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Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Intuitively, what she says is false: she is not able to hit the bullseye, as she is a poor darts-player. Yet there is an accessible and perfectly good possible world w at which she hits the bullseye — which is just to say, in the object language, that it is possible for her to hit the bullseye.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

This case suggests the Kratzer semantics lacks the resources to capture the distinctively agentive force of a sentences such as (3). There are, in addition, a number of other outstanding empirical problems for Kratzer’s semantics for ability modals. One is the problem of accounting for ‘compulsion’ modals such as ‘I cannot but tell the truth’ (Mandelkern et al. 2017). Another is that of accommodating the ‘actuality entailment’ whereby, in many languages, certain ability sentences entail that the act in question was actually performed (Bhatt 1999; see also Hacquard 2009). Whatever our verdict on (MAsemantic), the semantics of ability-ascriptions remains an unresolved and potentially rich issue at the boundary of linguistics and the philosophy of action.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The foregoing has indicated serious concerns about the adequacy of the orthodox approaches to ability and its ascription: the conditional analysis (CA), and the modal analysis (MA), of which (CA) is arguably just a special case. This raises the question of what a non-hypothetical and non-modal account of ability and its ascription might look like.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Since abilities are, as noted in Section 1.1, a kind of power, one natural idea is to analyze abilities in terms of some other kind of power. This appeal may proceed in different ways. One is by appealing to dispositions, and by analyzing abilities in terms of this purportedly better-understood kind of power. Another is by departing more radically from the standard ontology of recent metaphysics, and analyzing ability in terms of some new and distinctive variety of power. We will consider these approaches in turn in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Finally, in Section 5.3, we will turn to miscellaneous alternative approaches to ability, which reject the conditional and modal analyses, but which do not purport to analyze abilities in terms of powers either.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

In recent years several authors have revisited the thought that we may give a broadly hypothetical account of ability, without endorsing the problematic claim (CA). This is the view of ability that has been defended by Smith (2003), Vihvelin (2004, 2013), and Fara (2008). Following Clarke (2009), we may label this view the ‘new dispositionalism.’

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

What unifies the new dispositionalists is that they return to the conditional analysis of ability in light of two thoughts. The first thought is one already noted: that there is a variety of power, dispositions, that is similar in many respects to abilities. The second thought is that there are well-known problems of giving a conditional analysis of dispositions, in light of which many authors have been inclined to reject the long-assumed link between dispositions and conditionals. Taken together, these thoughts yield a promising new line on abilities: that though we ought to reject the conditional analysis of abilities, we may yet defend a dispositional account of abilities.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Why ought we reject the conditional analysis of dispositions? Consider the following analysis of the disposition to break when struck:

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

(CD) x is disposed to break when struck iff S would break if S were struck.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Despite the intuitive appeal of (CD), there appear to be at least two kinds of counterexamples to it. First, consider a crystal glass that, if it were about to be struck, would transform into steel. This glass is disposed to break when struck, but it is not true that it would break if struck—the transformation renders this false. This is a case of finking, in the language of Martin 1994. Second, consider a crystal glass stuffed with styrofoam packaging. This glass is disposed to break when struck, but it is not true that it would break if struck—the packaging prevents this. This is a case of masking, in the language of Johnston 1992. In light of such cases, it seems we ought to reject (CD).

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The bearing of these points on our earlier discussion of the conditional analysis is the following. There appear to be quite general problems for giving a conditional analysis of powers. So it may be that the failures of the conditional analysis of ability were not due to any fact about abilities, but rather to a shortcoming of conditional analyses generally. One way of overcoming this problem, if this diagnosis is correct, is to analyze abilities directly in terms of dispositions.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Such an analysis is proposed by Fara 2008, who argues:

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

S has the ability to A in circumstances C iff she has the disposition to A when, in circumstances C, she tries to A. (Fara 2008, 848)

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The similarity of this analysis to the hypothetical analyses canvassed earlier are clear. This raises several immediate questions, such as whether this analysis can overcome the problem of sufficiency that plagued those approaches (see Fara 2008, 851–852 for an affirmative answer, and Clarke 2009, 334–336 for some doubts). What is most striking about the new dispositionalists, however, is how they bring this sort of account of ability to bear on certain familiar cases.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Consider how the new dispositionalism bears on so-called ‘Frankfurt cases.’ These are cases due to Frankfurt 1969, where an agent chooses to and performs some action A while at the same time there is some other action B such that, had the agent been about to choose B, an ‘intervener’ would have altered the agent’s brain so that the agent would have chosen, and performed, A instead. One question about such cases is whether the agent, in the actual sequence of events, had the ability to B. Frankfurt’s intuition, and that of most others, is that she did not. Given the further claim that the agent is nonetheless morally responsible for doing A, this case appears to be a counterexample to the what Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for Aing only if she had the ability to perform some action other than A.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The new dispositionalists disagree. Let us focus on Fara’s diagnosis of the case. The question of whether the agent had the ability to B turns, for Fara, on the question of whether she was disposed to B when she tried to B. Fara claims that she does have such a disposition. The presence of the intervener is, on Fara’s view, like the aforementioned styrofoam packaging in a crystal glass. It masks the disposition of the glass to break when struck, but does not remove that disposition. Similarly, Fara argues, the presence of the intervener masks the agent’s disposition to B when she tries to B, but does not remove that disposition. (There is some disagreement among the new dispositionalists about whether this is a case of finking or masking; see Clarke 2009, 340 for discussion). So, pace Frankfurt, the agent does have the ability to B after all. And so we have, in this case at least, no counterexample to PAP.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

A natural worry at this point is that the new dispositionalist has simply changed the subject. For it seems clear that, in a perfectly ordinary sense of ability, Frankfurt’s agent lacks the ability to do otherwise. An account of ability which denies this seems to be speaking of some other concept altogether. One way of bringing out what is missing is the idea that there seems to be a connection between my abilities, in the sense of ability that is relevant to free will, and what is up to me. Clarke claims that this sort of connection fails on the new dispositionalist view of ability:

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Although the presence of a fink or mask that would prevent one’s Aing is compatible with having a general capacity (the unimpaired competence to A), there is an ordinary sense in which in such circumstances an agent might well be unable to A … If there is something in place that would prevent me from Aing should I try to A, if it is not up to me that it would so prevent me, and if it is not up to me that such a thing is in place, then even if I have a capacity to A, it is not up to me whether I exercise that capacity. (Clarke 2009, 339)

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Thus the objection is that, while the new dispositionalist has perhaps offered a theory of something, it is not a theory of ability.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

How should the new dispositionalist respond? One thought is that we are here again encountering the distinction between general and specific abilities. The new dispositionalist might contend that, while the agent in a Frankfurt case may lack the specific ability to do otherwise, she has the general ability to do otherwise, and that it is this general ability of which the new dispositionalist is giving an account.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.1 The ‘new dispositionalism’

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

This response, however, postpones a crucial and much broader question. The question is this: should ‘ability’ in (PAP) be understood as general ability, or specific ability? If general ability is what matters, then Frankfurt cases may indeed not tell against (PAP), for the agent retains the general ability to do otherwise. If it is specific ability that matters, however, the challenge to (PAP) stands (see also Whittle 2010). This is a vital question for understanding the purported connection between agents’ abilities and questions of moral responsibility, whatever our verdict on new dispositionalism itself. (See Cyr and Swenson 2019 for a helpful recent discussion of these issues).

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

As noted in Section 1.1, dispositions are simply one member of the broader family of powers, albeit one that has figured prominently in recent metaphysics. An alternative account of abilities might give an account of abilities in terms of some other kind of power, perhaps one better-suited to the distinctive aspects of abilities.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

One account of this kind is developed in a series of works by Barbara Vetter (especially Vetter 2015). Vetter proposes that our basic modal notion should be potentiality. On a traditional view (which Vetter rejects) dispositions involve a dyadic relation between a stimulus and a manifestation (for example: a glass is disposed to break when struck). In contrast, potentials involve a monadic relation to a manifestation (for example: a glass has the potential to break). This makes potentials especially well-suited to give an account of abilities, which also appear to involve a monadic relation to an act, namely the act denoted by the complement of an ability-ascription (for example: I am able to play tennis). To have an ability, Vetter argues, is simply to have a certain kind of potentiality. Vetter also provides an explicit semantics for agentive modality in terms of the ascription of potentiality (Vetter 2013), which constitutes a systematic alternative to (MA).

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Yet another view is suggested by recent work by Helen Steward emphasizing the traditional idea of a ‘two-way power’ (Steward 2012, Steward 2020; see also Alvarez 2013). Steward argues that actions are exercises of two-way powers — ‘powers which an agent can exercise or not at a given moment, even holding all prior conditions at that moment fixed’ (Steward 2020, 345). These are to be contrasted with one-way powers, which manifest whenever their manifestation conditions are realized, as a fragile glass breaks whenever it is struck. Unlike both the new dispositionalists on the one hand and Vetter on the other, Steward sees a fundamental asymmetry between agents, who are bearers of two-way powers, and mere objects, who are are bearers only of one-way powers. It is natural then to think that what it is to have an ability is to have a two-way power of a certain kind, and that a theory of ability should follow from an account of agency and the two-way powers.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

We thus have at least three ‘power-based’ views of abilities: the new dispositionalism, Vetter’s potentiality-based view, and Steward’s two-way power-based view. It is instructive to consider how these three accounts differ with respect to two larger philosophical projects.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

One is the project of giving an analysis of modal language, including ability-ascriptions, in terms of possible worlds. The new dispositionalist rejects (CA) and (MA) but she is still, in principle, sympathetic with that project, insofar as she allows that disposition ascriptions themselves may be ultimately understood in terms of quantification over possible worlds. This kind of view is explicitly endorsed, for instance, by Smith (2003). In contrast, Vetter is explicitly opposed to this project, while Steward’s view appears neutral on this question.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.2 Abilities as distinctive powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Another is the project of arguing that agents’ abilities are, or are not, compatible with the possibility of determinism. This is a question we touched on briefly in Section 5.1. As noted there, the new dispositionalists are motivated, in part, by the project of arguing for compatibilism. In contrast, Steward is explicitly concerned to defend incompatibilism. (Vetter appears to be neutral on this question.) The question of how the analysis of ability bears on the free will debates looms over many of these discussions, and we will confront it directly and at some length below in Section 6.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.3 Other approaches

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Still other approaches to ability reject (CA) and (MA) while rejecting also the thought that some appeal to power — be it a disposition, a potentiality, or a two-way power — is needed to account for abilities.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.3 Other approaches

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

One recurrent thought is that, despite the various challenges that have been brought against it, ability is still intimately connected to some kind of relation between an agent’s volitions (tryings, intendings) and her actions. One semantically sophisticated development of this thought is Mandelkern et al, 2017, which proposes to take as basic a notion of ‘practically available actions,’ and to develop in terms of these a semantics for agentive modality, one on which conditionals linking volitions to actions continue to play an essential role. Another approach, in a recent book-length treatment of ability (Jaster 2020), proposes that abilities should be thought of in terms of proportions of cases where an agent successfully does what she intends to do (compare the approach to dispositions advocated in Manley and Wasserman 2008). Both of these approaches are explicit in their denial of (CA), but they share — with the new dispositionalists — the thought that the analysis of ability should somehow appeal to a pattern of dependence between volition and action.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.3 Other approaches

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

This is not surprising. The conditional analysis is a redoubtable proposal, endorsed by many of the major figures in English-language philosophy. In light of that, it seems reasonable to try to discard the letter of (CA), but retain its spirit. For it may be that the historical failure of (CA) is due to difficulties and oversights that our perhaps firmer grasp of technical issues allows us to overcome. This is a sensible and well-motivated project, though it remains to be seen whether it will be, in the end, a successful one.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.3 Other approaches

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

There remain still other accounts that do not fit easily into the taxonomy provided here. These include primitivist proposals, which take ability or some closely related notion as analytically fundamental. One development of this idea is Maier 2015, who proposes, contrary to most authors, that specific ability is fundamentally prior to general ability. He argues that we should give an account of general ability in terms of specific abilities, which he calls ‘options’: roughly, an agent has the general ability to A iff she normally has A as an option. Options, in turn, are primitives. Much here will hang on saying more about options, and in what sense they figure as primitives in the theory of agency.

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.3 Other approaches

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Finally, an outline of a proposal by David Lewis (dated to 2001 but only recently published as Lewis 2020) offers an altogether different approach to ability. Lewis is motivated, like many proponents of (CA), by the goal of defending compatibilism, but he takes (CA) to be unsatisfactory. He therefore proposes a non-conditional analysis of ability. His analysis, roughly, is that S has the ability to perform an action B just in case there is some basic action A such that (i) S’s doing A would cause or constitute S’s doing B and (ii) there is no obstacle to S’s doing A. The problem of giving a theory of ability then becomes the problem of giving a theory of obstacles, something at which Lewis, in his outline, makes a beginning. (See Beebee et al 2020 for additional discussion).

Abilities

5. New approaches to ability

5.3 Other approaches

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Lewis’s proposal is an inspiration for further research in at least two ways. First, it indicates that Lewis, a systematic philosopher of modality, saw the problem of giving an analysis of ability as a significant outstanding project. Second, it demonstrates that genuinely novel approaches to ability remain available, and the project of giving a theory of ability may yet be in its early stages.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Thus far our questions about abilities have been formal ones: we have been asking what it is to have an ability without concerning ourselves with the substantive work that a theory of ability might have to do. But there is much work to be had for a theory of ability: abilities have figured as unexplained explainers in a range of philosophical theories, for example in accounts of concepts (Millikan 2000), of knowledge (Greco 2009, Sosa 2007), and of ‘knowing what it’s like’ (Lewis 1988). Perhaps the most prominent substantive role for a theory of ability has been the uses to which accounts of ability have been put in the free will debates. So let us close with a brief survey of what work a theory of ability might be expected to do in those debates.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Questions about abilities have figured most prominently in debates over compatibilism. ‘Compatibilism’ is used in many ways, but let us understand it here as the thesis that the ability to perform actions one does not perform is compossible with the truth of determinism, which we may take to be the view that the facts about the past and the laws jointly determine the facts about the present and all future moments. (We should sharply distinguish this view, which we might call classical compatibilism, from more recent views such as the ‘semi-compatibilism’ of Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Insofar as compatibilism, so understood, has been explicitly defended, these defenses have made appeal to theories of ability, notably the conditional analysis and its variants, as well as the dispositionalist analysis favored by the new dispositionalists.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

In the discussion of the conditional analysis, we distinguished between global and local counterexamples to hypothetical theories of ability, where the former appealed to the fact that any such theory would render ability compatible with determinism which, according to the objector, it is not. There we noted the dialectical limitations of such counterexamples, namely the contentiousness of their main premise. But compatibilists have often been guilty of what seems to be the opposite mistake. Namely, they have offered theories of ability which show abilities to be compatible with determinism, and have argued from this to the claim that such abilities are indeed compatible with determinism.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The shortcomings of this strategy are nicely diagnosed by Peter van Inwagen. After surveying the local counterexamples that arise for various hypothetical theories of ability, van Inwagen imagines that we have arrived at the best possible hypothetical theory of ability, which he labels ‘the Analysis’. van Inwagen then writes:

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

What does the Analysis do for us? How does it affect our understanding of the Compatibility Problem? It does very little for us, so far as I can see, unless we have some reason to think it is correct. Many compatibilists seem to think that they need only present a conditional analysis of ability, defend it against, or modify it in the face of, such counter-examples as may arise, and that they have thereby done what is necessary to defend compatibilism. That is not how I see it. The particular analysis of ability that a compatibilist presents is, as I see it, simply one of his premisses; his central premiss, in fact. And premisses need to be defended. (van Inwagen 1983, 121)

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

van Inwagen’s point is that, provided the incompatibilist has offered arguments for the claim that such abilities are incompatible with determinism—as, in van Inwagen’s presentation, the incompatibilist has—the production of an analysis is as yet no answer to those arguments. For those arguments are also arguments, inter alia, against the compatibilist’s favored account of ability.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

There are, then, several obstacles for the compatibilist who wishes to appeal to an account of ability in defense of compatibilism. First, there is the general difficulty of actually giving an extensionally adequate theory of ability. In addition, we have now turned up a couple of more specific challenges to the compatibilist. There is van Inwagen’s point just outlined, namely that arguments for the incompatibility of abilities and determinism are, inter alia, arguments against any theory of ability that is congenial to the compatibilist. And, finally, there is the point that we encountered in our discussion of the new dispositionalism in Section 5.1, which is that certain platitudes about ability — in particular, those involved in certain judgments about moral responsibility — may be recalcitrant to compatibilist treatments. Taken together, these points seem to pose a serious obstacle to any theory of ability that is both compatible with determinism and in accord with our ordinary judgments about what ability requires.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

What is the compatibilist to say in light of these obstacles? One response is to make a distinction between two kinds of compatibilist project. (Compare Pryor 2000 on responses to skepticism). One project is to convince someone moved by the incompatibilist’s arguments to retreat from her position. Call this ambitious compatibilism. For precisely the reasons van Inwagen gives, it is doubtful that any theory of ability will suffice for a defense of ambitious compatibilism. There is another project, however, that the compatibilist might be engaging in. Let us say that, for some reason or other, she herself is not convinced by the incompatibilist’s argument. She is still left with an explanatory burden, namely to explain, if only to her own satisfaction, how it could be that abilities are compatible with the truth of determinism. Here the compatibilist’s aim is not to convince the incompatibilist of the error of her ways, but simply to work out a satisfactory conception of compatibilism. Let us call this modest compatibilism. This distinction is not often made, and it is not always clear which of these projects classical compatibilists are engaged in. If the latter project is indeed part of classical compatibilism, then we may grant many of the above points while still granting the theory of ability a central place in defenses of compatibilism. For it may be that, though a theory of ability is of no use to the ambitious compatibilist, it has a crucial role to play in the defense of modest compatibilism.

Abilities

6. Abilities and the free will debates

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Even these compatibilist aspirations, however, may be overly optimistic, or at least premature. For in surveying theories of ability we have turned up serious difficulties, for both hypothetical and non-hypothetical approaches, which do not appear to turn on issues about determinism. So it may be that the best hope for progress is to pursue theories of ability while setting to one side the problems raised in the free will debates. For given the difficulties posed by abilities, and given the significance of theories of ability for areas of philosophy quite removed from the free will debates, there is something to be said for pursuing a theory of ability while embracing, if only temporarily, a certain quietism about the puzzles that determinism may pose.

Abner of Burgos

1. Life

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

There are not many sources on the life of Abner. The majority of the sources are autobiographical passages in his works (especially Mostrador de Justicia). Abner was born around 1260, probably in the Jewish community of Burgos, one of the major communities in Castile. While still Jewish, Abner worked as a book trader, a rabbi, and he may have been a physician as well. During this time he was the head of a yeshiva (Jewish academy) in Burgos, but we do not know if this yeshiva was a public institution or just a private group of students that met in his home. We know from a former pupil, Rabbi Isaac Pulgar, and from the sources that he utilizes in his works, that during the Jewish period of his life, Abner was a philosopher, being a part of the Maimonidean-Averroist trend of Jewish philosophy at the time.

Abner of Burgos

1. Life

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

In spite of the majority opinion of modern scholars,[1] Abner probably was not a Kabbalist before his conversion to Christianity. This mistake is based essentially on two sources: the fact that some of Abner’s arguments for the Trinity and Incarnation can be interpreted as deriving from Kabbalistic sources, and the existence of another Rabbi Abner (not a common name for Jews of his time), a Kabbalist whom Rabbi Isaac of Acre cited many times. In my opinion, Abner’s argument for the Trinity and Incarnation is not based on Kabbalistic sources, but stems from his Neo-Platonic and standard Christian scriptural background.[2] Additionally, Abner (the apostate) did not use many important Kabbalistic sources.[3] His opinions are not the same as the other Rabbi Abner’s (the one that Rabbi Isaac of Acre quotes), and we can see that the two authors do not share the same background, nor do they use the same sources, with Abner utilizing almost entirely sources taken from the Jewish philosophical and traditional rabbinic corpuses.[4] almost all of Rabbi Abner’s sources are taken from the commentary of Nahmanides to the Torah, a book that Abner the apostate almost never quoted.

Abner of Burgos

1. Life

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

The beginning of Abner’s doubts about Judaism began with the incident of a false messiah in Avila in 1295. According to Abner, the Jews of the community, which is in North Castile, went outside the city to welcome the messiah, but instead of the messiah they received a rainfall of crosses that stuck to their clothes. Some of the Jews who witnessed the miracle went to Abner for advice. This event instilled in Abner some doubts about the question of the reason for the ongoing exile of Israel and the truth of Judaism. After twenty-two years of feeling ambivalent (i.e., around 1317) Abner wrote about his first revelation in a dream.[5] In his dream he saw a man that told him to be “a teacher of righteousness” (mostrador de justicia, not coincidentally the name of Abner’s main book) and to bring his people to freedom from exile. This dream just accents the uncertainty of the Jewish Rabbi. After three more years of studies he had a second dream wherein he had the same revelation, this time noticing that on the clothes the man wore were crosses like the cross of Jesus the Christian. This dream prompted him toward his final conversion around 1320/1321. After his conversion, Abner became the sacristan of the collegiate church of Valladolid and devoted himself to the propagation of Christianity amongst his former fellows Jews (he had come to the conclusion that conversion to Christianity was the only way to be saved from the Exile). We know he wrote an extended polemicist oeuvre and that he took part in the anti-Jewish polemic effort in North Castile around 1336–1339. There was a public disputation between Abner and a rabbi that occurred probably around 1335–1336 on the subject of the prayer of the Jews against the apostates. This dispute was the main reason for the decree against this part of the Jewish prayer (birkatha-minim) by Alfonso XI in 1336. Abner probably died in 1347 or later.

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Abner’s works may be divided into three different categories: polemic, scientific and philosophic.

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Polemic works: Mostradorde Justicia is the earliest and most important work of those writings of Abner that have survived. Only a translation (probably by Abner himself) in Castilian exists today, whereas the original Hebrew was lost. The book starts with a brief introduction wherein Abner writes about the reasons for his conversion (the incident in Avila and his two dreams). The main part of the book is a debate between a Christian (the master) and a Jew (the rebel). In contrast to other works similar to this type of polemic debate, in the Mostrador, the rebel does not become a Christian, and despite his losing the debate, the Jew continues to believe in his ostensibly false religion. The book is divided into ten chapters, with each chapter being subdivided into a number of paragraphs. Each paragraph is a speech by one of the protagonists of the debate.[6]

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Summary of the chapters:

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Responses to the Blasphemer (Teshuvot la-Meharef): this book survived both in the original Hebrew[7] and in a Castilian translation.[8] This book is a response to the different letters that Abner’s only known student, Rabbi Isaac Pulgar, wrote against his determinist and Christian writings.[9] Abner did not divide this book into formal sections, though the book contains four main subjects presented in a contiguous fashion: (1) an introduction wherein Abner attacks his former pupil on his philosophical position and other personal matters between the two; (2) the Trinity and how it can be based on philosophy, scripture and quotes from the Jewish rabbinic literature; (3) the necessary existence of the incarnation of divinity in the world; and (4) a proof of the aforementioned Christian beliefs derived from scripture and other Jewish sources (Talmud and Midrashim). In this last part, which takes up almost half the book, Abner argues that the messiah had already come and that Christianity is true.

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

While Abner’s arguments regarding the Trinity and Incarnation are generally more developed in Mostradorde Justicia, the philosophical importance of this work resides with his critique of the Jewish philosopher. Here Abner distinguishes between the regular Jewish people (that have some hope to become Christian and to be saved) and Jewish philosophers (like Pulgar). The latter are hopeless and are left with no religion, mostly due to their opinions that only the people who attain scientific knowledge have some kind of existence after death. Due to their feeling elevated over others, these philosophers have no hope of improving and accepting the truth of Christianity. Parts of Abner’s critique of Jewish philosophers in this book most probably influenced Crescas.

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Libro de la Ley (Book of the Law). This work survived only fragmentally[10] in Castilian. The major argument of Abner in this book is that the Jewish people forgot the secrets of the Torah, which are manifested by the Christian doctrines, especially the Trinity.

Abner of Burgos

2. Works

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Sefer Teshuvot ha-Meshubot (The Book of Responses to the Apostasies) exists only in Hebrew.[11] There are three polemic letters[12] that deal especially with scriptural arguments on the subject of the coming of the messiah.[13]

Abner of Burgos

3. The Trinity and Incarnation

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

The two major subjects of the philosophical polemical works of Abner are the Trinity and Incarnation. Abner had an original view on the Trinity. In his opinion, one can prove philosophically the reality of the Trinity.[14] He claimed that only the division of the divine source of the world can explain the diversity of the world. The infinite force of God (the father) would burn the finite matter of the world if it were not for some “transformer” that adapted the divine force to the finitude of matter (the son). Abner distinguished between two parts of the son. The superior son is part of the transcendent divinity. The inferior son is the divine essence in all the different parts of the world. The transformer of the divine force and essence is the superior son.

Abner of Burgos

3. The Trinity and Incarnation

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Regarding the theory of the divine attributes, Abner also had an original opinion. He distinguished between the attributes that are the essence of God and the attributes that are essential to God. The attributes of the essence of God divide themselves only within the personas of the Trinity. The rest of the attributes are only essential to God (and could be attributed to any one of the personas). This division of the divine attributes influenced Rabbi Hasdai Crescas,who later influenced Spinoza.

Abner of Burgos

3. The Trinity and Incarnation

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Abner’s opinion on Incarnation was also very original. According to Abner, the essence of God is in the entire world. The world is composed only of corrupted matter and of divine essence in different degrees of purity. Even the most corrupted matter has inside itself some divine essence. The divine essence gives the corporeal form to matter and produces in it its dimensions. The uniqueness of a human being is the capacity to purify one’s matter, thereby reaching a higher degree of divine essence. According to Abner, what made Jesus unique was that he was born of the highest matter, enabling him to unite with the highest degree of divine essence that a human can attain. Abner thought that the superior son does not incarnate in this world. Jesus was only the highest degree of the inferior son that is present in the essences of the entire world.

Abner of Burgos

3. The Trinity and Incarnation

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

The opinion of Abner on Incarnation is closely related to his view of the doctrine of Original Sin. In Abner’s opinion, the reason for the original sin was Adam’s lack of comprehension. Adam thought that his intellect, which is an incarnation of divinity in people, was God, and he therefore wrongly concluded that he was God. In order to fix Adam’s error, humanity needed the Torah of Moses, which emphasized the unity of God in an exaggerated form and therefore explained (somewhat inaccurately) that God does not incarnate in the World at all. Only after this critical step, humanity was able to understand that, though there is divinity in humans, this divinity is not an independent God, but rather a part of the divine essence in the whole world. The Law of Moses that came to purify the world from idolatry has some problems. It does not enable the full emancipation of humanity from sin and error. Abner claimed that the negation of the incarnation of God in the world leads to negating the possibility of life after death. The possibility of life after death comes from understanding the incarnation of divinity in all humans. Negating life after death causes immorality. The Torah has to put up with all these inaccuracies in order to achieve its main goal, which is taking humanity out of the sin of idolatry (by believing that God is one). The outcome, though better than its predecessor, is ultimately a lost situation which humanity cannot overcome on its own. For that reason, God sent Jesus (who was born with a higher degree of matter and divine essence). Due to the divinity within Jesus, his miracles and his resurrection, people are able to understand that within everything in the world there is some divine essence that is part of the inferior son, and that the origin of all the divinity in the world is the superior son. This understanding enables salvation from the original sin and represents a true understanding of the relation between God and the world. The role of the sacramentental Mass is to remind us of the divine aspect of Jesus’ essence, as well as of all the miracles that Jesus performed and to continue their influence in our present time.

Abner of Burgos

3. The Trinity and Incarnation

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

We see that this opinion regarding the Trinity and Incarnation contradict the official dogma of the Catholic Church at the time of Abner. In his opinion, the incarnation of divinity in Jesus did not bypass the regular process of the emanation of the divine essence in the world. Rather, the manifestation of Jesus represented the pinnacle of incarnation of divinity, which, though indeed present in the entire world, yet in Jesus occurred in the purest form possible. This opinion of Abner, similar to his other philosophical views, was a part of the radical Neo-Platonic interpretation of Christianity. The difference between him and the other Neo-Platonic Christian philosophers, like Master Eckard, is the different sources from which they were influenced. Abner did not utilize the traditional Neo-Platonic Christian sources, like Dionysius the Areopagite. We do not see in any part of his work that he was aware of the existence of these sources. On the other hand, Abner did utilize some Arabic and Jewish sources. The origin of his uncommon position on Christianity is found in his opposition to the common Aristotelian-Maimonidean-Averroist trend of Jewish philosophy. Abner, similar to Spinoza after him, thought that the explanations of these thinkers on the question of the creation of the world by a perfect God were not sufficient and ultimately inaccurate. In place of these responses, Abner proposed his radical interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, an interpretation that was uninfluenced by the theological Christian tradition.

Abner of Burgos

4. Determinism

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

One of the more important philosophical opinions of Abner was his deterministic view.[15] Abner devoted his book Ofrenda de Zelos (Minhat Kena’ot in the original lost Hebrew text), along with other works that have since been lost, to the question of determinism and free will.[16] In the beginning of this book, Abner describes the opinion of his former pupil Rabbi Isaac Pulgar, who denies God’s foreknowledge of human decisions. After the explication of this opinion and its negation, Abner explains his deterministic opinion. Abner believed that people have free will in a limited sense, but act in a determined way in the broader sense. People are free in their relation to themselves, meaning that if a person is separated from the causes that influence him or her (e.g., education, society’s influences) while debating between two options, one is then really free to choose either of the two options. In this specific case a person can then utilize his or her will and choose freely between the two options. However, if one takes into account all the causes that influence his or her will, we may conclude that these causes limits that person’s will to only one of the two options. In the opinion of Abner, people are like wax, as follows: Wax may be melted and sculpted into many different shapes. However, the person who sculpts the wax determines its present form as only one of those options. The same is true about people: In themselves, they have the ability to choose between different possibilities, but their relation to the outside world determines their choices. We can see from this example how strong the determinist view of Abner was. It is important to note that Abner defines the will of people as an accord between the attractive force and the imagination, two forces common to humans and animals.

Abner of Burgos

4. Determinism

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Abner explains in the same way the meaning of possibility and accident. Things are only possible in their relation to themselves. In relation to the entire world and its causality, everything is truly determined. Accidents are only accidents relative to the seeming unlikelihood of their occurrence. However, relative to all the causal processes of the world, we see that even in the most unusual of circumstances the occurrence of what appears to be an accident in fact had to happen. In short, there are no accidents (according to the popular meaning of accident) for Abner.

Abner of Burgos

4. Determinism

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

This deterministic description of the world (based on rational arguments) resolves the theological problem of the contradiction between the free will of people and the foreknowledge of God. In the opinion of Abner free will does not really exist. For him, God is the first cause; He knows all the laws of the world and therefore knows everything that He has determined.

Abner of Burgos

4. Determinism

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

This deterministic description leads to two theological problems. The first is why God sent commandments to people who cannot truly decide whether to obey them or disobey them. The second question that arises is how people can receive reward or punishment for actions and decisions that they do not really have any control over? Abner answers the second question by explaining that forbidden things are naturally bad. The punishment of the sinner is not a special act of divine providence; rather it is the natural consequence of his bad action. This leads us to the answer to the first question. According to Abner, the goal of the Torah is to influence people to do what is right. The Torah and prophets (and God who sent them) act in the world in conformity to His nature. The only way to influence someone to do something is to give him enough causes to do it. The Torah is only another cause that influences people to do what is good. Abner compares reward and punishment to a father that obligates his son to take medication. The medicine will always work even if the son takes it unhappily. The same is true with regard to all actions of people. When people do what is right, they believe they will receive a reward, while if they do what is wrong, they believe they will receive a punishment—even if they do not essentially have the choice to do anything else.

Abner of Burgos

4. Determinism

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

It is interesting to note that this philosophical book that Abner wrote at the end of his life, more than twenty years after his conversion, is almost without Christian references.[17] In spite of this, the book is full of references to Jewish sources, including the Talmud and quotations of Jewish authorities like Maimonides.[18] We see that Abner, even many years after his conversion, wrote to the Jewish community and was part of the internal Jewish debate about the question of determinism. In fact, Abner is the first medieval Jewish philosopher to argue for a deterministic explanation of the world. His opinion influenced Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (who paraphrased an important part of Ofrenda de Zelos in his major philosophical work The Light of the Lord[19]), and through him, Spinoza. Some Jewish philosophers, like Rabbi Isaac Pulgar, Rabbi Mosses from Narbonne, and Rabbi Josef Ben Shem Tov[20] respond explicitly to the determinist opinion of Abner, such that there is no doubt that his opinion had a major influence on the internal Jewish debate on the question of free will throughout the 14th and 15th centuries.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

As we stated before, the major work of science of Abner (the New Philosophy) is lost. We can still try to reconstruct some of his scientific opinions through some parts of his other works, specifically the existing work Meyasher Aqob, Rabbi Isaac Pulgar’s brief summary of the lost work, and some scientific passages in Mostrador de Justicia.[21]

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

The first interesting opinion of Abner is his view on prime matter. Abner denied a necessary link, which the Aristotelians affirmed, between bodies and accidents (magnitude, weight, quantity, etc.), maintaining that a body untainted by all these accidents can nonetheless have actual existence. He explicated his view in the dogmatic context of the question of the rite of Mass.[22] The rebel’s main philosophical arguments against the Mass are as follows: (1) How can several bodies occupy the same place? (2) How can Jesus’ body be in the bread and wine without changing them? (3) How can the same body be two different materials at the same time? (4) How can one debase Jesus by eating and digesting him? At the start of his answer Abner emphasizes that the Mass is miraculous. Nevertheless, he does go on to offer a scientific explanation of transubstantiation. For Abner, everybody has a layer of pure divine existence, to which are superadded other forms and accidents; but if the body is stripped of all of these accretions it will be reduced to the original divine substance only. In this state the body will have no boundary, quantity, or weight to occupy the universe, and consequently is infinite. This body is the foundation of the entire material world, and normally—with the exception of the sacrament of the Mass and Incarnation—it does not exist without accidents (at least not in the sublunary world). This matter is identified with the flesh of Jesus, which has divine existence only, which means that Jesus’ body is identified with prime matter.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

The above description eliminates for Abner all of the difficulties posed by the rebel. The problem of the co-presence of two bodies in one place is eliminated, because all bodies, once they have been stripped of their form and accidents, incorporate the infinite body of Jesus, which fills the entire universe. After these forms have been removed, the bread and wine are identified with Jesus’ body. The very same principle eliminates the problem of the simultaneous existence of Jesus’ body in several places, since his body fills the entire universe and transcends all definitions of place. Because his body also transcends the definition of quantity, the problem of limited quantity is removed as well.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Another subject about which Abner critiques Aristotelian science is the definition of place and the relation between place and body. In the thought of Aristotle, the definition of place is ‘the limit of the encompassing body’. In his opinion, place has an important role in movement. The definition of a natural movement is the movement of a body to its natural place in the world. Aristotle explains that both the natural place attracts the body and that the body moves on his own to its natural place.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Abner distinguishes between the physical object and extension or dimension. According to Abner, dimension is “a simple and subtle quantity detached from all movable bodies”; in other words, it is space, independent of any physical body. Dimension is measurable per se, and is not linked to what occupies it. Nevertheless, Abner’s definition of place is still associated with body: “place” is the dimension occupied by a body, and it is the body that turns it into “place.” According to Abner, the movement of bodies is not due to their being attracted to some place where they must rest before resuming their movement; rather, they move because of the interaction of several forces, quite independent of any particular place. A body that is thrown upward rises, but if it suddenly begins to fall because of an opposing force, there would not be a moment of rest between the two opposing motions.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Thus Abner dismisses Aristotle’s concept that a body is attracted to its natural place. Different places are not characterized by different qualities (inasmuch as all places are equal and are merely points in space). Hence a body has no cause to move to a particular place and no place is a final cause of its motion.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

We know from Rabbi Isaac Pulgar that Abner also criticized the opinions of Aristotle on the possibility of a void and argues for the existence of voids in his lost scientific book The New Philosophy. Because of the influence of Abner on Rabbi Hasdai Crescas, we can assume that his criticism is closely related to the criticism of Crescas in the beginning of the first speech of Or Hashem

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Abner wrote his criticism of Artistotelian science at the beginning of the 14th century, approximately the same time that Ockham wrote his criticism of this science. In the writing and the thought of Abner we do not see any kind of influence of Ockham or of other late scholastics (the only scholastic philosopher that he cites is Thomas Aquinas and there are no quotations from Christian sources on a scientific subject). It is interesting to note that the systematic criticism of Aristotelian science started approximately at the same time in the Jewish milieu (with the writings of Abner) and in the Christian milieu, with probably no relation one to the other.

Abner of Burgos

5. Critics of the Aristotelian science

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

Abner’s criticism of Aristotelian science had an important influence on Crescas’s thought, and through him to Pico Della Mirandola and general Western philosophy.

Abner of Burgos

6. The influence of Abner

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

One must distinguish between two kinds of influence Abner had. Abner influenced with his polemical works the Jewish-Christian debate until the end of the Middle Ages. Some born-Christians, like Alfonso de Espina, and especially Jewish apostates, like Pablo de Santa Maria, utilized his polemical works. Against this trend, there are more than five Jewish polemicist works that explicitly answer the polemical arguments of Abner.[23] Despite the utilization of Abner in debates, his works had almost no philosophical influence on Christian theology because the Christian participants in the debates utilized the quotations of the Jewish sources by Abner and not his theological arguments as such, which in their content were very different from the official Catholic dogma.

Abner of Burgos

6. The influence of Abner

abner-burgos

First published Mon Jul 9, 2012; substantive revision Fri Aug 28, 2020

The second way in which Abner had lasting influence was on the purely philosophical plane. It should be noted that the direct philosophical influence of Abner was only on the Jewish community. In fact we do not see that any Christian philosophers read the works of Jewish apostates in any other forum apart from the purely polemical one. By contrast, in the Jewish community the works of Abner had an important impact until the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. The deterministic opinion of Abner is with no doubt one of the major causes to the extensive number of works written on this subject in the 14th and 15th centuries by Jewish philosophers. For the most part, these works were against the opinion of Abner. The most impressive philosophical influence of Abner was on Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (died in 1410/1411). Crescas was the main Jewish philosopher during the end of the Middle Ages. Despite their opposite positions in the Jewish-Christian debate (Crescas wrote one of the more philosophical anti-Christian works),[24] Crescas borrowed some of the major original philosophical opinions of Abner, including determinism, the difference between the attributes of the essence and the attributes that are essential, and the criticism of Aristotelian science. With regard to this entire subject, Crescas molded his opinion using Abner combined with other sources. In spite of this important change, we can clearly see signs of the philosophy of Abner in the writing of Crescas, and these signs constitute nearly all the post medieval influence of Abner on Jewish and general Western philosophy.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

There exists a large debate in the secondary literature concerning the place and role of Jews in Renaissance culture. One group envisages a synthesis between Jewish culture on the one hand, and the ideals of the Renaissance on the other.[2] Jews, according to this interpretation, could quite easily remain Jewish while still sharing in the values and culture of non-Jewish society. Another group, however, maintains that such a synthesis is historically untenable because Jews remained a small, persecuted minority left to the whims of various local governments.[3] These two approaches leave us with radically different conceptions of Renaissance Jewish philosophers. According to the first approach, a Jewish intellectual could quite easily partake of the ideals and categories of Renaissance Humanism and Neoplatonism. According to the second approach, however, such a synthesis could never occur, and, as a result, most Renaissance Jewish thinkers were more indebted to the legacy of Maimonides than the various trajectories of Renaissance thought. A more productive approach, however, exists between these two: The Italian Renaissance provided certain elite Jews with new literary genres, intellectual categories, and educational ideals with which to mine the depths of their tradition.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Judah Abrabanel was born in Lisbon, Portugal, sometime between 1460 and 1470. He was the firstborn of Don Isaac Abrabanel (1437–1508), who was an important philosopher in his own right. In addition to their intellectual skills, the Abrabanel family played an important role in international commerce, quickly becoming one of the most prominent families in Lisbon.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Despite the conservative tendencies in the thought of his father, Don Isaac insured that his children received educations that included both Jewish and non-Jewish subjects. Rabbi Joseph ben Abraham ibn Hayoun, the leading rabbinic figure in Lisbon, was responsible for teaching religious subjects (e.g., Bible, commentaries, and halakhic works) to Judah and his brothers. As far as non-Jewish works and subjects were concerned, Judah, like most elite Jews of the fifteenth century, would have been instructed in both the medieval Arabo-Judaic tradition (e.g., Maimonides, Averroes), in addition to humanistic studies imported from Italy.[4]

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

By profession, Judah was a doctor, one who had a very good reputation and who served the royal court. In 1483, his father was implicated in a political conspiracy against Joao II, the Duke of Braganza, and was forced to flee to Seville, in Spain, with his family. Shortly after his arrival, undoubtedly on account of his impressive connections and diplomatic skills, Isaac was summoned to the court of Ferdinand and Isabella, where he was to become a financial advisor to the royal family. Despite his favorable relationship with them, Isaac was unable to influence them to rescind their famous edict of expulsion—calling on all Jews who refused to convert to Christianity—to depart from the Iberian Peninsula.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Judah seems also to have been well connected at the Spanish court and was one of the physicians who attended the royal family. After the edict of expulsion had been issued, Ferdinand and Isabella requested that he remain in Spain. To do this, however, he still would have had to convert to Christianity. Yet, in order to try and keep Judah in Spain, a plot was hatched to kidnap his firstborn son, Isaac ben Judah. Judah, however, discovered the plot and sent his son, along with his Christian nanny, on to Portugal, where he hoped to meet up with them. Upon hearing that a relative of Isaac Abrabanel had re-entered Portugal, Joao II had the young boy seized and forcefully converted to Christianity. It is uncertain whether or not Judah ever saw or heard from his son again. In a moving poem, entitled Telunah ‘al ha-zeman (“The Travails of Time”), he writes:

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Time with his pointed shafts has hit my heart and split my guts, laid open my entrails, landed me a blow that will not heal knocked me down, left me in lasting pain… He did not stop at whirling me around, exiling me while yet my days were green sending me stumbling, drunk, to roam the world… He scattered everyone I care for northward, eastward, or to the west, so that I have no rest from constant thinking, planning— and never a moment’s peace, for all my plans.[5]

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Like many of those Jews who refused to convert, Judah and his immediate family, including his father, made their way to Naples. There, Ferdinand II of Aragon, the king of Naples, warmly welcomed the Abrabanel family, owing to its many contacts in international trade. In 1495, however, the French took control of Naples, and Judah was again forced to flee, first to Genoa, then to Barletta, and subsequently to Venice. It seems that he also traveled around Tuscany, and there is some debate as to whether or not he actually met the famous Florentine Humanist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (it seems unlikely that he did). In 1501, after the defeat of the French in Naples, he was invited back to be the personal physician of the Viceroy of Naples, Fernandez de Córdoba. Among all of these peregrinations, Judah found the time to write (but not publish) his magnum opus, the Dialoghi d’amore. He seems to have died sometime after 1521. Other than these basic facts, we know very little of the life of Judah Abrabanel.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.1 Life

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Especially enigmatic are the last years of his life, between 1521 when he was requested to give medical attention to Cardinal San Giorgio until 1535 when Mariano Lenzi published the Dialoghi posthumously in Rome. There is some evidence that Judah moved to Rome near the end of his life; some suggest that he fell in with a Christian group of Neoplatonists. Indeed, the 1541 edition of the work mentions that Judah converted to Christianity (dipoi fatto christiano). This, however, seems highly unlikely as (1) it is not mentioned in the first edition, the one on which all subsequent editions and translations were based, and (2) there is no internal evidence in the Dialoghi to suggest this. In fact, one of the characters in the work implies the exact opposite, stating that “all of us believe in the sacred Mosaic law” (noi tutti che crediamo la sacre legge mosaica).[6] It seems, then, that either a careless or over-zealous editor inserted the phrase “dipoi fatto christiano” into a later edition of the Dialoghi.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.2 Works

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

The only major work that we possess of Judah Abrabanel is the Dialoghi d’amore. There is some debate as to when the work was actually written. Many point to the year 1501–1502 owing to a phrase in the third book: “According to the Jewish tradition, we are in the year 5262 from the beginning of creation” (Siamo, secondo la veritá ebraica, a cinque milia ducento sessanta due del principio de la creazione).[7] The year 5262 of the Jewish calendar corresponds to 1501–1502 of the Gregorian calendar. Yet, manuscripts other than that based on the 1535 edition have the date of 5272 (i.e., 1511–1512). This is significant because many who argue that the Dialoghi could not possibly have been written in Italian point to the fact that Judah would not have been fluent in Italian. Yet, if we assume the 1511–1512 date to be correct this would place him in Italy for close to twenty years, more than enough time to gain proficiency in Italian (especially given the fact that he would have already known at least one Spanish vernacular and, as a physician, Latin).

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.2 Works

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

We also know that Judah wrote poetry (see the poem quoted above). In addition to his biographical poem, he also composed poetic introductions to three of his father’s last works: Rosh Amanah, Zevach Pesach, and Nachalat Avot.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.2 Works

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Finally, we possess a letter dating to 1566 from one Amatus Lusitanus, a physician who wrote that he attended to a patient by the name of Judah “who was the grandson of the great Platonic philosopher, known as Judah or Leon Abrabanel, who gave to us the most beautiful dialogues on love.” Further in this letter, he mentions that Judah also composed a work entitled De Coeli Harmonia (“On the Harmony of the Spheres”) and that, according to the introduction, he dedicated it to the “divine Pico della Mirandola.” Unfortunately, this work has not survived. If he dedicated to Pico as the letter indicates, it would most likely have been composed before the Dialoghi and also, based on the title, it would have been composed in Latin.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.3 Dialoghi d’amore and the Question of Language

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

The central question concerning the language of the Dialoghi’s composition is: How could a Jewish refugee from Portugal show such facility with Italian, let alone the Tuscan dialect, since Judah seems to have spent very little time in Tuscany?[8] Those who argue for a Latin original point to the fact that (1) he was a physician and would have known Latin, and (2) a phrase by Yosef Shlomo Delmedigo (1591–1655) in his Mikhtav Ahuz suggesting that he was going to translate Judah’s work from Latin. Those who argue for a Hebrew original point to another phrase, this time by Claudio Tolemei (1492–1556), a non-Jew, which states that Judah composed his treatise in sua lingua (“his own language”). Although, as others have pointed out, such a phrase could quite easily refer to “his own style.”

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.3 Dialoghi d’amore and the Question of Language

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

However, given the evidence, an Italian original for the work seems most likely since (1) all the manuscripts, including Mariano Lenzi’s edition of 1535, are in Italian; (2) it seems that Judah had lived in Italy for close to twenty years by the time that he wrote the Dialoghi (more than enough time for someone to gain an intimate knowledge of Italian, especially someone proficient in Latin and Spanish vernaculars); (3) neither later Jewish authors, e.g., Azaria de’Rossi,[9] nor non-Jewish authors, e.g., Tullia d’Aragona,[10] had any reason to suspect that it was written in a language other than Italian; (4) if we assume the later date of 1511–1512, many non-Tuscan Italian authors of this period called for the adoption of Tuscan as a literary language, owing primarily to the fact that this was the language of Petrarch (1304–1374) and Boccaccio (1313–1375);[11] and, (5) as for the question of the Tuscan dialect of the work, many Italian printers of the early sixteenth century “Tuscanized” Italian according to set criteria.[12]

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.3 Dialoghi d’amore and the Question of Language

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Moreover, many Jewish authors in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries increasingly resorted to Romance vernaculars in order to attract a Jewish audience (including conversos and ex-conversos), which no longer understood Hebrew. In sixteenth-century Italy, larger trends in rhetoric and the use of language increasingly led to the creation of the ideal of a pure Italian language. In this regard, Judah becomes an important transitional thinker in the encounter between Judaism and the Italian Renaissance. Whereas his father, Don Isaac, could still adapt humanistic themes to his Hebrew writings, which were still primarily in conversation with medieval thought,[13] increasingly in Judah’s generation the only way to engage in a full-scale examination of the universal tendencies associated with Humanism was to write in the vernacular.

Judah Abrabanel

1. Life and Works

1.3 Dialoghi d’amore and the Question of Language

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Finally, the very genre of the Dialoghi, that of the trattato d’amore (“treatise on love”), was the product of the Italian vernacular of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. When, for example, Judah discusses the concept of love as a universal or cosmic principle he draws upon, as will be clearer below, a particular vocabulary and set of concepts that only make sense when contextualized within this already existing discourse.[14]

Judah Abrabanel

2. Faith, Reason, and Myth

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Two features that are new in Judah’s work and, thus, serve to differentiate his thought from that of his Jewish and Islamic predecessors are: (1) his almost complete lack of concern with the venerable antagonism between faith and reason, and (2) his interest in elucidating the concomitant intersection between Greek myth and Judaism.

Judah Abrabanel

2. Faith, Reason, and Myth

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

The tension between faith and reason had been at the heart of medieval Jewish philosophy. This became especially pronounced in post-Maimonidean philosophy, which witnessed the radicalization of a number of principles (e.g., eternality of the universe, denial of bodily resurrection), and which threatened to undermine traditional religious belief. This led to a Kulturkampf between those who thought that non-Jewish learning (i.e., philosophy) had a valid role to play in the Jewish curriculum versus those who claimed that such “foreign” works led to apostasy. The reverberations of these conflicts, known collectively as the “Maimonidean controversies,” were severe.

Judah Abrabanel

2. Faith, Reason, and Myth

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

The antagonism between faith and reason is immediately palpable in the thought of Judah’s father, who constantly tried to uphold traditional Jewish belief against what he considered to be the onslaught of philosophical radicalism. Yet, in the thought of Judah this “conflict” between the hitherto venerable antagonists virtually disappears. The question we have to ask, then, is why? The most likely reason is to be located in the notion of sophia perennis, which played an important role in the thought of Florentine humanists. According to this doctrine, there exists a unity to all knowledge irrespective of its source. As a result, the rationalism of philosophy could quite easily be reconciled with that of revelation because both were regarded as articulating the same truth. Evidence of this may be seen in Judah’s frequent citation of biblical passages to support philosophical principles and vice versa. Furthermore, because Judah is primarily unconcerned with the antagonism between faith and reason, he becomes one of the first Jewish philosophers to ignore esotericism (viz., that philosophical truths must be kept from the unenlightened) as a philosophical principle. For him, traditional esoteric topics, such as metaphysics, now become part and parcel of the beautiful and dramatic unfolding of God’s beauty in the universe, and such topics are open to all (including women, as the character of Sophia demonstrates).

Judah Abrabanel

2. Faith, Reason, and Myth

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Further evidence of Judah’s use of the concept of sophia perennis may be witnessed in his orientation towards ancient Greek myth. The “rediscovery” of ancient Greek and Roman literature was one of the hallmarks of the Renaissance, and in the thought of Judah we certainly see this, only now with a distinctly Jewish “twist.” On one level, he wants to show that there exists a fundamental identity between Greek myth and the teachings of the Torah. Yet, on a deeper level he wants to argue that the Greeks ultimately derived their teachings from the ancient Israelites and subsequently corrupted them.[15] For instance, Judah argues that Plato studied among the ancient Israelites in Egypt,[16] and that Plato’s myth of the Androgyne, found in the Symposium, is actually a Greek plagiarism of a Jewish source:

Judah Abrabanel

2. Faith, Reason, and Myth

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Sophia: The story is beautiful and ornate (la favola è bella e ornata), and it is impossible not to believe that it signifies some philosophical beauty (bella filosofia), more especially since it was composed by Plato himself, in the Symposium, in the name of Aristophanes. Tell me, therefore, Philo what is the allegory? Philo: The myth was handed down by earlier writers than the Greeks—in the sacred writings of Moses, concerning the creation of the first human parents, Adam and Eve…it was from [Moses] that Plato took his myth, amplifying and polishing it after Greek oratory, thus giving a confused account of Hebrew matters (facendo in questo una mescolanza inordinate de le cose ebraiche).[17]

Judah Abrabanel

2. Faith, Reason, and Myth

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Judah seeks to accomplish at least two things with passages such as this. First, he claims, polemically, that the Jewish tradition, especially its mythopoeic tradition, is the source of all subsequent literary and philosophical streams of western civilization. Secondly (and this is less evident in the above passage than in other ones), he tries to wrest Christian-centric interpretations of biblical passages (e.g., the Garden of Eden and the concept of original sin), including those offered by thinkers such as Ficino and Pico della Mirandola,[18] away from what he considers to be the original intentionality of the text. Rather, he claims that the Jewish version or interpretation of such texts is actually more in keeping with the spirit of the Renaissance than those offered by Christians. The corollary of this is that any individual, Jewish or Gentile, should quite easily be able to accept equally the truths of Judaism and those of philosophy.[19]

Judah Abrabanel

3. Beauty and Love

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

In the thought of Judah Abrabanel, the concepts of beauty (bellezza) and love (amore) become technical terms through which he examines virtually every traditional philosophical issue. Frequently, however, his discussion of one of these terms is predicated on the existence of the other; as a result, beauty and love are inseparable in the Dialoghi, undoubtedly mirroring Judah’s understanding of the way in which these two principles operate in the universe. The intimate relationship between these two principles may be witnessed in his definition of beauty as that “which delights the mind that recognizes it and moves it to love” (dilettando l’animo col suo conoscimento, il muove ad amare).[20] Without Beauty, in other words, the intellect is unable to desire something outside of itself and, thus, it is effectively unable to cognize. Judah subsequently argues that the lower senses (i.e., taste, smell or touch) cannot grasp Beauty; only the higher senses (e.g., sight and hearing) can—in addition, of course, to the imagination and the intellect.[21] Moreover, since Beauty is mirrored throughout the universe, physical objects (notes, melodies, etc.) both participate in and point the way towards this incorporeal Beauty:

Judah Abrabanel

3. Beauty and Love

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Beauty is only found in the objects of sight (oggetti del viso), such as beautiful forms and shapes and beautiful pictures, the perfect symmetry of the parts with the whole, well-proportioned limbs, beautiful colors and clear light, the sun, the moon and the stars, and the heavens in all their splendor. This grace exists in objects of sight by reason of their spiritual nature, and it is the custom to enter through the clear and spiritual eyes, to delight our soul and move it to a love of such an object; and this is what it is that we call beauty. It is also found in objects of hearing, such as beautiful oratory, voices, speech, song music, consonance, proportion and harmony. For in the spiritual nature of these things is found grace which moves the soul to delight and to love through the medium of the spiritual sense of hearing. Thus grace and beauty are found among beautiful things that are endowed with a spiritual nature (sensi spirituali).[22]

Judah Abrabanel

3. Beauty and Love

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Based on this and other passages, Judah argues that it is primarily by means of the beauty of created things that the individual is able to apprehend and move towards incorporeal or spiritual Beauty. Love is what is ultimately responsible for directing the soul and the intellect of the individual to increasingly spiritual matters.

Judah Abrabanel

4. Philosophy of Beauty

4.1 The Elevation of Rhetoric, Aesthetics, and the Imagination

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

We witness the further departure of Judah’s thought from that of his predecessors when we examine his discussion of rhetoric and aesthetics. Medieval Aristotelians tended to locate rhetoric in the trivium (which also included logic and dialectic), and, thus, as propaedeutic to “higher” sciences such as metaphysics. In the Renaissance, however, eloquence was equated with wisdom, and the good rhetorician had to be proficient in all branches of human knowledge. This led many Jewish Renaissance thinkers to examine not only the classical authors (e.g., Cicero and Quintilian), but also to mine the Bible for its use of language and style. Whereas Maimonides and other Jewish Aristotelians had been interested in biblical rhetoric as a means to reproduce imaginative representations of philosophical truths to those unlearned in philosophy, Renaissance thinkers held that rhetoric was the art form par excellence, one that enabled the individual to command respect in public life.[23]

Judah Abrabanel

4. Philosophy of Beauty

4.1 The Elevation of Rhetoric, Aesthetics, and the Imagination

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Furthermore, following Maimonides (e.g., Guide I.2), many medieval thinkers envisaged beauty as contingent upon consensus and not a matter of the intellectual faculty. In the Renaissance, by contrast, beauty was elevated to an ideal that, inter alia, moved the intellect, by means of desire, to either perfect that which exists below it or to be perfected by that above. This principle was subsequently shared by philosophers, poets, and visual artists, and, quite frequently, there existed a fluid line separating these professions.

Judah Abrabanel

4. Philosophy of Beauty

4.2 Cosmology and Metaphysics

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Although there exists an intimate connection between sensual and cosmic beauty it is by means of the latter that Judah frames his discussion of cosmology, ontology, and psychology. Beauty, to reiterate, is what inspires love and desire, and thereby connects all levels of the universe into an interlocking and organic relationship. The result is that everything, both sensual and intelligible, has the potential to image and reflect God’s beauty.

Judah Abrabanel

4. Philosophy of Beauty

4.2 Cosmology and Metaphysics

abrabanel

First published Fri Dec 2, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jun 8, 2022

Judah’s cosmology is a case in point. In the Dialoghi he presents two distinct accounts of the origin of the universe. This issue—viz., was the universe created or is it eternal—was one of the touchstones in the debate not only between philosophers and non-philosophers, but also among philosophers. At stake in these debates was God’s omnipotence and omniscience: If the world was created, then clearly God is transcendent to the world as both its Creator and Sustainer; if not, then God’s power to act is potentially curtailed by another principle’s eternality. In his discussion of these matters, Judah adopts two models: one based on Islamicate Neoplatonism and the other on the Plotinian triad.