Datasets:

empiricist

/

philosophy_chat

like 2

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Mill has made as naïve and artless a use of the naturalistic fallacy as anybody could desire. “Good”, he tells us, means “desirable”, and you can only find out what is desirable by seeking to find out what is actually desired…. The fact is that “desirable” does not mean “able to be desired” as “visible” means “able to be seen.” The desirable means simply what ought to be desired or deserves to be desired; just as the detestable means not what can be but what ought to be detested… (Moore, PE, 66–7)

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

It should be noted, however, that Mill was offering this as an alternative to Bentham's view which had been itself criticized as a ‘swine morality,’ locating the good in pleasure in a kind of indiscriminate way. The distinctions he makes strike many as intuitively plausible ones. Bentham, however, can accommodate many of the same intuitions within his system. This is because he notes that there are a variety of parameters along which we quantitatively measure pleasure — intensity and duration are just two of those. His complete list is the following: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent. Thus, what Mill calls the intellectual pleasures will score more highly than the sensual ones along several parameters, and this could give us reason to prefer those pleasures — but it is a quantitative not a qualitative reason, on Bentham's view. When a student decides to study for an exam rather than go to a party, for example, she is making the best decision even though she is sacrificing short term pleasure. That's because studying for the exam, Bentham could argue, scores higher in terms of the long term pleasures doing well in school lead to, as well as the fecundity of the pleasure in leading to yet other pleasures. However, Bentham will have to concede that the very happy oyster that lives a very long time could, in principle, have a better life than a normal human.

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Mill's version of utilitarianism differed from Bentham's also in that he placed weight on the effectiveness of internal sanctions — emotions like guilt and remorse which serve to regulate our actions. This is an off-shoot of the different view of human nature adopted by Mill. We are the sorts of beings that have social feelings, feelings for others, not just ourselves. We care about them, and when we perceive harms to them this causes painful experiences in us. When one perceives oneself to be the agent of that harm, the negative emotions are centered on the self. One feels guilt for what one has done, not for what one sees another doing. Like external forms of punishment, internal sanctions are instrumentally very important to appropriate action. Mill also held that natural features of human psychology, such as conscience and a sense of justice, underwrite motivation. The sense of justice, for example, results from very natural impulses. Part of this sense involves a desire to punish those who have harmed others, and this desire in turn “…is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural…; the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling of sympathy.” (Chapter 5, Utilitarianism) Of course, he goes on, the justification must be a separate issue. The feeling is there naturally, but it is our ‘enlarged’ sense, our capacity to include the welfare of others into our considerations, and make intelligent decisions, that gives it the right normative force.

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Like Bentham, Mill sought to use utilitarianism to inform law and social policy. The aim of increasing happiness underlies his arguments for women's suffrage and free speech. We can be said to have certain rights, then — but those rights are underwritten by utility. If one can show that a purported right or duty is harmful, then one has shown that it is not genuine. One of Mills most famous arguments to this effect can be found in his writing on women's suffrage when he discusses the ideal marriage of partners, noting that the ideal exists between individuals of “cultivated faculties” who influence each other equally. Improving the social status of women was important because they were capable of these cultivated faculties, and denying them access to education and other opportunities for development is forgoing a significant source of happiness. Further, the men who would deny women the opportunity for education, self-improvement, and political expression do so out of base motives, and the resulting pleasures are not ones that are of the best sort.

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Bentham and Mill both attacked social traditions that were justified by appeals to natural order. The correct appeal is to utility itself. Traditions often turned out to be “relics” of “barbarous” times, and appeals to nature as a form of justification were just ways to try rationalize continued deference to those relics.

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

In the latter part of the 20th century some writers criticized utilitarianism for its failure to accommodate virtue evaluation. However, though virtue is not the central normative concept in Mill's theory, it is an extremely important one. In Chapter 4 of Utilitarianism Mill noted

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

… does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse. It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but also that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue … they not only place virtue at the very head of things which are good as a means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner …

The History of Utilitarianism

2. The Classical Approach

2.2 John Stuart Mill

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

In Utilitarianism Mill argues that virtue not only has instrumental value, but is constitutive of the good life. A person without virtue is morally lacking, is not as able to promote the good. However, this view of virtue is someone complicated by rather cryptic remarks Mill makes about virtue in his A System of Logic in the section in which he discusses the “Art of Life.” There he seems to associate virtue with aesthetics, and morality is reserved for the sphere of ‘right’ or ‘duty‘. Wendy Donner notes that separating virtue from right allows Mill to solve another problem for the theory: the demandingness problem (Donner 2011). This is the problem that holds that if we ought to maximize utility, if that is the right thing to do, then doing right requires enormous sacrifices (under actual conditions), and that requiring such sacrifices is too demanding. With duties, on Mill's view, it is important that we get compliance, and that justifies coercion. In the case of virtue, however, virtuous actions are those which it is “…for the general interest that they remain free.”

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Henry Sidgwick's (1838–1900) The Methods of Ethics (1874) is one of the most well known works in utilitarian moral philosophy, and deservedly so. It offers a defense of utilitarianism, though some writers (Schneewind 1977) have argued that it should not primarily be read as a defense of utilitarianism. In The Methods Sidgwick is concerned with developing an account of “…the different methods of Ethics that I find implicit in our common moral reasoning…” These methods are egoism, intuition based morality, and utilitarianism. On Sidgwick's view, utilitarianism is the more basic theory. A simple reliance on intuition, for example, cannot resolve fundamental conflicts between values, or rules, such as Truth and Justice that may conflict. In Sidgwick's words “…we require some higher principle to decide the issue…” That will be utilitarianism. Further, the rules which seem to be a fundamental part of common sense morality are often vague and underdescribed, and applying them will actually require appeal to something theoretically more basic — again, utilitarianism. Yet further, absolute interpretations of rules seem highly counter-intuitive, and yet we need some justification for any exceptions — provided, again, by utilitarianism. Sidgwick provides a compelling case for the theoretical primacy of utilitarianism.

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Sidgwick was also a British philosopher, and his views developed out of and in response to those of Bentham and Mill. His Methods offer an engagement with the theory as it had been presented before him, and was an exploration of it and the main alternatives as well as a defense.

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Sidgwick was also concerned with clarifying fundamental features of the theory, and in this respect his account has been enormously influential to later writers, not only to utilitarians and consequentialists, generally, but to intuitionists as well. Sidgwick's thorough and penetrating discussion of the theory raised many of the concerns that have been developed by recent moral philosophers.

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

One extremely controversial feature of Sidgwick's views relates to his rejection of a publicity requirement for moral theory. He writes:

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Thus, the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be this; that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively secret; and similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric. Or, if this concealment be difficult to maintain, it may be desirable that Common Sense should repudiate the doctrines which it is expedient to confine to an enlightened few. And thus a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands. (490)

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

This accepts that utilitarianism may be self-effacing; that is, that it may be best if people do not believe it, even though it is true. Further, it rendered the theory subject to Bernard Williams' (1995) criticism that the theory really simply reflected the colonial elitism of Sidgwick's time, that it was ‘Government House Utilitarianism.’ The elitism in his remarks may reflect a broader attitude, one in which the educated are considered better policy makers than the uneducated.

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

One issue raised in the above remarks is relevant to practical deliberation in general. To what extent should proponents of a given theory, or a given rule, or a given policy — or even proponents of a given one-off action — consider what they think people will actually do, as opposed to what they think those same people ought to do (under full and reasonable reflection, for example)? This is an example of something that comes up in the Actualism/possibilism debate in accounts of practical deliberation. Extrapolating from the example used above, we have people who advocate telling the truth, or what they believe to be the truth, even if the effects are bad because the truth is somehow misused by others. On the other hand are those who recommend not telling the truth when it is predicted that the truth will be misused by others to achieve bad results. Of course it is the case that the truth ought not be misused, that its misuse can be avoided and is not inevitable, but the misuse is entirely predictable. Sidgwick seems to recommending that we follow the course that we predict will have the best outcome, given as part of our calculations the data that others may fail in some way — either due to having bad desires, or simply not being able to reason effectively. The worry Williams points to really isn't a worry specifically with utilitarianism (Driver 2011). Sidgwick would point out that if it is bad to hide the truth, because ‘Government House’ types, for example, typically engage in self-deceptive rationalizations of their policies (which seems entirely plausible), then one shouldn't do it. And of course, that heavily influences our intuitions.

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Sidgwick raised issues that run much deeper to our basic understanding of utilitarianism. For example, the way earlier utilitarians characterized the principle of utility left open serious indeterminacies. The major one rests on the distinction between total and average utility. He raised the issue in the context of population growth and increasing utility levels by increasing numbers of people (or sentient beings):

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Assuming, then, that the average happiness of human beings is a positive quantity, it seems clear that, supposing the average happiness enjoyed remains undiminished, Utilitarianism directs us to make the number enjoying it as great as possible. But if we foresee as possible that an increase in numbers will be accompanied by a decrease in average happiness or vice versa, a point arises which has not only never been formally noticed, but which seems to have been substantially overlooked by many Utilitarians. For if we take Utilitarianism to prescribe, as the ultimate end of action, happiness on the whole, and not any individual's happiness, unless considered as an element of the whole, it would follow that, if the additional population enjoy on the whole positive happiness, we ought to weigh the amount of happiness gained by the extra number against the amount lost by the remainder. (415)

The History of Utilitarianism

3. Henry Sidgwick

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

For Sidgwick, the conclusion on this issue is not to simply strive to greater average utility, but to increase population to the point where we maximize the product of the number of persons who are currently alive and the amount of average happiness. So it seems to be a hybrid, total-average view. This discussion also raised the issue of policy with respect to population growth, and both would be pursued in more detail by later writers, most notably Derek Parfit (1986).

The History of Utilitarianism

4. Ideal Utilitarianism

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

G. E. Moore strongly disagreed with the hedonistic value theory adopted by the Classical Utilitarians. Moore agreed that we ought to promote the good, but believed that the good included far more than what could be reduced to pleasure. He was a pluralist, rather than a monist, regarding intrinsic value. For example, he believed that ‘beauty’ was an intrinsic good. A beautiful object had value independent of any pleasure it might generate in a viewer. Thus, Moore differed from Sidgwick who regarded the good as consisting in some consciousness. Some objective states in the world are intrinsically good, and on Moore's view, beauty is just such a state. He used one of his more notorious thought experiments to make this point: he asked the reader to compare two worlds, one was entirely beautiful, full of things which complemented each other; the other was a hideous, ugly world, filled with “everything that is most disgusting to us.” Further, there are not human beings, one imagines, around to appreciate or be disgusted by the worlds. The question then is, which of these worlds is better, which one's existence would be better than the other's? Of course, Moore believed it was clear that the beautiful world was better, even though no one was around to appreciate its beauty. This emphasis on beauty was one facet of Moore's work that made him a darling of the Bloomsbury Group. If beauty was a part of the good independent of its effects on the psychological states of others — independent of, really, how it affected others, then one needn't sacrifice morality on the altar of beauty anymore. Following beauty is not a mere indulgence, but may even be a moral obligation. Though Moore himself certainly never applied his view to such cases, it does provide the resources for dealing with what the contemporary literature has dubbed ‘admirable immorality’ cases, at least some of them. Gauguin may have abandoned his wife and children, but it was to a beautiful end.

The History of Utilitarianism

4. Ideal Utilitarianism

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Moore's targets in arguing against hedonism were the earlier utilitarians who argued that the good was some state of consciousness such as pleasure. He actually waffled on this issue a bit, but always disagreed with Hedonism in that even when he held that beauty all by itself was not an intrinsic good, he also held that for the appreciation of beauty to be a good the beauty must actually be there, in the world, and not be the result of illusion.

The History of Utilitarianism

4. Ideal Utilitarianism

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Moore further criticized the view that pleasure itself was an intrinsic good, since it failed a kind of isolation test that he proposed for intrinsic value. If one compared an empty universe with a universe of sadists, the empty universe would strike one as better. This is true even though there is a good deal of pleasure, and no pain, in the universe of sadists. This would seem to indicate that what is necessary for the good is at least the absence of bad intentionality. The pleasures of sadists, in virtue of their desires to harm others, get discounted — they are not good, even though they are pleasures. Note this radical departure from Bentham who held that even malicious pleasure was intrinsically good, and that if nothing instrumentally bad attached to the pleasure, it was wholly good as well.

The History of Utilitarianism

4. Ideal Utilitarianism

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

One of Moore's important contributions was to put forward an ‘organic unity’ or ‘organic whole’ view of value. The principle of organic unity is vague, and there is some disagreement about what Moore actually meant in presenting it. Moore states that ‘organic’ is used “…to denote the fact that a whole has an intrinsic value different in amount from the sum of the values of its parts.” (PE, 36) And, for Moore, that is all it is supposed to denote. So, for example, one cannot determine the value of a body by adding up the value of its parts. Some parts of the body may have value only in relation to the whole. An arm or a leg, for example, may have no value at all separated from the body, but have a great deal of value attached to the body, and increase the value of the body, even. In the section of Principia Ethica on the Ideal, the principle of organic unity comes into play in noting that when persons experience pleasure through perception of something beautiful (which involves a positive emotion in the face of a recognition of an appropriate object — an emotive and cognitive set of elements), the experience of the beauty is better when the object of the experience, the beautiful object, actually exists. The idea was that experiencing beauty has a small positive value, and existence of beauty has a small positive value, but combining them has a great deal of value, more than the simple addition of the two small values (PE, 189 ff.). Moore noted: “A true belief in the reality of an object greatly increases the value of many valuable wholes…” (199).

The History of Utilitarianism

4. Ideal Utilitarianism

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

This principle in Moore — particularly as applied to the significance of actual existence and value, or knowledge and value, provided utilitarians with tools to meet some significant challenges. For example, deluded happiness would be severely lacking on Moore's view, especially in comparison to happiness based on knowledge.

The History of Utilitarianism

5. Conclusion

utilitarianism-history

First published Fri Mar 27, 2009; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014

Since the early 20th Century utilitarianism has undergone a variety of refinements. After the middle of the 20th Century it has become more common to identify as a ‘Consequentialist’ since very few philosophers agree entirely with the view proposed by the Classical Utilitarians, particularly with respect to the hedonistic value theory. But the influence of the Classical Utilitarians has been profound — not only within moral philosophy, but within political philosophy and social policy. The question Bentham asked, “What use is it?,” is a cornerstone of policy formation. It is a completely secular, forward-looking question. The articulation and systematic development of this approach to policy formation is owed to the Classical Utilitarians.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

1. What Has Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

The question “What is intrinsic value?” is more fundamental than the question “What has intrinsic value?,” but historically these have been treated in reverse order. For a long time, philosophers appear to have thought that the notion of intrinsic value is itself sufficiently clear to allow them to go straight to the question of what should be said to have intrinsic value. Not even a potted history of what has been said on this matter can be attempted here, since the record is so rich. Rather, a few representative illustrations must suffice.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

1. What Has Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

In his dialogue Protagoras, Plato [428–347 B.C.E.] maintains (through the character of Socrates, modeled after the real Socrates [470–399 B.C.E.], who was Plato’s teacher) that, when people condemn pleasure, they do so, not because they take pleasure to be bad as such, but because of the bad consequences they find pleasure often to have. For example, at one point Socrates says that the only reason why the pleasures of food and drink and sex seem to be evil is that they result in pain and deprive us of future pleasures (Plato, Protagoras, 353e). He concludes that pleasure is in fact good as such and pain bad, regardless of what their consequences may on occasion be. In the Timaeus, Plato seems quite pessimistic about these consequences, for he has Timaeus declare pleasure to be “the greatest incitement to evil” and pain to be something that “deters from good” (Plato, Timaeus, 69d). Plato does not think of pleasure as the “highest” good, however. In the Republic, Socrates states that there can be no “communion” between “extravagant” pleasure and virtue (Plato, Republic, 402e) and in the Philebus, where Philebus argues that pleasure is the highest good, Socrates argues against this, claiming that pleasure is better when accompanied by intelligence (Plato, Philebus, 60e).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

1. What Has Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Many philosophers have followed Plato’s lead in declaring pleasure intrinsically good and pain intrinsically bad. Aristotle [384–322 B.C.E.], for example, himself a student of Plato’s, says at one point that all are agreed that pain is bad and to be avoided, either because it is bad “without qualification” or because it is in some way an “impediment” to us; he adds that pleasure, being the “contrary” of that which is to be avoided, is therefore necessarily a good (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1153b). Over the course of the more than two thousand years since this was written, this view has been frequently endorsed. Like Plato, Aristotle does not take pleasure and pain to be the only things that are intrinsically good and bad, although some have maintained that this is indeed the case. This more restrictive view, often called hedonism, has had proponents since the time of Epicurus [341–271 B.C.E.].[1] Perhaps the most thorough renditions of it are to be found in the works of Jeremy Bentham [1748–1832] and Henry Sidgwick [1838–1900] (see Bentham 1789, Sidgwick 1907); perhaps its most famous proponent is John Stuart Mill [1806–1873] (see Mill 1863).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

1. What Has Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Most philosophers who have written on the question of what has intrinsic value have not been hedonists; like Plato and Aristotle, they have thought that something besides pleasure and pain has intrinsic value. One of the most comprehensive lists of intrinsic goods that anyone has suggested is that given by William Frankena (Frankena 1973, pp. 87–88): life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and proportion in one’s own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honor, esteem, etc. (Presumably a corresponding list of intrinsic evils could be provided.) Almost any philosopher who has ever addressed the question of what has intrinsic value will find his or her answer represented in some way by one or more items on Frankena’s list. (Frankena himself notes that he does not explicitly include in his list the communion with and love and knowledge of God that certain philosophers believe to be the highest good, since he takes them to fall under the headings of “knowledge” and “love.”) One conspicuous omission from the list, however, is the increasingly popular view that certain environmental entities or qualities have intrinsic value (although Frankena may again assert that these are implicitly represented by one or more items already on the list). Some find intrinsic value, for example, in certain “natural” environments (wildernesses untouched by human hand); some find it in certain animal species; and so on.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

1. What Has Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Suppose that you were confronted with some proposed list of intrinsic goods. It would be natural to ask how you might assess the accuracy of the list. How can you tell whether something has intrinsic value or not? On one level, this is an epistemological question about which this article will not be concerned. (See the entry in this encyclopedia on moral epistemology.) On another level, however, this is a conceptual question, for we cannot be sure that something has intrinsic value unless we understand what it is for something to have intrinsic value.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

The concept of intrinsic value has been characterized above in terms of the value that something has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” The custom has been not to distinguish between the meanings of these terms, but we will see that there is reason to think that there may in fact be more than one concept at issue here. For the moment, though, let us ignore this complication and focus on what it means to say that something is valuable for its own sake as opposed to being valuable for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way. Perhaps it is easiest to grasp this distinction by way of illustration.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Suppose that someone were to ask you whether it is good to help others in time of need. Unless you suspected some sort of trick, you would answer, “Yes, of course.” If this person were to go on to ask you why acting in this way is good, you might say that it is good to help others in time of need simply because it is good that their needs be satisfied. If you were then asked why it is good that people’s needs be satisfied, you might be puzzled. You might be inclined to say, “It just is.” Or you might accept the legitimacy of the question and say that it is good that people’s needs be satisfied because this brings them pleasure. But then, of course, your interlocutor could ask once again, “What’s good about that?” Perhaps at this point you would answer, “It just is good that people be pleased,” and thus put an end to this line of questioning. Or perhaps you would again seek to explain the fact that it is good that people be pleased in terms of something else that you take to be good. At some point, though, you would have to put an end to the questions, not because you would have grown tired of them (though that is a distinct possibility), but because you would be forced to recognize that, if one thing derives its goodness from some other thing, which derives its goodness from yet a third thing, and so on, there must come a point at which you reach something whose goodness is not derivative in this way, something that “just is” good in its own right, something whose goodness is the source of, and thus explains, the goodness to be found in all the other things that precede it on the list. It is at this point that you will have arrived at intrinsic goodness (cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a). That which is intrinsically good is nonderivatively good; it is good for its own sake. That which is not intrinsically good but extrinsically good is derivatively good; it is good, not (insofar as its extrinsic value is concerned) for its own sake, but for the sake of something else that is good and to which it is related in some way. Intrinsic value thus has a certain priority over extrinsic value. The latter is derivative from or reflective of the former and is to be explained in terms of the former. It is for this reason that philosophers have tended to focus on intrinsic value in particular.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

The account just given of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value is rough, but it should do as a start. Certain complications must be immediately acknowledged, though. First, there is the possibility, mentioned above, that the terms traditionally used to refer to intrinsic value in fact refer to more than one concept; again, this will be addressed later (in this section and the next). Another complication is that it may not in fact be accurate to say that whatever is intrinsically good is nonderivatively good; some intrinsic value may be derivative. This issue will be taken up (in Section 5) when the computation of intrinsic value is discussed; it may be safely ignored for now. Still another complication is this. It is almost universally acknowledged among philosophers that all value is “supervenient” or “grounded in” on certain nonevaluative features of the thing that has value. Roughly, what this means is that, if something has value, it will have this value in virtue of certain nonevaluative features that it has; its value can be attributed to these features. For example, the value of helping others in time of need might be attributed to the fact that such behavior has the feature of being causally related to certain pleasant experiences induced in those who receive the help. Suppose we accept this and accept also that the experiences in question are intrinsically good. In saying this, we are (barring the complication to be discussed in Section 5) taking the value of the experiences to be nonderivative. Nonetheless, we may well take this value, like all value, to be supervenient on, or grounded in, something. In this case, we would probably simply attribute the value of the experiences to their having the feature of being pleasant. This brings out the subtle but important point that the question whether some value is derivative is distinct from the question whether it is supervenient. Even nonderivative value (value that something has in its own right; value that is, in some way, not attributable to the value of anything else) is usually understood to be supervenient on certain nonevaluative features of the thing that has value (and thus to be attributable, in a different way, to these features).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

To repeat: whatever is intrinsically good is (barring the complication to be discussed in Section 5) nonderivatively good. It would be a mistake, however, to affirm the converse of this and say that whatever is nonderivatively good is intrinsically good. As “intrinsic value” is traditionally understood, it refers to a particular way of being nonderivatively good; there are other ways in which something might be nonderivatively good. For example, suppose that your interlocutor were to ask you whether it is good to eat and drink in moderation and to exercise regularly. Again, you would say, “Yes, of course.” If asked why, you would say that this is because such behavior promotes health. If asked what is good about being healthy, you might cite something else whose goodness would explain the value of health, or you might simply say, “Being healthy just is a good way to be.” If the latter were your response, you would be indicating that you took health to be nonderivatively good in some way. In what way, though? Well, perhaps you would be thinking of health as intrinsically good. But perhaps not. Suppose that what you meant was that being healthy just is “good for” the person who is healthy (in the sense that it is in each person’s interest to be healthy), so that John’s being healthy is good for John, Jane’s being healthy is good for Jane, and so on. You would thereby be attributing a type of nonderivative interest-value to John’s being healthy, and yet it would be perfectly consistent for you to deny that John’s being healthy is intrinsically good. If John were a villain, you might well deny this. Indeed, you might want to insist that, in light of his villainy, his being healthy is intrinsically bad, even though you recognize that his being healthy is good for him. If you did say this, you would be indicating that you subscribe to the common view that intrinsic value is nonderivative value of some peculiarly moral sort.[2]

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Let us now see whether this still rough account of intrinsic value can be made more precise. One of the first writers to concern himself with the question of what exactly is at issue when we ascribe intrinsic value to something was G. E. Moore [1873–1958]. In his book Principia Ethica, Moore asks whether the concept of intrinsic value (or, more particularly, the concept of intrinsic goodness, upon which he tended to focus) is analyzable. In raising this question, he has a particular type of analysis in mind, one which consists in “breaking down” a concept into simpler component concepts. (One example of an analysis of this sort is the analysis of the concept of being a vixen in terms of the concepts of being a fox and being female.) His own answer to the question is that the concept of intrinsic goodness is not amenable to such analysis (Moore 1903, ch. 1). In place of analysis, Moore proposes a certain kind of thought-experiment in order both to come to understand the concept better and to reach a decision about what is intrinsically good. He advises us to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves “in absolute isolation,” we would judge their existence to be good; in this way, we will be better able to see what really accounts for the value that there is in our world. For example, if such a thought-experiment led you to conclude that all and only pleasure would be good in isolation, and all and only pain bad, you would be a hedonist.[3] Moore himself deems it incredible that anyone, thinking clearly, would reach this conclusion. He says that it involves our saying that a world in which only pleasure existed—a world without any knowledge, love, enjoyment of beauty, or moral qualities—is better than a world that contained all these things but in which there existed slightly less pleasure (Moore 1912, p. 102). Such a view he finds absurd.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Regardless of the merits of this isolation test, it remains unclear exactly why Moore finds the concept of intrinsic goodness to be unanalyzable. At one point he attacks the view that it can be analyzed wholly in terms of “natural” concepts—the view, that is, that we can break down the concept of being intrinsically good into the simpler concepts of being A, being B, being C…, where these component concepts are all purely descriptive rather than evaluative. (One candidate that Moore discusses is this: for something to be intrinsically good is for it to be something that we desire to desire.) He argues that any such analysis is to be rejected, since it will always be intelligible to ask whether (and, presumably, to deny that) it is good that something be A, B, C,…, which would not be the case if the analysis were accurate (Moore 1903, pp. 15–16). Even if this argument is successful (a complicated matter about which there is considerable disagreement), it of course does not establish the more general claim that the concept of intrinsic goodness is not analyzable at all, since it leaves open the possibility that this concept is analyzable in terms of other concepts, some or all of which are not “natural” but evaluative. Moore apparently thinks that his objection works just as well where one or more of the component concepts A, B, C,…, is evaluative; but, again, many dispute the cogency of his argument. Indeed, several philosophers have proposed analyses of just this sort. For example, Roderick Chisholm [1916–1999] has argued that Moore’s own isolation test in fact provides the basis for an analysis of the concept of intrinsic value. He formulates a view according to which (to put matters roughly) to say that a state of affairs is intrinsically good or bad is to say that it is possible that its goodness or badness constitutes all the goodness or badness that there is in the world (Chisholm 1978).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Eva Bodanszky and Earl Conee have attacked Chisholm’s proposal, showing that it is, in its details, unacceptable (Bodanszky and Conee 1981). However, the general idea that an intrinsically valuable state is one that could somehow account for all the value in the world is suggestive and promising; if it could be adequately formulated, it would reveal an important feature of intrinsic value that would help us better understand the concept. We will return to this point in Section 5. Rather than pursue such a line of thought, Chisholm himself responded (Chisholm 1981) in a different way to Bodanszky and Conee. He shifted from what may be called an ontological version of Moore’s isolation test—the attempt to understand the intrinsic value of a state in terms of the value that there would be if it were the only valuable state in existence—to an intentional version of that test—the attempt to understand the intrinsic value of a state in terms of the kind of attitude it would be fitting to have if one were to contemplate the valuable state as such, without reference to circumstances or consequences.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

This new analysis in fact reflects a general idea that has a rich history. Franz Brentano [1838–1917], C. D. Broad [1887–1971], W. D. Ross [1877–1971], and A. C. Ewing [1899–1973], among others, have claimed, in a more or less qualified way, that the concept of intrinsic goodness is analyzable in terms of the fittingness of some “pro” (i.e., positive) attitude (Brentano 1969, p. 18; Broad 1930, p. 283; Ross 1939, pp. 275–76; Ewing 1948, p. 152). Such an analysis, which has come to be called “the fitting attitude analysis” of value, is supported by the mundane observation that, instead of saying that something is good, we often say that it is valuable, which itself just means that it is fitting to value the thing in question. It would thus seem very natural to suppose that for something to be intrinsically good is simply for it to be such that it is fitting to value it for its own sake. (“Fitting” here is often understood to signify a particular kind of moral fittingness, in keeping with the idea that intrinsic value is a particular kind of moral value. The underlying point is that those who value for its own sake that which is intrinsically good thereby evince a kind of moral sensitivity.)

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Though undoubtedly attractive, this analysis can be and has been challenged. Brand Blanshard [1892–1987], for example, argues that the analysis is to be rejected because, if we ask why something is such that it is fitting to value it for its own sake, the answer is that this is the case precisely because the thing in question is intrinsically good; this answer indicates that the concept of intrinsic goodness is more fundamental than that of the fittingness of some pro attitude, which is inconsistent with analyzing the former in terms of the latter (Blanshard 1961, pp. 284–86). Ewing and others have resisted Blanshard’s argument, maintaining that what grounds and explains something’s being valuable is not its being good but rather its having whatever non-value property it is upon which its goodness supervenes; they claim that it is because of this underlying property that the thing in question is “both” good and valuable (Ewing 1948, pp. 157 and 172. Cf. Lemos 1994, p. 19). Thomas Scanlon calls such an account of the relation between valuableness, goodness, and underlying properties a buck-passing account, since it “passes the buck” of explaining why something is such that it is fitting to value it from its goodness to some property that underlies its goodness (Scanlon 1998, pp. 95 ff.). Whether such an account is acceptable has recently been the subject of intense debate. Many, like Scanlon, endorse passing the buck; some, like Blanshard, object to doing so. If such an account is acceptable, then Ewing’s analysis survives Blanshard’s challenge; but otherwise not. (Note that one might endorse passing the buck and yet reject Ewing’s analysis for some other reason. Hence a buck-passer may, but need not, accept the analysis. Indeed, there is reason to think that Moore himself is a buck-passer, even though he takes the concept of intrinsic goodness to be unanalyzable; cf. Olson 2006).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Even if Blanshard’s argument succeeds and intrinsic goodness is not to be analyzed in terms of the fittingness of some pro attitude, it could still be that there is a strict correlation between something’s being intrinsically good and its being such that it is fitting to value it for its own sake; that is, it could still be both that (a) it is necessarily true that whatever is intrinsically good is such that it is fitting to value it for its own sake, and that (b) it is necessarily true that whatever it is fitting to value for its own sake is intrinsically good. If this were the case, it would reveal an important feature of intrinsic value, recognition of which would help us to improve our understanding of the concept. However, this thesis has also been challenged.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Krister Bykvist has argued that what he calls solitary goods may constitute a counterexample to part (a) of the thesis (Bykvist 2009, pp. 4 ff.). Such (alleged) goods consist in states of affairs that entail that there is no one in a position to value them. Suppose, for example, that happiness is intrinsically good, and good in such a way that it is fitting to welcome it. Then, more particularly, the state of affairs of there being happy egrets is intrinsically good; so too, presumably, is the more complex state of affairs of there being happy egrets but no welcomers. The simpler state of affairs would appear to pose no problem for part (a) of the thesis, but the more complex state of affairs, which is an example of a solitary good, may pose a problem. For if to welcome a state of affairs entails that that state of affairs obtains, then welcoming the more complex state of affairs is logically impossible. Furthermore, if to welcome a state of affairs entails that one believes that that state of affairs obtains, then the pertinent belief regarding the more complex state of affairs would be necessarily false. In neither case would it seem plausible to say that welcoming the state of affairs is nonetheless fitting. Thus, unless this challenge can somehow be met, a proponent of the thesis must restrict the thesis to pro attitudes that are neither truth- nor belief-entailing, a restriction that might itself prove unwelcome, since it excludes a number of favorable responses to what is good (such as promoting what is good, or taking pleasure in what is good) to which proponents of the thesis have often appealed.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

As to part (b) of the thesis: some philosophers have argued that it can be fitting to value something for its own sake even if that thing is not intrinsically good. A relatively early version of this argument was again provided by Blanshard (1961, pp. 287 ff. Cf. Lemos 1994, p. 18). Recently the issue has been brought into stark relief by the following sort of thought-experiment. Imagine that an evil demon wants you to value him for his own sake and threatens to cause you severe suffering unless you do. It seems that you have good reason to do what he wants—it is appropriate or fitting to comply with his demand and value him for his own sake—even though he is clearly not intrinsically good (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, pp. 402 ff.). This issue, which has come to be known as “the wrong kind of reason problem,” has attracted a great deal of attention. Some have been persuaded that the challenge succeeds, while others have sought to undermine it.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

2. What Is Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

One final cautionary note. It is apparent that some philosophers use the term “intrinsic value” and similar terms to express some concept other than the one just discussed. In particular, Immanuel Kant [1724–1804] is famous for saying that the only thing that is “good without qualification” is a good will, which is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes but “in itself” (Kant 1785, Ak. 1–3). This may seem to suggest that Kant ascribes (positive) intrinsic value only to a good will, declaring the value that anything else may possess merely extrinsic, in the senses of “intrinsic value” and “extrinsic value” discussed above. This suggestion is, if anything, reinforced when Kant immediately adds that a good will “is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about,” that it “shine[s] like a jewel for its own sake,” and that its “usefulness…can neither add to, nor subtract from, [its] value.” For here Kant may seem not only to be invoking the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value but also to be in agreement with Brentano et al. regarding the characterization of the former in terms of the fittingness of some attitude, namely, esteem. (The term “respect” is often used in place of “esteem” in such contexts.) Nonetheless, it becomes clear on further inspection that Kant is in fact discussing a concept quite different from that with which this article is concerned. A little later on he says that all rational beings, even those that lack a good will, have “absolute value”; such beings are “ends in themselves” that have a “dignity” or “intrinsic value” that is “above all price” (Kant 1785, Ak. 64 and 77). Such talk indicates that Kant believes that the sort of value that he ascribes to rational beings is one that they possess to an infinite degree. But then, if this were understood as a thesis about intrinsic value as we have been understanding this concept, the implication would seem to be that, since it contains rational beings, ours is the best of all possible worlds.[4] Yet this is a thesis that Kant, along with many others, explicitly rejects elsewhere (Kant, Lectures in Ethics). It seems best to understand Kant, and other philosophers who have since written in the same vein (cf. Anderson 1993), as being concerned not with the question of what intrinsic value rational beings have—in the sense of “intrinsic value” discussed above—but with the quite different question of how we ought to behave toward such creatures (cf. Bradley 2006).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

In the history of philosophy, relatively few seem to have entertained doubts about the concept of intrinsic value. Much of the debate about intrinsic value has tended to be about what things actually do have such value. However, once questions about the concept itself were raised, doubts about its metaphysical implications, its moral significance, and even its very coherence began to appear.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Consider, first, the metaphysics underlying ascriptions of intrinsic value. It seems safe to say that, before the twentieth century, most moral philosophers presupposed that the intrinsic goodness of something is a genuine property of that thing, one that is no less real than the properties (of being pleasant, of satisfying a need, or whatever) in virtue of which the thing in question is good. (Several dissented from this view, however. Especially well known for their dissent are Thomas Hobbes [1588–1679], who believed the goodness or badness of something to be constituted by the desire or aversion that one may have regarding it, and David Hume [1711–1776], who similarly took all ascriptions of value to involve projections of one’s own sentiments onto whatever is said to have value. See Hobbes 1651, Hume 1739.) It was not until Moore argued that this view implies that intrinsic goodness, as a supervening property, is a very different sort of property (one that he called “nonnatural”) from those (which he called “natural”) upon which it supervenes, that doubts about the view proliferated.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

One of the first to raise such doubts and to press for a view quite different from the prevailing view was Axel Hägerström [1868–1939], who developed an account according to which ascriptions of value are neither true nor false (Hägerström 1953). This view has come to be called “noncognitivism.” The particular brand of noncognitivism proposed by Hägerström is usually called “emotivism,” since it holds (in a manner reminiscent of Hume) that ascriptions of value are in essence expressions of emotion. (For example, an emotivist of a particularly simple kind might claim that to say “A is good” is not to make a statement about A but to say something like “Hooray for A!”) This view was taken up by several philosophers, including most notably A. J. Ayer [1910–1989] and Charles L. Stevenson [1908–1979] (see Ayer 1946, Stevenson 1944). Other philosophers have since embraced other forms of noncognitivism. R. M. Hare [1919–2002], for example, advocated the theory of “prescriptivism” (according to which moral judgments, including judgments about goodness and badness, are not descriptive statements about the world but rather constitute a kind of command as to how we are to act; see Hare 1952) and Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard have since proposed yet other versions of noncognitivism (Blackburn 1984, Gibbard 1990).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Hägerström characterized his own view as a type of “value-nihilism,” and many have followed suit in taking noncognitivism of all kinds to constitute a rejection of the very idea of intrinsic value. But this seems to be a mistake. We should distinguish questions about value from questions about evaluation. Questions about value fall into two main groups, conceptual (of the sort discussed in the last section) and substantive (of the sort discussed in the first section). Questions about evaluation have to do with what precisely is going on when we ascribe value to something. Cognitivists claim that our ascriptions of value constitute statements that are either true or false; noncognitivists deny this. But even noncognitivists must recognize that our ascriptions of value fall into two fundamental classes—ascriptions of intrinsic value and ascriptions of extrinsic value—and so they too must concern themselves with the very same conceptual and substantive questions about value as cognitivists address. It may be that noncognitivism dictates or rules out certain answers to these questions that cognitivism does not, but that is of course quite a different matter from rejecting the very idea of intrinsic value on metaphysical grounds.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Another type of metaphysical challenge to intrinsic value stems from the theory of “pragmatism,” especially in the form advanced by John Dewey [1859–1952] (see Dewey 1922). According to the pragmatist, the world is constantly changing in such a way that the solution to one problem becomes the source of another, what is an end in one context is a means in another, and thus it is a mistake to seek or offer a timeless list of intrinsic goods and evils, of ends to be achieved or avoided for their own sakes. This theme has been elaborated by Monroe Beardsley, who attacks the very notion of intrinsic value (Beardsley 1965; cf. Conee 1982). Denying that the existence of something with extrinsic value presupposes the existence of something else with intrinsic value, Beardsley argues that all value is extrinsic. (In the course of his argument, Beardsley rejects the sort of “dialectical demonstration” of intrinsic value that was attempted in the last section, when an explanation of the derivative value of helping others was given in terms of some nonderivative value.) A quick response to Beardsley’s misgivings about intrinsic value would be to admit that it may well be that, the world being as complex as it is, nothing is such that its value is wholly intrinsic; perhaps whatever has intrinsic value also has extrinsic value, and of course many things that have extrinsic value will have no (or, at least, neutral) intrinsic value. Far from repudiating the notion of intrinsic value, though, this admission would confirm its legitimacy. But Beardsley would insist that this quick response misses the point of his attack, and that it really is the case, not just that whatever has value has extrinsic value, but also that nothing has intrinsic value. His argument for this view is based on the claim that the concept of intrinsic value is “inapplicable,” in that, even if something had such value, we could not know this and hence its having such value could play no role in our reasoning about value. But here Beardsley seems to be overreaching. Even if it were the case that we cannot know whether something has intrinsic value, this of course leaves open the question whether anything does have such value. And even if it could somehow be shown that nothing does have such value, this would still leave open the question whether something could have such value. If the answer to this last question is “yes,” then the legitimacy of the concept of intrinsic value is in fact confirmed rather than refuted.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

As has been noted, some philosophers do indeed doubt the legitimacy, the very coherence, of the concept of intrinsic value. Before we turn to a discussion of this issue, however, let us for the moment presume that the concept is coherent and address a different sort of doubt: the doubt that the concept has any great moral significance. Recall the suggestion, mentioned in the last section, that discussions of intrinsic value may have been compromised by a failure to distinguish certain concepts. This suggestion is at the heart of Christine Korsgaard’s “Two Distinctions in Goodness” (Korsgaard 1983). Korsgaard notes that “intrinsic value” has traditionally been contrasted with “instrumental value” (the value that something has in virtue of being a means to an end) and claims that this approach is misleading. She contends that “instrumental value” is to be contrasted with “final value,” that is, the value that something has as an end or for its own sake; however, “intrinsic value” (the value that something has in itself, that is, in virtue of its intrinsic, nonrelational properties) is to be contrasted with “extrinsic value” (the value that something has in virtue of its extrinsic, relational properties). (An example of a nonrelational property is the property of being round; an example of a relational property is the property of being loved.) As an illustration of final value, Korsgaard suggests that gorgeously enameled frying pans are, in virtue of the role they play in our lives, good for their own sakes. In like fashion, Beardsley wonders whether a rare stamp may be good for its own sake (Beardsley 1965); Shelly Kagan says that the pen that Abraham Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation may well be good for its own sake (Kagan 1998); and others have offered similar examples (cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999 and 2003). Notice that in each case the value being attributed to the object in question is (allegedly) had in virtue of some extrinsic property of the object. This puts the moral significance of intrinsic value into question, since (as is apparent from our discussion so far) it is with the notion of something’s being valuable for its own sake that philosophers have traditionally been, and continue to be, primarily concerned.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

There is an important corollary to drawing a distinction between intrinsic value and final value (and between extrinsic value and nonfinal value), and that is that, contrary to what Korsgaard herself initially says, it may be a mistake to contrast final value with instrumental value. If it is possible, as Korsgaard claims, that final value sometimes supervenes on extrinsic properties, then it might be possible that it sometimes supervenes in particular on the property of being a means to some other end. Indeed, Korsgaard herself suggests this when she says that “certain kinds of things, such as luxurious instruments, … are valued for their own sakes under the condition of their usefulness” (Korsgaard 1983, p. 185). Kagan also tentatively endorses this idea. If the idea is coherent, then we should in principle distinguish two kinds of instrumental value, one final and the other nonfinal.[5] If something A is a means to something else B and has instrumental value in virtue of this fact, such value will be nonfinal if it is merely derivative from or reflective of B’s value, whereas it will be final if it is nonderivative, that is, if it is a value that A has in its own right (due to the fact that it is a means to B), irrespective of any value that B may or may not have in its own right.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Even if it is agreed that it is final value that is central to the concerns of moral philosophers, we should be careful in drawing the conclusion that intrinsic value is not central to their concerns. First, there is no necessity that the term “intrinsic value” be reserved for the value that something has in virtue of its intrinsic properties; presumably it has been used by many writers simply to refer to what Korsgaard calls final value, in which case the moral significance of (what is thus called) intrinsic value has of course not been thrown into doubt. Nonetheless, it should probably be conceded that “final value” is a more suitable term than “intrinsic value” to refer to the sort of value in question, since the latter term certainly does suggest value that supervenes on intrinsic properties. But here a second point can be made, and that is that, even if use of the term “intrinsic value” is restricted accordingly, it is arguable that, contrary to Korsgaard’s contention, all final value does after all supervene on intrinsic properties alone; if that were the case, there would seem to be no reason not to continue to use the term “intrinsic value” to refer to final value. Whether this is in fact the case depends in part on just what sort of thing can be valuable for its own sake—an issue to be taken up in the next section.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

In light of the matter just discussed, we must now decide what terminology to adopt. It is clear that moral philosophers since ancient times have been concerned with the distinction between the value that something has for its own sake (the sort of nonderivative value that Korsgaard calls “final value”) and the value that something has for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way. However, given the weight of tradition, it seems justifiable, perhaps even advisable, to continue, despite Korsgaard’s misgivings, to use the terms “intrinsic value” and “extrinsic value” to refer to these two types of value; if we do so, however, we should explicitly note that this practice is not itself intended to endorse, or reject, the view that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties alone.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Let us now turn to doubts about the very coherence of the concept of intrinsic value, so understood. In Principia Ethica and elsewhere, Moore embraces the consequentialist view, mentioned above, that whether an action is morally right or wrong turns exclusively on whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of its alternatives. Some philosophers have recently argued that ascribing intrinsic value to consequences in this way is fundamentally misconceived. Peter Geach, for example, argues that Moore makes a serious mistake when comparing “good” with “yellow.”[6] Moore says that both terms express unanalyzable concepts but are to be distinguished in that, whereas the latter refers to a natural property, the former refers to a nonnatural one. Geach contends that there is a mistaken assimilation underlying Moore’s remarks, since “good” in fact operates in a way quite unlike that of “yellow”—something that Moore wholly overlooks. This contention would appear to be confirmed by the observation that the phrase “x is a yellow bird” splits up logically (as Geach puts it) into the phrase “x is a bird and x is yellow,” whereas the phrase “x is a good singer” does not split up in the same way. Also, from “x is a yellow bird” and “a bird is an animal” we do not hesitate to infer “x is a yellow animal,” whereas no similar inference seems warranted in the case of “x is a good singer” and “a singer is a person.” On the basis of these observations Geach concludes that nothing can be good in the free-standing way that Moore alleges; rather, whatever is good is good relative to a certain kind.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Judith Thomson has recently elaborated on Geach’s thesis (Thomson 1997). Although she does not unqualifiedly agree that whatever is good is good relative to a certain kind, she does claim that whatever is good is good in some way; nothing can be “just plain good,” as she believes Moore would have it. Philippa Foot, among others, has made a similar charge (Foot 1985). It is a charge that has been rebutted by Michael Zimmerman, who argues that Geach’s tests are less straightforward than they may seem and fail after all to reveal a significant distinction between the ways in which “good” and “yellow” operate (Zimmerman 2001, ch. 2). He argues further that Thomson mischaracterizes Moore’s conception of intrinsic value. According to Moore, he claims, what is intrinsically good is not “just plain good”; rather, it is good in a particular way, in keeping with Thomson’s thesis that all goodness is goodness in a way. He maintains that, for Moore and other proponents of intrinsic value, such value is a particular kind of moral value. Mahrad Almotahari and Adam Hosein have revived Geach’s challenge (Almotahari and Hosein 2015). They argue that if, contrary to Geach, “good” could be used predicatively, we would be able to use the term predicatively in sentences of the form ‘a is a good K’ but, they argue, the linguistic evidence indicates that we cannot do so (Almotahari and Hosein 2015, 1493–4).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

4. What Sort of Thing Can Have Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Among those who do not doubt the coherence of the concept of intrinsic value there is considerable difference of opinion about what sort or sorts of entity can have such value. Moore does not explicitly address this issue, but his writings show him to have a liberal view on the matter. There are times when he talks of individual objects (e.g., books) as having intrinsic value, others when he talks of the consciousness of individual objects (or of their qualities) as having intrinsic value, others when he talks of the existence of individual objects as having intrinsic value, others when he talks of types of individual objects as having intrinsic value, and still others when he talks of states of individual objects as having intrinsic value.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

4. What Sort of Thing Can Have Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Moore would thus appear to be a “pluralist” concerning the bearers of intrinsic value. Others take a more conservative, “monistic” approach, according to which there is just one kind of bearer of intrinsic value. Consider, for example, Frankena’s long list of intrinsic goods, presented in Section 1 above: life, consciousness, etc. To what kind(s) of entity do such terms refer? Various answers have been given. Some (such as Panayot Butchvarov) claim that it is properties that are the bearers of intrinsic value (Butchvarov 1989, pp. 14–15). On this view, Frankena’s list implies that it is the properties of being alive, being conscious, and so on, that are intrinsically good. Others (such as Chisholm) claim that it is states of affairs that are the bearers of intrinsic value (Chisholm 1968–69, 1972, 1975). On this view, Frankena’s list implies that it is the states of affairs of someone (or something) being alive, someone being conscious, and so on, that are intrinsically good. Still others (such as Ross) claim that it is facts that are the bearers of intrinsic value (Ross 1930, pp. 112–13; cf. Lemos 1994, ch. 2). On this view, Frankena’s list implies that it is the facts that someone (or something) is alive, that someone is conscious, and so on, that are intrinsically good. (The difference between Chisholm’s and Ross’s views would seem to be this: whereas Chisholm would ascribe intrinsic value even to states of affairs, such as that of everyone being happy, that do not obtain, Ross would ascribe such value only to states of affairs that do obtain.)

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

4. What Sort of Thing Can Have Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Ontologists often divide entities into two fundamental classes, those that are abstract and those that are concrete. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on just how this distinction is to be drawn. Most philosophers would classify the sorts of entities just mentioned (properties, states of affairs, and facts) as abstract. So understood, the claim that intrinsic value is borne by such entities is to be distinguished from the claim that it is borne by certain other closely related entities that are often classified as concrete. For example, it has recently been suggested that it is tropes that have intrinsic value.[7] Tropes are supposed to be a sort of particularized property, a kind of property-instance (rather than simply a property). (Thus the particular whiteness of a particular piece of paper is to be distinguished, on this view, from the property of whiteness.) It has also been suggested that it is states, understood as a kind of instance of states of affairs, that have intrinsic value (cf. Zimmerman 2001, ch. 3).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

4. What Sort of Thing Can Have Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Those who make monistic proposals of the sort just mentioned are aware that intrinsic value is sometimes ascribed to kinds of entities different from those favored by their proposals. They claim that all such ascriptions can be reduced to, or translated into, ascriptions of intrinsic value of the sort they deem proper. Consider, for example, Korsgaard’s suggestion that a gorgeously enameled frying pan is good for its own sake. Ross would say that this cannot be the case. If there is any intrinsic value to be found here, it will, according to Ross, not reside in the pan itself but in the fact that it plays a certain role in our lives, or perhaps in the fact that something plays this role, or in the fact that something that plays this role exists. (Others would make other translations in the terms that they deem appropriate.) On the basis of this ascription of intrinsic value to some fact, Ross could go on to ascribe a kind of extrinsic value to the pan itself, in virtue of its relation to the fact in question.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

4. What Sort of Thing Can Have Intrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Whether reduction of this sort is acceptable has been a matter of considerable debate. Proponents of monism maintain that it introduces some much-needed order into the discussion of intrinsic value, clarifying just what is involved in the ascription of such value and simplifying the computation of such value—on which point, see the next section. (A corollary of some monistic approaches is that the value that something has for its own sake supervenes on the intrinsic properties of that thing, so that there is a perfect convergence of the two sorts of values that Korsgaard calls “final” and “intrinsic”. On this point, see the last section; Zimmerman 2001, ch. 3; Tucker 2016; and Tucker (forthcoming).) Opponents argue that reduction results in distortion and oversimplification; they maintain that, even if there is intrinsic value to be found in such a fact as that a gorgeously enameled frying pan plays a certain role in our lives, there may yet be intrinsic, and not merely extrinsic, value to be found in the pan itself and perhaps also in its existence (cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 1999 and 2003). Some propose a compromise according to which the kind of intrinsic value that can sensibly be ascribed to individual objects like frying pans is not the same kind of intrinsic value that is the topic of this article and can sensibly be ascribed to items of the sort on Frankena’s list (cf. Bradley 2006). (See again the cautionary note in the final paragraph of Section 2 above.)

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

In our assessments of intrinsic value, we are often and understandably concerned not only with whether something is good or bad but with how good or bad it is. Arriving at an answer to the latter question is not straightforward. At least three problems threaten to undermine the computation of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

First, there is the possibility that the relation of intrinsic betterness is not transitive (that is, the possibility that something A is intrinsically better than something else B, which is itself intrinsically better than some third thing C, and yet A is not intrinsically better than C). Despite the very natural assumption that this relation is transitive, it has been argued that it is not (Rachels 1998; Temkin 1987, 1997, 2012). Should this in fact be the case, it would seriously complicate comparisons, and hence assessments, of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Second, there is the possibility that certain values are incommensurate. For example, Ross at one point contends that it is impossible to compare the goodness of pleasure with that of virtue. Whereas he had suggested in The Right and the Good that pleasure and virtue could be measured on the same scale of goodness, in Foundations of Ethics he declares this to be impossible, since (he claims) it would imply that pleasure of a certain intensity, enjoyed by a sufficient number of people or for a sufficient time, would counterbalance virtue possessed or manifested only by a small number of people or only for a short time; and this he professes to be incredible (Ross 1939, p. 275). But there is some confusion here. In claiming that virtue and pleasure are incommensurate for the reason given, Ross presumably means that they cannot be measured on the same ratio scale. (A ratio scale is one with an arbitrary unit but a fixed zero point. Mass and length are standardly measured on ratio scales.) But incommensurability on a ratio scale does not imply incommensurability on every scale—an ordinal scale, for instance. (An ordinal scale is simply one that supplies an ordering for the quantity in question, such as the measurement of arm-strength that is provided by an arm-wrestling competition.) Ross’s remarks indicate that he in fact believes that virtue and pleasure are commensurate on an ordinal scale, since he appears to subscribe to the arch-puritanical view that any amount of virtue is intrinsically better than any amount of pleasure. This view is just one example of the thesis that some goods are “higher” than others, in the sense that any amount of the former is better than any amount of the latter. This thesis can be traced to the ancient Greeks (Plato, Philebus, 21a-e; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1174a), and it has been endorsed by many philosophers since, perhaps most famously by Mill (Mill 1863, paras. 4 ff). Interest in the thesis has recently been revived by a set of intricate and intriguing puzzles, posed by Derek Parfit, concerning the relative values of low-quantity/high-quality goods and high-quantity/low-quality goods (Parfit 1984, Part IV). One response to these puzzles (eschewed by Parfit himself) is to adopt the thesis of the nontransitivity of intrinsic betterness. Another is to insist on the thesis that some goods are higher than others. Such a response does not by itself solve the puzzles that Parfit raises, but, to the extent that it helps, it does so at the cost of once again complicating the computation of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

To repeat: contrary to what Ross says, the thesis that some goods are higher than others implies that such goods are commensurate, and not that they are incommensurate. Some people do hold, however, that certain values really are incommensurate and thus cannot be compared on any meaningful scale. (Isaiah Berlin [1909–1997], for example, is often thought to have said this about the values of liberty and equality. Whether he is best interpreted in this way is debatable. See Berlin 1969.) This view constitutes a more radical threat to the computation of intrinsic value than does the view that intrinsic betterness is not transitive. The latter view presupposes at least some measure of commensurability. If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is commensurate with B and B is commensurate with C; and even if it should turn out that A is not better than C, it may still be that A is commensurate with C, either because it is as good as C or because it is worse than C. But if A is incommensurate with B, then A is neither better than nor as good as nor worse than B. (Some claim, however, that the reverse does not hold and that, even if A is neither better than nor as good as nor worse than B, still A may be “on a par” with B and thus be roughly comparable with it. Cf. Chang 1997, 2002.) If such a case can arise, there is an obvious limit to the extent to which we can meaningfully say how good a certain complex whole is (here, “whole” is used to refer to whatever kind of entity may have intrinsic value); for, if such a whole comprises incommensurate goods A and B, then there will be no way of establishing just how good it is overall, even if there is a way of establishing how good it is with respect to each of A and B.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

There is a third, still more radical threat to the computation of intrinsic value. Quite apart from any concern with the commensurability of values, Moore famously claims that there is no easy formula for the determination of the intrinsic value of complex wholes because of the truth of what he calls the “principle of organic unities” (Moore 1903, p. 96). According to this principle, the intrinsic value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts (Moore 1903, p. 28) As an example of an organic unity, Moore gives the case of the consciousness of a beautiful object; he says that this has great intrinsic value, even though the consciousness as such and the beautiful object as such each have comparatively little, if any, intrinsic value. If the principle of organic unities is true, then there is scant hope of a systematic approach to the computation of intrinsic value. Although the principle explicitly rules out only summation as a method of computation, Moore’s remarks strongly suggest that there is no relation between the parts of a whole and the whole itself that holds in general and in terms of which the value of the latter can be computed by aggregating (whether by summation or by some other means) the values of the former. Moore’s position has been endorsed by many other philosophers. For example, Ross says that it is better that one person be good and happy and another bad and unhappy than that the former be good and unhappy and the latter bad and happy, and he takes this to be confirmation of Moore’s principle (Ross 1930, p. 72). Broad takes organic unities of the sort that Moore discusses to be just one instance of a more general phenomenon that he believes to be at work in many other situations, as when, for example, two tunes, each pleasing in its own right, make for a cacophonous combination (Broad 1985, p. 256). Others have furnished still further examples of organic unities (Chisholm 1986, ch. 7; Lemos 1994, chs. 3 and 4, and 1998; Hurka 1998).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Was Moore the first to call attention to the phenomenon of organic unities in the context of intrinsic value? This is debatable. Despite the fact that he explicitly invoked what he called a “principle of summation” that would appear to be inconsistent with the principle of organic unities, Brentano appears nonetheless to have anticipated Moore’s principle in his discussion of Schadenfreude, that is, of malicious pleasure; he condemns such an attitude, even though he claims that pleasure as such is intrinsically good (Brentano 1969, p. 23 n). Certainly Chisholm takes Brentano to be an advocate of organic unities (Chisholm 1986, ch. 5), ascribing to him the view that there are many kinds of organic unity and building on what he takes to be Brentano’s insights (and, going further back in the history of philosophy, the insights of St. Thomas Aquinas [1225–1274] and others).

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Recently, a special spin has been put on the principle of organic unities by so-called “particularists.” Jonathan Dancy, for example, has claimed (in keeping with Korsgaard and others mentioned in Section 3 above), that something’s intrinsic value need not supervene on its intrinsic properties alone; in fact, the supervenience-base may be so open-ended that it resists generalization. The upshot, according to Dancy, is that the intrinsic value of something may vary from context to context; indeed, the variation may be so great that the thing’s value changes “polarity” from good to bad, or vice versa (Dancy 2000). This approach to value constitutes an endorsement of the principle of organic unities that is even more subversive of the computation of intrinsic value than Moore’s; for Moore holds that the intrinsic value of something is and must be constant, even if its contribution to the value of wholes of which it forms a part is not, whereas Dancy holds that variation can occur at both levels.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Not everyone has accepted the principle of organic unities; some have held out hope for a more systematic approach to the computation of intrinsic value. However, even someone who is inclined to measure intrinsic value in terms of summation must acknowledge that there is a sense in which the principle of organic unities is obviously true. Consider some complex whole, W, that is composed of three goods, X, Y, and Z, which are wholly independent of one another. Suppose that we had a ratio scale on which to measure these goods, and that their values on this scale were 10, 20, and 30, respectively. We would expect someone who takes intrinsic value to be summative to declare the value of W to be (10 + 20 + 30 =) 60. But notice that, if X, Y, and Z are parts of W, then so too, presumably, are the combinations X-and-Y, X-and-Z, and Y-and-Z; the values of these combinations, computed in terms of summation, will be 30, 40, and 50, respectively. If the values of these parts of W were also taken into consideration when evaluating W, the value of W would balloon to 180. Clearly, this would be a distortion. Someone who wishes to maintain that intrinsic value is summative must thus show not only how the various alleged examples of organic unities provided by Moore and others are to be reinterpreted, but also how, in the sort of case just sketched, it is only the values of X, Y, and Z, and not the values either of any combinations of these components or of any parts of these components, that are to be taken into account when evaluating W itself. In order to bring some semblance of manageability to the computation of intrinsic value, this is precisely what some writers, by appealing to the idea of “basic” intrinsic value, have tried to do. The general idea is this. In the sort of example just given, each of X, Y, and Z is to be construed as having basic intrinsic value; if any combinations or parts of X, Y, and Z have intrinsic value, this value is not basic; and the value of W is to be computed by appealing only to those parts of W that have basic intrinsic value.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Gilbert Harman was one of the first explicitly to discuss basic intrinsic value when he pointed out the apparent need to invoke such value if we are to avoid distortions in our evaluations (Harman 1967). However, he offers no precise account of the concept of basic intrinsic value and ends his paper by saying that he can think of no way to show that nonbasic intrinsic value is to be computed in terms of the summation of basic intrinsic value. Several philosophers have since tried to do better. Many have argued that nonbasic intrinsic value cannot always be computed by summing basic intrinsic value. Suppose that states of affairs can bear intrinsic value. Let X be the state of affairs of John being pleased to a certain degree x, and Y be the state of affairs of Jane being displeased to a certain degree y, and suppose that X has a basic intrinsic value of 10 and Y a basic intrinsic value of −20. It seems reasonable to sum these values and attribute an intrinsic value of −10 to the conjunctive state of affairs X&Y. But what of the disjunctive state of affairs XvY or the negative state of affairs ~X? How are their intrinsic values to be computed? Summation seems to be a nonstarter in these cases. Nonetheless, attempts have been made even in such cases to show how the intrinsic value of a complex whole is to be computed in a nonsummative way in terms of the basic intrinsic values of simpler states, thus preserving the idea that basic intrinsic value is the key to the computation of all intrinsic value (Quinn 1974, Chisholm 1975, Oldfield 1977, Carlson 1997). (These attempts have generally been based on the assumption that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value. Matters would be considerably more complicated if it turned out that entities of several different ontological categories could all have intrinsic value.)

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Suggestions as to how to compute nonbasic intrinsic value in terms of basic intrinsic value of course presuppose that there is such a thing as basic intrinsic value, but few have attempted to provide an account of what basic intrinsic value itself consists in. Fred Feldman is one of the few (Feldman 2000; cf. Feldman 1997, pp. 116–18). Subscribing to the view that only states of affairs bear intrinsic value, Feldman identifies several features that any state of affairs that has basic intrinsic value in particular must possess. He maintains, for example, that whatever has basic intrinsic value must have it to a determinate degree and that this value cannot be “defeated” by any Moorean organic unity. In this way, Feldman seeks to preserve the idea that intrinsic value is summative after all. He does not claim that all intrinsic value is to be computed by summing basic intrinsic value, but he does insist that the value of entire worlds is to be computed in this way.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Despite the detail in which Feldman characterizes the concept of basic intrinsic value, he offers no strict analysis of it. Others have tried to supply such an analysis. For example, by noting that, even if it is true that only states have intrinsic value, it may yet be that not all states have intrinsic value, Zimmerman suggests (to put matters somewhat roughly) that basic intrinsic value is the intrinsic value had by states none of whose proper parts have intrinsic value (Zimmerman 2001, ch. 5). On this basis he argues that disjunctive and negative states in fact have no intrinsic value at all, and thereby seeks to show how all intrinsic value is to be computed in terms of summation after all.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

5. How Is Intrinsic Value to Be Computed?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Two final points. First, we are now in a position to see why it was said above (in Section 2) that perhaps not all intrinsic value is nonderivative. If it is correct to distinguish between basic and nonbasic intrinsic value and also to compute the latter in terms of the former, then there is clearly a respectable sense in which nonbasic intrinsic value is derivative. Second, if states with basic intrinsic value account for all the value that there is in the world, support is found for Chisholm’s view (reported in Section 2) that some ontological version of Moore’s isolation test is acceptable.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

6. What Is Extrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

At the beginning of this article, extrinsic value was said simply—too simply—to be value that is not intrinsic. Later, once intrinsic value had been characterized as nonderivative value of a certain, perhaps moral kind, extrinsic value was said more particularly to be derivative value of that same kind. That which is extrinsically good is good, not (insofar as its extrinsic value is concerned) for its own sake, but for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way. For example, the goodness of helping others in time of need is plausibly thought to be extrinsic (at least in part), being derivative (at least in part) from the goodness of something else, such as these people’s needs being satisfied, or their experiencing pleasure, to which helping them is related in some causal way.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

6. What Is Extrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Two questions arise. The first is whether so-called extrinsic value is really a type of value at all. There would seem to be a sense in which it is not, for it does not add to or detract from the value in the world. Consider some long chain of derivation. Suppose that the extrinsic value of A can be traced to the intrinsic value of Z by way of B, C, D… Thus A is good (for example) because of B, which is good because of C, and so on, until we get to Y’s being good because of Z; when it comes to Z, however, we have something that is good, not because of something else, but “because of itself,” i.e., for its own sake. In this sort of case, the values of A, B, …, Y are all parasitic on the value of Z. It is Z’s value that contributes to the value there is in the world; A, B, …, Y contribute no value of their own. (As long as the value of Z is the only intrinsic value at stake, no change of value would be effected in or imparted to the world if a shorter route from A to Z were discovered, one that bypassed some letters in the middle of the alphabet.)

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

6. What Is Extrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Why talk of “extrinsic value” at all, then? The answer can only be that we just do say that certain things are good, and others bad, not for their own sake but for the sake of something else to which they are related in some way. To say that these things are good and bad only in a derivative sense, that their value is merely parasitic on or reflective of the value of something else, is one thing; to deny that they are good or bad in any respectable sense is quite another. The former claim is accurate; hence the latter would appear unwarranted.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

6. What Is Extrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

If we accept that talk of “extrinsic value” can be appropriate, however, a second question then arises: what sort of relation must obtain between A and Z if A is to be said to be good “because of” Z? It is not clear just what the answer to this question is. Philosophers have tended to focus on just one particular causal relation, the means-end relation. This is the relation at issue in the example given earlier: helping others is a means to their needs being satisfied, which is itself a means to their experiencing pleasure. The term most often used to refer to this type of extrinsic value is “instrumental value,” although there is some dispute as to just how this term is to be employed. (Remember also, from Section 3 above, that on some views “instrumental value” may refer to a type of intrinsic, or final, value.) Suppose that A is a means to Z, and that Z is intrinsically good. Should we therefore say that A is instrumentally good? What if A has another consequence, Y, and this consequence is intrinsically bad? What, especially, if the intrinsic badness of Y is greater than the intrinsic goodness of Z? Some would say that in such a case A is both instrumentally good (because of Z) and instrumentally bad (because of Y). Others would say that it is correct to say that A is instrumentally good only if all of A’s causal consequences that have intrinsic value are, taken as a whole, intrinsically good. Still others would say that whether something is instrumentally good depends not only on what it causes to happen but also on what it prevents from happening (cf. Bradley 1998). For example, if pain is intrinsically bad, and taking an aspirin puts a stop to your pain but causes nothing of any positive intrinsic value, some would say that taking the aspirin is instrumentally good despite its having no intrinsically good consequences.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

6. What Is Extrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

Many philosophers write as if instrumental value is the only type of extrinsic value, but that is a mistake. Suppose, for instance, that the results of a certain medical test indicate that the patient is in good health, and suppose that this patient’s having good health is intrinsically good. Then we may well want to say that the results are themselves (extrinsically) good. But notice that the results are of course not a means to good health; they are simply indicative of it. Or suppose that making your home available to a struggling artist while you spend a year abroad provides him with an opportunity he would otherwise not have to create some masterpieces, and suppose that either the process or the product of this creation would be intrinsically good. Then we may well want to say that your making your home available to him is (extrinsically) good because of the opportunity it provides him, even if he goes on to squander the opportunity and nothing good comes of it. Or suppose that someone’s appreciating the beauty of the Mona Lisa would be intrinsically good. Then we may well want to say that the painting itself has value in light of this fact, a kind of value that some have called “inherent value” (Lewis 1946, p. 391; cf. Frankena 1973, p. 82). (“Inherent value” may not be the most suitable term to use here, since it may well suggest intrinsic value, whereas the sort of value at issue is supposed to be a type of extrinsic value. The value attributed to the painting is one that it is said to have in virtue of its relation to something else that would supposedly be intrinsically good if it occurred, namely, the appreciation of its beauty.) Many other instances could be given of cases in which we are inclined to call something good in virtue of its relation to something else that is or would be intrinsically good, even though the relation in question is not a means-end relation.

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value

6. What Is Extrinsic Value?

value-intrinsic-extrinsic

First published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

One final point. It is sometimes said that there can be no extrinsic value without intrinsic value. This thesis admits of several interpretations. First, it might mean that nothing can occur that is extrinsically good unless something else occurs that is intrinsically good, and that nothing can occur that is extrinsically bad unless something else occurs that is intrinsically bad. Second, it might mean that nothing can occur that is either extrinsically good or extrinsically bad unless something else occurs that is either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad. On both these interpretations, the thesis is dubious. Suppose that no one ever appreciates the beauty of Leonardo’s masterpiece, and that nothing else that is intrinsically either good or bad ever occurs; still his painting may be said to be inherently good. Or suppose that the aspirin prevents your pain from even starting, and hence inhibits the occurrence of something intrinsically bad, but nothing else that is intrinsically either good or bad ever occurs; still your taking the aspirin may be said to be instrumentally good. On a third interpretation, however, the thesis might be true. That interpretation is this: nothing can occur that is either extrinsically good or extrinsically neutral or extrinsically bad unless something else occurs that is either intrinsically good or intrinsically neutral or intrinsically bad. This would be trivially true if, as some maintain, the nonoccurrence of something intrinsically either good or bad entails the occurrence of something intrinsically neutral. But even if the thesis should turn out to be false on this third interpretation, too, it would nonetheless seem to be true on a fourth interpretation, according to which the concept of extrinsic value, in all its varieties, is to be understood in terms of the concept of intrinsic value.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

It is important to clarify the levels at which a moral theory might be pluralistic. Let us distinguish between two levels of pluralism: foundational and non-foundational. Foundational pluralism is the view that there are plural moral values at the most basic level—that is to say, there is no one value that subsumes all other values, no one property of goodness, and no overarching principle of action. Non-foundational pluralism is the view that there are plural values at the level of choice, but these apparently plural values can be understood in terms of their contribution to one more fundamental value.[3]

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Judith Jarvis Thomson, a foundational pluralist, argues that when we say that something is good we are never ascribing a property of goodness, rather we are always saying that the thing in question is good in some way. If we say that a fountain pen is good we mean something different from when we say that a logic book is good, or a film is good. As Thomson puts it, all goodness is a goodness in a way. Thomson focusses her argument on Moore, who argues that when we say ‘x is good’ we do not mean ‘x is conducive to pleasure’, or ‘x is in accordance with a given set of rules’ and nor do we mean anything else that is purely descriptive. As Moore points out, we can always query whether any purely descriptive property really is good—so he concludes that goodness is simple and unanalyzable.[4] Moore is thus a foundational monist, he thinks that there is one non-natural property of goodness, and that all good things are good in virtue of having this property. Thomson finds this preposterous. In Thomson’s own words:

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Moore says that the question he will be addressing himself to in what follows is the question ‘What is good?’, and he rightly thinks that we are going to need a bit of help in seeing exactly what question he is expressing in those words. He proposes to help us by drawing attention to a possible answer to the question he is expressing—that is, to something that would be an answer to it, whether or not it is the correct answer to it. Here is what he offers us: “Books are good.” Books are good? What would you mean if you said ‘Books are good’? Moore, however, goes placidly on: “though [that would be] an answer obviously false; for some books are very bad indeed”. Well some books are bad to read or to look at, some are bad for use in teaching philosophy, some are bad for children. What sense could be made of a person who said, “No. no. I meant that some books are just plain bad things”? (Thomson 1997, pp. 275-276) 

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

According to Thomson there is a fundamental plurality of ways of being good. We cannot reduce them to something they all have in common, or sensibly claim that there is a disjunctive property of goodness (such that goodness is ‘goodness in one of the various ways’. Thomson argues that that could not be an interesting property as each disjunct is truly different from every other disjunct. Thomson (1997), p. 277). Thomson is thus a foundational pluralist—she does not think that there is any one property of value at the most basic level.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

W.D. Ross is a foundational pluralist in a rather complex way. Most straightforwardly, Ross thinks that there are several prima facie duties, and there is nothing that they all have in common: they are irreducibly plural. This is the aspect of Ross’s view that is referred to with the phrase, ‘Ross-style pluralism’. However, Ross also thinks that there are goods in the world (justice and pleasure, for example), and that these are good because of some property they share. Goodness and rightness are not reducible to one another, so Ross is a pluralist about types of value as well as about principles.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Writers do not always make the distinction between foundational and other forms of pluralism, but as well as Thomson and Ross, at least Bernard Williams (1981), Charles Taylor (1982), Charles Larmore (1987), John Kekes (1993), Michael Stocker (1990 and 1997), David Wiggins (1997) and Christine Swanton (2001) are all committed to foundational pluralism.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Non-foundational pluralism is less radical—it posits a plurality of bearers of value. In fact, almost everyone accepts that there are plural bearers of value. This is compatible with thinking that there is only one ultimate value. G.E. Moore (1903), Thomson’s target, is a foundational monist, but he accepts that there are non-foundational plural values. Moore thinks that there are many different bearers of value, but he thinks that there is one property of goodness, and that it is a simple non-natural property that bearers of value possess in varying degrees. Moore is clear that comparison between plural goods proceeds in terms of the amount of goodness they have.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

This is not to say that the amount of goodness is always a matter of simple addition. Moore thinks that there can be organic unities, where the amount of goodness contributed by a certain value will vary according to the combination of values such as love and friendship. Thus Moore’s view is pluralist at the level of ordinary choices, and that is not without interesting consequences. (I shall return to the issue of how a foundational monist like Moore can account for organic unities in section 2.1.)

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Mill, a classic utilitarian, could be and often has been interpreted as thinking that there are irreducibly different sorts of pleasure. Mill argues that there are higher and lower pleasures, and that the higher pleasures (pleasures of the intellect as opposed to the body) are superior, in that higher pleasures can outweigh lower pleasures regardless of the quantity of the latter. As Mill puts it: “It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.” (2002, p. 241). On the foundational pluralist interpretation of Mill, there is not one ultimate good, but two (at least): higher and lower pleasures. Mill goes on to give an account of what he means:

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

If I am asked, what I mean by difference in quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. (2002, p. 241).

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

The passage is ambiguous, it is not clear what role the expert judges play in the theory. On the pluralist interpretation of this passage we must take Mill as intending the role of the expert judges as a purely heuristic device: thinking about what such people would prefer is a way of discovering which pleasures are higher and which are lower, but the respective values of the pleasure is independent of the judges’ judgment. On a monist interpretation we must understand Mill as a preference utilitarian: the preferences of the judges determine value. On this interpretation there is one property of value (being preferred by expert judges) and many bearers of value (whatever the judges prefer).[5]

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Before moving on, it is worth noting that a theory might be foundationally monist in its account of what values there are, but not recommend that people attempt to think or make decisions on the basis of the supervalue. A distinction between decision procedures and criteria of right has become commonplace in moral philosophy. For example, a certain form of consequentialism has as its criterion of right action: act so as to maximize good consequences. This might invite the complaint that an agent who is constantly trying to maximize good consequences will often, in virtue of that fact, fail to do so. Sometimes concentrating too hard on the goal will make it less likely that the goal is achieved. A distinction between decision procedure and right action can provide a response—the consequentialist can say that the criterion of right action, (act so as to maximize good consequences) is not intended as a decision procedure—the agent should use whichever decision procedure is most likely to result in success. If, then, there is some attraction or instrumental advantage from the point of view of a particular theory to thinking in pluralist terms, then it is open to that theory to have a decision procedure that deals with apparently plural values, even if the theory is monist in every other way. [6]

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

One final clarification about different understandings of pluralism ought to be made. There is an ambiguity between the name for a group of values and the name for one unitary value. There are really two problems here: distinguishing between the terms that refer to groups and the terms that refer to individuals (a merely linguistic problem) and defending the view that there really is  a candidate for a unitary value (a metaphysical problem). The linguistic problem comes about because in natural language we may use a singular term as ‘shorthand’: conceptual analysis may reveal that surface grammar does not reflect the real nature of the concept. For example, we use the term ‘well-being’ as if it refers to one single thing, but it is not hard to see that it may not. ‘Well-being’ may be a term that we use to refer to a group of things such as pleasure, health, a sense of achievement and so on. A theory that tells us that well-being is the only value may only be nominally monist. The metaphysical question is more difficult, and concerns whether there are any genuinely unitary values at all.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

The metaphysical question is rather different for naturalist and non-naturalist accounts of value. On Moore’s non-naturalist account, goodness is a unitary property but it is not a natural property: it is not empirically available to us, but is known by a special faculty of intuition. It is very clear that Moore thinks that goodness is a genuinely unitary property:

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

‘Good’, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of ‘definition’ is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense ‘good’ has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. (Moore, 1903, p. 9)

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

The question of whether there could be such a thing is no more easy or difficult than any question about the existence of non-natural entities. The issue of whether the entity is genuinely unitary is not an especially difficult part of that issue.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

By contrast, naturalist views do face a particular difficulty in giving an account of a value that is genuinely unitary. On the goods approach, for example, the claim must be that there is one good that is genuinely singular, not a composite of other goods. So for example, a monist hedonist must claim that pleasure really is just one thing. Pleasure is a concept we use to refer to something we take to be in the natural world, and conceptual analysis may or may not confirm that pleasure really is one thing. Perhaps, for example,  we refer both to intellectual and sensual experiences as pleasure. Or, take another good often suggested by proponents of the goods approach to value, friendship. It seems highly unlikely that there is one thing that we call friendship, even if there are good reasons to use one umbrella concept to refer to all those different things. Many of the plausible candidates for the good seem plausible precisely because they are very broad terms. If a theory is to be properly monist then, it must have an account of the good that is satisfactorily unitary.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

The problem applies to the deontological approach to value too. It is often relatively easy to determine whether a principle is really two or more principles in disguise—the presence of a conjunction or a disjunction, for example, is a clear giveaway. However, principles can contain terms that are unclear. Take for example a deontological theory that tells us to respect friendship. As mentioned previously, it is not clear whether there is one thing that is friendship or more than one, so it is not clear whether this is one principle about one thing, or one principle about several things, or whether it is really more than one principle.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

Questions about what makes individuals individuals and what the relationship is between parts and wholes have been discussed in the context of metaphysics but these issues have not been much discussed in the literature on pluralism and monism in moral philosophy. However, these issues are implicit in discussions of the well-being, nature of friendship and pleasure, and in the literature on Kant’s categorical imperative, or on Aristotelian accounts of eudaimonea. Part of an investigation into the nature of these things is an investigation into whether there really is one thing or not. [7]

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

The upshot of this brief discussion is that monists must be able to defend their claim that the value they cite is genuinely one value. There may be fewer monist theories than it first appears. Further, the monist must accept the implications of a genuinely monist view. As Ruth Chang points out, (2015, p. 24) the simpler the monist’s account of the good is, the less likely it is that the monist will be able to give a good account of the various complexities in choice that seem an inevitable part of our experience of value. But on the other hand, if the monist starts to admit that the good is complex, the view gets closer and closer to being a pluralist view.

Value Pluralism

1. Some Preliminary Clarifications

1.2 A Purely Verbal Dispute?

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

However, the dispute between monists and pluralists is not merely verbal: there is no prima facie reason to think that there are no genuinely unitary properties, goods or principles.

Value Pluralism

2. The Attraction of Pluralism

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

If values are plural, then choices between them will be complex. Pluralists have pressed the point that choices are complex, and so we should not shy away from the hypothesis that values are plural. In brief, the attraction of pluralism is that it seems to allow for the complexity and conflict that is part of our moral experience. We do not experience our moral choices as simple additive puzzles. Pluralists have argued that there are incommensurabilities and discontinuities in value comparisons, value remainders (or residues) when choices are made, and complexities in appropriate responses to value. Recent empirical work confirms that our ethical experience is of apparently irreducible plural values. (See Gill and Nichols, 2008.)

Value Pluralism

2. The Attraction of Pluralism

2.1 Discontinuities

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

John Stuart Mill suggested that there are higher and lower pleasures (Mill, 2002, p. 241), the idea being that the value of higher and lower pleasures is measured on different scales. In other words, there are discontinuities in the measurement of value. As mentioned previously, it is unclear whether we should interpret Mill as a foundational pluralist, but the notion of higher and lower pleasures is a very useful one to illustrate the attraction of thinking that there are discontinuities in value. The distinction between higher and lower pleasures allows us to say that no amount of lower pleasures can outweigh some amount of higher pleasures. As Mill puts it, it is better to be an unhappy human being than a happy pig. In other words, the distinction allows us to say that there are discontinuities in value addition. As James Griffin (1986, p. 87) puts it: “We do seem, when informed, to rank a certain amount of life at a very high level above any amount of life at a very low level.” Griffin’s point is that there are discontinuities in the way we rank values, and this suggests that there are different values.[8] The phenomenon of discontinuities in our value rankings seems to support pluralism: if higher pleasures are not outweighed by lower pleasures, that suggests that they are not the same sort of thing. For if they were just the same sort of thing, there seems to be no reason why lower pleasures will not eventually outweigh higher pleasures.

Value Pluralism

2. The Attraction of Pluralism

2.1 Discontinuities

value-pluralism

First published Tue Jun 20, 2006; substantive revision Wed Feb 7, 2018

The most extreme form of discontinuity is incommensurability or incomparability, when two values cannot be ranked at all. Pluralists differ on whether pluralism entails incommensurabilities, and on what incommensurability entails for the possibility of choice. Griffin denies that pluralism entails incommensurability (Griffin uses the term incomparability) whereas other pluralists embrace incommensurability, but deny that it entails that rational choice is impossible. Some pluralists accept that there are sometimes cases where incommensurability precludes rational choice. We shall return to these issues in Section 4.