect several aspects of the dreamer’s waking life and many laboratory studies have confirmed what is generally termed the continuity hypothesis of dreaming (Schredl & Hofmann, 2003). However, some authors suggest that universal aspects of dreams are wrongly attributed to individual experiences when they should be interpreted as generic responses to common brain activation patterns shared across the sleep of all human subjects (Hobson & Kahn, 2007). Consolidation of new memory traces into long-term storage has been proposed as a plausible ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Dipartimento di Salute Mentale, A.O. San Paolo, via Antonio di Rudinì 8, 20142 Milan, Italy. Fax: +39 02 81844026. E-mail address: armando.dagostino@unimi.it (A. D’Agostino). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.006 A. D’Agostino et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 709 function of sleep, whereby key elements of recent experiences are integrated with previously encoded remote and semantic memories (Wamsley & Stickgold, 2011). Some evidence seems to support the contribution of Slow Wave Sleep in consolidating hippocampus-dependent episodic memories, whereas REM sleep appears to be more important for procedural and emotional memory consolidation (for a review, see Diekelmann & Born, 2010). The progression from quiet waking to sleep onset, NREM and REM sleep, has been experimentally correlated to an increase in vivid, hallucinatory percepts that are bound together hyperassociatively in bizarre dream experiences (for a review, see Stickgold, Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse, 2001). Given this strong brain/mind correlation, the dream process itself could somehow reflect the activation and recombination of mnemonic elements during sleep (Schwartz, 2003). However, the mechanism through which this process contributes to the generation of a complex, multimodal sensory experience remains unclear. Indeed, hippocampal activity has been shown to increase during REM sleep in comparison to both wakefulness and NREM sleep but complete episodic memories are rarely found in dreams (Hobson, Pace-Schott, Stickgold, & Kahn, 1998). It has been proposed that dreams incorporate memory fragments relative to waking life experiences that have occurred 5–7 days before the dream at a greater rate than those from 2 to 4 days before the dream (Nielsen, Kuiken, Alain, Stenstrom, & Powell, 2004). This ‘‘dream-lag effect’’ was suggested by experimental findings developed on the basis of the well-known concept of day residue, defined by Sigmund Freud as the incorporation of waking life elements within the dream. The confirmation of this finding in several studies, some of which rigorously designed to overcome methodological shortcomings (for example, Blagrove, Henley-Einion, Barnett, Edwards, & Heidi Seage, 2011), supports the view that dreaming and wakefulness are continuous subjective experiences. Indeed, learning-related hippocampal excitability has been shown to last approximately 1 week in several animal studies, when excitation of neocortical neuronal complexes is observed (Nielsen & Stenstrom, 2005). Two major obstacles have thus far delayed the possibility of correlating neurofunctional modifications to ongoing memory processing in dreams. First of all, direct access to the dream experience is not possible with the exception of lucidity, a rare phenomenon that has been hypothesized to be a hybrid state of consciousness (Dresler et al., 2011; Voss, Holzmann, Tuin, & Hobson, 2009). Dream reports, that are commonly used to infer knowledge on brain function, are memory reports that invariably involve two types of cognition, given that they are produced during sleep and reported during wakefulness (Schwartz & Maquet, 2002). Second, the possibility of accurately relating episodic or semantic memory fragments found in dreams to waking life experiences is limited by the broad variability of thoughts, emotions, interactions, events, etc. which characterize the dreamer’s wakefulness. 1.2. Relationship between dream mentation and psychosis Abnormal sleep architecture and impaired memory consolidation processes have been linked to the development of psychosis (Keshavan, Montrose, Miewald, & Jindal, 2011). The subjective experience of dreaming has been shown to share neurobiological and phenomenological similarities with psychosis (Limosani, D’Agostino, Manzone, & Scarone, 2011), but the relationship between sleep-dependent memory consolidation, cognitive deficits and psychotic symptoms found across diagnostic categories remains unclear. One possible approach is to explore the distinctive features of dream mentation during psychotic breaks. To the best of our knowledge, very few studies previously assessed the manifest content of dreams in Schizophrenia. Apprehension, death and mutilation-related anxieties as well as increased rates of ambivalent hostility were found to characterize the emotional tone of patients’ dreams (Carrington, 1972; Kramer & Roth, 1973; Schnetzler & Carbonnel, 1976; Stompe et al., 2003). The increased rates of threats towards the dream Self found in comparison to control populations were intuitively correlated to delusional persecutory experiences in waking life (Carrington, 1972; Langs, 1966; Noble, 1951; Stompe et al., 2003). According to this line of research, generic delusional themes, i.e. Grandiosity or Persecution appear to recur within patients’ dreams rather than specific contents. However, one Canadian group recently found that differences between the dreams of schizophrenic subjects and those of normal controls disappear after controlling for report length (Lusignan et al., 2009) and that ‘‘sleep stage cognitive style in schizophrenia is comparable to that observed in healthy individuals, with NREM sleep dream reports being more thought-like, less elaborate and less bizarre than REM sleep dream reports’’ (Lusignan et al., 2010). In most studies, dreams were collected from chronic schizophrenic subjects with varying degrees of active psychosis, so little or no inference can be made on the continuity between sleep mentation and waking thought processes during acute psychotic breaks. 1.3. Objectives Two distinct experimental procedures were designed to assess the continuity of dream content with delusional thoughts in acutely psychotic inpatients. (1) Several judges were asked to independently group the dreams of 10 subjects selected on the basis of their remarkably fixed and recurrent delusion. We hypothesized that judges with both a professional knowledge of delusional thought formation and direct acquaintance with patients’ specific delusional systems would recognize fragments more accurately within their dreams during an acute psychotic break. (2) The same dream reports were scored for the presence of typical delusional themes. Our objective was to confirm that correct identification of dreamers depended on the presence of delusional themes in their dreams. 710 A. D’Agostino et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 2. Methods and results 2.1. Patient sample Table 1 shows the demographic and clinical characteristics of the 10 participants. All actively psychotic patients admitted to the psychiatric ward of the San Paolo Hospital in Milan, Italy, over a period of 12 months, were screened for inclusion in this study. Inclusion criteria were (i) at least 4 hospitalizations in the previous 2 years with an entry diagnosis of acute psychosis, (ii) the recurrence of a fixed delusion within these episodes, (iii) marked to severe global rating of delusions upon admission and at the end of the dream collection period. Content of delusions was documented by examining all available clinical charts from the previous 2 years. Exclusion criteria were relevant cognitive impairment, alcohol and psychoactive substance abuse and a present or past history of a serious medical or neurological condition, including perinatal injury, cranial trauma, mental retardation and parasomnias. The subjects gave informed consent to use their reports in research but were not aware of the specific aim of this study. 2.2. Clinical assessment Clinical assessment was performed by using the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS, Overall & Gorham, 1962) and the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS, Andreasen & Olsen, 1982). Only participants with SAPS Item 20 Score P 4 throughout the dream collection period were included in the study (see next paragraph). Available reference values for the overall psychopathological assessment indicate that participants were on average markedly ill when the dream collection period ended (Leucht et al., 2005). Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) was administered at baseline and participants were included if they scored above the age- and education-adjusted cut off for cognitive impairment. None of the patients included in the study were drug-naïve but all had discontinued treatment prior to relapse. Various combinations of mood stabilizers and antipsychotic agents were administered to all patients during the week in which the experimental material was collected. 2.3. Collection of dream reports During the first week of hospitalization participants were asked to keep a dream diary where each morning they could report dreams recollected upon awakening. As instruction, participants were asked to report as many dreams as they could recollect and to accurately report the whole development of the dream plot whenever possible. Diaries were discontinued when clinical assessment began to suggest a significant remission of symptoms as evaluated by a SAPS Item 20 Score 6 3. Table 1 Demographic and clinical description of the population. a SAPSa Patient Sex Age (y) Education (y) DSM-IV-TR Diagnosis BPRS total score Items 8–19 [Score] Item 20 S.M. M 45 12 Schizophrenia – Paranoid Type 53 Persecution [5] Mind Reading [4] 4 F.L. F 60 13 Bipolar Disorder I – Manic Episode, Severe With Psychotic Features 49 Persecution [4] 4 F.B. F 37 13 Schizophrenia – Paranoid Type 49 Religious [4] 4 B.S. F 53 2 Schizophrenia – Paranoid Type 44 Religious [5] Control [4] 5 C.M. F 54 8 Bipolar Disorder I – Manic Episode, Severe With Psychotic Features 49 Grandiosity [5] 5 R.S. M 42 8 Schizophrenia – Disorganized Type 70 Persecution [5] Thought Insertion [5] Thought Withdrawal [5] 5 S.E. M 28 13 Bipolar Disorder I – Manic Episode, Severe With Psychotic Features 48 Grandiosity [4] 4 A.I. F 70 13 Schizophrenia – Paranoid Type 53 Persecution [5] Grandiosity [4] 5 R.A. M 48 13 Bipolar Disorder I – Manic Episode, Severe With Psychotic Features 64 Persecution [5] 4 L.C. F 47 8 Schizophrenia – Paranoid Type 41 Religious [5] Reference [5] 5 SAPS Items 8–19 score specific contents of delusions and Item 20 indicates a Global rating of delusions. Score range for each item is 0 (none)–5 (severe). A. D’Agostino et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 711 Collected dreams were transcribed on a word processing software and then edited by removing all specific identifiers such as the proper names of people and places. Clear references to the dreamer’s gender were also neutralized given the potential influence on dream classification (Domhoff & Schneider, 2008; Schredl, Becker, & Feldman, 2010). Enrolment of participants was completed when 10 subjects had reported at least 4 dreams longer than 40 words each. Forty reports belonging to 10 subjects (4 dreams per patient) were then randomly assigned cardinal numbers (1–40). 2.4. Judge selection and procedure 2.4.1. Study stage I 16 judges were chosen and divided into four groups (A–D) on the basis of their cultural and professional background and their acquaintance with the patients. All judges had an education mounting to 19 years. Group A included 4 female boardcertified psychiatrists who were working on the ward at the time of data collection (mean age = 35 years); Group B included 2 male and 2 female professional nurses who worked on the ward at close daily contact with the patients (mean age = 37.8); Group C included 2 male and 2 female board-certified psychiatrists who did not work on the same ward and consequently had no contact with the patients (mean age = 48.8); Group D included 2 male and 2 female judges with a University-level instruction in different fields who had no direct experience with psychiatric disorders and had never met the patients (mean age = 49.5). All judges were carefully instructed on the objectives of this study and were informed that the 40 dreams belonged to 10 patients with the previously specified characteristics. In particular, psychiatrists in Groups A were the physicians who treated the patients at the time of data collection. Obviously, not all were directly in charge of all participating patients. Nontheless, all judges belonging to this group were aware of the patients’ specific delusions given close contact on the ward and daily participation in routine clinical meetings. These judges were clearly told that the dreams belonged to a restricted pool of psychotic patients they knew well and were aware of the previously specified inclusion and exclusion criteria. Likewise, nurses in Group B were rotating on the ward 24 h a day at the time of data collection and were given the same information on the patients. All judges were given the reports and asked to group them by author knowing that each patient had contributed 4 dreams. Judges were also informed on their level of acquaintance with the participating subjects to test the hypothesis that those in Groups A and B would complete the assignment more easily by recognizing their patients’ delusional themes. This procedure is largely based on a previously published scheme (Hobson & Kahn, 2007). 2.4.2. Study stage II One judge was chosen from our research group (M.C.) on the basis of her expertise in both dream scoring procedures and the use of psychopathological rating scales. Blind to both the origin of the transcripts and the design of the study, she was instructed to score dream narratives according to SAPS Items 8–19. Each item of this scale reflects a specific delusional theme which can be scored 0–5 according to the fixity of the patient’s delusion. In order to adapt this psychometric tool to dream content, the judge was instructed to evaluate the presence of each specific theme (i.e. persecution, grandiosity, guilt) in the dream on a 0–5 scale. 2.5. Statistical analysis 2.5.1. Study stage I When all the judges had grouped the dreams by assigning each of the 40 reports to each of 10 authors, the data were analyzed with the aid of a mathematician. An index (f, t) was developed to compare the groups of judges, where (f) indicates the number of correct groupings of 4 dreams per subject and (t) indicates the number of correct groupings of 3 dreams per subject. Table 2 shows the distribution of (f, t) indexes for each judge, extracted by the full table of possible results that can be found in Appendix A (Supplementary material). The following procedure was followed to assign each judge an (f, t) index: – The probability p(f, t) was calculated for each (f, t) pair. – pairs were ranked on the basis of a decreasing p(f, t) from (10, 0) to (0, 0) where, for example, (5, 4) ranks higher than (6, 2). – pct(f, t) was calculated on the ordered list and a preliminary index (f, t) was calculated as the logarithm of the percentile function: log10(pct(f, t)). – The final index (f, t) is the 0–1 normalized score obtained with the following formula: Indexðf ; tÞ ¼ log10 ðpctðf ; tÞÞ log10 ðpctð10; 0ÞÞ According to the results table shown in Appendix A, p(0, 0)  96%. Consequently, the result of at least one correct grouping of 3 dreams per subject [index = (0, 1)] is statistically significant at the p = .05 level. Results obtained by judge Groups A to D were compared by One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 712 A. D’Agostino et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 Table 2 Indexes developed for judges belonging to groups A, B, C and D. Judge Index A1 A2 A3 A4 0.111 0.452 0.111 0.153 B1 B2 B3 B4 0.207 0.05 0.153 0.207 C1 C2 C3 C4 0 0.153 0.05 0.111 D1 D2 D3 D4 0.111 0.207 0.177 0.383 2.5.2. Study stage II Once a score was assigned to each of the 40 dreams for all coded delusional themes, a mean score was calculated for each subject on each of the evaluated SAPS items (see Appendix B – Supplementary material). Linear regression analyses were performed to assess the relationship between specific themes found in dreams and their homologues scored in wakefulness. All data analyses were performed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 19.0 (IBM SPSS Statistics Version 19, 2010). 2.6. Results 2.6.1. Study stage I Fig. 1 shows the mean Group indexes. Overall, judges’ grouping of dream reports was slightly above chance level. Their scores varied from 0 to 0.45, with the mean and the median scores at 0.17 and 0.15 respectively. While 3 of the 12 judges grouped the reports at chance level or below, the other nine judges all scored slightly above chance level. The two most successful judges correctly grouped the four reports of two patients and three reports of another four and three patients respectively [Judge A2 Index (2, 4) = 0.452; Judge D4 Index (2, 3) = 0.383]. Interestingly, the highest average group score was obtained by those who were neither formed in clinical psychiatry nor had ever met the patients (Group D, see Fig. 1). However, this score was not found to be statistically different from that of the other three groups (ANOVA yielded no statistically significant differences between the four groups [F(3, 12) = 1.297; p = n.s.]). 2.6.2. Study stage II Regression analyses yielded a positive linear relationship between dreams and wakefulness for Grandiosity and Religious themes. Grandiose delusion scores predicted analogous themes in dreams (b = .71, t(9) = 2.49, p < .05) and also explained a Fig. 1. Mean judge group indexes on the task of relating dream narratives to individual subjects belonging to a population of acutely delusional inpatients. A. D’Agostino et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 713 significant proportion of variance in grandiose dream content scores [F(1, 8) = 8.119, p < .05]. Likewise, Religious delusion scores predicted the same themes in dreams (b = .71, t(9) = 2.49, p < .05) and also explained a significant proportion of variance in religious dream content scores [F(1, 8) = 8.119, p < .05]. None of the other six analyzed delusional themes predicted dream content scores (Persecution, Mind Reading, Control, Thought Insertion, Thought Withdrawal, Reference). 3. Discussion 3.1. General observations Several observations can be made on the basis of these results. Patients enrolled in this study had a severe disorder of thought content, with a fixed and persistent delusion which had recurred several times over the previous years, and in one case for almost 20 years. Despite the obvious recurrence of common themes (Table 1), each patient presented with a highly specific content. For example, persecution could be by one’s neighbours or by extraterrestrial forces and grandiosity could relate to being a famous scientist or a divine authority. Delusions are considered irrational and persistent beliefs that cannot be modified by experience. Indeed, deluded subjects are unable to use new information to constrain and remodel the existing belief and reactivation of the delusion tends to reconsolidate and strengthen it (Corlett, Krystal, Taylor, & Fletcher, 2009). During an acute psychotic break, the aberrant belief shifts to the core of patients’ waking thoughts and tends to determine most of his/her behaviour. Dreams of acutely psychotic inpatients have been shown by our group to be continuous with their waking cognition in terms of bizarreness, possibly implying a common formal organization of the two types of mentation (Limosani, D’Agostino, Manzone, & Scarone, 2011; Scarone et al., 2008). One previous study suggested a continuity across delusions and dreams in terms of affective form rather than content in schizophrenic patients: threat anxieties were found to be significantly more present in the dreams of patients with waking delusions of persecution compared to controls (Stompe et al., 2003). However, the extent to which dreams reflect specific delusional contents during acute psychotic breaks had never previously been investigated. 3.2. Relationship with previous research It has been observed that given the broad range of memories, thoughts, and concerns any human being has during wakefulness, brief dream reports from one individual are unlikely to be similar enough to be distinguished from similar sets of reports of other individuals with equally diverse and complex thought patterns (Domhoff & Schneider, 2008). In the chosen population, we expected the relative narrowing of waking thought contents would easily guide judges towards a correct grouping of the reports to confirm the inclusion of delusional fragments within the dreams. Unlike previous findings in healthy subjects (Hobson & Kahn, 2007), most of the judges completed their assignment slightly above chance level. These results were neither influenced by the judges’ knowledge of typical delusional themes in general nor by their level of acquaintance with the delusional patients. Furthermore, the objective scoring of dreams for typical delusional contents confirmed a continuity for some themes. Although Fig. 1 clearly shows that group means were only marginally above chance, it seems reasonable to conclude that some delusional themes can be traced in the dream mentation of subjects whose waking experience is strongly influenced by specific delusions. These findings are in line with previous authors who suggested that dreams are influenced by the dreamer’s waking concerns (Cartwright, Agargun, Kirkby, & Friedman, 2006; Mancia, 2004; Nielsen & Levin, 2007). In a recent Commentary, Valdas Noreika proposed several different ways to approach the (dis)continuity hypotheses in Schizophrenia (Noreika, 2011). Our findings seem to support the statistical prediction of a positive correlation between waking experiences and dream content. Some studies have correlated impaired sleep-dependent memory consolidation mechanisms to the neuropsychological abnormalities that are typically described in Schizophrenia (Diekelmann, Wilhelm, & Born, 2009). Sleep spindles, a putative neurophysiological marker of the memory consolidation dialogue between the hippocampus and the neocortex (Fogel & Smith, 2011), have been found to be reduced in this population (Ferrarelli et al., 2007). Dysfunctional memory reconsolidation processes have been hypothesized to underlie delusion formation and stabilization (Corlett et al., 2009). Future studies will need to clarify whether impaired sleep-dependent consolidation of declarative memories somehow contributes to the continuous reconsolidation of delusionalbeliefs. 3.3. Limitations of the study Several limitations must be taken into account. First of all, both schizophrenic and manic subjects were on treatment with psychoactive drugs at the time of data collection, which might have interfered with both dream mentation and dream recall. Overall, antipsychotic molecules, taken by all patients who joined our study, tend to normalize sleep architecture (Maixner et al., 1998), whereas no significant effects have been found for the anticonvulsant valproate which two of the patients were administered (Nofzinger & Keshavan, 2002). Whereas previous studies have shown that most antidepressants decrease dream recall frequency and could intensify the affective component of dreams (for a review, see Tribl, Wetter, & Schredl, 2012), only few studies directly assessed the influence of antipsychotics and mood stabilizers on dream content and recall frequency. To the best of our knowledge only one study clearly showed that sulpiride, a preferential blocker of dopamine receptors, decreases the number (not the intensity) of dream recalls containing emotional aggressive and sexual contents 714 A. D’Agostino et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 708–715 (Gaillard & Moneme, 1977). Second, all participants shared a common waking context, i.e. the same psychiatric ward with the same staff and daily routine, that has been hypothesized to influence dream content in previous studies on schizophrenic inpatients (Schredl, 2011). Third, as we did not use EEG to monitor sleep stages in our patients, we did not correlate dream narratives to a particular stage of sleep. Spontaneously reported dreams are generally thought to derive from REM sleep more frequently (Nielsen, 2000), but given the frequent disruptions of sleep patterns in recently hospitalized psychotic patients, no conclusions can be drawn on the basis of our experimental design. Finally, the number of dreams collected for each patient was small, and an increase in the number of dream reports has been shown to improve reliability when measuring inter individual differences (Schredl, 1998). 3.4. Conclusion Some delusional themes tend to recur across dreams and wakefulness in acutely psychotic inpatients. Whether or not the incorporation of delusional themes within dreams can be related to ongoing processes of consolidation of waking experiences will have to be assessed in future studies. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank all the patients and the many judges who volunteered for this study. Appendix A. Supplementary material Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.concog.2013.04.006. References Andreasen, N. C., & Olsen, S. (1982). Negative v. positive schizophrenia: Definition and validation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 39, 789–794. 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Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Self-reference recollection effect and its relation to theory of mind: An investigation in healthy controls and schizophrenia Laurie Compère a,b,1, Célia Mam-Lam-Fook a,b,c,1, Isabelle Amado c,d,e,f,1, Marion Nys a,b,1, Jennifer Lalanne a,b,1, Marie-Laure Grillon a,b,1, Narjes Bendjemaa c,d,1, Marie-Odile Krebs c,d,e,f,1, Pascale Piolino a,b,f,g,⇑ a Paris Descartes University, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Institute of Psychology, Memory and Cognition Laboratory, Boulogne Billancourt, Paris, France INSERM S894, Center of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Paris, France Sainte-Anne Hospital, Service Hospitalo-Universitaire, Paris, France d INSERM U894, Laboratory Pathophysiology of Psychiatric Diseases, Center of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Paris, France e University Paris Descartes, Faculty of Medicine Paris Descartes, Paris, France f Institut de Psychiatrie – GDR 3557 CNRS, France g Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), France b c a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 3 July 2015 Revised 25 January 2016 Accepted 4 March 2016 Keywords: Self-reference effect Memory Recollection R/K/G paradigm Theory of mind Implicit learning Self-concept Schizophrenia a b s t r a c t This study explores the links between the Self-Reference Effect (SRE) and Theory of Mind (ToM) in typical adults and patients with schizophrenia. Participants were assessed with a self-referential memory paradigm investigating the mnemonic effect of both semantic and episodic self-reference with a recognition task associated with the Remember/Know/ Guess paradigm. They also completed a self-descriptive scale and shortened versions of the attribution of intention task and the reading the mind in the eyes test as measures of cognitive and affective ToM respectively. Unlike typical adults, the patients showed no semantic SRRE (correct recognition associated with remembering), and there was no episodic SRRE and no SRE (on the number of correct recognitions) in either group. Semantic SRRE was correlated with the affective ToM in patients and with the positivity of the self-concept in the healthy group. We discuss that patients and typical adults use different strategies during self and other-reflection. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The integration and the basis of mental representations of ourselves cannot be accomplished without the mobilization of high-level cognitive abilities that allow us to make inferences about what other people think of ourselves. Yet in the literature, the general knowledge that we have of ourselves is traditionally designated by the unitary concept of self while understanding others is often summarized in social cognition under the term of Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e. the attribution of mental states both to others and to oneself (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and requires conscious understanding of others (Frith & Frith, 2007). From a cognitive perspective, general mental representations or perceptions that we have of ourselves form the ‘‘self-concept”, i.e. the knowledge that the subject has of himself, his personality, his history, and his autobiography ⇑ Corresponding author at: 2 Ter rue d’Alésia, Centre de Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, 75014 Paris, France. 1 E-mail address: pascale.piolino@parisdescartes.fr (P. Piolino). Address: 2 Ter rue d’Alésia, Centre de Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, Hôpital Sainte Anne, 75014 Paris, France. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.004 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 52 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Markus, 1977; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013). The self-concept includes abstract knowledge about our personality traits and temperament that are constitutive of our personal and social identity (Conway, 2005; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996). Moreover, the self-concept is not only a higher elaborate structure in memory but is also known to be an active process which facilitates the memorization of information (Conway, 2005; Markus, 1977) by acting as a filter or a prism, selecting the stimuli that are relevant to oneself during self-reference processing (Liao, Audi, Magritte, Meyer-Bahlburg, & Quigley, 2012). Indeed, findings in healthy adults suggest that information about oneself is typically better remembered than other information. This phenomenon is named the Self-Reference Effect (SRE) (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) and reflects a deeper encoding of information related to a cognitively rich mental representation of the self (Henderson et al., 2009). It can be processed based on different kinds of representations of the self: either self-related semantic processing that requires participants to decide if a personality trait describes them, or self-related episodic processing of searching for a specific personal memory in connection with a personality trait (Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989). The SRE applies not only to the quantitative properties of memories (i.e., correct recalls and recognitions) but also to the qualitative properties (i.e., subjective sense of remembering). This Self-Reference Recollection Effect (SRRE) (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995) improves the correct recognitions associated with recollective experience (Remember responses in the Remember/Know/Guess paradigm, Gardiner, 2001) whereby participants consciously recollect specific details of an item presented earlier such as sensory aspects of the original item or associated thoughts and feelings. The action of the self as a cognitive filter extends to social cognition by acting as a prism through which others are seen using our self-concept and personal memories to make inferences about others (Corcoran & Frith, 2003). The view that we engage in similar processes during our own understanding and understanding of others is supported by brain imaging data that evidence a common brain network in self and other reference processing (Legrand & Ruby, 2009). The study of some pathologies such as autism (Henderson et al., 2009) and alexithymia (Moriguchi et al., 2006) also highlighted strong connections between self and social skills disruptions. Therefore, self-reference processing is considered crucial for adaptive functioning in social environments since a clear understanding of one’s own traits is critical in assessing one’s role in a social context (van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010) and since the ability to understand others’ mental states requires self-reflection as a basis for interpreting their experience (Carruthers, 2009). Many authors distinguish between two ToM (e.g., Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011): cognitive ToM and affective ToM. Cognitive ToM concerns the cognitive status, beliefs, thoughts or intentions of others, while affective ToM concerns the affective states, emotions and feelings of others. In addition to growing evidence of links between the processing and representations of others and of oneself (e.g., Centelles, Assaiante, Nazarian, Anton, & Schmitz, 2011; Corcoran & Frith, 2003; Duval, Desgranges, Eustache, & Piolino, 2009), one of these links seems to be their dependence on metacognitive and executive functions, i.e., the capacity to engage in mental activity on one’s own mental processes, i.e., to ‘‘think on one’s own thoughts” (Perner & Lang, 2000). On the one hand, the self is a higher-level construct (e.g., a working self, Conway, 2005) that through executive processes such as selection and inhibition, guides and modulates different cognitive systems, such as memory encoding and retrieval, affects and behaviors. It plays a crucial role in motivation, subjective self-evaluations and the management of self-goals in an individual’s life, allowing the construction of a coherent and positive self-image (Conway, 2005; Klein et al., 1989). Many studies have reported strong links between executive functions and self-related processes, such as autobiographical memory retrieval, especially in neurological or psychiatric diseases (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; Fivush & Nelson, 2004; Matuszewski et al., 2006; Piolino et al., 2010; Winthorpe & Rabbitt, 1988). On the other hand, understanding the mental states of others rests on the ability to inhibit our own perspective and integrate the various contextual elements that determine the behavior of others. This relationship between ToM skills and executive functioning has already been largely highlighted in studies of participants with typical (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002) and atypical development such as autism (Pellicano, 2010). Moreover, many authors including Duval et al. (2011) showed that the cognitive component of ToM is particularly based on the operation of executive functions. Schizophrenia (SCZ) is a particularly interesting model to study the interplay between self-reference processes and ToM, since SCZ is linked to particularities of subjective experience (e.g., the feeling of not being quite like oneself, and disintegration of self-consciousness, Lalova et al., 2013; Sass & Parnas, 2003). In fact, symptoms in SCZ such as delusions of control or thought insertion typically refer to the dysfunction of the self in the social world (Corcoran & Frith, 2003) and appear to stem from a failure to recognize one’s own actions and thoughts (Morgan et al., 2011). Moreover, the literature on SCZ reports a set of cognitive impairments including memory (Palmer, Dawes, & Heaton, 2009), social skills (Bazin et al., 2009), and executive functions (Braff et al., 1991), that are considered as central elements in SCZ and that contribute to the severe handicap observed in patients’ daily life. Harvey, Lee, Horan, Ochsner, and Green (2011) were among the first to investigate the SRE in SCZ with an incident memory task of personality traits encoded in three conditions: structural processing (‘‘Are the letters of the word uppercase or lowercase?”), social desirability (‘‘Is the trait socially desirable for other people in general?”) and semantic self-reference (‘‘Does this personality trait describe you?”). Their results supported the growing literature highlighting the lack of SRE in SCZ (Bedford & David, 2014; Pauly, Kircher, Weber, Schneider, & Habel, 2011). Patients, unlike controls, failed to show an improved recognition of adjectives encoded in the self-reference condition in comparison with alternative encodings (e.g., adjectives encoded in a social desirability condition). However, this study did not investigate SRRE and the two possible routes to SRE (semantic and episodic) as evidenced by Klein et al. (1989). Moreover, it did not investigate the links with L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 53 ToM. However, we know that in SCZ, both cognitive and affective ToM performances are impaired regardless of the tasks (for a meta-analysis, see Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & van Engeland, 2007) even if the affective component of ToM is often more impaired (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). Furthermore, the literature suggests that this may be a stable trait since this impairment was also observed during remission (Herold, Tényi, Lénárd, & Trixler, 2002) and in non-psychotic relatives (Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles, & van Os, 2003). Accordingly, we propose to study SRE in healthy controls and SCZ through an innovative protocol that distinguishes four incident encoding conditions: low-level processing, social desirability, semantic self-reference and episodic self-reference conditions. Another innovative aspect of our protocol in comparison to Harvey et al.’s (2011) is that memory performance is assessed through a recognition task associated with the Remember/Know/Guess paradigm (Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 1985) which makes it possible to investigate for the first time the SRRE in SCZ. Moreover, in order to evaluate the relationships between the SRE and ToM and to determine how the subjective evaluation of self-concept (e.g., valence of self) and executive functions may be involved in this link, we proposed a supplementary battery of tests. Among controls, we expected to replicate the episodic and semantic SRE highlighted by Klein et al. (1989). Concerning SCZ, we expected no benefit of self-reference encoding, even when investigating the different kinds of SRE (Klein et al., 1989) both on recognition and recollection. The strong hypothesis of this study is the existence of a link between SRE and ToM. As no study has so far investigated the existence of this relationship nor even distinguished semantic and episodic SRE or cognitive and affective ToM, it is difficult to establish accurate and strong assumptions. Nevertheless, since the literature in SCZ has already demonstrated an alteration of SRE in the semantic condition (Harvey et al., 2011) and shown that the affective component of ToM is particularly impaired (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007), it is likely that this connection particularly relates these two performances whose alteration has already been evidenced. Moreover, based on the assumption that episodic SRE depends more on control access processes than semantic SRE (Klein, Altinyazar, & Metz, 2013; Klein et al., 1989), we also expected that episodic SRE and cognitive ToM performance would depend on the executive functioning and that the magnitude of both SREs would rely on the quality of the self-concept (valence) in both groups. 2. Method 2.1. Participants The data are presented in Table 1. Fifteen schizophrenic patients (9 males and 6 females) and 21 healthy participants (10 males and 11 females) took part in this study. Patients were recruited from Sainte-Anne Hospital and all had given their informed consent in compliance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. Some of the healthy participants were Paris Descartes University undergraduates who participated for course credit and the other healthy participants responded to online or displayed ads. All participants were French native speakers. Each participant’s medical history was closely screened: healthy participants with a neurological and psychiatric history, and patients with severe medical or addictive antecedents, were excluded. The patients’ diagnosis was established by a senior psychiatrist and patients with comorbidities were excluded. Enrolment in the study was conditional on clinical stabilization of at least three months and therapeutic stabilization of at least one month. SCZ patients and healthy participants did not differ in terms of age [34.73 years (±10.80) for the patients and 30.91 years (±10.68) for the healthy participants (t = 1.06, df = 34, and p = 0.3)] and the proportion of men and women in each sample did not differ (v2 = 0.54, p = 0.46). The only difference between the two groups was in their years of education (t = 2.63, df = 34, and p = 0.01): controls were far more likely to have attended college than patients. All subsequent analyses were thus controlled for years of education. 2.2. Clinical measures An average score of 20.36 (SD = 9.48) on the BfS (Befindlichkeits-Skala, French version: Heimann, Bobon-Schrod, Schmocker, & Bobon, 1975) indicated no clinically relevant depressive symptomatology. Each patient’s psychopathology was assessed by the Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987). 2.3. Experimental assessment Healthy participants and patients were tested individually in sessions lasting approximately one hour and a half. In every session, participants had to perform a familiarization task before the incident encoding task. After completing distractor tasks during 20 min, participants performed an unexpected recognition task. Afterward, ToM tasks (Attribution of intention task and Eyes Test) were proposed to the participants in a counterbalanced order. Then, only healthy participants passed the Trail Making test. Finally, self-administered questionnaires were completed in both groups. The executive functions assessment for patients was carried out at a later time. 54 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 Table 1 Characteristics of the participant groups. Main characteristics Mean age (in years) Gender (Male/female) Number of years of education BFS PANSS Positive symptomatology scale Negative symptomatology scale Executive assessment Trail Making Test (TMTB-TMTA) in seconds WAIS code (standard score) D2 GZ (number of items processed) F% (percentage of errors) KL (number of correct answers) WAIS digit span (standard score) Wisconsin test WSCT Nerr (standard score) WSCT NerrP (number of perseverative errors) WSCT Ncat (number of categories achieved) Short-term feature binding score Healthy controls SCZ patients Group comparisons 30.91 (±10.68) (N = 21) 10/11 15.48 (±2.11) (N = 21) 7.94 (±6.66) (N = 18) 34.73 (±10.80) (N = 15) 9/6 13.2 (±3.1) (N = 15) 20.36 (±9.48) (N = 14) 67.71 (±11.10) (N = 14) 10.36 (±2.53) (N = 14) 19.71 (±5.76) (N = 14) t= 1.06, p = 0.30 v2 = 0.54, p = 0.46 t = 2.63, p = 0.01 F = 14.59, p < 0.001 33.29 (±24.83) (N = 21) 5.33 (±2.50) (N = 12) 385.92 (±96.06) (N = 13) 3.45 (±2.54) (N = 13) 194.69(±108.70) (N = 13) 8.25 (±3.14) (N = 12) 8.05 (±2.84) (N = 21) 26.83 (±21.55) (N = 12) 16.58 (±35.47) (N = 12) 5.42 (±1.24) (N = 12) 5.53 (±2.5) (N = 15) F = 3.13, p = 0.09 ± = standard deviation; BFS = Befindlichkeits-Skala Scale; PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale total score; WAIS = Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale. Table 2 Subjective self-assessment and theory of mind performances. Healthy controls SCZ patients Group comparisons Self-concept scale Positive valence score 283.43 (±22.17) (N = 21) 221.67 (±55.88) (N = 15) F = 17.84, p < 0.001 Cognitive ToM assessment: attribution of intention task ToM condition (max = 6) Control condition (character without intention) (max = 3) Control condition (physical properties of object) 5.72 (±0.57) (N = 18) 2.83 (±0.51) (N = 18) 2.94 (±0.24) (N = 18) 5.8 (±0.41) (N = 15) 2.93 (±0.26) (N = 15) 2.93 (±0.26) (N = 15) F = 1.19, p = 0.28 F = 1.45, p = 0.24 F = 0.21, p = 0.65 Affective ToM assessment: Eyes Test Global score (max = 15) 10.72 (±1.41) (N = 18) 9.2 (±1.66) (N = 15) F = 5.82, p = 0.02 ± = standard deviation. 2.3.1. Stimuli and self-reference memory task All material came from a French translation of Anderson’s personality traits inventory (Anderson, 1968). Eight lists of 12 adjectives were created by controlling the frequency of the items, their length, their familiarity and valence. The lists were validated in a previous study (for details, see Lalanne, Rozenberg, Grolleau, & Piolino, 2013). All stimuli were presented 2 s through the SuperLab Pro softwareÒ (1999) on a laptop and then a fixation cross was shown until the participant gave an answer (see Fig. 1). During the incident encoding phase, 4 lists of 12 adjectives, half positive and half negative, describing personality traits were pseudo-randomly distributed among four conditions in equal parts. In one condition, the order of words in the list was random. Participants had to decide for each personality trait whether (a) the first and last letters were in alphabetical order (alphabetical condition), (b) it was socially desirable in general (social desirability condition), (c) it described them (semantic self-reference) and (d) it was associated to the memory of a personal event (episodic self-reference). In all conditions, participants responded with a two-alternative forced-choice button press (i.e., ‘‘yes” or ‘‘no”). The alphabetical task served as a low-level control condition (perceptual processes) whereas the social desirability task was used as a high-level control condition (no self-reference processes) to allow for replication of an earlier finding that memory for traits referring to the self is comparatively better (Harvey et al., 2011). The task started after a short training phase using a separate task in which participants had to say whether or not some towns were located in France. The instructions for each task were presented at the beginning of the task for as long as participants needed to read and understand them. The sequence of conditions and lists of items were pseudo-randomized to avoid the effect of order, and four versions of the task were used, applying the Latin square method. Participants were not explicitly asked to remember the adjectives: the task was just presented to them as a vocabulary task. During the unannounced recognition task which followed after a 20 min delay, half of the lists presented in the encoding phase or 24 adjectives (targets) were presented together with 24 new personality traits (distractors) in random order. Half of each were positive adjectives and half were negative. The participants had to decide whether each personality trait had already been presented earlier or was new. When participants recognized the personality trait, they had to indicate the L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 55 Fig. 1. Incident encoding phase of the self reference memory task. conscious experience accompanying memory retrieval by means of the R/K/G procedure (Gardiner, 2001; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Tulving, 1985) that is, a sense of remembering, a sense of knowing or a sense of guessing that they had already seen the adjective. Participants were required to give an R response if they remembered in what context they had seen the personality trait, a K response if retrieval was achieved without any such recollection, or a G response if retrieval was doubtful. In each task, there was no time limit for giving a response. For the incident encoding phase, mean response time was calculated for each task condition. For the alphabetical condition and the social desirability condition, we calculated the number of correct answers. In the semantic self-referential condition, we calculated the number of adjectives self-attributed and in the episodic self-referential condition, we calculated the number of adjectives to which participants associated the memory of a personal event. For the recognition phase, we first calculated the hit rate (i.e., the number of old adjectives correctly recognized) for each condition. On the number of correct recognitions, we calculated the number of R, K and G responses. 2.3.2. Subjective self-concept assessment We used the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Duval, Eustache, & Piolino, 2007; French adaptation of Fitts & Warren, 1996) consisting of 82 positive or negative descriptive statements (e.g., ‘‘I am an honest person”, ‘‘I do not feel at ease with other people”), which were rated for self-descriptiveness on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (‘‘Does not describe me at all”) to 4 (‘‘Describes me absolutely”) in order to calculate a total valence score that gave an indication of whether people tended to have a generally positive self-image or not (i.e., positive sense of self, direction of the self) (for details, see Picard et al., 2013). 2.4. ToM assessment 2.4.1. Attribution of intention task This task, originally proposed by Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, and Decety (2000), aims at assessing cognitive ToM. We used a shortened version of a French version (Duval et al., 2012) which consisted of a set of 12 short comic strips, each of them composed of three pictures presenting a scenario. Participants were asked to find the most logical conclusion for each scenario by choosing a fourth picture among three others. The comic strips were divided into three conditions: six stories required participants to draw inferences from a character’s actions (ToM condition), three stories showed a character without any intention, and three scenarios were based on the physical properties of objects. The latter two formed control conditions. Scores were expressed in number of correct responses in each condition. 2.4.2. Eyes test This task, originally proposed by Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997), aims at assessing emotional ToM. We used a shortened version of a French version (Duval et al., 2012) which consisted of 15 black-and-white photographs of the eye region of a male actor who was asked to produce different facial expressions. Under each picture, three 56 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 adjectives (one target and two foils) described basic or complex emotions. Participants were asked to identify which adjective best described the person’s mental state. We calculated a score that corresponded to the number of correct answers on the entire test. 2.4.3. Brief executive functioning assessment Cognitive flexibility skills of healthy controls were briefly checked by the Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1958). SCZ patients went through an executive function assessment battery including code and verbal span tests (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997), attention test (D2, Brickenkamp, 1994), and WSCT (Heaton, 1993; WCST; number of perseverative errors). Finally, both groups performed an integration span task to assess short-term feature binding performance (Picard, Cousin, GuilleryGirard, Eustache, & Piolino, 2012). This task was presented on computer and subjects had to integrate and remember increasingly lengthy series of objects associated with specific spatial contexts (i.e., association between an object and one room in a house) and recall them immediately afterwards in the same order. For each cognitive test, raw scores were transformed into z scores (using means and standard deviations depending on the membership of the participant group i.e., control or patient, in order to compare participants’ performances on the same measurement scale). Some z scores were reversed (e.g., time scores in the TMT and number of perseverative errors in WSCT) so that, for all the tests, the higher the score, the better the performance and we calculated an overall score of executive functioning by averaging the z scores of those tests for each participant. 3. Results 3.1. Statistical analyses Statistical tests were performed using Statistica version 10. As Student t-tests for independent samples demonstrated that the groups differed in terms of years of education (see above), we performed all subsequent analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) with group as a between-subject factor, condition as within-subject factor and years of education as a covariate and used Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) when post hoc analyses were needed. Effect sizes were represented with partial eta squared (g2). In reference to Guéguen (2009), we defined effect sizes as small for g2 < .06, medium for .06 6 g2 < .14, and marked for g2 P .14. For reasons of clarity, we did not include valence as a within-subject factor in the subsequent statistical analyses as there was neither a significant main effect nor a significant interaction with this factor. Moreover, our first interest focused on the SRE in SCZ and HC and our second interest focused on the relationships between SRE and ToM performance in SCZ and HC. 3.2. Encoding phase Table 3 shows the data for the encoding phase and the corresponding statistics. We performed an ANCOVA on response time. Response time analysis showed a significant main effect of group with patients taking longer to answer than controls and no significant main effect of encoding condition and no interaction. ANCOVAs on the number of correct responses in the alphabetical condition, the number of correct responses in the social desirability condition, the number of self-attributed adjectives in the semantic self-referential condition and the number of memories recalled in the episodic self-referential condition did not yield a significant group effect. 3.3. Recognition phase Table 4 and Fig. 2 show the data for the recognition phase and the statistics. The repeated measures analysis of the number of correct recognitions revealed a main significant group effect. Overall, patients had a poorer recognition performance than controls. The main effect of encoding condition and the group by condition interaction were not significant. For the number of R responses, there was a significant main effect of group and a significant group by condition interaction. Overall, patients gave significantly fewer R responses than controls. Post hoc analysis showed that patients gave significantly fewer R responses than controls in the social desirability condition, in the semantic and in the episodic self-referential conditions (ps < 0.05) but no difference was observed in the alphabetical condition (p = 0.21). Controls showed significantly fewer R responses in the alphabetical condition than in the other conditions (ps < 0.001) and more R responses in the semantic self-referential condition than in the social desirability condition (p = 0.02). Controls also gave significantly more R responses in the semantic self-referential condition than in the episodic self-referential condition (p = 0.006). In patients, there were no significant differences in the number of R responses between conditions. Regarding the K responses associated with correct recognition, there was no significant main effect of group and encoding condition and no significant interaction. Regarding the number of G responses, there was only a significant effect of group. Globally, patients gave significantly more G responses than controls whatever the condition. These results indicated that overall patients with SCZ showed no SRE regardless of the type of R/K/G responses, whereas analysis of the number of R responses by controls evidenced a significant SRRE in the semantic self-referential condition. 57 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 Table 3 Mean (and standard deviation) results per group on encoding phase. Experimental conditions ANCOVAs Alphabetical condition (1) Social desirability condition (2) Semantic selfreference condition (3) Episodic selfreference condition (4) Group effect Encoding condition effect Interaction Response time (ms) HC SCZ 1057 1634 (908) (1189) HC 935 (1010) HC 750 (524) HC 941 (625) F(1, 33) 4.36⁄ g2 = 0.12 F(3, 99) 0.29 g2 < 0.01 F(3, 99) 2.27 g2 = 0.06 Number of correct responses 11.10 10.33 (1.45) (2.55) Number of correct responses 10.24 8.60 (2.36) (2.53) <0.21 – – SCZ 1605 (1635) SCZ 1932 (1905) Number of selfattributed adjectives 6.00 5.60 (1.95) (2.06) SCZ 2756 (3157) Number of memories recalled 7.48 7.27 (3.19) (2.60) g2 < 0.07 Table 4 Mean (and standard deviation) results per group on recognition phase. Score Experimental conditions Alphabetical condition (1) ANCOVAs Social desirability condition (2) Semantic selfreference condition (3) Episodic selfreference condition (4) Group effect Encoding condition effect Interaction HC SCZ HC SCZ HC SCZ HC SCZ F(1, 33) F(3, 99) F(3, 99) Number of correct recognitions (max = 6) 2.52 (1.4) 2.07 (1.94) 4.43 (1.08) 4.07 (1.28) 5.61 (0.67) 4 (1.81) 5 (1.1) 4.4 (1.55) 13.76⁄⁄⁄a 0.22 1.47 1.04 (1.07) 0.47 (1.06) 2.91 (1.55) 1 (1.51) 3.71 (1.71) 0.4 (0.63) 2.76 (1.37) 0.87 (1.41) g2 = 0.29 33.29⁄⁄⁄b g2 < 0.01 Number of R responses (max = 6) g2 = 0.04 7.62⁄⁄⁄c 0.48 (0.6) 0.73 (1.39) 0.76 (0.83) 1.8 (1.47) 0.91 (1) 2.27 (1.58) 1.48 (1.12) 2.13 (1.55) g2 = 0.50 1.26 g2 = 0.01 Number of K responses (max = 6) 0.76 (1) 0.80 (1.15) 0.67 (0.97) 1.27 (1.28) 0.76 (1.09) 1.33 (1.18) 0.57 (0.87) 1.4 (1.5) g2 = 0.04 9.66⁄⁄d g2 = 0.02 Number of G responses (max = 6) 1.5 g2 = 0.07 2.13 g2 = 0.23 g2 = 0.04 g2 = 0.06 0.5 0.69 g2 = 0.19 2.43 p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05 – Note size effect (g ) is low if less than 0.04 and strong if higher than 0.16. ANCOVAs: Post hoc LSD tests pairwise comparisons on group effect: a,bHC > SCZ, dSCZ > HC. Post hoc LSD tests pairwise comparisons on group  encoding condition effect: c In HC: 1 < 2, 3, 4⁄⁄⁄, 2 < 3⁄, 3 > 4⁄⁄; Between HC and SCZ: HC(2, 3, 4) > SCZ(1, 2, 3, 4)⁄⁄⁄. ⁄⁄⁄ ⁄⁄ ⁄ 2 3.4. Subjective self-concept assessment We performed ANCOVAs with group as a between-subject factor to compare patients and controls on the positivity score (Table 2 shows the data and statistics). There was a significant main effect of group on the valence score, the patients having a less positive self-concept than controls. 3.5. ToM performances We performed ANCOVAs with group as a between-subject factor to compare patients and controls on the ToM performances collected (Table 2 shows the data and statistics). These analyses did not reveal any group effect in the attribution intention task but there was a significant effect of group in the eyes test score on the global score (p = 0.02) with lower performances for patients than controls. 3.6. Exploratory correlations As we found a SRRE only in the semantic self-referential condition, we calculated a SRRE index by subtracting the number of R responses in the social desirability condition from the number of R responses in the semantic self-reference condition. We then computed correlations between the z scores of this index, ToM performances, subjective self-concept assessment and executive functioning for each group separately. The results of these correlations are shown in Table 5. We first focused on the relationship between the SRE and ToM in controls and patients: although no significant correlation appeared in controls, in patients, the SRRE index was positively correlated with the affective ToM performance. We then 58 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 Fig. 2. Mean (and standard deviation) results per group on recognition phase. explored whether the executive functions and subjective self-concept valence were linked to ToM and SRRE. Regarding the executive functions, correlations demonstrated a positive correlation with cognitive ToM performance in controls and a positive one with global ToM performance in patients. Regarding the valence (positivity) score, it correlated positively with the SRRE index in controls and negatively with executive functions in patients. Fig. 3 gives a summary of these results. 4. Discussion In this study, we used an original self-reference memory task in order to first investigate further the lack of SRE in SCZ and secondarily to see how SRE and ToM skills might be related in healthy adults and SCZ patients. The main findings in healthy controls indicated no SRE on recognition but a SRRE only in the semantic condition. Unlike healthy adults, patients did not exhibit a semantic SRRE. In patients only, this semantic SRRE index was positively related to affective ToM. We will discuss these new findings together with executive performance and subjective self-concept assessment in the light of the literature in both groups. 4.1. The semantic self-reference recollection effect in healthy adults As we hypothesized, healthy adults demonstrated a SRRE (Self-Reference Recollection Effect, i.e. the increased probability of recollective experience or R responses for material encoded in the self-reference condition in comparison with the semantic condition), but contrary to our assumptions, no SRE (Self-Reference Effect, i.e. the self-referent condition improves recall compared to the semantic condition). The findings suggest that self-reference is particularly effective in improving the quality of memories through a better sense of remembering (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). Interestingly, SRRE was observed in semantic self-reference, but not in episodic self-reference. This appears to contradict the findings of Klein et al. (1989) who showed that self-descriptive and autobiographical self-reference tasks, targeting semantic and episodic self-memory representations respectively (like our semantic and episodic self-reference conditions), are two tasks that support selfreferential memory processing. The most likely explanation is that the cognitive cost of searching for autobiographical material is greater in the episodic self-reference condition than in the other self-referential condition. Therefore, access to autobiographical memories might not have been fully achieved by participants. The analysis of reaction time in the encoding phase supports this hypothesis, demonstrating no significant difference between self-conditions whereas Klein et al. (1989) reported that autobiographical self-reference encoding took longer than semantic self-reference encoding (i.e., Healthy controls Semantic SRRE Cognitive ToM Affective ToM Global ToM score Self-concept positivity Semantic SRRE Cognitive ToM Affective ToM Global ToM score Self-concept positivity Executive functioning – r = 0.20, p = 0.43 – r= r= – r = 0.23, p = 0.36 r = 0.58, p = 0.01 r = 0.58, p = 0.01 – r = 0.49, p = 0.02 r = 0.16, p = 0.53 r = 0.21, p = 0.41 r = 0.31, p = 0.21 – r = 0.23, p = 0.31 r = 0.68, p = 0.002 r = 0.34, p = 0.17 r = 0.30, p = 0.23 r = 0.01, p = 0.96 0.46, p = 0.05 0.32, p = 0.20 SCZ patients Semantic SRRE Cognitive ToM Affective ToM Global ToM score Self-concept positivity Semantic SRRE Cognitive ToM Affective ToM Global ToM score Self-concept positivity Executive functioning – r= – r = 0.52, p = 0.045 r = 0.27, p = 0.33 – r = 0.25, p = 0.38 r = 0.80, p < 0.01 r = 0.80, p < 0.01 – r= r= r= r= – r = 0.22, p = 0.44 r = 0.47, p = 0.08 r = 0.37, p = 0.18 r = 0.53, p = 0.04 r = 0.56, p = 0.03 0.13, p = 0.64 0.21, p = 0.44 0.44, p = 0.11 0.24, p = 0.38 0.43, p = 0.11 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 Table 5 Correlation matrix between the z scores of the semantic SRRE index, ToM performances, subjective self-concept assessment (valence) and executive functioning for each group separately. 59 60 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 Fig. 3. Summary of the exploratory correlations performed in controls and patients SCZ. SRRE: Self-Reference Recollection Effect; ToM: Theory of Mind; EF: Executive Functioning – positive correlations are illustrated in red and negative correlations in blue. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) autobiographical memory versus self-description). This limitation of the episodic self-reference condition could be compensated in future research by asking participants a question during encoding about the autobiographical memory recollected in order to encourage complete retrieval of the autobiographical memory generating the SRE. 4.2. Absence of relationship between semantic SRRE and ToM in healthy adults Contrary to our hypothesis, there were no correlations between the SRRE and ToM. However, executive performance positively correlated with cognitive ToM performance as expected given the fact that the executive functions are a prerequisite for this component (Duval et al., 2011). Moreover, in accordance with the literature suggesting that the extensive knowledge that we have about ourselves favors a more elaborative encoding of self-referenced information (Harvey et al., 2011), the magnitude of the SRE relied on the quality of the self-concept, i.e., positive attitudes and judgments toward ourselves. Indeed, the higher the positivity of the self-concept, the better the semantic SRRE index. This can be related to the results of Campbell (1990) showing that self-concepts of high-self-esteem people are characterized by a greater definite selfconcept. Moreover, the quality of mental self-representation can directly determine the efficiency of SRE (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2005). 4.3. No self-reference effect in patients suffering from schizophrenia As we hypothesized, patients with SCZ showed no mnemonic benefit from the self-referential conditions. Indeed, unlike controls, patients have no SRRE when examining R responses associated with correct recognitions in the semantic selfreference condition. The present result is consistent with the current literature that has already highlighted the lack of a SRE in patients with SCZ (Bedford & David, 2014; Harvey et al., 2011; Pauly et al., 2011). However, to our knowledge, it is the first time that the absence of SRE has been observed in SCZ by studying the number of correct recognitions associated with either autonoetic consciousness or noetic consciousness, which reinforces the idea of a complete disruption of selfreferential processing in SCZ. Overall, whatever the condition, patients’ recognition performances were lower than those of controls, which is consistent with the genuine impairment of new episodic memory encoding reported in the literature in SCZ (Bilder et al., 2000; Danion, Huron, Vidailhet, & Berna, 2007; Grillon, Krebs, Gourevitch, Giersch, & Huron, 2010). Nevertheless, recognition was significantly poorer for the alphabetical condition in comparison with other conditions, which means that patients did benefit from depth of processing as has already been highlighted in the literature in SCZ patients (Harvey et al., 2011). Regarding the responses associated with correct recognition specifying the quality of the recall, as already evidenced by Danion et al. (2005), the number of R responses was lower in patients while the number of G responses was higher compared to healthy controls, thus highlighting the disruption of their recollective experience and low levels of confidence in the accuracy of their memory. By contrast, the analysis of K responses did not highlight a significant group effect which signals a preserved feeling of knowing in SCZ (Danion et al., 2005). Nevertheless, this preservation was not compensatory enough to preserve SRE in patients based on familiarity. Overall, the present findings extend previous studies by showing that SCZ patients do not benefit from the SRRE in a self-descriptive encoding condition. 4.4. The relationship between SRRE and ToM skills in schizophrenia Consistent with our hypothesis of a link between SRE and ToM in SCZ, and targeting particularly semantic SRRE and affective ToM, patients had a positive and significant correlation between the SRRE index and affective ToM performance while controls L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 61 exhibited none. Indeed, in patients, the better their semantic SRRE index was, the better their affective ToM skills. This supports the hypothesis that patients may use different strategies from controls during self and other-reflection and that the alteration of these inference strategies used might be responsible for reduced performance in both areas in SCZ. Unlike cognitive ToM, the performance of the affective ToM (the Eyes Test) was impaired in patients. Although our cognitive ToM task (attribution of intention task) may lack sensitivity, these results are consistent with the idea that the affective component is more impaired than the cognitive component in SCZ (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). A dissociation between the cognitive and affective ToM components was highlighted in healthy participants through transcranial stimulation (Kalbe et al., 2010) and in studies of lesions (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009), showing that a distinct neural network is critical for emotional ToM and for cognitive ToM (i.e., the inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule for emotional ToM and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, and the medial temporal lobe for cognitive ToM, Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). In the same line, Coricelli (2005) highlighted that affective ToM relies on automatic and preconceptual processes while cognitive ToM relies on voluntary and conceptual processes. Thus, the present findings suggest that patients with SCZ favor strategies during self-reflection that seem to share the same processes as affective ToM, which is assumed to rely on automatic and preconceptual processes. To our knowledge, only one study tested simultaneously SRE and ToM performances and it did so among higher functioning children with autism and matched healthy controls (Henderson et al., 2009). The authors used the Strange Stories Task (Happé, 1994) and the children’s eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001) as cognitive and affective ToM tasks respectively. As in our study, the patients showed a strong positive correlation between memory performance in the self-reference condition and eyes task performance whereas this correlation was not significant for the healthy controls. No correlation was significant between memory performance in the self-reference condition and the strange stories task performance for either group. The authors suggested that children with autism lack preferential processing of selfrelevant versus other types of semantic information, possibly because they assign less affective salience to self-referent information. These results are not directly comparable with ours but like SCZ patients, children or adults with autism do not benefit from SRE (Toichi et al., 2002) and for both, the SRE seems to rely on the same processes used to achieve affective ToM tasks. In the light of the literature that refers to several levels of relationship between representations of the self and the others, this relationship between semantic SRE and affective ToM might concern low-level functions rather than high-level functions in SCZ patients. Indeed, according to the mirror neuron theory, the ability to understand others relies on implicit inference process performed during the simulation of others’ views via bodily resonance (Centelles et al., 2011). By contrast, other theories consider that the relationship between self and others concerns high-level functions such as the fact that understanding another’s mental state relies on autobiographical memories in order to find a similar event which could help to disambiguate a social scenario (Adler, Nadler, Eviatar, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2010; Corcoran & Frith, 2003). Of course, other studies are needed to confirm this result and the nature of the processes involved in both self and other reference that are altered in SCZ. In this regard, our results on correlations added interesting avenues on strategies used by the patients. On the one hand, executive functioning did not seem to mediate the relationship between semantic SRE and affective ToM. Indeed, executive performance did not correlate with SRE, but it correlated with overall ToM performance, suggesting that in patients, executive functions could be useful to perform ToM tasks regardless of their cognitive or affective nature. On the other hand, the correlations did not reveal the expected link between quality of self-concept and magnitude of the SRE while controls showed a positive link. In patients, the correlations highlighted an unexpected negative relationship between positivity of self-concept and executive functioning. Consistent with the literature supporting a lesser quality of self-concept in SCZ patients (Sass & Parnas, 2003), our analysis of subjective self-evaluation showed differences between groups, with patients having a lower positivity of self-concept than healthy adults. This result implies that in SCZ, executive functions are directly involved in the subjective quality of self-concept and is consistent with the idea that executive functions should allow the construction of a more objective and therefore potentially less positive self-representation in patients. All in all, these findings further support the hypothesis that patients may use different strategies from controls during self and other-reflection. Therefore, it is likely that remediation targeting SRE and ToM processes and their potentially underlying disturbed mechanisms would benefit patients with SCZ. 4.5. Limits The present study adds some interesting new findings but future studies should continue to elucidate the mechanisms underpinning self and other-reflection in healthy individuals and their dysfunction in SCZ. Indeed, further studies with larger, well matched samples and a more extensive self, ToM and executive functioning assessment battery will be necessary to improve our understanding of the interlinks between SRE, ToM and executive functions. We do not consider that the absence of a link between SRE and ToM is a conclusive finding in healthy adults. Nor is this study conclusive concerning the episodic self-reference effect and future research should ask participants a question about the autobiographical memory recollected during encoding in order to encourage complete retrieval of the autobiographical memory generating the episodic SRE. 4.6. Conclusion This study has confirmed the absence of SRE resulting from a semantic self-referential encoding in SCZ but has extended previous findings by revealing the absence of SRRE when studying the quality of correct recognitions based on recollection or 62 L. Compère et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 51–64 familiarity. Moreover, the SRRE resulting from semantic self-reference was significantly related to affective ToM performance in patients and positive sense of self in controls. These results support the idea that SCZ patients may use different strategies from controls during self and other-reflection and that the alteration of these inference strategies might be responsible for reduced performance in both areas in SCZ. We propose that the residual relationship between representations of the self and others in SCZ might concern low-level functions rather than high-level functions. This study could represent the first step toward an experimental approach to the study of self/other processes as a field of research at the crossroads of executive functioning, emotional valence, SRE and ToM. Future studies should elucidate the neural and cognitive underpinnings of dysfunction in SCZ and should address how such representation processes might be targeted in the context of remediation. Role of the funding source None. Conflict of interest The authors have no conflict of interest to declare. 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Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog The others: Universals and cultural specificities in the perception of status and dominance from nonverbal behavior q Gary Bente a,*, Haug Leuschner a, Ahmad Al Issa b, James J. Blascovich c a Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany Department of English, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates c Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online 13 July 2010 Keywords: Culture Status Dominance Evaluation Nonverbal behavior Computer-animation a b s t r a c t The current study analyzes trans-cultural universalities and specificities in the recognition of status roles, dominance perception and social evaluation based on nonverbal cues. Using a novel methodology, which allowed to mask clues to ethnicity and cultural background of the agents, we compared impression of Germans, Americans and Arabs observing computer-animated interactions from the three countries. Only in the German stimulus sample the status roles (employee vs. supervisor) could be recognized above chance level. However we found significant correlations in dominance perception across all countries. Significant correlations were only found for evaluation between German observers and observers from the other two countries. Perceived dominance uniformly predicted the assignment of status-roles in all cultures. Microanalysis of movement behavior further revealed predictive value of specific nonverbal cues for dominance ratings. Results support the hypothesis of universalities in the processing of dominance cues and point to cultural specificities in evaluative responses to nonverbal behavior. Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Man is a ‘‘social animal” (Aronson, 1972) equipped with a unique capacity to process and to adapt to complex affordances created by our social environment (Freeman, Rule, & Ambady, 2009). Culture has been identified as a core factor influencing this capacity. With regard to social information processing it has been conceptualized as a human universal as well as a cause of diversity (see Chiao & Ambady, 2007), either applying a general or a particular concept (Vogeley & Roepstorff, 2009). With respect to the biological foundations of social cognition humans can be considered as equal and as distinct from all other living beings. Given that evolution created the biological basis for symbolic interaction, mutual understanding, and social organization, culture describes a general human achievement emerging from, and at the same time driving the particular phylogeny of the human brain (Nettle, 2009; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Culture in this perspective is conceptualized as a general or universal characteristic of humans’ cognitive capacities enabling us to construe a system of social structures, rules and rituals to cope with environmental and social challenges and to buffer collective and individual needs and urges. Different cultures however seemingly have found their own way to adapt to these life affordances, and furthermore also created different environments and communication systems to which homo-sapiens had to adapt (Chiao & Ambady, 2007; Rohner, 1984). Viewed this way culture no longer comes as a universal but as a cause of diversity, instantiated in self construal, cognitive styles, perceptual schemata and communication patterns which serve to q This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Self, Other and Memory. * Corresponding author. E-mail address: bente@uni-koeln.de (G. Bente). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.006 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 763 assign meaning to the physical and social world (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Consequently the question has repeatedly been raised regarding to which degree and under which conditions universals in social information processing override cultural specificities or, conversely, whether different cultures imply distinct cognitive implementations, which influence the way we perceive ourselves and others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 2003, 2006; Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988) and which might even affect the way our brain works (Hedden, Ketay, Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008; Chiao et al., 2010; White, Lehman, & Cohen, 2006). We consider expressions and perceptions of power and dominance as a paradigmatic case to approach this question. Social hierarchies are ubiquitous in human societies and successful navigation of the social world implies particular skills to produce and process social cues which reflect, construct or consolidate the vertical dimension of social systems. There is ample evidence that dominance and power are rarely communicated explicitly but mainly expressed through subtle nonverbal cues (Aguinis, Simonsen, & Pierce, 1998; Argyle, Salter, Nicholson, Williams, & Burgess, 1970; Burgoon, 1994; Carli, Martin, Leatham, Lyons, & Tse, 1993; Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982; Dovidio, Ellyson, Keating, Heltman, & Brown, 1988; Edinger & Patterson, 1983; Lee, Matsumoto, Kobayashi, Krupp, & Maniatis, 1992; Mehrabian, 1969, 1970; Mignault & Chaudhuri, 2003; Remland, 1982). It could be shown that culture is influential in molding these nonverbal expressions as well as their perception and cognitive processing (Kowner & Wiseman, 2003; Matsumoto, 2006; Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982). What poses a particular problem for our understanding of the subtle dynamics of nonverbal behavior is the fact that it is largely produced and processed automatically and without conscious awareness (see Burgoon, Berger, & Waldron, 2000; Choi, Gray, & Ambady, 2005; Newman & Uleman, 1989; Uleman & Bargh, 1989). Andersen (1999) commented on the potential implications for cross-cultural communication: ‘‘Because we are usually not aware of our own nonverbal behavior, it becomes extremely difficult to identify and master the nonverbal behavior of another culture” (p. 258). Against this background the current study aimed to identify universals and cultural specificities in the perception of nonverbal behavior and to answer the question whether people from different cultures are equally able to identify dominance and underlying status roles in nonverbal interactions shown in their own or in foreign cultures. 2. Background Cultures have been shown to differ with regard to the value they assign to the vertical dimension of social relations (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), either accepting that inequalities in power and status are natural or existential or seeing them as man-made and largely artificial (see Naylor, 2009). Against this background it doesn’t come as a surprise that cultures are regarded as a major source of diversity in the manifestation of power and consequently as a potential cause of misunderstanding when it comes to the perception and interpretation of dominance cues in intercultural communication (Aguinis et al., 1998; Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988; Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey, & Nishida, 1996). However, data on cultural diversity in this regard is elusive baring some evidence that nonverbal expressions of dominance, although based on culture-specific attitudes towards status and power, are recognized and processed as trans-cultural universals (Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1996; Guerrero & Floyd, 2005; Keating, 1985; Kowner & Wiseman, 2003). A clarification of the conflating concepts involved in this realm might be helpful to approach the partly contradictory results (see Burgoon, Johnson, & Koch, 1998). According to Dunbar and Burgoon (2005) the terms status, power and dominance should be treated as interrelated but nevertheless ‘‘separate constructs” (p. 208). With regard to dyadic power theory (Dunbar, 2004; Rollins & Bahr, 1976) power can be conceptualized as a latent variable (Komter, 1989), i.e. having the potential to influence others, which can rely on different power bases (French & Raven, 1959), such as explicit rules (legitimate power), means control (coercive and reward power), quality of relation (referent power) or skills and knowledge (expert power). Status thus can be understood as a structural basis of (legitimate) power, derived from asymmetric role assignments in social systems (superior vs. subordinate). In contrast, dominance describes an overt phenomenon which is manifest in the interaction patterns, i.e., a set of ‘‘. . .expressive, relationally based communicative acts by which power is exerted and influence achieved” (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005, p. 209; see also Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000; Burgoon et al., 1998). According to Kowner and Wiseman (2003) cultural values influence different instantiations of status and dominance on different levels: ‘‘Culture, we argue, determines the values attached to status, but it also affects the magnitude at which a person’s status is manifested through behavior in a given society” (p. 206). In a cross-cultural business negotiation, for example, cultural display rules might reveal different expressions of status in different groups; nevertheless observers could agree upon who is dominant and who is submissive. Moreover, inferences about underlying status relations could converge independently from what a particular culture would consider appropriate or successful in asymmetric interactions. Thus we can assume different layers of dominance perception: a descriptive layer, potentially relying on universal perceptual mechanisms, and an evaluative layer relying on culture-specific comparisons to the self and experiences with other members of the in-group. Kowner and Wiseman (2003) found that for the US and Japan although the descriptions of typical status-related behavior were ‘‘far from identical” (p. 207), the named behaviors were unanimously interpreted as either dominant or submissive across the cultures. These results support the hypothesis of culture-specific expressions of status and power (see also Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002), and also show that status-relevant cues can be identified by members of other cultures, even though not part of their own repertoire. In a recent brain imaging study Freeman, Rule, Adams, and Ambady (2009) provided additional evidence that members of different cultures (in this case Americans and Japanese) are equally able to differentiate dominant and submissive postures, displayed on digitally edited photographs (contour 764 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 images), but that both groups show distinct behavioral as well as neural responses to both classes of stimuli, which indicated different evaluative processes. Following different approaches both studies thus point to universals in the description and identification of dominance cues across cultures, but also suggest specificities in the evaluative component of person perception. Moreover as shown by Matsumoto and Kudoh (1987) different cultures also might give different priority to both impression dimensions when judging other people. While judgments of Japanese observing specific body postures were mainly concerned with status and power issues Americans focused on evaluative aspects (like or dislike). It seems promising against this background to more systematically differentiate dominance perception respectively the recognition of status roles from evaluative responses reflecting the perceived appropriateness and likability of the observed behavior. Beyond the unclear distinction between descriptive and evaluative aspects in impression formation the studies of Kowner and Wiseman (2003), Freeman, Rule, and Ambady (2009) and Freeman, Rule, Adams, et al. (2009) also bare a common methodological problem. They are based on preselected, prototypical dominance cues and widely neglect the subtle dynamics and inter-individual variance of nonverbal behavior, which to some degree limits ecological validity of the studies. In principle the use of video recordings of social interactions could help to solve this problem. However video samples carry category relevant information (e.g., clues to ethnicity and nationality) attached to the outward appearance of the actors (e.g. skin color, facial features, clothing) and thus are likely to activate particular stereotypes (see Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997) which could contaminate the effects of nonverbal cues. To escape from this dilemma we have suggested to employ computer-animations of neutral artificial characters instead of videos (Bente, 1989; Bente, Feist, & Elder, 1996). As revealed through earlier studies, character animations are able to accurately reproduce video recorded nonverbal behavior in its spatial details and subtle dynamics (Bente, Krämer, & Petersen, 2002; Bente, Krämer, Petersen, & de Ruiter, 2001; Bente, Petersen, Krämer, & de Ruiter, 2001) and to induce social impressions comparable to the original video sequences they are based on (Bente, Krämer, et al., 2001). This methodology has recently been introduced in cross-cultural research (Bente, Senokozlieva, Pennig, Al-Issa, & Fischer, 2008) and has been used in the current study to identify universalities and cultural specificities in the recognition of status roles, in the perception of dominance and in social evaluation based on nonverbal behavior. In particular we asked whether status-roles assigned to interlocutors can be identified independently from the country of origin of actors and observers or whether there is an in-group advantage for the recognition of power status comparable to the one described for the recognition of emotions from facial expressions (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2002b; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Matsumoto, 2002; Matsumoto, Olide, & Willingham, 2009). Further we aimed to explore the influence of culture on the production and perception of social dominance cues and liking and to determine how these two impression dimensions covary within and across cultures. The last step of our analyses should answer the question how selected nonverbal cues influence the perceptions of dominance and social evaluation and how perceived dominance leads to status-role ascriptions in different cultures. 3. Method 3.1. Selection of cultures The selection of cultures for the current study was guided by theoretical considerations and previous data on cultural differences as well as considerations of societal relevance. We selected three cultures described as either similar or dissimilar with regard to three basic cultural value dimensions ‘‘Power Distance (PDI)”, ‘‘Individualism/Collectivism (IDV)” and ‘‘Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) (see Hofstede, 1980, 2003; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1998). With regard to PDI Germany and the USA are described to be more similar and both different from UAE (PDI-scores: USA = 40; GER = 35; UAE = 80), Germany is placed on the IDV-rankings between the two other countries (IDV-scores: USA = 91; GER = 67; UAE = 38) and is placed on the UAI-ranking closer to the UAE (UAI-scores: USA = 46; GER = 65; UAE = 68) (see Clearly Cultural, 2009). As all three dimensions have to be considered as influential with regard to behavioral manifestations of power and dominance in particular in interpersonal conflict situations (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001, 2002) we overall assumed USA and UAE would provide the most different cultural background and Germany would range somewhere in-between the two. 3.2. Stimulus material The stimulus material consisted of 30 one-minute dyadic interaction sequences (10 from each country: Germany, USA and UAE). Voluntary male student participants were recruited for role play interactions at the University of Cologne (Germany), the University of California, Santa Barbara (USA), and the American University of Sharjah (UAE). Only applicants who were born and grew up in the respective country were included in the sample. The participants were informed that they could stop participation at any time and could ask for deletion and non-use of the video recordings. Furthermore they were informed that the video recordings would not be used in the subsequent perception study, but instead the study would utilize reconstructed computer animations, thus guaranteeing anonymity. Role players were instructed to solve a conflict in a managerial interaction either by taking the role of the employee or the supervisor. Participants were randomly assigned to the dyads as well as to the different roles (employee vs. supervisor). The task implied an interaction between a supervisor and an important, but recently unreliable employee. To increase self involvement the participants were told that this task is G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 765 Fig. 1. Snapshots from the original videos and corresponding screenshots from computer-animations (from: Bente et al., 2008). often utilized as a diagnostic tool with respect to the capability for professional conflict resolution. During debriefing the participants were asked whether they encountered any problems in identifying with the assigned role and in performing the task, which was not the case. Dyadic interactions were video recorded at the three institutions using a standardized central camera perspective. Oneminute sequences were selected from each of the recordings beginning after the actors had taken their places and completed greetings. Movement behavior was transcribed from these video sequences using a specially developed computer-assisted coding software as described in Bente et al. (2008). Computer animations of the dyadic interactions were rendered from these protocols with 25 frames per second using culture fair computer characters (avatars) appearing as wooden manikins. Fig. 1 shows three screen capture images of the original videos and the corresponding frames from the computer animation sequences. The resulting computer animation sequences accurately featured all details and dynamics of movement behavior visible in the video recordings, excluding facial activity. 3.3. Design of the perception study The computer animated stimuli were shown to observers in Germany, the USA and the UAE in a 3  3  2  2 experimental design, including one within-subject factor: stimulus origin (Germany, USA and UAE) and three between-subjects factors: observer nationality (Germany, USA and UAE), stereotype activation (with and without previous information about the origin of the stimuli) and role of the stimulus person (employee vs. supervisor). Pretests in Germany revealed that a maximum of 15 clips could be shown to each observer. Thus we decided to split the 3  10 stimulus sequences into two batches, to be shown to two independent observer groups in each country (five clips for each stimulus country). While this worked out for the observer samples in Germany and the USA the batch size for the UAE observers had to be cut down to 10 interaction sequences per observer instead of 15 after a first test, due to organizational time constraints (lecture pauses). Thus the first stimulus batch in the UAE contained four interactions from Germany, three interactions from the US and four interactions from the UAE and the second batch contained three interactions from Germany, three interactions from the US and four interactions from the UAE. 3.4. Participants Overall a total of 570 (USA: 187; GER: 189; UAE: 194) student participants took part in the observation study. The average age of the participants was 21.4 years, SD = 3.93 (USA: 20.1, SD = 2.85; GER: 23.8, SD = 5.15; UAE: 20.4, SD = 1.88). The sample consisted of 283 male and 287 female participants (USA: 94/93; GER: 91/98; UAE: 98/96), who were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions (stereotype activation: information vs. no information about the nationality of the stimulus dyads) in each country. In each condition, approximately half of the subjects were instructed to evaluate the person in the animation video sitting on the left side (employee) respectively on the right side (supervisor) of the screen from their point of view. Groups were balanced for gender. Cell frequencies combined for male and female observers varied between 45 and 50. 766 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 3.5. Procedure Three rotations were applied to stimulus presentations in each experimental condition to avoid serial effects. Participants completed the experiment in groups of up to 16 participants (maximum number for one stimulus rotation). For each condition (with and without pre-information about the stimuli’s country of origin) and for each of the three clip orders, participants took part in separate sessions. Before viewing the stimulus material the participants filled out a socio-demographic questionnaire. The participants were informed that the research objective was to learn more about the effects of nonverbal behavior on impression formation. Instructions were read to the participants in a standardized form indicating which person on the screen to focus and how to fill out the questionnaires. To analyze the effects of stereotype activation half of the subjects were informed about the country of origin of the dyads prior to each animation sequence (e.g., ‘‘the next dyad is coming from the US”). After the first sequence participants were asked about difficulties following the instruction and in the few cases were questions were raised (two groups in UAE) the instruction was repeated and if necessary explained in more detail. The animation clips (AVI-files) were then successively displayed via LCD wall projection. Following each animation sequence, the participants were prompted to fill out the questionnaire containing impression ratings (21 items), and a question about the assumed role of the interlocutors. After completion of the questionnaire, the next sequence was played. This procedure was repeated until all animations had been presented. The participants were then debriefed and received an incentive of 15 Euro (Germany), the corresponding sum in Dollars (USA) or a lunch voucher of the same value (UAE). 3.6. Dependent variables Status-role recognition was assessed by a single forced choice item asking which role combination was presented in the animation sequence viewed from the perspective of the target person (either right or left person on screen), thus achieving status-role ascriptions for both actors from all participants. Possible selections were: supervisor/employee, employee/supervisor, employee/employee, supervisor/supervisor. Seven-point bipolar adjective pairs were used to assess the observers’ impressions formed on the basis of the computeranimated nonverbal interactions. Overall 21 items were compiled covering basic dimensions of person perception as described in the literature (Andersen & Andersen, 2005; Andersen, Andersen, & Jensen, 1979; Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005; Kudoh & Matsumoto, 1985; Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1987; McCroskey & Jenson, 1975; Mehrabian, 1970; Osgood, 1966): In particular the list contained four items for Dominance (dominant–submissive, weak–strong, respectful–disrespectful and confident– unconfident) and four items for Evaluation (unfriendly–friendly, believable–unbelievable, likable–dislikeable and cold–warm-hearted). Further four items for Competence (incompetent–competent, intelligent–unintelligent, uninformed– informed and expert–inexpert) were selected from McCroskey and Jenson’s (1975) Source Credibility Scale (four items with highest loadings >.71) assuming particular correlations with the Dominance items. Beyond these items relevant to the current research questions the list further contained four items for Activity (rigid–flexible, dynamic–static, passive–active and lively–still), four items for Composure (anxious–calm, tense–relaxed, poised–nervous and composed–excitable) and one item for Masculinity (masculine–feminine; see Hofstede, 1980). The latter dimensions were included in exploratory factor analysis to ensure differential construct validity of the target dimensions but not treated as dependent variables in further analysis at this stage. To ascertain semantic equivalence of the items across cultures, all adjectives originally formulated in English were translated into German and Arabic by bilingual translators, and were then translated back to English by another translator. In the very few cases of resulting discrepancy both translators had to agree upon the most appropriate translation. 4. Results 4.1. Recognition of status roles First data inspection indicated a strong tendency for all observers to categorize the observed posers as employees. To correct for this response bias we calculated the ‘‘unbiased hit rate” (Wagner, 1993, 1997), which relates hit rates to false alarms (see also Elfenbein, Mandal, Ambady, Harizuka, & Kumar, 2002). So-called confusion matrices, including unbiased hit rates as well as unbiased chance values were calculated for each stimulus person. To test unbiased hit rates against chance value separate t-tests were conducted for each stimulus country separately. Significant effects above chance level were only found for German posers (employees: Mu = .357, SDu = .188; Mc = .278, SDc = .071), t(53) = 3.565, p = .000, d = .556; supervisors: Mu = .299, SDu = .198; Mc = .215, SDc = .072), t(53) = 3.587, p = .000, d = .564. No significant hit rates above chance level were found for USA and UAE posers, indicating that only in the German dyads the assigned status roles were recognizable from nonverbal behavior. To examine potential in-group advantage in status-role recognition we further conducted six separate ANOVAS for each combination of country of stimulus (USA, GER, and UAE) and role (supervisor and employee) with N = 60 stimuli and unbiased hit rate as dependent variables. No significant results were found to support the hypothesis of an in-group advantage in status-role recognition. Observers were no better in recognizing the status roles in the interactions from their own culture than from the other countries. 767 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 Table 1 Pearson-correlation coefficients for status-role ascriptions. Ascribed role Country of observers Employee USA GER Supervisor USA GER * ** GER UAE r p N r p N .759** .000 60 .699** .000 40 .679** .000 40 r p N r p N .736** .000 60 .702** .000 40 .653** .000 40 Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Two possible reasons might account for the low hit rates in particular for the US and the UAE sample. Either no meaningful status cues appeared in the interactions thus leaving the status-role recognition open for random guesses, or nonverbal status cues did not systematically covary with the roles as expected, i.e. there were employees showing high status behavior and bosses behaving in a low status manner. If the latter explication holds true we should be able to find high correlations in status role ascription across stimuli independently from the actual role assigned to the actors. This was in fact the case. Table 1 depicts the results of the corresponding analysis showing highly significant correlations across all countries in the ascription of both status roles. This result not only suggests a systematic influence of nonverbal behavior on status role ascription but also points to trans-cultural universals in the perception of the status-relevant cues. 4.2. Dimensions of impression formation As a basis for the comparative analysis of the impression ratings construct validity of the target dimensions Dominance and Evaluation as well as measurement invariance across cultures for these latent dimensions had to be established (Meredith, 1993; Wu, Li, & Zumbo, 2007). To determine the factor structure of the impression ratings we first analyzed the complete item set with Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Reliability Analysis (RA). Based on these results we set up a factor model according to our hypothetical model and used Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MG-CFA) to refine the factor model and examine the equivalence of measurement across all three countries. Rational and detailed results of EFA, RA and MG-CFA are provided as Complementary Material.1 EFA and RA lead to a reduced set of seven items revealing a two factor solution representing the dimensions Dominance (confident–unconfident, weak–strong, dominant–submissive, expert–inexpert) and Evaluation (unfriendly–friendly, likable– dislikeable, respectful–disrespectful). A few deviations from the item groupings found in the literature occurred in EFA. The item ‘‘expert–inexpert”, expected to load on an independent Competence factor loaded highly on the Dominance dimension. Further the item ‘‘respectful–disrespectful”, expected to load on the Dominance dimension showed high loadings on the Evaluation dimension (see Complementary Material). The model test for the two latent judgment dimensions Dominance and Evaluation by means of MG-CFA revealed strict factorial invariance across the countries (USA vs. GER vs. UAE) in all relevant fit criteria (SRMR = .039, RMSEA = .063, CFI = .903, see Complementary Material) and therefore the resulting factor scores could be used for ANOVA group comparisons (Meredith, 1993; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000; Wu et al., 2007). Factor score weights from the multiple-group model were then used to calculate individual values for the latent factors Dominance and Evaluation. The Pearson-correlation coefficient between the resulting scores was r = .012, p = .283 suggesting two largely independent latent impression dimensions. 4.3. Influence of independent variables on impression formation The influence of the independent variables on Dominance and Evaluation was analyzed by four-way (3  3  2  2) repeated measure ANOVA with country of stimulus CS: (USA, GER or UAE) as within-subjects factor and country of observer (CO: USA, GER or UAE), role (Ro: supervisor or employee) and advance information about the dyad’s country of origin (AI: information available or not available) as the between-subjects factors with N = 570 participants. In addition, pair wise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were conducted to determine simple main effects. 1 Complementary Material can be downloaded from the journal’s website. 768 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 Table 2 Means and standard deviations of dominance and evaluation referred to country of stimulus and role. Role Country of stimulus USA GER UAE Total M SD 3.946 .802 3.821 .743 4.094 .646 3.953 .731 Supervisor M SD 3.939 .771 4.185 .675 4.186 .751 4.103 .732 Total M SD 3.942 .786 4.000 .733 4.139 .701 4.027 .740 M SD 3.669 .608 3.688 .565 3.762 .551 3.707 .575 Supervisor M SD 3.573 .612 3.726 .539 3.795 .607 3.698 .586 Total M SD 3.622 .611 3.707 .552 3.778 .579 3.702 .581 Dominance Employee Evaluation Employee Table 3 ANOVA tables of four-way repeated measures ANOVA for dominance and evaluation with the factors country of stimulus. Country of observer, role, and advance information. Source of variance SS df MS F p g2 Dominance: within-subjects effects Country of stimulus (CS) CS  CO CS  Role CS  Info CS  CO  Role CS  CO  Info CS  Role  Info CS  CO  Role  Info Error(CS) 11.760 2.104 10.403 .199 10.616 2.383 .476 1.906 595.394 1.924 3.848 1.924 1.924 3.848 3.848 1.924 3.848 1071.534 6.113 .547 5.408 .103 2.759 .619 .248 .495 .556 11.002 .984 9.732 .186 4.966 1.115 .446 .891 .000 .413 .000 .822 .001 .347 .633 .465 0.012 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.002 Dominance: between-subjects effects Country of observer (CO) Role Info CO  Role CO  Info Role  Info CO  Role  Info Error .547 9.494 .202 .535 1.072 .000 .673 299.108 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 557 .274 9.494 .202 .267 .536 .000 .337 .537 .509 17.680 .377 .498 .998 .001 .627 .601 .000 .540 .608 .369 .979 .535 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 Evaluation: within-subjects effects Country of stimulus (CS) CS  CO CS  Role CS  Info CS  CO  Role CS  CO  Info CS  Role  Info CS  CO  Role  Info Error(CS) 7.102 3.970 1.720 .003 1.245 2.627 .156 1.096 261.480 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 4 1114 3.551 .993 .860 .001 .311 .657 .078 .274 .235 15.128 4.229 3.663 .006 1.326 2.798 .333 1.168 .000 .002 .026 .994 .258 .025 .717 .323 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.002 Evaluation: between-subjects effects Country of observer (CO) Role Info CO  Role CO  Info Role  Info CO  Role  Info Error 34.468 .030 .229 .154 .184 2.229 .381 266.004 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 557 17.234 .030 .229 .077 .092 2.229 .191 .478 36.088 .064 .479 .161 .193 4.668 .399 .000 .801 .489 .851 .824 .031 .671 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 Note: The ANOVA for dominance is greenhouse-Geisser corrected; effect size is calculated by g2 = SSbetween/SStotal. G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 769 Fig. 2. Interaction between Role and stimuli’s Country of Origin in Dominance ratings (scale ranges from 1 to 7 with 4 as the scale mean). The specified independent variables only accounted for 5.5% of variance in the dominance ratings and for 9.5% in the evaluative ratings. Due to the sample size of 570 participants, the test power of the ANOVAs was sufficiently high to confirm even smallest effects. In fact, group means deviated only minimally from the scale means (scale means = 4; see Table 2) and all significant results showed very weak effect sizes (see Table 3). Thus we refrain from far going interpretations and only point out two results relevant to the further analysis. First it is remarkable that advance information about the stimuli’s country of origin showed no significant main effect, which puts some emphasis on the predominant role of nonverbal behavior in impression formation. However it cannot be excluded that the stereotype induction intended was to weak or there were no preconceptions in the minds of the observers, which could have exerted a systematic influence on their judgments. Secondly a significant main effect of status role and an interaction effect between culture and status role could be found. The interaction is depicted in Fig. 2. Separate paired t-tests for the different stimulus countries revealed that the effects were due to differences in the German stimulus sample only, showing that across all observes German supervisors were perceived as more dominant as the employees (t = 6.119, p < .000, d = .513), which was not the case for the other countries (USA: t = .121, n.s.; UAE: t = 1.621, n.s.). Although unsystematic with regard to our independent variables the impression variance across the stimuli revealed a unique possibility to analyze cross-cultural correlations in the perception of the stimulus person independently from nationality and role of the actors. Further analyses therefore were based on stimuli as cases using averages of impression ratings across the observers from each culture as dependent measures. 4.4. Correlations of dominance and evaluation within and across countries To analyze within- and between-culture correlations of the impression ratings the factor scores of Dominance and Evaluation were aggregated for each stimulus person in the dyadic interactions and Pearson-correlation coefficients were calculated on this basis with N = 60 stimulus persons (USA and GER) respectively N = 40 stimulus persons (UAE). Results are shown in Table 4. Regardless of knowing the stimuli’s country of origin, observers of all three countries showed significant correlations in their dominance ratings (see also Fig. 3). Within-country correlations were even higher than cross-country correlations indicating a stable impression formation based on nonverbal cues and being immune towards advance information about the stimuli’s country of origin. The results suggest trans-cultural universals in dominance perception, which are independent from knowledge about the poser’s country of origin. For the Evaluation dimension within-country correlations were significant but except from Germany only of a medium size, indicating a potential influence of source information on the US and UAE judgments. Cross-country correlations were only significant for German and US observers and for German and UAE observers but not for US and UAE observers supporting the hypothesis that similarities in the basic cultural values might be influential with regard to the evaluation of nonverbal behavior (Freeman, Rule, & Ambady, 2009; Freeman, Rule, Adams, et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 2002). Again the correlation pattern was independent from advance information about the stimuli’s country of origin. Correlations between judgments of Dominance and Evaluation revealed further insights into cultural specificities in impression formation. Results are shown in Table 5. No significant correlations were found between cultures. However 770 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 Table 4 Pearson-correlation coefficients for dominance and evaluation between country of observers with regarding of advance information about country of stimulus. Country Dominance Without advance info USA GER UAE With advance info USA GER Evaluation Without advance info USA GER UAE With advance info USA GER r p N r p N r p N Without advance info With advance info GER UAE USA .766** .000 60 .720** .000 40 .781** .000 40 .793** .000 60 UAE .822** .000 60 .884** .000 40 .790** .000 60 r p N r p N r p N r p N r p N GER .486** .000 60 r p N r p N .085 .603 40 .441** .004 40 .689** .000 40 .816** .000 40 .509** .000 60 .694** .000 60 .412** .008 40 .429** .001 60 .303 .057 40 .529** .000 40 * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). ** within cultures we found a significant positive correlation between Dominance and Evaluation for the US observers, while for German observers we found a zero correlation and for Arabs we found a significant negative correlation. This result is in line with the findings of Freeman, Rule, and Ambady (2009) and Freeman, Rule, Adams, et al. (2009) showing that the expression of dominance is more favorable in a typical western culture (USA) than in a typical eastern culture, such as Japan. 4.5. Predicting the status-role assignment by dominance perception So far we found that the recognition of roles was only possible for the German stimulus sample (see also results from ANOVA), but that despite the failure to identify underlying status roles in the other countries, the Dominance ratings across all observer groups and all stimuli as well as the ascription of the status role – although wrong – correlated significantly. Consequently we asked the question whether role ascription could be predicted by Dominance ratings, independently from the actual role assigned to the actors. To determine to which degree the assignment of status-roles in the three countries was influenced by the perception of Dominance regression analyses were conducted across all observers and for each country separately with frequency of perceiving the poser as supervisor (M = 52.35, SD = 23.421) as response variable and Dominance (M = 4.034, SD = .602) as predictor variable. Regression analysis across countries explained about 65% of the total variance (r2 = .649; bstd = .806, p = .000). Separate analyses for the three countries confirmed the predictive value of dominance perception for status-role assignment explaining between 58% and 78% of the variance (USA: r2 = .583; bstd = .763, p = .000, GER: r2 = .774; bstd = .880, p = .000, UAE: r2 = .783; bstd = .885, p = .000). Fig. 3 visualizes the cross-cultural correlations in Dominance impressions and also shows that the observers from all countries most uniformly based their guesses of the underlying status-roles on this impression dimension. To determine the degree of accuracy with which the predictor variable Dominance was able to discriminate between the status-role ascriptions (supervisor or employee) we further conducted a discriminant analysis with 7331 valid individual judgments of all 570 participants The mean of Dominance (M = 4.034) as decision criterion was able to classify 70.5% of all cases correctly as mentioned supervisor or as mentioned employee: if the factor score of Dominance was greater than G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 771 Fig. 3. Scatter-plots for pair-wise cross-country correlations of Dominance ratings and status-role ascriptions (predominant role ascriptions determined via median split: j = supervisor; } = employee). 4.034, the observer identified the role as supervisor in 75.6% of all cases, and if the factor score of Dominance was less than 4.034, the observer identified the role as employee in 66.9% of all cases. Overall the results suggest that perceived dominance predicts ascription of status-roles in all cultures under investigation. 772 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 Table 5 Pearson-correlation coefficients between dominance and evaluation. Evaluation Country Dominance * ** USA GER UAE USA r p N .352** .006 60 .023 .862 60 .273 .088 40 GER r p N .176 .179 60 .004 .978 60 .287 .073 40 UAE r p N .088 .589 40 .008 .960 40 .349* .027 40 Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 4.6. Predicting dominance and evaluation by nonverbal behavior The last step of data analysis should answer the question which nonverbal cues account for the variance in Dominance ratings and consequently the status role ascription and for the variance in the Evaluation of the actors as well. To answer this question, movement and postural parameters, described as potentially relevant to the impression dimensions under investigation were extracted from the data protocols underlying our animations (see Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982; Dovidio et al., 1988; Fehr & Exline, 1987; Hall, Coates, & LeBeau, 2005; Harrigan, Oxman, & Rosenthal, 1985; Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1987; Schwartz, Tesser, & Powell, 1982) focusing on: (1) the orientation towards the partner (head rotation as mean angular deviation from direct eye line), (2) the vertical head position (mean angular up-down shift of the head), (3) the openness (mean distance between both hands and elbows as well as between both feet and knees), (4) the expansivity of extremities (mean distance of hands and elbows from chest plus distance between feet and knees from hips) and (5) the overall movement activity (time spent in motion as percentage of observation time any movement activity was observed). As shown in Table 6 relevant proportions of variance of the Dominance ratings could be explained by the chosen nonverbal parameters (USA: 33.2%, GER: 41.4%, UAE: 44.9%). Uniformly dominance was based on the vertical head posture as well as on the opening of upper and lower extremities. For all cultures a lifted head and an open posture were perceived as more dominant. German observers as well as American observers further based their judgments on the orientation towards the partner (rotational head orientation). A more direct orientation was perceived as more dominant. Two particularities further appeared for the German observers. Less movement activity and stretching of the lower extremities was perceived as more dominant here. Overall the exploratory analysis revealed a strong influence of nonverbal cues on Dominance perception and a remarkable overlap in the use of nonverbal cues across the cultures. Table 7 summarizes the results of the regression analysis for the Evaluation dimension. Explained variance was lower than for Dominance (USA: 25.8%, GER: 22.5%, UAE: 22.4%) and the cultural overlaps with regard to the predictive value of various nonverbal cues were smaller and more specific. US observers and UAE observers did not show any overlaps, while German observers showed overlaps with regard to one parameter with USA and one with UAE, which is consistent with the intercorrelations in the Evaluation ratings reported above. In USA and GER it was essential for higher Evaluation scores that the lower extremities were not outstretched. In UAE and GER higher Evaluation scores were predicted by closure of the lower extremities. A lifted head position only predicted evaluation for the US observers, showing the same direction as for Dominance, possibly explaining the significant correlation between evaluation and dominance ratings in the US as reported above. A peculiarity appeared for the US with regard to global movement activity indicating that higher activity levels were Table 6 Beta coefficients of analysis of regression for explaining dominance. USA R2 = .332 GER R2 = .414 UAE R2 = .449 Explanatory variable std. Beta t p std. Beta t p std. Beta t p Vertical head posture Rotational head orientation Opening upper extremities Opening lower extremities Expansivity up. extremities Expansivity low extremities Time spent in motion .328 .271 .320 .190 .026 .088 .069 2.702 2.266 2.720 1.607 .217 .683 .534 .005 .014 .004 .057 .415 .249 .298 .351 .181 .368 .223 .068 .215 .259 3.087 1.614 3.340 2.014 .612 1.791 2.151 .002 .050 .001 .025 .272 .040 .018 .330 .125 .392 .340 .081 .050 .176 2.297 .908 2.800 2.446 .558 .334 1.101 .014 .185 .004 .010 .291 .370 .139 Note: All significances are 1-tailed. 773 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 Table 7 Beta coefficients of analysis of regression for explaining evaluation. USA R2 = .258 GER R2 = .225 UAE R2 = .224 Explanatory variable std. Beta t p std. Beta t p std. Beta t p Vertical head posture Rotational head orientation Opening upper extremities Opening lower extremities Expansivity up. extremities Expansivity low. extremities Time spent in motion .250 .210 .044 .068 .140 .260 .356 1.954 1.665 .354 .547 1.117 1.923 2.627 .028 .051 .362 .293 .135 .030 .006 .091 .238 .152 .260 .150 .313 .022 .699 1.848 1.200 2.043 1.172 2.269 .158 .244 .035 .118 .023 .123 .014 .438 .103 .171 .194 .365 .072 .163 .172 .603 1.043 1.169 2.214 .417 .919 .909 .275 .152 .126 .017 .340 .183 .185 Note: All significances are 1-tailed. evaluated more positively. It is noteworthy that directed head orientation as an affiliation cue and an indicator of visual attention only accounted for positive evaluations in the German observer sample. Seemingly the interpretation of this strong social cue underlies particular cultural variance which might constitute a basis for misunderstanding and conflict in crosscultural encounters (Argyle & Cook, 1973; Ellsworth & Ludwig, 1972). 5. Discussion Applying a novel computer-animation methodology (see Bente et al., 2008), we investigated the effects of nonverbal behavior from Germany, the USA, and the UAE on status-role recognition and on the impression formation of observers in the three countries focusing on the dimensions Dominance and Evaluation. The study demonstrated the usefulness of the methodology which permitted the use of culture fair characters showing nonverbal behavior transcribed from real-life interactions and thus to avoid stereotype relevant inferences from the outward appearance of the original actors. Furthermore the animation methodology provided access to the quantification of movement patterns relevant to the impression dimensions under investigation and allowed for the analysis of differential effects of specific nonverbal cues on impression formation. Regarding the recognition of status roles we found hit rates above chance only for the German stimuli but nor for the US and UAE stimuli. No in-group advantage was found for status-role recognition in any of the countries comparable the one reported for the recognition of emotions from facial expressions (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2003; Matsumoto, 2002; Matsumoto et al., 2009). The fact that observers were not able to correctly identify status roles in the US and the UAE sample even if observer and stimulus country matched might cast some doubt on the effectiveness of our status role inductions. In principle the unexpected distribution of perceived Dominance across the roles might be due to the nature of the role-play situation. Comments during debriefing revealed that most role players took the task quite seriously, however they also suggested another explanation. The conflict imposed on the role play interaction in fact assigned status-power to the supervisor. But in addition it also assigned expertise and potential coercive power to the employee. Thus we might have created a power equilibrium based on different power sources (legitimate vs. expert/coercive; see French & Raven, 1959) which left room for control attempts on both sides. It remains unclear whether the induction of a more pronounced power asymmetry would have led to better recognition rates. Future studies will have to address this issue, e.g. by combining status role inductions with an organizational problem-solving task instead of a power conflict. By means of EFA and CFA we were able to provide a factorial model of social impressions distinguishing the two factors Dominance and Evaluation. Separate ANOVAs for both dimensions revealed unsystematic and weak effects of the independent variables (country of stimuli, country of observer, status-role and advance information about the stimuli’s country of origin). A significant main effect of role on Dominance ratings occurred, which was largely relying on a pronounced difference between employees and supervisors in the German stimulus sample only. No main effect of advance information about the stimuli’s country of origin was found, suggesting a strong effect of observed nonverbal behavior as compared to advance information. However, overall effect sizes were very small and all group means were close to the scale means. As a major cause we assume the large inter-individual variance in the behavior of the stimulus persons across and within cultures, which suppressed the influence of culture of origin as well as the status-role assigned to the posers. This assumption is supported by the analysis of the hit rates in the role recognition task and might also have been caused by the specific setting. The fact, however, that we found status-role recognition above chance for the German stimuli as well as an interaction effect between status-role and stimulus country for the Dominance ratings, pointing in the same direction, might also suggest another explanation referring to actual cultural differences in the expression of power status and dominance. Although described as a high power distance (PDI) culture the collectivistic orientation in the UAE could inhibit the open expression of status differences through nonverbal behavior (see Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001, 2002). Americans on the other hand, though characterized by an individualistic (IDV) orientation, could be expected, because of low power distance, to emphasize equality. Two different reasons thus could account for the same effect, namely the lack of significant differences in nonverbal dominance expression in status–asymmetric interactions. PDI and IDV however would not explain then the differences in 774 G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 perceived dominance between employees and supervisors in the German sample. It can be speculated whether the third dimension ‘‘uncertainty avoidance” (UAI) where Germany scores are approximately as high as UAE can explain this phenomenon. Not being inhibited by a collectivistic attitude, as the UAE people are, we could suppose that the indication of status roles through nonverbal behavior would be more likely then in the German culture. Overall this data makes a strong argument to avoid an isolated analysis of singular cultural value dimensions when it comes to the prediction of concrete behavior. More studies in fact are needed to disentangle the complex interplay between the various cultural value dimensions and social behavior in the future. Despite the still unclear influence of culture and status role on the expression of nonverbal dominance cues, the behavioral variance across the stimulus persons provided a solid basis for the analyses of cultural specificities and communalities on the perceptual level. In fact, our analysis based on the factor values revealed significant positive correlations for Dominance ratings between all three countries, supporting the hypothesis of cultural universalities in the perception of Dominance from nonverbal behavior. This result is in line with data reported by Keating et al. (1981), which revealed universals in Dominance perception from facial expressions and with those of Kowner and Wiseman (2003) who could show that nonverbal status cues could be identified as such even if not part of the own cultural repertoire. With regard to the Evaluation dimension of person perception we only found a significant correlation between German and US observers and between German and UAE observers but not between US and UAE observers. This result supports the hypothesis that culture has a more pronounced influence on Evaluation than on Dominance perception and that similarity in values breeds similarities in Evaluation (Swift, 1999). A similarity between Germany and the US has been found for PDI, while with regard to IDV-scores Germany lies between the two other cultures and with regard to UAI even is more similar to the UAE, thus positioning Germany in-between USA and UAE, when taking into account all three dimensions (see Clearly Cultural, 2009). This view is in fact consistent with the correlations found and holds that cultural differences can hardly be explained through a singular cultural value dimension, when it comes to understanding self-construal, other perception and communication in real-life encounters (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). As for Dominance prior information about the stimuli’s country of origin did not affect the pattern of inter-correlations in Evaluation. Exploratory analysis of nonverbal cues relevant to Dominance perception and Evaluation revealed tentative explanations for the correlation patterns found. While we found significant variance explanation and large cross-cultural overlaps in the predictive value of postural dynamics (in particular head lift, openness of extremities and head orientation to the partner) for Dominance, regression analysis for Evaluation showed a weaker predictive value of the selected nonverbal parameters. A few overlaps were only found between Germany and the US and Germany and the UAE, which matches the correlation patterns found for the Evaluation dimension. Overall results from correlation analysis strongly support the hypothesis of cultural universalities in the perception of Dominance and of cultural specificities in the Evaluation dimension and thus aligns with previous results based on different paradigms (Freeman, Rule, & Ambady, 2009; Freeman, Rule, Adams, et al., 2009; Kowner & Wiseman, 2003). The fact that disclosure of the stimuli’s country of origin did not influence correlation patterns in either of the dimensions also underpins the strong impact of nonverbal behavior in cross-cultural person perception, which is largely independent from stereotypes or predetermined evaluations of the other cultures as possibly caused by stereotypes or hearsay. It is noteworthy that the observers from the three cultures not only converged in their Dominance judgments but also unanimously based their guesses about the underlying status-roles on these impressions. Although hit rates mostly failed to surmount the chance level, the assignments of the roles (supervisor vs. employee), whether correct or incorrect, were predictable by the Dominance ratings as shown via regression- and discriminant-analyses. Thus it can be supposed that in view of a lack of additional context information, low level inferences from nonverbal behavior to Dominance also affected higher level inferences to underlying status roles. This observation might be of particular relevance in cross-cultural business encounters, where status differences are not known or obscured. In sum the data presented here suggests a multi-layer model of person perception which holds particular explanatory value for understanding cultural diversity in social cognition. While the perception of Dominance cues seems to rely on universals with regard to the extracted cues as well as to the inferential mechanisms they invoke, Evaluation as basic criterion to approach or avoid another person seems to be more affected by cultural standards. This is in accordance with the findings of Freeman, Rule, and Ambady (2009) and Freeman, Rule, Adams, et al. (2009), who showed that viewing photographs with dominant or submissive postures resulted in differential activities in areas related to evaluative processing of social cues, when seen either by Westerners (US-Americans) or by Easterners (Japanese). In fact this result implies the ability of both groups to uniformly and adequately qualify the displayed cues as either dominant or submissive. However based on this, both groups showed distinct evaluative responses. Both our own and Freeman et al.’s data thus point to two possibly independent layers of person perception, one which is more basic and culturally invariant (Dominance) and the other which is learning dependent and culture-specific (Evaluation). Yet it can be asked whether even more independent layers are active in social impression formation. Data from our explorative factor analysis, which have not yet been modeled in CFA at this point, support the assumption that perceptions of activity on one hand and inferences about the other persons’ inner states (composure, relaxation) on the other hand might be candidates for such layers. More systematic research will be needed to disentangle the interplay of these components and to determine the particular influence of culture on each level of information processing. In this endeavor a significant contribution of cultural neuroscience can be expected, as it would allow identification of potentially distinct neural mechanisms underlying social information processing on the different levels (Chiao & Ambady, 2007; Chiao, Li, & Harada, 2008; Chiao et al., 2010; Han & Northoff, 2008). Although the work reported here G. Bente et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 762–777 775 emphasized the implementation of behavioral paradigms, the experimental techniques applied possess particular value for cultural neuroscience studies as well, as they allow for unprecedented degrees of stimulus control In particular the computer animation approach can go beyond the use of verbal reports of prototypical behaviors (see Kowner & Wiseman, 2003) or static images of postures and gestures and include subtle variations of nonverbal behavior while preserving its natural dynamics. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Synesthetic grapheme-color percepts exist for newly encountered Hebrew, Devanagari, Armenian and Cyrillic graphemes Christopher David Blair ⁎, Marian E. Berryhill Department of Psychology, Program in Cognitive and Brain Science, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557, United States a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 11 February 2013 Available online 14 July 2013 Keywords: Synesthesia Synaesthesia Learning a b s t r a c t Grapheme-color synesthetes experience color, not physically present, when viewing symbols. Synesthetes cannot remember learning these associations. Must synesthetic percepts be formed during a sensitive period? Can they form later and be consistent? What determines their nature? We tested grapheme-color synesthete, MC2, before, during and after she studied Hindi abroad. We investigated whether novel graphemes elicited synesthetic percepts, changed with familiarity, and/or benefited from phonemic information. MC2 reported color percepts to novel Devanagari and Hebrew graphemes. MC2 monitored these percepts over 6 months in a Hindi-speaking environment. MC2 and synesthete DN, reported synesthetic percepts for Armenian graphemes, or Cyrillic graphemes + phonemes over time. Synesthetes, not controls, reported color percepts for novel graphemes that gained consistency over time. Phonemic information did not enhance consistency. Thus, synesthetes can form and consolidate percepts to novel graphemes as adults. These percepts may depend on pre-existing grapheme-color relationships but they can flexibly shift with familiarity. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction For most of us, the letter ‘T’ is not blue and happy, nor the number ‘7’ shiny, yellow and good. Yet those with synesthesia reliably experience perceptual phenomenon absent in the stimulus. Although it sounds like a holdover from the psychedelic era, reports of synesthesia date back 200 years (reviewed in Jewanski, Simner, Day, & Ward, 2011). The most commonly studied form of synesthesia is grapheme-color synesthesia (Simner et al., 2006), in which a grapheme reliably elicits a color percept (reviewed in Hochel & Milan, 2008; Hubbard, 2007; Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005; Mattingley, 2009; Rich, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005; Sagiv, Heer, & Robertson, 2006; Ward, 2013; Ward & Mattingley, 2006). Synesthetes do not remember forming grapheme-color associations. Indeed, anecdotal reports describe synesthetes feeling frustration when encountering ‘wrongly’ colored alphabets in preschool (e.g. our participant MC2). Others discover their unique percepts later in life when they find that such percepts are not universal (e.g. our participant DN; see also Mills, Metzger, Foster, Valentine-Gresko, & Ricketts, 2009; Mills et al., 2002). Because synesthesia emerges early in childhood, it is difficult to definitively answer questions related to the development of synesthetic experiences. There are few papers describing the acquisition and stability of grapheme-color synesthesia. Simner et al. demonstrated that grapheme color synesthesia may be identified in children as young as 6 years of age (2009). Furthermore, testing children at the beginning and end of a year revealed significant improvements in the consistency of their synesthetic percepts (Simner, Harrold, Creed, Monro, & Foulkes, 2009). Spector ⁎ Corresponding author. Address: 1664 N. Virginia St., Mail Stop 296, Reno, NV 89557, United States. Fax: +1 775 784 1126. E-mail address: netiger@gmail.com (C.D. Blair). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.06.002 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 945 and Maurer have worked with pre-literate and literate children to clarify effects of literacy on the development of synesthesia (2009, 2011). They demonstrated that toddlers made predictable color matches to letters and shapes (‘‘O” and ameboids are white; ‘‘Z” and jagged shapes are black), but these were based on letter shape and not letter sounds; whereas they failed to make other associations commonly observed in literate children and adults (‘‘B” is blue, ‘‘A” is red, etc.) (Spector & Maurer, 2009, 2011). Other findings show that grapheme-color synesthesia can exact a cost in task performance. Green and Goswami showed that children aged 7–15 years with grapheme-color synesthesia experience interference during numerical tasks if the digits were printed in color incongruent with their synesthetic percepts (2008). One possibility is that an early sensitive period during development is essential for the formation of grapheme-color percepts. If true, novel graphemes encountered in adulthood might not produce synesthetic percepts. Alternatively, synesthetes may continually and automatically develop new grapheme-color percepts, especially for symbols similar to familiar graphemes. Another possibility is that there is an early sensitive period in which color associations are made, and that these associations may then map onto newly encountered graphemes later in life based on similarities in shape, name, meaning, use, etc. Indeed, support for the latter view comes from a recent finding demonstrating that some synesthetes can directly transfer one pre-existing synesthetic color percept onto a novel symbol. These authors presented words written in English but replacing the Latin letter ‘A’ with a novel Glagolitic grapheme and found that the new grapheme produced the same synesthetic color percept associated with the familiar letter ‘A’ (Mroczko, Metzinger, Singer, & Nikolic, 2009). This finding shows that an explicit transfer of synesthetic color to a novel grapheme serving as a placeholder can occur in as little as 10 min. Yet it remains unclear if or how quickly grapheme-color percepts arise for novel graphemes presented without a pre-existing context. Even if novel graphemes elicit a synesthetic percept, the quality of these adult-acquired synesthetic percepts may be different. Case studies of synesthetes describing their experiences with multiple learned alphabets (Mills et al., 2002, 2009; Rich et al., 2005; Witthoft & Winawer, 2006) show that adult synesthetes may overlay pre-existing percepts onto novel graphemes based on similarities between letter shape (Mills et al., 2002; Witthoft & Winawer, 2006) or phoneme (Mills et al., 2009; Witthoft & Winawer, 2006). In the other direction, Mills and colleagues reported that synesthete MLS associated new synesthetic colors with known graphemes, but these associations were temporary and qualitatively different from the synesthetic experiences associated with her native language (Mills et al., 2002). These findings point towards a flexible relationship between grapheme and synesthetic experience, but they do not clarify whether novel graphemes can produce synesthetic percepts independent of specific training or implied association or whether these percepts remain stable and consistent. Furthermore, these studies examined the color associations and consistency of grapheme sets that have already been learned at some earlier point, and thus cannot characterize the acquisition process of grapheme and color associations. Here, we investigated the existence and consistency of grapheme-color associations for newly encountered novel grapheme sets in two grapheme-color synesthetes. In one unique case, we tested a synesthete before, during, and after she studied Hindi while abroad in India. Upon her return she and a second synesthete were trained in two new novel alphabets in a training study. In contrast to previous association forming studies (Mroczko et al., 2009) all graphemes were presented without any additional context, with the exception of Cyrillic characters, which were presented with an audio recording of their name. The present findings take advantage of two complementary approaches: one ecological and one laboratory based, to provide converging evidence regarding the consistency and quality of synesthetic percepts for novel graphemes as they become more familiar. 2. Experiment 1: Synesthetic color percepts to novel graphemes Can novel graphemes elicit a synesthetic color percept? If acquiring color percepts for graphemes without additional context requires that they be encountered during a sensitive period over which grapheme-color links form in early childhood, there should be no synesthetic color percept to entirely novel graphemes. Alternatively, it may be the case that synesthetic percepts are automatically elicited for novel graphemes throughout the lifetime, or that previous color associations may map onto new graphemes. If true, novel graphemes should elicit a synesthetic color percept. 2.1. Method 2.1.1. Participant MC2 (female, 26 years old) a psychology undergraduate at the University of Nevada, Reno participated. The University’s Institutional Review Board approved this and all protocols. MC2 and all participants (participating in Experiment 3) signed informed consent documents. MC2’s first language is English. MC2 reports taking four semesters of college Spanish, but does not claim fluency in any language other than English. 2.1.2. Synesthesia assessment MC2 describes her synesthetic experience of graphemes not only in terms of color, but also in texture, personality, and emotional terms; we tested grapheme-color percepts. MC2 further reports that she has experienced these percepts for as long as she can remember, and does not recall a time before she had color associations. She reports that she first recognized that her experiences were not typical for everyone when she encountered an ‘‘inappropriately colored alphabet” in 946 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 school. MC2 experiences color rapidly and automatically. This is confirmed by visual pop-out experiments similar to those reported by Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) and Ward, Jonas, Dienes, and Seth (2010). She identifies briefly presented (26–1000 ms) shapes defined by the synesthetic color of a letter embedded in letter arrays with different synesthetic colors. She can also use her synesthetic percepts to perform arithmetic. For example, when presented with the equation ‘‘7 + 2=” followed by a blue color patch, she can quickly and accurately answer true or false (McCarthy, Barnes & Caplovitz, 2013). To confirm that MC2 was a grapheme-color synesthete, she completed the grapheme color program in the Texsyn Toolbox running in Matlab (Eagleman, Kagan, Nelson, Sagaram, & Sarma, 2007). Each Latin grapheme (letters A–Z, digits 0–9) appeared with a color palette. Participants selected the color best corresponding to their synesthetic percept; there was also a ‘no color’ option. Next, a square patch of the selected color appeared and the participant adjusted its brightness before final selection. Graphemes were presented three times each in pseudorandomized order per 30-min session. Three values were derived. First, the within-grapheme consistency score reflects the similarity between the three colors selected per grapheme. Within-grapheme consistency is measured in the form of a ‘‘difference score.” Lower difference scores indicate higher consistency. In other words, if the ‘‘3” was always electric blue there is high consistency/low difference score whereas selections of electric blue, yellow and pink would have low consistency/high difference score. Second, the within-session consistency reflects overall consistency and is calculated by averaging the within-grapheme consistency scores. Participants scoring <1 are considered grapheme-color synesthetes. MC2’s overall consistency score was 0.34; see Fig. 1. Third, the between-session consistency scores reflect the stability of synesthetic percepts over time (Simner et al., 2009). For example, during session 1, ‘B’ elicited a selection of brown and during the next session ‘B’ remained paired with brown. The average color values (RGB) across sessions were compared to assess the reliability of the synesthetic color percept over time. The absolute differences between the old and new average colors for R, G, B were calculated separately, then summed and divided by 255 (color values in RGB color space may be modulated between a minimum of zero, and a maximum of 255) to yield the between session consistency score for a particular grapheme. Once again, lower values indicate greater consistency. 2.1.3. Tests of novel graphemes We modified the synesthesia assessment to measure MC2’s synesthetic percepts to novel graphemes. MC2 first viewed the Latin alphabet. She next viewed 10 Hebrew letters (Bet ‫ב‬, Dalet ‫ד‬, Gimel ‫ג‬, He ‫ה‬, Lamed ‫ל‬, Mem ‫מ‬, Qof ‫ק‬, Resh ‫ר‬, Shin ‫ש‬, Tav ‫)ת‬. The Hebrew letters served as a control condition for Experiment 2 as MC2 received no additional information about the Hebrew characters in the form of their names, sounds, meanings etc. over the course of testing, and was only exposed to them during testing sessions. This subset of Hebrew letters was chosen because these characters were less similar to Latin characters, and to minimize the length of the lengthy testing process MC2 graciously endured. We note that in a later experiment, a control grapheme set of length comparable to that of the test was used. MC2 also viewed 49 characters from the Devanagari alphabet that is used in Hindi. MC2 ran each of these programs twice on different days to obtain baseline values and to permit calculation of initial between-session consistency; see Fig. 1. Finally, we asked MC2 to report any similarities in shape between these graphemes and familiar graphemes. A period of roughly two and a half months passed between these two sessions. Fig. 1. A subset of synesthete color choices for MC2 (left) and DN (right) (see Supplementary Materials for full sets). Each row reflects the averaged colors for each grapheme during a single session. The results display the first and last sessions (when available) for each grapheme set: Latin, Hebrew, Devanagari, Armenian and Cyrillic. Graphemes shown in outline represent those for which the ‘‘no color” response was selected. Underlined Cyrillic graphemes represent those included in the non-Latin resembling subset. 947 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 2.2. Results and discussion The within- and between-session grapheme-color consistency scores were calculated for each alphabet. MC2’s withinsession difference scores were: Latin session 1, 2: 0.34, 0.28 (M = .31); Hebrew session 1, 2: 0.71, 0.78 (M = .68), Devanagari session 1, 2: 0.68, 1.00 (M = .84); see Fig. 2a. The between-session consistency scores indicating consistency over time were also very good: Latin = 0.18; Hebrew = 0.48; Devanagari = 0.79; see Fig. 2b. As expected, her most consistent performance was for her native Latin alphabet. However, performance on Devanagari and Hebrew letters was also highly consistent. In short, MC2 has stable initial synesthetic grapheme-color percepts for novel symbols. Our first question was to investigate whether adult grapheme-color synesthetes have synesthetic percepts for novel graphemes. Synesthete MC2 reported synesthetic color percepts associated with the presentation of novel Devanagari and Hebrew letters. Consequently, the answer to our first question is a resounding, ‘‘Yes”. Synesthetic percepts occurred even when the novel graphemes were not associated with a phoneme or other contextual information and even when she did not think the letters resembled previously encountered graphemes. Thus, at least some synesthetes are able to form novel associations immediately. Given that during these initial sessions, only shape/form information was available, it would appear that color associations may be based entirely on form information. This is somewhat surprising, given that synesthetes (A) Within-Session Consistency: Experiments 1 & 2 5 4.5 Difference Score 4 Devanagari Hebrew Latin 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Session (B) 1 Between-Session Consistency: Experiments 1 & 2 0.9 Difference Score 0.8 Devanagari Hebrew Latin 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 Session Fig. 2. (A) Within-session grapheme-color consistency for Experiments 1 and 2: MC2’s average difference scores for each grapheme set for each session. The larger symbols of the first two points for each grapheme set represent performance in the sessions described in Experiment 1. The dashed line at 1 represents the cutoff score below which people are considered to qualify as grapheme-color synesthetes. (B) Between-session consistency for Experiments 1 and 2: Consistency in average color choices for the same grapheme between sessions for each grapheme set. The first data point for each grapheme set (drawn larger) represents data described in Experiment 1. 948 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 do not report color associations for every symbol and grapheme encountered. For example, MC2 reports that ‘‘#” elicits no color percept for her. 3. Experiment 2: The effect of exposure on synesthetic experience Our second question was to investigate if and how synesthetic percepts to novel graphemes change with increased familiarity. MC2 provided us the rare opportunity of studying a grapheme-color synesthete studying a new language in a foreign country. She agreed to test herself in the grapheme-color association tests for Latin, Hebrew and Devanagari letters during a semester in India. This allowed us to evaluate consistency across three alphabets: Latin – her native language, Hebrew – a novel untrained set, and Devanagari – a novel set accompanied by increased familiarity through academic training and cultural immersion. We predicted that synesthetic percepts to Latin graphemes would not be labile after a lifetime of consolidation. We expected that living in a Hindi-intensive environment would enhance the consistency of percepts associated with Devanagari. However, it also seemed possible that some grapheme-color associations might shift with the addition of contextual information such as phoneme. We expected her responses to Hebrew letters to become somewhat more consistent due to familiarity from testing, but to improve less than Devanagari because she was not in a Hebrew-immersive setting. 3.1. Method In India (August–January, 2011–2012), MC2 studied Hindi in an academic/immersion setting. Anecdotally, MC2 reported that Devanagari graphemes were difficult to learn because they were differentiated by subtle sound and shape differences. She tested herself on her laptop six times in India, in addition to the two previous sessions performed in the laboratory at the University of Nevada, Reno. Thus, lighting, screen size, and monitor color output differed from the initial testing. This change inflates the between-session consistency score for sessions 1–2; Fig. 2b. All three grapheme sets (Latin, Devanagari, & Hebrew) were tested during each testing session. The first testing session abroad was performed on September 2, 2011 and subsequent sessions occurred at 2–3 week intervals. It must be noted that MC2 had some knowledge of the study’s purpose. She was aware that the study focused on the effect of continued exposure on novel grapheme color consistency. Further, she did see a brief visual representation of the relative consistencies for each grapheme tested, as well as her overall difference score for the grapheme set after each testing session. However, given the precision with which the paradigm measures color choices, it seems unlikely that her performance could have been significantly affected. 3.2. Results and discussion To assess the consistency of MC2’s grapheme-color associations over time, we first examined the within-session consistency scores. Improved consistency was confirmed by good fits to power functions with negative exponents, indicating an overall drop in difference scores over time: Latin: R2 = 0.69, Hebrew: R2 = 0.29, Devanagari: R2 = 0.47; see Fig. 2a. MC2’s consistency improved for Devanagari and Hebrew graphemes. As expected, there was little change in her consistency for Latin letters. The between-session consistency scores indicating whether MC2 selected the same color for each grapheme across sessions were also informative; see Fig. 2b. As expected, Latin consistency remained stable. Consistency improved over time for Devanagari and Hebrew graphemes. However, various graphemes underwent notable shifts in their synesthetic color associations. In Hebrew, the decrease for session 4–5 between-session consistency was driven by the sudden shift in MC2’s synesthetic color percept for 2 of the 10 Hebrew graphemes (‫ ש‬,‫)ג‬. In these cases, MC2 reported seeing elements of two Latin graphemes, which variably biased her synesthetic color percept towards one percept or the other inconsistently. In Devanagari, at various times the graphemes , and underwent significant color shifts. For example, MC2 experienced as both the digit ‘‘3” and the letter ‘‘T,” which led to conflicting synesthetic percepts. Otherwise, MC2 reported that her synesthetic percept shifted from being consistent with a similarly shaped Latin grapheme to the grapheme’s associated phoneme or acquired meaning. For example, the grapheme ‘‘ ” was originally identified as the letter ‘‘O” and elicited a synesthetic color percept consistent with that letter. However, MC2 reported that as she learned the meaning of this grapheme, which is actually the number ‘‘0,” her synesthetic color percept remapped accordingly. This experiment investigated if and how synesthetic percepts to novel graphemes change with increased familiarity over time. First, MC2’s synesthetic percepts to Latin graphemes were unaffected by increased familiarity with other graphemes. Second, studying Hindi in India increased MC2’s familiarity with the Devanagari alphabet and consistency improved with the associated synesthetic percepts both within- and between- session. This confirms that at least for some adult synesthetes, it is possible to develop new grapheme-color associations for novel grapheme sets that continue to stabilize over time, which may be comparable to the stabilization of color associations for a newly learned native alphabet demonstrated in school age children with synesthesia (Simner et al., 2009). We were surprised to see that she showed the same improved consistency with Hebrew letters that were encountered only during testing sessions. Since no phonemic information or additional context was available for the Hebrew characters, shape familiarity or similarity appears sufficient to improve the consistency of synesthetic color percepts, at least in the case of MC2. This result is particularly important, given that MC2 was partially 949 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 aware of the aims of the experiment, and an improvement was expected for the Devanagari, but not necessarily for the Hebrew graphemes. Given that both were observed, this allays fears that MC2’s knowledge of the experimental aims may have biased her responses. 4. Experiment 3: Training of novel graphemes, and grapheme + phoneme pairs If shape familiarity alone stabilizes synesthetic color percepts, phonemic information may not influence how quickly percepts became consistent. However, it was not clear whether phonemic information contributed any benefit or detriment, since colors for the Devanagari and Hebrew grapheme sets appeared to stabilize at the same rate. To test whether grapheme-phoneme associations affected the rate of synesthetic percept consistency, we conducted a laboratory based training experiment. Here, two grapheme-color synesthetes, MC2 and DN and two control participants were exposed to novel graphemes (Armenian) or grapheme-phoneme pairs (Cyrillic) over multiple sessions. The prediction was that if phonemic information affects the consistency of synesthetic percepts there should be a differential rate of improvements in consistency for the grapheme + phoneme pairs. To counter concerns that improved consistency is simply due to associational learning rather than synesthesia, we also included two control participants. If consistency were simply due to training there should be no difference in the consistency between the controls and the synesthetes. 4.1. Methods 4.1.1. Participants A second grapheme-color synesthete, DN, joined MC2. DN reports synesthetic color percepts for letters, digits, days, and months. Her first language is English and she took 5 years of Italian in high school. Her Latin difference score was 0.30. MC2, but not DN, also has sound-color synesthesia. MC2 reports that spoken words, voices, noises such as typing, and timbres of music all produce color experiences for her. Both synesthetes came forward after attending a lecture on synesthesia. Synesthetic participants were female, ages 21 and 26. Two age-, gender-, and major-(psychology) matched control participants, (female undergraduates, ages 22, 23) were also tested. The controls and MC2 performed 8 sessions on different days. Due to scheduling conflicts and availability, DN first participated in 3 sessions and resumed testing after 103 days for a series of 9 sessions conducted within several weeks; see Table 1. 4.1.2. Stimuli There were two novel alphabets: 38 Armenian graphemes, and 33 Cyrillic graphemes. During each session, participants performed three tasks: Cyrillic phoneme-grapheme association test, Armenian and Cyrillic synesthetic color assessments. For Cyrillic, separate within- and between-session difference score were calculated for a Cyrillic subset comprised of 16 graphemes previously judged to be non-Latin in appearance (after Mills et al., 2002). The separate analysis allays concerns that performance on Cyrillic is simply a re-mapping of Latin synesthetic percepts onto identically shaped Cyrillic graphemes. 4.1.3. Armenian and Cyrillic grapheme-color assessments Synesthetic percepts for Armenian and Cyrillic were assessed using the protocol described previously (2.1.2) after replacing Latin graphemes with Armenian graphemes, by themselves, or Cyrillic graphemes + phonemes. Both synesthetes (Initial and Final Difference Scores: MC2 = Armenian (A): 0.81, 0.42, Cyrillic (C): 0.82, 0.31, Cyrillic Subset (CS): 1.03, 0.34, DN = A: 0.92, 0.15, C: 0.31, 0.21, CS: 0.45, 0.18), but neither control (C1 = A: 3.54, 2.01, C: 2.86, 2.78, CS: 3.12, 2.51, C2 = A: 3.31. 3.78, C: 3.63, 3.51, CS: 3.77, 3.48), scored in the synesthetic range of below 1. Table 1 Between session intervals: days between each session for each participant. The total time between the first and last session is also included for each participant. Participant Session MC2 DN C1 C2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 14 7 103 2 4 2 2 3 7 2 1 0 1 7 2 4 1 6 1 0 2 7 2 3 2 5 2 First to last 44 145 22 22 950 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 4.1.4. Phoneme + grapheme association test It was assumed that participants learned to associate Cyrillic graphemes with their respective verbal labels as the two were repeatedly paired during the Cyrillic Grapheme-Color Assessment condition. To confirm that participants were learning phoneme + grapheme pairs, they were tested at the beginning of each session. Trials began with the presentation of a Cyrillic grapheme + phoneme pair. Graphemes were displayed 4 times, on 50% of presentations the phoneme + grapheme pair matched. Participants pressed a button indicating whether they matched or not. 4.2. Results and discussion 4.2.1. Phoneme–grapheme association test The Cyrillic phoneme + grapheme pair test confirmed that all participants demonstrated learning; see Table 2. However, there was a notable difference between the synesthetes’ final performance (M = 98.48%, standard deviation = 0) and the control participants’ final performance levels (M = 78.03%, standard deviation = 6.43). Paired t-tests between synesthetes and controls reach significance when either the first eight (original three sessions and first five of the second period) or last eight values (only sessions from the second period) from DN were included (p’s < .0001). Consequently, the synesthetes acquired the grapheme + phoneme pairs more readily than did the controls. This result is consistent with reports of memory encoding advantages for synesthetes, which may be a result of general learning and memory advantages inherent in the organization of the synesthetic brain, or a result of additional association opportunities due to both color and grapheme shape being available (Gross, Neargarder, Caldwell-Harris, & Cronin-Golomb, 2011; Radvansky, Gibson, & McNerney, 2011). We note that DN showed a substantial improvement in her association scores between sessions 4 and 5. Although speculative, one might argue that while performance on session 4 may have suffered due to the long delay between that test and the previous session, session 4 may have served to refamiliarize or ‘‘jog” DN’s memory, the effects becoming apparent in the session 5. It should also be noted the participants showed different learning patterns. MC2 learned letter name and shape associations quickly, while other participants performed near chance. Consequently, if both grapheme meaning and shape play a role in determining synesthetic color associations, we may expect MC2 to show meaning related color associations sooner, or to a greater degree than DN. 4.2.2. Within-session and between-session consistency Synesthetes performed more consistently within- and between-sessions than controls; see Fig. 3a. For the synesthetes, within-session consistency scores were initially within the synesthetic range (<1) and steadily improved, whereas the controls never achieved the cutoff level. The fitted power functions accounted for the following variance (R2): Synesthetes MC2: Armenian, Cyrillic, Cyrillic subset: R2 = A: 0.56, C: 0.70, CS: 0.65, and DN: R2 = A: 0.83, C: 0.37, CS: 0.44; Controls C1: R2 = A: 0.19, C: 0.07, CS: 0.28, and C2: R2 = A: 0.53, C: 0.02, CS: 0.08. The between-session consistency scores were always lower in synesthetes, indicating greater consistency; see Fig. 3b. Across participants there was no notable difference between Armenian and Cyrillic in within- or between-session consistency even though Cyrillic was accompanied by phonemic information. The correlation between phoneme + grapheme association test accuracy and Cyrillic subset consistency (R2 = 0.37) was actually weaker than the correlation between phoneme + grapheme association test accuracy and Armenian (R2 = 0.43). Here, we asked whether the addition of phonemic information facilitated synesthetic percept consistency. There was no apparent benefit or detriment of phonemic information as associations for both alphabets appeared to increase in consistency at a similar rate for both synesthetes. We also replicated the finding that some synesthetes perceive synesthetic colors for novel graphemes using novel alphabets and we also replicated that these percepts gained consistency over time. These findings were not simply due to associational learning because controls were unable to ever perform as well as synesthetes. Table 2 Cyrillic letter training accuracy: percent correct for each participant for each session in matching Cyrillic graphemes to their corresponding phonemes (chance = 50%). Participant Session MC2 DN C1 C2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 91.67 90.15 93.94 93.18 96.21 95.45 97.73 98.48 51.52 59.85 69.70 65.91 84.09 85.61 93.18 96.97 100 98.48 98.48 98.48 54.55 68.18 69.70 75.00 84.00 82.58 78.03 82.58 65.15 62.12 66.67 65.91 70.45 71.97 68.94 73.48 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 (A) 951 Within-Session Consistency: Experiment 3 5 Controls Cyrillic Controls Armenian Controls Cyrillic Subset DN Cyrillic DN Armenian DN Cyrillic Subset MC2 Cyrillic MC2 Armenian MC2 Cyrillic Subset 4.5 Difference Score 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Session (B) Between-Session Consistency: Experiment 3 1 0.9 Controls Cyrillic Controls Armenian Controls Cyrillic Subset DN Cyrillic DN Armenian DN Cyrillic Subset MC2 Cyrillic MC2 Armenian MC2 Cyrillic Subset Difference Score 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12 Session Fig. 3. (A) Within-session consistency for Experiment 3: MC2’s and DN’s average difference scores for each grapheme set per session. Controls’ data are averaged with error bars representing the standard error of the mean. The dashed line represents the cutoff score used to identify grapheme-color synesthetes. (B) Between-session consistency for Experiment 3: Consistency in average color choices for the same grapheme between subsequent sessions for each grapheme set for MC2, DN, and the Controls’ average. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Yet, this does not appear to be driven by faster learning in synesthetes because the correlation between the phoneme-grapheme association test and within-session consistency was higher for the untrained Armenian, rather than the trained Cyrillic. 5. General discussion Synesthesia is a captivating but poorly understood phenomenon. We undertook this investigation to address several open questions related to what happens when grapheme-color synesthetes encounter and learn novel graphemes. In particular, we tested whether synesthetic percepts were immediately present and the consistency of these percepts to a variety of novel graphemes. We found that for the synesthetes we tested, novel graphemes elicit color percepts at first glance and the consistency of these percepts improves with familiarity. This holds true for graphemes encountered in laboratory or immersion settings. Specifically, synesthetic percepts to Devanagari graphemes associated with phoneme and meaning in an immersion setting, or Cyrillic graphemes + phonemes trained in a laboratory, are not notably more consistent than synesthetic percepts to unaccompanied Hebrew or Armenian graphemes. Given the reports of synesthetes that grapheme name and shape were sometimes in conflict in determining grapheme color, it may be the case that increased information about graphemes increased association consistency, but this is balanced by the decrease in consistency caused by conflicts. However, if true, there should be lower difference scores for the Cyrillic alphabet after such conflicts had been resolved. While this may be 952 C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 the case for MC2 (Cyrillic: 0.31 Cyrillic Subset: 0.34 Armenian: 0.42), this was not the case for DN (Cyrillic: 0.21 Cyrillic Subset: 0.18 Armenian: 0.15). We also found that synesthetes may have an advantage in forming name associations for novel graphemes, suggesting that learning the novel graphemes of a new alphabet may even be facilitated by the presence and stabilization of grapheme-color percepts. Importantly, our findings demonstrate that it is not necessary for a grapheme to be encountered during an early sensitive period during development to establish a grapheme-color association. If this were required, synesthetes would not experience synesthetic color percepts when encountering novel symbols. However, such a sensitive period may play a role in establishing color associations for synesthetes’ first learned alphabets and influence color associations formed later for novel alphabets. In fact, synesthetes and controls have reported that shape associations between previously learned graphemes can be quickly noted for many graphemes used in these experiments. For some graphemes presented in this study, synesthetes may remap colors from previously learned graphemes to novel graphemes with similar shapes. Thus, new color associations may still be reliant on a previous sensitive period. Our results are also consistent with the view that the particular pattern of color associations may be influenced by an early sensitive period of language acquisition (Barnett, Feeney, Gormley, & Newell, 2009; Rich et al., 2005). In other words, if particular shapes, sounds, and/or grapheme meanings (Mroczko et al., 2009) are associated with particular color percepts during an early sensitive period, graphemes encountered later in life may then elicit colors consistent with graphemes with similar shapes and sounds that were encountered during this early sensitive period. Evidence supporting this view comes from several reports that childhood familiarity with commonly available colored refrigerator magnets (Fisher-Price) influences color-grapheme associations in synesthetes (Witthoft & Winawer, 2006, 2013; see also Rich et al., 2005). In contrast, the present studies relied primarily on two synesthetes. MC2 reported that she did not have these refrigerator magnets. DN reviewed the colors of the magnets and noted six matches between the magnet colors and her synesthetic percepts. Other possible mechanisms for the original acquisition of grapheme color pairings were examined by Simner et al. (2005). They considered correlations between factors such as the inherent and presentation order of graphemes, the frequency of grapheme use in the language, the ease of generation of color terms, the lexical frequency of color terms and the order in which color terms enter various languages (Berlin and Kay ordering). Their results showed the greatest correlations between grapheme frequency and color frequency, and between grapheme frequency and Berlin and Kay ordering. While colors acquired in this way for the Latin alphabet may have transferred to the novel graphemes used in this study, given the relatively limited exposure of our participants to these grapheme sets, it seems unlikely that grapheme frequency in the languages associated with these sets had any significant effect on the color associations our participants formed. One limitation of this paper and synesthesia research in general is that it remains unclear how findings generalize across synesthetes in general. We sought to enhance the relevance of these data by testing two rather different synesthetes; MC2 reports synesthetic percepts for phonemes, DN has pure grapheme-color synesthesia. Regardless, there is notable similarity in their within- and between-session consistency. As noted in the introduction, there are other case studies confirming that multilingual synesthetes have synesthetic color percepts across their languages (Mills et al., 2002, 2009; Rich et al., 2005; Witthoft & Winawer, 2006). It was known that synesthetes can directly transfer one synesthetic percept onto a novel replacement grapheme with explicit training (Mroczko et al., 2009). We extended these findings by tracking the improved consistency of synesthetic percepts to a range of novel graphemes as they gained familiarity. This expediency raises the question: How do synesthetic percepts emerge instantaneously? One neural theory that may account for these findings is termed the cascaded cross-tuning model. It proposes that synesthetic percepts may arise due to activity in ventral stream region V4 fed by posterior temporal grapheme areas responding to shape features (e.g. line segments, curvature) before feedback regarding grapheme identity modulates the color percept (Brang, Hubbard, Coulson, Huang, & Ramachandran, 2010). Neuroimaging evidence supports this view. Color responsive regions (V4) are activated when synesthetes view graphemes, and elicit the synesthetic color percepts, but not when they view other symbols that do not elicit synesthetic percepts (Hubbard, Brang, & Ramachandran, 2011; Nunn et al., 2002; Rouw, Scholte, & Colizoli, 2011). Furthermore, in a region of interest study examining predefined color and grapheme regions in the brain, differences were observed in V4, but there were no general differences in response to color observed between synesthetes and nonsynesthetes and differences in response to graphemes were not observed between synesthetes and non-synesthetes outside of V4 (Hubbard et al., 2011). Thus, familiar physical components elicit synesthetic percepts to novel graphemes. It also addresses why novel graphemes with similar shapes to familiar graphemes elicit similar synesthetic colors. Indeed, graphemecolor synesthetes often have similar percepts for similar letters within the Latin alphabet itself (Brang, Rouw, Ramachandran, & Coulson, 2011). Much of our data are consistent with predictions of the cascaded cross-tuning model. For example, our synesthetes noted that shape similarities promoted the transfer of one synesthetic percept to another. This stands to reason, given that no other information was available to participants about the graphemes apart from their shape with the exception of Cyrillic characters, which were presented with their name, and the Devanagari characters as MC2 studied them. However, transfer can also create problems. MC2 indicated that the initial similarity-based percepts required reconciliation with the meaning and use of the grapheme within the context of the Hindi language, and in Cyrillic with the sound of the letter’s name. This prompted notable shifts in the grapheme-color association over time. By way of example, the Cyrillic grapheme ‘‘H” originally elicited the same synesthetic color as the Latin letter ‘‘H.” However, this grapheme is associated with an ‘‘N” sound in Russian. By the end of testing, MC2 reported a synesthetic color that is closer to that of the Latin grapheme ‘‘N.” Furthermore, some graphemes bore little physical similarity to known graphemes. Indeed, this was one reason why we chose Hebrew, Devanagari and C.D. Blair, M.E. Berryhill / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 944–954 953 Armenian graphemes. Thus, there appears to be an influence of other associations on synesthetic percepts. Consistent with this view is the finding that Japanese synesthetes’ percepts for Kanji (logographs) appear to be strongly driven by phonological information and meaning rather than orthographic similarity to Hiragana (syllables) (Asano & Yokosawa, 2012). In Japan, Kanji is taught several years after children learn Hiragana, but also during childhood. Thus, learned phonological information and grapheme meaning appear to trump physical similarity in driving the synesthetic percept. Other studies have shown that grapheme meaning may have a greater effect on perceived photisms than grapheme shape. For example, when ambiguous graphemes are presented to synesthetic participants, (e.g. may be seen as an ‘‘S” or a ‘‘5”), changing the context in which the grapheme is viewed can completely change its perceived synesthetic color (Dixon, Smilek, Duffy, Zanna, & Merikle, 2006). However, it has also been shown that grapheme case and font can affect the saturation of resultant photisms (Witthoft & Winawer, 2006). Furthermore, there have been various situations cited in which the meaning of a word conflicts with its perceived synesthetic color (‘‘Blue” is red) (Gray et al., 2006), suggesting that meaning and usage of graphemes may not always be the only, or even principal determinant of perceived synesthetic color. These results seem to reinforce that grapheme shape, as well as meaning, have an effect on synesthetic percepts, though it is not entirely clear what the relative contribution of each may be, or to what degree one takes precedence over the other. Although the present data addressed our primary research questions, it raised several others. MC2 reports sound-grapheme synesthetic colors, but the addition of phonemes in Experiment 3 did not further enhance the consistency of her synesthetic percepts beyond the presentation of the grapheme alone. As discussed above, multiple competing processes resulting from the presentation of additional phonemic information may be leading to a null final result in our paradigm. However, despite the lack of effect of phonemic information on color consistency, we did find that when there was a conflict between the sound and shape of a grapheme, MC2’s final colors for Cyrillic appear to be divided equally between being consistent with the grapheme’s name, its shape, and something in between. In the case of DN, who does not report sound-color synesthesia, the majority of such graphemes elicited colors consistent with Latin graphemes of similar shape by the end of testing. While our results provide some additional clues, it still remains unclear exactly how different types of synesthetic percepts are modulated by experience or how they interact with each other. Further, the durability of the synesthetic percepts for novel graphemes has not been tested. It seems likely that the percepts remain constant over time, but lack of continued exposure may produce some degree of extinction. In the future, it would also be interesting to compare the grapheme-color percepts for native language speakers versus later learners and their respective patterns of cortical activations. Synesthesia continues to raise intriguing questions relating perception and conscious experience. What is clear is that color associations for novel graphemes can be formed with only shape information. However, shape is clearly not the only determinant of synesthetic color association, as acquisition of meaning and phonemic information can modulate colors originally associated based solely on shape information. These findings also confirm that the laboratory can shed light on the process by which new synesthetic percepts naturally emerge. Acknowledgments We would like to thank MC2 and DN as well as our two control participants for their patience and cooperation throughout these experiments. Research reported in this publication was generously supported by an Institutional Development Award (IDeA) from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences of the National Institutes of Health under Grant Number P20GM103650, Grant NEI R15EY022775 and start-up funding from the University of Nevada to MEB. Appendix A. Supplementary material Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. concog.2013.06.002. 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Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention Luca Bonini a, Pier Francesco Ferrari b, Leonardo Fogassi b,⇑ a b Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia (IIT), Brain Center for Motor and Social Cognition (BCMSC), via Volturno 39, 43125 Parma, Italy Rete Multidisciplinare Tecnologica (RTM) and Dipartimento di Neuroscienze, Università di Parma, via Volturno 39, 43125 Parma, Italy a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online xxxx Keywords: Mirror neurons Monkey Action organization Social cognition a b s t r a c t Philosophical and neuroscientific investigation on intentional actions focused on several different aspects, making difficult to define what should be meant with the concept of intention. Most of our everyday actions are constituted by complex and finely organized motor sequences, planned and executed in order to attain a desired final goal. In this paper, we will identify the final goal of the action as the motor intention of the acting individual. First, we will review the relative contribution of the vast neuroscientific literature on the role of different cortical areas in the organization of goal-directed movement. In particular, we will describe recent data on the cortical organization of natural action sequences, showing that this organization could be at the basis not only of our capacity of acting intentionally, but also of our ability to understand the motor intentions underlying others’ behaviour which is crucial during social interactions. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The concepts of ‘‘intention’’ and ‘‘intentionality’’ of human actions are, since centuries, the focus of philosophical reasoning and dispute, but in the last few decades even neuroscientists and biomedical engineers started focussing their efforts on decoding neuronal intentional signals from the human brain for building brain-machine interfaces (Andersen, Hwang, & Mulliken, 2010; Hochberg et al., 2006). However, in spite of the advances of modern neurophysiological and neuropsychological techniques and their crucial contribution to the clarification of the basic mechanisms underlying intentional actions, there are still some fundamental neuroscientific and theoretical issues that remain unresolved. First, concepts such as ‘‘action’’ and ‘‘intention/motor intention’’ are still elusive and not well defined. Second, the relationships between an overt intentional behaviour and its correspondent covert representations must be clarified. This last issue is critical for any attempt to identify the neural mechanisms underlying our capacity to plan and perform intentional actions, as well as to predictively understand the motor intentions of others. 2. Movements, motor acts, actions and intentions: hierarchical organizations of goals in the motor system According to Libet’s seminal works, an act is regarded as intentional when (1) it arises endogenously, (2) there are no externally imposed restrictions or compulsions that directly or immediately control its initiation, and (3) subjects feel introspectively that they are performing the act on their own initiative, starting or not as they wish (Libet, 1985). In the time domain, ‘‘intentionality is the premotor detail of the desired result of movement (...): the choice of what to do before the doing of it’’ ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: leonardo.fogassi@unipr.it (L. Fogassi). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 Please cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 2 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx (Llinas, 2002). Most philosophical and neurophysiological studies in the literature dealt with the concepts of intention and intentionality in such a way, suggesting that the intention of doing a certain act is something that precedes its actual motor execution, and that it is usually associated with the conscious experience of ‘agency’. Wittgenstein (1953) already envisioned the complexity of this issue by posing the question: ‘‘what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?’’ A plausible answer to this question could be ‘‘some sort of conscious experience to intentionally lift the arm’’, but the philosophical debate has considered the concept of ‘‘intention’’ as by far more complex. One of the most influential of these views (Searle, 1983) maintains that intentions can be considered at two distinct levels: prior intentions (e.g. to replace a burned out light bulb later on) and intention-in-action (i.e. the internal state that guides and monitors the arm lifting movement while reaching the light bulb). Several other theorists followed this dualistic approach, distinguishing between prospective and immediate intentions (Brand, 1984), future- and present-directed intentions (Bratman, 1987), distal and proximal intentions (Mele, 1992), while others proposed even more articulated models (Pacherie, 2008), identifying distal, proximal and motor intentions. What appears to be shared by all these views is some concept of motor goal that – although at different levels of complexity – constitutes the core of what intentions represent, that is, ‘‘goals and means to those goals’’ (Pacherie, 2008). The concept of goal is also central to the neurophysiological literature dealing with the correlates of intentional actions. Let’s consider a simple example. Opening a candy box can constitute the goal of an agent and, therefore, the content of his/ her intention. However, to attain this goal, the agent must organize a reaching-grasping action formed by a sequence of motor acts (see Rizzolatti et al., 1988), each of which is aimed at an immediate motor goal (e.g. reaching, grasping, lifting the handle of the lid). Motor acts are formed by more elementary muscle synergies, often called simple movements, which could serve for the execution of several different acts and actions, regardless of their goal. Thus, what is the agent’s intention in this example? One might say to grasp the lid, to remove the lid or even to eat a candy. This action clearly includes many goals and sub-goals, but it is unclear firstly at which level we should search for the agent’s intention in this motor hierarchy and, secondly, if some unifying concept of intention does exist at all. Usually, by definition, we consider an action as associated with only one goal. Bernstein (1996), for example, defined actions as ‘‘whole sequences of movements that together solve a motor problem (...) and all the movements parts of such a chain are related to each other by meaning of the problem’’. In this definition ‘‘motor problem’’ clearly refers to what we usually identify with the concept of motor goal. Nevertheless, even very simple discrete movements – such as arm reaches, saccades or extension/flexion of a finger – can be considered as goal-directed, provided that they are performed in order to reach a specific state and their execution is under voluntary control. This latter consideration is extremely useful in order to reconcile the many and diverse findings reported by neurophysiological studies on intentional actions, using behavioural paradigms extremely different one from the other in terms of motor complexity. 2.1. When, what and how of intentional actions Many authors employed different behavioural paradigms to investigate intentional actions focussing on motor details that are specified in advance to the actual movement execution. Neurophysiological studies showed, for example, that mesial premotor regions (supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas) and rostral cingulate motor cortex encode ‘when’ a general intention to act rises (Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Hoshi, Sawamura, & Tanji, 2005), particularly prior to selfgenerated actions (see Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010). Others (Andersen & Buneo, 2002; Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 1997) studied neuronal activity during the planning phase of simple reaching and saccadic movements directed to a target and showed that lateral intraparietal neurons specifically encodes ‘what’ the monkey intends to do (a reaching act or a saccade) prior to movement onset. Other authors, although not explicitly focussing on the issue of motor intention, demonstrated that planning-related neuronal activity in different premotor and parietal areas can specify ‘how’ an act has to be done, either in terms of specificity for the direction of the forthcoming reaching (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005) or for the grip selectivity of the planned grasping (Baumann, Fluet, & Scherberger, 2009), as soon as contextual information sufficient to make a decision becomes available (see Andersen & Cui, 2009). Taken together, these studies suggest that an intentional action stems from decisional processes carried out on potential concurrent motor plans simultaneously activated in a network of parietal and frontal areas and specifying the ‘whether’, ‘when’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the action to be performed (see Haggard, 2008). Most of these processes can occur covertly, automatically and without any need of conscious access: when grasping a handful of popcorn while watching a movie, we will not be certainly attending to when starting to move or how shaping the hand for doing it. Nevertheless, we could, if we want, carefully look at a single popcorn, precisely grasping it between our thumb and index finger tips, and specifically attending to when we decide to start the movement, what action to perform or even how to do it (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004): in both cases, i.e. attending or not to the action, our phenomenological experience of acting intentionally appears to us as a sort of unitary perception that is always inherent in our own voluntary behaviour. However, motor intention cannot be considered, as our phenomenological experience would suggest, a unitary phenomenon from a neurophysiological point of view, since different brain areas have been shown to play a role in processing different aspects of intentional actions. The pioneering studies by Penfield and Boldrey (1937) and more recent data by Desmurget et al. (2009) have shown that it is possible to dissociate the processes leading to motor execution of an action from those related to the awareness of the corresponding motor intention. For example, by means of electrical stimulation of the human right inferior parietal cortex, Desmurget and coworkers evoked the patients’ subjective feeling of Please cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 3 intending to move the hand, the arm or the foot without any overt muscle activation, while through the stimulation of the right premotor cortex they produced overt contralateral movements, but the patients firmly denied that they had moved (Desmurget et al., 2009). Furthermore, recent studies on patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia due to lesions in the territory of the right middle cerebral artery (with large involvement of subcortical structures) showed that motor intentions related to movement plans for the paralyzed hand can influence the performance of what the intact hand does (Garbarini et al., 2012). Taken together, these data indicate that conscious representations of motor intention - in terms of what to do and when doing it – can be anatomo-functionally dissociated from the motor representations underlying the actual motor behaviour, and both of them normally interact in the parieto-frontal circuits subserving the organization of intentional action. 2.2. Neural basis of the organization of intentional action sequences The studies reviewed so far dealt with a specific aspect of the concept of motor intention, that is, ‘‘the premotor details of the desired result of movement’’ (Llinas, 2002). However, intention does not terminate with action onset. In fact, ‘‘the desired result of movement’’, that is, the final goal of the action, does not fade out with movement onset, but remains still present in the agent’s phenomenological experience during action unfolding until its completion. A number of behavioural studies on humans’ reaching-grasping actions (Ansuini, Santello, Massaccesi, & Castiello, 2006; Ansuini, Giosa, Turella, Altoe, & Castiello, 2008; Armbruster & Spijkers, 2006; Gentilucci, Negrotti, & Gangitano, 1997; Marteniuk, MacKenzie, Jeannerod, Athenes, & Dugas, 1987; Rosenbaum, Chapman, Weigelt, Weiss, & van der Wel, 2012) indicated that the first motor acts (i.e. arm reaching and hand shaping when grasping an object) of a longer action sequence are influenced by the final action goal and, more specifically, by the forthcoming motor acts following grasping (e.g. lifting, placing). This peculiar organization of intentional actions seems to develop very early in life (Butterworth & Hopkins, 1988; Sparling & Wilhelm, 1993; Takeshita, Myowa-Yamakoshi, & Hirata, 2006). Indeed, kinematics studies (Zoia et al., 2007) carried out on foetuses in the womb by mean of ultrasonography revealed that while at the 14th week of gestation foetuses’ movements are by no means uncoordinated, since the 22th week of gestation they begin to assume the recognizable form of intentional actions, with kinematic patterns depending on the goal of the action (hand movements to-the-mouth or tothe-eyes). This conclusion supports the idea that an action, since very early in ontogeny, is planned and organized as a whole chain of acts well before its actual onset, and the bio-mechanical and temporal structure of motor acts embedded in the action depend on its final goal (for example bringing the hand to the mouth), that is, the motor intention of the acting individual. Recent neurophysiological studies shed new light on the possible neural mechanisms underlying the goal-related chained organization of motor acts into actions. Fogassi and co-workers (Bonini et al., 2010; Fogassi et al., 2005) recorded the activity of inferior parietal (area PFG) and ventral premotor (area F5) grasping neurons in monkeys while they performed simple grasping actions. In the basic experimental conditions the target was a piece of food or a metallic solid of the same size and shape of the food: the monkey was required to grasp the food and eat it (Condition 1) or grasp the object and place it into a container located near the target in order to receive a reward (Condition 2). Since the grasping motor act was the same in both conditions, one should expect that grasping neurons discharged similarly independently from the motor act following grasping. In contrast, most of the recorded neurons discharged stronger during grasping depending on the action (i.e. grasp-to-eat or grasp-to-place) in which the act was embedded. Control experiments were carried out to investigate which factors could determine grasp-to-eat or grasp-to-place neuronal selectivity. First, grasp-to-place neurons did not change their selectivity when the container in which the target had to be placed was located near the mouth rather than near the target: thus, neuronal selectivity was largely independent from target location and, therefore, from the motor sequence following grasping. Second, in a modification of Condition 2, monkeys were trained to grasp and place the same piece of food used for grasp-to-eat trials in order to receive a more palatable food reward. This condition was introduced in order to have the same target in both conditions. Neuronal selectivity remained unchanged even when a piece of food was used as target for placing actions. Third, motivational aspects are known to play a relevant role in driving the selection and execution of goal directed actions (Glimcher, 2003; Schultz, 2004), but the manipulation of the rewarding value of the food obtained by the monkey upon correct task accomplishment did not change the neuronal preference for eating or placing (Bonini et al., 2011). Taken together, these findings indicate that the discharge of PFG and F5 grasping neurons can reflect the goal of the action in which the coded act is embedded. Furthermore, they also support a model in which neurons coding distinct motor acts might be organized in chains in which each neuron is facilitated by the activation of the previous one in the sequence (Chersi, Ferrari, & Fogassi, 2011; Fogassi et al., 2005; Rizzolatti, Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2006). The chain model of action organization has been further assessed in monkeys by directly comparing, using the same grasp-to-eat and grasp-to-place motor task, the relative impact of action goal on the discharge of parietal and premotor grasping neurons (Bonini et al., 2010). Results showed that parietal area PFG has a greater proportion of neurons discharging differently according to the action goal and with a higher degree of action goal selectivity compared to F5. Furthermore, neuronal selectivity for the action goal significantly increases over time during grasping unfolding in PFG. Interestingly, we also found that the later was the peak of a neuron’s activity, the higher was its action goal preference, while this did not occur in F5. Tracers injections in the recorded regions of parietal and premotor areas of the monkeys employed for the neurophysiological experiments demonstrated the existence of a direct anatomical link between these two sectors (Bonini et al., 2010). Please cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 4 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx Therefore, areas PFG and F5 form an anatomo-functional circuit playing a crucial role in the organization of intentional actions. In particular, area PFG appears to have a leading role in linking the motor acts one to the other based on the goal of the action in which they are embedded. Models of neuronal chains underlying complex sequential behaviors have been also proposed, based on direct evidence derived from intracellular recording studies in songbirds. Strikingly, it has been found that the production of strings of syllables during singing reflect the propagation of activity through a chain network localized within a telencephalic premotor area (HVC) with high temporal precision (Long, Jin, & Fee, 2010). The structure of this network appears to be compatible with the hypothesized organization in neuronal chains proposed for primates parieto-premotor networks related to hand-arm movements, suggesting that an evolutionary ancient mechanism could underlie a wide range of functionally distinct sequential behaviours. In all single neuron studies in monkeys reviewed so far neuronal activity was recorded only during the execution of a single type of grip (i.e. precision grip). However, intentional grasping actions often imply not only the organization of the appropriate chain of acts leading to the achievement of the action goal, but also the selection of the appropriate type of grip, depending on the object’s physical properties. For instance, when grasping a fruit, a specific grip type has to be selected depending on the physical properties of the fruit (i.e. its size and shape). However, the agent could grasp the fruit in order to eat it or to place it in a basket, and the chosen action could imply the use of a different type of grip, so that the coding of action goal and of grip type must be strictly linked. A recent study (Bonini, Ugolotti Serventi, Bruni, et al., 2012) demonstrated that both parietal and premotor grasping neurons can integrate information concerning the type of grip and the action goal. In fact there are neurons in both cortical sectors that discharge stronger during a given type of grip (e.g. finger prehension) and at the same time show a modulation of their discharge due to the action goal. Furthermore, with a more detailed analysis of the temporal dynamics of grip and goal selectivity, it appears that grasping neurons activity, particularly in the parietal area PFG, reflects first ‘‘how’’ the object has to be grasped (grip), to guide and monitor the hand shaping phase, then ‘‘why’’ the action is performed (goal), very likely to facilitate the motor acts following grasping. While during simple actions the target is usually visible and directly cues the final goal, during many of the actions we perform in our everyday life the target is concealed, and has to be internally generated or kept in mind to shape action unfolding. For example, to eat a candy, one needs to open the candy box, grasp the candy and eat it: the first part of this action sequence is memory-driven, because the agent has to know that the candy is inside the box, although not visible, and has to use this knowledge for action planning. A neurophysiological study in monkeys (Bonini et al., 2011) investigated PFG and F5 grasping neurons activity with a behavioral paradigm more complex than those previously used, including two sequential grasping acts in the same action: the monkey had to grasp and open a container (1st grasping) in order to grasp the target hidden inside it (2nd grasping) and eating it (in case of a piece of food) or placing it in a container located near the mouth (in case of a metallic solid). Before each trial, the set was prepared by the experimenter behind a transparent screen, which allowed the monkey to see which object was put into the container and, therefore, to select in advance the action to perform. Recordings revealed that a relevant percentage of neurons, almost only in area PFG, reflected the final goal already during the first grasping act of the sequence, when only memory-driven information was available. Crucially, when an opaque screen was used during set preparation to prevent the monkey from seeing the target of the forthcoming action, these neurons lost their early action goal selectivity. Interestingly, the discharge during the first grasping act was still present, but was the same for both actions, suggesting that the monkey brain very likely activated at the same time two motor chains, until contextual information (vision of the target) did not allow to disentangle the type of action to be selected. In fact, during the second grasping act the differential discharge reappeared. These findings indicate that parietal neurons can reflect action goals also at a rather abstract level, depending on the availability of contextual information necessary to define the agent’s motor intention. 3. From action organization to others’ intention understanding 3.1. Mirror neurons and the role of the motor system in understanding others’ motor acts and motor intention Recent models on the selection of object-directed motor acts (see Cisek & Kalaska, 2010), together with the recent data so far reviewed, can provide an integrated account on how natural actions are organized in a world full of objects and of potential action choices. However, the natural environment of humans as well as of other primate species is not only crowded with inanimate objects, but it is also populated by other conspecifics as well as by other animal species. As Gibson wrote, ‘‘animate objects differ from inanimate objects in a variety of ways, but notably in the fact that they move spontaneously (...). Animals are thus by far the most complex objects of perception that the environment presents to an observer’’ (Gibson 1979). Since the beginning of the nineties, the general idea on the neuronal substrates for the representation of others’ actions maintained that sectors of the infero-temporal cortex processed increasingly complex information about others’ face and limb movements (see Puce & Perrett 2003), constituting the cortical mechanism for the recognition of biological motion. The discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of the macaque (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996) challenged this view, suggesting that the dichotomy between sensory, associative and motor brain regions was untenable. Please cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 5 Mirror neurons are a class of cells originally discovered in the ventral premotor area F5 of the macaque that discharge during execution of hand (Gallese et al., 1996) or mouth (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2003) motor acts, as well as during the observation of similar acts done by another agent. Assuming that the output of a neuron provides the same information every time action potentials are generated, then its output during grasping execution encodes unequivocally this act. Thus, also its activation during the observation of the same act done by another agent would correspond to the activation of an internal motor representation of the observed act. The others’ motor behaviour, besides being described pictorially by the activation of visual brain areas, is mirrored by the activation of correspondent motor representations in the observer’s brain. Since an individual masters and controls his own behaviour, as a consequence he/she knows the meaning of the motor representations underlying this behaviour. Thus, the activation of the same representations while observing others’ actions enable the observer to immediately recognize and understand what others are doing. In other words, the motor behaviour of others is ‘‘reflected’’ in the observer’s motor repertoire. Similarly to monkeys, a human mirror system (MS) has been demonstrated by means of electrophysiological (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2004; Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010) and neuroimaging (Buccino et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; see for a meta-analysis Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012) techniques, showing that the crucial nodes of this system are represented by the posterior parietal cortex, premotor cortex and inferior frontal gyrus. In both monkeys (Kohler et al., 2002; Rochat et al., 2010; Umilta et al., 2001) and humans (Buccino et al. 2004; Cattaneo, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Gazzola et al., 2007), a considerable set of data supports the idea that the activation of cortical motor areas during the observation of hand, mouth or foot actions, enables the observer to decode the immediate goal (i.e. grasping, biting, etc.) underlying the observed movements. In particular, two studies on monkey MNs of area F5 can illustrate this concept. In one study (Umilta et al., 2001) it has been shown that MNs discharged both when the monkey fully observed a grasping act and when it saw only the initial part of it, because the hand-target interaction was hidden behind a screen. This suggests that, during action observation, the corresponding motor representations are retrieved, despite the absence of a full visual description of the motor event. In a second study (Kohler et al., 2002), the monkey could both observe a noisy motor act (e.g. breaking a peanut) and listen to its noise. The results showed that a sub-class of MNs, called ‘‘audio-visual MNs’’, discharged not only during execution and observation of the noisy act, but also when the monkey listened to its noise, suggesting that the meaning (goal) of an act can be accessed through different sensory modalities. As in monkey studies, several human data support the concept that understanding other’s observed acts require the retrieval of one’s own motor representations of the corresponding acts. An example of one of these studies is that reported by Gazzola et al. (2007) on two aplasic individuals, born without arms or hands, who participated in an fMRI study in which they were visually presented with goal-related hand motor acts. Interestingly, compared with control subjects, during the observation of hand motor acts they activated the motor representations of the mouth and the foot. These are the effectors that aplasic subjects use to achieve the same motor goals that control subjects typically achieve with the hand. As previously discussed concerning the motor organization of intentional action sequences, humans as well as other primates do not usually perform single hand or mouth acts (i.e. grasping, biting) in isolation, but as part of motor chains in which these acts (i.e. reaching, grasping, biting), besides their immediate goal, are linked together to enable the achievement of a final behavioural goal (i.e. eat a piece of food). Fogassi and coworkers studied parietal (Fogassi et al., 2005) and premotor (Bonini et al., 2010) grasping neurons not only during the execution of simple grasp-to-eat and grasp-to-place actions, but also during the observation of similar actions done by an experimenter. The target of the observed grasping act could be either a piece of food or a metallic solid, and an empty container was present only in the context of grasp-to-place actions, informing the observer about the most likely final goal of the observed agent. Surprisingly, although the recorded neurons were all activated during grasping observation, the intensity of their discharge varied strongly according to the final goal of the observed action (either eating or placing the target). Noteworthy, their visual selectivity for grasp-to-eat or grasp-toplace matched their motor selectivity for the same action. According to the chain model of action organization (Chersi et al., 2011; Fogassi et al., 2005; Rizzolatti et al., 2006), the observation of a motor act in a given context would activate a neuronal chain associated to a specific behavioural goal (i.e. eating or placing), which corresponds to the agent’s motor intention. Thus, the activation of this chained representation of an action has a predictive value and allows the observer to generate an internal representation of the agent’s motor intention. 3.2. Understanding others’ intention: contextual information and movement kinematics If we accept that the activation of a chained set of neurons could underlie both the motor organization of intentional actions and the understanding of the same actions when observed, a fundamental issue concerns how the correct motor chain is selected in the observer’s brain. Overall, what the observer looks and the neurons code are simply motor acts. Converging data from neuroimaging and behavioural studies point to the idea that understanding others’ actions and intentions rely not only on one’s own motor competence, but also on previous experiences with actions in similar contexts. In fact, several elements in the contextual setting in which actions are performed and observed crucially contribute to our possibility to decode what others are doing and why they are doing it. A functional MRI study (Iacoboni et al., 2005) directly assessed the impact of contextual information in the cortical representation of grasping actions. In this experiment, human subjects watched three kind of visual stimuli: a hand grasping a cup without a context, a scene containing objects related to a table set for breakfast, and a hand grasping a cup in two difPlease cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 6 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx ferent contexts. In this latter condition, the context could suggest two different intentions underlying the grasping action: to drink or to clean. Results indicated that actions embedded in contexts yielded a significantly greater signal change, compared with the other conditions, in the posterior part of the right inferior frontal gyrus and ventral premotor cortex, where hand actions are represented. This result suggests that the motor system can not only encode the immediate goal of observed motor acts but, when sufficient contextual information is available, it can also contribute to the understanding of the intentions of others. Note that in this study the same activations have been obtained both when subjects were instructed to explicitly infer the intention of the observed grasping act and when the request was just to observe. This finding supports the idea that understanding intentions rely on the automatic, effortless and not inferential activation of the mirror system. Other studies employed high density electroencephalography (EEG) to explore the time course of cortical activation while human subjects watched similar type of stimuli (Ortigue, Sinigaglia, Rizzolatti, & Grafton, 2010): objects and tools were grasped either in presence or absence of contextual information suggesting potential motor intentions underlying the observed action. Results revealed that, following an early bilateral posterior activation after the visual presentation of the stimulus (a grasping hand in a context), a strong activation occurred in the left posterior temporal and inferior parietal cortices: this activation was associated with a complete disappearance of the activity in the right hemisphere, suggesting that this early lateralized temporo-parietal network mediates the understanding of the immediate goal of object-directed motor acts. Subsequently, the increased activation of the right temporo-parietal and frontal regions with simultaneously co-active left hemispheric sources showed longer duration when actions were presented embedded into contexts that allowed the decoding of the underlying motor intention. These findings suggest that areas of the mirror system in the right hemisphere of the human brain play an important role in understanding the intention of others based on contextual information. Although actions usually occur in contextual situations that provide a number of useful elements to understand the agent’s intention, sometimes these elements could be absent or not sufficient for identifying the agent’s final goal. In particular, several studies demonstrated that it is possible to understand biological motion from impoverished visual stimulation such as that provided by the movement of light-point displays (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Elsner, Falck-Ytter, & Gredeback, 2012; Johansson, 1973). These studies indicate that we can recognize others’ actions based on internal representation of movement kinematics. Is it possible to exploit kinematic information on others’ action also to predict his/her intention? In fact, it might be argued that movement kinematics can be sufficient to decode what the agent is immediately doing (i.e. grasping), but not necessarily why he/she is doing it (i.e. for eating, drinking, cleaning up, etc.) (see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). Recent kinematic studies in humans have shown that different motor intentions translate into different kinematics patterns (Ansuini, Giosa, Turella, Altoe, & Castiello, 2008; Ansuini et al., 2006; Sartori, Straulino, & Castiello, 2011). Interestingly, early kinematics features can be exploited by an observer to decode the intention underlying an observed action sequence (Becchio, Manera, Sartori, Cavallo, & Castiello, 2012; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011; Stapel, Hunnius, & Bekkering ,2012). For example, in the study of Stapel et al. (2012), participants observed movements of an actor in presence or absence of a context, and in presence or absence of an object. They were instructed to indicate how an observed action would continue. The results showed that participants’ predictions were more accurate when the action was contextualized and objectdirected. However, these predictions appeared to depend more on movement cues provided by the observed actor rather than from direct visual information on object and context. Altogether, these studies suggest that both context and kinematics cues can be used for recognising the motor intention of another agent and can be exploited by the observer to anticipate others’ behaviour during social interaction. 3.3. Understanding others’ actions in social contexts Movement kinematics do not vary solely in relation to object features or forthcoming motor acts in an action sequence, but also depending on the more general context in which actions occur. In particular, social contexts are by far the most complex situations humans, and animals in general, have to deal with. Social interactions often consist of at least two interacting individuals who cooperate or compete to attain a certain goal. Studies on the movement kinematics pattern during a cooperative or competitive social interaction (reaching-to-grasp a wooden block) revealed that each of these contexts was associated to a specific kinematics pattern, which was different from that of the same action performed by the subject alone (Georgiou, Becchio, Glover, & Castiello, 2007). In a further study, participants were asked to collaborate or compete with a partner in the same task, but the partner was an actor instructed to show either a cooperative or competitive attitude. In congruent trials, in which both participants had a collaborative or competitive attitude, the kinematics pattern was that expected based on previous findings, and coherent with the task instructions. In incongruent trials, in which the actor displayed an attitude manifestly in contrast with the task instruction provided to the subject, the subject’s kinematics pattern became more similar to that typical of the attitude shown by the actor (Becchio, Sartori, Bulgheroni, & Castiello, 2008). These findings suggest that participants can infer the partner’s incongruent intention and use this information to plan and organize a more appropriate interaction. However, the fact that the actor displays an actually different kinematics pattern during cooperation and competition raises an alternative interpretation of the findings: possibly, a social affordance directly provided by the observed movement might automatically induce a variation in the subject’s kinematics pattern to match that of the partner. The concept of ‘social affordance’, first proposed by Loveland (1991), refers to all those (typically) human activities that occur during social interaction and indicate to other individuals a required or appropriate pattern of behaviour. An example is unfolding the hand showing the palm as if to ask for an object. Becchio, Sartori, Bulgheroni, and Castiello (2008) reported Please cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 7 that when an agent performs an action sequence constituted by reaching and grasping an object and places it on the hand of a conspecific, there are significant variations in the kinematics of the reach-to-grasp action compared to the same sequence aimed at placing the object into a container. Interestingly, when the same hand-begging gesture is performed unexpectedly by an agent in front of a subject committed to perform a simple task consisting in grasping an object and placing it on a platform, the arm trajectory of the grasping action varies significantly, suggesting that this social affordance is powerful enough to override and alter the ongoing motor plan (Sartori, Becchio, Bulgheroni, & Castiello, 2009). Similar findings have been reported by studies focused on feeding behaviours. When an agent reaches and grasps a piece of food to directly put it into the mouth of a human receiver, the final phase of the reaching and the placing acts slow down compared to when the food has to be put into a mouth-like aperture placed on the ‘face’ of a fake human body shape (Ferri, Campione, Dalla Volta, Gianelli, & Gentilucci, 2010). Ferri, Campione, Dalla Volta, Gianelli, and Gentilucci (2011) also showed that the request gesture of mouth opening by a receiver during feeding behaviour was necessary to produce the kinematics variation in the agent’s feeding action, but also sufficient to induce the same variation when the sequence was not finalized to feed but to put the food into a mouth-like aperture. Summing up, the activation of a social affordance is extremely powerful and automatic, suggesting that in our everyday interactions the automatic and fast decoding of social cues influences our intentional behaviour, in order to maximize the efficiency of our responses. 4. Understanding intention through inferential processes According to ‘‘simulation theories’’ (see Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004), we usually rely on fast, automatic mirror mechanisms to understand others’ actions and intentions. However, there could be ambiguous situations in which direct observation of others’ behaviour does not allow to directly disentangle the different goals underlying it. A number of studies have been carried out in order to investigate the neural substrates of humans’ inferential and ‘‘mentalizing’’ abilities (see Csibra & Gergely, 2007; de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Dodell-Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe 2011; Frith & Frith, 2006), suggesting that the temporo parietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the medial prefrontal cortex form a so-called ‘mentalizing network’. The proponents of this view, often claimed that simulation mechanisms cannot explain how we understand others’ mind in many complex social situations. However, they further extend the limits of simulation theories arguing that they are not relevant to the explanation of any socio-cognitive process (Saxe, 2005). More recent proposals stand in favour of the idea that understanding others’ mind in real-life situation can be hardly achieved in an efficient manner relying on purely simulative or purely inferential mechanisms, and suggest that simulation and mentalizing networks are often concurrently activated (Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Thioux, Gazzola, & Keysers, 2008), with a variable degree of prevalence of one or the other depending on the contextual situation. For example, recent fMRI studies showed that, when volunteers were required to judge the intentions behind different observed actions, areas of the MS were activated, regardless of the condition, but there was, in addition, a specific activation of areas that do not belong to the classical mirror circuit, being considered as part of the mentalizing network (de Lange et al., 2008). In another fMRI study (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007) the observation of unusual actions performed in plausible versus implausible contexts was compared. Results showed that the activation of the MS was the same in all conditions, but interpreting unusual actions in implausible contexts required, in addition, the activation of areas of the mentalizing network. Another recent fMRI study (Becchio et al., 2012) showed that both areas of the MS and of the mentalizing network activate more strongly when the kinematics features of the observed movements are typical of social actions. This finding led to the hypothesis that social intentions, through the activation of the MS, might automatically engage regions of the mentalizing network which are required for social reasoning in complex situations. In conclusion, the observation of others’ actions in everyday life always recruits the mirror system, enabling an immediate understanding of the observed acts and of the agent’s intentions when sufficient contextual information is available. Instead, in presence of novel or ambiguous actions/contexts, inferential processes are also needed, requiring the activation of further brain areas (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), strongly indicating that intention understanding is a complex process which cannot be attributed to a single neuronal mechanism. 5. Conclusions The present review proposes a specific neurophysiological account of intention coding that can explain both how we can organize our intentional actions and how we decode the motor intentions underlying other agents’ actions. Usually, the validation of a theoretical model of brain functioning implies the correlation of clinical deficits with focal brain damages or functional alterations of specific neuronal circuits, either in animal models or in human patients. Several studies on clinical populations with lesion in the parieto-premotor regions deemed to host MNs showed deficits in the subjects’ capacity to reproduce and, in some cases, to recognize several types of gestures (Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005; Heilman, Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982; Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, Pes, & Aglioti, 2008; Pazzaglia, Smania, Corato, & Aglioti, 2008; Rothi, Heilman, & Watson, 1985), but whether these patients are also unable to recognize the intentions underlying others’ observed actions remains still unknown. Please cite this article in press as: Bonini, L., et al. Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001 8 L. Bonini et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx A more deeply investigated link is that between deficits of the basic mirror mechanism and some neuropsychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia (Arbib, 2007; Burns, 2006; Enticott et al., 2008; Ferri et al., 2012) and autism (Gallese, Rochat, & Berchio, 2012; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Oberman et al., 2005; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001), although only a few studies specifically dealt with the issue of altered recognition of others’ motor intention. In particular, Boria et al. (2009) showed that autistic children appears to be capable of reporting ‘‘what’’ is the goal of an individual observed act, while they make errors in identifying ‘‘why’’ the act is performed (i.e. which is the underlying motor intention), particularly in the absence of functional information derived from the object’s standard use. In another study (Cattaneo et al., 2007) typically developed (TDC) and autistic children (AC) were required to perform and observe grasp-to-eat and graspto-place actions. In TD in both execution and observation conditions there was an increase of the activity of a muscle (mylohyoid) involved in mouth opening before the hand touched the target, as to prepare the mouth to bite the food. In AC there was a delay of activation of the same muscle during grasping, and no activity was recorded during observation. These results suggest that these intention deficits found in autistic subjects might derive from a basic impairment in the cortical ‘chain’ organization of actions. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 996–1002 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog More than meets the eye: Implicit perception in legally blind individuals Alan S. Brown a,⇑, Michael R. Best a, David B. Mitchell b a b Department of Psychology, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University, Dallas TX 75275, United States WellStar College, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, United States a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 25 April 2013 Available online 2 August 2013 Keywords: Implicit perception Blindsight a b s t r a c t Legally blind participants (uncorrected vision of 20/200+) were able to identify a visual stimulus attribute (clock hand position) in the absence of consciously identifying its presence. Specifically, participants—with their corrective lenses removed—correctly guessed the hour-hand position above chance (8%) on a clockface shown on a computer screen. This occurred both when presented in a 1-clockface display (28%), as well as when shown a display containing 4 clockfaces (21%), in which only 1 face contained a hand. Even more striking, hand identification accuracy in the 4-clockface condition was comparable whether the clockface containing the hand was (21%) or was not (20%) correctly identified. That legally blind individuals are capable of identifying stimulus attributes without conscious awareness provides an additional vehicle for exploring implicit perception. Consistent with previous research, the visualsystem can apparently cope with degraded visual input through information available through a(n unconscious) secondary pathway via the superior colliculi. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Research on perception without awareness has focused for many years on establishing an unambiguous empirical paradigm (Marcel, 1983; Merikle & Reingold, 1990; Mitchell, 2013). The psychophysical concept of defining an ‘‘objective’’ consciousness threshold has been elusive, even with signal detection, linear regression, and relative sensitivity measures (Hannula, Simons, & Cohen, 2005). Furthermore, although self-report is the clearest indication of a lack of conscious awareness, its very subjectivity raises concerns about participants’ confidence and decision criteria. Indeed, subjective awareness estimates vary widely with different measures, e.g., Perceptual Awareness Scale, confidence ratings, and post-decision wagering (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). Kihlstrom and his colleagues (Kihlstrom, 2008; Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & Tataryn, 1992) suggested redefining subliminal vs. supraliminal perception as implicit vs. explicit perception, parallel to implicit vs. explicit memory (Mitchell, 2006; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987). Regarding an event or object ‘‘in the current environment,’’ Kihlstrom (2008) defined implicit perception as ‘‘. . .any change in the person’s experience, thought, or action that is attributable to such an event, in the absence of (or independent of) conscious perception of that event’’ (p. 588). Kihlstrom et al. (1992) reviewed a number of paradigms used to measure implicit perception, including phenomena with normal participants (perceptual defense; hypnotic suggestion), participants with psychopathology (conversion disorders, or hysterical blindness), and patients with the neurological impairment known as ‘‘blindsight.’’ The methodological difficulties ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275, United States. E-mail address: abrown@smu.edu (A.S. Brown). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.07.002 A.S. Brown et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 996–1002 997 in this area of research range from response bias (perceptual defense; hysterical blindness) to subject selection (hypnotic suggestion). In spite of these methodological issues, research interest in implicit perception has been robust in the two decades following Kihlstrom et al.’s (1992) review. The phenomenon of ‘‘blindsight’’ presents a particularly compelling instance of implicit perception. Patients with primary visual cortex (V1) damage who are unable to consciously acknowledge the presence of a stimulus can nevertheless identify stimulus characteristics such as location, color, contrast, and orientation (Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; Sanders, Warrington, Marshall, & Weiskrantz, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1980, 1986). Some even equate ‘‘unconscious visual processing’’ with blindsight in terms of the functional dissociation between awareness and performance (Marzi, Minelli, & Savazzi, 2004). In attempting to mimic blindsight phenomena in visually intact observers, Meeres and Graves (1990) used traditional threshold setting procedures and presented an open circle subliminally (25–55 ms, followed by a pattern mask) at various locations in the visual field. When asked to identify the circle’s location, participants were correct above chance even when they claimed that no stimulus was present. Blindsight in normal observers was also demonstrated by Kolb and Braun (1995) with a binocular rivalry paradigm, but their phenomenon was not replicated (Morgan, Mason, & Solomon, 1997; Robichaud & Stelmach, 2003). More recently, Lau and Passingham (2006) used metacontrast masking to produce ‘‘relative blindsight’’ inhealthy observers, but again, their paradigm was challenged on methodological grounds (Jannati & Di Lollo, 2012). Related to the present investigation, Hannula et al. (2005) indicate that ‘‘observers are often under-confident about their perceptual experiences and report no awareness even when detection of stimuli by forced-choice methods is better than chance’’ (p. 248). This illustrates the critical dissociation between subjects’ reports of their own awareness vs. their forced-choice accuracy. Hannula et al. underscored that both proponents of implicit perception and its skeptics can agree on two key points: (1) ‘‘the evidence for implicit perception cannot rely solely on participants to accurately report their state of awareness,’’ and (2) ‘‘qualitative differences in performance can support claims of implicit perception even if they are not definitive on their own’’ (p. 247). In the present research, we eschew perceptual threshold per se (whether dichotomous or continuous, cf. Overgaard, 2011) and focus instead on stimulus clarity (vs. intensity or duration), which circumvents some difficulties with prior implicit perception research. Our use of participants classified as ‘‘legally blind’’ addresses the first concern above regarding participants’ subjective judgments of their own awareness: without their corrective lenses, their inability to see a stimulus is a genuinely objective condition. In other words, asking our participants to remove their glasses served as a proxy for setting an objective threshold. The second criterion above will emerge if these individuals exhibit qualitative differences in performance with and without their lenses. Thus, we manipulated lens maladjustment rather than stimulus duration to mimic thresholds in legally blind individuals without (subthreshold) and with (suprathreshold) their corrective lenses. We examined their ability to identify the hour hand location on a clockface. A variety of orientation tasks were tested with D.B., the famous blindsight patient (Weiskrantz, 1986, 1987; Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974). Using forced-choice procedures, he was able to discriminate a vertical bar from a horizontal bar, the letters ‘‘X’’ vs. ‘‘O,’’ a horizontal vs. a non-horizontal grating, square vs. diamond, and even ‘‘T’’ vs. ‘‘4.’’ However, we reasoned that these simpler orientation tasks used by Weiskrantz and colleagues would be too easy for our subjects. The clockface has the advantage of a forced-choice paradigm, but with 12 multiple-choice answers instead of a binary decision. Also, all of our subjects were completely familiar with the basic stimulus format. In addition, based on D.B.’s performance, Weiskrantz (1986) argued that orientation ‘‘must be reckoned to be one of the most sensitive’’ residualcapacities (p. 72). In the 1 clockface condition, participants simply provided the hand location. In the 4 clockface condition, participants identified both the hand location as well as the face containing the hand. Following Kihlstrom (2008), we refer to uncorrected and lens-corrected viewing conditions as implicit and explicit perception, respectively. 2. Method 2.1. Participants A total of 23 ‘‘legally blind’’ individuals participated in the present investigation. They were affiliated with either Southern Methodist University or a medical facility in San Antonio, Texas. All of the participants had uncorrected vision of 20/200+ in both eyes and corrected vision (via glasses) of 20/20 in both eyes. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 49 yrs (mean = 35 yrs) and participated on a voluntary basis. Students were given extra course credit as a reward for their participation, and the IRB at both institutions approved the research. 2.2. Design A 2  2 within-subjects factorial design was used, with the variables of vision (implicit, or lens uncorrected vs. explicit, or lens corrected) and clockface (1 vs. 4). On the 1 clockface trials, a single 3-in diameter clock face was presented in black in the center of a white background on a computer screen. The border of the clock was 1/8 in wide. Twelve 1/16-in wide ‘‘spokes’’ projected inward 3/8 in from the outer border, in locations representing the hour positions of an analog clock face. On each trial, one 1/16-in wide hand projected from the center of the clock face outward toward one of the 12 h positions (see Fig. 1). 998 A.S. Brown et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 996–1002 Fig. 1. Sample stimulus for the 1-clockface condition. Fig. 2. Sample stimulus for the 4-clockface condition. For the 4-clockface trials, a clock face identical to the 1-clockface condition appeared in each of four quadrants on the monitor. A hand appeared on only one of the 4 clockfaces,pointing to one of the 12 h positions (see Fig. 2). The visual angle was 10° in the 1-clockface display, and 22° in the 4-clockface display. 2.3. Procedure Each participant was tested individually, accompanied by an experimenter who evaluated their visual acuity and initiated each trial. All responses were made orally and recorded by the experimenter. Prior to the study, the participant’s visual acuity was evaluated using a Snellen derivative vision chart on the computer screen. The test established the distance each participant sat from the computer monitor so that their corrected vision was 20/20, and uncorrected vision was 20/200 or worse: legally blind in each eye according to visual disorders rules in the Federal Register (71 FR 67037, 11/20/2006). Although this applies with glasses on, our subjects had this acuity with their glasses off, so we use this term colloquially for research purposes only. The average distance between the participant’s face and the computer screen was 5 ft. PowerPoint software was used to present test stimuli on the computer screen. Participants had 10 successive trials under each of four experimental conditions (40 trials total): (a) 1 clockface implicit, without corrective lenses; (b) 1 clockface explicit, with corrective lenses; (c) 4 clockface implicit, without corrective lenses; (d) 4 clockface explicit, with corrective lenses. The trials for each condition were blocked together, and the order of blocks was randomly determined for each participant. Prior to each trial, participants focused on a point at the center of the screen, and a ready signal preceded the stimulus display by 1 s. The test stimulus appeared for 1 s, followed by a blank (white) screen. On each trial in both the 1 clockface and 4 clockface conditions, participants first indicated whether they actually saw the clock hand. If seen, they provided the hour position (1–12) that the hand was pointing to. In addition, in the 4 clockface condition they identified which clockface contained the hand. On those trials where the participant was unable to see the hand, they first guessed the hand position (1–12) in both the 1-clockface and 4-clockface conditions. In the 4-clockface conditions, participants next guessed which clockface contained the hand. Participants had templates in front of them for reference (see Fig. 3), which consisted of a single clockface without hands but with hour positions numbered around the outside, and a 4-clockface display with each face identified by letter (A, B, C, D). A.S. Brown et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 996–1002 999 Fig. 3. Templates for identifying clock hand position and clockface location (4-clockface). Three practice trials preceded the 10 test trials in each of the four conditions, to assure that participants (a) understood the instructions, (b) were able to detect the clock hand in the explicit condition, and (c) unable to see the clock hand in the implicit condition. In all four conditions, the hand position was randomly determined on each trial. For the 4-clockface conditions, the clockface containing the hand was also randomly determined on each trial. Participants were told that a hand would appear on all trials. Blank (catch) trials were not used in the 1-clockface condition because we established the functional absence of perceptual ability in the implicit condition via (a) preliminary visual evaluation, (b) practice trials, and (c) instructions to report any implicit trials where the clock hand was detected. However, to minimize methodological uncertainty, the 4-clockface condition served procedurally as catch trials, since 3 of the 4 clockfaces contained no hour hand. 3. Results To keep the implicit condition uncontaminated, we excluded those trials where the participants claimed to have seen the clock hand. This happened with 12 participants, and these excluded trials comprised 4.3% of all trials in the 1-clockface implicit condition, and 3.0% in the 4-clockface implicit condition. An alpha level of .05 was used throughout. 3.1. 1-Clockface condition As expected, correct hand identification accuracy was very high (90.4%) in the explicit condition, which was significantly above chance (1 in 12; 8.3%), z = 15.86. More importantly, performance in the implicit condition (27.5%) was also significantly above chance, z = 4.82. Thus, it appears that participants can process a visual property of a stimulus in the absence of conscious awareness of seeing it. Implicit access to orientational information should also be evident in the pattern of errors. More specifically, errors should tend to cluster around the actual hand position. This is confirmed in Fig. 4, which plots the deviation in hand-position 1000 A.S. Brown et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 996–1002 Fig. 4. Percentage of responses at each guessed hand position, in increments from the correct hand position (0). increments between guessed and actual clock hand location. To illustrate, if the correct hand position is ‘‘4,’’ a guess of ‘‘2’’ would be scored as ‘‘ 2’’ while a guess of ‘‘9’’ would be scored as ‘‘+5.’’ Fig. 4 reveals that the percentage of error responses decreases with increased separation between the guessed and actual positions in both the clockwise (+) and counterclockwise ( ) directions. Collapsing the data to reflect absolute (rather than relative) hand position deviation yielded six hand position error increments. After an arcsine transformation, the data revealed a significant linear decrease in percentage of error responses across deviations 1 through 6 in the implicit condition (12.5%, 7.7%, 6.8%, 4.2%, 2.2% and 5.0%, respectively), F(1, 22) = 38.79, MSe = .04, g2 = .64. Thus, support for the existence of implicit perception in the 1-clockface condition was found both in the above-chance hand position guessing accuracy, as well as the clustering of guesses around the correct hand position. 3.2. 4-Clockface condition In the 4-clockface condition, participants correctly identified the clockface containing the hour hand at a level significantly above chance (25%) in the explicit (90.0%) condition, as expected, z = 10.00. However, guessing accuracy was not evident in the implicit condition, where performance (29.6%) did not deviate from chance, z = 0.51. In contrast, accuracy for hand location was significantly above chance (8.3%) in both the explicit (84.8%), z = 14.70, and implicit (20.5%), z = 3.60, conditions. In addition, the implicit condition hand identification accuracy was above chance both on those trials when face identification was correct (21.2%), z = 3.84, and incorrect (19.8%), z = 3.47, with no significant difference between these two types of trials, F < 1. The distribution of hand position responses for the 4-clockface condition in Fig. 4 again reveals that the errors cluster around the correct hand position. There was a significant linear decrease in errors away from the correct position (deviation positions 1 through 6) for the implicit condition (11.4%, 11.8%, 6.0%, 4.4%, 4.6% and 4.8%, respectively), F(1, 22) = 38.69, MSe = 10.03, g2 = .64. Furthermore, this linear decrease was significant both when target clock face identification was correct (7.2%, 10.6%, 8.9%, 6.5%, 5.8%, and 0.7%, respectively), F(1, 22) = 7.99, MSe = 0.12, g2 = .27, and incorrect (12.2%, 13.0%, 4.7%, 4.0%, 3.7%, and 5.9%, respectively), F(1, 22) = 29.53, MSe = 0.05, g2 = .57. Thus, both the clockface and hand identification accuracy under the 4-clockface implicit conditions again support implicit perception. It is particularly impressive that in the implicit condition, participants can identify hand position above chance whether or not they correctly guessed which clockface contained the hand. 4. Discussion The outcome of this investigation documents implicit perception in humans as defined by the absence of perceptual awareness due to lens maladjustment. That positional information is available without conscious recognition was supported in several ways. First, the clock hand position was identified above chance in both the 1- and 4-clockface conditions when participants reported no conscious perception of the hand (without corrective lenses). Second, the distribution of incorrect hand position guesses in the implicit conditions in both the 1- and 4-clockface conditions clustered around the correct hand position and tapered away in a systematic manner, suggesting that some fragmentary information was available to influence the guesses. Finally, the hand position guess accuracy was above chance in the 4-clockface implicit condition, whether or not A.S. Brown et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 996–1002 1001 the correct clockface was selected. Again, this indicates that information about the hand directionality was available evenwhen the source location on the screen was not accessible to conscious awareness. This finding is crucial, as it demonstrates that the clock-hand positions were truly unavailable for conscious report. With the 1-clockface data alone (without catch trials), our claim would not be as strong. Since location information was at chance, but hand-pointing perception was above chance, we have clearer evidence for implicit perception. In light of the list of preserved residual capacities in blindsight (cf. Weiskrantz, 1998), the reader might wonder why localization was so difficult for our subjects. Our task was considerably more subtle: identifying which clock had an hour hand is harder than simply indicating where a light had flashed (e.g., Pöppel et al., 1973; Sanders et al., 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986; Weiskrantz et al., 1974). In addition, the dependent variables employed in the blindsight studies were more elementary: eye movements and manual reaching. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of implicit (unconscious) perception among individuals with a correctable visual impairment. Participants can be functionally unperceptive, yet respond to a visual stimulus in a manner suggesting that some information is being processed. One alternative explanation for the present outcome is that participants can actually see the stimulus configuration under the implicit condition but are acquiescing to the demands of the experimenter. This argument seems unlikely for several reasons. First, one would expect the accuracy of guesses to be much higher than the range of 21–28% if participants could actually see the hand. Second, one would not expect the obtained error pattern (clustering near the correct position) if participants were faking errors. Rather, one would expect a more even distribution of errors across deviation positions. Perhaps most importantly, the probability of identifying the correct hand in the 4-clockface implicit condition was the same whether participants identified the correct face or not. Incidentally, it should also be noted that this task was moderately challenging under the best perceptual conditions, given that participants made errors on 10% of the explicit lens-corrected trials. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the possibility that some of our subjects might have been able to make out the broad contours of the clockface. Ultimately, there is no sure way to rule this out. However—as we mentioned previously—we excluded those trials where subjects reported seeing the hand, and performance in the 4-clockface condition adds additional credence to our subjects’ difficulty in consciously perceiving the stimuli. Although no one reported this, it is not inconceivable that our subjects may have been able to read the clockface from after-images. Weiskrantz, Cowey, and Hodinott-Hill (2002) reported this phenomenon in D.B., and labeled it ‘‘prime-sight.’’ However, this seems unlikely in our subjects, as their after-images (presumably) would also suffer from poor acuity. Although arguably not conclusive, our results have implications for the neurological and methodological debate surrounding blindsight findings (Blythe, Kennard, & Ruddock, 1987; Gazzaniga, Fendrich, & Wessinger, 1994; Overgaard, 2011; Sanders et al., 1974; Weiskrantz, 2009; Weiskrantz et al., 1974). Within the human visual system, the primary visual pathway projects from the retina to the striate visual cortex, while a secondary projection runs from the retina to the superior colliculus and finally to the extrastriate visual cortex. It has been assumed that the primary pathway handles most visual processing in humans. However, since all blindsight patients have damage to their primary striate visual cortex, Weiskrantz (1986, 1998) proposed that blindsight is mediated by a secondary visual pathway which conveysimplicit or unconscious visual information. All participants tested in the present study presumably had intact primary visual pathways, so damage to the primary pathway is not necessary to demonstrate implicit perception analogous to blindsight. In addition, recent brain imaging data (fMRI) are consistent with the theory of neocortical involvement in awareness vs. subcortical (superior colliculus) involvement for an unaware mode in normal observers (Fang & He, 2005; Hesselmann, Hebart, & Malach, 2011; Tavassoli & Ringach, 2010). In conclusion, we have demonstrated implicit perception through impaired stimulus clarity (lens maladjustment) rather than stimulus duration to sub-threshold levels. Without corrective lenses, participants could identify the correct hand position (1- and 4-clockface conditions) above chance levels, and hand identification accuracy was above chance whether or not the face containing the clock hand was correctly located (4-clockface condition). Guessing errors clustered around the correct position, and decreased linearly away from this as the discrepancy between actual and guessed position increased. The outcome suggests that defining sub-threshold processing through lens limitations rather than exposure duration can be a viable approach to investigate implicit perception. Perhaps individuals with focusing disorders develop ways of extracting information from low frequency visual displays, and this may lead them to evolve responses to their environment that are notaccessible to their conscious awareness. Individuals with low vision often develop alternative perceptual skills known as ‘‘sensory compensation,’’ and although this mainly comes from other modalities (e.g., auditory, tactile), there is some evidence that compensation may occur within the visual system (Cattaneo & Vecchi, 2011). Our findings imply that such dimensions of unconscious awareness may involve orientation, if not location. Acknowledgments We thank J.F. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Short Communication Theory of Mind experience sampling in typical adults Lauren Bryant a,⇑, Anna Coffey a,1, Daniel J. Povinelli b, John R. Pruett Jr. c a b c Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA Department of Biology, University of Louisiana, 104 University Circle, Lafayette, LA 70504, USA Department of Psychiatry, Washington University in St. Louis, School of Medicine, 660 S. Euclid Ave., St. Louis, MO 63110, USA a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 2 July 2012 Available online 15 May 2013 Keywords: Theory of Mind Experience sampling Social cognition Folk psychology a b s t r a c t We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind (ToM) attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period. Additionally, participants noted the direction of their thought (self versus other) and degree of socializing (with people versus alone) at the time of inquiry. We were interested in the relative frequency of ToM (mental state attributions) and how prominent they were in immediate social exchanges. Analyses of multiple choice answers suggest that typical adults: (1) spend more time thinking about actions than mental states and miscellaneous things, (2) exhibit a higher degree of own- versus other-directed thought when alone, and (3) make mental state attributions more frequently when not interacting (offline) than while interacting with others (online). A significant 3-way interaction between thought type, direction of thought, and socializing emerged because action but not mental state thoughts about others occurred more frequently when participants were interacting with people versus when alone; whereas there was an increase in the frequency of both action and mental state attributions about the self when participants were alone as opposed to socializing. A secondary analysis of coded free text responses supports findings 1–3. The results of this study help to create a more naturalistic picture of ToM use in everyday life and the method shows promise for future study of typical and atypical thought processes. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Individuals capable of reasoning and making attributions about their own or another’s beliefs, desires, or intentions are said to possess a Theory of Mind (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The development of this higher-order cognitive ability and its relationship to other areas of cognition has been the topic of much research. A great deal of the ToM literature has been devoted to its function and development, particularly focused on the age at which ToM abilities arise. The capacity to represent false beliefs—mental states containing content contrary to reality—has been widely considered a marker of ToM abilities in children (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Proponents reason that to arrive at correct ⇑ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 314 747 6777. E-mail addresses: lauren.k.bryant@vanderbilt.edu (L. Bryant), meridian.coffey@gmail.com (A. Coffey), djp3463@louisiana.edu (D.J. Povinelli), pruettj@psychiatry.wustl.edu (J.R. Pruett Jr.). 1 A. Coffey was enrolled at St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN, USA at the time of research. 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.005 698 L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 predictions or explanations of other people’s behavior, it is necessary to understand that mental states are sometimes independent of reality and may misrepresent the state of the world. Wimmer and Perner’s classic Sally-Anne task and others like it have demonstrated that the ability to understand false beliefs and thus the possession of ToM consolidates around the age of 5 years. However, experiments examining visual perspective taking and those utilizing anticipatory looking paradigms to test false beliefs suggest the possibility of ToM understanding in children as young as 15 months (Baillargeon, Scott, & Zijing, 2010; Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002). ToM has been understood as a key component of humans’ intricate social lives, contributing to the ability to understand irony, tell and detect lies, and participate in positive social interactions (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993). It is thought that such a skill is crucial for social adequacy and overall normal cognitive development. For this reason, deficits in ToM have been linked to social dysfunction seen in disorders such as schizophrenia and autism. Many individuals with schizophrenia display deficiencies in areas such as emotional perception and attribution that may be reflective of a ToM deficit. They also perform more poorly than non-affected subjects when trying to ‘‘read between the lines’’ (i.e., identifying what a given individual is thinking or feeling) (Penn, Sanna, & Roberts, 2008; Pickup & Frith, 2001). Children with autism often fail to develop proper social relationships and appropriately interpret social cues. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) hypothesized a link between the social deficits of individuals with autism and a deficit in ToM. Using the Sally-Anne task, BaronCohen et al. compared performance of subjects with autism to that of controls and children with Down’s syndrome. Results revealed that even when the mental age of children with autism was higher than that of the controls, they failed to attribute beliefs to others. This has been replicated using variations of the Sally-Anne task (see Grant, Grayson, & Boucher, 2001 for review), including a non-verbal adaptation (Colle, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2007). While this is a well-replicated finding, ToM impairment likely does not cause autism, and some high-functioning individuals with autism pass ToM tasks (Boucher, 2012). Nonetheless, understanding why many with autism fail ToM tasks may reveal something fundamental about this disorder. In recent years, a number of researchers have stressed the importance of naturalistic – as opposed to laboratory-based – studies of social cognition. Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, and Garcia (1990) explored the overt behavior and covert thoughts and feelings of pairs of subjects during a period of unstructured interaction to examine ‘‘empathic accuracy’’. More recently, Malle and Pearce (2001) asked participants to report on their thoughts and speculate about those of their partner during a dyadic interaction. Importantly, both methods required subjects to make perceptual judgments based upon their memory of previous interactions and not within the moment. Frith, Happe, and Siddons (1994) explored the ecological validity of ToM tasks with respect to parent-teacher reports of the everyday social interactions of individuals with autism. However, most ToM research to date involves studies in highly controlled laboratory settings. In the lab, tasks are explicitly designed to elicit ToM attributions. Tailoring tasks towards a mentalizing state of mind may lead to a greater number of mental state attributions. A lack of naturalistic social distractions may also allow more time to make ToM attributions given research which demonstrates that ToM is cognitively taxing (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008; Malle & Pearce, 2001). In addition, experimental settings that do not mirror life’s complexities could lead to an inaccurate record of the type and target of thought attributions. Support for this notion comes from research conducted by Malle and Pearce (2001) hypothesizing that attentional bias motivated by the complex nature of social interactions leads a person to focus on and recall their own inner states over their actions and another’s actions over that person’s inner states. The goal of the present study was to explore the extent to which typical adults make ToM (mental state) attributions and under what conditions in everyday life. One approach to doing so involves experience sampling variants such as those used to study the default mode network and the role of mind wandering (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Schooler et al., 2011). Therefore, to examine ToM attributions in a more ecologically valid manner, we adopted the experience sampling method to randomly query subjects about their thoughts throughout the day (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). Similar to the Electronically Activiated Recorder (EAR) (Mehl & Robbins, 2012), this methodology allowed us to gather information from a day in the life of the participants as they choose to live it, filled with the intricacies of the human experience that are difficult to replicate in laboratory settings. As a starting point, we hypothesized that ToM attributions might occur relatively infrequently outside the lab, and that ToM might not prominently figure into immediate social exchanges under most circumstances. This hypothesis is based largely on a conceptual consideration of the socio-cognitive abilities of humans and nonhuman primates. Non-human primates are capable of producing a variety of behaviors during social interactions that mimic those of humans, including deception, reconciliation, and gaze following (see Marrus et al., 2011; Povinelli, 2000; Watts, 2002). However, Povinelli and Giambrone (2001) argue that chimpanzees may not reason about the mental and perceptual states that appear to be fundamental for ToM attributions. If social interactions amongst chimpanzees occur despite lack of the higher-order representational ability Povinelli and colleagues claim is necessary for ToM (see Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008; Penn & Povinelli, 2007), it is plausible that humans may also rely primarily on underlying cognitive and perceptual abilities to interpret and react to behaviors and only secondarily on ToM, lending to infrequent ToM attributions. Furthermore, given that everyday social interactions in humans draw on a multitude of cognitive resources, and such resources are more readily available in the absence of social ‘‘distractions’’, we predicted that when ToM attributions do occur, they will happen more frequently outside of social interactions. L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 699 2. Method 2.1. Participants We recruited subjects and performed the experiment according to an IRB approved human-studies protocol. Participants included 30 adults (15 male, 15 female; mean age = 22.1, SD = 1.8) with no reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders and no family history of an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) or Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Participants were recruited through word of mouth (snowball sampling), resulting in a sample comprised mostly of undergraduate and graduate students at Washington University in St. Louis. Assessments included the matrix reasoning and vocabulary subsets of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), full scale derived mean = 127, SD = 6. We also quantitatively assessed the burden of autistic traits in our subjects by using the Social Responsiveness Scale, (SRS: Constantino; Western Psychology Services), mean = 23, SD = 3. All subjects scored below 65, two standard deviations below the mean SRS score for Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) in a population sample (Constantino et al., 2004). Ethnicity was not an important subject variable, however, participants self-identified as White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic. Participants were compensated hourly, based on length of participation. 2.2. Design We were interested in measuring the frequency and type of thought attribution, especially with respect to social context. We adapted the Experience-Sampling Method to test our hypothesis. The Experience-Sampling Method is often used in personality and behavioral psychology and relies on self-reports to measure the frequency and the patterning of mental processes in everyday situations (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). Barrett and Barrett (2001) computerized this method, enabling us to query participants using a handheld electronic device called a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) (see http:// www.experience-sampling.org/ for software details). We used a PDA made by Palm, Inc. (model VIIx). Participants’ responses were stored on the PDA, and after the sampling period, transferred to a computer for analysis. 2.3. Procedure Participants carried a PDA loaded with a questionnaire for a continuous 10-h period. At approximately 30 pseudo-random time points, they were prompted to answer a brief questionnaire without assistance. The randomized times were based on an algorithm written for the ESP software. Participants may have been alerted to answer a questionnaire within minutes after completing the previous one, but no more than an hour passed in between each query. Participants were instructed to categorize the thought immediately preceding the beep as Action, Mental State (MS) or Neither (Miscellaneous). Before the PDA was assigned, participants were instructed on how to categorize their thoughts according to strict definitions and examples (see Appendix for Instructions and General Information). Action thought content was defined as ‘‘what you or another is doing, has done or will do’’, a mental state was defined as a thought that ‘‘exists in your own or someone else’s head’’, and the content of miscellaneous thought was neither mentalistic nor an action. If categorized as an action or mental state, participants also noted the direction of that thought (own versus other). Participants were also asked about the degree to which they were socializing (alone or interacting with others). Lastly, participants responded in free text form to two questions, ‘‘What are you doing?’’ and ‘‘What are you thinking about?’’ in order to give context for their self-categorized thoughts. We verbally instructed subjects that all queries applied to thought they reported having immediately prior to the beep in order to minimize confusion. Participants were allotted 10 min to respond to the questionnaire for safety reasons (i.e., if they were driving) and were not penalized for missing queries. Yet on average, participants took 11.94 (SEM = 5.94) seconds to respond to each survey. This allows us to be relatively confident that participants were responding in most cases promptly after the beep. The PDA automatically turned off at the end of each questionnaire. 3. Analyses 3.1. Primary analyses We explored relationships between the frequencies of thought type (Action, MS, and Miscellaneous), direction (own versus other) and degree of socializing (alone versus interacting with others) and subject variables with SPSS 18.0 (SPSS, Inc.). Tests included an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), paired sample t-tests, and bivariate correlations between thought type frequencies and IQ and SRS scores. Primary analyses were performed solely on the quantitative (button press) results, excluding responses to the free text response questions ‘‘What are you doing?’’ and ‘‘What are you thinking about?’’. 3.2. Secondary analyses To examine validity of participants’ button press responses and their interpretation of their thoughts based on the instructions provided, we recalculated the frequencies of thought type, direction, and degree of socializing according to 700 L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 Fig. 1. Mean frequency of thought type. This figure illustrates the mean frequency of Action, Mental State and Miscellaneous thought type. Data from subjects’ button press responses are shown (original) compared to the recoded data. participants’ qualitative responses. Categorization was based on the independent coding of two raters following the instructions of a strict coding scheme (see Section 3.2.1). Coding disagreements were completely resolved, and raters’ responses were then compared to the subjects’ button press responses. One subject was excluded due to insufficient qualitative data necessary for coding. 3.2.1. Coding scheme A coding scheme was modeled after various experiments that examined children’s utterances of mental terms (see Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman, & Sibler, 1983; Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Two coders (authors LB and AC) were trained on this scheme. They practiced analyzing literature rich in dialogue and containing mental state references, such as a psychiatry training book and online romance novels (Miller & Rollnick, 2002; Reeves, 2008). Training continued until an acceptable inter-rater reliability was reached, percent agreement (M = 75.23, SEM = 1.08, kappa = 0.63). Blind of participants’ original button press responses, raters then categorized participants’ thoughts using the qualitative responses based upon these strict coding instructions (see Appendix for coding instructions). 4. Results 4.1. Subjects button press responses We analyzed the frequencies of Action (M = 47.40, SEM = 3.53), MS (M = 31.76, SEM = 2.69), and Miscellaneous (M = 20.63, SEM = 3.07) thoughts as seen in Fig. 1. Frequency counts were established based upon the number of events per category over total number of events during the 10 h sampling period. Paired sample t-tests demonstrated a significant difference in the frequency of Action versus MS thoughts, t(29) = 2.85, p = .008, Action versus Miscellaneous thoughts, t(29) = 4.43, p < .001, and MS versus Miscellaneous thoughts, t(29) = 2.44, p = .021 (uncorrected p values are reported). Collapsing across thought type, we performed a 2-way repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA) between direction of thought (own or other) and degree of socializing (alone or interacting), and found a significant interaction effect between direction of thought and socializing, F(1, 29) = 52.64, p < .001, where the difference in frequency of own-directed thought when alone (M = 41.94, SEM = 3.00) compared to thoughts about others when alone (M = 9.04, SEM = 1.57) was much greater than the difference in frequency of own-directed thought when interacting (M = 16.97, SEM = 1.77) compared to thoughts about others (M = 11.41, SEM = 1.65) when interacting, as seen in Fig. 2. There was also a significant main effect of direction, F(1, 29) = 76.69, p < .001, with a higher frequency of own-directed thoughts (M = 73.76, SEM = 2.49) compared to other-directed thoughts (M = 26.25, SEM = 2.50), and a significant main effect of socializing, F(1, 29) = 19.42, p < .001, with a higher frequency of overall thought attribution (MS, Action, and Miscellaneous) (M = 64.29, SEM = 3.03) occurring when subjects were not interacting with others than when socializing (M = 35.80, SEM = 3.01). The frequency of MS thought attributions was isolated and examined with respect to degree of socializing (alone or interacting with others). A paired sample t-test revealed a significant difference between the proportion of MS attributions when participants were interacting with others (M = 10.39, SEM = 1.53) versus when they were alone (M = 20.96, SEM = 2.07), t(29) = 4.30, p < .001. We also performed a repeated measures ANOVA across the 3 categories of thought type, socializing, and direction. Results produced a significant 3-way interaction, F(1, 29) = 4.25, p = .048. There was a numerically higher frequency of action thoughts about others while interacting with others (M = 7.34, SEM = 1.17) than when alone (M = 4.85, SEM = 1.09), whereas there was no increase in frequency of MS attributions about others while interacting (M = 4.06, SEM = 0.96) than when alone L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 701 Fig. 2. Direction  Socializing. This graph illustrates the mean frequency of own-directed and other-directed thoughts with respect to socializing (Int. = Interacting), collapsed across Action and Mental State thoughts. Data from subjects’ button press responses are shown (original) compared to the recoded data. Error bars corrected for repeated-measures design. Fig. 3. This graph illustrates the mean frequency of Action (ACT) and Mental State (MS) thought types with respect to direction (own and other) and socializing (Interacting (INT) and alone). Data from subject’s button press responses are shown (original) compared to the recoded data. Error bars corrected for repeated-measures design. (M = 4.19, SEM = 1.1.4). Concurrently, there was a similar increase in frequency of both Action (M = 25.17, SEM = 2.75) and MS (M = 16.77, SEM = 1.70) thought attributions about one’s self when alone, than when interacting with others (Action, M = 10.14, SEM = 1.40 and MS, M = 6.83, SEM = 1.09). There was also significant 2-way interaction effect of direction by socializing, F(1, 29) = 52.63, p < .001; and significant main effects of thought type, F(1, 29) = 8.21, p = .008, direction, F(1, 29) = 76.69, p < .001, and socializing, F(1, 29) = 19.42, p < .001, as seen in Fig. 3. We found no significant correlation between frequencies of MS, Action, and Miscellaneous thought and IQ assessments (vocabulary scaled scores and matrix reasoning scaled scores) and SRS scores. However, there was one subject that was 2.55 standard deviations above the mean SRS score of 22.67. This subject’s score was not greater than 2 standard deviations below the PDD-NOS mean from a population sample; it would not have triggered an autism work-up, per protocol, in our other research studies (e.g., Pruett, LaMacchia, Hoertel, Squire, McVey et al., 2011); and it was not more than 1.5 interquartile ranges above the third quartile. However, the subject reported the highest frequency of Action thoughts, M = 93.1, SD = 2.36, leading us to consider the data without the subject. Previous statistical tests of thought type, direction, and degree of socializing remained significant at p < .05, however the 3-way interaction (Thought Type  Direction  Socializing) dropped to trend level, F(1, 28) = 3.09, p = .09. 4.2. Recoding To validate our results further, we coded and re-categorized the subjects’ responses based upon their free text responses to the questions ‘‘What are you doing?’’ and ‘‘What are you thinking?’’ One subject was excluded from subsequent 702 L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 analyses due to insufficiently descriptive responses. We analyzed the frequencies of Action (M = 38.78, SEM = 2.06), MS (M = 29.17, SEM = 2.78), and Miscellaneous (M = 33.32, SEM = 2.15). A paired sample t-test demonstrated a significant difference in the frequency of Action versus MS thoughts, t(28) = 2.24, p = .034. Differences in Action versus Miscellaneous thoughts, t(28) = 1.79, p = .084, and MS versus Miscellaneous thoughts, t(28) = 0.91, p = .371 were insignificant, depicted in Fig. 1. A 2-way repeated measures ANOVA between direction of thought and degree of socializing revealed a significant interaction effect between direction of thought and socializing, F(1, 28) = 39.07, p < .001, where the difference in frequency of own-directed thought when alone (M = 35.65, SEM = 1.71) compared to thoughts about others whenalone (M = 10.15, SEM = 1.90) is much greater than the difference in frequency of own-directed thought when interacting (M = 13.78, SEM = 1.63) compared to thoughts about others (M = 8.95, SEM = 1.41) when interacting, as seen in Fig. 2. There was also a significant main effect of direction, F(1, 28) = 75.60, p < .001, with a higher frequency of own-directed thoughts (M = 73.54, SEM = 2.63) compared to other-directed thoughts (M = 26.52, SEM = 2.62), and a significant main effect of socializing, F(1, 28) = 34.54, p < .001, with a higher frequency of overall thought attribution (MS, Action, and Miscellaneous) (M = 63.66, SEM = 3.11) occurring when subjects were not interacting with others, than when socializing (M = 36.55, SEM = 3.09). A paired sample t-test revealed a significant difference between the proportion of MS attributions when participants were alone (M = 19.42, SEM = 1.65) versus when they were interacting with others (M = 9.76, SEM = 1.71), t(28) = 4.76, p < .001. A repeated measures ANOVA across the 3 categories of thought type, socializing, and direction produced a significant 2way interaction effect of direction by socializing, F(1, 28) = 49.78, p < .001, and significant main effects of thought type, F(1, 28) = 4.84, p < .038, direction, F(1, 28) = 93.78, p < .036, and socializing, F(1, 28) = 33.62, p < .001, as seen in Fig. 3. The 3-way interaction was insignificant, F(1, 28) = 0.42, p = .520. 5. Discussion 5.1. Summary of findings Subjects’ button press responses reflected a higher frequency of thoughts about actions than mental states and miscellaneous things. This relationship was validated upon recoding their free text responses. Action thoughts were the most frequent, which is what we predicted given how much of our thought is devoted to planning behavioral responses. After isolating MS attributions with respect to direction and degree of socializing, the results revealed that MS attributions occurred more offline (i.e. when alone) than online, and that these thoughts were most frequently oriented towards the self. Further, a significant 3-way interaction between thought type, degree of socializing, and direction of thought arose, signifying that action but not mental state thoughts about others occurred more frequently when participants were interacting with people versus when they were alone, while self-directed action and mental state attributions were both less frequent when participants were interacting with people, than when in isolation. Although this 3-way relationship was not statistically significant in our secondary recoding, the remaining effects are encouraging for future studies involving the use of ToM during social exchanges. 5.2. Closer examination of ToM attributions An examination of MS responses revealed interesting details about the circumstances and orientation of such attributions. The higher frequency of own-directed thoughts as compared to other-directed thoughts (across both action and MS thought types) may not be too surprising given humans’ demonstrated disposition towards egocentricity (Greenwald, 1980; Krueger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 2008). Even more intriguing is the frequency of own-directed MS thoughts (M = 75.19, SEM = 4.03), compared to other-directed MS thoughts (M = 24.81, SEM = 4.03). Examining these statistics with respect to social context, there were more MS thoughts reported outside of social interactions, and a majority of those thoughts were self-directed. These results allude to the reflective nature of ToM and seem to echo prior research conducted by Andersen and colleagues that suggest that, in constructing self-knowledge, people give greater weight to their internal subjective experiences than to overt behavioral expressions (Andersen & Ross, 1984). Although it may be premature to draw conclusions about the frequency of MS attributions with respect to current views on ToM, our implementation of the experience sampling method has produced novel results which may represent caveats to Theory of Mind. Nevertheless, such results invite further examination of how ToM is used within a naturalistic setting before making any resounding claims on its utility. 5.3. Limitations The experience sampling method has high ecological validity, yet methodological weaknesses do exist. It is impracticable to query participants on their thoughts without bringing them to conscious awareness of those thoughts. It is possible that the method of randomly alerting participants may have prompted an increase in MS attributions simply because we were asking them to critically analyze thoughts that, under normal circumstances, may not contain much mentalistic substance. There were also a few rare instances in which participants responded that they were thinking about why they or someone L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 703 else was doing something, thinking, or appeared some way. This raises the question as to whether participants are able to distinguish between the things they had questions about (often behaviors or observations) and the potential answers to those questions (typically mental states). In review of participants’ free-text responses about what they were thinking about, statements revolving around ‘‘why’’ were flagged. For sake of parsimony, these infrequent (16 events in total across all subjects) types of thoughts were not included in the analyses for sake of parsimony and did not have a significant impact on the results. Interestingly, in a review by Higgins and Pittman (2008) regarding people’s concerns with comprehending, managing, and sharing the inner states of self and others, it is stated that people try to make sense of another person’s actions by analyzing the feelings or attitudes that provide reasons for or caused his or her actions. However, one is not similarly motivated to consider one’s own inner states produced the action because people tend to comprehend their own action from a situational standpoint and believe their action was the natural, objective response to seeing the world. This might explain why the majority of the ‘‘why’’ thoughts we flagged consisted of others’ thoughts and behaviors, rather than the participant’s own thoughts and behaviors. Future studies will investigate the relationship between this type of metacognition and ToM. Additionally, there were some participants who reported thinking about ‘‘nothing.’’ Further considering the procedure, we instructed participants to refer to the thought immediately preceding the auditory signal at the start of each questionnaire. Some participants reported that the beep interrupted their current thought, and this interruption might have led to confusion and possible miscategorization. Future studies may utilize Mehl’s EAR system, which provides audio recordings of selected interactions. This might allow more accurate recall about such things as thought contents (Mehl & Robbins, 2012). The type of participants recruited may have also introduced an influential subject variable, as most of the participants were undergraduate and graduate students. Immersion in an analytical environment where many students are striving towards degrees in areas that involve reasoning about mental states (i.e. psychology, marketing) could have led to an overestimation of MS attributions. Nevertheless, comparisons of subjects’ button press and recoded responses show subjects’ introspection was relatively accurate when determining mental state thoughts. Of the thoughts the raters categorized as mental states, subjects’ button press responses coincided 71% of the time. Many of the discrepancies between subjects’ button press responses and the coders’ categorizations can be partially attributed to misinterpretation of the instructions if subjects were not focusing on the object of their thought. Specifically concerning action and miscellaneous thought types, a participant might respond that she was thinking, ‘‘What am I going to eat for dinner’’ and categorize the thought as an action, referring to eating, when the object of the thought is actually the type of food she will eat. Because the object of her thought is neither mental or an action, it would be re-categorized as miscellaneous. Although there is no way to know exactly what her thought was referring to, coders were explicitly instructed to focus on the object of the subject’s thought. In the future, we will take measures to ensure that this concept is clear to the subjects as well. Ideally, a future study would also make use of coders who are not only blind to the subjects’ original button press responses but also naïve to both the theory and the hypotheses in order to achieve the most impartial analysis and interpretation. 5.4. Future directions Our hypothesis was that ToM attributions would occur relatively infrequently outside the lab. A challenge with the current study involves exactly how to determine a baseline for the frequency measure. In this study, we used the frequency of action thoughts as an anchor for comparison. However, future studies might use frequencies recorded within a laboratory setting where social context or thought type is controlled and compare it to that of an experience sampling or similarly ecologically valid method. Such studies may help to reveal previously unknown facets of ToM. The Experience Sampling method has the potential to become a viable avenue of research in understanding the social deficits seen in psychiatric disorders such as autism and schizophrenia and also in the study of dyadic situations. There has already been precedent set by Hurlburt, Happe, and Frith (1994), who used experience sampling and interview techniques in order to examine the form of thought in three adults with Asperger’s Disorder, and more recently by Hintzen, Delespaul, van Os, and Myin-Germeys (2010) to explore social needs in the daily lives of people with PDD-NOS. Implementation of the present experience sampling approach in atypical populations would require successive approximation, starting first with the highest functioning individuals and adapting the method to subjects with increasingly more severe social-communicative impairments. If we were to successfully repeat this experiment in individuals with high functioning ASD or schizophrenia, would we see different frequencies of MS thought attributions versus those seen in matched control subjects? Based on the claim that these individuals experience deficits in ToM, we might expect to see a decrease in MS attributions. Research conducted on the ecological validity of ToM tasks demonstrated that regardless of performance on in-lab ToM tasks, children who were normally developing and handicapped showed significant evidence of ToM in their everyday lives as measured by an adapted Vinland Adaptive Behavior Scale. However, most subjects with autism, even those who passed in-lab ToM tasks, showed impairment in ToM use in everyday life (Frith et al., 1994). If we were to conduct the current study with subjects with autism, we may also see a different pattern in the direction of thought, given research that suggests that individuals with autism also have more difficulties representing their own beliefs than the beliefs of other people (Williams & Happe, 2009). However, one would have to pay careful attention to potential deficiencies in introspective and communicative capabilities when analyzing and interpreting the results. Interestingly, the participant who was excluded before recoding received the highest SRS score and had the highest frequency of action thought attributions at 93.1%. Although the excluded subject’s SRS score was not high enough to trigger more formal evaluations for a research categorization of an ASD diagnosis, this anomaly further serves as motivation to 704 L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 explore relationships between the frequency of Action, MS, and miscellaneous thought attributions in atypical populations using the experience sampling method. While other studies have looked at the effects of personality, motivation, and emotional factors on thought attributions (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006; Sheldon & Johnson, 1993), our research did not parse out these factors. In addition, a study conducted by Andersen, Glassman, and Gold (1998) emphasized how emotional connectedness between two people may affect thought attribution. Although we are motivated to study thought attribution in the most naturalistic manner, future studies might manipulate social context where subjects are surrounded by significant others and see if spontaneous thoughts about others are more frequent and whether they are more mentalistic than behavioral in content. We also did not probe whether subjects’ thoughts were reflective of the past or present. Research conducted by Pronin, Olivola, and Kennedy (2008) examined the hypothesis that people’s decisions for future selves differ from their decisions for present selves and instead more closely resemble decisions for other people. It would be interesting to see if there were a unique delineation between thought type, direction, and socializing with respect to the tense of the thought. A number of social cognitive research studies have relied heavily on participants describing their response to hypothetical scenarios. Our methods might also be adapted to address these sorts of questions. Despite reported and hypothesized relationships between ToM and measures of general intelligence, we did not find significant correlations between scores on verbal (r = .149) or matrix reasoning (r = .164) and the frequency of ToM (MS) attributions (de Villiers, 2007; Muller, Liebermann-Finestone, Carpendale, Hammond, & Bibok, 2012; Pellicano, 2007). However, since all subjects were above average in intelligence and adults who possess higher-order relational reasoning, a ceiling effect is unsurprising. Future studies may involve subjects with diverse relational reasoning abilities (e.g., children and those with intellectual disability and language disorders) and may include specific measures of executive functioning (e.g., working memory and inhibition) in order to tease apart potential relationships. 6. Conclusion The purpose of this study was to explore the use of ToM in the real world. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no previous experience sampling account of how frequently and under what circumstances people make ToM attributions in everyday life. We have demonstrated that experience sampling presents an ecologically valid way to address this question. This study opens up new avenues for research and discourse surrounding typical and atypical thought processes, and sets the stage for future studies in younger children and in individuals with autism and/or intellectual disability. Funding K12 EY16336 and McDonnell Center for Systems Neuroscience (Pruett), JSMF Centennial Fellowship (Povinelli), C-SURE Training Program at Washington University in St. Louis (Bryant & Coffey). Acknowledgments Sridhar Kandala, Eric Feczko, Sarah Hoertel. Appendix A. A.1. Instructions You will be completing a series of questionnaires over a period of ten hours on the device provided. Each questionnaire should take no longer than five minutes to complete. You must complete the questionnaire individually when the alarm sounds, without assistance or input from anyone else. The PDA will automatically shut off at the end of each questionnaire. Two of the questions require a short written response. Using the stylus located on the back of the PDA, tap the ‘‘abc’’ icon in the bottom left corner of the screen. This will bring up an onscreen keyboard with which you can respond. Please be thorough in your responses; one to two sentences should be sufficient. You will be compensated based on the length of participation in this study (see consent form). Participation requires answering each question throughout this study. Before participating, please ensure that you can fulfill these requirements. We will accommodate your needs in order to arrange a day where you do not have any conflicts. You will not have access to anything but the questionnaire on the PDA. Do NOT remove the batteries to the PDA. Name (print): ________________ Signature: ________________ Date: ________________ Subject number: ________________ L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 705 A.2. General information In this study we are asking you to report on your own thoughts throughout the day. Please refer to the thought occurring right before the alarm sounds. We ask about mental states and actions, which are explained as follows:  A mental state exists in your own or someone else’s head.  An action is what you or another is doing, has done or will do. A.3. Examples What if I can’t respond immediately (e.g. using the restroom, showering, driving)? You will have a window of 10 min to respond to the questionnaire. Please do not endanger your health in order to complete a questionnaire. If you must miss one or two questionnaires, you won’t be penalized. It says ‘‘Fatal alert,’’ what do I do? Do not panic. Tap ‘‘reset’’ and it should return to a home screen. Then press the home symbol (a small house) below the touch screen and this should take you back to the ESP screen. If you run into any major problems regarding your PDA, please contact (contact information excluded). Appendix B. B.1. Coding instructions Use the subject’s response to the prompts ‘‘What are you doing’’ and ‘‘What are you thinking’’ to categorize the object of the subject’s thought. In the columns provided, code each response based on whether the object of the subject’s thought is a mental state, action, or something else (other): Mental State?Code as 1. Action?Code as 2. Miscellaneous?Code as 3. Indeterminate?Code as 4. No thought?Code as 5. B.1.1. Mental state ‘‘Mental state’’ should be coded if the subject reported thinking about their own or someone else’s beliefs, thoughts, desires, memories, emotions, or states of knowledge.  For example, the subject may report thinking of wants, fears, hopes, or beliefs. DO NOT code ‘‘mental state’’ for responses that use mental terms in a conversational manner where the mental state term is not the object of the subject’s thought. For example, if someone writes ‘‘I think I will go to the park after lunch,’’ the use of 706 L. Bryant et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 697–707 the word ‘‘think’’ is a mental term but is not what the subject is thinking about. (This example would be categorized as Action). Alternately, if someone responds, ‘‘I was thinking about the significance of Charles asking Danielle out for lunch when he has a wife,’’ you could categorize it as a mental state. Another example is ‘‘the light seemed welcoming,’’ where the meaning of ‘‘seemed’’ simply means ‘‘looked’’ (This example would be categorized as Miscellaneous). Thoughts about emotions should also be categorized as mental states. For example, the statement ‘‘I wonder if he is upset that I did not call’’ (‘‘upset’’ is an emotion). Likewise, if the subject reported that they were thinking about ‘‘I love that box!’’ this would be coded as ‘‘mental state’’ because the object of the thought the subject’s love for the box. The subjects should be coded as thinking about mental states even if the subject is not human or animate (e.g., ‘‘I was thinking about how much I hate my computer’’, ‘‘I was thinking that the dog doesn’t know where his bone is buried.’’). B.1.2. Action ‘‘Action’’ should be coded when the subject reports thinking about what someone or something is doing, has done or will do. For example, ‘‘I will drive to work at 9’’ and ‘‘That driver just cut me off’’ are action thoughts. This also includes planning, e.g. ‘‘What I need to get done before work tomorrow’’. Cost–benefit (e.g., ‘‘Whether or not I should. . .’’) should be categorized as action, unless explicitly referencing a mental state. B.1.3. Miscellaneous When the object of the subject’s thought is neither a mental state nor an action, categorize the thought as ‘‘miscellaneous’’. This includes observation such as ‘‘It is hot’’, ‘‘The music is loud’’ and ‘‘There are flowers in the garden’’. This would also include less descriptive responses such as ‘‘Dinner’’ or ‘‘Tomorrow afternoon’’. B.1.4. Indeterminate If the meaning is still unclear, judge the statement to be indeterminate, especially given instances where more than one interpretation could be equally appropriate. ALL ‘‘why’’ statements or questions (e.g. ‘‘Why did she go to work today?’’) should be categorized as indeterminate but flagged using an asterisk (i.e., 4). B.1.5. No thought Statements in which the subject reports he or she is thinking of ‘‘nothing’’ should be coded as ‘‘No thought’’. This category does not include responses that are left blank. References Andersen, S. M., Glassman, N. S., & Gold, D. A. (1998). 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Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Emotional valence, sense of agency and responsibility: A study using intentional binding J.F. Christensen a,⇑, M. Yoshie b,c, S. Di Costa a, P. Haggard a a Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London (UCL), United Kingdom Human Informatics Research Institute, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Japan c Automotive Human Factors Research Center, AIST, Japan b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 5 August 2015 Revised 31 January 2016 Accepted 26 February 2016 Keywords: Sense of agency Intentional binding Valence Emotion Retrospective Prospective a b s t r a c t We investigated how the emotional valence of an action outcome influences the experience of control, in an intentional binding experiment. Voluntary actions were followed by emotionally positive or negative human vocalisations, or by neutral tones. We used mental chronometry to measure a retrospective component of sense of agency (SoA), triggered by the occurrence of the action outcome, and a prospective component, driven by the expectation that the outcome will occur. Positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective component of SoA, but only when both occurrence and the valence of the outcome were unexpected. When the valence of outcomes was blocked – and therefore predictable – we found a prospective component of SoA when neutral tones were expected but did not actually occur. This prospective binding was absent, and reversed, for positive and negative expected outcomes. Emotional expectation counteracts the prospective component of SoA, suggesting a distancing effect. Ó 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc. 1. Introduction Sense of agency is the experience of control over our own voluntary actions, and, through them, events in the outside world. Sense of agency is a core feature of normal mental life, at least in healthy adult humans, and a prerequisite of a well-functioning society. For example, legal systems assume that we will always know whether we have caused an event or not, because we experience our actions, and, at least partly, understand their consequences, at the time that we make them. Other things being equal, a defendant who has a sense of agency regarding the appropriate action is expected to plead guilty, and one who does not is expected to plead not guilty to the appropriate charge. If the sense of agency perfectly tracked the facts of agency, there would never be doubt about who caused a particular outcome, and was thereby responsible. However, the sense of agency is limited for several reasons. First, sense of agency does not perfectly track the objective facts of agency. For example, a person may make an action and cause an outcome, but not realise they have done so. One reason for this gap between objective and subjective agency is limited cognitive capacity: people clearly cannot foresee all the consequences of their own actions. Here we focus on a different limitation, namely the strong biasing effect of affective valence on sense of agency. These effects are often considered under the label self-serving bias (Bandura, 1982; Bradley, 1978; Heider, 1958). People attribute positive actions and outcomes to ⇑ Corresponding author at: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London (UCL), Alexandra House, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom. E-mail address: j.christensen@ucl.ac.uk (J.F. Christensen). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.02.016 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc. 2 J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 themselves, while distancing themselves from bad actions and outcomes, notably by attributing them to others. Previous studies of such biases have used a framework of attribution judgement to consider these biases, often within the social context of praise and blame. However, the relation between such social judgements of agency, and the primary experience of agency, remains unclear. This issue is important, since people often know from direct experience that they are responsible for an outcome, yet then explicitly attribute responsibility to another (e.g., ‘‘passing the buck”, ‘‘only obeying orders”; Miller, 1947, 2009). Such psychological phenomena imply a basic, pre-attributional experience of agency, which is sensitive to valence. However, this experience, and its valence-sensitivity have proved difficult to measure scientifically, resulting in a knowledge gap in the literature on psychology of agency and responsibility. Here we have used action binding (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi, 2012) as an implicit measure of sense of agency. The perceived time of a voluntary self-generated action is shifted towards the action’s outcome, as compared to a condition where the action is not followed by a sensory outcome. There is also a corresponding shift in the perceived time of the outcome back towards the action that caused it. Yoshie and Haggard (2013) compared intentional binding for actions which predictably had either positive, negative or neutral sounds as their outcomes. Binding was reduced for negative action outcomes as compared to positive ones. This implies a stronger sense of agency over positive compared to negative events, consistent with the concept of a selfserving bias (Bandura, 1984), and/or a distancing from negative outcomes as a form of reappraisal mechanism (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). Takahata et al. (2012) obtained similar results in the context of a gambling task. Different tones were first associated with either positive or negative outcomes of one’s own action (gains or losses). Subsequent intentional binding measures showed less binding, implying reduced sense of agency, for tones that had previously been associated with losses, compared to rewards. The experience of agency over an outcome could be based on predicting the outcome (e.g., I feel in control of my bicycle, because I predict that turning the handlebars will change my direction), or on inferring retrospectively the consequences of my own actions (e.g., I win money because I gambled. Although the stakes were 50–50 my winning makes me retrospectively attribute the winning to my skill in choosing) (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It remains unclear whether valence effects on sense of agency are primarily prospective, or primarily retrospective. In previous studies (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013), the valence of an action was entirely predictable, since participants generated positive, negative or neutral outcome sounds in separate blocks. In this situation, both prospective and retrospective components can contribute to sense of agency, but cannot be specifically disentangled. In Takahata et al. (2012), the valence of the outcome was randomised, and therefore unpredictable. In their results, outcome valence influenced sense of agency retrospectively. However, it remains unclear whether valence can also influence prospective sense of agency. This issue has important implications. Purely retrospective valence effects imply a failure to feel responsible for actions with negative outcomes. This would be highly adaptive in ensuring well-being, but would have catastrophic implications for society. A well-functioning society, at least one similar to our own, presupposes that individuals avoid making actions with negative outcomes, even when these actions are superficially tempting. Presumably, individuals learn from previous experience the relation between actions and negative outcomes, and then use these experiences to prospectively guide future agency. A genuine, valence-sensitive experience of agency at the time of an action therefore plays an important role in minimising future harmful actions. Moore and Haggard (2008) proposed an experimental design to distinguish the influence of prospective and retrospective mechanisms on sense of agency, based on manipulating outcome probabilities. The probability of producing an outcome is set to 50% in one block of the experiment, and to 75% in another (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). An estimate of the retrospective component of sense of agency is obtained by comparing the binding of action towards tones on those trials in the 50% block where a tone does occur, with those trials where it does not. An estimate of the prospective component is obtained by comparing the binding of actions towards tones on trials where tones do not in fact occur, but are more likely (i.e., 75% block), compared to less likely (i.e., 50% block). Prediction should clearly be stronger in the 75% block than in the 50% block, although it is not total in the former, nor absent in the latter – thus the design affords a partial estimate of the prospective component, rather than a perfect measure. Nevertheless, comparing estimates for prospective or retrospective components between groups (Voss et al., 2010), or between different conditions may clarify whether a particular factor influences prospective or reconstructive components of sense of agency. We investigated how the valence of an action outcome would influence the retrospective and prospective components of sense of agency. The probability of producing an action outcome was either highly likely (75%) or moderately likely (50%), and retrospective and prospective components of action binding were calculated. In Group 1, outcome valence was unpredictable, because positive, negative and neutral sounds were randomised. This means that for this group, the valence of the outcome, if it occurred, was experienced anew on each trial. This allowed us to assess whether the outcome valence of an action modulates sense of agency retrospectively. In Group 2, the same outcome sounds were blocked, so that the valence of the sound was always predictable, though its occurrence could be more or less predictable, as before (50% or 75%). With this we sought to establish whether the prospective component of sense of agency would emerge if the valence of the outcome, as well as its occurrence, were predictable. Our general research question was whether outcome valence influences the prospective or the retrospective part of sense of agency, and whether this influence depended on valence itself being predictable. J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 3 2. Method 2.1. Participants A total of 56 right-handed volunteers (30 male) participated in the experiment in exchange for a small time reimbursement (£7.50/h). They were randomly assigned to the two conditions (randomised, unpredictable emotion trials, vs. blocked, predictable emotion trials); Group 1 (28; 14 male; mean age = 23.54, SD = 4.53) and Group 2 (28; 16 male; mean age = 24.25, SD = 5.49). Emotion predictability was used as a between rather than within subjects factor, largely because a within subjects approach would have shown an order effect (once emotions are predicted, they may continue to be predicted, even after they become unpredictable). All participants were of European Linguistic background to match the actors of the vocal sound stimuli. To determine the sample size of the two groups, we performed two power calculations, using GPower 3.1. (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) for two contrasts of interest. First we determined the sample size necessary to identify a significant effect of emotion within a single group (effect size = .80; alpha = .05; power = .90). This gave a suggested sample size of 15. In addition, we also planned to compare the group receiving blocked emotion outcomes with the group receiving randomized emotion outcomes. For this, we performed an additional power calculation for an independent samples t-test (effect size = .80; alpha = .05; power = .90). This gave a suggested sample size of 28 per group. The total sample size was fixed based on this second power calculation. 2.2. Procedure An Intentional Binding task was used as an implicit measure of sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Participants were seated in front of a computer screen with an external silent SODIAL(R) Flexible Foldable USB keyboard in front of them to provide their responses on. At each trial, participants were instructed to press a key [ENTER] on this keyboard at the time of their choosing (=the moment they felt the urge to do so) while they looked at the centre of a clock which was displayed on the screen with a continuously rotating clock hand. The clock was
2  2 cm large and the clock hand 12 mm, rotating about a clock face with the common numbers 5. . ..10. . ..15, etc., at a rate of 2560 milliseconds (ms). After the key press, after a fixed duration of 250 ms a tone occurred. This brief interval between action and tone gave participants the impression of causing the tone. The clock hand continued rotating for a random amount of time, then stopped. At this time, participants were prompted to state verbally where the clock hand was in the moment they pressed the key. The experimenter entered the number on a different keyboard and launched the next trial. In the classical action binding procedure, the binding measure is obtained by calculating the difference in estimation accuracy between the following two conditions: first, the participant performs this task in a baseline condition where no tone occurs. In the operant condition, they generate the tone by their own voluntary action. Their judgment ‘‘shifts” towards the tone, signalling that the outcome of their action (the tone) modulated their temporal estimation of the time of the action. This difference between baseline and operant conditions is defined as ‘‘action binding”, and serves as a proxy for sense of agency. In order to give the action outcomes different affective significance, three types of emotional sounds were selected, following previous empirical work (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Eight emotional sounds were selected from an extensivelynormed database of nonverbal emotional vocal sounds (Sauter, Eisner, Calder, & Scott, 2010). There were four sounds with positive valence (two sounds of laughter and two of achievement), and four of negative valence (two of disgust and two of fear). In addition, four neutral ‘‘beep”-tones were generated to be used as a neutral comparison condition. This resulted in a total of 12 outcome sounds, of three different valence significance. Subjective ratings from an independent group of participants in a previously published study confirmed this classification of the sounds as positive and negative, and also verified matching for pitch and duration; see Supplementary material of Yoshie and Haggard (2013). Prospective and retrospective processes in sense of agency can be investigated using the intentional binding paradigm by varying the outcome probability across two conditions, one 50% and one 75% condition (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). The same procedure was followed here. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of the basic trial structure. Participants performed a total of 240 trials. Both groups started with an action baseline block (48 trials). Group 1 (randomised unpredictable emotion group) subsequently went through 4 blocks of 48 trials. In 2 of the blocks the sound occurrence predictability was 50% (in only 50% of the trials a sound actually occurred) and in another 2 blocks sound occurrence predictability was 75% (in 75% of the trials a sound occurred). In the 50% predictability condition participants had a total of 16 negative, 16 positive and 16 neutral sound outcomes (=48), and a further 48 trials with no sound outcome (randomised across 2 blocks, with equal numbers of each trial type in each block). In the 75% predictability condition participants had 24 stimuli of each valence (72 trials) plus 24 trials with no sound outcome (randomised across 2 blocks, equal number of trials of each in each block). This means a total of 96 in each of the 2 conditions (=192), plus 48 from the baseline condition (=240 in total). There were two groups of participants. Group 2 (the predictable blocked emotion group) received the same number of stimuli of each kind as the group in Group 1. To allow the blocked paradigm, however, the stimuli were arranged as follows: participants in Group 2 performed 3 shorter blocks of 32 stimuli for each of the two outcome probabilities (50% and 75%), 6 in total; 2 for each valence (negative, neutral, positive). In each of these blocks, there were 16 stimuli of the respective valences and 16 without any sound (50% condition), or 24 of each valence and 8 without sound outcome (75% condition). 4 J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 Fig. 1. Trial structure. This resulted in 32 trials in 6 blocks (=192) plus the 48 from the baseline (=240 in total). In both experiments, blocks were counterbalanced between participants but participants always performed either the 50% or the 75%. Participants always performed the baseline condition first, then followed by the blocks of the experiment, in counterbalanced order. See Fig. 2 for an illustration of the procedure and Table 1 for the design. To ensure participants would not ignore the sounds’ emotional significance, participants were informed that a few randomly interleaved ‘‘extra questions” would appear throughout the experiment, asking them to state whether the sound they just heard was positive or negative (this question was never asked after a neutral beep). Participants were told they would receive a bonus (25 pence) for each correct answer in addition to their normal payment. There were 10 such trials throughout each experiment. Participants in both groups generally judged between 8 and 10 of these trials correctly (average: 9.80; SD 1.10). One outlier scored only 2/10. Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the procedure. (A) Voluntary actions are followed by an outcome sound (beep) 250 ms later. This produces a shift in the perceived time of the action (dotted arrow). (B) In one block, the probability of a sound given an action is 50%. Binding towards outcome is compared between trials with and without outcome sound. This identifies the retrospective component of action binding. (C) In another block, the probability given an action is 75%. Comparing action binding on trials across the two probability blocks where no outcomes occur, reveals how outcome binding varies with the degree of prediction. J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 5 Table 1 The experimental design was based on the factorial combination of two factors. Outcome occurrence was a within-subjects factor, referring to whether the outcome was more (75%) or less (50%) likely. Outcome valence was a between-subjects factor, and was either unpredictable (Group 1) or predictable (Group 2). OUTCOME OCCURRENCE VALENCE Less Predictable More Predictable Probability of sound given an action = 50% Probability of sound given an action = 75% No Sound 25% UNPREDICTABLE (GROUP 1) No Sound 50% Sound 75% Sound 50% No Sound 25% PREDICTABLE (GROUP 2) No Sound 50% Sound 75% Sound 50% 2.3. Statistical analyses We calculated a retrospective and a prospective component of action binding, following previous studies (Moore & Haggard, 2008), and we analysed these components separately. The retrospective component of action binding was calculated as the difference in action binding in the 50% occurrence probability condition between trials where there was an outcome sound and trials where there was no outcome sound. For Experiment 1 the no sound trials were averaged across all three valences, as these trials were presented at random and could not be allocated to any specific valence. For Experiment 2, each valence was presented in a separate block, and we therefore used the no sound trials from the relevant block to calculate the retrospective component: (positive outcome) – (no outcome in the positive block), (negative outcome) – (no outcome in the negative block), and (neutral outcome) – (no outcome in the neutral block). The prospective component was calculated by subtracting the average action binding in the no sound trials of the 50% condition from the average action binding effect in the no sound trials of the 75% condition. The prospective component therefore captures the extent to which action binding depends on the probability of the outcome, given the action. A Repeated Measures design was used with separate blocks of judgments of action with outcome sound valence as withinsubjects factor (negative, neutral or positive) and predictability of outcome valence as between-subjects factor (unpredictable; Group 1, vs. predictable; Group 2). Specifically, in Group 1 emotional outcomes were fully randomised to create circumstances of fully unpredictable emotional outcomes. In Group 2 the emotional outcomes were blocked into separate blocks of predictably negative, neutral or positive outcomes. As effect sizes we report partial eta (gp2), where .01 is considered a small effect size, .06 a medium effect and .14 a large effect, and Cohen’s d for t-tests (Cohen, 1988). 3. Results The data are shown in Table 2. Our analyses focussed on the retrospective and prospective components, rather than the individual cell means. The results are shown in Fig. 3. The Retrospective component was analysed using a mixed Repeated Measures ANOVA with betweensubjects factor of predictability of outcome valence (unpredictable, vs. predictable), and a within-subjects factor of outcome sound valence (negative, neutral or positive). We found no significant effect of either factor (predictability: F(2, 53) = 2.425, p = .125, g2 = .043; outcome valence: F(2, 53) = 1.638, p = .199, g2 = .029), but a significant interaction between these factors (F(2, 53) = 5.581, p = .005, g2 = .094). Simple effects tests were used to explore this interaction. First, we compared the groups receiving predictable and unpredictable valence of outcome sounds, for each outcome sound individually. There was no difference between these groups for the neutral outcome sound (t(54) = 1.631, p = .109, ns). However, the groups did differ for the negative (t(54) = 1.743, p = .087, d = .46) and for positive sounds (t(54) = 2.835, p = .006, d = .77). Action binding was stronger when these sounds were unpredictable (Group 1), compared to predictable (Group 2). In addition, we also used simple effects to explore differences between the different valences of outcome sounds within each group. In Group 1 for whom 6 J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 Table 2 Results of Experiments 1 and 2. Values are rounded to the nearest ms. Conditions Outcome Group 1 (unpredictable emotion trials) Group 2 (predictable emotion trials) Mean SD Mean SD Baseline – 36 57 7 58 Probability of sound 50% No outcome (average) No outcome – negative No outcome – neutral No outcome – positive Negative outcome Neutral outcome Positive outcome 28 N/Aa N/A N/A 40 29 44 69 N/A N/A N/A 72 71 68 0 15 6 13 2 10 9 60 83 56 52 70 56 70 Probability of sound 75% No outcome (average) No outcome – negative No outcome – neutral No outcome – positive Negative outcome Neutral outcome Positive outcome 28 N/A N/A N/A 35 28 26 71 N/A N/A N/A 73 62 76 1 1 12 1 14 18 1 53 62 55 58 65 63 64 Retrospective component Negative outcome Neutral outcome Positive outcome 11 1 16 36 35 26 17 24 22 78 65 65 Prospective component Average over outcomes Negative outcome Neutral outcome Positive outcome 0 N/A N/A N/A 29 N/A N/A N/A 0 16 18 13 41 72 46 55 a These values cannot be calculated for Group 1 because the emotional sounds were randomised across trials and thus the ‘‘no sound” trials cannot be attributed to any specific emotional valence condition. Fig. 3. Retrospective component of sense of agency. See text for explanation. Error bars represent S.E.M. ⁄p < .05. yp < .10. outcome valence was unpredictable, we found more binding for positive than for neutral sounds (t(27) = 2.069, p = .048, d = .48). No such difference was found between positive and negative sounds (t(27) = .588, p = .562, ns), nor between negative and neutral sounds (t(27) = 1.407, p = .171, ns). In Group 2, for whom outcome valence was predictable, we found a significant difference in action binding between negative and neutral sounds (t(27) = 2.388, p = .024, d = .57), and between positive and neutral sounds (t(27) = 2.779, p = .010, d = .70), though in the opposite direction as compared to Group 1. Group 2 showed less action binding for negative and positive outcomes, as compared to neutral outcomes. The prospective component could not be analysed factorially. In the condition where valence of outcome sounds was blocked (Group 2), we could compare the prospective components for each valence condition. However, in the condition where valence of outcome sounds was randomised (Group 1) and therefore unpredictable, we cannot assign individual no-sound trials to any particular valence condition, and could therefore not calculate a prospective component for J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 7 each valence. We therefore performed two separate analyses. First, we used a between-subjects t-test to compare groups receiving unpredictable or predictable valence of outcome sounds, averaging over the different outcome sound valences in the latter case. There was no significant difference between the groups (t(54) = .067, p = .947, ns). Second, for the predictable valence group (Group 2) only, we used a one-way ANOVA to compare how valence influenced the prospective component. This showed a significant overall effect of outcome sound valence (F(2, 27) = 3.195, p = .049, g2 = .106. Follow-up ttests showed significant differences between the prospective component when a negative sound might be predicted compared to when a neutral sounds might be predicted (t(27) = 2.424, p = .022, d = .75), and between the prospective component when a positive sound might be predicted compared to when a neutral sound might be predicted (t(27) = 2.359, p = .026, d = .62). The difference between negative and positive conditions was not significant (t(27) = .157, p = .876, ns). No correction for multiple comparisons was performed: when omnibus ANOVA shows a difference between three conditions, subsequent pairwise comparisons do not use additional degrees of freedom (Cardinal & Aitken, 2006) (see Fig. 4). 4. Discussion We have investigated the relation between the valence of an outcome and the sense of agency in a laboratory experiment with healthy adult volunteers. Previous work on agency–valence relations has traditionally been dominated by the pervasive concept of self-serving bias. This implies enhanced sense of agency for positive outcomes, and a distancing, or reduced sense of agency for negative outcomes (Bandura, 1984; Jones et al., 1972). Crucially, our method combined a number of innovations relative to previous work: we used an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency, we distinguished between prospective and retrospective components of sense of agency, and we used naturalistic human vocalisations as action outcomes, ensuring a basic affective valence because of the emotional nature of these sounds. Our study generated three main findings. First, unexpectedly positive outcomes enhanced the retrospective sense of agency. Second, when the valence of an outcome was expected, this retrospective effect was abolished, and in fact reversed – for both positive and negative outcomes. Third, the prospective component of sense of agency was enhanced when a neutral outcome was expected, compared to when a positive or negative outcome was expected. Conversely, when there was no expectation regarding the valence of an outcome, the prospective component of sense of agency was reduced. In principle, the negative scores found for prospective and retrospective components of action binding in Group 1 and 2 could be due to some process other than affective modulation of sense of agency by action outcome. For example, in Group 2, the predictable emotional valence of each action might favour learning time perception. However, participants never get feedback, so the opportunities for learning are limited. Therefore we disregard this interpretation of the current results. Our results may reflect two qualitatively different interactions between the neurocognitive systems for emotion and for action. The first of these might be called agentic serendipity. When outcomes were (a) relatively unlikely, (b) of unpredictable valence, and (c) happened to be positive, we found a significant increase in the binding of an action towards the sound. We interpret this as a retrospective boost of sense of agency, consistent with self-serving bias (Bandura, 1984, 2002; Heider, 1958). Importantly, the conditions for this effect occurring are relatively restrictive: the effect was absent for unexpectedly negative sounds, ruling out an effect of mere salience. Further, the effect was absent in a group of participants for whom the valence of the sound was predictable. Thus, we confirmed a self-serving bias in sense of agency, and showed that it operates retrospectively, only once the positive valence of the outcome is known. These findings are consistent with an inferential Fig. 4. Prospective component of sense of agency. See text for explanation. Error bars represent S.E.M. ⁄p < .05. 8 J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 mechanism, which attributes ‘‘nice surprise” effects to one’s own voluntary agency. Interestingly, we found no comparable retrospective distancing effect. That is, unexpectedly negative outcomes were not associated with a reduced sense of agency. This may be reassuring in social and legal contexts: individuals are expected to accept responsibility for their actions. Even when an action has an unforeseen negative outcome, as in manslaughter, society still attributes the action to the agent. Our result suggests that this social attribution is consistent with the agent’s low-level perceptual experience of their action. Our concept of retrospective agency was based on changes in intentional binding when an outcome unpredictably occurred after an action, compared to when it did not. Importantly, however, we found that ability to predict the outcome’s valence had a clear effect, over and above the ability to predict its occurrence. Group 2 of our study experienced each outcome valence in a separate block, and could therefore predict in advance the valence of an outcome, if one were to occur. In this group, the actual occurrence of a sound could be more or less predictable, according to the block, but the valence of the sound, if it occurred, was always predictable. Emotional valence of an unpredictable sound reduced the sense of agency, both when the sound was positive and when it was negative, as compared to when it was neutral. That is, the retrospective component of action binding was reversed when a predictably positive or predictably negative vocalization occurred. Because this effect was equivalent in positive and negative outcome blocks, it remains unclear whether it is based on valence, or merely on salience. The retrospective component of agency has often been associated with poor understanding of the relation between one’s actions and their outcomes, with ‘leaping to conclusions’ about agency (Voss et al., 2010), and with uncertain contexts. Our results suggest these processes are reduced, rather than increased, by a stable emotionallyvalenced context, whether positive or negative. When the valence of an outcome can be predicted, the tendency for emotional events to rapidly restructure experience is abolished, and even reversed. Predictable, emotionally-valenced outcomes may produce a general emotional context, by a process similar to mood induction. While exogenous, bottom-up positive affect can augment retrospective inferences underlying sense of agency, the ability to predict emotional outcomes appears to decouple sense of agency from the influence of actual sensory evidence about outcomes, via a kind of emotional distancing. Thus, the agentic serendipity effect is cancelled when valence is predictable. This result may be related to altered sense of agency in affective pathologies such as depression and euphoria (Alloy, Abramson, Metalsky, & Hartlage, 1988; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Msetfi, Murphy, & Kornbrot, 2012; The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V, 2013). The second link between agency and valence might be called ‘cold prediction’. The prospective component of sense of agency was identified as an increase in binding of actions towards outcomes when outcome occurrence is more rather than less likely. We found no evidence for a prospective component when the valence of outcomes was unpredictable. When outcome valence was predictable we found a significant prospective component of binding only for neutral outcomes. In fact, greater predictability of negative or positive outcomes leads to less binding than lower predictability. This result suggests that sense of agency involves both a cold, prospective component and a warm, retrospective one. For both components, the negative–positive comparison is never significant, so the mechanisms seem to be sensitive to valence in general, that is, unsigned valence rather than signed valence. We recognise that unsigned valence and salience may be confounded, because positive and negative vocalisations may both be more salient than neutral sounds. Briefly, the prospective mechanism seems to be a cold and rational one: it is reduced, and even reversed when the affective valence can be predicted. Affect and cold prediction are thus mutually antagonistic. Conversely, in situations of low statistical predictability, the sense of agency appears to be driven by a postdictive mechanism based on positive affective surprise. This latter mechanism requires that both the occurrence and the valence of an action outcome be surprising: the effect was abolished when occurrence was unpredictable, but valence was predictable. The legal concept of responsibility for action can be linked to specific views about the roles of volition and cognition in psychology of action. In particular, the law assumes that individuals have voluntary control over their actions, and that they understand the relation between their action and the consequences of those actions. For example, the M’Naghten rules (case 1843-60 All ER Rep 229) famously ask whether an individual knows ‘‘the nature and quality of the act” at the time of their action. At first sight, a hypothetical individual who simply lacks any sense of agency could not be found guilty under these rules (though they could instead be found ‘criminally insane’). We have described prospective and retrospective aspects of sense agency. According to these concepts, an agent might not know the nature and quality of their act if they have lack an advance representation of their goal with which to guide their action control, and also lack any experience of linkage between their action and the actual outcome. At the same time, the law frequently deals with situations where intentional action, emotional state, and outcome valence are co-occurring and important factors. Thus, any influences of affective valence on sense of agency may be relevant for legal concepts of responsibility. In loss of control defences (Sec. 54 Coroners, 2009), an ongoing, extreme emotional state is invoked to explain an agent’s escape from normal voluntary control. In particular, loss of control may potentially explain why people perform actions with clearly negative outcomes. Our data showed that the prospective component of sense of agency is lost when an outcome is predictably negative, or predictably positive. We speculated that regular exposure to negative outcomes could cause a kind of negative mood induction, like a very diluted version of the depressive realism effect (Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1988). In extreme form, these co-occurring elements may provide a psychological mechanism relevant to the loss of control defence. That is, regular extreme negative experience, combined with reduced ability to predict and register a potential negative outcome of one’s own action could constitute a departure from normal sense of agency. Our key result is that affective context may change the experience of the nature and quality of the act. In particular, recurrent and predictable negative experiences appear to reduce the prospective sense of agency. The prospective component of sense of agency is thought to arise at the time of action, since it does not depend on actual outcome occurrence (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It J.F. Christensen et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 1–10 9 may depend on the same brain processes that generate intentional actions (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). To this extent, our study may clarify why, in criminal contexts, the normal cognitive mechanisms of action control seem to be replaced by emotionally-charged drives to action that lack the normal experiences of agency and responsibility. The existence of such a brain mechanism clearly does not excuse wrong doing. However, it does suggest that a feeling of reduced responsibility could potentially reflect an agent’s actual experience during emotionally-charged action. Reduced responsibility could correspond to a fact of human psychology, rather than a hopeful story to avoid punishment. Clearly, these considerations do not change the way justice should be done, but rather highlight features of human psychology that justice sometimes may, or may not, wish to take into account. Our study has some obvious limitations. First, it is based on an implicit proxy marker for sense of agency. Using implicit measure gives several advantages relative to asking participants to report sense of agency directly – these have been reviewed elsewhere (Jensen, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2015). On the other hand, intentional binding measures have been criticised. For example, Dewey and Knoblich (2014) noted poor correlations between intentional binding and explicit agency measures, and therefore suggested that these measures did not measure the same thing. Second, while implicit judgements may be useful in scientific investigations of cognitive mechanisms, their relevance for social concepts of responsibility is less clear. For example, the law deals largely with explicit self-reports about actions. Third, some of the effects in our study are relatively small, in some cases only just achieving the boundary of statistical significance. Replication in an additional sample would therefore be valuable. Fourth, the results might generalise poorly to real-life situations outside of the experimental laboratory. Finally, our emotional vocalisation stimuli may have been imperfectly designed. We could not readily match positive and negative emotional vocalisations for strength and recognisability. Thus, positive and negative valences may not have been equally convincing or successful in manipulating affect. Negative emotional stimuli tend to be relatively ineffective in mood induction experiments (e.g., Davies, Dapretto, Sigman, Sepeta, & Bookheimer, 2011), and may induce the opposite states, i.e., laughter (Levenson, 2014). More naturalistic stimuli or alternative mood induction methods especially for negative emotions, may support a stronger claim about the link between laboratory measures of sense of agency and personal responsibility for action. Acknowledgements This work was supported by AHRC Science in Culture grant to PH (Award number: 162746; project number: 515388). P.H. was additionally supported by an ESRC Professorial Fellowship, and by ERC Advanced Grant (HUMVOL). We are grateful to Lisa Claydon and Caroline Roediger for discussions and comments on legal concepts of responsibility. References Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and non-depressed students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108(4), 441–485. Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1988). Depressive realism: Four theoretical perspectives. Alloy, L. B., Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Hartlage, S. (1988). The hopelessness theory of depression: Attributional aspects. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27(1), 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1988.tb00749.x. American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders: DSM-5 (5th ed.). 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Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Beliefs about hearing voices Michael H. Connors ⇑, Serje Robidoux, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Australia Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Australia a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 20 October 2015 Revised 17 March 2016 Accepted 6 May 2016 Keywords: Auditory verbal hallucination Belief Delusion Hallucination Insight Phenomenology Psychosis a b s t r a c t People who experience auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) vary in whether they believe their AVHs are self-generated or caused by external agents. It remains unclear whether these differences are influenced by the ‘‘intensity” of the voices, such as their frequency or volume, or other aspects of their phenomenology. We examined 35 patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder who experienced AVHs. Patients completed a detailed structured interview about their AVHs, including beliefs about their cause. In response, 20 (57.1%) reported that their AVHs were self-generated, 9 (25.7%) were uncertain, and 6 (17.1%) reported that their AVHs were caused by external agents. Several analytical approaches revealed little or no evidence for associations between either AVH intensity or phenomenology and beliefs about the AVH’s cause; the evidence instead favoured the absence of these associations. Beliefs about the cause of AVHs are thus unlikely to be explained solely by the phenomenological qualities of the AVHs. Ó 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc. ‘‘A hallucination is a fact, not an error. What is erroneous is a judgement based on it” [Bertrand Russell, 1914, p. 173] 1. Introduction Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) – experiences of hearing voices – are one of the most common forms of hallucinatory experience and a characteristic symptom of schizophrenia (for a review, see McCarthy-Jones, 2012). AVHs are generally thought to result from a failure in self-monitoring of internally-generated thoughts, as distinct from other generated speech (Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 2013; Waters et al., 2012). Patients who experience AVHs, however, vary in their beliefs about the origin of their voices (Kinderman, 2011; Larøi & Woodward, 2007; Lera et al., 2011; Thomas, Farhall, & Shawyer, 2015; Wilkinson & Bell, 2016). Some patients have insightful beliefs about their AVHs and acknowledge that their voice-hearing experiences are self-generated. Some do not espouse any firm beliefs and express confusion. A third group accept the voice-hearing experience as a veridical representation of external reality and adopt the delusion that the voices originate from some other agent. These different beliefs about the voices can lead to other delusions (concerning, e.g., the intent of the ‘‘speakers”), affect patients’ levels of subjective distress and anxiety, and shape their subsequent behaviour, including whether they act on ⇑ Corresponding author at: Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia. E-mail address: michael.connors@mq.edu.au (M.H. Connors). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.001 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc. 90 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 harmful command AVHs (Beck-Sander, Birchwood, & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Junginger, 1990, 1995). As a result, patients’ beliefs about their voices, and their hallucinations more generally, are a specific focus of clinical interventions (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; Kingdon, Turkington, & John, 1994; Michail & Birchwood, 2011; Penn et al., 2009). Although previous research has examined the consequences of such beliefs about AVHs on patients’ behaviour and mood, it remains unclear whether some characteristics of AVHs increase the likelihood of delusions about the cause of AVHs (Garrett & Silva, 2003). Maher (1988, 1999, 2001, 2006) has written extensively about the role of anomalous experiences in explaining delusional beliefs. According to Maher, unusual experiences, such as AVHs, lead people to search for explanations for their experiences and it is these explanations that constitute delusions. A person hearing buzzing sounds, for example, might incorrectly infer that their head is filled with bees, when the sounds are actually due to pathology of the middle ear (Maher, 1988). Although various inferential processes are involved in shaping the specific content of the delusional belief, these are normal responses to unusual events and similar inferential reasoning occurs in people who do not have anomalous experiences. As such, a single pathology – an unusual experience – is sufficient to cause a delusion (by contrast, other theorists propose that a second pathological factor, such as a deficit in belief formation, is additionally required to account for a delusion; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). When the same anomalous experience is present – AVHs in the context of this paper – an important issue for Maher’s one-factor account to explain is why some patients accept the aberrant percept as veridical and believe that an external agent is responsible, while other patients come to believe that the voices are self-generated. One possibility is that the intensity of the hallucinatory experiences – whether this is conceptualised in terms of the amount of speech, the number of different voices heard, the frequency with which the voices are heard, or the length of utterances – might influence patients’ beliefs. It might be the case that when the voices are many, frequent, and involve large amounts of speech, patients may be more overwhelmed by the voices and likely to attribute them to external agents; that is, to adopt delusional beliefs about the origin of their hallucinations. Such an idea was proposed by Maher (2006, p. 182): For a delusion to develop, the experience must be repeated or continue over an extended period. It must also be vivid and intense enough to preoccupy the consciousness of the individual while it is happening. In short, it must create a compelling sense of reality. In other words, the more intense or vivid the aberrant voice-hearing experiences, the more likely a delusional belief about how the voices originate. Some preliminary support for Maher’s account comes from a study in which psychotic patients experiencing treatmentresistant hallucinations (operationalised as: voices not modified in any way by treatment over the course of one year; voices present at least once a day; and patients’ use of at least two antipsychotics) demonstrated less insight into their psychosis than patients who had experienced voices at least once and had responded to treatment and patients who had never experienced voices (Lera et al., 2011). Insight in this study was assessed, however, using the single 7-point insight item from the PANNS, a general measure of psychotic symptoms (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987). This single rating does not take account of the multidimensional nature of insight, conflating, for example, insight concerning the presence of a mental illness, insightful beliefs about different psychotic symptoms, and acknowledgement of the need for treatment. Thus, it remains unclear whether there exists a relationship between the amount of speech heard and the degree of insight concerning the cause of voices. Another possibility for why patients adopt different beliefs about the cause of their AVHs is that other dimensions of ‘‘intensity” or other phenomenological qualities of the hallucinatory speech influence whether the voices are believed to be externally generated. These qualities include, for example, the volume, intelligibility, speed, emotional tone, and ‘‘personification” of the voices – the perception of the voice as coming from someone of a certain age, sex, familiarity, and social class. Consistent with this proposal, Hustig and Hafner (1990) asked patients with persistent auditory hallucinations to complete daily diaries about the momentary qualities of their hallucinations, as well as their associated mood and beliefs. They found correlations between levels of conviction in delusional beliefs and the loudness and intrusiveness of the hallucinations. While these results are suggestive, it was not clear in this study if the authors were focusing on voices and whether the associated delusional beliefs related specifically to the agent(s) responsible for generating the voices or co-occurred with the voices (e.g., secondary persecutory delusions about ‘‘the speaker’s” intent). In another study, acute inpatients with AVHs were found to commonly describe discernible features of the voices that were similar to those of actual speech, including properties of speech that were different to the patient’s own voice (e.g., a different age, sex, etc.), as well as the speed of the voices, and their emotional quality (Garrett & Silva, 2003). Commanding voices were also described as being generated by external agents by some patients in this study. However, aside from the descriptive results, the only characteristics of voices that were found to associate statistically with whether or not patients experienced their auditory hallucinations as caused by another agent were emotional and religious content. A third study found that patients who heard AVHs as located outside their head showed less insight into their psychosis than patients who heard AVHs as located inside their head (Lera et al., 2011), though, once again, this study considered general insight rather than insightful beliefs concerning the cause of the voices and other studies have not found evidence of this association (Copolov, Trauer, & Mackinnon, 2004). In sum, despite some suggestive findings and the availability of detailed measures of the phenomenology of AVHs (Langdon, Jones, Connaughton, & Fernyhough, 2009; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014; Nayani & David, 1996), comparatively little M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 91 research has examined whether these experiential qualities are related to patients’ beliefs about the cause of their AVHs. In addition to understanding AVH and developing effective interventions, this question is relevant to theories of delusions more broadly, including, for example, whether a single anomalous experience (e.g., an AVH) is sufficient to cause a delusion or whether a second pathological factor is also required. In the current study, we examined this question in a stable chronic group of patients with schizophrenia who completed a detailed phenomenological survey of their AVHs based on the phenomenological properties probed by Nayani and David (1996). We assessed whether intensity of AVHs – defined in terms of amount of speech and other statistical properties, such as their frequency, volume, number of voices, and length of utterances – or various phenomenological qualities of AVHs were related to whether patients were insightful or delusional about the origin of their AVHs. Given the complexity of this phenomenological data, we used a range of statistical methods to determine if there was an association. 2. Methods 2.1. Participants Data was drawn from a pre-existing dataset that was used to examine associations between the phenomenology of AVHs and inner speech in patients with schizophrenia and to compare the inner speech experiences of patients and controls (Langdon et al., 2009). From the original sample, which had included 41 clinical patients, we focused on the 35 patients (19 males, 16 females) who reported AVHs. These patients had a mean age of 42.14 years (SD = 10.80; range 24.00–72.00) and a mean illness duration of 17.00 years (SD = 9.02; range 4.00–41.00 years). All patients had a diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective according to DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and were on stable doses of antipsychotic medication. All patients spoke English as their first language and had, on average, 12.97 (SD = 2.78; range 9.00–18.50) years of formal education. Patients were recruited from outpatient clinics of the Sydney South West Area Health Service and the general community Volunteer Register administered by the Australian Schizophrenia Research Bank (Loughland et al., 2010). Exclusion criteria included history of head injury, neurological illness, substance dependence, and severe thought disorder. All participants gave written informed consent. The experiment was approved by the local human research ethics committee and followed principles outlined in The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). 2.2. Materials and procedure 2.2.1. Assessing AVHs Participants’ beliefs about the cause of their AVHs and the statistical and phenomenological properties of patients’ AVHs were assessed using the first part of the semi-structured ‘Voices and Inner Speech Interview’ (Langdon et al., 2009). This part of the interview begins by confirming the presence of the symptom of hearing voices and then focuses on the properties of AVH, similar to Nayani and David’s (1996) interview. Structured questions are posed to participants and, if the answers are unclear, further clarification is sought. Participants’ verbatim responses to the questions, posed alongside the response options, were used to code responses. Two questions in the interview probed patients’ beliefs about the cause of their AVHs. The first of these questions was quite general: It asked participants how they explained the voices. The second question followed up with a more specific probe about where the voices came from (i.e., who was responsible for generating the voice). Additional probing was used where necessary to determine whether patients believed that their AVHs were self-generated or not. On the basis of the responses to these two questions and any additional probes, each participant was classified as either: (a) believing the voices originated from themselves (i.e., explaining that the voices were their own thoughts, arose from their own mind, or were due to illness, thereby demonstrating insight); (b) being confused (‘‘I don’t understand what’s happening”) or unable to explain the voices (‘‘I don’t know where the voices come from”); or (c) believing the voices originated from an external agent (i.e., not having insight about the cause of the voices and believing the voices were a veridical representation – the voice of some external agent or agents). Other questions in the interview related to the statistical and phenomenological properties of the voices heard, including the number of voices, their frequency, their age, sex, accent, class, identity, intelligibility, speed, location, and the overall emotional content of the voices. Two further questions assessed some of participants’ reactions to their voices, such as whether they responded to their voices and their perceived ability to control them. 2.2.2. Current severity of other symptoms After the Voices and Inner Speech Interview, the general severity of patients’ current symptoms was assessed using the Scales for the Assessment of Positive and Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia (SAPS and SANS; Andreasen, 1983, 1984). 2.2.3. Basic and clinical demographics We also recorded age, sex and NART-estimated IQ, as well as age of illness onset and duration of illness. 92 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 3. Results 3.1. Patient characteristics The patient group had a mean SAPS global rating of 1.95 (SD = 1.01; range 0.0–4.0) and a mean SANS global rating of 1.89 (SD = 0.87; range 0.4–4.4), where ‘0’ = absent, ‘1’ = questionable, ‘2’ = mild, ‘3’ = moderate, ‘4’ = marked, and ‘5’ = severe. Hence, this was a chronic stable clinical sample with mild levels of current symptomatology on average. Of the 35 patients reporting AVHs, 20 (57.1%) believed that the voices originated from themselves, 9 (25.7%) were unsure, and 6 (17.1%) believed that the voices were caused by an external agent(s). As an example of believing the voices originated from themselves, one patient said that although she had previously thought the voices were from aliens, she now realised that the voices were all due to her illness. As an example of believing the voices were from an external agent, one patient said that the voices were agents from behind the Iron Curtain telling him what to do, and another patient said that the voices were all people she knew speaking to her from a distance. We first compared the basic and clinical demographic data for these three groups (see Table 1). ANOVAs revealed no significant differences in age, IQ, age of illness onset, duration of illness, or current severity of symptoms (all Fs < 2.438, all ps > 0.103). Next, we focused on the intensity data for the AVHs. Table 2 shows the data on four statistical properties of intensity of the AVHs in each of these three groups, while Table 3 shows the data on 13 other phenomenological properties of the AVHs in each of these three groups. We also considered separately two other questions pertaining to participants’ actions and beliefs related to their voices – whether they answered their voices and whether they believed that they could control their voices (Table 4). 3.2. Statistical analyses We wanted to determine whether, in any of the two-way contingency tables presented in Tables 2–4, there was an association between a patient’s level of insight into the cause of their AVH (full insight, partial insight, or no insight) and how intense (in a statistical or a phenomenological sense) that patient’s AVHs were. To foreshadow the results, we found no clear evidence in this dataset for a relationship between any of the variables discussed here and level of insight (with one variable – frequency of command hallucinations – that produced mixed results). To minimise the risk that we were failing to uncover an effect that was present, we analysed the data in a wide range of ways. In the first analysis, we used traditional null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) while treating the data as categorical. Since NHST cannot provide evidence for null hypotheses, we repeated our analysis using Bayesian techniques which are able to compare both the null and the alternative hypotheses. In some cases, variables could be considered ordinal and so we re-analysed them as such. We also explored the possibility that while no single variable is related to insight, some combination of variables may be important. In particular, we asked whether the speech properties (count of voices, volume, and frequency) might influence insight together, or if patients whose AVHs were more strongly ‘‘personified” would be less likely to demonstrate insight. In the following sections, we discuss the results from each of these analyses. 3.2.1. Analysing the data as categorical First, we took the most conservative approach and considered all the variables to be categorical. The typical approach here would have been to apply X2 (chi-squared) tests to the two-way contingency tables, but we could not do that because our contingency tables are sparse (many cells with very low expected values). Fisher’s exact test is also inappropriate, for Table 1 Basic and clinical demographics according to insight. Measure Overall (n = 35) Insightful (n = 20) Partial Insight (n = 9) No Insight (n = 6) Age 41.14 ± 10.80 (24–72) 12.97 ± 2.78 (9–18.5) 105.26 ± 12.15 (75–128) 24.97 ± 7.78 (15–50) 17.00 ± 9.02 (4–41) 1.95 ± 1.03 (0.00–4.00) 1.93 ± 0.92 (0.40–4.40) 45.40 ± 11.24 (27–72) 13.43 ± 2.90 (9–18) 105.95 ± 11.99 (84–128) 26.85 ± 8.98 (16–50) 18.70 ± 9.92 (5–41) 1.70 ± 0.99 (0.00–3.25) 1.71 ± 0.88 (0.40–3.20) 36.67 ± 8.43 (24–53) 12.00 ± 2.06 (10–15) 102.67 ± 13.98 (75–118) 22.89 ± 5.62 (15–32) 12.78 ± 5.61 (5–23) 2.25 ± 0.88 (1.00–4.00) 2.13 ± 0.97 (1.00–4.40) 39.50 ± 9.69 (28–50) 12.92 ± 3.35 (10–18.5) 106.83 ± 11.34 (84–115) 21.83 ± 4.54 (15–28) 17.67 ± 9.22 (4–25) 2.33 ± 1.26 (1.00–4.00) 2.37 ± 0.87 (1.20–3.20) Education NART IQ Age of onset Duration of illness SAPS average SANS average Note. Data expressed as mean ± SD (range). 93 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 Table 2 Severity of auditory verbal hallucinations and the number and percentage of patients experiencing each level of severity according to insight. Measure Overall (n = 35) Insightful (n = 20) Partial Insight (n = 9) No Insight (n = 6) Frequency of voices* Daily (2) or more (1)a Once a week (3) Monthly (4) Less than monthly (5) Question not answered 13 (37.1%) 8 (22.9%) 2 (5.7%) 11 (31.4%) 1 (2.9%) 6 (30.0%) 5 (25.0%) 1 (5.0%) 7 (35.0%) 1 (5.0%) 5 (44.4%) 3 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) Number of voices* 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) P4b (4/5) Unsure Question not answered 8 (22.9%) 6 (17.1%) 2 (5.7%) 18 (51.5%) 1 (2.9%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (30.0%) 2 (10.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (55.0%) 1 (5.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 2 (22.2%) 2 (22.2%) 4 (44.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Amount of speech* Just a few words (1) A few sentences (2) Continuous speech (3) Varies Question not answered 12 (34.3%) 10 (28.6%) 14 (34.3%) 1 (2.9%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (40.0%) 5 (25.0%) 6 (30.0%) 1 (5.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (22.2%) 4 (44.4%) 3 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Volume* Softer than speechc (1/2/3) Normal speech Shouting Varies Question not answered 8 (22.9%) 19 (54.3%) 2 (5.7%) 6 (17.1%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (15.0%) 11 (55.0%) 1 (5.0%) 5 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (44.4%) 5 (55.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) Note. Italicised numbers in parentheses indicate the rank coding for each response. * Indicates variables that could be treated as ordinal. a This category collapses Daily (2 responses) and more than daily (11 responses). b This category collapses 4 (1 response) and 5 or more (17 responses) voices. c This category collapses ‘‘no volume” (1 response), ‘‘whispers” (3) and ‘‘softer than normal” (4). two reasons. First, Fisher’s test assumes that both column and row totals are fixed, whereas in our data only the column totals are fixed. Second, Fisher’s test is at its core an exhaustive test of the likelihoods of all possible data patterns, which it is not feasible to compute with the large number of possible combinations here. Hence, we adopted an alternative (nonparametric) approach to NHSTs. The nonparametric approach we adopted was to use a randomisation test. We briefly summarise the approach here, but provide a more detailed treatment of our methods in the Appendix A (see Edgington & Onghena, 2007, for a description of the general rationale for the randomisation test approach). Any randomisation test requires some measure of the effect being investigated. Pearson’s X2 statistic is a measure of the degree to which the observed data deviates from the expected data under the null hypothesis. The difficulty is that Pearson’s X2 is not suitable for sparse contingency tables such as ours. Fortunately, Shields and Heeler (1979) offer an alternative measure of deviation that does not suffer this limitation. For our analysis, we have used their Ks statistic to index the degree of variation. Details about this statistic are available in the Appendix A. Tables 2–4 detail 19 different possible measures of the properties of AVHs. For all 19, the randomisation tests yielded pvalues exceeding 0.05 for the proportion of random results that yielded greater values of the measure of association than the value occurring in the data table. Table 5 gives the value of this proportion for each measure of intensity. For none of the 19 measures we used was there any evidence of a significant relationship between the hallucinatory property and whether or not patients are delusional about their AVHs. Using traditional p-value criteria, ‘ability to control voices’ appears to show a trend (p = 0.09). We are disinclined to trust this result in the absence of replication for two reasons. First, in order to maximise the possibility of finding relationships, we have not corrected the alpha-level for family-wise error, meaning that even a p-value of 0.05 has a high likelihood of being spurious. Further weakening the criterion would exacerbate this risk. Second, any trend association here seems to be unidirectional rather than bi-directional, such that the presence of a delusional belief that voices are caused by an external agent(s) leads participants to believe that they cannot control the voices (which accords with the zero cell for ‘No insight’ and ‘Yes/Able to control voices’), while the majority of those with insightful beliefs about their AVHs still reported a lack of control. 3.2.2. Bayesian analysis Given that randomisation tests demonstrated a lack of association between AVH properties and beliefs, we used other statistical methods to verify this and confirm the absence of an association. The randomisation test described above is undertaken using the same logic as traditional hypothesis testing. That is, we can look for evidence against the null hypothesis but our method cannot uncover evidence for the null hypothesis. Bayesian analysis techniques allow researchers to go one step 94 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 Table 3 The number and proportion of patients reporting different phenomenological characteristics of their hallucinations according to level of insight. Quality Overall (n = 35) Insightful (n = 20) Partial Insight (n = 9) No Insight (n = 6) Relative age of voice* Mainly younger (1) Mainly same age (2) Mainly older (3) Varies Unsure Question not answered 4 (11.4%) 15 (42.9%) 6 (17.1%) 4 (11.4%) 1 (2.9%) 5 (14.3%) 3 (15.0%) 8 (40.0%) 2 (10.0%) 2 (10.0%) 1 (5.0%) 4 (20.0%) 1 (11.1%) 3 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (66.7%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Sex of voice Male Female No sex Both sexes Unsure Question not answered 10 (28.6%) 3 (8.6%) 4 (11.4%) 14 (40.0%) 3 (8.6%) 1 (2.9%) 5 (25.0%) 3 (15.0%) 3 (15.0%) 6 (30.0%) 3 (15.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (22.2%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 5 (55.6%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Same sex as subject Yes No Varies Unsure Question not answered 6 (17.1%) 6 (17.1%) 17 (48.6%) 3 (8.6%) 3 (8.6%) 4 (20.0%) 3 (15.0%) 7 (35.0%) 3 (15.0%) 3 (15.0%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (11.1%) 7 (77.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Social class of voice Working class Middle class Upper class No class Varies Unsure Question not answered 4 (11.4%) 9 (25.7%) 2 (5.7%) 5 (14.3%) 4 (11.4%) 10 (28.6%) 1 (2.9%) 1 (5.0%) 5 (25.0%) 1 (5.0%) 3 (15.0%) 2 (10.0%) 7 (35.0%) 1 (5.0%) 3 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (22.2%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) Same class as subject Yes No Varies Unsure Question not answered 13 (37.1%) 3 (8.6%) 2 (5.7%) 3 (8.6%) 14 (40.0%) 6 (30.0%) 3 (15.0%) 2 (10.0%) 2 (10.0%) 7 (35.0%) 6 (66.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 4 (66.7%) Accent Same as patient Unsure Varies Question not answered 18 (51.4%) 2 (5.7%) 2 (5.7%) 13 (37.2%) 7 (35.0%) 2 (10.0%) 1 (5.0%) 10 (50.0%) 7 (77.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (22.2%) 4 (66.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (16.7%) Recognises identity of voice Yes No Sometimes/varies Unsure Question not answered 15 (42.9%) 12 (34.3%) 4 (11.5%) 3 (8.6%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (35.0%) 7 (35.0%) 3 (15.0%) 2 (10.0%) 1 (5.0%) 2 (22.2%) 6 (66.7%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) Intelligibility* Always intelligible (4) Mostly intelligible (3) Makes sense half the time (2) Mostly makes no sense (1) Question not answered 22 (62.9%) 6 (17.1%) 3 (8.6%) 4 (11.4%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (55.0%) 3 (15.0%) 3 (15.0%) 3 (15.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (66.7%) 2 (22.2%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (83.3%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Speed* Slow (1) Normal rate (2) Sped up (3) Varies Question not answered 1 (2.9%) 27 (77.1%) 3 (8.6%) 3 (8.6%) 1 (2.9%) 1 (5.0%) 12 (60.0%) 3 (15.0%) 3 (15.0%) 1 (5.0%) 0 (0.0%) 9 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Location of voicea,* Always outside head (1) Usually outside head (2) Both inside and outside (3) Usually inside head (4) Always from inside head (5) Unsure 14 (40.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (14.3%) 2 (5.7%) 12 (34.3%) 2 (5.7%) 8 (40.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (15.0%) 1 (5.0%) 7 (35.0%) 1 (5.0%) 2 (22.2%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (11.1%) 5 (55.6%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (66.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 95 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 Table 3 (continued) Quality Overall (n = 35) Insightful (n = 20) Partial Insight (n = 9) No Insight (n = 6) Form of address Second person only Third person only Both persons Question not answered 19 (54.3%) 4 (11.4%) 12 (34.3%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (60.0%) 4 (20.0%) 4 (20.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (55.6%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (44.4%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (66.7% 0 (0.0%) Overall content of voice* Happy/excited/positive (1) Neutral (2) Negative/angry (3) Varies Unsure Question not answered 7 (20%) 7 (20%) 15 (42.9%) 5 (14.3%) 1 (2.9%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (20%) 5 (25.0%) 7 (35.0%) 4 (20.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (11.1%) 5 (55.6%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Command hallucination* Always tell what to do (3) Sometimes tell what to do (2) Never like that (1) Question not answered 9 (25.7%) 10 (28.6%) 16 (45.7%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (15.0%) 5 (25.0%) 12 (60.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (50.0%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) Note. Italicised numbers in parentheses indicate the rank coding for each response. * Indicates variables that could be treated as ordinal. a This category collapses into either 3 groups (inside, both, outside) or 5 groups (always inside, usually inside, both, usually outside, always outside). Both ways were analysed – see Table 5. Table 4 The number and proportion of patients reporting different actions and beliefs related to their voices according to level of insight. Property Overall (n = 35) Insightful (n = 20) Partial Insight (n = 9) No Insight (n = 6) Answer voices Yes No Unsure Question not answered 25 (71.4%) 9 (25.7%) 1 (2.9%) 0 (0.0%) 13 (65.0%) 6 (30.0%) 1 (5.0%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (77.8%) 2 (22.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (83.3%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) Able to control voices Yes No Question not answered 12 (34.3%) 23 (65.7%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (35.0%) 13 (65.0%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (55.6%) 4 (44.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) further and evaluate the evidence both against and for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014), thus helping to address concerns that non-significant of tests against the null hypothesis may reflect limited power. Here, we make use of Bayes Factors, which are the ratio of the evidence for one model versus the evidence for another. As a result, Bayes Factors fall between 0 and infinity, where factors greater than 1 favour the presence of the effect over the absence of the effect, while factors less than 1 favour the absence of the effect. Conventional rules for interpreting Bayes Factors assign strength of the evidence as follows: Factors greater than 3 (or less than 1/3; i.e., less than 0.33) are considered ‘‘some evidence”, factors greater than 10 (or less than 1/10; i.e., less than 0.01) are considered ‘‘strong evidence”, and factors greater than 30 (or less than 1/30; i.e., less than 0.03) are considered ‘‘very strong evidence.” For this study, we compared the evidence for the presence of a relationship between insight and each variable to the evidence against the relationship using the ‘‘conting” analysis package (Overstall & King, 2014) developed for R (R Core Team, 2015). The results from our Bayesian Analysis are presented in the second column of Table 5. For all properties, except the frequency of AVHs that are commanding, the evidence favours the absence of the effect over the presence of the effect. In most cases that favour the absence of an effect, that evidence meets the 1/3 standard for ‘‘some evidence” (and often the 1/10 standard for ‘‘strong evidence”). In other cases, the trend is toward the absence of an effect, but the evidence cannot clearly mediate between the two hypotheses. In the single case where the evidence favours the presence of a relationship between frequency of commanding AVHs and level of insight, this Bayes factor (1.09) is so near 1 as to be essentially equivocal (as is the Bayes factor for the ability to control AVHs at 0.99). 3.2.3. Analysing the data as ordinal While many of the variables are categorical, some could be treated as ordinal, including the insight variable. Ordinal data provides additional information about relative ranking, and so statistical approaches for ordinal data are considered more powerful than statistical approaches for categorical data. We considered ranked-correlation results between the insight variable and those AVH variables that could be ranked. To do this, we calculated both Spearman’s ranked correlations, and Kendall’s tau (which is an alternative method that is better able to cope with ties in the data, of which there are many here). The 96 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 Table 5 Results of the analyses for each property of AVHs. Measure Contingency table analysis Ranked correlation analysis Randomisation test Bayes factor N Spearman p Kendall p N Severity Frequency of voices Number of voices Amount of speech Volume of speech 0.37 0.41 0.77 0.46 0.36 0.14 0.09 0.19 34 35 35 35
0.063 0.030 0.141
0.045 0.72 0.87 0.42 0.82
0.060 0.022 0.130
0.046 0.70 0.89 0.41 0.79 34 34 34 29 Personification qualities Relative age of voice Sex of voices Relative sex Social class of voice Recognise identity of voice 0.73 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.64 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.68 0.14 30 34 34 34 34 0.229 0.27 0.203 0.28 25 Phenomenological qualities Intelligibility of voice Speed of speech Location of voice (5 categories) Location of voice (3 categories) Form of address Command hallucinations Overall emotional content 0.86 0.46 0.44 0.24 0.60 0.29 0.60 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.53 0.04 1.09 0.07 35 34 35 35 35 35 35 0.245
0.177
0.113
0.109 0.16 0.34 0.53 0.55 0.222
0.166
0.102
0.099 0.15 0.33 0.52 0.54 35 31 33 33 0.375 0.084 0.03 0.67 0.340 0.079 0.03 0.65 35 29 Response to voice Answer voices Ability to control voices 0.82 0.09 0.04 0.99 35 35 Note. The Randomisation Test is the likelihood that the data observed were could be due to random chance. The Bayes Factor is the degree to which the evidence favours a relationship between Insight and the property (numbers in bold indicate Bayes Factor < 0.33; i.e., providing some evidence against an association). The first N is the number of responses that are included in the Contingency Table analysis. Spearman is the ranked correlation score for properties that could be treated as ordered. Kendall is Kendall’s tau for the same. The final N is the sample size for the Spearman and Kendall correlations after removing non-ordinal responses such as ‘‘unsure” or ‘‘varies”. variables which could be treated as ordinal are indicated with an asterisk (⁄) in Tables 2 and 3, and the associated coding schemes are indicated in italics beside the responses. The results of the correlational analysis appear in the latter columns of Table 5. Here we do find a significant result for the effect of the ‘command’ variable on beliefs, so that more frequent commanding voices are associated with less insightful beliefs. This effect is such that the absence of commanding voices appears to protect against delusional beliefs (only one of the 16 who never experienced their voices as commanding was delusional about the cause of their AVHs). In contrast, of the nine whose voices were always commanding, the likelihood of delusional beliefs was higher, but only to the extent of equal numbers with delusional beliefs, partial insight, and insightful beliefs. No other correlations are significant. 3.2.4. Combining speech properties Another possibility is that more intense experience could reflect a combination of variables rather than the variables on their own. For example, while voice characteristics such as frequency, count, and amount of speech are not individually important it may be that these variables combined provide for a better measure of intensity. To test this, we used Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and, given limitations of sample size for a PCA, focused on the three AVH intensity variables related to ‘‘amount of speech” (number of voices, frequency of voices and length of utterances), after having recoded them so that higher AVH scores indicate greater intensity. An additional aim was to subsequently plot the AVH composite scores against degree of insight so as to graphically illustrate, not only the strength of any overall relations, but also any dissociations (e.g., patients with severe intensity of AVHs and yet insightful beliefs). Results revealed a single component for the variables concerning amount of speech (Eigenvalue = 1.58) that explained 52.6% of the variance and comprised the highest loadings for frequency (0.82) and number of voices (0.84) and the lowest loading for amount of speech per utterance (0.45). The single component score was saved and correlated with patients’ degree of insight. There was no significant relationship between these variables, r =
0.006; p = 0.975. Fig. 1 illustrates the scatterplot of beliefs against the amount of speech component score. Of the six cases who were delusional, half fell in the quadrant for relatively lower intensity of AVHs; of the 20 cases with full insight, just over half (11) fell in the quadrant for higher intensity of AVHs. So once again we found no evidence of any relationship between AVH intensity and AVH insight and clear evidence that the amount of speech doubly dissociates from beliefs about the cause of voices. 3.2.5. Combining personification properties Another dimension that could contribute to the intensity of the experience is the degree to which the voices are personified, in the sense that their ages, sexes, classes, or other personality dimensions are identifiable. To test this hypothesis, we created a personification index that combined sex, class, age, and identity. For each case, we counted the number of person- 97 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 Composite Intensity Score 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 - 0.5 -1 - 1.5 -2 Partial Insight No Insight Insight Beliefs about AVHs Fig. 1. Graph showing component intensity score against degree of insight. The component intensity score is a composite of the different statistical properties of AVHs; the higher the score, the more intense the AVH. Table 6 Correlations between the personification of the voices, and the degree of insight. Criterion Pearson p Spearman p Kendall p N Liberal Strict 0.212 0.101 0.22 0.56 0.185 0.099 0.29 0.57 0.155 0.083 0.32 0.58 35 35 ification variables that were clearly identified. We did this using both a liberal scoring criterion (wherein any response other than ‘‘unsure” was treated as known), and a stricter criterion (which also treated responses such as ‘‘none” for sex as not personified). These scores were then correlated with our ranked insight variable, using a traditional Pearson’s correlation, the Spearman ranked correlation, and Kendall’s tau. Though the liberal personification score produced higher correlations than the stricter score, none approached significance; so yet again we found no relationship between beliefs about the cause of AVHs and a measure of AVH intensity (see Table 6). 4. Discussion Contrary to Maher’s proposal, the statistical intensity of participants’ AVHs – whether conceptualised as the frequency with which they occurred, the number of voices, their volume, or other aspects related to how often patients were preoccupied by hearing their voices – was not related to patients’ beliefs about the cause of the voices. The personification of voices was also unrelated to beliefs. Analyses with Bayes factor revealed that, for the majority of AVH variables, there was significant evidence for a lack of association. This was consistent with the dissociations evident in Fig. 1 and the contingency tables (Tables 2 and 3) showing cases in every cell. Of the 18 AVH properties considered, only two – ability to control voices and frequency of a commanding nature – showed equivocal support for a relationship with beliefs. In both cases, however, some patients with insightful beliefs gave similar ratings to patients with delusions, indicating that these properties by themselves are not sufficient to account for the different beliefs. Overall, patients with AVHs varied considerably in the frequency, amount, volume, and other phenomenological qualities of the voices they heard with no strong evidence of robust relationships between qualities of AVHs and beliefs. These findings have important implications for theories of delusions. As already noted, there are two main approaches to explaining delusional beliefs at a cognitive level: a one-factor approach and a two-factor approach. Both approaches accept that delusions can arise as an explanation for an unusual experience or neuropsychological anomaly. This can be illustrated by the example of Capgras delusion, the belief that a loved one has been replaced by an imposter. In this case, loss of autonomic responsiveness to faces, acquired through brain injury, leads an individual to encounter their loved one with an affective response weaker than that to which they have been accustomed, and hence to the idea of an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). According to the one-factor theory (see, e.g., Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010; Maher, 1974, 1988), such a neuropsychological anomaly is sufficient to explain the delusion. By contrast, according to the two-factor theory (Coltheart, 2007, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2011; Langdon, 2011; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000), an additional pathological factor is needed to explain why the delusion is accepted and not rejected. This second factor is thought to involve a deficit in belief evaluation and explains why some patients with a neuropsychological anomaly develop a delusion while other patients with this anomaly do not (Coltheart et al., 2011; see also Connors & Coltheart, 2011; Connors & Halligan, 2015; Connors, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2015; Langdon, 2011; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Langdon & Connaughton, 2013). This second factor may involve damage to specific brain areas, such as the right 98 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Coltheart, 2010), right medial prefrontal cortex (Gilboa, 2010), or the right inferior frontal gyrus (Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011). These two theories offer different predictions about how delusions arise in response to AVHs. Any such account needs to explain not only the presence of AVHs and their phenomenological qualities (including intensity and amount and other qualitative features) but also the associated belief about their cause. As one-factor approaches assume that delusional beliefs can be explained without proposing some additional anomaly beyond the aberration(s) that causes the AVH experience, advocates of this approach would presumably assert that a single underlying factor is responsible for both the generation of the AVHs and the generation of the delusional belief about the AVHs. In Maher’s (2006) view, for example, delusions about AVHs arise as a normal response to sufficiently intense AVHs, and explaining the intensity of AVHs is sufficient to explain the presence or absence of an associated delusion. By contrast, a two factor approach would suggest that explaining the presence of AVHs and their intensity is not sufficient to explain the presence of delusional beliefs about the cause of the AVHs: some other distinct factor needs also be present to explain why some voice-hearers with AVHs are delusional, while other voice-hearers with equally intense (and sometimes even more intense) AVHs have insightful beliefs about their cause. Our data thus are more consistent with the two-factor approach. Our findings indicate that the intensity of hallucinatory experiences and the beliefs about the cause of the AVHs are dissociated for almost all of the properties of the hearing-voices experiences that we assessed. The only AVH property for which the presence of a delusional belief aligned completely with the presence of a particular AVH property was ‘‘ability to control voices” (i.e., all delusional cases reported inability to control voices). The pattern of data suggested, however, that it was the presence of a delusional belief that explained the voices being self-reported as uncontrollable, while the presence of insightful beliefs conferred no protection against experiencing the voices as uncontrollable. In other words, the pattern of data suggests the experience of uncontrollability was a consequence of the delusional belief, rather than the experience of uncontrollability explaining the delusional belief. These findings suggest that, while the voice experience helps to explain the content of an associated delusional belief, some additional distinct factor(s) is involved in explaining why a patient is delusional about the cause of the voicehearing experience. This is consistent with the two-factor theory of delusions, but cannot be easily reconciled with a onefactor account. It is also not readily explained by a ‘‘prediction error” account, a type of one factor approach, which posits a common underlying mechanism for delusions and hallucinations (Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This account holds that an aberrant sense of unexpectedness – ‘‘prediction error” – drives the formation of both hallucinations (by causing internal experience to appear not self-generated) and delusions (by leading innocuous stimuli to appear highly salient and unrelated stimuli to appear associated). While this general mechanism may still be involved, it would seem that a second distinct factor is necessary to account for the divergences between insightful beliefs, partial insight, and delusions about voices. This dissociation appears to be somewhat consistent with neuroimaging and neuropsychological research. Previous research examining the neural correlates of AVHs has identified activation of circuits involved in auditory processing, such as in left fronto-temporal areas (Jardri, Pouchet, Pins, & Thomas, 2011; Kompus, Westerhausen, & Hugdahl, 2011). In several studies, researchers have asked participants to rate the subjective reality of their AVHs and examined the neural correlates of these ratings (Raij et al., 2009; Vercammen, Knegtering, Bruggeman, & Aleman, 2011). While not explicitly examining insight, these studies have found correlations between the self-reported subjective reality of AVHs and activation in other brain regions, including the right hemisphere (Vercammen et al., 2011) and coupling between the IFG, ventral striatum, auditory cortex, right posterior temporal lobe, and cingulate cortex (Raij et al., 2009), in addition to the circuits involved in auditory processing. Research examining delusions – rather than AVHs – has found strong evidence of right frontal involvement in delusions (Coltheart, 2007, 2010; Devinsky, 2009), rather than areas shared with hallucinations. Similarly, studies examining belief evaluation in healthy participants without AVHs have found evidence of activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Corlett et al., 2004; Fletcher et al., 2001; Turner et al., 2004) and right inferior frontal gyrus (Sharot et al., 2011). Altogether, the findings suggest distinct brain regions are responsible for AVHs and the associated beliefs about them. This research, however, is limited by the relatively small number of studies in the area and, in particular, by the lack of research examining neural correlates of insight into the cause of AVHs, as opposed to self-reported subjective reality. Our study was limited somewhat by its small sample size, although our Bayesian analyses helps to address this concern. Our results are also based on a chronic well-functioning schizophrenia sample. Insight is likely to be worse, for example, in patients during the early stages of psychosis or with uncontrolled schizophrenia. Future studies might therefore consider beliefs about AVHs in other schizophrenia cohorts and other clinical conditions (e.g., borderline personality disorder). Other factors that we did not assess, such as the specific content of the AVHs – including whether the voices offer predictions about future events that the voice-hearers believe to subsequently eventuate – could also influence patients’ beliefs about whether the voices originate from some other power/agent. Despite these limitations, however, the findings provide evidence that beliefs about AVHs are not dependent on the underlying intensity or phenomenology of the AVHs themselves. Instead, the findings suggest that delusional beliefs about AVHs involve factors other than the AVHs themselves, including additional pathologies in belief evaluation. Nevertheless, given the large degree of distress caused by AVHs, future research could examine whether specific interventions designed to change interpretations of voices might alter the observed phenomenological qualities of voices and examine whether patients themselves might be able to identify idiosyncratic features in their own voices that promote insightful beliefs. M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 99 Acknowledgments We are grateful to Glen Carruthers, Emily Connaughton, Simon McCarthy-Jones, Vince Polito, Robert Ross, Neralie Wise and other members of the CCD Belief Formation group for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work was supported by the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Cognition and its Disorders (CE110001021) <www.ccd.edu.au>. Appendix A. Statistical methods and results Here we describe the Ks measure of deviation, as well as the algorithm used in our randomisation tests. A.1. The Ks measure of deviation Shields and Heeler (1979) developed the Ks statistic as an alternative to the more traditional X2 statistic. The advantage of this statistics is that it is able to evaluate goodness of fit for so-called ‘‘sparse contingency tables”: contingency tables containing zeroes in the expected values (X2 requires all expected values to be positive). The equation for their statistic is as follows: Ks ¼ 2 X lnðOij !Þ
X lnðEij !Þ  There are other measures of deviance that can accept zero values that could have been used (e.g., a sum of simple squared deviances). We chose Ks, first because it was shown by Shields and Heeler (1979) to behave very much like Pearson’s X2 statistic on well-formed data, and second because, in testing other measures, we found Ks to be relatively less conservative, giving us a better chance of discovering even weak associations if they exist. A.2. Our randomisation tests A statistic chosen, we now turn to a brief overview of how the randomisation test was applied to the data in this study (Edgington & Onghena, 2007, provide a fuller and more general treatment of this approach). The goal is identical to traditional null hypothesis statistical testing: estimate a p-value representing how likely we would be to observe an Ks statistic greater than or equal to our actual observed statistic, if there were no relationship between the variable of interest and level of insight. To do this we generate random contingency tables assuming no relationship, and measure how often the Ks statistic exceeds the one observed for our actual data. In each case where we report a p-value from the randomisation test, the algorithm was as follows: 1. Create a two-way contingency table of random frequencies by assigning the 35 observations at random to the cells in that table with the following constraints: a. the number of rows in the randomly generated table had to be the same as in the obtained contingency table being analysed. That is, if there participants provided three different responses to the question, the random table would also contain all three responses (even if some were given zero times by all groups). b. the column sums of the random table had to be the same as the column sums in the actual data table (namely, 20, 9 and 6). That is, while particular participants were randomly assigned responses, there were always the same number of participants with insight, partial insight, and no insight as in our sample. 2. Calculate the value of Ks for that random contingency table. This measures how strong the association is in that particular random contingency table. 3. Repeat the first two steps 100,000 times for each analysis to get a range of the possible Ks under the null hypothesis. 4. The value of Ks computed from our observed data (Tables 2–4) was then compared to the 100,000 values obtained via Step 3, and the proportion of random tables that produce larger deviances can be observed. Computing the proportion of random tables that deviate from the expected by more than our observed data provides an estimate of the likelihood that our data were due to random chance. The smaller this proportion is, the stronger is the evidence for an association between the column factor (whether a patient had insight, some insight, or no insight into his or her AVHs) and the row factor (one of the measures of AVH intensity). For example, a proportion of 0.05, would indicate that only 5% of randomly constructed datasets depart from zero association as much or more than our dataset did. This value can thus be interpreted the same way a p-value from a traditional X2 would be: if less than 0.05, then the data provide evidence against the null hypothesis. Conversely, if this proportion were, say, 0.60, this would indicate that our dataset does not provide any evidence against the null hypothesis. 100 M.H. Connors et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 89–101 References American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. Text revision (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 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Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy Antonella Corradini ⇑, Alessandro Antonietti Department of Psychology, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano, Italy a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online xxxx Keywords: Mirror neurons Empathy Reenactive empathy Rational explanation Social cognition Mindreading Theory–theory Simulation theory Emotion Intention understanding a b s t r a c t The current renewal of interest in empathy is closely connected to the recent neurobiological discovery of mirror neurons. Although the concept of empathy has been widely deployed, we shall focus upon one main psychological function it serves: enabling us to understand other peoples’ intentions. In this essay we will draw on neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical literature in order to investigate the relationships between mirror neurons and empathy as to intention understanding. Firstly, it will be explored whether mirror neurons are the neural basis of our empathic capacities: a vast array of empirical results appears to confirm this hypothesis. Secondly, the higher level capacity of reenactive empathy will be examined and the question will be addressed whether philosophical analysis alone is able to provide a foundation for this more abstract level of empathy. The conclusion will be drawn that both empirical evidence and philosophical analysis can jointly contribute to the clarification of the concept of empathy. Ó 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. 1. Introduction The mirror neuron system (MNS) has been recently proposed as the biological basis of social cognition (e.g., Pineda, 2009). This encompasses a broad range of phenomena, which includes, among others, empathy (Gallese, Gernsbacher, Heyes, Hickok, & Iacoboni, 2011, Question 6). The term ‘‘empathy’’ is used to denote different phenomena (Roganti & Ricci Bitti, 2012). It is sometimes deployed to refer to simple forms of behavioural sharing, as occurs in emotional contagion: when a person is performing an action which is usually associated with the experience of a given emotion, another displays the same behaviour (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). This is the case of a baby who begins crying because another baby close to her is crying or the case of laughter which spreads in a group even though people are not aware of why the others are laughing. On the other hand, empathy can be conceived of as a mainly cognitive phenomenon, which allows us to figure out the propositional attitudes that are at the basis of another’s deciding, planning, and acting. Emotional aspects are not excluded, but they play a minor role in the empathic process. In the light of this special issue’s topic, empathy can be conceived of as a person’s capacity to understand what others intend to do by experiencing the sensations, emotions, feelings, thoughts, beliefs, and desires which the other is experiencing (or has previously experienced). The assumption is that, if we experience the mental states of a fellow person, we can understand her reasons for her acting in a given way, and thus understand the intentions underlying her behaviour. For instance, if we realise, by watching Tom, that he has been offended by Dick and that he is now becoming angrier and angrier as a consequence of such an offence, we can understand why Tom behaves aggressively towards Dick. In turn, the comprehension of another’s mental states is based, beside verbal communication, on the overt behaviour displayed by her (Avenanti & Aglioti, ⇑ Corresponding author. Fax: +39 02 72342280. E-mail addresses: antonella.corradini@unicatt.it (A. Corradini), alessandro.antonietti@unicatt.it (A. Antonietti). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 2 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 2006), thus the observation of others’ bodily signals can be an important source of intention ascription. For instance, as suggested by Wolpert, Doya, and Kawato (2003), facial expressions – one of the main body signals we use to communicate, intentionally or incidentally, our emotional state to the others – can be seen as actions aimed at revealing the subject’s intentions. The function of empathy in understanding others’ intentions can be analysed both from a scientific and a philosophical point of view. The aim of this essay is to address this topic from both perspectives. From the viewpoint of scientific inquiry, the distinction between different forms of detecting others’ intentions is taken into account by referring to recent psychological literature. This will allow us to identify the specific form of empathy which is allegedly associated with MNS. Then, empirical data supporting the role of MNS in empathy will be shortly reviewed. The first section of the essay will end with some critical remarks about the need for conceptual clarification when appealing to MNS to ground empathy. These comments, by stressing the necessity of a fine-tuned analysis of such conceptual issues, will build the bridge to the philosophical section. This mainly focuses on whether reenactive empathy, that is to say cognitively understood empathy, can be conceived of as a genuine epistemic capacity, able to justify rational explanation. After a short introduction to the topic of empathy in contemporary social sciences, part 3.2. will be devoted to a defence of the soundness of rational explanation against criticisms raised by Hempel and other authors belonging to the empiricist tradition. In part 3.3, then, two arguments will be subjected to scrutiny, whose aim is to show that only reenactive empathy is able to ensure the validity of rational explanation. The upshot will be that neither argument proves to be conclusive. This result, however, does not definitively rule out empathy as an original kind of knowledge, since empirical evidence based on mirror neurons might offer some support to this epistemological thesis, in particular if basic kinds of empathy are taken into consideration. 2. Empathy and MNS from the point of view of psychology and neuroscience 2.1. Mirroring and mentalising mechanisms underlying empathy Empathy is a complex phenomenon involving different aspects and dimensions. In fact, the understanding of others’ intentions through the experience of their mental states may be underwritten by different processes. On the one hand, as shown by the example reported in the previous section, we can immediately understand the reasons for Tom’s aggressive behaviour on the basis of the perception of his face and/or the tone of his voice. We establish a direct connection between what Tom looks like (in terms of bodily appearance and bodily movements), his mental states, and his acts. On the other hand, we can understand Tom’s intentions by integrating the perceptual information Tom provides us with and some inferences based on contextual cues (for instance, the presence of other people on the scene who are mocking him), specific notions we have about Tom (for instance, remembering that Tom is a choleric guy), and abstract concepts (for instance, our conviction that an offended man should always take revenge). In the fields of psychology and the neurosciences some distinctions have been drawn in the attempt to clarify the mechanisms underlying the understanding of others’ intentions. A relevant starting point may be the distinction which has been made, under different concepts and linguistic labels, between a system which allows human beings to comprehend immediately others’ intentions and a system which allows humans to reach such an outcome through an inferential process which implies the mediating role of some forms of reasoning. This distinction relies on a more fundamental distinction which has been recurrently proposed by different authors in recent years in the domain of thinking and decision-making processes (Sloman, 1996), namely, the distinction between the so-called System 1 and System 2. System 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000) – also labelled as intuitive (Pretz, 2008), experiential (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), tacit (Hogarth, 2001), impression-based (Kahneman, 2003) – is fast and action-oriented; it is activated unintentionally and its functioning is rigid and partially behind the control of the individual. Usually it operates effortlessly on the basis of associations. System 2 (Stanovich & West, 2000) – also called analytical (Slovic et al., 2002), deliberative (Hogarth, 2001), judgment-based (Kahneman, 2003), rational (Epstein, 1994) – operates slowly, intentionally, and flexibly, predominantly on the basis of abstract representations and logical rules. Usually it is not emotionally charged. The functioning of System 2 may fail to be optimal because of the excessive cognitive load it requires, its slowness, and the large amount of effort its activation needs. In this vein, with specific reference to social cognition, Bohl and van den Bos (2012) proposed the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 process. The former is fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and lacks flexibility. The latter is slow, involves a high cognitive load and elaboration, is flexible and accessible to consciousness. With a more specific focus on processes involved in understanding other people’s intentions, Waytz and Mitchell (2011) distinguished between mirroring and self-projection mechanisms. The first mechanism enables us to understand other people by experiencing vicariously their mental states: thanks to such a mechanism, the others’ mental states are mirrored in our mind. Through the second mechanism we project our mental states onto the situation of another individual, so to infer her mental states. According to the authors, the two mechanisms involve different degrees of immediacy in others’ understanding. Mirroring is a sort of on-line process which allows us to resonate immediately according to what another person is experiencing; self-projection, by contrast, implies imagining off-line what we should experience if we were in the other’s shoes and then attributing such an experience to her. The distinction between mirroring and self-projection overlaps partially the distinction between mirroring and mentalising (Chiavarino, Apperly, & Humphreys, 2012). The mirroring system responds to observation of others’ acts and seems to Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 3 code their goals immediately by establishing purely behavioural relations between the perceptual appearance of the actor and her corresponding intentions. Mentalising instead requires inferences about the mental states which are at the basis of the behavioural relations. More precisely, the second system has two subcomponents: a representational one, which serves the task to represent the actor’s intention as a mental state (but not as a behavioural relation), and a conceptual component ‘‘representing the semantic and logical properties of intentions, abstractly reasoning over these properties, and relating them to other mental states’’ (Chiavarino et al., 2012, p. 286). 2.2. Mirror neurons and empathy: empirical data The neural circuits constituting MNS have been proposed as the best candidate for the biological basis of empathy, which is to be thought of as the expression of the mirroring process. In fact, MNS has been invoked as a putative interpretation of empathy and some experimental findings have been taken as evidence supporting the involvement of MNS in empathy (Gallese, 2001, 2003; Iacoboni, 2009; Preston & de Waal, 2002). First of all, it is documented that humans, when watching people showing facial expressions corresponding to well-defined emotions, covertly activate the same muscles which are involved in the creation of those expressions (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Moreover, if people are prevented from automatically imitating the muscle contractions of the faces they are exposed to (for instance, by compelling them to keep a pencil with the teeth transversal to the mouth), they become less able to detect the emotional expression of the observed faces (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). This experimental finding supports analogous results observed in patients affected by the Moebius syndrome, which impedes them to move their facial muscles: as a consequence of such an impairment, these patients fail to recognise the emotions expressed by others (Cole, 2001). Finally, it is worth noting that the same cortical areas are activated when people observe and imitate faces expressing emotions (Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004). Hence, it is proved that, in emotion recognition, observation and action are linked together, as in the case of the functional actions directed at manipulating things, which have been the main topic of investigation in MNS field. These findings, however, only concern emotion recognition, which is not empathy, but rather its precursor or precondition. Further empirical evidence is required. Indeed, other studies showed that the link between observation and perception also regards empathy. For instance, if individuals are paired with a confederate who imitates their postures, gestures, and body movements during the execution of a joint task, they perceive the confederate as more agreeable than controls paired to a non-imitating confederate do (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). In addition, individuals who spontaneously imitated the behaviour of the confederate scored higher on an empathy scale subsequently, showing a positive relation between the frequency of imitative behaviours and the empathy rates (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Two emotional reactions have been often investigated in the attempt to prove the involvement of MNS in empathy: pain and disgust. As to pain, Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, and Aglioti (2005) recorded the excitability of the muscle of the hand which generates an approaching movement toward a noxious stimulus (a needle): when people looked at a video showing other people whose hand was penetrated by a needle in the same point, the excitability of the muscle decreased (as if they were trying to move away the hand from the needle); in addition, the reduction of the excitability of the muscle was proportional to the estimated level of pain the subjects attributed to other people when their hand was penetrated by the needle (see also Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Sforza, & Aglioti, 2009; Valeriani et al., 2008). As far as the brain counterparts of pain experience are concerned, it was showed that neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex responding to painful stimuli applied to the subject’s hand also fired when the subject observed another person being stimulated by the same noxious stimuli (Hutchison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, & Dostrovsky, 1999). Anterior cingulate cortex, together with some regions of the insula, was also activated by observing relatives who were not currently exposed to painful stimuli, but would be stimulated painfully later (Singer et al., 2004). Hence, not only the direct observation of suffering people, but also the prefiguration of a future pain affecting others activate the brain areas corresponding to the actual experience of pain in first person. The same message is provided by studies concerning the neural counterparts of disgust. It has been proved that the same brain structure (the insula, in this case), which is active when the individual experiences disgust personally, is activated even when the individual looks at faces expressing disgust and that the intensity of such an activation is proportional to the level of disgust expressed by the face (Phillips et al., 1997). The evidence was later supported by recording the activity of neurons in the anterior part of the insula through electrodes implanted in the brain of epileptic patients (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003). A clear proof that the same neural counterparts are involved in experiencing disgust and observing other people experiencing that emotion was provided by Wicker et al. (2003) in a fMRI study where the same participants were both exposed to disgusting odours and to pictures of persons smelling the same odours. The impairment in experiencing negative emotions is associated with the impairment of recognising similar emotions in other people. In fact, a case was reported of a patient with brain lesions in the putamen and in the insula who failed to subjectively experience disgust (and, as a consequence, to react to disgusting situations appropriately) and also was not able to detect disgust in other people by observing their facial expressions or by listening to non-verbal sounds which they produced, as well as to the prosodic aspects of their speech (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000). A similar case was successively reported by Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio (2003). When trying to find evidence that MNS is specifically involved in empathy, we can point to the fact that the activation of brain areas included in MNS has been recorded in participants both when they were simply looking at actors showing facial Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 4 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx expressions whose emotional meaning corresponded to that of the story they were telling (Decety & Chaminade, 2003) and when they were asked to identify the emotional states of actors by observing their body postures, gestures, and facial expressions (Lawrence et al., 2006). Further support came from the experiment executed by Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, and Piefke (2007): mirror-neuron mechanisms were activated when participants, exposed to facial expressions, had to identify both the emotions concurrently experienced by themselves and the emotions expressed by the others’ faces. The involvement of MNS in empathy is also proved by correlational studies. Two investigations demonstrated that the level of emotional empathy developed by the participants was correlated to the intensity of the activity of premotor areas, presumably containing mirror neurons, when the participants were asked to look at other people carrying out the act of grasping with different intentions, as suggested by contextual hints (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006) or to listen to sounds produced by human actions (Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006). More specifically, participants who showed higher activation of brain areas involved in MNS when looking at facial expressions by focussing on their emotional valence (SchulteRüther et al., 2007) obtained high scores on empathy scales. MNS, together with other brain structures such as the limbic system and the insula, constitutes a large neural circuitry which has been proved to be activated by both the execution, through imitation, and observation of facial expressions associated to emotional experiences (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Iacoboni & Lenzi, 2002). The association between MNS and both the subjective experience of emotions and the detection of the same emotions in others through the observation of their behaviour is further supported by a fMRI study which showed that the activation of MNS in preadolescents while observing and imitating emotional facial expressions is positively correlated with the level of empathic skills (Pfeiffer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008). An additional support is provided by clinical studies carried out with people affected by autism. On the one hand these patients – who are impaired in recognising emotions from others’ facial expressions and to imitate such expressions – fail to show the usual reactions when looking at other people being affected by painful stimuli (Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009). On the other hand people with autism show deficits in MNS functioning and their level of activity of MNS is reduced in correspondence with the level of severity of the pathology (Dapretto et al., 2006). 2.3. Mirror neurons and empathy: conceptual problems One of the main messages which are associated to the findings concerning the involvement of MNS in the understanding of others’ mental states, including intentions, is that such an understanding does not exclusively depend on linguistic and mentalistic processes (Gallese, 2001, p. 34). On the contrary, intentions are embodied. Such an embodiment is shared both by the actor and the observer and relies on the motor schema of action. When the motor schema of the actor matches a motor schema in the repertoire of the observer, the intended meaning of the action is detected (Gallese, 2001, p. 36). If this general framework is applied to empathy, the consequence is that empathy is grounded in the experience of the lived body: others are conceived ‘‘not as bodies endowed with a mind but as persons like us’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 43). In this way we can recognise why persons behave in a certain manner. In some circumstances, the comprehension of the intentions of others’ behaviour occurs predominantly on the basis of the emotions they are experiencing rather than of the functions of the actions they are performing. When this happens, empirical findings summarised above suggest that MNS is involved, either because some cerebral areas belonging to MNS are directly activated or because other brain structures, connected to the main mirror-neuron areas, are activated, such that they successively involve the proper mirror-neuron areas. In any case, the resulting outcome is that the same brain structures, which are activated when we experience the affective state the other is experiencing, are activated. This would lead the affective states of other people to resonate in the mind of the perceiver (Gallese, 2001, p. 38; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 121) or, put differently, would generate in the perceiver a sort of inner imitation of what the other is feeling (Iacoboni, 2008, chap. 4). Another way of thinking of this is that the cerebral system of the observer would be activated as if she were behaving as the observed human being. This occurs because the observed behaviour is translated into a program which acts as a sort of signal (efference copy signal) which enables the simulation of the behaviour (Gallese, 2001, pp. 40–41). As a consequence, the other’s behaviour is modelled as an action thanks to the behavioural equivalence between the perceiver’s and the other’s actions (Gallese, 2001, p. 39). A first critical remark is that further clarification of the mental process supported by MNS during an empathic relation is required. Resonance, inner imitation, simulation, and modelling are different processes and the authors claiming that MNS grounds empathy should be more explicit and precise about the psychological counterparts of the corresponding cerebral activations. Whatever these processes may be which are supported by MNS and lead to empathy, authors maintaining that MNS is involved in empathy generally agree that intention understanding does not involve any form of abstract thought. To put it in the authors’ words, it is ‘‘non-predicative’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 44), ‘‘without verbal mediation’’ (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 120), ‘‘without the need of theorising’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 41), ‘‘without propositional attitudes’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 41), ‘‘non-inferential’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 44; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 174), ‘‘without any knowledge operation’’ (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 127), ‘‘not needing cognitive processes’’ (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 174), ‘‘pre-reflective’’ (Iacoboni, 2009, p. 666). In these authors’ view, MNS leads us to comprehend others’ experience in the absence of any conceptual representation and inference. Now, how should this form of understanding be conceived? This is a list of the adjectives which are attributed to it: ‘‘direct’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 41), ‘‘immediate’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 41; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, p. 127), ‘‘effortless’’ (Iacoboni, 2009, p. 666), ‘‘automatic’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 41; Iacoboni, 2009, p. 666), ‘‘implicit’’ (GalPlease cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 5 lese, 2001, p. 41), ‘‘unconscious’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 41), ‘‘subpersonal’’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 42 and 46). Here, too more precision seems to be required (Debes, 2009). In fact these attributes have different meanings and do not implicate one another. For instance, pure knowledge operations and cognitive processes, with no form of embodiment, can also be immediate and effortless, if adequately trained. Also the meaning of ‘‘automatic’’ and ‘‘unconscious’’ should be specified. A process can be automatic by its very nature or because it has become such after having been carried out for a long time with effort and the labour of reasoning. The same is true of the unconscious character of intention understanding: is it a process which has become unconscious as a consequence of its automatisation or because it has always been unconscious? In other words: the process might be conscious (and involving effort) when the individual is trying to learn to carry it out, but it becomes unconscious (and effortless) when she had learnt to master it. In addition: does the unconscious character of the process make reference to how the process develops or to the outcome of the process? We can be unaware of how we compute the sum 5 + 2, but we are aware of the output of the process (and also of the fact that we are computing the sum). Also the claim that intention understanding supported by MNS through empathy fails to involve knowledge and cognitive mechanisms can be questioned. As noted by Roganti and Ricci Bitti (2012, pp. 583–584), appraisal processes are always implied in emotion comprehension, and thus an interpretative component can never be discarded, otherwise only a form of emotional synchronisation or synthonisation, but not a real understanding, occurs. Thus, the specific forms of cognition which should be excluded by the kind of empathy supported by MNS have to be clarified, since it has been proved that other cortical regions, beside MNS, are involved in cognitive manifestations of empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2008). In conclusion, it appears that a more fine-grained analysis of the features of the empathic relation supported by MNR is needed. To this end, this issue has to be addressed from the philosophical perspective, which we turn to now. 3. From mirror neurons to reenactive empathy 3.1. Empathy as reenactive empathy As the first part of this essay has shown, the renewed, current interest in empathy is strictly related to empirical research in the fields of neurobiology and psychology. In particular, the discovery of MNS in monkeys has given new impulse to the scientific treatment of empathy. However, the notion of empathy has a long philosophical tradition, characterised by many ramifications and several divergent approaches (for an informed reconstruction of the history of empathy see Stüber, 2006, Introduction, and 2008). As far as philosophy of the social sciences is concerned, the most influential twentieth century supporter of empathy has been the philosopher of history Robert Collingwood (1949) who, against explanatory monism, maintained that explanation in history requires an essential empathic component. In fact, we cannot explain the behaviour of a historical character without re-enacting her intentions, beliefs, desires and choices. Yet, the role of reenactive empathy has not always been positively evaluated within the philosophy of the social sciences, partly because it introduces a sharp dualism between natural and social sciences, partly because it appears to represent a capitulation to any sort of subjectivism and arbitrariness (see Popper’s criticism of the epistemological role of empathy in Popper, 1972, 4.12). In recent years, however, authors such as Jane Heal and Karsten Stüber have revived the fortunes of empathy and have argued in favour of a strict correlation between rational explanation and empathy as a fundamental epistemic capacity. Most part of what follows is a discussion about the theses put forward by both authors. 3.2. Rational explanation As is well known, there are two main ways of conceiving explanation in folk-psychology. The first is theory–theory and the second is simulation theory. According to theory–theory, human actions are explained on the basis of the classical Hempelian method, which, although imperfect in a number of ways, nonetheless maintains its fundamental validity. What is essential in this method is the presence within the explanans of empirical laws having the form of universal conditionals. From the point of view of theory–theory supporters, then, action explanation is an empirical theory, which explains agents’ actions through empirical laws, just as any empirical theory explains the behaviour of certain objects. The laws may be different from some other empirical theories, since in folk-psychology they often are probabilistic or ceteris paribus laws; nonetheless, the explanatory structure is the same. By contrast, according to simulation theory, an agent’s behaviour is explained through simulation of the reasons, beliefs and desires which move the agent to action. An example of the theory–theory paradigm consists in the last of the three inferences involved in a successfully performed false belief task. ‘‘Predicting where Maxi will look for the chocolate. i. Maxi wants to eat the chocolate, and he believes that the chocolate is in cupboard, and he believes that looking for the chocolate in cupboard is a means of satisfying one’s desire of eating it. ii. Central action principle: If somebody desires x and believes that A-ing is a means of achieving x, then, ceteris paribus, he will do A. iii. Max will look for the chocolate in cupboard.’’ (Stüber, 2006, pp. 109–110). Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 6 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx The issue at stake is to clarify the nature of Central Action Principle (also named by Kim (1984, 1998) Desire/Belief/Action Principle – DBA), which in the inferential scheme fulfils the function of a general law. For theory–theory supporters this principle is an empirical law expressing a kind of nomological necessity and its presence is necessary. The notion of nomological necessity is, in fact, essential in order to define the relation of causal explanation. Critics of the theory–theory paradigm, however, cast doubts on the empirical nature of laws like DBA. What they question is not their general character; rather, critics point at the fact that they do not express a nomological necessity but a logical– analytical necessity, which sometimes is defined as a ‘‘rational’’ necessity (Dray, 1957). In other words, principles of this kind are principles that define the notion of rationality. They are the axioms of practical rationality, formally encoded in practical syllogisms (or practical inferences) (Anscombe, 1957; von Wright, 1971). Hempel’s criticism of rational explanation is well known (Hempel, 1965, chap. 5). If the DBA principle is a rationality axiom, it cannot be the object of empirical confirmation and, thus, it cannot be considered as a principle endowed with explanatory capacity. To avoid this consequence it is necessary to modify DBA to the following principle, DBA. Central action principle revised: If somebody desires x and believes that A-ing is a means of achieving x and she is a rational agent, then, ceteris paribus, she will do A. However, this move is fatal to rational explanation, since a rationality clause cannot be included among the particular facts of a law that claims to contribute to the definition of rationality itself. Indeed, to obtain confirmation of a law like DBA we must be in the business of establishing the truth of the antecedent, including the rationality clause. But, how is it possible to establish an agent’s rationality, if we need the principle DBA itself to define the rationality notion? The contrast between rational and nomological explanation seems to be so stark as to only allow two possibilities. Either we maintain that explanation should be nomological in the human sciences just as in the physical sciences, which almost necessarily leads to a naturalistic re-interpretation of folk-psychology. Or we give up the claim that actions are explainable as human actions and fall back on the less ambitious idea that they can only be the object of understanding; that is to say they are behaviours that we can interpret in the light of an agent’s subjectivity but that have their cause elsewhere. Is there a way out of this dilemma? Borrowing from Stüber (2003) we assume that principles like DBA can be conceived of both as analytical principles and as empirical generalisations. If they are understood as analytical principles, they express a necessity of a conceptual kind and have, on top of that, a normative meaning, as they formalize a correct way of reasoning. An agent who does not abide by them does not reason correctly and, as a consequence, does not decide correctly. These principles, however, can also be conceived of as empirical generalisations, inasmuch as they describe the way agents ‘‘in flesh and blood’’ reason and take decisions. In this latter meaning, and only in this latter meaning, they are falsifiable by experience. ‘‘The distinction between understanding a general statement as the articulation of a normative standard or as the description of a regularity in behavior points to different functions of the same statements in different contexts’’ (Stüber, 2003, p. 268). But why can they also be conceived of as empirical generalisations? Expanding on the previous argument, we can give the following answer. Analytically understood DBA principles define the concept of rationality. As we said before, they are rationality axioms and, thus, define the way a real mind (or a mechanism like a mind) should function in order to be a mind that operates rationally. It is worth noting that, from this viewpoint, also principles belonging to scientific theories could be conceived of as axioms that define certain models of empirical reality. In this way theory confirmation would not be anything other than the confirmation of the fact that the model defined by the theory is actually instantiated in empirical reality. Owing to this analysis of DBA, the rationality clause, which Hempel considered as a necessary condition in order to justify the explanatory character of practical argumentation, can now be put in the right place. For the previously mentioned reasons, such a clause must not be put among the other clauses of the conditional that makes the law. It must be considered, instead, as a fundamental presupposition, that is to say as a background assumption, that permits us the very use of those laws. In other words, it is the same assumption made in the practical–inferential model of rationality, understood as an explanatory model of empirical agents’ concrete actions. This assumption could be of course totally wrong, if the model did not work at all, that is to say if no set of actions did exist, which can be explained by any exemplification of the model. However, this can hardly be the case, since this would be tantamount to saying that the set of the actions to be rationally explained is empty. Instead, it is easier to falsify such a hypothesis on particular occasions, in which the action under scrutiny does not derive from true premises of the DBA principle. However, also on these particular occasions it is not the falsification of DBA as an analytical (logically correct) principle that occurs, but the falsification of the principle considered as an explanatory scheme. Thus, in the end, it is the falsification of the validity of the principle in that particular case. Yet, at this point a problem arises. The correctness of the DBA scheme can be justified by means of a priori reasons. It is an analytical principle and, therefore, it has to be founded in a similar way as those of the formal sciences. But what about DBA as an explanatory law, that is to say as the fundamental presupposition concerning the explanatory dimension of the practical–inferential model in its application to reality? 3.3. Is reenactive empathy an epistemic capacity? Authors such as Heal and Stüber answer this question by recourse to the empathy thesis. We are supposed to have the direct perception of the connections established by the DBA principle among our desires, our beliefs and the actions we perform. This perception is a first-person perception. It is the agent’s ego who perceives the logic of her acting. At this point Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 7 empathy enters the scene. The agent is able to put himself in others’ shoes, meaning not only that she succeeds in grasping the others’ point of view, but also in reenacting the same experiences which characterise others’ mental and emotive processes. In this way empathy becomes the epistemic element able to endow schemes like DBA with an explanatory dimension: that is to say empathy guarantees the soundness of their explanatory use. As Stüber puts it: ‘‘The special status of DBA just derives from the fact that we ourselves have access to our cognitive states and reasoning from the first person perspective and have to use this ability in a projective or reenactive manner in order to understand the reasons of other agents’’ (Stüber, 2003, pp. 275–276; Stüber, 2006, pp. 212–213). But why should we resuscitate reenactive empathy or co-cognition (Heal, 2003, p. 97 ff) in order to account for the soundness of the practical inferential explanation of actions? Heal (2003) and Stüber (2006, p. 152 ff) put forward two arguments in favour of the epistemic relevance of empathy. In the remainder of this essay I will expound and comment on both arguments. (A) The argument from the essential contextuality of thoughts as reasons As the argument goes, theory–theory aims to deliver a complete theory of action, including both a formal inferential scheme to allow people’s thoughts to be related together until the final decision is taken and a criterion to objectively establish the premises of the inferential scheme. But such a theory does not exist, because there is no complete formal inferential scheme and, above all, there are no criteria to objectively establish the premises of the inferential scheme, as they are dependent on the context. In fact, according to the frame problem, in order to establish the premises it is necessary to know what are the relevant aspects for ends choice. But to understand what are the relevant beliefs for explaining an action it is necessary to understand what are the beliefs that are meaningful to themselves as a subject, and this is not possible without reenactive empathy. Analysis of and comment on the argument. Three aspects of the previous argumentation should be distinguished. a. Theory–theory is criticised because it is unable to deliver a complete theory of action: it only partly covers the process of practical decision. In particular, it cannot solve the problem of the premises identification. Thus the theory is insufficient, since it is incomplete as regards its premises. b. Theory–theory is criticised because it is objective, that is, it does not account for the first person’s perspective. c. Theory–theory is criticised because it cannot justify the attribution of a causal role to agents’ desires and beliefs when these concern strictly subjective contents. But – as we learned from the contextuality argument – how is it possible to explain agents’ behaviours if we do not have any access to their subjectivity, that is, if we do not succeed in understanding how and why these contents are meaningful to the agent? Such an access presupposes an original and irreducible capability to empathically identify ourselves with a subject different from us. Now, our comment is that reenactive empathy may be needed, if it is needed at all, to provide a solution for the problem formulated at point c, but neither for the problem mentioned at point a nor for that at point b. Let us ask ourselves, in fact, what is needed to overcome incompleteness (point a). A method is needed that is able to establish the premises, which, however, are formulated from the subject’s viewpoint. They are premises which do not express states of affairs of the agent’s life that can be described as causes or objective conditions of the agent’s conduct. The states of affairs corresponding to such premises are not characterised by empirically detectable properties, thus we cannot grasp them without taking into account the subjective framework in which they are situated. In other words, they are states of affairs that can be described as structurally identical with the desires and beliefs from which our actions originate. Thus they presuppose the access to the first person’s perspective. We can then conclude that in order to overcome the incompleteness of the theory we need to modify it so to make it able to express the first person’s perspective. What is it necessary for such a goal? To say that we need reenactive empathy appears to us to be too a hasty strategy. Instead, we need to replace the Hempelian D–N scheme with the P–I scheme of practical inference. Practical inference, in fact, consists in a general scheme including assertions of the goals to be reached (B(x, goal p) as premises, beliefs on the chain of actions to perform for reaching those goals (B(x, N(p Ò to do q) and, as a conclusion, the action the subject decides to perform (x does q). Premises and conclusion are not connected to each other by empirical laws, but by principles belonging to practical logic (epistemic and deontic logic at first place). It is this very essential aspect of P–I that makes it capable of expressing the first person’s perspective. Actually, the above outlined scheme works perfectly if we replace x with the indexical ‘‘I’’, a typical expression of the first person’s perspective. So far, however, no kind of reenactive empathy is needed. We are dealing with the first person’s perspective, which only requires the subject’s capacity to grasp the nexus between the practical–inferential scheme and the world of her own desires and beliefs. To this end a form of self-perception or of self-awareness, but not of empathy is needed. Reenactive empathy could perhaps play a role at point c, when the P–I scheme is transferred to other subjects. We can in fact ask ourselves what would justify the extension of the scheme to other subjects and how would it be possible to explain their actions through a scheme like P–I if we could not accede the other’s world as if it were our own world. This part of the argument from contextuality will be expanded on in the second argument from the indexicality of thoughts as reasons (Stüber, 2006, p. 161 ff). Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 8 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx (B) The argument from the essential indexicality of thoughts as reasons This argument is divided into two parts. The first part of the argument can be formulated in the following way. The scheme: 1. B(x, goal p) 3 B(x, N(p ? q)) ? x makes q appears to me as explicative of the actions x does only if it appears to me as explicative of the actions I do. But it is explicative of my actions only if I understand that my belief that goal p and my belief that N(p ? q) imply my doing q. In other words, my reasons for my doing q must be ego-indexed. 2. The second part of the argument reads that when I think of goal p and N(p ? q) as reasons for others, I have to think of them as if they were my own reasons. Analysis of and comment on the argument. a. Our first remark is that indexicality essentially requires the first person’s perspective. However, this does not imply empathy, but only self-perception or inner perception. b. Secondly, empathy as an ability to reenact others’ thoughts is required, if at all, in the passage from my reasons to others’ reasons. That is, it has to be introduced as early as in the second part of the argument from indexicality. c. Thirdly, it is debatable whether reenactive empathy should be understood as a sui generis kind of knowledge. Empathy is in fact a form of knowledge which, on the one hand, is different from empirical perception, but which, on the other, is of the very same kind as perception, that is to say it is a form of perception and not a sort of pure a priori evidence. Thus it would represent a third kind of knowledge, in addition to empirical knowledge and genuinely a priori knowledge. The question then is whether it is strictly necessary to assume this new form of knowledge or whether it could be replaced by the synergic work of both inner perception and a priori knowledge. Empathy could be understood as an intentional capacity addressed to a ‘‘something’’ which is different from ourselves and is conceived of as a subject rather than as an object. The knowledge we suppose to have of the other could be actually interpreted in a different manner, that is, as the result of the information we derive from our capacity to represent to ourselves the other’s world and to draw from this the explanation of her behaviour. On this construal, we would be entitled to believe in the existence of others’ inner worlds thanks to their capacity to explain others’ behaviours to me. 4. Conclusion Heal’s and Stüber’s arguments in favour of the epistemic role of reenactive empathy do not appear to be conclusive. However, the way the argumentation has been developed does not preclude the possibility of exploiting empirical research to ascertain whether reenactive empathy is or is not an original kind of knowledge of others’ minds. Clearly, the deployment of empirical data to deal with an epistemological problem requires a theory about the relationship between conceptual and empirical knowledge. Its function is to legitimate the contribution of the empirical data to the construction of a conceptual and apriori kind of knowledge like that supplied by philosophy. We cannot exhaustively treat this topic in the present essay, but, since MNS delivers the most influential empirical result so far about empathy, we shall deal with the issue of whether the empirical results lend some support to this philosophical account of empathy. First, it is appropriate to stress that apriori and empirical considerations about empathy are not incompatible. In fact, the philosophical reflections provided above leave open the question about empathy. The possibility of empathy as an original kind of knowledge of other subjects’ minds has not been excluded, even though doubts have been cast on the claim that a priori reasons are sufficient for reaching a positive verdict on empathy. However, something more than mere compatibility is needed for arguing for the relevance of MNS to the empathy issue. It is necessary that neurobiology tells us what the role of mirror neurons is in the construction of intersubjectivity and if this role supports the thesis of a capacity which cannot be explained through the perception of a purely objective phenomenon like behaviour. We believe that the answer to the first question is quite uncontroversial. Empirical evidence shows that mirror neurons play a major role in the construction of a basic kind of relationship with the other. The answer to the second question is instead more thorny. It implicitly contains a hint at an impossibility proof. A theory about mirror neurons, in fact, should provide an argument to the effect that mirror neurons possess a capacity for intersubjectivity that is not explainable through the mere elaboration of objective perceptive data. In other words, the theory about mirror neurons should be able to exclude the possibility that mirror neurons can perform their function without implying empathic capacities. As is known, proofs of impossibility (or of indispensability) are very difficult and, sometimes, not conclusive. An opponent of the empathy thesis based on mirror neurons could argue that she can explain the evidence of intersubjectivity in a different way, i.e. by means of evolutionary theory. The argument would go as follows. The promptness with which neurons react to others’ mental world does not depend on any specific empathic capacity, but on the fact that this circumstance expresses in an immediate and non-reflexive way the capacity that the organism has acquired in its millenary history to represent to itself others’ mental world on the basis of their behaviours. The mirroring capacity of mirror neurons should not then be explained empathically, since it can be conceived of as the result of an evolutionary application of theory–theory. Please cite this article in press as: Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003 A. Corradini, A. Antonietti / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 9 However plausible this interpretation may appear, we think that the evolutionary way of arguing is debatable. In fact, it could be employed to all of the a priori capacities. As the evolutionary theory of knowledge affirms, these too are the result of the sedimentation of the species’ experiences in the individual. Thus, just as we believe that the evolutionary argument does not hold as regards the a priori in general, it seems to us quite wobbly also in the case of an empathic reading of mirror neurons. To sum up, there is no question that philosophical reflection successfully argues for the validity of the first person’s perspective, while the a priori arguments in favour of the empathy thesis remain problematic. 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Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 135–141 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Altered states of consciousness are related to higher sexual responsiveness Rui M. Costa a,⇑, José Pestana b, David Costa a, Marc Wittmann c a WJCR – William James Center for Research, ISPA – Instituto Universitário, Rua do Jardim do Tabaco 34, 1149-041 Lisbon, Portugal ISPA – Instituto Universitário, Rua do Jardim do Tabaco 34, 1149-041 Lisbon, Portugal c Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health, Wilhelmstr. 3a, 79098 Freiburg, Germany b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 24 January 2016 Revised 2 March 2016 Accepted 14 March 2016 Keywords: Sexual responsiveness Orgasm Altered states of consciousness Psychological absorption a b s t r a c t Altered states of consciousness lead to profound changes in the sense of self, time and space. We assessed how these changes were related to sexual responsiveness during sex. 116 subjects reported (a) intensity of awareness concerning body, space and time, and (b) satisfaction, desire, arousal, and orgasm occurrence. We differentiated vaginal intercourse orgasm from noncoital orgasm. Female vaginal intercourse orgasm was further differentiated as with or without concurrent clitoral masturbation. Overall, sexual responsiveness was related to greater body awareness and lesser time and space awareness. Satisfaction, desire, and arousal were especially associated with less time awareness in women. Female orgasms during vaginal intercourse were related to greater body awareness and lesser time awareness, but noncoital orgasms were unrelated. Our findings provide empirical support for the hypotheses that altered states of consciousness with attentional absorption are strongly related to sexual responsiveness in women, and to a lesser extent in men. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Altered states of consciousness induced through meditation, in sensory deprivation, in rhythm-induced trance or under the influence of drugs lead to profound changes in the sense of the self, time and space (Block, 1979; Vaitl et al., 2005; Wittmann, 2015). Altered states of consciousness can also occur in varying degrees during sexual activity (Mosher, 1980; Nielsen et al., 2013; Passie, Hartmann, Schneider, & Emrich, 2003; Swartz, 1994). States of ‘absorption’ are altered mental states characterized by an intense attentional focus on sensory and/or imaginary experiences which leads to changes in the perception of self, space, and time (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Given that sexual arousal is enhanced by focusing attention on sensory and imaginary sexual stimuli (Brody & Weiss, 2010; Smith & Over, 1987), absorption likely plays an important role in sexual responsiveness. This view is strengthened by studies revealing that the capacity for vivid imagination was related to proneness to sexual excitability in both sexes (Harris, Yulis, & Lacoste, 1980), and that hypnotic suggestibility was greater in women who attain orgasm during coitus more easily (Bridges, Critelli, & Loos, 1985). Both vividness of imagination and hypnotic suggestibility are characteristics of persons predisposed to absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Moreover, creative self-forgetfulness, a personality trait reflecting the tendency for experiencing absorbed states was related to higher sexual desire in women (Costa, Oliveira, Pestana, Costa, & Individual Differences, 2016). During sex, absorbed states occur in ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: rmscosta@gmail.com (R.M. Costa). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.013 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 136 R.M. Costa et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 135–141 varying degrees and are characterized by an intense focus on physical sexual sensations, and to some extent, as long it is not distractive, in erotic imagination. Such an absorption in bodily sensations comes together with a reduced awareness of surrounding space and alterations in the sense of time, which can take the form of loss of awareness of time (timelessness) (Swartz, 1994). Similar effects of a loss of time and space can be found in meditative states in experienced meditators (Berkovich-Ohana, Dor-Ziderman, Glicksohn, & Goldstein, 2013; Droit-Volet, Fanget, & Dambrun, 2015) suggesting that changes in the senses of space and time are general characteristics of altered states of consciousness, i.e. of states of absorption and flow (Glicksohn, 2001; Wittmann, 2015). Swartz (1994) proposed that absorbed states are essential for high sexual arousal and orgasm in many, if not all, women. He further proposed that absorbed states may facilitate male sexual arousal and orgasm by enhancing the subjective hedonic quality, but these altered states are not essential for sexual responsiveness in most men (Swartz, 1994). The present retrospective study aims at assessing how the senses of self, time and space during the last sexual encounter were related to sexual responsiveness. Specifically, it is hypothesized that greater satisfaction, desire, arousal, and orgasm occurrence during the last sexual encounter are related to greater awareness of the body and to lesser awareness of space and time. It is further hypothesized that these associations are stronger for women than for men. Consistency of female orgasm during coitus was previously related to a greater capacity to enter altered states of consciousness, such as hypnotic suggestibility, enjoying the feeling of being ‘‘carried away” by alcohol, and lack of control of movements and thoughts near the end of the coitus (Bridges et al., 1985). In addition, greater likelihood of orgasm from vaginal intercourse without clitoral masturbation (vaginal orgasm) has been more consistently related to higher sexual desire and satisfaction than other orgasm triggers (Brody, 2007; Brody & Weiss, 2011; Nutter & Condron, 1983; Tao & Brody, 2011); hence, in our study we assessed whether occurrence of vaginal orgasm is more strongly related to greater awareness of the body and lesser awareness of space and time. 2. Material and methods 2.1. Participants and procedure After giving informed consent, 68 women and 48 men participated in the study. All participants were Portuguese recruited in the Lisbon area. Subjects were on average 24.89 years of age (SD = 6.98). For more detailed characteristics of the participants, see Table 1. Exclusion criteria were defined as taking prescribed psychotropic medication, i.e. for treating psychiatric conditions, or having been under the influence of recreational psychoactive substances during the last sexual activity (including alcohol, but with exception of nicotine). In order to have a homogeneous sample, individuals reporting homosexual and bisexual inclinations were excluded in this analysis. However, these participants form a subgroup of a laboratory study (not described here) and also provided information on the variables of interest of the present study. The study had the approval of the local Ethics Committee and complied with the principles of the declaration of Helsinki. All participants received a ten-euro voucher or course credits. 2.2. Measures Two visual analog scales (VAS) with scores from 1 to 7 were used to measure intensity of awareness of body and space during the last sexual activity. The questions in Portuguese were ‘‘How intensively did you perceive yourself?” and ‘‘How Table 1 Descriptive statistics. Women (N = 68) Men (N = 48) Age (years) Mean (SD) 24.84 (7.11) 24.96 (8.12) Education High school % Current university attendance % University degree % Masters degree or more % 4.4 45.6 36.8 13.3 8.3 45.9 35.4 10.5 Occupation University student % Employed % Unemployed % 63.2 35.3 1.5 66.7 29.1 4.2 Relationship characteristics With regular sexual partner % Relationship duration (months) Mean (SD) Cohabitating (total sample %) Smoking tobacco before last sex % 73.5 42.24 (32.61) 27.9 8.8 77.1 38.58 (40.75) 21.1 4.2 137 R.M. Costa et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 135–141 How intensely did you perceive yourself? ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ How intensely did you perceive space? ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ How intensively did you perceive time? Not at all Extremely intensive How fast did time pass for you? Extremely slowly Extremely fast Fig. 1. Visual analog scales to measure the intensity of the awareness of body and space; visual analog scales to measure intensity of awareness of time and the speed of the passage of time. intensively did you perceive space” (see Fig. 1); higher scores indicate greater awareness of body and space during last sexual activity. Two visual analog scales (VAS) with a length of 100 mm were used on which respondents had to mark the point which reflected their impression of time during the last sexual activity. The questions were ‘‘How intensively did you perceive time?” and ‘‘How fast did time pass for you?”. The time awareness scale was anchored from 0 mm (not at all) to 100 mm (extremely intensive). The time speed scale was anchored from 0 mm (extremely slow) to 100 mm (extremely fast). See Fig. 1. Pertaining to the last sexual encounter, women were asked to report if they had an orgasm from (1) penile-vaginal intercourse (henceforth, intercourse) without clitoral masturbation, (2) intercourse with clitoral masturbation, (3) partnered noncoital sex (scores: 0 = orgasm did not occur, 1 = orgasm did occur). In addition, a composite measure was created for assessing orgasm occurrence regardless of triggering activity (scores 0 = no orgasm during last sexual activity, 1 = orgasm during last sexual activity). Men were asked if during the last sexual encounter they had an orgasm from (1) intercourse, (2) partnered noncoital sex (scores: 0 = orgasm did not occur, 1 = orgasm did occur). Like for women, a composite measure of orgasm occurrence regardless of triggering activity was created (scores: 0 = no orgasm during last sexual activity, 1 = orgasm during last sexual activity). Sexual satisfaction, desire and arousal during last sexual encounter were measured with a scale from 1 (absolutely nothing) to 6 (extremely). 138 R.M. Costa et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 135–141 The tendency to respond in a socially desirable fashion was measured with a 13-item form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Ballard, 1992). 2.3. Statistical analyses Partial correlations controlling for social desirability and smoking tobacco during the last sexual activity were used to examine the intercorrelations between all variables of interest, i.e. sexual responses and the awareness of body, space and time. The reason for controlling these variables is that people scoring high in social desirability may misreport their sexual responses (Meston, Heiman, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 1998), and although it is unclear if nicotine affects the perception of body, space and time during sex, smoking cigarettes may affect sexual responsiveness (Cao, Gan, Dong, Liu, & Lu, 2014; Costa & Peres, 2015). Initial significance levels were set to p < 0.05. The false discovery rate (FDR) method, a multiple comparisons correction procedure by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) was used to control for multiple tests. 3. Results As depicted in Table 2, men had a tendency to retrospectively report more satisfaction and arousal during sex than women. Men and women did not differ in the degree of sensing their body, space, and time during the last sexual activity. Table 3 displays the intercorrelations between the intensities of awareness of body, space, and time, and the passage of time. Notably, for both sexes, a lower awareness of time correlated with a lower awareness of space (female: r = .31, p = .012; male: r = .42, p = .003). Greater body awareness correlated with lower time awareness in women (r = .53, p < .001). As can be seen in Table 4a, for women, greater satisfaction (r = .66, p < .001), desire (r = .75, p < .001) and arousal (r = .76, p < .001) during last sexual activity were strongly related with a greater body awareness. For men (see Table 4b), satisfaction (r = .56, p < .001), desire (r = .46, p < .001), and arousal (r = .58, p < .001) also correlated moderately-to-strongly with greater body awareness, but with smaller correlation coefficients than for women. Correlations of body awareness with desire and arousal were significantly larger in women than in men (z = 2.45, p = .007, and z = 1.72, p = .013, respectively). In women, desire (r = .28, p = .023) correlated weakly with lesser space awareness; in men desire (r = .37, p = .011) and arousal (r = .39, p = .007) both correlated similarly moderately with lesser space awareness. Regarding time awareness, strong inverse relations can be seen in women with satisfaction (r = .52, p < .001), desire (r = .61, p < .001) and arousal (r = .52, p < .001). That is, the greater sexual response, the smaller time awareness during sex. A moderate negative correlation can be seen in men between satisfaction and time awareness (r = .36, p = .013). Whereas perceiving time as passing faster correlated with greater satisfaction (r = .36, p = .003) and desire (r = .32, p = .008) in women, it was uncorrelated with sexual responses in men. Orgasm occurrence was strongly related to greater body awareness in women (r = .62, p < .001), and moderately to greater body awareness in men (r = .38, p = .010). Orgasm was also related to lower time awareness in women (r = .48, p < .001), but not in men (see Tables 4a and 4b). When orgasms were differentiated by trigger, female orgasm from vaginal intercourse without clitoral masturbation was moderately associated with perceiving time as passing faster (r = .47, p < .001). Female orgasm from vaginal intercourse with clitoral masturbation was moderately associated with greater body awareness (r = .32, p = .009). 4. Discussion Our findings are evidence supporting Swartz’s hypothesis that absorbed states are related to female sexual responsiveness, and to a lesser degree to male sexual responsiveness (Swartz, 1994). Women’s sexual satisfaction, desire and arousal during last sexual activity were related to the capacity of attentional absorption in bodily sensations and to a profound loss of the sense of time. Female desire and arousal also imply a loss of the sense of space, but on average it seems of less importance than the loss of the sense of time. Higher sexual responsiveness in women correlates especially strongly with less time awareness and the feeling that time speeds up. For men, sexual satisfaction, desire and arousal during last sexual activity were also related to greater awareness of the body. As compared to women, men’s satisfaction, desire and arousal during Table 2 Sex differences at last sexual activity. Univariate analyses of variance with social desirability and nicotine use during last sexual activity as covariates. Body awareness (1–7) Space awareness (1–7) Time awareness (1–100) Perception of time speed (1–100) Satisfaction (1–6) Desire (1–6) Arousal (1–6) Women Mean (SD) Men Mean (SD) F (p) 5.99 (1.28) 4.10 (1.54) 25.78 (28.80) 64.87 (28.05) 4.49 (1.32) 4.85 (1.14) 4.81 (1.21) 6.29 (.82) 3.92 (1.57) 24.77 (22.17) 63.06 (25.68) 4.96 (1.03) 5.21 (.74) 5.23 (.75) 1.85 (.177) .50 (.479) .07 (.800) .28 (.600) 4.10 (.045) 3.33 (.071) 4.28 (.041) 139 R.M. Costa et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 135–141 Table 3 Partial intercorrelations controlling for social desirability and nicotine use between awareness of body, space, and time, and perception of time speed during last sexual activity. Body awareness Body awareness Space awareness Time awareness Speed of time * Space awareness – .15 (.238) .29 (.051) .24 (.103) .07 (.644) – .42 (.003)* .01 (.934) Time awareness Time speed .53 (<.001)* .31 (.012)* – .01 (.974) .21 (.084) .02 (.892) .36 (.003)* – Significant after FDR-adjustment; correlations for women are above the diagonal; correlations for men are below the diagonal. Table 4a Partial correlations controlling for social desirability and nicotine use between sexual responses and awareness of body, space, and time during last sexual activity for women. * Women Body awareness r (p) Space awareness r (p) Time awareness r (p) Time speed r (p) Satisfaction Desire Arousal Orgasm by vaginal intercourse without clitoral masturbation Orgasm by vaginal intercourse with clitoral masturbation Orgasm by partnered noncoital sex Orgasm (unspecified trigger) .66 (<.001)* .75 (<.001)* .76 (<.001)* .24 (.054) .32 (.009)* .06 (.624) .62 (<.001)* .11 (.39) .28 (.023)* .25 (.044) .08 (.510) .07 (.572) .06 (.663) .13 (.290) .52 (<.001)* .61 (<.001)* .52 (<.001)* .27 (.031) .21 (.097) .06 (.653) .48 (<.001)* .36 (.003)* .32 (.008)* .27 (.027) .47 (<.001)* .006 (.961) .09 (.496) .14 (.248) Significant after FDR-adjustment. Table 4b Partial correlations controlling for social desirability and nicotine use between sexual responses and awareness of body, space, and time during last sexual activity for men. * Men Body awareness r (p) Satisfaction Desire Arousal Orgasm by vaginal intercourse Orgasm by partnered noncoital sex Orgasm (unspecified trigger) .56 (<.001)* .46 (.001)* .58 (<.001)* .19 (.197) .03 (.851) .38 (.010)* Space awareness r (p) .34 (.023) .37 (.011)* .39 (.007)* .10 (.524) .06 (.705) .03 (.877) Time awareness r (p) .36 (.013)* .17 (.263) .14 (.349) .14 (.369) .03 (.854) .19 (.203) Time speed r (p) .24 (.110) .20 (.195) .05 (.733) .02 (.912) .17 (.255) .24 (.108) Significant after FDR-adjustment. sex do not seem to be as strongly related to the loss of sense of time. That is, in men, only satisfaction is moderately associated with lower time awareness, and desire and arousal are moderately connected to the loss of sense of space. In accordance with Swartz’s proposal (Swartz, 1994), in our retrospective study greater attentional absorption in bodily sensations and a greater loss of the perception of time were strongly related to women’s orgasms, but only moderately so to men’s orgasms. That is, absorbed states seem to be more strongly related to the female orgasm, particularly to orgasm during vaginal intercourse. Orgasm from penile-vaginal intercourse without clitoral masturbation (also known as vaginal orgasm; Brody & Weiss, 2010) was related to time passing subjectively faster. Orgasm during vaginal intercourse with clitoral masturbation appears to be of importance in the context of absorbed states with a stronger focus on body awareness, but changes in the sense of time or space seem unimportant. Future research might explore if alterations of time perception are more likely if attention is more focused on the vagina; more attentional focus on vaginal sensations during intercourse was related to greater capacity to attain vaginal orgasm (Brody & Weiss, 2010). According to the present findings, absorbed states do not appear to be important for female orgasm from partnered noncoital sex. It has been shown that state absorption in visual erotica is more clearly related to sexual arousal in response to those stimuli than trait absorption (Koukounas & McCabe, 1997, 2001), which makes it plausible that absorbed states during sex might be relatively independent of personality predispositions to enter absorbed states in a variety of situations. However, there is evidence that proneness to absorbed states in diverse situations does promote more sexual excitability in both sexes (Harris et al., 1980) and women’s ability to attain coital orgasm (Bridges et al., 1985). This question warrants future research. Psychological inhibitions can decrease attention to sexual stimuli and awareness of sexual motivation (Bloemers et al., 2013; Brody & Costa, 2008, 2013; Costa & Brody, 2010, 2013; Costa & Oliveira, 2015; Poels et al., 2013; van der Made et al., 2009; van Rooij et al., 2013). Thus, future research might explore to what extent psychological inhibitions and maladaptive ways of coping with psychological conflicts interfere with absorbed states during sex. Greater frequency of and orgasmic responsiveness from vaginal intercourse without clitoral masturbation is associated with several indices of better health and well-being (Brody, 2010; Brody & Costa, 2008; Costa & Brody, 2010, 2012a, 140 R.M. Costa et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 135–141 2012b). Future research might examine to what extent the intensity of absorption during sex causes or otherwise explains these relationships. Better well-being has been shown to occur as a result of other activities that trigger altered states of consciousness with attentional absorption and timelessness, such as mindfulness (Keng, Smoski, & Robins, 2011; Manuello, Vercelli, Nani, Costa, & Cauda, 2016), flow (Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), and psilocybin-induced mystical-type experiences (Griffiths et al., 2011). Future research might also explore the effects of these altered states of consciousness on sexual activity. At least mindfulness was shown to improve sexual desire, arousal and satisfaction in women (Brotto & Basson, 2014). Absorption during sex means that all mental faculties are coherently focused on the sexual act. Such a state of consciousness during sex thereafter is an extreme as well as special form of ‘‘flow” which can be experienced as peak states in sports, work, or musical play, when one is fully immersed (focused) in challenging activities typically accompanied by a loss of time and the surrounding space. Similarly, absorption during sex means that one loses track of time and space. The intercorrelations between the variables assessing the states of consciousness confirm this notion, since the awareness of time and space are positively correlated in both women and men, and the loss of time awareness is related to the speeding up of subjective time in women. One difference between the typical ‘‘flow” of time during non-sexual activities and sexual flow as assessed in our study is the increased sense of the bodily self. Typically, a full immersion in activities leading to the experience of flow and a diminished awareness of time is characterized by a loss of the sense of self (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). That is, the feeling of self and time are conjointly modulated (Craig, 2009; Wittmann, 2015). The case of altered states of consciousness during sex however is a special situation where the immersion happens within pleasurable body states. The body itself is then the focus of awareness which nevertheless leads to a loss of time and space. In our first attempt to retrospectively assess states of consciousness during the last sexual activity we did not take into account the time course or the dynamics of the experience, our assessment implies some sort of average memory of the whole experience. It is however known from prior experiments with retrospective recall of bodily sensations such as pain that (a) peak experiences and (b) the final moments of an experience exert a strong influence on the overall retrospective judgment (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). Potentially different peak times occur for increased bodily sensations on the one hand and a marked loss of sense of time and space on the other hand. ‘La petite mort’ as culmination of the sexual act could nevertheless occur as concerted loss of the sense of self, time and space. In conclusion, our findings provide empirical support for the hypotheses that absorbed states are related to female sexual responsiveness, and to a lesser extent also to male sexual responsiveness. Acknowledgments This study was funded with grants from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT – DFRH – FRH/BPD/76130/2011 and UID/PSI/04810/2013) e Fundação Bial (no. 103/12). References Ballard, R. (1992). 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Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 3 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Dedication This special issue titled The Neurobiology of Animal Consciousness is dedicated to the memory of Donald A. Griffin (1915–2003), whose thoughtfulness, courage, and integrity were essential to reawakening scientific interest in animal awareness. doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(05)00050-4

Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Predictable and self-initiated visual motion is judged to be slower than computer generated motion John A. Dewey a,⇑, Thomas H. Carr b a b Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Frankel Leó út 30-34, Budapest 1023, Hungary Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823-1116, United States a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 30 November 2012 Available online 19 July 2013 Keywords: Agency Sensory attenuation Action effect Forward model a b s t r a c t Self-initiated action effects are often perceived as less intense than identical but externally generated stimuli. It is thought that forward models within the sensorimotor system pre-activate cortical representations of predicted action effects, reducing perceptual sensitivity and attenuating neural responses. As self-agency and predictability are seldom manipulated simultaneously in behavioral experiments, it is unclear if self-other differences depend on predictable action effect contingencies, or if both self- and externally generated stimuli are modulated similarly by predictability. We factorially combined variation in (1) predictability of action effects, (2) spatial congruence, and (3) performance by the self or computer to dissociate these influences on a visual discrimination task. Participants performed 2AFC speed judgments. Self-initiated motion was judged to be slower than computer-initiated motion when action effect contingencies were predictable, while spatial congruence influenced speed judgments only when action effect contingencies were unpredictable. Results are discussed in relation to current theories of sensory attenuation. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The sensory consequences of voluntary actions, henceforth ‘‘action effects’’, are often perceived differently from identical but externally generated stimuli. This general finding has been conceptually replicated in several sensory modalities. Selfinitiated action effects, for instance stimuli triggered by a button press or other voluntary movement, are judged to be less loud (Sato, 2008; Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011), less forceful (Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003), and less ticklish (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Claxton, 1975) than equivalent stimuli initiated by another person or mechanical apparatus. Self-initiated action effects are also perceived differently from external events with respect to their timing. Compared to externally triggered stimuli, there is a perceived shortening of the temporal interval between an intentional action and its effect, a phenomenon known as intentional binding (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Similar findings have been reported at the neural level. For example, the sounds of one’s own speech elicit a reduced blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response in auditory cortex compared to listening control conditions (Christoffels, van de Ven, Waldorp, Formisano, & Schiller, 2011). Self- and externally initiated action effects have also been compared by means of ERPs (e.g. Baess, Widmann, Roye, Schroger, & Jacobsen, 2009; Hughes & Waszak, 2011; Martikainen, Kaneko, & Hari, 2005). The N1 is a negative deflection around 100–150 ms post stimulus thought to be associated with early cortical ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: DeweyJ@ceu.hu (J.A. Dewey). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.06.007 988 J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 processing of sensory stimuli. Self-initiated action effects evoke lower amplitude N1 responses compared to externally generated stimuli. For example, Baess et al. (2009) found a reduced auditory N1 for self-initiated tones, and Hughes and Waszak (2011) found attenuated cortical responses over frontal and parietal areas to self-initiated visual effects starting around 150 ms post stimulus. These results suggest cortical sensory attenuation occurs at an early stage in perception, with the caveat is that no study has simultaneously assessed phenomenological and neurophysiological indices of attenuation. The different experiential qualities of self-initiated action effects are normally explained in terms of predictive forward models within the sensorimotor system (see Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2012 for a review). Forward models predict the future state of a system, for instance, an upcoming perception, based on a combination of current sense data (i.e. the current state of the world), outgoing (efferent) motor signals, and knowledge about the likely consequences of an action in a particular environment based on past experiences (Körding & Wolpert, 2004). A proposed mechanism to explain attenuation of self-initiated action effects is that action preparation triggers a forward model which activates perceptual areas representing the predicted action effect (Waszak et al., 2012). This prior activation makes the objective presence or absence of incoming sensory signals less discriminable (or intense), compared to situations with no prior predictions, or an incorrect prediction. An implication is that sensory attenuation should not be observed, or should be less pronounced, when an action effect turns out differently than expected, or when the statistical properties of an environment make it difficult to predict the action effect. Consistent with this account, sensory attenuation may be reduced or absent when action effects are temporally delayed (Bays et al., 2005; Blakemore et al., 1998) or incongruent with expectations (Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010). This suggests sensory attenuation is linked to specific external events caused by self-generated movements, rather than movements per se. By contrast, intentional binding does not seem to depend on specific action effect predictions, as similar binding effects occur for both congruent and incongruent action effects (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). Thus sensory attenuation and intentional binding may rely on different mechanisms. There has been some question whether sensory attenuation is a unique property of self action, or alternatively results from a more general predictive mechanism that could generalize to other types of perceptual events (e.g. Lange, 2011; Sato, 2008). To investigate the specific role of self-agency in sensory attenuation, Weiss, Herwig, and Schütz-Bosbach (2011) compared the perceived loudness of predictable tones that were either self-initiated, or produced by another person or computer agent. They found that self-initiated tones were judged to be less loud compared to the other conditions. This suggests perception is influenced by processes recruiting by performing actions, such as efferent motor signaling or a sense of agency. However, all the tones during the test phase were congruent with the prior acquisition phase, so it is uncertain whether predictability and congruence would also modulate the perceived intensity of externally generated tones. In an ERP study by Gentsch, Kathmann, and Schütz-Bosbach (2012), participants were briefly presented with primes which were either congruent or incongruent with subsequent visual events, for both low and high contingency conditions. Attenuation of the visual N1 in the self-initiated condition was modulated by prime-effect congruence for both low and high contingency conditions. However, in the externally generated condition, the prime-effect congruence only influenced the N1 in the high contingency condition. Thus, there is some evidence that that congruence and predictability may influence perception of external stimuli differently from self-initiated action effects. To summarize, self-initiated action effects often have a unique perceptual quality that distinguishes them from external stimuli which seems to depend on specific sensory predictions generated during voluntary actions. A recent review of the literature concluded that several factors likely play a role in sensory attenuation, including motor prediction, temporal predictability and control, action effect congruence, and top-down beliefs about one’s causal agency (Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013a). Some studies emphasize the role of action effect congruence (e.g. Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Lally, Frendo, & Diedrichsen, 2011) while others emphasize the self-other distinction (e.g. Sato, 2008; Weiss et al., 2011). However, no study to date has simultaneously investigated the effects of internal vs. external origin (i.e. self-initiated vs. externally triggered), statistical predictability, and congruence of the action effect using behavioral measures of perception, as opposed to ERP. The theoretical contribution of such a study would be to disentangle these known influences on perception. For example, it’s unclear whether self-initiated and externally generated stimuli are similarly modulated by predictability (i.e. the strength of contingency between a triggering event and its effect) and/or the congruence of the action effect. Another question is whether perceived differences between self-initiated and externally triggered events might remain even when action effects are unpredictable. For example, in one ERP study, self-initiated tones evoked a reduced N1 even when they were temporally unpredictable (Lange, 2009). Furthermore, top-down knowledge about one’s status as a causal agent appears to enhance sensory attenuation (Desantis, Weiss, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2012). These findings suggest the possibility that self-initiated action effects might be attenuated compared to externally generated stimuli regardless of predictability, provided the actor feels a sense of agency for the action effect. The purpose of the present study was to distinguish the influences of self origin, predictability, and action effect congruence on perception of a visual action effect. To this end, we factorially combined (1) variation in predictability of action-effect contingencies, (2) spatial congruence of action effects, and (3) performance by the self or a computer. The specific action effect relationship we investigated was the perceived speed of a moving stimulus triggered by key press. In everyday life, the onset of motion is a particularly salient action effect which often marks the beginning or end of an event. For this reason motion stimuli are frequently used to study the perception of causality (see Wagemans, van Lier, & Scholl, 2006 for a review). In a previous study, participants’ ability to detect coherent motion in a random dot motion display was influenced by the spatial congruence of self-generated arm movements with respect to an array of moving distracter dots (Lally et al., 2011). This indicates that visually-defined motion is subject to sensory attenuation as a result of sensorimotor predictions J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 989 generated during voluntary actions. However, there was also a degree of novelty to our task, as we are not aware of any previous studies which investigated the effects of self-agency on speed perception per se, as opposed to motion coherence. We used modified version of paradigms previously used to study sensory attenuation of tactile and auditory sensations (Bays et al., 2005; Sato, 2008; Weiss et al., 2011). A challenge in comparing self-initiated action effects to external stimuli is that the self-initiated action effect may tend to be more temporally predictable due to the onset being under the participant’s control. This is a potentially important confound, because temporal expectations and control may modulate attentional capture with implications for perceptual processing (Lamy, 2005; Hughes et al., 2013a). To make the self and externally triggered conditions as comparable as possible with respect to temporal predictability, and to lessen the impact of temporal control, the pace of participants’ actions was dictated by computer generated go signals. Thus the timing and temporal control of participants’ actions were stimulusdriven. Intuitively, more force is required to move objects with greater speed. Furthermore, it is known that attention increases perceived speed (Anton-Erxleben, Herrman, & Carrasco, 2013; Turatto, Vescovi, & Valsecchi, 2007), and greater speed is associated with a larger neural response in motion sensitive area MT (Zacks, Swallow, Vettel, & McAvoy, 2006). We predicted that if speed perception is influenced by a forward model in the sensorimotor system, this would predict a three-way interaction between the agent, predictability of the action effect, and congruence, such that only predictable, spatially congruent, and self-initiated action effects become attenuated, with little or no difference between the other conditions. By contrast, if speed perception is governed by a general predictive mechanism, a predictable (or spatially congruent) effect should be perceived be slower than a less predictable effect regardless of whether it was self- or computer-initiated (i.e. a main effect of predictability). Another possibility is that self-initiated motion would invariably be perceived as slower than computer-initiated motion. In previous studies which reported self-other differences in attenuation, there was always a reliable action effect contingency. By orthogonally manipulating the agent from spatial congruence and the predictability of the action effect contingency, we hoped to reveal whether the impact of agency is partially independent of these factors, or alternatively, if it depends on a predictable action effect. 2. Methods 2.1. Participants An a priori power analysis determined that a sample of 82 participants would achieve 80% power to detect a ‘‘small’’ interaction within-between interaction between Agent and Predictability. In total, 88 healthy participants with normal or corrected vision were recruited in exchange for course credits. Of these participants, 44 were assigned to the predictable condition (mean age 20, range 18–31, 9 males and 35 females), and 44 more were assigned to the unpredictable condition (mean age 20.73, range 18–31, 15 males and 18 females). Two participants from the unpredictable condition were excluded from the final analysis after leaving the experiment early, resulting in a final sample size of 86. All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. Informed written consent was obtained from each participant prior to the experiment. 2.2. Design The experiment had a 2  2  2 mixed factorial design with two within-subject factors, Agent (self or computer) and Congruence (congruent or incongruent), and one between-subjects factor, Predictability (predictable or unpredictable). 2.3. Stimuli and procedure Participants performed the task on a desktop Dell PC with a 17 in. monitor at an approximate viewing distance of 40 cm and a screen resolution of 1024  764. All the stimuli were programmed and presented using MATLAB (the MathWorks, Natick, MA) with the Psychophysics toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997). The main visual stimulus was a white square set against a black background with a field of random white dots. Each dot was 4 pixels. The average number of dots displayed on the screen at any one time was 62.5. The square was located at the center of the display and subtended about 2° of visual angle. The dots in the background moved left or right when triggered by a key press (in the self condition) or by the computer (in the computer condition), while the square remained stationary at the center of the screen. This produced the impression of a square moving through outer space (i.e. induced motion). Participants fixated on the square at the center of the screen to avoid complications related to eye movements. Following the approach of Sato (2008) and Weiss et al. (2011), experimental sessions were divided into two phases: an acquisition phase, during which participants learned the action effect, and a test phase, during which sensory attenuation was assessed. Fig. 1 summarizes the sequence of trial events during the acquisition and test phases. Go signals were used to ensure similar timing and temporal predictability of the onset of motion across conditions. The go signal was a green bar which appeared on either the left or right side of the white square. The side on which the go signal appeared was random, but crucially, there were equal numbers of trials in which the go signals appeared on the left and right side within each condition. This controlled for possible effects of adaptation or neural habituation to motion in a particular direction. During the 990 J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 Fig. 1. Sequence of trial events. The go signal could appear on either the left or right side of the white square, cueing the participant or computer to perform a left or right response, respectively. The direction of the standard move was either congruent or incongruent with the preceding response. The ratio of congruent to incongruent moves was 4:1 for the predictable group, and 1:1 for the unpredictable group. self condition, participants pressed the ‘‘a’’ key whenever the go signal appeared on the left, and pressed the ‘‘4’’ key whenever the go signal appeared on the right. The go signal was also shown during the computer condition to warn participants when the computer was about to trigger a move and to indicate, analogous to the self blocks, which key the computer was about to ‘‘press’’. The delays between the go signal and the computer’s response were sampled with replacement from previous participants’ RTs in the self condition, after removing trials more than two standard deviations above the mean. Each key press response or computer action made the square turn green for 50 ms (the command received signal), followed by a move at the standard speed which lasted 500 ms. Sometimes the induced motion of the white square was congruent with the direction of the triggering key press or computer action (e.g. left key press to move left). Other times the motion was incongruent with the direction of the triggering action. The ratio of congruent to incongruent trials depended on whether the participant was assigned to the predictable or unpredictable group. The predictable group underwent an acquisition period consisting of 100% congruent moves, followed by a test period with 80% congruent and 20% incongruent moves. The unpredictable group experienced 50% congruent and 50% incongruent trials during both the acquisition and test phases. During the test phase, each standard move triggered by the participant or the computer was followed by a comparison move that was always triggered by the computer. A staircase procedure was employed to adaptively change the speed of the comparison moves in order to find the point of subjective equality (PSE) where the speeds were judged to be equally fast. The staircase procedure was controlled by Quest, an efficient algorithm for the estimation of psychophysical thresholds (Watson & Pelli, 1983). Quest begins with a prior guess and associated standard deviation for threshold (for PSE, the threshold is 50% correct). Then the observer is tested, and Quest saves the actual intensity of the stimulus along with whether the observer got it right. On this basis Quest re-estimates the threshold, and the cycle repeats. The final estimate of the PSE was the mean of the posterior probability distribution estimated by Quest (King-Smith, Grigsby, Vingrys, Benes, & Supowit, 1994). 2.3.1. Acquisition phase The acquisition phase consisted of four blocks of 100 trials each, two blocks each of training for the self and computer conditions. The block order was counterbalanced across participants using the ABBA method. The computer program J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 991 prompted participants to take a short break between blocks if they desired. As before, a warning in red font appeared at the start of each block so participants knew whose turn it was to act. For participants in the predictable group, the direction of the square was always congruent (i.e. the apparent motion of the square matched the direction of the triggering action). For participants in the unpredictable group, the direction was congruent on only half the trials, randomly selected. The acquisition phase usually lasted about 15 min. 2.3.2. Test phase The test phase consisted of two blocks (one each for the self and computer conditions), with 250 trials per block. The block order was counterbalanced across participants. The computer program prompted participants to take a short break between blocks if they desired. Following a go signal, either the participant or computer triggered a standard speed move. In the predictable group, the direction of the move was congruent on 80% of trials, but incongruent on 20% of trials. In the unpredictable group, the direction was congruent on 50% of trials, and incongruent on 50% of trials. Congruent and incongruent trials were randomly ordered within each block. The speed of the first standard move was the same as the previous experiments (20.4 deg/s). The speed of the comparison move was systematically varied following the staircase procedure to zero in on the PSE. The comparison move was always in the same direction as the standard move, i.e. congruent if the standard move was congruent, and incongruent if the standard move was incongruent. The total duration of the test phase was about 45 min. 2.4. Data analysis The dependent measure was the point of subjective equality (PSE) where the comparison move was judged to be faster than the standard move with 50% probability. The PSE values estimated by Quest were entered into a three factor mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on two factors, Agent (self or computer) and Congruence (congruent or incongruent). Predictability (predictable or unpredictable) was a between-subjects factor. We report generalized eta-squared as the measure of effect size (Bakeman, 2005). 3. Results The mixed effects ANOVA showed no significant main effect of Agent, F(1, 84) = 2.39, p = .13, g2G = .004, Predictability, F(1, 84) = .02, p = .88, g2G < .001, or Congruence, F(1, 84) = 1.22, p = .27, g2G < .001. However, there were two significant Fig. 2. Means and standard errors of the PSE values in the predictable (top panel) and unpredictable (bottom panel) groups. The dashed line indicates the point of objective equality (POS). 992 J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 interactions: Predictability  Agent, F(1, 84) = 6.16, p = .02, g2G = .01, and Predictability  Congruence, F(1, 84) = 4.48, p = .04, g2G = .003. The other interactions were not significant: Agent  Congruence, F(1, 84) = .36, p = .55, g2G < .001; Predictability  Agent  Congruence, F(1, 84) = .28, p = .21, g2G < .001. Means and standard errors are shown in Fig. 2. Post-hoc simple effects analyses using single –factor F tests were used to break down the two significant interactions. For Agent  Predictability, there was a significant effect of Agent in the predictable group, F(1, 43) = 12.31, p = .001, g2G = .02, caused by a lower PSE in the predictable-self condition compared to the predictable-computer condition. The effect of Agent was not significant in the unpredictable group, F(1, 41) = .36, p = .55, g2G = .002. For Congruence  Predictability, the effect of Congruence was not significant in the predictable group, F(1, 43) = .42, p = .62, g2G < .001, but was significant in the unpredictable group, F(1, 41) = 6.04, p = .02, g2G = .006, where the unpredictable-incongruent condition had a higher PSE (i.e. was judged to be faster) than the unpredictable-congruent condition. There was no difference between the predictable-congruent and predictable-incongruent conditions. 4. Discussion Many previous studies have demonstrated a reduction in the perceived intensity or neural response to predictable and congruent self-initiated action effects compared to external stimuli. In particular, many studies vary the predictability and/or congruence of action effects that are always self-initiated, or else compare self-initiated to external stimuli while controlling for predictability. However, until now the impacts of predictability, congruence and self-agency on perception had not been simultaneously assessed within a single experiment using behavioral measures. Thus, the aim of the present study was to better understand how self-agency, action effect predictability, and action effect congruence contribute to perceived differences between self- and externally initiated action effects, and to characterize possible interactions among these factors. Two particular questions we set out to investigate were (1) whether the subjective speed of self-initiated motion is perceived differently from external stimuli, and (2) how predictability and/or congruence influence the perceived speed of selfinitiated and externally generated stimuli. Regarding our first question, we found no significant main effect of Agent. This suggests the presence of self-generated motor signal alone is insufficient to modulate perceived speed of a moving stimulus. What we found instead was a twoway interaction between the Agent and Predictability, where a difference between self-initiated and computer generated motion only emerged when there was a predictable action effect contingency. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that sensory attenuation results from a general predictive mechanism. However, the results are also problematic for the forward model account of sensory attenuation where reductions in perceived intensity depend on specific sensorimotor predictions generated during intentional actions. A forward model account would predict sensory attenuation when the action effect is self-initiated, predictable, and congruent. However, we found that self-initiated motion was perceived as slower than computer generated motion in both the congruent and incongruent condition, as long as the action effects were produced in a predictable context. Our results contrast with a previous report in which congruent visual action effects were attenuated compared to incongruent action effects (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010). Similarly, ERP studies have reported significant attenuation of the auditory and visual N1 for congruent compared to incongruent action effects (Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013b; Gentsch, Kathmann, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2012). The difference between these results and those of the present study could be due to differences in the mechanisms governing speed perception as compared to sensory attenuation in other domains or sensory modalities. Although our results do not follow the expected pattern for a forward model account of sensory attenuation, they are reminiscent of some findings from the intentional binding literature. Intentional binding may occur when an action effect is predicted but fails to actually occur (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007) or is even when the action effect is incongruent with the prediction (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). In this sense, the affect of voluntary action on speed perception seems more akin to time perception than to classic sensory attenuation effects. As with intentional binding, it is therefore somewhat unclear what the driving mechanism(s) are. One possibility, which might explain the two way interaction between Agent and Predictability, is that perceived causality drives the effect: an argument could be made that the perception of a causal link between the triggering action and the moving stimulus would be strongest in the predictable-self condition. For now, this remains an issue for future work. We were also interested how expectation might influence the perceived speed of externally generated stimuli. There was no main effect of Predictability or Congruence. There was, however, a significant two way interaction between Predictability and Congruence, caused by a significant effect of Congruence in the unpredictable (50/50) group, but not in the predictable (80/20) group. This shows that spatial congruence can in some cases influence the perceived speed of an external stimulus. Since there were equal numbers of congruent and incongruent moves in the unpredictable group, the difference between the unpredictable-congruent and unpredictable-incongruent conditions must have been related to the spatial compatibility (or lack thereof) between the go signal and the induced motion of the square. This suggests a pre-existing association between left and right handed sided action responses and the direction of motion influenced the perceived speed of the stimulus. It is surprising, however, that congruence did not have a similar impact on the predictable group. This indicates that the trialwise effect of spatial congruence seems was somehow suppressed or overridden by the expectation of motion in a particular direction. The predictability manipulation was defined by a difference in the proportion of congruent vs. incongruent trials for the two groups (80/20 vs. 50/50). This may have had the unintended side effect of interacting with attention. For J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 993 example, a cue that validly predicts the location of a subsequent target with 80% probability is sufficient to increase attention toward the cued location (see Summerfield & Egner, 2009, for a review of the relationship between expectation and attention). Therefore it is possible that participants in the predictable group paid more attention to the congruent condition than to the incongruent condition. Since an increase in attention would be expected to increase the PSE, this might have counteracted the effect of congruence in the predictable group. We note that while PSE values differed across conditions, in all conditions the PSE was greater than the point of objective equality (POE = 20.4 deg/s, see dashed line in Fig. 2). A possible explanation for this is that neural adaptation occurred during the presentation of the standard move. As adaptation reduces perceived speed (Krekelberg, van Wezel, & Albright, 2006), and perceptual adaptation to motion can occur after only tens of milliseconds (Glasser, Tsui, Pack, & Tadin, 2011) the second stimulus could be systematically perceived as slower. A second possibility is that the go signal increased attention to the standard move relative to the comparison move. It is known that attention can alter the perceived speed of moving objects (Anton-Erxleben et al., 2013; Turatto et al., 2007). Visual warning signals were presented prior to each standard move (the go signal and command received signal), but not prior to the comparison move. If these visual signals increased attention to the standard move relative to the comparison move, this would tend to increase the perceived speed of the standard move relative to the comparison move. Critically, however, this is not a confounding variable because the same visual warnings were present in all conditions. There are significant limitations to the present study. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate how selfagency influences speed perception. Further studies would be required to determine the precise nature of this effect. For example, there is known a relationship between contrast and perceived speed where lower contrast stimuli are generally perceived as slower (Blakemore & Snowden, 1999). The present study cannot distinguish whether self-action influenced perceived speed directly, or if the effect was mediated by a shift in the perceived contrast. Another limitation of the study is inherent to the PSE method of assessing attenuation. Specifically, we cannot rule out the possibility of a response bias to respond that self-initiated movements were slower. However, we note that in a previous study, perceptual performance in detecting coherent motion was improved when distracter motion matched the direction of voluntary arm movements, compared to non-matching movements or a condition with no overt movement (Lally et al., 2011). This suggests a central cancellation of motion by self-produced movement influences perceptual sensitivity, not just response bias. In any case, the finding that predictable and self-initiated motion was perceived to be slower than computer generated motion is consistent with the general finding that self-initiated action effects are perceived differently from externally generated stimuli. Given that activity in the MT complex, which is known to be specialized for motion, increases with an object’s speed (Zacks et al., 2006), it could be interesting to compare activity in MT to self-initiated and externally triggered motion stimuli. Self-initiated action effects differ from externally generated stimuli in several possibly important ways. Predicting selfinitiated action effects involves forming an intention to act, and a richer set of sensory and proprioceptive cues compared to predicting computer generated stimuli. It could be argued that the difference between predictable-self and predictable-computer conditions might be related to different levels of attention. In particular, it seems possible attention would be more focused during self-initiated trials. However, differences in attention seem unlikely to account of self-other differences, because attention tends to increase perceived speed, whereas the predictable-self condition was actually perceived as slower than the predictable-computer condition. The relative impacts of the various cues to self-agency on perception are topics of active research. Nonetheless, we believe the self-other comparison is still a theoretically interesting and useful one, particularly in light of the proposal that sensory attenuation itself contributes to our ability to recognize the consequences of one’s own actions (e.g. as argued by Weiss & Schütz-Bosbach, 2012; Weiss et al., 2011). Considering the influence of self-agency on perception, it has been suggested that sensory attenuation can be used as an implicit measure of the sense of agency (Weiss & Schütz-Bosbach, 2012). Based on the present results, this equivalence seems valid for predictable action effects, but we would caution that agency may be dissociated from perceived intensity of the action effect in a context where action effect contingencies are unpredictable. Although the present study did not include an explicit measure of the sense of agency, there was no ambiguity that participants were triggering the moves during the self condition, while the computer was in charge during the computer condition. With respect to the speed judgments, however, self and computer were only differentiated when the action effect was predictable. Nonetheless, we believe sensory attenuation holds promise as an implicit measure of agency, as long as it is studied in a context with predictable action effects, or else complemented by explicit self-reports. A distinction is often drawn between voluntary versus stimulus-driven control with respect to both attention and overt behavior (e.g. Bugg & Crump, 2012; Haggard & Clark, 2003; Hughes, Schütz-Bosbach, & Waszak, 2011; Krieghhoff, Waszak, Prinz, & Brass, 2011). In the former case, participants choose when to act or what action to perform, whereas in the latter case these parameters are determined by the stimulus itself. Most sensory attenuation experiments focus on voluntary actions, whereas in the present study, go signals were used to control for potential differences in the temporal predictability of self-initiated and externally triggered motion. Thus, although participants’ actions were voluntary in the sense of being actively generated and accompanied by efferent motor signals, they were stimulus-driven in the sense of being reactions to external signals. It is unclear whether our results would differ if participants triggered the moving stimulus at a time of their own choosing. However, Herwig and Waszak (2012), using intentional binding as a dependent measure, found that shortterm action effect associations were equal for both voluntary and stimulus-based actions, but long term action-effect associations were only observed for intentional actions. Similarly, we would predict that the effect of Agency on speed perception would be, if anything, more robust for voluntary actions. 994 J.A. Dewey, T.H. Carr / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 987–995 Sensory attenuation is considered a general principle of self-action which influences different sense modalities in a similar way (Waszak et al., 2012). However, this does not necessarily imply that the mechanism must be the identical in all cases. We note that the effect sizes reported here and in studies reporting attenuation of auditory action effects tend to be very small, whereas attenuation of tactile stimuli (such as perceived ticklishness) is rather more dramatic. It seems plausible that efferent motor information would play a larger role in predicting body position and somatosensory sensations, compared to visual or auditory action effects. Determining whether attenuation in different modalities relies on the same or different mechanisms is one avenue for future research. Another potentially interesting future direction for this research involves investigating differences between self and other in the context of joint action. While there is now considerable evidence that people predict and attenuate the sensory consequences of their own actions, it is unknown whether the additive effects of one’s own and another’s action are attenuated in a similar manner, or how this type of action effect anticipation might relate to the sense of agency for joint actions (Vesper, Butterfill, Knobich, & Sebanz, 2010). To summarize and conclude, self-initiated motion is perceived to be slower than equivalent but externally generated motion, but only when the motion is produced in a predictable context. This may result from internally generated predictions produced during action. Interestingly, this applied to both spatially congruent and incongruent motions. Thus it seems selfaction coupled with a predictable context is sufficient to reduce perceived speed. Perceived speed was also modulated by an interaction between Congruence and Predictability. Overall, our results add further weight to the hypothesis that self-initiated action effects are perceived differently from effects with an external origin, and these differences cannot be accounted for by differences in overall predictability. This suggests that among the many functions of ‘‘the predictive brain’’, anticipating the consequences of one’s own actions has a particular functional significance. 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Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Review Functional consequences of perceiving facial expressions of emotion without awareness John D. Eastwood a,*, Daniel Smilek b a Department of Psychology, York University, Ont., Canada M3J 1P3 b University of Waterloo, Ont., Canada Received 21 July 2004 Available online 19 February 2005 Abstract A substantial body of research has established that even when we are not consciously aware of the faces of others we are nevertheless sensitive to, and impacted by their facial expression. In this paper, we consider this body of research from a new perspective by examining the functions of unconscious perception revealed by these studies. A consideration of the literature from this perspective highlights that existing research methods are limited when it comes to revealing possible functions of unconscious perception. The critical shortcoming is that in all of the methods, the perceived facial expression remains outside of awareness. This is a problem because there are good reasons to believe that one important function of unconsciously perceived negative faces is to attract attention so that they are consciously perceived; such conscious perception, however, is never allowed with existing methodologies. We discuss recent studies of emotional face perception under conditions of visual search that address this issue directly. Further, we suggest that methodologies that do not examine cognitive processes as they occur in more natural settings may result in fundamental misunderstandings of human cognition. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Face perception; Unconscious perception; Perception without awareness; Ecological validity; Facial expression; visual attention * Corresponding author. Fax: +1 416 736 5814. E-mail address: johneast@yorku.ca (J.D. Eastwood). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.01.001 566 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 1. Introduction At any given moment, the human perceptual system is able to process a vast amount of information from the environment. However, given the capacity limits of conscious experience (Miller, 1956), we do not notice (Bowers, 1984) or have a conscious experience of all the information that is processed by the perceptual system. Rather, we can perceive information without an accompanying awareness of the information that was perceived, and without awareness of the fact that such perception has occurred (Dixon, 1971, 1981; Merikle & Daneman, 2000; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). Considerable research has investigated perception without awareness; and, in so doing, has established that information perceived without awareness can significantly influence behaviour, physiology, and subsequent conscious experiences (see Merikle et al., 2001 for a review). Such observations challenge the conventional view that the influence of environmental information is necessarily mediated by a conscious experience of that information. Earlier, investigators such as Arne Öhman (e.g., Öhman, Anders, & Lundqvist, 2000) have suggested that, given the existence of unconscious perception has been extensively demonstrated, it is now time to shift the focus of inquiry to gaining a better understanding of the functions of unconscious perception (see also Merikle et al., 2001). One critical step in this new direction is to review existing studies of unconscious perception (much of which was conducted to find evidence for the existence of unconscious perception) in terms of what they can tell us about the functions of unconscious perception. After reviewing past studies in this manner, another important step is to consider how the existing methodologies determine, and limit, what functions of unconscious perception can be revealed. In this paper, we seek to move in this new direction by taking a function-oriented perspective on one area of unconscious perception research—namely, the unconscious perception of affective stimuli. We choose to focus our discussion on affective stimuli in general, and affective faces in particular, for several reasons. First, affective stimuli are a basic and important aspect of our environment. For example, with respect to our survival and well-being, some aspects of our environment are ‘‘good or bad’’ (Clore, Schwartz, & Conway, 1994) and, therefore, need to be approached or avoided (Gray, 1987). Thus, the unconscious perception of affect is likely to have numerous important functions for an individualÕs successful interaction with their environment. A second reason for focusing on the function of unconscious perception of affective stimuli is that there is a large body of research showing that affective information can be perceived quickly, efficiently (Junghöfer, Bradley, Elbert, & Lang, 2001; Zajonc, 1980) and without awareness (see Öhman, 1999). Our re-evaluation of the existing literature in terms of the functions of unconscious perception requires that we begin by describing the empirical methodologies that have been used historically to establish that affective stimuli can be perceived without awareness. Because our aim is to describe existing methodologies, we do not provide an exhaustive review of all the literature concerning unconscious perception of emotional stimuli and all of the debates that have emerged in that literature. Instead, we focus on studies that clearly illustrate the methodologies used to study unconscious perception. We then narrow our consideration of affective stimuli and focus specifically on unconscious perception of facial expression and outline what the established methodologies have revealed about the functions of perceiving emotionally expressive faces without awareness. Our goal in this regard is to elucidate what the existing literature tells us about the functions of J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 567 unconscious perception of emotionally expressive faces—rather than attempting to demonstrate that the functions of perceiving facial expression without awareness are necessarily unique. Based on our consideration of existing demonstrations of unconscious perception of emotionally expressive faces, we suggest that the commonly used methods for demonstrating unconscious perception fail to capture important functions of such perception. We suggest that new empirical methodologies may be required in order to generate a more complete, accurate understanding of the functions of perceiving facial expression without awareness. Finally, we suggest that experimental methodologies that do not examine cognitive processes as they occur in more natural settings may result in fundamental misunderstandings of human cognition. 2. Methodologies for studying unconscious perception of emotion Historically, three different types of experiments have been used to establish the presence of unconscious perception of affective stimuli. The first method of demonstrating different recognition thresholds for emotionally laden words fell out of favour relatively quickly and is rarely employed today. In contrast, the logic of showing a dissociation between conscious and unconscious measures of perception or showing qualitatively different consequences of perception with or without awareness have proved to be more compelling and are often used today. 2.1. Recognition thresholds Many early empirical investigations of the question whether or not affective information can be perceived without awareness focused on the notion of Ôperceptual defenseÕ (see Brown, 1961; Kragh, 1960 for a review); namely, the idea that conscious recognition thresholds for stimuli vary as a function of the emotional meaning of the stimuli to be recognized (Bruner & Postman, 1949; Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948; McGinnies, 1949). Specifically, in these studies it was found that longer stimulus durations were required for observers to consciously recognize emotionally laden ‘‘taboo’’ words compared to more neutral words. Modulation of the information reaching awareness would require observers to be able to discriminate between emotional and non-emotional information prior to conscious awareness in order to selectively alter conscious recognition thresholds. Therefore, the presence of a Ôperceptual defenseÕ was taken as evidence for the claim that emotional information can be perceived without awareness. However, the original concept of Ôperceptual defenseÕ was brought into question by critiques of the empirical evidence on which it was based (see Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965; Erdelyi, 1974). Perhaps the most devastating critique arose from considering lowered recognition thresholds for taboo words to result from a response bias in which participants were hesitant to report emotionally laden information. Based on these early studies of perceptual defense, therefore, it was unclear if in fact emotional information could be perceived without awareness. 2.2. Dissociation between measures The claim that emotional information can be perceived without awareness was given stronger support from other studies based on different methodologies. Most commonly, researchers 568 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 attempted to demonstrate dissociation between two measures of perception (Goldiamond, 1958). In such an approach, one measure is assumed to assess the presence or absence of a conscious experience of stimulus information, while a second measure is assumed to assess whether or not an observer is sensitive to, or has ‘‘taken in,’’ stimulus information. Therefore, if the second measure indicates that observers have indeed been influenced by stimulus information while the first measure indicates that observers have no awareness of the critical stimulus information, then it is concluded that perception without awareness has occurred (see Marcel, 1983; for an example of this approach used with non-affective stimuli). An early experiment by Smith, Spence, and Klein (1959) serves as an example of how dissociation between two measures can be used to demonstrate the presence of unconscious perception of emotion. They found that tachistoscopically presented emotional words, presented below the threshold for awareness, influenced the judgment of a consciously perceived face. In the first session of their experiment, they determined the minimal exposure duration at which each individual participant consciously detected the presence of a briefly presented word. Then, in the second session, participants were shown a neutral, expressionless face and told that small and subtle changes would occur in the expression on the face and that they were to detect these changes and report them to the experimenter. The experimenter did not actually change the facial expression but rather presented the word ‘‘happy’’ for a group of trials and the word ‘‘angry’’ for another group of trials very briefly below each participantÕs previously determined threshold for awareness. Subjectively, participants reported seeing a constant presentation of the face interrupted by brief flickers. The experimental results, however, indicated that participants judged the face to be more positive when preceded by the word ‘‘happy’’ than when preceded by the word ‘‘angry.’’ This second measure, the judgment of facial expression, revealed that participants perceived the emotional words even though the measure of conscious perception (the threshold for detecting the presence of words) indicated that participants had no conscious experience of perceiving the emotional words. In other early experiments, researchers employed a variety of measures thought to be sensitive to the perception of emotional information without awareness. For example, it was shown that emotional information contained in displays of unconsciously perceived words and pictures can: (1) determine the threshold at which other, neutral stimuli are consciously detected (Dixon, 1958; Hardy & Legge, 1968), (2) influence the evaluation of other stimuli, such as a cartoon character (Eagle, 1959) and responses to Thematic Apperception Test cards (Goldstein & Barthol, 1960), and (3) alter heart rate as well as other physiological measures such as the electroencephalogram (Dixon & Lear, 1963, 1964). It was claimed that all of these effects occurred even when participants had no conscious experience of perceiving the emotional information. Recent investigations of unconscious perception of emotion continue to rely heavily on the same basic method of demonstrating dissociation between a measure of conscious perception and a measure of unconscious perception. However a notable change over the past several decades has been a shift away from psychodynamic conceptualizations of unconscious perception of emotion (Dixon, 1971) towards conceptualizations informed by evolutionary (Öhman, 1999; Plutchik, 1994) and neurobiological (LeDoux, 1996) approaches to the study of emotion and consciousness. An example of a more recent approach to the study of the unconscious perception of emotion using dissociation between measures is the work of Öhman and Soares (1993). These investigators conducted a conditioning study and concluded that physiological responses to J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 569 conditioned fear stimuli can be elicited ‘‘after merely an automatic, non-conscious analysis of the stimuli’’ (p. 128). Their experiment consisted of a conditioning and an extinction phase. During the conditioning phase, participants consciously perceived ‘‘fear-relevant’’ (snakes and spiders) or ‘‘fear-irrelevant’’ (flowers and mushrooms) stimuli that were paired with either an uncomfortable electrical shock or no aversive stimulus. In the subsequent extinction phase, the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli were presented briefly for 30 ms and masked. When the fear relevant and irrelevant stimuli were presented under these conditions participants were not able to verbally guess above chance which category (snake, spider, flower, or mushroom) the masked stimuli belonged to. Therefore, Öhman and Soares claimed this measure of conscious perception indicated that participants were not consciously aware of the stimuli. However, even though participants did not consciously perceive the conditioned stimuli, during the extinction phase of the experiment differential skin conductance responses (a measure of unconscious perception) were elicited by the unconsciously perceived fear-relevant stimuli that had been paired with a shock. In contrast, unconscious perception of fear-irrelevant conditioned stimuli, such as flowers and mushrooms, was not evident during the extinction phase. Öhman and SoaresÕ work illustrates the most common approach that is currently used to establish unconscious perception of emotion; namely, demonstrating dissociations between measures of conscious and unconscious perception. Although demonstrating dissociation between a measure of conscious perception and a measure of unconscious perception continues to be a very common methodology used in studies of unconscious perception of emotion, significant criticisms have been raised regarding the validity of such an approach (see Merikle et al., 2001; Merikle & Joordens, 1997a; Merikle & Reingold, 1998; Öhman, 1999). Since early investigations into unconscious perception, considerable debate has taken place regarding what constitutes a satisfactory measure of an observer’s conscious experience (Merikle, 1992). In particular, investigators have debated whether observers’ conscious experience should be measured by ÔsubjectiveÕ self-reports, that is, observers’ report of whether or not they consciously perceived the stimuli, or, by ÔobjectiveÕ performance on a task for which conscious perception is assumed to be both necessary and sufficient for successful completion (see Bowers, 1984; Merikle et al., 2001). In addition, considerable debate has taken place as to whether or not the basic assumptions underlying dissociation strategies can be satisfactorily achieved. For example, the dissociation strategy is predicated on the assumption that the measure of conscious perception has exhaustively assessed an observerÕs conscious experience. However, a measure may fail to indicate that an observer was aware of stimuli simply because the measure lacks statistical power or is not sensitive to all of an observerÕs conscious experience. Furthermore, the measure of conscious perception must assess the same aspect or dimension of the stimulus that is assessed by the measure of unconscious perception. For instance, if the measure of unconscious perception is sensitive to the affective valence of a stimulus then the measure of conscious perception must also assess awareness of the valence of the stimulus, rather than some other stimulus dimension. Second, in order for the dissociation procedure to be successful it is important that the measure of conscious perception is just that—an exclusive measure of conscious influences. If, for example, the measure of conscious perception is actually influenced by unconscious perception then an investigator may, in an overly conservative manner, fail to find evidence for an effect of unconscious perception because the dissociation method would inappropriately attribute an observerÕs ability to discriminate among stimuli to conscious perception. In light of problems with the dissociation strategy 570 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 and continued disagreement regarding its application, researchers have turned to different methodologies. 2.3. Qualitative differences Another approach to establishing the presence of unconscious perception of emotion is to demonstrate that observers respond in a qualitatively different manner to emotional information that is perceived with awareness, compared to without awareness (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Dixon, 1971; Merikle et al., 2001; Merikle & Joordens, 1997a). In general, this approach is predicated on the assumption that information perceived without awareness will result in more automatic, less deliberate responses than the same information perceived with awareness. Therefore, it is often possible to predict qualitatively different response patterns depending upon whether observers perceive the emotional information with awareness or without awareness. For example, under certain situations an inverse relation between awareness and the impact of a stimulus is predicted; that is, a larger effect is expected when a stimulus is perceived without awareness compared to when it is perceived with awareness because when a stimulus is perceived with awareness its potential influence can be excluded (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) or otherwise avoided or resisted. The ‘‘exclusion task’’ developed by Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) is a historically and theoretically important example of demonstrating that observers respond in a qualitatively different manner to conscious and unconsciously perceived information. In the ‘‘exclusion task’’ the influence of consciously and unconsciously perceived information is placed in opposition to one another. For example Debner and Jacoby (1994) asked participants to complete a three letter word stem (e.g., spi_ _) with the first five letter word that came to mind (e.g., spice or spike, etc.). After collecting a baseline measure of how frequently various words were used to complete the stems, participants were shown a potentially biasing prime word (e.g., spice) immediately before the three letter word stems. In one condition the potentially biasing prime word was presented for 50 ms. and then masked. In another condition the potentially biasing prime word was presented for 500 ms and then masked. In both conditions participants were instructed to complete the three letter word stem with any word that came to mind, except the word that had just been presented. Debner and Jacoby observed that participants were able to follow the exclusion instructions when the prime word was presented for 500 ms (i.e., they completed the word stem below baseline levels for the prime word); whereas, they failed to follow the exclusion instructions when the prime word was presented for 50 ms (i.e., they completed the word stem above baseline levels for the prime word). This pattern of results suggests that the prime word was perceived when it was presented for 50 ms and when it was presented for 500 ms; however, relative to baseline, it had an opposite influence in these two conditions. Based on the assumption that conscious perception is necessary and sufficient for deliberate exclusion (i.e., following instructions) then successful exclusion is taken as evidence for conscious perception; whereas, unsuccessful exclusion (that is significantly above baseline stem completion) is taken as evidence for unconscious perception. Jacoby (e.g., 1991) has also used the exclusion task as part of a more complex Ôprocess-dissociation procedureÕ which, he argues, can estimate separate conscious and unconscious influences on behaviour. However, some debate exists as to whether or not it is more fruitful to J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 571 think about conscious and unconscious perception giving rise to separate, independent influences (e.g., Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelineas, 1993; Jacoby, Toth, Yonelinas, & Debner, 1994) or relatively more or less influence (e.g., Joordens & Merikle, 1993; Merikle & Joordens, 1997b; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). Research on terror management theory (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) provides a good example of how qualitatively different consequences of perceiving emotional information with and without awareness can be used to establish unconscious perception of emotion. Terror management theory postulates that we instinctively fear death, and that we attempt to cope with an awareness of the fact that we will inevitability die by clinging to our cultural belief system (cultural world-view). Therefore, reminding people of their mortality will increase their faith and adherence to their cultural world-view and lead to more negative judgments of others who threaten, or do not endorse their cultural world-view. Critically, however, subtle and unconscious reminders of mortality are thought to be more effective at bolstering oneÕs world-view than conscious reminders of death. Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1997), for example, found that participants showed a pro-United States bias when evaluating essays regarding cultural values, if they were previously shown the word ‘‘dead.’’ However, this bias was only evident if the word ‘‘dead’’ was masked and presented so briefly that participants had no awareness of perceiving it. In contrast, if participants perceived the word ‘‘dead’’ with awareness, no pro-United States bias was observed in the evaluation of the essays. 2.4. Summary In summary, numerous studies have sought to demonstrate that emotional information can be perceived without awareness. These studies have relied exclusively on three methodologies, which involve demonstrating: (a) different recognition thresholds for emotionally laden words, (b) a dissociation between conscious and unconscious measures of perception, and, (c) qualitatively different consequences of perception with or without awareness. In some sense, the conclusion that emotional stimuli can be perceived without awareness is not entirely surprising given the importance of emotional information for human survival. Indeed, it seems clear that having a capability of perceiving affective stimuli without awareness would be extremely functional. What remains unclear, however, is what specific function(s) does such unconscious perception serve in the human context? And, are the existing methodologies for studying perception without awareness adequate for demonstrating critical functions of unconscious perception of emotional content? It is to these functional considerations that we turn next. 3. Functions of unconscious perception of facial expression In considering the functions of unconscious perception, we will narrow our focus to a commonly studied affective stimulus—emotional facial expression. Based on a consideration of these studies, we ultimately suggest that while the existing methodologies for studying unconscious perception reveal important functions of unconscious perception of facial emotion, the methodol- 572 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 ogies typically employed are limited in terms of the possible functions that they could potentially uncover. Facial expression is one type of affective stimulus that has received special attention in studies of unconscious perception. Faces are a critically important source of social information and it appears as though we are biologically prepared to perceive and respond to faces in a unique manner (Ekman, 1993). A considerable amount of research has established that the visual system is highly efficient at perceiving facial expression (e.g., Bruce, Desimone, & Gross, 1981; Desimone, 1991; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Gorea & Julesz, 1990; Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989; Hochberg & Galper, 1967; Homa, Haver, & Schwartz, 1976; Purcell & Stewart, 1988; Schwartz, Izard, & Ansul, 1985; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). It has also been shown that infants demonstrate an early proficiency at discriminating faces from non-face stimuli (e.g., Öhman & Dimberg, 1978; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Sackett, 1966) and at discriminating different emotional expressions (Younge-Browne, Rosenfeld, & Horowitz, 1977). Furthermore, it has been shown that the affective information contained in facial expression is perceived involuntarily (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003) and is able to constrict the focus of attention (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003). Considering the critical social relevance of facial expression of emotion, it is perhaps not surprising that the emotion displayed in facial expression can be perceived even when observers have no conscious experience of perceiving facial expressions.1 Such unconscious perception of facial expression has been shown to have several important functions. These functions include: eliciting emotional responses in the observer; influencing the conscious experience of other stimuli; and influencing face-to-face communication. 3.1. Eliciting emotional responses When confronted by a fear-inducing stimulus, such as an angry facial expression, observers show emotional responses that consist of distinct patterns of physiological arousal. These patterns of physiological arousal include a large skin conductance response, hormone changes, and sympathetic nervous system responses involving the amygdala and hypothalamus (Globisch, Hamm, Esteves, & Öhman, 1999; Hamm, Cuthbert, Globisch, & Vaitl, 1997; Öhman, 1999). This emotional response can even be elicited by facial expressions that are perceived without awareness. Specifically, research has demonstrated that unconsciously perceived angry facial expressions alter amygdala activity (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998, 1999), levels of stress hormones (van Honk et al., 2000), and skin conductance (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Esteves, Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994; Öhman, 1986). Consistent with the unconscious perception of other threatening stimuli, like spiders and snakes (e.g., Öhman & Soares, 1993, 1994), it appears that a physiological response to a fear-inducing facial expression is initiated before we have a conscious experience of what it is that we are responding to. This rapid physiological response to an unconsciously perceived facial expression prepares us to react in an adaptive manner to the presence of a threatening individual. 1 As mentioned earlier, we are not arguing that faces are unique in terms of their ability to be perceived without awareness; nor do we wish to argue that the functions of perceiving faces without awareness are unique. Rather, in the present manuscript, we attempt to: (1) summarize what existing findings tell us about the functions of perceiving emotionally expressive faces without awareness and (2) highlight critical limitations in current methodologies. J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 573 Many sympathetic responses to threat are mediated by the amygdala (Davidson & Irwin, 1999); therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that unconsciously perceived facial expressions have been shown to alter amygdala activity. Morris et al. (1998, 1999) found that overall; the amygdala was more active when observers were presented with an aversively conditioned angry face than when they were presented with a non-conditioned angry face. Critically, however, they also found that a significant neural response was evident in the right amygdala even when the conditioned angry faces were masked and therefore not consciously perceived. Whalen et al. (1998) also examined whether or not the amygdala is activated in response to emotionally expressive faces, even when observers are unaware that such stimuli have been presented. These investigators used fMRI and found significant increases in activation in the amygdala in response to fearful faces and significant decreases in activation in the amygdala in response to happy faces when the facial expressions were perceived without awareness. This finding that amygdala activity is sensitive to unconsciously perceived facial expressions is consistent with LeDouxÕs (1996) claim that there is a direct neural pathway from the sensory thalamus to the amygdala, which is able to support rapid and defensive responses to potentially dangerous stimuli, even before conscious identification and evaluation of the stimuli. Unconsciously perceived angry faces have also been shown to alter levels of stress hormones. In a series of studies, van Honk and his colleagues have explored the relations between salivary hormone levels, trait anxiety, trait anger, and the unconscious perception of facial expression. They have found evidence indicating that individuals high in baseline levels of cortisol (van Honk et al., 1998) and high on measures of trait anger (van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout, & Stam, 2001) are able to distinguish angry and neutral faces that are perceived without awareness. van Honk et al. (2000) also found evidence which indirectly suggests that perceiving angry faces without awareness leads to increases in salivary testosterone and cortisol levels from pre-exposure baseline levels (van Honk et al., 2000). This latter finding has the potential to extend previous observations showing a temporary increase in testosterone and cortisol levels when observers face social threat (Gladue, Boechler, & McCaul, 1989) by suggesting that they may not need to be aware of the source of social threat. Research has also established that a threatening face perceived without awareness can elicit increased skin conductance, which is another component of the fear response. For example, observers show an increased skin conductance (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Öhman, 1986; Esteves et al., 1994) in response to an unconsciously perceived angry face that has previously been paired with an unconditioned aversive stimulus. Furthermore, Öhman and his colleagues (Esteves et al., 1994) have demonstrated that associative learning can occur with faces expressing anger, even when observers remain unaware of the angry faces that are paired with an unconditioned aversive stimulus. In response to subsequent presentations of these conditioned angry faces, observers show an increased skin conductance. Taken together, these studies suggest that conditioned skin conductance responses can be both elicited by, and also associated with an unconscious perceived angry face. In summary, a substantial amount of research has established that unconsciously perceived facial expression elicits emotional responses that include various forms of physiological arousal. When a negative or threatening facial expression is perceived without awareness, observers show a pattern of physiological arousal that includes a large skin conductance response, hormone changes, and alteration in amygdala activity. This rapid physiological response to an uncon- 574 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 sciously perceived facial expression is likely adaptive because it prepares us to react in an effective manner to the presence of a threatening individual. 3.2. Influencing conscious experience Another important consequence of perceiving a facial expression without awareness is that unconsciously perceived facial expression can influence subsequent conscious experience. For example, research conducted with both healthy observers (e.g., Edwards, 1990; Kragh, 1960, 1962; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Niedenthal, 1990) as well as neurological patients (de Gelder, Pourtois, van Raamsdonk, Vroomen, & Weiskrantz, 2001) has demonstrated that unconsciously perceived facial expression can bias how other stimuli are consciously experienced. Furthermore, facial expressions that are perceived without awareness have also been shown to bias observersÕ self-evaluation (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990). Experimental studies with normal observers have shown that unconsciously perceived facial expressions can influence how other stimuli are consciously experienced. For example, in an experiment reported by Niedenthal (1990), observers were briefly (i.e., 2 ms) presented with a face displaying joy, disgust or a neutral emotion followed by a neutral cartoon character that they were required to evaluate. Although observers had no conscious experience of the facial expressions and were not able to identify the expressions when tested with a forced choice task, evaluations of the cartoon characters were biased by the affective tone of the facial expressions. That is, observers formed affective judgments of the cartoon characters that were consistent with the emotional expression of the unconsciously perceived faces. Zajonc and his colleagues (Edwards, 1990; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995; Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997) have also used a priming procedure to demonstrate that unconsciously perceived faces expressing happiness and anger bias the evaluation of a neutral Chinese ideograph (see also Kemps, Erauw, & Vandierendonck, 1996; Raccuglia & Phaf, 1997). Experiments with neurological patients have also demonstrated that facial expression can be perceived without awareness (de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999) and influence how other stimuli are consciously experienced (de Gelder et al., 2001). For example, de Gelder et al. (2001) report a study with GY, a blindsight patient who has sustained damage to the left striate and extra-striate cortex, and therefore is unaware of stimuli presented in his right visual field. GYÕs reaction time to facial expressions presented in his intact visual field was influenced by the emotional expression of faces that were presented in his blind visual field even though he was unaware of the facial expressions in his blind visual field. GY was able to identify the emotional expression of faces in his intact visual field more quickly when a congruent emotional expression was simultaneously presented in his blind visual field. This finding suggests that the emotional expression of a face that was perceived without awareness, facilitated or interfered with the identification of the emotion displayed by another, consciously perceived face. In addition to influencing the experience of external stimuli, unconsciously perceived facial expressions may also bias observersÕ self-evaluations. For example, Baldwin et al. (1990) demonstrated that graduate studentsÕ self-evaluations were lower after they unconsciously perceived their department chair expressing a disapproving scowl compared to when they unconsciously perceived a postdoctoral fellow expressing an approving smile. Participants first completed what was described as a reaction time task in which they were required to press a key as quickly as J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 575 possible when an orange patch appeared on a screen. Unbeknownst to the participants, a picture of a significant department figure displaying either an approving or disapproving facial expression was very briefly presented before the orange patch. The face was presented briefly and masked by the patch of orange such that participants had no conscious experience of the approving and disapproving face. After completing the reaction time task, participants were then required to evaluate their research ideas. The findings indicated that participants evaluated their research ideas more negatively after unconsciously perceiving a chairpersonÕs disapproving face (Baldwin et al., 1990). In summary, studies using healthy observers and studies using neurological patients support the idea that an unconsciously perceived facial expression can influence how other stimuli are consciously experienced. Furthermore, it appears as if facial expressions that are perceived without awareness can bias observersÕ self-evaluations. Taken together, the available evidence provides support for the general claim that unconsciously perceived facial expressions are able to influence subsequent conscious experiences. 3.3. Social interactions It has been demonstrated that perceiving facial expression without awareness can play a role in social interactions. For example, researchers have demonstrated how facial expression perceived without awareness might influence experience in everyday social situations outside the laboratory (de Gelder, Pourtois, Vroomen, & Bachoud-Lévi, 2000). Furthermore, it appears that unconsciously perceived facial expression can modulate face-to-face communication (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). de Gelder et al. (2000) describe the case of AD, a prosopagnosic patient. AD cannot recognize facial expression in isolation and yet a concurrently presented happy or fearful face was shown to influence her judgment of the affective tone of a voice. Therefore, for AD, an unconsciously perceived facial expression exerts a ‘‘cross-modal’’ bias on the conscious experience of voice expression. de Gelder and Vroomen (2000) have also found that normal observers show an involuntary influence from facial expression on the judgment of the emotional tone of a voice. In everyday social contexts, then, our evaluation of an individualÕs tone of voice may be influenced by the speakerÕs facial expression, even when we are unaware of facial expression. Such an influence of unconsciously perceived facial expression on the conscious experience of voice quality might prove to be an example of how social interactions can be subtly influenced by unconscious perception of facial expression. Another example of how facial expression perceived without awareness plays a role in social interactions is found in the micro-components of face-to-face exchanges between people. Dimberg et al. (2000) have demonstrated that facial muscle activity in observers mirrors the emotional expression of faces that are perceived without awareness. In their study, observers were prevented from consciously perceiving happy, angry, and neutral facial expressions by a backward-masking procedure. Yet, despite being unaware of the facial expressions, observers showed larger zygomatic major muscle activity and smaller corrugator supercillii activity in response to happy compared to angry faces. Thus, they conclude that facial responses to the facial expression of others are ‘‘controlled by rapidly operating affect programs that can be triggered independently of conscious cognitive processes’’ (p. 88). These results suggest that facial expressions 576 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 perceived without awareness can evoke physiological responses that have important social consequences. Dimberg et al. note that these facial responses to the expressions of others might represent either a mimicking of external behaviour or a change in observersÕ underlying emotional state. In either case, such implicit facial dialogue likely forms a foundation for faceto-face communication. Research has begun to explore some of the functions that unconsciously perceived facial expression might play in everyday social contexts. To date, it has been demonstrated that facial expression perceived without awareness can bias the experience of voice quality and can also elicit ‘‘mirroring’’ facial responses in an observer. 3.4. Summary and limitations As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the common methods for studying unconscious perception of emotionally expressive faces show that such perception serves several distinct and interesting functions. Unconscious perception of emotional faces serves to: (a) elicit emotional responses in the observer, (b) influence how other stimuli are consciously perceived, and (c) influence social communication. Yet a consideration of the methods used also suggests they are limited in their ability to reveal the possible functions of unconscious perception of facial expression. Specifically, to date, the experimental methods used to explore unconscious perception of facial expression have all required that the perceived facial expression remains outside of awareness. That is, the goal has been to create laboratory situations where observers are never aware of the facial expressions. Indeed, the very logic of the experimental designs hinge on the fact that observers never become aware of the faces. While this approach has facilitated attempts to establish the existence of unconscious perception, it necessarily imposes limits on our ability to understand the functions of unconscious perception of facial expression in more natural settings; because in more natural settings one might think that an unconsciously perceived facial expression would attract the attention of an observer, resulting in the observer efficiently becoming aware of the affective face. Therefore, while the stimuli in these studies often have good ecological validity, the methods are lacking ecological validity in a critical way. 4. A new function: Unconsciously perceived affective faces grab awareness Ideas from the field of ethology provide a clear rationale for why the emotion expressed by an unconsciously perceived negative face might serve to attract attention so that it is consciously perceived. Namely, conscious perception of facial expression is important because many of the behaviours that one must make in response to perceived facial expression require conscious mediation (Öhman, 1986). For example, facial expression is inextricably involved in displays of dominance and submission, or what has been termed ‘‘ritual agonistic behaviour’’ (Trower & Gilbert, 1989). Ritualized agonistic behaviour, such as the dominant expression of anger with a fixated staring gaze and the corresponding submissive expression of fear with averted eye gaze, serves to establish and maintain dominance hierarchies (Hinde, 1974; Mazur, 1985) without actual physical conflict. Such dominance hierarchies are believed J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 577 to be a critical component of group living because they secure social order and regulate social exchange. When confronted with a dominant individual, however, one cannot escape by simply fleeing, as one might when confronted by a predator threat. Instead, one must determine their relative social status and, if appropriate, signal defeat and submissiveness. Typically such submissive gestures include gaze aversion and ‘‘an uncomfortable, appeasing smile’’ (Öhman, 1986, p. 129). Therefore, unlike simple and automatic ‘‘fight’’ or ‘‘flight’’ physiological responses, submissive gestures require a more complex and subtle behavioural repertoire (Öhman, 1986). Given that subtle and complex social responses are often required in response to perceiving negative facial expression, it would be advantageous for attention to be guided to an unconsciously perceived negative face so that observers become aware of the face and thus are able to engage in the conscious processing that is necessary to make adaptive responses. However, this possible mechanism cannot be evaluated with previously used experimental methodologies. To evaluate the possibility that unconscious perception of facial expression results in an observerÕs focal attention being attracted to the face, a methodology is needed in which the ultimate result of perception is awareness—while still providing some indication of a pre-awareness sensitivity to facial expression. One task that provides precisely these conditions, though it is not often used to study unconscious perception, is the Ôvisual search taskÕ (e.g., Eastwood et al., in press). When participants are required to search through a varying number of distractors to find emotionally expressive faces, it is possible to plot a function that displays the increasing time required to find each affective face as the number of distractors increases. These search functions provide an indication of the efficiency of search for a face in a given distractor context. Critically, when the distractor context is held constant (i.e., faces with neutral expressions) and participants do not know whether to expect a positive or negative target face, a comparison of the slopes of the search functions for the positive and negative faces can indicate whether positive and negative faces differ in their ability to attract attention and compete for awareness (see Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 1994). A comparison of the respective search slopes is critical because any difference in the drawing power of different affective faces becomes more evident as set size increases because each additional distractor has a relatively smaller impact on overall search times for the face with the stronger drawing power. Therefore, if the search slopes differ for positive and negative faces it would indicate that the emotional expression associated with the shallower slope is the expression that observers became aware of more rapidly. In this manner, the visual search task is capable of assessing whether observers have a bias to preferentially process and become aware of particular types of facial expressions. To date, applications of visual search methodology to the study of face perception have not led to clear, consistent conclusions (e.g., Fox et al., 2000; Hampton, Purcell, Bersine, Hansen, & Hansen, 1989; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Nothdurft, 1993; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Purcell, Stewart, & Skov, 1996; White, 1995). We argue that this lack of clarity is the result of methodological complications associated with applying the visual search task to the question: ‘‘Can emotionally expressive faces be perceived without awareness and bias the deployment of attention?’’ One critical methodological issue is that many studies have confounded variations in the emotion expressed by the target face with variations in the emotion expressed by faces in the distractor context. For example, Hansen and Hansen (1988) found that the slope of the search function for 578 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 locating a target face expressing anger presented among distractor faces expressing happiness was shallower than the slope of the search function for locating a target face expressing happiness presented among distractor faces expressing anger. Although these findings suggest that focal attention is more readily guided by an angry face than by a happy face, there is an equally plausible alternative interpretation. Perhaps the reason it took longer to detect the target face expressing happiness than to detect the target face expressing anger is that it takes longer to search through angry distractor faces than it takes to search through happy distractor faces (Hampton et al., 1989). Indeed there is a considerable amount of evidence showing that the efficiency of visual search depends both on the nature of the target as well as on the nature of the distractor context (e.g., Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Treisman & Gormican, 1988; Wolfe, 1994). Another methodological issue that has confounded investigators is that it has proven difficult to determine if the observed differences in the speed with which faces expressing different emotions are detected reflects a difference in the emotions expressed by the faces or a difference in the component parts or features that distinguish the faces. By definition, faces expressing different emotions, such as anger and happiness, are composed of different composites of features. Given these differences, any evidence showing differential guidance of attention by unattended faces expressing different emotions can often be accounted for in terms of the different features rather than in terms of the different emotions expressed by the faces (e.g., Nothdurft, 1993; Purcell et al., 1996; White, 1997). For this reason, it is absolutely critical that investigators employ various methodological strategies for ruling out potential feature based explanations of findings. Finally, confusion exists around the question of what constitutes satisfactory evidence that unconsciously perceived information has guided attention. In a number of studies, the underlying assumption has been that the only satisfactory evidence that a face guides attention is a pattern of findings showing that the speed with which a face is detected is relatively unaffected by the number of distractor faces (e.g., Fox et al., 2000; Nothdurft, 1993; Hampton et al., 1989; Öhman et al., 2001; Purcell et al., 1996; White, 1997). In other words, the slope of the search function across increasing numbers of distractors should be relatively flat. A flat search function showing that a target face pops out when it is embedded in displays of distractor faces certainly provides strong evidence for the guidance of attention. However, a flat search function is not the only evidence that can be used to show the importance of unconsciously perceived information in guiding attention. Another way to establish the role of unconsciously perceived information in guiding attention is to compare the slopes of the search functions for locating different targets. In this way, it is possible to assess whether the different targets lead to relatively more or less guidance of attention (see Smilek, Eastwood, & Merikle, 2000; Wolfe, 1998). Therefore, by comparing the slopes of the search functions for locating faces expressing positive and negative emotions, it is possible to determine whether the positive or negative emotional expression is the more effective expression for guiding attention. When these methodological complications have been addressed, results from the visual search task have indeed demonstrated that unconsciously perceived facial expressions attract attention, resulting in an awareness of the emotionally expressive face (e.g., Eastwood et al., in press; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Fox et al., 2000; see also Öhman et al., 2001). For example, recently we (Eastwood et al., in press; 2001) have argued that the emotion expressed in a face that is outside of awareness can be perceived and bias the selection process by which emotionally expressive faces are brought into awareness. In the experiments reported by Eastwood et al., participants J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 579 searched displays of faces for the location of a unique face expressing either a positive or a negative emotion. The unique face was embedded among a varying number of distractor faces expressing neutral emotion. We found that increasing the number of distractor faces had a smaller impact on the time required to detect the negative face compared to the positive face. From these results we concluded that faces expressing negative emotion attract attention and thereby gain access to awareness more effectively than faces expressing positive emotion. Theoretically comparable results have also been found by examining observerÕs error rates when searching for the presence or absence of friendly and threatening faces embedded in neutral face distractors (i.e., Öhman et al., 2001). Specifically, in experiments two and three Öhman et al. (2001) found significant interactions between set size and target emotion such that for threatening faces, a minimal decrement in performance was evident, whereas for friendly faces, observers made notably more errors as set size increased. In summary, this pattern of findings suggests that for the friendly target faces observers traded accuracy for speed at the larger set sizes; therefore, differences between the threatening and friendly target faces were evident in error rates rather than reaction times. In summary, recent research, using the more ecologically valid visual search task, has demonstrated that attention is preferentially attracted by unconsciously perceived negative faces so that observers become aware of negative faces more rapidly (or accurately) than positive faces. By demonstrating such differential attraction of attention, support was found for the more general conclusion that the emotion expressed by a face that is outside of awareness can be perceived and bias the selection process by which emotionally expressive faces are brought into awareness. 5. Conclusions and implications for future research To establish the existence of unconscious perception in the laboratory, investigators have typically sought conditions under which unconsciously perceived information remains outside of awareness while still exerting an influence on the observer. As discussed earlier, two distinct methodologies have been most commonly employed; namely, the method of dissociating measures of conscious and unconscious perception, and the method of demonstrating qualitatively different influences of conscious and unconsciously perceived stimulus information. If, as we are suggesting here, one of the consequences of perceiving facial expression without awareness is that attention is attracted to the facial expression, thereby resulting in an awareness of the emotionally expressive face, the potential limitation of these existing methodologies becomes readily apparent. The important finding that unconsciously perceived facial expressions do not remain unconscious, but rather draw an observersÕ attention to the faces so that they are perceived with awareness would have never been discovered using previous methodologies. We believe that our consideration of the functions of unconsciously perceived emotional faces has implications beyond this domain. In many domains in psychology there emerge specific methodologies (or paradigms) that become the gold standard for studying various phenomena. The dissociation and qualitative difference approaches are good examples of such paradigms in studies of unconscious perception. It is important to realize, however, that the methods we use to study a phenomenon constrain and determine the conclusions we make. On first glance this claim may seem trivially obvious and in no need of re-asserting. However, the present review provides a good 580 J.D. Eastwood, D. Smilek / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 565–584 example of how this point can easily be missed; we must be constantly vigilant to the limits imposed by our methodological tools. One way to ensure that our methods do not lead us astray is to consider the possible functions of the phenomenon in question. We believe that a critical aspect of any behaviour or process is its ÔfunctionÕ and, therefore, that psychologists should study human behaviour by considering the whole person embedded in their real-life context and performing real world tasks. This point goes well beyond simply using ecologically valid stimuli in artificial laboratory settings. We are arguing that in addition to using ecologically valid stimuli, researchers also need to use more ecologically valid tasks/situations. It is humbling for us to consider the fact that our own work on how emotional faces guide attention is still far from meeting this ecological goal. And we hope to move further towards this goal in our future studies. Ultimately, new methods and procedures will have to be developed in order to study ‘‘cognition in the wild’’ (Hutchins, 1995; see also Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic, Friesen, & Eastwood, 2003). Neisser (1982), for example, has argued that psychologists should ground their research and theories in everyday behaviour, rather than experimental procedures. By doing so, he asserted, we will be able to ‘‘find out what really happens in the world around us, and that will be worth knowing in any imaginable future’’ (p. 10). It is essential for cognitive psychology to embrace the critically important task of studying cognition in a manner that has relevance to real-life situations. Acknowledgments This research was supported by grants to: J.D.E. from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council and to D.S. from NSERC, Killam Foundation and the Michael Smith Foundation for Health Research. The authors thank Philip M. Merikle for his considerable contribution to the manuscript and his invaluable support and guidance. Significant portions of the manuscript were presented earlier as part of the first authorÕs doctoral dissertation. 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Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 1 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Editorial We are pleased to announce that Dr. Bruce Bridgeman will join us as an editor of Consciousness and Cognition starting with this issue. Dr. Bridgeman is professor of psychology and psychobiology at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Editing this journal requires knowledge in many areas, and he comes to us with a distinguished record of well over 100 publications of both research and theory in a wide swath of topics we cover. He is known for his research in vision, and particularly to our readership for his work on perceptual awareness in visually guided action. He has contributed theoretically on the topics of the ‘‘grand illusion,’’ the visual representation of the world, and other areas related to perceptual awareness. His most recent book (2003) is Psychology and Evolution: The Origins of Mind. He has been reviewing for journals for his entire career, and he edited the Handbook of Perception and Action, Vol. 2 with Wolfgang Prinz. With his breadth and expertise he will certainly be a great asset to our readers and our authors. William P. Banks Bernard J. Baars Antti Revonsuo doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(05)00009-7

Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR William P. Banks Pomona College, Claremont, California Bernard J. Baars ASSOCIATE EDITORS Bruce Bridgeman The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego, California University of California Santa Cruz Antti Revonsuo University of Turku EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade J. Allan Hobson W. Trammell Neill University of Sheffield Massachusetts Mental Health Center University at Albany University of Tartu Larry L. Jacoby Alan Baddeley New York University Ontario Institute for Studies in Education MRC Applied Psychology Unit E. Roy John Steven Palmer John Bargh New York University Medical Center University of California Berkeley New York University John F. Kihlstrom John Pani Arthur L. Blumenthal University of Louisville Bronxville, New York University of California Berkeley Gordon H. Bower Christof Koch Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversit/t, M1nchen Talis Bachmann Stanford University Deborah Burke California Institute of Technology Stephen M. Kosslyn Keith Oatley Ernst Pçppel William Prinzmetal Harvard University University of California Berkeley University of California Santa Barbara Alfred B. Kristofferson Arthur Reber Ontario, Canada Brooklyn College of CUNY David Chalmers David LaBerge Eyal Reingold University of California Irvine University of Toronto Stephen LaBerge Graduate School of CUNY Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of Arizona Tucson Antonio Damasio University of Iowa Stanford University Meredyth Daneman Benjamin Libet University of Toronto University of California San Francisco Richard Davidson University of Wisconsin Donald G. MacKay Daniel C. Dennett Tufts University University of California Los Angeles Andreas K. Engel George Mandler Hamburg University Matthew Erdelyi University of California San Diego David Rosenthal Daniel Schacter Harvard University Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles Jonathan W. Schooler University of Pittsburgh Tim Shallice University College London Brooklyn College of CUNY Bruce Mangan Owen Flanagan University of California Berkeley Jerome L. Singer Anthony Marcel David Spiegel Duke University David Galin Yale University MRC Applied Psychology Unit Stanford University School of Medicine Hazel R. Markus Petra Stoerig University of Michigan Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Philip M. Merikle Giulio Tononi University of Washington University of Waterloo The Neurosciences Institute Henk J. Haarman Thomas Metzinger Geoffrey Underwood Johannes GutenbergUniversit/t Mainz University of Nottingham Jeff Miller Harvard University Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco Michael S. Gazzaniga Dartmouth College Anthony G. Greenwald University of Maryland Stevan Harnad Princeton University Steven A. Hillyard University of California San Diego University of Otago Michael C. Mozer University of Colorado Daniel M. Wegner Charles Yingling University of California San Francisco

Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR William P. Banks Pomona College, Claremont, California Bernard J. Baars ASSOCIATE EDITORS Bruce Bridgeman The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego, California University of California Santa Cruz Antti Revonsuo University of Turku EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade J. Allan Hobson W. Trammell Neill University of Sheffield Massachusetts Mental Health Center University at Albany University of Tartu Larry L. Jacoby Alan Baddeley New York University Ontario Institute for Studies in Education MRC Applied Psychology Unit E. Roy John Steven Palmer John Bargh New York University New York University Medical Center University of California Berkeley Arthur L. Blumenthal John F. Kihlstrom John Pani University of California Berkeley University of Louisville Christof Koch Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversit/t, M1nchen Talis Bachmann Bronxville, New York Gordon H. Bower Stanford University Deborah Burke Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of California Santa Barbara David Chalmers University of Arizona Tucson Antonio Damasio University of Iowa Meredyth Daneman University of Toronto Richard Davidson University of Wisconsin Daniel C. Dennett California Institute of Technology Stephen M. Kosslyn Ernst Pçppel William Prinzmetal Harvard University University of California Berkeley Alfred B. Kristofferson Arthur Reber Ontario, Canada Brooklyn College of CUNY David LaBerge Eyal Reingold University of California Irvine University of Toronto Stephen LaBerge Graduate School of CUNY Stanford University Benjamin Libet University of California San Francisco Donald G. MacKay Tufts University University of California Los Angeles Andreas K. Engel George Mandler Hamburg University Keith Oatley David Rosenthal Daniel Schacter Harvard University Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles Jonathan W. Schooler University of Pittsburgh Tim Shallice Matthew Erdelyi University of California San Diego Brooklyn College of CUNY Bruce Mangan Owen Flanagan University of California Berkeley Jerome L. Singer Duke University David Galin Anthony Marcel David Spiegel University College London Yale University Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco MRC Applied Psychology Unit Stanford University School of Medicine Michael S. Gazzaniga Hazel R. Markus Petra Stoerig Dartmouth College University of Michigan Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Anthony G. Greenwald Philip M. Merikle Giulio Tononi University of Washington University of Waterloo The Neurosciences Institute Henk J. Haarman Thomas Metzinger Geoffrey Underwood University of Maryland Johannes GutenbergUniversit/t Mainz University of Nottingham Jeff Miller Harvard University Stevan Harnad Princeton University Steven A. Hillyard University of California San Diego University of Otago Michael C. Mozer University of Colorado Daniel M. Wegner Charles Yingling University of California San Francisco

Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR William P. Banks Pomona College, Claremont, California Bruce Bridgeman University of California Santa Cruz ASSOCIATE EDITORS Axel N. Cleeremans James T. Enns Université Libre de Bruxelles University of British Columbia Antti Revonsuo University of Turku EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade Steven A. Hillyard Keith Oatley University of Plymouth University of California San Diego Ontario Institute for Studies in Education J. Allan Hobson Steven Palmer Bernard J. Baars The Neurosciences Institute San Diego Talis Bachmann Massachusetts Mental Health Center University of Tartu Larry L. Jacoby Alan Baddeley New York University MRC Applied Psychology Unit E. Roy John John Bargh New York University Medical Center New York University Arthur L. Blumenthal John F. Kihlstrom The New School University University of California Berkeley Gordon H. Bower Christof Koch Stanford University Deborah Burke Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of California Santa Barbara David Chalmers Antonio Damasio Stephen LaBerge University of Iowa Stanford University Meredyth Daneman Donald G. MacKay University of Wisconsin Daniel C. Dennett University of Louisville Ernst Pçppel Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversitt, Mnchen William Prinzmetal University of California Berkeley Arthur Reber David Rosenthal David LaBerge University of Arizona Tucson Richard Davidson John Pani California Institute of Technology Brooklyn College of CUNY Stephen M. Kosslyn Harvard University Eyal Reingold University of Toronto Alfred B. Kristofferson Ontario, Canada University of California Irvine University of Toronto University of California Berkeley University of California Los Angeles George Mandler University of California San Diego Tufts University Bruce Mangan Andreas K. Engel Hamburg University University of California Berkeley Matthew Erdelyi Graduate School of CUNY Daniel Schacter Harvard University Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles Jonathan W. Schooler University of Pittsburgh Tim Shallice University College London Jerome L. Singer Anthony Marcel Yale University Brooklyn College of CUNY MRC Applied Psychology Unit David Spiegel Owen Flanagan Hazel R. Markus Duke University University of Michigan Stanford University School of Medicine David Galin Philip M. Merikle Petra Stoerig Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco University of Waterloo Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Thomas Metzinger Giulio Tononi Michael S. Gazzaniga The Neurosciences Institute Dartmouth College Johannes GutenbergUniversitt Mainz Anthony G. Greenwald Jeff Miller University of Nottingham University of Washington University of Otago Henk J. Haarman Michael C. Mozer University of Maryland University of Colorado Stevan Harnad W. Trammell Neill Princeton University University at Albany Geoffrey Underwood Daniel M. Wegner Harvard University Charles Yingling University of California San Francisco

Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR William P. Banks Pomona College, Claremont, California Bruce Bridgeman University of California Santa Cruz ASSOCIATE EDITORS Axel N. Cleeremans James T. Enns Université Libre de Bruxelles University of British Columbia Antti Revonsuo University of Turku EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade Steven A. Hillyard Keith Oatley University of Plymouth University of California San Diego Ontario Institute for Studies in Education J. Allan Hobson Steven Palmer Bernard J. Baars The Neurosciences Institute San Diego Talis Bachmann Massachusetts Mental Health Center University of Tartu Larry L. Jacoby Alan Baddeley New York University MRC Applied Psychology Unit E. Roy John John Bargh New York University Medical Center New York University Arthur L. Blumenthal John F. Kihlstrom The New School University University of California Berkeley Gordon H. Bower Christof Koch Stanford University Deborah Burke Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of California Santa Barbara David Chalmers Antonio Damasio Stephen LaBerge University of Iowa Stanford University Meredyth Daneman Donald G. MacKay University of Wisconsin Daniel C. Dennett University of Louisville Ernst Pçppel Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversitt, Mnchen William Prinzmetal University of California Berkeley Arthur Reber David Rosenthal David LaBerge University of Arizona Tucson Richard Davidson John Pani California Institute of Technology Brooklyn College of CUNY Stephen M. Kosslyn Harvard University Eyal Reingold University of Toronto Alfred B. Kristofferson Ontario, Canada University of California Irvine University of Toronto University of California Berkeley University of California Los Angeles George Mandler University of California San Diego Tufts University Bruce Mangan Andreas K. Engel Hamburg University University of California Berkeley Matthew Erdelyi Graduate School of CUNY Daniel Schacter Harvard University Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles Jonathan W. Schooler University of Pittsburgh Tim Shallice University College London Jerome L. Singer Anthony Marcel Yale University Brooklyn College of CUNY MRC Applied Psychology Unit David Spiegel Owen Flanagan Hazel R. Markus Duke University University of Michigan Stanford University School of Medicine David Galin Philip M. Merikle Petra Stoerig Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco University of Waterloo Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Thomas Metzinger Giulio Tononi Michael S. Gazzaniga The Neurosciences Institute Dartmouth College Johannes GutenbergUniversitt Mainz Anthony G. Greenwald Jeff Miller University of Nottingham University of Washington University of Otago Henk J. Haarman Michael C. Mozer University of Maryland University of Colorado Stevan Harnad W. Trammell Neill Princeton University University at Albany Geoffrey Underwood Daniel M. Wegner Harvard University Charles Yingling University of California San Francisco

Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Bruce Bridgeman University of California, Santa Cruz ASSOCIATE EDITORS Axel Cleeremans Université Libre de Bruxelles Chris Frith Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging Michael Graziano Princeton University Leah Light Pitzer College Antti Revonsuo University of Turku EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade University of Plymouth Steven A. Hillyard University of California, San Diego Talis Bachmann University of Tartu J. Allan Hobson Harvard Medical School Alan Baddeley MRC Applied Psychology Unit Larry L. Jacoby Washington University St. Louis, MO John Bargh New York University Arthur L. Blumenthal The New School University Gordon H. Bower Stanford University Deborah Burke Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of California Santa Barbara E. Roy John New York University Medical Center John F. Kihlstrom University of California Berkeley Christof Koch California Institute of Technology Stephen M. Kosslyn Harvard University David Chalmers University of Arizona, Tucson Alfred B. Kristofferson Ontario, Canada Antonio Damasio University of Southern California David LaBerge University of California, Irvine Meredyth Daneman University of Toronto Stephen LaBerge Simons Rock College of Bard Richard Davidson University of Wisconsin Donald G. MacKay University of California Los Angeles Daniel C. Dennett Tufts University Andreas K. Engel Hamburg University Matthew Erdelyi Brooklyn College of CUNY Owen Flanagan Duke University David Galin Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco Keith Oatley Ontario Institute for Studies in Education Steven Palmer University of California Berkeley John Pani University of Louisville Ernst Pçppel Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversitt, Mnchen William Prinzmetal University of California Berkeley Arthur Reber Brooklyn College of CUNY Eyal Reingold University of Toronto David Rosenthal Graduate School of CUNY Daniel Schacter Harvard University Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles George Mandler University of California, San Diego Jonathan W. Schooler University of California at Santa Barbara Bruce Mangan University of California, Berkeley Tim Shallice University College, London Anthony Marcel MRC Applied Psychology Unit Jerome L. Singer Yale University Hazel R. Markus University of Michigan David Spiegel Stanford University School of Medicine Philip M. Merikle University of Waterloo Petra Stoerig Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Michael S. Gazzaniga University of California at Santa Barbara Thomas Metzinger Johannes GutenbergUniversitt Mainz Anthony G. Greenwald University of Washington Jeff Miller University of Otago Geoffrey Underwood University of Nottingham Henk J. Haarman University of Maryland Michael C. Mozer University of Colorado Daniel M. Wegner Harvard University Stevan Harnad University of Southampton W. Trammell Neill University at Albany Charles Yingling Standford University Giulio Tononi The Neurosciences Institute FOUNDING EDITORS Bernard J. Baars The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego William P. Banks Pomona College

Consciousness and Cognition EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Bruce Bridgeman University of California, Santa Cruz ASSOCIATE EDITORS Talis Bachmann University of Tartu Axel Cleeremans Université Libre de Bruxelles Georg Northoff University of Ottawa Antti Revonsuo University of Turku Michael Graziano Princeton University EDITORIAL BOARD Jackie Andrade University of Plymouth J. Allan Hobson Harvard Medical School Alan Baddeley MRC Applied Psychology Unit Larry L. Jacoby Washington University St. Louis, MO John Bargh New York University Arthur L. Blumenthal The New School University Gordon H. Bower Stanford University Deborah Burke Pomona College Wallace Chafe University of California Santa Barbara David Chalmers University of Arizona, Tucson Antonio Damasio University of Southern California Meredyth Daneman University of Toronto Richard Davidson University of Wisconsin Daniel C. Dennett Tufts University Andreas K. Engel Hamburg University Matthew Erdelyi Brooklyn College of CUNY Owen Flanagan Duke University David Galin Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, San Francisco Michael S. Gazzaniga University of California at Santa Barbara Anthony G. Greenwald University of Washington Henk J. Haarman University of Maryland Stevan Harnad University of Southampton Steven A. Hillyard University of California, San Diego Steven Palmer University of California Berkeley John Pani University of Louisville E. Roy John New York University Medical Center Ernst Pçppel Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversitt, Mnchen John F. Kihlstrom University of California Berkeley William Prinzmetal University of California Berkeley Christof Koch California Institute of Technology Arthur Reber Brooklyn College of CUNY Stephen M. Kosslyn Harvard University Eyal Reingold University of Toronto Alfred B. Kristofferson Ontario, Canada David Rosenthal Graduate School of CUNY David LaBerge University of California, Irvine Daniel Schacter Harvard University Stephen LaBerge Simons Rock College of Bard Donald G. MacKay University of California Los Angeles George Mandler University of California, San Diego Bruce Mangan University of California, Berkeley Anthony Marcel MRC Applied Psychology Unit Hazel R. Markus University of Michigan Philip M. Merikle University of Waterloo Thomas Metzinger Johannes GutenbergUniversitt Mainz Arnold Scheibel University of California Los Angeles Jonathan W. Schooler University of California at Santa Barbara Tim Shallice University College, London Jerome L. Singer Yale University David Spiegel Stanford University School of Medicine Petra Stoerig Heinrich-Heine-Universitat Giulio Tononi The Neurosciences Institute Jeff Miller University of Otago Geoffrey Underwood University of Nottingham Michael C. Mozer University of Colorado Daniel M. Wegner Harvard University W. Trammell Neill University at Albany Charles Yingling Standford University Keith Oatley Ontario Institute for Studies in Education FOUNDING EDITORS Bernard J. Baars The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego William P. Banks Pomona College

Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Conceptual expansion and creative imagery as a function of psychoticism Anna Abrahama,b,*, Sabine Windmannb, Irene Daumc, Onur Güntürkünb a International Graduate School for Neuroscience (IGSN), Ruhr University, 44780 Bochum, Germany b Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Biopsychology, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr University, 44780 Bochum, Germany c Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Neuropsychology, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr University, 44780 Bochum, Germany Received 1 July 2004 Available online 5 February 2005 Abstract The ability to be creative is often considered a unique characteristic of conscious beings and many efforts have been directed at demonstrating a relationship between creativity and the personality construct of psychoticism. The present study sought to investigate this link explicitly by focusing on discrete facets of creative cognition, namely the originality/novelty dimension and the practicality/usefulness dimension. Based on EysenckÕs conceptualisation of psychoticism as being characterised by an overinclusive cognitive style, it was expected that higher levels of psychoticism would accompany a greater degree of conceptual expansion and elevated levels of originality in creative imagery, but would be unrelated to the practicality/usefulness of an idea. These hypotheses were confirmed in 80 healthy participants who were contrasted based on their EPQ psychoticism scale scores. Our findings suggest that the link between psychoticism and creativity is based on associative thinking and broader but weak top-down activation patterns rather than on goal-related thinking. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Creativity; Creative cognition; Psychoticism; Schizotypy; Top-down processing; Originality; Overinclusive thinking; Conceptual expansion; Creative imagery * Corresponding author. Fax: +49 234 3214377. E-mail address: anna.abraham@rub.de (A. Abraham). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.12.003 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 521 1. Introduction The notion of a fascinating association between creativity and mental illness has existed since antiquity. Efforts aimed at demonstrating this purported link are largely case study reviews that correlate the incidence of mental illness among either creative geniuses or individuals in creative professions (Andreasen, 1987; Jamison, 1989; Ludwig, 1995; Richards, 1981; Wills, 2003), and psychometric investigations that demonstrate better performance on standardised creativity tests in some psychotic populations relative to healthy controls (Hasenfus & Magaro, 1976; Jena & Ramachandra, 1995; Keefe & Magaro, 1980; Ryabova & Mendelvich, 2002). These endeavours have spilled over into the non-clinical spectrum of investigations with healthy functional individuals under the domain of personality research. Following a dimensional-approach where psychosis and normalcy are viewed as two ends of a continuum (Claridge, 1985, 1997), it is possible to identify and test healthy individuals with a psychoticism (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976) or schizotypal (Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995; Raine, 1991) personality disposition that is believed to be pathological in clinically psychotic populations. Expected differences between psychotic and healthy populations can thus be extended to non-clinical samples, albeit only to a limited extent, by contrasting groups of healthy individuals who are differentiated in terms of the degree of their psychotic personality characteristics. Using this approach, greater creativity was associated with higher levels of psychoticism in terms of performance on tasks of creative or divergent thinking (Eysenck, 1994; Merten & Fischer, 1999; Rawlings, Twomey, Burns, & Morris, 1998; Stavridou & Furnham, 1996; Woody & Claridge, 1977), and when correlating the incidence of psychoticism personality characteristics with highly creative individuals like artists and musicians (Booker, Fearn, & Francis, 2001; Wills, 1984). This is finding is not entirely unanimous, however, as some studies do not lend support to this pattern of results (Kline & Cooper, 1986; Kwiatkowsi, Vartanian, & Martindale, 1999; Wuthrich & Bates, 2001). One of the critical issues requiring clarification though is the underlying concept of creativity itself. Several theories of what creativity entails have been derived from different conceptual levels of study, i.e., in terms of the person, the product, the process, the person–environment interactions, and the brain (classification based in part on Plucker & Renzulli, 1999; Rhodes, 1987). Although this has led to the espousal of a diverse array of variables that are equated with creative ability and expression, one major factor uniting the many perspectives is the concept of ÔnoveltyÕ or ÔoriginalityÕ of ideas being central to any characterisation of creativity. The second vital factor underlying most theories is concept of Ôrelevance.Õ AmabileÕs (1983, 1990) theory typifies the standard view in that a product is defined to be creative in the extent that it is novel, useful and appropriate in a given situation. Eysenck (1993, 1995) on the other hand, derived the concept of originality from the concept of relevance by positing that Ôoverinclusive thinkingÕ or thought processes that are characterised by a wider conception of relevance than is conventional, as evident from the unusualness or unconventionality of responses on a word association task for instance, is the cognitive style that forms the cornerstone of creative ability. He went on to postulate that this cognitive style typifies individuals of a high psychoticism personality type. In the former view then, originality and relevance are two discrete components of creativity, whereas in EysenckÕs theory these two components define one another. 522 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 One need not, however, subscribe to only one of these stances for as long as creativity is not viewed as a unitary construct per se these are not mutually exclusive standpoints. More often than not, differing conceptions of creativity stem from addressing the same question from different planes. By defining the planes or the processes in question at the outset, one can integrate dissimilar viewpoints of creativity as diverse facets of the same complex construct. This is partly possible within the outlook of the Geneplore model (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995), which is a heuristic model rather than an explanatory theory of creativity, where the processes underlying creative thinking are twofold in that they involve the initial generation of potential ideas or ‘‘preinventive’’ structures followed by extensive exploration and interpretation of these ideas. Examples of preinventive structures include the formation of simple associations between stored conceptual structures in memory, synthesis of new mental structures, and analogical transfer of information from one domain to another. The examples of the exploratory processes include the search for desired attributes in structures, the search for conceptual limitation of structures and the evaluation of structures from different contexts or perspectives. The multifaceted nature of creativity is strongly emphasised in the Geneplore model where examining various normative cognitive processes under explicitly generative conditions is held to allow for a more thorough understanding of how creative thought can emerge in all its diversity. By acknowledging that many different thought processes underlie creative thinking, it allows for the examination of several discrete mental operations that comprise different elements of creative cognition. ÔConceptual expansionÕ and Ôcreative imageryÕ were two such processes that were identified and for which experimental tasks were developed. Conceptual expansion refers to the ability to broaden existing conceptual structures or loosen the confines of acquired concepts, a process that is especially vital in the formulation of novel ideas which is a core feature of creative thinking (Ward, 1994). This kind of process is tapped typically by experimental tasks that require the person to imagine an animal that lives on another planet which is different from Earth and what is assessed is how far the personÕs drawing of an animal deviates from existing schemas of animals in general, i.e., of having certain fundamental features like bilateral symmetry of form, presence of common appendages and sense organs, and so on. How ÔcreativeÕ one is on this task is assessed by how well one can expand this concept. The better one is able to imagine an animal that does not have a bilaterally symmetrical form, that lacks the customary appendages and sense organs found on most animals on this planet and, furthermore, has unusual features that are not found on most animals on earth, the greater oneÕs conceptual expansion. As enhanced performance on this task involves having a broader conception of relevance, the process of conceptual expansion fits in neatly with the Eysenckian conception of overinclusive thinking. Drawing from historical and anecdotal accounts of the role of imagery in aiding insights, discoveries and artistic expression, creative imagery relates to the vividness of abstract imagination in generativity. The creative imagery task (Finke, 1990) requires the construction of an object that falls into a predetermined category (e.g., transportation) using three randomly assigned simple three-dimensional figures (e.g., a sphere, a cone, and a cross). The invented object is then judged in terms of ‘‘originality,’’ or how unusual the object is, and ‘‘practicality,’’ or how functional the object is. A total creative imagery score is derived from the sum of the scores obtained on these A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 523 two sub-measures. The concepts of originality and relevance are separately assessed in this task and are thus differentiable constructs in creative imagery. To be able to create something unusual or novel, one must deviate from what is already known. Prior knowledge and expectations that one derives from past experience is thus a critical factor in the ability to be original. From an information processing perspective, Ôtop-downÕ or expectationdriven information processing refers to the influence of oneÕs knowledge and expectations on the processing of incoming information (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001). Deficits in top-down processing as noted in patients with schizophrenia (John & Hemsley, 1992; Karatekin & Asarnow, 1999; Vianin et al., 2002) appear to manifest in the case of high psychoticism or high schizotypy, a related but disparate personality construct, as a propensity for diffuse or less constrained top-down control as evidenced by reduced negative priming and subtle insufficiencies in sustained attention (Obiols, Garcı́a, de Trincherı́a, & Doménech, 1993; Stavridou & Furnham, 1996). The effect of top-down processes can be likened to the action of a spotlight. If the focus of the spotlight is narrow, the influence of expectation and prior activation are relatively concentrated on selected representations. In the case of diffuse top-down control, the spotlight is broader so that more loosely associated and more widely distributed representations are co-activated, although perhaps with less intensity. Diffuse top-down control may thus support both the overinclusive thinking that Eysenck claimed to be characteristic for individuals with high psychoticism as well as certain aspects of creative cognition. In the conceptual expansion task, the key to expanding a concept is to move beyond what is already known about its specific conceptual structures. As the influence of oneÕs knowledge and expectations would pose a hindrance to oneÕs ability to this perform this operation, diffuse top-down influence would be rather profitable to the process of conceptual expansion owing to the diminished influence of the usual restraining effect posed by oneÕs conceptual repertoire. With regard to the creative imagery task, the originality component in this task, which measures how novel and unique the invented object is, would also be expected to benefit from broadened top-down processing in a similar manner as the conceptual expansion task. Although there is considerable pressure given the randomness of the task design in the assignment of figures and categories to create novel objects or inventions, the overriding tendency is to produce an invention that matches or is similar to familiar objects drawn from existing knowledge. Diminished topdown control should weaken this tendency to invent conventional objects and thus give rise to greater originality on such a task. The same would not hold true for the practicality component as it relates to the functionality or usefulness of the object which is a fundamentally different element within this task as it relates to the creativity dimension of relevance. The present study addressed the issue of what specific types of creative cognitive processes relate to psychoticism and how this fits within the mould of EysenckÕs view of creativity versus the standard view of creativity. We refer to EysenckÕs conception of psychoticism (as measured by the EPQ), as opposed to the more recent conceptions of schizotypy, as EysenckÕs psychoticism scale most directly relates to overinclusive and unconventional thinking. In addition, the EPQ psychoticism scale was developed to measure nonconformist tendencies (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976), and correlates with novelty seeking and impulsivity scales (Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, & Teta, 1993). All these traits seem highly relevant for the ability to develop novel, unusual and original ideas as gauged by the conceptual expansion and creative imagery tasks in this study. There is some controversy concerning additional personality features that are tapped by the EPQ 524 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 psychoticism scale which are not explicitly psychopathological in nature, such as antisocial and impulsive characteristics. More recent versions of the EPQ have, however, reduced the loading of these traits on the psychoticism scale. By contrasting individuals based on the magnitude of psychoticism, we expected greater levels of psychoticism to be related to enhanced performance on the conceptual expansion task and higher levels of originality on the creative imagery task, but not necessarily to greater levels of practicality on the creative imagery task. 2. Method 2.1. Participants This study was originally carried out on two separate populations—University students (n = 44) and schooled adults with no University training (n = 36). As the results from both populations were comparable, the data from both samples were pooled. A total of 80 individuals, 29 men (mean age 31) and 51 women (mean age 30), were thus recruited for this study and received payment (the equivalent of $8/h) for their participation. 2.2. Sample description and procedures Participants were instructed to first complete the German version of the revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire—short form (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991; Ruch, 1999). The Cronbach a values (a) and the test-rest reliability (r) values for each of the scales of the short form of the German EPQ-R were as follows. Psychoticism: a = .72 and r = .85, Extraversion: a = .85 and r = .88, Neuroticism: a = .79 and r = .84, Lie Scale a = .72 and r = .84. Scores obtained on the psychoticism scale (P-scale) were taken as a measure of psychoticism and the sample was divided into two groups for the analyses using a median-split division. As the median P-scale score for the group was 3 (mean = 3. 41), participants with a P-scale score of 0–3 formed the low-psychoticism or lowP group (n = 45) and participants with a P-scale score of 4 and above formed the high-psychoticism or high-P group (n = 35). To obtain an elementary measure of IQ, subjects were required to complete the Picture Completion task, which taps attention to fine detail, and the Similarities task, which provides a measure of concept formation, from the German WAIS-R (Dahl, 1986). The low- and high-P groups were found to be matched as scores obtained on the P-scale did not correlate significantly with either of these WAIS-R scales. Conceptual expansion was then assessed with the use of the German translation of the Ward Ôanimal taskÕ (Ward, 1994). In this task participants were required to imagine and draw animals that lived on another planet that is wholly unlike Earth. The fact that the planet to be imagined was to be very different from Earth was strongly emphasised. Participants were asked to generate animals that were of two different species. The drawings were subsequently coded in accordance with the procedures previously described by Ward (1994, pp. 7–8) with the help of two scorers who had to simply note the presence of fundamental features common to animals found on Earth and the presence of atypical features (see Fig. 1). Both scorers were blind to the hypothesis of the experiment and had no information about A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 525 Fig. 1. Properties that are coded from the Conceptual Expansion drawings (adapted from Ward, 1994, p. 7 Copyright 1994 by Academic Press). the participants. Using an intra-class correlation coefficient, the inter-rater reliability was found to be highly significant (a = .85, p < .0001). A coding was deemed valid when both scorers were in agreement. In the occasional situation when both scorers were not in agreement, a third scorer was consulted and the majority result was accepted. This data were then further processed by the experimenter by extracting 5 elements from the valid coded data—bilateral asymmetry, lack of appendages, lack of sense organs, unusual appendages, and unusual sense organs (as shown in Fig. 1). Presence or absence of an element gave rise to a score of 1 or 0, respectively. Thus the total 526 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 Fig. 2. Stimuli used in the Creative Imagery task (adapted from Finke, 1990, p. 41 Copyright 1990 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates). expansion score for each picture ranged from 0 to 5. Statistical analyses on this task were carried out on by averaging the scores obtained on both the drawings for each subject. The participants were then required to complete the German translation of the creative imagery task (Finke, 1990). In this task, the participant is asked to assemble an object that falls into a predetermined category using three figures from an array of simple three-dimensional figures (see Fig. 2 for stimuli). Except for altering the form of the figures, the participants were allowed to vary the figures provided to them in any way with regard to size, orientation, position, texture, and so on. The participants were required to put the figures together in a meaningful way so as to form a useful object from a certain category. Following the procedure utilised by Finke (1990), the figures and the category were randomly assigned for every participant. As each participant was given six trials, a maximum of six inventions per person were obtained. The inventions were rated by two trained raters along two dimensions—Originality (how unusual and unique the invention is) and Practicality (how functional and usable the invention is) using a 5-point scale and the average of their ratings were taken as the scores for the inventions. The interrater correlations (intra-class correlation coefficient) on the creative imagery measures were significant for both the originality scale (a = .56, p = .0002), and the practicality scale (a = .35, p = .0307). Each participant consequently obtained an average score of practicality, originality and total creative imagery (practicality + originality) from the six inventions they generated across trials. 3. Results Preliminary analyses were carried out at the outset to gauge if any sex differences were present across the variables under study. Apart from a strong trend for women to score higher than males on the EPQ neuroticism scale, t (78) = 1. 960, p = .054, a pattern consistent with previous research findings, there were no significant results. When contrasting the four different scales of the EPQ-R, the psychoticism scale, the extraversion scale, the neuroticism scale, and the lie scale (taps the propensity to make socially desirable responses), a highly significant negative correlation A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 527 was present between the EPQ psychoticism scale and the EPQ lie scale, revealing that lower the psychoticism score, higher the lie scale score (r = .342, p = .003). As a check, all the analyses presented below were repeated after excluding participants who had a very high lie scale score (excluding L > 6, remaining N = 74). As the results obtained were virtually the same as the ones outlined below, the values presented here are those obtained from the whole sample (n = 80). Table 1 shows the descriptive data for the psychoticism groups across all the experimental variables. As described earlier in the methods section, the sample was divided in two groups (low-P and high-P) based on their psychoticism scale scores. Using t tests to contrast the groups on the total conceptual expansion score, the low-P group relative to the high-P group obtained lower scores on this task, t (78) = 2. 346, p = .022 (d = .521). A non-parametric test of statistical significance, the Mann–Whitney U test, was employed to contrast the psychoticism groups on the measures of the creative imagery task as the minimum obtainable score on the creative imagery variables was 1 which does not allow for the use of parametric tests such as t tests. The high-P group were found to surpass the low-P group on the originality-imagery measure, U = 581, p = .045 (d = .455). There were however, no differences between the groups on either the practicality-imagery score, U = 772, p = .88, or the total creative imagery score, U = 680, p = .297. The degree of association between psychoticism and the dependent variables were also analysed using bivariate correlation analyses (the PearsonÕs correlation coefficient for the analyses involving the total conceptual expansion score and the SpearmanÕs q for analyses involving the creative imagery scores). A low but significant positive correlation was found between the total conceptual expansion score and psychoticism (r = .285, p = .01) suggesting that higher the psychoticism score, greater the conceptual expansion. While no significant relationship was found between psychoticism and both the total creative imagery score and the practicality-imagery score, there was a low but significant positive correlation between psychoticism and the originality-imagery score (r = .234, p = .037). The correlations between the three imagery variables and the conceptual expansion score were non-significant although there was a trend towards a positive correlation between the conceptual expansion score and the originality imagery score (r = .213, p = .058). Table 1 Descriptive data for both psychoticism groups across all the variables Mean (SD) Conceptual expansion: Total score (a) Bilateral asymmetry (b) Lack of appendages (c) Lack of sense organs (d) Unusual appendages (e) Unusual sense organs Creative imagery: Total score Originality-imagery Practicality-imagery WAIS-Picture completion WAIS-Similarities Low psychoticism High psychoticism 1.567 (1.080) 0.200 (0.290) 0.322 (0.340) 0.167 (0.282) 0.456 (0.367) 0.422 (0.384) 5.489 (0.844) 2.524 (0.477) 2.965 (0.530) 109.700 (8.573) 113.422 (6.174) 2.200 (1.335) 0.429 (0.405) 0.543 (0.391) 0.371 (0.408) 0.429 (0.346) 0.429 (0.367) 5.735 (0.805) 2.725 (0.403) 3.010 (0.502) 110.286 (7.439) 114.057 (5.578) 528 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 The results of the correlations between the variables under study are displayed in Table 2. Interestingly, the creative imagery variables were found to correlate significantly with the WAIS-Picture Completion subscale. Significant positive correlations were found between the originality-imagery score and the WAIS-Picture Completion measure (r = .286, p = .01). The practicality-imagery score also correlated significantly with the WAIS-Picture Completion measure (r = .31, p = .005) as did the total creative imagery score (r = .361, p = .001). However, no significant correlations were found between the WAIS subscale measures and the total conceptual expansion score. In addition, simultaneous multiple regression analyses were carried out with six independent variables including sex, scores obtained on the psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism scales, and scores obtained on the WAIS-Similarities and the WAIS-Picture Completion measures. Taking the total expansion score as the dependent variable, the multiple regression analysis revealed that in the presence of all other variables, only the beta weights for psychoticism were significantly associated with conceptual expansion (b = 0.285, p = .013). The multiple regression analyses using the creative imagery measures as criterion revealed that only the WAIS-Picture Completion measure significantly predicted the originality-imagery (b = 0.290, p = .015) and practicality-imagery measures (b = 0.266, p = .032). The regression summaries for each of the these variables is shown in Table 3. Table 2 Correlations between psychoticism, the WAIS-IQ subscales and the creative cognition variables Psychoticism Psychoticism Conceptual expansion Originality-imagery Practicality-imagery WAIS-Picture completion WAIS-Similarities — .285** .234* .044 .133 .124 Conceptual expansion — .213 .003 .032 .198 Originality-imagery Practicality-imagery — .454*** .286** .129 — .310** .099 WAIS-Picture completion — .376** * p < .05. p < .01. *** p < .001. ** Table 3 Regression summaries using (a) total conceptual expansion score, (b) originality-imagery score, and (c) practicalityimagery score as dependent variables Psychoticism Extraversion Neuroticism Sex WAIS-Picture completion WAIS-Similarities Conceptual expansion Originality-imagery Practicality-imagery b value p level b value p level b value p level 0.285 0.007 0.002 0.098 0.061 0.190 .013 .952 .989 .399 .617 .129 0.162 0.039 0.127 0.078 0.291 0.125 .137 .714 .267 .483 .015 .294 0.086 0.113 0.066 0.150 0.266 0.031 .445 .314 .580 .198 .032 .802 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 529 4. Discussion The findings demonstrate that, as expected, the subjects who scored higher on the EPQ-R psychoticism scale performed better on the conceptual expansion task than subjects who obtained lower scores on the scale. Fig. 3 displays selected exemplars that were generated by the groups which serves to illustrate this difference. The high-P group tended to be better able to generate animals that are not prototypically like familiar animals by altering fundamental features, like creating bilaterally asymmetrical forms and excluding limbs and sensory organs typical of most Fig. 3. Some exemplars of Ôanimals on another planetÕ that were generated in the conceptual expansion by (A) the highpsychoticism group and (B) the low-psychoticism group. 530 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 Earth animals. In the creative imagery task, the high-P group was found to surpass their low-P counterparts in the ability to generate inventions that are original, unique or uncommon in an abstract imagery task. Some exemplars are displayed in Fig. 4 that contrast both groups in terms of originality-imagery where the differences in strategies adopted to complete this task range Fig. 4. Some exemplars from the creative imagery task by (A) the high-psychoticism group and (B) the lowpsychoticism group to illustrate the difference between the groups on the originality dimension of this task. A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 531 widely from making the figures fit to a preconceived notion of an object in a particular category (e.g., a ÔchairÕ as a common object that falls into the category ÔfurnitureÕ) versus creating a unusual invention that stems from a novel idea for an object in a category (e.g., a Ôclose combat pokerÕ as an unusual object that falls into the category ÔweaponsÕ). The trend for a positive correlation between performance on the conceptual expansion task and scores on the originality dimension of the imagery task appears to indicate that there is some underlying commonality between the two processes in that they both tap the tendency to produce original, unusual or statistically rare responses, as is also indicated by the similar performance by individuals on both these tasks as a function of psychoticism. However, the fact that the correlation is relatively low may also be suggestive of the inherent differences between the two creative cognitive processes with regard to their intrinsic complexities as they both tap originality yet necessitate differential levels of abstraction during execution. In the conceptual expansion task, oneÕs existing conceptualisation of animals guides the ability to expand the animal concept, whereas in the imagery task random figures must be mentally visualised and manipulated to form particular object within a category. A greater degree of abstraction is hence involved in the latter situation as there the conceptual structures drawn upon are not as well-defined. This point receives support from the finding that the pattern of performance on the creative cognition tasks diverged particularly with reference to the association with the WAIS-Picture Completion task. While performance on the conceptual expansion task did not correlate with performance on either of this IQ subscale, the contrary was true of the imagery task, as was critically shown in the regression analyses. The imagery task lays more restrictions on the creative process as both the elements and the purpose of the creative invention are predefined by the experimenter. Solving the imagery task therefore requires more goal-directed thinking relative to the conceptual expansion task where subjects are allowed substantially more mental liberty. In a way, the imagery task seems to tap processes that are associable to a scientific conception of creativity as originality plus functionality, whereas the conceptual expansion task draws on processes that fit within an artistic conception of creativity. Given the intrinsic complexity of creative imagery task where vividness of mental imagery and imagination are tapped, the level of intellectual abilities appears to play a vital role in the execution of the process. Furthermore, the results indicate that only originality in creative cognition appears to be enhanced as a function of psychoticism. In showing that the psychoticism groups differed in performance on the conceptual expansion task and the originality-imagery measure, there is support for EysenckÕs notion of overinclusive and nonconformist thinking as a fundamental cognitive style in high psychoticism individuals as originality in these processes was derived from a wider conception of relevance. However, high originality alone cannot be equated with higher levels of creativity per se and the lack of differences between the psychoticism groups on the practicality-imagery and total creative imagery measures demonstrate that both groups show similar performance in producing appropriate responses. Psychoticism then appears to only facilitate the ability to produce original, unusual or uncommon responses in a generative task and has little bearing on the usefulness or suitability of these responses. The results of the study are also in line with existing literature that link greater levels of psychoticism with enhanced creative ability (Eysenck, 1994; Merten & Fischer, 1999; Rawlings et al., 1998; Woody & Claridge, 1977). The Götz and Götz studies (1979a, 1979b), for example, found 532 A. Abraham et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 520–534 that visual artists had higher levels of psychoticism relative to non-artists and, moreover, that greater degrees of success within a sample of artists was associated with psychoticism. The present findings were predicted in light of diffuse top-down control and its effect on differing aspects of cognition in high psychoticism or high schizotypy individuals. Stavridou and Furnham (1996), for instance, examined psychoticism in relation to creative thinking and cognitive inhibition in a negative priming task and found that in addition to high-P scorers producing more unique responses on divergent thinking tasks in comparison to the low-P scorers, they also demonstrated reduced negative priming. The effect that task-irrelevant stimuli have on the processing of information can be tapped in a Stroop experimental paradigm with a manipulation for negative priming, which refers to the slower reaction time to a target that was a distractor in a previous display in comparison to the reaction time to a target that is unrelated to the previous display. This typical slowness in responding when the to-be-attended information in a trial is the same as the to-be-ignored information on a previous trial was found to be diminished in the case of the high-P scorers relative to the low-P scorers. Reduced negative priming can be explained in terms of diffuse top-down influence on information processing. When trying to ignore a distractor, oneÕs focus is centred on the task at hand by keeping the task goals in mind. With diffuse top-down influence, the spotlight of this focus is broader so as to include more irrelevant information. As a result, the distractor item is more easily accessed when it becomes the target item as it is not adequately inhibited and remains within the purview of oneÕs attentional stream. Although speculative at this point, we propose that this kind of diffuse top-down control gave rise to better performance on part of the high-psychoticism group on the conceptual expansion task and the originality measure of the creative imagery task given that a less concentrated yet broader influence of oneÕs knowledge and expectations would allow for a wider conception of relevance and, consequently, the ability to generate more original responses. Drawing from previous findings in diverse areas that explore personality traits, creative thinking and other aspects of complex cognition, this paper attempted to weave a common thread through these domains by postulating a role for top-down influence on information processing in select aspects of creative cognition, or more specifically, in the ability to generate original responses. The present findings could allow for the development of a broad framework within which the neuropsychological underpinnings of creative cognition with reference to the operation of other complex cognitive processes and personality variables can be more comprehensively examined. The study is limited in that only psychoticism in the sense of EysenckÕs model was examined as a crucial personality variable in facilitating certain facets of creative cognition. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1041–1046 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Short Communication Paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection than skeptics Michiel van Elk ⇑ University of Amsterdam, Department of Social Psychology, The Netherlands a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 29 May 2013 Available online 9 August 2013 Keywords: Biological motion Agency detection Paranormal beliefs Signal detection theory Illusory pattern perception a b s t r a c t It has been hypothesized that illusory agency detection is at the basis of belief in supernatural agents and paranormal beliefs. In the present study a biological motion perception task was used to study illusory agency detection in a group of skeptics and a group of paranormal believers. Participants were required to detect the presence or absence of a human agent in a point-light display. It was found that paranormal believers had a lower perceptual sensitivity than skeptics, which was due to a response bias to ‘yes’ for stimuli in which no agent was present. The relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory agency detection held only for stimuli with low to intermediate ambiguity, but for stimuli with a high number of visual distractors responses of believers and skeptics were at the same level. Furthermore, it was found that illusory agency detection was unrelated to traditional religious belief and belief in witchcraft, whereas paranormal beliefs (i.e. Psi, spiritualism, precognition, superstition) were strongly related to illusory agency detection. These findings qualify the relation between illusory pattern perception and supernatural and paranormal beliefs and suggest that paranormal beliefs are strongly related to agency detection biases. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Imagine yourself walking on your own through a dark forest. Each and every movement that you perceive will result in the feeling that another person or animal is present. From an evolutionary point of view, incorrectly assuming the presence of another agent while there is none (i.e. a false positive) is associated with only little costs, whereas the false belief that no other agent is present while in fact there is one (i.e. a false negative) can cost one’s life. Accordingly, it has been suggested that evolution has favored the selection of a hyper-active agency detection device (HADD) and that our perceptual systems are biased towards detecting the presence of patterns and other agents, such as animals or humans in the environment (Barrett, 2000). The perceptual mechanisms to detect patterns and agency may in turn be at the basis of belief in supernatural agents and belief in paranormal phenomena (Barrett & Lanman, 2008). The perceived presence of other agents in ambiguous situations and the anthropomorphic interpretation of ambiguous information may reinforce people’s belief in the continuous presence of external agents, such as ghosts, spirits or gods. Examples of anthropomorphism abound: people have reported seeing the face of Jesus in clouds, buildings and even on a cheese sandwich. Experimental studies on illusory agency perception indicate that the tendency to detect meaningful patterns in random noise is quite high, with face detection rates above 40% (Rieth, Lee, Lui, Tian, & Huber, 2011) and with substantial individual variation in the tendency to report illusory faces (Gosselin & Schyns, 2003). ⇑ Address: University of Amsterdam, Department of Social Psychology, Weesperplein 4, 1018 XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail address: m.vanelk@uva.nl 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.07.004 1042 M.van Elk / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1041–1046 Several studies have shown that paranormal believers are indeed more biased towards detecting faces in scrambled pictures or in artifact pictures than skeptics (Krummenacher, Mohr, Haker, & Brugger, 2010; Riekki, Lindeman, Aleneff, Halme, & Nuortimo, 2013). This finding fits with other studies indicating that paranormal believers compared to skeptics tend to perceive more meaningful patterns in ambiguous information (Blackmore & Moore, 1993; Brugger et al., 1993; Gianotti, Mohr, Pizzagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger, 2001). However, three important issues regarding the relation between paranormal beliefs and pattern perception remain to be elucidated. Many studies have used static pictures and focused on face perception and the detection of meaningful patterns in meaningless noise (Krummenacher et al., 2010; Riekki et al., 2013). However, from an evolutionary point of view detecting agency from movement related information (e.g. does a movement signal the presence of another animal?) is at least equally important for survival as pattern recognition. A well-established experimental paradigm to study the perception of agency is the use of point-light-walker displays, in which participants are required to detect the presence of a walking human in a cloud of moving dots (e.g. Troje & Westhoff, 2006). Accordingly, in the present study the relation between belief in parapsychology and agency detection was investigated, by using point-light stimuli. A related advantage of using point-light stimuli is that it allows determining the boundary conditions for illusory agency detection to occur, by varying the amount of randomly moving dots. Previous studies have used scrambled or distorted pictures to measure pattern perception in believers (Krummenacher et al., 2010; Riekki et al., 2013). In the present study the amount of ambiguity in the stimulus could be systematically manipulated, by including stimuli with both a low and a high number of visual distractors. In this way it could be investigated whether illusory agency detection occurs only for stimuli that are intermediately ambiguous (cf. Blackmore & Moore, 1993) or irrespectively of the level of stimulus ambiguity. Finally, it remains to be determined which aspects of parapsychological belief are relevant for illusory agency detection. The ‘paranormal’ is a fuzzy concept that involves different aspects, such as belief in Psi, superstition, belief in spirits and magical thinking among other things (see: Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012, for review). As described above, the notion of the HADD predicts that illusory agency detection should be primarily related to the belief in supernatural agents (Barrett & Lanman, 2008). In the present study the revised paranormal belief scale was used (Tobacyk, 2004) and the relation between the different subscales (e.g. measuring traditional religious belief, belief in Psi, spiritualism, etc.) and illusory agency detection was determined. 2. Method 2.1. Participants A total of 67 (48 women, mean age = 28.3 years) healthy participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were included in this study. 38 participants were recruited from the student population of the University of Amsterdam and they participated for course credits or for a financial remuneration. The other 29 participants were recruited at a paranormal fair (i.e. Paraview, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; www.paraview.nl) and were offered a financial remuneration for participation. 2.2. Stimuli The point-light stimuli were generated using the software package PointLightLab (http://www.pointlightlab.com/). The target stimulus consisted of an animated-point-set of 12 points, representing a human avatar walking on a treadmill at a pace of about 1 step cycle per 2 s. Animated-noise-point populations were generated by using the motion drawn from the same animation source and by randomly scrambling the location of each individual dot across the display. In 50% of the stimuli an unscrambled walker was presented and in 50% of the stimuli a scrambled walker was presented. The walker could appear at 5 different horizontal locations (i.e. 10°, 5°, 0°, 5° and 10° with respect to the center of the screen) and could be walking in a leftward- or rightward direction. 6 different levels of animated-noise-points were added to each stimulus (12, 24, 48, 96, 192 and 384 noise points). Thus in total 120 different stimuli were used in the experiment, according to the following factors: Walker (Unscrambled vs. Srambled), Location (10°, 5°, 0°, 5° and 10°), Direction (Left vs. Right) and Noise (12, 24, 48, 96, 192, 384). Each stimulus was presented once and accordingly for each noise level there were 10 trials in which a signal was present (unscrambled walker) and 10 trials in which no signal was present (scrambled walker). Stimuli were presented against a black background at a resolution of 1024  768 pixels and each stimulus was presented for 2 s. 2.3. Experimental setup and procedure Participants were instructed that they were going to see short movies in which a human walking figure could be present or not. In order to establish that all participants were able to correctly identify the walker, before the start of the experiment an example movie of an unscrambled walker was shown, until participants indicated that they recognized the walking human figure. During the experiment each movie was presented for 2 s after which the participant was required to indicate whether he or she believed that a walking human figure was present or not, by pressing the left or the right button on the computer keyboard (mapping of response buttons was counterbalanced across participants). In the instructions it was emphasized that in case of uncertainty, participants should trust their first impression of the stimulus and not think too long. M.van Elk / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1041–1046 1043 In case of correct responses, no feedback was given and the next trial started after 1500–2000 ms. In case of incorrect responses, feedback was presented on the screen for 2 s, indicating either a miss (‘incorrect: a human walking figure was present’) or a false alarm (‘incorrect: no human walking figure was present’). Performance feedback was included to enhance participant’s attention during the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, participants conducted 10 practice trials to familiarize with the task. The experiment was conducted using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral systems, Albany, CA, USA). At the end of the experiment, participants completed the revised paranormal belief scale (RPBS; Tobacyk, 2004).1 The RPBS consists of 26 items assessing different aspects of belief in the paranormal, namely: traditional religious beliefs, belief in Psi, superstition, belief in witchcraft, spiritualism and precognition. 2.4. Data analysis A signal detection analysis was used to analyze the data from the biological motion detection task (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmilan & Creelman, 2005). The perceptual sensitivity (d0 ) was calculated by computing the difference of the z-transforms of the hit and false alarm rates for each of the different noise levels. As a measure of response bias, the z-transform of the false alarm rates was used, z(FA), which represents the distance in standard deviations of the response criterion from the mean of the hypothetical noise-distribution. This measure was preferred over other indexes of response bias (c or b), as it is independent of hit rates and thereby provides a more direct measure of illusory pattern perception. 3. Results 3.1. Covariate analysis In the first analysis, the score on the revised paranormal belief scale (RPBS) was entered as a covariate in the repeated measures ANOVA with Noise (6 levels: 12, 24, 48, 96, 192 and 384 distractors) as within-subjects factor. For the perceptual sensitivity (d0 ), a main effect of Noise, F(5, 280) = 45.3, g2 = .45, p < .001, indicated that with an increased number of visual distractors d0 decreased. A significant interaction was observed between Noise and the RPBS score, F(5, 280) = 3.6, p < .005, g2 = .06. This interaction reflected that the effect of noise on the perceptual sensitivity was modulated by the score on the paranormal belief scale (see also: Section 3.2). For the response bias, z(FA), a main effect of Noise, F(5, 280) = 20.9, p < .001, g2 = .27, indicated that the bias function increased as a function of the number of visual distractors in the stimulus. An interaction was found between Noise and the RPBS score, F(5, 280) = 2.7, p < .05, g2 = .05. This interaction reflected that the effect of noise on the response bias was modulated by the score on the paranormal belief scale (see also: Section 3.2). 3.2. Group comparison The covariate analysis indicated that the effect of noise on the perceptual sensitivity and the response bias was modulated by the score on the revised paranormal belief scale. In order to further investigate this effect, a between-subjects comparison was conducted. Groups of Paranormal believers and Skeptics were created based on the median split according to the scores on the RPBS and subsequently, Group was used as a between-subjects factor in the repeated measures ANOVA with Noise (6 levels: 12, 24, 48, 96, 192 and 384 distractors) as within-subjects factor. As expected, a main effect of Noise, F(5, 290) = 215.1, p < .001, g2 = .79, indicated that the perceptual sensitivity (d0 ) decreased with an increased number of visual distractors (see Fig. 1). A main effect of Group, F(1, 58) = 9.5, p < .005, g2 = .14, indicated that skeptics had a higher perceptual sensitivity (d0 = 1.5) than believers (d0 = 1.1; see Fig. 1). No significant interaction was observed between Group and Noise (F(5, 290) = 1.3, p = .25). For the response bias (z(FA)), a main effect of Noise, F(1, 58) = 90.6, p < .001, g2 = .61, indicated that the bias function increased as a function of the number of visual distractors (see Fig. 1). A main effect of Group, F(1, 58) = 8.4, p < .005, g2 = .13, indicated that skeptics showed a reduced response bias (z(FA) = .88) compared to believers (z(FA) = .52; see Fig. 1). Finally, an interaction between Group and Noise, F(5, 290) = 3.1, p < .01, g2 = .05, indicated that the difference between skeptics and believers was most pronounced for stimuli with a low to intermediate number of visual distractors (see Fig. 1). To investigate whether the groups selectively differed only in their bias for reporting illusory patterns (z(FA)) and not in their bias for reporting real patterns (z(HR)), an additional analysis was conducted using the z-transformed Hit rates: z(HR). A main effect of noise, F(5, 290) = 106.2, p < .001, g2 = .65, indicated that with increased noise it became more difficult to distinguish whether a signal was present. Importantly, no main effect of group was observed (F(1, 58) = 1.3, p = .26) and no significant interaction was found (F < 1), indicating that the groups did not differ in their responses with respect to the trials in which a signal was present. 1 The subscale to measure belief in ‘Extraordinary Life Forms’ (ELF) was not used in the analysis of the RPBS, as it contained ambiguous items to which both skeptics and believers would agree (e.g. ‘There is life on other planets’). 1044 M.van Elk / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1041–1046 Fig. 1. Perceptual sensitivity (left graph) and response bias (right graph) as a function of the number of visual distractors. Dark lines represent skeptics and light lines represent believers in paranormal phenomena. Table 1 Correlations between the revised paranormal belief scale (RPBS) and the response bias (z(FA)). Different rows represent stimuli with different numbers of visual distractors. Different columns represent the different subscales of the RPBS (TRB = traditional religious belief; PSI = Psi; WTC = witchcraft; STS = superstition; SPT = spiritualism; PC = precognition). Significant correlations are marked in bold. z(FA) 12 visual distractors z(FA) 24 visual distractors z(FA) 48 visual distractors z(FA) 96 visual distractors z(FA) 192 visual distractors z(FA) 384 visual distractors RPBS TRB PSI WTC STS SPT PC r = .448 p <.001 r = .291 p < .05 r = .429 p < .001 r = .408 p < .001 r = .155 p = .25 r = .066 p < .621 r = .140 p = .29 r = .046 p = .73 r = .204 p = .12 r = .189 p = .155 r = .062 p = .64 r = .050 p = .71 r = .491 p < .001 r = .302 p < .05 r = .394 p < .005 r = .427 p < .001 r = .121 p = .37 r = .009 p = .95 r = .166 p = .214 r = .029 p = .83 r = .202 p < .13 r = .243 p = .07 r = .103 p = .44 r = .072 p = .589 r = .325 p < .05 r = .349 p < .01 r = .352 p < .01 r = .221 p = .1 r = .115 p = .25 r = .07 p = .59 r = .498 p < .001 r = .380 p < .005 r = .448 p < .001 r = .363 p < .005 r = .149 p = .27 r = .101 p = .45 r = .441 p < .001 r = .379 p < .005 r = .448 p < .001 r = .363 p < .005 r = .157 p = .24 r = .061 p = .65 3.3. Correlation analysis Significant correlations were observed between the RPBS score and the response bias for stimuli with 12 distractors, 24 distractors, 48 distractors and 96 distractors (see Table 1). In an exploratory analysis it was investigated which of the subscales correlated specifically with the response bias. As can be seen in Table 1, belief in Psi, superstition, spiritualism and precognition correlated with the response bias for stimuli with a small to intermediate number ofdistractors. 3.4. Control for context-effects Part of the present data was collected in a field-study at a paranormal fair, which presents a less controlled research environment than lab-based research. To control for the possibility that differences in the testing environment may have contributed to the effects observed a control analysis was conducted. As expected, visitors of the paranormal fair had higher scores on the RPBS (mean = 3.5, SE = .19) than university students (mean = 2.5, SE = .15), t(62) = 4.2, p < .001. Within the group of university students a significant correlation between the RPBS and the response bias was observed for stimuli with 48 distractors (see Table 2). Within the group of paranormal fair visitors significant correlations between the RPBS score and the response bias were observed for stimuli with 12 and 96 distractors (see Table 2). Thereby this analysis indicates that the correlation between the RPBS and response bias is not driven by context, but holds to some extent within groups. 1045 M.van Elk / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1041–1046 Table 2 Correlations between the score on the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) and the response bias (z(FA)) for University Students (left column) and visitors at the Paranormal Fair (right column). Different rows represent stimuli with different numbers of visual distractors. z(FA) 12 visual distractors z(FA) 24 visual distractors z(FA) 48 visual distractors z(FA) 96 visual distractors z(FA) 192 visual distractors z(FA) 384 visual distractors RPBS university students RPBS paranormal fair visitors r = .112 p =.50 r = .014 p < .94 r = .389 p < .05 r = .149 p = .37 r = .137 p = .41 r = .141 p = .40 r = .460 p < .05 r = .271 p = .25 r = .250 p = .29 r = .509 p < .05 r = .343 p = .139 r = .110 p = .644 4. Discussion Three main findings support and qualify the notion that paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection than skeptics. First, it was found that paranormal believers had a lower perceptual sensitivity than skeptics, which was primarily related to a response bias to ‘yes’ for stimuli in which no agent was present. This finding suggests that paranormal believers were more biased towards detecting agency than skeptics. Whereas previous studies focused only on static stimuli (Krummenacher et al., 2010; Riekki et al., 2013) in the present study a biological motion perception task was used in which participants were required to detect the presence or absence of another human agent. Paranormal believers’ tendency towards detecting human agents may be related to a general response-tendency towards ‘yes’, a confirmation bias (Hergovich, 2003; Wiseman, Greening, & Smith, 2003) and a tendency to jump to conclusions based on only limited evidence (Brugger & Graves, 1997). Second, the relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory agency detection held only for stimuli with low to intermediate ambiguity, but for stimuli with a high number of visual distractors responses of believers and skeptics were at the same level. This finding indicates that illusory pattern perception is driven by both bottom-up and top-down factors: paranormal believers show a stronger response bias than skeptics for stimuli that in principle could afford agency-detection (i.e. if a human agent is present, it should be detectable) but not for stimuli that are obviously too noisy (see also: Blackmore & Moore, 1993). In other words: illusory pattern perception seems limited to stimuli that in principle could be meaningful (Riekki et al., 2013). Finally, it was found that traditional religious belief and belief in witchcraft were unrelated to illusory agency detection, whereas paranormal beliefs (i.e. belief in Psi, spiritualism, belief in precognition, superstition) were strongly related to illusory agency detection. This finding extends earlier studies showing a relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory pattern perception (Krummenacher et al., 2010; Riekki et al., 2013). The tendency to over-attribute agency to random motion displays may be primarily related to belief in paranormal phenomena, as these are often characterized by aberrant perceptions (e.g. seeing aura’s, spirits, etc.) and an emphasis on pattern perception in general (e.g. reading hands, coffee reading, sand reading, etc.). One can only speculate about why no relation was observed between traditional religious beliefs and illusory agency detection. According to the cognitive science of religion, belief in supernatural agents (e.g. gods, demons or angels) may find its basis in perceptual agency detection biases (Barrett & Lanman, 2008). However, religion is a complex phenomenon and encompasses beliefs, rituals, experiences and group processes among other things. As a consequence religiosity may be determined by a number of different factors such as upbringing, education and culture, rather than hyperactive agency detection alone. An interesting parallel may be drawn between the present findings – showing a relation between illusory agency detection and belief in the paranormal – and research on schizotypy and schizophrenia. The schizotypal personality is often characterized by delusional beliefs, magical thinking and aberrant perceptual experiences (Brugger & Mohr, 2008; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). For instance, several studies have shown that persons with schizotypal personality features are more prone to detect meaningful patterns in meaningless noise (Galdos et al., 2011; Vercammen, de Haan, & Aleman, 2008). Furthermore, it has been found that schizotypy is associated with a stronger tendency to see connections between unrelated events – a phenomenon that is also known as ‘apophenia’ (Brugger, 2001; Brugger & Graves, 1997; Fyfe, Williams, Mason, & Pickup, 2008). For instance, by using the ‘moving triangles task’ it has been found that participants with schizotypal personality features were more prone towards ascribing meaning to random movements of geometrical figures (Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000; Blakemore, Sarfati, Bazin, & Decety, 2003; Fyfe et al., 2008; Russell, Reynaud, Herba, Morris, & Corcoran, 2006). Given the close link between schizotypy and belief in the paranormal (Lawrence & Peters, 2004), the present findings extend these previous studies and indicate that in addition to intentional attribution biases, belief in the paranormal may also be characterized by perceptual biases to detect agency. In sum, the present study shows that paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection. Thereby this study adds to the growing literature showing that one’s religious or paranormal beliefs determine to a strong extent how 1046 M.van Elk / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1041–1046 one perceives the surrounding world (Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2008; Colzato et al., 2010; Hergovich, 2003; Krummenacher et al., 2010; Lindeman, Svedholm, Riekki, Raij, & Hari, 2012; Riekki et al., 2013). Acknowledgment This research was supported by a VENI Grant No. 016.135.135 from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). References Abell, F., Happe, F., & Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of mental states to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development. Cognitive Development, 15(1), 1–16. Barrett, J. L. (2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 29–34. Barrett, J. L., & Lanman, J. A. (2008). The science of religious beliefs. Religion, 38(2), 109–124. Blackmore, S. J., & Moore, R. (1993). Seeing things: Visual recognition and belief in the paranormal. European Journal of Parapsychology, 10(91–103). Blakemore, S. J., Sarfati, Y., Bazin, N., & Decety, J. (2003). The detection of intentional contingencies in simple animations in patients with delusions of persecution. Psychological Medicine, 33(8), 1433–1441. Brugger, P. (2001). From haunted brain to haunted science: A cognitive neuroscience view of paranormal and pseudoscientific thought. In J. Houran & R. Lange (Eds.), Hauntings and poltergeists: Multidisciplinary perspectives. North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc. Brugger, P., & Graves, R. E. (1997). Testing vs. believing hypotheses: Magical ideation in the judgement of contingencies. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2(4), 251–272. Brugger, P., & Mohr, C. (2008). The paranormal mind: How the study of anomalous experiences and beliefs may inform cognitive neuroscience. Cortex, 44(10), 1291–1298. Brugger, P., Regard, M., Landis, T., Cook, N., Krebs, D., & Niederberger, J. (1993). ‘Meaningful’ patterns in visual noise: Effects of lateral stimulation and the observer’s belief in ESP. Psychopathology, 26(5–6), 261–265. Colzato, L. S., van Beest, I., van den Wildenberg, W. P., Scorolli, C., Dorchin, S., Meiran, N., et al (2010). God: Do I have your attention? Cognition, 117(1), 87–94. Colzato, L. S., van den Wildenberg, W. P., & Hommel, B. (2008). Losing the big picture: How religion may control visual attention. PLoS One, 3(11), e3679. Eckblad, M., & Chapman, L. J. (1983). Magical ideation as an indicator of schizotypy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51(2), 215–225. Fyfe, S., Williams, C., Mason, O. J., & Pickup, G. J. (2008). Apophenia, theory of mind and schizotypy: Perceiving meaning and intentionality in randomness. Cortex, 44(10), 1316–1325. Galdos, M., Simons, C., Fernandez-Rivas, A., Wichers, M., Peralta, C., Lataster, T., et al (2011). Affectively salient meaning in random noise: A task sensitive to psychosis liability. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 37(6), 1179–1186. Gianotti, L. R., Mohr, C., Pizzagalli, D., Lehmann, D., & Brugger, P. (2001). Associative processing and paranormal belief. Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 55(6), 595–603. Gosselin, F., & Schyns, P. G. (2003). Superstitious perceptions reveal properties of internal representations. Psychological Science, 14(5), 505–509. Green, D., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics. New York: Wiley. Hergovich, A. (2003). Field dependence, suggestibility and belief in paranormal phenomena. Personality and Individual Differences, 34(2), 195–209. Krummenacher, P., Mohr, C., Haker, H., & Brugger, P. (2010). Dopamine, paranormal belief, and the detection of meaningful stimuli. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(8), 1670–1681. Lawrence, E., & Peters, E. (2004). Reasoning in believers in the paranormal. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders, 192(11), 727–733. Lindeman, M., & Svedholm, A. M. (2012). What’s in a term? Paranormal, superstitious, magical and supernatural beliefs by any other name would mean the same. Review of General Psychology, 16(241–255). Lindeman, M., Svedholm, A. M., Riekki, T., Raij, T., & Hari, R. (2012). Is it just a brick wall or a sign from the universe? An fMRI study of supernatural believers and skeptics. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. Macmilan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user’s guide. Mahwah New Jersey: Erlbaum. Peters, E., Joseph, S., Day, S., & Garety, P. (2004). Measuring delusional ideation: The 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30(4), 1005–1022. Riekki, T., Lindeman, M., Aleneff, M., Halme, A., & Nuortimo, A. (2013). Paranormal and religious believers are more prone to illusory face perception than skeptics and non-believers. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(2), 150–155. Rieth, C. A., Lee, K., Lui, J., Tian, J., & Huber, D. E. (2011). Faces in the mist: Illusory face and letter detection. Iperception, 2(5), 458–476. Russell, T. A., Reynaud, E., Herba, C., Morris, R., & Corcoran, R. (2006). Do you see what I see? Interpretations of intentional movement in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 81(1), 101–111. Tobacyk, J. (2004). A revised paranormal belief scale. The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 23, 94–98. Troje, N. F., & Westhoff, C. (2006). The inversion effect in biological motion perception: Evidence for a ‘‘life detector’’? Current Biology, 16(8), 821–824. Vercammen, A., de Haan, E. H., & Aleman, A. (2008). Hearing a voice in the noise: Auditory hallucinations and speech perception. Psychological Medicine, 38(8), 1177–1184. Wiseman, R., Greening, E., & Smith, M. (2003). Belief in the paranormal and suggestion in the seance room. British Journal of Psychology, 94, 285–297.

Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Unconscious processing of multiple nonadjacent letters in visually masked words Richard L. Abrams * Department of Psychology, University of Washington, USA Received 13 August 2004 Available online 25 February 2005 Abstract The claim that visually masked, unidentifiable (‘‘subliminal’’) words are analyzed at the level of whole word meaning has been challenged by recent findings indicating that instead, analysis occurs mainly at the subword level. The present experiments examined possible limits on subword analysis. Experiment 1 obtained semantic priming from pleasant- and unpleasant-meaning subliminal words in which no individual letter contained diagnostic information about a wordÕs evaluative valence; thus analysis must operate on information more complex than that contained in individual letters. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that analysis must operate on information more complex than that represented by individual bigrams (adjacent letters) or trigrams (three consecutive letters). These findings suggest that while subliminal priming is driven by subword analysis, the effective units of analysis are distributed widely across at least short (four- and five-letter) words. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Unconscious; Subliminal; Priming 1. Introduction The research described here examined the possibility that unconscious processing of visually masked words—words hereafter referred to by the convenient vernacular term ‘‘subliminal’’—is * Present address: Department of Psychology, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA 17013, USA. Fax: +1 717 245 1971. E-mail address: abramsr@dickinson.edu. 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.01.004 586 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 limited to operating on subword elements as small as individual letters. This possibility arises from recent findings (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000) that suggest that subliminal words undergo analysis not at the level of whole-word meaning, but at the subword level. The present series of experiments followed up on those findings by testing various limits on subword analysis, beginning with the intriguing possibility that only individual letters are analyzed. To test the level at which analysis of subliminal words occurs, the present experiments used a semantic priming, or congruency, procedure that has been the basis for numerous studies of unconscious processing. In this procedure a briefly flashed, visually masked word (the subliminal prime) is presented just prior to a visible target word that participants categorize semantically (for example, as pleasant or unpleasant in meaning, or as a male or female name). Faster or more accurate classification of targets preceded by same-category primes is the priming (or congruency) effect that has been widely reported (for a review, see Draine & Greenwald, 1998). Ostensibly it is a semantic effect, because it involves the primeÕs semantic category. However, several recent findings demonstrate that such subliminal ‘‘semantic’’ priming effects may arise from processing that occurs—paradoxically—at the subword level. These findings are reviewed briefly below. The key evidence that makes plausible subliminal ‘‘semantic’’ priming in which analysis is at the subword level, not the level of word meaning, is that subliminal priming occurs robustly only when subliminal words have first been practiced as visible words. ‘‘Practiced’’ here means classified repeatedly into the same categories used in a subsequent priming task in which the words reappear as subliminal primes. Such earlier-practiced primes will be referred to as practiced words, and words that appear as primes without having been practiced earlier will be referred to as notpracticed words. The evidence that subliminal priming requires practice is of two types. First, in the only studies that have directly compared practiced and notpracticed words, only the practiced words yielded subliminal priming (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; which used words classified as pleasant and unpleasant in meaning; Damian, 2001; which used words classified as bigger or smaller than a computer monitor). Second, a similar pattern can be discerned in the literature when studies that have used practiced words as subliminal primes are compared with studies that have used notpracticed words. Many (perhaps all) of the studies that recently have reported substantial subliminal priming effects have used practiced words (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000). In contrast, earlier studies typically used notpracticed primes and reported effects that have been characterized as small in magnitude and difficult to replicate (for representative characterizations, see Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Forster, 1998). The difficulty in obtaining reliable subliminal priming from notpracticed words suggests that subliminal words do not routinely undergo processing at the level of word meaning. The ease with which subliminal priming can be obtained from practiced words suggests the possibility that, for these words, priming is driven by processing that occurs at the subword level. Both types of words are assumed to undergo processing limited to operating on subword elements. For practiced words, however, this subword processing apparently is sufficient to produce ‘‘semantic’’ priming, because it ‘‘triggers’’ semantic activation associated earlier in practice with whole words in which the subword elements appeared. This view that practice enables subsequent semantic activation through ‘‘triggering’’ by subword parts is similar to the priming theory of attention proposed by Treisman (1960) and elaborated with regard to spatially unattended words by Broadbent and Gathercole (1990). R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 587 Empirical support for this view is provided by the results of Experiment 1 and 2 in Abrams and Greenwald (2000; see also Greenwald & Abrams, 1999, 2002). In Experiment 1, after practice in which words were classified as pleasant-meaning (e.g., angel, warm) or unpleasant-meaning (prison, brutal), subword parts of those words were rearranged to form nonwords that were then presented as subliminal primes. As would be expected if processing of subword elements triggers activation associated with earlier practice, the nonwords functioned as subliminal ‘‘semantic’’ primes that had the valence of the words from which they had been formed. For example, anrm (formed from angel and warm) functioned as a pleasant-meaning subliminal prime, and prital (formed from prison and brutal) functioned as an unpleasant-meaning subliminal prime. In Experiment 2, subliminal primes were again formed from rearranged parts of practiced words, but this time the parts were combined to form words whose valence was opposite that of the words from which they came. The unpleasant-meaning practiced words smut and bile, for example, contributed parts to form the prime smile, and the pleasant-meaning practiced words sun and glad contributed parts to form the prime sad. As in Experiment 1, these rearranged-parts subliminal primes functioned with the valence of the practiced words from which they were formed, even though that valence was now opposite their whole-word valence: smile functioned as an unpleasant-meaning word, and sad as a pleasant-meaning word. Thus, the processing that produced the priming in this experiment must have occurred at the level of subword parts and not at the level of whole-word meaning. Additional support for the view that subliminal priming involves stimulus parts and not wholestimulus meaning comes from a recent experiment with subliminal number primes (Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache, & Dehaene, 2003). Greenwald et al. gave practice classifying two-digit numbers as greater than or less than 55 (e.g., 16, 49; 73, 82). Subliminal primes were then tested that were formed by rearranging digits of practiced numbers to yield numbers from the opposite category: for example, 64, 91, 27, and 38. As in Abrams and Greenwald (2000), these rearrangedparts primes functioned paradoxically with the less-than- or greater-than-55 value of the numbers from which they had been formed, rather than with their whole-number value (64 and 91 acted as less-than-55 primes; 27 and 38 acted as greater-than-55 primes). Taken together, these findings—the difference in effectiveness of practiced and notpracticed subliminal primes, and the effectiveness as subliminal primes of words and nonwords (and numbers) formed from parts of practiced stimuli—characterize subliminal priming as driven by subword processing, processing that suffices to produce robust priming when there has been earlier practice with the words that then reappear as the subliminal primes. The findings above are clear in establishing an important role for subword analysis in subliminal priming, but they provide little evidence about what information at the subword level receives analysis. It is possible, for example, that relatively large portions of words are analyzed. This is a conclusion compatible with the results of Abrams and GreenwaldÕs (2000) experiments, because the subword parts in those experiments were mostly sequences of between two and four letters. The part-word subliminal priming that Abrams and Greenwald observed could plausibly have been driven by analysis that computed the identity of as many as three or four letters in each fourand five-letter subliminal word. On the other hand, Abrams and GreenwaldÕs results are also compatible with analysis limited more severely, to individual bigrams or even individual letters. This range of conclusions regarding limits on subword analysis is possible because in principle, any fully diagnostic subword element might suffice to ‘‘trigger’’ activation associated with the 588 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 word earlier in practice. To illustrate this point, consider a set of four words classified evaluatively in practice: the pleasant-meaning words hearth and miracle, and the unpleasant-meaning words horror and enemy. Many of the individual letters in this four-word set are potentially diagnostic. For example, the ‘‘y’’ in enemy is diagnostic because no other word contains that letter. After practice with this set of words in visible form, analysis of just the letter ‘‘y’’ in a subliminal word would suffice to diagnose the word as enemy. If it is assumed that some information about letter position is analyzed unconsciously, then many other individual letters in the example would be diagnostic as well (e.g., the ‘‘m’’ in miracle, the ‘‘m’’ in enemy). To the extent that small subword elements, such as individual letters and bigrams, are diagnostic in actual (larger) word sets, analysis limited to such elements could underlie subliminal priming. Examination of a number of word sets used in studies that have reported robust subliminal priming shows that, indeed, quite small subword elements frequently are diagnostic. For example, in the set of 50 pleasant and unpleasant words used by Draine (1997), approximately a third of the individual letters were diagnostic in that they appeared in a specific serial position in a word of only one category. This set represents the upper end of the size range typically used in studies of subliminal priming with practiced words. In smaller sets, the proportion of small diagnostic elements is likely to be higher. In Abrams and GreenwaldÕs (2000) Experiment 3, for example, out of a total of 71 letters occurring in specific positions of the 16-word set, 54 were diagnostic in their serial positions. Given the ample diagnostic information at the individual-letter level, priming driven by analysis limited to individual letters is a possibility that deserves serious consideration.1 The present series of experiments begins with an experiment that tests this possibility. In Experiment 1 the words presented in practice and subsequently as subliminal primes were chosen such that, in contrast to typical word sets, no individual letter in its serial position was diagnostic. No letter was diagnostic because each letter in a word of one category (pleasant or unpleasant in meaning) appeared in the same serial position in a word of the opposite category. For example, all the letters in the unpleasant-meaning word slum appeared in the same position in the pleasant-meaning words song, glee, laud, and warm. All the letters in the pleasant-meaning word warm appeared in the unpleasant-meaning words weep, hate, hurt, and slum. Thus, analysis limited to individual letters in these words when they appeared as subliminal primes—that is, analysis of any or all of the individual letters, as individual letters—would be equally consistent with the pleasant and unpleasant categories. (Analysis of the ‘‘s’’ in the prime song, for example, would be equally consistent with the earlier-practiced pleasant-meaning word song and the earlier-practiced unpleasant-meaning word slum). Such nondiagnostic analysis would not be expected to produce priming. Priming could occur in Experiment 1Õs set of words only if unconscious analysis operated on diagnostic combinations of at least two letters (such as the ‘‘s’’ and ‘‘o’’ which appeared as first and second letters only 1 Notice that logically this possibility could be extended further, to features smaller than individual letters, if such features were diagnostic in the way that letters are. However, sub-letter features are unlikely to be diagnostic because typical subliminal priming procedures present visible targets in one case (in the present experiments, lower-case) and masked primes in the complementary case. Upper- and lower-case letters share only some features; therefore features that might have been diagnostic among the set of visible words may not be present in masked primes. For this reason it is assumed that analysis of subliminal words occurs at least at the level of abstract letter detectors operating independently of case and font (cf. Coltheart & Freeman, 1974; Smith, Lott, & Cronnell, 1969). R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 589 in song). A finding of subliminal priming from these words would therefore rule out the possibility that analysis of subliminal words is limited to operating on individual letters. 2. Experiment 1 2.1. Participants Forty-eight University of Washington undergraduates participated in exchange for credit towards a course requirement. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were fluent in English, and were naive about the experimental hypothesis. Four participants did not complete the entire experiment and their data were excluded from analysis. 2.2. Materials A set of 14 words with unambiguous evaluative valence, half pleasant in meaning and the other half unpleasant in meaning, was chosen so that, as described above, each letter in each word appeared in the same serial position in a word of the opposite category. All words were four letters long. See Appendix A for a full list of the words. Because analysis of any one letter in these words would have been nondiagnostic, the words are hereafter referred to as 1-nd words (1-letter nondiagnostic). The 14-word set of 1-nd words was used for both targets and primes. When the words were presented as targets, they appeared in lower-case Arial font; when they appeared as masked primes, they appeared in upper-case Arial. Targets and primes were presented in black against a white background at the maximum text-background contrast allowed by the software controlling the experiment. Masks in Experiment 1 were composed of fragments of upper-case Arial letters distributed over a rectangular area slightly larger than that covered by five-letter words displayed in Arial (in anticipation of Experiments 3 and 4 in this paper, which used five-letter words). A set of eight such masks was created; these served as the forward and backward masks in Experiment 1. 2.3. Procedure and apparatus Participants were tested individually in brightly lit, sound-resistant small rooms, seated before a computer keyboard on which they made their responses by pressing either the ‘‘D’’ key with a finger of their left hand (to classify a word as unpleasant in meaning) or the ‘‘K’’ key with a righthand finger (to classify a word as pleasant in meaning). IBM-compatible computers presented all stimuli on 17 in. (diagonal) monitors operating at a vertical refresh rate of 120 Hz. Each participant underwent a single experimental session consisting of a priming task followed by a test of prime perceptibility. 2.3.1. Priming task Participants first received three 42-trial blocks of practice in which they classified the 1-nd words, appearing as fully visible targets preceded by the masked letter string XXXX, as pleasant 590 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 or unpleasant in meaning. These practice blocks were followed by six 42-trial data-collection blocks in which the 1-nd words continued to be classified as visible targets, but were now preceded by 1-nd words appearing as masked primes. In the first practice block, participants were instructed to take as long as they needed to classify each target word. In subsequent blocks a response window was introduced in the form of an exclamation mark that appeared on the screen for 133 ms following target offset; participants were instructed to make their classification response to the target while the exclamation mark was present. (The response window procedure has proved useful in obtaining subliminal priming by constraining latencies to be relatively fast and consequently maximizing the short-lived effect of primes on target response accuracy; for a detailed description of the procedure, see Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald et al., 1996.) The 133-ms response window interval was temporally centered at 483 ms in the second practice block, at 433 ms in the third practice block, and at 400 ms at the start of data collection. After each subsequent block, the program controlling the experiment advanced or delayed the window center by 33 ms in order to maintain an error rate of approximately 35%.2 The sequence of events on practice and data-collection trials was as follows: fixation point (a plus sign) at the center of the screen for 300 ms; forward mask for 300 ms; prime (or in practice blocks, the string XXXX) for 33 ms; backward mask for 33 ms; target for approximately 333 ms; exclamation mark representing the response window for 133 ms.3 To signal to participants that a response had successfully been made within the window, the exclamation mark briefly turned red. Masks were selected randomly on each trial from the set of eight with the constraint that the same mask not serve as forward and backward mask on any one trial. Primes and targets were selected randomly from the set of 1-nd words to yield approximately the same number of trials, across each block, of each of the four possible combinations of prime-target valence. The same word never appeared as prime and target on a single trial. Selection of primes (from the set of upper-case 1-nd words) and of targets (from the set of lower-case 1-nd words) occurred without replacement until each set was exhausted, then selection began anew (thus each item in each 14word set appeared exactly three times as target and prime in each block). Following the end of each trial (marked by offset of the exclamation mark), a 500-ms pause preceded the start of the next trial. In the practice blocks, an ‘‘error’’ message was given after each incorrect response. This feedback was discontinued in the data-collection blocks, but end-of-block feedback was provided on percent of targets correctly classified, mean response latency, and percent of in-window responses. 2 Specifically, the window center was increased by 33 ms if in the just-finished block error rate in classifying targets was greater than or equal to 45%, or if error rate was greater than or equal to 35% and mean response latency exceeded the window center value by more than 100 ms. The interval was decreased by 33 ms if error rate was less than or equal to 20% and mean latency did not exceed window center value by as much as 100 ms. 3 In the initial data-collection block, with the 133-ms window interval centered at 400 ms following target onset, target duration was 333 ms. If the window center was advanced or delayed from this initial setting, target duration varied accordingly. Observed minimum and maximum values for the window center were 334 ms (target duration = 267 ms) and 467 ms (target duration = 400 ms). However, for most participants the window center remained between 367 and 433 ms in all blocks. R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 591 2.3.2. Perceptibility task To assess the extent to which participants had conscious awareness of primes in the priming task, that task was followed by a test of prime perceptibility in which trials were essentially the same as priming-task trials, but the task was now to categorize the masked word (i.e., the prime) that preceded the target. The same words were used for primes and targets as had been used in the priming task. Trial sequence was identical, except that the exclamation mark no longer turned red after a within-window response. Participants were instructed to disregard the exclamation mark and to take as long as necessary to make an accurate response (earlier testing has shown that obliging participants to respond within the window in this task substantially impairs accuracy when the prime duration is long enough to be visible).4 Two 42-trial practice blocks were provided. In the first, the to-be-classified masked words were presented at a duration (100 ms) that allowed them to be fully visible, and in the second at a duration (50 ms) not quite as brief as in the subsequent data-collection blocks. Data collection consisted of four 42-trial blocks. Posttrial error feedback was given in the practice but not the data-collection blocks; end-of-block feedback on response accuracy and latency was provided in both types of blocks. 2.4. Results and discussion In this and the following experiments, data were analyzed in terms of the signal detection measure d 0 . Computation of d 0 was identical for the priming and perceptibility tasks in Experiment 1: hits were defined as pleasant-key responses on trials with pleasant-valence primes, and false alarms as pleasant-key responses on trials with unpleasant-valence primes. Thus, in both tasks d 0 reflects sensitivity of participants to prime valence, either indirectly (through the response to the target, in the priming task) or directly (through the response to the masked word itself, in the perceptibility task). For the benefit of readers who are more familiar with accuracy measures of priming, results of the priming task are also given (in parentheses following the priming d 0 ) in terms of accuracy difference (accuracy rate on category-congruent trials minus accuracy rate on category-incongruent trials). Data from two participants with outlying latencies in the priming task were excluded from analysis. (The slow responding of these participants indicated substantial noncompliance with the response window instruction.) For the remaining participants, priming-task trials with latency greater than 1000 ms and visibility-task trials with latency greater than 5000 ms were omitted from analysis.5 4 To minimize backward priming or other effect of the visible targets in this task on the responses to primes, subjects were repeatedly and emphatically instructed to ignore the targets and attend to the masked primes. It is impossible to exclude effects of target processing in this task, but any effects of target processing on prime visibility are assumed to create no greater visibility than they do in the priming task (where targets are fully attended), and so the visibility task is at least as sensitive a measure of prime visibility as the priming task. 5 These 1000 and 5000 ms criteria were chosen to exclude responses that clearly were slower than would be reasonably expected in the two tasks. They are the same criteria that have typically been applied in other studies that used the response-window procedure. The 1000 ms criterion excluded approximately 2% of responses in the priming task, and the 5000 ms criterion excluded approximately. 1% of responses. The percentage of responses excluded was about the same in the subsequent two experiments, which used the same criteria. 592 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 Fig. 1. Priming (A) and visibility (B) from Experiments 1–3. For Experiment 1, the data point in each panel represents the 1-nd words (words in which no individual letter in its serial position provided diagnostic category information). For Experiments 2 and 3, the filled data points represent the 2-nd words (in which no individual bigram was diagnostic) and 3-nd words (no individual trigram diagnostic), respectively. Open circles represent the counterpart words. Vertical bars show the 95% confidence interval for each data point. Fig. 1 shows that the 1-nd words yielded significant priming in the priming task and zero visibility in the visibility task. In the priming task, d 0 for the 1-nd words was .29 (SD = .19), which differed significantly from zero, t (41) = 9.81, p < .001. (Accuracy difference = .12, SD = .07.) In the visibility task, d 0 =
.03 (SD = .20), t (41) =
.99, p = .328. The fact that the 1-nd words functioned as effective subliminal primes is clear evidence that unconscious analysis must not be limited to operating on individual letters in their serial positions. Analysis limited in this way could not have produced priming, because no individual letter provided necessary diagnostic information about the category of the word in which it was contained. To have been effective, analysis must have operated on combinations of at least two letters (the minimal diagnostic unit in the 1-nd words). 3. Experiment 2 In obtaining priming from 1-nd words in which no single letter in its position was diagnostic, Experiment 1 showed that unconscious analysis is capable of operating on information more complex than that represented in individual letters. Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1Õs test by one letter: Experiment 2 tested whether analysis is limited to operating on individual bigrams (two adjacent letters). Analysis limited to bigrams is a plausible basis for subliminal priming because, first, bigrams have been implicated as a critical unit in word recognition (for a review, see Jordan, 1990). And second, bigrams are likely to be highly diagnostic features even in quite large sets of targets and primes. In the sets of 12–50 words typically used in studies of subliminal priming, a large proportion of bigrams will almost certainly be diagnostic. R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 593 Experiment 2 used a variant of Experiment 1Õs strategy to test whether priming could be obtained from words in which no individual bigram was diagnostic. It was necessary to modify Experiment 1Õs strategy because of the constraints imposed by bigrams as compared with individual letters. A set of words analogous to the 1-nd words, but with nondiagnostic bigrams, would have required all the bigrams in one category to appear in the same position in opposite-category words. Attempts to construct sets meeting this requirement suggested that they would have to be extremely small in size and constrained to include uncommon or evaluatively ambiguous words (thereby limiting generalizability of findings). The approach used instead in Experiment 2 was to create a set of stimulus words that consisted of two related subsets. The first, critical subset consisted of words in which no individual bigram was diagnostic (here called 2-nd words, because each 2 adjacent letters formed a nondiagnostic unit). It was this critical subset that provided the test of whether unconscious analysis is limited to operating on bigrams. The function of the second subset, which consisted of what will be called counterpart words, was to render all the bigrams in the 2-nd words nondiagnostic. Each counterpart word rendered nondiagnostic (‘‘countered’’) a single bigram in an opposite-category 2-nd word. Thus three counterpart words were required to ‘‘counter’’ each 2-nd word. For example, the three bigrams in the unpleasant-meaning 2-nd word nerd were ‘‘countered’’ by the pleasantmeaning counterpart words nest, hero, and lord. The three bigrams in the pleasant-meaning 2nd word soul were countered by the unpleasant-meaning counterpart words sore, pout, and maul. All the words, 2-nd and counterpart, were presented as masked primes after first being classified extensively in practice as visible targets. Because each bigram in 2-nd primes had appeared equally often in an earlier-practiced 2-nd word from one category, and a counterpart word from the opposite category, those bigrams were evidence equally consistent with both categories and did not provide diagnostic information. Analysis limited to individual bigrams in 2-nd words therefore would not be expected to produce significant priming. Priming could occur only if analysis operated on diagnostic combinations of at least two letters separated by one other letter (such as the ‘‘n’’ and ‘‘r’’ which appeared as first and third letters only in nerd). 3.1. Participants Sixty University of Washington undergraduates participated in exchange for credit towards a course requirement. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were fluent in English, and were naive about the experimental hypothesis. Two participants did not complete the entire experiment and their data were excluded from analysis. 3.2. Materials The 32-word set used for primes and targets consisted of eight 2-nd words (four pleasant and four unpleasant in meaning), along with 24 counterpart words (12 pleasant, 12 unpleasant). The 2-nd and counterpart words were chosen as described above so that each bigram in a 2-nd word appeared in the same serial position in an opposite-category counterpart word. All words were four letters long. As in Experiment 1, the words were presented in lower-case Arial font when they appeared as visible targets, and in upper-case Arial when they appeared as masked primes. A full list of the words is given in Appendix B. 594 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 The same set of masks was used as in Experiment 1. 3.3. Procedure and apparatus Apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1, and the procedure was nearly identical. The minor differences were as follows. Each block in Experiment 2 had 64 trials (versus 48 in Experiment 1). In the selection of primes and targets, there was no longer the constraint that the same word not appear as both prime and target on any one trial. This was done to ensure that all the words in the 32-word set were presented exactly the same number of times throughout the experiment. (In Experiment 1, the constraint resulted in very slight differences between words in the number of times they were presented as targets.) Trials on which the same word appeared as prime and target were, however, excluded from subsequent data analysis. A third block of practice was added to the perceptibility task. Practice for that task now consisted of a block in which the masked words were presented for 133 ms, a block in which they were presented for 100 ms, and a block in which they were presented for 67 ms. 3.4. Results and discussion Data from one participant with an outlying value for latency in the priming task were excluded from analysis. For the remaining participants, as in Experiment 1, priming trials were excluded that had latency greater than 1000 ms. (Perceptibility task trials with latency greater than 5000 ms were excluded.) Also, data from two participants whose values of d 0 in the visibility task were extreme cases (equivalent to accuracy over 80%) were excluded. Fig. 1 shows that, similarly to the 1-nd words in Experiment 1, the 2-nd words yielded significant priming in the priming task and zero visibility in the visibility task. In the priming task, d 0 for the 2-nd words = .10 (SD = .29), t (54) = 2.61, p = .012. (Accuracy difference = .07, SD = .10). In the visibility task, d 0 = .03 (SD = .37), t (54) = .67, p = .508. The magnitude of priming from the 2-nd words, though significant, was relatively small (.10 versus .29 for the 1-nd words in Experiment 1). One reason for the apparent small magnitude of priming may be a greater number of slower responses in Experiment 2, owing to the greater confusability of the words compared with Experiment 1. As a recent study has shown, d 0 from priming data sets that have slow mean latencies may underestimate the actual magnitude of the priming effect (Greenwald et al., 2003). This occurs because the effect peaks at quite short latencies (350–400 ms), and this peak may be offset or ‘‘diluted’’ by responses with slow latencies that show no priming. To determine whether this ‘‘diluting’’ occurred in Experiment 2, the data were analyzed using a method like the one described in Greenwald et al., 2003. Briefly, priming data from all participants were pooled and then partitioned into bins defined by latency. The d 0 for each bin was then calculated. (This pooling was necessary because there were too few trials to allow each participantÕs data to be partitioned separately.) Fig. 2A shows the results of this analysis for the 2nd words. The pattern of priming as a function of latency is similar to that reported in Greenwald et al. (2003). Priming reaches a peak at about 350 ms, and drops rapidly to zero by about 500 ms. At latencies between about 500 and 600 ms, d 0 is below zero, a feature also present in some of the Greenwald et al. (2003) data sets and possibly related to the negative compatibility effect reported R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 595 Fig. 2. Priming as a function of latency for 2-nd words in Experiment 2 (A) and 3-nd words in Experiment 3 (B). For each experiment, data are from all participants pooled and then partitioned into 11 bins defined by latency. The first bin (leftmost data point) includes all responses with latency below 300 ms; successive bins are defined by intervals of 33 ms except for the last bin (rightmost point) which includes all responses with latency greater than 600 ms. Average number of trials per bin is about 280 (no bin has less than 100 trials). The data points show d 0 computed for all trials within a bin. The abscissa for each data point is the mean latency for the responses in that pointÕs bin. by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998, 2002) and others (compare the results of the present Experiment 3). The partitioning-by-latency analysis thus reveals evidence of strong priming from Experiment 2Õs 2-nd words, despite the rather small effect represented by the mean d 0 computed for all responses. Notice that the peak magnitude of priming in Fig. 2A (d 0 = about .6) is roughly six times as large as the mean d 0 for the entire data set. The counterpart words yielded significant priming too, as would be expected given that they contained more diagnostic information than the 2-nd words (each counterpart word had only one bigram that was nondiagnostic). For the counterpart words, d 0 = .24 (SD = .22), t (54) = 8.37, p < .001. (Accuracy difference = .11, SD = .08.) Visibility for the counterpart words was just below the .05 level for significance (d 0 = .05 (SD = .19), t (54) = 2.04, p = .046), again perhaps because they contained more diagnostic information. Magnitude of priming from the counterpart words was significantly larger than priming from the 2-nd words, t (54) =
3.20, p = .002. The critical result of Experiment 2 is the combination of priming from the 2-nd words and chance performance in categorizing those words in the visibility task. Processing of the 2-nd words in the priming task must not have been limited to operating on individual bigrams. Analysis limited to individual bigrams could not have produced priming, because no individual bigram provided diagnostic category information. To have yielded priming, analysis must have operated on combinations of at least two letters separated by one other letter (the minimum diagnostic unit in the 2-nd words). 4. Experiment 3 By showing that priming can be obtained from subliminal words in which no bigram is diagnostic, Experiment 2 demonstrated that analysis of subliminal words is capable of operating on 596 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 information more complex than that represented by pairs of adjacent letters. Experiment 3 extended the test of unconscious analytic capacity again by one letter: in Experiment 3 the question was whether analysis is limited to operating on individual trigrams (three consecutive letters). Experiment 3Õs strategy was essentially the same as Experiment 2Õs. The set of words presented in practice and then as subliminal primes consisted of a subset of critical words, and a subset of counterpart words. No trigram in the critical words (called 3-nd words) was diagnostic, because it also appeared in an opposite-category counterpart word. Each counterpart word rendered nondiagnostic (‘‘countered’’) a single trigram in an opposite-category 3-nd word. Thus, the design of Experiment 3 paralleled that of Experiment 2 in that three counterpart words were required to ‘‘counter’’ each critical (here, 3-nd) word. For example, the three trigrams in the unpleasantmeaning 3-nd word alone were ‘‘countered’’ by the pleasant-meaning counterpart words aloha, blond, and shone. The three trigrams in the pleasant-meaning 3-nd word great were countered by the unpleasant-meaning counterpart words greed, dread, and cheat. As in Experiment 2, both the 3-nd and counterpart words were presented as masked primes after first being classified in practice as visible targets. Because each trigram appeared in practice equally often in words from both categories, analysis of 3-nd subliminal primes that was limited to individual trigrams would provide information equally consistent with both categories and would not be diagnostic. Such limited analysis would not be expected to produce priming. Priming could occur only if analysis operated on diagnostic combinations of at least two letters separated by two other letters (such as the ‘‘g’’ and ‘‘a’’ which appeared as first and fourth letters only in great). 4.1. Participants Fifty-six University of Washington undergraduates participated in exchange for credit towards a course requirement. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were fluent in English, and were naive about the experimental hypothesis. Two participants did not complete the entire experiment and their data were excluded from analysis. 4.2. Materials Two 24-word sets were used as primes and targets; each contained six 3-nd words (three pleasant and three unpleasant in meaning) along with 18 counterpart words (nine pleasant, nine unpleasant). The 3-nd and counterpart words were chosen as described above so that each trigram in a 3-nd word appeared in the same serial position in an opposite-category counterpart word. All words were five letters long. Words were presented in lower-case Arial font when they appeared as targets, and in upper-case Arial when they appeared as masked primes. A full list of the words is given in Appendix C. The same set of masks was used as in Experiment 1 and 2. 4.3. Procedure and apparatus Apparatus and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2 except for two minor modifications. Experiment 3 used two similar sets of 3-nd and counterpart words, and the assignment of these sets was counterbalanced, with half the participants receiving one set and the other half R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 597 the other set. The number of trials in each block was changed to 48 in Experiment 3 in order to allow the entire set of words to appear as primes and targets exactly twice per block (as had the 32-word set in Experiment 2Õs 64-trial blocks). 4.4. Results and discussion The two counterbalanced stimulus sets had no noticeably different effect on priming or perceptibility, and the following analyses collapse across this design factor. To maintain consistency with Experiments 1 and 2, data were excluded from participants whose values of latency in the priming task were outliers (five participants had outlying slow latencies; three had outlying fast latencies). Also, data from one participant with an extreme value of d 0 in the visibility task were excluded. Fig. 1A shows that the 3-nd words yielded significant priming in the priming task: d 0 = .10 (SD = .27), t (44) = 2.52, p = .016. (Accuracy difference = .07, SD = .10.) In the visibility task (Fig. 1B), performance in categorizing the 3-nd words did not differ significantly from zero, d 0 = .03 (SD = .43), t (44) = .40, p = .693. Because the magnitude of priming from the 3-nd words was small—about the same as from the 2-nd words in Experiment 2—the partitioning-by-latency analysis performed on Experiment 2Õs data was performed here as well. Fig. 2B shows that the relationship between priming and latency in Experiment 3 was similar to that found in Experiment 2. Priming peaked at short latencies (about 350 ms) and decayed rapidly to zero by about 500 ms. As in Experiment 2, responses with latencies greater than 500 ms show evidence of reverse priming (below-zero d 0 ). The magnitude of priming at the peak (d 0 about .5) was considerably larger than the magnitude indicated by d 0 computed for all data (.10). Again, as in Experiment 2, the many responses that lagged behind the response window had the effect of offsetting the priming from fast responses, so that the mean d 0 underestimates the strength of priming from responses occurring in the window.6 Like the counterpart words in Experiment 2, ExperimentÕs 3 counterpart words yielded significant priming, as would be expected given that they contained more diagnostic information than the 3-nd words (each counterpart word had only one nondiagnostic trigram): d 0 for the counterpart words = .15 (SD = .20), t (44) = 5.15, p < .001. (Accuracy difference = .08, SD = .07.) Visibility for the counterpart words did not differ significantly from zero, d 0 = .004 (SD = .20), t (44) = .14, p = .893. The magnitude of priming from the counterpart words and 3-nd words did not differ significantly, t (44) =
.96, p = .345. Experiment 3Õs finding of unconscious priming from 3-nd words demonstrates processing that must not have been limited to individual trigrams. No individual trigram in the 3-nd words provided diagnostic category information. Processing of the 3-nd words must have operated on combinations of at least two letters separated by two other letters (the minimum diagnostic unit in the 3-nd words). 6 The features common to the charts in Figs. 2A and B—d 0 that peaks at about 350–400 ms, decays to zero by about 500 ms, and that may be below zero between 500 and 600 ms—were found also when similar analyses were performed on the data from Experiment 1. 598 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 5. General discussion The present experiments are a continuation of earlier research (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000) demonstrating that analysis of subliminal words occurs mainly at the subword level, not at the level of whole-word meaning. Here several possible limits on subword analysis were tested. Experiment 1 tested the possibility that analysis of subliminal words is limited to operating on individual letters. Subliminal priming was obtained in Experiment 1 from words in which no individual letter in its serial position was diagnostic (the 1-nd words); thus analysis must operate on information more complex than that represented in individual letters. In Experiment 2 priming was obtained from subliminal words in which no individual bigram was diagnostic (2-nd words), and in Experiment 3 from subliminal words in which no individual trigram was diagnostic (3nd words). Thus analysis must operate on information more complex than that represented by individual bigrams or trigrams. These results demonstrate that relatively complex subword processing occurs even for masked words whose processing is time-constrained, as it was in the current procedure by the use of the response-window method. It has been argued (by, for example, Naccache & Dehaene, 2001) that the response-window method yields processing dominated by subword analysis because of the constraint on response time. Whether procedures without response deadlines yield more elaborate analyses is a question beyond the scope of this paper. What this paper does show, however, is that even under the time constraint of the response window, processing occurs that is not limited to simple individual subword elements. In interpreting these results, the distinction made in Section 1 between practiced and notpracticed primes should be kept in mind. All the primes in Experiments 1–3 were practiced primes; they were all practiced extensively as visible targets before they appeared as masked primes. The present findings, therefore, apply specifically to practiced primes. The findings show that unconscious processing can discriminate between structurally similar words (subliminal primes) from small, recently practiced sets. The findings show, especially, that this unconscious discrimination involves the processing of multiple, nonadjacent letters rather than being limited to simple subword elements like individual bigrams or trigrams. What the findings do not imply is anything about the processing of notpracticed words. The two types of priming—from practiced and from notpracticed words—presumably are driven by different forms of processing and draw on different sources of memory (Greenwald et al., 2003). In the case of practiced words, practice apparently establishes short-term word-category associations, enabling, when the words reappear as masked primes, rapid unconscious analysis of orthographic features that triggers the practiced associations (Abrams, Klinger, & Greenwald, 2002; Greenwald et al., 2003). In the case of notpracticed words, priming presumably requires more complex integration of features in order to access longterm semantic representations. While the processing of practiced primes involves discrimination among small sets of practiced candidates, processing of notpracticed primes requires discrimination among essentially all the words in the lexicon. The present results may complement the interesting recent argument by Kouider and Depoux (2004) regarding subword processing of masked practiced primes. Kouider and Depoux argue that ‘‘unconscious’’ Stroop priming from masked primes occurs only when subjects have partial awareness of the primes: that is, they can process subword elements but not whole-word identity. (In Kouider and DepouxÕs study, partial awareness in the absence of global awareness was dem- R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 599 onstrated by subjectsÕ ability to discriminate the spatial orientation of a word, without being able to identity the word.) It is possible that subjects in the present experiments had the kind of partial awareness without global awareness that Kouider and Depoux describe. Subjects in Experiments 1–3 (and other experiments using similar display conditions) typically reported, in post-study debriefing, that they could ‘‘tell that there was a word [the prime] present’’ or could identify a letter or two. But this partial awareness could have been responsible for priming in the way that Kouider and Depoux suggest only if the awareness was of word parts large enough to be diagnostic. For example, in Experiment 3, awareness of the three letters rea in the 3-nd word great would not have sufficed to ‘‘reconstruct’’ (in the terminology of Kouider and Dupoux) the practiced word great, because those letters were also practiced in the opposite-category word dread. So if Kouider and DepouxÕs argument does generalize, as they conjecture, to forms of unconscious priming other than Stroop priming, then it must be the case that the partial awareness that underlies those other forms of priming involves awareness of complex subword units (not simply individual letters, bigrams, or trigrams). From a broader perspective, the findings of Experiment 1–3 belong to an ongoing effort to characterize the kinds of operations that can be processed outside of awareness (and, by extension, the kinds of operations that require conscious cognition because they are beyond the capabilities of unconscious processing). That the focus of this effort has shifted radically over the last twenty years can be appreciated by recalling GreenwaldÕs ‘‘two-word’’ challenge (Greenwald, 1992). Greenwald (1992) argued that a benchmark test of complex unconscious processing might consist of whether processing occurred for the combined meaning of two words, neither of whose individual meaning alone could be used to infer the combined meaning. Draine (1997) applied the two-word challenge to such combinations (e.g., enemy loses) and found no evidence for unconscious processing at the phrase level. Subsequently, even the view that unconscious analysis occurs for the meaning of individual words—a view held by the majority of researchers polled in Greenwald, 1992—has been cast into doubt by research showing little or no priming from notpracticed subliminal words. A more appropriate focus for tests of unconscious capability may therefore be at the subword level. The present research, in examining limits on processing at that level, might be considered as, in part, a reformulation of GreenwaldÕs test as a ‘‘two-letter’’ challenge: whether processing occurs for the combined information from two letters contained within a word. Experiment 1 showed that such processing does occur, and Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that the two letters do not have to be adjacent. Appendix A 1-nd words used as primes and targets in Experiment 1 Unpleasant-meaning Pleasant-meaning hurt cold weep hate slum lose gang cute help warm host laud glee song 600 R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 Appendix B 2-nd and counterpart words used as primes and targets in Experiment 2 Unpleasant-meaning 2-nd words and their corresponding pleasant-meaning counterpart words Pleasant-meaning 2-nd words and their corresponding unpleasant-meaning counterpart words 2-nd words Counterpart words 2-nd words Counterpart words nerd doom pain hate nest, hero, lord doll, good, prom park, sail, coin harp, bath, cute kiss soul flag boat kill, risk, loss sore, pout, maul flee, slay, snag bore, goad, brat Appendix C 3-nd and counterpart words used as primes and targets in Experiment 3 Unpleasant-meaning 3-nd words and their corresponding pleasant-meaning counterpart words Pleasant-meaning 3-nd words and their corresponding unpleasant-meaning counterpart words 3-nd words Counterpart words 3-nd words Counterpart words Set 1 alone creep minus aloha, blond, shone crest, trees, sleep minty, pinup, venus champ great party chasm, shame, swamp greed, dread, cheat parch, warts, dirty Set 2 bleak worst faint bless, clear, steak worth, horse, first faith, gains, point crown grand train croak, prowl, blown grave, prank, bland tramp, frail, stain References Abrams, R. L., & Greenwald, A. G. (2000). Parts outweigh the whole (word) in unconscious analysis of meaning. Psychological Science, 11, 118–124. Abrams, R. L., Klinger, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Subliminal words activate semantic categories (not automated motor responses). Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 100–106. Broadbent, D., & Gathercole, S. (1990). The processing of non-target words: Semantic or not?. Quarterly Journal of Experiment Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology, 42, 3–37. Coltheart, M., & Freeman, R. (1974). Case alternation impairs word recognition. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 3, 102–104. Damian, M. F. (2001). Congruity effects evoked by subliminally presented primes: Automaticity rather than semantic processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27, 154–165. Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Le Clech, G., Koechlin, E., Mueller, M., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., et al. (1998). Imaging unconscious semantic priming. Nature, 395, 597–600. Draine, S. C. (1997). Analytic limitations of unconscious language processing. Dissertation. Washington: University of Washington, Seattle. R.L. Abrams / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 585–601 601 Draine, S. C., & Greenwald, A. (1998). Replicable unconscious semantic priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 286–303. Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (1998). Effects of masked stimuli on motor activation: Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24, 1737–1747. Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (2002). The locus of inhibition in masked priming. Journal of Motor Behaviour, 34, 3–10. Forster, K. I. (1998). The pros and cons of masked priming. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 27, 203–233. Greenwald, A. G. (1992). New Look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist, 47, 766–779. Greenwald, A. G., & Abrams, R. L., (1999). Dumb or smart? Subliminal perception of valence uses small pieces of words. Paper presented at meetings of the Psychonomic Society, Los Angeles, CA. Greenwald, A. G., & Abrams, R. L., (2002). Visual masking reveals two qualitatively different levels of unconscious cognition. Paper presented at meetings of the Psychonomic Society, Kansas City, MO. Greenwald, A. G., Abrams, R. L., Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2003). Long-term semantic memory versus contextual memory in unconscious number processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 235–247. Greenwald, A. G., Draine, S. C., & Abrams, R. L. (1996). Three cognitive markers of unconscious semantic activation. Science, 273, 1699–1702. Jordan, T. (1990). Presenting words without interior letters: Superiority over single letters and influence of postmask boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 16, 893–909. Klinger, M. R., Burton, P., & Pitts, S. (2000). Mechanisms of unconscious priming: I: Response competition, not spreading activation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 441–455. Kouider, S., & Depoux, E. (2004). Partial awareness creates the ‘‘illusion’’ of subliminal semantic priming. Psychological Science, 15(2), 75–81. Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2001). Unconscious semantic priming extends to novel unseen stimuli. Cognition, 80, 215–229. Smith, F., Lott, D., & Cronnell, B. (1969). The effect of type size and case alternation on word identification. American Journal of Psychology, 82, 248–253. Treisman, A. (1960). Contextual cues in selective listening. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 242–248.

Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 1156–1159 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Acknowledgment The Editor thanks the following people for serving as guest reviewers of manuscripts from November 7, 2008 to December 31, 2009. Consciousness and Cognition Reviewers Henk Aarts Anna Abraham Joseph Daniel Ackerson Donna Addis Salvatore Aglioti Kathleen Akins Liliana Albertazzi Thorsten Albrecht Igor Aleksander Michael Alkire Philippe Allain Adam Alter Holly Andersen Tobias Søren Andersen Jim Anderson Jackie Andrade Luigi Anolli Ulrich Ansorge John S. Antrobus Amit Atad Erin Austen Malika Auvray Murat Aydede Bernard J. Baars Claudio Babiloni Talis Bachmann Rajendra D Badgaiyan Michela Balconi Chris Ball David Balota Yoav Bar-Anan Bruce Barber Joseph Barber John Bargh M. Rose Barlow Amanda Barnier Neus Barrantes-Vidal Paolo Bartolomeo Karl-Heinz Bauml Andrew Bayliss Courtney Beard doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(10)00237-0 Melissa R Beck Cordula Becker Ralf-Peter Behrendt Tristan Bekinschtein Dorit Ben Shalom Sliman Bensmaia Gary Bente Heather Berlin Jose Bermudez Sven Bernecker D. Berntsen Anna Berti Derek Besner John Bickle Mark Blagrove Randolph Blake Olaf Blanke Ned Block Otmar Bock Glen Edward Bodner Inge Boot Jan Borjdal Jennifer Borton Elizabeth Bradley Timothy Brady Jason Braithwaite Matthias Brand David Brang Serge Bredart Bruno Breitmeyer J. Douglas Bremner Andrew Brook Matthew Broome Richard Brown Steven Ravett Brown Steven Brown Peter Brugger Martin Brune Brian J. Bruya Andreja Bubic Karl Ernst Buehler Simona Buetti Deborah Burke Peter G Burton Giorgio Buzzi Michel Cabanac Larry Cahill William Cain Joseph Keim Campbell Etzel Cardena David Carmel Thomas Carr Jonathan Scott Andrew Carriere Glenn Carruthers P. Carruthers Maria Casagrande Alan Castel Luigi Castelli Umberto Castiello Kyle Cave Michel Cermolacce Loredana Cerrato Joseph Cesario Thierry Chaminade C. Richard Chapman Lin Chen Z. Chen James Allan Cheyne Simon Chu Piera Carla Cicogna Gordon Claridge Axel N. Cleeremans Colin Walter Giles Clifford Asher Cohen Rajal Cohen Roi Cohen Kadosh Sam Coleman Daniel Collerton Max Coltheart Louise Connell Stephanie Cosentino Alan Paul Costall Mary Courage Acknowledgment / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 1156–1159 Stephen Cowen Matthew John Charles Crump David Crundall Holk Cruse Sheila J Cunningham Ruud Custers Armando D’Agostino Kirsten Dalrymple Polly Dalton Ljubica Damjanovic Casasanto Daniel Elena Daprati Rueven Dar Arnaud D’Argembeau Nicole David Jan De Houwer Helena Maria Palmyra De Preester Marci DeCaro Hedwige Dehon Joseph DeKoninck Laurent Demany Ian Dennis Natalie Depraz Stuart Derbyshire Natacha Deroost Geneviève Desmarais Arnaud Destrebecqz Teresa DiCicco Zoltan Dienes Ap Dijksterhuis Giancarlo Dimaggio Georg Dirnberger Michael Dodd G. William Domhoff Martin J. Dorahy Dietrich Dorner Martin Dresler Paula Droege Sylvie Droit-Volet Frank Durgin Raymond Durso Dawn Eagle John D. Eastwood Doris Eckstein Shimon Edelman Jonathan CW Edwards Tobias Egner Henrik Ehrsson Martin Eimer Baruch Eitam Andrew Elliot Mark Elliott Stephen M Emrich Paloma Enriquez Peter Enticott Marc Ernst James Anthony Keith Erskine Francis Eustache Scott Fairhall Alessandro Farnè Chlöé D. Farrer Jillian Fecteau Adam Feltz Mark Fenske Myra Fernandes F. Richard Ferraro Andrew A Fingelkurts Catherine Fischer Rico Fischer Ira Fischler Gary Dale Fisk John Foxe Gregory Francis Nancy Franklin Walter Freeman Christian Frings Alexandra Frischen Xiaolan Fu Kazuhiko Fukuda R. Michael Furr Shai Gabay Jayne Gackenbach Shaun Gallagher Adam James Galpin David Gamez Nivedita Gangopadhyay Tao Gao Teresa Garcia-Marques R. Edward Geiselman Matthew Gendle Rocco J. Gennaro Lisa Geraci Limor Gertner Freja Gheysen Anne Giersch Joseph Glicksohn E.L. Glisky Scott Glover Gilberto Gomes Paula Goolkasian Stephen Gourlay Jonathan Grainger Pär Anders Granhag Anthony G. Greenwald Thut Gregor Werner Greve Marc Grosjean Yossi Guterman Steven Jay Haase Hilde Haider Lars Hall Peter Halligan H. Hamalainen David Hambrick Todd Handy Rick Hanley Keren Haroush Rick Harrington Laurence R. Harris Ran Hassin Sheng He Mike Heap Hauke Heekeren Morton Heller Paul Hemeren Jeanne Hernandez Mitchell Herschbach Michael H Herzog Herbert Heuer Philip A. Higham Matthew Hilimire Steve Hillyard William Hirstein Britta Hoelzel Donald David Hoffman Jakob Hohwy Emily Holmes Nicholas Holmes Bernhard Hommel Ralph W. Hood Jens Max Hopf Todd Horowitz Caroline Linda Horton Darlene V. Howard Mark Howe Edward M. Hubbard David E. Huber Bryce Huebner Gethin Hughes Thomas Hummel Ira Hyman Jukka Hyona Pentek Imre Elizabeth Irvine Eve Isham Zoltán Jakab Lori Elizabeth James Yoonhee Jang Piotr Jaskowski Luis Jimenez Luis Jiménez Susan Johnson Lucy Johnston Gary Jones Chisholm Joseph David Kahn Kiran Kalidindi Sakari Kallio Ryota Kanai Michael Kane Jeffrey Karpicke Mike Kaschak Julian Paul Keenan Elizabeth Kensinger Markus Kiefer 1157 1158 Andrea Kiesel John F. Kihlstrom Chai-Youn Kim Sachiko Kinoshita Irving Kirsch Julian Kiverstein Ray Klein Eric Klinger Nadine Kloth Werner Klotz Christof Koch Irving Koch Mika Koivisto Sid Kouider Milton Kramer Rolf Kuehni Gustav Kuhn Simone Kühn John Kulvicki V. Krishna Kumar Lia Kvavilashvili David Labbe Elisabetta Ladavas Gilles Lafargue Melissa Lamar Tony Lambert Ellen Langer Nicolas Langlitz G.D. Lassiter Hakwan C. Lau Dorothee Legrand Bigna Lenggenhager Peter Lenkic E.C. Leritz Hartmut Leuthold Lisa Libby Scott Lilienfeld Ivan Limosani Jeffrey Lin Marjaana Lindeman Axel Lindner D. Stephen Lindsay Pierre Livet Sue Llewellyn Shayne Loft Jack Loomis Lester Loschky Peter Lovibond Olivier Luminet Juan Lupianez Antoine Lutz William Lycan Steven Jay Lynn Paul H Lysaker Donald G. MacKay Colin MacLeod Rafael Malach Susan Malcolm-Smith David Mallard Acknowledgment / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 1156–1159 Bruce Mangan Raffaele Manni Riccardo Manzotti Giorgio Marchetti Hans J. Markowitsch Sander Martens Yousri Marzouki George Mashour Oliver Mason Michael E. J. Masson Jennifer Matey Mohan Matthen Andrew Mayes Ali Mazaheri Kathleen McDermott Patrick McNamara Monica Meijsing Alfred Mele Lucia Melloni Harald Merckelbach Philip Merikle Bjorn Merker Janet Metcalfe Thomas Metzinger Banissy Michael Christoph Frederik Michel Jeff Miller Bruce Milliken Aaron Leonard Mishara David Mitchell Robert William Mitchell Steve Mitroff Nicholas Moberly Cathleen Moore James W Moore Aidan Moran Michael Morgan Alain Morin Tony Morland Matteo Mossio Steve Most Michelle Moulds Konstantinos Moutoussis Notger Muller Jochen Musseler Samuel Myers Hamid Reza Naghavi Eddy Nahmias Peter Naish Robert A Nash Maja Nedeljkovic W. Trammell Neill Katherine Nelson Kevin Nelson Albert Newen Tore A. Nielsen Ruth Elaine Nieuwenhuis-Mark Ellert Nijenhuis Valdas Noreika Elisabeth Norman Georg Northoff Wim Notebaert David Arthur Oakley Sukhvinder S Obhi Haluk Ogmen Aude Oliva Christian Olivers Chris Oriet James Ost Morten Overgaard Krista Overvliet Edward Pace-Schott Elisabeth Pacherie Galina Paramei Raja Parasuraman Marise Parent Josef Parvizi Frederic Pierre Pascal Jessica Payne Marcus Pearce Charlie Pelling Fabien Perrin Elaine Perry Navindra Persaud Kathy Pezdek Mark Phelan Louise Phillips Gualtiero Piccinini Steven M. Platek Susan Pockett Bruce Polichar Jamie Matthew Poolton Stephen Porter Emmanuel Pothos Pierre Pouget Elfed Huw Price Jesse Prinz Wolfgang Prinz Michael J. Proulx Matthew Prull Zenon Pylyshyn Robert Rafal Hannes Rakoczy Arthur Reber Patrick Rebuschat Lynne Reder Eugene Redmond Eric Reichle A.A.T.S. Reinders Eyal Reingold Ronald Rensink Bruno Repp Heiko Reuss Georges Rey Bert Reynvoet Martina Rieger Evan Frank Risko Tony Ro Acknowledgment / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 1156–1159 Philippe Rochat David M. Rosenthal Susan Rossell V.S. Rotenberg Gerhard Roth Michael Roy Jérôme Sackur Noam Sagiv Valerio Santangelo E. L. Santarcangelo Julio Santiago Vedat Sar Atsushi Sato Magdalena Sauvage Silvio Scarone E. Glenn Schellenberg Elizabeth Schier Frederike Schlaghecken Hank Schlinger Ralph E. Schmidt Thomas Schmidt Werner Schneider Jonathan W. Schooler Michael Schredl Jurgen Schroder Johannes Schroeder Johannes Schultz Hartmut Schulz Paul Schweizer Eric Schwitzgebel Alan Scoboria Ryan Scott Michael Scullin William Seager Natalie Sebanz Catherine Sebastian Andrea Serino Thomas Serre Anil Kumar Seth Terence Sewards Simone Shamay-Tsoory Stefanie Sharman Gordon Shepherd Rick Shifferstein David Shore Mauricio Sierra-Siegert Pilleriin Sikka Michael Silver Julia Simner Jefferson Singer Wolf Singer Angela Sirigu S.D. Slotnick Jonathan Smallwood Tom Smeets Saul Smilansky Daniel Smilek Patricia Smiley John Smythies John Michael Snodgrass Ahmad Sohrabi Hyunjin Song Salvador Soto-Faraco Celine Souchay Sean Spence Michael Spivey R. Nathan Spreng Arun Sripati Giovanni Stanghellini Craig Steel Eric Stei Timo Stein Marco Steinhauser Victor Stenger Catherine (Kate) Stevens Richard Stevenson John Stewart Robert Stickgold Joachim Stoeber Tom Stoffregen Anna M. Stone Anna Strasser Christopher Striemer Petroc Sumner Heinz-Martin Süss Angelina Sutin John Sutton Timothy Sweeny Matthis Synofzik Karl Szpunar Ana Tajadura-Jimenez Devin Terhune Paul Thagard Evan Thompson Ian Thornton Bert Timmermans Rachel Tomer Arnold Trehub Jan Treur Manos Tsakiris Naotsugu Tsuchiya Endel Tulving Massimo Turatto David John Turk Joseph Tzelgov Lucina Qazi Uddin Geoffrey Underwood Costa Vakalopoulos Elizabeth Valentine Katja Valli Geert van Boxtel Saskia van Dantzig Wim van de Grind Eva Van den Bussche Martial Van der Linden Maarten J. van der Smagt Rob van Gerwen Neil van Leeuwen Marie Vandekerckhove M. Vergeer Justus Verhagen Francois Benoit Vialatte Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal Ennio Vivaldi Kai Vogeley Kristen Volz Gottfried Vosgerau Martin Voss Ursula Voss Jiri Wackermann Kimberley A. Wade Graham Wagstaff Eamonn Walsh Erin Wamsley Man-Ying Wang Joel Warm Florian Waszak Edward Watkins Marcus Watson Daniel M. Wegner Jonathan Weinberg Peter Weiss-Blankenhorn Daniel Weissman Rex Welshon Mike Wendt Markus Werning Geraint Wiggins Sylvie Willems A.D. Williams David Williams John Williams Claudia Wilmzig Richard Wiseman Richard Wolman Philip S. Wong Erik Woody Robert Woolfolk James Worthen Hal Wortzel Pascal Wurtz Eunice Yang Yi-Yu Yeh Garry Young Tiziana Zalla Hubert Zimmer Sharon Zmigrod 1159

Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Edges, colour and awareness in blindsight Iona Alexander *, Alan Cowey University of Oxford, Department of Experimental Psychology, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 25 September 2009 Available online 18 February 2010 Keywords: Blindsight Colour contrast Luminance contrast Narrow-band colours a b s t r a c t It remains unclear what is being processed in blindsight in response to faces, colours, shapes, and patterns. This was investigated in two hemianopes with chromatic and achromatic stimuli with sharp or shallow luminance or chromatic contrast boundaries or temporal onsets. Performance was excellent only when stimuli had sharp spatial boundaries. When discrimination between isoluminant coloured Gaussians was good it declined to chance levels if stimulus onset was slow. The ability to discriminate between instantaneously presented colours in the hemianopic field depended on their luminance, indicating that wavelength discrimination totally independent of other stimulus qualities is absent. When presented with narrow-band colours the hemianopes detected a stimulus maximally effective for S-cones but invisible to M- and L-cones, indicating that blindsight is mediated not just by the mid-brain, which receives no S-cone input, or that the rods contribute to blindsight. The results show that only simple stimulus features are processed in blindsight. Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Blindsight is the ability, possessed by many patients following destruction of the striate cortex (V1), to detect, localise and even discriminate among visual stimuli in their clinically blind field by ‘guessing’, despite not consciously experiencing a visual percept. Occasionally the patients say that they are aware that something happened but that it was not a visual percept, named type 2 blindsight by Weiskrantz (1998). In this paper we do not formally consider this distinction. Despite three decades of research it is still unclear which stimulus properties sustain this ability and precisely where the processing takes place. For example, the ability of hemianopic monkeys and patients to detect stimuli whose space-averaged luminance is the same as the background, i.e. isoluminant, has been repeatedly demonstrated (for reviews see Cowey (2004), Stoerig (2006) and Stoerig and Cowey (1997). However, the stimuli had either a spatially sharp luminance or chromatic boundary with respect to their background and it may be the ability to detect sharp luminance or chromatic borders that survives in blindsight rather than perception of other qualities of the entire stimulus itself, such as surface colour or texture or brightness or shape. In this paper we describe five experiments, one on luminance and four on colour, in order to elucidate the properties of the pathways that subserve the ability of hemianopic subjects to detect and discriminate such unseen stimuli in their blind field. Visual information is transmitted from the retina to the brain via nine direct projections (see Cowey (2010), Cowey & Stoerig (1991), Stoerig (2006), and Stoerig and Cowey (1997) for reviews) and visual information can reach and be processed at further stages in the brain via the interlaminar layers of the dLGN, the superior colliculus, the pre-tectum and the pulvinar. These connections have been explored extensively (Stoerig & Cowey, 1997), but their role in blindsight, and how some stimuli sustain blindsight more readily than others is still contested. Traditionally, residual visual functions in monkeys were * Corresponding author. Fax: +44 1865 310447. E-mail address: iona.alexander@psy.ox.ac.uk (I. Alexander). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.01.008 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 521 attributed to mediation by the scotopic rod system (Klüver, 1942, 1949; Leporé, Cardu, Rasmussen, & Malmo, 1975; Malmo, 1966), but Humphrey (1974) reported that destriate monkey Helen could navigate her complex outdoor environment in daylight, which surely requires more than rod vision! She certainly did not behave like human rod monochromats, who are severely visually disabled in bright light. However, it must be acknowledged that their vision is not identical to normal rod vision. As well, Schilder, Pasik, and Pasik (1972) and Keating (1979) reported that monkeys with total removal of V1 could discriminate between different wavelengths, as can human subjects with blindsight in their field defects (Stoerig, 1985), even when luminance was varied in order to make it irrelevant. Cowey and Stoerig (1999) and Stoerig and Cowey (1989) showed that rod and cone mechanisms operate in both the normal and the hemianopic fields of patients and monkeys, and that the blind field even shows a Purkinje shift, indicative of both rod and cone function, results also shown by Brent, Kennard, and Ruddock (1994) in patient GY. The retino-collicular pathway, rather than the koniocellular or pulvinar LGN pathways, has been implicated in colour processing in blindsight. However, electrophysiological evidence (de Monasterio, 1978; Marrocco & Li, 1977; Schiller & Malpeli, 1977) indicates that there is no direct retinal input from the S-cones to the colliculus, implying that colour discrimination should be impaired when it requires S-cone, blue/yellow, processing. Indeed, Sumner, Adamjee, and Mollon (2002), using the same reasoning, demonstrated that stimuli visible only to the S-cones failed to produce the saccadic distraction widely attributed to the superior colliculus. But it should be acknowledged that more recent evidence (Hall & Colby, 2009) does point to a pathway from S-cones to the superior colliculus. Ignoring the latter for the moment, if chromatic information in blindsight is processed via the superior collicular, rather than a pulvinar or koniocellular LGN pathway, blindsight should be insensitive to stimuli that isolate the S-cone mechanism. This prediction is born out in patients who have blindsight following complete hemispherectomy (Leh, Mullen, & Ptito, 2006; Ptito, 2007) but might not be true for patients in whom the blindsight followed damage only or chiefly to striate cortex. We therefore tested two such subjects with narrow-band coloured stimuli, one of which would be barely detectable by M- and L-cones. The experiments were designed to investigate the role of simple stimulus features such as colour, luminance, edges and temporal onsets in facilitating the ability of blindsight patients to detect stimuli in their blind field and accordingly to shed light on what is being processed in blindsight. 2. Subjects Two hemianopes (GY and MS) were studied. Both took part in the target localisation, and narrow-band stimuli studies but only GY in the colour discrimination experiments because MS’s V1 lesion additionally and bilaterally destroyed the ventral temporal region concerned with colour vision and previous publications showed that he was unable to discriminate between colours even in his seeing hemianopic field (reviewed by Heywood and Cowey (2003)). In all four experiments the stimuli were displayed on a computer screen and eye fixation was monitored on a large screen, visible to one of the two experimenters by means of an infra-red camera at the side of the display throughout all trials. Any trials where fixation was not maintained during stimulus presentation were eliminated but this rarely occurred. Hemianope GY has been reported in detail elsewhere (e.g. Barbur, Ruddock, & Waterfield, 1980; Barbur, Watson, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1993; Azzopardi & Cowey, 2001; Brent et al., 1994; Bridge, Thomas, Jbabdi, & Cowey, 2008; Cowey & Walsh, 2000). In brief, he suffered a unilateral lesion in his left medial occipital cortex caused by a traffic accident when he was 8 years old. In his left hemisphere the occipital pole is the only part of his striate cortex to survive, accounting for his macular sparing of about 3°. GY has been extensively examined for his residual visual function in his hemianopic field and he retains the ability to detect, localise and discriminate stimuli there. But even when he reports being aware of a stimulus he denies having a visual percept, referring instead to ‘a feeling that something happened’. Subject MS has also been reported in detail elsewhere (reviewed by Heywood and Cowey (2003)). In brief, MS contracted herpes encephalitis in 1971 which destroyed most of the ventral temporal cortex of both hemispheres and in addition the calcarine cortex on the right, leaving him with a complete left homonymous hemianopia. In his intact hemifield he is agnosic for faces and objects and has total achromatopsia, which has been studied extensively. Surprisingly he has not hitherto been tested for any residual visual capacity in his blind field, apart from his pupillary response, which is intact (Cowey, Alexander, Heywood, & Kentridge, 2008). He was aged 61 at the time of the current investigation. Control subjects were not needed as both experimenters could perform all tasks faultlessly. 3. Experiment 1: localisation task Stimuli were generated using a Cambridge Research Systems VSG II/5, programmed with a Dan computer and visual basic software. Stimuli were displayed on an EIZO 19inch monitor, calibrated using OPTICAL (Cambridge Research Systems), with a viewing distance of 57 cm. The five stimuli were: a plain white 8  8° white square, a vertical square-wave grating (contrast 0.5) of the same size as the white square and with a mean luminance the same as the background, a Gaussian of the same peak luminance as the square, a Gaussian of the same mean luminance as the square but of higher peak luminance, and a Gabor of the same mean luminance and contrast as the grating (see Fig. 1). Background screen luminance was 10 cd/m2, the same as the mean luminance of the gratings and the second Gaussian and the Gabor. The square was 25 cd/m2 and the peak luminance of the two Gaussians was 25 or 50 cd/m2. Each block of one stimulus type contained 100 trials and GY completed two blocks of each stimulus condition. The parameters for the Gaussian, Gabor and gratings were determined using VSG 522 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 Fig. 1. Examples of the stimuli in the localisation paradigm. Top left: plain square; bottom left: Gaussian; top right: square-wave grating; bottom right: Gabor patch. Subjects completed 100 trials with each stimulus type, and each stimulus appeared in any one of the four locations at random. For subject MS the stimuli were 1.7 times larger in linear extent but centred on the same position. The central spot marks the start light. software and the spatial frequency of the grating and Gabor was 0.75 cpd and the radial size of each standard deviation of the Gaussian patch was the height of the screen in pixels divided by 20, and for the Gaussian it was set to 40. With GY the stimuli were presented in either the upper or lower quadrants, at random, in both the left and right hemifields. Because of time constraints the task was simplified for MS by making the stimuli larger, 13  13°, and presenting them only in the blind hemifield after establishing that he could perform the task perfectly when they were in the seeing hemifield. 3.1. Methods On each trial the subject fixated a white start light that appeared at the centre of the VDU. When the subject pressed the space bar on the keyboard, the start light disappeared and was instantaneously followed by a 200 ms stimulus in one of the four quadrants of the VDU, either in the good field (upper or lower) or in the blind field (upper or lower). Stimuli were equiprobable in both visual fields for GY, but were predominantly in the blind field for MS. The subject started each trial and was instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible using the keyboard responses; upper left ‘q’, lower left ‘z’, upper right ‘p’, lower right ‘m’. The four keys were prominently marked by blobs of plasticene so that the subject could rest four fingers on them throughout testing and did not have look at them. Examples of the displays are shown in Fig. 1. MS found the keyboard response too confusing and was only comfortable with a verbal response. Accordingly, the experimenter entered MS’s verbal responses on the keyboard. Manual reaction time data were therefore not collected for MS. After each block of trials the two hemianopes were asked whether they had experienced any kind of awareness of the stimuli but this was not done after every trial, given the large number of trials and constraints on time. 3.2. Results When performance with the Gabor stimulus, and its control stimulus (square-wave grating) were compared there was, as predicted, a significant difference in performance for both GY (v2 = 24.355; df = 1, p < .001, 1-tailed) and MS (v2 = 3.945; df = 1, p < .05, 1-tailed). A binomial analysis demonstrated that MS’s performance with the Gabor was no better than expected by chance (p > .05). A one-way ANOVA revealed a large and significant difference in GY’s reaction times (F(1, 163) = 40.180, df = 1, p < .001). GY’s mean reaction time for the Gabor was 818.01 ms and for the grating 545.93 ms (Fig. 2 right panel), i.e. GY was much slower to respond to the stimulus which lacked sharp luminance contours. The reaction time in the good field for the Gabor was 681.25 ms and for the grating was 549.74 ms. There was a significant difference between the percentage correct for the square and the first Gaussian, whose peak luminance was matched to that of the plain square, for GY (v2 = 10.940; df = 1, p < .001, 1-tailed) and for MS (v2 = 32.175; df = 1, p < .001, 1-tailed). Binomial analysis demonstrated that MS’s performance with the Gaussian was no better than expected by chance (p > .05). There was a significant difference between percentage correct for the second Gaussian, mean luminance matched to that of its control the square 20 compared to the plain square for GY (v2 = 9.872; df = 1, p < .001, 1-tailed) but not for MS (v2 = 2.240; df = 1, p > .05, 1-tailed). There was a significant difference between GY’s reaction times for the plain square (578.4 ms) compared to the Gaussian (674.76 ms) (F(1, 170) = 2.845, df = 1, p > .05) and between the plain square and the Gaussian20 (672.60 ms) (F(1, 171) = 17.664, df = 1, p < .001) (see Fig. 2 left panel). The reactions times in the good field for the plain square was 601.80, for the Gaussian 651.51 and for the Gaussian20 597.42. I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 523 Fig. 2. Right panels: results of the localisation task using a square-wave grating stimulus or a Gabor patch. Performance declined for GY and was reduced to chance level for MS when the stimulus lacked sharp contours. Mean reaction time was also significantly longer for GY in the Gabor condition. Left panels: results with a flashed plain white square or a Gaussian white patch of the same peak luminance or the same mean luminance. Performance was impaired for GY, but his reaction time was longer in responding to the Gaussian. MS localised the flashed square well but was totally unable to localise the Gaussian until it’s peak luminance was raised to 20 cd/m2. 4. Experiment 2: red/green colour discrimination using Gaussian patches Stimuli, generated using the VSG II/5 system as described in experiment 1, were 10° in size and presented in the blind hemifield straddling the horizontal meridian. The stimuli were coloured Gaussian patches of either red or green, presented on a grey background. Each stimulus lasted for 500 ms followed by a 50 ms interval and then another Gaussian patch of either the same colour or the complementary (green or red) colour for 500 ms (Fig. 3). Subject GY, had to indicate whether or not the Gaussian had changed colour. There were five conditions, where luminance was varied either for the background or for the red or the green Gaussian (see Table 1). Note that GY did not have to name the colour, merely to say whether it had changed. Next, in order to assess whether GY could determine whether a Gaussian patch was green (9 cd/m2) or red (9 cd/m2) on a grey background of 9 cd/m2, we used a similar procedure but this time only one coloured Gaussian was presented, for 1000 ms, and GY verbally reported ‘red’ or ‘green’. Following this, for 100 trials we presented a single red or green Gaussian of unlimited duration while the screen was covered by a white card before slowly moving the card upwards over a period of about 2 s to uncover the complete Gaussian, which then had to be categorised as red or green. Only then was the stimulus turned off. Finally, for 50 trials, the screen was no longer obscured by the card. Instead GY had to close his eyes, and then open them after the stimulus appeared on the screen as indicated by the experimenter. The purpose of both procedures was to minimise any transients present when the entire stimulus is presented in a single frame and to eliminate all transients caused by stimulus offset. 4.1. Results GY could discriminate whether or not the colour had changed at every ratio of red/green luminance and at two different background luminances when the stimuli were briefly flashed (Fig. 4). Although he performed least well when the two stimuli were photometrically isoluminant against a background of much higher luminance his score of 87% correct was only just significantly different from the condition where the background was the same luminance as the stimuli (Fig. 4, top left, v2 = 3.911; df = 1, p < .05). All other comparisons were insignificant and he scored close to 100% correct (Fig. 4 top right and bottom left). Despite denying any visual percept he described the red stimulus as ‘‘having a bigger effect”, which is why the luminance of the green stimulus was increased to 20 cd/m2 in an attempt to make it even more salient so that it matched the red in salience. But he still described the red as being easier to detect. Nor was there any significant change in his excellent performance when the red luminance was reduced from 9 cd/m2 to 6 cd/m2 and the green was 20 cd/m2. These results indicated that GY could tell the difference between a flashed red and green even when they had a Gaussian 524 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 Fig. 3. Examples of the Gaussian blob sequences used in experiment 2. The subject indicated whether or not the Gaussian blob had changed colour in a 2interval task. Table 1 Stimulus luminance of the background and the red and green stimuli in experiment 2. Condition 1 2 3 4 5 Luminance (cd/m2) Background Red Green 18 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 9 9 12 20 20 profile. However, it became evident that he was detecting differences in the salient stimulus onset or offset, or both. When the stimuli and the background were all isoluminant and now only one colour was presented on each trial and it remained there until GY responded by naming it red or green he scored 100% correct and explained that he could do it because the red produced a stronger feeling whereas the green did not. But when the stimulus was presented behind the white card before being slowly uncovered he scored only 54/100. The difference between the scores for the two conditions was highly significant (v2 = 17.160; df = 1, p < .001, see Fig. 4, bottom right). When asked about this he said that when the stimulus was I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 525 Fig. 4. Percentage correct for the red/green colour discrimination task. GY could detect a sudden change from green to red or visa versa but this ability was abolished when the stimulus onset was gradual or completely obscured. Top left: background luminance varies, bottom left: green luminance varies, top right: red luminance changes, bottom right: onset varies. flashed he could detect an event and that the events were different for red and green. But he could detect nothing when the identical coloured stimuli were slowly uncovered, no matter what the colour on any trial (Fig. 4, bottom right). Since it could be argued that the slow removal of the card might have ‘masked’ the coloured stimulus, the procedure was repeated by presenting the stimulus immediately after he closed his eyes, which he then re-opened on command. He was still unable to discriminate red from green (22/50) because, he said, ‘‘neither of them produced any feeling” (Fig. 4, bottom right). 5. Experiment 3: edges and temporal onsets In order to assess the role of stimulus transients and edges on stimulus detection we used stimuli with temporal envelopes designed to minimise any transients present when the entire stimulus is presented in a single frame, and used stimuli with and without Gaussian envelopes to evaluate edge detection mechanisms. A forced choice detection paradigm was used and on each trial the subject indicated whether or not a stimulus was presented. There were two types of stimuli: a circle with sharp edges or a Gaussian i.e. without sharp edges. The stimulus was either red (9 cd/m2, x = 0.596, y = 0.346) green (9 cd/m2, x = 0.291, y = 0.556) on a grey background (9 cd/m2, x = 0.300, y = 0.316) or blue (5.5 cd/m2, x = 0.151, y = 0.075) on a grey background (5.5 cd/m2, x = 0.300, y = 0.311), and the onset was either sudden or the stimulus reached its peak slowly, over 1 s. When there was no offset, the stimulus remained on the screen until a response was made. When there was an offset the stimulus remained at its peak for 200 ms and then disappeared suddenly. Four conditions were used: (1) a stimulus with sharp edges and a sudden onset, but no offset; (2) sharp edges with slow onset of 1 s, but no offset; (3) sharp edges and slow onset of 1 s but sudden offset and (4) a Gaussian with a sudden onset and no offset. The stimuli were 8° in diameter and presented in the blind field with their nearest ‘edge’ 9° lateral to the fixation spot. There were 50 trials per condition, per colour. 5.1. Procedure The subject looked at the fixation spot and when the experimenter said ‘now’ the trial was initiated and a stimulus appeared in the blind field, in which case the correct response was ‘yes’, or there was no stimulus and he had to respond ‘no’. Responses were recorded manually and percentage correct calculated. The fixation mark remained on the screen throughout and eye movements were monitored. The subjects were told that there would be a stimulus on half of the trials at random and that responding ‘No’ on every trial was inappropriate; the procedure was therefore Yes or guess. 526 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 5.2. Results Fig. 5 shows that when the stimuli had sharp edges and a sudden onset GY was able to detect the red, green and blue stimuli (binomial tests, all p < .001). But this ability was abolished when the temporal onset was slow (1 s) and the stimulus was either green or red (all p > .05), but not when it was blue (p < .001). When the stimuli had a slow onset, but a sudden offset performance was re-established for the red (p < .001), but not for the green (p > .05). Thus GY can use the onset or the offset for stimulus detection. He could detect a red or blue (p < .001 in both cases) but not a green (p > .05) Gaussian. (Fig. 5, bottom). MS was able to do two of the 12 discriminations. He could accurately detect a green Gaussian stimulus (p < .05) and a blue stimulus (p < .001) with a sharp onset and no offset. Unlike GY, MS was unable to detect a stimulus with a slow onset and a sudden offset, even for blue stimuli. (Fig. 5 top). 6. Experiment 4: colour discrimination: red/green and blue/yellow This experiment was carried out only with GY. Visual stimuli were presented on a white background on 17-in colour monitor incorporating a touch screen (Phillips UP2799) at a viewing distance of 28 cm. The stimulus could appear in any Fig. 5. Pecentage correct scores in detecting a red, green or blue stimulus with sharp or Gaussian spatial profile, and different temporal onsets and offsets. Only GY could perform well with several of the conditions but even he was unable to achieve better than chance performance with a green stimulus unless its contours were sharp and its onset sudden and he was equally poor with a red stimulus whose onset was slow. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 527 one of the four quadrants at random, as in experiment 1. The luminance and chromaticity of each stimulus was measured as before. On each trial a single stimulus was presented for 200 ms and was designated either positive or negative. A go/no-go procedure was used. If the stimulus was positive GY had to touch its remembered position as quickly as possible i.e. a go trial. If it was negative he had to refrain from responding for 3 s until the trial ended. i.e. a no-go trial. For each pair of colours the positive stimulus remained the same luminance throughout the experiment but the luminance of the negative stimuli was changed after each block of 100 trials in order to determine whether GY could discriminate between the two colours irrespective of their relative luminance. Two discriminations were used; red (positive, go trial) vs. green (negative, no-go trial) and blue (positive, go trial) vs. yellow (negative, no-go trial). 6.1. Procedure On each trial GY had to touch the start light at the centre of the screen. This initiated the trial and produced a 200 ms target in one of four quadrants; top left, bottom left, top right or bottom right. If it was the positive target GY had to respond by touching its remembered location; if it was negative, he had to refrain from responding. Incorrect responses were instantly signalled by turning the display black. Correct touches were signalled by filling the previous stimulus area with bright white light for 1 s. The inter-trial interval was 4 s, after which the start light re-appeared for the next trial. Trials were selfpaced and there were 100 trials with each condition. 6.2. Results In this experiment the display was the same as in experiment 2 but only one stimulus was presented, for 200 ms, in any one of the four quadrants on each trial and GY had to respond by touching its remembered position if it was positive and refrain from responding if it was negative. The stimuli were spatially of uniform colour and luminance with a sharp chromatic border with the 10 cd/m2 background. The luminance of the standard red stimulus was 2 cd/m2 in a further attempt to reduce its salience. When the luminance of the green stimulus was titrated down in relation to the red stimulus, GY remained able to detect a difference between red and green when green was 46 cd/m2, 27 cd/m2, 18 cd/m2 (p < .001), 5.5 cd/m2 or 2.3 cd/m2 (p < .01), but not when green was 13.5 cd/m2 or 7.5 cd/m2 (p > .05). In the latter conditions he said that he was still aware of the stimuli but that they produced the same ‘feeling’. When a similar procedure was used with blue positive, 5.5 cd/m2, and yellow negative and the luminance of the yellow was titrated, his excellent performance when yellow luminance was 5.5, 6.5. 10, or 28 cd/m2 (about 70–90% correct, p < .001 in all cases) was replaced with chance levels of responding (when it was 12.4, 14, 18.5 or 23 cd/m2 (p > .05). Again in the difficult pairings he reported that ‘‘the two colours gave him the same impression”. In other words he was responding to salience rather than only to hue, the salience varying with the luminance of the colours (Fig. 6). Of course, salience might be mediated by an interaction between the hue and luminance of the stimuli if both are being processed in blindsight. 7. Experiment 5: narrow-band colours There is evidence that the S-cones provide no direct input to the superior colliculus (e.g. Sumner et al., 2002). If blindsight is mediated chiefly by the superior colliculus, as some experiments indicate, blindsight should not be present with stimuli that can only be detected by S-cones. Experiment 5 investigated this. Unfortunately VDU phosphor emissions are broad-band and any ‘pure’ blue stimulus generated by exciting only the blue gun will stimulate not only S-cones but also L and M-cones, albeit to a lesser degree. In order to circumvent this, a tritanic confusion line (Smithson, Sumner, & Mollon, 2003) for any given subject can be calculated, thus ensuring that stimuli really do isolate the S-cones. Although this is straightforward in subjects with normal vision, it is very difficult to achieve in blindsighted subjects. One could assume that the two hemifields are similar with respect to their chromatic properties, in which case the tritanopic confusion line could be determined in the good field, then translated to the blind field. However, there is extensive transneuronal retrograde retinal degeneration of retinal ganglion cells following ablation of the striate cortex and there is therefore no assurance that the two hemifields are the same. Furthermore, as this retinal degeneration is selective for the colour-opponent P ganglion cells (Cowey, Stoerig, & Perry, 1989), it would not be surprising if the tritanopic confusion lines in blindsight and real sight differed substantially. Accordingly we avoided the problem of trying to match the line in the two hemifields and instead we assessed whether GY and MS could detect or discriminate a range of narrow-band stimuli in their blindfield. This was done by using a series of 5  5 cm interference filters (Schott, Glaswerke) which transmitted light of different peak wavelengths with a band-width of 10–12 nm at half height. The filters were calibrated by a spectrophotometer (Perkin–Elmer Lambda Series/PECSS) and their characteristics are shown in Fig. 7 (top). A Kodak carousel S-AV 2020 projector was mounted immediately behind the subject’s shoulder on his blind side, making it possible to project an intense beam of narrow-band light on a large white card 57 cm in front of the subject. The shutter in the projector could be programmed to deliver a stimulus for any period of time. The circular stimulus subtended 10° for GY and 20° for MS and its nearest edge in the blind field was 10° from the fixation point on the white card. Focal lighting was arranged so that the sighted hemifield was flooded with white light at a mean intensity of about 70 cd/m2, leaving the background of the blind hemifield in the region of the stimulus at 10 cd/m2 for GY and 2 cd/m2 for MS. Eye movements were monitored throughout. 528 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 Fig. 6. Results of experiment 4. Discrimination between red and green and between blue and yellow at different relative luminances of the two stimuli, which were presented singly. GY was unable to score at better than chance levels at certain luminance ratios, indicating that colour discrimination independent of other stimulus properties was absent. 7.1. Procedure On each trial, signalled verbally by the experimenter, a single stimulus was presented for 500 ms, either before or after a blank stimulus (i.e. no stimulus) for 500 ms, at random and with an interval of 500 ms between them. The subjects had to report whether the stimulus appeared in the first or second interval. Six different filters were used (Table 2) with the same filter throughout each block. In addition we carried out three further conditions on patient GY. First, GY had to guess whether the narrow-band stimulus was red or blue (18 cd/m2). Second, in order to minimise the transients present at stimulus onset we repeated this condition but GY closed his eyes prior to stimulus presentation, and opened them only after the stimulus had appeared (as signalled by the experimenter), and indicated whether the stimulus was red or blue within 5 s (before the stimulus was removed). Finally he was asked to repeat the previous condition, but on half the trials the stimulus was red as before and on half it was blank, rather than blue. GY indicated whether there was a stimulus or not. The purpose of this test was to minimise any transients present when the entire stimulus is presented in a single frame and to eliminate all transients caused by stimulus offset. 7.2. Results As shown in Fig. 8. GY scored 100% correct for 4 of the coloured stimuli and his poorest score was 87% with the deep blue stimulus that peaked at 426 nm. MS was less successful but still scored between 65% and 83% with all the stimuli other than deep red (Fig. 8). After each block of 100 trials with a given stimulus both subjects were asked what they had experienced, if anything. GY was confident that he could tell that ‘‘something happened in his blind field” with all the colours except deep blue 426 nm and green 514 nm, which he said hardly ever elicited any experience; yet he scored 87% with the former and 100% with the latter, which amounts to pure guesswork, i.e. blindsight. In contrast, MS struggled to describe how he decided on the correct interval and said he ‘‘thought he might know the right one”. He often took several seconds to make up his mind 529 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 Fig. 7. Top: transmission characteristics of the seven narrow-band stimuli used in experiment 5. The four symbols near the top of the curves indicate, from left to right, the absorption maxima for the S-cones, rods, M-cones and L-cones. The numbers indicate the filter reference number. Bottom: mean absorbance spectra for the four human photoreceptors (redrawn from Dartnall, Bowmaker, & Mollon, 1983); filled circles, rods; squares, S-cones; triangles, M-cones; plain circles, L-cones. Table 2 Properties of narrow-band stimuli used in experiment 4. Filter Peak wavelength (nm) Peak transmittance cd/m2 4 2 6 5 1 1 3 426 462 464 514 529 529 629 .51 .49 .58 .59 .50 .54 .35 2.1 12 18 12 12 18 18 and said that he ‘‘was just doing his best to guess”. No feedback about performance was given until the end of each block and GY thought he had scored no better than chance with the two colours that elicited no feeling. MS was pleased to find that he had scored so well. Unlike GY, MS did not score better than expected by random responding to the deep red stimulus, a point taken up in the discussion. Finally, and revealingly, GY scored 46/50 when asked to discriminate between a red and blue narrow-band stimulus, but only 24/50 when he was asked to close his eyes, and open them after the onset of the stimulus (indicated by the experimenter). Repeating this paradigm but with a red and blank, rather than red and blue stimulus, demonstrated that GY was unable to detect the presence of the stimulus (23/50) under these conditions. 8. Discussion The performance of both hemianopic subjects on a variety of visual discrimination tasks varied substantially, even within a particular discrimination paradigm, according to changes in the luminance, contrast, wavelength and onset–offset 530 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 Fig. 8. Performance on two-interval forced-choice task with narrow-band stimuli. Both GY and MS could discriminate short-wavelength stimuli in their blind field, but unlike GY, MS could not detect or discriminate red (629 nm). characteristics of the stimuli. The five main tasks are discussed separately before a general discussion of the implications of the results for ideas about blindsight. 8.1. Experiment 1: target localisation GY’s reaction time in the localisation task was lengthened when stimuli lacked any sharp luminance borders, as with Gabors and Gaussians, but his performance in both conditions was significantly above chance; it was merely impaired rather than abolished under these conditions. This is contrary to MS’s performance, which was reduced to chance levels with both the Gabor and Gaussian stimuli compared to their sharp-edged controls. Not only does this highlight the importance of sharp boundaries, it shows that the latter stimuli could not have been detected by stray light because discernable light scatter would be similar for both stimulus pairs. As eliminating the sharp boundaries significantly impaired rather then abolished performance in GY, it is impossible to determine from this experiment whether other properties such as colour and texture may also contribute to an object’s salience. Although the sharp edge was eliminated it is possible that GY could not detect the Gaussian function from its onset to peak in its entirety, but rather from a point along that curve, thus resulting in a perceived ‘smaller’ stimulus. By varying the point of interpolation of the Gaussian or Gabor function it should be possible to investigate the existence of a null point, and the sensitivity of edge detection mechanisms in blindsight with varying stimulus edges, and determine whether it is possible to impair blindsight, perhaps to the point of abolishing it in this way. Whatever the outcome of such further experiments these results indicate that processing stimulus properties such as colour, surface or texture is intact, and that the ability of blindsight patients to detect isoluminant stimuli is not solely attributable to luminance boundaries. Unlike GY, MS described himself as ‘‘flummoxed” by the elimination of sharp borders in the stimuli, and he performed no better than chance. This is consistent with the extensive damage to his extra-striate ventral visual pathway, which is intact in GY, and his denial of being aware of any stimulus. 8.2. Experiment 2: coloured Gaussians GY could detect a colour change from red to green or vice versa when both stimuli had sharp temporal onsets and offsets, and he could correctly name a single colour as red or green. But the latter ability was abolished when the stimulus was slowly uncovered, regardless of whether the colour was red or green, and was similarly abolished when the stimulus was presented with his eyes closed and he had to identify the colour after opening his eyes while the stimulus remained in view for up to 5 s. This suggests that the onset and/or offset of the stimulus, as well as the sharpness of its boundary, is paramount. Thus, although Gabor and Gaussian patches of luminance stimuli impaired blindsight (experiment 1), they did not do so with the coloured stimuli used in this experiment. Although this was a discrimination task, rather than a localisation task, coloured stimuli appear to have their own salience, which further supports the idea that some chromatic processing mechanisms are intact in blindsight. 531 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 8.3. Experiment 3: edges and temporal onsets The results could hardly be clearer. MS only responded reliably to the blue stimulus with sharp spatial and temporal onset. GY performed more effectively, i.e. to blue stimuli whatever their spatial and temporal properties and to red except when it had a slow onset. As with luminance stimuli (Barbur, Harlow, & Weiskrantz, 1994) the subjects were responding to spatial and temporal properties of the coloured stimuli rather than to their chroma, as confirmed in experiment 4. The excellent performance with blue stimuli may indicate that it is mediated by rods, whose quantum catch at mesopic viewing conditions will be substantial. 8.4. Experiment 4: colour discriminations Green/red: GY could usually discriminate the difference between red and green. But when the red stimulus was 2 cd/m2 his performance was impaired when the green was 13.6 cd/m2 or 7.5 cd/m2 (p > .05) although not when the green was at the higher values of 46 cd/m2, 27 cd/m2 18.3 cd/m2or the lower values of 2.3 cd/m2 and 5.5 cd/m2 (p < .01). Thus the mechanism of red/green colour discrimination in GY must be different from that in normal vision in that for GY there is a luminance ratio at which the difference between green and red becomes undetectable. Further, at this point GY reported that the stimuli produced the same ‘feeling’, i.e. their salience became matched. Interestingly, when cone contrasts are calculated for each stimulus (i.e. (bgL stL)/(bgL + stL) for the L-cones and (bgS stS)/(bgS + stS) for the S-cones where bg = background and st = stimulus) the results can be predicted according the S-cone excitation, i.e. the stimuli GY was unable to tell apart (red 2 cd/m2 and green 13.6 cd/m2) have the smallest difference between the S-cone excitation induced by red or green (see Table 3). Whether rods might also be activated is discussed below. Blue/yellow: As with green and red, there was a luminance ratio at which discrimination of blue from yellow became impossible for GY in his hemianopic field. Although he could discriminate between blue and yellow when the yellow was 5.5, 6.5, 10, 23 and 28.5 cd/m2 (p < .01) he failed to do so when it was 12.5, 14 or 18.5 cd/m2 (p > .05). This suggests that blue – like red – is a particularly salient stimulus for him but that if yellow is made much more luminously intense it becomes as salient as the blue and accordingly indistinguishable from the blue. 8.5. Experiment 5: narrow-band stimuli Both GY and MS could discriminate and detect short wavelength blue stimuli in their blind field. Unlike GY, MS was unable to detect or discriminate red. This is contrary to what was expected if blindsight is entirely mediated by the superior colliculi, which lack any input from S-cones, and if the narrow-band blue which peaked at 427 nm, does not stimulate Lcones which peak at 564–580 nm (with a range of 500–700 nm) or M-cones which peak at and 534–545 nm (range 450– 630 nm) (see Fig. 7 bottom). Either there are other pathways, as argued by Stoerig and Cowey (1992) and Cowey and Stoerig (1999) who found that spectral sensitivity of hemianopic patients and macaque monkeys was not selectively impaired at short wavelengths or, alternatively, GY and MS were detecting the narrow-band stimuli via their rods, whose peak absorbance is 498 nm and which do contribute to the collicular input. All the testing was carried out at mesopic adaptation levels and rods must have contributed. All investigators of residual visual sensitivity following damage to V1 (from Klüver, 1942, onward) have found that low levels of ambient light assist, or are even necessary for, residual visual processing in the blind field. This might also explain why MS, whose lesion is very much larger and destroys almost the entire ventral temporal cortex, could not detect or discriminate the narrow-band red stimulus, which peaked at 630 nm, well outside the effective range of rods. Perhaps the most illuminating result with narrow-band stimuli was GY’s inability, when the abrupt onset and offset were removed, to discriminate between red and blue or red and blank, which is consistent with the old notion that the superior colliculi are especially effective at detecting transients. There is an important rider to the arguments above. It is known that the sensitivity of the M and L-cones is sufficiently broad for them to respond weakly to wavelengths as short as 426 nm (e.g. Stockman & Sharpe, 1999), a fact not obvious from the customary normalised sensitivities shown in Fig. 7. However, although the L and M-cones do have a quantum catch right Table 3 Cone excitation for the stimuli used in experiment 4. Luminance Y x y L-cone S-cone Performance Red 125 150 175 75 200 255 100 Background 1.81 8.15 13.9 18.3 2.51 26.8 46.2 5.47 4.6 0.583 0.285 0.289 0.284 0.29 0.286 0.284 0.303 0.29 0.357 0.6 0.595 0.597 0.592 0.595 0.594 0.571 0.325 0.813419 0.649824 0.651305 0.649689 0.651781 0.650401 0.649853 0.657124 0.679429 0.155507 0.165661 0.169145 0.173496 0.173649 0.174235 0.179707 0.19584 1.154527 ns ns s s s s s 532 I. Alexander, A. Cowey / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 520–533 across the visible spectrum their relative sensitivity is so low in the short wavelength range that it can hardly account for why in blindsight the patient is actually better at detecting narrow-band blue than green stimuli. Similarly it is difficult to see why, for GY, narrow-band red was so good. Furthermore, even if the L and M-cones could detect the narrow-band blue stimuli in the normal hemiretina any effectiveness in a degenerated and blindsighted hemiretina is unknown. Unfortunately there are no single cell recordings in the mid-brain of monkeys in which V1 has been removed. The general message from the set of experiments on GY and MS is that although there are circumstances where they can localise, and discriminate between, a variety of chromatic and achromatic stimuli in their blind hemifields, their highly successful performance is based on relatively simple aspects of the stimuli, notably sharp contrast borders, relative intensity, and steep temporal onsets and offsets. All these features allow the subjects to detect ‘events’ but the events appear to vary only in subjective salience (here meaning roughly strength of feeling, or valency) and when salience is equated discrimination becomes impossible. With the stimuli used here categorisation of colours was absent when GY was asked to identify them (experiment 4) but, importantly, some chromatic processes are intact in blindsight as revealed by the detection task in experiment 2. This notion of the simple nature and importance of salience was first clearly expressed by Humphrey (1974) but has been curiously neglected in subsequent work on blindsight. Of great interest in this respect is the study by Morland et al. (1999), which demonstrated that GY could successfully discriminate and match colours, but not brightness, between hemifields. Taken together our experiments provide evidence that it is certain simple stimulus attributes that remain intact in blindsight but the role of the two channels with distinct spatio-temporal properties mediating blindsight, as first revealed by Barbur et al. (1994), remains to be established. Finally the experiments, especially when taken in conjunction with the finding that uncertainty about the precise timing of an expected stimulus drastically reduces its detection (Cowey & Stoerig, 2003) even though the stimulus has sharp edges and steep temporal gradient at onset and offset, indicate that even in the most intensively studied subject GY, blindsight might be of little practical use in everyday life and that attempts at rehabilitation might best be directed at training hemianopes to use their surviving visual field more effectively. Acknowledgment This research was supported by a UK Medical Research Council Grant to AC and an EPA Cephalosporin Trust Award to IA. References Azzopardi, P., & Cowey, A. (2001). Motion discrimination in cortically blind patients. Brain, 124, 30–46. Barbur, J. L., Harlow, A. J., & Weiskrantz, L. (1994). Spatial and temporal response properties of residual vision in a case of hemianopia. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Review Possibilities and limits of mind-reading: A neurophilosophical perspective Kathinka Evers a,⇑, Mariano Sigman b,c a Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics (CRB), Uppsala University, Sweden Laboratorio de Neurociencia Integrativa (LNI), Departamento de Fisica, FCEN-UBA, Buenos Aires, Argentina c Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Alte. Juan Saenz Valiente 1010, Buenos Aires C1428BIJ, Argentina b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 8 April 2012 Available online 25 June 2013 Keywords: Functional magnetic resonance imaging Trace conditioning Mind-reading Consciousness disorders Communication Infant minds 1st-Person access Privacy a b s t r a c t Access to other minds once presupposed other individuals’ expressions and narrations. Today, several methods have been developed which can measure brain states relevant for assessments of mental states without 1st person overt external behavior or speech. Functional magnetic resonance imaging and trace conditioning are used clinically to identify patterns of activity in the brain that suggest the presence of consciousness in people suffering from severe consciousness disorders and methods to communicate cerebrally with patients who are motorically unable to communicate. The techniques are also used non-clinically to access subjective awareness in adults and infants. In this article we inspect technical and theoretical limits on brain–machine interface access to other minds. We argue that these techniques hold promises of important medical breakthroughs, open up new vistas of communication, and of understanding the infant mind. Yet they also give rise to ethical concerns, notably misuse as a consequence of hypes and misinterpretations. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Contents 1. 2. 3. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Detecting consciousness from brain activity in behaviorally noncommunicative patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 2.1. Functional magnetic resonance imaging as a measure of consciousness and a method of communication . . . . . . . . . . . 888 2.2. Trace-conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 2.3. Ethical and clinical implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 2.3.1. Interpretation and diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 2.3.2. Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 2.3.3. Care and therapeutic interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Reading thoughts from brain activity in healthy individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 3.1. Neurotechnological access to mental contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 3.2. Decoding the infant mind from non-invasive measures of brain activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 3.2.1. Infant phoneme discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 3.2.2. Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 3.3. Reading hidden intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 3.4. Predicting visual responses to images and detecting unconscious vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 3.4.1. Predicting visual responses to images. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 3.4.2. EEG cortically coupled computer vision for rapid image search: detecting unconscious vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 ⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics (CRB), Uppsala University, Box 564, SE-75122 Uppsala, Sweden. Fax: +46 18 4716675. E-mail address: kathinka.evers@crb.uu.se (K. Evers). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.05.011 888 4. K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 4.1. Stereotypical mind–brain relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 4.2. Conclusion: possibilities and limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 1. Introduction In typical conditions, a subject has direct access to a subset of her or his own thoughts and experience. Access to other minds is perforce indirect, passing via that other individual’s expressions and narrations. Under some aspects, knowledge of another mind might be more accurate than introspective thought; for example, when emotional involvement such as love, fear, repression, or self-deceit make it difficult for us to face or see in ourselves what may be more apparent to others (friends, family, psychotherapists), who are less directly involved. Nevertheless, knowledge of others is necessarily indirect in a manner that self-knowledge need not be. For human beings, who dispose of symbolic and recursive languages, the spoken word is primordial in gaining accurate knowledge about other minds. Until recently, these behavioral expressions, body language, and narrations exhausted our possibilities of interpreting other minds and their mental states, but that situation is now rapidly changing. Several methods have been developed which can measure brain states relevant for assessments of mental states. These states need not be conscious to the subject being mind-read. Electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), deep-electrode recordings and near-infrared (NIRs) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) have opened a door that was previously sealed to entering the minds of others, and to communication without 1st person overt external behavior or speech. Notably, functional magnetic resonance imaging is used to identify patterns of activity in the brain that suggest the presence of consciousness in people suffering from severe consciousness disorders and methods to communicate cerebrally with patients who are motorically unable to communicate. It is also used non-clinically to access conscious or non-conscious subjective awareness, e.g. perceptions, or intentions in adults and infants. These new techniques hold promises of important medical breakthroughs and new knowledge about consciousness but also give rise to ethical concerns, e.g. in terms of health care and privacy. In this article we inspect technical and theoretical limits on the brain–machine interface access to other persons’ minds. We begin by reviewing recent assessments of consciousness in patients with serious consciousness disorders, proceed to non-clinical attempts to access mental contents, and conclude with a discussion of the possibilities, promises and perils. 2. Detecting consciousness from brain activity in behaviorally noncommunicative patients 2.1. Functional magnetic resonance imaging as a measure of consciousness and a method of communication Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) maps the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response associated with neural activation to study normal and disordered functions. Because it is non-invasive, it can be used to study also vulnerable subjects, such as children, who could not be studied by other functional brain imaging methods that use radiation. Today, the fMRI technique is widely used in clinical practice as an assessment tool; for example, to identify disease risk, e.g. the early identification of Alzheimer’s Disease (Wierenga & Bondi, 2007); augment surgical planning (Bookheimer, 2007); monitor rehabilitation outcome and assist in drug development (Paulus & Stein, 2007). fMRI measurements have contributed considerably to our knowledge about abnormalities of brain response in many neuropsychiatric conditions (Brown, 2007). fMRI can also be valuable to differentiate objectively patterns of cerebral activity in patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DOC) (Boly et al., 2005). In this context, fMRI functions as method for assessment of consciousness in these patients, when the technique is used to investigate whether they may have preserved mental abilities that evade detection using standard clinical methods that exclusively rely on behavioral indexes. Persistent vegetative state (PVS) is characterized by wakefulness without awareness and has been described as ‘‘one of the least understood and most ethically troublesome in modern medicine’’ (Owen et al., 2006). PVS patients can move, grimace and have their eyes open, but are considered to be by definition unaware of themselves or their surroundings.fMRIstudies have shown that substantial portions of the cortex may still function in PVS patients. A patient’s own name was found to elicit a stronger cerebral response than unfamiliar names, suggesting that the patient could process auditory stimuli to a semantic level (Perrin et al., 2006). This observation per se does not demonstrate conscious processing since experiments in normal subjects using masked stimuli demonstrate that a stream of perceptual, semantic and motor processes can occur without awareness (Dehaene et al., 1998). In fact, at the group level cerebral activation is usually limited to subcortical and ‘low-level’ primary cortical areas and is often disconnected from fronto-parietal network whose coordinated activity appears to be necessary for conscious processing (Laureys, 2005). K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 889 Stronger conclusions were drawn in a recent study where a patient who fulfilled all the diagnostic clinical criteria for a vegetative state was allegedly found able to retain the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through external behavior, such as speech or movement. The patient’s apparent decision to cooperate by imagining particular tasks when asked to do so – playing a game of tennis, or moving through the rooms of her house starting from the front door – by the authors was said to represent ‘‘a clear act of intention, which confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings’’ (Owen et al., 2006: 1402). A spectacular finding suggested in a subsequent study was that one minimally conscious state (MCS) patient who was totally unable to establish any functional communication at the bedside appeared able to establish communication with the researchers reliably responding yes or no to questions using directed imagery (think about A to say yes or think about B to say no) communication device (Monti et al., 2010). fMRI has also been used to detect cognitive and emotional processing in patients diagnosed with coma. Coma has been defined as a state of unarousable unconsciousness due to dysfunction of the brain’s ascending reticular activating system (ARAS), which is responsible for arousal and the maintenance of wakefulness. fMRI used on a patient with a prolonged comatose unresponsiveness following traumatic head injury revealed cortical responses to visual, auditory and tactile stimulation. The responses varied in correlation with the level of familiarity and relevance of the stimuli: stimuli from familiar people evoked significantly stronger amygdala activation than those from unfamiliar people, and direct addressing showed the same difference compared to neutral phrases (Eickhoff et al., 2008). Similar results were obtained in a more recent study suggesting that: ‘‘activity of the language network may serve as an indicator of high-level cognition and possibly volitional processes that cannot be discerned through conventional behavioral assessment alone’’ (Moreno, Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar, & Hirsch, 2010). 2.2. Trace-conditioning Even very simple and inexpensive technology, conceivable for large-scale use across the planet, can be used to investigate the possibility of conscious processing in PVS patients. Classical conditioning is a simple form of associative learning in which contingencies are established between a behaviorally important stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, UCS) and a closely paired neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS). In the trace conditioning of the eyeblink response, the CS is a tone that is presented several hundred milliseconds before the UCS, which is an air puff to the cornea. The temporal demand imposed by the silent trace interval between both stimuli has been shown to engage a broad cerebral network, including the cerebellum, neocortex and hippocampus (Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2001), and to require awareness of the contingencies between stimuli (Clark & Squire, 1998). Instead, when the UCS and CS are continuous in time, referred as delay conditioning (the term is slightly confusing but this is how it is traditionally referred and we follow this convention), blink responses are elicited despite the lack of awareness of the contingency and are observed in patients with medial temporal lobe lesions (Clark & Squire, 1998; Clark & Squire, 1999). Consistent with these results, fMRI investigations of conditioning have shown overlapping patterns of activation in regions including the anterior cingulate, medial thalamus, and visual cortex during delay and trace procedures. Instead, the hippocampus, SMA, frontal operculum, middle frontal gyrus, and inferior parietal lobule are activated during trace, but not during delay, conditioning (Knight, Cheng, Smith, Stein, & Helmstetter, 2003). Consequently, delay conditioning has been considered a hallmark of non-declarative learning (Lavond et al., 1993) and trace learning – due to its specific dependency on conscious awareness of the contingency between stimuli (Christian & Thompson, 2003) a potential ‘‘Turing-test ’’ of consciousness (Koch, 2004). This relies on a translational hypothesis that is discussed below in detail in its logical content. This translational hypothesis assumes that if a normal person (with no obvious pathology of consciousness) only shows trace learning when showing explicit signs of consciousness of the contingency, the same must be true for agents who cannot express consciousness explicitly. This has been used to investigate consciousness in PVS patients. Despite being unable to report awareness explicitly, PVS patients were reported able to learn this procedure (Bekinschtein et al., 2009). Learning was specific and showed an anticipatory electromyographic response to the aversive conditioning stimulus, which was substantially stronger than to the control stimulus and was augmented as the aversive stimulus approached. While this may be considered as a signature of consciousness, the translational argument has been debated and it is also logically possible that in these patients the same logical relation (blink only if consciousness of the contingency might not be true). The best case in favor of this lack of translation is that trace conditioning can be learnt by invertebrate sea slugs (Glanzman, 1995). In simple words, the finding that PVS patients elicit trace learning has two interpretations: (1) trace learning is an adequate test for consciousness as robustly confirmed from an investigation of healthy subjects and then, using the translation argument, PVS patients have some form of consciousness; or (2) the translation argument is wrong: this logical association may break in patients wherefore trace learning is not a good test to determine consciousness. As we discuss below, this is a formal limitation for any signature of consciousness observed in healthy subjects and then used diagnostically in subjects who cannot indicate their own consciousness via overt behavior. In this specific case, there are several lines of evidence that suggest (probabilistically) that patients who show trace learning may have consciousness. First, the amount of learning correlated with the degree of cortical atrophy. Secondly, and more importantly, the extent of trace learning was a better indicator of recovery than other clinical assessments (Bekinschtein et al., 2009). This is exactly 890 K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 what one would like to obtain from a new measure: to show some disagreement with previous criteria (if not it is not an improvement) and perform better when there is no agreement. Finally, there is an argument of consistency between different signatures. Assessing consciousness by trace learning ability or by fMRI measurements elicited consistent results, suggesting that individuals with DOCs might have partially preserved conscious processing, which cannot be mediated by explicit reports and is not detected by behavioral assessment (Boly et al., 2007; Owen et al., 2006). All this suggests that trace learning with high probability constitutes a good marker of consciousness in healthy subjects and also in PVS patients. 2.3. Ethical and clinical implications 2.3.1. Interpretation and diagnosis The results of these studies can be taken to suggest that patients with DOC can retain the capacity for voluntary brain activity, follow commands, execute high-level cognitive tasks and learn procedures that are believed to require awareness of the contingency. However, it needs to be confirmed that the activated regions could not be activated without any voluntary effort of the patient with DOC, i.e. that the activation could not have been wholly automatic and unconscious (Nachev & Husain, 2007). ‘‘Inferring volition, command following, mental effort, or even awareness from brain activation patterns remains hazardous without a strict demonstration that these patterns might not be exogenously triggered in an injured brain’’ (Goldman, 2010: 1860). More generally, while brain activity measures obtained can index processes such as long-range integration that are idiosyncratic of executive function (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), they cannot say much about phenomenal consciousness or the quality and specific content of subjective experience. In fact, it may be impossible to infer the presence and content of phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1998) – the qualia, the subjective experience that is not locked to specific behaviors. Our argument is that from an ethical point of view, a patient who shows obvious signs of higher cognitive functions (which can be determined empirically as argued here) should be counted as conscious even if the patient may not have phenomenal consciousness comparable to healthy subjects. When exploring tools to assess consciousness we’re not dealing with logical possibilities but with probabilities. Assigning consciousness to another agent is a probabilistic inference based on markers, which, as in any Bayesian form of inference, carry signals of different strength based on experience (priors) and the current data. As the capacity of brain–machine interface communication devices increases, this communication form should constitute a more reliable input to infer presence and should be considered equivalent to external behavioral evidence. Often, the cues to infer the state of the mind in another agent use the principle of translation: if x denotes consciousness (through language) and each time that the agent expresses x he/she expresses y, then y constitutes a physiological signature of this state and can be considered as a measure of the state denoted by x in agents which cannot express x. An example of this principle is to use trace conditioning learning (Bekinschtein, Peeters, Shalom, & Sigman, 2011) to denote consciousness in VS patients. Normal subjects only show this form of learning (y) when expressing a verbal consciousness of the contingency (x). Hence it is assumed that the expression of trace learning (y) in patients who cannot produce deliberate speech (and hence cannot produce x) is indicative of consciousness. Note that this argument may produce obvious errors as discussed in Bekinschtein et al. (2011): moving the wings may be indicative of a state of flying in hummingbirds but this does not mean that if an animal moves it wings it necessary flies. However, this translational signature constitutes in many cases the best resources we may have to assess mental states (including consciousness) on subjects that cannot produce a direct report. Similarly, when Julian Jaynes infers the form of consciousness in the history of culture, he is using text as a fossil of thought and introspection (Diuk, Slezak, Raskovsky, Sigman, & Cecchi, 2012; Jaynes, 2000). This inference of assigning the content of thought from imperfect data (because texts have been censured, degraded, changed through time and because even the simple act of writing is a form of filtering through words and text the content of the mind) can be seen in analogy with our current effort to assign a probability that another person is conscious from noisy data (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). These devices mediate communication when the content of language is preserved but the motor devices or even cerebral switches to make it effective are not functional. Measures, such as the trace conditioning learning, or spontaneous activation measured in fMRI can go beyond this providing markers and signature of consciousness that do not use (even by-passing the muscle) traditional linguistic schemes. Communication accordingly plays a key role in the confirmation process. 2.3.2. Communication Patients with DOC are unable to translate neuronal activity to external behavior, e.g. verbal communication. The studies above suggest: (a) A method by which externally noncommunicative patients can use their residual cognitive capabilities to communicate their thoughts and feelings to those around them by modulation of their own neural activity (Owen et al., 2006). (b) An ethical imperative to give a noncommunicative person the opportunity to reveal high-level mental activity, which in turn could indicate mental capacity (Goldman, 2010). From an ethical point of view, if a DOC patient shows obvious signs of higher cognitive functions (something that can be checked fairly reliably), then even if that does not justify the conclusion that the patient has phenomenal consciousness comparable to healthy subjects (something that is harder to check using brain imaging), the patient should still be counted as K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 891 being conscious. Moreover, if neurotechnology has opened the door to communication with previously noncommunicative patients, to the effect that the presence of consciousness has been confirmed that was previously excluded, the care provided for these patients needs to be substantially revised. 2.3.3. Care and therapeutic interventions The clinical implications of these studies are immense. The suggestion of awareness in a patient with DOC has radical effects on decisions concerning: (a) The type of care that should be provided. Self-evidently, awareness in a patient necessitates entirely different services, including continuous diagnoses. Even the possibility of awareness justifies continuous diagnoses and regular checks for signs of consciousness that without obvious behavioral signs would otherwise go unnoticed. In many hospitals, it is not current practice regularly to check consciousness in patients diagnosed with coma, or persistent vegetative state, once a certain time has elapsed, but the studies described above suggest a change of practice in this regard. (b) The benefit of therapeutic interventions. Assessment of cortical function may in the long run help to identify patients who may benefit from interventional treatment, e.g., deep-brain stimulation, DBS. DBS of the unspecific thalamocortical system through midline thalamic nuclei has been shown to have an alerting effect and increase the level of arousal defined by the ability to respond to the environment, as well as motor control in a patient who had been in a minimally conscious state for 6 years (Schiff et al., 2007). Whilst the results of this study were positive, it involved only one patient, and the authors did not consider it likely that the treatment would be useful also for patients in coma or in a persistent vegetative state. Nevertheless, if larger clinical trials confirm that DBS can be used to treat the minimally conscious state, it provides hope for a better prognosis for these patients. (c) Decisions of euthanasia. Awareness of imagery, of learning, and of others may imply a conscious perception of pain and suffering. If this should lead to induced death is an important and difficult question that consequently arises. (d) Given the wide public health dimensions of the problem of traumatic brain injuries, the possibilities that these studies suggest arguably present a humanitarian imperative to further investigate the state of consciousness of DOC patients (Schiff et al., 2005). The interpretation of fMRI and the relationship between cerebral activation and consciousness have spurred a number of controversies that are to date unresolved. The mentioned studies raise important questions about the level of awareness that patients with DOC can experience and how this can be measured. They challenge the validity of behavioral indexes for discerning levels of consciousness. They challenge the care that is presently being provided for these patients. However, even if the hypotheses that DOC patients can have conscious awareness and purposeful volition are supported by the evidence presented so far and accepted as an inference to the best explanation (Owen et al., 2007), further more detailed studies must be performed in order to determine the extent of awareness in DOC patients. For this to be successful, a close collaboration between philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, neurophysiology and brain imaging is essential (Sörös, 2010). It seems by all accounts clear that improved diagnostic clarity concerning consciousness disorders is called for. 3. Reading thoughts from brain activity in healthy individuals 3.1. Neurotechnological access to mental contents Neurotechnology is also used non-clinically to enter and read the contents of the human mind via its cerebral activities. As these technical possibilities advance, the question arises: how far do they permit us to enter other minds? There is a logical limit to this pursuit: the human mind has an essentially private sphere. An individual can in some sense and measure be known by others, but not completely. Subjectivity introduces an unknowable realm in the world of every individual, as impressions of another – and maybe of oneself – always pass through a filter of subjective interpretations. To live the experience of another is a logical impossibility. Individual experience cannot be completely shared by or conveyed to another individual. This means that individuals have a private room that cannot logically be violated. It should, however, be noted that the privacy thus entailed can still be extremely limited. We shall here focus the discussion of how far brain reading can enable mind reading on three research areas: decoding infant minds, intentions, and vision. 3.2. Decoding the infant mind from non-invasive measures of brain activity Every parent seeks to infer the states of an infant mind (desires, pains, thoughts, dreams) conducting informal experiments to explore these seemingly inaccessible states that cannot be expressed by formal symbolic communication. The formal exploration of the infant mind remained for a long time exclusive to philosophical inquiry and beyond empirical and scientific determination. Today, abstract philosophical conceptions develop in synergic construction with scientific knowledge, notably through an increasing neurotechnological capacity to gain a non-invasive access to the infant brain. However, there is a crucial difference between projects of brain imaging to investigate the minds of infants versus those 892 K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 of comatose patients. In both cases, brain measures can be used as a decoder to infer which aspects of the universe are observable in another’s mind that cannot be expressed verbally. In both cases, observation can be directed to known markers of certain thought processes (for instance, signatures of consciousness) to investigate by translation whether such processes may be instantiated in the other’s mind. The crucial difference is that, unlike comatose patients, babies’ body language, gaze, gestures, are a formidable communicative niche which expresses their knowledge about the world and which can be decoded with ingenious behavioral experiments of various kinds. Still, a part of infant thought may be intangible and remains completely introspective, encapsulated in the infant mind, unexpressed by any motor effector. This observation is important when assessing the capacity of brain imaging to gain access to infant minds that cannot be inferred from pure observation of behavior. 3.2.1. Infant phoneme discrimination Observations from brain imaging and behavior are complementary. Studies using paradigms of adaptation and behavioral responses to distracters have showed convincingly that infants can discriminate phonemes In fact phoneme discrimination extends to phonemes that are not used in their native language, an ability that regresses during the first year of life (Kuhl, Wiliams, Lacerda, Stevens, & Lindblom, 1992). This method, however, does not reveal how fast infants can detect phonetic changes, whether the brain mechanisms involved resemble those used in the adults, or the variability from trial to trial in responses which may provide an idea of the degree of fluctuations in perception of the infant mind. The first documentation of brain responses to phoneme discrimination was performed by Ghislaine and Stanislas Dehaene. They analyzed high-density recordings of event-related potentials in 3-month-old infants listening to syllables whose first consonants differed in place of articulation (Dehaene-Lambertz & Dehaene, 1994). They presented, on each trial, a sequence of five syllables (/ba/ or /ga/). In half the trials, one syllable was repeated five times. In the other half, the syllable was repeated only four times, followed by one instance of the other syllable. Any significant difference in event-related potentials (ERPs) to repeated and deviant trials indicated that the two syllables had been discriminated. The results revealed a component localized to the temporal lobes, which indexed phonological novelty in less than 400 ms. The results also revealed that following this component there was a relatively late (700–1100 ms) frontal response to novelty, reminiscent of a similar anterior negativity, which has been observed in response to unexpected visual and auditory stimuli. This suggests that, beyond phoneme discrimination, 3-month-old infants already possess a supramodal anterior network for novelty detection that can be activated in less than one second. These results go beyond an enumeration of infants’ abilities (i.e. phoneme discrimination), decomposing a complex capacity into a series of processing steps, whose duration and brain implementation can be estimated. Moreover, the dynamics and tentative localization provided by EEG is reminiscent of phoneme discrimination in adults. Further evidence of a network language instantiated in pre-verbal infants comes from fMRI studies, which can localize brain activation close to millimeter resolution (Dehaene-Lambertz, Dehaene, & Hertz-Pannier, 2002). While this is insufficient for deciphering the neural code, it provides sufficient evidence to understand the role of different cortices in the formation of a language network. A study of the brain activity evoked by normal and reversed speech in awake and sleeping 3month-old infants showed that the left-lateralized brain regions similar to those of adults, including the superior temporal and angular gyri, were already active in infants. Thus, precursors of adult cortical language areas are active in infants well before the onset of speech production. A subsequent study examined the functional organization of cerebral activity in 3-month-old infants when they were listening to short-sentences in their mother tongue (Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2006). fMRI was used to obtain the dynamics of brain activity which is typically of very poor temporal resolution (Sigman, Jobert, Lebihan, & Dehaene, 2007). The infant’s network of responsive regions was then parsed into functionally distinct regions based on their speed of activation and sensitivity to sentence repetition. As in the previous study, an adult-like structure of functional MRI response delays was observed along the superior temporal regions, suggesting a hierarchical processing scheme. The fastest responses were recorded in the vicinity of Heschl’s gyrus (the primary auditory cortex), whereas responses became increasingly slower toward the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus and toward the temporal poles and inferior frontal regions (Broca’s area). Activation in the Broca area increased when the sentence was repeated after a 14-s delay, suggesting the early involvement of Broca’s area in verbal memory. 3.2.2. Implications Broca’s area has been shown to be involved in tasks requiring language production. In fact it constitutes one of the most famous examples of brain function localization and lesions in the Broca area systematically result in a deficit on production (but not on comprehension) of oral language. The fact that Broca’s area is active in infants before the babbling stage has several consequences. First, it implies that activity in this region may drive, through interactions with the perceptual system, the learning of the complex motor sequences required for future speech production. Second, the observation of mirror neurons in the macaque ventral premotor cortex, (Kohler et al., 2002) a possible homologous to Broca’s area, has raised the hypothesis of a broader function of this region in action understanding and imitation (Heiser, Iacoboni, Maeda, Marcus, & Mazziotta, 2003). In view of these observations, activation of Broca area while 3-month infants listen to sentences suggests early common frame relating speech perception and production, possibly providing an early and covert training to the (future) speech pro- K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 893 duction apparatus. However, this extension seems impossible without a direct access to brain measures, unless Broca activity is expressed by very subtle transformation which may be a covert precursor of language. Pre-linguistic infants show brain activity that is consistent with a very rudimentary form of language. Parents naturally help and assist their infants on tasks, which they begin to accomplish, reaching, grasping, crawling, walking, etc. Gaining awareness of aspects of the newborn and the infant mind, such as language production, numerosity, objecthood, moral and social constructs, which remain silent and opaque to the external observer may change attitudes in parent care and improve and change policies in early informal education. 3.3. Reading hidden intentions When humans engage in goal-related activities, there is an increased activity in the prefrontal cortex. This increased level of activity could be a sign of a number of different things, such as motoric response preparation, (Haggard & Elmer, 1999) reflection on potential choices, or current intentions (Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006). In a recent study, subjects were given the choice between two tasks to perform: adding or subtracting two numbers, and asked to hold onto their intention during a variable period of delay during which fMRI measurements were taken (Haynes, 2007). The activity measured in the medial and lateral regions of prefrontal cortex allowed the researchers to identify which of the two tasks the subject was intending to perform. From the choice of answers it was possible to infer which task the subject had chosen. There was no explicit instruction or behavioral response prior to the onset of the response screen, subjects responded randomly and the arrangement of numbers on the screen was also random so as to exclude that any information decoded from brain activity during the delay period would be related to covert preparations of motor responses. Several regions were found to predict intentions to perform the addition or subtraction tasks. The most accurate (71%) was the medial prefrontal cortex, which did not register intention during task execution but only during the preparation delay. Reversely, a region more superior and posterior along the medial wall registered only during the execution of the chosen task. The medial prefrontal cortex showed the same overall level of activity for the two intentions suggesting that their neural difference is not in the global levels of activity but in the detailed spatial patterns of cortical responses. A conclusion drawn from the study was that hidden intentions and covert goals are represented by distributed patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex, and that in humans a network of brain regions including both lateral and medial prefrontal cortex contains task-specific representations (Haynes, 2007). Hidden intentions could accordingly be detected by reading these patterns of brain activity. A future research program is whether this binary decoding strategy can be extended to more realistic situations in which subjects opt amongst many possible, perhaps an unlimited number, of options and intentions. Moreover, the focus is entirely on conscious intentions. The next step would be to detect intentions before they reach the conscious level. The question then arises whether these increased difficulties are purely technical, or whether they reflect a fundamental problem. Is it even theoretically possible to read intentions without any limits on options, or outside the realm of conscious awareness? What would be a reason for thinking that it is, or isn’t, and how could this question be decided? The difference between a merely technical and a more fundamental difficulty is complex and dynamic; and it may be subject to change over time: what is considered a fundamental problem at one time might be conceived as a technical matter at another (or vice versa) as science and technology develop (Revonsuo, 2001a, 2001b; Revonsuo, 2006). If we had a device by which we could read the undetermined and perhaps unconscious intentions of others, we would truly be capable of advanced mind reading. Studies of visual responses are relevant to consider in that light. 3.4. Predicting visual responses to images and detecting unconscious vision 3.4.1. Predicting visual responses to images fMRI has been used to predict responses to images, and to decipher what image of a given set a person is looking at. The first studies decoded orientation (Haynes & Rees, 2005), position (Thirion et al., 2006), and object category (Cox & Savoy, 2003) from measuring activities in the visual cortex. These first studies showed that it is possible to infer and categorize simple features in the visual scene from patterns of brain activity evoked by different kinds of images. However, they typically used quite simple stimuli and a relatively small number of images to which the subject’s responses were already known. The next step was to use fMRI to predict responses to new images, where the responses were not previously established, which was done in a recent study (Kay, Naselaris, Prenger, & Gallant, 2008). In this study, a newly developed decoding method based on quantitative receptive field models that characterize the relationship between visual stimuli and fMRI activity in early visual areas succeeded in identifying with high accuracy which specific natural image an observer saw for an image chosen at random from 1000 distinct images. According to the authors, it may soon be possible to decode a person’s visual experience from brain activity alone (Gallant, 2008), which ‘‘prompts the thought that it may soon be possible to decode subjective perceptual experiences such as visual imagery and dreams, an idea previously restricted to the realm of science fiction.’’ (Editor’s summary, 2008) The possibility to interpret what a person is seeing without having to select from a set of known images theoretically requires better models and measurements of brain functions than are presently available, and the question again arises whether the difficulty is technical or fundamental. One aspect of this endeavor concerns the detection of unconscious responses to images. 894 K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 A new important study that was recently published made a significant step in this direction (Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, & Kamitani, 2013). Patterns of brain activity were examined during dreaming and compared to waking responses to visual stimuli. The findings suggest that the visual content of dreams is represented by the same neural substrate as observed during awake perception. A conclusion drawn by the authors is that specific visual experience during sleep is represented by brain activity patterns shared by stimulus perception, providing a means to uncover subjective contents of dreaming using objective neural measurement. 3.4.2. EEG cortically coupled computer vision for rapid image search: detecting unconscious vision The human brain is slow compared to a digital computer in which individual transistors can switch 106 times faster than neurons can spike. In contrast, the human visual system is superior to computers: we are far better at recognizing objects at a glance than any computer vision system. In other words, whereas the computer functions fast, it’s performance on object recognition is poor, whereas we excel at recognizing objects, say, faces, although it takes quite some time for us to do it. What if the two capacities could be combined? Can we use computers to optimize the use of available human visual processors for searching through large collections of imagery? Optimizing image throughput is an important problem in a number of disciplines, e.g. radiology or satellite reconnaissance. In the aim of coupling human vision with computer speed, a group of researchers have developed a real-time electroencephalography (EEG)-based brain–computer interface (BCI) system for triaging imagery presented using rapid serial visual presentation (Gerson, Parra, & Sajda, 2006) According to this study, a target image in a sequence of nontarget distractor images elicits in the EEC a stereotypical spatiotemporal response, which can be detected. Because the response is stereotypical, the computer can detect a subject’s recognition of a target image before the subject becomes aware of recognizing the target image. As illustration, we can imagine a BCI system operating with the aim of recognizing one specific face in a huge crowd; say, people passing through a major international airport. The subject is placed in a position to observe the faces of the people passing, and if the target face appears, the response will be read by the computer – possibly without the subject ever becoming aware of this act of recognition. A core question prompted by each of these studies is whether the difficulties that their further developments will encounter are of a purely technical nature, or whether they reflect fundamental problems. Is it only a matter of time and technical advances before the brain can reveal the mind’s innermost secrets, or are there limits in principle to that quest? The possibility of principled limitations and their distinction from technical limitations would need to be specifically motivated and spelled out. We have pointed out a logical limit with reference to Leibniz’ law, but with respect to scientific theory we do not assert any specific principled limitation to mind reading. The possibility of decoding a person’s subjective experience from brain activity alone theoretically requires not only better models and measurements of brain functions than are presently available, but also better models of mental contents and the many languages of thought. 4. Discussion 4.1. Stereotypical mind–brain relations In the studies described above, the focus is on thoughts (ideas, mental contents) with clear objects, such as a specific visual image, or a mathematical task, to which related processes are stereotypically activated in the brain, where the term ‘‘stereotypical’’ refers to constancy, or perpetuation without change. The thought (e.g., the intention, or recognition) is recognizable and identifiable via its cerebral process because of this stereotypical relationship. A thought eliciting a different cerebral process each time it occurs would presumably be illegible by neurotechnology. Not just for technical reasons but also on theoretical grounds: there could be no constant cerebral patterns to recognize it by. So, the assumption of some constancy, that we may label stereotypical, in the mind–brain relationship seems crucial to mind reading via brain measurements. The question arises: How much of our thinking is stereotypically related to specific brain processes? All of it, or can a distinction between diversely and stereotypically related mental events be drawn? If so, what distinguishes mental contents that are thus stereotypically related from those that are not? In addition to these theoretical challenges, the practical challenge for mind reading via brain reading will be to establish these structures of thought/brain-processes, which requires the thought and its process to be repeatable. In a strict, logical sense, each thought is unique by virtue of its distinction and can never recur. However, thoughts can be categorized as types, and a type of thought can have many distinct tokens, or occurrences. In philosophy, the type/token distinction separates the type as a concept and an abstract object from the token, which is the realization, or instantiation, or occurrence of the type. For example, the concept ‘‘cat’’ is a type of thought that can be instantiated, e.g., by a real cat becoming a focus of attention, or by the memory of a cat. We here use the terms types and tokens leaving open the tokens’ ontological categorization as, e.g., ‘‘abstract’’, ‘‘real’’, etc. Whilst distinct occurrences, as distinct, are all essentially unique, they will also, as tokens of the same type, have some relevant similarity between them permitting their identification as ‘‘that (type of) thought’’. In order words, the repeatability of a thought (having ‘‘the same’’ thought twice) is not a question of the occurrences being logically identical or indiscernible, but similar. Likewise, a repeated thought eliciting ‘‘the same’’ cerebral process elicits not identical or indiscernible but similar processes. Presumably, both the thoughts and the cerebral K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897 895 related processes must be relevantly similar i.e., similar in such a way as to allow the former to be legible via the latter. In other words: only if the cerebral processes related to the tokens of a given type of thought are relevantly similar can they theoretically permit identification of that thought. By this argument, we arrive at the following requirement for neurotechnological mind reading: In order for a thought to be neurotechnologically legible it must be stereotypically related to a cerebral process, of which each occurrence as such is relevantly similar to every other. In the process of reading the contents of an individual mind via its cerebral activities, a mind–brain profile can be developed. Communication is an essential element in this process, where neurotechnology offers methods to communicate without overt external behavior. The mind might become increasingly legible in proportion to this profile becoming increasingly detailed and sophisticated. This could have important clinical use, for example, as a means to refining a method of communication for behaviorally noncommunicative patients, as described above. The question arises, if mind–brain profiles can be developed for individuals, can they also be developed for groups? Are the neuronal structures sufficiently similar across individuals for communities of mind–brain profiles to be developed? If they are, how much can an individual profile help outline the profile for another individual? The replies to these questions depend on the extent and types of neuronal variability that individuals exhibit, and on their capacity for communication. Human beings are neuronally quite dissimilar, even in the case of monozygotic twins, which raises important questions concerning how (well) we are able to communicate (Evers, 2009; Evers, Kilander, & Lindau, 2007). The uniqueness of our individual brains, (our distinction) also poses a challenge for detailed brain reading. Interindividual brain variability is caused both by genetic variability and by idioyncrasies of epigenetic, experience dependent pruning processes. An object, say, a coffee cup will cause different patterns of activity in different brains and unless it is possible to establish an unambiguous relation between a particular cup and the corresponding activity pattern – which will not be possible in the majority of cases because of methodological limitations (one would have to explore and exclude a huge space of alternatives) – one would not be able to interpret the observed pattern. Because the global layout of networks is genetically specified and similar for brains of the same species it is possible to infer from non-invasive measurements which networks are active at a particular moment in time. If the visual areas are engaged one can assume that the subject is busy either with visual perceptual tasks or with visual imagery – and this holds for all sensory modalities. If the default network is active, it is likely that the subject is idling and concerned perhaps with introspection, if reward centers light up, one can assume that the subject either expects reward or has experienced rewarding conditions – and the same holds for aversive conditions. Often, however, one can only infer that the subject deals with emotionally loaded conditions because in most the limbic structures neurons responding in the context of aversive/rewarding conditions are intermingled and spatial resolution is too low to disentangle them. Deciphering the semantic content of the respective processes would presuppose that one has already scanned an individual brain and established correlations between the signatures of brain activity and a particular content. However, if with the aid of communication and neurotechnology, communities of mind–brain profiles could be developed grouping together features of relevant similarity, such as aspects of neurological disorders, this could have possible therapeutic benefits. 4.2. Conclusion: possibilities and limits The possibilities of neurotechnological mind-reading that we have today allow access to mental states without 1st person overt external behavior or speech. With the advancement of decoders of cerebral activity (and also of other non-cerebral markers of inner thought) it is very likely that in the near future we will see a rapid progression in the capacity to observe – without mediation of language – contents of the others’ mind. As discussed above, we might be able to efficiently use a subject’s cerebral cortex for rapid object recognition, even when the subject is not aware of having seen the recognized object. This may be extended as a great promise to the domain of dreams, to observe in real time the content of a visual narrative during sleep. We might be able to infer a myriad of simultaneous intentions whose deliberation process to reach explicit agency is not tangible even to the same subject. We might be able to use this technology in medical situations (most notably in VS patients) where this might be the only available tool to infer another person’s will. Certainly, applications in commercial setups to control objects (games, cars, airplanes) that are currently under massive development will become more frequent and effective. There is a logical limit to these pursuits, in that an individual cannot wholly share another’s experience without merging with it. Their distinction necessarily introduces a filter, an interpretation that individuates their respective points of view. In other words, by virtue of our distinction we have a private room that cannot logically be violated. The presence of this logical limit says nothing about the extension of our privacy, except that it isn’t null. It does not exclude that our unalienable privacy may be extremely small. Moreover, it does not entail that we need have privileged access to our on experiences: the fact that there is an essential incompleteness in any other person’s knowledge or experience of you does not mean that there is no, or less, incompleteness in your own self-understanding. To the contrary, we have suggested that a brain decoder may access more information about, say, the intention of a subject than that which may be simply accessed by introspection (Corallo et al., 2008, Marti et al., 2010). The specific benefits of neurotechnological mind reading for which we argue in this article are the following: 896 K. Evers, M. Sigman / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 887–897  For a person who suffers from behavioral incapacity for communication, the prospect of neurotechnological mind reading opens up promising vistas of developing alternative methods of communication.  The development of these techniques holds promises of important medical breakthroughs, notably improvements in the care and therapeutic interventions of patients with disorders of consciousness.  For those – parents, pediatrics, and others – interested in understanding the infant mind, the research opens promising vistas.  For radiology or satellite reconnaissance, notably, optimizing image throughput by coupling human vision with computer speed is a promising area of research.  For philosophy of mind and all sciences of mind, whether they are clinically orientated or not, the research into neurotechnological mind reading is exciting and appears theoretically promising. The development of mind reading can also be perilous, however, increasingly so if or when the techniques advance. There is, notably, a risk for misuse as a consequence of hypes, exaggerations, or misinterpretations, and a potential threat to privacy unknown in history. At present, the possibilities of neurotechnological mind reading are so rudimentary that the techniques pose threats to privacy mainly in the form of misuse, but this threat might expand and increase if the techniques are refined. In that context, the question arises: who is best placed to know what goes on in a person’s mind? Who is authorized to say? Does the 1st person have privileged access, or the one to perform/interpret the cerebral measurements? Already, a person’s unconscious recognition of an image can be detected. How far can that be taken? Today, at the present level of science and technology: not far. 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Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Review article The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis Todd E. Feinberg a,⇑, Jon Mallatt b a b Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai and Mount Sinai Beth Israel Medical Center, New York 10003, USA School of Biological Sciences, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4236, USA a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 7 April 2016 Accepted 20 May 2016 Keywords: Primary consciousness Neurobiological naturalism Explanatory gaps Hard problem Subjectivity Evolution a b s t r a c t While the philosophical puzzles about ‘‘life” that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the ‘‘mystery of consciousness” remains unsolved due to multiple ‘‘explanatory gaps” between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the ‘‘explanatory gaps” between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the ‘‘experiential gaps” between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Contents 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Introduction: What makes consciousness unique? The explanatory gap, the hard problem, and neurobiological naturalism. . 114 Multiple explanatory gaps exist, not one: the neuroontologically subjective features of consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Large anatomical diversity means the gaps cannot have a single explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Consciousness is so diverse that many biological features must characterize it: the general and special features. . . . . . . . . . . 117 The general and special features explain the subjective features of consciousness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 5.1. The transition to mental images: the general and special features and the ‘‘explanatory gaps” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 5.1.1. Mental images and the transition to referral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 5.1.2. Mental images and the transition to unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 5.1.3. Mental images and the transition to mental causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.1.4. Mental images and the transition to qualia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.2. Affective consciousness and the transitions to the subjective features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Auto-ontological and allo-ontological irreducibilities: the ‘‘experiential gaps” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Neurobiological naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: tfeinber@chpnet.org (T.E. Feinberg). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.009 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 114 T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 1. Introduction: What makes consciousness unique? The explanatory gap, the hard problem, and neurobiological naturalism In his book What Makes Biology Unique? evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr (2004) argues that while modern biology has disproved theories of vitalism – the idea that living organisms are animated by virtue of some fundamental force (vis vitalis) – nonetheless life is characterized by principles and functions that are in fact unique to biology among the sciences. Mayr cites among these unique features the great complexity of living systems, the refractoriness of biological systems to purely reductive approaches, the rampant emergence of novel features in biological systems, and the evolution of teleonomic (goaldirected) processes. However, despite life’s special and unique features, all its processes are explainable by natural principles: the heart is a pump; digestion is the physical and enzymatic breakdown of food; quadriplegia results from interrupted neural transmission through the upper spinal cord; ecosystems arise from the interactions of populations of living organisms with each other and the physical environment. The scientific basis life is not a conceptual mystery (Fry, 2000; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2015). Mayr concludes that while a full understanding of biology does not require the positing of novel physical forces beyond those already known to physics, it does require an analysis of natural features and principles that are unique to biological systems. Mayr’s view is now the accepted dogma in biology. But when it comes to consciousness studies, many scholars from different disciplines have proposed that there is something fundamentally ‘‘different” about the biology of consciousness when compared to other biological phenomena (Chalmers, 2010; Koch, 2012; Schrödinger, 1967; Sperry, 1977). These scientists and philosophers agree with Mayr that while biology in general and the non-conscious brain functions can in fact be wholly explained by the known laws of physics and chemistry, consciousness presents a mysterious ‘‘explanatory gap” (Levine, 1983) between the physical properties of the brain and the subjective experiences that the brain thereby creates. They claim that whenever one attempts to explain subjective experience in terms of physics, chemistry or even neurobiology, there is always something ‘‘left out” of the equation, and something more is needed beyond the unique biological principles enumerated by Mayr. David Chalmers (1995) relates the explanatory gap to the ‘‘hard problem of consciousness”, which is the problem of how and why conscious experiences exist. John Searle traces the gap to the mutual irreducibility of subjective and objective points of view. . . . consciousness has a first-person or subjective ontology and so cannot be reduced to anything that has third-person or objective ontology. If you try to reduce or eliminate one in favor of the other you leave something out . . . biological brains have a remarkable biological capacity to produce experiences, and these experiences only exist when they are felt by some human or animal agent. You can’t reduce these first-person subjective experiences to third-person phenomena for the same reason that you can’t reduce third-person phenomena to subjective experiences. You can neither reduce the neuron firings to the feelings nor the feelings to the neuron firings, because in each case you would leave out the objectivity or subjectivity that is in question. [Searle, 1997, p. 212] Most problematically, the discontinuity is such that it seems unbridgeable when compared to the seamless unification of biology with the physical sciences. The challenge for a science of consciousness is to bridge or close the gap with a natural explanation. To address this problem, we have formulated a theory called neurobiological naturalism. It was inspired by the earlier theory of biological naturalism, which Searle (1984, 2007) presented as a philosophical solution to the mind-body or mind-brain problem. Biological naturalism stated that mental phenomena are strictly biological, ‘‘caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.” While we agree with Searle that consciousness arises exclusively through biological principles, we felt that more must be said about the special nature of consciousness in the natural world, so we extended the theory to include the neurobiological features that only consciousness has (Feinberg, 2012; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). Our theory of neurobiological naturalism is based on three tenets. First, in using natural science to solve the mind-brain problem one must begin with the biological features described by Mayr and others. Second, while consciousness is built upon the features shared by all life, it also depends on additional special neurobiological features. Third, because consciousness is so complex and multifaceted, a complete theory of consciousness that closes the explanatory gaps must use multiple approaches that integrate philosophical, neurobiological, and evolutionary principles. By using these principles, a natural elucidation of consciousness, the subjective mind, and the hard problem is possible. 2. Multiple explanatory gaps exist, not one: the neuroontologically subjective features of consciousness We focus on the most basic kind of consciousness rather than on higher kinds of awareness. That is, we seek the neurological basis and evolutionary origins of phenomenal consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006, 2010), which is also called primary consciousness (Edelman, 1989) or subjectivity (Feinberg, 2012; Metzinger, 2003; Nagel, 1989; Searle, 1992, 1997; Tye, 2000; Velmans, 2000). As defined by Revonsuo: T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 115 Table 1 The neuroontologically subjective features of consciousness (NSFC). Adapted from Feinberg (2012). 1. Referrala 2. Mental unityb 3. Mental causationc 4. Qualiad Conscious experiences are about (referred to) the outer world, the body, or affective states, but are not referred to the neurons that produce the experiences Consciousness is unified and bound into a relatively unified field of awareness in contrast to the divisible set of individual neurons that create it How the subjective mind can have causal influence on behavioral actions, the material body, and the outside world Qualities, the subjectively experienced attributes such as colors, pains, sounds, etc. a Referral: Brain (1951), Feinberg (2012), Sherrington (1947), Velmans (2000), Velmans and Schneider (2007). Mental unity: Baars (1988), Baars et al. (2013), Bayne (2010), Bayne and Chalmers (2003), Dennett (1991), Edelman (2004), Feinberg (2012), Meehl (1966), Metzinger (2003), Sellars (1963), Teller (1992). c Mental causation: Dardis (2008), Davidson (1980), Heil and Mele (1993), Kim (1998), Popper and Eccles (1997), Walter and Heckmann (2003). d Qualia: Chalmers (1995, 1996), Churchland (1985), Churchland and Churchland (1981), Crick and Koch (2003), Dennett (1991), Edelman (1989), Jackson (1982), Kirk (1994), Levine (1983), Metzinger (2003), Revonsuo (2006, 2010), Searle (1992, 1997), Tye (2000). Edelman (2004) also considers the specific memories of such attributes to be qualia. b Phenomenal consciousness is the current presence of subjective experiences, or the having of subjective experiences. An organism possesses phenomenal consciousness if there is any type of subjective experience currently present for it. The mere occurrence or presence of any experience is the necessary and minimally sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness. [Revonsuo, 2006, p. 37] It is the ‘‘gap” between the phenomenal or primary consciousness and the brain that we seek to close. But rather than there being a single gap, philosophers and scientists have actually identified multiple explanatory gaps between subjective experience and the material brain. We (Feinberg, 2012; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a, 2016b, chap. 1) have grouped these into four neuroontologically subjective features of consciousness (NSFC): referral, mental unity, mental causation, and qualia. All these gaps must be closed or scientifically bridged if we are to understand the nature of consciousness. The NSFC are summarized and referenced in Table 1. Referral means sensory experiences are perceived, never as if in the brain where they are constructed but as if in the outside world (from stimuli received by exteroceptors on the body surface), or inside the body (from stimuli received by interoceptors), or as an affective state of positive or negative feeling that involves the whole self. The experiential gap here is between the brain where sensation is actually created and to where the brain refers that experience. In mental unity the gap is between the divisible, discontinuous brain that consists of individual neurons and the unified, continuous field of awareness. This has been called the ‘‘grain problem” meaning that the divisible ‘‘grain” of the neurons of the brain is far coarser than the apparently seamless ‘‘grain” of subjective experience (Meehl, 1966; Sellars, 1963; Teller, 1992). Mental causation is the puzzle of how the subjective, seemingly immaterial mind can cause physical effects in the material world, including the physical body. Qualia are subjectively experienced qualities, both sensed traits (textures, smells, patterns of light) and affective states. Explaining qualia scientifically is the classical hard problem, the particular explanatory gap that has received the most attention. 3. Large anatomical diversity means the gaps cannot have a single explanation If it were possible to identify a single or even a few physical features of conscious brains that could explain all four explanatory gaps, that could provide a biological solution to the puzzles of consciousness. However, to complicate matters greatly, our analysis of the neural basis of consciousness both within and across species reveals extensive diversity in the brain architectures that create subjective experience (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). The first illustration of this diversity is that the three different aspects of consciousness – exteroceptive, interoceptive, and affective – are associated with different brain regions and varied brain architectures (Fig. 1). For example, although some researchers who focus on humans and other mammals claim that all three aspects stem exclusively from the cerebral cortex and the thalamus (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Berlin, 2013; Craig, 2010; Koch, Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016), there is mounting evidence that affects arise subcortically in vertebrates (Aleman & Merker, 2014; Damasio, Damasio, & Tranel, 2012; Fabbro, Aglioti, Bergamasco, Clarici, & Panksepp, 2015; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a; Merker, 2007; O’Connell & Hofmann, 2011; Panksepp, 1998, 2011; Panksepp & Panksepp, 2013). Further, the circuits for the exteroceptive and affective aspects are organized differently. That is, the neural pathways of exteroceptive consciousness are physically organized into point-by-point representations of the outer world or of the receptor fields in the body and brain, in a topographic arrangement called ‘‘isomorphic mapping” (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; Kaas, 1997; Risi & Stanley, 2014), but the brain structures involved in affective consciousness do not require isomorphic organization (Fig. 7.1 in Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). The second example of conscious diversity in mammalian (including human) brains is that the conscious pathway for smell differs from the pathways for the other senses. That is, only the smell pathway lacks a mandatory relay through the thalamus, while corticothalamic paths are held to be vital for consciously perceiving the other senses (vision, hearing, touch, etc.) (Gottfried, 2010; Shepherd, 2007). Smell has a minor thalamic path to the brain (Mori, Manabe, Narikiyo, & Onisawa, 2013), but this not essential for olfactory consciousness so the stated difference remains. 116 T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 Fig. 1. How diverse structures in the vertebrate (mammalian) brain contribute to three different aspects of consciousness: exteroceptive, interoceptive, and affective. Large brain regions are represented by the two rectangular boxes. Notice that exteroceptive images (such as consciously seeing a flower) arise from mostly different brain regions than do affective feelings (such as liking or disliking the flower). Adapted from Feinberg and Mallatt (2016a). Third is the case of birds differing from mammals. The behavioral evidence for consciousness existing in birds is as strong as it is for mammals in general (and many authorities now accept that cats, dogs, and horses are conscious) (Århem, Lindahl, Manger, & Butler, 2008; Boly et al., 2013; Butler, 2008; Butler, Manger, Lindahl, & Århem, 2005; Lefebvre, Nicolakakis, & Boire, 2002; Pepperberg, 2009). Yet birds’ cerebral areas for consciousness differ considerably from those of mammals in structure and relative location. For example, the primary visual area is much farther forward in the bird cerebrum than in mammals. The differences are so substantial that only recently have enough commonalities been found to allow comparisons (Dugas-Ford, Rowell, & Ragsdale, 2012; Jarvis et al., 2013; Karten, 2013). Birds and mammals have experienced a lot of independent evolution in these cerebral structures since diverging from a common reptile-like ancestor a third of a billion years ago. This shows diversification of the brain structures responsible for consciousness. As a fourth example of diversity, the brain regions for exteroceptive consciousness seem to differ in different groups of vertebrates. Fish and amphibians (‘‘anamniotes”) differ from mammals and birds in lacking topographically organized sensory maps of the world in their small cerebrums. That is, anamniotes lack the maps that have been associated with conscious images in the cerebral cortex of mammals (see above). Most workers say that a large cerebral cortex (or the bird homologue) is required for consciousness (Boly et al., 2013; Butler, 2008; Edelman, Baars, & Seth, 2005; Edelman & Seth, 2009; Ribary, 2005; Rose et al., 2014; Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005), and would take the lack of cerebral sensory maps as evidence that anamniotes are not conscious. However, fish and amphibians do have such topographical maps in their subcortical midbrain, or optic tectum (Fig. 2). To us, this is evidence of tectal consciousness in lower vertebrates. Our reasoning is that these tectal maps would have no purpose unless used to produce images, to which fish and amphibians can refer for accurate behavioral interactions with their environment. Indeed, many workers who study the optic tectum use the terms of consciousness to describe its function in anamniotes: ‘‘perception,” ‘‘recognition,” (Dicke & Roth, 2009), and ‘‘object identification and location” (Wullimann & Vernier, 2009). Sensory consciousness in the anamniotes is consistent with their elaborated sensory organs (eyes that are more acute than those of most mammals, hearing ears, a lateral line, olfactory organs, many electroreceptors and mechanoreceptors). Consciousness is also consistent with the alert attention that fish pay to the abundant sensory stimuli they encounter, along with the complex behaviors they perform in response to the stimuli (Abbott, 2015; Bshary & Grutter, 2006; Griffin, 2001; Hotta et al., 2015; Kardong, 2012; Vindas et al., 2014). Our reasoning and evidence say that the cortex-based consciousness of mammals and birds differs from the predominantly tectum-based consciousness of fish and amphibians. That is diversity. T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 117 Fig. 2. Two different brain regions for conscious images among the vertebrates. (A) Cerebral cortex of a mammal (human). (B) Optic tectum of a fish. Fifth, though least certain, some invertebrates may be conscious. After assembling a set of criteria for identifying consciousness in the vertebrates (Tables 2 and 3), we applied them to various invertebrates (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). The nearest relatives of vertebrates, the invertebrate sea squirts and lancelets (amphioxus), have comparatively simple brains and neural circuits (Lacalli, 2008, 2016; Lacalli & Holland, 1998), so they failed our test. By contrast, arthropods (mainly insects and crabs) and cephalopod molluscs (mainly octopuses) met most of the criteria, including multiple, complex sensory organs and highly organized sensory pathways to the brain, behavioral preferences indicating remembered likes and dislikes, and more. For arthropods, the small sizes of their brains throw doubt on whether they could be conscious, and although the large-brained cephalopods exceed most of the requirements for which they have been tested, they have not been studied enough. Still, we have uncovered some evidence for arthropod and cephalopod consciousness. Because arthropods, vertebrates, and cephalopods are only distantly related, this would suggest the greatest diversity of all. Other investigators have likewise suggested early origins and some invertebrate consciousness, for reasons other than ours (Barron & Klein, 2016; Cabanac, 1996; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010a, 2010b, 2015; Huber, Panksepp, Nathaniel, Alcaro, & Panksepp, 2011; Packard & Delafield-Butt, 2014). In summary, the striking diversity among the neural architectures indicates that there is not a single emergent process that can explain all aspects of primary consciousness, the ‘‘explanatory gaps,” and the ‘‘hard problem.” Thus, past studies of consciousness may have focused too much on single, dominant causes, such as the reciprocal corticothalamic interactions mentioned above, or primary drives from the core of the brain (Denton, 2006), or motor actions and rhythms (Llinás, 2002; Merker, 2007). Instead, there are many different ‘‘emergences” that contribute to subjectivity. Based on these considerations, we next look for the common factors among the diverse neural architectures (both within and across species) that have primary consciousness. 4. Consciousness is so diverse that many biological features must characterize it: the general and special features While the law of parsimony dictates that the simplest answer (i.e., with the fewest variables) is usually the best, it can lead to overly simplistic explanations when a process is multi-factorial in origin. In such cases more elaborate theories are better, and in the end are more parsimonious because only they explain all the observations. By scrutinizing the many diverse anatomies that produce consciousness, we found features shared by all (Tables 2 and 3). These features are either observable structures or known natural processes. They indicate that consciousness is always created in hierarchical levels in complex systems, and all the levels are necessary. Here is a preliminary summary of the features in the tables: starting with the basic hierarchical systems of life, neurons were added and evolved into increasingly complex neural hierarchies. Most basic are the general biological features that apply to all living organisms, even those without nervous systems (Table 2). These features were the first to evolve and they laid the foundations for life and consciousness. The second level 118 T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 Table 2 The defining features of consciousness, Levels 1 and 2: General biological features and reflexes. First level: General biological features, which apply to all living things 1. Life, embodiment, and process 2. System and self-organization 3. Hierarchy, emergence, and constraint 4. Teleonomy and adaptation Life: use of energy to sustain self, responsiveness, reproduction, adaptiveness. All known life is cellular Embodiment: body with interior separate from the exterior. Has a boundary, such as a cell membrane or skin Processes: Life functions are processes not material things System: Entity considered as a whole, in which arrangements and interactions between the parts are important Self-organization: Interactions of the parts organize the patterns at global level of the whole Hierarchy: Complex system with different interacting levels, organized from simpler to more complex: e.g., macromolecules to cells to organs to the organism. New, more elaborate features emerge at each higher level. Higher levels constrain lower levels for integration of the parts Teleonomy: Biological structures perform programed, goal-directed functions Adaptation: A teleonomic structure or function as evolved by natural selection Second level: Reflexes, which apply to all animals with nervous systems 1. Rates and connectivity Fast rates: Reflexes are fast, automatic responses to stimuli. Neural communication is rapid Connectivity: Simple reflex arcs are chains of several neurons connected at synapses. More complex arcs have more neurons in the chain (C) and in networks (N); they also have more neuronal interactions (I) and process more information (P). Further increase in CNIP was the royal road to complex nervous systems and consciousness 2. Advanced examples include basic motor programs from central pattern generators (but still not conscious) Table 3 The defining features of consciousness, Level 3: Special neurobiological features. Third level: Special neurobiological features, which apply to animals with sensory consciousness 1. Elaborate sensory organsa 2. Complex neural hierarchies 3. Neural hierarchies create unique neural-neural interactions 4. Multisensory convergencea 5. Neural hierarchies create isomorphic representations and mental images, and/or affective statese 6. Unique combination of nested and non-nested hierarchical functions 7. Attention 8. Memory Image-forming eyes, multiple mechanoreceptors, olfactory and taste chemoreceptors. Plus high locomotory mobility, to travel and gather the sensory information Overall neural complexity: A brain, many neurons,b many neuronal subtypes Hierarchy complexity: For example, at least four successive levels of neurons before premotor centers in the conscious sensory pathways of humanc Interactions: Extensive reciprocal (reentrant, recurrent) communication within and between the hierarchies for the different senses Synchronized communication by gamma-frequency oscillations may be required, or else an ‘‘activated EEG”d Pathways of the different senses converge in the brain: allows unification of the senses into a single experience Isomorphic representations: neurons arranged in topographic maps of the world or body structures Affective statese: Involve affect-associated neurotransmitters or neuromodulators such as dopamine and serotonin Nested function is the assembling of conscious unity by progressively unifying the sensory precepts Non-nested features include: some top-down control by higher brain; the physically separate parts of the conscious neurohierarchy; and topical convergence on grandmother neurons in mammals Selective attention mechanisms in brain: for directing consciousness to salient objects in the environment. Related feature of arousal is also present Memory regions in brain: needed for temporal continuity of experience, for providing learned reference-templates by which newly sensed objects can be recognized, etc. a Actually, our theory says that vision and visual consciousness evolved first, but this was consequently followed by elaboration of the other senses for olfactory, mechanosensory, electrosensory, taste, and auditory consciousness (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016a). These followed so quickly as to be effectively simultaneous with vision. b Our rough guess here is that 20,000 neurons is not enough for consciousness (amount in gastropod Aplysia), but 10,000,000 neurons may be enough (amount in zebrafish): Table 9.2 in Feinberg and Mallatt (2016a). c Based on the number of levels in humans, to and including the primary sensory cerebral cortex. This marker is rough, because it does not consider the extensive neural interactions within the levels. d See Koch et al. (2016). e Non-structural, behavioral markers of affective consciousness are: operant conditioning based on learned positive and negative valences, behavioral trade-off between choices of different valence, frustration behavior, self-delivery of rewards, and conditioned place preference: Chapter 8 in Feinberg and Mallatt (2016a). T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 119 is reflexes that occur in animals that have the general biological features plus the added dimensions that nervous systems bring to an animal’s life. But reflexes operate without creating sensory consciousness. Finally, only systems with consciousness possess the special neurobiological features (Table 3), which evolved through the elaboration of reflexes into neurohierarchies with more neurons, more levels, and more interactions between the neurons and levels (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a; see also Cornelis & Coop, 2014, and Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010b). Although consciousness always evolved step by step just like any other emergent biological process, the special features – in association with the general features and reflexes – provided the advanced and unique properties that make primary consciousness possible. 5. The general and special features explain the subjective features of consciousness The fossil record shows that the first, bacteria-like, life (with general features) evolved about 3.5 billion years ago, and the first multicellular animals that had nervous systems and reflexes arose around 580 million years ago. Then, according to our theory, with the appearance of the special features, consciousness was created in the earliest fishes (and perhaps the first arthropods), which evolved in the Cambrian Period about 540–520 million years ago (Buatois, Narbonne, Mángano, Carmona, & Myrow, 2014; Erwin & Valentine, 2013; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013, 2016a; Schopf & Kudryavtsev, 2012). Thus, we propose that critical to the nature and origin of consciousness is that with the addition of the special features to the general features, there occurred a transition from reflexes to conscious mental images and affects, and it was at that point that subjectivity, the philosophical ‘‘explanatory gaps,” and the hard problem were all naturally created (Fig. 3). In the following sections we explain how this occurred. 5.1. The transition to mental images: the general and special features and the ‘‘explanatory gaps” We first consider how sensory mental images evolved and created ‘‘explanatory gaps” and along with them some aspects of the hard problem. We use the term ‘‘mental images” in the context of primary consciousness, to mean consciously experienced mental representations of things in the world or in the subject’s body as these things are being sensed (Edelman, 1992). We do not use ‘‘images” to mean the capacity for imagining scenes in the absence of sensory information (Shepard, 1978). We know that basal forms of sensory responsiveness were reflexive and innate, and they characterized the early, nonconscious bilaterian animals such as ancestral worms. These reflexes can be fully described in an objective way and do not entail any ‘‘gaps” in their biological explanation. But when the increasing brain complexity and the evolution of the special features first turned reflexive processing into ‘‘mental images” before 520 million years ago, many aspects of Fig. 3. The nested hierarchy of the general and special objective features explains the subjective features of consciousness (namely the four NSFCs, Referral, Unity, Causation, and Qualia). The ‘‘Special Features of Consciousness” are present in all vertebrates (and arguably in arthropods and cephalopods). The ‘‘General Features of Life” were retained when consciousness evolved. 120 T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 ontological subjectivity were created. This is because mental images are referred, unified, mentally causal, and possess qualia (Table 1) – and thus images are one aspect of primary consciousness that entails all four explanatory gaps that characterize subjectivity. In the first vertebrates, these sensory images were enabled by a great expansion of the senses for detecting things at a distance: detailed vision, hearing, olfaction, electroreception, and advanced mechanoreception using the lateral line of fish. Accompanying this sensory expansion was the evolution of special embryonic tissues named neural crest and ectodermal placodes, which develop into most of the receptors and sensory neurons for the distance senses of vertebrates (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a, chap. 5; Schlosser, 2014). These same kinds of distance senses arose in the first arthropods and cephalopods (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a, chap. 9; Mather, 2012; Strausfeld, 2013). Taking all this varied sensory information, then organizing it, sharpening it, attending to it, recording it (in memory), and joining it into a detailed image – that is what drove the evolution of the special neurobiological features, with their complex neuroprocessing hierarchies (Table 3). The next question is how did the construction of mental images create the specific explanatory gap for each of the NSFC, referral, unity, causation and qualia. 5.1.1. Mental images and the transition to referral Despite the vital contribution of the special features to consciousness, the general features remain operative and were critical to the creation of each NSFC (Fig. 3). Referral, for example, is a teleonomic system feature of an embodied animal (Table 2, First Level). The eye-blink reflex automatically protects the cornea from abrasive dust in the same way that a noxious pin-prick can still activate reflexive withdrawal in coma patient, or an earthworm uses its withdrawal reflex to retreat into the safety of its burrow when sensing vibrations from a predator in the external environment. In these primitive and non-conscious reflexes, the world-versus-organism and internal-versus-external relationships are already established, thus setting the stage for the later evolution of referred mental images. With these reflexes serving as the neural scaffolding upon which referral is based, the addition of the special neurobiological features including elaborate sensory organs, complex neural hierarchies, and nested and non-nested sensory functions, led to the creation of the higher-order, differentiated, mental images that simulated the world and body but were not about the brain itself (Feinberg, 2000, 2012; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013, 2016a, 2016b, chap. 1, 2016c, chap. 2; Table 3). Thus, referral away from the brain is a multisource process based on both the general and special features, the latter having been added to the former. The transition was uninterrupted due to the continuous evolutionary increase in neurohierarchical complexity. 5.1.2. Mental images and the transition to unity Mental unity, like referral, is determined by the general and special features. A general feature of unity is that it is a process, as is life, and not a material thing that can be assigned to any one location. In other words, there is no single place where consciousness is physically unified (Dennett, 1991). That is, the many brain regions that contribute to mental unity are spread out in space, as exemplified by the different sensory pathways for the different senses and by the various brain-centers of multisensory convergence; and consciousness itself results from processes performed by these widespread neurons (James, 1904). And as was the case with the evolution of referral, the creation of subjective mental unity occurred in the Cambrian at the critical transition between the general biological and special neurobiological features. As noted above, the special feature of complex neural hierarchies constructs mapped representations of different environmental objects from multiple types of sensory input and joins all these percepts into a unified conscious image. Consciousness arose as unified because using fragmented sensory maps to guide one’s behavior would be inefficient or lethal. The feature of neurohierarchy is important to unity for another reason as well: constraint imposed by higher brain centers upon lower levels of the neurohierarchy allows the unification and nestedness of sensory systems (Feinberg, 2011). Conscious unity may be assigned to neurobiological causes. Synchronized oscillatory patterns of spiking activity in the gamma frequency range occur across complex, intercommunicating networks of neurons, and these oscillations may contribute to unity by binding different percepts and different sensory modalities together (Zmigrod & Hommel, 2013). Such oscillations have been tied to many other aspects of consciousness as well, although they are much better studied in mammals than in more basally arising vertebrates like fishes (mammals: Buzsáki, 2006; Cabral-Calderin, Schmidt-Samoa, & Wilke, 2015; Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Melloni et al., 2007; Northoff, 2013a, 2013b; Uhlhaas et al., 2009; fishes and amphibians: Bullock, 2002; Caudill, Eggebrecht, Gruberg, & Wessel, 2010; Northmore & Gallagher, 2003). Recently, doubt has been thrown on all this because the gamma oscillations seem to be absent in certain conscious states in humans; however, a similar phenomenon of integrated, low-voltage, fast waves (‘‘activated EEG”) remains a consistent marker of consciousness (Koch et al., 2016). As was the case with referral, we now see how the philosophical, neurobiological, and evolutionary points of view can be reconciled and integrated to explain mental unity. Due to the evolution and neurobiology of the special neurobiological features, mental unity – another ‘‘gap” between the brain and subjective consciousness (the hard problem) – was created. But, most importantly for the hard problem, this occurred without the addition of any new ‘‘mysterious” or ‘‘fundamental” processes. T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 121 5.1.3. Mental images and the transition to mental causation Mental causation, in which subjective consciousness with mental images can ‘‘mysteriously” affect the ‘‘material world,” entails every general and special feature enumerated in Tables 2 and 3. Among the general features that produce mental causation, embodiment is especially noteworthy. An individual brain is only capable of subjectively acting upon motor neural pathways that are embodied within that brain. I have no ability to directly control your actions through my thoughts, or vice versa. The general feature of self-organization also relates closely to mental causation because every living organism carries out programmed, teleonomic, goal-directed processes within the self-organization feature (Mayr, 2004) – and mental causation is certainly goal-directed. The groundwork for mental causation was laid by the non-conscious reflexive stage that we have modeled as a simple worm, because even reflexes are behaviors that affect the surroundings. We can readily see how philosophical, neurobiological, and evolutionary features together explain the history of mental causation. Starting with an embodied organism (worm) that reflexively interacted with its environment to carry out its goaldirected survival processes, the subsequent addition of elaborate, non-reflexive, neural hierarchies led to complex and context-dependent behaviors. This was because the brain’s new, mapped, images of the environment guided the behavioral actions to the right location and because the newly evolved affective feelings (see below) motivated and directed the behaviors toward ‘‘positive” and away from ‘‘negative” stimuli. This transition opened a seeming ‘‘gap” between subjective experience and drive, on the one hand, and the objective world that was affected by the behaviors, on the other. But, once again, there is nothing philosophically ‘‘mysterious” about this process when viewed within the evolutionary context and the general biological and special neurobiological features. 5.1.4. Mental images and the transition to qualia Exteroceptive and interoceptive qualia arise when the brain represents sensory information from the subject’s environment or body. As with the other three NSFC, the key factors are the combination of the general and special features, with qualia arising when the special features appeared. The general feature of adaptation is paramount for explaining qualia because qualia act to distinguish among a wide range of sensory stimuli, as is needed for survival. To mate successfully and leave offspring, a female fish must be able to distinguish a brightly colored male from another, dully hued female. We propose that the first qualia were relatively simple, perhaps the crudest sensory assemblages that could form any image. Then, the qualia rapidly evolved more discriminations among viewed features (edges, shapes, shades, colors, depths, movements), among different odors, tastes, and mechanical stimuli. This increasing richness would have occurred during the explosive evolution of the distance senses in the Cambrian Period (see above). A strength of this proposal is that once the ability to make any conscious discriminations evolved – any at all – they could become increasingly fine-grained simply by adding more processing neurons to the existing neural hierarchies. The first, simple qualia evolved into millions of subtly differentiated qualia by a natural process not much more difficult than mathematical addition. The increasingly refined sensory discriminations provided survival benefits for finding food items and mates, avoiding predators, detecting dangers, and these benefits would apply in many different habitats and adaptive situations. Qualia overlap the other three NSFC, so we have already explained much of this phenomenon and its natural, physical, and evolutionary origin. Thus, a subjective mental image is qualia assembled into a unified scene that refers to the outer world or body and guides behaviors and creates mental causation (for references, see Table 1). Logically, this means that because the mental images stem from complex sensory hierarchies, isomorphic maps, and hierarchical nestedness, so do the qualia. And, as we have just reviewed, both referral and unity are system features of embodied brains. In this respect qualia are no different. So if one asks ‘‘why should there be qualia at all?” as Chalmers wonders (1995, 1996) we could answer ‘‘because they are highly adaptive.” But from a broader perspective, we could say there are multiple parts to the answer: Qualia are another unique consequence of the multiple general and special neurobiological features of complex nervous systems. Finally, consider another aspect of consciousness that Chalmers called the character of experience. This is the perplexing question of why ‘‘red” subjectively feels exactly and uniquely the way red does. Or, why does the activation of the auditory pathway lead to subjectively heard sounds? Isn’t that beyond scientific explanation? Chalmers states this problem of the character of experience as: . . . why do individual experiences have their particular nature? When I open my eyes and look around my office, why do I have this sort of experience? At a more basic level, why is seeing red like this, rather than like that! It seems conceivable that when looking at red things, one might have had the sort of color experiences that one in fact has when looking at blue things. Why is the experience one way rather than the other? Why, for that matter, do we experience the reddish sensation that we do, rather than some entirely different sensation, like the sound of a trumpet? [Chalmers, 1996, p. 5] Again, we reply that the reason this problem is so ‘‘hard” is because it requires a multi-disciplinary answer that combines the neurobiological, neuroevolutionary, and neurophilosophical domains. If you ask, ‘‘why does red subjectively feel ‘‘red” and not as the note C sharp,” we first give the neurobiological answer that the neural pathways of color processing and those of sound processing are quite different, so they shouldn’t and indeed couldn’t feel the same. We can measure different people to tell whether red-coding neurons (light at 570 nm) ever get crossed with blue-coding neurons (light at 440 nm) or with auditory-path neurons, and can show that they seldom or never do so. Second, we would point out from an evolutionary perspective that color and sound stimuli usually signify different things, so there is strong selection pressure for a response 122 T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 to a sound to be appropriate to the sound, rather than to an irrelevant color. Third, to answer ‘‘Why is it subjective?” we offer the philosophical solution that arises from systems and hierarchy theory (Fig. 3), as well as our philosophical analysis of the subjective/objective divide discussed below in Section 6. 5.2. Affective consciousness and the transitions to the subjective features While sensory mental images can be neutral, the feelings of affective consciousness always have a valence – the aversiveness (negativity) or the attractiveness (positivity) of the stimulus or event. The most basal affects are the capacity to have experiences of a negative (noxious) or positive (pleasurable) valence. As mentioned, affects do not have the map-like isomorphism that characterizes mental images. Without isomorphism to use as a marker, it is much more difficult for us to date and model the evolution of affects than of mental images, and to determine which living animals have affects. Therefore, the evolution of affects must be reasoned out step by step as follows. Investigators who study the relatively simple behaviors and nervous systems of sea slugs and other gastropod molluscs have identified a core circuit for affects (Gillette & Brown, 2015; Hirayama, Catanho, Brown, & Gillette, 2012; Hirayama & Gillette, 2012). They call this a sensory integrator circuit for incentives (Gillette & Brown, 2015), and it associates with neuronal ‘central pattern generators’ that control rhythmic movements and survival behaviors. The integrator circuit labels the sensory input it receives as either rewarding (+) or aversive ( ) then it codes the motivations that dictate approach (+) versus avoidance ( ) behaviors. It also potentiates memories of the salient stimuli, for associative learning. In gastropods, this incentive circuit is very simple, and may have too few neurons to produce true, affective, experiences in these invertebrates. Yet in all the vertebrates the corresponding set of structures is enormously complex, including parts of the brain’s mesencephalon, diencephalon, and telencephalon: specific parts are the ventral tegmental area or posterior tubercular nucleus, laterodorsal tegmental nucleus, habenula, amygdala, ventral striatum, and more (Butler & Hodos, 2005; O’Connell & Hofmann, 2011; Ryczko & Dubuc, 2013; Ryczko et al., 2013; Stephenson-Jones, Flores, Robertson, & Grillner, 2012). We have concluded that in fishes these brain structures are similar enough to those in humans to indicate all vertebrates have affective consciousness (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a, chap. 8). These affective brain structures are at the top of complex neurohierarchies that have all the general and special features of consciousness listed in Tables 2 and 3. For example, affective neural circuits require the general features of an embodied brain, and they perform teleonomic processes that aid survival. Furthermore, they participate in the special features of arousal and forming memories. Affects in vertebrates also seem to depend on specific neurotransmitter and neuromodulatory molecules such as brain-generated dopamine and serotonin (Barron, Søvik, & Cornish, 2010; Gillette & Brown, 2015; Hikosaka, 2010; Naderi, Jamwal, Chivers, & Niyogi, 2016; Remage-Healey, 2014; Waddell, 2013), and these neurochemicals are present in all vertebrates, fish and lampreys. Behavioral evidence, based on global operant learning and other criteria, also indicates that all vertebrates experience affects (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). Therefore, we date the evolutionary appearance of conscious affects to the origin of the brain complexity with the above-mentioned neurochemicals, around 540–520 million years ago. This date was also when vertebrates evolved the other aspect of consciousness, mental imagery. The same date may apply to the arthropods, as their brains and behaviors meet many of our criteria for affects (Perry & Barron, 2013; Strausfeld, 2013; Waddell, 2013). Consistent with the proposals of Michel Cabanac and others, we conclude that affective consciousness benefited the first vertebrates (and arthropods?) by efficiently directing motor responses to salient stimuli. Affects do this by motivating the animals and telling them which such stimuli to approach and which to avoid (Cabanac, 1996; Gallese, 2013; Giske et al., 2013; Ohira, 2010; Packard & Delafield-Butt, 2014). However, when compared to the consciousness of mental images, the affective aspects of sensory pain and pleasure, and the pure global affects such as fear, raise a question about the ‘‘explanatory gaps” they create. This question does not involve the three subjective features of unity, causality, or qualia. No confusion or new gaps to fill here, because affects, just like mental images, are unified, causal, and qualitative. Instead the question involves the other subjective feature, referral, which differs for affects versus mental images: Whereas the consciousness of mental images ‘‘refers” a stimulus to a specific place Fig. 4. Auto-ontological and allo-ontological irreducibilities: Fundamental barriers to reducing the objective to the subjective (and vice versa). (1) Subject has access to his or her conscious experiences. (2) Auto-ontological irreducibility: subject has no conscious access to his or her own objective neurons. (3) Observer has access to subject’s material neurons. (4) Allo-ontological irreducibility: observer has no access to subject’s conscious experiences. T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 123 in the external world or to the point in the body where the stimulus was applied, affective consciousness refers to the global, embodied self (‘‘I” am scared.). However, this difference in referral sites proves irrelevant in the end because for mental images and affects alike the brain never refers experience to the neural substrate of the brain that creates it. We call this key feature of the conscious brain ‘‘auto-ontological irreducibility” (Fig. 4) and it provides more pieces to our understanding of the hard problem. 6. Auto-ontological and allo-ontological irreducibilities: the ‘‘experiential gaps We have demonstrated how the neurobiological basis and evolutionary origins of the NSFC (the ‘‘explanatory gaps”) can be explained without any mysterious or missing ingredients. However, when subjectivity evolved from the general and special features over 520 mya, two barriers arose to uniting subjective awareness and objective science in a single conceptual framework (Fig. 4). We call these barriers auto- and allo-ontological irreducibilities (Feinberg, 2012). Auto-ontological irreducibility means one’s subjective consciousness never experiences or ‘‘refers to” the objective neurons that create it. As Gordon Globus expressed it (1973, p. 1129), ‘‘It does not appear that the brain in any way codes or represents . . . its own structure. (The nervous system has no sensory apparatus directed to its own structure).” This irreducibility is explained in part by the way consciousness evolved: an organism’s survival depends on neural networks attending to the outer world and to the body, so it would be maladaptive if sensory neural networks evolved to consciously attend to their own functions. That would be redundant because neuronal activity is already optimized by physiological mechanisms that maintain the ionic constancy of body fluids bathing the neurons (Abbott, 2004; Hall, 2011, pp. 358–382). Additionally, supportive glial cells automatically help with this ionic homeostasis and they also attend to the other needs of neurons by regulating neurotransmission at synapses, energy metabolism, blood flow, and immune defense (Oberheim, Goldman, & Nedergaard, 2012; Verkhratsky & Parpura, 2014). Neurons have operated efficiently like this since the pre-conscious, reflexive stage. For example, phylogenetic analysis indicates the ancestors of vertebrates, of arthropods, and of molluscs all had glial cells (Hartline, 2011). Besides being redundant, any conscious attention to neuronal maintenance would distract from the other important purposes of consciousness. Inefficiency and waste of effort are selected against, so no ‘‘objective” experiencing of the brain’s own neuronal signals ever evolved. This means the auto-ontological barrier was present ever since the dawn of consciousness. Additionally, even if it were possible for someone to objectively observe his or her own neurons in the act of creating experience – via the use of a hypothetical ‘‘autocerebroscope” for example (Feigl, 1967) – these observations would amount to the same thing as an outsider’s third person observations, thus raising the same ontological barriers to one’s experience as is encountered by an outsider. This means there will always be an ‘‘experiential gap” between the subjective and objective points of view. There is no way that the subject can become objectively aware of his or her own neurons in the same way they are subjectively experienced from the embodied inside. Allo-ontological irreducibility means that an outside observer has no access to a subject’s conscious experience (Fig. 4). It emerges not only from referral but from all the NSFC. This is because, by definition, all the NSFC are ontologically subjective and therefore cannot be experienced by anyone other than the subject. And, as we have already demonstrated, the neurobiological basis and evolutionary origins of the NSFC can be explained without any mysterious or missing ingredients. This point is not trivial because allo-ontological irreducibility is real, even absolute: Although two individuals can have similar or equal experiences (with both sensing the environmental temperature, light level, or a sound, for example), they naturally have different bodies, brains, viewpoints, different memories for reference, and incomplete intercommunication, so the allo-ontological barrier between them will always remain. Thus, the allo-ontological gap can be ‘‘bridged scientifically” or naturalized without needing to reduce the subjective to the objective points of view, or visa versa. The allo-ontological barrier exists and it contributes to the ‘‘experiential gap” between the objective and subjective, yet it poses no problem to science. Therefore, despite the biological uniqueness of auto-ontological and allo-ontological irreducibilities, and the fact that they form absolute barriers between the objective and the subjective points of view, they have a perfectly natural explanation that is provided by the evolution and nature of the general and special features. The ontological subjectivity of consciousness is the result of its being an embodied, neurohierarchical, system-feature process, and all its unique subjective qualities follow from that. In summary, for both mental images and affects, we can clearly understand the relationships among the philosophical issues of subjectivity and the evolution and neurobiology of complex nervous systems. Once nervous systems become sufficiently hierarchical, organized, and complex with the addition of the special features, there emerged the unique subjective features including auto- and allo-ontological irreducibilities, and the hard problem naturally arose without the addition of any mysterious features, new fundamental properties, or quantum factors. We emphasize that to solve the difficulties of subjective experience, it is necessary to bring together the philosophical, neurobiological, and evolutionary perspectives, with each informing the others (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). 7. Neurobiological naturalism Having updated our theory of neurobiological naturalism, we will summarize its unique approach to the problems of consciousness. Rather than considering subjectivity as a single perplexing ‘‘mystery,” we divided it into more manageable 124 T.E. Feinberg, J. Mallatt / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 113–127 Table 4 Summary of the main findings. A. Our logical steps to the solution of the hard problem 1. Biology has no explanatory gaps but consciousness does, posing the hard problem 2. Multiple explanatory gaps exist, not one (Table 1) 3. Diversity of brain structures for consciousness means the gaps cannot have just one explanation 4. Instead, many general and special features contribute (Tables 2 and 3) 5. Evolutionary transitions from the general to the special features explain both aspects of subjectivity: mental images and affects. This closes the explanatory gaps 6. Biological consideration of the allo-ontological and allo-ontological irreducibilities shows that the subjective/objective divide is real but can be explained by normal science. That bridges the experiential gaps 7. The theory of neurobiological naturalism addresses the hard problem by dividing consciousness (subjectivity) into more parts and from more perspectives than do other theories B. Newly recognized division of the hard problem 1. Explanatory gaps: gaps to explaining subjectivity; are solvable; now are explained so these gaps are closed 2. Experiential gaps (Fig. 4): the objective/subjective divide; is real and cannot be closed, but now is bridged by scientific characterization sub-problems. First, we broke down subjectivity into four ‘‘explanatory gaps”: referral, unity, qualia, and causation. We next divided and analyzed the diverse neurobiological sources of primary consciousness and identified the numerous general biological and special neurobiological features that create it. We then traced the evolutionary origins of primary consciousness and demonstrated how the general and special features naturally created subjectivity and the ‘‘explanatory gaps.” Finally, we showed how once subjectivity evolved, two additional features – auto- and allo-irreducibilities – naturally and ‘‘nonmysteriously” emerged and contributed to the hard problem. Ultimately, this approach of de-constructing and repeatedly dividing the problem of consciousness into its components allowed a natural solution that enabled us to see that three different disciplines – philosophy, neurobiology, and evolution – are needed to explain consciousness. Although we are presenting a broad and unified resolution from a new perspective, we wish to point out that neurobiological naturalism is consistent with many other neurological theories of consciousness, in almost all ways except for precise evolutionary dating. That is, neurobiological naturalism reconciles with theories that focus on recurrent neuronal interactions and feedback loops, information integration, oscillatory binding, neural coding strategies, or other brain processes that contribute to the creation of consciousness (Baars, 2002; Baars, Franklin, & Ramsoy, 2013; De Assis, 2016; Gennaro, 2012; Koch et al., 2016; Llinás, 2002; Min, 2010; Northoff, 2013a, 2013b; Ribary, 2005). However, each of those theories emphasizes a particular neurobiological aspect whereas neurobiological naturalism joins many such aspects and it brings in more philosophy and evolution. Table 4 summarizes the logical steps and findings of this paper. 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Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Bad is freer than good: Positive–negative asymmetry in attributions of free will Gilad Feldman a,⇑, Kin Fai Ellick Wong b, Roy F. Baumeister c a Department of Work and Social Psychology, Maastricht University, Maastricht 6200MD, The Netherlands Department of Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clearwater Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region c Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 4 April 2015 Revised 20 February 2016 Accepted 6 March 2016 Keywords: Accountability Action valence Attributions Free will Outcome valence a b s t r a c t Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons’ sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction The idea that people have the capacity to make free, autonomous, and responsible choices is one fundamental assumption of most, if not all, modern civilizations. Although most cultures operate based on some degree of belief in freedom of choice, people vary in how much they regard human beings, including themselves, as capable of making free choices (e.g., Baumeister, 2008; Paulhus & Carey, 2011). They also differ in their perceptions of how much free will they have compared with others (Gray, Knickman, & Wegner, 2011; Pronin & Kugler, 2010), and how much free will is exerted in certain situations (Helzer & Gilovich, 2012). Such fluctuations in free will beliefs and attributions of free will are far more than idle metaphysical speculations, having been shown to alter cognition and behaviors (e.g., Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013; Vohs & Schooler, 2008) and with important legal and societal implications (Greene & Cohen, 2004; Roskies, 2006). Over two millennia, philosophers have been debating what the concept of free will means, how it should be defined, and what purpose it serves. Despite the long-standing debate there has so far been very little convergence with several schools of thought and countless views conceptualizing free will in different—sometimes conflicting—ways. In recent years, a group of experimental philosophers and social-cognitive psychologists have begun to look beyond the academic and philosophical debate on the meaning of free will and have instead examined laypersons’ beliefs, cognition, and the behavioral consequences related to the elusive concept of free will. ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: gilad.feldman@maastrichtuniversity.nl (G. Feldman), mnewong@ust.hk (K.F.E. Wong), baumeister@psy.fsu.edu (R.F. Baumeister). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.005 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 27 A growing body of literature examining free will beliefs and attributions has converged on the idea that in laypersons’ minds the concept of free will is associated with moral responsibility. The belief in free will has been shown to promote socially responsible and moral behavior, such as more honesty (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), better learning from emotional experiences (Stillman & Baumeister, 2010), and more prosocial behavior (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009). The theory underlying these findings is grounded on the philosophical argument that free will is a prerequisite for holding people morally responsible for their actions (Kant, 1788/1997). The link between free will and moral responsibility is also reflected in the attributions people make to agents, with immoral agents perceived as having higher free will and higher perceived blameworthiness (Phillips & Knobe, 2009), resulting in more retributive behavior (Shariff et al., 2014), as well as activating the belief in free will so as to allow punishment of these agents (Clark et al., 2014). However, studies on free will beliefs and cognition are not limited to morality and moral situations but have extended to broader behavior in everyday life to reflect a wider view of the self as an active agent who is free to choose actions and pursue goals. The laypersons’ concept of free will is theorized as a core mechanism that enables the person to better pursue what he/she wants (Dennett, 2003; Edwards, 1754/1957; Hume, 1748). Those who believe in free will enjoy greater self-efficacy and less helplessness (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012), have higher levels of autonomy and more proactivity (Alquist et al., 2013), exhibit better academic performance (Feldman, Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016) and job performance (Stillman et al., 2010), and have more positive attitudes and higher perceived capacity for decision making (Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014). These findings are not about morality but rather about agents capable of change to improve their own behavior and take responsibility for their actions. To exemplify that free will attributions are about more than just morality, it has been shown that free will attributions are affected by self-serving biases differentiating between perceptions of the self and of others. Pronin and Kugler (2010) showed that people tend to perceive themselves as having more free will than others, perceiving their own behaviors as less predictable, and their own futures as less determined and more driven by intent. If free will were mainly about holding people responsible and punishing them for immoral actions, it would make little sense for people to attribute high free will to themselves, because that simply increases their own vulnerability to punishment. We propose that the concept of free will extends beyond morality and punishment to encompass change and accountability more broadly. In our use of the term ‘accountability’ we refer to the acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility. Thus, if a behavior or an outcome deviates from the expected, then an accountable person accepts his or her own role and seeks to learn from mistakes and correct future action. Using this view, the popular notion of free will may have evolved to enable proactivity and learning by promoting people to see themselves as more accountable for their own actions (Baumeister, 2008). A judgment based in accountability (moral, legal, performance, learning, and otherwise) is essentially a decision about whether a person should have acted differently in a particular situation, especially if the outcome was undesirable or if it did not meet with expectations (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). To assert that someone should have acted differently only makes sense if one assumes that the person could have chosen to act differently. This assertion implies that the actions and outcomes, although subject to many causes, were not fully coerced or predetermined, in the sense that there was no room left for agentic choice (Nichols, 2006). Choice has been shown to be an important factor in people’s perception of agency and freedom (Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Bode et al., 2014; Feldman et al., 2014), and the assumption that a person could have chosen to act differently in the same situation is the essence of most laypersons’ conception of free will (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011). The conceptual link between free will and accountability provides the basis for the proposition that attributions of free will would be higher for negative actions or outcomes because these attributions allow people to perceive that change is possible and accept their personal role in affecting such change. This would not be merely for the sake of punishment, but also to promote change and learning (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013). Negative outcomes are generally undesirable, and they motivate people to engage in counterfactual thoughts about what could have happened differently (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997), yet to allow for the possibility of controlled change, negative outcomes would more specifically trigger a search for what the agents involved could have chosen to do differently to prevent, correct, or overcome the negative outcome (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015). Fig. 1. Free will attribution model: Attributions of responsibility for actions/outcomes depend on the perceptions of free will (#1 and #2). Theorized link: The conceptual link between free will and responsibility (#3) leads to a cognitive association between valence and free will attributions (#4) – negative actions and outcomes trigger higher attributions of free will. 28 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 Our theoretical model is summarized in Fig. 1. A perception of an action or an outcome as negative leads to an attribution of responsibility, which is dependent on the perceptions of the agent as having free will. On the basis of this link, we expect that the perception of a negative action or outcome would also directly trigger the attribution of free will as to allow for accountability and future change in behavior. We expected that attributions of free will would be triggered in a wide array of negative circumstances, including those that are morally neutral or devoid of intent. From moral situations to everyday life learning, the perception of having free will (the capacity to have chosen otherwise) is an essential component of accepting responsibility for one’s past, present, and future behavior so that negative outcomes can be corrected. In this view, the attribution of higher free will to agents would not be limited to the judgments of others, but will also extend to those of the self, and would not be limited to specific actions, but would also extend to outcomes regardless of action. 2. The present studies Five experiments were conducted to test our hypothesis that negative actions and outcomes, compared to positive ones, lead to higher attributions of free will to the enacting agent, for both self and for others. Experiment 1 employed a classic Asian disease scenario to examine the attributions following negative versus positive outcomes to a risky decision in which the action and the intent were held constant. Experiment 2 assessed the attributions to negative versus positive framings of identical outcomes in the same scenario, with both intent, action, and outcome held constant. Experiment 3 used a prisoner’s dilemma game theory paradigm to examine free will attributions to defection versus cooperation, showing that the effect extends to social behavior. Experiment 4 was designed to extend the test to real-life events by having participants recall ordinary interactions they had with other people. Lastly, Experiment 5 contrasted action valence and outcome valence in free will attributions and their link to intent. Taken together, these experiments provide a comprehensive test for the hypothesized positive–negative asymmetries in general free will attributions. 2.1. Experiment 1 Experiment 1 provided the first test of the hypothesis, using a variation on the Asian disease scenario originally used by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). The scenario refers to an impending epidemic and a choice between two public health interventions, one of which may save everyone but may also save no one, whereas the other would guarantee saving some lives but not all. Tversky and Kahneman used this scenario to show that people’s preferences between those options shift as a function of whether the interventions are described in terms of lives saved or lives lost. We adapted this scenario to hold the action constant while manipulating outcome. Participants were told to imagine that the decision had been made either by themselves or by someone else, and that the decision made was to pursue the high-risk high-payoff option (i.e., take a chance on saving everyone). Half were told that the decision had turned out well, thus all lives had been saved, whereas the others were told to imagine it had gone badly and no one was saved. Our hypothesis predicted that people would attribute more freedom to the decision-maker whose decision turned out badly rather than favorably. The specific scenario was chosen as it allowed us to hold both the action and the intent constant. The two options presented in the scenario did not contrast between a positive or a negative action but rather an action that is either risk-seeking or risk-averse, thereby holding intent (to save lives) constant. Furthermore, in all scenarios the agent chose the risky option, as this option allowed us to hold the action constant while contrasting two different possible outcomes. Thus, in the contemplated scenario there is no question that the decision maker intends to minimize the number of lost lives, there are two viable alternatives and both can be argued as acceptable, and in our manipulation of the outcomes the agent has chosen the same action. Holding action and intent constant served two main purposes in this experiment. First, we aimed to establish that free will attributions are different from previous effects about intent, such as Knobe’s (2003) finding that people attributed greater intent when a decision maker chose an action that had bad rather than good side effects. Second, since the action is the same, there is no contrast between moral and immoral behavior, which would demonstrate that the effect is not merely about encouraging moral over immoral behavior (Clark et al., 2014; Phillips & Knobe, 2009; Shariff et al., 2014) but also extends to envisioning the possibility for change more broadly. 2.1.1. Method 2.1.1.1. Participants and design. A total of 204 participants (Mage = 30.15, SDage = 8.99; 84 females) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk, and each received US$0.05 for completing one of the four versions of the questionnaire (2  2, between-subject, self versus other, and negative versus positive, randomly assigned). 2.1.1.2. Manipulations. The participants were presented with the Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) in which a decision maker faces the dilemma of choosing between two types of medicine aimed to help in a situation in which 600,000 people are expected to die from an impending epidemic. There were two options. The riskier option offers a one-third chance of saving everyone and a two-thirds chance of not saving anyone. The safer option presented a certainty of saving one-third of the lives but consigning the other two-thirds to certain death. The participants were also told that G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 29 the decision had been made to pursue the riskier option. Half were told to assume that they themselves had made that decision, whereas the rest were told to imagine that someone else had made the decision. The outcome was also manipulated: half were told to assume that the intervention had been successful and everyone had been saved, whereas the rest were told to imagine that it had failed and that all 600,000 lives had been lost. The scenario was followed by two multiple-choice quiz questions that the participants had to answer correctly to proceed and a manipulation check. The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with free will statements. 2.1.1.3. Free will attributions. In order to avoid priming people’s beliefs in free will and confounding answers to the different perspectives people hold regarding the loaded term of ‘free will’ we applied indirect measures of free will attributions and avoided using the term of free will (Pronin & Kugler, 2010), instead asking the relevant operative regarding the agency’s capacity to choose differently (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013; Nichols, 2004). We adopted the definition of free will reached by a recent combined effort of social psychologists, neuroscientists, and experimental philosophers as being the capacity to perform free actions (Haggard, Mele, O’Connor, & Vohs, 2010), meaning that the person could have acted otherwise in the availability of options and with the capacity to choose among those options without coercion (Baumeister, 2008; Kane, 2002; Wong & Cheng, 2013). Both sophisticated philosophical treatments (e.g., Kane, 2011) and layperson views (e.g., Feldman et al., 2014; Monroe & Malle, 2010) tend to regard the capacity for choice to act otherwise as an essential core of free will (Nichols, 2004). These measures were specifically meant to provide the clearest and simplest measure of free will attributions without addressing the issue of determinism, capturing the participant’s own views of free will regardless of views on compatibilism (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005). We therefore asked the participants about the ability of the decider to choose otherwise. The first question asked whether the person (self or other) ‘‘could have chosen to act differently in that situation”. To go beyond the specific context of the situation and examine the implications for possible learning and change in the future, we also asked about future situations of what may be, so the second question asked that if the two people ‘‘were to face the same situation again” whether the actor ‘‘would be able to choose a different course of action that would lead to a different outcome” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). These two items were designed to capture the dimensions of both past reflection and future prospection. Clearly, in the scenario described agents had an alternative option. Therefore, any differences in attributions between the manipulation conditions would reflect a bias in the perception of the agent’s capacity to be able to choose differently based on who decided and what the outcome was. 2.1.2. Results and discussion Means and standard deviations for the manipulation check and the free will attributions are reported in Table 1. The manipulation of valence was successful. The participants in the negative conditions rated the outcome as more negative than those in the positive conditions (F (1, 200) = 303.97, p < .001, gp2 = .60). Contemplating the bad outcome led people to attribute greater freedom to the decision maker than contemplating the good outcome. Two-way between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed the main effects of outcome valence on both free will attribution measures (findings are plotted in Fig. 2). That is, participants rated the bad-outcome decision as freer than that of the good-outcome (F(1, 200) = 16.45, p < .001, gp2 = .08), and likewise they rated the decision leading to a bad-outcome as freer with regard to possible future decisions in similar situations (F(1, 200) = 30.76, p < .001, gp2 = .13). The main effects of the self/other variable were not significant on either measure (F < .63, p > .427). The interactions between outcome valence and self-other were likewise not significant (F < .24, p > .627). Experiment 1 showed that people attributed more free will to the authors of an action which resulted in a negative outcome than to the authors of the same action taken by the same author leading to a positive outcome. The pattern was the same regardless of whether self or another made the decision. This provided the first support for our hypotheses about a positive–negative asymmetry in attributions of free will. The action and the intent were controlled for, and the effects consistent for when the contemplated enacting agent was the self or someone else and for the current situation and future similar situations, lending support for the theory that free will attributions are not merely about the contrasts between moral and immoral behavior and the punishment of misbehaving agents, but rather a broader bias triggering the perceived capacity for change when well-intended actions turn out badly. 2.2. Experiment 2 Experiment 2 was a companion to Experiment 1. It again used the Asian disease scenario, but this time we went further by holding both the action and the outcome constant, varying only the framing of the outcome. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the outcome of a risky decision that turned out either positively or negatively. However, in Experiment 2, the actions and outcomes were the same across conditions, and we only manipulated whether the outcome was described in terms of lives saved (positive) or lives lost (negative). If the effect found in Experiment 1 is replicated in Experiment 2 when both the action, intent, and outcome are the same, then this would show a fundamental bias in which simply focusing on the negative rather than the positive in any given situation would trigger higher free will attributions and the envisioned capacity to act differently and obtain different outcomes in future situations. 30 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 Table 1 Experiment 1 – means and standard deviations for the manipulation check and free will attributions. Manipulation check – valence Negative Self Other Total 36.62 (68.95) [47] 62.18 (58.02) [55] 50.40 (64.26) Free will attributions – current situation Free will attributions – future situation Positive Total Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total 78.73 (38.00) [51] 75.80 (35.80) [51] 64.26 (36.76) 23.41 (79.71) 4.21 (84.50) 3.87 (.90) 3.78 (1.01) 3.82 (.96) 3.27 (1.23) 3.12 (1.24) 3.20 (1.24) 3.56 (1.12) 3.46 (1.17) 4.13 (.85) 4.16 (.83) 4.15 (.84) 3.43 (.98) 3.33 (1.21) 3.38 (1.10) 3.76 (.98) 3.76 (1.11) Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviation. Brackets indicate number of participants. See Fig. 2 for the plots of free will attributions. Fig. 2. Experiment 1 – attributions plot. Error bar indicates standard error. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001, ns – p > .05. The top comparison is for the main effect contrasting positive and negative for self–other combined. The bottom comparison is between the self–other conditions within the positive and negative conditions. 2.2.1. Method 2.2.1.1. Participants and design. A total of 221 participants (Mage = 29.98, SDage = 9.11; 93 females) on Amazon Mechanical Turk received US$0.05 for completing one of the four versions of the Asian disease scenario (2  2, between-subject, self versus other, and negative versus positive frame, randomly assigned). 2.2.1.2. Procedure and materials. The Asian disease scenario in Experiment 1 was adapted for Experiment 2. As in the previous study, it described an impending epidemic and a choice of interventions made by either the self or another person. This time, however, participants were instructed to visualize that the non-risky option rather than the risky option had been chosen, thus saving a third of the at-risk lives (or, framed negatively, killing two thirds). For half of the participants, this outcome was described in terms of the lives that were saved. For the rest, the outcome was described in terms of the number of deaths. This differential framing was similar to what was originally used by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) with this scenario. The scenario was followed by two multiple-choice quiz questions that the participants had to answer correctly in order to proceed (again, intended as checks on attention and understanding) and a manipulation check. The participants were then asked to rate their perceptions of whether the person could have chosen to act differently, using the same two items as in Experiment 1. 2.2.2. Results and discussion The means and standard deviations for the manipulation check and the free will attributions are reported in Table 2. The participants in the positive framing conditions rated the outcome as more positive than those in the negative framing conditions (F (1, 217) = 44.93, p < .001, gp2 = .17), even though the outcome was the same—thus indicating a successful manipulation of the framing valence. A two-way between-subject ANOVA revealed the significant main effects of framing on both free will attribution measures (findings are plotted in Fig. 3). Regarding the decision itself, the participants perceived more scope for the decision maker to have chosen otherwise when the outcome was framed in terms of losses than gains (F(1, 217) = 16.54, p < .001, gp2 = .07). They also attributed higher freedom to the decision maker in similar future situations following the death frame than the lives-saved frame (F(1, 217) = 7.11, p = .008, gp2 = .03). As in Experiment 1, the main effects of the decision maker (self versus other) were not significant on either measure (F < .89, p > .347). The interactions were also not significant (F < 1.08, p > .300). Thus, even when the decision outcome was objectively the same (i.e., 400,000 deaths and 200,000 lives saved) and only the framing was manipulated, the attributions of free will varied as a function of valence. Contemplating the outcome in 31 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 Table 2 Experiment 2 – means and standard deviations for the manipulation check and free will attributions. Manipulation check – valence Self Other Total Free will attributions – current situation Free will attributions – future situation Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total 6.30 (64.84) [54] 3.24 (69.89) [51] 4.81 (67.03) 47.97 (41.35) [59] 59.16 (34.65) [57] 53.47 (38.45) 28.05 (57.55) 32.75 (60.80) 3.59 (1.09) 3.45 (1.12) 3.52 (1.10) 2.98 (1.12) 2.84 (1.11) 2.91 (1.12) 3.27 (1.14) 3.12 (1.15) 3.72 (1.12) 3.47 (.95) 3.60 (1.04) 3.17 (1.16) 3.23 (1.17) 3.20 (1.16) 3.43 (1.17) 3.34 (1.07) Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviation. Brackets indicate number of participants. See Fig. 3 for the plots of free will attributions. Fig. 3. Experiment 2 attributions plot. Error bar indicates standard error. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001, ns p > .05. The top comparison is for the main effect contrasting positive and negative for self–other combined. The bottom comparison is between the self–other conditions within the positive and negative conditions. terms of lives lost made people attribute more freedom to the decision maker than contemplating it in terms of lives saved. As in the preceding experiment, the same effect was found for judging the specific decision as for evaluating future possible similar actions, and for contemplating the action taken by both the self and others. Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 to show an even broader bias triggering the perceived capacity for change not only when well-intended actions turn out badly but even when simply thinking about outcomes as negative. In both experiments, the action and the intent were controlled for, and the effect was observed when contemplating both self and others for either the current situation or other similar situations in the future. 2.3. Experiment 3 Experiment 3 sought to extend Experiments 1 and 2 using a more specific fixed interaction between the participant and another person to capture a social situation involving the participant with consequences for the participant in a more realistic situation. That is, the experiment measured free will attributions in a two-person ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma” interaction (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) in which the actions of a person hold direct and clear consequences for the other party and one of the parties is the participant. The decision is either prosocial or selfish, and it is made either by the participant toward a friend or by a friend toward the participant. Defection in this game is not an immoral act but rather a selfish act, as there is no cheating, reciprocation or lack of, and both options of cooperation or defection are within the set rules of the game.1 This specific paradigm was chosen as a widely used and simplified classical representation of a social interaction. Based on the findings in the first two experiments, the prediction was that participants would perceive more free will when it is perceived that the person acted negatively toward the other person than when the person is perceived as having acted positively toward the other person. 2.3.1. Method A total of 208 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk received US$0.05 for completing the study. They were randomly assigned among four conditions (2  2, between-subject, self versus other, and negative versus positive action). The participants were presented with the prisoner’s dilemma scenario, in which they were asked to imagine playing together with a friend to win a possible prize and in which both the self and the friend have the option to cooperate or defect. The unilateral defection brought significant gains for the defector (US$75), whereas the cooperating partner received 1 Prosocial and moral behavior are not the same construct, as – for example – two players can act cooperate to act unethically (Feldman, Chao, Farh, & Bardi, 2015; for an example using game theory defection and cooperation see Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). 32 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 nothing. Mutual cooperation brought both parties a good outcome (US$45). Mutual defection resulted in a small benefit (US $15) to both. Four multiple-choice questions were administered to ascertain that the participant understood the game and the instructions. These had to be answered correctly before proceeding. Next, the participants were told to imagine that the game had been played. They were told to imagine a particular response either by themselves or by the friend (other player). Thus, four conditions existed: the friend cooperated, the friend defected, the participant cooperated, or the participant defected. The scenario only described a single action taken by one of the actors without indicating the other player’s decision in order to minimize the possible confound of reciprocity. The perceptions of the outcome valence in game theory scenarios can vary considerably across participants based on many factors, and we therefore administered outcome comprehension check questions also serving as manipulation checks (1 – ‘‘indicate whether [your/your friend’s] choice has positive or negative implications for [your friend/you]” with an answer of either positive or negative, and 2 – ‘‘on a scale of 100, most negative, to +100, most positive, how would you rate the implications of [your/your friend’s] decision for [your friend/you]”). Correct answers in the manipulation checks were a prerequisite to inclusion in the analyses (above or below zero for the second manipulation check), because only participants who properly answered the manipulation can be considered as a test of the hypotheses regarding valence. After excluding those who gave wrong answers about the manipulation, we were left with a sample of 137 (Mage = 30.36, SDage = 9.56; 63 females). Nonetheless, the pattern of results for the full sample was similar to the findings reported below. Finally, the participants were asked about their attributions of free will. Two items were similar to the items used in the preceding studies: the choice to act differently in the current situation and choice to act differently in similar future situations. Based on Pronin and Kugler’s (2010, Experiment 1) conceptualization of free will attributions, we also added an item which measured free will attributions by an indirect measure of predictability (more predictable indicative of lower capacity for free will) – ‘‘I could have predicted the other person’s behavior in that situation even before it happened” or ‘‘the other person could have predicted my behavior in that situation even before it happened” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; reversed). 2.3.2. Results and discussion The means and standard deviations for the free will attributions are reported in Table 3. The results of a two-way between-subject ANOVA are plotted in Fig. 4. For the attributions of the current decision made, the participants perceived a negative action toward another person to indicate higher free will than a positive action (F(1, 133) = 4.03, p = .047, gp2 = .03). If the same situation were to arise again in the future, the participants perceived that an agent who behaved negatively would have a higher capacity to behave differently in the future than an agent who acted positively (F(1, 133) = 5.75, p = .018, gp2 = .04). The predictability measure in this study followed the overall expected pattern, and negative behaviors were rated as less predictable indicating higher free will than positive behaviors (F(1, 133) = 7.22, p = .008, gp2 = .05). There was a marginal interaction for attributions to the current situation (F = 3.69, p = .057), indicating that the effect was stronger for attributions to others. However, no other significant self-other main effects or interactions were found (F < 1.19, p > .278). Experiment 3 tested the hypotheses using a game theory of prisoner’s dilemma simulation of an everyday life social interaction. Overall, free will was again perceived more strongly in connection with the negative than with the positive valence, which in this study took the form of making selfish moves rather than cooperation. Although the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm resembled a realistic social interaction context, a limitation of this paradigm is that the outcome of either cooperation or defection could be interpreted to be both positive and negative, depending on the perspective taken, an issue which we attempted to control for using the manipulation checks. Another limitation of the game theory paradigm has to do with the ambiguous intent, as it is not clear whether the action taken by either side was intended as positive or negative toward the other party or merely as a reaction to an anticipated decision by the other party. Notwithstanding these limitations, Experiment 3 extended the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 to demonstrate the effect in a more realistic scenario involving the participant contrasting between selfish and prosocial actions. 2.4. Experiment 4 In Experiment 4, we sought to extend the findings from Experiments 1 to 3 to actual behaviors in everyday life rather than hypothetical vignettes (for the importance of evaluating an effect from both reader and observer perspectives, see Girotto, Ferrante, Pighin, & Gonzalez, 2007). The participants rated their perceptions of free will after recalling either a good or a bad Table 3 Experiment 3 – means and standard deviations for the free will attributions. Self Other Total Free will attributions – current situation Free will attributions – future situation Free will attributions – predictability Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total 3.42 (1.26) [19] 4.00 (.75) [26] 3.76 (1.03) 3.40 (.97) [47] 3.24 (1.17) [45] 3.33 (1.07) 3.41 (1.05) 3.52 (1.09) 3.84 (1.17) 3.73 (.87) 3.78 (1.00) 3.36 (1.26) 3.20 (1.16) 3.28 (1.21) 3.50 (1.24) 3.39 (1.09) 3.05 (1.03) 3.23 (.86) 3.16 (.93) 2.62 (.99) 2.64 (1.17) 2.63 (1.08) 2.74 (1.01) 2.86 (1.10) Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviation. Brackets indicate number of participants. See Fig. 4 for the plots of free will attributions. G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 33 Fig. 4. Experiment 3 – attributions plot. Error bar indicates standard error. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001, ⁄⁄p < .01, ⁄p < .05, ns p > .05. The top comparison is for the main effect contrasting positive and negative for self–other combined. The bottom comparison is between the self–other conditions within the positive and negative conditions. action by themselves or by someone else. The main prediction was, again, that people would attribute more free will for the bad than the good actions, regardless of whether the actions were performed by self or others. To complement the attribution questions common in the literature and demonstrate that negative valence triggers perceiving higher capacity for agents to do otherwise, we also measured agentic counterfactuals. Counterfactual thinking involves the tendency to think of all possible alternative realities that could have taken place, both in general circumstances or for the person, upwards or downwards. Past work has shown that negative actions and outcomes generally elicit more upward counterfactuals than good ones, with regard to what could have happened differently to produce a better outcome (Boninger, Gleicher, & Strathman, 1994; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1997). We hypothesized that the concept of accountability underlying free will and the need for responsibility are likely to elicit a very specific set of counterfactuals, one that mainly focuses on what the agent could have chosen to do differently.2 2.4.1. Method 2.4.1.1. Participants and design. Undergraduate students (N = 212, 112 females; Mage = 19.17, SDage = .97) received course credit for completing one of the four versions of a survey questionnaire, assigned at random. The design was a 2  2 between-subject factorial, varying whether the self or the other person was the responsible agent and whether the action was negative versus positive. 2.4.1.2. Procedure and materials. The participants were instructed to recall and describe in writing a recent interaction with another person, in which one person did something that affected the other. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to write about them doing something that affected another person, and the rest were assigned to write about the other 2 To clarify, free will attributions cannot be reduced to counterfactual thinking. Although the two are related, there are important differences between the two constructs. Counterfactuals are broader and include all that could have happened differently leading to a different outcome, while free will attributions focus more specifically on what the agent could have chosen to do differently, free from internal and external constraints (for a more detailed review see Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008; Alquist et al., 2015; Baumeister, Crescioni, & Alquist, 2011). For example, counterfactual thinking may trigger many types of alternative realities that lack free will, such as external constraints that confound free will: luck (‘if I only had luck on my side’), nature (‘if only it did not rain’), fate (‘if only I my astrological sign were different’), and laws of physics (‘if only the sun did not rise this morning’), or internal constraints that confound free will, such as personality (‘if only I were an extravert/’), background (‘if only I had been born rich’), genes (‘if only I were taller’) or counterfactuals that do not involve a deliberate choice (‘if only I were not so tired’). 34 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 Table 4 Experiment 4 – means and standard deviations for the manipulation check and free will attributions for current and future situations. Negative Positive Total Free will attributions – recalled situation Self Other Total 3.68 (1.00) [53] 3.94 (1.03) [52] 3.81 (1.02) 2.48 (1.09) [54] 3.41 (1.05) [53] 2.94 (1.16) Self Other Total Free will attributions – agentic counterfactuals 1.36 (1.26) 0.91 (1.12) 1.92 (2.26) 1.42 (1.47) 1.64 (1.84) 1.16 (1.33) Negative Positive Total Free will attributions – future situation 3.07 (1.20) 3.68 (1.07) 1.13 (1.20) 1.67 (1.91) 3.33 (.98) 3.15 (1.16) 3.25 (1.07) 2.55 (1.04) 2.79 (1.04) 2.67 (1.04) Free will attributions – predictability 3.42 (.95) 2.59 (.92) 2.67 (1.04) 2.83 (.99) 3.05 (1.06) 2.71 (.96) 2.94 (1.08) 2.97 (1.11) 3.00 (1.02) 2.75 (1.02) Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviation. Brackets indicate number of participants. See Fig. 5 for the plots of free will attributions. Fig. 5. Experiment 4 – attributions plot. Error bar indicates standard error. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001, ⁄⁄p < .01, ⁄p < .05, ns p > .05. The top comparison is for the main effect contrasting positive and negative for self–other combined. The bottom comparison is between the self–other conditions within the positive and negative conditions. person doing something that affected them. Cross-cutting this, half were randomly assigned to write about positive actions, and the rest wrote about negative ones. The short essay was followed by the measuring of free will attributions in the recalled situation and similar future situations (Experiments 1 and 2) and predictability (Experiment 3). Because we examined real life complex interactions rather than a fixed scenario, this allowed us to add an additional measure. The fourth measure was adapted from the Pronin and Kugler measure of free will as alternatives to action (2010, Studies 2 and 3) and asked about agentic counterfactuals: how the self or the other person could have acted differently in the specific recalled situation. The participants were asked the following: ‘‘Looking back, how—if at all—could [you/the other person] have acted differently? Please provide as many options as you can about how you think [you/the other person] could have acted differently in that situation” and were further instructed to ‘‘write down ‘no other possible actions’ if and only if you think [you/the other person] could not have acted differently in any way.” The responses were coded for the number of alternatives mentioned. 2.4.2. Results and discussion The means and standard deviations for free will attributions are reported in Table 4. Bad actions were rated as freer than the good ones, as indicated by a two-way between-subject ANOVA (see Fig. 5 for plots). G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 35 A significant main effect was found for the valence of the action. The participants gave higher free will ratings to the actor who performed the bad action than to the actor who did something good, both for the specific action they wrote about (F (1, 208) = 36.16, p < .001, gp2 = .15), and for possible similar situations in the future (F(1, 208) = 15.54, p < .001, gp2 = .07). Participants also wrote down more agentic counterfactuals in the negative conditions than in the positive condition (F (1, 208) = 4.86, p = .029, gp2 = .02). Lastly, a main effect for valence indicated lower predictability (higher free will) for negative actions (F (1, 208) = 6.14, p = .014, gp2 = .03). We examined the situations recalled by participants in terms of morality, by coding whether the situations recalled involved blatant unethical actions that intentionally harmed others, or clearly violated laws or regulations. We found that none of the recalled situations involved unethical behavior or a moral dilemma, and that participants recalled every-day life situations (for example, negative behaviors recalled were a professor giving a bad grade, roommates making noise, someone chewing gum in class, romantic disappointments, etc.). Unlike in the previous experiments, there was also a significant main effect indicating that more free will was attributed to the other person than to the self using three measures (recalled situation: F(1, 208) = 17.40, p < .001, gp2 = .08; predictability (F (1, 208) = 3.53, p = .062, gp2 = .02; agentic counterfactuals (F(1, 208) = 15.23, p = .015, gp2 = .03). A significant interaction also emerged in two measures (recalled situations: F (1, 208) = 5.46, p = .02, gp2 = .03; predictability: F(1, 208) = 13.30, p < .001, gp2 = .06) indicating that differences between self and other were larger with regard to the positive action than the negative one. Across the four measures we found that negative valence was associated with a higher degree of free will than positive valence. The coding of the recalled situations showed that they did not involve any moral dilemmas or morally valenced actions but rather represented simple interactions between people in their everyday lives. Together with the previous three experiments, we conclude a consistent positive–negative asymmetry bias for free will attributions. Some differences in attributions to self versus others were found in this study unlike in the previous experiments. High free will was attributed to others than to the self in two out of four measures for both positive and negative actions. The findings that positive and negative actions were both perceived as higher free will for others might be due to the easier recall of circumstances and constraints for their own actions while being typically unaware of the circumstances and constraints of others, thus possibly leading to more perceived freedom of action (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). In Experiments 1–3, the alternatives to the action were predefined and controlled. That is, the complexity of real-life situations may have introduced additional biases to free will attributions. 2.5. Experiment 5 Experiment 1 manipulated outcome, Experiment 2 manipulated outcome framing, and Experiments 3 and 4 manipulated action. In Experiment 5, we sought to manipulate both action and outcome. To address previous challenges about the role of desire for blameworthiness and intent confounds in the Knobe Effect (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010), we also directly manipulated intent. That enabled us to examine and contrast all three in their effect on perceived free will. 2.5.1. Method A total of 301 participants (Mage = 35.08, SDage = 11.58; 169 females) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk in return for US$0.15. The participants were presented with a scenario based on a design by Cushman (2008) and adapted from a scenario in Phillips and Knobe (2009), in which a doctor was ordered by the chief of surgery to prescribe medicine to a patient (each of the brackets below represents a single manipulation): At a certain hospital, there were very specific rules about the procedures doctors had to follow. The rules said that doctors have to follow the orders of the chief of surgery. One day, the chief of surgery went to a doctor and said: ‘I don’t care what you think about how this patient should be treated. I am ordering you to prescribe the drug Accuphine for her!’. The doctor had always [liked this patient and actually wanted the patient/disliked this patient and actually did not want the patient] to be cured. The doctor knew that giving this patient Accuphine would result in an immediate [recovery/death]. The doctor went ahead and prescribed Accuphine. As a result of the medicine, the patient [recovered immediately/died shortly after]. The scenario manipulated the valence of three factors. First, intent was manipulated by whether the doctor had positive or negative attitudes toward the patient and wanted to see the patient helped or harmed. Second, the action varied, as in the doctor knew the outcome of the action taken would be either positive or negative. Third, the outcome was positive or negative. The design was therefore 2  2  2 for intent, action, and outcome as either positive or negative. The participants were then presented with three manipulation checks in which they were asked to indicate the valence of the doctor’s intent, the action taken by the doctor, and the outcome on a scale of 100 (very bad) to 100 (very good). The participants were then asked about the doctor’s perceived capacity to have chosen not to prescribe the medicine as a measure or perceived free will (0 = No choice – had to prescribe; 100 = Had choice – could have chosen NOT to prescribe). 36 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 2.5.2. Results and discussion The correlations between the manipulation checks and the dependent variables are detailed in Table 5. Free will attributions were negatively correlated with both action valence (r = .27, p < .001) and outcome valence (r = .17, p = .004) and only marginally correlated with intent valence (r = .10, p = .07 ns). The strong correlations between intent and action and between action and outcome perceived valence indicate that perceptions of intent, action, and outcome valence may be linked to one another regardless of the manipulations. The manipulations were successful. Participants indicated more negative intent when the doctor disliked and wanted to harm the patient (N = 153, M = 57.58, SD = 61.73) than when the doctor liked and wanted to help the patient (N = 148, M = 40.97, SD = 62.34; t(299) = 13.04, p < .001). Likewise, they perceived the action as more negative when the doctor thought that the medicine would be harmful (N = 150, M = 46.57, SD = 69.93) than when the doctor thought that the medicine would be helpful (N = 151, M = 31.10, SD = 74.38; t(299) = 9.33, p < .001). Last, and unsurprisingly, they rated the outcome as more negative when the patient died (N = 152, M = 87.52, SD = 37.97) than when the patient recovered (N = 149, M = 88.62, SD = 29.17; t(299) = 45.07, p < .001). However, the action valence manipulation also affected perceived intent (t (299) = 8.47, p < .001) and the outcome valence manipulation also affected perceived action (t(299) = 10.536, p < .001) and perceived intent (t(299) = 2.06, p = .04). Therefore, the analyses below were supplemented the regression analyses using manipulation checks. A three-way ANOVA of the three manipulations examined the free will attributions and revealed significant effects for action (F(1, 293) = 20.57, p < .001, gp2 = .07) and outcome (F(1, 293) = 7.57, p = .006, gp2 = .03), but not for intent (F(1, 293) = .89, p = .348 ns), on free will attributions. No interactions were significant (F < 1.65). The participants in the negative action condition perceived higher free will (M = 81.47, SD = 27.53) than those in the positive action condition (M = 65.11, SD = 34.75; t(299) = 4.53, p < .001). Those in the negative outcome condition perceived higher free will (M = 78.16, SD = 30.83) than those in the positive outcome condition (M = 68.28, SD = 33.21; t(299) = 2.67, p = .008). A step-wise regression using the manipulation checks showed that when put together in a regression, only action emerged as a significant predictor of free will attributions (F(1, 299) = 23.91, p < .001, b = .27, p < .001, DR2 = .07), with no other effects found. In summary, free will attributions were affected by both action valence and outcome valence, but were not affected by intent manipulation or associated with intent attributions. Thus, we conclude that the findings differ from the pattern shown in Knobe’s (2003) findings about intention to produce unwanted side effects. 3. General discussion The primary finding of this investigation was that bad was perceived as freer than good for both actions and outcomes and regardless of the agent. The findings are summarized in Table 6. Higher attributions of free will for bad than for good actions and outcomes were consistent across multiple methods, including the hypothetical Asian disease scenario (Experiments 1 and 2), a two-person social interaction in a prisoner’s dilemma game theory scenario (Experiment 3), and autobiographical experiences from participants’ lives (Experiment 4). We showed that the valence effect on free will attributions generalized for outcomes (Experiment 1), the mere framing of an outcome (Experiment 2), and actions taken (Experiments 3 and 4), and using several measures, including free will attributions to current or recalled situation and a similar situation taking place in the future (Experiments 1–4), predictability (Experiments 3 and 4), and agentic counterfactuals (Experiment 4). 3.1. Free will as the capacity for change The present results indicate that people perceive free will more strongly in connection with bad than good. The perception that someone is free and able to do otherwise is personally and socially useful, insofar as it emphasizes accountability and facilitates learning and possible change. The present findings make sense in that context: It is seemingly most useful to perceive freedom of action when something goes wrong, because learning and change are most urgently desirable then. The very undesirability of negative actions or outcomes raises attention to the fact that the person really could have (and probably should have) done otherwise. That conclusion dovetails well with the research on counterfactual thinking: people engage in counterfactual thinking by reflecting on bad actions and bad outcomes, and the benefits of such thinking are Table 5 Experiment 5 – correlations table. Free will attributions Intent valence Action valence Outcome valence Note. **p < .01; ***p < .001. M SD Free will 73.27 9.11 7.60 .33 32.36 75.06 81.95 94.48 – .10 .27*** .17** Intent Action – .64*** .17** – .58*** 37 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 Table 6 Summary of findings. Ex N Sample IV1 IV2 DV Behavior Details Contributions 1 204 MTurk Outcome valence Self/Other FW attributions Past + future 2 221 MTurk Self/Other FW attributions Past + future 3 137 MTurk Outcome Framing valence Action valence Self/Other 4 212 Students Action valence Self/Other Asian Disease scenario, Tversky and Kahneman (1981), high risk option Asian Disease scenario, Tversky and Kahneman (1981), low risk option Prisoner’s dilemma: Rapoport and Chammah (1965) Recalled real-life interactions Baseline effect: Negative ? higher FW attributions 1. Framing effect 2. Addressing # of deaths confound Action focus: fixed situation, fixed actions + predictability measure Real life situations + agentic counterfactuals measure 5 301 MTurk Intent, Action, & Outcome – FW attributions Past + future + predictability FW attributions: Past + future + predictability + ACF FW attributions High versus low risk options High versus low risk options Cooperation versus defection Ordinary everyday life behaviors Moral behavior Hospital scenario, Phillips and Knobe (2009) Contrasting intent, action and outcome with FW attributions Note. FW = free will; ACF = agentic counterfactuals. derived from thinking about how one could have acted differently (Roese, 1997). The unique form of action control that humans exercise, which in layperson perspective corresponds to free will, may well be an adaptation to enable people to improve themselves so as to function better in society and, in turn, enable society to function better, thereby benefiting the group (e.g., Baumeister, 2008). People may only reflect on it when faced with subpar or negative outcomes, or when an agent behaves badly or makes bad decisions—because those are the cases in which it is most obvious that by acting otherwise, the person could benefit self and society. 3.2. Attributions of free will versus intent Our findings extend previous literature regarding asymmetries in attributions. Knobe (2003) showed that people attribute more intent to a decision maker whose choices produced a bad than a good side effect that he had explicitly said was not his intention (he expressed complete indifference). Experiments 1 and 2 held intent and action constant while manipulating outcome or framing of an outcome. Experiment 5 directly addressed the question of the difference between intent and free will. The relationship between free will and intent attributions was not significant and negative. Thus, previous findings about attributions of intent do not explain the present findings. Attributions of intent and free will are conceptually different. Intention is a mental representation of purposive action, and as such it could exist without free will. Meanwhile, some concepts of free will (e.g., random action; see Brembs, 2011) could operate without intention, simply by enabling the agent to make a different choice in the moment. Many concepts of free will also invoke the absence of external coercion, or even opposition to external pressure, which is largely irrelevant to intention. In the Knobe (2003) dilemma, the decision maker was presented as being fully able to do what he chose, and so his level of free will was conceptually the same across conditions, whereas people judged his intention quite differently depending on outcomes. Furthermore, intent is internal and people know whether they intended for something to happen or not, and therefore the Knobe Effect is not meaningful for self attributions. The effect regarding the self can only be interpreted as the capacity for choice, not as intent. This is best exemplified in the Experiment 4 recall task, as it relates to real everyday life actions taken by the self, and the intent by the self is known. We therefore conclude that intent and free will attributions are different, and that the valence asymmetry effect found is unique, together allowing for fuller understanding of intentionality (Alicke, 2000; Malle & Knobe, 1997) with possible implications for recent theories about the attribution of blame and responsibility (Malle et al., 2014). 3.3. Free will extends beyond morality We theorized that higher free will attributions would be elicited in a wide array of situations. Recent findings have linked the concept of free will serves mainly to moral responsibility and to the need to punish wrongdoers (Clark et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014), and we readily acknowledge the importance of free will in moral judgment. However, there is more to free will than moral choice. Our findings extend beyond morality and punishment in multiple ways. First, the actions assessed in Experiments 1–4 were morally neutral. In Experiment 1, the action was the same across conditions and therefore did not involve a contrast between moral and immoral, and indeed if anything the moral goal of saving lives was held constant across conditions. Experiment 2 went even further in minimizing moral variation, insofar as the both the action and the outcome were the same across conditions, only varying the framing of the outcome. Furthermore, in both 38 G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 experiments the two possible decisions were not between a moral and an immoral decision but rather a decision between a risk-seeking versus risk-averse decision—both undertaken in the service of the morally commendable goal of saving lives. In Experiment 3 the decision made was between prosocial versus selfish behavior, both morally acceptable within the set rules of the game. Experiment 4 used a sample of autobiographical memories from everyday life, and none of the stories involved any sort of blatantly immoral behavior. Second, we examined free will attributions for both self and others. The hypothesis that people attribute free will to negative actions and outcomes may not be easily extended to cases in which the agent is the self, which might reflect a potential bias in attributions to self in order to try and reduce own responsibility and avoid punishment. If a key factor driving free will beliefs and attributions is the need to punish wrongdoers, then we would expect people to act in accordance with selfserving bias (e.g., Kunda, 1987; Zuckerman, 1979), by which people seek to take credit for success but deny blame for failure. Similarly, negative agency bias (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Morewedge, 2009) argues that people tend to attribute success to internal factors and failures to external causes or to an agent. If so, positive actions taken by the self might elicit higher attributions of free will to elicit praise and receive credit (‘‘I could have done bad, but I made the decision to do good”) and negative actions to lower attributions of free will in order to reduce feelings of guilt or possible social punishment (external: ‘‘I was forced to do it”, or internal: ‘‘I was drunk/mentally insane”). On that basis, one would predict that people would attribute high free will to others who caused negative outcomes but not to themselves for producing negative outcomes. However, we found no evidence indicating such a bias. In fact, the attributions were for the most part similar for the self and other (Experiments 1–3). While this null difference cannot rule out the possibility of the above prediction, the best available evidence suggests that the core of free will attributions and belief is more about the assumption of responsibility as to envision change and enable learning. Punishment and retribution can be seen as one of several possible mechanisms to facilitate such learning, which are rendered ineffective when one does not perceive the capacity for change. 3.4. Implications and future directions The present investigation focused on cognitive biases in attributions of free will, and it is plausible that these attributions may interact with beliefs, motivations, and affect. For example, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have shown that contemplating moral responsibility of emotionally valenced crimes led to more compatibilist attributions (attributing responsibility in a deterministic universe). Possibly, contemplating more affective situations would lead to an even stronger positive–negative bias in attributions of free will. Future studies may examine impact of affect for free will attributions and whether generalized beliefs in free will would moderate the positive–negative asymmetry bias. The positive–negative asymmetry in free will attributions may also be related to lay-assumptions regarding human nature, specifically whether people are inherently good or inherently bad. The predictability measures in Experiments 3 and 4 showed that people find bad actions to be more unpredictable than good ones, which according to some scholars (Brembs, 2011; Pronin & Kugler, 2010) is a measure indicative of more free will, because it suggests that people expect good behavior and are surprised by bad actions or bad outcomes. Future research may examine the interaction of these implicit lay-beliefs of agency and human nature against one another to see the effect those may have over attributions, teasing apart the two effects. It is possible that the two lay-beliefs may interact so that free will would be attributed to negative situations when assumptions are that human nature is good, but that this effect might be reversed if the assumption is that human nature is bad. In Experiment 4 using a free recall of everyday real-life situations has also revealed that people tend to attribute higher free will to others than to themselves. Experiments 1–3 in which the alternative actions were controlled did not show a similar effect, which suggests that complex situations may involve additional biases in free will attributions. These findings also seem to counter Pronin and Kugler’s (2010) finding that people believe they have more free will than other people. Pronin and Kugler acknowledged an alternative account for their findings regarding the self/other main effect: People may see predictability as undesirable and therefore may try to protect their self-image by rejecting being predictable. The interaction found between valence and agent using the predictability measure in Experiment 4 may suggest that participants were indeed acting to maintain their self image, but that in this case they emphasized wanting to be seen as being inherently good, as they report their negative actions to be less predictable than their good actions. We note, however, that Pronin and Kugler’s research differs from this study in several key respects. In particular, they examined neutral situations in life rather than explicitly good or bad actions (e.g., school, career, romance, social life, and everyday life). Moreover, the actions in their study held no clear implications. In contrast, the actions in the present study involve direct consequences for the other party. Quite possibly, people may perceive their actions as having more free will than others’ for neutral everyday actions, which would bolster their sense of being capable or deserving—but when actions involve valence and other parties, the effect is weakened or even reversed. Future studies may more closely examine moderating factors for the self–other bias in attributions of free will and the role of the positive–negative asymmetry. Experiments 1 and 2 may also offer an insight into the classical paradigms of the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), potentially shedding light over an unexplored factor involved in decision making. A possible interpretation of our findings regarding the framing effect could be that the tendency to undertake riskier decisions under negative framing may be related to the perception that negative situations involve a greater ability to see other options or to choose nonconforming or unexpected options. A negative context may be a cognitive trigger to perceived free will, thereby leading one to consider taking more risks (Hills, Noguchi, & Gibbert, 2013). Therefore, the association between risk seeking or G. Feldman et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 26–40 39 avoidance behaviors and free will deserves further exploration. Future studies may attempt to examine free will attributions for different negative outcomes. Considerable evidence indicates that bad actions and bad events have a stronger impact than good ones (for reviews, see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The present findings extend that work to show that bad is also seen as freer than good ones. However, there are important differences between these two effects, as ‘stronger’ situations usually imply more rather than less constraints, and hence less capacity for free choice. If the implications of a bad action are perceived as more impactful and with higher anticipated affect, then this suggests that people would feel more constrained and hesitant to engage, and therefore the perception of less free will to act. Future research could examine the interaction of these two effects and their possible implications. 4. Conclusion Although it may at first seem disappointing that people seem to associate freedom of action with negative circumstance, that perception may actually serve an important role for both self and for societal functioning. Our findings suggest that invoking the concept of free will in connection with negative actions or outcomes facilitates the contemplation of what went wrong, the evaluation of what could have been done differently, and the perception that things could be done differently in the future. Ultimately, free will highlights the importance of being able to learn, evolve, and act differently. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1092–1094 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Editorial Mirroring mirror neurons in an interdisciplinary debate Since the discovery of mirror neurons in the early 1990s, numerous experiments have been carried out to investigate what functions such neurons serve in their different domains of application. Among these experiments, one in particular has given rise to a lively debate involving not only neuroscientists, but also philosophers, psychologists and experts in the social sciences. This is Fogassi’s experiment concerning whether mirror neurons differentiate between actions with the same motor pattern but which are associated with different intentions (Fogassi et al., 2005). Fogassi’s result was that mirror neurons fire differently (that is, at a much higher rate) when the same action of grasping leads to eating food compared with placing an inedible object into a container. Fogassi’s experiment seems therefore to support the hypothesis that mirror neurons are the neural correlates of mindreading. However, the evidence bearing on this issue is quite controversial, as the literature shows. In the literature there are at least two distinct criticisms of the proposed role of mirror neurons in intentionality. The first criticism maintains that the function of mirror neurons is negligible or even irrelevant (Borg, 2007; Jacob, 2008). The second criticism accepts that mirror neurons do have a function to perform, but argues this function is different from that assigned to them by the Parma team, since it has rather to do with predictive simulation (Csibra, 2007). As part of an attempt to clarify and extend the above mentioned debate by integrating scientific and philosophical contributions (Antonietti & Iannello, 2011; Corradini, 2011), the editors of this Special Issue ran a workshop on this topic at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart on 4th September 2011 in Milan, under the auspices of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP7). This Special Issue contains not just the contributions presented on that occasion, but a series of new essays both by participants in the 2011 workshop and by authors who have subsequently joined the original group. As the title of the Special Issue indicates, the starting point of this collection of papers are articles that report experimental evidence, respectively from the neurosciences, social psychology and developmental psychology (Fogassi’s, Prinz’ and Southgate’s contributions). These studies are followed by more theoretical essays which either update the ongoing discussion (Hutto’s, Jacob’s and Borg’s articles) or introduce a new associated theme, as Corradini and Antonietti do in their essay about the relationship between mirror neurons, intentionality and empathy. Let us see the contributions in more detail. In the first paper Leonardo Fogassi and co-workers (Bonini, Ferrari, & Fogassi, 2013) of the Parma group, while acknowledging that the intentionality of behaviour has been subject to wide interest in many different disciplines, point at the fact that there is no general consensus about how to describe and explain intentions underlying human beings’ motor acts. A possible contribution to the debate has come in the last decades from neuroscientific studies whose aim was to identify some pre-motor processes associated to ‘whether’, ‘what’ or ‘when’ performing an action. A different line of research consisted in identifying the content of motor intentions with the agent’s behavioural goal, that is, with the ‘why’ of her action. The article reviews the most recent neurophysiologic experiments of the Parma group on the organisation of intentional actions in monkeys and on the role of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) in intention understanding. In the last part of the paper the authors discuss some recent human data based on neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques demonstrating that, as in monkeys, some of the areas belonging to the human mirror system play an important role in an immediate form of decoding other people’s intention on the basis of their motor behaviour. In the second paper Prinz (2013) addresses some conceptual issues tied to the examination of mirroring mechanisms from the viewpoint of cognitive science (Prinz, 2012). As to the topic of this Special Issue, on the author’s approach embodied mirroring does not require explicit communication and perception; rather, it appears to be a form of automatic response to others’ behaviour. On the other hand, symbolic mirroring needs a common-sense framework for action description and explanation, as well as mirroring devices which enable humans to couple perception and action. Prinz then moves to describe the design principles underpinning the mirroring mechanisms, which leads him to investigate the concepts of common coding and distal reference. Afterwards, the crucial distinction between embodied devices, based on implicit 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc.. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.007 Editorial / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1092–1094 1093 procedural knowledge, and symbolic devices, based on explicit declarative knowledge, is taken into account. Body schemes and action schemes are the two main devices which serve embodied mirroring. By summarizing a broad corpus of empirical studies, the author supports the idea that common representational resources are needed by mirroring. Even though the construction of the self through mirroring (namely, how we can succeed in understanding ourselves by watching others) is the topic on which the article prevalently focuses, important conceptual distinctions are deepened, which contribute to clarify the kind of understanding of others’ intentions which is allegedly supported by mirror neurons. In the third paper, Southgate (2013) proposes a view about the role of mirror mechanisms which mainly relies on developmental studies. The author takes into account the dominant view about why humans recruit the motor system when observing others’ actions: on this view this happens because people simulate others’ actions and thus understand others’ goals. However, in Southgate’s opinion, this interpretation fails to account for human infants’ behaviour, whose ability to attribute goals to actions is neither related to their own motor skills nor, by implication, to their ability to simulate the action. On the author’s alternative construal, the motor system plays the role of leading us to predict actions by emulation. Under this view, the action is understood (namely, its goal is identified) outside the motor system and the motor system is recruited to find out a likely way to achieve the goal. Southgate backs up her position both by critically reviewing previous studies and by reporting recent empirical evidence which is incompatible with the simulation view but well matches the emulative view. Borg’s (2013) paper expresses scepticism about MNs’ capacity to provide the key to intentional understanding (on this also see Borg, 2007). This criticism is labelled by the author as ‘‘the intentional worry’’. She thoroughly examines the answers which have been recently given by supporters of MNs along two main lines of defence. The first argues that the intentional worry rests on a misunderstanding of MNs, the second, and more concessive one, maintains that it rests on a misunderstanding of the MNS mindreading hypothesis. As to the first series of answers, in the author’s view none of them is satisfactory: not that appealing to subtle kinematic differences, neither that resting on prewired motor chains and contextual triggers, nor the third one, which draws on associative mechanisms. On the other hand, more concessive points of view, such as those represented by the second line of defence, succeed on the author’s understanding in saving the MNS mindreading hypothesis, but at the price of making MNS much less relevant to cognitive psychology and the cognitive neurosciences. The main worry voiced in Jacob’s (2013) essay is that, if we support a strong identity between mirroring and mindreading (Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009), it becomes difficult to bridge the gap between the mere sharing of an agent’s intention and the ascription of an intention to another. After an in-depth critical examination of the three-step model of intention-ascription put forward by Gallese, Jacob draws two conclusions. In his eyes, Gallese’s model does not justify the strong identity claim between action-mirroring and mindreading that it postulates. Moreover, a tension is shown to exist between features of the three-step model and the embodied approach to mental simulation that Gallese and several mirror theorists share. Hutto’s (2013) paper is a discussion about the function of mirror neurons in social cognition: Do they suffice for or constitute any kind of action understanding? Many mirror neurons theorists support a weak interpretation of the relationship between mirror neurons and mindreading: Mirror neurons enable us only to a non-folk psychological kind of action understanding. In the attempt to clarify what such an understanding looks like, the author first examines Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia’s (2006) theory of the understanding brain and, secondly, Gallese’s idea of embodied simulation, on the background of which intention understanding takes place at the organism and not at the brain level. The author greets Gallese and Sinigaglia’s (2011) turn to bodily-formatted and action oriented representations, to be distinguished from propositional representations. However, he radicalizes this position, by maintaining that manual activity, such as reaching and grasping, can be explained without appeal to the existence of representations of any kind. On radical enactivism, the function of mirror neurons is not embodied understanding but embodied responsiveness to the doings of others. Finally, Corradini and Antonietti’s (2013) paper conducts an interdisciplinary analysis of the relationship between mirror neurons and empathy, mainly conceived of as a cognitive capacity to understand others’ intentions. The first part of the essay thoroughly reviews the psychological and neuro-scientific literature dealing with the involvement of mirror neurons in empathy. Several empirical findings are mentioned, which are meant to provide evidence in favour of the claim that mirror neurons are the mechanisms underpinning empathy. The last section of this part is devoted to a critical examination of the linguistic uses of the concepts involved in the debate, with the aim to show that more clarity and precision are needed. The second part of the essay tackles the question whether philosophically grounded empathy (re-enactive empathy in Collingwood’s (1949) words) is a necessary justificatory element of rational explanations of behaviour. After defending the soundness of rational explanation against the criticisms of the supporters of the deductive-nomological model, it is argued that rational explanation is likely to require only ego-indexicality, but not empathy. However, this negative result still admits the possibility of basic kinds of empathy whose existence is backed by empirical evidence regarding mirror neurons. References Antonietti, A., & Iannello, P. (2011). Social sciences and neuroscience: A circular integration. International Review of Economics, 58, 307–317. Bonini, L., Ferrari, P. F., & Fogassi, L. (2013). Neurophysiological bases underlying the organization of intentional actions and the understanding of others’ intention. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1095–1104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.001. Borg, E. (2007). If mirror neurons are the answer, what was the question? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14, 5–19. Borg, E. (2013). More questions for mirror neurons. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1122–1131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j/concog.2012.11.013. Collingwood, R. G. (1949). The idea of history (revised ed.: 1993). Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 1094 Editorial / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1092–1094 Corradini, A., & Antonietti, A. (2013). Mirror neurons and their function in cognitively understood empathy. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1152–1161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.003. Corradini, A. (2011). Philosophy and neuroscience. In C. Kanzian, W. Löffler, & J. Quitterer (Eds.), The ways things are. Studies in ontology. Frankfurt/Paris/ Lancaster/New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag. Csibra, G. (2007). Action mirroring and action understanding. In P. Haggard, Y. Rossetti, & M. Kawato (Eds.), Sensor motor foundations of higher cognition. Attention and performance XXII. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal lobe: From action organisation to intention understanding. Science, 308, 662–667. Gallese, V., Rochat, M., Cossu, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2009). Motor cognition and its role in the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding. Developmental Psychology, 45, 103–113. Gallese, V., & Sinigaglia, C. (2011). What is so special about embodied simulation? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 512–519. Hutto, D. (2013). Action understanding: How low can you go? Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1142–1151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.concog.2013.01.002. Jacob, P. (2008). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language, 23, 190–223. Jacob, P. (2013). How from action-mirroring to intention–ascription? Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1132–1141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j/ concog.2013.02.005. Prinz, W. (2012). Open minds: The social making of agency and intentionality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Prinz, W. (2013). Self in the mirror. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1105–1113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.01.007. Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2006). Mirrors in the brain: How our minds share actions and emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Southgate, V. (2013). Do infants provide evidence that the mirror system is involved in action understanding? Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 1114–1121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.008. Guest Editors ⇑ Alessandro Antonietti Antonella Corradini Department of Psychology, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano, Italy ⇑ Tel.: +39 02 72342909; fax: +39 02 72342280. E-mail address: alessandro.antonietti@unicatt.it (A. Antonietti) Available online 16 May 2013

Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Subliminal understanding of negation: Unconscious control by subliminal processing of word pairs Anna-Marie Armstrong a,⇑, Zoltan Dienes a,b a b School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, UK a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 19 February 2013 Available online 7 August 2013 Keywords: Subliminal priming Subjective thresholds Guessing criterion Contrast masking Unconscious cognition a b s t r a c t A series of five experiments investigated the extent of subliminal processing of negation. Participants were presented with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick an accompanying noun, followed by a choice of two nouns. By employing subjective measures to determine individual thresholds of subliminal priming, the results of these studies indicated that participants were able to identify the correct noun of the pair – even when the correct noun was specified by negation. Furthermore, using a grey-scale contrast method of masking, Experiment 5 confirmed that these priming effects were evidenced in the absence of partial awareness, and without the effect being attributed to the retrieval of stimulus– response links established during conscious rehearsal. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Just how much information and knowledge can be acquired through subliminal perception, or just how intelligent unconscious cognitive processing is, remains a familiar and controversial theme (Greenwald, 1992; Norman, 2010). In a classic priming experiment, subjects are briefly presented with a word, or prime, that is prevented from entering conscious perception through the use of a forward or backward mask. When subsequently presented with a further target word, participants are quicker to categorise the target if both the prime and target are semantically related. Whilst the unconscious analysis of letters is more sophisticated than the analysis of individual lines or angles, the semantic analysis of subliminal words or even multiple word-strings would indicate a far more intelligent and sophisticated interpretation of ‘unconscious cognition’ (Loftus & Klinger, 1992). Evidence suggests that the subliminal presentation of a word facilitates lexical and semantic access (e.g., Abad, Noguera, & Ortells, 2003; Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Forster & Davis, 1984; Fowler, Wolford, Slade, & Tassinary, 1981; Gaillard et al., 2006; Marcel, 1983; Ortells, Daza, & Fox, 2003), although the precise interpretation of these results will be addressed below. Subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA) studies offer evidence of some of the most sophisticated subliminal priming effects, apparently demonstrating the semantic analysis of multiple word primes (Bronstein & Rodin, 1983; Nissenfeld, 1979; Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Waller & Barter, 2005). However, SPA studies have been heavily criticised by others that have tried and failed to replicate results (Allen & Condon, 1982; Condon & Allen, 1980; Heilbrun, 1980). Furthermore, whatever the replicability of the results, given that the sentences used differ in the specific words used, any effect evidenced may instead be attributable to simple single-word priming. In fact, there still exists controversy regarding whether or not the semantic analysis of subliminal primes even occurs (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Hutchison, Neely, Neill, & Walker, 2004; Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). In an article investigating the extent ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: am_armstrong@btinternet.com (A.-M. Armstrong). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.06.010 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1023 of unconscious cognition, Greenwald (1992) argued that unconscious cognitive processing is far less sophisticated in its analytical capabilities than is often reported. Greenwald’s (1992) argument rests on the premise that additional research has demonstrated unconscious analysis and processing of nothing more elaborate than word fragments. As an example, Abrams and Greenwald (2000) required participants to categorise a set of consciously perceived ‘parent’ primes as either positive or negative in valence. Participants were subsequently required to categorise a set of subliminally perceived ‘hulip-type hybrid primes’, a non-word hybrid of two positive or two negative parent primes (e.g., humour–tulip– hulip, smut–bile–biut). Results indicated that participants were successfully able to categorise emotional valence despite the nonsensical nature of the hybrid primes. In a follow up study, having consciously categorised parent primes, participants were required to positively or negatively categorise a set of so called ‘tumour-type hybrid primes’. These primes were similarly created by combining two congruent parent primes to create a semantically comprehensible prime of different valence to parent primes (e.g. humour–tulip–tumour, smut–bile–smile). Results indicated that participants continued to classify emotional valence according to the valence of the parent prime rather than tumour-type prime, even to the extent that ‘smile’ was categorised as negative. The results of this study compellingly suggest that words are analysed at the level of (consciously primed) word-parts as opposed to whole-word meaning. However, Sklar et al. (2012) have suggested that subliminal processing may have appeared limited in past research because of the small time windows that processing is given for backward masked stimuli (typically in the order of 30 ms). Their solution was to use continuous flash suppression, maintaining stimuli as subliminal for as long as 2 s. Impressively, they found that semantically incoherent sentences (e.g., ‘‘The bench ate a zebra’’) broke through suppression faster than coherent sentences (e.g. ‘‘The lion ate a zebra’’). However, as with SPA studies, there may have been a word-level effect influencing breakthrough as literally different words were used in the different conditions (in this example, ‘‘bench’’ versus ‘‘lion’’). In a second series of experiments, they found that three-term subtractions (e.g. 9–3–4) (though not additions) primed the speed of pronunciation of the subsequent correct answer. In neither the sentence coherence nor three-term subtraction experiments did the stimuli constitute obvious ‘‘set phrases’’ that may have been previously well learnt as a unit. These results raise the question of what sort of combinations of stimuli are possible to process subliminally. For example, Van Opstal, Gevers, Osman and Verguts (2010) demonstrated that a same/different judgement task on consciously perceived number targets (e.g., 1–1 or 1–3) extended to subliminal letter stimuli (e.g., a–A or a–D) even when participants were unaware of the presence of the letters. Van Opstal, Calderon, Gevers and Verguts (2011) extended this finding by demonstrating that responding to the subliminal same/different judgements (e.g., a–A) could be modulated by unconscious context (e.g., either a–a or a–D). Therefore, priming effects were dependent upon the processing of both elements. We similarly wished to demonstrate semantic priming of two-element (word) primes and unconscious cognitive control by investigating whether it is possible to process instructions to exclude (i.e., negation) subliminally. As we will discuss, negation has a special place in consciousness research. The use of negation allows easy control of stimuli, because stimuli can consist of the same words, just with or without ‘‘not’’. The use of negation also addresses one of the theoretical limits assigned to unconscious processes. According to Jacoby, Lindsay, and Toth (1992), what the conscious is uniquely equipped to do is control behaviour by excluding certain responses. Unconscious control exerted by subliminal stimuli was investigated by, for example, Lau and Passingham (2007), in which a subliminal shape indicated which of two tasks to perform; and by van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, and Lamme (2010), in which a subliminal no-go cue slowed down responses and activated a frontal-parietal inhibition network (see van Gaal, de Lange, & Cohen, 2012, for a review of related work). Van den Bussche, Segers, and Reynvoet (2008) indicated limits to unconscious control in that the proportion of conscious stimuli could be used to modulate responding but not the proportion of subliminal stimuli. In contrast to previous studies that have looked at subliminal control, we will be exploring it in the specific case of linguistic negation processing. Although not dealing with linguistic negation, the previous work is encouraging in showing that there exists a mechanism by which unconscious control could operate. In this respect, the current work is consistent with Dienes and Perner’s (2007) cold control theory of hypnosis, which postulates that hypnosis consists of unconscious executive control. It is also consistent with the findings of, for example, Norman, Price, and Jones (2011) and Wan, Dienes, and Fu (2008), who showed people could exert control over the use of structural knowledge, even when it was unconscious. That is, while the processing of subliminal linguistic negation has not been shown, it is plausible that the unconscious can deal with control and exclusion. Thus, the subliminal processing of negation in two-word phrases presents itself as possible on those theories that allow unconscious control (contrast Jacoby et al.), but beyond what has so far been shown to occur subliminally. The present set of studies attempted to assess whether, contrary to Abrams and Greenwald (2000), subliminal perception is sensitive to the semantic comprehension of word combinations and sentence structure. In summing up his argument against complex unconscious cognition, Greenwald (1992) issued an empirical two-word challenge. This two-word challenge asserts that to demonstrate successful subliminal priming of two-word primes, neither word should individually impart the final meaning. Therefore, to claim successful unconscious processing of multiple words, each word would need to be individually processed. The present experiments aimed to meet this challenge by presenting participants with a two word instruction, instructing them which of two subsequent words to choose. Therefore, performance would depend on the successful semantic processing of both words. One explanation to account for the failure of many studies to demonstrate successful subliminal semantic activation of single or multiple word primes may be due to the adherence to strict objective thresholds using backward masking when measuring subliminality. Objective methods of assessing unconscious cognition presume that trial accuracy, beyond what 1024 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 would be expected by chance, indicates conscious knowledge (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). However, objective methods of assessing subliminal perception fail to take into account subjectivity; that is, an individual’s conscious awareness of accuracy. The two thresholds differ, with unconscious processing occurring below the subjective threshold but limited unconscious processing below the objective. Therefore, the use of objective methods in measuring subliminal perception and unconscious processing have been heavily criticised for testing not just unconscious cognition, but degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau & Passingham, 2006). This indicates that to determine the full extent of unconscious processing, it is necessary to use the subjective threshold (compare Masters, Maxwell, & Eves, 2009; contrast Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009, who found no significant effect of using objective versus subjective thresholds in a meta-analysis of subliminal priming effects1). Therefore, using subjective methods of measuring subliminality, the following series of experiments required the participants to choose between two common nouns (e.g. ‘kite-moon’), having been subliminally instructed with which noun to choose (e.g. ‘pick kite’, or ‘not kite’). Correct identification of the instructed noun would then indicate that unconscious cognition is capable of both processing and comprehending more complex demands, such as the pick and not instructions in this study. Whilst it could be argued that success in the ‘pick’ conditions may not necessarily demonstrate the semantic comprehension of pick but rather simple recognition processes or partial word analysis (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000), success in the ‘not’ conditions would require the participant to inhibit initial recognition processes. In turn, this inhibition of recognition processes would imply lexical and semantic comprehension of negation. Therefore, if correct identification is above chance expectations then this would indicate that cognition is capable of processing word combinations outside of conscious perception, as measured by the guessing criterion (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986) and/or the zero-correlation criterion (ZCC). Like Sklar et al. (2012), we will attempt to determine the limits of subliminal perception when it is given more time to operate than allowed by objective thresholds found with backward masking. 2. Experiment 1 Current investigations into subliminal perception and unconscious cognition have shown the superior priming effects of practiced versus novel primes (Abrams & Grinspan, 2007; Abrams, Klinger, & Greenwald, 2002; Draine & Greenwald, 1998). That is, the priming effects of subliminal primes that have earlier been perceived as conscious targets prove more successful than non-practiced novel primes. This effect has been attributed to consciously perceived primes creating an episodic memory trace which is later re-activated upon subsequent subliminal presentation (Forster & Davis, 1984). Therefore, to achieve maximum likelihood of successful subliminal priming effects, all subliminal primes in Experiment 1 were first practiced as a series of conscious trials. It was expected that for the conscious trials, participants would identify the correct noun in both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions on close to 100% of the trials. For the subliminal trials, it was hypothesised that, using a subjective threshold, participants would identify the correct noun for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions beyond chance expectations (that is, beyond 50% correct). In addition, the inhibition of recognition processes necessary in ‘not’ conditions makes it likely that noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster than noun identification in ‘not’ conditions. Therefore, it was hypothesised that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials. In this first experiment we attempted to make the effect likely to occur, so that its absence would be informative. To anticipate, in subsequent experiments we tighten up alternative explanations to determine if the effect goes away. 2.1. Method 2.1.1. Design and participants In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being the dependant variable, 25 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. Fifteen of the participants were female and ten male, with ages ranging from 18 to 40 years (M = 22.63, SD = 8.52). 2.1.2. Apparatus and materials The experiment was presented on a Dell laptop with a 60 Hz screen refresh rate, limiting minimum stimulus presentation to 16 ms, with 16 ms increments. The study was created using E-Prime version 2.0. Trials were created from 20 common nouns, making up a total of 10 noun-pairs (e.g. ‘baby-yard’ and ‘ant-sky’). All nouns were between 3–5 letters in length, and noun-pairs were phonemically and semantically distinctive and matched in length. Each screen display was centrally presented in lower-case, black, bold Courier New font, and point size 18 on a white background. The arrangement of each 1 The mean effect for subjective thresholds was 0.85 (SE  0.5) and for objective, 0.68 (SE  0.24). While the difference is non-significant, a rough Bayes Factor calculated on the difference (0.17, SE  0.55), using a uniform from 0 to 0.85, is 0.87, indicating the non-significant result is insensitive (as the Bayes factor is between 1/3 and 3), and no conclusions follow from this contrast (see Dienes, 2011, for more on Bayes Factors, which are also explained in more detail below). Note also that these studies were not designed to test the difference between subjective and objective thresholds under otherwise equivalent conditions, unlike, for example, Cheesman and Merikle (1984). A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1025 of the 10 noun-pairs and instructions were counterbalanced so that participants viewed each of the eight permutations for each noun-pair (e.g. ‘pick yard. . .1. baby, 2. yard’, ‘pick yard. . .1. yard, 2. baby’, ‘not yard. . .1. baby, 2. yard’ and ‘not yard. . .1. yard, 2. baby’ etc.), creating a total of 80 distinct conscious and subliminal trials. 2.1.3. Procedure Participants were tested individually in a small quiet space in which they sat before a laptop such that their eyes were approximately 60 cm from the monitor screen. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, and English was the first language for all participants. All trials consisted of four separate components: a fixation cross presented for 350 ms, the stimulus instruction (e.g. ‘pick baby’ or ‘not baby’), a backward mask, longer in length than the stimulus and in the form of a series of ampersands (i.e., &&&&&&&) presented for 150 ms, and the final component consisting of the noun-pair choice (e.g. ‘1. baby, 2. yard’) in which the participant was required to indicate the number corresponding to the noun in which they had been instructed to choose. The experiment was separated into four continuous phases; conscious trials, SOA setting, subliminal trials, and re-testing the SOA threshold to check for drift. 2.1.3.1. Conscious trials. Having read the instructions, the procedure began with a set of 6 practice conscious trials to accustom the participant to the task required. The common noun-pairs used in all practice trials were different from those used in experimental conscious and subliminal phases. Following the fixation cross, the stimulus instruction was presented for 350 ms to ensure conscious perception. Programming in E-Prime ensured that the offset of the stimulus instruction was immediately followed by the onset of the backward mask in all experimental trials. This was especially important for subliminal trials in order to eliminate conscious visual perception. After the backward mask, participants were presented with the noun-pair choice in which they were required to press ‘1’ if they had been instructed to choose the first word, and ‘2’ if they had been instructed to choose the second. The noun-pair choice remained on the screen until the participant had made their choice. Having made their choice, a 250 ms pause preceded the onset of the next trial. Having completed the set of 6 practice trials, participants were instructed to continue to the experimental conscious trials. The procedure for the conscious trials followed the exact procedure used in the practice trials. Participants completed two blocks of 40 randomly presented conscious trials, with an emphasis placed on accuracy as opposed to speed. Participants were not informed whether their choice was correct or incorrect. 2.1.3.2. SOA setting. The SOA of each participant was assessed separately to ascertain individual subjective thresholds. Following the two blocks of conscious trials, participants moved on to the SOA setting phase. Participants were required to complete the same task format used in the conscious phase. Participants were presented with the fixation cross and the instruction prime, followed immediately by a backward mask and then the noun-pair choice. Following each trial, participants were required to rate, on a scale of 50–100%, how confident they were that they had chosen the correct noun; 100% would indicate that the participant absolutely knew which noun to choose, whilst 50% would indicate that they were purely guessing. During this part of the experiment, if a participant rated confidence to be anything above 50%, stimulus duration was reduced by 16 ms after each trial, from a starting point of 140 ms. Once a participant had rated confidence to be at 50% (guessing), the SOA remained at that same presentation speed for the following trials. Once confidence had been rated at 50% (chance performance) for five successive trials, the experiment proceeded to the subliminal phase. If during any of these five successive trials participants rated confidence to be anything above 50%, SOA was again reduced until five successive trials at 50% confidence had been completed. Before the SOA setting phase began, participants completed a set of 6 practice trials to accustom themselves to the confidence procedure. For the practice trials, prime presentation was held at 140 ms. The common noun-pairs used in both practice and SOA setting phases were different from those used in conscious and subliminal phases. 2.1.3.3. Subliminal trials. Once the SOA setting phase had been completed, the subliminal phase of the experiment consisted of the same 80 trials used in the conscious phase, divided into the same two blocks of 40 randomly placed trials. There were no practice trials for the subliminal phase. Stimulus duration for the subliminal trials was determined by the point at which participants had rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive trials during the SOA setting phase. To prevent rhythmic pressing of the ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘2’’ keys, and to remind participants of the task required, each block of 40 subliminal trials additionally contained 10 randomly placed conscious trials (at 350 ms exposure) (cf. Eimer, Kiss, Press, & Sauter, 2009), creating two blocks of 50 trials. 2.1.3.4. Threshold drift. The final phase of the experiment aimed to assess whether individual subjective thresholds of awareness had drifted through the course of the experiment. If the SOA at the finish of the experiment was lower than at the beginning of the subliminal trials, this could indicate that participants may have been consciously aware of the subliminal primes (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). The SOA threshold drift phase followed the exact format used in the SOA setting phase, using the same materials, with 16 ms decrements in presentation speed from a starting point of 140 ms. Once the participant again rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive trials, the participants were thanked and the experiment ended. After completion of the experiment, participants were fully debriefed and received an information sheet giving some background to the study as well as experimenter details. 1026 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 2.2. Results 2.2.1. SOA setting Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 64 ms, with an average experimental subliminal presentation speed of 48 ms (SD = 15). 2.2.2. Trial accuracy It was expected that for the conscious phase of the experiment, participants would get approximately 100% of the trials correct. In fact, the mean number of correct identifications for conscious trials was slightly off 100% (M = 97%, SE = .5). For the ‘pick’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 95% (SE = .9), whilst for ‘not’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 98% (SE = .4). Mean correct noun identification for subliminal trials was 62% (SE = 2), with accuracy for ‘pick’ (M = 66%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 59%, SE = 2) conditions being presented in Fig. 1, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. For all statistical tests, we used an alpha level of .05 to determine significance. Accuracy in both ‘pick’ (t(24) = 7.46, p < .001, d = 3.05) and ‘not’ (t(24) = 3.9, p = .001, d = 1.59) conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. In addition, a paired-sample t-test looking at the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun (i.e. ignoring the preceding instruction) significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 66%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 41%, SE = 2, t(24) = 5.97, p < .001, d = 2.44) conditions. Such discrimination was also assessed in terms of (logistic) d0 , which differed significantly from zero, M = .60, SE = .11, t(24) = 5.62, p < .001, d = 2.29. 2.2.3. Response time The time taken to identify the instructed noun was recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 712 ms, SE = 20) than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 844 ms, SE = 32, t(24) = 5.92, p < .001, d = 2.42). Similarly, for the subliminal trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 864 ms, SE = 50) when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 894 ms, SE = 50, t(24) = 2.27, p = .03, d = 0.93). 2.2.4. Threshold drift Data from the threshold drift phase reveals that subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 32 ms to 80 ms, with a mean experimental subliminal presentation speed of 48 ms (SD = 16.24), matching the sample mean value found in the SOA setting phase, t(24) = .04, p = .97, d = 0.02. For 15 of the 25 participants, SOA’s at the finish of the subliminal trials differed from the SOA at the start of the subliminal phase. Subjective thresholds reduced by 16 ms for seven of the participants, and by 32 ms for one participant. For six of the participants, SOA increased by 16 ms, and for one participant the SOA increased by 48 ms. There was a significant relationship between the SOA setting stage and the SOA threshold drift phase, r = .4, p = .04, indicating there was some consistency in measuring the threshold. 2.2.5. Trial accuracy and response time When the data from the eight participants whose SOA had reduced by P16 ms was removed, d’ significantly differed from zero (M = .56, SE = .15, t(16) = 3.60, p = .002, d = 1.8), and accuracy in both subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 3, t(16) = 4.81, Fig. 1. Mean percentage values for correct identification of the noun in subliminal pick and not conditions for Experiments 1–5 with a 50% reference line. A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1027 p < .001, d = 2.41) and ‘not’ (M = 58%, SE = 3, t(16) = 2.63, p = .02, d = 1.32) conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. Similarly, when the instruction is ignored, the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 3) and ‘not’ (M = 42%, SE = 3, t(16) = 3.8, p = .002, d = 1.90) conditions. In addition, on removal of the eight participants, participants remained significantly quicker to identify the noun in subliminal ‘pick’ conditions (M = 845 ms, SE = 64) when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 1139 ms, SE = 86, t(16) = 2.66, p = .02, d = 1.33). 2.3. Discussion Participants in the subliminal ‘pick’ condition correctly identified the noun on an average 66% of the trials, whilst correct noun identification in subliminal ‘not’ trials averaged 58%. Therefore, as hypothesised, participants successfully identified the correct noun at above chance expectations for both subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. Whilst it could be argued that correct identification in the subliminal ‘pick’ trials may have demonstrated the ability of unconscious processing to merely recognise letter patterns, correct identification in the subliminal ‘not’ trials would require the inhibition of these recognition processes. Furthermore, the occasions in which the participant simply chose the subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, further demonstrating the appropriate use of the subliminal instruction. Consequently, the success of Experiment 1 in demonstrating successful subliminal priming in the ‘not’ condition may demonstrate the semantic comprehension of ‘not’. The use of the guessing criterion for establishing subliminal perception could be criticised on the grounds that participants come with different interpretations as to what ‘‘guess’’ means. However, in the instructions, and on each screen shot when participants were required to rate confidence, they were given a definition of what ‘guessing’ (and ‘know’) means. The participants were told to give a value of 50% if they believe that they were purely guessing; that they had no idea which word to choose and that they may as well have tossed a coin. They were also told that if they had any confidence at all, if they believed they saw anything of potential relevance at all, they were to give a value above 50. Poorly defined end points on a confidence scale can render the guessing criterion meaningless; thus, the instructions precisely defined the required concept of ‘‘guess’’. Further support for the unconscious processing of negation in subliminal conditions was provided by response time data, which demonstrated the difference in cognitive difficulty between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions. Once the word pick has been read and cognitively processed, the word indicates that the accompanying noun is the correct noun to choose. Therefore, upon presentation of the noun-pair choice, the letter mapping and recognition processes required to identify the just-presented noun respond quickly. However, the word not indicates that the accompanying noun is not the correct noun to choose. Consequently, upon presentation of the noun-pair choice, it is first necessary to identify the just-presented noun using the same letter mapping and recognition processes used in ‘pick’ trials before then indicating the other noun. Therefore, the additional time required to indicate the correct noun in ‘not’ conditions should be evident in both conscious and subliminal response times. Response times for the conscious trials suggested that, as predicted, it took significantly longer to identify the noun in ‘not’ conditions when compared to ‘pick’ conditions, an average 131 ms longer. Although it only took an average of 30 ms longer to identify the noun in subliminal ‘not’ conditions when compared to ‘pick’ conditions, this difference in response times was also significant, thereby demonstrating the difference in task difficulty, even though participants were not consciously aware of which noun to choose. Past research investigating the extent of subliminal priming paints a controversial and confusing picture. Whilst some studies clearly demonstrate successful (e.g., Diaz & McCarthy, 2007; Ortells et al., 2003), and even sophisticated (e.g., Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Silverman et al., 1978) semantic subliminal priming, other studies suggest that the unconscious analysis of words is actually only completed at the sublexical level (e.g. Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Hutchison et al., 2004). Experiment 1 aimed to successfully demonstrate the cognitive processing of subliminally presented two-word instructions using individual subjective thresholds. That is, if the individual believed they did not know the correct noun to choose, it can be assumed that they did not possess conscious knowledge (Dienes, 2008). However, whilst the results of Experiment 1 appear to have demonstrated successful unconscious semantic processing, threshold drift data suggests that for eight of the participants, subliminal subjective thresholds may have reduced between SOA settings phases and completion of the subliminal trials. This in turn may indicate conscious, as opposed to unconscious, knowledge of which noun to choose for some of the participants. In addition to potential conscious awareness, significant criticisms arise due to the use of practiced versus novel primes (Damian, 2001; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). Abrams and Grinspan (2007) argue that simple processing at the feature level is all that is needed to identify a stimulus that is predicted by experience and expectation. As mentioned previously, when primes are practiced consciously they acquire memory traces between a given stimulus and response. These stimulus–response (S–R) mappings remain in short-term memory and are later re-activated upon presentation of the same trials presented subliminally. Whilst these S–R mappings may result in successful subliminal priming, it indicates that the semantic analysis of subliminal primes need not necessarily occur as the semantic system is by-passed. That is, participants may simply have formed an S–R link between, for example, ‘‘not baby’’ and ‘‘yard’’ (although ‘‘yard’’ was associated with each button press equally in this situation). A subsequent correct response merely relies on the successful retrieval of the established S–R link and not the semantic processing of ‘‘not’’. Experiment 1 used conditions that were most likely to find a priming effect if there were one, and so the 1028 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 results motivate further and more rigorous testing of subliminal priming. Therefore, the issue of practiced versus novel primes and S–R mappings are explored further in Experiment 2. 3. Experiment 2 In Experiment 2, participants performed the same task performed in Experiment 1; a set of conscious trials were followed by an SOA setting phase, a set of subliminal trials and finally a threshold drift phase. However, separate sets of common nouns were used in conscious and subliminal trials to avoid potential successful subliminal priming being attributed to the retrieval of S–R links. To achieve maximum likelihood of successful priming without the establishment of S–R links, participants first practiced ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials consciously with one set of nouns. Participants then consciously viewed the list of nouns that would be used in subliminal trials, in an attempt to activate word representations, before continuing with the experiment. In this way, any positive results could not be credited to the retrieval of S–R links as at no point had the subliminal nouns been paired with any particular response. 3.1. Method 3.1.1. Design and participants In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being the dependant variable, 25 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants took part in Experiment 1. Eighteen of the participants were female and seven male, with ages ranging from 18 to 44 years (M = 20.96, SD = 6.2). 3.1.2. Apparatus and materials Apparatus for Experiment 2 replicated that used in Experiment 1. The 10 noun-pairs used in Experiment 1 were used as conscious trials in Experiment 2, with an additional 20 common nouns between 3–5 letters in length creating a further 10 phonemically and semantically distinctive noun-pairs for subliminal trials. 3.1.3. Procedure Procedure replicated that of Experiment 1, however following the conscious trials and before the SOA setting, participants were presented with a list of the 20 nouns that would be used in the subliminal trials. Each noun in the list appeared at the centre of the screen for 2000 ms, with a 150 ms pause between each noun. This list of 20 nouns was presented twice. 3.2. Results 3.2.1. SOA setting Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 64 ms, with an average experimental subliminal presentation speed of 48 ms (SD = 15). 3.2.2. Trial accuracy The mean rate of correct identifications made on conscious trials was 95% (SE = .01). Mean correct identifications was 94% (SE = .8) for ‘pick’ trials, and 97% (SE = .6) for ‘not’ trials. The mean number of correct noun identifications for the subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 58%, SE = 2) conditions are presented in Fig. 1 with a reference line indicating 50% chance performance. On subliminal trials, accuracy on both ‘pick’ (t(24) = 8.17, p < .001, d = 3.34) and ‘not’ (t(24) = 4.31, p < .001, d = 1.76) conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. A paired-sample t-test looking at the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun (i.e. ignoring the preceding instruction) significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 42%, SE = 2, t(24) = 6.67, p < .001, d = 2.72) conditions. Overall subliminal d0 values also differed significantly from zero (M = .51, SE = .08, t(24) = 6.63, p < .001, d = 2.71). 3.2.3. Response time The time taken to identify the noun they had been instructed to choose was again recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. A paired-sample t-test revealed that on average, for the conscious trials, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 685 ms, SE = 11) than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 875 ms, SE = 28, t(24) = 6.53, p < .001, d = 2.67). Whilst the results suggested that participants were similarly quicker in subliminal trials to identify the noun in ‘pick’ (M = 885 ms, SE = 49) conditions when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 952 ms, SE = 33), a paired-sample t-test revealed that this difference in response times was not significant (t(24) = 1.76, p = .09, d = 0.72). However, from the non-significant result we are unable to determine whether this implies that there is evidence for the null hypothesis, that there would be no difference in response times between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, or that there is no evidence for any conclusion (Dienes, 2011). To do this, we can use a Bayes Factor. Whilst values under 1/3 are substantial evidence in support of the null hypothesis, values over 3 are seen as substantial evidence in support of the experimental hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961); a Bayes Factor of 1 indicates the evidence is exactly neutral between the two theories. A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1029 Values between 1/3 and 3 indicate data insensitivity and no conclusions should be drawn. To calculate the Bayes Factor, it is first necessary to specify the likely mean response time difference. The difference in subliminal response times for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions in Experiment 1 was 30 ms. Thus, a half normal was used with a standard deviation equal to 30 (as per the guidelines in Dienes, 2011, Appendix). The sample mean difference between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions was 67 ms (SE of the difference = 38), leading to a Bayes Factor of B = 2.46, indicating more support for the experimental hypothesis than the null hypothesis (Bayes Factor greater than 1), but also indicating that the data were not sensitive. 3.2.4. Threshold drift Data from the threshold drift phase reveals that subjective SOA durations ranged from an SOA of 16–80 ms, with an average experimental subliminal presentation speed of 48 ms (SD = 17), matching the mean value found in the SOA setting phase, t(24) = .65, p = .52, d = 0.27. However, for 17 of the participants, SOA’s at the end of the experiment differed from the SOA at the start of the experiment. Subjective thresholds reduced by an average of 16 ms for ten of the participants, and for seven of the participants, SOA increased by 16 ms. There was a significant relationship between the SOA setting stage and the SOA threshold drift phase, r = .67, p < .001, indicating there was some consistency in measuring thresholds. 3.2.5. Trial accuracy and response time When the data from the 10 participants whose SOA had reduced by 16 ms was removed, overall d0 values remained significantly above zero (M = .47, SE = .1, t(14) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 2.48). Accuracy in both subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 63%, SE = 2, t(14) = 6.03, p < .001, d = 3.22) and ‘not’ (M = 57%, SE = 3, t(14) = 2.72, p = .02, d = 1.45) conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. Similarly, when the instruction is ignored, the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 63%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 43%, SE = 3, t(14) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 2.48) conditions. On removal of the 10 data sets, the difference in response times between subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 975 ms, SE = 39) and ‘not’ conditions (M = 1019 ms, SE = 76), remained non-significant (t(14) = .55, p = .59, d = 0.29). 3.3. Discussion The accuracy data from the conscious trials in Experiment 2 replicates that found in Experiment 1. For the subliminal trials, participants correctly identified the noun in ‘pick’ trials at an average rate of 63%, whilst correct identification in subliminal ‘not’ trials averaged at 57–58%. The results of Experiment 2 replicate those found in Experiment 1 in that the data appears to support the hypothesis that participants would successfully identify the correct noun, above chance performance, for subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions. Similarly, when the instruction was ignored, the occasions in which the participant simply chose the subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, providing further evidence to support the appropriate processing of the subliminal instruction. As in Experiment 1, response time data suggested that for conscious trials, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions when compared to ‘not’ conditions, by an average 189 ms. Although participants were on average 67 ms quicker to identify the noun in subliminal ‘pick’ conditions when compared to ‘not’ conditions, this difference in reaction time was not statistically significant. However, a Bayes Factor indicated insensitive data not strong enough to yet draw conclusions, albeit with more support for the hypothesis of a difference in response times than for the null hypothesis. Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 1, whilst avoiding the assumption that successful subliminal priming was a result of the retrieval of S–R links established during conscious rehearsal of stimuli. By consciously viewing the nouns to be used in subliminal trials, presented individually, participants gained the advantage of practiced rather than novel primes (Kunde et al., 2003), but were prevented from establishing S–R links by viewing the nouns in the absence of either ‘pick’ or ‘not’ instructions, supporting research demonstrating that semantic priming can extend to novel and unpractised stimuli (e.g., Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). The results of Experiment 2 appear to support the contention that participants would successfully discriminate between the two nouns at above chance performance in subliminal trials. However, whilst the results of both Experiments 1 and 2 provide support demonstrating successful unconscious processing of logical negation, threshold drift data from both experiments could suggest that conscious processing may be responsible for success in subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. It has been found, for example, that practice with an initially subliminal task can result in participants learning to be conscious, admittedly over considerably more trials than we used (Schwiedrzik, Singer, & Melloni, 2009, 2011). In both Experiments 1 and 2, the threshold drift phase aimed to determine whether individual subjective thresholds of subliminality remained the same at the start and at the end of the subliminal phases of the experiment. If subjective thresholds at the end of the experimental subliminal condition were lower than at the start, it could be argued that participants may have consciously been aware of the stimulus instruction, and thus possessed conscious knowledge as to which noun to choose. While there was not an overall drift down in subjective thresholds, some participants drifted down whilst some drifted up. When the data from those participants whose SOA had drifted down were excluded, the effect remained intact. However, the presence of changes in the assessed thresholds mean that it is possible there existed trials where perception was conscious. The issues regarding conscious awareness and threshold drift was explored further in Experiment 3. 1030 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 4. Experiment 3 Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that the cognitive unconscious is capable of analysing the syntactic function of subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions without attributing the priming effect to the retrieval of established S–R links. However, individual visual thresholds may vary from trial to trial as a result of, for example, dark adaption (Holender, 1986). This variation in visual threshold may in turn allow conscious perception of stimuli that is intended to be subliminal. The threshold drift data from both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate this possible variance in subjective thresholds as for a number of participants; the measured SOA differed between the start and finish of the subliminal phase. For those participants whose SOA reduced between SOA setting and threshold drift, conscious perception of subliminal primes may be responsible for any successful priming effects. For those participants whose SOA increased between SOA setting and threshold drift, we cannot be sure there was a simple linear increase. Therefore, Experiment 3 aimed to replicate Experiments 1 and 2 by investigating subliminal processing whilst continually assessing subjective thresholds (cf. Marcel, 1983, who also assessed stability of thresholds throughout the priming phase). This was achieved by requiring participants to rate their confidence in selecting the right noun after each trial in the subliminal phase. As in Experiments 1 and 2, it was hypothesised that for the subliminal trials, participants would correctly identify the noun for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions beyond 50% chance expectation. As evidenced in Experiment 1, it was predicted that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials. 4.1. Method 4.1.1. Design and participants In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being the dependant variable, 24 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants took part in Experiments 1 or 2. Nineteen of the participants were female and five male, with ages ranging from 18 to 32 years (M = 20.21, SD = 3.27). 4.1.2. Apparatus and materials Replicated Experiment 2. 4.1.3. Procedure Replicated Experiment 2. Participants were also asked to rate their confidence in choosing the correct noun on a scale of 50–100%. Participants were required to rate over 50% if they believed they had any awareness of which noun to choose, and to rate 50% if they believed they were guessing. 4.2. Results 4.2.1. SOA setting Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16–64 ms, with an average experimental subliminal presentation speed of 48 ms (SD = 17). 4.2.2. Trial accuracy The mean rate of correct identifications made on conscious trials was 98% (SE = .4). Mean correct identifications was 96% (SE = .8) for ‘pick’ trials, and 99% (SE = .3) for ‘not’ trials. For the subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% (i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 80 subliminal trials, the number of trials upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged between 0 and 26 trials (M = 7, SD = 7). Mean percentage correct responses for subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 58%, SE = .6) and ‘not’ (M = 51%, SE = .6) conditions are presented in Fig. 1, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. On subliminal trials, overall d0 values significantly differed from zero (M = .20, SE = .02, t(23) = 10.57, p < .001, d = 4.40). Accuracy on ‘pick’ (t(23) = 12.58, p < .001, d = 5.25) trials was significant, whilst ‘not’ (t(23) = 1.84, p = .07, d = 0.77) trials did not significantly differ from what would be expected by chance. In the previous two experiments, the subliminal ‘not’ trials produced an effect approximately 8% above baseline. A Bayes Factor, using a half-normal with SD equal to 8%, was B = 2.09, indicated that the data were insensitive, but if anything supported the hypothesis of a subliminal effect. Furthermore, looking at the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun (i.e. ignoring the preceding instruction) significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 58%, SE = .6) and ‘not’ (M = 49%, SE = .6, t(23) = 10.82, p < .001, d = 4.51) conditions. Only if pick and not were differentially processed could there be a significant difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials in the proportion of times the presented word was selected. Conscious knowledge of the subliminal instruction was also assessed using the zero-correlation criterion (ZCC) to establish whether there was a relationship between confidence and accuracy on trials when the participant rated confidence to be above 50%. The difference in accuracy between ‘guess’ and ‘any confidence’ was .54%, which was not significant (t(23) = 1.69, p = .11, d = 0.70). A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether the data supported the null hypothesis that A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1031 there was no relation between confidence and accuracy. Firstly, the range of effect sizes expected if there were conscious knowledge needed to be specified. The maximum slope was determined by the overall accuracy in Experiment 3 (3%) divided by the proportion of confident responses (.08).2 Therefore, the maximum slope = 37.5%. Using a uniform distribution between 0 and 37.5 (sample M = -.54, SE = .31) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.00, providing strong evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no relation between confidence and accuracy3. The correlation between confidence and accuracy was additionally measured using Type II d0 . Type II d0 did not significantly differ from zero (M = .01, SE = .01, t(23) = 1.69, p = .10, d = 0.70. A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether the Type II data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between confidence and accuracy. Given plausible assumptions, Type II d0 does not exceed Type I (Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, in press). Thus, the alternative hypothesis that there existed some relation between confidence and accuracy (i.e., some conscious perception) was modelled as a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d0 of .2. The Bayes Factor of 0.03 provided strong support for the null hypothesis and hence the existence of subliminal perception. 4.2.3. Response time The time taken to identify the noun they had been instructed to choose was recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 728 ms, SE = 23) than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 851 ms, SE = 35, t(23) = 4.7, p < .001, d = 1.96). Participants were similarly quicker in subliminal trials to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 834 ms, SE = 45) when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 854 ms, SE = 43), however, as evidenced in Experiment 2, a paired sample t-test revealed that this difference in reaction times was not significant (t(23) = 1.63, p = .12, d = 0.68). The mean effect from Experiments 1 and 2 was 48 ms; this was as the standard deviation of a half-normal, as before. With a sample mean difference between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions of 20 ms (SE of the difference = 13), the Bayes Factor was B = 1.47 indicating data insensitivity and no conclusions should be drawn, with the evidence slightly telling against the null hypothesis. 4.3. Discussion Using individual subjective thresholds (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984), the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that when presented with a subliminal prime instruction to choose a particular noun, unconscious cognition is able to successfully choose the correct noun above mere chance performance. Experiment 3 validated the threshold-setting procedure used in the previous experiments. The ZCC indicated a sensitive confirmation of the null hypothesis of no conscious awareness, ruling out partial awareness (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). Note that partial awareness of the displayed noun in itself is not sufficient to know in any way which choice to make; a participant would need to consciously have partial information to both the noun and the instruction (‘not’ versus ‘pick’). Any such awareness should be reflected in confidence ratings; the ZCC, by contrast, supports the claim that perception was subliminal. It could be argued that maybe participants gave up on using the confidence scale (despite clearly using it appropriately on conscious trials). Even this objection cannot be plausibly sustained because the Bayes factor which indicated strong evidence for the ZCC assumed that the population effect could be indefinitely small. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that was rejected is consistent with participants trying to some degree but in a noisy way (i.e. ‘‘giving up’’ to some degree). The ‘‘giving up’’ hypothesis, to survive this test, would need to assert a priori that participants gave up completely. Without any prior basis for asserting complete failure to follow instructions, the ‘‘giving up’’ hypothesis can be rejected. There were trials on which participants indicated some confidence. The results for the ZCC implied that participants used confident responses when they had no better access to information than when they used guess responses. Thus, participants may have been driven by a need to vary the response used, and thus sometimes gave a confidence greater than 50%. Such a tendency will add noise to measuring the threshold, partly explaining the lack of 100% reliability in threshold measurement, and also indicating how the apparent threshold drift in some participants in previous experiments could have been spurious. Because noun pairs were repeated, it might be argued that if a noun pair that had been confidently seen were repeated the subliminal choice effect we observed may in fact depend on consciously primed specific stimulus–response links. However, trials were not repeated exactly, as noun pairs were only repeated for counter-balancing reasons. Thus having once associated a given noun with a left response, there is a higher probability that that same noun will be associated with right response on its next appearance. Thus, S–R links would induce subjects to make incorrect rather than correct responses. 2 Let X be a weighted average of the performance above baseline when guessing (G) and when confident (C), with the weights being the proportions of each type of response. That is, X = (1  pc) * G + pc * C. By definition, our measure of confidence accuracy relation, the slope, is C–G. This will be maximum when all guessing responses are at baseline, i.e. when G = 0. In this case, slope = C  G = C. Also in this case, X = pc * C, with the G term dropping out. Rearranging, C = X/pc. Thus, since maximum slope = C in this case, maximum slope = X/pc. QED. See, for example, Guo et al. (2013) and Li, Guo, Zhu, Yang, and Dienes (2013) for the previous use of this method for the zero correlation criterion. 3 Kanai, Walsh, and Tseng (2010) offer a subjective discriminability of invisibility (SDI) index to further discriminate between a lack of confidence as a result of either perceptual or attentional blindness. However, due to the lack of trials in which a stimulus was ‘absent’, or an appropriate equivalent, we were unable to apply the SDI in this case. For Type II sensitivity, Maniscalco and Lau (2012) show their meta-d’ measure is superior in principle to Type II d’ (see also Barret et al., in press, for confirmation with detailed analyses); however, meta-d’ is more unstable for small N than Type II d’ in our experience, so we have used the latter. 1032 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 Further, the results of the ZCC indicate that ‘‘confident’’ responses may not have reflected conscious perception, but rather, for example, a desire to use all response options. Whilst an effect of ‘not’ versus ‘pick’ remained in Experiment 3, the demonstration would be stronger if the accuracy of ‘not’ trials were individually significantly above baseline performance. However, research has demonstrated that the type of mask used, for example a string of letters or ampersands, can adversely influence the processing of stimuli by interfering with phoneme, grapheme and semantic interpretation (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; McClelland, 1978; Perfetti & Bell, 1991; Walley & Weiden, 1973). Therefore, Experiment 4 aimed to develop a more sensitive method of delivering subliminal stimuli. 5. Experiment 4 To render a prime unconscious, it is necessary to mask the prime in order to avoid conscious perception. The most common method of masking is to use backward masks in the form of symbols (e.g. hatch marks or ampersands), or letter strings (Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007). However, previous research has highlighted the detrimental effect that backward masking has on the cognitive comprehension of subliminal primes (Di Lollo et al., 2000; McClelland, 1978; Perfetti & Bell, 1991; Walley & Weiden, 1973), due to interference during the pattern and letter recognition part of processing (Grainger, Diependaele, Spinelli, Ferrand, & Farioli, 2003). Koudier and Dehaene (2007) state that for a prime to be subliminal, it needs to be presented for a sufficiently short duration, and the mask needs to either share stimulus features or fit the contours of the prime closely. Therefore, Experiment 4 attempted to successfully demonstrate subliminal semantic priming using a greyscale contrast masking method established by Lamy, Mudrik, and Deouell (2008). The experiment followed the same format as Experiment 3 in that participants viewed the list of nouns to be used in subliminal trials to gain the advantage of practice without the establishment of S–R links, and continually assessed subliminal subjective thresholds. As in Experiments 1–3, it was hypothesised that for the subliminal trials, participants would correctly identify the noun for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions beyond 50% chance expectation. As evidenced in the previous 3 experiments, it was predicted that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials. 5.1. Method 5.1.1. Design and participants In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being the dependant variable, 22 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants took part in Experiments 1, 2, or 3. Sixteen of the participants were female and six male, with ages ranging from 18 to 31 years (M = 20.23, SD = 3.44). 5.1.2. Apparatus and materials Replicated that used in Experiments 2 and 3. 5.1.3. Procedure 5.1.3.1. Conscious trials. The stimulus instruction was presented within a rectangular box of the same size as used for the fixation. The background of the rectangle was filled with grey at a contrast level set by equally altering the red, green and blue (RGB) channels to 212 on the computer monitor. The stimulus instruction was presented within this box in grey at an RGB contrast level of 108 (see Fig. 2 for an example). The stimulus instruction was presented on the screen for 250 ms to ensure conscious perception. The stimulus instruction was immediately followed by the two-noun choice (e.g. ‘1. baby’ and ‘2. yard’) presented in the centre of the screen. 5.1.3.2. SOA setting. In an attempt to block conscious perception of the prime instruction, each stimulus instruction was presented at an RGB level of 208 against a background RGB contrast of 212 (see Fig. 3 for an example). 5.1.3.3. Subliminal trials. The subliminal phase of the experiment contained three blocks of 40 subliminal trials (with the third block being a replication of the first block, at an RGB level of 208 against a background RGB contrast of 212). The Fig. 2. Example of a conscious contrast mask. A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1033 Fig. 3. Example of an unconscious contrast mask. presentation time of the stimulus instruction was determined by the point at which the participant rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive trials in the SOA setting phase. Confidence ratings were taken after each trial. Randomly placed within each block of 40 subliminal trials was an additional 10 conscious trials (with the stimulus instruction at an RGB of 108 against a background RGB contrast of 212, presented for 300 ms) to prevent rhythmic pressing of the ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘2’’ keys, and to remind participants of the task required (cf. Eimer et al., 2009). 5.2. Results 5.2.1. SOA setting Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 32–112 ms, with an average experimental subliminal presentation speed of 56 ms (SD = 21). 5.2.2. Trial accuracy The mean number of correct identifications for conscious trials was slightly off 100% (M = 97%, SE = 1). For the ‘pick’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 97% (SE = 1), whilst for ‘not’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 96% (SE = 1). For the subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% (i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 120 subliminal trials, the number of trials upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged between 0 and 89 trials (M = 20, SD = 22). Mean percentage correct responses for subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 51%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 52%, SE = 1) conditions are presented in Fig. 1, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. On subliminal trials, overall d0 values significantly differed from zero (M = .07, SE = .03, t(21) = 2.60, p = .02, d = 1.13). Although, taken individually, neither accuracy on ‘pick’ (t(21) = 1.84, p = .08, d = 0.80) or ‘not’ (t(21) = 1.89, p = .07, d = 0.82) conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. However, when looking at the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun, noun identifications significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 51%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 48%, SE = 1, t(21) = 2.6, p = .02, d = 1.13) conditions, indicating the appropriate processing of ‘pick’ versus ‘not’. As in Experiment 3, conscious knowledge was assessed by ZCC. The difference in accuracy between ‘guess’ and ‘any confidence’ was 1.11%, which was not significant (t(21) = 1.88, p = .07, d = 0.82). A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether the data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between confidence and accuracy. The maximum slope was determined by the overall accuracy in Experiment 4 when confidence was ignored (3%) divided by the proportion of confident responses (.17). Therefore, the maximum slope = 17.65%. Using a uniform distribution between 0 and 17.65 (sample M = 1.11, SE = .59) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.48, suggesting that the data were insensitive and we are thus unable to say whether or not the ZCC is satisfied. Type II d0 , another way of measuring the ZCC, did not differ significantly from zero (M = .01, SE = .01, t(21) = 1.88, p = .08, d = 0.82). Using a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d0 of .07 (sample M = .01, SE = .01) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.50, providing only weak evidence for the null hypothesis. However, the guessing criterion indicates that there was some unconscious knowledge. 5.2.3. Response time The time taken to identify the noun the participant had been instructed to choose was recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggests that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 746 ms, SE = 20) than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 920 ms, SE = 34, t(21) = 5.14, p < .001, d = 2.24). Similarly, participants were slower in subliminal trials to identify the noun in ‘not’ conditions (M = 942 ms, SE = 36) when compared to ‘pick’ conditions (M = 874 ms, SE = 52). However a paired sample t-test revealed that this difference in reaction times between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions was not significant (t(21) = 1.69, p = .11, d = 0.74). Using the average effect for Experiments 1–3, 39 ms as the standard deviation of a half-normal, with a sample mean difference between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions of 68 ms (SE of the difference = 40), a Bayes Factor of B = 2.55, indicated insensitive data, but with more support for the experimental hypothesis than the null hypothesis. 5.3. Discussion For the subliminal trials, the accuracy data suggested that participants chose the correct noun beyond chance expectations at an average rate of 51–52%. When analysed individually, participants did not significantly choose the correct noun 1034 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 beyond what would be expected by chance for either ‘pick’ or ‘not’ conditions, because of data insensitivity. Nevertheless, participants did choose the presented noun significantly more often in the ‘pick’ rather than the ‘not’ condition, supporting the theory that people do process the instructions appropriately. However, the aim of Experiment 4 was to develop a more sensitive method of subliminal priming than that used in Experiment 3 by utilising a grey-scale contrast method of masking (Lamy et al., 2008). Despite using the grey-scale contrast method, Experiment 4 failed to demonstrate successful priming in subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. However, further research has demonstrated the superior priming effects achieved when primes are presented repeatedly (Atas, Vermeiren, & Cleeremans, 2012; Marcel, 1983). This superior priming effect was demonstrated by Wentura and Frings (2005), who used objective thresholds to compare the effectiveness of a single standard masked prime with a masked prime that was presented ten times in quick succession. The results indicated that only the repeated masked prime condition produced a significant priming effect. That is, repeatedly presenting a masked prime increased subliminal priming without increasing subjective awareness. The issue of repeated prime presentation was explored further in Experiment 5. 6. Experiment 5 Experiment 5 aimed to refine the grey-scale contrast method of masking utilised in Experiment 4 whilst taking advantage of the superior effects of repeated priming (Marcel, 1983; Wentura & Frings, 2005). Experiment 5 replicated the procedure and format used in Experiment 4, but rather than one presentation of the prime, each prime was repeated three times. As in Experiments 1–4, it was expected that for the subliminal trials, participants would correctly identify the noun for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions beyond 50% chance expectation. As evidenced in Experiment 1, it was predicted that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials. 6.1. Method 6.1.1. Design and participants One problem with the previous study was low power. The dz for the accuracy on not trails was 0.40. For a power of 80%, a sample size of 51 is needed. In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being the dependant variable, 51 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants took part in Experiments 1, 2, 3, or 4. Forty-four of the participants were female and seven male, with ages ranging from 18 to 32 years (M = 19.69, SD = 2.53). 6.1.2. Apparatus and materials Replicated Experiments 2–4. 6.1.3. Procedure Replicated Experiment 4. However, there were three equal duration presentations of the prime for conscious, SOA, and subliminal trials, with a 150 ms pause between each presentation. 6.2. Results 6.2.1. SOA setting Subjective threshold durations of the single prime presentation ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 192 ms (a cumulative range of 48–576 ms), with an average experimental presentation speed of 64 ms (SD = 35, with a cumulative mean presentation speed of 192 ms). 6.2.2. Trial accuracy The mean number of correct noun identifications for conscious trials was 95% (SE = 1). For the ‘pick’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 95% (SE = 1), whilst for ‘not’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 95% (SE = 1). For the subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% (i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 120 subliminal trials, the number of trials upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged between 0 and 86 trials (M = 23, SD = 26). Mean percentage correct responses for subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 53%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 52%, SE = 1) conditions are presented in Fig. 1, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. On subliminal trials, overall d0 values significantly differed from zero (M = .11, SE = .03, t(23) = 3.59, p = .001, d = 1.02). Accuracy on ‘pick’ conditions significantly differed from chance expectations (t(50) = 2.43, p = .02, d = 0.69), as well as performance accuracy on ‘not’ (t(50) = 2.37, p = .02, d = 0.67) conditions. In addition, a paired-sample t-test looking at the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 53%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 48%, SE = 1, t(50) = 3.6, p = .001, d = 1.02) conditions. Conscious knowledge was again assessed in Experiment 5 using the ZCC. The difference in accuracy between ‘guess’ and ‘any confidence’ was 5.04%, which was not significant (t(50) = 1.72, p = .09, d = 0.49). A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether the data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between confidence and accuracy. The A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1035 maximum slope was determined by the overall accuracy in Experiment 5 when confidence was ignored (2%) divided by the proportion of confident responses (.19). Therefore, the maximum slope = 10.53%. Using a uniform distribution between 0 and 10.53 (sample M = 5.04, SE = 2.93) produced a Bayes Factor of 2.84, suggesting that the data were insensitive (albeit providing more evidence for there being some rather than no conscious knowledge), and we are thus unable to say whether or not the ZCC is satisfied. Type II d0 , an alternative measure of the ZCC, also did not significantly differ from zero (M = .10, SE = .16, t(50) = 1.15, p = .26, d = 0.33). Using a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d0 of .11 (and a sample Type II d0 of M = .04, SE = .04) produced a Bayes Factor of 1.15, indicating that the data were insensitive and that we are unable to draw conclusions as to whether or not there was any conscious perception. However, the guessing criterion indicated that there was some unconscious knowledge. 6.2.3. Response time The time taken to identify the noun the participant had been instructed to choose was recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggests that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 711 ms, SE = 15) than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 883 ms, SE = 24, t(50) = 9.97, p < .001, d = 2.82). Similarly, for the subliminal trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 866 ms, SE = 29) when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 959 ms, SE = 25, t(50) = 4.46, p < .001, d = 1.26). 6.3. Discussion Participants in the subliminal ‘pick’ condition correctly identified the noun at an average rate of 53%. Similarly, the results suggest that participant’s chose the correct noun on an average 52% of occasions for subliminal ‘not’ conditions. Experiment 5 showed that participants could successfully identify the correct noun at above chance expectations for both subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. However, the degree of priming in experiment 5 was not significantly greater than in experiment 4, t(71) = .68, p = .49, d = 0.16, indicating that repeated presentation of a prime did not greatly boost the amount of unconscious processing. As evidenced in Experiments 1–4, the response time data for conscious trials shows the difference in task difficulty between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions in that it took significantly longer to identify the instructed noun in ‘pick’ trials when compared to ‘not’, an average 171 ms longer. Similarly, there was a statistically significant response time difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials in subliminal conditions. Therefore, even though confidence ratings ensured that priming was below the subjective threshold, participants were still an average 93 ms slower to identify the noun in ‘not’ conditions when compared to ‘pick’ conditions. 7. General discussion The present research investigated the ability of unconscious cognition to process the semantic meaning of subliminal stimuli. In a series of five experiments, participants were subliminally primed with a two word instruction, instructing the individual with which of two subsequent nouns to choose. This prime was in the form an instruction to either pick the accompanying noun (the second word in the instruction, e.g., ‘pick yard’), or to not pick the accompanying noun (e.g., ‘not yard’), when presented with the accompanying noun and a paired noun (e.g., ‘1. baby, 2. yard’). If able to correctly identify the instructed noun, this should demonstrate the semantic comprehension of the subliminal instruction. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants were able to choose the correct noun beyond what would be expected by chance alone for both subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, without this effect being attributed to the retrieval of S–R links (Exp. 2). To minimise the likelihood of conscious awareness, Experiment 3 measured confidence after each trial and excluded trials in which the participant rated any degree of confidence in their decision from the analysis. However, the results indicated that participants failed to identify the correct noun, beyond chance performance, for ‘not’ conditions. The Bayesian analysis conducted on the trial accuracy data indicated support for the experimental hypothesis that participants would choose the correct noun depending on subliminal instruction. Experiments 4 and 5 aimed to develop a more sensitive method of subliminal priming by adopting a grey-scale contrast method of masking employed by Lamy et al. (2008). The results of Experiment 5 additionally adopted a method of repeated priming and demonstrated that participants identified the correct noun beyond chance for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. In addition to looking at above chance accuracy, we also looked at the percentage of occasions that participants chose the noun based on the primed noun. That is, if the participant chose the primed noun, this would lead to a correct response for ‘pick’ trials, but an incorrect response for ‘not’ trials. Therefore, if the participant merely chose the primed noun, there would not be a significant difference in accuracy between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. However, the results suggest that there was a significant difference in choosing the primed noun for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ in each of the five experiments (including Experiments 3 and 4 where accuracy for each instruction separately did not significantly exceed chance expectations), indicating appropriate processing of the presented instruction. Response time data for the conscious trials in Experiments 1–5 demonstrated the difference in cognitive task difficulty between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the ‘pick’ instruction, the reader is informed that the accompanying noun is the 1036 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 correct noun to choose. So when subsequently presented with the noun-pair choice, the participant needs to first match the noun they had just been presented with, with the two nouns on the screen, and then indicate which noun they had been instructed to choose. For the ‘not’ trials, the reader is informed that the accompanying noun is the incorrect noun to choose. When presented with the noun-pair choice, the participant has two tasks. The first is to identify the noun they had just been presented with, and the second is to indicate the other noun in order to fulfil the task. This relative difficulty in task expectations was reflected in the response time difference between conscious ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials, as participants were on average quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials in each of the five experiments. Perhaps more interestingly, this response time difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials was similarly evidenced in subliminal conditions. Although this response time difference was only statistically significant in Experiments 1 and 5, the Bayes Factor in Experiments 2 and 4 indicated that the non-significant results were not evidence for the null hypothesis. Furthermore, a meta-analysis indicated an overall significant result for the response time difference over all subliminal conditions (p < .001).4 These response time data lend further support to the argument that participants were able to comprehend the logical function of both subliminal pick and not, demonstrating unconscious cognitive control. The series of experiments presented here demonstrate that unconscious processing of two-word primes is feasible, a controversial idea in current literature. Whilst there exists numerous studies demonstrating the ability of unconscious processing to semantically analyse single and even multiple word strings (e.g., Abad et al., 2003; Bronstein & Rodin, 1983; Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Marcel, 1983; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Sklar et al., 2012; Waller & Barter, 2005), still other studies doubt the ability of subliminal perception and the cognitive unconscious to complete more complex analyses than pattern and feature recognition (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Condon & Allen, 1980; Greenwald, 1992). One argument attempting to explain the inability of many studies to find unconscious semantic activation involves the use of objective thresholds, which not only test unconscious cognition, but degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 2008), or the use of limited processing time resulting in degraded unconscious cognition (Sklar et al., 2012). Conversely, subjective methods of assessing subliminal perception assume that if an individual possesses knowledge, yet is unaware that they possess this knowledge, then there is evidence of unconscious knowledge (Ziori & Dienes, 2006). Experiments 3–5 here only included trials in which confidence was rated to be at 50% (i.e., guessing), thereby indicating a lack of conscious knowledge according to subjective measures of subliminality. Whilst confident responses on a number of trials may indicate partial conscious awareness, participants may also sometimes give confidence ratings above 50% just because they think they should, or because they hallucinate. A meta-analysis of the overall ZCC indicated an overall non-significant relationship between confidence and accuracy (p > .05)5, whilst a Bayes Factor of B = 0.366 suggested that the data were not quite sensitive enough by conventional standards (i.e., less than 0.33) but more strongly supports the claim of no conscious knowledge rather than partial conscious knowledge. Fig. 1 indicates that when changing the paradigm from pure back masking to contrast masking, the proportion of times the displayed noun was chosen changed. The tendency to pick the displayed noun in experiments 1/2/3 combined was 53% overall (SE = .4) significantly different from the tendency in experiments 4/5 combined (50%, SE = .54), t(145) = 5.02, p = .02, d = 0.83. If a subject had awareness of just the displayed noun, nothing follows about whether they should pick it. If a subject had awareness of just the instruction (pick or not) nothing follows about which noun to choose. But if the subject had awareness of the whole phrase, they should pick the displayed noun to an equal extent above 50% on PICK trials as they reject it below 50% on NOT trials. Thus awareness has the tendency to move displayed noun choice towards 50%. The finding of a bias above 50% in the earlier rather than latter experiments thus argues against any claim that participants had more awareness in the first three experiments than in the last two. Given we tightened up the measurement of awareness in the last experiments, this is an important point. Jacoby (1991) developed the process-dissociation procedure to demonstrate the separate contributions of both conscious and unconscious knowledge using stem completion tasks (cf. Marcel, 1983, who showed a failure to exclude in subliminal conditions). Inclusion tasks require the participant to complete the stem with a word that has been presented outside of conscious awareness. Exclusion tasks require the participant to complete the stem with a different word to the unconsciously primed word. If knowledge of the primed word is conscious, this should lead to a below baseline performance, however evidence suggests that participants continue to complete the stem with the primed word above baseline performance (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). Jacoby argues that it is this inability to exclude primed words that is evidence of unconscious knowledge. Therefore, conscious equates to cognitive control, whilst unconscious equates to a lack of cognitive control. From a higher order perspective (e.g., Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), the ability to exclude an item indicates conscious perception only if the instruction is, or is taken to be, to exclude if you think you saw the stimulus, that is if there was an appropriate higher order thought of seeing. In these experiments, exclusion instructions were not conditional on higher order thoughts: participants were simply instructed to exclude a particular item. Thus, on a higher order perspective, there is 4 A meta-analysis conducted on all response time differences between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions (M = 37, SE = 8) revealed a significant relationship, t(142) = 4.51, p < .001, d = 0.76. 5 The meta-analysis conducted on all of the ZCC data revealed that the relationship between confidence and accuracy was non-significant, t(94) = 0.52, p > .05, d = 0.11. 6 The maximum slope was determined by the mean overall accuracy in Experiments 3, 4 and 5 when confidence was ignored (3%) divided by the mean proportion of confident responses (.15). Therefore, the maximum slope = 20%. Using a uniform distribution between 0 and 20 (sample M = 1.87, SE = 3.6) produced a Bayes Factor of B = 0.36. A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 1037 no reason why exclusion could not occur unconsciously. We argue that the series of experiments presented here provides evidence of unconscious knowledge precisely because participants were able to demonstrate unconscious cognitive control by following the subliminal instruction to not choose the presented word. Additional research using subjective measures of unconscious have similarly demonstrated unconscious cognitive control in grammar studies (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Norman et al., 2011; Wan et al., 2008), the serial reaction time task (Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010), and in hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 2007). In the current case, not only could participants exclude a specified item when the item was subliminal, they could exclude it when the instruction to exclude was itself subliminal, which is the novel feature of the experiments reported here. We used subjective measures to establish the conscious status of perception. Some researchers believe objective measures most sensitively determine the conscious status of perceptual states (see e.g. Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004). To some extent, which measure one prefers depends on which theory of consciousness one subscribes to (Dienes & Seth, 2010a): On higher order and global workspace theories, conscious knowledge either entails or disposes awareness of the perception, which would be reflected in confidence ratings (consistent with the current methodology); on other hand, according to Wordly Discrimination Theory, the very fact that participants chose the correct word at above chance levels entails that the perception of the word was conscious, whatever the confidence rating. Holders of the latter sort of theory may say that while participants may sincerely and earnestly believe they saw nothing of relevance, that just goes to show they lacked higher-order or reflective awareness, but the perception itself was still conscious. We do not wish to quibble over words. We have shown that the sort of awareness picked out by higher order thoughts is not necessary for the processing of linguistic negation, whether one calls it ‘‘unconscious perception’’ (as seems natural to us) or ‘‘reflectively unconscious perception’’, or some other name. A second line of criticism over our methods may accept the logic of subjective methods in principle (e.g., Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012), but deny we used the best subjective method. Methods involving gambling may motivate careful and honest reports of awareness, and future research could use, for example, the ‘‘no loss gambling’’ of Dienes and Seth (2010b; see also Mealor & Dienes, 2012). Another approach is to ask subjects to report not on their accuracy, which is something ultimately unknowable to a subject (cf. Dienes & Perner, 2004), but on the quality of the visual experience itself, quite apart from its unknown mapping to the world (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) of Ramsøy and Overgaard asks subjects to distinguish four degrees of visual clarity, from no visual experience (1), to a glimpse (but no idea of what) (2), to almost clear image (3) to clear image (4). Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010) compared confidence ratings and PAS for measuring conscious perception of shapes, and argued PAS was more exhaustive. People can be aware of seeing something before knowing that they have seen something relevant. Dienes and Seth (2010c) argued that as perception is defined in part by its contents, having some conscious experience is consistent with other perceptual contents remaining unconscious, which PAS would miss out on, but confidence ratings would be sensitive to. Further, Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchoń, and Cleeremans (2013) argued that confidence ratings were more sensitive than PAS for emotional facial expression; maybe this is true in general for stimuli more complex than shapes. But what constitutes the best subjective measure of perceptual awareness is still a matter of debate. Future research should determine the replicability of the current results when PAS and other scales are used. Additionally, whilst the current work was motivated on the grounds that subjective measures are more sensitive than objective measures, this still remains a conjecture in the current case. Future studies may benefit from a direct comparison of subjective and objective measures in the case of unconscious negation. Furthermore, due to the limitations in subliminal presentation using computers (i.e., presentation speeds using a 60 Hz computer monitor being limited to 16 ms screen refresh rates), a tachistoscope allowing millisecond manipulation would be optimal so that there is an accurate estimate of both subjective and objective thresholds (cf. Masters, Maxwell, & Eves, 2009). In his study investigating the limitations of unconscious cognition, Greenwald (1992) concludes that unconscious processing is not able to complete more sophisticated analyses than letter recognition and partial word detection. In summing up, Greenwald issues a two-word challenge in which the investigations into multiple-word subliminal primes need to ensure that each word needs to be processed in unison, that no single word should be sufficient to impart sentence-meaning. The studies presented here attempted to meet this challenge by using two-word subliminal primes as instructions to choose a subsequent word. Whilst the ‘not’ conditions in this study appear compelling in their need to require semantic comprehension of not in order to inhibit recognition, the semantic analysis of the second word is not necessarily vital in choosing the correct word; recognition is all that is required to discriminate between the two words. Further research into this arena may benefit from adapting the study to make semantic interpretation of the second word vital. Future research into the unconscious processing of subliminally presented multiple word-strings may also benefit from developing a more sensitive method of delivering subliminal stimuli. Experiments 4 and 5 presented here aimed to address this issue by employing a grey-scale contrast method of masking established by Lamy et al. (2008). Although Experiment 5 produced some positive results, participants were indicating the correct noun at an average rate of 52%, only 2% above a baseline of 50% performance. Therefore, whilst it was expected that the longer presentation durations afforded by contrast masking would result in greater semantic processing, this was not necessarily the case. However, Lamy, Mudrik, and Deouell (2008) successfully demonstrated unconscious processing by reducing the contrast between prime and background whilst keeping presentation speed constant until subjective thresholds were reached. In Experiments 4 and 5 presented here, prime and background contrasts were held constant whilst presentation speeds were reduced. It is possible that reducing the contrast rather than reducing duration may have resulted in a greater depth of processing and thus higher accuracy. 1038 A.-M. Armstrong, Z. Dienes / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1022–1040 Furthermore, Wentura and Frings (2005) indicate that maximum priming effects were evidenced when subliminal primes were presented 10 times in quick succession, whilst Marcel (1983) found an increasing priming effect up to 20 prime repetitions. Therefore, further research may improve subliminal priming effects by investigating the benefits of contrast masking and repeated priming. The current study makes a start towards showing processing of syntax under subliminal conditions in showing people can process a linguistic ‘‘not’’, and extract meaning from the combination of words. Nonetheless, a stronger case for subliminal syntax would be made if the effect was stronger for ‘‘not baby’’ rather than ‘‘baby not’’, which would indicate that syntactically correct word order is also important for processing word combinations. Armstrong and Dienes (submitted) provide further support for the syntactic processing of subliminal phrases by showing that when active (e.g. the boy hits the girl) and passive (e.g. the boy is hit by the girl) sentences are presented below the subjective threshold, participants can nonetheless pick an appropriate picture at above chance levels. 8. Conclusion To conclude, we present a series of experiments that utilised subjective thresholds of subliminal priming to demonstrate a significant priming effect that cannot be attributed to partial conscious awareness or the retrieval of S–R links. Previous research into the effects of priming has often demonstrated at best the semantic comprehension of single-word primes, and at worst simple letter and pattern recognition processes. However, our results suggest that far from simple and unsophisticated analyses, unconscious cognition is capable of processing the logical function of negation when instructed to choose between two nouns. 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Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Review article Through the forest of motor representations Gabriele Ferretti ⇑ Department of Pure and Applied Science, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Via Timoteo Viti, 10, 61029 Urbino, PU, Italy Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, S.S. 208, Lange Sint Annastraat 7, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 1 March 2016 Revised 26 May 2016 Accepted 30 May 2016 Keywords: Motor representations The two visual systems model Visuomotor processing Action possibilities Ventro-dorsal visual sub-system a b s t r a c t Following neuroscience, and using different labels, several philosophers have addressed the idea of the presence of a single representational mechanism lying in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes involved in different functions and useful for shaping suitable action performances: a motor representation (MR). MRs are the naturalized mental antecedents of action. This paper presents a new, non-monolithic view of MRs, according to which, contrarily to the received view, when looking at in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes, we find not only a single representational mechanism with different functions, but an ensemble of different subrepresentational phenomena, each of which with a different function. This new view is able to avoid several issues emerging from the literature and to address something the literature is silent about, which however turns out to be crucial for a theory of MRs. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Contents 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 The positions in play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 2.1. MRs are dorsal phenomena, not consciously accessible and represent action goals, bodily movements and action properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 2.2. MRs are subserved by both streams, can be conscious and represent only action properties, not goals or bodily movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 2.3. MRs arise from the activity of the premotor cortex and mainly encode goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 2.4. Philosophical problems with (the literature on) MRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 A new perspective on MRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 The decomposing strategy and the dorsal stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 4.1. The visuomotor component and the simulative one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 4.2. Goals/outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 4.3. The egocentric/peripersonal component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 MRs between ventral and dorsal perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 5.1. The dorsal/ventral interplay in action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 5.2. Dorsal visual processing and the possibility of deception of vision for action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 5.3. The connection between V-D and ventral perception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 5.4. The many facets of our visuomotor interactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 5.5. Dorsal multimodal spatial processing, conscious vision-for-action and MRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 ⇑ Address: Department of Pure and Applied Science, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Via Timoteo Viti, 10, 61029 Urbino, PU, Italy. E-mail address: gabriele.ferretti88@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.013 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 178 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 6. 7. 5.6. MRs: an unexpected functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Extending the neural correlates of MRs even further: the OFC cortex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Appendix A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 A.1. Acronyms used in the paper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 1. Introduction The hand has a very complex anatomical structure. Functionally, movements of the hand require a coordinated interplay of the 39 intrinsic and extrinsic muscles acting on 18 joints. Among all the joints of the hand, of particular importance is the carpometacarpal joint of the thumb. This joint is of a saddle type and its immense significance for the hand function emanates from the extra mobility this joint is endowed with, resulting in the opposition of the thumb to the other fingers. The plethora of bones, joints, and muscles of which the hand is constituted gives to this structure amazing biomechanical complexity. From the kinematic perspective, the hand has over 20 degrees of freedom. Thus the question arises: how does the brain control the hand? [Raos, Umiltà, Murata, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2006: 709] The importance of investigating the mind starting from the naturalization of the mental antecedents of actions has been recently and excellently brought to the attention of the philosophy of mind (Nanay, 2013b). Accordingly, following neuroscience, and using different labels, several philosophers have addressed the idea of the presence of a single representational mechanism lying in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes involved in different functions and useful for shaping suitable action performances: a motor representation (MR).1 MRs are the naturalized mental antecedents of action – I am excluding mental action here. This paper presents a new, non-monolithic view of MRs, according to which, contrarily to the received view, when looking at in between (visual) perceptual processes and motor processes, we find not only a single representational mechanism with different functions, but an ensemble of different sub-representational phenomena, each of which with a different function. This new view is able to avoid several issues emerging from the literature and to address something the literature is silent about, which however turns out to be crucial for a theory of MRs. Before developing my account, I need to sketch the basic positions in the literature about MRs. 2. The positions in play In order to sketch the basic positions held in the literature, a premise on neurophysiology is needed. A common ground to link visual perception with action is the ‘‘Two Visual Systems Model” (TVSM), which suggests the presence, in humans and other mammals, of a separation of two main (see Sections 4.1 and 5.5) visual pathways, grounded on distinct anatomo-functional structures (Milner & Goodale, 1995): one for visual recognition, the ventral stream, and one for visually guided action, the dorsal stream. They can be dissociated due to cortical lesions. Lesions in the dorsal stream (the occipito-parietal network from the primary visual cortex to the posterior parietal cortex) impair one’s ability to use what one sees to guide action (optic ataxia), but not object recognition; lesions in the ventral stream (the occipito-temporal network from the primary visual cortex to the inferotemporal cortex) impair one’s ability to recognize things in the visual world (visual agnosia), but not action guidance (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; see also Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005). Moreover, we have behavioral studies of normal subjects involving visual illusions that can deceive the ventral stream but not the dorsal one; thus, it seems that, unlike ventral perception, dorsal perception is completely inaccessible to consciousness (I’ll come back to this in Section 5.2). Starting from this specification, we now come to the list of the positions about MRs. I should specify that I will just mention the positions in the literature which propose a naturalized account of these mental antecedents of action, namely, those that follow neuroscience in order to build an idea of MRs. Indeed, I agree that, in order to understand MRs, we have to turn to empirical science (Nanay, 2014), something not always pursued in the literature about action-representations. 2.1. MRs are dorsal phenomena, not consciously accessible and represent action goals, bodily movements and action properties A widely agreed idea about MRs is that they are due to the dorsal stream (Pacherie, 2000, 2011) and, given its encapsulation, MRs are not normally consciously accessible (Pacherie, 2000: sec. 5, 2002: 63, 2006: 14, 2007: 8, 2011: 14; Jacob & 1 I will ignore the different labels found in literature and simply talk about MRs. G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 179 Jeannerod, 2003: 252–255, 186, and sec. 6.4; see chap. 6; see Brogaard, 2011: 1094; see Jeannerod, 1994, 1997). MRs might become conscious by accessing the short-term memory long enough, when action is blocked, delayed, or through top-down attentional amplification, something that is usually impossible (Jeannerod, 1994; Pacherie, 2000: sec. 5; p. 104, 2006: 8, 2008: 195, 198). Also, since dorsal perception is not sensitive to certain perceptual illusions, thus MRs cannot therefore access ventral conscious semantic representations (I’ll suggest this is not completely true in Section 5.2) – as suggested by cases of visual agnosia (Pacherie, 2000: 411–412, 2008: 196). However, sometimes a slight inter-streams interaction is allowed (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003) (I’ll come back to this in Section 5.1) and it is suggested that, while MRs are dorsal processes, pragmatic and semantic representations should not rely on the ventral/dorsal anatomical distinction (Pacherie, 2000: 411, 412). Moreover, MRs guide action as long as it unfolds (Pacherie, 2002: 61, 2006: 14, 2011: 14 and sec. 4; see also Nanay, 2014: 4). In general, MRs represent an action goal (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Pacherie, 2000: 409, 2002: 71–72, 2007: 2, 2011:13), which determines the type of grip chosen for motor interaction (as we shall see below, talking about grips is too general) (Pacherie, 2000: 409, sec. 5, 2002: 71–72, 2006: 8, 2007: 2, 8, 2008: 186, 2011: 10, 13; Jacob, 2005), and which is computed in egocentric coordinates (Pacherie, 2000: 413, 2002: 70,71, 2011: 10; see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003: chap. 8.2; see Sections 4.1,4.2,5.4) – the literature on MRs privileges the case of grasping, insofar as this specific motor act is the most studied one in the neuroscientific literature about visuomotor behavior; while I will follow the literature in privileging this kind of motor act, it is worth noting that the discussion about the perception of action possibilities can be extended to most of the motor acts we are able to perform (see Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). Furthermore, MR functions ‘fall between’ a sensory function (extracting objects’ features relevant for action) and a motor one (encoding motor acts) (see Section 4.1) and those two aspects of the content of motor representations (goal and object features) are not separate components of the content (see Sections 4.1,4.2,5.4). Finally, MRs also represent bodily movements for a given situation, being grounded on the simulation of the required motor acts (Gallese, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2009; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003: chap. 6; Jeannerod, 2006) – (I’ll offer an analysis of simulation in Section 4.1). However, it is not clear how MRs can select a singular motor act with respect to different action possibilities that a singular object can offer (this problem is recognized by Pacherie, 2002: 71–72) (I will be back to this issue in Sections 5.3 and 5.4). 2.2. MRs are subserved by both streams, can be conscious and represent only action properties, not goals or bodily movements Another view is that MRs represent action properties extracted from the object’s geometrical properties relevant for action performance (Nanay, 2011, 2013a: 75, 2013b: 39; 2014: 4). However, while for Nanay (2011) MRs also encode action goals, for Nanay (2013b: 41, 42) this is not the case and they do not represent bodily movements (Nanay, 2013b: 41), in contrast to the position described in (Section 2.1). Furthermore, while dorsal perception is important for the implementation of MRs, it is not the only one (Nanay, 2013a: 1055, 2013b: 3.4, p. 64). Also, Nanay is the only one to explicitly suggest that MRs are subserved by both streams and can be conscious, although they are typically unconscious (Gentilucci, Daprati, Toni, Chieffi, & Saetti, 1995; Morgado, Muller, Gentaz, & Palluel-Germain, 2011; Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2005; Stein, Stanford, Wallace, Vaughan, & Jiang, 2004; for a discussion see Nanay, 2013b: 3.4). However, dorsal processing is supposed to be quick and automatic and thus should not be sensitive to top-down influences. Therefore, MRs are not fully exhausted by dorsal perception. Finally, the expression ‘‘dorsal vision” deals with anatomical criteria, while action-guiding vision deals with functional criteria and we should not use anatomical data in analyzing the cognitive impenetrability claim (Nanay, 2013a: 1058) confusing the functional level (vision-for-action) and the anatomical level (dorsal stream) (p. 1055). 2.3. MRs arise from the activity of the premotor cortex and mainly encode goals Finally, there is the view according to which MR processing lies in the activity of premotor areas, without clarifying the precise cortical circuits, nor addressing the ventral/dorsal issue (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014). Following this view, the main function of MRs is to represent action outcomes. However, they can also represent ways of acting, objects (properties) on which actions are performed (2013: 137) – this is because action outcomes often specify both a way of acting and also what to act on. Also, they are useful in planning and in monitoring (p. 123, 124; see also Gallese, 2000; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011; Pacherie, 2000: 410–413). I’ll discuss this account more extensively later (Section 4.2).2 2.4. Philosophical problems with (the literature on) MRs Reading this list, several philosophical issues remain unspecified for a theory of MRs: (1) there are accounts for which the same MR has not the same function (e.g., for some commentators the function is to represent the goal, for others it represents motor commands, and for others still it is both). We should precisely address all MR functions; (2) more than just one function is addressed for a single MR, which can be engaged in different tasks. The doubt is whether and how the same representation can deal with so many functions, enslaving different tasks, insofar as every representation should have a singular content, a singular vehicle, and thus, a singular function (what the content is, in this case, what the function is about: goals, action properties, etc.), being this aspect crucial in determining the accuracy conditions of the representation (this is widely 2 Here I do not talk about the direction of fit, the format and the link with imagery of MRs. 180 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 agreed in the philosophical literature about perception and neuroscience, see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Nanay, 2010; Siegel, 2006, 2010a, 2010b); (3) there is no clear-cut distinction between the functions addressed in the literature, it being unclear when one ends and the other begins. This issue is closely related to the following point: (4) while MRs are taken to be mainly dorsal phenomena, it is not clear as to how those functions are precisely subserved by the dorsal stream: even confining them to the activity of the dorsal stream, we do not know the precise dorsal neural correlates these functions arise from. Another issue (5) is that MRs are mainly, but not totally, dorsal phenomena. Ventral processing is involved in MR activity, in the light of evidence about the interplay between the two streams. If the precise dorsal contribution has failed to be addressed, the precise nature of the ventral contribution – and the possibility of conscious accessibility – is even more neglected. Finally, (6) there is no reference to any emotional component for MRs. However, neuroscientific results strongly suggest the presence of a further affective-emotional component of MRs. 3. A new perspective on MRs My proposal is that MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, but depend on ventral processing as well. The advantage of this proposal is that it allows me to develop a theory of MRs able to avoid the aforementioned issues (Section 2.4), by clarifying what are the functions and what is the precise geography of the neural underpinnings of MRs. Indeed, contrarily to what is generally proposed, I argue that a singular MR can be decomposed into different motor representational sub-components3 with different functions (this resolves issues 1 and 2 mentioned in Section 2.4). For each of these components, I address the precise function and the precise neural underpinning in relation to both streams (this resolves issues 4 and 5), showing that these components are deeply interconnected, but in principle discernible (and this resolves issue 3). I also add an emotional component for MRs (resolving issue 6). Summarizing, my aim is twofold: to defend a non-monolithic view of MRs and to suggest, on the basis of this view, the precise relation they entertain with the two visual streams. Here’s the way I will develop my theory. Since MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, in the first part of the paper, I develop my decomposing strategy (Section 4), focusing on the dorsal contribution to MRs and suggesting that MRs can be decomposed into an ensemble of different sub-representations, each one subserving a singular function, necessary for MR processing: (Section 4.1) the visuomotor component and the simulative one; the goal-related component (Section 4.2); the indexical component (Section 4.3). However, MRs also depend on ventral perception. Thus, in the second part of the paper, I suggest the importance of ventral processing for the functions addressed above which mainly pertain to dorsal perception, showing that MRs depend on the dorsal/ventral interplay (Section 5). Then, I propose an unexpected function (Section 5.6) and an emotional component, for MRs (Section 6) completely neglected in the literature. Constructing my account is important for two reasons. Too often, MRs are invoked in terms of the perception of action of others, at the expense of the perception of action for the acting subject (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014) – and there is sometimes confusion about this distinction (see Section 4.2). Also, though evidence about visuomotor behavior is constantly accumulating, we still lack a philosophical theory able to support it. My theory reconciles philosophy with neuroscience. So, we can start with the decomposing strategy. 4. The decomposing strategy and the dorsal stream This first part of the paper limits the discussion to the neurological geography of the dorsal stream (and its projections), leaving aside the ventral contributions. Saying that the functions of MRs primarily rely on dorsal activity is not trivial and, for this reason, may be too general a claim. Indeed, the dorsal stream is an extremely complex pathway whose activity starts from the primary visual cortex, V1, and, passing through the parietal lobe, projects to the premotor areas. Nevertheless, the complex connectivity of its cortical sub-portions should not lead us to couple MRs with dorsal activity, without specifying the nature of this coupling. Indeed, when we focus on a deeper level of grain, we find that different dorsal (sub)pathways subserve different representational functions. The sum of these processes shapes, at the high level of grain, the (apparent) single phenomenon we call MR. If we do not properly draw a distinction between those different processes, we risk using the word ‘‘MR” – with respect to those functions – as a folk notion: it makes no sense to talk about a general MR we can point our finger at when we locate it on the dorsal stream, just as we cannot generally point our finger at our belly and say: ‘‘well, this is where you find digestion”. In other words, an MR is the ensemble of different processes whose complex organization gives us the impression of a single phenomenon; but this is only an impression. Ignoring this leads us to fall into the problems mentioned in (Section 2.4). I would like to make transparent my argument here and point out that the separability of the functions of the subrepresentations composing an MR are individuated through the separability of the anatomo-functional portions of our visuomotor system. That is, my argument is based on separability of functions in neural areas (see also Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & Baldassarre, 2013; cfr. with footnote 3). 3 Important specification: for Pacherie different action representations deal with different stages of action specification (2002: 67, 2008: 195), concerning a vertical differentiation about intentions. Differently, I argue that the same floor of action, that is MRs, can be decomposed into different sub-representations: I am drawing a horizontal, not vertical decomposition. This pertains to the lowest level of motor intentions and the linked level of MRs. G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 181 Note that the dorsal stream, which is involved in several important visuomotor tasks, is divided, at least, into two (but see Section 5.5): the dorso-dorsal stream (D-D), also known as the dorso-medial circuit, which projects to the dorsal premotor cortex and which, following the division of the intraparietal sulcus that subdivides the posterior parietal lobe, is related to the superior parietal lobule (SPL); the ventro-dorsal stream (V-D), also known as the dorso-lateral circuit, which projects to the ventral premotor cortex and is related to the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Gallese, 2007; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Turella & Lignau, 2014). Though both chunks of the dorsal stream are crucial for motor interaction (especially grasping), V-D and the ensemble of its parietal-premotor networks (AIP-F5 and VIP-F4), is the crucial pathway, both in humans and non-human primates, concerning the representational components of MRs listed above in (Section 2) – with respect to DD, mostly involved in proprioceptive input, but with an important visual contribution (Gallese, 2007). I will now propose a neurological guided tour of the V-D pausing in each cortical site dealing with an MR component. Following what I said in (Section 2), I individuate here three main components for MRs: (a) The Visuomotor Component and the Simulative one. (b) The one linked with Goals/Outcomes. (c) The Egocentric Component. For the sake of coherence toward neuroscience, I should specify that, of course, while my analysis is more accurate than those usually found in the philosophical literature, it is not so technical as those in the neurophysiological literature. But this is not a neuroscientific review of the neural underpinnings of action-guiding vision (Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016). It is a philosophical analysis that considers the necessary empirical background in order to avoid a too simplistic monolithic view of MRs. Now we can start with the decomposition, which starts from the visuomotor component, accompanied by the simulative one. 4.1. The visuomotor component and the simulative one Objects exhibit geometrical properties (e.g., size, shape, texture) that are, from a motor point of view, action/motor properties,4 to the extent that they permit a precise action possibility satisfiable with a precise motor act. For example the geometrical features of a mug are action properties permitting an action possibility (grasping), which can be satisfied by a proper motor act: a power grip. This important function of MRs is due to their visuomotor component. This visuomotor transformation relies on a well defined parietal-premotor network lying in between the posterior parietal cortex and the ventral premotor cortex, that is, a precise portion of the V-D, whose main components for these tasks are the anterior intraparietal (AIP) area (related to the anterior intraparietal sulcus) and area F5, in the most rostral part of the ventral premotor cortex (for a review of the leading role of AIP-F5 in the detection of action possibilities and the related visuomotor transformation of object properties into action properties and then of action properties into motor acts see Baumann, Fluet, & Scherberger, 2009; Borghi & Riggio, 2015; Castiello, 2005; Castiello & Begliomini, 2008; Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016; Ferretti, 2016; Fluet, Baumann, & Scherberger, 2010; Grafton, 2010; Janssen & Scherberger, 2015; Kandel, Schwartz, Jessell, Siegelbaum, & Hudspeth, 2013: chap. 19; Murata et al., 1997; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Raos et al., 2006; Romero, Pani, & Janssen, 2014; Sakata, Taira, Murata, & Mine, 1995; Shikata et al., 2003; Srivastava, Orban, De Mazière, & Janssen, 2009; Theys, Pani, van Loon, Goffin, & Janssen, 2012, 2013; Theys, Srivastava, van Loon, Goffin, & Janssen, 2012; Theys, Romero, van Loon, & Janssen, 2015 concerning lesion studies see Andersen, Andersen, Hwang, & Hauschild, 2014; Graziano, 2009; Turella & Lignau, 2014) – see footnote 19. AIP is one of the end-stage areas of the dorsal stream, and perhaps the fundamental area of the dorsal stream (see Culham, Cavina-Pratesi, & Singhal, 2006). AIP neurons respond selectively to objects during both passive fixation and grasping, extracting visual object information concerning action possibilities for grasping purposes (for a review see Raos et al., 2006; Romero et al., 2014); then, they relay this information to F5 neurons, with which AIP is directly connected (Borra et al., 2008), which then activate the primary motor cortex. In F5 we find visuomotor canonical neurons, which use the information received by AIP about action properties of the objects and compute the motor commands in order to interact with them. Also canonical neurons respond during object fixation, regardless the actual execution of an action. In canonical neurons activity, there is a strict congruence between their high selectivity for a particular type of prehension (executed grip) and the visual selectivity for objects that, although differing in shape, require prehension in order to be grasped (for a review see Raos et al., 2006). Imagine you have to grasp first a little box that can be contained inside your hand, and then a little 4 There is a crucial point here. The concept of action/motor property/possibility recalls the famous notion of affordance, proposed by Gibson (1979), which has captured the interest of both neuroscientists and philosophers in the last twenty years (Borghi & Riggio, 2015; Chemero, 2009; Ferretti, in press; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Nanay, 2013b; Thill et al., 2013). Affordances involve both perception and action, insofar as they consist in the visual perception of the invitation to action that is offered to the active subject by the objects she/he deals with in the environment. However, the notion of affordance is strictly related to the gibsonian idea of a direct visual perception of action possibilities, to the extent that we do not need to use any visual representation in order to detect them (for a complete analysis see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). However, despite the original gibsonian anti-representational view of affordances (for an analysis see Chemero, 2009; Nanay, 2013b), a lot of neuroscientists and philosophers agree that action possibilities are perceived through perceptual representations (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Nanay, 2013b; for an argument built on empirical evidence see Ferretti, in press) and avoid the use of the term ‘‘affordance” with an anti-representationalist stance. Here I follow this second view insofar as my account is framed in terms of MRs. Hence, I avoid the use of the term ‘‘affordance” and refer to the more neutral expression ‘‘action property/possibility”. 182 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 stone: although their shape is different, these objects show the same action property; therefore the motor acts satisfying this action possibility (grasping the object with the whole hand) are the same. This is a first example of how features of objects are read (during visuomotor transformation) as contents of a (sensori)motor nature. Representational presence concerning the visuomotor component is also suggested by an automatic process of grip formation taking place during the transportation of the hand in which the fingers are preshaped long before the hand touches the object. At about 60% of its transportation the hand reaches its widest opening, or maximum grip aperture (henceforth: MGA) and the size of the finger-grip at MGA (though much larger than the object to be grasped) is linearly correlated with the size of the object: as Jeannerod suggests, this process is largely anticipatory and pertains to an automatic action representation, not to a mere on-line adaptation of the motor commands to the object (Jeannerod, 2006: 5; for the shown automaticity of the process see Gentilucci et al., 1995; for a review see Nowak & Hermsdörfer, 2009). These visuomotor phenomena are the crucial process of the visuomotor component.5 A further specification is that these cortical circuits exhibit both the visuomotor transformation processes and a mechanism of visuomotor resonance during object fixation, regardless of the action execution: motor simulation. Simulation is an automatic mechanism with a perceptual function to facilitate the motor preparation (Gallese, 2009).6 Motor activation frames the represented action within the constraints of a real action7: represented actions correspond to covert actions as a neurophysiological simulation of the mechanisms normally involved in the physical action generation (Jeannerod, 2006: 130–131).8 However, we have an issue here: for Jeannerod the representation of the action is basically the simulation of the action, even though he admits that ‘‘the representations for executing and simulating do not completely overlap, allowing this distinction even in the absence of sensory reafferences” (Jeannerod, 2006: 131). In spite of this incomplete overlap I would like to suggest a distinction between motor simulation and visuomotor representation. Simulation concerns motor response during fixation with respect to the activity of both AIP and F5 visuomotor canonical neurons. The visuomotor representational mechanism concerns the interplay of (the resonance of both) AIP and F5 (the former resonating in the encoding of layout properties of objects as action properties and the latter in encoding the motor act with respect to these action properties) for the visuomotor transformation of object properties (both without the necessity of action performance). Therefore, I maintain that motor simulation and MRs are deeply linked (Jeannerod, 2006, 130–131; see the concept of ‘‘S-state” introduced by Jeannerod, 2001 in order to denote ‘‘those mental states which involve an action content and where brain activity can be shown to simulate that observed during the same, executed action”, p. 103), but reformulate Jeannerod’s idea that the (overt) execution of an action is necessarily preceded by its (covert) simulation, while a (covert) simulation is not necessarily followed by an (overt) execution of that action. The simulation is possible only given the result of the visuomotor transformation. All I said here recalls – and is deeply in line with – the idea of the common coding theory of perception and action planning, according to which perceptual contents and motor programs which instantiate action plans are coded in a common representational process to the extent that seeing an object activates the action associated with that object. In this view, perceptual representations and motor representations are linked by shared representations in a common code for both perception and action, insofar as actions are coded in terms of the perceivable effects they can generate (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1997; for a complete review see Prinz, Beisert, & Herwig, 2013; for an analysis of the compatibility between these sets of evidence and the common coding theory see Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 7). Summarizing, when I am looking at the cup of coffee on my desk, V-D responds to those 3D geometrical properties of objects that serve such visuomotor tasks as grasping them. The AIP-F5 parietal-premotor network is crucial in translating those geometrical features into action properties and then into motor acts. Thus we can grasp the cup. First of all, AIP detects the geometrical features of the handle that exhibit precise motor characteristics. This means that shape, texture, size are encoded. Thus, the geometrical features are read as action properties. This information is sent to F5, which, given the information received by the AIP, computes the most suitable motor act (with respect to my motor repertoire, say, a power grip) in order to grasp the handle of the cup. At the same time, during this translation, the simulation of the appropriate motor behavior is encoded: the visuomotor brain is both perceiving the action possibility and simulating its readiness for potential related motor interaction, setting a motor act ‘‘in the quiver”.9 5 However, AIP needs the help of F5 for encoding action properties; thus, the encoding of motor acts and action properties cannot be properly divided (Romero et al., 2014). This is a clear form of motor perception (Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000: 165, 176; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003: 177) and is in line with the evidence reported by other studies concerning the close computational relation between vision, action preparation and visuomotor processing (Collins, Doré-Mazars, & Lappe, 2007; Gutteling et al., 2015; Gutteling, Park, Kenemans, & Neggers, 2013; Romero, Van Dromme, & Janssen, 2013; Theys et al., 2015; van Elk, van Schie, Neggers, & Bekkering, 2010). 6 ‘‘What is a ‘plan’ to act? It is a simulated potential action” (Gallese, 2007: 7; see also Gallese, 2000; Jeannerod, 2006; for a review see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Decety & Grezes, 2006). Motor simulation is a mental rehearsal of the motor acts able to satisfy an action possibility related to the object (Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006). 7 . . .though neural commands for muscular contractions are effectively present, but simultaneously blocked by inhibitory mechanisms (Jeannerod, 2006: 2.3.3). 8 Overt action execution is necessarily preceded by its covert representation and simulation, but covert representation and simulation are not necessarily followed by overt execution. Thus, representation can be detached from execution, existing on its own (Jeannerod, 2006: 2; chap. 2, 6). Also, motor activation is highly specific to the action that is represented (Id.), involving the main neural structures needed in action execution. 9 For the behavioral counterpart of these experiments see (Borghi & Riggio, 2015). G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 183 4.2. Goals/outcomes Action performance presupposes a some sort of representation of the goal (for a review see Nanay, 2011, 2014, for critics see Nanay, 2013b) and this is due to the second of MRs component that deals with goals/outcomes. Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014) have recently described the goal-related nature of MRs. As they suggest, ‘‘the representation of the goal is not a mere representation of a sequence of joint displacements, insofar as it captures something shared by different patterns of joint displacements/postures involving different effectors – e.g., hand, mouth, use of normal pliers (grasping requires closing the hand), use of reverse pliers (grasping requires opening the hand) (p. 121) – and discerns between the same sequence of joint displacements in different contexts, depending on distal outcomes, e.g., eating or throwing the object after having grasped it”. Indeed, ‘‘the joint displacements which realise grasping in one context might in another context realise a different action, such as scratching” (p. 122). This is confirmed by evidence that ‘‘markers of motor processing, such as a pattern of neuronal discharge or motor-evoked potentials, carry information about action outcomes” (p. 122) and not joint displacements. On this matter, the Authors report experiments with varying kinematic features while holding constant the outcome achieved using different effectors (Cattaneo, Sandrini, & Schwarzbach, 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), studies where the same action outcome requires closing or opening the hand depending on the tool used (Cattaneo, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti, 2009; Rochat et al., 2010; Umiltà et al., 2008), experiments with varying action outcome while holding kinematic constant (Bonini et al., 2010; Cattaneo et al., 2007; Fogassi et al., 2005), and studies about the same grasping movements performed in the presence/absence of a target object (Umiltà et al., 2001; Villiger, Chandrasekharan, & Welsh, 2010) or in the presence of objects which could, or could not, be grasped with such movements (Koch et al., 2010; see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014: 121)10 – (for the empirical reference see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014). While the goal-related component might be exhausted by Butterfill and Sinigaglia’s account, there is a problem with the evidence exposed above, which I need to address in order to build my theory. First of all, note that area F5 (Section 4.1), contains (at least) two large groups of neurons: the first is that of (A) purely motor neurons, whose activation is exclusively connected to actual movements. They constitute the overall majority of all F5 neurons, and belong to two kinds: (A1) neurons that fire whenever a movement is performed, and (A2) goal-related neurons, which code only the achievement of a goal regardless of the effector (i.e., the particular limb employed) (Fadiga et al., 2000; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). But we also have (B) visuomotor neurons, also distinguished into two groups: (B1) canonical neurons described in (Section 4.1); (B2) mirror neurons, which respond when the monkey – for the bridge between the experimental results on human and non-human primates see footnote 19 – observes an action performed by another individual, or when it performs the same or a similar action (Cook et al., 2014). The experiments reported by Butterfill and Sinigaglia – I reported above – pertain to different families of neurons. However, most of them are about mirror neurons (B2) (Cattaneo, 2010; Cattaneo et al., 2009; Fogassi et al., 2005; Koch et al., 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Umiltà et al., 2001, 2008; Villiger et al., 2010). Since here I am interested in the individual dimension of our motor behavior, I would like not to focus on the evidence about the representation of goals during observation (B2) – even if it is very useful, as shown by Butterfill and Sinigaglia – for the purpose of building my theory of MRs and explaining the representations allowing us to act. However, if we endorse my suggestion, there are important experiments quoted in their account, namely, that of Umiltà et al. (2008) – about grasping with normal and inverse pliers – which is the same experiment as Cattaneo et al. (2009), but without the mirror counterpart – that of Bonini et al. (2010) – which, however, is about both action organization and understanding concerning the activity of the ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortices – and that of Cattaneo et al. (2007) – concerning how parietal and premotor neurons coding a specific motor act (e.g., grasping) show a significant different activation when this act is part of actions linked to different goals (e.g., grasping for eating vs. grasping for placing), see above (for the empirical reference see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014). So, I would like to point out here that into enquiring the goal-relatedness – of the dorsal underpinnings – of MRs, research should focus on those last mentioned kinds of experiments on the individual side. For example among the neurons involved in representing outcomes are those called goal-related neurons (A2), which don’t encode elementary movements as joint displacements, but motor acts (coordinated movements with specific purposes) (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). They are interesting because the same elementary movement activating a neuron during a specific motor act (e.g., grasping) doesn’t activate it during a different motor act (e.g., scratching). There are thus different groups of neurons from F5: grasping neurons, grasping-with-the-mouth neurons, hugging neurons, etc. This is possible because during our ontogenetic development, the pruning of our neural networks under the pressure of experience selects in F5 the neural populations linked to the (representations of the) most effective motor acts. This learning mechanism is called ‘‘motor reinforcement”. This is important because F5 is a vocabulary whose words are neural populations representing one kind of motor act as the ensemble of different motor words (rather than a simple movement). The referent of these ‘‘words” can be of different generality: the goal, the execution, etc. (Gallese & Metzinger, 2003, 367; Rizzolatti et al., 1988). As Jeannerod puts it, in the ‘motor vocabulary’ actions are encoded element by element (2006: 12). Due to its somatotopic organization, this vocabulary provides computational efficiency, insofar as the appearance of the graspable object in the visual space will immediately 10 They also suggest that MRs are useful in motor planning and monitoring. Since the literature contains a vast amount of evidence I can avoid this point (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014: 123, 124; Nanay, 2014: 4; Pacherie, 2002: 61, 2006:14, 2008: 189, 90, 2010: 10, 11; 2011: 14 and sec. 4; for a more general discussion about action control see Shepherd, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Wong, 2009, 2010, 2015). I am primarily interested in the MR functions necessary to transform the sensory input into motor output in order to explain the mental antecedents of actions. 184 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 retrieve motor words with the description codifying the appropriate motor act (Gallese & Metzinger, 2003, 367–368),11 recorded in the motor vocabulary as an internal copy of an action (Fadiga et al., 2000). This is closely related with the activity of the visuomotor component (Section 4.1). Of course, goal encoding is not exhausted by these phenomena, insofar as the motor system plays a crucial role in the goal-component of MRs (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003; Jeannerod, 2006). However, I am particularly interested in the dorsal contributions – which are at the heart of the debate – leaving aside its projections to the motor system. So, even if I completely endorse the philosophical analysis by Butterfill and Sinigaglia, they leave out something really crucial for the goal-related component, namely, that we should report only the evidence concerning the individual aspect of the goal-relatedness of these neural underpinnings, and not the mirror-social aspect. An important related point: for Jeannerod actions are represented in terms of their goal, but the goal is only part of the content of the action representation.12 By representing the goal, we can answer the question of ‘What the action is about’, but not the question of ‘How to do it’, insofar as this question requires motor simulation to be answered (Jeannerod, 2006: 134). I agree with Jeannerod that actions are represented in terms of their goal, which are only part of the content of the MR. However, I think that goal representation is also concerned with the ‘‘how to do it” question. Computing a motor command depends on the goal to reach and, vice versa, trying to achieve a goal depends on the possibility of performing a motor act among those skills one has. The details of this interplay become clearer in (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Summing up, visuomotor transformation and motor simulation are necessarily accompanied by the goal we have in mind (e.g., grasping the cup in order to lift it), on the basis of which we compute the motor act (e.g., a precision grip permitting me to grasp the cup and lift it to bring it to my mouth). All I said is strengthened by evidence that during action planning the action goal dominates over the hand grip (van Elk, Paulus, Pfeiffer, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2011) and specific motor programs are selected on the basis of the action outcome (Bonini et al., 2012; Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 7). However, we are usually faced with more than one motor possibility, and we have to figure out, with respect to the goal, which is the most appropriate way to interact (to grasp the cup with a power or a precision grip to better transport it to the mouth); matters on this point will become clearer in (Section 4.3). The next section is about the egocentric component. An important specification here is that, in accordance with what I said in footnote 3, there are many different levels of goals (a joint configuration can be the lowest level of a goal while a full action is also a goal) (see the analysis provided by Gallese & Metzinger, 2003: 369; see also Bonini et al., 2012; Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; van Elk et al., 2011) which might be all coded by specific cortical sites (e.g., F5, see below). The concept of action hierarchy allows to achieve different level goals coherently. That is to say, from the lowest level MRs dictionary you can build all possible MRs, having increasingly complex goals and characteristics. 4.3. The egocentric/peripersonal component When we try to reach and grasp an object, we need to represent where the object is located with respect to us,13 since we can actively interact only with those objects presented within our peripersonal-action space. Visuomotor representation and motor simulation are deeply dependent on the peripersonal spatial location of the object (Borghi & Riggio, 2015; Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, & Committeri, 2010; Holmes & Spence, 2004; ter Horst, van Lier, & Steenbergen, 2011; Turella & Lignau, 2014). This is due to corto-cortical functional interconnections of different areas within the circuits of grasping (Castiello, 2005; Turella & Lignau, 2014): namely, the two main – but not the only, see footnote 19 – parietal-premotor circuits in the ventrodorsal stream: AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 (Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016; Gallese, 2007; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). The circuit crucially involved in the mapping of our peripersonal space is composed of the ventral intraparietal area (VIP), located in the fundus of the intraparietal sulcus, and area F4, which occupies the posterior sector of the ventral premotor cortex, next to F5, with which it is adjacent (see Gallese, 2007; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). VIP neurons respond to both visual and tactile stimuli and the visual receptive field is related to a three-dimensional spatial region around the tactile receptive field (often defined as the peripersonal space) (see Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003: 151). As for VIP neurons, most of the receptive fields of the F4 neurons do not change position with respect to the observer in case of eye movement, insofar as they do not detect retinal positions, but positions of the observer in relation to its different body parts – there is no single reference point (see Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003: 152; see also Graziano, 2009 and Pesaran, 2006 for the relation of these egocentric representations with the goal of action). F4 activity is due to simulated motor action directed toward a particular spatial location, linked to a very specific motor space: ‘‘when a visual stimulus is presented, it directly evokes the simulation of the congruent motor schema which, regardless of the execution, maps the stimulus position in motor terms” (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003: 154; but see also Gallese, 2007; for a philosophical analysis of space in relation to the TVSM see Briscoe, 2009; Grush, 2000). Interestingly for this paper, the AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 circuits are extremely interconnected from an anatomo-functional point of view: ‘‘parietofrontal connections create a link between the rostral intraparietal cortex (areas AIP and VIP) and the ventral premotor cortex (areas F5 and F4)” (Luppino, Murata, Govoni, & Matelli, 1999). Indeed, the VIP-F4 circuit represents the peripersonal space related to the motor space for arm reaching in which motor interaction is encoded by AIP-F5 11 Different populations of goal-related neurons can be described as being different representations. I avoid this point here. This is in line with my idea that different portions of the information encoded by MRs are subserved by different sub-representations. 13 For a philosophical defense see (Nanay, 2011); for criticism see (Nanay, 2013b: 41–42). 12 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 185 (Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 9). For example, F5 canonical neurons respond only to those objects presented in the peripersonal space (Bonini, Maranesi, Livi, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2014). This is due to the connections between area F5 and area F4 (Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 7; Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; Costantini, Committeri, & Sinigaglia, 2011, see also 2010; Bonini et al., 2014). This spatial constraint holds in general for the ventral premotor cortex as well (Bonini et al., 2014; Maranesi, Bonini, & Fogassi, 2014; Turella & Lignau, 2014) – see footnote 19. All this means that the visuomotor transformation (performed by AIP-F5) is bound to the peripersonal/egocentric action space (performed by VIP-F4) – but see footnote 19. The importance of peripersonal encoding of the target for detecting its action properties is widely agreed upon in the literature (Ambrosini & Costantini, 2013; De Stefani et al., 2014). More generally, action possibilities are detected, and the related motor acts are encoded, only when objects fall into the action space (Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 7; Bosco, Breveglieri, Reser, Galletti, & Fattori, 2014; Fattori, Gamberini, Kutz, & Galletti, 2001; Fattori, Kutz, Breveglieri, Marzocchi, & Galletti, 2005; Hadjidimitrakis, Bertozzi, Breveglieri, Fattori, & Galletti, 2013; Hadjidimitrakis et al., 2011; for a philosophical analysis of these sets of empirical evidence see Ferretti, 2016). Returning to the example of the cup, I can perform an appropriate motor act upon its handle because I can represent it as affording an action, due to the interplay of the visuomotor (and simulative) and goal related components. However, representing the cup as affording an action, means to represent the cup as reachable for me (that is, in my peripersonal space) (cfr. with 2.1). To conclude this first part of the paper, this decomposing strategy has suggested ensembles of different subrepresentations dealing with different functions subserved by different neural correlates of the V-D at the basis of MRs. This is important, insofar as these functions are often mistakenly attributed to a single general MR, and too generally to dorsal perception. This is a first way to avoid the confusions reported in (Section 2.4). However, I take MRs to depend on ventral perception and on interstream interplay. The second part of the paper explores this dependence with respect to the functions of MRs reported above and adds some features that can be explained only by referring to ventral perception. 5. MRs between ventral and dorsal perception My decomposing strategy defends a new non-monolithic view of MRs by addressing their different and specific representational functions in relation to dorsal perception. However, we know that any sophisticated visual behavior requires interstream collaboration (Bruno & Battaglini, 2008; Kitadono & Humphreys, 2009; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013; McIntosh & Schenk, 2009; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010: Box 3, p. 42). The literature about MRs neglects these results.14 By discussing them here, I defend the second important idea of this paper: MRs also rely on ventral processing, which shapes important computational aspects of their components outlined in the decomposing strategy. I also report important insights on dorsal perception neglected even by those claiming that MRs are only dorsal phenomena. 5.1. The dorsal/ventral interplay in action Neurophysiology of vision suggests there is no clear-cut functional distinction between the streams at various points in perceptual processing (Gallese, Craighero, Fadiga, & Fogassi, 1999; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010): they integrate in early visual areas by feedbacks allowing each pathway to affect the other (Deco et al., 2004) and by sharing common early visual inputs, insofar as both connect with the frontal eye field, ‘‘so that eye movements concerning one stream have a sort of influence on the other” (Kravitz et al., 2013: 42, Box 3). This interplay is at the basis of vision for action (for a complete review of the anatomo-functional aspects see Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016), suggesting that MRs cannot be genuinely dorsal phenomena. Accordingly, dorsal vision is not involved, alone, in the detection of action possibilities, because motor responses to action properties during off-line visual processing are possible by using visual memory even after 700 ms after the object has been removed from view and this suggests that dorsal vision is supplemented by higher processing (see Derbyshire, Ellis, & Tucker, 2006, especially the experiment number two). Accordingly, (at least some) detection of action possibilities is not only dorsal, but results from an interstream interaction for off-line visual processing. Accordingly, we know that dorsal perception encodes action possibilities (unconsciously), whereas ventral perception does this consciously (Young, 2006), following object semantic categorization (Gallese, 2007: 3) – for an important analysis of how dorsal and ventral vision interact in vision-for-action, especially in the case of delayed grasping with respect to action guided by memory-stored information see (Singhal, Culham, Chinellato, & Goodale, 2007; Singhal, Monaco, Kaufman, & Culham, 2013; concerning interaction in attention see Adamo & Ferber, 2009; cfr. with my Section 5.3).15 Also, it has been suggested that it is not a necessary condition that our motor acts are monitored by dorsal processing. Indeed, ventral processing can, sometimes, be responsible for action. This can happen before we are able to perform a specific kind of action automatically (I’ll come back to automaticity in Section 5.4) and, thus, at this first stage, action needs an aware supervision (Milner & Goodale, 2010: 83). Accordingly, there is 14 Nanay simply pointed out that MRs are not exclusively dorsal phenomena. Here I add a meticulous cortical geography of MR functions with respect to both streams. 15 I cannot report the full details here. 186 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 an open debate concerning the relation between ventral vision and dorsal vision with respect to motor planning and motor programming, in order to enquire the amount of ventral and dorsal processing in vision-for-action (for an analysis of the debate see Dijkerman, McIntosh, Schindler, Nijboer, & Milner, 2009; Goodale & Milner, 2004a, 2004b; McIntosh & Schenk, 2009; Milner & Goodale, 2008); interestingly, we know that impairment of action planning (computation of high-order motor aspects) does not lead to the impairment of action programming (computation of movement parameters in relation to visual information), because the former is computed by ventral processing (see the analysis of the case of visual agnosia offered by Dijkerman et al., 2009, but cfr. with Milner & Goodale, 2008). Finally, another important evidence is the one about the fact that both visual agnosia and optic ataxia only support dissociation between central visual processing and peripheral visual processing: ataxic patients cannot reach and grasp in peripheral vision, but can in central vision (for different angles on this point see Himmelbach, Karnath, Perenin, Franz, & Stockmeier, 2006; Jackson et al., 2009; Pisella et al., 2000; Rossetti, Pisella, & Vighetto, 2003; Rossetti, Revol, McIntosh, et al., 2005). This suggests that the dissociation between visual recognition and vision-for-action is not that sharp as originally proposed by the TVSM. This interstream interplay subserving MRs becomes clearer when talking about the deception, of vision-for-action, to illusions. 5.2. Dorsal visual processing and the possibility of deception of vision for action A big issue about the dorsal/ventral dichotomy concerning vision-for-action is whether or not illusions can deceive it. While the original response with the 3-D version of the Ebbinghaus illusion was negative (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995), results in a variety of different experimental settings showed that the Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion similarly deceives both vision and grasping because it seems that they are able to deceive a shared representation involved in the detection of the size of the object that both processes access (Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008) – of course, that means that the representation is non-veridical, not really deceived; subjects or persons are who get deceived. Accordingly, we have a huge meta-analysis showing that the Müller-Lyer illusion (Bruno, Bernardis, & Gentilucci, 2008; Bruno & Franz, 2009; but see also Bruno, 2001) can deceive action, even if it has been suggested that all depends on the availability of visual feedback (Franz, Hesse, & Kollath, 2009, see especially the experiment number three; cfr. with Bruno et al., 2008; Bruno & Franz, 2009). Also, evidence that visuomotor reaction time is sensitive to both the Ponzo and Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion suggested that vision-for-action can be subserved by ventral perception (Sperandio, Savazzi, & Marzi, 2009, but cfr. with the analysis of Franz et al., 2009 concerning the proposal about no shifts from dorsal to ventral processing during the Müller-Lyer illusion; see also Bruno et al., 2008; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002; and see Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016: sec. 7.4.4 for technical details concerning illusions, vision and action). While these results concern few illusions and few kinds of motor acts, a more general analysis (Briscoe, 2009) revealed that visual perception seems to be fooled by illusions more than visionfor-action, only because dorsal processing is not attuned to contextual depth cues when action is automatic, but in the case of non-automatic responses, visuomotor processing is misled due to dorsal/ventral interaction, in part given by the dorsal access to the ventral memory-stored information (here I am reporting the interpretation offered by Briscoe, 2009: especially pp. 437, 439, 441) – this is perfectly in line with what I said in (Section 5.1). An important point: as Briscoe correctly pointed out, the real result by Aglioti et al. (1995) – which is the cornerstone of this debate – found that the Ebbinghaus illusion has a slighter effect on perception than on action, showing only a greater sensitivity of ventral processing to illusions than dorsal (see Briscoe, 2009: 436). Summing up, of course there are illusions incapable of deceiving action, but only visual perception. However, at least in the case of particular illusions, also vision-for-action can be deceived – something denied by Pacherie, Jacob and Jeannerod (cfr. with Section 2.4), because dorsal processing has access to the information coming from the ventral stream (for an analysis see Briscoe, 2009: 437). Thus, MRs can be deceived as well – saccadic adaptation is a very good example of this (Collins et al., 2007). Moreover, even those who deny conscious access to dorsal processing16 agree that conscious ventral vision affects dorsal vision-for-action (for a critical review see Brogaard, 2011: 1094), insofar as illusions can affect the latter.17 However, besides a general interstream interplay, precise ventral/ventro-dorsal connections shape MRs; the next section focuses on these. 5.3. The connection between V-D and ventral perception Everyday objects offer us a variety of action possibilities and thus different motor acts to perform upon them. The selection of the appropriate motor act does not rely only on the layout object properties (cfr. with Section 4.2), but also on what we intend to do with it, in relation to its functions. The interplay between the analysis of physical properties (pragmatic analysis) and object identity (semantic analysis) is due to connections lying between V-D and ventral perception and suggests the importance of ventral perception for MR functions (see Borghi & Riggio, 2015). Indeed, we saw in (Section 4.1) that AIP selects the geometrical properties to be translated into action properties and to be sent to F5 for the encoding of proper motor acts. Importantly, the action properties linked to the semantic functions of the object – e.g., think about the different 16 Arguably, there is no crucial evidence to suggest that dorsal processing cannot be conscious (Nanay, 2015: 187), cfr. with (Sections 5.2 and 5.5). I cannot survey here the complete literature concerning illusions and dissociation, for a more detailed account see (Briscoe, 2009; Bruno & Battaglini, 2008; Bruno & Bernardis, 2002; Bruno & Franz, 2009; Bruno et al., 2008; Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Franz et al., 2009; McIntosh & Schenk, 2009; Nanay, 2014; Vishton et al., 2003: sec. 7.4.4). 17 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 187 grips we can use in order to use a pen in different ways: writing or placing the pen somewhere else – are possible because AIP is involved in object recognition (Fogassi & Luppino, 2005: 627; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008; for a complete review, which I cannot offer here, about the complete functional processing of the pathways linking the early visual areas to the motor areas and about the relationships between the ventral stream and the ventro-dorsal stream see (Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016: 69). After the semantic analysis, the information processing from AIP to F5 results in a competition of the neural populations encoding different potential motor acts with respect to the action possibilities detected, in relation to the action goal, and on the basis of this semantic analysis – (cfr. with the last part of Section 2.1) – (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008: 36–38; but see also Kandel et al., 2013: chap. 19; for the analysis of the competition see Baumann et al., 2009; Borghi and Riggio, 2015; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010).18 We have related evidence of a semantic component for motor processing (Helbig, Graf, & Kiefer, 2006; Iachini, Borghi, & Senese, 2008; Kalènine et al., 2013; Tucker & Ellis, 2004), and action preparation (Lindemann, Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2006) given by the influence of ventral perception on action (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010), as well a dorsal involvement in semantic encoding (Pulvermüller, 2013: Box.1, Box.2) – interaction is also suggested by the fact that while the computation of the spatial location of the object does not need ventral information, dorsal vision needs the selection of the object’s features on the basis of the semantic encoding performed by the ventral stream in order to build a reliable motor act (Goodale & Milner, 2004a). Also, MRs manage situations in which structural information and functional information may conflict (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). This is in line with the evidence by McIntosh and Lashleya (2008) discussed by Nanay (2013b: 66) that top down factors influence our MRs – e.g., the brand of a matchbox influences our grip size when grasping it. Summing up, the visuomotor component of MRs is always supplemented by semantic object recognition through ventral processing: all I mean here is that the ventral contribution is mainly related to the selection of goals for MRs, through different types of visual properties not processed by the dorsal stream. I am not saying that there is a visuomotor component in the ventral stream. Rather, direct connections between the two streams make the ventral stream access, indirectly, motor and visuomotor properties of objects (cfr. with Sections 5.1 and 5.2). The most ventral chunk of the dorsal stream, V-D, with its projections to the ventral stream, is the cutting edge of dorsal perception involved in MRs functions, bringing together all the dorsal computational characteristics with an important ventral computational shade in relation to the goal-related component (Section 4.2) and the visuomotor one (Section 4.1). Thus, MRs rely on the ventral/dorsal interplay (cfr. with the account by Pacherie, Jacob and Jeannerod Section 2.1). This also strengthens my remark about Jeannerod’s idea that the encoding of goals and motor properties are interconnected (cfr. with Section 4.2) and underlines the importance of goal encoding in order to compute action properties, both denied (Nanay, 2013b) and endorsed (Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014; Nanay, 2011) in the literature (cfr. with Section 2). This specification is important because the dorsal stream contains another important chunk: the D-D. Pointing out the characteristics of the two chunks is crucial to understand the contribution of the different ventral and dorsal bifurcations, not of the visual brain in general, but of the dorsal stream in particular, to MRs. 5.4. The many facets of our visuomotor interactions Here I want to specify that different specific MRs circuits, D-D and V-D,19 compute specific kinds of action possibilities. We can distinguish between variable and stable mechanisms detecting action possibilities (see the proposal by Borghi & Riggio, 2015). Stable action possibilities derive from stable/invariant properties of objects due to the associations between the visual aspects of a precise object and the motor response it produces that can be incorporated into an object memory-stored representation (e.g., we ‘‘know” that this object is graspable with a precision grip) (cfr. with Section 4.2) (Borghi & Riggio, 2015; cfr. with a similar previous analysis by Glover, 2004 and Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003: 253).20 Differently, variable action possibilities are linked to the actions we are about to perform, but deal with rather temporary object characteristics which are not memory-stored. V-D is responsible for the former, and by managing our knowledge of objects influences the way we represent them. D-D is responsible for the latter, in the online interaction with objects (in new motor situations) during visually guided action, and continuously adjusting the motor performance online (this evidence concerns the case of grasping, see Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 4). This is really important for the issue concerning the online processing of MRs – cfr. with footnote 10. Accord18 It is unclear whether all action possibilities are automatically activated and then some of them decay, or if a single action possibility is directly encoded among others. Borghi and Riggio (2015: 13, see also p. 8 for a discussion of the empirical results I cannot review here) go for the second hypothesis. 19 In line with (Sections 5.1 and 5.2) V-D, D-D and ventral pathways are strictly interconnected and finish in cortical frontal areas (Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 351). The same dependence between spatial encoding and the visuomotor one in the V-D, holds for the D-D (Bosco et al., 2014; Fattori et al., 2001, 2005; Hadjidimitrakis et al., 2011, 2013). However, data – that I cannot review here – suggest the leading role of (both AIP-F5 and VIP-F4 in the) V-D concerning the visuomotor transformation (in the peripersonal space); for a critical review see (Castiello, 2005; Castiello & Begliomini, 2008; Janssen & Scherberger, 2015; Kandel et al., 2013; Turella & Lignau, 2014: 871; for the role played by the posterior parietal cortex MRs see Buneo & Andersen, 2006). An important point is that, while the evidence I report about the two visual streams is mostly grounded on humans, the evidence about the AIP-F5 circuit in particular and the ventral premotor cortex in general, is mostly based on monkeys. Nonetheless, there are good examples of bridge cortical geographies between these two cortical portions (see Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 3; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Shikata, 2003; for example, the human phAIP circuit seems to correspond to the AIP-F5 circuit we find in monkeys, Orban & Caruana, 2014; see also Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016: 2.3.2, in particular, the 2.3.2.2, for a nice brief review of the relations between the AIP in humans and the AIP in monkeys concerning the most important studies reported Begliomini, Wall, Smith, & Castiello, 2007; Castiello & Begliomini, 2008; Culham et al., 2003; Grefkes & Fink, 2005; Grefkes, Weiss, Zilles, & Fink, 2002; Tunik, Rice, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2007 and the 2.3.3 for an analysis of the relations concerning the ventral premotor cortex in humans and monkeys, e.g., Castiello & Begliomini, 2008; Chao & Martin, 2000). 20 ‘‘Stable” does not mean that action possibilities are not processed and responded to online, but that they might need a certain degree of adjustment of the organism in relation to objects. 188 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 ingly, MRs’ detection of action possibilities is not so automatic, as agreed in the philosophical literature – indeed, the issue of automaticity of MRs is hotly debated in the neuroscientific literature, in which it is suggested that the task and the context are crucial in determining the ‘‘behavior” of the MR (see Borghi & Riggio, 2015: 8; Girardi, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010; van Elk et al., 2014; cfr. with my footnote 18). Also, MRs handle contexts where multiple objects are present, hence where multiple action possibilities are activated with respect to memory stored information (Derbyshire et al., 2006; Pezzulo, Barca, Bocconi, & Borghi, 2010) and the different semantic, functional, spatial, geometrical, context and task relations existing between objects, strongly affect motor responses (Borghi, Flumini, Natraj, & Wheaton, 2012; Borghi & Riggio, 2015; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). In line with this and the notion of MGA expressed in (Section 4.1), and with the idea of a competition motor acts with respect to action possibilities expressed in (Section 5.3), we know that, different neurons in the AIP, related to the encoding of different grips, simultaneously respond after the presentation of objects, and the specific grip is selected with respect to contextual informations (Baumann et al., 2009). This is how MRs manage different complex motor scenarios and deal with several motor possibilities with respect to a single object, as well as different objects in different contexts – something addressed, but left unspecified by Pacherie. 5.5. Dorsal multimodal spatial processing, conscious vision-for-action and MRs I need to point out here some important characteristics of MRs in relation to their dependence on the dorsal/ventral interaction: the possibility, for MRs, of being conscious, regardless of the fact that dorsal processing is taken to be consciously accessible (something problematic in the literature – see the claims reported in Section 2.1); the multimodality of the dorsal stream, which is an important characteristic, sometimes neglected in the literature even by those who argue that MRs are genuinely and only dorsal phenomena. First of all, I want to suggest that – and this is an important point for a theory of MRs (see the review of the positions I offer in Section 2) – MRs can be consciously accessible. With this idea I just mean that there is the possibility for conscious vision for action, or, in other words, that there is the possibility of having conscious representations for action, that is, conscious MRs. If we think that MRs are subserved only by dorsal processing, then, it is not easy to suggest that MRs are conscious. On the one hand, the old picture that dorsal processing is completely unconscious and subpersonal has been recently questioned and several counter-arguments have been proposed against this view (Nanay, 2015: 187; Wallhagen, 2007; for critics see Jacob & de Vignemont, 2010; there is also an open debate about the exclusive identification of the contents of visual awareness with ventral perception (Clark, 2009; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). Indeed, we effectively know that dorsal lesions disrupt (in the case of neglect due to lesions of the dorsal stream) the conscious awareness of the quality of objects in the peripersonal space (Gallese, 2007: sec. 4) – in particular, Gallese claims that the IPL, related to the V-D, plays this crucial role; that means that ventral perception is insufficient to obtain conscious (spatial) perception without dorsal processing (2007). On the other hand, it has been suggested that this evidence only shows that the IPL plays a role in visuospatial awareness, but not that dorsal representations are conscious: even if dorsal processing is functionally necessary, nonetheless, it is functionally insufficient, on its own, for normal visuospatial awareness. As Brogaard suggests, ‘‘one hypothesis is that the IPL transmits information to the ventral stream, perhaps via feedback to striate cortex, and that this feedback of information is required in order for ventral stream processing to give rise to conscious spatial representations. This hypothesis is consistent with Bullier, Hupé, James, and Girard’s (2001) suggestion to the effect that feedback from the dorsal stream to striate cortex can influence ventral stream processing. On this view, the two visual streams interact via extrastriate-striate or parietalstriate feedback” (2011: 1094). Accordingly, it has been claimed that dorsal vision is not sufficient for the visual awareness of shape (Jacob & de Vignemont, 2010: 142). Given this, however, we can maintain that, in some situations, MRs can be conscious, because, in the view I am defending here, MRs are not exclusively dorsal phenomena, but are shaped by dorsal/ventral interactions, and we have sufficient evidence that the processing resulting from the ventral/dorsal interactions can, sometimes, give raise to high visual spatial processing for motor interaction (see Briscoe, 2009; cfr. with the case of illusions for action in Section 5.2) – and, accordingly, that action guiding vision should not be equated with dorsal processing (for a review see Nanay, 2013b, 2014). This is in line with the idea that, in case of high-level pragmatic visual processing, ‘‘the border between pure perception and pure action becomes very thin indeed” (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003: 255). This is not to say that dorsal representations for action are consciously accessible, and, indeed, dorsal visuomotor representations for automatic motor interaction seem not to be accessible: this is suggested by lesion studies in which we can isolate the contribution of each stream to a particular visual processing – see the case of the so called automatic pilot for the visual guidance of the hand in optic ataxia (Himmelbach et al., 2006; Milner and Goodale, 2006: 8.3.2; Pisella et al., 2000; Rossetti et al., 2003, 2005) and the case of visuomotor capacities in visual agnosia (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). Also, as said in (Section 5.2), even those who deny that dorsal representations are unconscious do not deny the interstream interaction and that conscious vision can affect action (Brogaard, 2011). Now, passing to the multimodality of the dorsal stream, many neurons in the rostral part of V-D are multimodal, sensitive to ‘‘somatosensation, motor activity and visual stimuli in peripersonal space” (Kravitz et al., 2011: 223) – cfr. with (Section 4.3)21 and crossmodal influences on dorsal processing suggest that dorsal processing for action is effectively multi- 21 Cfr. with footnote 19. G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 189 modal (Gentilucci et al., 1995) insofar as several posterior parietal spatial representations exhibit a multimodal nature (Holmes & Spence, 2004) – all this is in line with the idea that dorsal stream processing is definitely multimodal, as AIP is (Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016); also, often multimodality and action semantics (cfr. with Section 5.3) March in step (van Elk et al., 2014). This is possible because the IPL receives inputs from both streams and is important in shaping – at least, concerning the right hemisphere – spatial representations at different levels of grain (see Milner and Goodale, 2006: especially section 8.2.3; but see also Gallese, 2007). This is because V-D (the IPL in particular) integrates several non-visual stimuli (e.g., tactile, kinesthetic, proprioceptive) (Fogassi & Luppino, 2005; Gallese, 2007: 7; Jeannerod, 2006: 1.2.3, especially p. 15; see also Kravitz et al., 2011: 223, Box 1) and the IPL transmits information to ventral perception required to construct conscious spatial representations (see the analysis offered few lines above of Bullier et al., 2001 reported by Brogaard, 2011: 1094). Finally, the IPL plays an important role in attending action goals (for this role of the IPL, as well as its importance in the geography of the two visual streams see SinghCurry & Husain, 2009, but see also Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005; cfr. with Milner and Goodale, 2006: 8.2.3). Furthermore, posterior parietal and dorsal processing play a crucial role in the visuomotor control of eye and hand motor responses with respect to depth (Fearraina, Battaglia-Mayer, Genovesio, Archambault, & Caminiti, 2009) and different families of AIP neurons encode the 3-D structure of shapes linked to binocular disparity and stereopsis (Romero et al., 2014; Srivastava et al., 2009; see Chinellato & del Pobil, 2016: sec. 5).22 This suggests that dorsal-parietal projections process a lot of cues that seemed to pertain exclusively to ventral perception. This is an important implication for the relation between ‘‘higher” vision and dorsal vision. Also, in addition to what I said and against the view – which I criticized in the decomposing strategy – that MRs can be equated with dorsal perception without any specifications, it should be noted that, the dorsal stream can be divided not only into two sub-pathways, but, actually, into three sub-pathways – the divisions are compatible – all of them involved in conscious and non-conscious visuospatial representations and spatial working memory (Kravitz et al., 2011: especially pp. 220–222). All I am saying here is important for the peripersonal component of MRs (Section 4.3), as well as its conscious counterpart, in the light of the open debate about the exclusive identification of the contents of visual awareness with ventral perception (Clark, 2009; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). 5.6. MRs: an unexpected functioning Here I have a further important new point concerning MR processing. While dorsal perception distinguishes between images of graspable and non-graspable objects (Chao & Martin, 2000; Rice, Valyear, Goodale, Milner, & Culham, 2007), it cannot discriminate between normal and depicted objects, because this capacity is subserved by ventral perception: dorsal perception does not construct a complete 3D structural description of the target object. However, this description is necessary for response selection, in order to detect the action afforded by an object, or in the case of pictures, to understand that there is no possible interaction.23 It is ventral perception that plays the key role in response selection, based on a comprehensive analysis of object volumetric structure, distinguishing between 3D objects and 2D images of objects by detecting conflicts between various visual cues24 and selecting different visuomotor strategies for a 2D image versus a 3D object. Instead, dorsal perception plans the precise metrics of the intended action, based on a pragmatic analysis of the object’s spatial features (see Westwood et al., 2002). For this reason, dorsal perception responds to depicted objects without the need of any volumetric representation, which is not possible in picture seeing.25 Indeed, we have evidence that the visuomotor component (Section 4.1) is activated for depicted objects presented in the peripersonal space of the observer (Chao & Martin, 2000; Costantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, & Committeri, 2010; Romero et al., 2014; Zipoli Caiani, 2013). This might be due to the fact that, in most cases, in the experimental settings the vehicle/surface of the depicted object (a monitor, a screen, a picture) actually falls within the peripersonal space of the observer as well and, since dorsal perception cannot really distinguish between a depicted object and a normal one once an object, whether depicted or real, is perceived – even if apparently – as located in the peripersonal space of the observer, dorsal perception responds (for a complete review of this specific point see Ferretti, 2016). It follows that, if MRs were not subserved by both streams, it would be hard for us to discriminate the nature of the objects we try to act upon, it being difficult to activate response selection and discriminate between normal and depicted objects. We are able to perform motor acts without clashing against a picture because MR is based on ventral/dorsal interactions. So this is another crucial argument for the dependence of MRs on the processing of both streams. But there is a further crucial notion I want to point out. A common intuition is that, first ventral conscious perception selects the target/goal of interest for action and establishes if it is actable upon – if it is a real 3-D object, then, it sends the information to visuomotor dorsal perception which, only at this point, sets the parameters for interaction (see Pacherie, 2008: 186–187; Young, 2006: 140). That is, it is widely believed that visual consciousness establishes whether the computation of the coordinates for motor action can start due to the response selection establishing whether we are dealing with a reliable motor scenario (a real object) or not (a picture). However, things are exactly the other way. Indeed, 22 Also, caudal intraparietal (CIP) neurons in the dorsal stream encode multiple depth cues (Tsutsui, Taira, & Sakata, 2005). For the crucial link concerning action, depth cues, stereopsis and egocentric localization see (Vishwanath, 2014). 23 Volumetric object representation is necessary for the visual control of grip formation and response selection, to ensure that we do not attempt to reach for objects that cannot be grasped (Westwood, Danckert, Servos, & Goodale, 2002). 24 It is ‘‘computationally efficient for one visual system to handle the tasks of response selection and object recognition, because both require complete, detailed information about 3D object structure” (Westwood et al., 2002: 262). 25 For the difference between shape perception and volumetric object recognition see (Briscoe, 2008). 190 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 the visuomotor encoding is activated, despite the fact – and even before – that ventral conscious perception has computed whether the object is ‘‘real” or not. Few indeterminate cues are in fact sufficient in order to trigger the visuomotor transformation: before ventral volumetric reconstruction a motor act computed on the basis of the 2-D geometrical properties of the target is already stored in our motor quiver, regardless of the fact that actual overt interaction will follow. So, our visuomotor system doesn’t need any trigger, nor any confirmation from our conscious visual system in order to start the visuomotor translation. Rather, the translation is already ready to be used at the discretion of the ventral conscious response selection, which arrives later (for a complete review see Ferretti, 2016) – I have to point out that the selection and release signals come probably from the prefrontal cortex (and basal ganglia for selection, too), not directly from the ventral stream – indeed, the prefrontal cortex has to manage and match information coming from both streams in order for us to build the appropriate motor act (Lebedev & Wise, 2002; Sereno, Trinath, Augath, & Logothetis, 2002). Of course, while visuomotor transformation and motor simulation are automatically activated when the objects’ geometrical properties perceived (e.g., shape) are salient from a motor point of view and recall specific motor interaction (even if the object is depicted, see Ferretti, 2016), when the object does not present such particular properties, or when the person does not discriminate relevant action properties, visuomotor transformation and motor simulation are not activated (Tipper et al., 2006). This well explains the character of mental antecedents of action (Jeannerod, 2006; Nanay, 2013b) that MRs seem to have. The next section addresses an emotional component for MRs. Summing up, this second part of the paper has clearly shown that MRs are subserved also by ventral vision (Section 5.3) – and are, in general, dependent on interstream interplay (Section 5.1), even though dorsal processing itself is more complex than widely believed in the philosophical debate. With my addition, we gain a lot of explanations concerning the functions reported in the decomposing strategy and we can add features to these functions that are usually neglected in the literature: MRs are not always automatic, but they can alternate between automatic and online processing and conscious or unconscious processing (Sections 5.3–5.5); they can rely on semantic computations (Section 5.3), due to their specific context dependency (Section 5.4). They can also be deceived, in some cases, by some kinds of illusion (Section 5.2), and can make use of both visual and motor memory (Section 5.1). I also suggested an unexpected functioning for MRs (Section 5.6). But I want to suggest something very new concerning MRs. 6. Extending the neural correlates of MRs even further: the OFC cortex We saw that MRs extend beyond the two streams. Indeed, evidence shows that each stream projects to the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), an area involved in emotional-affective encoding. This suggests an emotional component for MRs, crucially neglected in the literature.26 Here I use the term affective and emotional representation interchangeably (in order to suggest my neutrality with philosophy and neuroscience, which often use these two different terms while referring to the same mental phenomenon), in order to denote these representations involved in the detection of the relevant properties, from an emotional point of view (e.g., the property of being dangerous, which might trigger a mental state which is linked to fear), of the objects we face with and that have an important role in inhibiting or eliciting our motor responses. During visual recognition, affective responses in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) – the orbital sector of the prefrontal cortex (Barrett & Bar, 2009, but see also O’Reilly, 2010 and Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000) – assist the visual perception of an object by integrating sensory information in order to build an affective representation of the object (Barrett & Bar, 2009). The two main OFC circuits connect with both visual streams. The medial OFC projects to the dorsal stream and is involved in the representation of the affective information related to the object that then activates the internal bodily changes suitable for action performance in that specific context. Accordingly, due to connections with the lateral parietal cortex, the OFC’s encoding of these bodily changes is sent back to the dorsal stream, so that the information about the emotional relevant properties of the object can be used to guide reliable motor interaction (Barrett & Bar, 2009: 1329). The lateral OFC projects to the ventral stream – entertains connections with the inferior temporal areas (TEO, TE and temporal pole) of the ventral stream (Barrett and Bar, 2009: 1330)27 – and is involved in the representation of affective information related to the object, which is useful, during object recognition, in order to detect the emotional value, in a given context, of the object represented. Interestingly, the medial OFC encoding starts before the lateral OFC (for technical details, see Barrett and Bar, 2009: 1330). This strengthens the presence of a privileged way from V1, through the dorsal stream, to the OFC and back to the dorsal stream. Therefore, since MRs are mainly dorsal phenomena, they are deeply linked to emotional encoding. However, since both streams are connected to those emotional areas, the failure to address a further emotional component for MRs is due both to those who argue that MRs are dorsal phenomena and to those who argue that they are also the result of the interplay between the two streams as well. Thus, MRs emerge from a complex encoding, given by both streams and their projections to the OFC. Crucially, not only can MRs be conscious or unconscious, but also their related emotional encoding can, due to the link with the OFC; indeed, the OFC’s emotional encoding can be, with respect to the different proections to the visual streams, conscious or unconscious (Barrett & Bar, 2009: 1328–1329). This link between MRs and emotions is confirmed by behavioral evidence that while graspable neutral objects that can be approached without any risk activate a 26 27 To my knowledge, the only one that sketches the possible link between MRs and emotions is Nanay (2013b: 155). Remember that AIP is involved in a functional interplay with the inferotemporal areas (TEm, TE and TEO). 191 G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 facilitating motor response, dangerous objects that pose a potential risk evoke aversive action possibilities, generating an interference-effect: information about an object’s potential risks conflicts with the motor actions that are activated while observing that object (Anelli, Borghi, & Nicoletti, 2012). I cannot go into great detail here. Furthermore, this point is very important, insofar as affective perception might play a crucial role in shaping the process of competition of action possibilities I reported in (Section 5.3) – however, a fully fledged argument about this point will have to wait for another occasion. 7. Conclusion In (Section 2.4) I addressed several philosophical issues remained unspecified for a theory of MRs: (1) the same MR has not the same function; (2) more than just one function is addressed for a single MR, which can be engaged in different tasks; (3) there is no clear-cut distinction between the functions addressed in the literature, it being unclear when one ends and the other begins; (4) while MRs are taken to be mainly dorsal phenomena, it is not clear as to how those functions are precisely subserved by the dorsal stream; (5) while MRs are mainly, but not totally, dorsal phenomena, the precise nature of the ventral contribution – and the possibility of conscious accessibility – is even more neglected; (6) there is no reference to any emotional component for MRs. My theory is able to address and sort out all these issues following the experimental results. Through the decomposing strategy (Sections 4,4.1,4.2,4.3), in the first part of the paper, I suggested the basic components of an MR and how they are related in the same MR, with the necessary philosophical clarifications concerning the notion of MR and its nature (addressing issues 1, 2 and 3); I also addressed the experimental results in order to effectively suggest the main dorsal nature of MRs (concerning issue 4); then, in the second part of the paper (Sections 5,5.1,5.2,5.3,5.4,5.5,5.6), I addressed the contribution of the ventral processing to the dorsal processing, in shaping our MRs (concerning issue 5). Finally, in (Section 6), I suggested an emotional component for MRs (concerning issue 6). Summing up, I have reported sufficient evidence to defend the main twofold claim of the paper: that MRs are not monolithic representational processes, but an ensemble of sub-representations with different functions and that those functions primarily rely on the dorsal stream but are also deeply dependent on interstream interaction, the ventral processing being crucial for the dorsal components of MRs. This specification is very important, insofar as, while in the neuroscientific literature it is widely agreed that, at a certain level of fine-graining, very few representational processes can be monolithic, the philosophical literature always talk about MRs without meticulously specifying their components and their complex anatomo-functional nature (see Section 2.4). So, my theory aims to bridge the gap between philosophy and neuroscience concerning the notion of MRs and to establish their functions with respect to their neural underpinnings. I do that, by reconciling our best philosophical theory about MRs with the most important sets of empirical evidence we get from vision and motor neuroscience, especially these about motor perception and the TVSM, which are hotly debated in both philosophy and neuroscience. If we endorse my decomposing strategy, we are able to avoid the problems reported in (Section 2.4) and to add important features for MRs, which are usually neglected in the philosophical literature. This is also useful in order to build an account of MRs which can collect all the crucial empirical results coming from neuroscience, which, otherwise, risk being left out of our philosophical theory of MRs, remaining just a bunch of detached sets of evidence, with no background philosophical theory. Funding This work was supported by the FWO Odysseus grant G.0020.12N and the FWO Research grant G0C7416N. Acknowledgment Very special thanks go to Bence Nanay, Eris Chinellato, Anna Maria Borghi, Joshua Shepherd, Pierre Jacob, Corrado Sinigaglia and Riccardo Cuppini. Appendix A A.1. Acronyms used in the paper MRs AIP VIP V-D D-D Motor Representations Anterior Intraparietal Area Ventral Intraparietal Area Ventro-Dorsal Stream, also known as the dorso-lateral pathway Dorso-Dorsal Stream, also known as the dorso-medial pathway (continued on next page) 192 IPL SPL OFC G. Ferretti / Consciousness and Cognition 43 (2016) 177–196 Inferior Parietal Lobule Superior Parietal Lobule Orbitofrontal Cortex References Adamo, M., & Ferber, S. (2009). A picture says more than a thousand words: Behavioural and ERP evidence for attentional enhancements due to action affordances. Neuropsychologia, 47(6), 1600–1608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.07.009. Aglioti, S., DeSouza, J. F. X., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. 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Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Introduction Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: The evidence from neurobiology and behavior q Bernard J. Baars * The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego, CA, USA Received 16 November 2004 Available online 28 January 2005 Abstract In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical (T-C) complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This basic anatomy and physiology is highly conserved in mammals and perhaps ancestral reptiles. While language is absent in other species, homologies in perception, memory, and motor cortex suggest that consciousness of one kind or another may be biologically fundamental and phylogenetically ancient. In humans we infer subjective experiences from behavioral and brain evidence. This evidence is quite similar in other mammals and perhaps some non-mammalian species. On the weight of the biological evidence, therefore, subjectivity may be conserved in species with human-like brains and behavior. Ó 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc. q I am most grateful to Dr. Gerald M. Edelman and his colleagues at The Neurosciences Institute in San Diego for numerous discussions that have helped to strengthen this special issue of Consciousness and Cognition. * Fax: +1 858 626 2099. E-mail address: bbaars@comcast.net. 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.002 8 B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 1. Introduction Some years ago a popular book suggested that conscious cognition emerged 2500 years ago, between the writing of the Illiad and the Odyssey (Jaynes, 1976). JaynesÕ criterion of consciousness was whether HomerÕs heroes talked to themselves—the warriors of the Illiad did not, while Odysseus did. But speech is not a necessary condition for consciousness. After all, aphasics with impaired inner and outer speech show no sign of losing consciousness. This Special Issue of Consciousness and Cognition explores extensive evidence that consciousness is a major biological adaptation going back many millions of years. Subjective consciousness is of course inferred from observable evidence, much like working memory or other scientific constructs like electrons (Banks, 1995). Thus consciousness is not a metaphysical absolute, but a scientific construct like any other. In humans, the standard behavioral index of conscious cognition is accurate or verifiable report. It has been used scientifically since the beginning of psychophysics in the 1820s. Accurate report is highly reliable, but of course it is subject to limitations like any other empirical measure (Baars, 1988). However, behavioral measures of conscious cognitions are reliable enough to be routinely used in optometry, audiology, and the design of video screens and audio equipment. Physicians routinely use such evidence to test patients for impaired consciousness. Thousands of human experiments use verifiable report to study conscious perception, episodic memory, explicit cognition, focal attention, and the like (Baars, Banks, & Newman, 2004). But behavioral evidence is less useful when we study the question of animal consciousness. Bees meet the ‘‘accurate report’’ criterion when they convey information about food sources by doing a ‘‘waggle dance.’’ But human-like consciousness seems implausible in bees. Thus when we look beyond the human species, brain evidence may be a more useful source of evidence. Can we infer subjectivity in other mammals? It is an inferential leap for one person to believe in the consciousness of another. Such inferences are made routinely when physicians test head-injured patients with impaired responsiveness. But if we make such inferences to other humans, then why not to other creatures, if the objective basis is the same? It is sometimes argued that animal subjectivity is not a testable claim, but we now have a number of studies that have tested such inferences, for example, on the question of visual consciousness in monkeys (e.g., Cowey & Stoerig, 1995). When we include other kinds of sensory awareness (especially touch, hearing, and pain) the circle of conscious animal species seems to grow larger. Non-mammals have been studied in less detail, but the range of conscious species will likely expand as we learn more. 2. Articles in this issue of Consciousness and Cognition This issue is dedicated to the memory of Donald R. Griffin (see the obituary by Speck, 2005). Donald Griffin devoted his life to field studies of animals, and took intense criticisms from scientific colleagues when he began to address the question of animal consciousness—initially phrased as ‘‘animal cognition.’’ He was a scientific pioneer of outstanding courage and integrity, and we owe him a great debt of gratitude. Jaak Panksepp is another modern pioneer, in his case in the study of the brain substrates of emotion in humans and other mammals. He has made many contributions to understanding the mammalian social attachment system associated with the region surrounding the cerebrospinal aqueduct, B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 9 called the peri-aqueductal grey (PAG). This brainstem region is of fundamental importance in mother–infant attachment, and appears to be involved in such behavioral events as separation distress cries in mothers and infants. Brainstem regions are of course phylogenetically old, and Panksepp makes a case that conscious emotional feeling states have a long biological history. One of PankseppÕs famous discoveries is the existence of high-frequency distress cries in newborn rat pups separated from the mother; another is the reward value of tickling and social play in rats. Panksepp is the author of the landmark volume Affective Neuroscience (1998), which lays out a coherent brainbased framework for emotion. For this special issue he has written two papers. His major empirical case is made in ‘‘Affective Consciousness: Core Emotional Feelings in Animals and Humans’’; a second article in this issue is a commentary called ‘‘Toward a science of ultimate concern.’’ It pursues the ethical implications of the evidence for consciousness and emotions in animals. How do we deal with a world in which animals as well as humans experience pain and pleasure? Bjorn Merker is a Swedish neurobiologist who also conducts field work with Gibbons in Indonesia and experimental studies of music. Merker has recently published a significant article on the functional implications of neocortical layer structure (Merker, 2004). In this article he suggests one of the few serious evolutionary hypotheses for the biological origins of consciousness. As he points out, our conscious experience of the world is relatively stable compared to the sensory input. We constantly change our visual gaze, head orientation, body motion and the like, without noticing a change in the world. Self-other discrimination in motion perception has been thought to be fundamental since Helmholtz pointed out that the eye can be moved by gentle external pressure, and the world will be seen to jump. Yet much larger endogenous eye movements do not result in consciously experienced changes in the world. Such self-other discrimination is needed even for earth worms being investigated by a curious dog. The worm must distinguish between the friction of its own movements compared to being licked by a dog. One is a danger to survival; the other is a sign needed to keep moving. One implication of MerkerÕs point is to notice that consciousness may originate in the intersection between decision processes and sensory input. Humans make decisions based on conscious alternatives, though shaped by unconscious biases. Numerous recent studies show that conscious, but not unconscious sensory input activates executive regions of prefrontal and parietal cortex (Frackowiak, 2004). In order to make decisions, one must have a reasonably stable representation of the current state of the world. Perhaps one function of consciousness is to facilitate this interaction between world and self. Banks (1995) has suggested that understanding the functional role of consciousness may also give us a line of evidence on its emergence. FranklinÕs commentary proposes such a functional generalization of MerkerÕs argument, suggesting that consciousness may be a distant pre-mammalian development (2005). Franklin also argues that an analogue of consciousness may be implemented in non-biological hardware. Seth and Baars (2005) pursue the function of consciousness from the perspective of Neural Darwinism (ND), an influential theory of brain function developed by Gerald M. Edelman and colleagues (e.g., Edelman, 1993). While Edelman has repeatedly described ND as the brain basis for consciousness, this article posits a set of specific objective criteria for consciousness and explores the adequacy of ND for their understanding. It may therefore be one of the most detailed evaluations of EdelmanÕs hypothesis regarding consciousness, coming to the conclusion that ND fares rather well by the criteria discussed. 10 B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 Developing empirical hallmarks for poorly understood empirical questions is a standard goal of science. In neuroscience the empirical criteria for neurotransmitters were a hot topic of debate some decades ago, leading to the discovery of acetylcholine and a host of other chemicals that met those standards. Perhaps the major reason for confusion about consciousness is the absence of an agreed-upon set of empirical indices. Seth, Baars, and Edelman (2005) therefore propose a set of 17 testable aspects of consciousness that command widespread agreement among scientists. Others have been proposed by Edelman (2003) and Crick and Koch (2003). Edelman, Baars, and Seth (2005) apply this approach to the question non-mammalian consciousness. For reasons discussed in this Introduction, the case for mammalian consciousness is quite compelling, using objective indices available today. It is always possible, of course, that there is some distinctive human brain feature that excludes consciousness in other species. However, we have two centuries of neuroanatomical evidence and 70 years of EEG studies of waking, sleeping, and dreaming. In addition, we now have much greater insight into the phylogeny of nervous systems as well as its genetic basis. Brain homologies that were highly controversial a few years ago are now widely accepted, because the genetic codes are known to be the same across species. Non-mammals have less obvious homologies, but still share basic classes of neurons, neurotransmitters, and even types of connectivity that may potentially resemble the human neocortex. Although our ignorance about the brain basis of consciousness continues to be vast, it is not infinite. What we know today suggests that consciousness is a basic biological adaptation, with an evolutionary basis like any other. Living organisms are characterized by functional redundancy, as pointed out by Edelman and Gally (2001) and Price and Friston (2003). (The technical term is ‘‘degeneracy.’’) We have two lungs, two cortical hemispheres, four heart chambers, and many regenerating regions of the liver. That suggests that consciousness, like other major adaptations, may have multiple functions, and that we should not become trapped into looking for only one. A closely related example is the case of sleep, whose function is not at all agreed on at this time. Sleep probably has many functions, including circadian timing of gene expression, possible stress reduction, and perhaps others, such as detoxifying glutamate products that accumulate during the waking state. We argue below that there is an indisputable association between waking consciousness and goal-directed survival and reproductive behavior. Its biological primacy is therefore hard to dispute. Valli et al. (2005) take the functional debate another step. REM dreaming1 is a state closely related to waking consciousness. The EEG of REM dream states is hard to distinguish from waking, and people can even learn to signal on cue from REM dreams. While skeletal muscles are typically paralyzed during REM, eye movements are not, and can be performed on contingent voluntary control. Finally, REM dreams can be reported, as we know from virtually universal human experience. They therefore meet the standard behavioral criterion of consciousness. REM emerges with early mammals, and Valli et al. (2005) suggest that the function of dreams is to simulate, and therefore prepare to deal with, threatening situations. These authors make creative use of dreams from traumatized children as an empirical basis for their hypothesis. 1 The term ‘‘REM dreams’’ is used here because the previously accepted association between physiological REM and dream reports has come under considerable question in recent years. These comments refer to physiological REM that is also reflected in classical dream reports. B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 11 Finally, Greenspan and Baars explore some reasons why the question of consciousness in animals and people was expelled from science after 1900. The seminal role of Jacques Loeb, Ivan P. Pavlov, and other physical reductionists is explored. It is interesting that the experimental evidence we use today to explore the brain basis of conscious experience was well known to William James and Charles Sherrington. For example, binocular rivalry has been one of the major experimental techniques for exploring consciousness in recent years (see below). Much of the evidence known before 1900 is not very different from todayÕs findings, yet we are currently seeing some 5000 articles per year citing the world ‘‘consciousness’’ in the biobehavioral literature, after a century of virtual taboo. The reason for the long taboo is therefore somewhat puzzling. 3. The rediscovery of consciousness Charles Darwin wrote that ‘‘Consciousness appears to be the product of complexity of organization,’’ an hypothesis that continues to draw serious scientific attention today (e.g., Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). In the 19th century scientists like Darwin treated consciousness as an obvious scientific topic. Research on conscious sensory perception, conscious and unconscious influences on memory, selective attention, and even hypnosis began in 1800s. The 1400 pages of William JamesÕ Principles of Psychology (1890/1983) provide a guide to the rich domain of empirical knowledge gathered during that period. It is filled with facts that have since been rediscovered, and which are the subject of much current research (e.g., Baars, 1986, 1988; Baars et al., 2004). Yet in the years before 1900 the openminded scientific attitude toward human and animal consciousness began to change. Thomas Henry Huxley, known as ‘‘DarwinÕs Bulldog’’ for his public defense of biological evolution, suggested that consciousness might be a useless by-product of normal brain functioning. He wrote that ‘‘Consciousness would appear to be related to the mechanism of the body simply as a (side) product of its working, and to be completely without any power of modifying that working, as the (sound of) a steam whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive is without influence upon its machinery.’’ (quoted in James, 1890/1983, p. 135). The empirical phenomena of consciousness, which are plentiful and easy to obtain, became entangled in the snares of the mind-body problem, a set of philosophical conundrums that are not subject to empirical test. Further, consciousness came to be seen, in the words of the American behaviorist John B. Watson, as ‘‘nothing but the soul of theology.’’ It soon fell victim to a culture war between science and religion. In biology C. Lloyd Morgan proposed the ‘‘Lloyd Morgan Canon,’’ claiming that anthropomorphic generalizations about animals are dubious in principle (Morgan, 1896). I.P. PavlovÕs work on conditional associations in dogs was interpreted to mean that psychological concepts like volition were meaningless, and that learning could be automatic, without conscious involvement. Both of these interpretations are now known to be false (e.g., Baars, 1986, 1988). But PavlovÕs work was very much in tune with the times, and H.G. Wells, for example, welcomed Pavlov as ‘‘a star which lights the world, shining above a vista hitherto unexplored.’’ (quoted by Skinner, 1976). Behaviorism was celebrated as soon as it was proclaimed, launching the influential careers of John B. Watson and B.F. Skinner in the United States, and logical positivist philosophers in Britain and elsewhere. The early 20th century saw a massive scientific purge of consciousness and related ideas—including purpose, mental imagery, emotional feelings, unconscious processes, attention, meaning, 12 B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 thinking, and inner speech. Consciousness came to have the status of a scientific taboo. A hundred years of useful empirical discoveries were forgotten. Behaviorists popularized several standard criticisms of 19th century consciousness science; but those criticisms have now themselves come under serious question (e.g., Blumenthal, 1979; Hilgard, 1987). They now appear to be almost entirely erroneous. Since the decline of behaviorism, hundreds of facts about consciousness described in JamesÕ Principles have been rediscovered (Baars, 1986, 1988; Baars et al., 2004). Indeed, nineteenth century findings about topics like sensory psychophysics have continued to accumulate in the last hundred years without serious controversy. No one can have a simple eye examination today without benefiting from psychophysical methods first developed in the 1820s. Psychophysics was considered to be the scientific study of conscious sensations, and indeed that is how we are once again seeing it. Yet we are still recovering from a century in which consciousness became a taboo. Obviously, for those who doubt that humans are conscious, the question of other animals cannot be addressed with an open mind. The evidence is now extensive that behavioristic skeptics were wrong. Today some 5000 articles per year cite the term ‘‘consciousness’’ in the scientific literature. The importance of consciousness in humans, as assessed by objective evidence, is beyond empirical dispute. What about other animals? 4. Behavioral and brain evidence It is essential to distinguish between ‘‘intelligence’’ (as problem solving) and ‘‘consciousness’’ (as wakeful alertness and conscious perception, including the perception of pain and pleasure). We know of hundreds of differences between humans and other mammals in problem-solving tasks, ranging from word retrieval to migratory travel. Problem-solving tends to be species-specific. Early in life humans all over the world are able to learn a very large vocabulary, demonstrating a distinct species-specific capacity. Pigeons, on the other hand, excel in finding their way in air space, far beyond unaided human abilities. Throughout the animal kingdom, different brains support high evolved species-specific abilities. Yet the fundamental brain mechanisms of conscious alertness and of conscious sensory perception are not limited to a few animal species. They have extremely wide distribution among vertebrates and perhaps more widely. Species differences such as the size of neocortex seem to be irrelevant to wakefulness and perceptual consciousness. To stay close to the established evidence, this review is limited to waking alertness and perceptual consciousness in mammals, including humans. 5. Behavioral indices of consciousness: Accurate report In humans, the standard observational index of consciousness is ‘‘accurate or verifiable report’’ (e.g., Baars, 1988, 1998; Baars et al., 2004). In humans reports of conscious experiences do not have to be verbal; pressing a button, or any other voluntary response, is routinely accepted as adequate in research. Reporting responses are equally useful in animals. B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 13 Humans are extraordinarily good in detecting conscious sensory events. Seeing a single star on a dark night has been calculated to require no more than a single stream of photons activating a single retinal receptor, that is, the lowest physical amount of light energy. Likewise, in a very quiet place humans can hear a background hiss due to the random motion of air molecules in the outer ear canal; that, too, is a stimulus at the lower physical limit of auditory stimulation. Seeing a star and hearing noise are provably conscious events in humans, because they meet the standard operational definition of accurate report; thus these extraordinary sensory abilities are in some sense capacities of consciousness. Animal sensory capacities are likewise remarkable, and can be reported by way of overt behavior just as clearly as humans can tell us about their conscious visual or auditory experiences. In primates, birds, and marine mammals that can use artificial symbols like sign language, gestures or computer keyboards, referential accuracy is well established. 6. The ‘‘commentary key’’ as evidence for mammalian consciousness Skeptics sometimes question whether the ability of monkeys and cats to accurately report sensory events really involves conscious perception. That hypothesis can be tested in a number of ways. Recent research in macaques and other species is especially remarkable, because it allows us to ask if the animals studied respond to conscious events differently than they do to comparable brain events that are unconscious. Weiskrantz (1991) and Cowey and Stoerig (1995) have developed a ‘‘commentary key’’ method for the macaque, allowing it to give a behavioral comment on a previous response. This reflects the idea that human reports of conscious experiences are shared comments about those experiences. When a child exclaims, ‘‘Mommy, airplane!’’ s/he is making a public comment about a conscious visual event, telling an outside observer what was just experienced. The commentary key is especially useful in the study of cortical blindness, where humans can make accurate discriminations while claiming that they do not actually see the discriminated targets consciously. Cortical blindness is a condition in which the first cortical projection area (V1) of the primary visual pathway is damaged. In the occluded part of the field humans report a loss of conscious visual qualities like stimulus color, motion, and location. Yet there is excellent evidence that such properties of the visual stimulus are still processed by the visual brain, as shown by forced-choice responses. Thus blindsight patients can sometimes point to the location of a visual object, and detect motion and color, while strongly denying that they have normal visual experiences of those features. A remarkable study by Cowey and Stoerig (1995) made use of a commentary response to test whether macaques with cortical blindness lose conscious visual qualia like color and motion, which humans report losing with similar brain damage. The macaqueÕs visual brain resembles the human one in a number of respects. Careful lesion studies show that the macaque behaves much like a human blindsight subject when selected parts of area V1 are removed. But can we be sure that the ‘‘blindsighted’’ macaque has also lost visual conscious qualities, the qualia discussed by philosophers, such as color, motion, and texture? Cowey and Stoerig make this case, using a behavioral commentary key, which allows the monkeys to make a metacognitive comment about their discriminative responses. Like a human blindsight subject, the blindsighted macaque can choose accurately between colors, for example. The commentary key allows it to signal whether its accurate behavior has a corresponding conscious qualitative experience—specifically, 14 B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 whether a stimulus in the occluded visual field can be distinguished from a blank display in the intact field. In the event, macaques did not learn to discriminate between the two, just as if a human blindsight patient were saying, ‘‘I canÕt tell the difference between input in my blind field and a completely blank input in my sighted field.’’ This is in effect a denial of visual qualities. Thus the commentary key apparently provides an equivalent of the reportability criterion in humans. 7. Other behavioral evidence A number of other behavioral sources of evidence suggest consciousness. For example, mere distractibility in animals indicates a limited capacity for competing sensory streams, a well-established feature of conscious but not necessarily unconscious input processes (e.g., Baars, 1988, 1998; Baars et al., 2004). Simply presenting a distracting stimulus when an animals appears to be orienting to an event of interest creates competition between the two sources of information. Such competition is the standard method for assessing limited conscious capacity. When a giraffe bends down to drink from a water hole, it cannot at the same time monitor what its offspring are doing, whether a predator is in the neighborhood, or whether another giraffe is showing unexpected signs of social or sexual competition. Animals routinely ‘‘catch each other unawares’’ during such moments of distraction; many predation strategies are based on prey distractability. Likewise, in humans, moving our eyes and ears to a source of stimulation leads to conscious experiences. Such receptor orienting can be observed in other mammals at every moment of the waking day. The same may be said for exploratory behavior, the willingness of animals to work for novel or biologically significant information. Finally, animals show unmistakable behavioral signs of sleep, drowsiness, and alertness that correspond to distinct conscious states in humans. Scientists have been extremely cautious before attributing consciousness even to animals that closely resemble humans in their abilities and brain functions. There is an effective consensus today that consciousness can be attributed in the case of visual perception in macaque monkeys, using the very rigorous criteria illustrated above. The weight of evidence in these cases seems so clear at this time that we may begin to relax our current high demands for proof to some degree. For example, it seems likely that perceptual consciousness may become routinely accepted, even in mammals that do not communicate by way of referential symbols like sign language. In the coming years, as the pattern of brain and behavioral evidence grows, we may begin to attribute consciousness on the basis of a mammalÕs ability to match and discriminate between classes of stimuli, combined with evidence about the underlying brain events. It has been known for decades that a vast range of animals show this ability. It is effectively equivalent to saying, ‘‘I hear a tone, and can match it with the same tone an octave above; but I can distinguish between that tone and another one a half-tone up in the octave scale.’’ Such descriptive responses appear equivalent to reports of conscious events in humans. 8. Electrical activity It has been known since the late 1920s that there is a major difference in scalp electrical activity (EEG) between waking consciousness and deep, unconscious sleep, as reported by human B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 15 subjects. These EEG phenomena apply to humans and other mammals alike, so much so that mammalian EEG studies are often applied to humans. In all mammalian species studied waking shows fast, irregular, and low-voltage field activity throughout the thalamocortical core. In contrast, deep sleep reveals slow, regular, and high-voltage field activity. Thus the electrical activity of the thalamocortical core in waking appears to support reports of conscious experiences in humans. But the underlying brain activity is so similar in humans, monkeys, and cats, that these species are routinely studied interchangeably to obtain a deeper understanding of states of consciousness. The specific neuronal activities underlying these global differences in EEG are now increasingly understood. During unconscious sleep, slow-wave global EEG appears to reflect highly regular and coordinated burst-pause firing patterns in many billions of individual neurons in thalamus and cortex. In contrast, waking EEG reflects irregular firing in the same billions of single neurons, as well as rapidly changing periods of gamma coherence between them. (Destexhe, Contreras, & Steriade, 1999). The regular burst-pause pattern of neurons during slow-wave sleep is highly synchronized, with effective zero-lag correlations between individual neurons at a distance of a centimeter or more. Significantly, the same pattern of slow-wave, synchronized EEG appears in other states of global unconsciousness such as general anesthesia, coma, and epileptic ‘‘states of absence’’ (Baars et al., 2004). In all these cases human beings do not report events that are conscious during the waking state. All mammalian species studied so far show the same massive contrast in the electrical brain activity between waking and deep sleep. Thus we have some seventy years of cumulative evidence related to brain activity during consciousness and its absence in humans and other mammals. 9. Neuroanatomy of consciousness In years past it was commonly said that consciousness must be some vague and non-specific aspect of the human brain. In fact, the waking state can be abolished by less than cubic centimeter lesions in the brainstem reticular formation and even smaller bilateral cuts in the intralaminar nuclei of the thalami (Bogen, 1995; Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949). In contrast, very large volumes of cortex can be lost without impairing the state of consciousness. Entire hemispheres are routinely removed surgically without loss of consciousness. While the sleep–waking cycle is controlled by basal brain ‘‘spritzers’’ that distribute neuromodulating transmitters throughout the forebrain, in humans and other mammals the contents of perceptual consciousness depend on cortex. There may be species differences in this respect, with visual contents being in part dependent on the tectum in other mammals (the colliculi). But in all mammals the state of consciousness seems to require only small anatomical areas, the brainstem reticular formation, intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus, and basal neuromodulatory nuclei. 10. The thalamocortical (T-C) complex In humans the thalamus and cortex are crucial for supporting the contents of consciousness (Edelman & Tononi, 2000). Thalamus is often considered to be an extension of cortex, an added 16 B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 sandwich of interacting layers that controls most traffic to and from cortex. Local damage to cortical sensory regions, like the fusiform gyrus for face perception, results in a loss of conscious knowledge about faces but not about other visual features like color, location, or size. If the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus are lesioned bilaterally, the conscious state is lost. By comparison, large lesions to cerebellum, basal ganglia, and spinal cord do not impair either conscious contents or state. Cerebellar damage can cause paralysis but not loss of consciousness. Lesion evidence on these points is supported by stimulation experiments using electrodes, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and microdialysis. It is also reflected in functional brain imaging. The evidence is therefore very strong that the T-C system supports consciousness. That is why many neuroscientists consider the T-C system to be the ‘‘seat’’ of conscious experience, and have done so for at least a century. What about the T-C system in other animals? All mammals have a highly developed T-C system, suggesting that they must be conscious. Mammals are 100–200 million years old. Although we cannot directly observe ancestral forms of mammals, by studying skulls and gene conservation across species, it certainly seems that the fundamental T-C system has not changed much in 100– 200 million years. Contrary to the Jaynes hypothesis, therefore, it seems that at least some types of consciousness are not merely 2500 years old, but closer to 100 million years. Notice that brainstem mechanisms like the reticular formation are also extremely ancient phylogenetically, going back at least to early vertebrates. Thalamic structures like the intralaminar nuclei also exist in mammals generally. Both these facts suggest that the brain anatomy of conscious wakefulness is very ancient indeed. 11. Visual consciousness in human and mammalian cortex In the last 20 years we have made considerable progress on understanding perceptual consciousness in humans and other mammals. We have already discussed studies of blindsight in the macaque, suggesting that these primates have qualitative conscious visual experiences that closely resemble human visual experiences. Along the same lines, in a landmark series of multipleneuron recording studies, Logothetis and colleagues have used binocular rivalry at different levels of visual analysis to track neurons responding to both conscious and unconscious input features in the occipito-temporal lobes of the macaque (Logothetis & Schall, 1989; Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). Binocular rivalry involves presentation of two incompatible visual stimuli, one to each eye. Only one stimulus becomes visually conscious in the sense of being reportable, but the unconscious stimulus still evokes appropriate feature cell activation in visual cortex, starting with the first visual projection area and succeeding to more and more elaborate feature-detecting neurons. Rivalrous pairs of visual stimuli can be designed to activate each level of visual feature analysis in the ventral temporal cortex. By experimentally counterbalancing stimulus conditions between the two eyes, one can rule out stimulus and eye effects, and focus only on those neural processes that are due to consciousness of a stimulus in either eye. Binocular rivalry experiments can be designed, therefore, to tease out the effects of visual consciousness For example, a downward flow of stairstep lines can be presented to the right eye, along with an upward flow to the left eye. While only one eyeÕs input becomes conscious at any given moment, some motion-sensitive neurons in area MT (V5) respond to a conscious stimulus, while others fire B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 17 to a competing unconscious stimulus. Likewise, right-diagonal lines can be presented to the right eye, and left-diagonal lines to the left eye, thereby activating neurons in areas V1 and V2 that are sensitive to edge orientation. Finally, different objects can be presented to each eye, creating competing streams of input into object-recognition neurons in the anterior pole of the lower temporal cortex (area IT), and in the superior temporal sulcus (STS). Thus each level of visual feature analysis can be interrogated with a distinct set of binocular stimuli, one conscious and the other not. Earlier work showed that binocular rivalry activates small numbers of cells in early visual cortex, where single visual features are represented, such as color, motion, line orientation, and spatial frequency. Some of these early cells respond to the ‘‘conscious eye’’ while others respond to unconscious input in the ‘‘unconscious eye.’’ More than half of the cells at early levels of visual analysis do not respond to either stream. However, Sheinberg and Logothetis (1997) demonstrated that this pattern changes dramatically toward the anterior end of the visual ventral stream, where whole objects are represented in inferotemporal cortex (area IT). In this region 90% of neurons responded to conscious, but not to unconscious visual input. Area IT therefore appears to be the best current candidate for a distinctive locus of visual consciousness in cortex, because it clearly distinguishes between the conscious and unconscious input stream, and unlike earlier regions it massively favors the conscious stream. Since IT represents whole visual objects, it involves the integration of many specific visual features into a single, integrated representation. Nevertheless, conscious vision still appears to be crucially dependent on other parts of the brain, including earlier visual areas, other parts of cortex, and subcortical regions such as the thalamus. The macaque is often chosen for these studies because its visual brain and abilities so closely resemble the human case. Findings from macaque vision studies are routinely found to generalize to humans. The opposite must be true as well: If humans are visually conscious, given the same kind of brain, the same kinds of results from studies of single neurons, and the same overall psychophysical parameters of vision, it becomes plausible to say that macaques and their close relatives must be visually conscious much as humans are.2 12. Neurochemistry In all mammals, waking, sleeping, and dreaming are controlled by brainstem nuclei that widely project their axons to the forebrain, secreting neuromodulators widely to the forebrain. Hobson (1997) writes that ‘‘in waking, the aminergic systems of the brain stem are spontaneously, continuously, and responsively active; in REM (rapid eye movement state), they are shut off by an active inhibitory process that is probably gaba-ergic. As a function of this shut-down of aminergic systems in REM, the cholinergic systems of the brain stem become disinhibited and excite the brain with strong tonic and phasic activation signals. The net result is that, in REM sleep, the brain is aminergically demodulated and cholinergically hypermodulated.’’ (p. 392). Again, the fact that 2 The most obvious difference between humans and other mammals, of course, is the great expansion of frontal cortex. While cetaceans have comparable brain size, their anterior cortices are homologous with parietal rather than prefrontal regions. The closest cortical homologies among mammals therefore seem to apply to perceptual regions that are located in the posterior half of cortex in humans. 18 B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 neuromodulation of conscious and unconscious states is controlled by brainstem nuclei suggests an ancient evolutionary origin. Current evidence suggests that all mammals without exception have similar fundamental brainstem mechanisms. High-dose general anesthesia often shows a slow-wave pattern of EEG similar to deep sleep, though often mixed with other waveforms. While different anesthetic agents seem to have quite different mechanisms of action, recent findings indicate that they may have similar global effects in the thalamocortical core. Thus Alkire, Haier, and Fallon (2000) have found evidence for a thalamocortical switch in general anesthesia across different anesthetic agents. 13. Functional evidence: In mammals, all goal-directed survival and reproductive behavior takes place during the conscious waking state Mammalian locomotion, hunting, evasive action, exploring, sensing, actively attending, learning, eating, grazing, nursing, mating, social interaction, and all other goal-directed survival and reproductive actions take place only during waking, as defined by EEG and other indices. Perceptual consciousness, as defined objectively by recent brain research, only takes place during waking periods. It therefore appears that brain activity that supports consciousness is a precondition for all goal-directed survival and reproductive behavior in humans and other mammals. The biologically fundamental nature of the conscious waking state is beyond serious question. Another hint of the fundamental biological nature of waking consciousness is the recent finding that wakefulness triggers the expression of early-immediate genes in rats (Cirelli, Pompeiano, & Tononi, 1996). Early-immediate genes are highly conserved among species, and appear to be needed for fundamental functions such as learning. This kind of basic biological evidence suggests a long evolutionary development, leading to recognizably conscious and unconscious states in humans and other species (Baars, 1987, 1993). Not so long ago it was common for some observers to claim that consciousness might be an epiphenomenon, with no causal role at all (e.g., Block, 1995). On the weight of the evidence, however, it seems that waking consciousness involves a basic biological adaptation with many survival functions. 14. Consciousness beyond mammals What about non-mammals? The gross anatomy of bird brains they seems different from mammals. Like most non-mammals, birds have collections of nuclei rather than the beautiful fiber radiations of the thalamus into cortex. But gross-level nuclei could still have neuronal connectivities that are similar to the T-C system. At the level of neurons there is interesting evidence suggesting homologies. Some birds certainly pass the behavioral test. Irene PepperbergÕs African Grey Parrot Alex is able to use spoken words accurately, which is another way of satisfying the accurate report criterion. Ravens spontaneously perform gaze-sharing (looking in the same direction to see an ‘‘intersubjective’’ object). Other birds bury nuts for the winter, and can find them very accurately when the visible scenery has changed very much. That is another measure of accurate report. B.J. Baars / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 7–21 19 So the evidence is very strong for mammals, and a little less so for birds. What about large-brained invertebrates, like squid or octopi? How about fast-moving reptiles like lizards, or at a larger brain scale, Komoda Dragons? We need more evidence, but these questions are becoming ripe to be studied. 15. Summary Cumulative evidence suggests that consciousness is a fundamental biological adaptation. The known brain correlates of consciousness appear to be ancient phylogenetically, going back at least to early mammals. In all mammals alertness and sensory consciousness are required for the goaldirected behaviors that make species survival and reproduction possible. In all mammals the anatomy, neurochemistry and electrical activity of the brain in alert states show striking similarities. After more than seven decades of discoveries about waking as well as sensory consciousness, we have not yet found fundamental differences between humans and other mammals. Species differences such as the size of neocortex seem to be irrelevant to the existence of alertness and sensory consciousness, though different mammals obviously specialize in different of kinds of sensory, cognitive and motor abilities. Skeptics sometimes claim that objective evidence for consciousness tells us little about subjective experience, such as the experience of conscious pain. Scientifically, however, plausible inferences are routinely based on reliable and consistent patterns of evidence. 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Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog Unnoticed intrusions: Dissociations of meta-consciousness in thought suppression Benjamin Baird a,⇑, Jonathan Smallwood b, Daniel J.F. Fishman c, Michael D. Mrazek a, Jonathan W. Schooler a a Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660, United States Department of Psychology, University of York, United Kingdom c Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada b a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 18 December 2012 Available online 2 August 2013 Keywords: Thought suppression Mind-wandering Meta-awareness Monitoring Consciousness Experience sampling a b s t r a c t The current research investigates the interaction between thought suppression and individuals’ explicit awareness of their thoughts. Participants in three experiments attempted to suppress thoughts of a prior romantic relationship and their success at doing so was measured using a combination of self-catching and experience-sampling. In addition to thoughts that individuals spontaneously noticed, individuals were frequently caught engaging in thoughts of their previous partner at experience-sampling probes. Furthermore, probe-caught thoughts were: (i) associated with stronger decoupling of attention from the environment, (ii) more likely to occur under cognitive load, (iii) more frequent for individuals with a desire to reconcile, and (iv) associated with individual differences in the tendency to suppress thoughts. Together, these data suggest that individuals can lack meta-awareness that they have begun to think about a topic they are attempting to suppress, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes that are involved in attempting to control undesired mental states. Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction From stressful upcoming events to past loves, there are often things that people would prefer to avoid thinking about. Although it would certainly be nice if it were possible to be able to promptly forget anything one wished to not think about, the conscious attempt to suppress or avoid certain thoughts is difficult and can even backfire, in some cases leading to suppression-induced obsession (see Wegner, 1992). This ‘‘ironic’’ return of unwanted thoughts was first shown experimentally in a study in which individuals asked not to think about a white bear for a period of time later reported thoughts of a white bear more frequently than those not given this instruction (Wegner et al., 1987). Other studies on suppression have found similar results, showing that attempts to suppress a thought often lead to an increase in its occurrence, either immediately or after the suppression has ended (for reviews see Wegner (1994) and Wenzlaff and Wegner (2000)). Research on thought suppression has generally assumed that the difficulty people have in suppressing unwanted thoughts results from some interplay between unconscious and conscious thought. In an influential theory, Wegner (1992, 1994, 1997) has argued that the recurrence of unwanted thoughts is due to a two-stage process in which an automatic monitor searches preconsciousness for thoughts that require suppression, followed by a cognitively-demanding (and conscious) process of actually suppressing the thought. As Wegner (1997) states, ‘‘because the monitor searches for potential ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: baird@psych.ucsb.edu (B. Baird). 1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.06.009 1004 B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 mental contents that signal failure of mental control, it increases the accessibility of these contents to consciousness’’ (p. 299). While considerable research supports this theory (e.g., Wegner, 1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), research in other domains (in particular in the related area of mind-wandering), suggests that the challenges surrounding attempts at thought control may in addition occur at the conscious level. Specifically, recent investigations of mind-wandering have documented the value of a distinction between two different levels of conscious thought: experiential consciousness – thoughts that occur without explicit self-reflection, and meta-awareness – thoughts that are accompanied by the explicit awareness of having the thought (e.g., Schooler, 2002; Schooler, Mrazek, Baird, & Winkielman, in press; Schooler et al., 2011). In order to assess mental lapses that occur with versus without meta-awareness, research on mind-wandering has employed two self-report measures: (i) self-catching, in which individuals are asked to press a response key every time they notice that they have been engaging in unrelated thoughts and (ii) experience sampling, in which individuals are periodically interrupted by a prompt which asks them about the content of their current conscious experience (e.g., Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, 2010; Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Sayette, Schooler, & Reichle, 2010; Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). For example, Schooler, Reichle, and Halpern (2005) asked participants to self-report whenever their minds wandered while reading, and intermittently probed participants to report on whether they were mind-wandering at that moment. Despite the fact that readers were asked to self-report an episode of mind-wandering as soon as it occurred, they were nonetheless sometimes ‘‘caught’’ engaging in off-topic thoughts at the experience-sampling probes. Furthermore, the frequency of probe-caught episodes of mind-wandering was associated with worse comprehension on a post-reading test, but those episodes that were self-caught were not, suggesting that reading comprehension is particularly disrupted by mind-wandering episodes that evade detection. Building on the hypothesis that the capacity to notice off-task thoughts is crucial to the effective regulation of behavior, subsequent research has shown that when participants describe their mind-wandering at probes as lacking explicit metaawareness, this is associated with greater propensity for error (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007, 2008), worse reading comprehension (Smallwood et al., 2008) and more careless responding in a go/no-go task (Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). Moreover, manipulating external focus through alcohol (Sayette et al., 2009) or craving (Sayette et al., 2010) has been shown to increase reports of mind-wandering at probes while reducing the proportion of these lapses that are explicitly noticed. Together these data highlight the importance of the distinction between the occurrence of specific thoughts and the explicit recognition (i.e., meta-awareness) of what one is thinking about (for recent reviews see Schooler et al., 2011, in press). The distinction between thoughts that occur with versus without meta-awareness could provide novel insight into the cognitive processes that are involved in attempting to suppress thoughts for several reasons. First, previous studies examining self-reports of failures of thought suppression have largely relied on a self-catching methodology. This leaves open the possibility that individuals may experience conscious thoughts regarding the content they are trying to avoid but fail to selfcatch those experiences due to dissociations of meta-awareness (Schooler, 2002; Schooler et al., 2011, in press). Given prior demonstrations of qualitative differences between thoughts that occur with versus without meta-awareness, the fact that previous investigations have relied exclusively on self-catching raises the possibility that processes and characteristics previously ascribed to suppressed thoughts might only apply to those thoughts that reach meta-awareness. Second, recognition that one’s mind has drifted back to the topic one wishes to avoid is potentially a necessary first step in the process by which control can be initiated. Understanding failures of thought suppression can therefore be advanced by understanding the circumstances in which the monitoring of such thought is compromised. As research on mind-wandering has shown, effective metacognitive monitoring of thought may be hindered when the mental resources required to monitor thought are dampened (Sayette et al., 2009, 2010) and thus unable to engage in effective top-down control. Most fundamentally, the distinction between consciousness and meta-awareness introduces another level at which the monitoring of suppressed thoughts could take place. As noted above, in prior theoretical discussions of thought suppression, Wegner (1994) has reviewed considerable evidence indicating that thought suppression involves the interplay of two juxtaposed processes: a control process that attempts to think about anything but the undesired thought, and an automatic process that searches for failures of the control process. For example, when executive resources are available (thereby enabling the control process that avoids unwanted thoughts) participants are generally quite effective at minimizing such thoughts (Wegner & Erber, 1992). However, when resources are limited (thereby undermining the control process), suppressed thoughts ‘‘rebound’’ in frequency. This latter finding suggests that in the absence of the control process, the automatic monitor primes and then finds the very thoughts the individual is seeking to avoid. Although considerable research has amassed in support of this ironic process model, one question has gone largely unaddressed, namely: What exactly is the automatic monitor monitoring? Wegner (1997) suggests that the automatic monitor searches the contents of preconsciousness. Although such a speculation is certainly plausible, it raises the question of why the monitor would search the contents of preconsciousness when such thoughts might otherwise never reach consciousness. While it may be of questionable value to dredge up suppressed thoughts that are outside of consciousness, there can be little question that one would want to know when an unwanted thought is currently in consciousness. In short, the fact that consciousness and meta-awareness can become dissociated suggests an additional potential locus for monitoring suppressed thoughts: namely, monitoring the contents of consciousness in order to alert the mind when it currently engaging in the very thought it is intending to avoid. B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 1005 2. Experimental overview In the current studies, we combined experience-sampling and self-catching methodologies (referred to as the self-caught/ probe-caught paradigm) to explore the interaction between thought suppression and individuals’ explicit awareness of thoughts that they are currently attempting to suppress. In each study we used a paradigm in which participants tried to suppress thoughts about a previous romantic relationship partner (see Wegner & Gold, 1995). As commonly done in this procedure, we asked participants to press a response key every time they noticed they were thinking about their previous partner, thereby providing a measure of suppressed thoughts that reached meta-awareness. In addition, participants were also periodically probed and asked to indicate whether they were thinking about their previous partner at that particular moment, providing a measure of suppressed thoughts that escaped explicit detection. With this design, we first investigated whether people can experience thoughts they are attempting to avoid in the absence of meta-awareness. If this is the case, participants should be caught engaging in thoughts of their previous partner at experience-sampling probes, even in the context of an experiment in which they are asked to report such thoughts as soon as they occur. Second, we explored whether, relative to self-caught thoughts, probe-caught thoughts involving the previous romantic partner would be associated with a greater decoupling of attention from the external environment. In the current studies, we measured thought suppression during reading. This paradigm enabled us to assess whether probe-caught thoughts in a suppression context would be associated with a greater decoupling of attention from the primary task of reading, as previous research has shown in the context of probe-caught thoughts more generally (Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008). Third, we investigated the effects of cognitive load on probe-caught and self-caught suppressed thoughts. As noted, previous studies have found that cognitive load increases the recurrence of suppressed thoughts (Wegner & Erber, 1992). However, given previous findings which suggest that the capacity to monitor thought requires cognitive resources (Sayette et al., 2009, 2010; Schooler, 2002; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), load may not only undermine the control processes necessary for suppression, but also the ability to notice the occurrence of a suppressed thought. Fourth, we evaluated the relationship between the emotional significance of the thought individuals were attempting to suppress and the capacity to notice the occurrence of those thoughts. Wegner and Gold (1995) found that participants who suppressed thoughts of a ‘‘hot-flame’’ (a previous partner they still desired) self-reported fewer thoughts than cold-flame participants. However, other research has shown that emotionally significant thoughts are in general more difficult to suppress (e.g., Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998). One possibility is that emotionally salient thoughts are more absorbing, making them more difficult to suppress from consciousness, as prior work suggests, and therefore also easier to become ‘‘caughtup’’ in and more difficult to explicitly reflect upon. According to the present framework, an alternative possibility that is consistent with both of these findings is that individuals with a desire to reconcile with a previous partner may think about their partner more but be less likely to acknowledge that they are doing so. Finally, we examined how explicit awareness of unwanted thoughts relates to individual differences in two alternative chronic tendencies: the tendency to suppress thoughts and the tendency to repress emotional experiences. Given that probe-caught mind-wandering has been shown to increase when individuals are in a negative mood (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011) or score highly on indexes of depression (Smallwood et al., 2007), and that chronic suppression is associated with negative emotions such as anxiety and dysphoria (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), individuals with chronic suppression tendencies may be more likely to experience unnoticed suppressed thoughts. Alternatively, if a failure to notice suppressed thoughts corresponds to a defense mechanism that leads individuals to ignore the fact that they are experiencing certain thoughts, then individuals who tend to repress emotional experiences should exhibit a high number of thoughts that evade self-catching. 3. Study 1 We used a self-caught/probe-caught paradigm to assess thought intrusions during a reading task in which participants were asked to try not to think about a previous romantic relationship partner. Given that participants were instructed to report the occurrence of thoughts of their previous partner as soon as they recognized them, reports of having those thoughts at experience-sampling probes correspond to situations when participants have not recognized the occurrence of the thought. On the basis of previous mind-wandering research (Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008), we hypothesized that thoughts about a past relationship partner that the participant failed to notice would be particularly associated with detriments in reading comprehension. 3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants Participants were 81 undergraduate students (22 males, 59 females) who participated in exchange for extra credit. Data from two participants were excluded because their data files were not saved properly. To be eligible for this and all subsequent studies, participants were required to have had a significant romantic relationship in which they were no longer involved. 1006 B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 3.1.2. Procedure Participants were asked to recall a past romantic relationship and were given 2 min to think about the relationship. Participants were then asked to type in the initials of their previous partner and were asked several questions about their relationship, including how long the relationship lasted and how long ago it ended. Participants were then instructed to suppress thoughts of their prior relationship partner for the duration of the experiment. The experimental task consisted of four sections. The first three parts were reading sections composed of three different non-fiction articles of unrelated subject matter taken from online professional journals. The reading passages were presented one page at a time and each article was divided into five sections of approximately equal length, with the participant advancing to the next section at their own pace. The fourth section consisted of a ‘‘quiet’’ section in which participants viewed a fixation point on a computer screen. The order of the reading sections was counterbalanced using a Latin-square design. All participants were asked to press the space bar each time they noticed that they had a thought about their previous partner. Half of the participants additionally received experience-sampling probes in which they were periodically interrupted by a screen that asked: ‘‘Just now, were you thinking about your previous relationship partner?’’ Participants responded by pressing ‘‘y’’ for Yes and ‘‘n’’ for No. Probes appeared approximately every 30 s, with a range of 8–150 s, and thought probe timing was independent of self-catching. After the computer portion of the study, participants completed a 15-question comprehension test. 3.2. Results and discussion Participants self-caught significantly more thoughts of their previous partner in the self-caught-only condition compared to the self-caught-plus-probe condition in both the reading (M = 33.9 and 15.6 respectively, t(77) = 3.14, p < .01) and quiet sections (M = 17.1 and 9.5, t(77) = 2.49, p < .05). This finding suggests that thought probes caught thoughts that (at least sometimes) would have been eventually noticed by the participants themselves. With the addition of probes, participants were caught engaging in thoughts of their previous partner 18% of the time while reading (M = 3.83, SD = 3.73) and 22% of the time while sitting quietly (M = 1.80, SD = 1.42). No difference was observed in reading comprehension between the self-caught-only condition (M = 10.78, SD = 2.17) compared to the self-caught-plus-probe condition (M = 10.44, SD = 2.10, t(77) = 0.68, p > .50), indicating that the experience-sampling method did not in itself alter reading comprehension performance. Simultaneous linear multiple regression analysis revealed that the frequency of probe-caught thoughts of the past romantic partner significantly predicted reading comprehension (b = .25, SE = .09, t(41) = 2.86, p < .01) while self-caught thoughts of the suppression target did not predict comprehension (b = 0.03, SE = .02, t(41) = 1.31, p = .20). This analysis suggests that probe-caught suppressed thoughts are particularly associated with decoupling of attention from what is being read. These findings mirror prior research indicating that probe-caught mind-wandering episodes are significantly more disruptive to reading comprehension than are those that individuals catch themselves (Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008). 4. Study 2 Study 2 was designed to replicate the finding that individuals can lack meta-awareness of the fact that they have begun to think about a suppression target, while also addressing the influence of cognitive load. Previous studies (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992) have generally found that cognitive load increases the recurrence of suppressed thoughts. In the current study, we wanted to explore whether load elicits a comparable effect on noticed and unnoticed suppressed thoughts. Prior evidence suggests that mental content is more difficult to regulate under cognitive load. For example, probe-caught estimates of depressive rumination for dysphoric individuals increase when the task has a working memory component (Smallwood et al., 2007). Moreover, given previous findings which suggest that the capacity to monitor thought requires cognitive resources (Sayette et al., 2009, 2010; Schooler, 2002; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), cognitive load may not only increase the occurrence of suppressed thoughts, but also reduce people’s meta-awareness of their thoughts (Sayette et al., 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In this experiment we also assessed participants’ desire to reconcile with their previous partner. Previous research (Wegner & Gold, 1995) has shown that individuals who still want to be with their ex-partner self-report fewer thoughts about their partner. However, it is unclear whether this decrement in the number of reported thoughts is attributable to a reduction in the occurrence of thoughts or a reduction in self-report. Indeed, other research suggests that emotionally significant thoughts are in general more difficult to suppress (e.g., Petrie et al., 1998). According to the present framework, an alternative hypothesis is that suppressed thoughts of a ‘‘hot flame’’ (a previous romantic partner that the person still desires) may be more difficult to suppress because of their emotional salience but also less likely to be reported. 4.1. Method 4.1.1. Participants Participants were 74 undergraduate students (29 male, 45 female; mean age = 20.3) who participated in exchange for extra credit. Two participants were excluded: one for not understanding the instructions and the other for receiving the wrong test materials. B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 1007 4.1.2. Procedure The procedure for Study 2 was identical to Study 1 with the following exceptions: (1) all participants were asked to selfreport thoughts of their previous partner and received thought probes, (2) following Wegner and Erber (1992), participants received a low or high cognitive load manipulation by giving them 30 s to memorize for subsequent recall either a 1-digit (low load) or 9-digit (high load) number just prior to beginning the computer session, and (3) participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they still wanted to be involved with their previous romantic partner on a 7-point scale. 4.2. Results and discussion Participants reported that the probes caught them thinking about their previous partner before they had realized it at a similar rate (M = 14%) as participants who received probes in Study 1. Replicating Study 1, a linear regression analysis revealed that the frequency of probe-caught suppressed thoughts (M = 4.36, SD = 4.36) predicted performance on the reading comprehension test (b = .14, SE = .06, t(70) = 2.24, p < .05), while self-caught thoughts (M = 21.0, SD = 18.9) were not a significant predictor of comprehension (b = .002, SE = .015, t(70) = 0.161, p = .87). Participants under high load reported that they were thinking about their previous partner at the probes more often (M = 5.40) than those under low load (M = 3.38, F(1, 70) = 4.02, p < .05). For self-caught thoughts, no differences were observed between high (M = 22.14) and low load (M = 19.91) [F(1, 70) = .24, p = .62]. Mean probe-caught and self-caught suppressed thoughts under high and low load are presented for both reading and quiet sections in Fig. 1. These results suggest that participants under high load were more likely to report thinking about their previous relationship but were no more likely to notice these thoughts. These findings extend previous results indicating that mental content is more difficult to regulate under load (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2007), and are consistent with the idea that mental resources may be important in monitoring consciousness during suppression (Sayette et al., 2009, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Finally, we explored the relationship between participants’ desire to reconcile with their ex-partner and the frequency of self-caught and probe-caught thoughts they had about that person. A simultaneous multiple regression model revealed that together self-caught and probe-caught thoughts of the past relationship partner accounted for approximately 20% of the variance in desire to reconcile [R2 = .202; F(2, 69) = 8.73, p < .001]. Individuals who reported a strong desire to reconcile had fewer self-caught thoughts (b = .038, SE = .01, t(70) = 3.09, p < .01) and more probe-caught thoughts (b = .21, SE = .05, t(70) = 3.92, p < .001) about their past partner. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1 for all participants, as well as separately for high and low cognitive load conditions. The results reveal that for both high and low load conditions, desire to reconcile was associated with fewer self-caught thoughts and more probe-caught thoughts of the previous relationship. We additionally observed an association between desire to reconcile and the amount of time since the relationship ended (r(70) = .34, p < .01), indicating that more recent relationships were associated with a stronger desire to reconcile. In order to evaluate the association between self-caught and probe-caught thoughts and desire to reconcile independent of recency effects, we therefore conducted an additional multiple regression analysis with time since the relationship ended included as a covariate (entered as Step 1 in a hierarchical linear regression model). Controlling for time since the relationship ended, the results remained consistent: individuals who had a strong desire to reconcile had fewer self-caught thoughts (b = .032, SE = .013, t(70) = 2.52, p = .014) and more probe-caught thoughts of their previous partner (b = .18, SE = .06, t(70) = 3.21, p = .002). Fig. 1. Cognitive load increases the report of probe-caught but not self-caught suppressed thoughts. 1008 B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 Table 1 Regression analysis predicting desire to reconcile for all participants, and participants who received a high or low cognitive load manipulation. Variable All B Probe-caught Self-caught R2 F N * ** High load SE B 0.21*** 0.04** 0.05 0.01 .20*** 8.73*** 72 B b .48*** .37** Low load SE B 0.19* 0.04* 0.07 0.02 .21* 4.33* 35 B b .44* .34* 0.24* 0.04* SE B b 0.10 0.02 .15 3.03 37 .49* .46* p < .05. p < .01. p < .001. *** The negative relationship between self-caught unwanted thoughts and desire to reconcile is consistent with Wegner and Gold’s (1995) finding that people who wanted to be with their partner self-reported fewer thoughts about them under suppression instructions. However, this result was reversed for probe-caught thoughts, indicating that desire to still be with a partner was positively associated with the likelihood of being caught by experience-sampling probes thinking about that partner. In summary, the desire to be with a partner was simultaneously associated with an increased likelihood of thinking about the partner and a decreased probability of spontaneously noticing such thoughts. 5. Study 3 Study 3 was designed to (1) replicate the results from Studies 1 and 2 that probe-caught thoughts of a previous romantic partner are particularly damaging to reading comprehension using a different set of reading passages and comprehension questions, (2) replicate the finding that desire to reconcile with a previous partner is associated with an increased likelihood of probe-caught unwanted thoughts, and (3) examine how individual differences in the tendency to repress emotional experiences and chronically suppress thoughts are related to the ability to successfully suppress thoughts of a past romantic partner. Specifically, in this study we used an individual differences approach to explore two alternative relationships between individuals’ chronic thought suppression patterns and the capacity to notice that a suppression target had entered consciousness. According to one view, some individuals may chronically fail to acknowledge their suppressed thoughts to themselves. This hypothesis is one way of interpreting the relationship between meta-awareness of suppressed thoughts and desire to be in the relationship that was observed in Study 2. Accordingly, individuals who still desire to be in the relationship may fail to acknowledge the thoughts to themselves as a defense mechanism, thereby leading them to fail to report the thoughts even though they regularly experience them. If such defense mechanisms contribute to failures to self-catch suppressed thoughts, then individuals with a tendency to repress emotions (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979) may be especially susceptible to experiencing suppressed thoughts without acknowledging them to themselves. An alternative account of individual differences in the capacity to suppress thoughts is suggested by research on individuals’ tendency for chronic thought suppression. Wegner and Zanakos (1994) introduced a measure of individuals’ chronic tendency to struggle with unwanted thoughts, the WBSI (White Bear Suppression Inventory), and found that individuals who scored high on this measure also were inclined towards depressive and anxious affect. The authors concluded, ‘‘anxiety-producing thoughts and depressing thoughts... represent two broad classes of thinking that could often prompt suppression in a person so inclined’’ (p. 619). Given that probe-caught mind-wandering has been shown to increase when people are in a negative mood (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011) or score highly on indexes of depression (Smallwood et al., 2007), individuals with chronic suppression tendencies may be more likely to be caught thinking about suppression targets. Importantly, although a priori it was possible that reduced meta-awareness of suppressed thoughts could be associated either with a tendency to repress or a tendency to suppress thoughts, it was very unlikely that both relationships would be observed, as Wegner and Zanakos (1994) found that the WBSI was inversely correlated with repression. 5.1. Method 5.1.1. Participants Participants were 84 undergraduate students (27 male, 59 female; mean age = 19.6) who participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 5.1.2. Procedure The procedure for Study 3 was identical to Study 1 with the following exceptions: (1) a new set of reading passages was used that consisted of excepts of non-fiction science writing from Bill Bryson’s A Short History of Nearly Everything (Bryson, 2003), (2) all participants were asked to self-report thoughts of their previous partner and received thought probes, (3) participants completed an 8-item questionnaire (Wegner & Gold, 1995) assessing the extent to which they wished they were B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 1009 still involved with their previous romantic partner, and (4) individual differences in the tendency to repress emotional experiences and suppress thoughts were assessed. Weinberger et al. (1979) defined repressors as individuals who score normatively low on a measure of trait anxiety (the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale) but normatively high on a measure of defensiveness (the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale). Thus, following Weinberger et al., our repression measure was a composite computed from scores on these two different scales, and consisted of two groups composed of individuals with low repressive tendencies and individuals with high repressive tendencies. Following Wegner and Zanakos (1994), the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) was used to assess individual differences in chronic thought suppression. 5.2. Results and discussion Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, participants were caught thinking about their previous relationship partner on average 16% of the time (M = 4.13, SD = 4.56), and caught themselves thinking about their partner on average 11.42 times (SD = 12.41). Replicating Studies 1 and 2, a simultaneous linear multiple regression model revealed that the frequency of probe-caught thoughts of the past romantic partner predicted reading comprehension (b = .18, SE = .08, t(82) = 2.26, p < .05) while self-caught thoughts did not predict comprehension (b = .00002, SE = .001, t(82) = .02, p = .98), again suggesting that only failures of suppression that people did not notice were associated with impaired comprehension of the material. Next we examined the relationship between probe-caught and self-caught suppressed thoughts and desire to reconcile with one’s previous partner. Simultaneous multiple regression revealed that together self-caught and probe-caught thoughts of the previous partner accounted for approximately 11% of the variance in desire to reconcile [R2 = .107; F(2, 81) = 4.86, p < .01]. Individuals who reported a stronger desire to still be in their previous relationship were more likely to be caught thinking about their previous partner (b = 1.58, SE = .60, t(82) = 2.64, p < .01), but were no more likely to catch themselves thinking about their partner (b = .002, SE = .009, t(82) = .26, p = .79). As in Study 2, we additionally observed an association between desire to reconcile and the amount of time since the relationship ended (r(82) = .39, p < .001), indicating that more recent relationships were associated with a stronger desire to reconcile. To examine the association between self-caught and probe-caught thoughts and desire to reconcile independent of recency effects, we conducted an additional regression analysis controlling for time since the relationship ended. Again we observed that individuals who had a strong desire to reconcile were more likely to be caught thinking about their previous partner (b = 1.54, SE = .56, t(82) = 2.78, p < .01), but were no more likely no catch themselves thinking about their partner (b = .0001, SE = .009, t(82) = .02, p = .98). These findings are consistent with the proposal that individuals with a desire to reconcile actually think about their previous partner more often, but are not more likely to self-report this fact. Finally, we examined the relationship between the relative frequency of probe-caught and self-caught thoughts of the previous relationship and both the tendency for repression and for suppression. There was no difference between high and low repressors in their tendency to report thoughts of the romantic partner as revealed by either the self-caught (F(1, 82) = .01, p = .91) or probe-caught (F(1, 82) = .17, p = .68) measures. In contrast, a simultaneous linear regression analysis revealed that individuals who frequently suppress thoughts were more likely to be caught having thoughts about their previous partner at the probes (b = 1.49, SE = .42, t(82) = 3.54, p = .001), while no such relationship between chronic thought suppression and self-caught thoughts was found (b = .008, SE = .007, t(82) = 1.2, p = .22). Additionally, consistent with Wegner and Zanakos (1994), there was a strong positive relationship between scores on the WBSI and Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale (r(82) = .58, p < .000001), a measure that reflects individuals’ sensitivity to (rather than repression of) their negative emotional affect. This observation lends further support to the proposal (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) that thought suppression as measured by the WBSI and repression as traditionally defined are distinct trait variables. 6. General discussion In three experiments, participants were instructed not to think about a prior romantic relationship, were asked to indicate when they failed at this activity, and periodically received experience-sampling probes that assessed the contents of their thoughts. Despite the fact that they were instructed to report thoughts of their previous partner as soon as they occurred, participants were frequently caught engaging in those thoughts at experience-sampling probes. This finding reveals that individuals can lack meta-awareness that they have begun to think about a topic they are attempting to suppress and provides important insight into what happens when the mind fails to expel a thought from consciousness. Specifically, the finding that probe-caught suppressed thoughts were associated with the largest deficits in reading comprehension suggests that this measure captures episodes during which participants’ conscious thoughts are particularly decoupled from one’s primary task (Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008). Moreover, high cognitive load increased the frequency that thoughts of a previous relationship partner were caught at probes, suggesting that a dual-task context makes it harder to notice the occurrence of a thought one is attempting to avoid (Wegner, 1994, 1997). Finally, an individual’s desire to rekindle a prior relationship was associated with an increased likelihood that they were caught engaging in thoughts about that person, indicating that the emotional salience of thoughts may contribute to failures of suppression, which can initially re-enter consciousness in the absence of explicit awareness. 1010 B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 A compelling explanation for the distinction between the probe and self-caught measures is that they access different elements of an individual’s conscious experience. As the probe-caught measure does not rely on the individual to spontaneously report the occurrence of the thought, it can capture elements of the experience that people have difficulties in recognizing or admitting to themselves. By contrast, self-caught thoughts have already been identified by the individual and so this measure captures elements of the experience that the individual has independently recognized. One feature that may contribute to an individual’s capacity to explicitly reflect on the current contents of thought is how absorbing the thought is. Accordingly, interesting, unpleasant or otherwise salient thoughts may be easier to become ‘‘caught-up’’ in, making them more difficult to explicitly reflect upon. This could help to explain why individuals who still desired their previous partner were more likely to be caught thinking about them at experience-sampling probes, as well as why those thoughts involved greater decoupling of attention from the primary task. Consistent with this interpretation, research has shown that the mind-wandering state often involves conscious processing of relatively complex trains of thought, which may occupy the same executive systems required for maintaining attention on the primary task (Smallwood, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). For example, mind-wandering is more frequent when the primary task does not involve a working memory component (Baird et al., 2012; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). Additionally, the content of mind-wandering frequently involves executive functions such as processing current concerns (Klinger, 1999) and making plans for the future (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009). Furthermore, neuroimaging findings that show that mind-wandering in the absence of meta-awareness activates executive prefrontal structures such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior prefrontal cortex (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009). If the recruitment of processes necessary for meta-awareness are occupied by processing the conscious thoughts themselves, then this could help to explain why the capacity to effectively monitor the contents of our thoughts is often compromised. An alternative account of thoughts that are in principle available for report but fail to be reported in the moment is that such states are unconscious or ‘‘preconscious’’, and are only mobilized into consciousness when a probe directs an individual’s attention towards them (e.g., Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Dennett, 1991). Although it is difficult to conclusively differentiate between these alternative accounts (Schooler et al., in press), the fact that, in line with previous findings (e.g., Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood et al., 2008) unnoticed thoughts required cognitive resources and were disruptive to primary task performance lends support to individual’s self-reports that they were experiencing the thoughts consciously prior to the onset of experience-sampling probes. The current experiments suggest that differentiating between probe-caught and self-caught thoughts could help shed light on the cognitive processes that are involved in attempting to control undesired mental states. As recognition that an unwanted thought has occurred is likely a necessary first step in the process by which control can be initiated, meta-awareness could plausibly make it easier for individuals to dispel the thought from consciousness. According to this view, metaawareness could potentially contribute directly to the regulation of suppression, as the ability to assess the current state of the mind enables the detection of mental content that could be missed by more low-level implicit monitoring systems (Schooler, 2002). An alternative possibility, and the one that we favor, however, is that the capacity to monitor thought is indirectly related to control (see Schooler et al., 2011 for a discussion of these different views). From this perspective, the ability to take stock of our conscious experience allows the individual to initiate downstream changes that will ultimately allow thought to be better controlled, for example by engaging in practices aimed at curbing dysfunctional thinking (e.g., Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Beck, 1979). The value of distinguishing between awareness and meta-awareness of thoughts during attempts at suppression is further underscored in the present research by the relation between suppressed thoughts and whether the target of thought suppression was a ‘‘hot flame’’ (a previous partner that the person still desired). Wegner and Gold (1995) found that individuals self-reported fewer thoughts of a ‘‘hot flame’’ under suppression instructions. Although we replicated this effect in Study 2, this result is somewhat counterintuitive because the most obvious consequence of a desire to reconcile would be to increase rather than decrease the frequency of thoughts with this particular content. By contrast, the relationship between probe-caught thoughts of a past romantic partner and desire to reconcile with that partner was positive in both Studies 2 and 3. This result may indicate that individuals who still wanted to be in the relationship thought about the relationship more, but were less likely to recognize (and therefore report) that they were thinking about it. This finding is consistent with previous research demonstrating that suppressing emotionally relevant thought is more difficult (e.g., Petrie et al., 1998), and further highlight that the self-catch measure does not necessarily accurately reflect the frequency of conscious thoughts of suppressed content. As a result, conclusions regarding the frequency of suppressed thoughts that are based exclusively on measures that require self-catching should be treated with caution. The tendency to be caught thinking about the suppression target was found to have no association with individual differences in the tendency to repress thoughts but a strong relationship with the tendency to report chronically struggling with suppressing thoughts. These findings further Wegner and Zanakos’s (1994) conclusion that ‘‘thought suppression is tapping something quite unlike repression as traditionally defined and measured.’’ While our data revealed a strong association between individual differences in chronic thought suppression and probe-caught thoughts of the suppression target, individual differences in the number of self-caught thoughts were not related to suppression tendencies. A possible implication of these findings is that the tendency to struggle with thought suppression is related to less sensitive meta-awareness of the contents of thought. While high scores on the WBSI thought suppression measure by definition indicate that an individual B. Baird et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1003–1012 1011 have awareness of the fact that they frequently struggle to suppress thoughts, individuals who scored high on this measure had the most difficulty recognizing the onset of thought about the suppression target when it occurred. The proposal that deficits in the capacity to effectively metacognitively monitor the contents of thought is related to chronic suppression tendencies is consistent with the fact that unwanted thoughts are associated with negative affective conditions such as dysphoria and anxiety (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). If spontaneous thoughts associated with negative states are not recognized, this may enable them to proceed without repair. Moreover, given that attempts to control thinking can often backfire, problems in identifying unwanted thoughts, followed by ineffective control strategies, could lead to a perseverative cycle that extends the amount of time devoted to those thoughts. If correct, this helps to explain why chronic suppressors are generally bad at suppressing thoughts (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), as well as the effectiveness of therapy techniques that encourage individuals to engage in mental practices that encourage recognition of thought content (e.g., Beck, 1979; Teasdale et al., 2000). Finally, the present findings may also help to clarify several features of Wegner’s (1994, 2009) ironic model of thought suppression. As noted above, according to this model, thought suppression involves two juxtaposed processes: a cognitively demanding control process that attempts to suppress the thought and a non-cognitively demanding monitoring process that searches for control failures. This ironic process model has proven successful in accounting for many diverse findings (see Wegner (2009), for a review), yet little is known about the search functions the automatic monitor provides. Wegner (1997) suggests that the monitor searches preconsciousness to catch unwanted thoughts before they reach the threshold of awareness. Although plausible, there is a self-destructiveness to a process that brings suppressed thoughts into consciousness before they arrive on their own accord. The fact that consciousness and meta-awareness can become dissociated suggests that monitoring for unwanted thoughts may also occur at a conscious level. Indeed, as discussed above, a search of the contents of consciousness itself could be a useful way to prevent perseverating on negative thoughts. The notion that the automatic monitoring process must work in conjunction with meta-awareness in order to explicitly note the occurrence of unwanted thoughts offers another reason for why cognitive load exacerbates the impact of suppression. Given that meta-awareness is resource demanding, load may not only undermine the control processes necessary for suppression, but also the ability to notice and explicitly reflect on the current contents of thought. Under load the automatic monitor may be unable to trigger meta-awareness and the ensuing control processes necessary to reinstate suppression. Such an account is consistent with recent neuroimaging data indicating transient increases in the brain’s control systems following reports of unwanted thoughts (Mitchell et al., 2007). Thus, adding further irony to an already ironic process, it seems our capacity for noticing unwanted thoughts may be minimized at precisely those times at which unwanted thoughts are most likely to occur. Acknowledgments This research was supported by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council awarded to JWS. BB is supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-0707430. 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Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog The rapid-chase theory does not extend to movement execution Jenna C. Flannigan a, Romeo Chua b, Erin K. Cressman a,⇑ a b School of Human Kinetics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa K1N 6N5, Canada School of Kinesiology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z1, Canada a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 8 October 2015 Revised 7 February 2016 Accepted 6 March 2016 Keywords: Masked priming Movement corrections Unconscious processing Rapid-chase theory Prime-mask SOA a b s t r a c t It is assumed that the processing of a prime followed by a mask occurs sequentially in a feedforward manner when the three (initiation, takeover, and independence) criteria outlined by the rapid-chase theory are met. The purpose of the current study was to determine if the processing of the prime and mask fit the predictions of the rapid-chase theory when the prime and mask are presented during an ongoing movement. In two experiments, participants made rapid pointing movements to a target indicated by the mask. In Experiment 1, the prime was presented at movement onset and the prime-mask stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was manipulated. In Experiment 2, the prime-mask SOA was constant but the delay between movement and prime onset was manipulated. Although the results support the initiation and takeover criteria, the data did not support the independence criterion. Consequently, the rapid-chase theory does not appear to extend to movement execution. Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction In many daily activities, online movement corrections are necessary to successfully perform an intended goal-directed action. Movement corrections can occur online due to changes in task goals or the presence of additional information. Furthermore, movement corrections can occur automatically and unconsciously in response to visual stimuli as evidenced by the anti-pointing (Day & Lyon, 2000; Johnson, Beers, & Haggard, 2002) and the double-step paradigms (Bard et al., 1999; Goodale, Pelisson, & Prablanc, 1986; Pélisson, Prablanc, Goodale, & Jeannerod, 1986). With advances in technology, it has become easier to use pointing tasks, instead of discrete tasks (e.g., reaction time (RT) tasks) to gain a better understanding of movement corrections as well as the cognitive events that underlie corresponding decision making processes (Song & Nakayama, 2009). Specifically, the analysis of pointing trajectories allows for real-time observation of the control processes leading to the successful completion of the task. This advantage has made pointing movements a valuable tool in the investigation of invisible stimuli on behaviour (Cressman, Franks, Enns, & Chua, 2007; Cressman, Lam, Franks, Enns, & Chua, 2013; Finkbeiner & Friedman, 2011; Finkbeiner, Song, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2008; Fukui & Gomi, 2012; Ocampo & Finkbeiner, 2013; T. Schmidt, Niehaus, & Nagel, 2006; Xiao & Yamauchi, 2014). In these studies, participants pointed as fast and as accurately as possible in response to a visible stimulus. Unbeknownst to the participants, a briefly presented smaller stimulus (i.e., prime) preceded the larger stimulus and the two stimuli shared task relevant characteristics. Although these studies differed with respect to such experimental manipulations as the type of masking that was used (i.e., metacontrast or pattern masking), the number of stimuli in the sequence, the distance of the ⇑ Corresponding author. E-mail address: erin.cressman@uottawa.ca (E.K. Cressman). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.007 1053-8100/Ó 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 76 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 targets, and the onset of the prime relative to movement onset, in all cases, participants remained unaware of the prime and the prime still influenced their behaviour. These results are in agreement with traditional masked priming studies, which have typically used a RT task to investigate unconscious processing. In a prime-mask RT task, the mask has the dual function of suppressing the visibility of the prime in addition to specifying the required response. The impact of the prime on behaviour is mainly determined by comparing performance on congruent (i.e., prime and mask specify the same response) and incongruent trials (i.e., prime and mask indicate opposite responses). The difference between incongruent and congruent conditions with respect to a specific performance variable (e.g., RT, movement time (MT) or errors), is termed the priming effect. Some studies have also included neutral trials (i.e., prime does not specify a response) to determine the cost or benefit associated with the congruent or incongruent prime. Initial investigations using RT tasks have shown that RTs are faster in congruent than neutral or incongruent trials (Klotz & Wolff, 1995; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003). Several factors have been shown to influence the overall priming effect, including participant expertise (Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner, & Hoffmann, 2009), task instructions (Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004), probability of stimulus presentation (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Cressman et al., 2013), and stimuli characteristics (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006). One of the most influential factors affecting the priming effect is the stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA), defined as the time between prime onset and mask onset. Typically, as the SOA increases, the priming effect increases as well (Vorberg et al., 2003). Recently the priming effect has also been examined during movement initiation in a pointing task. Specifically, T. Schmidt et al. (2006) used a metacontrast masking paradigm, a common backwards masking method of rendering the prime invisible whereby the outer contour of the prime is equal to the inner contour of the mask, to examine the influence of the mask stimulus on the processing of the prime stimulus. In this task, a green and a red prime disc were presented simultaneously in opposite quadrants of a display. After a prime-mask SOA of 17, 33, 67, or 100 ms, a green and a red annulus mask appeared in the same quadrants as the primes. In congruent trials, the same coloured prime and mask appeared in the same quadrant, whereas they appeared in opposite quadrants in incongruent trials. In addition to manipulating the prime-mask SOA, colour contrast and mask strength were manipulated in order to determine the influence of the mask on the processing of the prime stimulus. Participants were to complete a fast pointing movement to the predetermined coloured mask target. Overall, the pointing trajectory was initially guided by the direction of the prime, such that participants started moving in the incorrect direction in incongruent trials. Importantly, the spatial priming effect (i.e., the difference between the spatial pointing trajectories of incongruent and congruent trials) increased as the SOA increased and the initial spatial priming effects were time locked to prime onset and independent of the characteristics of the mask, meaning the prime and mask were processed sequentially and independently. As a result, T. Schmidt et al. (2006) proposed their rapid-chase theory outlining three criteria that, if respected, can lead one to assume that the processing of the prime stimulus occurs in an unconscious, feedforward manner based on the motor output observed in response to the prime stimulus. The rapid-chase theory integrates ideas from the feedforward sweep1 (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) as well as from direct parameter specification (DPS; Neumann, 1990; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). According to the feedforward sweep hypothesis (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000), visual information that is processed through an initial feedforward sweep is not consciously available since recurrent processing must occur for the information to reach a conscious level. In the context of the masked priming paradigm, the feedforward sweep initiated by the onset of the mask stimulus interferes with the recurrent processing of the prime stimulus, leading to the inability to consciously perceive the prime. Yet, the prime can still activate its associated response without eliciting conscious awareness if its stimulus features are relevant to the task and coincide with the person’s intentions as proposed by DPS (Neumann, 1990; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). The prime is thought to be processed as a feedforward sweep if all three criteria outlined in the rapid-chase theory are met. The three criteria are the initiation criterion, the takeover criterion, and the independence criterion (T. Schmidt et al., 2011, 2006; T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009; Vath & Schmidt, 2007). According to the initiation criterion, the prime influences the initial trajectory of the response. However, the influence of the prime is limited since, during movement, the mask takes control of the movement such that movements are successfully completed to the goal location indicated by the mask as specified by the takeover criterion. The independence criterion ensures that the processing of the prime stimulus is unaffected by the properties of the mask as reflected in the initial kinematics (e.g., position and velocity) of the movement. While the initial response is dependent only on the prime, the onset of the mask has been shown to enhance later response processes since it is more salient and task relevant than the prime. Hence later portions of the movement may be affected differently depending on the mask’s onset time, and the prime and mask will still be processed in a feedforward sweep according to the rapid-chase theory (F. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010; T. Schmidt, 2014; T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009). Evidence supporting the rapid-chase theory as it relates to unconscious visual processing during response initiation is provided by behavioural studies examining the priming effect when categorizing pictures (T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009), pointing to differently shaped targets (T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009), or pointing to targets cued by a specific stimulus feature (e.g., colour or shape) (F. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010) or by a spatial cue (T. Schmidt & Seydell, 2008). On the other hand, certain factors such as event timing, task difficulty, and the presence of occluding stimuli demonstrate the limitations of the applicability of the rapid-chase theory to certain situations. When the prime-mask SOA is too short (<30 ms), the prime 1 Although the feedforward sweep hypothesis (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) requires a strict feedforward processing (i.e., no recurrent processing), the rapid-chase theory does allow for some local recurrent processing to occur (T. Schmidt et al., 2011; T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009; T. Schmidt & Seydell, 2008). J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 77 and mask are integrated into a single stimulus (T. Schmidt et al., 2006). Furthermore, if feedback connections are required to process the prime since the task is too difficult and requires cognitive control (e.g., categorizing pictures based on their relative size), or the properties of the prime are partially occluded by overlapping stimuli then the observed motor output will not follow the criteria described in the rapid-chase theory (F. Schmidt, Weber, & Schmidt, 2014; T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009). The research outlined above demonstrates that the rapid-chase theory can, under certain circumstances, be applied to unconscious processing during movement initiation of a RT or pointing task. However, it remains to be determined whether the rapid-chase theory can be applied to the processing of visual stimuli during movement execution. The application of the rapid-chase theory to ongoing movements is essential to our understanding of the limits of unconscious information processing and the role of conscious information processing in our daily lives (Kunde, Reuss, & Kiesel, 2012). It is thought that differences in processes underlying movement initiation and movement execution might exist due to mechanical ease (Christensen, Kristiansen, Rowe, & Nielsen, 2008), the involvement of the dorsal stream (Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2008), or a lowered prime activation threshold (Cressman et al., 2007). Nevertheless, no studies have examined the rapid-chase theory in the context of movement execution. To date, only a few studies investigating the influence of unconscious information processing actually presented the prime after movement onset. These studies (Cressman et al., 2007, 2013; Fukui & Gomi, 2012) used metacontrast masking to investigate the impact of invisible primes on movement control. Participants completed a rapid aiming movement to a center target flanked by a left and a right target. The prime was presented at movement onset or after a 100 ms delay and was followed by the mask after a constant prime-mask SOA. In a proportion of the trials, participants were required to correct their movement to the left or right target in response to the mask. Overall, the results indicated that the primes did influence the control of ongoing movements since adjustments to the correct target occurred sooner in congruent compared to incongruent and neutral trials. Furthermore, participants initially made movement deviations towards the incorrect target in incongruent trials. These studies provide preliminary evidence that movement execution follows the rapid-chase criteria; specifically, the observed motor output abides by the initiation and takeover criteria. Nevertheless, the independence criterion could not be verified since the SOA was not varied. The present experiment varied the time between prime and mask onset relative to movement onset to determine if unconscious visual stimuli are processed according to the rapid-chase theory at different time points during an ongoing movement. The importance of looking at several time points to establish the feedforward processing of the visuomotor system has been documented by previous researchers to avoid certain misconceptions about the priming effects as it changes across time (F. Schmidt, Haberkamp, & Schmidt, 2011; Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). In the present study, the time between prime and mask onset was manipulated in order to investigate unconscious processing during movement execution (Experiment 1). We hypothesized based on the rapid-chase theory that the priming effect would increase as the SOA increased because the prime would be able to influence the movement for a longer duration leading to larger overt deviations to the incorrect target in incongruent trials. Additionally, the time between movement onset and prime onset was manipulated, while keeping the prime-mask SOA constant, to determine if the influence of the primes changes depending on the time they are presented during movement (Experiment 2). We predicted that the priming effect would be unaffected given the constant SOA, but that deviations elicited by the prime and corrections in response to the mask would occur later as the time between movement onset and prime onset increased. 2. Methods 2.1. Participants Twelve right-handed young adults (mean age = 21.8 years, 7 females) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision volunteered to participate in the experiment. Handedness was assessed using the modified Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971; mean score = 71.9 ± 18.7). The study was approved by the University of Ottawa Health Sciences and Science Research Ethics Board. Prior to data collection, participants provided written informed consent. 2.2. Experimental set-up Participants were seated approximately 10 cm from the edge of the table in a dimly lit room. Participants performed the task with their right hand. An infrared-emitting diode, positioned on the tip of the participants’ right index finger, was monitored using an OPTOTRAK (Northern Digital, Waterloo, Ontario) motion analysis system, with a spatial resolution of 0.01 mm. In each trial (see Section 2.4 Procedure) data were collected at a sampling frequency of 500 Hz for 3 s. The stimuli were projected from a Samsung 245B LCD monitor (refresh rate of 60 Hz and a response time of 5 ms), onto a reflective surface that was placed 28 cm below the monitor so that the stimuli appeared to lie in the same plane as the occluded right hand. 2.3. Stimuli Stimuli were presented using C/C++ software, within which a custom written timer was created to ensure the proper timing of all events. All stimuli were white on a black background. The 17 ms prime stimulus consisted of a left-pointing arrow, 78 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Direct pointing trials to the center target Congruent Neutral Incongruent Perturbed pointing trials to the left target Perturbed pointing trials to the right target Fig. 1. Prime-mask stimuli presented in the direct pointing trials (top row) and in the perturbed pointing trials (left mask: middle row; right mask: bottom row), separated by prime-mask congruency (congruent, neutral, and incongruent). Note: Primes were white on a black background. a right-pointing arrow, or a neutral prime. The dimensions of the arrow primes were 4
9 mm. The neutral star shaped prime was constructed by superimposing the left and right arrow primes. The mask stimulus consisted of a left-pointing arrow, a right-pointing arrow, or a neutral mask. The arrow masks were similar in shape to the arrow primes but were larger in size (23
28 mm) (see Fig. 1). The center of each mask had a cut-out of the neutral shape such that the outer contour of the neutral prime equalled the inner contour of the masks. 2.4. Procedure Participants completed two mask pointing tasks and a prime identification task. The two mask pointing tasks were completed on separate days. The mask pointing tasks differed with respect to the timing of the stimulus sequence. In one task, the time between prime and mask onset was manipulated by presenting the prime at movement onset and varying the prime-mask SOA between 33, 50, and 67 ms (Experiment 1). The start of the movement began when the finger moved a resultant distance of 10 mm from its initial location on the home position, which was determined by monitoring the finger position data online using a windows socket (Winsock). In the other task, the time between prime and mask onset was constant at 50 ms, but prime presentation followed movement onset by a time of 17, 33, or 50 ms (Experiment 2). The two tasks were completed in different sessions, each lasting between 1.5 and 2 h. The mask pointing tasks were counterbalanced between participants. In both mask pointing tasks, participants placed their right index finger on the home position indicated by a white circle (1 cm in diameter) that was approximately 20 cm in front of their body and aligned with their body midline. The three targets (33
33 mm) consisted of a white square outline. The distance from the center of the circular home position to the center of the middle target was 27 cm and the distance from the center of the middle target to the center of the left and right targets was 7 cm (see Fig. 2). Participants fixated on the middle white square target displayed in the center of the screen. Participants could initiate their response to the middle target at any time once the outline of the target boxes became bold (go-signal), so long as their movement was complete within 3 s following the go-signal. Participants were told to initiate their response by lifting their finger and moving it towards the middle target. The task was not a reaction time task, but participants were given a movement time goal of 400–600 ms. After movement onset, a prime was presented in the middle target. The prime was either a left-pointing arrow, a rightpointing arrow, or a neutral star shape. A blank screen followed the prime which in turn was followed by the mask. The mask indicated the target location and remained on the screen, in the middle target box, until the response was completed. In Experiment 1, the prime was presented in the middle target at movement onset, defined as the time when the finger moved 10 mm from the home position. In this case, the prime-mask SOA varied between 33, 50, and 67 ms. In the other task, the prime-mask SOA was constant at 50 ms but the onset of the prime relative to movement onset varied between 17, 33, and 50 ms (see Fig. 2). In 2/3 of the testing trials (direct pointing trials), a neutral prime was followed by a neutral mask and, in this case, participants were instructed to complete their movement initiated to the middle target box (see Table 1). After each direct pointing trial, participants received verbal feedback on their MT. MT was defined online as the time from when the finger moved 10 mm from its initial position on the home position until velocity fell below 0.01 m/s (provided that it remained below 0.01 m/s for 500 ms). Terminal feedback regarding final position was provided on all direct pointing trials by a yellow circle (1 cm in diameter) appearing directly above the location where the movement was completed, regardless of where the finger landed (i.e., inside or outside the target). In the remaining 1/3 of the testing trials (perturbed trials), the left- or rightpointing arrow mask was presented requiring participants to modify their initial movement and move to the left or right target box, respectively. In these trials, the mask was preceded by the neutral, left- or right-pointing arrow prime. The perturbed trials were divided equally among the neutral, congruent, and incongruent prime-mask conditions. No feedback with regards to MT was provided on these trials, but participants did receive terminal feedback regarding their endpoint position. Participants began each mask pointing session with a practice block of 20 trials to the middle target to get accustomed to the task and MT goal. In the practice trials, a neutral prime and mask were presented with a prime-mask SOA of 50 ms. Participants then completed 540 randomized mask pointing trials with the restriction that no more than 3 perturbed trials were J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 79 Feedback Until next trial Experiment 1 SOA 33, 50, 67 ms Mask Until response is completed Blank screen 17, 33, 50 ms Prime 17 ms Mask Until response is completed Go signal Until movement onset Blank screen 33 ms Prime 17 ms Fixation 500 - 1500 ms 7 cm 27 cm Go signal Until 17, 33, 50 ms after movement onset Fixation 500 - 1500 ms SOA 50 ms Experiment 2 Fig. 2. The time course of stimulus presentation for the mask pointing task in Experiment 1 (on the left) and Experiment 2 (on the right). The trial sequence depicts a direct pointing trial requiring a movement to the middle target since both prime and mask were neutral. SOA: stimulus onset asynchrony. presented in a row and that at the beginning of every 108 trials (which coincided with self-terminated breaks) the first 5 trials were direct pointing trials. A breakdown of the number of trials completed in each mask pointing task separated by prime-mask congruency is presented in Table 1. Overall, there were a total of 18 different perturbed trial combinations per experiment since there were 3 prime shapes, 2 directional mask shapes, and 3 varying times for stimuli presentation (Experiment 1: prime-mask onset and Experiment 2: movement-prime onset). Following the second session of the mask pointing task, participants were made aware of the prime stimulus and completed a prime identification task to assess their conscious awareness of the primes. Presentation of the prime and mask in the prime identification task differed slightly from that of the mask pointing task. First, participants did not execute a movement, but were instructed to keep their right index finger on the home position during the entire task. Since participants did not execute a movement, the prime appeared 1500 ms after the targets turned bold and the mask remained on the screen for 500 ms. Similar to the mask pointing task, prime shape and prime-mask SOA were randomized. In contrast to the mask pointing task, the mask shapes were not randomized and one block of trials contained neutral masks while the other block contained directional masks (i.e., randomized between left and right-pointing arrow masks), as the shape of the mask has been shown to bias participants’ responses (Albrecht & Mattler, 2012; Vermeiren & Cleeremans, 2012). Participants were told that each prime was presented with the same probability and that they had to try and identify the shape of the prime. If they were unsure, they were asked to provide their best guess. To avoid any indirect priming effects (see Vorberg et al., 2003), participants verbally reported their answer 500 ms after mask onset, which was denoted by the disappearance of the mask. In addition to the objective measures, subjective measures were included to capture participants’ perception of their visual experience. Following the 3-alternative forced choice task, participants rated their perceptual awareness using a perceptual awareness scale with values ranging from 1 to 5. The scale was adopted from Christensen et al. (2008), where the values 1 to 5 were associated with (1) ‘‘no perception of a stimulus”, (2) ‘‘possible vague perception of a stimulus without the ability to identify it”, (3) ‘‘definite perception of a stimulus without the ability to identify it”, (4) ‘‘definite perception of a stimulus with the possible ability to identify it”, and (5) ‘‘definite perception of a stimulus with a definite ability to identify it”. Participants’ responses were manually entered by the experimenter. There was no time limit for identifying the prime or providing a perceptual awareness rating since accuracy was the main objective of the task. No feedback was provided regarding the shape of the prime stimulus. Before each prime identification block, participants viewed three trials in which each prime was presented for 167 ms with a prime-mask SOA of 334 ms so that the participants could clearly see each prime once before the start of the testing session. This also allowed the participants to familiarize themselves with the shape of the primes and the type of responses required. Participants completed one prime identification block with neutral masks and one with directional masks. Each block contained 10 trials for each prime shape and prime-mask SOA combination resulting in 90 trials per block for a total of 180 trials. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced between participants. 80 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Table 1 The breakdown of the 540 trials for each of the mask pointing tasks based on the number of trials for each prime-mask combination. The table is further divided by the time between prime offset and mask onset for Experiment 1 and the time between movement onset and prime onset for Experiment 2. The neutral mask appeared in 2/3 of the trials and each prime stimulus occurred with equal probability in trials with a directional mask. Experiment 1: Time between prime offset and mask onset Experiment 2: Time between movement onset and prime onset Mask shape Neutral Directional (left and right) Total Prime shape Neutral Congruent Incongruent Neutral 17 ms 120 20 20 20 180 33 ms 120 20 20 20 180 50 ms 120 20 20 20 180 Total 360 60 60 60 540 2.5. Data analyses For the perceptual data, the proportion of correct responses in the objective task were submitted to an arcsin-square root transformation and a repeated measures analysis of variance (RM ANOVA) was used to compare the data across conditions of block (neutral or directional mask), SOA (33, 50, 67 ms), and prime direction (left, right or neutral). Additionally, the proportion of correct responses was compared to chance levels (33%) using a t-test. For the subjective task, the frequency of each response on the perceptual awareness scale was calculated as a percentage and is reported as a descriptive measure. In the mask pointing task, each pointing trajectory (x (lateral) and y (forward) coordinates) was plotted using Matlab software (Mathworks Inc, version 8.4.0), along with the corresponding velocity and acceleration profiles. The start position corresponded to the time when the finger first moved 10 mm from the home position and end position was manually selected and corresponded to the time at which velocity fell below 0.01 m/s without rising above 0.01 m/s for another 50 ms. In perturbed trials, errors were defined as trials in which participants landed within the 2 SD bandwidth of the average endpoint position of the direct pointing trials or landed on the opposite target; thus, they failed to reach the proper target. To determine the time at which participants made corrections in the perturbed trials, we averaged each individual’s average x position across time for a specific prime-mask combination and SOA (Experiment 1) or Delay (Experiment 2) to obtain their average lateral spatial trajectory. In addition, the standard deviation of the mean position in the x direction was calculated across trials. Path length was calculated by adding each increment of distance travelled between two subsequent time points over the course of the trajectory. We looked to establish the maximum horizontal deviation achieved after 250 ms, which was defined as the maximum horizontal position achieved in the incorrect direction, relative to the group average start position, before trajectories were adjusted to the appropriate left or right target. Consequently, if the trajectory only deviated towards the target then the maximum horizontal position was a positive value, but if participants initially moved in the incorrect direction then the maximum horizontal position was a negative value. The time associated with this maximum deviation was also recorded. The time of correction corresponded to the time point when participants’ lateral position met the spatial criterion, defined as the spatial location when the lateral position fell outside of the 2 SD bandwidth of the group average lateral position calculated over the first 250 ms of the movement (see Fig. 3). To obtain the lateral spatial priming effect, we first normalized each individual’s pointing trajectories by subtracting their average lateral position over the first 250 ms from their average lateral spatial trajectory. This was done for each SOA, congruent, and incongruent condition. Then the normalized average lateral position in the congruent condition was subtracted from the normalized average lateral position in the incongruent condition. Unless specified otherwise, a 2 Mask (Left, Right)
3 Congruency (Congruent, Neutral, Incongruent)
3 SOA (33, 50, 67 ms) within-subjects RM ANOVA was used to analyse the data in Experiment 1 and a similar RM ANOVA was used in Experiment 2 where the factor SOA was replaced by the factor Delay (17, 33, 50 ms). If the assumption of sphericity was violated then the Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor was used and post hoc tests were conducted using the Bonferroni correction with a set at 0.05. The data are reported as mean values with their associated standard deviation. 3. Results 3.1. Prime identification Due to errors in data collection, 3 objective response trials (0.14%) and 4 subjective response trials (0.19%) were not recorded. Participants’ objective awareness in the prime identification task was first analyzed by comparing their total percent of correct responses (44.5% ± 4.2 SD) across both blocks to chance levels (33%) using a t-test, which resulted in a significant difference, t(11) = 9.519, p < 0.001. A 2 Block
3 SOA RM ANOVA was then performed and revealed no significant main effects for Block, F(1, 11) = 2.855, p = 0.119, or for SOA, F(2, 22) = 1.276, p = 0.299. 81 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 A B Displacement (mm) 80 Left 60 40 Maximum horizontal deviation 20 Time of correction 0 100 20 200 300 400 500 600 700 Right Time (ms) Fig. 3. (A) An example of a single pointing trajectory in an incongruent trial where a right prime arrow preceded a left mask arrow (black solid line). The solid gray line represents the participant’s average trajectory in the xy plane, defined as the average x position for every 2 mm of forward movement progression in the y direction, in direct pointing trials with its 2 standard deviation (SD) bandwidth (dotted gray line). Notice that the trajectory was first modified in the direction of the prime arrow but was then corrected to the target indicated by the mask. (B) An individual’s average lateral position over time for a single prime-mask combination and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; Experiment 1) or Delay (Experiment 2). The gray arrow indicates the maximum horizontal deviation while the gray dotted line represents the time of correction. Since there was no significant main effect for Block or SOA, we focussed the remainder of our analysis on the block with the directional masks because these trials were similar to those in which participants had to make a correction to the left or right target in the mask pointing task. A 3 Congruency RM ANOVA revealed that there was a main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 3.457, p = 0.049, but post hoc tests did not reveal any significant differences between the congruency conditions. However, the neutral prime condition was the only condition where performance was significantly above chance, t(11) = 3.787, p = 0.003. Consequently, participants were not aware of the directional primes above chance levels in perturbed trials. This was further confirmed by participants’ subjective awareness responses (see Table 2), which revealed that participants reported ‘‘no perception of a stimulus” on the majority of trials at all SOAs. In fact, when participants subjectively reported ‘‘no perception of a stimulus”, they guessed the neutral prime on 51% of these trials. As a result, any differences in movement trajectory between congruent and incongruent trials cannot be attributed to the perception of the prime stimulus. 3.2. Experiment 1 3.2.1. Direct pointing trials A total of 2.66% of the direct pointing trials, trials in which a neutral prime and mask were presented, were lost because the marker was not visible or the participant did not finish their movement within 3 s after the go signal. On the remaining trials, participants completed their movements within the movement time goal (average MT = 505.8 ms ± 23.3 SD) and landed within the center target. Average performance measures of these remaining trials were submitted to a 3 SOA RM ANOVA. Analyses revealed that there were no significant differences in MT, path length or endpoint position between the different SOAs (MT: F(2, 22) = 3.310, p = 0.055; Path length: F(2, 22) = 0.450, p = 0.643; x endpoint position: F(2, 22) = 1.141, p = 0.338; y endpoint position: F(2, 22) = 2.154, p = 0.140). Furthermore, endpoint variable error did not differ between the different SOA conditions as there was no significant main effect for SOA in the x direction, F(2, 22) = 0.845, p = 0.443, or the y direction, F(2, 22) = 0.072, p = 0.931. Consequently, SOA did not influence movement time, pointing trajectories or final position when the prime and mask were neutral. 3.2.2. Perturbed pointing trials A total of 4.91% of the trials were lost because the marker was not visible or participants did not complete the movement within 3 s after the go signal. An additional 7 trials (0.34%) were excluded from analysis because participants went straight to the correct target location without initiating their movements to the center target. To extend the rapid-chase theory to movement execution it must be shown that all three criteria were followed. By examining the number of successful corrections to the appropriate target it can be determined whether the mask was capable of exerting its influence before the movement was completed as outlined by the takeover criterion. In fact, 88.2% ± 12.7 SD of the perturbed trials were successful such that participants corrected their movement to the appropriate target (see Table 3 for average error results). Thus, the masks were capable of taking over the movement. On trials that were not corrected, participants landed on the center target. The number of these error trials were modulated by SOA, F(2, 22) = 5.945, p = 0.009, and Congruency, F(2, 22) = 4.419, p = 0.024, such that more errors occurred with a 67 ms SOA compared to a 33 ms SOA, p = 0.027, and more errors were committed in the neutral prime trials compared to incongruent trials, p = 0.026. 82 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Table 2 The percentage (%) of correct responses and frequency (%) of perceptual awareness responses with their associated standard deviations for the prime identification task separated by block and prime-mask stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The percent correct was further divided by prime shape (neutral and directional). Note that 1 indicated ‘‘no perception of a stimulus” and 5 indicated ‘‘definite perception of a stimulus with a definite ability to identify it”. Block Neutral mask Directional mask SOA Prime direction 33 ms 50 ms 67 ms Total 33 ms 50 ms 67 ms Total Percent correct (%) Neutral Directional 60.8 (19.3) 35.9 (8.7) 57.5 (19.1) 40.4 (12.1) 56.7 (18.3) 43.8 (11.5) 58.3 (13.9) 40.0 (8.6) 49.6 (22.8) 35.8 (14.6) 55.8 (21.5) 35.8 (13.8) 64.2 (23.5) 35.9 (13.7) 56.5 (16.8) 35.8 (11.8) 60.7 (18.6) 17.3 (13.8) 6.7 (6.7) 6.7 (5.3) 8.6 (11.5) 60.6 (15.6) 14.2 (16.2) 5.3 (5.2) 10.0 (7.1) 10.0 (10.2) 59.4 (17.9) 13.9 (14.3) 7.2 (5.3) 10.6 (6.5) 8.9 (9.0) 60.2 (16.1) 15.1 (13.9) 6.4 (4.8) 9.1 (5.1) 9.2 (9.6) 57.4 (26.4) 20.3 (18.5) 12.8 (7.4) 7.2 (7.6) 2.2 (3.3) 60.0 (20.1) 20.3 (22.1) 9.4 (7.2) 6.4 (5.8) 3.9 (4.0) 61.2 (16.5) 15.6 (16.0) 10.3 (7.4) 7.8 (6.9) 5.0 (5.6) 59.6 (18.9) 18.7 (17.1) 10.9 (5.1) 7.1 (4.9) 3.7 (3.3) Response Frequency of perceptual awareness responses (%) 1 2 3 4 5 Having established that the masks took over control of the movement on the majority of trials, we next looked to determine the prime’s influence on performance. The subsequent analyses were performed only on successfully completed perturbed trials (i.e., trials completed to the correct left and right targets). Importantly with these trials, the prime-mask SOA did not affect average final endpoint position or the variability around this position when pointing to the left and right targets (p > 0.05). To demonstrate that the prime influenced the trajectory of the movement as stated by the initiation criterion, we must show that the prime influenced kinematic variables such as time and position by showing a difference between congruency conditions. In support of the initiation criterion, MT analyses revealed a main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 17.701, p < 0.001. As expected, MT in congruent trials was significantly shorter in the congruent than in the incongruent and neutral conditions, p < 0.001 and p = 0.018, respectively. No significant differences were observed between the incongruent and neutral trials, p = 0.212. Furthermore, there was a significant main effect for Mask, F(1, 11) = 38.981, p < 0.001, since MT was significantly longer when pointing to the left target compared to the right target. In addition to the MT data, the time of correction provides further support in favour of the initiation criterion suggesting that the prime influenced the pointing trajectory (see Fig. 4). Specifically, the analysis of the time of correction resulted in a significant main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 42.038, p < 0.001, revealing that corrections occurred sooner in the congruent condition compared to the incongruent and neutral conditions, p < 0.001, and corrections occurred sooner in the neutral condition compared to the incongruent condition, p = 0.010. Participants’ maximum horizontal deviation also showed a significant main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 15.490, p < 0.001. Participants deviated more in the incorrect direction in the incongruent condition compared to the congruent (p = 0.003) and neutral (p = 0.001) conditions. In other words, participants were closer to the correct target in the neutral and congruent conditions compared to the incongruent condition. This deviation towards the incorrect target in incongruent trials is highlighted in the average lateral spatial trajectories (see Fig. 5A), where participants clearly started moving in the direction indicated by the prime before making a second correction towards the correct target. Overall, the current analysis of the kinematic variables supports both the initiation and takeover criteria of the rapidchase theory. The prime initially influenced the direction of the movement supporting the initiation criterion. On most trials, participants were able to finish their movement at the correct target location providing evidence for the takeover criterion. We next looked to determine whether or not the data fit the prediction of the independence criterion. To do this, we established the influence of SOA on the lateral spatial priming effect functions. Specifically, the lateral spatial priming effect should initially be the same for all SOA conditions, such that all priming functions follow the same average time course, as they are initially controlled by the prime. Once the mask starts to exert its influence on the prime the different priming functions would be expected to deviate one at a time from the remaining invariant functions. Specifically, the priming effect functions would start to individually deviate from the common time course in a predictable manner based on the primemask SOA with the shorter SOAs deviating before the longer SOAs. It is possible that the time of correction not only increases with SOA in the incongruent condition, but also in the congruent condition, as the mask may enhance the response process at different times depending on its onset as shown by F. Schmidt and Schmidt (2010) and T. Schmidt and Schmidt (2009). Moreover, it is predicted that the maximum horizontal deviation and the corresponding time at which this position occurred should be similar across SOAs in congruent trials. In contrast, these variables should show an increase in incongruent trials as the SOA increases because the prime would control the movement for a longer duration resulting in larger deviations in the incorrect direction, which is reflected by a larger priming effect. With respect to the neutral condition, similar horizontal deviation values should be seen across SOAs since participants would be travelling straight ahead to the center target. Similar to the congruent and incongruent conditions, the time of correction should also increase in the neutral condition. Overall, these predictions are not supported by the data derived from participants’ average lateral position over time as shown in Fig. 4A or observed in the lateral spatial priming functions shown in Fig. 5B. MT and the time of correction revealed a main effect for SOA (MT: F(2, 22) = 78.444, p < 0.001; Time of correction: F(2, 22) = 10.481, p = 0.001). As outlined above, SOA 33 ms 50 ms 67 ms Congruency Mask C N I C N I C N I Errors (%) Movement time (ms) Both Left Right Both 8.4 (9.3) 640.8 (51.7) 588.1(62.3) 614.4 (54.0) 11.8 (15.7) 649.7 (47.9) 607.7 (59.4) 628.7 (50.5) 6.5 (8.3) 665.2 (52.6) 612.4 (61.5) 638.8 (52.1) 11.8 (14.3) 643.4 (51.8) 599.8 (56.2) 621.6 (53.1) 17.3 (19.5) 657.7 (50.0) 620.0 (65.4) 638.8 (51.2) 10.0 (12.9) 676.2 (58.0) 622.0 (62.7) 649.1 (57.6) 12.1 (14.6) 674.6 (54.7) 611.7 (47.8) 643.2 (45.1) 16.4 (17.6) 697.6 (69.1) 632.8 (51.8) 665.2 (53.9) 14.4 (17.2) 699.8 (58.0) 648.5 (59.0) 674.1 (54.5) J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Table 3 Average errors (%) and movement times (ms) in Experiment 1 separated by SOA (33 ms, 50 ms, and 67 ms) and Congruency (Congruent (C), Neutral (N), and Incongruent (I)) with the associated standard deviation. The results are collapsed across the directional masks (Both) when no significant differences were observed between the left and right-pointing arrow masks. 83 84 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Congruent Maximum horizontal deviation (mm) A Incongruent Neutral 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 Time of maximum horizontal deviation (ms) B 370 350 330 310 290 270 250 Time of correction (ms) C 480 460 440 420 400 380 360 340 33 ms 50 ms SOA 67 ms 17 ms 33 ms 50 ms Delay Fig. 4. (A) The maximum horizontal deviation, (B) the time of maximum horizontal deviation and (C) the time of correction relative to movement onset collapsed across the left and right masks as a function of the different stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) (Experiment 1: left side) and Delay (Experiment 2: right side) conditions. Congruent: black lines; Neutral: dark gray lines; Incongruent: light gray lines. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. the time of correction is expected to increase with SOA in the incongruent conditions and may increase in the congruent trials. In accordance with these predictions, it appears that the time when participants started moving in the correct direction slightly increased with SOA for all prime-mask congruency conditions, as seen in Fig. 4C. In contrast to our hypothesis, the maximum horizontal deviation data did not reveal a main effect for SOA, F(2, 22) = 3.336, p = 0.079. Furthermore, both the maximum horizontal deviation, F(4, 44) = 0.286, p = 0.792, and the time at which this value was attained, F(4, 44) = 0.927, p = 0.457, failed to show a significant Congruency
SOA interaction as predicted by the independence criterion (see Fig. 4A and B). In the incongruent condition, the maximum horizontal deviation did not increase between the 50 ms and 67 ms SOA nor did the time at which this value occur increase between the 33 ms and 50 ms condition. There were no significant main effects for Mask so the results are collapsed across directional masks. The independence criterion is further refuted by observing the priming effect functions found in Fig. 5B. When pointing to both the left and right targets, it can be seen that the priming effect functions do not follow the rapid-chase theory. Even though the three functions initially share a similar time course, the point at which they deviate and the maximum priming amplitude achieved is incompatible with the prediction of the rapid-chase theory. For the left mask, the spatial priming effect for the 50 ms SOA appears to deviate from the average time course before the 33 ms SOA which in turn deviated before the 67 ms condition. Furthermore, the 33 ms and 50 ms conditions resulted in similar amplitudes suggesting that the prime influenced the pointing trajectory to the same extent in the 33 and 50 ms conditions. For the right target, while the 33 ms condition showed the smallest priming amplitude the spatial priming effect in the 50 ms condition is similar to that of the 67 ms condition as they both achieved similar amplitudes. In addition, the error bars overlap between the different priming effect functions suggesting that the priming effect at the different SOAs are not distinct. Consequently, the data do not seem to support the independence criterion of the rapid-chase theory since the priming functions do not deviate from the average 85 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Left Target Right Target 33 ms A 80 50 ms 67 ms X position (mm) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 Priming effect (mm) B 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Time from prime onset (ms) Fig. 5. (A) The average lateral spatial trajectory and (B) the lateral spatial priming effect (incongruent–congruent) when pointing to the left and right targets in Experiment 1 as a function of prime onset (i.e., movement onset). The line colours in (A) represent the different congruency conditions (congruent: black; neutral: dark gray; incongruent: light gray). The standard error of the priming effect functions in (B) for the various SOA conditions are represented by different colours (33 ms: light gray; 50 ms: dark gray; 67 ms: black). The vertical lines on the x-axis indicate the time of mask onset. For clarity the neutral prime condition is excluded in the top figures but is presented from 300 to 500 ms in the inset. Positive values indicate movement in the correct direction while negative values indicate movement in the incorrect direction. time course according to the relative timing of the stimuli. However, this is mainly due to the 50 ms condition being similar to the 33 ms condition and the 67 ms condition when pointing to the left and right target, respectively. 3.3. Experiment 2 3.3.1. Direct pointing trials A total of 3.33% of the direct pointing trials were not recorded because the marker was not visible or the participant did not finish their movement within the 3 s allotted time. In the remaining trials, participants completed their movements within the goal MT (average MT = 511.1 ms ± 28.7 SD) to the center target. Performance measures for these trials were analyzed using a 3 Delay RM ANOVA. The MT analysis revealed a main effect for Delay, F(2, 22) = 12.965, p < 0.001. Post-hoc tests showed that when the prime was presented 17 ms after movement onset, MT was significantly faster (501.4 ms ± 26.9 SD) compared to when the prime was presented 33 ms (512.2 ms ± 32.1 SD, p = 0.017) or 50 ms (519.8 ms ± 29.7 SD, p = 0.004) after movement onset. The difference between 33 ms and 50 ms was not significant, p = 0.135. Similar to Experiment 1, there were no significant differences in the distance travelled in either delay conditions, F(2, 22) = 1.950, p = 0.166, as determined by the path length. Additionally, no significant differences were observed with respect to endpoint position in the x, F(2, 22) = 0.648, p = 0.533, and y direction, F(2, 22) = 0.311, p = 0.736, or variable error in the x, F(2, 22) = 0.468, p = 0.633, and y direction, F(2, 22) = 1.410, p = 0.265. The results indicate that the delay did not impact path length or final position when pointing to the center target. 3.3.2. Perturbed pointing trials A total of 7.27% of the trials were not recorded because the marker was not visible or participants took longer than 3 s to complete their movement following the go signal. In addition to these trials, 4 trials (0.20%) were excluded from analysis because participants went straight to the correct target location without making a correction. Participants corrected their movement to the appropriate target on 82.2% ± 11.9 SD of the remaining perturbed trials (see Table 4 for average error results). The error data revealed a Delay
Congruency interaction, F(4, 44) = 2.667, p = 0.045. At the 50 ms delay, more errors were committed in the neutral condition compared to the congruent (p = 0.041) and incongruent (p = 0.032) conditions. There was also a main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 4.361, p = 0.025, but post hoc tests showed no significant difference between conditions. Once again, the percentage of correct responses supports the takeover criterion since the mask was able to take over the movement such that participants landed on the correct target on most of the trials. 86 Delay 17 ms 33 ms 50 ms Congruency Mask C N I C N I C N I Errors (%) Movement time (ms) Both Left Right Both 15.2 (14.1) 636.7 (57.1) 597.7 (59.1) 617.2 (53.4) 17.7 (16.1) 664.4 (69.1) 618.6 (56.2) 641.5 (58.8) 15.1 (12.8) 668.3 (51.3) 616.2 (63.2) 642.3 (55.3) 16.8 (11.7) 670.4 (39.0) 611.9 (43.0) 641.1 (38.9) 18.4 (14.7) 684.0 (61.3) 626.2 (62.1) 655.1 (57.8) 16.4 (10.8) 685.8 (56.2) 634.9 (54.4) 660.3 (49.4) 17.9 (15.3) 676.9 (51.7) 623.3 (61.6) 650.1 (53.1) 27.9 (16.8) 698.0 (56.6) 661.7 (62.8) 679.9 (55.3) 15.3 (12.3) 706.9 (55.6) 665.2 (43.1) 686.1 (46.0) J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Table 4 Average errors (%) and movement times (ms) in Experiment 2 separated by Delay (17 ms, 33 ms, and 50 ms) and Congruency (Congruent (C), Neutral (N), and Incongruent (I)) with the associated standard deviation. The results are collapsed across the directional masks (Both) when no significant differences were observed between the left and right-pointing arrow masks. J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 87 The influence of the prime at various points in the pointing trajectory was determined by looking at movement time, time of correction, and the maximum horizontal deviation on trials in which participants completed their movement to the target indicated by the mask. Importantly, the final position in the x and y directions and corresponding variable errors were not affected by the delay between movement onset and prime onset (p > 0.05). The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine the impact of the prime when presented at different time points throughout the pointing trajectory. Experiment 2 does not explicitly test the rapid-chase theory since the prime-mask SOA was not manipulated, but it can still provide insight into the theory. An influence of prime-mask congruency across all delays would suggest that the primes can still exert an influence following various delays after movement onset, supporting the initiation criterion of the rapid-chase theory. Similar to Experiment 1, the mask is expected to control the later portion of the movement, according to the takeover criterion, such that participants reach the correct target location. Although movement time and time of correction relative to movement onset should differ between congruent and incongruent conditions, these time variables should increase in all congruency conditions as the delay increased. In support of the independence criterion, we would expect that, when time locked to prime onset, the initial deviations in the average spatial trajectories (in Fig. 6A) would be unaffected by the prime onset delay since the prime-mask SOA was constant. We would predict that the maximum horizontal deviation would not be influenced by the time delay; however, the time at which this value was achieved relative to movement onset should increase in the incongruent condition. Furthermore, the time of correction should also increase linearly in all congruency conditions. To summarize, it is expected that the priming effect functions should be the same for all delay conditions, but the onset of the priming effect functions will be delayed depending on the time between movement onset and prime onset. The movement time analysis revealed a main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 12.978, p < 0.001, suggesting that the prime influenced movement regardless of the delay condition. The MT data, once again, support the initiation criterion since MT was significantly shorter in the congruent condition compared to the neutral, p = 0.002, and incongruent conditions, p = 0.001. There was also a significant main effect for Mask, F(1,11) = 33.837, p < 0.001, since MT was faster to the right target compared to the left target. Similar to the movement time data, the time of correction supports the initiation criterion. With respect to time of correction, analyses showed a main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 14.810, p = 0.001. The time of correction was significantly earlier in congruent trials compared to the neutral and incongruent trials, p = 0.026 and p < 0.001, respectively. No significant differences were seen between neutral and incongruent trials, p = 0.137. Similar to the time data, analyses of the maximum horizontal deviation revealed a significant main effect for Congruency, F(2, 22) = 6.884, p = 0.017. Participants’ position in congruent and incongruent conditions differed significantly, p = 0.008. In sum, when participants started correcting their movement, they were closer to the correct target in the congruent and neutral conditions compared to the incongruent condition suggesting that the prime initially triggered its response resulting in a deviation in the incorrect direction in incongruent trials. Taken together, the analyses of the kinematic variables provide evidence that the prime exerted an influence on the movement regardless of when it came on during the execution of the pointing task; nevertheless, participants were able to land on the correct target location indicated by the mask. Participants corrected and completed their movement later in incongruent trials as can be seen in Fig. 6A. Even though the prime-mask SOA did not vary during Experiment 2, the kinematic data can still provide some insight with respect to the independence criteria of the rapid-chase theory. Specifically, MT and time of correction relative to movement onset should increase as the delay increases, but the maximum horizontal deviation should not increase since the mask followed prime onset at a constant time of 50 ms. In fact, MT and time of correction increased as the delay increased as evidence by the significant main effect for Delay (MT: F(2, 22) = 25.699, p < 0.001; time of correction: F(2, 22) = 15.575, p = 0.001), and the maximum horizontal deviation data did not reveal a significant main effect for Delay, F(2, 22) = 0.061, p = 0.868. The data are collapsed across directional masks since there were no significant main effects for Mask. In addition, it is expected that the time at which the maximum horizontal deviation was achieved should increase in incongruent trials relative to movement onset but remain the same for congruent and neutral trials. In contrast to this prediction, the time following movement onset at which the trajectory reached its maximum deviation did not increase linearly in the incongruent condition, Congruency
Delay: F(4, 44) = 0.462, p = 0.763 (see Fig. 4A and B). While the MT, time of correction, and position data support the independence criterion, the time at which the maximum deviation was achieved does not. Furthermore, the rapid-chase theory predicts that priming onset, the time when the priming function deviates from 0 indicating a difference between congruent and incongruent trials, should be similar across all delay conditions when time locked to prime onset. The amplitude of the different priming functions should be similar because the prime-mask SOA was constant. However, when examining Fig. 6B it is evident that the spatial priming effects do not follow the independence criterion of the rapid-chase theory. The left and right spatial priming effects show a different pattern of results, as the order in which the different delay conditions deviate from the average time course is different. To the left target, the 17 ms and 50 ms Delay conditions deviated at approximately the same time while the 33 ms condition deviated later and achieved a smaller peak amplitude. When pointing to the right target, the 50 ms condition deviated first followed by the 33 ms and then the 17 ms Delay conditions. The onset of the priming effect does not appear to be tied to prime onset, as it does not reflect the timing of the input conditions. Although the maximum position and time of correction data support the independence criterion, the time of the maximum horizontal deviation and priming effect data do not support the independence criterion. In general, the results from Experiment 2 reveal that primes can influence the control of movements, when they are presented after a delay following movement onset, provided that sufficient time remains to execute a correction to the target 88 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 Left Target Right Target 17 ms A 80 33 ms 50 ms X position (mm) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 B 5 Priming effect (mm) -10 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Time from prime onset (ms) Fig. 6. (A) The average lateral spatial trajectory and (B) the lateral spatial priming effect (incongruent–congruent) when pointing to the left and right targets in Experiment 2 as a function of prime onset. The line colours in (A) represent the different congruency conditions (congruent: black; neutral: dark gray; incongruent: light gray). The standard error of the priming effect functions in (B) for the various Delay conditions are represented by different colours (17 ms: light gray; 33 ms: dark gray; 50 ms: black). The vertical line on the x-axis indicates the time of mask onset. For clarity the neutral prime condition is excluded in the top figures but is presented from 300 to 500 ms in the inset. Positive values indicate movement in the correct direction while negative values indicate movement in the incorrect direction. location. Additionally, Experiment 2 supports the initiation and takeover criteria, but provides further evidence against the independence criterion during an ongoing movement. 4. Discussion The two experiments investigated the influence of the timing of prime and mask onset on the online control of pointing movements. Specifically, Experiment 1 was designed to test the predictions of the rapid-chase theory as it relates to movement execution. Previous pointing studies have shown support for the initiation and takeover criteria during movement execution but could not investigate the independence criterion because a fixed SOA was used. In order to determine if primes and masks are processed according to the rapid-chase theory during response execution, we manipulated the prime-mask SOA between 33, 50, and 67 ms which allowed us to determine if the data met the three criteria of the rapid-chase theory. It was hypothesized that the observed motor output would abide by the three criteria outlined in the rapid-chase theory, as has been shown in response initiation tasks (T. Schmidt et al., 2006; T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009; T. Schmidt & Seydell, 2008). In particular, the prime would dictate the initial portion of the movement (initiation criterion), such that, in incongruent trials, participants would deviate more in the incorrect direction compared to congruent trials. However, the mask would seize control of the movement so that the correct target was reached before the movement was completed (takeover criterion). Finally, the processing of the prime would initially be independent of the characteristics of the mask (independence criterion), such that the prime would have a greater influence (e.g., greater deviations in the incorrect direction) with increases in SOA. The results from the current experiment support both the initiation and takeover criteria of the rapid-chase theory and replicate previous findings (Cressman et al., 2007, 2013; Fukui & Gomi, 2012), which have shown that a prime can influence the online control of movement before the mask exerts its control. On the other hand, the results do not support the independence criterion, and thus refute the hypothesis that primes and masks are processed according to the rapid-chase theory during response execution. In particular, the maximum horizontal deviation and the time of its occurrence did not reveal any significant Congruency
SOA interactions in Experiment 1. However, Schmidt and colleagues mainly determine whether the data conform to the rapid-chase theory by observing the priming effect functions. In the current experiments it was found that the observed spatial priming effect was not the same as the theoretical spatial priming effect predicted by the independence criterion. According to the independence criteria of the rapid-chase theory, the shortest SOA should deviate from the average time course first and the longest SOA should deviate last with the intermittent SOA deviating after the first SOA but J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 89 before the last SOA condition. As the results in Experiment 1 demonstrate, not only did the spatial priming effect not deviate in this predicted manner but the deviation pattern was different when correcting to the two target locations. The argument that the independence criterion was not supported by the data in Experiment 1 is further substantiated by the findings of Experiment 2. In Experiment 2 the time that the primes were presented relative to movement onset was manipulated, while holding the prime-mask SOA constant at 50 ms. In this case, the rapid-chase theory would predict that the priming onset and amplitude of the priming functions would be the same for all three delay conditions when time locked to prime onset. The results failed to show the predicted time course since the priming onset for the different delay conditions occurred at different times relative to prime onset and, once again, the pattern between the two targets was different. Although the results indicate that the prime can influence movement when presented after a delay following movement onset, the data do not seem to abide by the independence criterion. Previous studies in which prime-mask processing did not support the rapid-chase theory claimed that it was due to the short prime-mask SOA (<30 ms; T. Schmidt et al., 2006), task difficulty (T. Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009), or the occlusion of the prime stimulus by other distracting stimuli (F. Schmidt et al., 2014). Consequently, it was argued that recurrent processing was necessary to complete these tasks. It is unlikely that these explanations apply to the current situation because the prime-mask SOA was longer than 30 ms, the task did not require cognitive control in order to semantically process the prime since there was a direct relationship between the prime and response (Klapp, 2015), and the relevant features of the prime were not occluded. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the fact that fast recurrent processing (Bullier, 2001) could have occurred in the present paradigm, leading to the lack of large overt deviations at the longer SOAs. It is not surprising that the feedforward sweep elicited by the mask would have occurred faster than the one activated by the prime, since the mask would have been more salient than the prime given it was larger in size and more task relevant, meaning it specified the required response (Lamme, 2004). It was thought that the unconscious processing of the prime might differ between movement initiation and movement execution because of the increased mechanical ease of corrections (Christensen et al., 2008), the increased involvement of the dorsal stream (Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2008) or the decrease of the activation threshold during movement execution compared to movement initiation (Cressman et al., 2007). Specifically, it was thought that the prime would be processed faster during movement execution because it would have access to the dorsal stream which has been shown to be involved in the online control of action and does not necessitate conscious perception (Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2008). In fact, Brenner and Smeets (2004) observed that participants adjusted their movements earlier during movement execution than movement initiation. However, in the current study, participants were slower to correct their movement compared to previous pointing studies (Brenner & Smeets, 2004; Cressman et al., 2007). This may be a result of the more complicated stimulus–response (SR) mapping used in the current experiment compared to previous keypress and pointing studies (Klotz & Wolff, 1995; Ocampo & Finkbeiner, 2013; T. Schmidt et al., 2006) that have mostly used relatively simple SR mapping conditions where there is a one-to-one relationship between the mask and response. The current experiments used a relatively difficult SR mapping since there were three possible responses with the middle target being the most probable response. Furthermore, the timing of the mask relative to movement onset was varied, possibly leading participants to wait or slow their movement until mask onset. Studies using complicated SR mappings, where two stimuli (e.g., a left or upper semicircle) require a left keypress and two different stimuli (e.g., a right or lower semicircle) require a right keypress response, show that priming effects tend to be reduced in these situations (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Ro, Singhal, Breitmeyer, & Garcia, 2009). Consequently, task difficult may contribute to the current findings and should be considered in future experiments. Moreover, the amount of activation needed to trigger an action in response to the prime could differ depending on the task to be performed. In fact it was hypothesized that the activation threshold would be lower in a pointing task as suggested by Cressman et al. (2007) compared to a response initiation task. The current results suggest that there is a difference in unconscious processing between movement initiation and movement execution since the current data do not follow the rapid-chase theory, but previous movement initiation studies have supported the rapid-chase theory (T. Schmidt et al., 2006; see also T. Schmidt et al., 2011 for a review). In contrast to our hypothesis, the prime activation threshold might have been increased instead of lowered during movement execution. Similarly, the use of a gating mechanism or the manner in which movements are controlled during flight could differ between movement initiation and execution. The prime threshold might have been adjusted in advance of prime onset due to prior experience. Consciously perceived positional errors (i.e., landing on the incorrect target in perturbed trials) (Jaśkowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003) or temporal errors (i.e., failure to meet the MT goal in direct pointing trials) from previous trials could have resulted in participants increasing the activation threshold needed to trigger a response to the onset of the prime stimulus in order to prevent unintentional errors. Processing fluency, the subjective feeling associated with the ease of processing information, could also have led to a modification of the prime activation threshold (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Desender, Van Opstal, & Van den Bussche, 2014). This increased activation threshold following errors would lead to a decrease in the overt deviations observed in response to the prime stimulus. The use of a gating mechanism is another possibility that could explain why the rapid-chase theory does not apply to movement execution. Kiefer (2007) proposed a gating framework to explain the ability of an unconscious stimulus to elicit an automatic response. Kiefer suggested that primes are under preemptive control, such that top-down influences such as intention, task sets, and attention can be established prior to prime onset to enhance or reduce the unconscious processing of the prime stimulus. The specification of these top-down factors allow prefrontal areas to gate specific information processing 90 J.C. Flannigan et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 42 (2016) 75–92 pathways that are relevant to the task as specified by the top-down factors (Kiefer, 2007). For example, in high conflict environments such as when a larger proportion of trials are incongruent the priming effect was smaller (Bodner & Lee, 2014; Jaśkowski et al., 2003; Wolbers et al., 2006; see Ansorge, Kunde, & Kiefer, 2014 and Kunde et al., 2012 for a review), suggesting the gating mechanism decreased the processing of the prime leading to a decrease in the automatic response to the prime. In the current experiments, only 33% of the perturbed trials were congruent (11% of all trials). Consequently, for optimal performance it would have been beneficial to limit the amount of control exerted by the prime because, in perturbed trials, the prime was mainly task-irrelevant in the sense that it did not indicate the target location. In comparison to Schmidt’s studies, we included neutral trials; thus it could be argued that the neutral prime and neutral mask condition was congruent leading to an increase in the percentage of congruent trials (78% of all trials). The argument that direct pointing trials were treated as congruent is supported by the finding that a greater number of errors in the perturbed trials occurred with a neutral prime suggesting that it was activating a response to the center target. Although the direct pointing trials could be argued to be congruent trials, the presentation of the neutral prime before the neutral or directional mask should not have altered participants’ original intentions because they were asked to initiate their movement to the center target; therefore, the neutral prime did not specify a new response but was in line with the current and most common response. According to Klapp (2015), a stronger stimulus–response binding would be established between the neutral prime and a response to the center target because all neutral masks were preceded by a neutral prime leading to direct response priming. Hence, the directional primes would not elicit as strong a response to the center target as the neutral prime. Klapp’s (2015) automatization account is in contrast to the gating mechanism account since Klapp proposed that direct response priming results from the automatization of the stimulus and response links and not from intentional control. On the other hand, the current data may not obey the rapid-chase theory, not because the visual processing of the prime and mask did not occur in a strict feedforward manner, but because of the way online movements are controlled. According to the minimal intervention principle (Liu & Todorov, 2007; Todorov & Jordan, 2002), movements that deviate from the average trajectory are only corrected if they impede performance. To minimize effort, accuracy is prioritized in the task relevant direction allowing for variability in the task-irrelevant dimension (Todorov & Jordan, 2002). In the present experiment, deviations in the horizontal direction might only become task relevant once the mask appears, specifying the target location. Therefore, the system does not concern itself with these minimal errors due to sensory and motor noise because it might have to correct the movement later in this direction once the mask appears indicating which target to land on. Nevertheless, once the pointing trajectory exceeds an allowable margin of error, an adjustment is executed based on the person’s intention, meaning the prime can only control overt deviations to a certain extent determined by the goals of the task. Similarly, Oostwoud Wijdenes, Brenner, and Smeets (2011) found that the intensity of a correction depends on the time remaining until the movement is complete. As a result, early corrections and late corrections occurred with a similar latency of correction but late corrections were made with a greater intensity providing additional evidence that corrections are executed differently as the movement progresses. Possibly the greater correction intensity in response to the mask might have obscured the influence of the prime on movement trajectory because the prime was presented before the mask. Consequently, ongoing pointing movements might not be sensitive enough to detect the small changes induced by the prime when a limited number of short prime-mask SOAs is used. Only 3 SOAs were used in Experiment 1 and the two extreme SOAs were only separated by 50 ms.2 Having more SOAs might provide more insight into the application of the rapid-chase theory to ongoing movements. Furthermore, the movement variability observed in the current study might have occurred because the moving hand was hidden from view. The inability to see the moving limb during movement could also explain why movement time (Reichenbach, Thielscher, Peer, Bülthoff, & Bresciani, 2009) was longer in the current study compared to previous studies using a similar experimental set-up where the hand was visible (Cressman et al., 2007, 2013). Our MT goal also allowed for longer movement durations. However, in Experiment 2, MT in direct pointing trials increased as the delay increased suggesting that participants might have been waiting for the onset of the mask stimulus before completing their movement to the center target. Overall, the present results reveal that the prime is able to influence a movement even if it is presented at various time points following movement onset and the mask can take over control of the movement as long as there is sufficient time to make a correction. While these results support the first two tenets of the rapid-chase theory, the prime does not appear to be initially processed independently from the mask as suggested by the third tenet (independence criterion). Thus, the results do not appear to support the application of the rapid-chase theory to ongoing movements which means that determining whether or not the prime and mask are processed in a feedforward manner cannot be resolved by simply observing the behavioural output of the motor system. The prime and mask may still be processed in a feedforward manner but fast recurrent processing, modifying the prime activation threshold, gating the prime’s access to certain pathways or controlling movements in a certain manner could have prevented feedforward processing or reduced the impact of the prime leading to smaller movement deviations. All these explanations deserve further exploration using a reaching task since it has the 2 We also limited our analysis to the 33 and 67 ms SOAs but still found no significant Congruency
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