elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1045008

201210

1201-1800

TEB.Airport

NJ

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90

Air Taxi

Beechjet 400

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Initial Climb

SID RUUDY FOUR

Class D TEB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1045008

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1045005.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

This event occurred on initial climb off of Runway 24 at TEB. On departure the crew inadvertently overshot the initial altitude by a small amount and quickly corrected back to the appropriate altitude. The departure procedure was continued and the crew was not queried by ATC.

During the climb on the RUUDY4 departure from Runway 24 in TEB we inadvertently exceeded the initial altitude in the level off. We overshot and recovered to 1;500 FT very quickly. We continued the flight normally and assumed that our altitude was in limits. We were not made aware of any error until we were advised today by our Director of Safety.

BE400 First Officer reports slightly overshooting the initial level off altitude on departure from Runway 24 at TEB.

1575306

201809

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Engine Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 15000

Situational Awareness

1575306

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft

After landing and clearing [the] runway; we momentarily stopped awaiting ATC instructions for taxi to the gate. When ready to proceed; throttles were advanced but both engines were unresponsive. Both engines were stuck at 20.2% N1; idle. Throttles were moved several times both together and individually with no engine response. Both reverser and both engine control lights on the aft overhead engine panel were illuminated. Both EECS were manually selected to ALTN and when throttles were again moved; the engines responded. Total time from stopping the aircraft to regaining engine control was probably less than 60 seconds. The manual selection on ALTN and the regaining of throttle response may have been purely coincidental as it was discovered later by maintenance that that there were 6 thrust reverser 'stow' faults. It appears that the cause was a bad Engine Accessory Unit (EAU).

B737 Captain reported that after landing both engines were unresponsive to throttle input.

1717583

202001

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1717583

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I was the PF (Pilot Flying); the First Officer was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). During climbout we noticed fumes that would not dissipate. We contacted the flight attendants and asked them if they smelled anything. They said there was an exhaust smell throughout the entire cabin and that they and a passenger were experiencing adverse symptoms. We transferred control and I ran the Smoke; Fire or Fumes in Passenger Cabin or Flight Deck checklist. Through the checklist we decided to divert back to our origination airport. I found the Air Quality Event checklist and referenced that. We advised ATC and requested ARFF to meet the aircraft. We had an uneventful overweight landing. We had a large margin in our landing data. All passengers were offered medical assistance. To my knowledge all declined. Our three flight attendants asked to be medically evaluated due to varying degrees of dizziness; burning eyes; burning throats; light headedness; etc. Two flight attendants were given oxygen. All flight attendants declined transport to the hospital. We debriefed over the event. The Smoke; Fire or Fumes in Passenger Cabin or Flight Deck checklist was ran. In the moment there was confusion about a part of the checklist regarding turning on all lights in the cabin. It was daylight and since we did not know the origin of the smell we elected not to have all lights turned on. The reasoning was not clear at the time why the checklist was directing that action. We were within minutes of landing so we elected to take the safest course of action to continue with the checklist. We believed the smell to be dissipating after completing the checklist items. During the debrief the flight attendants thought the smell was intensifying with the aircraft below 10;000. Inflight; the flight attendants had said the smell was consistent.The cause was unknown; even after a ground-run of the aircraft. Recommendations would be for a small note to be added for the reasoning of turning on the cabin lights. I can only speculate about the reasoning at this point. Another strong recommendation would be for checklists like the 'Air Quality Event' and security 'Threat Levels' to be in more accessible 'books' than the FOM. They share a lot of similarities. They are run and used like checklists; they are both difficult to find and both have time critical information in them. Events like smoke and fumes have a lot of moving parts to juggle and it would be safer if information found in the checklists were more intuitive to find instead of being part of the treasure hunt that are our manuals.

Air carrier Captain reported a fumes event resulting in a return to the departure airport.

1224768

201412

1201-1800

A80.TRACON

GA

3000.0

Daylight

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ATL

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ATL

Facility A80.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1224768

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy

Company Policy

I was working AR-V for my first session of the morning. We were in the middle of a small traffic 'bump.' Conditions on the approach were ideal. Excellent visibility; aircraft slowing predictably inside the marker with little compression. Aircraft X was cleared for the visual approach to follow traffic. At 10 miles; I noticed he was a little slower to bleed speed off than the other aircraft; so instead of using 180 knots as I normally do; I slowed him to 170 to build an extra 1/2 mile. Spacing was fine; so I switched him to tower (I believe) 'at AJAAY' (the FAF). I noticed his speed slow to 140 knots across the ground. I told Aircraft X to 'don't cheat; I need 170 knots to the FAF.' There was no answer. I called the LC responsible for the runway and said Aircraft X either needed to do the assigned 170 knots to the FAF or he needed to turn to a 360 heading and climb to 4000. He sped up. Behind him was Aircraft Y. Thinking he would be heavy and a little faster inside the FAF; I told them Aircraft X had slowed early but I had extra room behind him. I told him speed was his discretion and switched him to tower. Behind Aircraft Y was Aircraft Z. Aircraft Z was 5+ in trail of Aircraft Y. We use RECAT at ATL. I'm allowed in IFR conditions to use 3.5 in trail of this type aircraft. When volume is light; I typically try to get closer to the old standard of separation. I told Aircraft Z what happened ahead of him and also offered him additional speed reduction if he wanted it. Aircraft Z was on a visual approach following the traffic; so while I could let that compress to the point the lead aircraft barely clears the runway; I don't do that. After Aircraft Z; I had 4 miles in trail; so I was back to normal at that point. I was relieved for a scheduled break shortly after this. At ATL; we have high speed taxiways that are built at ideal places. It's not unusual to have aircraft 1.5 in trail and both land. We've had awful problems with [Aircraft X and Z company] not complying with ATC instructions. When [Company] came to ATL; they told us how they were going to fly their airplanes. Well; at the busiest airport in the world; we'll do what we can; but it's about efficiency of all users; and if that means 180 knots instead of 170 knots to the FAF; then that's what we need. Today; however; was blatant and affected not just the two airplanes behind; but my sequence behind him. I advised the supervisor of the situation; and I believe they were going to 'talk' to the crews. I say the time to 'talk' is past. If [company] is going to do whatever they want; it's time to start sending a message that when an ATC clearance is received you do it. If you can't; you ask for something else. You don't just do it and not tell anyone what you're doing. Violating the pilots is the last option. I don't like resorting to that; but [company] leaves us few other options. [Company] is not the only user at Atlanta. They need to comply with instructions and yield to the way we do business. We've done it for quite a while and we're pretty good at it.

A80 Controller describes a situation where an aircraft slows; slower than the assigned speed and causes problems for traffic that is following.

1804056

202104

1801-2400

ALW.Airport

WA

0.0

VMC

10

Night

25000

UNICOM ALW

Personal

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 409; Flight Crew Type 196

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1804056

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Horizontal 500

N

Person Flight Crew

Other landing

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While doing a training flight at night a maintenance vehicle entered the runway while aircraft were actively doing touch and goes and stop and goes. After landing with my student the vehicle announced that he was taking the runway while we were still stopped on the runway itself. I notified over the radio that I was stopped on the runway and the vehicle continued. Then another student from the same flight school was forced to do a go around because the vehicle entered the runway while he was on final. An attempt to contact the airport manager was made but they did not try to reach out. This could have ended very differently but the maintenance vehicle made a very unsafe situation.

A Flight Instructor reported a vehicle entered the active runway at a non towered airport without communicating while their aircraft was stopped on the runway. Another aircraft had to go around due to the vehicle on the runway.

1632458

201903

0001-0600

MSY.Airport

LA

1200.0

Tower MSY

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B MSY

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other Hovering

Class B MSY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1632458

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

After takeoff from ZZZ noticed a drone hovering at about 1;200 feet and about one half mile left of the departure path. The drone was not a factor for the aircraft. I informed the Tower of the drone.

B737-800 pilot reported a UAV in the vicinity of the airport during takeoff.

1684659

201909

1201-1800

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

245.0

150.0

41000.0

Mixed

Thunderstorm

Daylight

Center ZAB

Corporate

Learjet 35

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZAB

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2950; Flight Crew Type 1600

Situational Awareness

1684659

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While flying from MAXXO transition point after the departure from SDL; we were tracking towards TXO using our FMS. All of the sudden; we noticed that our position was uncertain and that we had no GPS signal. At the same time; we heard other aircraft reporting GPS jamming in the area so we reported experiencing the effects of GPS jamming as well. The ATC thanked us for the report and told us that we showed tracking correctly to the NAVAID. Soon after; we requested a deviation up to 10 degrees to the left to avoid a build up ahead of us. We were deviating for a while and were asked to go direct to TXO. We pressed direct in our FMS which showed a 079 track to TXO. Then we changed controllers. After about 10 minutes the new controller asked us where we were going. He said that we should be tracking 065 to TXO. By then we were quite close to the NAVAID. We repeated that we have FMS issues due to the GPS jamming and he gave us a heading of 095 and told us to proceed direct to our destination when able. We flew the 095 heading for about 15 minutes and once we regained GPS signal we proceeded on course.

Learjet Captain reported experiencing GPS jamming.

1122787

201310

0601-1200

BUR.Airport

CA

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C BUR; Class D VNY

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195

Confusion

1122787

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 233

Confusion

1122789.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Airport

Ambiguous

On approach into BUR; we were assigned 3;000 MSL until VNY and cleared the visual to Runway 8. We were number three on the approach. During the approach; we heard both aircraft in front of us report TCAS RA's over the VNY airport. Both aircraft reported 'climb' RA's. Both aircraft reported that there was no traffic in sight and ATC reported no conflicting traffic in the area. There were aircraft at VNY; but well below a TCAS issue. As we continued towards the runway; we paid close attention to the TCAS display. The only traffic on our display was traffic 2;000 FT below us. As we approached VNY; about one mile prior; a TCAS target popped up with an immediate 'Descend' RA. At no time was there a TA that we can remember and the traffic showed as +1 and almost immediately on our nose. There would have been almost no possible way to not see something at that position. I; as the Pilot Flying; disconnected the autopilot to comply with the RA. We did not see any traffic visually and ATC reported no traffic other than the low traffic at VNY. Although we were pretty confident there was something in the area giving false RA's; we complied as long as we could as we were descending over an active airport. The RA continued for what seemed like a long time even though we were well past any traffic on the display. Due to the location of the event; where we ended up and the fact that the RA was a descend; I decided that a go-around was not prudent due to the terrain north; south; and east of the airport. We were already fully configured for the approach. Once everything went away; we were about 1;500 AGL and about one dot low on the glide path. I leveled off and made the decision to continue to land as that appeared to be the safest course of action based on traffic; our location; and the unknown of what was causing all the RA's for multiple aircraft with no apparent traffic. This whole situation was very strange due to the fact that it happened to multiple aircraft. As the First Officer and I discussed this after the flight; we both agreed that even though the procedure for a RA on approach was a go-around; this situation was somewhat unique and we took the safest action based on what we knew at the time. I think if we had received a 'Climb RA' like the other aircraft; a go-around would have been appropriate. After landing; I called Dispatch and informed them of what happened so they could inform other Burbank arrivals to be aware of the issue.

On visual approach in VMC to Runway 8 at Burbank; we heard the preceding aircraft experience a RA and they initiated a go-around. Then they decided to continue the approach. The discussion with Tower ensued and they described what they had over Van Nuys; but no traffic was sighted by either the aircraft or Tower. Tower told us that the two preceding aircraft received RA's over Van Nuys; but he did not have any traffic to report. We continued the approach and crossed over Van Nuys at 3;000 FT and began down the glideslope. We were paying attention to the TCAS but saw no traffic. Once we started down; we got an RA directing a slight increased descent. I noticed on the TCAS; the traffic was on the First Officer side 200-300 FT lower than us. I looked outside; but could not see any traffic. The Captain increased the descent rate in an attempt to initially comply with the RA. The intruder aircraft now showed 300-500 FT lower than us as we continued our descent. The Captain decided to shallow the descent since we were slightly below the glide path at this time. The next time I noticed the intruder aircraft position on the TCAS; it had moved to 500 below us and was on the Captain's side of the aircraft. Then it disappeared and we never got a 'clear of conflict.' We then continued the visual approach and landed uneventfully. We relayed our experience to Tower. The following aircraft also experienced a TCAS Alert; but did not see any aircraft either. That was four aircraft with false TCAS Alerts on final that we heard of.

B737 flight crew reports a TCAS RA at 3;000 FT over VNY during approach to BUR; but no aircraft is sighted. The two aircraft preceding the B737 and one following also reported TCAS RA's over VNY with no traffic sighted.

1870580

202201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Turbulence; Windshear; 10

Daylight

20000

5000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 74; Flight Crew Total 380; Flight Crew Type 100

1870580

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Other landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Departed ZZZ at approx XA30 PST for ZZZ1. Weather briefing METAR on departure was calm winds but TAF had predicted crosswinds up to 20 kts. by XG00. ATIS on arrival to terminal area said wind 200/09 but some low level wind shear reported. ZZZ1 was landing XXR /XXL; so this was setup to be a quartering tailwind landing. I was setup to land with 10 flaps and on short final was doing about 90 kts. On 1 mile short final; wind check with tower was 190/10. Over the numbers I deployed full flaps and touched down at around 70 kts. I was honestly pleased with the setup and felt fully stabilized to make the landing safely and expected to use a lot of the 5500 ft. Runway to slow down. We touched down at the markers and started the ground roll without any problems. With 3 wheels down; flaps ft. will deployed; prop idle; I felt a gust from the left rear which I believed was 'weather vaning' the plane to the left and so I put in right rudder and had the controls down and away (full forward and turning to the right). I had not applied any brakes yet.The plane briefly tipped up so that the left main was no longer in contact with the Runway and the plane was rolling on the nose and right main only. I was concerned/scared that the plane was going to tip over. At this point the prop made contact with the Runway surface briefly. I estimate that we were doing between 40-50 kts. The plane righted itself on the centerline and we were able to taxi off at Taxiway1 and go to FBO without further incidentThoughts/reflections: Should I have deployed full flaps or just landed with 10 flaps? Should I have asked the tower for return to the pattern and land Runway XY (better with wind direction). I do not think a 'go round' was feasible as I was already on the ground and decelerating when the plane tipped to the right. Application of power would probably not been beneficial at this point. Future action: get additional training in cross wind landing; personal note to bug wind direction on HSI / PFD on final; and reset personal minimums for crosswind components.

Cessna 182 pilot reported encountering a wind gust from his left rear that lifted the aircraft enough to cause the propeller to strike the runway.

1319533

201512

0001-0600

GSP.Airport

SC

6.0

4500.0

VMC

10

Night

25000

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E GSP

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 333; Flight Crew Type 20

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1319533

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

During cruise flight; I noticed a bright green light; like a laser; low and off my left side that really grabbed my attention. I glanced down to see it coming from just in front of a house and then it ceased within a second or two. While staring at the area to try to determine if someone was really standing in the yard shooting me with a laser; I noticed another laser hit me from a different house nearby in the same subdivision. After about two seconds of the laser; it ceased and was followed by another laser within two seconds. This time it was red instead of green and short lived in duration.After seeing the second set of lasers coming from in front of a house and being red and green; I immediately thought of what it could be. Rather than a person with a laser pointer; I have seen several houses lit up with a holiday decoration that projects red and green laser beams on the house. If pointed incorrectly some of the lasers in the array could project over the house and into a cockpit.While the effects of the lasers were not noticeably damaging to my eyesight; they were certainly a great distraction in the cockpit. These could be a danger to flight if a pilot were to be in a critical phase of flight; such as a gusty crosswind approach and were hit with several beams from a nearby house to the airport. These could also cause alarm for a pilot operating near or in the Washington DC SFRA as these look like the laser warning system employed there. As I am a fan of freedom and do not believe the devices should be banned for homeowners; there should be a strong public campaign to educate owners and potential buyers of these laser decoration products about the dangers that they can pose to not just aircraft; but to pedestrians and automobile drivers if these devices are misused or misaimed.

Pilot reported of multiple laser lights of red and green color entering the cockpit while in flight. Pilot determined that they were holiday decorations that illuminate houses with possibly a misdirected light not hitting the house. Pilot would like the general public educated that these types of lights might pose a danger to aircraft; pedestrians; and automobiles.

1266785

201505

0001-0600

SAT.Airport

TX

0.0

Rain; 6

Night

10000

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1266785

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

After Landing on Runway 12R Ground control cleared [Aircraft X] to taxi to FBO via inner ramp Delta hold short of runway 12R at Delta. Next clearance was to taxi to FBO via Delta; cleared to cross runway 12R and runway 12L. After passing runway 12L boundary line a ground vehicle (pick Up Truck) rushed in front of our path. Brakes were rapidly applied to stop aircraft by captain. Ground control informed flight crew that ground vehicle was instructed to give way to Aircraft. Taxi was then continued with no further incident.

An Air Taxi Captain; while taxiing to the FBO after landing; had a ground vehicle rush in front of him on the taxiway. He applied brakes rapidly and was told by Ground Control that the ground vehicle had been told to give way to him.

1285412

201508

1801-2400

IAD.Airport

DC

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 3416

Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

1285412

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

The Captain requested from our lead flight attendant that we eat our meals after take-off. She informed us that she wasn't in charge of the galley; but would check. We heard back that they would 'need to make some room in the oven' as they were already full with the first class meals. She made mention that she may need to cook them in the back; but since we were boarding she couldn't cook them on the ground. The Captain stated that it was fine; because we didn't want our meals until after we took off. One hour after departure; I called back to query the status of the meals; as I was the non-flying pilot. I spoke with [a flight attendant] who said that the meals had been cooked and she was waiting on a blocker. I called again [20 minutes later] and [the flight attendant] answered the interphone. I told him we had been waiting for our meals for an hour and a half. He stated that [they] didn't have a blocker; as they were finishing cart service in the back and were coordinating to open the door in a few minutes. After parking at the gate I was waiting for the Captain on the jet bridge. [Two flight attendants] questioned him about the crew meals. [One] said that they weren't allowed to interrupt the passenger service to bring us our crew meals. [Flight attendant] then stated that I was 'rude' and 'demanding'. I could hear the entire conversation from the jet bridge. The Captain stated that we coordinated on the ground for the meals after take-off and they should have been brought to us sooner. Being forced to wait for meals is a safety issue and we shouldn't need to call back multiple times to question the status to take us away from our flying duties. Furthermore; I think it was unprofessional for [the flight attendants] to question the Captain about his request for the meals early and complain about the First Officer while the passengers were deplaning. It causes me concern and makes me question [whether] direction by the cockpit could have been followed in an emergency.

B737 First Officer reported difficulty getting the flight attendants to bring up crew meals in a timely fashion.

1189266

201407

1201-1800

EWR.Airport

NJ

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction

1189266

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

When cleared for the visual approach to [Runway] 4R in EWR at 3;000 FT on the way to intercept final; multiple targets started to paint on our TCAS between our 9 to 12 o'clock 500 FT to 1;000 FT below our altitude. Since the Captain was flying and I was monitoring I started to look for those aircraft (usually low altitude helicopters). At first I spotted a drone; small in size dark gray and very shiny flying south southwest opposite to our direction of flight; and it coincided with the direction and altitude of one of the targets on the TCAS. Shortly after I spotted two more of these drones around the same altitude flying also south southwest and they were no factor but I still pointed them out to the Captain. I felt the need to report it to Tower; like I would if I saw a flock of birds; so the aircraft approaching behind [could] exercise caution while during their approach. Once upon landing I was given a phone number to explain the shift ATC supervisor what I saw. The question was raised by several people about why a device like a drone would paint on the TCAS as they would also have to have a transponder. I fully understand the operation and capabilities of the TCAS-transponder relationship; so my only conclusion is that those drones had an operating transponder onboard. After landing during the debrief with my Captain; he says he only saw a 'balloon' and he would leave the phone call to ATC to me. The aircraft was never compromised; we didn't have to take evasive action and there was never an undesired aircraft state.

An air carrier First Officer on approach to EWR Runway 4R at 3;000 FT reported what appeared to be drones 500 FT to 1;000 FT below his aircraft's altitude at locations which coincided with TCAS targets.

1288967

201508

0001-0600

EUG.Tower

OR

0.0

Night

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Parked

None

Facility EUG.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1288967

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Ground Personnel

Other Post Flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Airport Ops called me on the land line and asked me if I had spoken to an Aircraft X. I did not recall speaking to an aircraft with that callsign; but I told him I'd check the tapes to verify. He informed me that he found the aircraft on the north ramp and believed that he had landed and taxied without any ATC authorization. According to airport ops there were 3 souls on the aircraft; 2 of which were deaf and mute and the third had no identification and he claimed that he was given ATC authorization to land.Upon further investigation we established that the aircraft entered the Class Delta airspace and landed without ever speaking to ATC. I did not see the aircraft since it was dark and he landed on the east runway which can be difficult to see aircraft during the day when you're looking for them.There's a lot you could do in this situation I think it was just a fluke occurrence.

EUG Tower Controller reported that he was questioned by Airport Operations if he had spoken to a particular aircraft. The Controller did not recall talking to the aircraft. Aircraft was found to be at the north ramp. Pilot stated he had ATC clearance to land. It was found out later that the pilot never talked to ATC.

1199501

201408

1201-1800

I90.TRACON

TX

12000.0

Marginal

Rain

Daylight

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR SKNRD2

Class E ZHU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1199501

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

We were deviating north of weather on SKNRD 2 arrival. Originally given AEX transition then it changed to direct EGULZ which is on the SWB transition. We joined the arrival at EGULZ. Then we needed more deviations. We were given a series of southerly courses and step down altitudes from our cruise altitude which I think was in the mid-30s. We then were instructed to fly direct DOOBI and descend maintain 12;000 feet. A minute or two after we were instructed to descend via the arrival. Which we complied with. We slowed our descent rate to comply with the arrival and intercept the VPI. We then switched from Houston Center to Houston Approach. We checked in with 'Houston Approach passing FL250 descending via the SKNRD 2 Arrival' We crossed DOOBI between the published altitudes of FL190-220 at 280 knots. At that time Approach asked us why weren't we at 12;000 feet crossing DOOBI. We explained we were given descend via with no restrictions by the previous controller. He told us he would look into it with the previous controller. Soon after another crew; behind us; busted the altitude as well with the same incorrect instructions issued from the previous controller. The major threat was the possibility of a RA or near miss because of the lack of communication between the two controllers. As a group we need to do better at making sure we are all on the same page with these arrivals. Especially when there is a weather event affecting them. They can be confusing especially with this new phraseology. Primarily the two controllers (center and approach) absolutely need to be on the same page. Or at least catch us checking on with incorrect instructions.

Air Carrier First Officer is informed by ATC that the assigned crossing restriction at DOOBI of 12;000 feet has been missed. The crew thought the clearance was to descend via the SKNRD 3 to maintain 12;000 feet and crossed DOOBI at the published altitude.

1078215

201304

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Antiskid System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

1078215

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Staffing

Aircraft

We received a Brake Control Fault message during climb out. The QRH stated the braking capability may be degraded. We contacted Dispatch via ACARS to notify them of our maintenance issue and to see if they wanted us to continue towards our destination which has very modest length runways. We attempted to get additional information from Flight Department/Maintenance regarding the fault and resulting landing performance but did not receive any input. We did receive a message from our Dispatcher that she was OK with us continuing to our short runway destination if we were. Ultimately; we made the decision to divert to another airport because of its longer runways and the fact we were unclear as to the possible degradation to landing/stopping performance.This aircraft had two previous write-ups that I saw in the logbook for the same Brake Control Fault issue; one the previous day. I think it would have been prudent to send this aircraft to somewhere other than our planned destination after the repair to the brake system the previous day. Finally; the volume of ACARS communications became impossible to keep up with while handling the emergency and flying the airplane. Input from the Flight Department would have been helpful after we requested it; essentially we were on our own.

When faced with a Brake Control Fault message enroute to an airport with short runways the flight crew of an ERJ-170 elected to divert to an airport with superior facilities. The decision to divert was made in part due to their inability to communicate effectively with Dispatch and Maintenance to determine the extent of the failure's threat to stopping distance; a subject of great importance given the modest runways at their destination. In the reporter's words '...essentially; we were on [our] own.'

1617758

201902

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

24000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Pneumatic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Workload

1617758

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Y

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Company Policy

Aircraft

Departed ZZZZ with BLEED 2 INOP (MEL); with both Packs operational. At FL240 we received a BLEED 1 FAIL caution message. I stopped the climb at 24;000 feet and informed Center; got approved to maintain FL240. First Officer was pilot flying. I ran the QRH and could NOT clear the message. I [advised] Center and initiated an emergency descent. Donned the crew masks; established communication and set XXXX on squawk. Informed the flight attendants via emergency button to prepare for emergency descent. Descended visually to 14;000 feet to avoid terrain. Called [Center] for MEA and was informed that it is 24;000 feet at my current position. Ran the QRH again with no success. QRH instructed us to use the APU BLEED and fly at maximum altitude of 15;000. I was unable due to terrain map maximum altitude of 16;000 feet in our current position. At that point decided to divert to ZZZZ1.Informed Company. Gave the [emergency information and instructions] to the flight attendants. 'Loss of pressurization; diverting to ZZZZ1. No BRACE; no EVACUATION required. We will be on the ground in 15 minutes.' I briefed the passengers over public address with the same message. Passing 10;000 feet we received a CREW OXY LO PRESS caution message. At this point I was forced to commit to an overweight landing with 76;400 pounds. I instructed the First Officer to aim to the threshold and come in flat so we can put the airplane smoothly on the ground. Great airmanship on the First Officer side allowed a perfect execution of this maneuver. We landed with 0-200 feet per minute descent rate. Taxied to a cleared area on the tarmac in ZZZZ1. Fire trucks were waiting for us on the scene. Called the passengers over the public address; 'Remain seated' three times. Got the 'Okay' signal from the Fire Rescue and Tower [that] there was no damage to the aircraft and that we are good to deplane. I then gave Ground Crew the okay to connect the air stairs. I called the Tower over the radio and degraded the [situation] back to normal. All souls plus 4 crew members deplaned the aircraft safely.After talking to Maintenance they mentioned that it was possible that both Packs were putting too much pressure on the BLEED 1 Valve. MEL 36-XX-XX-A and MEL 36-XX-XX-B DO NOT instruct us to use only one Pack. This is a serious problem in the Embraer 175 MEL instructions for a BLEED 1 (2) INOP. This emergency was a game changer for me with regard to dispatching an E-175 with one BLEED INOP. A change to the manual is required here to prevent this occurrence in the future. In my humble opinion; if one BLEED is INOP then the associated Pack should also be OFF manually by flight crew for as long as that BLEED is INOP; to prevent the operative BLEED source from failing.

Embraer E175 Captain reported a dual bleed failure resulting in a diversion and an overweight landing.

1747248

202006

1201-1800

ONL.Airport

NE

0.0

VMC

CTAF ONL

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1747248

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway

Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I was departing RWY 31 out of ONL; I made at least two calls on CTAF before taking the runway stating my intentions. As I lined up on the runway; I noticed several vehicles working at the far end of the field on both sides of the runway but they were all well clear of the safety area. Shortly after I started my takeoff roll; I noticed a large pickup truck pulling a trailer approach the runway at the far end. As I had made radio calls and was currently moving at about 80 kts in the opposite direction; I thought he was going to hold short; let me pass and then take the runway. He did not hold short. He did not even pause before taking an active runway; and ended up nose to nose with a rotating [aircraft]. It was unseasonably cool due to the passage of a recent storm so I was able to climb very quickly above him. Still; I would estimate the distance between us to be about 200 feet when I crossed over.What caused this event was the truck driver's lack of knowledge and experience with airport operations. I never heard any calls from him when he took the runway so it is a fairly safe assumption that he did not have a radio and did not hear my calls. Also a quick visual check to make sure the runway was clear in both directions as is standard practice could have prevented this.[I responded to the incursion by climbing] at VX and [hoping] I clear him.Train people who intend to operate on an airfield proper see and avoid techniques and have them monitor CTAF.

Pilot reported a runway incursion by a ground vehicle during takeoff roll.

1781538

202101

1801-2400

IAD.Tower

DC

Tower IAD

Corporate

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class B IAD

Tower IAD

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Landing

Visual Approach

Class B IAD

Facility IAD.TWR

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1781538

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Software and Automation

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X departed Runway 30 on an assigned 270 heading. Shortly after switching the aircraft to departure; I scanned the radar and saw Aircraft X turning through a 270 heading and continuing a left turn to the east directly into the arrival corridor for aircraft landing Runways 1L and 1C. At that moment; a controller at PCT; I think Departure Control contacted me. My initial thought was that Aircraft X had misunderstood my assigned heading and had not switched to Departure Control and was still on my frequency. While the controller was speaking to me other aircraft were talking on the frequency. The cross-talk prevented me from clearly understanding the information that was being relayed in the coordination. I heard the controller say climb the aircraft to 3;000 ft.; and turn him to the west immediately.Because I did not clearly hear the call sign of the aircraft he was referencing my mind jumped to Aircraft X as the aircraft needing the instructions. I immediately issued a climb and turn to Aircraft X and began issuing traffic alerts. Midway through issuing the traffic alerts I recognized that Aircraft X was descending and turning to join final for Runway 1L. In that instance I recognized what Departure Control was trying to coordinate and I sent Flight Number X around and vectored him away from Aircraft X and issued a traffic alert.Aircraft X checked onto my frequency on a mile final. I cleared him to land. Immediately after clearing him to land; the ASDE-X alerted with a taxiway proximity alert. It appeared to me that Aircraft X was correcting back toward Runway 1L. I asked the pilot if they requested priority handling. The pilot said no. The aircraft appeared aligned with the runway and the pilot confirmed they were; but because he was not a priority. I sent the plane around as required by the 7110.65. Coordination would have been easier and clearer had the radar data tag scratchpad entry for Aircraft X been changed to '01L' which would have indicated that he was inbound to land. The scratchpad showed the SID he filed; which contributed to my initial thinking that he was off course and not a priority. Additionally; had Departure Control requested priority handling in the coordination; I believe I would have immediately keyed onto the fact that Aircraft X was returning.The Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-X) ASDE Taxiway Arrival Prediction Software (ATAP) has had five alerts since its implementation on Date. In every case; the aircraft have been properly aligned with the runway and the alerts have been the result of poorly designed taxiway capture zones. The ATAP enhancement should be temporarily disabled and a full review of the ATAP system should occur.

A Tower Local Controller reported a departure deviated from its clearance and turned back to the airport to land and into confliction with an arrival on final approach.The Tower received an alert from an automated system (ASDE X ATAP) warning that the aircraft was aligned with a taxiway and not the runway although the aircraft had corrected back to course. The reporter states that false alerts from the ASDE X ATAP (Airport Surface Detection Equipment Taxiway Arrival Prediction Software) is a recurring issue.

1265440

201505

Rain; Thunderstorm

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

1265440

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure; Weather

Company Policy

I have been working at IAH for almost 15 years and the most dissatifaction I get is when so much time taken to close the ramp even if lightining strikes are so close and visible above our heads and within the airport area.This must be addressed on a war basis as human life have priority over operation and customer service; last night due to the major thunderstorm I heard several heated conversations over the radio that should not have taken place if timely decison was taken.I hear that there are lights installed to caution lightining strikes but to be honest a better commuication and alert methodology must be adopted.Given the tools and technology close to error free forecasting gives an idea as to where we are headed in terms of operation.

A IAH Ramp Agent reported that his company is slow to clear ramp personnel to safety with lightning in the vicinity even when it is close; over head and within the airport area.

1583815

201810

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

4500.0

VMC

10

Night

25000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

DA42 Twin Star

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Propeller Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Total 550.5

1583815

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft

I was in cruise with my student and another instructor in the backseat as well. I noticed we were about 25-30 miles southwest of ZZZ airport and decided I had enough time to simulate an engine [failure]; feather it; and then do a restart. So; I simulated the engine failure by bringing the left throttle to idle; and my student went through all the checklists to identify and verify the engine and do a simulation of restarting the engine; and then deciding to actually feather the engine which is what I wanted him to do. After doing the items for feathering I noticed after about 5 seconds that the propeller was still moving freely and not feathering or shutting off completely. After noticing this; I still had my student keep the controls and go through the checklists for doing an actual restart; and as we were going through these checklist a 'L ALTN FAIL' and 'L OIL PRESS' enunciated on the PFD. Once seeing this; I also tried going through a re-feather checklist to see if I could get the engine to feather since it could help to fly the aircraft smoother. After that failed to work; I told my student I had controls and we gave each other positive control exchange; and asked him to find the alternator failure checklist. After telling me he could not find the checklist I noticed I was only 15 miles southwest at this point from ZZZ and so I asked the instructor in the back to call our head of safety manager to let him know what was happening and then I told my student what I was planning to do and to not touch the controls or rudder; and if I needed assistance I would ask for whatever I needed. I told Approach (we were on VFR flight following) that we were having left engine issues. The Controller asked me where I wanted to land. I told ATC at that time I was about 15 miles south of ZZZ and knowing we can keep straight and level flight that I wanted to continue to the airport. Continued to the airport and eventually asked ATC to switch frequencies to turn on the lights to see the airport/runway better. I eventually landed with no damage to the aircraft or injury to the two other passenger and taxied off of the runway and had to shutdown since it was impossible to taxi with just the right engine. We were off the runway completely when deciding to shut it down. We were towed back by our company that night.

DA42 instructor pilot reported being unable to restore power to the left engine after a simulated engine failure in flight.

1420326

201701

1201-1800

GSP.Airport

SC

7000.0

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Night

TRACON GSP

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E GSP

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1420326

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather

We were arriving into GSP from the northwest. Our weather radar was painting a few small but severe thunderstorms (steep color gradients) between our location and the west side of the approach to land north at GSP. The storms were moving north. One strong cell was immediately to the west of the final approach. The east side of the airport and approach appeared to be free of the small thunderstorms. I requested deviations to the east to clear the area of thunderstorms by passing north of the field by 20 miles or so. We were at 7000 ft at this time and experiencing moderate turbulence with +/- 10-15 kt airspeed changes. During the deviation to the east we received a couple of severe turbulence encounters. We were on the autopilot yet the aircraft rolled 30 degrees right and then 35-40 degrees left in 1-1.5 seconds. We extended our diversion further east; eventually being handed off to Charlotte (CLT) approach. During the diversion we were able to pick up the northern edge of the thunderstorms on the extreme right side of the weather radar. The colors displayed were levels 4 (red) and 5 (magenta). The advancing storms were too close to maneuver to get a better view of the area to the west and southwest towards GSP. CLT informed us that the weather was still approaching from the south and they were planning on closing the arrivals down after the last few airplanes landed. CLT approach had weather radar capability and they recommended we divert to ZZZ as it was in the clear still.ZZZ was closer than our filed alternate at this point. We coordinated with dispatch; our FA and the cabin our intent to divert to ZZZ. The FA informed us there were no injuries and everyone was ok in the cabin. We diverted to ZZZ for refueling and to let the weather pass the area.

CRJ-200 Captain reported deviating to an alternate airport after encountering weather at GSP.

1491190

201710

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

6000.0

Mixed

Cloudy; 10

Daylight

30000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 775; Flight Crew Type 200

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1491190

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

ATC issued vectors; fly-heading 320. I lost situational awareness when entering a cloud; momentarily lost directional control and inadvertently turned westbound. I was correcting as ATC queried my direction; headed back to 320 heading. ATC issued modification to clearance: vectors to an intersection; [then] direct. I lost situational awareness and proceeded direct to [the intersection] until ATC queried my direction. I then corrected and flew [assigned] vectors.Cause: When I entered the cloud; I failed to go to the artificial horizon immediately and quickly began unintended turn. I became alarmed and further distracted; so I missed the instruction to follow vectors to [the intersection] and proceeded direct instead. This was poor instrument technique on my part followed by failure to get my emotions under control quickly in order to continue navigating correctly.

A Beach Bonanza pilot reported that he lost situational awareness when he entered a cloud.

1231103

201412

1801-2400

D10.TRACON

TX

10600.0

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E D10

Facility D10.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Radar 30

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1231103

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

The flight had been level for some time at the published altitude 11000 FT. I reduced his speed to 220 KTS and issued crossing traffic climbing to 10000 FT. The flight crew acknowledged the traffic and began descending into him. I do not believe we ever had less than standard separation; but I would love to know why a pilot would ever descend into traffic he just acknowledged.This is one of a constant stream of pilots that fail to comply with the published crossing altitudes on the new OAPM [Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex] procedures. They [the procedures] need to be immediately terminated until the real source of the problem can be identified and corrected. This is a safety hazard.

Following a B737NG flight crew's descent toward traffic climbing below them about which they had just advised; a D10 Approach Controller lamented the frequent failure of flight crews to comply with crossing restrictions as published in the new OAPM arrival.

1167984

201404

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Dawn

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Weather Radar

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1167984

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

During taxi out; we decided to turn on the Radar during our taxi out to make sure that it was operating correctly as we were going to be flying in an area were there was widespread heavy rain and embedded T-Storms. At this point in time we discovered that the Radar was only displaying STBY on the MFD and would not 'paint any weather or ground returns.' Since we were now aware that a piece of equipment on the aircraft wasn't working properly I followed the proper procedure and notified Dispatch that our Radar wasn't working and that we would need to return to the gate to call Maintenance via landline. The Dispatcher returned an ACARS message that there was nothing convective in the area and we should deal with it in the next station. This Dispatcher had no concern about what I considered a safe operation nor was he concerned with the legal standpoint of entering a maintenance discrepancy in the logbook and performing a proper MEL procedure. He wanted me to just go without a write-up. We returned to the gate to complete the maintenance logbook entry at which point in time Maintenance wanted to MEL it. The Maintenance Controller found it objectionable that I didn't feel it was safe to be flying the aircraft in the current weather conditions without an operable weather Radar; he went to switch me over to connect us with the Dispatcher for a conference call and did not realize that I was on the line while they discussed how I wouldn't fly the aircraft. The tone from the Maintenance Controller as well as the Dispatcher was not conducive to safety. It amounts to pilot pushing and creates a very unsafe work environment. They replaced the Radar control panel and the Radar worked perfectly all day after that. Dispatchers need to realize that when there is some sort of maintenance anomaly; that once it is known it needs to be addressed at that point in time by making the proper maintenance logbook entry and either applying an MEL or performing some sort of repair/reset function under the guidance of Maintenance Control. Also all parties need to realize that just because there is an MEL for a particular aircraft system such as the weather Radar; there are certain circumstances when that MEL provides no relief such as today. Some pilots; such as myself; require operating Radar when flying in conditions such as today with low ceilings; heavy rain; and embedded T-Storms. The Dispatcher's statement of 'it is just rain showers;' doesn't satisfy my safety requirements for avoiding convective activity without an operable Radar when I can't see and avoid the T-Storms due to solid IFR conditions.

CRJ-200 Captain reports returning to the gate after discovering the Radar is inoperative with heavy weather in the forecast. This action is met with some resistance by Dispatch and Maintenance Control. The Radar Control Panel was replaced and the Radar worked perfectly after that.

1243554

201503

1801-2400

FPR.Tower

FL

150.0

VMC

Night

300

Tower FPR

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

Training

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 10R

Final Approach

Class D FPR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1243554

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Instrument Training; Non-precision approaches; LOC intro. Student pilot lost situational awareness when descending to MDA from step down fix on the ILS/LOC 10R FPR approach: Instead of leveling off at 380 ft he descended steeply to almost 150 ft needing the instructor pilot to take the controls and recover safe flight path in order to prevent an imminent crash on short final. There was an unexpected broken cloud layer at about 300 ft that permitted to spot the runway intermittently (at times in sight; no visual cues other times). The student did very well shooting a previous approach though having the same type of unexpected weather; the difference was that we stayed above the clouds at all times watching the layer from atop whereas in the LOC we were flying through the clouds and close to the ground. First encounter with IMC by student pilot.To encourage pilots to follow school rules on wx minima to conduct a flight and to have a contingency plan in case unforeseen wx becomes an issue.

PA-28 instructor pilot reported his student descended steeply to 150 feet AGL during a practice non-precision instrument approach in IMC conditions.

1291952

201508

0001-0600

MDW.Airport

IL

0.0

Mixed

Night

Ramp MDW

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 232; Flight Crew Type 9600

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1291952

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Company Policy; Weather

Company Policy

We showed up to an aircraft going into MDW; with a current and forecast wet runway (BR); with 20.4 thousand pounds of tanker fuel already loaded on the aircraft. The METAR and TAF were calling for mist until 1.5 hours after scheduled land time. The FOM says we can't tanker with forecast runway conditions less than good. Wet-good is less than good. Therefore I considered this illegal. The Dispatcher put me on hold for six minutes to call the MDW Tower. He announced that the Tower was calling a dry runway at that moment and I was 'legal'. I called the Chief Pilot on Call and discussed the situation. Before we took off; our landing data showed a stopping margin of 140 feet and our actual stopping margin with MAX braking was only 40 feet! Although it was 'legal'; it was pushing the boundaries of being 'SAFE'. I was told that a total mishap would cost the company 2.5 billion dollars; yet Dispatch has no trouble pushing Aircrew right up to the edge of performance limits to save a few dollars. This dumps all the responsibility on the Captains; and the Dispatcher is bullet proof: 'legal'. We attend required training that emphasizes risk management and mitigation; yet our Dispatcher has no trouble pushing us right up to the safety LIMITS and exposing us to unnecessary risks. I'm writing this report because I think Dispatch was illegal to tanker fuel with the current and forecast weather reports indicating a wet runway. They increased our operational risk and pushed me into the corner as to whether I was going to even take the aircraft. I spent a lot of time on the phone with two calls to Dispatch and one to the Chief Pilot on Call; and we pushed late because of it. Moreover; it was on our minds while operating the flight; a very unnecessary distraction.Common sense would have gone a long way here. It is one thing to sit behind a desk and think of the world with a black and white perspective; legal versus illegal. It is another thing to actually have to fly the aircraft full of people counting on you to keep it out of the dirt. If the FOM says not to tanker fuel; we shouldn't do it. It is a safety issue. If the runway forecast is dry; the Dispatchers should back off the performance limit a bit and give the Pilots additional breathing room because flying is fluid in nature. The assumption that all conditional will be perfect is naïve.

An air carrier Captain questioned tankering fuel into MDW and landing on a wet runway with very little stopping margin.

1602058

201812

1201-1800

ROA.Airport

VA

5200.0

VMC

10

Night

CLR

Tower ROA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class C ROA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 1251; Flight Crew Type 345

Situational Awareness

1602058

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Descending into ROA on an extended left downwind for Runway 24 in VMC; level at 5;200 feet; we received a GPWS [Ground Proximity Warning System] warning 'Terrain; pull up.' Captain disengaged the autopilot increased power and began to climb. First Officer notified ATC of warning and altitude deviation; ATC acknowledged and told us 5;200 feet was minimum vectoring altitude for the area. Returned to assigned altitude and continued on visual approach to [Runway] 24 with no further incident.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a GPWS while descending into ROA airport; ATC advised the altitude they were at was at the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1806199

202105

SKBO.ARTCC

FO

40000.0

Turbulence

Center SKBO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1806199

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather

Shortly after commencing the initial descend from 40;000 on the ISVA3E for SKBO and no weather indicated on the radar; we hit turbulence causing the airplane to rapidly climb and then descend. I observed from the FC seat +/- 800 feet and +/- 10 knots of airspeed. The autopilot was engaged with LNAV/VNAV and VNAV PATH indicated on the FMA. The seatbelt sign was on. After the unexpected turbulence was over; the Captain asked me to call the Flight Attendants. #1 FA stated that it appeared two FAs were injured and that he would call back with the final assessment. A few minutes later #1 FA called back and stated two FAs and a passenger were indeed injured and required medical attention. I briefed the Captain and he directed me to have medics meet us at the gate. Upon arriving at gate; the medics boarded the airplane and only took the FAs to the local hospital.Cause - This was unexpected turbulence. Perhaps now in the summer months with convective weather in the area of SKBO; I will suggest to the Captain ask the FAs to remain seated from descend to landing.Night flying into SKBO could hide weather disturbances not shown in the radar; perhaps have the FAs finish service early and sit from descend to landing.

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing unexpected turbulence at FL400 during initial descent to SKBO airport.

1712787

201912

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Class B ZZZ

Indicating and Warning - Fuel System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 1737; Flight Crew Type 681

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1712787

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

At about 50 minutes into flight just north of ZZZ1 at FL350 we experienced a loss of our Left Fuel quantity gauge; and fuel totalizer. After conferring with QRH; Dispatch; and [Technical Support Maintenance Control]; it was determined that there was no inflight reset; and we did not feel comfortable continuing an Atlantic crossing without knowing the fuel quantity. We [Requested Priority Handling]; notified crew; and diverted to ZZZ where we made a safe overweight landing.

B757 First Officer reported the failure of the fuel quantity indicator; the return to departure airport and overweight landing.

1846353

202110

0601-1200

D01.TRACON

CO

21000.0

TRACON D01

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Ambulance

Descent

Class E ZDV

Center ZDV

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

2.0

IFR

Initial Climb

Class E ZDV

Facility D01.TRACON

Government

Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1846353

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I am reporting this event after it was brought to my attention by the controller working the sector. I reviewed and derived details of the event from the FALCON replay. XA:11Z: ZDV apreqs Aircraft X direct to APA as 'Critical' which would have the aircraft track over SOLAR on the D01/ZDV boundary. No altitude was specified. The DR4 controller accepts the apreq. This aircraft should have originally be assigned the ZOMBZ3 arrival. XA:21Z: DR4 conducts a position relief briefing without mentioning that an aircraft had been approved direct APA.XA:30Z: ZDV Sector 41 initiates a hand off of Aircraft X roughly 10 miles south of SOLAR descending out of FL240 to 17;000. ZDV41 calls DR4 and states that they weren't sure what was coordinated as the coordination was roughly 30 minutes prior; they also request control on Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y had been a departure from APA pointed out from SR4 to DR4 to climb to FL200 for the ALS transition; which routes over SOLAR southbound. This aircraft was in direct conflict with Aircraft X as Aircraft X was assigned 17;000 from ZDV without coordination. DR4 stops Aircraft X at FL210 as soon as the pilot checked in. No LoSS occurred.DR has to then vector and descend Aircraft X through several DEN departures well east of APA and sequence Aircraft X behind slower turboprop traffic because that was the only place to effectively fit them into the flow of APA traffic. Had Aircraft X been routed via the ZOMBZ3 arrival; they would have been de-conflicted with Aircraft Y and all of the DEN traffic. Aircraft X would have likely been cleared direct to APA within D01 airspace and expedited to the airfield because there was less traffic west of APA. We are having a significant issue between ZDV and D01 regarding priority handling of MEDEVAC aircraft. Situations like this highlight exactly the reasons we have tried to explain to ZDV that simply direct destination is NOT advantageous to all aircraft. In fact; it often times delays MEDEVAC aircraft even more and is clearly unsafe. We have discussed this issue with NATCA and Management at ZDV several times now; however they refuse to comply with the LOA because their interpretation of priority handling is not consistent with reality of the NAS in general; and expeditious terminal operations.

D01 TRACON Controller reported issues with a MEDEVAC aircraft not being able to get an expedited routing and becoming a conflict with another aircraft.

1766598

202010

0001-0600

ZZZ.Tower

US

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Tower DEN

Helicopter

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction

1766598

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We departed on the RNAV Departure. The Captain was flying. I was Pilot Monitoring. Shortly after takeoff; while in a turn on the assigned lateral profile; Tower asked if we had helicopter traffic in sight at approximately our 2 o'clock position. I responded that we had the green helicopter in sight. The helicopter was slightly higher than our altitude. Shortly thereafter we received an Amber TCAS TA alert followed immediately thereafter by a Red TCAS RA alert instructing us to continue our climb rate. The helicopter had made a left turn directly toward us. We responded according to the RA guidance to climb even though the helicopter was slightly higher than us. Additionally we added a turn to increase visual separation with the helicopter traffic as we climbed above them and they passed below us.Because I don't know what clearance the helicopter traffic had; I don't know what could have been done to prevent this incident. It does strike me as odd that the helicopter was flying so close to the charted SID lateral profile that low to the ground and that close to the departure runway.

B747-800 First Officer reported TCAS warnings during climb.

1353264

201605

0601-1200

CYYJ.Airport

BC

13500.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZSE

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class E ZSE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1353264

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

1353269.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

While enroute; SEA Center asked what approach we were planning for CYYJ. We informed them that we would like the ILS RWY 9. We were then given a descent clearance by SEA Center of 14;000 ft and direct to OMINU at the same time. We were unfamiliar with OMINU intersection but believing it was on the approach plate (as we had just informed ATC of our request for the ILS 9 approach); and that we could quickly locate it; we began our descent and started looking for the fix on the corresponding approach plate. In doing so; we must have missed or rushed the cross verification of the set altitude in the FMA as I had set 4;000 when we had actually been cleared to 14;000. Normally a difference of 10;000 (between what I thought I had heard and the actual clearance) would have set off alarms in my head; but we were close enough to the airport at this time so that a clearance to 4000 ft didn't seem odd. After briefly looking at our charts we couldn't find OMINU intersection; so we asked ATC for its spelling. Once we received it; we proceeded direct to it. Shortly after; I noticed a traffic alert on our TCAS of another aircraft approximately 5 miles away. This aircraft was at 12900 and we were passing through about 13500 on our way down to 4000 ft as that is what I had incorrectly set. About this time; ATC called us and said 'maintain 14000'. I immediately realized the mistake and the confusing of 4000 ft for 14000 ft and we initiated a climb back up to 14000 ft. However; because we were descending at about 2500 FPM; we descended to a low of about about 12400 ft before the climb back up began. At this point; the conflicting aircraft had passed behind us. The remaining portion of the flight proceeded normally. The root cause was not using proper altitude verification procedures when setting a new altitude. The First Officer had written down 14;000 ft on his clipboard but because we got really busy in a short period of time finding and inputting a new fix; getting a spelling clarification; and beginning a quick descent relatively close to a new airport; we apparently didn't properly verify the altitude between pilots. I believed that we had done so while in the moment; but because of task saturation; it must have been missed.The two biggest items I could come up with were: First - not asking for a spelling of OMINU intersection when we first got the clearance to it. Having to search for it on the approach plate distracted both of us from executing proper altitude verification procedures. I had set 4;000 ft as that is what I thought I heard; but the FO had written down a correct 14;000 on his clipboard. Second - I was concerned with getting 'too high' during the descent to the airport; and that also contributed to rushing the verification of the 'set' altitude between pilots. Because of the distance to the airport; and that concern of being too high; I must have heard '4;000 ft' in my mind and set that accordingly. I could have done a better job prioritizing tasks. If we did indeed end up a little high on the arrival that could have quickly been alleviated with descent vectors.

The workload for both of us was high as we were confused about a number of factors concerning the descent and approach. We failed to confirm the 14000 altitude with each other due to numerous other distractions. The altitude confirmation already exists in our SOP for a reason. Even in busy moments it needs to be confirmed with the other pilot.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported an altitude overshoot resulted when the wrong altitude was entered into the MCP alert window. Crew cited workload and distractions as contributing.

1195522

201408

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

Parked

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards

Flap/Slat Control System

McDonnell Douglas/Boeing

X

Malfunctioning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Inspector

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 10; Maintenance Technician 15

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance

1195522

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Paperwork Audit

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Several Non-Routines I wrote up were signed-off by the Inspection Manager as 'visually re-inspected.' then he decided that the discrepant component was OK. The components were pulley and Slat Track bearings on a B717 aircraft. The Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) has procedures to determine the wear of bearings. The procedures require bearing removal to verify the condition of the bearings. The pulley bearings had fretting residue from the deterioration of the needle bearings. The Slat track bearings had plating worn down to the base metal causing rust. Engineering provided a Repair document which contradicted the written criteria in the Boeing SOPM. In the past the bearings were replaced because of the SOPM criteria. Lack of time is no excuse to overlook safety. Recently a jammed slat caused the aircraft to roll during take-off. The mentioned worn components would cause the same situation when they fail. Our Air Carrier has not had cable pulley failures because we have been replacing the pulleys when they show signs of bearing wear. [Found] during audit of the Check Non-Routines. This type of maintenance is being used in a desperate attempt to make an unrealistic C-Check Estimated Time of Release (ETR.) This type of maintenance will cause future delays when the aircraft leaves the Check. [Recommend that] Inspection Manager realizes his lack of B717 experience along with his lack of B717 knowledge and follows Boeing procedures. Stop blindly signing-off. Maintenance Inspector. Hangar. C-Check.

Reporter stated their Inspection Manager was also the Chief Inspector for their Air Carrier and did not have any experience on the B717 aircraft. The Manager had been 'Overriding' numerous Inspector write-ups by using the same information in the Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) that the Inspector had referenced in his write-up indicating excessive wear. The Manager would than state on the Inspector's write-ups; that the pulley and Slat Track bearings were serviceable. He believes the Inspection Manager's comments on the write-ups could be considered fraudulent sign-offs. Reporter stated the Inspection Manager had been fired; no reason was given. Their Fleet Engineering however; continues to try and deviate from the Boeing SOPM and allow the excessive wear on the pulley and Slat Track bearings in order to reduce the maintenance time of the aircraft. Engineering still has not shown any information that Boeing has approved changes to the bearing wear criteria.

An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports their Inspection Manager; who is also their Chief Inspector; had been overriding non-routine write-ups made by inspectors during C-Checks for excessive wear on B717 aircraft pulley and slat track bearings; and then signing them off as serviceable bearings.

1714595

201912

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Tower

FO

VMC

Air Carrier

Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

1714595

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Other On Approach

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

The purpose of this report is to offer information about an incident that took place during the execution of a visual approach to Runway 27 at ZZZZ; that induced the inadvertent penetration of the US Contiguous ADIZ while lining up for SDM just north of the border. We had briefed and planned en-route for the VOR DME 1 27 ZZZZ. SOCAL had already cleared us direct to TIJ VOR with progressive step downs in altitude and told us that ZZZZ was landing runway XX. Once handed off to ZZZZ Approach; the controller inquired as to whether we could accept the visual to Runway XX in effort as to make us number one for landing. I verified with my FO (First Officer) to confirm we were both comfortable with that and proceeded to brief the differences for the visual. I called the runway and airport in sight. Our clearance was to descend to 4000 ft. and establish left downwind to Runway XX. Over the airport and approximately midfield I slowed to request FLAPS 15. Established on the left downwind we received further descend clearance to pattern altitude and clearance for the visual to Runway XX with a handoff to Tower. I slowed further to call for GEAR DOWN; CONDITIONS MAX; FLAPS 25; BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST. My FO (First Officer) was preoccupied with configuring and running the checklist while I maneuvered to establish what appeared to be just south of final for Runway XX ZZZZ. As we neared the airport ZZZZ Tower immediately alerted us that we were headed for the wrong airport and to look 10 o'clock to make correction. My FO identifies that we are in fact lined up for a visual approach to Runway 26R at SDM. It took me a moment to realize my mistake as I was conflicted with my positional awareness as well as how I had missed and/or shifted my frame of reference from ZZZZ airport to SDM north of the border. I immediately corrected towards the ZZZZ Airport at which point Tower cleared us for landing Runway XX ZZZZ. At this point I re-established a stabilized final using normal descent and normal maneuvers while proceeding to landing. The remainder of the flight was carried out without further incident.ZZZZ Tower immediately made us aware that we were headed for the wrong airport and to correct with airport at our 10 o'clock. My First Officer also realized that I was lined up for SDM. I re-situated myself identifying the border as a reference and looking at both airports then made the correction and turned to re-establish a stable final for Runway XX ZZZZ.My penetration of the ADIZ from Mexico to US was inadvertent; however; a clear accumulation of factors lead to a chain of events such as lining up for the wrong runway to the wrong airport and on the same token; re-penetrating the ADIZ in the commission of my error. My error was a result of a lack of situational and positional awareness on my part and my FO; as well as being task saturated flying an airplane that I do not regularly operate; closely spaced airports within close proximity to the US Contiguous ADIZ (US/Mexico Border); stronger than usual winds out of the East that may have offset my flight path to cause the airplane to fly closer than planned to ZZZZ and in effect causing me to lose my frame of reference and shifting my sights to SDM.I took immediate evasive action to re-orient and re-establish situational and positional awareness while maneuvering the aircraft safely to a stabilized visual approach for Runway XX ZZZZ. Staying familiar and proficient in an aircraft is a vital contributing factor that can make a sizable impact in the cockpit with regard to procedure; situational awareness; system awareness; efficiency; airmanship and safety in general. I believe that my mistake was compounded by a lack of situational awareness; high winds; and possible distraction due to lack of familiarity and practice in the aircraft type. 'The first step to solving any problem is recognizing there is one.' To fix this in subsequent flights faced with similar conditions; I would of course account for winds; and possibly widen out my traffic pattern to allow for more space on downwind and therefore a wider angle and wider view to identify the airport; this would buy me time and room for error. When operating so closely to the border it's best to give myself more space by remaining farther south to account for wide turns and/or unruly winds as a margin of error.

EMB-120ER Captain reported that on approach they became disoriented and lined up with runway at an adjacent airport.

1798831

202104

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

Corporate

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class C ZZZ

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

Lubrication Oil

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 121; Flight Crew Total 1434; Flight Crew Type 1172

1798831

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

During a tour in ZZZ; at straight and level flight on my way to the landing zone; the helicopter seemed to be operating with reduced power when at max continuous power (MCP). Please keep in mind that during my preflight inspection of the helicopter in the morning; before conducting tours; I noticed no visible abnormalities. There was no low rotor RPM condition and no visible change in RPM throughout the tour. I noticed that with 2 passenger flights; earlier in the day; I was able to maintain MCP and 100 KIAS. Then; at the time of the occurrence; I noticed that with relatively the same weight in another 2 passenger flight that I was only able to maintain MCP and fly at 80 KIAS without decreasing in altitude. Given the 20 knot loss; I felt I should shut down prior to taking any more flights and just give the engine a once-over. Upon my inspection; I noticed oil spray over the engine on the helicopter's right side and some on the firewall. As a pilot; I felt at that point I needed to call our maintenance guy to give me his opinion on the situation. Our maintenance guy is also the Chief Pilot and Primary Manager of the company. He instructed me not to sell or take up any other flights with passengers. He then proceeded to tell me to fly the helicopter to ZZZ for him to come inspect it and make necessary repairs. Given the amount of oil I started with during pre-flight and the amount of oil in the engine after 2 hours of run time (the difference was 1.5 quarts burned; 8 quarts in the morning and 6.5 in the engine at the time of shutdown and pilot inspection) I felt I was within limits to fly the helicopter not even 5 minutes from the landing zone to Company at ZZZ. There was no oil light illumination in flight during that time or any time during tours. Both the oil temperature and oil pressure gauges were in the green. There has been a cracked cylinder on this helicopter before which resulted in reduced power as well. Given that; in my experience as a pilot; I believed this to be another cracked cylinder or maybe even a bad valve. I felt that my flight back to the airport was within limits. I topped off the oil; performed a power check and a magneto check prior to takeoff from the landing zone. I made my call to Tower; lifted off from the landing zone; flew my .03 flight over to Company; shutdown; and left back to ZZZ1 for Maintenance to handle it. This is the facts from my perspective; from what I was experiencing; to what I was told from Maintenance/Management; and how it was handled.

Pilot reported after discovering a serious engine oil leak; he was directed to fly to another airport so it could be fixed; instead of getting a ferry permit.

1260208

201505

1801-2400

RPLL.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

Ground RPLL

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1260208

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1260209.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

We were vectored for the ILS to Runway 06 by RPLL tower. During our briefing we discussed turning off at the high speed taxiway R1. During my review of the notes on page 10-9; I took note of the procedures for landing on Runway 06 while aircraft may be departing on Runway 13. Approach and landing were normal. I used Auto-brakes 3. We exited R1 at low speed; maybe 30 knots and were still slowing to normal taxi speed. Tower stated '[Aircraft X]; turn on Charlie'. With a quick glance at the taxi chart; we continued straight to turn right on Charlie taxiway. At that moment I was sure that this was the intent of the tower controller's instructions. If he had meant for us to turn left on Charlie; he would have had to tell us to first turn left on R2 and then left on Charlie. Additionally; as per 10-9; there is not supposed to be traffic on take-off from runway 13 while we were still moving. We were barely over the hold short line and the tower said '[Aircraft X]! You are on the runway!'. At that point we were NOT on the runway; but our nose was over a hold short line. I looked left and there was an aircraft airborne off runway 13 and climbing through about 50 feet. He was at least 4;000 feet from our position. Fortunately; at no time were we in danger of a catastrophic collision with this aircraft. After this the controller had us turn left on Charlie taxiway and continue taxiing. Why did this happen? Here are all the facts; as I see them. 1. Tower gave us an incorrect and incomplete instruction. 2. We had expectation bias about our next instruction. 3. We were unfamiliar with the airport. 4. We were not given adequate information from flight control about where to park. 5. This duty night is a well-documented risk to safety and service. It is one of the longest and most difficult duty periods currently being flown by the fleet. 1. The tower controllers said; '[Aircraft X]; turn on Charlie'. These were his exact words - I wrote them down when we stopped and were delayed during taxi to our parking area. No other instructions were given except those words. I was not taxiing the aircraft - but if I had been; I would have continued straight ahead as the captain did. It was the only logical way to go; having been given those instructions. We assumed that runway 13 would not be in use; as per 10-9. The fact is; the aircraft that was cleared for takeoff on runway 13 had to have been so cleared while we were on short final; which is contrary to the text on 10-9. Also; according to what I see on the airport diagram; in the hot spot blow up section; at no time were we on the runway. I think the controller said that in error. Additionally; we were not told to turn on R2; we did not know where we were going to park and we were attempting to get clear of the active runway. 2. The expectation bias really needs no explanation. We thought we were going to; and supposed to do something different from what the Tower expected. At international airports; it is expected that you get your aircraft clear of the active runway as well. 3. This was a last minute change to our schedule. We each had flown into Manila before; but it has been at least 12 years. The area where this occurred is a hot spot area. 4. We should have been given more information about why and what we were supposed to do in Manila. On the ground before takeoff we were given a flight release; Gen Decs and weather. We assumed that a load and unload would occur. I did not ask for runway data because I assumed they would give us that in Manila. We communicated with Dispatch on the way to Manila - he was very helpful and tried to get us a parking spot. All we were given was a potential parking spot; but not exactly where to go or who to contact on the ground in Manila. When we landed; we took a 28 minute taxi delay as tower had to find out where we were parking. We were also further delayed on the ground due to incomplete paperwork. Nobody told us this was just a tech stop. That information should have been conveyed to the Captain. If it had been; we would have been able to get what we needed - from who we needed it - in a more timely manner. We could have reviewed the non-maintenance staffed airport procedures; made sure we had a number or name to tell tower on the ground to avoid the taxi delay; we could have made sure that we had all the paperwork we needed and avoided the delays while talking on satcom to a Duty Manager. All that information is pertinent to the flight. It was obviously a big decision in operations about what to do with flights going to our original destination. Why wouldn't anybody inform the crews of ALL the information about what decisions were being made related to our flight? 5. I have been told that this 3 leg night has been written up in event reports and that it has generated fatigue calls by crews doing this night. This trip is well known among us to be a potentially unsafe night for the crews. We are operating at max duty; into and out of 4 different countries in the middle of the night. We contend with weather; language issues; non-standard clearances by foreign controllers and long complicated taxi instructions. Every time I have done the trip it goes past scheduled duty time. It is very hard to understand why this trip remains part of the bid package. Word from the crews that fly it is that it has been written up and discussed with the company and the union numerous times. Maybe that is not good information; or people are saying that they write it up and fatigue calls have happened; but they haven't. All I know for a fact is my experience on this trip. I am not sure why we keep this trip when it is clearly a risk to our safety and making service for our customers. Did the length of the duty day play a part in this? Absolutely. The Captain is very experienced - and I am a very senior First Officer (FO) with 13 plus years on the aircraft and years of Asia experience. I was well rested for this duty night. I planned for almost 4 days on how and when to sleep to get ready for this single night. Every time I have done this trip the Captain and I both fall asleep in the car on the way to the hotel. It's impossible to stay awake. The long hotel travel times are also a valid consideration relating to crew rest in Asia. I assume that the folks who put together this trip have not actually flown this night. It is time to reduce this duty night. It is irresponsible and dangerous to continue to schedule this pairing. We have made so many positive changes relating to safety it really is confusing to still see this pairing. It is my hope that maybe this report will spark a discussion about making a change.

Pilot Monitoring (PM) on final approach for Runway 06; I asked the tower if R-1 was open; they confirmed it was open. After exiting Runway 06 at R1 tower instructed: '[Aircraft X]; turn onto taxiway C'. It appeared to me I was past R2; continued straight ahead to end of R1 and join C. Both pilots were in agreement. Tower suddenly said 'Stop; [Aircraft X]' we complied. ATC said we were on the runway; we were past hold line but definitely not on the runway. There was no Threat! Next the Tower told us to turn left C; right on J and hold on J. Tower or the crew didn't know where we were going to park. It took 20 minutes to finally get a parking spot. Prior to landing I had studied the insert on 10-9 it showed that the end of R13 ends at G3 far left of where we where I saw NO hold lines on that 10-9 insert depicted it is labeled E3. After tower told us to Stop; I looked left and saw an aircraft already airborne half way down the runway. There was NO Threat! After much discussion; thought and research of 10-9 page. I believe that the instruction from the Tower was not specific enough '[Aircraft X]; turn to join C'. It would of been clearer if they would of said; 'left R2; left on C'. MY question is why would ATC clear an aircraft for takeoff on R13 when we were not stopped or clear of R1? I believe this could of been an error on ATC part as well. Unfamiliar airport; not knowing where we were going to park prior to landing. I was focused on the 10-9 insert not looking outside at the time we crossed the hold line. During the TOD brief I missed briefing the last note which states: 'R06 vacating; take R1; R2 for C'. Long duty day scheduled by the company 13:23 actual 13:55. I was awake 3 hours prior to hotel lobby show time making it a 16:55 day for myself. During an earlier stop; rest facility NOT available in a TIMELY manner and unable to rest there; starting to feel the oncoming effects of fatigue and not making the call. All of these chains together was the cause of this crew error. I have filed Pairing Event report concerning the fatigue producing duty day; we were scheduled for by the company. The bottom line is I'm the Captain and take full responsibility of this taxi error.

After landing on Runway 06 at Manila; crew exited on to Taxiway R1; but failed to continue taxiing onto R2 and left on C as stated in the airport diagram notes. As a result the aircraft crossed the Hold-Short line for the Runway 13 extension.

1285440

201507

0601-1200

SAN.Airport

CA

4200.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors; STAR LYNDI3

Class E SCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1285440

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1285136.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

We were arriving in SAN on the LYNDI3 RNAV arrival and the controller took us off the arrival with vectors and altitude and speed instructions. We followed her instructions and repeated them back each time she gave them to us. She never put us back on the arrival; but instead cleared us to the RNAV RWY 27 approach fix and cleared us to 4;000 feet. She cleared us direct VYDDA; descend to 4;000 feet; cleared RNAV 27 approach. I repeated 'direct VYDDA; descend to 4;000 feet; cleared RNAV 27'. We were in perfectly clear skies and could see all ground objects. We both noted that the clearance brought us pretty low; but our flight path took us clear of any terrain. At about 4;200 feet the controller contacted us with an urgent request to immediately climb back to 5;000 feet and maintain 5;000 feet. We stopped our descent and climbed back to 5;000 feet and maintained constant clearance of all terrain and objects. We both looked at the approach plate again and noticed that VYDDA crossing restriction was 4;000+; so we assumed that the controller screwed-up and descended us to 4;000 feet a little too early or that our descent rate was faster than she had predicted. Since we were off the arrival and under her control; and since VYDDA crossing restriction was 4;000+; we felt we could accept her clearance to 4;000 feet. We felt this was a controller error. Within a few seconds of climbing back to 5;000 feet she once again cleared us for the approach. Please note that the controller seemed very stressed at the time and seemed to be struggling with traffic issues; which is why she took us off the arrival and vectored us in the first place.I believe the event was a controller mistake due to heavy workload. She was trying to time the traffic for the approach and took us off the arrival with vectors; altitude; and speed instructions. As we got closer and closer to the airport; she could no longer put us back on the arrival; so she cleared us for the approach and descend to 4;000 feet; but apparently she gave us the 4;000 foot altitude too early and we descended below the MDA briefly before passing the constraint line. At no time was the aircraft in danger of hitting the obstacles as we maintained clear visual separation at all times.In this case; I'm not sure what we as pilots could have done differently. We were no longer on the arrival and were following controller instructions. We are trained that when flying in foreign countries; especially South and Central America; that we must check all MDA's and know that those controllers will descend you and it is up to you to determine if that is a safe altitude. But in USA; we are told our controllers will NOT descend you below the MDA and that we can trust our controller instructions. Even so; I checked the approach and noticed that we were allowed to 4000+ for VYDDA intersection; so once again; we accepted the clearance. I believe this was a controller error.

We were flying the LYNDI3 arrival into SAN. ATC vectored us off the arrival. I cannot remember if an initial altitude was given to us or not. I am thinking that initially she gave us 5;000 feet. She then cleared us to 4;000 feet and gave us a southerly heading. Visibility was unlimited and I had my terrain GPWS selected. I made the statement to the FO that I was surprised that she could clear us to that low of an altitude. However; I never thought it was unsafe; but I remember that it didn't seem like she was leaving much room for error. She was very busy on the radio. She then came on and instructed us to climb immediately to 5;000 feet and that we had a low altitude alert. My thought was that ATC must have messed up. I never doubted that we were cleared to 4;000 feet. From my perspective; we complied with all of ATC instructions.

A Controller cleared an air carrier crew to 4;000 feet on SAN LYNDI THREE RNAV arrival and then issued a terrain alert with a clearance back to 5;000 feet. The crew suspected a SCT Controller error.

1591304

201811

0001-0600

LAX.Airport

CA

0.0

Night

Tower LAX

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 2510

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1591304

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1591327.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Other takeoff roll

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

After LAX Ground Control granted us pushback clearance from Gate; they advised us to plan for Runway 25R. Having already planned and briefed for Runway 24L; the FO (First Officer) requested 24L; but LAX Ground Control denied the request. After the Before Taxi Checklist and prior to taxi; the FO and I reprogrammed the FMC; briefed the Runway 25R particulars and completed the Departure Plan Checklist. Upon requesting Taxi Clearance; LAX Ground Control advised us to plan for Runway 24L. Again; the FO and I reprogrammed the FMC and re-briefed the Runway 24L particulars and re-ran the Departure Plan Checklist.When we requested taxi again; LAX Ground Control gave us 'Taxi to 24L via Delta 8; Echo. Prior to turning right onto Taxiway Echo; Tower cleared us for takeoff. We completed our Takeoff Flows and I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. During the taxi; I will note it was very dark and there were no center line taxiway lights. The only lights illuminated were the Runway 24L threshold approach lights and the runway center line lights. During the takeoff roll; the FO realized we were departing from intersection Victor (the point of approach threshold lighting) and not the full length from Echo 6.The FO stated the discrepancy; but by the time I recognized the discrepancy; we were rapidly approaching 80 knots. Given the runway length from intersection Victor was greater than 10;500' and our takeoff weight was exceptionally low due to a light fuel load and [comparatively few] Passengers; I elected to continue the takeoff.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 pilots reported taking off from the incorrect ATC assigned clearance position.

1586267

201810

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

10

Dusk

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

None

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

DA20 Undifferentiated

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Landing

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 208; Flight Crew Type 163

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1586267

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 0

Y

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was entering the pattern at ZZZ to land flying a C172. I crossed the runway at 1000ft MSL to enter the right downwind for runway XX which uses right traffic. As I crossed over the runway there was Aircraft Y; a DA20; executing a low pass over the runway. I started my turn into the downwind and he started his turn to crosswind and then to downwind. I looked back and he was closer to me then I was comfortable with so I speed up a little bit. Then when I turned final I received a traffic alert saying he was at my six less than one mile. I asked my passenger to watch him and she told me he looked like he was 200 feet from us and looked like he was about to pull up alongside us. I chose to go around rather than risk him landing on top of us. I also chose to execute the go-around because he never acknowledged my position in the pattern during his radio calls he acknowledged the two aircraft in front of me.

C172 pilot reported a NMAC on final at a non-towered airport; resulting in a go around.

1184502

201407

0001-0600

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

34000.0

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1184502

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Equipment / Tooling

This is not really a safety event but an ongoing problem with facilities east and south of ZMP. I could file one of these every week or two and will start filing them all. Aircraft X had a flight plan in the system that departed JFK enroute to ZZZ. It was on a very circuitous route most likely due to weather. The aircraft flight plan departed JFK and progressed through ZDC; ZJX; ZTL; ZME; and ZKC prior to entering ZMP airspace. The aircraft showed up overdue in our EDST and we started to look for it. ZKC Controller had no knowledge of the flight. I called Aircraft X's Company Dispatch and they said the flight had been canceled. My issue is how does an aircraft flight plan go through 5 Centers and numerous sectors and have every controller along the way either delete or ignore an overdue aircraft?Training on recognizing an overdue aircraft in the EDST and following up to find the aircraft.

Reporter stated he has filed three reports of this nature within the last two weeks of this report. In discussion with other people; one person thought this might be an ERAM problem. This reporter is not sure if it is controllers in the system who are not doing what they are required to do by tracking down the aircraft and then removing the flight plan; or is this being done but then the problem still passes on to various ATC Centers.

ZMP Controller complains about a flight that isn't airborne and has been canceled; progresses electronically from departure airport through 5 other centers before reaching his center.

1007527

201204

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22500; Flight Crew Type 5500

1007527

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

Many separate problems with the Flight Plan. First it arrived 23 minutes late. I call the Dispatcher and noticed RLSE 02 and he said 'ZFW went down and redispatch plan wouldn't take in the computer; so I guess your still on 5%.' I was confused and asked him to send it to me; then once I saw it maybe I could figure out what he was talking about and that was another 6 minutes then the printer failed. Once airborne we lost data link around 80N and I attempted probably 15 times over the next 90 minute to contact any LDOC [Long Distance Operational Control] or Commercial Radio facility printed on the Arctic/Polar chart but never a response. I did send a full position report with FUEL and asked GANDER on HF to send to the company at NEUTR but after that lost them; but got Magadan OK at NALIM but no data link comm until just short of KUBON. We did comply with the 90 minute reporting on the 5% OPS SPEC B343 but can't prove it and Dispatch claims they never received the NEUTR report from Gander. The Dispatcher said he was filing a report and told of us of all the shortcomings in the computer system and I concur that we should no longer dispatch above 80N on the 5% because it's very difficult to comply since LDOC is about 50/50 over many years of trying.

Air Carrier Captain laments his company's computer flight plan and the poor communication capability above 80N.

1167307

201404

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

2.0

Part 135

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Other / Unknown

1167307

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew; Person Observer

In-flight; Routine Inspection

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

Landed at the receiving hospital following a scene flight. On walkaround inspection found that the helipad perimeter chain was broken. Ambulance personnel that witnessed the landing stated that the chain had been broken by the helicopter on landing. Upon inspection of the helicopter; found that both of the tail rotor strike indicators had been bent flat and that both of the abrasion strips had impact damage. The lower vertical fin had paint matching the perimeter chain. I had no indications from the cockpit that I had contacted anything on landing. Need to position aircraft forward of the helipad 'H' to ensure adequate tail rotor clearance.

Helicopter pilot discovers during post flight and is informed by observers; that the tail rotor had contacted the perimeter chain during landing severing the chain.

1307563

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Ferry / Re-Positioning

GPS

Descent

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 6200; Flight Crew Type 530

Situational Awareness

1307563

Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I took off with full fuel; 36 gallons; that I verified on the ground. I used [a] website to plan the flight. At 110 knots TAS [my route] was planned to take 3:45. Using the performance charts I estimated 2.9 gallons to climb to an altitude of 8;500 feet and then a fuel burn of 8 gallons per hour in cruise.Approximately 15 NM from my destination the engine began to sputter and power was reduced. I had begun a descent at the request of Approach from 8;500 feet to 4;500 feet. When I recognized the fuel starvation I informed ATC and requested vectors to the best landing area as well as information on the local terrain. There was also a 172 in the area that gave local information. I spotted a nice field with little obstruction and chose to land at that spot. I was able to make the approach to landing without further incident.After landing; with the assistance of the landowner; I purchased 10 gallons of auto fuel at a local gas station and poured 5 gallons in each wing tank. In the process spilling around .5 gallons from each tank.After being released by the local authorities and the FAA I started the aircraft; performed a run-up and attempted to take off. During the roll; at 40 KIAS I hit a small bump that made the aircraft become airborne with the stall warning horn. I rejected the takeoff and came to a stop at the end of the runway.I taxied the aircraft for a longer takeoff roll and attempted to depart again. I was able to depart the field and land at my destination without further incident.

C172 pilot reported making an off airport landing because of fuel starvation.

1802052

202104

1801-2400

AVL.Airport

NC

VMC

Night

TRACON AVL

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E AVL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1802052

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

During our approach briefing; First Officer pointed out that there was an antennae approximately nine miles to the southwest of AVL that is 5;049 feet tall and that Approach Control would leave us high until we were clear of that. While approaching the airport; we were given a descent from 6;000 feet to 5;100 feet. It was during this descent that we received our 'Terrain' GPWS caution alert. We were on vectors at this time due to the First Officer requesting vectors for our RNAV 35 approach. This was done because Center had left us at a high altitude until about 15 miles from AVL and we needed time to descend. Our position at the time of the GPWS caution was approximately 2.5 miles to the southwest of the fix ZICZU. Immediately upon receiving the caution; we notified Approach Control; and added that we were now climbing to 6;000 feet. I then reminded the First Officer that there was a note on our Jeppesen REF plates that says that high rates of descent could result in GPWS alerts (our descent rate was approximately 1;500 FPM). The cautions did not stop until we were at 6;000. Approach Control replied that the Minimum Safe Altitude in that region was 5;100 feet and that we were fine. Upon reaching 6;000; we informed Approach Control that we had AVL in sight. We were cleared for the visual and turned towards the final approach course. Once we were established; we descended down to 4;200 feet for the fix ZICZU and continued the approach. We received no further GPWS alerts.We complied with the GPWS caution directive to 'Pull Up' that we received during our climb to 6;000 feet. Perhaps the northwesterly winds had blown us close enough to the fix AVEBE which is about 13 miles to the southwest of AVL that the terrain database triggered the GPWS alerts. The Minimum Safe Altitude in this region is 6;200 feet. In the future; I could not descend as fast as 1;500 FPM and can be more proactive at requesting a lower altitude from Center well before entering the terminal area.

Air carrier Captain reported a GPWS event during approach to AVL airport requiring a pull up maneuver.

1126893

201311

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Q400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1126893

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

Reaching top of climb; we got a master warning FUSELAGE DOOR and; upon consulting the doors page on the MFD; the galley service door showed open. There was a pressure 'bump' when the warning occurred but within 15 seconds the pressurization system returned to normal. Per the checklist we consulted with the aft Flight Attendant and she visually confirmed that the galley service door handle was no longer locked. We advised her that; per the checklist; she should not touch the door and could reposition herself to a passenger seat if she felt that was a safer option. She chose to move to row 18. The checklist advised to LAND IMMEDIATELY AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT. We consulted with Dispatch and decided to divert to ZZZ; which was our closest airport in terms of time. Advised ATC; FA and passengers and continued to a normal landing. The passengers were bused to their destination and we went to the hotel for a much needed rest.

A Q-400 flight crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport when the aft galley door came unlocked during flight.

1425241

201702

1201-1800

MTJ.Airport

CO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF MTJ

Fractional

Light Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Taxi

Class E MTJ

Air/Ground Communication

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1425241

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1426095.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Human Factors

I was taxiing for takeoff at MTJ. As we approached Runway 13/31 I advised my First Officer (FO) that we were about to cross a runway. I looked left and called clear left. He looked right and said clear right. I asked him to announce our crossing. He did so. After crossing 13/31 on our way to 17/35 I noticed that the frequency was awfully quiet. I looked down at the FMS and saw that my FO had inadvertently put in 122.28 instead of 122.8 for the UNICOM frequency. After he corrected the frequency we heard the conversation of a small low wing airplane that had apparently aborted his takeoff on Runway 31 because we had crossed it. He sounded upset and said that we had made no calls and crossed his runway. Realized only after we heard the conversation on the proper Unicom frequency. My FO inputting the wrong frequency for Unicom into the FMS. Also; my FO failing to see the departing traffic when he cleared right. The only reaction after the fact was to acknowledge that my FO had failed to see the departing traffic on Runway 31. To be more vigilant when inputting frequencies into the FMS and making sure the runway is in fact clear before crossing the runway.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Business jet flight crew reported crossing a runway while transmitting on the incorrect CTAF frequency which caused another aircraft to abort their takeoff.

1692326

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

12000

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 1096

Situational Awareness

1692326

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Instructor and passenger were traveling northeast from ZZZ on a training flight; approximately 20 miles north-east of ZZZ; a large amount of smoke was encountered in the cockpit. Instructor immediately closed cabin heat vent; and secured all non essential electronics and opened the windows and cabin vents; executed a 180 degree turn; flew back towards ZZZ and [advised ATC]. Upon completion of the initial actions; smoke in the cockpit was vacuumed out of the cabin and whatever component that was causing it seemed to have been secured; as the smoke stopped. No further issues nor injuries occurred. Upon landing; the plane was taxied back to [FBO] where it was secured and evacuated until cleared by the local fire chief. Upon the chief clearing the aircraft; it was tied down; chocked; and is awaiting further action by [FBO] personnel.

C-172 Flight Instructor reported encountering smoke in the cockpit and returning to departure airport.

1111310

201308

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1111310

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

During cruise the Standby Power Off light illuminated. The QRH directed us to place the Standby Power switch in the BAT position; which we did. The First Officer then noticed that the C5 Bat Bus Sect 2 circuit breaker was popped on the P-6-5 Standby Power Control Unit and that the illumination of the Standby Power light may have been coincident with his retrieving his personal bag from the area in front of the P-6- 5 panel and possibly inadvertently pulling it out. We contacted Dispatch and advised Maintenance of the situation but they did not want us to reset the circuit breaker and directed us to divert for repairs. We advised ATC that we were diverting and declaring a precautionary emergency since we did not know if the breaker had popped on its own and the Battery Bus appeared to be unpowered although there was no drain on the ships batteries. Maintenance replaced the Standby Power system and we continued the flight without incident. It would be helpful if Maintenance Control had the ability to communicate to the flight crew the various systems that would be affected when a particular circuit breaker is open.

B737-700 Captain reports the Standby Power Off light illuminated in cruise. QRH procedures are complied with and it is discovered that a circuit breaker is tripped on the P-6-5 Standby Power Control panel. The First Officer may have inadvertently tripped it retrieving his bag from the area but Maintenance directs a diversion for repairs.

1564692

201807

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Gate Agent / CSR

Troubleshooting

1564692

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Maintenance; Person Gate Agent / CSR

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Airport

I went to check the cabin temperature for the flight. When I arrived at the gate I noticed pc unit was switched off; and mechanic was walking down the jet bridge. I asked him if [he] switched it off. He said it was cold on board so he switched it off and will call back if it needs to be [turned] back on. While I was inside aircraft checking aircraft cabin temps mechanic told me he smells fuel; I came down the jet bridge and I noticed wet around the pc air unit. So I checked if it's a fuel spill. Fuel was still dripping out of the unit nonstop; fuel was spilled from the Jet bridge where pc unit was staged to all the way down to taxi lane. I notified my supervisor; he respond quickly and showed up to the gate; he asked me to bring fuel spill cart and we start cleaning the fuel and secured the spilled area.

Ground personnel reported a fuel leak/spill from pc unit on jet bridge.

1615465

201902

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

100.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1615465

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We were flying a Visual Approach. It was nighttime and VMC. At some point below 100 feet in the flare Tower cleared the aircraft on the intersecting runway for takeoff. As our aircraft touched down I visually saw the other aircraft ahead and to the right of us. This means we had not cleared the intersecting runway. To my knowledge they had not started the takeoff roll yet; but they were cleared to takeoff of the intersecting runway before we even rolled through the runways intersection. As we cleared the runway at the taxiway; I queried the Tower and he said that we were through the runway intersection when he issued the takeoff clearance for the other aircraft. This is not true and could have resulted in aircraft damage or injury to those onboard. The Tower Controller had not verified our location before clearing the other aircraft on the intersecting runway for takeoff.

CRJ-900 Captain reported that; while landing; he heard ATC clear an aircraft for takeoff from an intersecting runway before he had rolled through the intersection.

1276838

201507

0601-1200

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

0.0

Daylight

Center ZOB

No Aircraft

Facility ZOB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Other

1276838

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

A controller came in to work. He called medical to see if he could take some medicine. They no longer have a doctor on call 24/7. It is now [three hours later] and we still do not have a returned call from medical about whether or not the controller can work. Our job requires us to be able to work or know if we are able to work 24/7 so we need to be able to get an answer about medications 24/7. I don't know when this started but it has been this way for at least 6 months. From what I have been told the doctor will not accept calls from 10pm till 8am. I don't know if this is Western; Mountain; Central; or Eastern Time zone. This is unacceptable. We need to be able to get an answer about medication immediately.Have someone available 24/7 to answer questions about medications or stop the airplanes from 10pm to 8am.

ZOB Controller reports of a Controller coming to work and attempting to find out from medical if they can take some medicine and work. Time passes and there is no answer from medical. Controller complains about not being able to find out if a Controller can work while taking a specific type of medicine.

1096449

201306

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Taxi

EC135

1.0

Part 135

Ambulance

Takeoff / Launch

Class E ZZZ

Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1096449

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On departure the Number 1 ENG FAIL light illuminated on the CAD and VEMD with no supporting indications of an engine failure. This was a repeat of symptoms that I experienced in this airframe two days ago. I was enroute to home base; severe thunderstorms were expected in the vicinity and there was no means of getting the aircraft under cover at [destination] so I elected to continue. On approach to the hospital the lights extinguished. Aircraft secured; fault written up in logbook and Maintenance alerted. [We] provided Maintenance with observations from this event that differed from my previous event to assist with troubleshooting.

Eurocopter pilot reported Number 1 ENG FAIL light illuminated with no corroborating indications; so he continued to destination. Reporter stated he had seen this same false indication on this aircraft previously.

1739846

202004

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

30.0

13.0

8500.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

M-20 F Executive 21

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29.3; Flight Crew Total 384.8; Flight Crew Type 302.4

1739846

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Approximately 1 hour 40 minutes into flight; during cruise; there was an over voltage indication. While trouble shooting the issue; there was a pop noise and a puff of smoke from the right side under the glare shield. The smoke did not continue on after the initial pop. [Advised ATC]; shed all non essential electric load; pulled the alternator CB; received vectors toward closest airfield and landed safely. Landing gear; flaps; and boost pump all worked normal with battery power.

M20 pilot reported diverting due to an alternator failure.

1109034

201308

1201-1800

MLB.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

Thunderstorm

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Situational Awareness

1109034

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1109042.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather

There were thunderstorms forecast and planned for. We had a routing to avoid as much of the weather as possible and an alternate of Tampa with a FAR :45 of 4;000 LBS and a planned land at MCO via the PIGLT 4 arrival of 10;100 LBS. I was the pilot flying. During our arrival; we were rerouted to the north over OTK to avoid a large cell. Then; having done that; ATC changed their mind and re-routed us over LEGGT and PIE for the COSTR arrival. The landing runways switched from 18 to 36. On the COSTR arrival we overflew our planned divert; where the weather looked good. As we approached the field; the airport switched back to landing south and we were assigned a visual approach to 18R. Upon switching to Tower frequency; we overheard the 757 landing in front of us; stating that windshear was not encountered on final. At about 2;000 FT MSL and past the final approach fix we got a microburst alert for our runway of a 40 KT loss. We verified that it was an alert and for our runway and executed a missed approach; we had no other indication of windshear. We were then vectored back around for another visual approach to 18R. The conditions visually still looked fine. Prior to the final approach fix; we were told that the runway was still in alert; but improving and we decided to hold for 1 turn at the final approach fix at 3;000 FT. On the downwind leg of that first hold; we were told that the alert was downgraded to a windshear alert at 25 then 20 KTS and improving. We were still very close to our divert fuel + FAR :45 (the Captain remembers just over 6;000 LBS); the field still visually looked fine; and there were no other signs of windshear. We decided to give it another try. Once again; inside the FAF; the Tower gave us a Microburst Alert and we immediately decided to execute a missed approach and divert to our planned alternate of TPA. While receiving vectors; we were informed that Tampa was closed. Given that and taking into account the existing cells near MCO; we decided and informed ATC that we wanted to divert to West Palm Beach. The initial vectors to West Palm were to the Northeast and at 4;000 FT to avoid the cell that was impacting the airport. We declared minimum fuel with ATC at that time; sent an ACARS to Dispatch informing him about the divert and asking about West Palm Beach; and also continued around the cell followed soon after by vectors direct to West Palm Beach. After a short period; we received a response from Dispatch asking us if SRQ was OK; but by then we were committed to the east coast of Florida by our position and the weather. As we started our climb to 20;000 FT; we loaded the FMGC with the PBI divert. The forecast land fuel was 2;400 LBS and the PBI weather was VFR. 2;400 LBS was clearly emergency fuel to the Captain and me; and at that moment we were overflying Melbourne; FL; which was in the clear and with which; I was familiar. I knew they had a 10;000 FT runway; commercial service; good weather; and that 2;400 LBS in PBI was too low. We did a quick check in the FMGC for nearest alternates and found no better alternative (Patrick AFB etc). We slowed to max L/D (Green Dot) and sent a query to Dispatch about Melbourne. After a couple of minutes with no response; the Captain; demonstrating excellent CRM/TEM skills; convinced me that landing at PBI with such little fuel was a bad plan either way; and so about 10 miles South of Melbourne at 20;000 FT we decided to divert to Melbourne. We quickly obtained the weather; coordinated with ATC; and programmed the visual approach into the FMGC. We landed with approximately 3;600 LBS and blocked in (according to the pre-service fuel on the outbound leg back to Orlando) with 3;300 LBS. That was clearly a better plan than West Palm Beach with 2;400 LBS or potentially less. After block in; I noticed that our last message telling Dispatch about our divert to Melbourne was still on the scratch pad; i.e. the send prompt was probably pressed inadequately in the heat of the battle and that message was never sent. In any case; we both felt strongly that we did not have the time to wait for coordination from Dispatch as there was no better alternative. In retrospect; we should have declared an emergency because our fuel state didn't allow us the time to coordinate. Our thinking was that we avoided the emergency fuel situation by diverting to Melbourne; but Melbourne was not an authorized divert field for this aircraft thus requiring the emergency declaration anyway. I believe that it was the right field to land at; as it was a safe good weather field (and a regular airport for [similar aircraft types to ours]); but we should have declared an emergency before landing there.

Thunderstorms throughout Florida caused delays and vectors in our arrival to MCO. Our route brought us near TPA and PIE and we checked weather for those airports. We received vectors around cells between PIE and MCO. During our downwind on right traffic to RWY 18R we saw the runway and were cleared for a visual approach to RWY 18R to cross ORL 2;500 FT or above. Approximately 2;000 FT Tower reported a Microburst Alert; 40 KT winds and the First Officer executed a missed approach. We were vectored around weather to another downwind. Approach Control asked us why we diverted; and they were not aware of the alert. They reported it had dissipated and we were vectored to a 2nd approach to 18R. We accepted the ILS 18R and the runway was in sight. During the approach Tower reported another Microburst Alert; winds at 50 knots. And offered holding on the final approach course to wait until it dissipated. During our first turn in holding the Alert was gone and we started to the runway. Shortly after they had another Microburst Alert on our runway and we executed another missed approach. Fuel to TPA was 2;090 and 22 min. This would put us just under our FAR fuel of 4;021. Just as our weather check showed TSRW we were informed that TPA was closed. My First Officer was familiar with Florida airports and suggested PBI. We informed Dispatch we were going to PBI; informed ATC and were currently being vectored north and east around another cell to the east. I declared minimum fuel. When heading south towards PBI the FMGC showed us arriving with 2;400 LBS of fuel. I was about to declare Emergency fuel when the Controller gave us vectors away from direct PBI. The ATC Controller was unaware we had already declared minimum fuel with the previous Controller. We saw MLB in front of us. It was clear for miles. Further down the coast there was some more weather towards PBI. The First Officer said he was familiar with MLB. We asked the Dispatcher about MLB and he suggested SRQ. SRQ would have required vectors around huge thunderstorms. Our choice was emergency fuel to PBI and possibly more weather; landing with less than 2;400 LBS. or going into MLB with a visual approach; 10;000 FT runway; no terrain or obstacles; landing with close to FAR fuel; on a runway used by C17's and 747's; and the runway was selectable in the FMGC. We informed the Dispatcher we were going to MLB. The First Officer was flying and familiar with MLB. I was not familiar with PBI or MLB. I felt MLB was the better choice and the First Officer concurred. After an uneventful landing we taxied to the gate and arrived with 3;300 LBS. of fuel at shutdown. This was a very dynamic environment. Decisions had to be made very quickly. Options were changing and disappearing fast. I was distracted explaining to ATC that we had already declared minimum fuel and in hindsight I should have declared emergency fuel at that moment. The First Officer was extremely helpful and he did an excellent job.

Air carrier flight crew reports being vectored for weather during arrival to MCO then executing two missed approaches due to microburst alerts from the Tower. The decision is made to divert to their filed alternate and is informed it is closed due to weather. The crew then decides to divert to the nearest suitable alternate and lands with 3;600 LBS of fuel.

1576762

201809

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class B IAH

Aero Charts

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1576762

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Chart Or Publication

We were descending along the ZEEKK arrival into IAH. Crossing SOFFT we were cleared the ILS Runway 27. When we loaded the approach we choose SILLS as the IAF. We missed there was and inset on the approach plate which included another IAF CLSIK and the intermediate fix GRUNG. The depiction on the chart is not intuitive and easy to miss. Having been cleared the approach; we flew direct to SILLS. The approach advised we had skipped CLSIK and GRUNG; ATC did not raise a fuss and we landed without further incident. Sounded like we were not the first to miss this.Error in understanding between ATC and the flight crew. Also the Jeppesen plate is not intuitive; lists multiple IAF's for the same approach. I think the approach transitions should be included to the east of the approach and not as an inset. The line indicating other fixes to the east is obscured by writing on the chart.Needless to say this error will result in being more vigilant in the future when transitioning from the arrival to the approach as well as all other phases of flight.

An E170 First Officer reported that there was an inset on the approach plate which included another IAF (initial approach fix) that was missed.

1225454

201412

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

3500.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Type 1100

Other / Unknown

1225454

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Type 8000

Situational Awareness

1225460.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

It was VFR night time on approach. We briefed the visual approach backed up with the ILS. I had just slowed to about 230 knots as we were about seven miles from the FAF and I knew a descent was coming. ATC gave us a descent from 4000 FT to 2000 FT. At approximately 3500 FT we hit a flock of birds. I heard and felt multiple impacts. A rancid odor filled the cabin. I also saw a bird pass by my right side and my first thought was it may have gone in the #2 engine. I immediately looked at the engine parameters for both engines but noticed no change or abnormal indication. The only abnormal indication was the illumination of the Forward Leading Edge in Transit light accompanied by a yellow Overhead Left Wing flap in transit light. The Captain told ATC we hit multiple birds and needed to verify the aircraft configuration before continuing the approach and asked for a vector off final approach to run through the Flap Leading Edge in Transit QRH Checklist. Before running the checklist; the Captain called the Flight Attendants and informed them we hit birds and he would get back to them after we knew our status. While the Captain was talking to the Flight Attendants and turning a downwind; the aircraft started to vibrate. I looked at the VIB display and Number 1 showed 0.1 and Number 2 showed 0.4. I did see the Number 2 engine N1 fall about 15% lower than the Number 1 engine; but the autothrottles pushed it back up to match the Number 1 N1. I reduced the power on the Number 2 engine and the vibration stopped. At some point the autothrottles automatically disengaged. The Captain finished talking to the Flight Attendants and informed me that they reported that the Number 2 engine was on fire. There were no cockpit indications of a fire. The Captain advised ATC we needed to return to the field and have the fire trucks standing by. He also took control of the aircraft and became the Pilot Flying. We decided that the report of the fire and our proximity to the airport made getting on the ground a priority. The Captain asked for landing gear and flaps to start slowing down. The aircraft handled symmetrically so Forward Leading Edge in Transit light was not a concern when compared to getting on the ground. While we were on about a seven-mile final; the Flight Attendants informed me that the fire was out and to see if we could make a PA because the Passengers were upset. I made an announcement that we hit some birds and would be making a normal landing shortly. I did not inform the Captain that I made that PA so he ended up making the same announcement about 30 seconds later. Due to the Forward Leading Edge in Transit light; we decided to land flaps 15. The Captain had me run the numbers for a flaps 15 landing. We had the stopping margin and used auto brakes max. In the short time before touchdown; we ran through the Forward Leading Edge in Transit light QRH Landing Checklist. After touchdown; we cleared the runway and we did after landing flow without changing the configuration of the aircraft. We still had no cockpit indications of a fire. I talked to the Fire Chief to have him see if any fire was observed. The Captain talked to the Flight Attendants to update them on our situation. No evacuation planned at this point. ARFF indicated there was no fire upon inspection and we taxied to gate and deplaned normally. We ran the Shutdown Checklist and made a logbook entry. There were no reported injuries to the Passengers or Crew.The number of people that want your story immediately after an event is understandable. However; it is difficult to tell your story so many times to different people minutes after the incident. It would be helpful to take some time to wait for our reports or to get the story out to one person and have them be a liaison for others wishing to hear the events. Multiple bird strikes causing Leading Edge Flap light and engine vibration/fire.

We briefed the Visual Approach; backed up with the ILS and ATC gave us a descent from 4000 FT to 2000 FT with a vector towards the airport. At approximately 3500 FT; we encountered a flock of birds. I heard and felt multiple impacts. We first notice the Forward Leading Edge in Transit light accompanied by a yellow Overhead Left Wing Flap in Transit light. I told ATC we hit multiple birds and needed to verify the aircraft configuration before continuing the approach; and asked for a vector off final approach to run through the Flap Leading Edge in Transit Checklist. Before running the checklist; I called the Flight Attendants and informed them we hit birds and I would get back to them after we knew our status. After we turned away and started to work the checklist; we got a call from the Flight Attendants informing us the #2 engine was on fire. There were no cockpit indications of a fire. The First Officer observed a reduction in #2 engine N1. We both felt the vibration; the First Officer further reduced the power in the #2 engine and the vibration stopped. I declared an emergency and advised ATC we needed to return to the field and have the fire trucks standing by. We transferred aircraft control and I was the Pilot Flying. The aircraft handled symmetrically. We agreed we needed to land immediately. We got a descent to 2000 FT and took clearance for the visual. The Flight Attendants called to say the fire was out.We decided to land flaps 15. We ran the QRH for a flaps 15 landing. We had the stopping margin and used auto brakes max. We did a PA to tell the Passengers and Flight Attendants that we had hit birds; but the aircraft was flying fine; and we would land in three minutes; and it would be a normal landing. After touchdown; we still had no cockpit indications of a fire. The First Officer talked to the Fire Chief to have him see if any fire was observed. I talked to the Flight Attendants to update them on our situation. No evacuation planned at this point. ARFF indicated there was no fire upon inspection; and we taxied to gate and deplaned normally. We ran the Shutdown Checklist and made a logbook entry.Do do not ask Crew Members if they can continue on; just pull them; they are not capable to make that call under the circumstances. We hit a big flock of big birds.

B737-700 flight crew encounters a flock of birds at 3;500 feet during a night visual approach. The crew felt multiple impacts and a Forward Leading Edge in Transit light illuminated. Vibration is felt and indicated on the number two engine and flight attendants report the engine is on fire. When thrust is reduced on the right engine the vibration stops and the flight attendants report the fire is out; although no fire was ever indicated in the cockpit. A flaps 15 approach and landing ensues.

1057653

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure

1057653

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Prior to crossing ZZZZZ while in icing conditions [we] received WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP message on EICAS. After complying with AOM1 checklist reset approach speed for Vref 45+30 KIAS and insured calculated landing distance exceeded available landing distance. Upon landing used max reverse. Emergency not declared due to lack of time prior to touching down.

EMB-145LR Captain approaching final approach fix reported receiving EICAS messages WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP. The appropriate adjustment to V speeds was made and aircraft landed safely.

1045304

201210

1801-2400

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

33000.0

Center ZOB

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZOB

Center ZOB

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZOB

Facility ZOB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1045304

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

I was working an increasingly busier session on RADAR at the Sector 68. The E170 was northwest and level at FL340; requesting FL320 for moderate chop. I descended the E170; switched communications to Sector 67; and lost the Data Block for an A320 in a mess of Data Blocks; who was eastbound level at FL330. When I realized separation was going to be lost; I attempted to turn the A320 away from the E170; but the instructions were not received until the third transmission; for some apparent reason. As the A320 was making the turn I instructed; Sector 67 was turning the E170 away from the A320 at the same time; and separation was regained; but the A320 responded to a RA which instructed them to climb; and separation was lost on the next RADAR hit. Work on my scan; but why would TCAS climb an aircraft into one at a higher altitude?

ZOB Controller described a loss of separation event when failing to note conflicting traffic prior to issuing a descent. The reporter stated the TCAS RA resolution provided compounded the conflict.

1741688

202004

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Class B ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Distraction

1741688

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Gate Agent / CSR

Other at arrival

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

I was the X FA and I disarmed my door; but forgot at first to move my door flag to the disarmed position; I gave the Gate agent a thumbs up; and when she didn't move; I realized my mistake; moved the flag to the correct position; gave a thumbs up and then we opened the L1 door. Triple check myself before giving a thumbs up! I was concerned about getting my face mask on for door opening and deplaning and I allowed this to interfere with my usual focus. In the future I will put this on after the door is opened since I can't wear the mask and use the intercom to call to the back.

Flight Attendant reported initially forgetting to move the door flag to the disarmed position due distraction from putting a mask on to avoid COVID-19 exposure.

1107930

201308

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Nose Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 30; Flight Crew Type 30

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1107930

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

I arrived at the flight training [facility] for first three hours of ground school and then planned out a solo cross country with me planning to do three touch and go's and then return to [the departure airport]. After lunch; my instructor and I did the preflight and found the airplane to be fine. The weather was clear; but the wind was gusty and the flight was turbulent. During my flight I was flying at 2;500 FT and in contact with ATC Approach the entire time. Approximately 10 miles out; I called and requested three touch and go's and was cleared to start a left downwind. While on the downwind I was cleared to land. My approach was normal; my speed and altitude were both normal. At the last minute when I was flaring just a few feet off the ground; there seemed to be a gust of wind that caused the plane to float; as the plane settled back to the ground; the landing was bumpy; and I felt as if the plane hit hard on the nose and thought the propeller had struck the ground; so I elected to kill the power and not try to go-around. The plane then bounced several times and I tried to stay on the rudders and keep the plane straight on the runway. At one point; the front nose wheel came off the aircraft and I continued to remain calm and keep the plane as straight as I could with the rudder. The plane finally came to a stop on the runway. I immediately called the Tower and told them that I had crashed; but did not get a response after about thirty seconds. I shut off the lights; but left the avionics Master switch on; just in case I needed to try to contact Tower again. I then got out of the plane and tried to call 911 on my cell phone; as I had been on the ground for some time and the Tower had not responded or sent anyone to assist me. After dialing 911 I let the line ring several times; but received no response. I then reached into the plane to put my headset on and call Tower again; and this time received a response. I was told to shut off all electrical equipment and get out of the plane and walk thirty feet away. I did as I was told and shortly after that people started arriving on the scene. I then called my instructor and informed her of the incident. I was not injured in any way; so required no medical care. I stayed [with the aircraft] until airport personnel took me to the FBO. My instructor then flew [over] by herself to pick me up; and she and I both met with the FAA. My instructor and I then flew back to [the departure airport].

The student pilot on a solo cross country flight experienced gusty winds during landing resulting in damage to the nose landing gear of the Cessna 162.

1569561

201808

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1569561

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

1569637.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Evacuated

Aircraft

Cause of smoke is unknown to me at this time. I was the pilot monitoring [when] the flight attendant called up to the front and noted that she saw a smoke/ haze in the back of the cabin. She later indicated to us that several of the passengers had noticed the smoke and had also notified her. I asked her to come to the front of the aircraft and call me when she had done so. My FO utilized his phone to take a picture through the peephole so we could see what was occurring. We noted the smoke in the rear of the cabin. I began to smell the acrid odor in the flight deck. At that point I commanded masks on and began QRH procedures. I told them that [we intended to divert to a nearby airport]. I spoke with the FA again and told her to find the source possibly in the walls or ceiling. I did have several calls between myself and the FA in the descent. The FO got established on a visual approach. I elected to have him continue the pilot flying role so I could continue to monitor the emergency. Once we landed I brought the aircraft to a complete stop on the runway. I immediately called the FA and inquired if there was still smoke. The FA noted that she could still smell the smoke and I was concerned that we still had an active fire onboard. At that point I told the FA we were going to be evacuating on the runway. I made an announcement to the passengers to evacuate out the left and right side of the aircraft and to go to the nose of the aircraft. I completed the emergency evacuation QRH and noted that the FO was unable to egress out of the flight deck door. I decided that we needed someone on the ground to assist the evacuation at this point. I egressed through the Captain DV window and helped several of the passengers egress through the main cabin door as that was where the majority of the passengers were. Once we were completely egressed I began coordinating.Since cause of smoke is unknown at this time I cannot state; however I have a few lessons I would like to pass on.1. After the cabin O2 masks were deployed the mask door above the entrance caused difficulty in opening the flight deck door. This was unexpected and slowed egress.2. Locating the lead or incident commander is vital.

I was the First Officer and PF. While en route the Flight Attendant contacted the cockpit to notify us of a smoke/haze that was in the back of the aircraft in which she was made aware of from a passenger ringing their call button. Since the FA informed us that she was in the rear of the aircraft; the Captain asked her to continue to the forward cabin and contact us again to see if there was any noticeable difference throughout the cabin. While the FA was still on the phone with the flight crew; I decided to use my iPhone camera to peer through the cockpit peephole to see if I could see any of the smoke. As the Captain and I zoomed in on the photo that I took; we quickly noticed that we could not even see the FA in the rear of the aircraft through the smoke developing in the cabin. It was then that we started to notice the haze that was developing in the cockpit and the acrid smell coinciding with it and we quickly donned our oxygen masks. Center gave us [a nearby alternate] as an option and we took it and began an expedited descent. There were 2-3 additional calls between the cabin crew and cockpit as we continued our descent and once again after landing; where a decision was made to do an evacuation on the runway to eliminate any potential of being onboard in case a fire was developing. The Captain and Flight Attendant made it clear that the passengers were to deplane in the forward [part] of the cabin through the entrance door; but some of the people in the rear took it upon themselves to remove the emergency exit doors and evacuate over the wings.

EMB-145 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport and evacuating on the runway after experiencing smoke in the cabin enroute.

1771134

202011

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

7300.0

VMC

CLR

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

1771134

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1771144.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

The Captain and I discussed not doing a Visual Approach. Passing through about 9;000 feet; we were going direct to the FAF; conditions where ceiling and visibility unlimited. Approach cleared us for a Visual Approach. We accepted and started descending to 7;000 feet; the altitude for FAF. At about 7;300 or 7;200 feet ATC advised us the Minimum Vectoring Altitude was 7;500 feet. The Captain immediately stopped descending and went to 7;500 feet until just outside the FAF. We made a normal stable approach.We didn't want to do a Visual Approach when we briefed it. We were lured in by the visual conditions and the fact that that everything was stable and non rushed. It was late. Lesson is; do not do night visuals at airports that you are not to familiar with; try to do what you brief especially around terrain. I did get distracted when I lost my flight deck WiFi when I was trying to pull up a new ATIS on iPad. Don't do visual approaches at night; especially near terrain. Fly what you brief.

While descending on the arrival and approximately 10 miles south of ZZZ; ATC asked us to report the field in sight. It was clear and unlimited visibility. So we called it. When cleared visual [Runway] XXL; I began a descent out of 9;000 feet. I felt that we were within the airspace; but when descending to the FAF altitude of 7;000 feet and at approximately 7;200 feet; we got a call from ATC saying altitude alert. Climb to 7;500 [feet] min vectoring altitude. We immediately climbed to 7;500 [feet] and continued approach. ATC handed us to Tower and nothing else said.During cruise; my First Officer and myself went through all company pages and arrival and approach plates. We discussed terrain and even said that we shouldn't accept a visual approach since it was night time. However; we got direct to FAF and not a usual vector outside the FAF. ATC asked us to report the field. We both evaluated that we were comfortable accepting the visual. We should have stayed with the plan because after being cleared approach; we descended below the ATC min vectoring altitude. Bottom line; be conservative and when flying approaches at night; I will no longer accept a visual approach.

B737-800 Flight Crew reported they descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude while conducting a night time Visual Approach.

1438663

201704

0601-1200

MYEH.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Cloudy

Daylight

2000

CTAF MYEH

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1438663

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

Basically there are no visible runway markings on this runway. I have never been here before and I will never go back again. At 500 feet you are looking at what looks like a road in the middle of nowhere and have to decide if you can land. We have airline service to this place so I assume it must be ok. Paint is so faded on runway that you can't make anything out. No numbers; edge marking; centerline marking; or anything else. No part 121 carrier should be flying to this place.No tower; no radar. Ceiling was much lower than we were told. Reported weather was 6500 SCT. Actually weather was 2000 BKN; good visibility. Multiple VFR aircraft flying around. Short; skinny runway; no runway numbers; no runway markings. If it doesn't look like a runway then don't land there.

Air carrier Captain reported that in his opinion no air carrier should operate into MYEH because of substandard conditions.

990857

201201

0001-0600

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

12000.0

Center ZAU

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Descent

Class E MKE

Facility ZAU.ARTCC

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

990857

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We recently had a change in airspace and procedures with C90 climbing departures northbound to 15;000 (it used to be 13;000). I had an overflight that was at 16;000; he asked to descend to 12;000 as soon as he was clear of C90 airspace. There was aircraft departing ORD that were also traffic for him. Once aircraft was clear of C90 and departing traffic; I descended him to 12;000 without thinking about the fact that I was over Milwaukee Approach airspace who owns up to 13;000. I was more concerned with missing the new C90 airspace. All the airspace below us was uniform when it was at 13;000. The change in procedures took my attention away from Milwaukee Approach airspace. Nothing happened from the incident other than I descended into somebody else's airspace with no appreq. I have worked this airspace very little since the change in airspace and procedures.

ZAU Controller descended aircraft into Milwaukee airspace after the traffic cleared the lateral confines of C90 airspace. Reporter cited confusion following a recent airspace change.

1264788

201505

1201-1800

PHL.Airport

PA

0.0

Dusk

Ground PHL

Air Carrier

Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1264788

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

After landing on 35 at Philly and being cleared into the ramp from Spot 15 we were taxiing southbound. As I was preparing to make the turn in to the gate; I asked the First Officer (FO) to 'keep me honest' on the right side of the aircraft. He said it was clear; but a fuel truck was heading our way. I continued taxiing forward (still southbound) a little bit then started to angle the plane to the right towards the gate. The FO then stated that the fuel truck was still coming. I slowed down some more and asked him how far the truck was. Being that this was apparently his first trip off of IOE; I was trying to gauge his comfort level and what distance 'coming towards us' could be. As I came through about 30 degrees of turn the FO stated that the fuel truck wasn't stopping. At this point I applied the brakes and came to a complete stop. Within a second or two I had visual on the truck as he drove on by staring into what appeared to be a cell phone. At no point did he ever look our way; and the FO stated that he was shocked that the guy stayed at the same speed the entire time he was watching him. I immediately contacted the ramp and described the situation with them; and gave them the number of the fuel truck. There was still substantial room (150 plus feet) between the nose of the aircraft and the vehicle roadway at the time of the incident.Fuel truck driver not paying attention. The potential for an incident was increased ever so slightly by my choice to turn the plane in towards the ramp assuming the truck would see us and stop. Fortunately the FO was paying attention to where I couldn't see and kept us well out of danger.

A CRJ Captain reports a fuel truck driver not yielding as they were turning into the ramp. The aircraft is stopped and as the truck passes by the driver appears to be fully engrossed in his cell phone.

1276520

201507

1801-2400

HCF.TRACON

HI

39000.0

Night

TRACON HCF

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A HCF

Facility HCF.TRACON

Government

Enroute; Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1276520

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

A new procedure has been placed at HCF that we need to call a supervisor to watch the R7 Controller start a track on an IAFDOF [Incorrect Altitude For Direction Of Flight] aircraft inbound. According to the CEDAR; we are required to call the supervisor on initial contact with the IAFDOF aircraft. I tried calling out to a supervisor upon initial contact of Aircraft X; who was coming inbound at AUNTI at an inappropriate altitude of FL390; but there was no supervisor at the desk. An OM [Operations Manager] was at the desk; but he ignored my attempts to contact him. I tried calling on the 'ZHN SUP' line; but the OM did not answer; and neither did the supervisor. I stated 'Article 65' on the line; because I was unable to perform a required task. I still kept attempting to find a supervisor. I even called sector R2/D2; and she said she saw a supervisor; behind the watch desk. I do not know why [the supervisor] did not respond to my verbal calls or my landline call; but I was unable to perform the IAFDOF procedure that we are required to do; in a timely manner. This new procedure is a distraction to the R7 and the D7 controllers because we need to locate a supervisor when supervisors are not always at the desk; or even on the floor. We put our traffic and the safety of the flying public at risk with this new procedure. Please; fix this.We need a coordinator at R7; especially if our management is putting additional unsafe procedures for us to do at a very busy sector. I am concerned there will be a catastrophic incident involving a mid-air; if we need to divert our attention from the radar; in order to locate a supervisor. Quite honestly; if this is how management is treating this new procedure; I will be unable to comply with it; especially if I am working the sector combined. I will not be able to sacrifice safety for a procedure that is totally unsafe and inappropriate.And staff the facility; in order to have a coordinator position. Not; a supervisor; but a controller; who understands the traffic. Most supervisors at the HCF are not even current on sector R7.

HCF Controller reports of a new procedure that he needs to coordinate with a FLM. The controller cannot find a FLM and then States Article 65. The controller does not know why the FLMs are not being able to be found when this is part of the procedure.

1167568

201404

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

SR20

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30.7; Flight Crew Total 78.4; Flight Crew Type 78.4

Training / Qualification; Distraction

1167568

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection; In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was in flare for a landing for Runway 14. The nose of the plane dropped while I was in ground effect and uptown landing. The plane took off again. It bounced twice before coming to a full stop. Upon taxing to the parking at the FBO; I exited the plane and saw that I apparently had a prop strike; and the front gear had bend and push the oil drain in and began leaking oil from the plane.

A SR-22 pilot reported the aircraft's nose dropped in the flair after which the aircraft lifted off and bounded twice. During the subsequent ramp inspection a bent propeller and oil leak were discovered.

1814627

202106

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.25

500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Personal

Stearman

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Gate / Ramp / Line

Contracted Service

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 940; Flight Crew Type 300

Training / Qualification; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1814627

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 400; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Procedure

My student was preforming pattern work at ZZZ. Traffic pattern altitude being used was 1;800 feet. Conditions were VFR. My student made his crosswind; downwind; and final calls every time. At the same time a C182 was operating for a skydive operation out of ZZZ. My students downwinds were always flown to provide clearance for the skydivers designated landing zone. Throughout his 7 landings in the C172; a PT-17 Stearman joined the pattern; not making any radio communication calls so the student paid extra attention to focus on where the Stearman was operating. The Stearman continued to fly low patterns at about 1;300 feet; with tight downwinds right over the skydiving drop zone. The Stearman sometimes would not even take off from the runway. They would add power then come to a complete stop at the end of the runway and taxi back. While the student was downwind midfield; the skydive C182 was holding short of the runway and made a CTAF call they were waiting for the Stearman to to depart.When the student turned base about 1/2 mile from the runway; the C182 announced they were departing. The student then turned to final and made his radio calls. Flaps were extended about 25 to 30 degrees and the student was coming in at about 70 to 75 MPH. At about 500 feet and 1/4 mile final; the Stearman came down in front of the students C172 about 400 feet away in a rapidly descending base to final and cut right in front of the student. The student had no choice but to abort the landing and go-around since they descended to a lower altitude in front of him. The made a CTAF call on 122.8; '<tail number> going around; aircraft on runway'. Adding full throttle and waiting for a positive rate of climb the student retracted the flaps. The student's initial thought was to just fly runway heading and perform a go around but because of the lack of communication his instincts told him they would perform a touch and go. He then made a 30 degree turn to the right of the runway then turned left to fly parallel to the runway and watched below for the Stearman as he gained altitude. To no surprise the Stearman was performing a touch and go.If my student had flown runway heading the Stearman more than likely would have ascended from under him. If he was any lower on my glide slope; and due to lack of communication from the high performance Stearman; his high wing aircraft would not have seen anyone above him; and the Stearman biplanes nature would not have seen him below them and they would have collided on the displaced threshold. The student had plenty of fuel and flew to the west of ZZZ and waited for them to land before returning. The way the pilots of the Stearman were flying a high performance aircraft with no radio; contrary to the flow of traffic; and without observing Part 91 right of way rules while conducting their operations poses a significant safety hazard.

An instructor pilot observing their student in the VFR pattern at a non-towered airport reported another aircraft was not communicating via CTAF and flying against the flow of traffic cut the student off on short final causing a NMAC. The student performed an evasive maneuver and a go-around offset from the runway to avoid the traffic.

1199505

201408

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Fractional

BAe 125 Series 800

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Fuel Line; Fittings; & Connectors

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1199505

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft

We were assigned and aircraft for an early morning departure. The plane had arrived a few hours prior. During preflight there was an overwhelmingly strong odor of fuel when I preflighted the right wheel well area. The entire bottom of the plane was wet with condensation. I ran my finger along the bottom skid and it became completely covered in jet fuel. I wrote the airplane up for a fuel leak. Later in the day I talked to the Mechanic who worked on it. He had cleaned the bottom of the airplane and he showed me a hole in the skid where the fuel was coming from. He told me the plan was to sign it off as an acceptable leak so that it could be moved somewhere were it could be fixed. The next morning I ran into the crew assigned to the aircraft. I discovered that they were not moving it to a place where it could be fixed; but were flying several revenue legs with the aircraft. I informed them of the prior day's history.Having another of several recent could not duplicate write ups this morning I also want to report something else that has been bothering me. In December I had a bad fuel leak from the refueling panel area. There is a report on file concerning the incident. I don't believe I was the first to have a leak in this area in this aircraft; and since December I have seen probably ten write ups on this aircraft for a fuel leak in the refueling/ventral tank area. How many fuel leaks in the same aircraft and the same area that obviously haven't been fixed are needed before this is considered a major safety problem?I would recommend reviewing the maintenance records from the last year for this aircraft in relation to this fuel leak.

An HS-128-800 Captain reported a fuel leak in the refueling/ventral tank area which apparently had not been repaired since he recorded the leak in the maintenance log nearly nine months earlier.

1760017

202009

ZZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1760017

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

FO's leg home; we observed and discussed the re-release on ground in ZZZZ; commented that it was unusual to see it coming from Continent X. Approaching ZZZZZ we never received the re-release and FO (flying) and Relief Pilot (monitoring) with CA on break failed to catch it. We didn't realize the mistake until CA asked me 'OBW [Oh By the Way] how'd that re-release go while I was asleep' while taxiing to gate at ZZZ! 1. FO's First flight in nearly 6 months.2. Unaccustomed to seeing re-release out of Continent X. 3. Crew failed to brief it when we swapped out for last break. 4. Dispatch failed to send it. 5. Should have put a reminder in computer; as a last ditch catch all; or a tried and true sticky note on dash.Avoid complacency; any number of reminders via sticky note; computer; following crew swap brief outline; timer; blaze yellow highlighter!

First Officer reported not realizing that they did not receive a re-release.

1071582

201303

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Vectors

Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1071582

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1071591.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

Hand flying A/P and A/T off descending from 2;400m to 1;800m while being vectored to the ILS 02R final; ATC issued a runway change to 02L. My misplaced confidence in selecting the correct EFB approach plate and making the required Baro DH change while simultaneously leveling off at 1;800m was obviously the major factor. Complicating the situation was the new EFB software. It is far from intuitive and the touch screen accuracy; despite repeated calibration; is anything but accurate. Additionally; I attempted to set the new DH while the altimeter was set for meters; further distracting me from my primary task of flying the jet. I recognized my error descending through approximately 1;770m with a max deviation of 50m (approximately 150 feet) before correcting back to 1800m. ATC soon thereafter issued a descent down to 1;200m.I have several suggestions. 1. Aviate; navigate; communicate; fly the jet first always! 2. Last minute unanticipated changes by approach control on base to final; A/P and A/T on. 3. The new EFB software is a SITUATIONAL AWARENESS black-hole. Definitely a major detractor in all flight phases. 4. Company required EFB training and self study accessible training aids totally inadequate. JEPPS change is about money with apparently a total disregard of the real/potential safety implications.

During descent; First Officer flying; First Officer decided to fly aircraft manually from about 10;000 feet. We were on vectors downwind descending to assigned altitude of 1;800 meters. At some point; approximately 1;000 to 2;000 feet above level; approach issued a runway change from 02R to 02L. I went heads-down and changed the approach in the FMS; then selected the new approach chart on the EFB as we approached level-off. As I was working on the EFB; I heard the 'altitude' CAWS alert; followed by the First Officer verbally state '1;800 meters.' My attention immediately shifted to the PFD; and I saw that we were below the assigned altitude; with the First Officer correcting back to the assigned altitude. With 1 to 2 seconds of this; and while the First Officer was still correcting; ATC issued a further descent clearance to 1;200 meters. My estimate is that we were never more than 200 feet below the assigned altitude; although I did not actually see the altimeter until we were already correcting back to 1;800 meters. Both other crewmembers stated that the deviation did not exceed 150 feet. Threats: Workload. When the First Officer decided to fly the aircraft manually at about 10;000 feet; the workload level was quite low. The approach had been briefed; we were on vectors; and traffic was relatively light. However; multiple communications from ATC; multiple altitude step-downs and heading assignments increased the workload somewhat. The runway change increased the workload significantly. The electronic charts are still new to us (my fourth leg using the system) and require more time and mental concentration than usual. This would have been a good time to discuss using the autopilot to reduce workload; or at least otherwise communicate that workload was becoming a factor. Gradually increasing workload needs to be recognized. Forthright communication between crew members that distractions increasing; and offering options to address them would have helped. We had already discussed that the new charts were an issue. My ability to effectively monitor was diminishing as my workload increased. Although we were honoring the sterile cockpit procedures; I could have managed necessary communication better. During our debrief; we all agreed that re-engaging the autopilot would have been a good choice as soon as the runway change was assigned. Only one person had to state 'I'm getting busy' to totally change the dynamic. Pilots tend to be reluctant to change a plan once it has been implemented. In this case the changed plan would have been to re-engage the autopilot. We acknowledged that we did not recognize the 'red flag' of distractions associated with gradually increasing workload. Situational awareness and communication associated with workload when manually flying are key to not repeating this event.

A flight crew using a new EFB software package commented about distractions caused by the lack of its usability and the First Officer overshot an assigned altitude while searching for a DH after a runway change.

1720985

202001

0001-0600

Mixed

Windshear

Night

Air Carrier

Q400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class B ZZZ

Pressurization Control System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Workload; Confusion

1720985

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Procedure

Leaving ZZZ to ZZZ1. I forgot to turn the bleed switches on at acceleration height. Our takeoff required the bleeds to be off. We got a cabin press warning at cruise; to which we noticed the bleeds we're off and we turned them on. This cleared the cabin press warning and pressurization was normal; I went over the E&A checklist to confirm everything. We didn't execute an emergency descent as it wasn't required. Flight continued on with no incidents. Same as above.The early morning; plus the dark cockpit led to me noticing the bleed switch position. In the dark; the switches appear normal. A technique taught during sim is to touch the bleed switches during the acceleration height flow. I'll definitely be using that technique from here on out.

Captain reported not turning engine bleed air switched to on after an engine bleed off takeoff; causing a loss of cabin pressure control.

1665025

201907

1201-1800

BOS.Airport

MA

37000.0

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZBW

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZBW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1665025

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

Had been cruising at FL370 and was issued a descent to FL290. While in descent at Mach .77 and around 31;000 feet; experienced significant wake turbulence roll (approximately 45 degrees AOB along with aircraft 'roll authority' warning) due to Boeing 767 aircraft 8-10 miles ahead of us. I contacted ATC and told them that we needed more separation and they allowed us to slow. When I had the chance; I made announcement to passengers explaining that it was unexpected and isolated wake turbulence that should not happen again. Later near 10;000 feet; I started to get into wake turbulence again; so I queried ATC as to was it same aircraft and stated we needed more separation. Boston Approach stated that they had just implemented new reduced separation criteria for B-767 aircraft which were now considered a lower category heavy aircraft (I believe 'Re-certified as Class C' was terminology used or something close to that). Not sure what the ATC separation standard was at altitude; but I am very thankful we were already descending or it likely would have been an emergency descent. Down low with approach control; the new 3.5 miles of separation minimum behind 'heavy; low and slow' B-767 (previously was 5 mile minimum per my query to Controller) was not sufficient. The FAA should further address safety issues associated with reduced wake turbulence separation. Been flying close to [XX] years and this was an eye opener at altitude.

Air carrier Captain reported encountering wake turbulence descending into BOS in trail of a heavy B767; and expressed concern about an apparent recent change to ATC procedures allowing reduced separation to heavy B767 aircraft.

1120809

201310

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Taxi

Nosewheel Steering

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Type 7800

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1120809

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

We were on our sixth leg and were running approximately 30 minutes late due to a ground stop. Operations wanted us to push off the gate anyway because a Company aircraft was waiting for the gate. We pushed off under some time pressure (two-man wired push). We started one engine with the intention to taxi out and hold somewhere when we were informed that the hold was no longer in effect. So I directed the First Officer to start Number 1. I finally cleared the ground crew off. Just after completing the Before Taxi Checklist; Ground informed us that the inbound Company aircraft noticed something hanging from the nose gear. I suddenly realized that the ground crew had not held up the bypass pin and was certain the pin had not been removed. We called Company and asked them to get the push crew back out to remove the bypass pin. They came out and removed the pin. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We were tired and under some time pressure due to the lifting of the ground stop; which led to increased coordination to start the second engine. Couple this with being at the end of a long day; I didn't catch the pushback crew not having removed the bypass pin. This may have been a training issue (or a long day for them); but it was still incumbent on me to confirm the pin had been removed. Lesson learned and I will make sure I see the pin in hand before I clear the crew off.

B737 Captain reports a rushed pushback and engine start where the ground crew departs without removing the nose wheel steering bypass pin. The flight waiting for the gate notes the flag attached to the pin and informs the reporter. The ground crew is recalled and the pin is removed before taxiing is attempted.

1196787

201408

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

14500.0

VMC

Cloudy

Daylight

Center ZZZ

FBO

King Air C90 E90

1.0

Other Part 105

None

Skydiving

Cruise

None

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 305

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1196787

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Observer

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Weather; Procedure

Procedure

While climbing to altitude over jump zone; I observed a large cloud moving over the airport. The cloud was at approximately 6;000 feet; and estimated 1 mile by 1/2 mile in diameter. Approximately 500 to 700 feet in depth. As we approached our exit point for the skydivers; I noticed part of the cloud was still over the airport. I advised the jumpers in the aircraft that there was a cloud in the vicinity of the airport and to let me know which way to adjust my flight path in order to ensure cloud clearance. When I was on jump run and turned the exit light on; 5 experienced jumpers exited the aircraft. As the tandem instructors approached the door; they advised me to go around and offset jump run slightly to the west to avoid the cloud. The remaining jumpers exited the airplane.When I landed; I was advised by an Observer on the ground that the first 5 jumpers had penetrated the cloud. An announcement was made to the entire drop zone that disregard for cloud clearance requirements would not be tolerated and everyone was warned.

A C90 skydiving jump pilot at 14;500 feet attempted to avoid dropping his jumpers on a cloud at about 6;000 feet but was told after landing the divers had penetrated the cloud.

1737105

202003

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 423

Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1737105

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

We experienced a disruption in ATC service because the ZZZ Tower evacuated due to Coronavirus concerns. This is the second occurrence of ATC Controllers immediately abandoning their duty stations with airborne aircraft to avoid exposure risk. This protocol poses an unacceptable risk to Aircrew and Passengers; and should be re-evaluated based on the number of lives put at risk versus the number of Controllers avoiding virus exposure. If ATC Controllers won't stay at their duty station long enough to recover airborne aircraft in these scenarios; we should be dispatching every flight with a suitable alternate until the Corona Virus crisis is contained.

Air carrier Captain reported a Control Tower that was ATC Zero; leading to a disruption in communications.

1477655

201708

0601-1200

BOS.Airport

MA

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

APU

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 9599; Flight Crew Type 4691

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1477655

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 960

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1477882.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Approximately 12 minutes prior to push; the APU was started. After APU start; the blue 'APU Maintenance' light illuminated. Per CRM; I advocated to the Captain that; per the FM (Flight Manual); we could legally operate and write it up at our destination. The FM allows continued operation with this light on. The Captain; however; desired to have Maintenance address the problem. Maintenance was then called and the Mechanic arrived at the cockpit in a very timely manner and investigated via the FMC. The FMC Maintenance page read 'APU oil low.' The Captain and the Mechanic then agreed to close the main cabin door while the Mechanic added the oil; and then communicate through the cockpit window. While the Mechanic was adding oil to the APU; a ramp person yelled up to the captain through the cockpit window; 'It's going to be okay.' The Captain interpreted this to mean that it was now okay to start the APU. Unknown to me; the Captain then started the APU. After realizing the error; the Captain immediately shut down the APU. A few minutes later; the mechanic was finished servicing the APU and walked up the cockpit window. The Captain was highly apologetic to the mechanic. Fortunately; neither the mechanic nor anyone else was hurt. The flight then proceeded normally. This was a miscommunication problem. While it's true that the ramp agent was merely trying to be helpful; nonetheless; a communication error occurred somewhere between the Mechanic; the Ramp Agent; and the Captain. I believe the primary factors involved were expectation bias and time pressure. The Captain had an expectation bias and heard what he wanted to hear since we were at/near pushback time. Better monitor and cross check between us could have prevented this mishap.

About 15 minutes prior to scheduled pushback; saw the APU required maintenance. Maintenance determined oil was needed. At push time; I asked mx on the radio if it was OK to close the door and start the APU without anyone coming back to the flight deck. They said it was OK to use the APU (I saw the oil had been serviced) and it did not require a new Maintenance Release; but I didn't ensure the aircraft was clear. I attempted to start the APU and then immediately shut it down when I realized I didn't know if there was still a technician outside the rear of the aircraft by the APU.

B737 flight crew reported unconsciously starting the APU while the unit was still being serviced by a Mechanic.

1271986

201504

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Daylight

Fractional

HS 125 Series

2.0

IFR

Parked

System Monitor: Indicating and Warning

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1271986

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy

Aircraft

Upon landing in ZZZ the yellow AUX HYD LO LEVEL light illuminated on the master warning and caution panel. The light remained on during the landing rollout and for most of the taxi to the FBO. After our passengers left the FBO; I contacted Maintenance Control. An appropriate M2B form was submitted and the aircraft went AOG. Another aircraft arrived in ZZZ and we went into a 6 hour [tentative] status at the FBO. Two mechanics arrived to repair Aircraft X. They walked over and wanted to discuss the write up. I was glad to talk to them. I communicated the symptoms previously described and commented that on my post flight a meniscus was clearly visible in the auxiliary hydraulic system sight tube. They also commented that the system was full. Nevertheless; both mechanics stated that [Headquarters] just wanted them to add a little fluid and sign it off. The next day we were assigned Aircraft X. The M2B form from the previous night was cleared in this manner. Subsequently; we departed ZZZ for ZZZ1. Upon landing; the yellow STALL IDENT light illuminated on the master warning and caution panel. It remained illuminated during the landing rollout and for part of the taxi to the blocks. Again; an M2B form was completed and the aircraft was AOG. A day or two later I observed that the aircraft was grounded for corrosion behind the master warning and caution panel.There are times that I find myself wondering if we are really trying to fix aircraft properly the first time an event happens. Over the past couple years I have reported the following events to the Chief Pilot: (1) Right engine oil cap found on preflight at maintenance facility. (2) At maintenance facility I was accepting an aircraft that was released to the line. The aircraft was in maintenance for repeated auto shutdowns of the APU. At power up; the APU auto shut down. (3) Aircraft in maintenance for a thrust reverser issue. After the aircraft was released from maintenance the issue persisted. Other repeat issues have included avionics write ups; fuel leaks and cabin electrical discrepancies. While it is probably more challenging than I could imagine; are we serious about properly effecting repairs?

Captain reported his concern over observing chronically unresolved repeat maintenance issues.

1694655

201910

1801-2400

ZZZ1.Airport

US

4000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Cargo Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1694655

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1694656.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Procedure

We began our day in ZZZ with a flow delay of approximately 20 minutes. Once airborne we encountered moderate turbulence going into ZZZ1. ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 was our next flight. We flew in moderate turbulence with a 30 kt. wind from the west; and a bumpy approach to landing. We were delayed for 2+ hours due to flow on the next flight to ZZZ2. The flight was mostly moderate turbulence enroute and on landing in ZZZ2 had LLWS (Low-Level Wind Shear) with gains + 15 kts. on final with winds gusting 28+ kts. Our fourth leg was a flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 with only 5 passengers and a light load.I - the FO (First Officer) - was the Pilot Flying. As we were climbing out of ZZZ1 we encountered continuous moderate turbulence and entered IMC conditions around 3000 - 4000 ft. As we turned on a crosswind departure just past 4000 ft. a Master Caution fuselage doors light illuminated. We were then given a climb clearance to 6000 ft. We then set the autopilot to level off at 6000 ft. The Captain as the PM (Pilot Monitoring) opened the checklist; [and] we both realized the autopilot was not leveling off. As the Captain said '6000 ft. level off' I disengaged the autopilot and began to level off. Due to the turbulence; it took some time to level off and [to] keep the aircraft from over speeding. We reached around 6400 ft. and then descended to 6000 ft. ATC advised us of the altitude as we were correcting. Once level we continued with the checklist. The checklist concluded that the aircraft was pressurizing correctly indicating the doors were closed even though the aft cargo door was indicating red on the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display). It allowed PIC (Pilot in Command) discretion to land as soon as practical. We accepted a climb to 12000 ft. and continued east trying to get out of the continuous moderate turbulence and reduce our work load. The Captain called Dispatch at that time. After discussing our options we concluded that we should continue to ZZZ3 runway; rather than return to ZZZ1 in a strong headwind; continuous moderate turbulence and LLWS reported on final with winds gusting to 30+ kts. The Captain informed the flight attendants of the situation; and kept them in the loop. Once on the ground in ZZZ3 it was found that the cargo handle on the aft cargo door had popped out.In such a dynamic environment as ZZZ1; especially when being stepped up in IMC conditions while trying to run an emergency checklist; pushing 'ALT' would have been a better way to level off immediately and control the altitude assigned.

Departing ZZZ1 to ZZZ3 at about 4000 ft. the Master Caution fuselage doors light illuminated during moderate turbulence. We were then given a climb clearance to 6000 ft. We advised ATC of our door issue and requested no higher. We set the autopilot up for the level off at 6000 ft. I reached for the checklist book and as we were nearing level off I saw that the AP (Autopilot) was not leveling off. I said 6000 level off and PF (Pilot Flying) disengaged AP. Due to the turbulence it took some time to level and [to] keep speed from increasing. We reached 6500 and then descended back to 6000.Once level we began the checklist which concluded that the aircraft was pressurizing indicating that the doors were closed. We accepted a climb to 12000 and continued east in an attempt to escape the continuous moderate turbulence. Once there; I called Dispatch and advised that due to wind shear and turbulence we did not want to return to ZZZ1 or any airport in the cascade mountain or gorge area. The checklist allowed landing as soon as practical so I chose to continue to ZZZ3 where winds were aligned with the runway and more resources were available on the ground. We also had a 50 kt. tailwind which made the time difference negligible versus turning around and being sequenced to another airport. We landed uneventfully. Our day started in ZZZ with a 20 minute flow delay and a moderate turbulence encounter going to ZZZ1. We then went to ZZZ2 where the winds were 30 kts. from the west and had a bumpy approach to 30. We then had a 2 hour flow delay. By the time we left ZZZ2; the surface winds had diminished but on climb out we were quickly back into moderate turbulence. We landed in ZZZ1 with LLWS (Low Level Wind Shear) and gains of +15 on short final. We only had 5 passengers and few bags. Departing ZZZ1 to ZZZ3 for our fourth leg after a hard day the FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying) and was working to manage the climb with such a light airplane. After turning on the crosswind departure at about 4000 ft. the Master Caution fuselage doors light illuminated during moderate turbulence. We were then given a climb clearance to 6000 ft. We advised ATC of our door issue and requested no higher. We set the autopilot up for the level off at 6000 ft. I reached for the checklist book and as we were nearing level off I saw that the AP was not leveling off. I said 6000 level off and PF disengaged AP and due to the turbulence it took some time to level and keep speed from increasing; we reached 6500 and then descended back to 6000. ATC advised us of the altitude as we were correcting. Once level; we began the checklist which concluded that the aircraft was pressurizing indicating that the doors were closed even though the aft cargo door was indicating red on MFD (Multi-function Flight Display). It allowed PIC (Pilot in Command) discretion to land as soon as practical. We accepted a climb to 12000 and continued east in an attempt to escape the continuous moderate turbulence and reduce our workload. Once there I called Dispatch and advised that due to wind shear and turbulence we did not want to return to ZZZ1 or any airport in the cascade mountain or gorge area. We had seen standing lenticulars southeast of ZZZ2 earlier and yellow radar returns along the gorge. I chose to continue to ZZZ3 where winds were aligned with the runway; the weather was VMC and more resources were available on the ground. We also had a 50 kt. tailwind which made the time difference negligible versus turning around and being sequenced to another airport. We called the flight attendants and the aft position reported a loud bang had been heard but no noises were currently present. I asked them to report any changes. We landed uneventfully and found that the cargo door handle had popped out.With good weather the obvious choice would have been to return to ZZZ1 but considering the existing weather and the workload it imposed I believe the safest and most 'practical' solution was to continue as planned to a more favorable location.

DH8-400 flight crew reported receiving a Master Caution fuselage doors light warning in flight.

1442444

201704

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

7000.0

Mixed

Dawn

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Caravan Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial

Other / Unknown

1442444

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

I remember being a little tired after a long week. We work long hours away from home and it can wear on a guy. I also remember being excited that it was almost the weekend. Everything was running on time that morning and the weather was decent with mild temps and about 1600 overcast. With plenty of time to do a preflight and obtain a clearance and after a small issue with a knot in a cargo strap; I taxied out and completed a run up and departed. [The aircraft] seemed to be a great airplane and I had flown it several times that week. I did notice what I considered a lower than average oil pressure and noted it on the trend the previous day 90-91 lbs in cruise; which is well within parameters for operations. The flight was a canned flight plan with an altitude of 7;000 feet MSL and I had leveled off. The autopilot was flying the plane and I had been handed off from tower to departure and then handed over to center. I had even called the company with my departure times. I remember anxiously waiting for some winds aloft information to pop up on the sometimes slow Garmin gmx200. I sometimes will request a higher altitude for a better ground speed.What happened next; caught me so off guard and startled me that I didn't do anything for a few seconds except retard the throttle. A loud explosion; equivalent to a shot gun blast and a winding down sound; kind of like a Jake brake on a big truck. Every emergency procedure I had ever trained for became all jumbled up in my head! With little or no NG% (Engine Gas Generator Speed) I didn't want to but I pulled the fuel condition lever over the gate to OFF. The controller wasted no time in giving me a quick vector to a nearby airport and I also managed to put it in the GPS. I had to get back on the gauges as my Caravan descended into the clouds for what must have been about a minute and a half. It was very dark below the cloud layer but I could see the surface. At one point I had picked out a gravel road but talked myself out of it thinking about telephone poles. I never did see that airport that was still 4 miles away I will say the radar altimeter was very useful by letting me know it was time to land [off airport]. A headwind helped with the 1800 lbs of cargo. This was not easy to write and I feel very lucky considering the variables and terrain.

C208 pilot reported an engine failure at 7000 feet followed by an off airport landing.

1366495

201606

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

1366495

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Dispatch

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Equipment / Tooling

I took the pass down and was told there was 1 flight remaining and no issues. When I logged into my desk; I researched why [my] flight did not have out or off times in the system. Based on their scheduled departure time they should have already been airborne. I looked for the flight on my fusion screen and it was not visible. I called Operations to ask for verification and was given the out and off times for the mentioned flight. I then checked flightaware.com for the location of the flight and saw that it was crossing the Mexican border. I then proceeded to try to contact the flight via ACARS; but received the message 'ACARS free text could not be delivered at this time.' I then tried to establish communication with flight via ARINC phone patch. ARINC was also unsuccessful in contacting the crew. I tried ACARS several more times but got the same undeliverable message. I informed the Chief of Dispatch about the situation. I was unable to establish communications with the crew for the duration of the flight. I verified that the flight landed safely with Operations.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported he was unable to establish contact with his flight.

1821604

202107

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Mixed

Rain; Thunderstorm; Windshear

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1821604

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1821267.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Take Off

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Weather

I elected to perform a high speed aborted takeoff due to pop up severe weather conditions. Prior to departure; the weather was VFR and clear. Small thunderstorms were developing around the area north of the airport; but nothing was seen while taxiing to the runway. Both crew members engaged weather radar with an upward tilt; with nothing indicating the possibility of weather impacting departure. ATC issued a takeoff clearance for runway XX and advised us of a small cell of extreme precipitation north of the airport; and said it didn't appear to be a factor. We were lined up on Runway XX; facing south; and could not see any adverse weather around us. After initiating the takeoff roll; at around 100 knots; we encountered immediate extreme precipitation and wind forces. Visibility was reduced to 0 (I could not even see the nose of the aircraft). Simultaneously; ATC advised of 40-60 knot windshear over the runways and of a micro burst. Due to being unable to see out of the windshield and feeling the wind forces coupled with the windshear and micro burst warning; I elected to abort the takeoff. I estimate that the abort was initiated at 115 knots accounting for the reactionary delay of retarding the thrust levers. The flight attendant verified no one was injured. Aborted takeoff procedures were followed; and after a follow up with maintenance; dispatch; we were able to depart normally after the cell had passed.The conditions were not present at the time of takeoff; and no one (flight crew nor ATC) had a way to predict such a rapid; immediate change. We used wet takeoff numbers as a precaution since there were storms in the forecast while at the gate. I believe all parties involved functioned proficiently.

We were clear to take off runway XX in ZZZ. Weather was clear; and winds calm. A little bit of rain on the East side of the airport while our takeoff roll at 90 knots; Captain (CA) and the First Officer (FO) lost sight of the runway due to extreme precipitation; and simultaneously the Tower Controller came on line and reported a Wind Shear alert on all runways; and a gain and loss of 25-30 knots. Winds went up to 50 knots. Captain decided to abort the takeoff. We initiated the abort at 117 knots. Our V speeds were as follows: V1: 129; Vr: 131; V2: 136. We stopped on the runway safely; made sure everyone in the back was all right; passengers and Flight Attendants. Tower asked us to exit the runway at the next available taxiway to our right; and stated that he did not have visual on us. We exited the runway on taxiway D; and did the after landing checklist. Tower then asked us to taxi to the run up pad of runway XX. Once at the pad; the CA contacted dispatch; talked to maintenance control and operations. We received our amendment; and we were cleared to takeoff again. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

Flight crew reported a high speed Rejected Take Off after extreme precipitation and wind shear caused visibility to go to zero.

1345803

201604

0601-1200

JFK.Airport

NY

2500.0

VMC

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B JFK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1345803

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1345794.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

Arrival into JFK; weather CAVU. Captain was pilot flying; First Officer was pilot monitoring. Planned and briefed the visual 13L with the RNV RNP RWY 13L approach as backup. Approach cleared us direct to ASALT; cross ASALT 3;000; cleared approach. During the descent we received several calls for a VFR target at our 10-12 o'clock position. We never acquired the traffic visually; but had him on TCAS. Eventually Approach advised traffic no factor; contact Tower. On contact with Tower we were cleared to land. Approaching ASALT I noticed we were approximately 500 feet below the 3;000 foot crossing altitude. Somewhere during the descent while our attention was on the VFR traffic the plane dropped out of VNAV path and I didn't catch it. I disconnected the autopilot and returned to 3;000 feet. Once level I reengaged VNAV and completed the approach with no further problems.

FMA mode changes are insidious. In clear weather; with your head out of the cockpit clearing for traffic in a high density environment; especially at your home field on a familiar approach; it is easy to miss a mode change. This is a good reminder to keep instruments in your cross check on those relatively few great weather days.

B737-800 flight crew reported an altitude deviation on approach to JFK that resulted when they lost autoflight mode awareness.

1274094

201506

0601-1200

DTO.Airport

TX

0.0

Mixed

Rain; 8

Daylight

1400

Tower DTO

Corporate

Premier 1

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Antiskid System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 84; Flight Crew Total 5160; Flight Crew Type 34

1274094

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 1300

1274121.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft

The following is my best recollection of the aircraft event at DTO.We were re-dispatched to DTO with [an] the alternate. As always; weather was one of the items discussed as part of the Company dispatch procedure. Once airborne and in range of DTO; based upon the DTO weather; runway conditions; and aircraft performance in consultation with the Captain (Flying Pilot); he chose to fly the localizer 18 approach into Denton. The glideslope portion of the ILS was out of service. We calculated landing performance as per Company procedures and verified it with the flying pilot. The performance data showed a 4;300 FT for a wet runway with a ref of 116 KIAS. Runway 18 at Denton is 7;000 FT. The approach was very normal and we broke out as the reported weather showed. Wind check from tower on a 2 mile final was from 080 at 19 KTS. Upon landing; we noted the runway was wet and later on noted small areas of standing water. The aircraft touched down on Ref (116 KTS). The brakes were applied; followed by the lift dump within the first 1;000 FT of the runway threshold. The lift dump felt to be operating correctly; but we immediately noticed the brakes did not seem normal and the Captain even commented that to me. I never felt the anti-skid system cycle at all throughout the entire landing. The Captain had control of the airplane and was able to maneuver as necessary. I started calling out runway distances when we had approximately 5;000 FT remaining.With approximately 2000 FT remaining; and feeling like we may not be able to stop; the Captain decided to shut down the right engine in order to remove excess thrust. He also called the tower to inform them that we would most likely be going off the end of the runway. With approximately 1;000 FT remaining; he turned off the anti-skid system as we both felt it was not functioning correctly. We then felt the tires grab and from there on he just made sure we were tracking perfectly straight with maximum braking effort; thinking we would be exiting the runway.I estimate we exited the runway at around 20 KTS. Once stopped; we made sure everyone was safe and sound. We then called the tower again to tell them we indeed had gone off the runway and had come to a stop about 60 FT off the end and everyone was safe. The Captain then directed me (type rated for a RA390); due to the fact that I'm an A&P mechanic; to do a walk around to get a general idea of the state of the aircraft before personnel arrived to disembark the passengers and begin to extract the aircraft. I noted that the left main tire was flat. As soon as all the passengers were safely on their way to the FBO; the Captain contacted our Director of Operations via cell phone.I am filing this report due to the FAA referring to this event as an incident when corresponding with us. To the best of my knowledge; and in consultation with our Director of Operations; this event does not fall under the category of an accident or incident as per the FARs definition. There was also no loss of separation or conflict between any aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

On landing rollout on a wet runway; flight crew experienced malfunction of aircraft's anti-skid system. As a result; the aircraft rolled off the end of the runway at low speed and experienced a blown tire. Passengers were evacuated and the aircraft was towed to the ramp.

1771329

202011

ZZZ.TRACON

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aerofoil Ice System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1771329

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1771321.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

When conducting an ice system test in flight the test performed normally until we turned the system off. When turning the system off we the flight crew noticed a 'boom' sound; however didn't receive any ICAS notification or any other signs of abnormalities. The Flight Attendant called us to ask if we hear the same thing but she also reported the sound of a 'grinding noise.' She stated a passenger also told her they heard something abnormal and asked the Flight Attendant what it was. After getting this information I decided it was best to return to the airport of departure. We told ATC we needed to return to the airport. We landed safely and upon further inspection MX did state to us there was a broken bleed line that was causing all the noise and the initial boom.

On departure; the PIC and I initiated the ice detection test per the checklist and first flight of the day. We heard a boom noise as if somebody had dropped a case of water in the cabin. The flight attendant called us directly after and informed us of a loud grinding noise coming from underneath the floor of the aircraft. The PIC and I elected to return to [departure airport] where ample maintenance was present; and we were only on the departure. We returned safely with no further issues.

EMB-135 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing an anomaly in the anti-ice system.

1600861

201812

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

10

Daylight

5500

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 152

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

None

Rudder Control System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 69; Flight Crew Type 69

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1600861

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

I landed on the Runway XXL to do touch and go. I was stabilized and on the centerline. After landing; I turned off the carburetor heat; put flaps up and full throttle in order to do touch and go. When I rotated at 50 knots; the airplane didn't lift off and I lost directional control. I couldn't maintain centerline so I pulled throttle out and pushed on the brakes. I ended up skidding to the left side of runway on the grass; hitting the runway lights. The runway was wet so I think I could have hydroplaned. I could have done more rudder control. I could have stopped and go.

C152 student pilot reported a loss of control and runway excursion during landing on a wet runway.

1054628

201212

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

PA-42 Cheyenne IIA

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

None

Class E ZZZ

Main Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 1400

1054628

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I filed an IFR flight plan in a Cheyenne III I have flown for a private company for many years. In the pattern; I lowered the landing gear handle; I felt the landing gear extend but did not get a green light for the left main and the 'gear not locked' light was illuminated. I abandoned the landing and gained altitude to orbit and run the checklist(s). Using the Emergency Gear Extension Checklist I tried using the hand pump and the blow down systems and could not get a safe indication. I assessed weather; fuel and daylight and decided to fly to another airport; 170 NM away because I felt I needed to burn down fuel to make the aircraft lighter and minimize the fire hazard. I checked NOTAMS and weather at another airport along the way. ATC suggested I fly by the Tower and have them visually inspect the landing gear. They advised me the landing gear appeared down but the inner gear doors were open. I advised them I wanted to go to another airport and land. I arrived in the pattern and a local pilot in a Cirrus offered to have a closer look at the gear and I accepted. He advised me the landing gear appeared extended with the inner doors open. I proceeded with a normal landing. About 500 FT after main wheel touchdown and decelerating through 90 KTS; the left main gear retracted and the left propeller; flap and aileron contacted the runway. When I filed my flight plan; I anticipated a flight student would come with me but they did not. My flight plan was filed showing 2 Souls On Board (SOB) and I did not change it to reflect 1. I should have changed the flight plan to reflect the correct number of SOB.

PA42 pilot reports unsafe left main landing gear during approach and elects to divert to another airport. All attempts at obtaining a safe indication are futile and after a normal landing the left main gear collapses.

1590462

201810

Air Carrier

B757-300

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1590462

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1590462.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Aircraft; Company Policy

Aircraft

This is my first time working this aircraft; a B757-300. When giving the pilots a break I deployed the cart since there is no gate. When deploying the cart across the aisle I noticed that it does not rest against the wall as it does in all the other aircraft in the fleet. The B757-300 has a wider aisle where the galley meets the door cross-aisle. As such the cart is not 'stable' and I truly believe that it is a security threat. An assailant would easily be able to topple the cart as such.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight Attendant reported the galley cart cannot be secured to block the flight deck for pilot breaks.

1255981

201504

1801-2400

ROW.Airport

NM

0.0

Turbulence

Tower ROW

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Landing

None

Class D ROW

Facility ROW.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1255981

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1257377.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors

There were two VFR arrivals; one from the southeast and one from the southwest and approach asked if I could provide the sequence. I agreed; and when I talked to aircraft Y from the southwest; I instructed him to enter a right downwind for runway 17 and report midfield downwind. Then; I talked to aircraft X from the southeast and instructed him to enter a left downwind for runway 17 and report midfield downwind. Aircraft X made a wide (nonstandard) left downwind outside of runway 21 and reported midfield downwind for runway 17. At that point; I instructed aircraft X to extend downwind to sequence him behind aircraft Y. When aircraft Y was no longer a conflict; I instructed aircraft X base turn his discretion and cleared him to land on runway 17. Next; aircraft Z called at the ramp requesting taxi for a northwest departure. I entered aircraft Z into the ARTS IIE keyboard and taxied him to runway 21 at intersection delta. Aircraft Z came back and requested a departure from taxiway alpha and charlie and I taxied him as requested. As aircraft Y was on landing roll; I instructed him to turn left at taxiway hotel and taxi to parking via hotel charlie alpha; hold short of taxiway alpha (for aircraft Z at the intersection). Aircraft Z called up at charlie and alpha and requested takeoff clearance and I told him to hold position for traffic landing runway 17 on short final (which is where I estimated aircraft X to be). To confirm aircraft X's position; I scanned runway 17 final; but was unable to locate the aircraft. Seconds later I located aircraft X and he was on a very short final for closed runway 12. At that moment I issued go around instructions several times to aircraft X but the aircraft was unresponsive and landed on runway 12 which has boneyard airplanes parked on it (with a small open area between the aircraft). After the aircraft rolled out on closed runway 12; I gave him instructions to taxi to the FBO and asked him to call the tower (but did not give the brasher warning). All other aircraft landed and departed without incident and no one was injured. After reporting the incident to management; I was able to listen to the recording and I realized that I had issued go around instructions to 'aircraft Y [wrong call sign off by a letter]' instead of 'aircraft X' but issued two more general go around statements in an attempt to get the aircraft to abandon the landing.The Albuquerque VFR sectional still shows runway 12/30 (which is closed) on the airport icon which could lead an aircraft to believe it is an open runway and should be updated to remove that runway from the icon. Also; the airport should paint larger; brighter; and more frequent closed runway markings on the runway.

I was on flight following from to ROW. I talked to ROW approach and the ROW Tower and was cleared to land. I thought the tower said Runway 27 and I turned to what I thought was Runway 27. As I descended I wanted to call tower for correct runway verification. The tower told another aircraft to hold position; another aircraft was on short final; my position. I knew the tower saw me and the runway I was going to land on. I was prepared to go around; but when the tower told another aircraft to hold; there was another aircraft on short final; I knew the tower saw me and where I was landing. They said nothing about me making a landing on the wrong runway until after I landed. I realize I made a mistake but I do believe the tower should have warned about my mistake rather than just watching it being made.

ROW Tower Controller and pilot reported of landing at ROW on a closed runway.

1769509

202010

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Personal

PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

1.0

Personal

Landing

N

Y

Inspection; Repair

Brake System

X

Design; Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Inspector; Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 30; Maintenance Repairman 35

Troubleshooting

1769509

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Other landing

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Pressurized brakes...It did it again. It was not even X years ago that I landed a Piper Malibu on a short runway only to notice upon touchdown that one complete side of the brake system was completely inoperative. Now; just last week; it happened again. Here's the story; and Piper needs to fix to the design problem...The Malibu has inverted master brake cylinders on the rudder pedals like many Pipers. Normally; the brakes work and there are no problems. Yet an insidious problem will develop. There are 3 O-rings on each master cylinder and these O-rings will leak. Yet; they will not leak brake fluid out of the system; they will and do let air into the system. The Malibu is pressurized; and when flown with a differential cabin pressure; the pressure is pushing air in to the brakes system thru the brake master cylinders. The cabin air which is under pressure is flowing to any opening in the cabin which to escape. When the O-rings in the brake system allows the cabin air to enter the braking system; the brakes stop working. If allowed to persist; the air in the system renders the brakes on the affected side or both sides ineffective...or even non-existent.Upside-down brake master cylinders...As you would expect; the air migrates upwards and enters the brake lines even so insidiously and it doesn`t take much air to make the brakes disabled. Here's the issue; Malibu brake failures are common on flights where the brakes worked perfectly on run-up and pre flight checks. The problem does not reveal itself until the brakes are used on landing.Although the checklist in the Malibu clearly states to check the brakes prior to takeoff. How do you check the brakes in flight prior to landing?If either side of the braking system is weak or non-existent; perform a go-around and consider your options. Pilot might want to fly to an airport with a longer runway if they have fuel. They may want to fly an approach a little slower and maybe plan to touch down as early as practicable on the runway. They might want to call for safety vehicles to be ready in case there is a landing over run issue and notify the FAA. In any case; you do not want to touch down on the runway and then realize you've got a brake problem. Many Piper pilots and passengers are in danger when this occurs.

PA-46 Malibu pilot reported brake failure during landing rollout; citing a possible design flaw in the braking system.

1821271

202107

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1821271

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Software and Automation

Software and Automation

Climbing out; Autopilot/Flight Director would indicate an overspeed and the plane would pitch up violently. Disconnected Autopilot and reestablish. 5 minutes later same thing. Happened 50-60 times during flight. Aircraft would not capture NAV. Flight Level Change (FLCH) would not engage. Could only fly in Heading (HDG) mode and Flight Path Angle (FPA). FADEC never shifted from TO mode with the Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) armed. Checked Emergency Procedure Checklist (EPC) but could not find a checklist that would pertain to us. Decided to return to ZZZ. At decision time it indicated we would be 3000 lbs over landing weight so we initiated procedures to minimize overweight landing and returned to ZZZ. Landed approximately 750lbs over weight. Aircraft landed fine and there were no additional issues. Upon return I wrote the airplane up. Priority handling was not requested as the aircraft was still controllable with no Autopilot or Flight Director.

EMB-175 Captain reported malfunctioning autoflight system which resulted in a return to departure airport.

1245629

201503

1201-1800

MDPC.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1245629

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

This incident started about 5-10 minutes after the last passenger deplaned. Doors 1L and 2L were both open; ostensibly for deplaning and boarding. There were many cleaners on aircraft from the front to the back. The situation was busy at best; frantic at worst. I was standing on the front air stairs when a Flight Attendant asked me if I could supervise her opening door 2R. The cleaners were beating on the door to have it opened so that the trash could be emptied. I agreed to supervise as no other crew members were available. I followed her to the back of the airplane where various ramp personnel were in aft galley conducting their work. She proceeded to arm the door as it had been disarmed from deplaning. It was at this point that I became confused. Before I could intervene; she pulled up on the handle; the door opened and the slide blew. She looked back at me in shock and said; 'Oh my god; I am so fired!' She was visibly shaken and in shock as was I.I should have done a better job confirming what was actually going on and trying to slow the process down. This included finding another flight attendant; pulling out manuals or rechecking door disarm indications in the cockpit. The overall issue for me was being distracted; rushed and uncertain of my supervision objective. I also believe she was trying to do the right thing; especially as a new employee. She was rushed and getting pressure from the cleaners. In retrospect; I think she was operating on muscle memory. Since she had already disarmed the door; the next event was to arm it. Additionally; she has a great attitude and was just trying to help others do their job. Procedurally; this might be avoided if aircraft crew deplanes immediately and gets out of the way of outstation cleaners. Or a procedure needs to be implemented as it relates to who is authorized to open and close doors during cleaning.

A320 Captain reports being asked by a new Flight Attendant to monitor her actions while she disarms and opens an aft galley door. The door is already disarmed but is rearmed and opened before the reporter can react; blowing the slide.

1809861

202105

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

33000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Type 4952

Troubleshooting

1809861

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

In cruise flight FL3XY; we received a yellow EICAS Left Hydraulic Quantity (L HYD QTY) message. We opened the QRH and followed the checklist for L HYD QTY message which had us turn off the associated Left hydraulic pumps in order to conserve (if able) quantity in the system. We had the status page up and noticed it was approximate .47 on the Quantity listed; and then also noticed it continued to slowly drop in number as we continued to complete the checklist. The checklist had us reference Hydraulic System Pressure -Left (only) checklist to see affected subsystems (extensive list and checklist). When referencing this and seeing the involvement with degraded flight control systems (spoilers; nose wheel steering; thrust reversers; etc.) and looking at ZZZ's current and forecast wind (strong steady and gusty crosswinds); Captain transferred controls and ATC communication to me and began consultation with Company on best options for us. The quantity during his conversation with Company continued to drop and I (with his agreement) slowed the cruise speed in case we elected to divert based off of possible flight control degradation based on the conditions in ZZZ. We both discussed the nice conditions back in ZZZ1 and long runway for a potential flaps 20 landing with other degraded flight control systems. As the discussion with Dispatch/Maintenance Control/ Chief Pilot continued; the hydraulic quantity continued to drop and then stabilized around .17 (where the standpipe sits in the reservoir?). Hydraulic pressure continued steady at approximately XY00 with some slight fluctuations and we agreed (temporarily) that ZZZ would still be viable based off of the Power Transfer Unit (PTU) input to the Left Hydraulic system.As the conversation with the Company continued; the Hydraulic pressure then started to fluctuate and eventually went to zero along with the quantity. At that moment; the status message POWER TRANSFER UNIT popped up. The captain relayed to Company this information and with the concurrence of all; the election to divert back to ZZZ1 was made based off of all the available information of system degradation; weather conditions in ZZZ and time to complete the extensive HYDRAULIC SYSESTEM PRESSURE - Left (Only) checklist. With concurrence; I advised ATC our wishes to divert to ZZZ1 and [request] for priority handling. Shortly after receiving revised clearance; ATC coordination and required information for them; we reprogrammed the box and began our diversion back to ZZZ1. Within a few minutes; we received an ACARS message from Dispatch that ZZZ2 was reporting good conditions with a favorable runway alignment for the winds. Captain and I evaluated runway XY (RWY XY) and agreed ZZZ2 was a good option at only 233NM from our current position (plenty of time to reprogram; complete the involved checklist and land safely with a direct headwind on RWY XY).At the moment of agreement; we then asked for diversion to ZZZ2 for RWY XY under emergency authority with full fire equipment standing by for precautionary purposes. We were then given revised clearance to ZZZ2 and completed the flight without further incident after completing the checklist.Being that the nose wheel steering was inoperative; we stopped the aircraft on the runway after landing on the centerline and waited for evaluation by fire/rescue and awaited tow-in to gate from the runway to the gate from a supertug. Supertug tow was delayed for several minutes after evaluation from fire/rescue and their report of significant fluid leakage from the aircraft right wheel well pertaining to the system malfunction.

B757 Captain reported having to divert after losing yellow system hydraulic quantity during cruise.

1213525

201410

1201-1800

ZPH.Airport

FL

0.0

200.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Personal

PA-34-200 Seneca I

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

None

Class G ZPH

Personal

Sail Plane

1.0

Part 91

Training

Final Approach

None

Class G ZPH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 600

Situational Awareness

1213525

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 150; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Seneca was on short final to runway 23 had to break out to avoid collision with glider on base or final to runway 19. Both aircraft took evasive action to avoid collision. Weather was clear with unlimited visibility; ASOS winds 280/08. Multiple glider tow traffic was departing north (runway 1) then using a right hand traffic pattern to land south (midfield runway 19). Additional traffic was parachute-jump Otters departing north (runway 1) and using a left hand traffic pattern to land south (midfield runway 19). Local traffic was using right hand traffic to runway 23 (the wind favored runway). I believe that simultaneous up-wind takeoffs; downwind landings; both right and left hand traffic patterns on runway 1/19 are a collision hazard when combined with heavy local and transient traffic.

PA34 pilot reports a NMAC with a glider during approach to Runway 23 at ZPH; while the glider was apparently on approach to Runway 19. Runway 23 was the wind favored runway while Runway 19/1 was being used by jump aircraft and gliders and both left and right hand traffic patterns.

1693104

201910

1201-1800

SAN.Airport

CA

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1693104

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

We were conducting the RNAV 27 approach in Day VMC conditions to SAN with a Tailwind during most of the Arrival and initial Approach phase. The Captain was the Pilot Flying. When Cleared for the approach he followed the typical routine of arming Approach Mode which quickly captured lateral and vertical guidance and began descending on the glideslope. At the time we were at flaps one with about 10-15 kts buffer under the Flaps 1 redline of 235. Because of the tailwind and the somewhat steeper than normal approach angle; the aircraft started to accelerate after capturing the glideslope and quickly oversped the flaps by approximately 5-10 kts. The Captain began to intervene immediately with use of the speedbrakes but the acceleration trend carried us into the red line. After removing the aircraft from approach mode and taking us off the glideslope; the aircraft slowed below the red line and we continued configuring and landed normally. We wrote up the overspeed at the Gate in SAN.I believe that the core reason for this was a misunderstanding on the part of the PF (Pilot Flying) about what the aircraft would do once approach was armed. The PF said repeatedly that he thought the aircraft wouldn't overspeed with the automation set up with a selected speed and Approach Captured. Because of the tailwind and the aircraft's priority to follow the glideslope without regard to selected speed; an overspeed was possible. He may have been thinking of flight envelope protections in normal mode which would have protected an extreme overspeed but will allow the aircraft into the redline before they intervene.As the PM (Pilot Monitoring); I should have spoken up when approach mode was about to capture the glideslope to caution that an overspeed was possible. We had briefed during the approach briefing that a threat in SAN was the likelihood of being fast and high but I will add in the future that flap overspeeds; especially on the initial stage of the approach are possible. Additional emphasis in training about automation priorities where the aircraft will follow vertical guidance without regard to airspeeds may also be beneficial.

A321 First Officer reported flap overspeed during a coupled approach with a tailwind.

1051445

201211

1801-2400

JAX.TRACON

FL

2000.0

TRACON JAX

SR22

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 32

Final Approach

TRACON JAX

Military

S-70/UH-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Pavehawk/Knighthawk

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 32

Final Approach

Facility JAX.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1051445

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

I was working Aircraft X from the southwest for an ILS to CRG. I asked NRB RADAR who was working Aircraft Y; to keep the pattern tight so I could follow with my approach to CRG. I asked the pilot to reduce his speed for sequence. Both CRG and NRB airports were VFR with low ceilings. Our Letter of Agreement states that CRG Tower will provide visual separation when the field is VFR; unless the Tower states otherwise. The final to NRB crosses over CRG Tower; and in this case the aircraft was vectored out a little further than I anticipated. I knew it was going [to] get close; but I figured that NRB would point-out the helicopter to CRG Tower; in turn CRG Tower would be talking to Aircraft X on final to Runway 32 to circle to Runway 5. My instinct was to verify with CRG that they could provide visual separation; and the Tower's response was that they were both above the bases of the clouds and they could not see them. I immediately called CRG Tower back and told him to break the aircraft out. I assigned a heading of 210 and 3;000 FT altitude. By the time CRG Tower got the aircraft turned; they seemed to have gotten close. NRB aircraft doing a GCA approach to Runway 5 is a conflict with aircraft doing practically any approach at CRG. The airports are just in close proximity to each other; and it's always a hand-full. Also; be more mindful of the bases in the future; and realize that CRG Tower might not be able to give the visual separation they are required due to weather.

JAX TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event when anticipated visual separation could not be provided by CRG Tower.

1470929

201708

0601-1200

DCA.Airport

DC

400.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower DCA

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID HORTO2

Class B DCA

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1470929

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

1469957.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

Following take off from 15; at 400 feet; I called for NAV mode as we were flying the HORTO2 RNAV departure. The First Officer (FO) selected NAV and confirmed 'FMS.' I happened to look down at the CDI and saw the head of the needle pointing toward HORTO which was behind us! My first reaction was we didn't have the proper runway selected. The FO checked the FMS and said it showed 15. The MFD showed the proper ground track. I expected the next fix to be CAPVC. Having briefed this at the gate; I knew a right turn was required at 515 feet; so I started a right turn. Then; the FMS 'caught up' with us. I've never seen this on any FMS before. After returning to DCA; we were able to depart 15 again. The second time; the FMS worked properly.Not sure what the cause was. We did have some ACARS issues enroute which seemed due to the ACARS-FMS keypad interface. I don't know if those are somehow related.

Following a runway change to 15 from 19 the FMS either dropped out or was never updated with the departure runway. We already had set the aircraft up and briefed for 19. On the initial climb out the Captain (CA) caught the fact that the Map page was blank. He then verbally remarked that there was no runway entered into the FMS after he tried to call for NAV. I reacted by trying to change the FMS to input the runway back into the box. At the same time a caution appeared for a Right AOA HEAT error. At this point we were still in our initial climb phase. This caused me to get distracted as I had to see what the message was. When I saw it was something we could handle at a later point I refocused on reentering the runway. I entered 15 into the SID; executed; and told the CA we had good NAV. During this the CA had started a turn at 512 feet as depicted on the SID. However; with the delay in reacting to the FMS combined with the caution message we flew beyond the SID turn by at least 2 miles. We competed the turn on NAV/FMS and continued with no other issues on the SID. Failure to check the FMS during the Takeoff Brief for a runway change by myself. Whether the FMS dropped out or the runway was never entered was not known. We only realized it after rotation.

CRJ200 flight crew reported departing Runway 15 at DCA on the HORTO2 RNAV with Runway 19 selected in the FMC. The Captain turned late at 515 feet while the First Officer corrected the FMC.

1658301

201906

1201-1800

DEN.Airport

CO

1500.0

VMC

Tower DEN

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1658301

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

On our return flight we were cleared the visual approach about 20 miles south of DEN for Runway 35R. Before being handed over to Tower we were assigned 170 kts until FRONZ and intercepted the LOC and GS well south of FRONZ. South of FRONZ we were given our landing clearance and I had a gradual intercept with the GS. I am not exactly sure what happened in the interim but I remember being just inside FRONZ on the LOC and GS and we got the gear horn in which we immediately lowered the gear; got fully configured; ran the landing checklist and continued to landing. In the moment where we were it just seemed so stable just not fully configured. The Captain said the approach looked fine and we were on speed; fully configured and had the before landing checklist completed so quickly at that moment it seemed like the best decision and we landed safely. I do not feel that I was fatigued but I do remember being pretty tired on our return; we descended on the arrival without incident around some weather and the approach just seemed so uneventful. 20/20 hindsight I thought I remember thinking that the gear horn went off at 1;500 feet but I don't think that was correct and realized that it may not have qualified for the stabilized approach minimums. I feel like in the future having a bit more situational awareness of the Final Approach Fix regardless of our visual status would have helped. Communicating a bit more and using more callouts for both the Non-flying pilot and myself to hear to help with that situational awareness would have helped as well. I normally am pretty good about being in managed speed before the final approach fix as well but today I was not so I will work on making sure that speed is managed to approach speed by that point in the future regardless of ATC requests for us to hustle on our arrival.

A321 First Officer reported unstabilized approach into DEN citing fatigue as a factor.

1853007

202111

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Class D ZZZ

GPWS

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

1853007

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

While on a visual approach into Runway XX into ZZZ; we received an Aural Terrain Warning. The CA was Pilot Flying (PF) and I was Pilot Monitoring (PM); and we had been cleared for the visual approach while abeam the airport on an ATC assigned downwind heading at 4;000 ft. We had discussed the terrain in the area; and maintained 4;000 ft. until we were past the largest terrain factor of towers around 2;750 ft. on downwind. Once beyond those obstacles; the CA descended to the FAF altitude of 2;800 ft. As PM; I was closely monitoring terrain on my Navigational Display as well as my GPS location on my iPad approach plate. We were at 180 knots and on a heading to intercept the final approach course when we received an Aural Terrain Warning. We were level at 2;800 ft. and there were no visual indications on either Navigational Display of any terrain threat as well as no Radio Altimeter Reading. Since there was no terrain threat showing on the Navigational Display; we were referencing the approach plate and the highest of the terrain around us was 2.000 ft. Regardless; the Captain called 'my aircraft'; cut off the autopilot; and climbed 250 feet while beginning to execute the EGPWS maneuver; however; the alert went away before selecting TOGA; and we were then intercepting the final approach course. I had no RA readings to call out as PM since the Navigational Display did not show a threat. Since we were above the FAF altitude and above any charted or displayed terrain threats; we elected to continue the approach and landed without incident or further alerts. The largest factor here; I believe is accepting a visual approach with surrounding terrain at night. There is no company procedure prohibiting it for ZZZ; however since we did receive an aural warning; there was either an obstacle that was not shown on our charts or in our GPS database; it was registering the obstacles on the south side of the localizer as threats (though still did not show any yellow or red on the Navigational Display); or it could have been a false reading. This was a new airport for me; and if assigned again; I will request vectors to final or extend the downwind leg to the initial fix to remain at a higher altitude.Since we appeared to be clear of any terrain threats but still received an aural warning; I would suggest incorporating notes into the company pages not to descend to the FAF altitude until established on the localizer or not to accept a visual approach clearance at night. My personal plan going forward; if operating at night; will be to maintain 4;000 ft. until established on the localizer course or request vectors from ATC if they are requesting a shorter approach.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving an Aural Terrain Alert during a visual approach while clear of any terrain factors. The alert ceased before the Captain initiated an escape maneuver and elected to continue approach to a safe landing.