Datasets:

empiricist

/

philosophy_chat

like 2

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Theorem (Young 1975). Suppose that \(V\) is a voting method that requires voters to rank the candidates. Then, \(V\) satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality, Reinforcement and Continuity if and only if the method is a scoring rule.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

See Merlin 2003 and Chebotarev and Smais 1998 for surveys of other characterizations of scoring rules. Additional axioms single out Borda Count among all scoring methods (Young 1974; Gardenfors 1973; Nitzan and Rubinstein 1981). In fact, Saari has argued that “any fault or paradox admitted by Borda’s method also must be admitted by all other positional voting methods” (Saari 1989, pg. 454). For example, it is often remarked that Borda Count (and all scoring rules) can be easily manipulated by the voters. Saari (1995, Section 5.3.1) shows that among all scores rules Borda Count is the least susceptible to manipulation (in the sense that it has the fewest profiles where a small percentage of voters can manipulate the outcome).

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

I have glossed over an important detail of Young’s characterization of scoring rules. Note that the reinforcement property refers to the behavior of a voting method on different populations of voters. To make this precise, the formal definition of a voting method must allow for domains that include profiles (i.e., sequences of ballots) of different lengths. To do this, it is convenient to assume that the domain of a voting method is an anonymized profile: Given a set of ballots \(\mathcal{B}\), an anonymous profile is a function \(\pi:\mathcal{B}\rightarrow\mathbb{N}\). Let \(\Pi\) be the set of all anonymous profiles. A variable domain voting method assigns a non-empty set of voters to each anonymous profile—i.e., it is a function \(V:\Pi\rightarrow \wp(X)-\emptyset\)). Of course, this builds in the property of Anonymity into the definition of a voting method. For this reason, Young (1975) does not need to state Anonymity as a characterizing property of scoring rules.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Young’s axioms identify scoring rules out of the set of all functions defined from ballots that are rankings of candidates. In order to characterize the voting methods from Section 2.2, we need to change the set of ballots. For example, in order to characterize Approval Voting, the set of ballots \(\mathcal{B}\) is the set of non-empty subsets of the set of candidates—i.e., \(\mathcal{B}=\wp(X)-\emptyset\) (selecting the ballot \(X\) consisting of all candidates means that the voter abstains). Two additional axioms are needed to characterize Approval Voting:

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

We then have:

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Theorem (Fishburn 1978b; Alos-Ferrer 2006 ). A variable domain voting method where the ballots are non-empty sets of candidates is Approval Voting if and only if it satisfies Faithfulness, Cancellation, and Reinforcement.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Note that Approval Voting satisfies Neutrality even though it is not listed as one of the characterizing properties in the above theorem. This is because Alos-Ferrer (2006) showed that Neutrality is a consequence of Faithfulness, Cancellation and Reinforcement. See Fishburn 1978a and Baigent and Xu 1991 for alternative characterizations of Approval Voting, and Xu 2010 for a survey of the characterizations of Approval Voting (cf. the characterization of Approval Voting from Goodin and List 2006).

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Myerson (1995) introduced a general framework for characterizing abstract scoring rules that include Borda Count and Approval Voting as examples. The key idea is to think of a ballot, called a signal or a vote, as a function from candidates to a set \(\mathcal{V}\), where \(\mathcal{V}\) is a set of numbers. That is, the set of ballots is a subset of \(\mathcal{V}^X\) (the set of functions from \(X\) to \(\mathcal{V}\)). Then, an anonymous profile of signals assigns a score to each candidate \(X\) by summing the numbers assigned to \(X\) by each voter. This allows us to define voting methods by specifying the set of ballots:

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.2 Characterization Results

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Myerson (1995) showed that an abstract voting rule is an abstract scoring rule if and only if it satisfies Reinforcement, Universal Domain (i.e. it is defined for all anonymous profiles), a version of the Neutrality property (adapted to the more abstract setting), and the Continuity property, which is called Overwhelming Majority. Pivato (2013) generalizes this result, and Gaertner and Xu (2012) provide a related characterization result (using different properties). Pivato (2014) characterizes Formal Utilitarian and Range Voting within the class of abstract scoring rules, and Mace (2018) extends this approach to cover a wider class of grading voting methods (including Majority Judgement).

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

The voting methods discussed above have been judged on procedural grounds. This “proceduralist approach to collective decision making” is defined by Coleman and Ferejohn (1986, p. 7) as one that “identifies a set of ideals with which any collective decision-making procedure ought to comply. … [A] process of collective decision making would be more or less justifiable depending on the extent to which it satisfies them.” The authors add that a distinguishing feature of proceduralism is that “what justifies a [collective] decision-making procedure is strictly a necessary property of the procedure — one entailed by the definition of the procedure alone.” Indeed, the characterization theorems discussed in the previous section can be viewed as an implementation of this idea (cf. Riker 1982). The general view is to analyze voting methods in terms of “fairness criteria” that ensure that a given method is sensitive to all of the voters’ opinions in the right way.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

However, one may not be interested only in whether a collective decision was arrived at “in the right way,” but in whether or not the collective decision is correct. This epistemic approach to voting is nicely explained by Joshua Cohen (1986, p. 34):

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

An epistemic interpretation of voting has three main elements: (1) an independent standard of correct decisions — that is, an account of justice or of the common good that is independent of current consensus and the outcome of votes; (2) a cognitive account of voting — that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs about what the correct policies are according to the independent standard, not personal preferences for policies; and (3) an account of decision making as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs of others.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Under this interpretation of voting, a given method is judged on how well it “tracks the truth” of some objective fact (the truth of which is independent of the method being used). A comprehensive comparison of these two approaches to voting touches on a number of issues surrounding the justification of democracy (cf. Christiano 2008); however, I will not focus on these broader issues here. Instead, I briefly discuss an analysis of Majority Rule that takes this epistemic approach.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

The most well-known analysis comes from the writings of Condorcet (1785). The following theorem, which is attributed to Condorcet and was first proved formally by Laplace, shows that if there are only two options, then majority rule is, in fact, the best procedure from an epistemic point of view. This is interesting because it also shows that a proceduralist analysis and an epistemic analysis both single out Majority Rule as the “best” voting method when there are only two candidates.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Assume that there are \(n\) voters that have to decide between two alternatives. Exactly one of these alternatives is (objectively) “correct” or “better.” The typical example here is a jury deciding whether or not a defendant is guilty. The two assumptions of the Condorcet jury theorem are:

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

See Dietrich 2008 for a critical discussion of these two assumptions. The classic theorem is:

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Condorcet Jury Theorem. Suppose that Independence and Voter Competence are both satisfied. Then, as the group size increases, the probability that the majority chooses the correct option increases and converges to certainty.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

See Nitzan 2010 (part III) and Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013 for modern expositions of this theorem, and Goodin and Spiekermann 2018 for implications for the theory of democracy.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.3 Voting to Track the Truth

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Condorcet envisioned that the above argument could be adapted to voting situations with more than two alternatives. Young (1975, 1988, 1995) was the first to fully work out this idea (cf. List and Goodin 2001 who generalize the Condorcet Jury Theorem to more than two alternatives in a different framework). He showed (among other things) that the Borda Count can be viewed as the maximum likelihood estimator for identifying the best candidate. Conitzer and Sandholm (2005), Conitzer et al. (2009), Xia et al. (2010), and Xia (2016) take these ideas further by classifying different voting methods according to whether or not the methods can be viewed as a maximum likelihood estimator (for a noise model). The most general results along these lines can be found in Pivato 2013 which contains a series of results showing when voting methods can be interpreted as different kinds of statistical ‘estimators’.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.4 Computational Social Choice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

One of the most active and exciting areas of research that is focused, in part, on the study of voting methods and voting paradoxes is computational social choice. This is an interdisciplinary research area that uses ideas and techniques from theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence to provide new perspectives and to ask new questions about methods for making group decisions; and to use voting methods in computational domains, such as recommendation systems, information retrieval, and crowdsourcing. It is beyond the scope of this article to survey this entire research area. Readers are encouraged to consult the Handbook of Computational Social Choice (Brandt et al. 2016) for an overview of this field (cf. also Endriss 2017). In the remainder of this section, I briefly highlight some work from this research area related to issues discussed in this article.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.4 Computational Social Choice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

Section 4.1 discussed election scenarios in which voters choose their ballots strategically and briefly introduced the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. This theorem shows that every voting method satisfying natural properties has profiles in which there is some voter, called a manipulator, that can achieve a better outcome by selecting a ballot that misrepresents her preferences. Importantly, in order to successfully manipulate an election, the manipulator must not only know which voting method is being used but also how the other members of society are voting. Although there is some debate about whether manipulation in this sense is in fact a problem (Dowding and van Hees 2008; Conitzer and Walsh, 2016, Section 6.2), there is interest in mechanisms that incentivize voters to report their “truthful” preferences. In a seminal paper, Bartholdi et al. (1989) argue that the complexity of computing which ballot will lead to a preferred outcome for the manipulator may provide a barrier to voting insincerely. See Faliszewski and Procaccia 2010, Faliszewski et al. 2010, Walsh 2011, Brandt et al. 2013, and Conitzer and Walsh 2016 for surveys of the literature on this and related questions, such as the the complexity of determining the winner given a voting method and the complexity of determining which voter or voters should be bribed to change their vote to achieve a given outcome.

Voting Methods

4. Topics in Voting Theory

4.4 Computational Social Choice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

One of the most interesting lines of research in computational social choice is to use techniques and ideas from AI and theoretical computer science to design new voting methods. The main idea is to think of voting methods as solutions to an optimization problem. Consider the space of all rankings of the alternatives \(X\). Given a profile of rankings, the voting problem is to find an “optimal” group ranking (cf. the discussion or distance-based rationalizations of voting methods from Elkind et al. 2015). What counts as an “optimal” group ranking depends on assumptions about the type of the decision that the group is making. One assumption is that the voters have real-valued utilities for each candidate, but are only able to report rankings of the alternatives (it is assumed that the rankings represent the utility functions). The voting problem is to identify the candidates that maximizes the (expected) social welfare (the average of the voters’ utilities), given the partial information about the voters’ utilities—i.e., the profile of rankings of the candidates. See Pivato 2015 for a discussion of this approach to voting and Boutilier et al. 2015 for algorithms that solve different versions of this problem. A second assumption is that there is an objectively correct ranking of the alternatives and the voters’ rankings are noisy estimates of this ground truth. This way of thinking about the voting problem was introduced by Condorcet and discussed in Section 4.3. Procaccia et al. (2016) import ideas from the theory of error-correcting codes to develop an interesting new approach to aggregate rankings viewed as noisy estimates of some ground truth.

Voting Methods

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 From Theory to Practice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

As with any mathematical analysis of social phenomena, questions abound about the “real-life” implications of the theoretical analysis of the voting methods given above. The main question is whether the voting paradoxes are simply features of the formal framework used to represent an election scenario or formalizations of real-life phenomena. This raises a number of subtle issues about the scope of mathematical modeling in the social sciences, many of which fall outside the scope of this article. I conclude with a brief discussion of two questions that shed some light on how one should interpret the above analysis.

Voting Methods

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 From Theory to Practice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

How likely is a Condorcet Paradox or any of the other voting paradoxes? There are two ways to approach this question. The first is to calculate the probability that a majority cycle will occur in an election scenario. There is a sizable literature devoted to analytically deriving the probability of a majority cycle occurring in election scenarios of varying sizes (see Gehrlein 2006, and Regenwetter et al. 2006, for overviews of this literature). The calculations depend on assumptions about the distribution of rankings among the voters. One distribution that is typically used is the so-called impartial culture, where each ranking is possible and occurs with equal probability. For example, if there are three candidates, and it is assumed that the voters’ ballots are rankings of the candidates, then each possible ranking can occur with probability 1/6. Under this assumption, the probability of a majority cycle occurring has been calculated (see Gehrlein 2006, for details). Riker (1982, p. 122) has a table of the relevant calculations. Two observations about this data: First, as the number of candidates and voters increases, the probability of a majority cycles increases to certainty. Second, for a fixed number of candidates, the probability of a majority cycle still increases, though not necessarily to certainty (the number of voters is the independent variable here). For example, if there are five candidates and seven voters, then the probability of a majority cycle is 21.5 percent. This probability increases to 25.1 percent as the number of voters increases to infinity (keeping the number of candidates fixed) and to 100 percent as the number of candidates increases to infinity (keeping the number of voters fixed). Prima facie, this result suggests that we should expect to see instances of the Condorcet and related paradoxes in large elections. Of course, this interpretation takes it for granted that the impartial culture is a realistic assumption. Many authors have noted that the impartial culture is a significant idealization that almost certainly does not occur in real-life elections. Tsetlin et al. (2003) go even further arguing that the impartial culture is a worst-case scenario in the sense that any deviation results in lower probabilities of a majority cycle (see Regenwetter et al. 2006, for a complete discussion of this issue, and List and Goodin 2001, Appendix 3, for a related result).

Voting Methods

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 From Theory to Practice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

A second way to argue that the above theoretical observations are robust is to find supporting empirical evidence. For instance, is there evidence that majority cycles have occurred in actual elections? While Riker (1982) offers a number of intriguing examples, the most comprehensive analysis of the empirical evidence for majority cycles is provided by Mackie (2003, especially Chapters 14 and 15). The conclusion is that, in striking contrast to the probabilistic analysis referenced above, majority cycles typically have not occurred in actual elections. However, this literature has not reached a consensus about this issue (cf. Riker 1982): The problem is that the available data typically does not include voters’ opinions about all pairwise comparison of candidates, which is needed to determine if there is a majority cycle. So, this information must be inferred (for example, by using statistical methods) from the given data.

Voting Methods

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 From Theory to Practice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

A related line of research focuses on the influence of factors, such as polls (Reijngoud and Endriss 2012), social networks (Santoro and Beck 2017, Stirling 2016) and deliberation among the voters (List 2018), on the profiles of ballots that are actually realized in an election. For instance, List et al. 2013 has evidence suggesting that deliberation reduces the probability of a Condorcet cycle occurring.

Voting Methods

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 From Theory to Practice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

How do the different voting methods compare in actual elections? In this article, I have analyzed voting methods under highly idealized assumptions. But, in the end, we are interested in a very practical question: Which method should a group adopt? Of course, any answer to this question will depend on many factors that go beyond the abstract analysis given above (cf. Edelman 2012a). An interesting line of research focuses on incorporating empirical evidence into the general theory of voting. Evidence can come in the form of a computer simulation, a detailed analysis of a particular voting method in real-life elections (for example, see Brams 2008, Chapter 1, which analyzes Approval voting in practice), or as in situ experiments in which voters are asked to fill in additional ballots during an actual election (Laslier 2010, 2011).

Voting Methods

5. Concluding Remarks

5.1 From Theory to Practice

voting-methods

First published Wed Aug 3, 2011; substantive revision Mon Jun 24, 2019

The most striking results can be found in the work of Michael Regenwetter and his colleagues. They have analyzed datasets from a variety of elections, showing that many of the usual voting methods that are considered irreconcilable (e.g., Plurality Rule, Borda Count and the Condorcet consistent methods from Section 3.1.1) are, in fact, in perfect agreement. This suggests that the “theoretical literature may promote overly pessimistic views about the likelihood of consensus among consensus methods” (Regenwetter et al. 2009, p. 840). See Regenwetter et al. 2006 for an introduction to the methods used in these analyses and Regenwetter et al. 2009 for the current state-of-the-art.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

1. Wyclif's Later Works

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Government and the relation of divine justice to human law, both secular and ecclesiastical, figure as occasional themes throughout the treatises of the Summa de Ente. After receiving his doctorate in theology in 1373, his attention began to focus more completely on these topics, and his realism continued to undergird his thought at least through 1381, during which period he wrote the treatises that make up the second of his great Summae, the Summa Theologie. In late 1373, he began De Dominio Divino, which serves as bridge from the later, formal theological treatises of the Summa de Ente to the political, social, and ecclesiological subject matter of the Summa Theologie. He began royal service during this period, participating in an embassy to Bruges for negotiations with papal envoys in 1374. Wyclif remained in the service of John of Gaunt for the rest of his life; the Duke protected him from the formal prosecution prompted by five bulls of papal condemnation in 1377. After being condemned for his views on the Eucharist at Oxford in 1381, Wyclif withdrew to Lutterworth, where he remained until his death in December 1384. Though still protected by John of Gaunt, he was no longer in active service after 1379. During these tumultuous years, Wyclif wrote the ten treatises of the Summa Theologie: four on just human government, two on the structure and government of the church, one on scriptural hermeneutics, and three on specific problems afflicting the Church. Our interest lies in De Mandatis Divinis (1375–76), De Statu Innocencie (1376), and De Civili Dominio (1375–76), where he provides the theological foundation for the radical transformation of the church he prescribes in De Ecclesia (1378–79) De Potestate Pape (1379), and De Officio Regis (1379). Towards the end of his life, Wyclif summarized his entire theological vision in Trialogus (1382–83), reiterating the connections between his earlier philosophical works and later political treatises in a three-way dialogue written in language that would appeal to members of the royal court.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Dominium and its generally accepted translation, 'lordship', suggest the sovereignty exercised by one individual over another, but Roman law allowed for complexity in distinguishing between property ownership, its primary referent, and jurisdiction, governance, and political power. When twelfth-century canon lawyers resurrected Roman law as the foundation for the ascendant papal monarchy, it was common to distinguish between jurisdictive authority, secular power, and the use and possession of private property.[1] By the beginning of the fourteenth century, dominium largely connoted property ownership, though this usually entailed jurisdictive authority. Most political theorists agreed with Thomas Aquinas in saying that a civil lord who supposed that his jurisdictive authority arose from property ownership rather than from a constitution would be a tyrant (Summa Theologiae IaIIae, Q.56, a.5; Q.58, a.2). Given that the legal use of dominium referred to property ownership and not to the authority to govern, it seems odd that Wyclif used the term to do so much more. The reason may be found in the connection of Augustinian theology to theories of the justice of property ownership. As the papal monarchy developed, its theorists, such as Giles of Rome, found it useful to identify all earthly justice, including just property ownership, with the source of justice in creation.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.1 Augustine

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Augustine's De Civitate Dei was the basis for relating property ownership and secular justice to divine authority. Here the division between two classes of men is clear: some are members of the City of Man, motivated by love of self, while others are motivated by the love of God and a contempt for self, placing them in the City of God.[2] There is really only one true Lord in creation. Mastery of one man over another is the result of Original Sin and is therefore unnatural except in the case of paternity, which is founded on parental love for a child. Among members of the City of God, the relation of prince and subject is not political and does not entail the sort of mastery we see in the City of Man, but rather involves service and sacrifice, as exemplified by the parent/child relationship.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.1 Augustine

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Property ownership has been united to mastery in the City of Man because of Original Sin, whereby man turned away from God in the mistaken belief that he could make claims of exclusive ownership on created beings. This is not to say that Augustine thought that all private property relations are wrong; indeed, he is famous for having argued that all things belong to the just (De Civitate Dei 14, ch. 28). But people who own things are not de facto just. Those for whom ownership is not an end in itself but a means by which to do God's will are freed from the bondage of selfishness imposed by the Fall. They easily recognize the truth of the dictum that one should abstain from the possession of private things, or if one cannot do so, then at least from the love of property (Enarratio in Psalmam 132, ch.4).

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.1 Augustine

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Augustine's thought on the relation of ownership to political authority is open to interpretation. One can easily read him as arguing that the Church, as the Body of Christ and earthly instantiation of the City of God, can best exemplify loving lord/subject relations through its ecclesiastical structure, thereby justifying a top-down papal monarchy. Likewise, one can read him as having so separated secular political authority from the rule of love as to make political and ecclesiastical jurisdictive authority utterly distinct. Again, one could interpret Augustine's 'all things belong to the just' as meaning that the Church is the arbiter of all property ownership in virtue of being the Body of Christ and seat of all created justice, or one could argue that the Church should abandon all claims to property ownership, just as the Apostles abstained from the possession of private property. This ambiguity in interpretation was the source of some of the competing theories that influenced Wyclif's position.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.2 Giles of Rome

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

During the conflict between Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII in 1301, Giles of Rome wrote De Ecclesiastica Potestate, establishing the absolute secular superiority of the papacy. Giles' master Boniface VIII was responsible for the two famous Bulls, Clericos laicos (1296), which forbade clergy to give up property without papal approval, and Unam sanctam (1302), which declared that secular power is in the service of, and subject to, papal authority. De Ecclesiastica Potestate is an articulation of the concept of power underlying these two Bulls and arising from one of the two interpretations of Augustine described above. In it, Giles describes all power “spiritual and secular” as rooted in the papacy, likening its structure to a papal river from which smaller, secular streams branch out. The source of this river, he continues, is the sea, which is God: “God is a kind of font and a kind of sea of force and power, from which sea all forces and all powers are derived like streams.”[3] Not only is secular power reliant on papal authority; all property ownership, insofar as it is just, is similarly dependent on an ecclesiastical foundation. The key element in just secular power and property ownership, he continues, is grace: without God's will directly moving in creation through the sacraments of the Church, power and ownership are empty claims, devoid of justice. Although Giles did not explicitly call the combination of ownership and temporal power dominium, his uniting the two in a consistent, Augustinian fashion was sufficient for the next generation of Augustinian theorists.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.3 The Franciscans and Their Opponents

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Thirty years earlier, in Bonaventure's Apologia pauperum of 1269, the Franciscans had defined any property ownership, communal or individual, as inimical to the ideals of their Order. The Fall from paradise and the introduction of selfishness to human nature makes property ownership of any type, private or communal, an abberation. For the Franciscans, “all things belong to the just” only in the sense that “belonging” entails non-exclusive sharing (usus pauper), not ownership. Within three decades, the Franciscans were divided on this issue: one party, the Spirituals, demanded that the friars adopt usus pauper as their ideal of spiritual perfection, while the other, the Conventuals, argued for a more lenient interpretation of the Rule. The Spirituals, under the guidance of the philosopher John Peter Olivi and his follower Ubertino de Casale, outnumbered the Conventuals by century's end, and had become sufficiently vocal to attract the attention of the pope.[4] John XXII was deeply suspicious of the Spiritual Franciscans' arguments, perhaps fearing a reappearance of the communitarian Waldensian heresy. Private ownership, John argued, was not the result of Original Sin, but a gift from God that Adam enjoyed in Paradise and which the blessed still can enjoy, secure in the knowledge that their ownership is sanctioned by God's dominium. This argument was to have notable consequences. John's eventual controversy with the Spiritual's champion, William Ockham, led to the first important use of the concept of natural right. But for our analysis, the important thing is that iurisdictio and proprietas were united in the concept of dominium. Wyclif would make use of the Franciscans' arguments for apostolic poverty, as well as of John XXII's idea that divine dominium provides the basis for all human dominium, though in a way that would certainly have displeased both parties.[5]

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.3 The Franciscans and Their Opponents

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

By the 1350s, opponents of the Franciscans had broadened their range of criticism to question the legitimacy of the Order itself. Richard Fitzralph, (d. 1360) wrote De Pauperie Salvatoris, a sustained examination of the Franciscans' claim to function without supervision by diocesan bishop in which he argues that if the friars rely on the justice of the owners of what they use, they are bound by the same laws that bind the owners. Thus, if the owners of what the friars use are ecclesiastical, it follows that the friars must obey ecclesiastical authority.[6] Fitzralph's position is important here because it argues that grace alone is the justification for any instance of dominium in creation, and that all just dominium ultimately relies on God's dominium. Both serve as cornerstones of Wyclif's position. God's dominium is a natural consequence of the act of creating, and with it comes divine governance and conservation of created being. The rational beings in creation, angels and human beings, enjoy the loan of elements of God's created universe, but this is not a divine abdication of ultimate authority since everything is still directly subject to divine dominium.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

2. Dominium in Political Thought Before Wyclif

2.3 The Franciscans and Their Opponents

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

When the nature of the dominium lent to Adam changed with the Fall, the love defining our natural dominium was affected, but not eradicated. Men devised political dominium to regulate property relations, and although sin keeps them from recognizing the borrowed nature of any dominium, it does not preclude there being grace-justified property ownership. In some cases, God infuses the artificial property-relations that we call dominium with sufficient grace to make them generally equivalent to prelapsarian dominium. These grace-favored cases of human dominium do not replicate the authority of God's dominium, but can exhibit the love that characterizes it. Fitzralph's expression of the Augustinian papal position makes grace the deciding factor in ownership relations and ultimately in political authority, both of which had become nested in the term dominium. Wyclif's interpretation of the Augustinian position would stretch past arguments about papal authority and the friars, even past arguments between popes and kings, to stir the very nature of the church as Christ's earthly body. All of this begins, he would argue, with an understanding of God's dominium as the causal exemplar of created lordship.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

The relation of universal to particular defines Wyclif's conception of how God's dominium causes all instances of dominium in creation. Divine dominium is “the standard prior to and presupposition of all other dominium; if a creature has dominium over anything, God already has dominium over it, so any created dominium follows upon divine dominium” (De Dominio Divino I, ch. 3, p.16.18–22). This relation exceeds mere exemplarity, where human dominium only imitates God's dominium without divine causal determination. God's dominium has causal efficacy over all instances of human mastery such that no true created dominium is possible without direct participation in and constant reliance upon God's dominium. The instrument through which divine dominium moves is grace, which instills in human rulers an essential love defining their every ruling action. Thus, every case of just human dominium entails a constant reliance upon grace as the hallmark of its being an instantiation of God's universal dominium.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

God's dominium has six aspects, three identifiable with lordship's ruling element (creation, sustenance, and governance), and three that define lordship's proprietary nature (giving, receiving, and lending) (De Dominio Divino III, ch. 1, p.198.9).7 The necessary precondition for an act of dominium is creation, of which no created being is capable. This makes God's dominium the only true instance of dominium and the source of all created instances of dominium. Because the Divine Ideas and their created correlates, the universals, are ontologically prior to particular created beings, God's dominium over universals is prior to His dominium over particulars. This means that God creates, sustains, and governs the human species prior to ruling over — and knowing — individual people. This led to questions about determinism that served as a starting point for many refutations of Wyclif's theology.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

The second set of acts that define dominium — giving, receiving, and lending — provides the foundation for Wyclif's argument that all created dominium necessarily requires grace. God's giving of the divine essence in creating is the truest form of giving because God is giving of Himself through Himself, which no created being can do. Nor can any created being receive as God receives; God truly receives only from Himself through His giving. God gives up nothing in His giving, and acquires nothing in His receiving; creation is God's self-expression, an act in which the divine essence is neither decreased nor increased. The crucial act from the created standpoint is God's lending, for here there is real interaction between Lord and subjects. What human beings as conscious participants in God's lending relation can claim as their own is lent to them by divine authority, which they enjoy through grace.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

It is easy to confuse giving with lending because a lord who has only been “lent” a gift of God for use during his lifetime appears to have been “given” that gift. God's giving is communicative, not translative. For us, most giving is translative in that it involves the giver's surrender of every connection to the gift, making it natural for us to suppose that God renounces His authority over what He gives us. In fact, God's giving is communicative, which does not involve surrender of the gift. Because all that God gives to creation will ultimately return to Him, it makes more sense to speak of God's giving as lending.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

With any instance of lending, Wyclif explains, the lender seeks assurance that the borrower truly deserves what is to be lent. Human desert of the dominium they are lent is a matter of some complexity involving examination of the theological concept of grace. When a temporal lord lends his subject according to the subject's worthiness, the subject's merit is commensurable with the lord's, and the mutual agreement defining the loan can be made according to the respective merit of each party. The merit that allows the subject desert of consideration for the loan is “condigna”, i.e., grounded in the dignitas shared by lender and subject. Condign merit implies that the meritorious truly deserve the reward, requiring the giver to give it to the merited as something due, as when an olympic athelete earns a gold medal by besting all her opponents. Such a loan is impossible between Creator and creature, because there is no way of placing a creature's merit on the same scale as God's perfect nature; all the creature has, including its worth, is from God, whereas God's perfection is per se. There is no way in which a creature can be considered to deserve anything from God in such a relation. Congruent merit obtains when the meritorious does not have the power to require anything of the giver. In instances of congruent merit, the goodness of the act does not require the giver to reward the agent, though it does provide sufficient cause for the reward to be given, as when one receives an Academy Award: although many of the audience members may deserve an Oscar, the winner receives it because something about her performance is somehow pleasing to the Academy. Still, Wyclif holds that “It is the invariable law of God that nobody is awarded blessedness unless they first deserve it” (De Dominio Divino III, ch. 4, p.229.18). We can move our wills to the good, and from this, Wyclif says, grace may — but need not — follow. Thus, we merit congruently thanks to God's generosity towards a will in accord with His own. In effect, God lends merit.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Wyclif's theology of grace is the key to understanding how his theory of human dominium relates to divine dominium, its causal paradigm. Man's lordship is at once ownership and jurisdictive mastery, but when a human lord governs, or gives, or receives, or lends, these acts are only just insofar as the lord recognizes that his authority is that of a steward: “Any rational creature is only improperly called a lord, and is rather a minister or steward of the supreme Lord, and whatever he has to distribute, he has purely by grace” ([De Dominio Divino III, ch. 6, p.250.25–29). The essential characteristic of every instance of human dominium is the grace God lends to the individual lord, which itself is grounded in the grace of the Holy Spirit. The human lord appears to have proprietary and juristictive authority by virtue of his own excellence, but this is really only an instantiation of divine dominium, a grace-realized agent of God's lordship. This makes the human lord both master and servant; from the divine perspective, the lord is God's servant, but from the viewpoint of the subject, he is master. Wyclif is tireless in his emphasis on the illusory nature of this mastery; grace allows the human lord to recognize that he is, in fact, the servant of his subjects, ministering to them as a nurturing steward, not lording over them as would a powerful sovereign.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

3.1 Natural Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

De Civili Dominio begins with the motto, “Civil justice presupposes divine justice; civil dominium presupposes natural dominium.” Man's dominium is threefold — natural, civil, and evangelical — but comprehensible as an instantiation of the justice of God's dominium. As he moved into his general analysis of human dominium, Wyclif's thoughts turned to the most fundamental instance of God's loving governance, the Scriptural commandments. The foundation of all that is right (ius) in creation, he explains, is divine justice (iustitia), so we cannot begin to understand right and wrong in creation without understanding God's uncreated right. This was a significant departure from the Aristotelian position that unaided human reason is capable of justice, and Wyclif explicitly rejects any conception of justice that does not rely on uncreated right.[8] The laws of Scripture are the purest expression of uncreated right available to human eyes, he explains, and are most clearly expressed in the Ten Commandments of Exodus 20, and again in the two greatest commandments of Matthew 22: 37–40. Wyclif's analysis of Christ's law of love and of the Ten Commandments proceeds directly from his disquisition on the relation of earthly justice to eternal right in De Mandatis Divinis. That Wyclif uses the same title Robert Grosseteste had used in his analysis of the decalogue is no accident; Wyclif's debt to Grosseteste's conceptions of sin, love of God, idolatry, and the substance of true faith is obvious throughout the treatise. In De Statu Innocencie, the innocence into which we were created before the Fall, he says, is the optimal condition for any rational being. In our prelapsarian state, our wills would have been in perfect concord with the divine will, so that all human action would be just, effortlessly aligned with the natural order of creation. In this condition, there would be no need for civil or criminal law, since we understood what is right naturally.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

3. Divine Dominium: Creating, Lending, and Grace

3.1 Natural Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

This denial of the need for human law is of special import, for Wyclif later argues that the evangelical lord, or priest, as heir of Christ's restoration of the possibility of natural dominium, should never be concerned with such matters. In such a state, private property ownership was unknown. The natural dominium described in Genesis 1:26 is characterized by lack of selfishness, ownership, or any distinction between 'mine' and 'thine'. The true sense of Augustine's “All things belong to the just” is most fully apparent in the prelapsarian natural disposition to share in the use of creation while acting as faithful steward to its perfect lord. The Fall was brought about by the first sin, which Wyclif characterizes as a privation of God's right in man's soul. We are left with wills prone to value the physical, material world above spiritual concerns, and the unavoidable result is private property ownership. We no longer understand a given created good as a gift on loan from God, but can only see it in terms of our own self-interest, and the unfortunate result is civil dominium, an enslavement to material goods.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Wyclif's definition of civil dominium as “proprietary lordship in a viator over the goods of fortune fully according to human law” is centered not on legislative authority, but on the private property ownership enjoyed by the viator, or wayfarer, along life's path (De Civili Dominio III ch. 11, p.178.9–17).[9] This is because all civil dominium is based on the use of goods owned, which is the basis for all postlapsarian conceptions of justice (recall that for Wyclif, only God truly owns created things because creating a thing is necessary for owning it; hence, human beings are only lent created things and can use them justly, or unjustly in case they appropriate them for themselves). Before the Fall, our use of created goods was communal, unencumbered by the complexity that follows upon selfishness. But now, Wyclif explains, there are three types of use: that directly consequent upon civil ownership, civil use without ownership, and evangelical use. The first two are natural results of the Fall, and the third is the result of Christ's Incarnation. Before the Incarnation, civil ownership and civil use were grounded in man-made laws designed primarily to regulate property ownership. These legal systems tended to have two general structures: they were either monarchies, as in most cases, or else they were aristocratic polities. The harmony of the aristocratic polity is certainly preferable because it most resembles the state enjoyed before the Fall; the benevolent aristocracy, as evidenced in the time of the Biblical judges, would foster the contemplative life, communalism, and an absence of corruptible governmental apparatus.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

The most common species of civil dominium is monarchy, in which a chief executive power holds ultimate legislative authority. This centralized authority in one man is necessary to implement order; there is no real possibility that the many are capable of ruling on behalf of the many, given the prevalence of sin. The point of civil dominium is not, as with Aristotle, the sustenance of individual virtuous activity. Civil dominium is a phenomenon based on Original Sin, and is therefore unlikely to produce justice per se. If the government of Caesar is occasionally just, it is because it has accidentally realized divine justice. But if civil dominium that is not grounded directly in divine dominium is incapable of sustained just governance, and if natural dominium is the instantiation of divine dominium for which man was created, how can any talk of just civil dominium be possible? To return to the opening dictum of De Civili Dominio, if natural dominium is free from private property ownership, how can civil dominium rely upon it in any way?

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Before resolving this problem, we will need to address evangelical dominium as yet another factor in Wyclif's conception of man's postlapsarian state.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

4.1 Evangelical Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Christ restores the possibility of gaining our lost natural dominium both through His apostolic poverty and His redemptive sacrifice as described in Holy Scripture. Because of Christ's sinless nature, He was the first man since Adam capable of exhibiting the purity of natural dominium. This Christ shared with His disciples, who were able to renounce all exclusive claims to created goods in a recreation of the communal caritas lost in the Fall (De Civili Dominio III, 4, p. 51.17–24). This poverty is not simply the state of not owning things; one can live sinfully as easily in squalor as one can in luxury. The apostolic poverty of the early Church is a spiritual state, not an economic rejection of civil dominium. The similarity between Wyclif's conception of spiritual poverty as the ideal state for Christians and the Franciscan ideal is noteworthy. Wyclif seems to make a case similar to the Spiritual Franciscans: Christ's life was exemplary for all Christians and Christ lived in apostolic poverty; therefore, all Christians ought follow His example, or at the least have that option open to them. Wyclif's consonance with the Franciscan tradition is also suggested in his use of Bonaventure's definition of apostolic poverty in the third book of De Civili Dominio, but Wyclif's motives are distinctly different from the Friars' (De Civili Dominio III, 8, pp. 119–120). While the Franciscans argued that their rule allowed them to regain the ownership-free purity enjoyed by the early Apostolic church, Wyclif contended that Christ's redemptive sacrifice enabled all Christians to regain natural dominium itself, not just its purity. This suggested that the Franciscan life was a pale imitation of true Christianity, which Wyclif's Franciscan colleagues were quick to point out. One of the first critics of Wyclif's dominium thought was William Woodford, O.F.M., who argued that Wyclif had gone too far in equating apostolic, spiritual poverty with prelapsarian purity. The extensive third book of De Civili Dominio is Wyclif's response to Franciscan critics like Woodford, and in which lie the seeds of the antifraternalism that would characterize his later writings.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

4.1 Evangelical Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Wyclif describes apostolic poverty as a mode of having with love, comprehensible in terms of the individual's use of a thing for the greatest spiritual benefit. God alone can bring about the love instantiating divine dominium, making grace necessary for apostolic poverty. Because the church is founded not on the materially-based laws of man, but on the spiritually-grounded lex Christi, it must be absolutely free of property ownership, the better to realize the spiritual purity required by apostolic poverty. Any material riches that the church comes upon as “goods of fortune” must be distributed as alms for the poor, following the practice of Christ and the disciples, and the apostolic church. This is the ideal to which the Church must aspire through the example of Christ, and some of the harshest invective in Wyclif's prose is directed against the Church's refusal to return to this apostolic state. The turning point in Church history was the Donation of Constantine, on the basis of which the Church claimed to have the civil dominium of a Caesar. Wyclif was vigorous in his condemnation of the Donation, and would likely have been pleased had he lived into the early fifteenth century, when Nicholas of Cusa argued persuasively that the document was a ninth-century forgery.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

4.2 Civil Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

Given the deleterious influence civil dominium has had on the evangelical dominium of Christ's law, it is difficult to imagine how Wyclif would set aside some civil lords as capable of instantiating divine justice. But apostolic poverty is not identical with an absence of property ownership; it is having with love. While the clergy as spiritual lords ought to follow Christ's example of material poverty, it does not follow that all ownership precludes love. God can certainly bestow grace on those whom He wills to be stewards of created goods. Wyclif envisions the just civil lord or king as the means by which the Church is relieved of its accumulated burden of property ownership. So long as the Church exists in postlapsarian society, it must be protected from thieves, heresy, and infidels. Certainly no evangelical lord ought to be concerned with such matters, given their higher responsibility for the welfare of Christian souls. As a result, the Church needs a guardian to ward off enemies while caring for its own weel-being and administering alms to the poor. This allows Wyclif to describe just, grace-favored civil dominium as different in kind from the civil lordship predicated on materialistic human concerns: “It is right for God to have two vicars in His church, namely a king in temporal affairs, and a priest in spiritual. The king should strongly check rebellion, as did God in the Old Testament, while priests ought minister the precepts mildly, as did Christ, who was at once priest and king.” When he raises conventional topics in political thought, like the particulars of just rule, the responsibilities of royal councillors to their king, the nature of just war, and royal jurisdiction in commerce, his advice is priestly: “[A] lord ought not treat his subjects in a way other than he would rationally wish to be treated in similar circumstances; the Christian lord should not desire subjects for love of dominating, but for the correction and spiritual improvement of his subjects, and so to the efficacy of the church” (De Officio Regis ch. 1, p. 13.4–8). The king ought provide few and just laws wisely and accurately administered, and live subject to these laws, since just law is more necessary for the community than the king. Also, the king should strive to protect the lower classes' claims on temporal goods in the interests of social order, for “nothing is more destructive in a kingdom in its political life than immoderately to deprive the lower classes of the goods of fortune” (De Officio Regis ch. 5, p. 96.9–27).[10] On occasion he discusses the king's need of reliable councillors, generally when discussing the king's need for sacerdotal advice in directing church reform, but he never mentions Parliament as a significant aspect of civil rule.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

4.2 Civil Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

The most immediate concern of a civil lord living in an age when the Church is being poisoned by avarice should be the radical divestment of all ecclesiastical ownership. Wyclif is tireless in arguing for the king's right to take all land and goods, and indeed, even the buildings themselves, away from the Church. Should the clergy protest against royal divestment, threatening the king with excommunication or interdict, the king should proceed as a physician applies his lancet to an infected boil. No grace-favored civil lord will be disposed to save up the divested goods of the Church for his own enrichment, despite the obvious temptation. He will distribute the Church's ill-gotten lands and goods to the people. This, Wyclif explains, will be his continued responsibility even after the Church has been purged, for he is the Church's custodian as well as its protector.

John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy

4. Types of Human Dominium

4.2 Civil Dominium

wyclif-political

First published Sat Jun 10, 2006; substantive revision Tue Apr 23, 2013

The hereditary succession by which civil lordship passes from father to son is a problem for Wyclif. People cannot inherit the grace needed to ensure just ownership and jurisdiction. Primogeniture imperils grace-founded civil lordship, making lords prone to rule on behalf of their own familial interests rather than in the interests of their subjects. The only means by which Wyclif can envision hereditary succession operating is through spiritual filiation, in which a civil lord instructs a worthy successor. He suggests adoption as the basis for the spiritual primogeniture by which lordship is passed on, which would be preferable to general election, for Wyclif is clear about the impossibility of widespread recognition of grace in a potential civil lord: “It does not follow, if all the people want Peter to be their civil lord, that therefore it is just” (De Civili Dominio I, 18, p. 130.6). Central to his ecclesiology is the impossibility of determining the presence of grace in another's soul, which militates against identifying members of the elect with certainty, and therefore against excommunicating any of them from the Church, as well as ruling out popular election as a means of instituting just civil dominium. Grants in perpetuity, commonly employed by civil lords to guarantee the ongoing obligation of subjects in return for a gift of land or political authority, are as impossible as hereditary inheritance. A lord might reward someone with a grant while acting as God's steward, but he certainly cannot thereby make his subject's progeny deserve the gift.