elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1650981

201906

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Cockpit Window

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1650981

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft

During flight we were on final approach to Runway XXR. At approximately 200 feet above ground level; I heard a loud bang and saw some motion or light refraction at the Captain's window. I looked over to the left and noticed the Captain's front window was cracked. ATC was notified of the cracked window. We landed normally and taxied to the gate. During post flight no evidence of a bird strike was found. We were unable to determine the cause of the cracked window. During post flight no evidence of a bird strike was found.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported the cockpit window cracked on approach to landing.

1328712

201602

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

7000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID ZZZZ

Positional / Directional Sensing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 157; Flight Crew Total 5547; Flight Crew Type 4364

1328712

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft

We were departing from an overseas airport [on a SID]. LNAV and VNAV were engaged and operating normally. All indications were normal until we were cleared to climb and maintain 7000 feet. ATC gave us a heading of 360. FO (First Officer) was flying. Captain pushed the HDG SEL knob and rotated the selector to assigned heading of 360. FMA indications indicated HDG. FO asked for 'heading select 360' which had been assigned; while turning to 360; as indicated on both HSIs. Capt confirmed HDG mode was indicated on the FMA and heading window on the MCP indicated 000. Nonetheless the FD steer bars were indicating full right displacement. The course and heading indicator on the Captain and FO HSI; aka the 'sailboat' both indicated 360. The RDMI indicated approximately 348 degrees; and the magnetic compass was difficult to read in the light chop; but seemed to average about 350. Meanwhile; ATC sternly repeated (twice) for us to fly heading 360. While FO maintained the indicated heading and altitude; Captain explained to ATC that we had an indication problem and asked ATC what heading they showed us flying. ATC said they showed us on a heading of 346 degrees. As we were unable to comply with ATC instructions without additional assistance; Captain asked ATC for assistance in the form of flying straight ahead; and confirming our heading; while we worked technical issues. ATC confirmed; changed our altitude a couple times and (climbs to 10;000 and 11;000). While FO flew and worked radios; Captain and relief pilot performed checklists and attempted to contact Dispatch and Maintenance. Satellite phone did not work despite 3 attempts from Capt to call out; and at least 2 attempts of company to call our flight. We managed to communicate nature of problem to company who advised Maintenance would contact us. There were no amber bars on any of the HSI; EICAS screens or EICAS messages. The steer bars on both FMAs indicated full right. The AFDS roll mode indicated HDG SEL but the heading select knob had no effect on the roll bars of either FD. We tried turning both FDs off and back on. They came back on in 'VS' and 'HDG SEL' (rather than HDG HOLD). The heading select knob would turn; but did not affect the FMA steer bars in either direction. Because the system had been working normally in LNAV prior to failure; Capt. tried selecting LNAV and back to HDG select. The FMAs correctly indicated change from HDG to LNAV and back to HDG; but FMA steer bars remained pegged full right. We requested a turn to 270 which was more on course; and also directly into the wind. After turning to 270; the 'sailboat' and FMA steer bar came alive and centered. Moving the HDG select knob then showed positive control of the heading indicator and all indications showed normal. We asked ATC for a clearance to the next waypoint on our flight plan and cautiously engaged LNAV. All systems indicated normal capture. Having completed all relevant checklists and having normal indications again; we advised we no longer needed any assistance or special handling. We also completed all the Class II checks; including gross nav error check. Our route took us over some VORs and we verified lat/long and heading indications against the raw data. Meanwhile we communicated with Company through ACARS and advised them of our status; checklist completion; and normal indications. Company confirmed that we were cleared to continue to our destination. Maintenance sent us a message advising that he knew of similar problems which were resolved by switching from NORM to TRUE and back to NORM on FWD instrument panel. As we had all systems functioning normally at that time; we elected not to do this. Somewhere enroute we got a message from Maintenance asking if our heading indications had returned to normal. We advised they had. Excellent CRM on the part of both FOs; particularly since we were addressing a problem not exactly covered by any checklists in busy airspace. Also worth noting is that the cabin lost all audio and first and business lost all reading lights and call lights. None of these cabin issues were resolved by resetting the [system].

Aircraft systems' temporarily lost reliable heading indications during climb.

1070879

201302

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

1500.0

VMC

15

Daylight

25000

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Learjet 35

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Landing Gear Indicating System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 3075; Flight Crew Type 600

1070879

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were cleared for the visual approach. On about a 5 to 7 mile final while conducting the Before Landing Checklist; the landing gear handle was moved to the 'down' position. After the landing gear was finished cycling; it was noted that the right main landing gear 'down' light was not illuminated. The landing gear was recycled; and again the right main landing gear 'down' light did not illuminate. I notified Tower that we were not receiving an indication that our right main landing gear was down and locked and that we would like to do a low approach and have them look to see if they saw all three landing gear down and the landing lights on. After the low approach; we were informed by the Tower that they could see all three landing gear and the main landing gear lights were on; and then asked what we would like to do. I informed the Tower we were running our checklists but would like to stay in the pattern while we conducted the checklists. We were then asked by the Tower if we would like the fire trucks standing by when we made our landing; which I replied 'Sure'. After discussing the situation in the cockpit; it was the conclusion of both pilots that the light bulb was most likely burnt out and the landing gear was indeed down and locked; and a normal landing should be made. However; just to make sure the landing gear was actually down and to avoid any problems; the Emergency Landing Gear Extension Checklist was run and the landing gear was 'blown down' using the nitrogen bottle. The landing was made normally; and after landing; the fire trucks pulled up next to the aircraft to inspect it and verify that everything was OK. After we relayed everything was fine; they drove off and the airplane was taxied the FBO where service was then set up by the Director of Maintenance. The aircraft was serviced and flown home the next day without incident.

LR35 Captain notes the failure of the right main landing gear down light to illuminate after gear extension during approach. A go around is initiated and the Tower advises that the gear appear to be down. To make sure the emergency landing extension checklist is run and the gear is blown down followed by a safe landing.

1227372

201411

0601-1200

CCR.Airport

CA

1000.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 5

Daylight

Tower CCR

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Final Approach

Class D CCR

Tower CCR

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Class D CCR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 190

1227372

Conflict NMAC

Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was descending on a 4 mile left base to Runway 32L at Buchanan Field in Concord; CA (CCR); in a low wing aircraft. I was doing so at the command of the FAA Control Tower at said airport. I started a descent at approximately 3000 ft MSL. During this descent I heard the Tower clear a Cessna aircraft for a touch and go on runway 32L. There were several other aircraft in the pattern on Runway 32R. I heard no other communication from the Tower concerning 32L. At a distance of approximately one (1) mile on base a Cessna high wing aircraft passed left to right below my aircraft at a vertical distance of approximately fifty (50) feet. The white Cessna aircraft appeared from below my left wing flying diagonally from my wing to fuselage. I clearly saw the two occupants in the front seats. They did not look up and did not appear to see my aircraft pass above them as they proceeded downwind in the pattern. At no time did the radar equipped Tower warn of an impending collision. I was given permission to land and after landing I reported the near midair collision. I was told to call the Tower after parking and engine shut down. When I did so and described the event I was told that their (the CCR Tower) radar coverage was 'spotty' in that direction. The Tower person also said I was asked to report a two (2) mile base. I did not receive that radio call from the Tower; nor was I warned of the near midair collision.Visibility at the time of this incident was approximately five (5) miles in haze. I think the Tower Controller might have been distracted by the relatively heavy traffic on the parallel Runway 32R. It would be best if the radar coverage to the southwest was continuous at the CCR Tower. This should be repaired or fixed immediately.

General aviation pilot on a visual approach to CCR experiences a NMAC with a Cessna on downwind not reported by the Tower. When queried after parking; the Tower indicates that their Radar is 'spotty' in the southwest quadrant.

1659159

201906

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

300.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1659159

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1659157.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

After flying the published RNAV procedure for Runway 21; and then getting the runway in sight visually an EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System) sounded at approximately 300 ft AGL. The aircraft was on the glide slope and in a position to land. After receiving the EGPWS alert an EGPWS [escape] maneuver and subsequent go around were performed and the aircraft landed safely the opposite direction.The aircraft had flown the published RNAV approach and proceeded visually to the runway on the glide slope. I am not sure what could've been done to prevent it. It's possible that we shouldn't land on Runway 21 in ZZZ if this was in fact an actual EGPWS warning. The aircraft was stabilized and on glide for a normal landing into ZZZ on Runway 21.

While flying the published RNAV for Runway 21 and getting the runway in sight visually an EGPWS terrain warning sounded at 300 ft AGL while following the PAPI for landing Runway 21. An EGPWS escape maneuver was performed and subsequent go around. We landed the aircraft safely on the opposite runway.Unsure of contributing factor. At the time of the warning we had the runway visually on final approach and we were following the PAPI.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported a ground proximity warning at approximately 300 feet while on glideslope with runway visual contact.

1084736

201304

1801-2400

SAN.Airport

CA

1200.0

Tower SAN

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B SAN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1084736

Other laser

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related

On approach the First Officer and I were lasered. The First Officer had a direct hit and later had headaches and experienced disorientation.

A321 Captain reported being struck by a laser on approach to SAN; resulting in disorientation and headaches for the First officer.

1731628

202001

1201-1800

S56.TRACON

UT

IMC

Daylight

TRACON S56

Air Carrier

Airliner 99

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class B SLC

Compass (HSI/ETC)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1731628

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

I just departed on an initial ATC heading. I entered IMC conditions shortly after takeoff continuing during the climb out. I noticed a heading flag on the Captain's side HSI and immediately looked to the Co-pilot's side HSI and observed the course headings disagreed by more than 20 degrees. I used the information from the right side HSI to return the aircraft to the correct assigned heading. With the plane back on the correct heading I looked over to the right side electrical panel and noticed the breaker for the Captain's side HSI was tripped. Per the Company OPSPECS I reset the breaker; and the HSI returned to normal operations. I was then handed off to the next controller. I informed the next controller I suffered a primary Nav failure on climb-out which caused a momentary course deviation but the instrument was now working. About a minute into the flight and one mile north of the airport the Captain became aware of the failure by the appearance of the heading flag on the left HSI and confirmed the failure by referencing the copilot HSI. The cause of the deviation was the failure of the Captains primary navigation display immediately after take off in IMC conditions. I informed the next controller I had a nav failure that fortunately I was able to reset. Upon reaching our destination I notified the Dispatcher; the Head of Maintenance; and the Station Manager that I had a primary nav failure. An entry of the failure was made in the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook.The event was caused by an equipment failure. Equipment failures will occur often without warning; and I critical times of flight. I was able to handle the failure by training and experience. There is no way to prevent equipment failures; we can only learn how to manage failures with training.

Beech 99 Captain reported that an HSI failure during climb resulted in a course deviation.

1614042

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

44300.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

PC-24

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Climb

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Personal

Check Pilot; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1614042

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Pilot Flying was undergoing Supervised Operating Experience 'Mentoring' on the Pilatus PC-24 for single pilot operations.After checking on the pilot in the climb at FL430 and FL440 I returned to my seat in the cabin where I had a birddog position to watch the pilot with ATC on the overhead speaker. Pilot was climbing in PIT (PITCH) mode aware of the dangers in climbing in that mode. Many pilots like to climb in Pitch mode through FL300 at it gives the passengers a smoother ride and allows the pilot to reach cruising altitude without hunting in FLC or VS.At FL443 I heard the Center controller Yell in a DEMANDING VOICE 'I need you at FL450 in 1 minute or less.'Hearing this exclamation; I ran to the flight deck to see the pilot's reaction. The Pilot Flying selected Manual Speed on the Autothrottle and dialed the speed back. (A common technique for climbing in Autothrottle FMS mode is when a controller asks you to expedite the climb you switch to Manual Speed on the Autothrottle and dial back 20-30 knots -- this will command the APFDS to pitch up exchanging airspeed for altitude); however; in this situation; the pilot didn't realize that dialing the speed back in PITCH mode would actually retard the throttles to IDLE.The Pilot [Flying] immediately corrected for the situation; however; once the aircraft lost the energy; the plane would no longer be able to reach assigned altitude. The Controller under a lot of pressure from the government shutdown clearly took his stress on the situation that required the pilot to get to FL450 in 1 minute or less out on the Pilot Flying and hit him over and over again with radio calls task saturating the pilot. The Pilot Flying did a great job on flying the aircraft; lowering the nose to break the approaching stall; and finally when he had a minute to breathe; informed the controller he needed lower.The pilot was ground schooled after the incident that he should of 'Declared an Emergency for Safety' and told the controller of the situation.The Pilot Flying now learned how to manage that type of situation and more importantly how to manage ATC in an emergency.

PC24 Check Pilot reported the pilot in training did not comply with ATC clearance.

1725196

202001

0601-1200

CYVR.Airport

BC

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground CYVR

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion

1725196

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1725199.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Airport

Ground cleared us to taxi to Runway 08R after crossing Runway 13 via L; hold short L. As we taxied to 08R via L; there was Aircraft Y holding short of 08R at L4. The Captain (CA) pulled in behind the Aircraft Y as it was taxing onto Runway 08R. I told the CA we were cleared to L; but this was my first time to this runway; and he said they usually want us at L4. I contacted ground to verify. Ground stated they cleared us to L not L4; but if we were able to depart L4; we could depart 08R at L4. The CA said yes we can take the L4 as the full length runway was 11;500 feet and L4 would not be an issue.The main contributing factor was the Aircraft Y holding short of L4 of 08R in which we pulled in behind. This was night time; and the signage could be brighter for taxing to L; as you must veer to the right; and loop around back to Runway 08R. The crew was given clearance to depart 08R at L4 by Ground Control prior to taxing onto the runway.L4 at 08R is well lit at night and very wide with lots of room. During night operations; crews should incorporate the possibility of pulling up to L4; and not L due to the size of the taxiway. The lesson I learned was to always contact Ground to confirm; should any confusion arise with where they cleared you to taxi to.

We received taxi instructions to taxi to Runway 8R via Taxiway L after crossing another runway. We were at the Taxiway L/L4 intersection and due to poor lighting and nighttime conditions it was difficult to determine our location at that time. We taxied past the taxiway directional sign array and there was no ground-based location marking for Taxiway L4. At this intersection for L4 and L; L4 leads to the threshold markings. Because we were unfamiliar with this area; we presumed that we were staying on L when in fact we turned on to L4. We held short of 8R and we were advised by Tower that we turned on to wrong taxiway. There was no incursion or safety hazard.Contributing factors to this situation were: Poor lighting; unfamiliarity with this area of the airport. Nighttime conditions; new crew; possible inadequate airport marking.In order to prevent a situation like this from happening again we will better identify threats such as unfamiliarity and environmental factors that may lead to confusion during ground operations. Additionally; the airport markings at this intersection and or environment could be improved to help pilots new to this airport navigate well on the ground. Thus; enhancing airport operational safety.

Air carrier flight crew reported that poor lighting; inadequate airport markings; night time conditions; and lack of familiarity with the CYVR airport resulted in a taxiway incursion.

1756520

202008

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

3000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Vectors

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Training / Qualification

1756520

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Procedure

I was not actually working during the event. I am the Operation Supervisor of the employee who had the event. I worked the day shift on the day of and the employee worked the night shift. The following day I became aware of the event and conducted a performance discussion with him. The employee and I reviewed the event and discussed factors that contributed to [it] and mitigations for the future. The employee was very engaged and receptive. The employee's normal performance is excellent. After reviewing the event the controller did not violate any rules and never lost separation. Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach following traffic and switched to the Tower. The aircraft was turning to final from the left base when he went through final and conflicted with an aircraft on a parallel runway. We discussed the dangers of using the same altitude on opposing bases but I felt that was not a contributing factor in this instance. The Controller also issued a 30 degree intercept in a timely manner. It was the pilot's error of going through final that caused the event. I honestly believe that the 7110.65; 7-4-4; is responsible for placing these two aircraft in an unsafe proximity. I have had to have way too many performance discussions with employees about this very same scenario of vectoring aircraft to parallel runways during visual approaches. The procedure does not prevent aircraft from being vectored to the same point on the finals at the same altitude as long as a Controller issues the visual approach to only one aircraft. It also only gives best practices and not direction on how to keep the planes separated. I see far too many close calls where planes don't collide from pure luck. The 7110.65; 7-4-4 needs to be changed to require aircraft to have standard separation until ESTABLISHED INBOUND on the final approach course. Until then we will continue to have these very unsafe events at airports around the NAS.

ATC Supervisor reported a Controller complied with the rules and cleared an aircraft for a visual approach which subsequently conflicted with parallel runway traffic by flying through the final approach course.

1807778

202105

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12.6; Flight Crew Total 139; Flight Crew Type 135

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1807778

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing Rollout

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

While landing on Runway XX at approximately 70 KIAS and power pulled to idle; after touchdown; plane started to veer to the left. Plane ultimately veered off of runway onto grass; where it came to a near-complete stop. Power was added to keep the plane moving in order to avoid getting stuck in the grass. Tower asked if we were OKAY; which I responded in the affirmative.Tower instructed us to re-enter [Runway] XX; and taxi to the T-hangars (with runway crossing and holding instructions included). We inspected the airplane and there was no apparent damage to the plane; just grass stains on the wheel pants; which we cleaned up. The airport operations reported there was no damage to anything on the runway environment. And there were no injuries to me (PIC) or my safety pilot passenger.The airplane was inspected the following day and was found to be in good operating condition and has been successfully flown since; with no reported issues.I believe the cause was my feet inadvertently slipped up the pedals and activated the toe brakes after landing; with the left side braking more strongly. There were some tire marks on the runway that seem to support this; according to the ground ops personnel.I plan to go up with a CFII as soon as possible; paying special attention to my foot position on takeoffs and landings. I may also fly with the seat farther back to make it less likely that my toes will accidentally be on the brakes.

PA-28 pilot reported a runway excursion on landing rollout.

1778699

202012

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

250.0

20.0

15000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID ZZZZA3

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer; ATC

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1778699

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 210

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1778698.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Departing Runway XXR ZZZ we were filed ZZZ1 Departure ZZZ transition then ZZZZZ [fix]. Upon receipt of CPDLC clearance there was a route modification that was obtained that had us routed via the ZZZZA3 ZZZZZ. I loaded the flight plan per the CDU prompt and accepted the clearance and printed it out. There was plenty of time as loading was delayed. When I reviewed the loaded clearance it came up ZZZZA3 ZZZZA ZZZZZ. I then went back to the DEP/ARR page and checked the runway and SID which I had previously selected to ensure it was still in the FMC. I did notice that the routing had us now going south to ZZZZZ and thought the ZZZZA ZZZZZ was a short cut ATC wanted due to light traffic and time of day. I also looked at the printout and didn't see the period between ZZZZA3 and ZZZZZ as in ZZZZA3 DZZZZZ verses ZZZZA3.ZZZZZ meaning that ZZZZZ was the transition. Once we were airborne ATC cleared us directly to 12;000 which we were initially given 7;000 in the clearance. ATC then came back and said maintain 12;000 unrestricted which in my mind validated the shortcut because usually you get the phraseology 'Climb via the SID except maintain XXX'. ATC then informed us our deviate and asked us if we were on the SID. I said affirmative except from ZZZZA we were direct to ZZZZZ which was incorrect according to the clearance. After getting to cruise the Captain and I discussed the situation looking at both the clearance; the FOM and the loaded routing from the CPDLC. We realized that two errors were made. When I loaded the SID I did not reselect the runway and SID with the ZZZZZ transition because when I checked it was in the box and because we both missed the period in the printout and ZZZZZ was on the regular routing I thought ATC wanted us to cut that part of the SID off because of low traffic volume. It was pilot error and it's a difficult lesson. I am fully aware that a period means a transition but I missed it on the printout and assumed ATC wanted a shorter routing which has become the norm is so many ATC environments with COVID. I also realize that I will always double check every period on the CDU against the printout copy as it's easier to see. In addition I will ensure that every modification in the future requires an input of both the runway and SID even when uploading clearances from CPDLC which I'm aware to do but I didn't see the period on the printout. I take full responsibility for this mistake and I feel really bad I missed such a small but signification part of the clearance. I know better so there's no excuses for this missed detail.

First leg (and only leg) with FO; blocked XX mins late for loading; so not rushed. Filed FP was ZZZ1 ZZZ transition; ZZZ [VOR]; ZZZZZ; RXXX ....CPDLC had 'route change' (I was doing exterior prefect when it came): cleared ZZZZA3 ZZZZZ; RXXX ... climb via SID except maintain 7;000 feet. The actual printout was 'ZZZZA3. ZZZZZ'; which means the ZZZZZ transition with the 'dot' in between. We missed that dot. We both assumed the clearance was direct from ZZZZA to ZZZZZ. The ZZZ1 does not have ZZZZZ as a transition; yet it was on our filed flight plan. To add some justification for our assumption; the ZZZ1 goes way north and west before heading west. The ZZZZA SID went south of ZZZ [airport] and more direct west on course. Add that is was [early] in the morning (very light traffic plus Covid19 low traffic) we assumed we were cleared a more direct routing south of ZZZ [airport]. And the Controller gave us climb unrestricted to 12;000 which also made sense for the Direct ZZZZZ we had in the FMC. And then climb to FL340 but then stopped us at 15;000. But we were wrong. He questioned us and we discovered the actual clearance was the entire transition out to ZZZZZ. At that point he cleared us to ZZZZZ and to climb to FL340 again. No TCAS or other traffic was in the area. This was a crew error. We both were very disappointed with the mistake. We reviewed the FOM and saw our mistake. We have both done this correctly many times but the 'ZZZZZ' on the filed route threw us off. No other excuse. And as the Captain I take responsibility.

Air carrier flight crew reported a track deviation occurred due to misreading a changed departure clearance.

1315217

201512

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

1200.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

Final Approach

Class B EWR

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Type 506

1315217

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 154

1315231.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Vertical 200

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

While descending through 1200 feet on final to Runway 22L EWR we received a TCAS TA of traffic; I assumed it was a helicopter below. The Captain and jumpseater observed out of the left cockpit window to our East two drones. They estimated them at 1000 feet AGL. I never saw them and landed the plane without incident. We reported this to tower so they could advise traffic behind us.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 flight crew experienced a TCAS TA at 1200 feet on final approach to Runway 22L at EWR and assumes it is from a helicopter below. The Captain and a jumpseater note two drones on the left side and 200 feet lower. No evasive action is required.

1088373

201305

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Caravan 208B

1.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1088373

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

I was holding number four in sequence on Hotel Taxiway. When I applied power to continue taxiing; I lost braking action and the airplane began to turn to the right. I applied the brakes and they where NOT responding. The airplane was heading toward the grass area at CHARLIE. I called the Controller to ask to taxi to CHARLIE and somebody blocked my call. Since the airplane was still not responding and the frequency was congested I switched frequency (thinking I still had ground frequency on STBY) I called again (unfortunately I had Departure frequency 120.9) The Controller told me that I had the wrong frequency and when I switched back to Tower frequency 132.05. I was already at CHARLIE and called again and had no answer. A few seconds later the Controller (in a very angry tone) calls me to tell me that before I enter CHARLIE I needed permission. She did not give me the chance to tell her I had a situation in the airplane. She then asked me if I needed assistance and what where my intentions; to which I replied 'NO assistance needed (because by that time I had regain control of the airplane) and I needed to return to APRON 6. She switched me to Ground frequency. With extreme caution I taxied back to APRON 6 as Ground had cleared me. I never got to tell the Controller I had lost breaking action and that's why I entered CHARLIE without permission.

A C-208B Captain reported a brake failure as she was attempting to hold short of a taxiway where prior entry permission was required as a result of frequency congestion could not communicate the aircraft's condition.

1460450

201706

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Hydraulic Lines; Connectors; Fittings

X

Improperly Operated

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

1460450

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Captain requested a phone patch with Maintenance Control to report that First Officer had found a brake line disconnected. He requested Maintenance Control file a safety report. Maintenance Control disagreed with him because he thought 'I did nothing wrong'. The captain and I want this investigated as brake lines just do not routinely come off. Apparently the airplane had some brake work done in the past few days according to Maintenance Control. Both the captain and I came away with the impression that Maintenance Control just wanted to have a mechanic re-attach the brake line; and leave it at that. Shoddy maintenance or possibly even aircraft tampering are both serious situations which warrant the utmost concern from anyone that works at [this company]. In addition to the brake situation; unfortunately this is not the first time that a Maintenance controller falls short on professionalism. This needs to be addressed soon.

A Dispatcher reported that a flight crew member wanted maintenance control to file a safety report after finding a brake line disconnected.

1110552

201308

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Maintenance

1110552

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The RADAR feed in the Tower Cab froze and then some of the targets continued as discreet beacon codes no longer tagged. There were Mode C and VFR targets on the scope that also froze. During the RADAR 'outage' we had frozen verified Mode C targets that we were watching other targets fly through. As ATC we were knowingly running an operation merging IFR targets! We reset our RADAR feed by going to our backup and then returned to our primary. When the people in charge put us back on the primary RADAR; Tech Ops was never notified; and the ASR-9 was never taken out for maintenance or recertified. During the 'outage' no one deemed the Primary ASR-9 inoperative. In last 20 minutes; the same error had occurred for a second time! Denver Tower and the TRACON have the ability to run the RADAR feeds off of a couple of different locations. I do not understand why the people in charge never went to a back up RADAR feed. I also highly doubt that Tech Ops was notified; or the primary ASR9 recertified. My gut feeling is that for the last 20 hours everything happening in the Denver Class Bravo airspace is being done on an uncertified RADAR source. I might be wrong; and I hope that I am; but it is definitely worth looking into. Also I think the people in charge deserve a fair amount of scrutiny.

Tower Controller described a primary RADAR unit failure and questioned the Class B operations that continued after the failure along with doubtful coordination with Maintenance.

1343554

201603

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

High

Overhead Bins; Latches

X

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

1343554

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

AFT FA said she need[ed] to make an ice bag for a passenger. I ask[ed] her did the passenger injure herself on our equipment or was it a preexisting condition. She replied that the passenger hit her head on the overhead bin. The AFT FA gave the passenger the ice bag to the passenger. I explained to the AFT FA the she needs to get the details of what happened and the name of the passenger and complete a [report]. I personally did not see what happen[ed]; but the passenger sat with the ice bag to the right side of her head during the entire flight. The passenger asked for additional ice during flight. Passenger deplaned the AC without a complaint related to the injury; returned the bag of melted ice and said Thank You for the assistance. Passenger did not use caution while moving around the seating area.

CRJ-900 Flight Attendant reported a passenger hit her head on the overhead bin during boarding. Ice was supplied and applied during the flight without further consequence.

1302537

201510

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 9717; Flight Crew Type 3965

Situational Awareness

1302537

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 35000; Flight Crew Type 8131

Situational Awareness

1302849.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Human Factors

Waited outside of gate area for several minutes for self park system to light up. It turned on with green light; and as we were pulling into the gate; lights went completely dark for a second or two. As Captain applied the brakes to stop; system came back on with yellow light for several seconds; then turned completely off. By this time we were completely stopped. I looked out the side window and saw a ground personnel with the light controller in his hand; partially disassembled; and he was working on it with a screwdriver. He saw me looking at him; and then turned around and pushed the emergency stop button on the wall behind him. Self park light system then went from completely off to red. We came to find out we were 2-3 feet past the stop line. Ground crew hooked up tug and pushed the aircraft back to the line.

Upon arrival at terminal at KSFO; we found the self park system to be off as we approached the gate. Several ground personnel were milling around the area; which appeared to be clear of all obstacles. There appeared to be some confusion about bringing us into the gate. After several minutes; the self park system illuminated normally and we proceeded forward to the parking spot. As we moved forward approximately 30 feet; the lights of the self park system suddenly went dark again; so I stopped. There was no effort from the ground personnel to guide us in; stop us or give us any guidance whatsoever. Again; the system illuminated; so I proceeded forward. Once again as soon as forward movement was established; the lights went out and again; I stopped. This time as the system once again illuminated and we were in close proximity to the gate; we could clearly see that the guideman who was supposed to be operating the controller to the lights was performing maintenance to the back of the controller. It appeared that the back of the controller box was off and he had a screwdriver in his other hand. He was far off to our left of the airplane and near the terminal support of the jetway. Again the lights came on; this time with a yellow caution light from the system; so I again proceeded slowly forward. Almost immediately; the lights went completely off and again I stopped. This time; I set the brakes and shut the airplane down as I could clearly see we were getting very close to the terminal and jetway. The lights came on once again; flashed red; and went dark.The agent who was in the forward jetway; appeared to be confused regarding our position and motion to us with her hands that we were about two feet off of the parking spot. Two feet forward; or two feet too far back we had no idea. There was no indication from anyone on the ground as to our position. No hand signals were given and no wands were displayed. Finally; someone came on the headset from below and informed us that we were too close and that they would push us back.

B747 flight crew reported parking at a gate with a self park system that was providing erratic guidance while they were parking; resulting in an overshoot of the intended stop point.

1142340

201401

1201-1800

BUR.Airport

CA

VMC

Night

TRACON SCT; Tower BUR

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent; Final Approach; Initial Approach

Class C BUR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Confusion; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1142340

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

While a night circle to Runway 26 at BUR would be an unusual event and very uncommon event; I believe that is precisely the reason why we should prohibit it; unless we wish to specifically train for the maneuver in the simulator; which is clearly cost prohibitive and impractical. My concern is with the following scenario: A crew departs for Burbank with the expectation of landing on Runway 08; or maybe [Runway] 33; the most common landing runways. For the landing the conditions are 'good;' i.e. a clear night with good VMC conditions. Shortly before landing; maybe while [we were] getting the ATIS or shortly afterwards; Runway 08 became unusable; possibly due to tailwinds exceeding 10 KTS. Runway 33/15 is unusable due to unexpected closure; with little or no notice; for whatever reason; lighting or disabled aircraft on the runway; pick your reason. The crew has little loiter fuel normally we plan to land in BUR with 5.0-5.5; which makes sense as you want to be as light as possible and there are plenty of alternates close by. The crew is now time compressed (heading into the yellow). The crew; with an inadequate briefing (no time; last-minute; no access to topographical charts to assess the terrain risk; no time to review such charts even if they had them) decides to attempt a night circling approach to Runway 26. The aircraft has an incident or accident; worst case; CFIT with the high terrain just off the approach end of Runway 26 or a hard/long/short/rejected landing. I am assuming in this ASAP report the crew makes a left circle to Runway 26 should a crew make a right circle (prohibited even in day visual conditions by the easy to miss note on the Company Visual for Runway 26 Chart page) then the situation would be even worse. I believe a substantial majority of our captains would attempt a night visual to Runway 26 based upon an informal survey I have taken. Most initially ask 'can we even do that;' but when they realize it is 'legal' about 80% say they would 'give it a go.' About 20% say; no; they would divert. I believe a circling approach to Runway 26 at night in VMC conditions carries an unacceptable level of risk because: 1. Almost all of our crews; probably 99.9% or more; have no experience circling to Runway 26 at Burbank; either day or night. I also do not have that experience. 2. Many of our crews have little mountain flying experience. It is not in our culture or general experience here. Also; we do not routinely train for mountainous terrain operations unlike say for example; airlines operating into Telluride or Aspen. 3. Circling to Runway 26 at Burbank at night carries (rather like circling at night at Aspen) an extreme risk of CFIT. 4. Using none-exact; but probably very close to actual numbers on my iPad with some mapping software; I estimate on final to Runway 26; the 1;379 MSL contour line is 3.3 miles from the end of the runway. The 2;200 MSL contour line is about 4.6 miles from the end of Runway 26. The Runway 26 touchdown zone is at 697 MSL; so in other words; a 'normal' three mile base to final turn; if straight in and not slanted toward the runway; would put the aircraft at maybe 300 FT to 500 FT AGL over the terrain. In fairness; a really close final at 1.5 miles would put the aircraft safely inside the rapidly rising terrain but we don't train for that here so I would not expect all crews to safely be able to do that on a reliably repeatable basis. 5. The aircraft would have to be fully configured for landing on the base to final leg; with gear and flaps extended. The company manual does not give enough specifics for me to be sure. (I would need the actual equipment manual) but it appears the GPWS terrain mode is inhibited with the flaps in the landing configuration. 6. I am not sure; but maybe the EGPWS terrain mode might also be inhibited as you are so close to the landing runway; maybe not; I am not sure about this. 7. Either way; an aircraft making a left base circling approach to Runway 26 that received an EGPWS terrain warning could probably not follow our guidance exactly as in the non-normal section of the QRH. The guidance calls for; in Step 4; 'Simultaneously roll wings level' depending on how low the aircraft was; and where it was in the circling approach and what heading it was on when the alert came up; the only viable escape might be to continue the left circle rolling wings level might well not allow sufficient climb gradient to out climb the terrain. I know some might say its common sense to not roll wings level; but again; that is not what we are trained to do. 8. Even if the crew managed the terrain risk successfully; the approach is still very challenging as it has to be done as a tight circling approach; with a two-mile or less final and the there is no visual approach path guidance to Runway 26. No PAPI or VASI and of course; the runway is rather short to be landing without any approach path guidance.I think there are some contributing factors that might 'encourage' crews to attempt a visual approach to [Runway] 26 at night. 1. The landing data is in the Performance Publication. This implies Company approval to land on [Runway] 26. There is no caution note in the Performance Publication or anywhere else about night landings on [Runway] 26. 2. There is a note on the Company Procedures page that states 'Arrivals on Runway 26 may be given by the Tower.' This implies the Company has the expectation that Runway 26 may be used for landing from time to time. 3. We do not have a Safety Alert page highlighting the terrain risk of attempting to circle to Runway 26; especially at night. 4. While the information that there is no PAPI or VASI on Runway 26 is available on the back of the Airport Diagram page; it would be easy to miss when making a last-minute decision to use that runway. 5. On the ILS Runway 8 approach; there is a specific note that circling to Runway 26 is not authorized at night but this prohibition does not apply to visual approaches. Plus; the note is in a smaller typeface and would be easy to miss. Even a daytime right circle to [Runway] 26 is prohibited on the ILS; but the only note prohibiting a visual right circle to Runway 26; day or night is hard to find/easy to miss; in the text of the Company Visual for Runway 26 Chart page which is titled in the iPad app as 'Weather.' Preventative Measures: 1. Publish a Safety Alert page highlighting the risks of circling to Runway 26 during the day; should the Company wish to continue to allow day circling to [Runway] 26. 2. Prohibit night circling to Runway 26. 3. Highlight the Performance Publication's Runway 26 landing data with 'daylight use only' assuming the company wishes to permit daytime use of [Runway] 26. 4. Make specific reference to the lack of a PAPI or VASI on [Runway] 26 in the Additional Runway 26 Approach Reference Chart page and also on the Company Procedures page. 5. Repeat the reference on the Company Visual for Runway 26 Chart page about circling to land is not authorized northeast of Runway 15 and [Runway] 26 on the Company Procedures page and the Additional Runway 26 Approach Reference Chart page. 6. Change the title in the iPad app for the Company Visual for Runway 26 Chart page from 'Weather' to 'Overview' so it falls as the second page listed on the Reference charts tab rather than being at the bottom of the reference section; under the title of weather where it might be missed. For example; the only place the important note prohibiting any (day or night) circling northeast of Runway 15/26 is under this Weather section.

An air carrier Captain described his reasoning for suggesting that night visual approaches to BUR Runway 26 be prohibited.

1850795

202110

1801-2400

SFO.Airport

CA

VMC

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 8648; Flight Crew Type 8648

1850795

Ground Event / Encounter Jet Blast

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

Winds and weather had SFO operating with both arrivals and departures using Runway 28L/R. We were cleared into position Runway 28R after a B777 landed on the same runway. The B777 cleared the runway but held short of Runway 28L. We were then cleared for takeoff. The takeoff was normal and I was Flying Pilot. I happened to notice the B777 to the left between the parallels as I began a normal rotation. As we passed the B777 we experienced a hard jolt from the left. Thankfully it was a sudden but short jolt as it required some maneuvering to settle the flight path. I am not sure if the B777 had been cleared across but it felt like a significant jet blast we got from the heavy. No anomalies or limitations were exceeded. The flight continued normally.

B737NG First Officer reported encountering jet blast on takeoff from a taxiing Widebody aircraft.

1267358

201506

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A310

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1267358

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

1267365.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Autopilot and autothrottles appeared to re-engage at touchdown after being disconnected (autopilot at 500 FT and autothrottles at 200 FT). At touchdown throttles came up and F/O had [to] physically retard them. At this point throttles would not go into reverse and aircraft looked like it was going to exit the right side of Runway 23. Capt stepped on the left rudder (acted as if autopilot was still engaged); [it] would not respond. Hit the disconnect switches (autopilot and autothrottles) again while engaging manual brakes pretty heavy. At this point the reversers came up; and a/c started to respond normally. Throttles were stiff; other than that I have no clue.Increase maintenance budget; better test equipment and more in depth training for maintenance folks with all the electronic systems on the aircraft.Prevention! Better than reaction.

[Report narrative had no additional information]

A310 flight crew reported that autopilot and autothrottles appeared to re-engage at touchdown after being disconnected; slowing selection of reverse thrust and affecting directional control.

1002444

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Cockpit Window

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1002444

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

In cruise flight at FL370 I noticed in the First Officer's windshield what appeared to be St. Elmos fire. This was curious since we were in clear air. Further inspection revealed what appeared to be a crack quickly developing from the upper right corner down to the lower left corner. Inside the crack; what I thought was St. Elmos Fire; was the inner heating element arcing continuously as the crack quickly spread. The best way to describe this was watching a fuse burn across and within the windshield. We quickly went to the QRH for guidance and just as we opened it up the right windshield heat faulted shutting off power. The First officer and I tried to determine which pane it was and in more than one spot I felt what appeared to be a crack by sliding my finger nail back and forth across the area. We descended to FL230 and got the cabin PSI to less than 5; per the QRH; but the crack continued to spread across the glass. Further descent to 11;000 FT seemed to halt its spread but now I felt the safest course of action was to get the airplane on the ground. We contacted Dispatch through ACARS to inform them of our intentions to divert. We finished QRH procedures for windshield crack and arcing and landed uneventfully. No emergency was declared. ATC was very helpful expediting our arrival and the First Officer and our cabin crew did an outstanding job of working the problem and preparing the cabin as I flew the airplane. This allowed me to concentrate on the approach and airport facilities. Under the circumstances I felt this to be the safest course of actions for the given conditions.

A319 Captain reports a cracked windshield on the First Officer's side at FL370. Descent is initiated to FL230 per QRH but the crack continues to grow and the Captain elects to divert to a suitable airport.

1868443

202201

1201-1800

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1868443

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Got HAZMAT form and forgot to call Dispatch to do a pen and ink change to show HAZMAT onboard in remarks of Release.

Air Carrier Captain reported he neglected to call Dispatch to do a pen & ink change to show Hazmat onboard on Flight Release.

1177862

201406

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1177862

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Ground Personnel

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Apparently company message sent at XA:37; aircraft airborne XA:38. TOGA thrust set; First Officer flying; aircraft on takeoff roll - ECAM; EWD; scan I noticed company message. I'm not going to abort takeoff for a company message. Weight and Balance (W/B) 'do not takeoff' message after airborne. First W/B printer message at XA:31/after aircraft clean-up and climb received amended W/B printer message at XA:42/aircraft weighed approximately 2;000 LBS over; but more importantly; aircraft configuration required a flaps 2 and V-speed change. Aircraft weighed approximately 190;000 LBS and OAT was 28C. Contacted Dispatcher and he was made fully aware of the situation. If the company plans on last second/minute changes on W/B; an audible chime associated with the ACARS messages must be installed. Workload during taxi out; completing taxi check; below the line; mental preparation for takeoff roll and departure must not be interrupted with a situation such as this. Apparently there are not enough properly trained employees in Load Control and W/B to achieve these tasks in a timely manner. Time lapse of XA:31 until XA:42 does not appear to be normal for a W/B change. Company message on ECAM 'blends in' with all the other indicators making it difficult to notice. These situations have just started to appear in the past few months. I saved and printed ACARS messages if they are needed. Suggestion; install audible ACARS chime or a flashing company message que if this practice is to continue. Hire more W/B employees. Improve and update W/B procedures.

A321 Captain reports receiving a company message during takeoff which is ignored until safely airborne. The message reads W/B do not takeoff. Takeoff weight had increased by 2;000 LBS with flap setting and V-speed changes.

1497075

201711

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

40000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Interior Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 500

Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload

1497075

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

About 10 minutes after reaching our cruise altitude of 40;000 feet; the door seal light illuminated. I prepared for an emergency descent and asked for a lower altitude. ATC approved it and a few seconds later a loud sound was heard from the door as the pressure started escaping. I started my emergency descent down to 10;000 feet and informed ATC of my intention to divert. Upon inspection by a mechanic; it was found that condensation had built up in the door seal after heavy rain two nights before. That condensation froze and caused the seal malfunction. The water was drained; and the trip continued uneventfully.

Cessna Citation pilot reported the illumination of a cabin door seal warning light; followed by a loss of cabin pressure warning came on during cruise. A descent was executed; and a successful diversion a suitable airport was accomplished.

1779057

202012

1801-2400

IAH.Airport

TX

7000.0

IMC

Thunderstorm

Dusk

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 26R

Descent

STAR DRLLR FIVE

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 2365; Flight Crew Type 123

Workload; Distraction

1779057

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Assigned DRLLR 5 arrival into IAH. We were planning 26R RNAV Y. We were cleared to descend via the DRLLR 5. 6000 was set in altitude window and aircraft was in LNAV/VNAV. Runway was not assigned so approaching SKLER; Captain queried ATC. ATC advised ILS 26R. Crew discussed ensuring proceeding straight after SKLER. Captain as Pilot Monitoring began to change the approach in the FMC; in the process the aircraft leveled off at 7000; rather continuing the decent to 6000. We recognize this a couple miles from SKLER but before we were able to notify ATC that we might be high at SKLER; ATC assigned us a descent to 5000. We proceeded to descend to the new altitude and land uneventfully.

First Officer reported leveling off high while they attempted to reprogram the FMC following a late runway assignment on the DRLLR FIVE STAR into IAH.

1791982

202103

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

3500.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1791982

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Procedure

On Aircraft X to ZZZ at around XA:00 local time in our descent we received an EGPWS 'Terrain terrain; pull up pull up'. From 3;500 ft. on downwind CA (Captain) [Name] asked me to bug 2;500 ft. on the altitude knob. As we were descending I had mentioned to him that it looked like there may be rising terrain ahead of us. Continuing down to 2;500 ft. shortly after we were given the EGPWS audio to pull up. CA [Name] then clicked auto pilot off; added power and pitched up clearing any terrain that lie below us. The rest of the approach proceeded with no other complications. We had debriefed after engine shutdown at the gate. Looking forward I feel that my actions in this case would be to maybe be more assertive with my thoughts on the possible rising terrain in front of us and suggest to wait to descend until a base turn.

First Officer reported a lack of assertiveness caused the flying pilot to descend in rising terrain; triggering EGPWS warnings and an autopilot disconnect to regain altitude.

1125120

201310

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

1.0

400.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

7000

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 9100; Flight Crew Type 110

1125120

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 900

1125138.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Climbing out; shortly after flap retraction we received an amber CAS alert - UNCMDED STAB. Climb was continued to a safe altitude to allow checklist reference and procedure. At 7;800 feet there was a temporary CAS message of a PYLON HOT L message. At that point we declared an emergency and returned via radar vectors and landed without incident. During the final phase of our visual approach the CAS message cleared. The aircraft is currently being evaluated by Gulfstream technicians.

No additional information was provided by the secondary narrative.

A Gulfstream V flight crew returned to their departure airport following receipt of UNCOMED STAB and PYLON HOT L CAS warnings.

1228136

201412

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

CTAF ZZZ

Fractional

Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)

1.0

Part 91

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1228136

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1228246.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

While on a visual approach; we experienced a total loss of Hydraulic power. On the downwind leg the landing gear was lowered and immediately after all landing gear had normal down indications (three green lights) the amber HYDRAULIC VOLUME LOW CAS message appeared and the hydraulic fluid quantity indicated a low condition of only 90 cubic inches. The downwind leg was extended and the emergency checklist was accomplished. It was determined that a safe landing could be made and the landing was executed with no incident and emergency braking was applied to stop the aircraft. This was an unforeseen and unavoidable rare system failure. Our training proved effective and resulted in the safe completion of this event.

Hydraulic Volume Low CAS message illuminated on a left downwind after gear was selected down. Positive ID of gear down was established with 3 illuminated green lights and throttle/flap position. Extended downwind leg to run appropriate checklist. Landed successful.

CE680 flight crew experiences a hydraulic failure after the landing gear is extended during a visual approach. After landing emergency braking is used to stop the aircraft.

1474521

201708

1201-1800

S46.TRACON

WA

1800.0

VMC

TRACON S46

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 32L

Final Approach

Class D BFI

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Climb

Facility S46.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Workload

1474521

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Airspace Structure

During North flow; I was working Arrivals. Aircraft X was on vectors for the ILS approach. After issuing Aircraft X his ILS approach clearance I scanned and noticed a VFR target climbing southbound. I issued traffic; but Aircraft X did not have the aircraft in sight. The target appeared to be continuing towards Aircraft X and started climbing; so I elected to cancel Aircraft X's approach clearance and issued a climb and turn to the East to avoid the traffic. I subsequently vectored Aircraft X back around and onto the approach.My previous reports involved the proximity of VFR targets to BFI arrivals when our airspace is in a South Flow. This report is a perfect example of the fact that this problem also exists when our airspace switches to a North Flow. The timing of this report is also a perfect example of how; even in a North Flow; this problem is continuous and always present.Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solutions are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

S46 Controller reported vectoring an aircraft off of an ILS in order to avoid conflicting unidentified VFR traffic.

1115794

201309

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Tower ZZZ

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1115794

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

Aircraft X; wad descended to 3;000 FT and was slowed to 170 KTS and issued traffic to follow at 12 o'clock and 4 miles a B737 descending out of 2;000 FT; the pilot of Aircraft X readback; 'traffic in sight descending to 2;000 FT.' I held back the visual approach clearance knowing the aircraft had not passed the obstruction ahead who's MVA was 3;000 FT. I observed the aircraft descending through 2;300 FT and issued a low altitude alert and an immediate climb to 3;000 FT. The aircraft saw the obstruction and climbed back up to 3;000 FT. I would not have told him the altitude of the traffic; if I thought it would have confused the pilot into thinking that was his altitude.

TRACON Controller described a below MVA event when an IFR aircraft was issued the latitude of traffic and interpreted same as an assigned altitude starting a descent.

1769481

202011

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

105.0

8.0

2700.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Other Other

Mustang (P51)

1.0

Part 91

None

Cruise

Other visual

Class D ZZZ

PA-24 Comanche

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Other

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 1250

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1769481

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 20

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were returning from a local flight. We were using Runway XXL & R which is not our normal pattern. Therefore; instead of flying closer to the airport; we were maneuvering to a XX landing pattern. We had called the tower 15 miles Southeast to obtain a clearance to enter the D space. We were given a squawk code and told by the tower operator we were observed now at 8 miles Southeast and told to 'fly present heading to avoid traffic'. We were doing so and a minute or two later saw what appeared to be Aircraft Y at our 12:00 position lightly lower and noticed a rapid close rate. He initiated a rapid turn to his left; east. We turned rapidly to our left; west; and avoided contact. The tower called at about that time and instructed us to dive immediately. It was a close call. The tower asked me to call him after we landed. We discussed the event from the point at which he gave us the beacon code. I am not sure if he was talking to Aircraft Y traffic or not. We were able to see and avoid the traffic so it worked out. The operator and I agreed we were closer than we would have liked to be.

P51 pilot reported a NMAC enroute to the airport.

1278694

201506

1201-1800

BFI.Airport

WA

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower BFI

Corporate

Challenger 605

2.0

IFR

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D BFI

Tower BFI

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D BFI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1278694

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

During our approach to Runway 31L into BFI we received a TCAS RA; initially to; 'level off' and then 'climb'. We subsequently complied with the RA and then executed a missed approach.Approaching the airport from the south and west we were left on a fairly high left base to final in good visual conditions. While the approach was higher than normal we were stabilized well above 1;000 feet and use of speed brakes was not required. After confirming that we had the airport in sight with SEA Tracon; they subsequently cleared us for a visual approach to Runway 31L. We were given instructions to contact BFI tower. During the transition from approach to tower both the PM and myself noticed traffic ahead and to our left. I'm pretty sure the aircraft was slightly above us or at our same altitude when I initially noticed him. After checking in with BFI tower we were given a traffic point out and told that this aircraft; whose position was at our same altitude and west of us; was going to be landing on Runway 31R. At this point I started wondering how this was going to work out. Around the same time I started to doubt the success of this approach we received a RA to; 'level off.' We were just inside the outer marker descending on the glide path. After responding to the RA; first a level off command then a climb command; we executed a missed approach. I started to climb out expecting more instruction from the tower on our missed approach instructions. At this point the BFI tower controller told us to execute the; 'published missed approach procedure;' this was strange because we were cleared for a visual approach. Thinking the controller wanted us to execute the published missed approach off of Runway 31L ILS; this is how I proceeded. Somewhere around 3;000 feet the tower said he wanted us on the published missed approach procedure; 2;100 feet. To my knowledge there is no published missed approach altitude or procedure for the visual approach to Runway 31L in BFI. The only 2;100 restriction I know of is the departure procedure off of 31L; NEEDLE NINE.I don't think there is any reason to revisit our frustration with the TCAS issues in BFI. That said the Tower Controller in this situation seemed to have little to no situational awareness. Trying to cross traffic from left-to-right and underneath our path while descending on the glide path? The controller should have had us or the C-172 complete a 270 degree turn to rejoin the final. The final area of frustration concerning this approach; the expectation that we complete a published missed approach procedure that doesn't exist. If the controller wanted us at a specific altitude he should have just cleared us to the altitude; i.e. climb to 2;100 feet

CL605 Captain on a visual approach to Runway 31L at BFI is informed of C172 traffic on a left base for Runway 31R. A TCAS RA is received and the reporter initiates a go around. The Tower instructs to fly the published missed approach but actually intended that the flight fly runway heading and climb to 2;100 feet.

1348560

201604

1201-1800

SDL.Airport

AZ

30.0

6000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON P50

Air Taxi

Embraer Phenom 300

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class B PHX

TRACON P50

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Climb

Class B PHX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 5050; Flight Crew Type 1300

1348560

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

During descent into SDL; we were under the control of Phoenix approach on vectors. We were given a heading of 040 and descent to 6;000. We were advised of a Cessna flying VFR under the control of approach and that it was on a converging course. The plane was told to level at 5;500 feet. At this time the autopilot was on and I was looking at the TCAS and outside while the pilot flying was looking outside and monitoring the autopilot. The Cessna did not level at 5;500 and continued to climb. TCAS promptly gave a traffic advisory followed by a resolution advisory which required us to descend from 6;000 feet and ended up at 5;200 when we were given a 'clear of conflict' advisory. In the process I told approach we were responding to an RA. After leveling at 5;200 I asked what altitude they would like us to maintain (as it was time to descend). We were then cleared direct to the field; maintain 5;000; and contact another approach frequency. We continued to destination without any other issues. The Cessna was very close and I never saw the aircraft until it was within 100 feet horizontally at our altitude. I saw the aircraft when responding to the descend RA. Without TCAS we may have had a different outcome. The Cessna blew the clearance; not the controller.

Phenom 300 Captain experienced a TCAS RA and NMAC at 6000 feet during vectors for approach. A VFR Cessna climbing to 5500 feet with the same Controller had continued to climb resulting in evasive action and a NMAC.

1714033

201912

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Taxi

Direct

Data Processing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 11151; Flight Crew Type 11151

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1714033

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

This is the third of the last six aircraft that I've flown to exhibit this fault. If the FMC generated Gross Weight is deleted from the ACARS Takeoff Date Request Page during preflight; for example; fueling not complete; to receive Planned Takeoff Data Message; then the FMC generated Gross Weight (the actual aircraft weight after final zero fuel weight is uplinked) never repopulates to the ACARS Takeoff Data Request page. This causes the final Takeoff Data uplinked to be the sum of final ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight) and Planned Takeoff Fuel; a number which; in my experience; seldom if ever is the actual aircraft weight at takeoff. On this flight the FMC generated Gross Weight after final ZFW uplink was 629.4. The ACARS Takeoff Data Request page returned performance numbers for a weight of 627.7 (the sum of the final ZFW and OFP planned takeoff fuel. The actual aircraft weight at throttle advance was 628.4. Had we not caught this error; we would have departed using invalid performance data.When we manually entered the FMC generated Gross Weight on to the ACARS Takeoff Data Request page; proper performance data resulted but the weight entered was not dynamic. It never changed.Until whatever change was made to these aircraft's software the FMC generated Gross Weight; when available; always populated to the ACARS Takeoff Data Request page and was dynamic. If deleted; the FMC generated Gross Weight would have repopulated the next time you opened the Takeoff Data Request page and it would always reflect current aircraft weight.

B777 Captain reported under certain circumstances entering weight data for departure will give inaccurate aircraft weights.

1832940

202108

3J1.Airport

SC

0.0

VMC

Personal

Sail Plane

1.0

Other unknown

None

Training

Landing

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 990; Flight Crew Type 644

Troubleshooting

1832940

No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Airport

Glider landing Area is not properly maintained by Airport management. Grass is overgrown and small bushes are [growing]. In the case of a crosswind; a slight wing drop could generate a dangerous Ground-loop both during Aero-Tow and landing phases.

Sail Plane Pilot reported the glider landing area runway at the 3J1 airport is in disrepair. Growing vegetation on runway could be a hazard for landing aircraft.

1043902

201210

0001-0600

SMF.Airport

CA

2000.0

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C SMF

Government

Learjet 60

VFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 34L

Initial Climb

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1043902

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1043911.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure

A LR60 was conducting a Flight Check to the Runway 34L Localizer. A delay vector was given to B737 north of SMF who was landing Runway 16R to give space for LR60 to Runway 34L. The supervisor said the operation was OK and was watching the scope at the time. The LR60 was about crossing landing threshold and the B737 was approximately 9 mile final and Tower called and asked what we were doing with the B737. I asked if they wanted me to break them out and they said yes. The B737 was broke out and re-sequenced. Separation was not lost between the two aircraft but I was advised by the supervisor on duty that he was going to report the event and that I should as well. That opposite direction rules is better studied.

There were approximately 5-6 aircraft on my frequency. The ILS for 16R/34L was OTS and a LR60 had been doing 10 mile arcs east-west off of the 34L localizer. The pilot was talking to the Delta Sector Controller. I was working finals for 16R; which was the active runway. The LR60 requested to proceed inbound on the 34L ILS; and Delta Sector coordinated the opposite direction arrival with me. This was the second time he would be conducting this operation; so the Delta Controller requested to sequence the LR60 after a B737 that I had on an 8 mile base; which I approved. I began sequencing 3 other aircraft to follow the LR60's arrival; the first was B737; then another B737 and another air carrier of similar type. When the LR60 was on short final for 34L; and the B737 was on 9 mile final and cleared for the Visual Approach for 16R; the Tower called and said something to the effect of 'The LR60 is on short final; I can't have the B737 inbound' I confirmed that the LR60 would be making the left turn to 210 again as he had the last time. Tower said 'yes; but the B737 can't be less than 10 miles with the LR60 inbound'. My instructor asked Tower something like 'well what do you want me to do...break him out?' Tower said yes. I cancelled the B737's approach clearance; turned him right heading 250 and maintain 2;000 FT. By the time the LR60 had made his low approach and established in his turn; the B737 would have been approximately 6-7 mile final. In reference to the Orders my supervisor was told were violated - NCT N 7110.71/SMF N 7110.02 Interim Same Runway Opposite Direction Arrival/Departure; and JO 7110.596 Interim Same Runway Opposite Direction Arrival/Departure Procedures:I think this is a non issue based on how I have been briefed on these orders. The LR60 was VFR; maneuvering on his own accord. He could not have been cleared for the ILS even as a VFR practice approach because it was out of service. This was simply a VFR arrival from the south asking Tower to land Runway 34L while an IFR arrival is inbound on 9 mile final for 16R; which in my understanding can be allowed. If the interpretation stated above is correct; I recommend that Tower be better briefed on these orders; as well as what it means when the LR60 is conducting the above mentioned operations.

NCT Controller described a possible separation infraction involving 'opposite direction traffic' procedures. The event included a Flight Check aircraft and an Air Carrier operation at SMF.

1332775

201601

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Parked

Company

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 766.8; Flight Crew Type 83.2

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1332775

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

I am a Flight Instructor at a university; upon the start of a new semester we received our new students. I began checking documents and TSA currencies of all my new students. I received my first international student and was new to the restrictions and requirements of the alien TSA. [We use a] program to monitor student currencies and hard stops are placed in the computer to prevent us from flying when anything has expired. When looking in [the system; a student's] alien TSA was not going to expire until the end of [the next month]. Thinking the currency was still valid we went on his first flight in the Instrument course. It was not until after the flight that I realized that the notes within the currency stated the currency was only valid for his prior flight commercial course and that the alien TSA was not valid for the instrument course. I believe the cause of the problem was not being familiar with the alien TSA as much as I should have been as it is my responsibility as a CFI; to prevent a reoccurrence I have educated myself on the alien TSA process and [the university] will not assign any instructor until the student has already gone through the TSA process fully before getting an instructor and starting the new course.

A Flight Instructor reported a misunderstanding with the alien TSA requirements related to an international student beginning an instrument course when only approved for a commercial course.

1811682

202106

1201-1800

LAS.TRACON

NV

150.0

8.0

7000.0

Daylight

TRACON L30

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Direct

TRACON L30

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Other unknown

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Other unknown

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1811682

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Human Factors

As PM; the Captain and I were nearing BERBN intersection on the COKTL 1 Arrival into LAS. After receiving the ATIS for LAS; and before beginning the descent on the COKTL 1 Arrival; the Captain briefed the COKTL 1 Arrival; along with the visual approach; backed up with the ILS to Runway 26L. Conditions at the time were VMC DAY (15;000' few/10SM vis). Prior to reaching BERBN intersection; Approach Control asked us if we had the ILS loaded. I looked over to the Captain and we both nodded; at which time I stated that we did indeed have the ILS 26L LAS loaded into the FMC (from the direction of PRINO intersection). The Approach Controller cleared us to fly the ILS 26L with a clearance to cross BERBN at or above 7;000 feet MSL. I then queried the Approach Controller about whether or not they would like me to call our base leg for Runway 26L. The Controller replied that our base leg would be visible on their radar; and that a call was not necessary. Not realizing that there was INDEED a transition from the BERBN intersection to HUXAR on the ILS 26L; we proceeded turn north whilst descending to intercept the Runway 26L localizer just outside of RELIN intersection (D7.2 IRLE) Runway 26L.Shortly thereafter; we were told by the Approach Controller that we had initiated the turn too soon; and we were given a heading to the East in order to avoid traffic (other carrier) that was already established on final for Runway 26L. We did receive a TCAS TA (no RA); and after completing the turn to the East; the TCAS TA was resolved. After the turn to the East; and with proper separation between our aircraft and Aircraft Y; Approach Control vectored us back to the north to join the localizer and clear us for the visual to LAS Runway 26L. We were then handed-off to LAS Tower. Landing was uneventful. After landing; we were provided a phone number to call LAS TRACON. The COKTL 1 Arrival and the latest ILS 26L charts for LAS are dated (date). I can tell you that I was certainly not familiar; nor had I ever been assigned the ILS 26L from the COKTL 1 Approach (I wasn't even aware that there was a transition from BERBN intersection; as that transition is located on the new ILS 26L Approach chart). My apologies to the LAS Approach Controller for our misunderstanding.As an added measure; I would prefer to see more information added to the COKTL 1 Arrival; like a ball note referring Pilots to the BERBN transition on the ILS 26L LAS. An added note within our company pages may help bring attention to this transition as well.

Air Carrier First Officer reported a heading deviation caused by a new and unfamiliar approach procedure for LAS airport.

1621492

201902

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain; Snow

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Workload

1621492

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was assigned flight number X to ZZZZ. I have a lot going on that day with bad weather snow wet and slippery condition; I thought I loaded the fifteen (15) bags around the dangerous goods. Not until after pushing the flight load planner notify me of not having the fifteen (15) bags around.

Ground employee reported inadvertently did not load the required 15 bags around the Hazmat cargo.

1429739

201703

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 579; Flight Crew Type 579

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1429739

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Evacuated

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was preparing to depart for a local VFR personal flight alone. Good weather; no substantial crosswind. Pre-flight and checklists complete. Lined up on runway-final checks done. Aligned on center line. Gradually opened throttle and began takeoff roll. Engine sounded fine; fuel flow; MP fine. It did not feel as though the aircraft was accelerating and gaining speed as quickly as usual. I was concerned that I may have been inadvertently still applying slight pressure to toe brakes. Both feet on pedals; right rudder pedal more depressed than Left to compensate for P factor. Tried to barely remove some pressure from both rudder pedals. Within a split second the aircraft veered sharply left; perhaps 30 degrees or more. I was not moving fast enough to fly; but too fast to make it stop straight quickly. I quickly pulled the throttle fully back; saw the edge of runway rapidly approaching. Nose lifted to avoid obstacles; stall horn sounded; perhaps mains came off a bit. Felt plane hit ground wheels first; bounced once; stall horn sounding; then a firm thud to ground-rolled to a gradual stop in high grass between runway and taxiway. No smell of smoke; I felt ok; just shaken. Shut down engine and all electrics quickly; mags off; key removed. Evacuated onto wing and stepped to ground.I think when I tried to release some pressure on pedals; I let off too much from the right rudder pedal. Engine was almost at full throttle. P factor pushed it hard left and toward non-runway surface. I was alert; well rested; comfortable; properly positioned and secured in cockpit. Plane was operating normally-in my experience with it. I believe I let off R rudder pressure too much. Maybe I should have pulled throttle back the instant I thought I wasn't gaining speed quickly enough.

Bonanza 35 pilot reported a runway excursion during takeoff roll.

1350983

201604

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF ZZZ

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

None

Elevator ControlSystem

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Trainee

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1268; Flight Crew Type 106

Situational Awareness

1350983

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 3350; Flight Crew Type 215

Situational Awareness

1351247.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

Demonstration of soft field takeoff. Excessive nose high and light crosswind resulted in loss of directional control causing aircraft to drift to left side of runway on lift off striking runway light and taking corrective action lowering wing cause left wing tip to contact grass and rebound right wing tip to pavement correcting back onto runway. Keep less back pressure on yoke.

Pilot exercised soft field takeoff. While adding full power with nose high pitch attitude; pilot was unable to maintain directional control of aircraft. As aircraft exited left side of runway; as it was redirected to the right the left wingtip contacted the grass. The aircraft swerved to the right; the right wingtip scraped the runway; the aircraft exited the right side of the runway and came to a stop. The aircraft contacted a runway light; denting the antennae and scraped the underside of the horizontal stabilizer.

A C182 flight instructor and trainee reported a loss of control and runway excursion during a soft field takeoff due to excessive elevator input.

1328187

201601

1201-1800

ABQ.TRACON

NM

6000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Class B P50

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1328187

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Situational Awareness

1328192.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Had left that morning for a long day; flew the first leg uneventfully then briefed flight to ABQ. Main points of discussion were possible visual approach to Runway 26 at ABQ; the terrain; and the strong forecast gusty winds (our forecast was winds 250 at 19 gust 30 knots with KPHX as an alternate). Prior to descent; briefed visual to runway 26; and build a white line from runway 26 for orientation. Briefed 15/20 Flaps approach for gusty winds. Never discussed possibility of windshear; which wasn't discussed on the ATIS as I recall. Discussed high rate of unstable approaches at ABQ and terrain issues. Captain flew the approach with flaps 15/20 uneventfully until about approximately 2 mile final (maybe around 6;100 to 6;000 MSL?) when we got a 'Windshear; Windshear' warning. The Captain was flying and did not respond with either go-around or windshear escape manuever. I said 'Windshear; windshear' as reinforcement; expecting a windshear escape manuever; but captain kept flying the approach. Within a very brief time; the windshear warning ceased; and we were stable prior to 500 feet AGL or 500 feet above field elevation. Landing was uneventful. We debriefed this in the chocks; and the Captain indicated that my not calling 'go-around' reinforced his opinion that it was safe to continue. I had not called go-around because I was expecting him to execute the windshear escape maneuver; and then almost immediately the windshear alert went away. As far as my performance; I did not do a good job of pilot monitoring. Several factors; none of which are excuses; contributed. I was a little tired from a long day; I wasn't thinking about windshear although I should have; and I was more focused on the visual and terrain issues to runway 26. When the event happened; I was surprised when the Captain didn't execute the escape maneuver; my tone about the windshear was probably not sufficiently urgent; and by the time I thought about saying 'go-around'; the event was over. We did experience an airspeed loss of somewhere around 10 - 12 knots very briefly; but the airspeed loss by itself did not seem unsafe as we had added 15 knots for the gust factors. In hindsight; when the captain did not execute the escape maneuver; I should have said 'Windshear escape Maneuver' or 'Go-around' urgently.The windshear event was caused by the very gusty winds. The failure on my part to direct the appropriate escape maneuver was due to surprise (I know I should not have been surprised; but I was focusing on terrain and the visual). We should have discussed the possibility of windshear and appropriate reactions in the approach brief. The ATIS did not discuss windshear advisories; I don't think. Next; a stronger reaction on my part could have led to appropriate response of the pilot flying. My lack of stronger reaction and direction was based on surprise and how quickly event was over.First of all; to anticipate this windshear threat based on gusty-winds; and to brief it. Second; on my part; stronger response in commanding a correction as pilot monitoring. (i.e say something like 'Execute Windshear maneuver' or 'Firewall Power' or even 'Go-around'. We discussed all of this in the debrief.

We flew a visual approach to runway 26. On final outside of 2 miles we got a windshear alert. The airplane was stable and did not appear to be in wind shear. I failed to perform the windshear escape maneuver. Looking back on it after discussion with the First Officer we should have accomplished the escape despite my feeling we were not in windshear.I should execute windshear recovery whenever windshear annunciates.

A300 flight crew experienced a windshear warning at 800 feet during visual approach to Runway 26 at ABQ with strong gusty winds reported. The Captain elects not to go around and the First Officer is not forceful in suggesting that he should. The windshear warning stops after two announcements and a normal landing ensues.

1100969

201307

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Gate Agent / CSR

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

1100969

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Gate Agent / CSR

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1100975.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Other Person

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Human Factors

I was assigned to work a flight to ZZZ another agent was meeting an inbound flight before the outbound and said he needed help with meeting the inbound flight and he asked me if I could assist him. The inbound aircraft was a 737 and the gate had a movable jetway. To the best of my ability on movable jetway I was trying to assist him; I am more familiar with stationary gates that requires slight movement. I was positioned at the end of the jet bridge and when I opened the door; there was room that the door was not touching anything of the jet bridge. Not realizing how a jetway can move and shift if the alignment is not correct will cause damage. I want to request additional training specifically on the movable jetways. I would like to apologize for the assistants under duress that would have cause an aircraft to be out of service.

I was assigned to meet an inbound flight. Since I had not met a plane from a drivable jet bridge since I was initially trained in April 2013; I asked another agent if he could assist me in meeting the flight. I was at the controls of the jet bridge and he stood toward the end of the jet bridge and acted as my guide. The aircraft was a 737 and low to the ground so there was a lot adjustments to be made; vertically and directionally. I had to drive the jet bridge back and forth 3 times to correct my approach to the plane. It took around 7 minutes to finally get the jet bridge up to the door and by then I was worried about the outbound flight; could take a departure delay. Since he was positioned at the end of the jet bridge; he went ahead and opened the door for me. The aircraft door opened fully in the locked position without touching any part of the jet bridge or canopy. We then returned to the podium to work the flight. As we were finishing up the flight; a Supervisor came out of the jet bridge and asked me if I had met the inbound. I answered yes; [and] then he asked me to follow him down the jet bridge because he said the aircraft door was jammed. He then called Maintenance to come up to take a look at the situation. A Maintenance employee came up and attempted to un-jam the door but could not so he called his supervisor. The Maintenance Supervisor took a look at it and instructed his employee to move the aircraft back a few inches to un-jam the door. It was successful. The Maintenance Supervisor then inspected the aircraft door and he deemed it undamaged and safe so he closed the door and said we could dispatch the flight. This was the third time I had been assigned to work gates since my initial training in April 2013. This was my first time assigned to meet a flight on a drivable jet bridge. I was very comfortable during my jet bridge training but after 3 months I felt uncomfortable; hence the reason I asked for assistance. The shift I picked up today was going to be at the Lobby and I did not think I would be pulled to the domestic gates. I do believe if I had been assigned more often to the gates in the past 3 months this would have not happened.

Gate agent reports difficulties operating the jet bridge controls which he has not operated since training several months prior. All appears well until departure time when the aircraft door is found to be jammed by the jet bridge. Maintenance is able to free the door without damage.

1870030

202201

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

GPS

Class B DEN

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

Failed

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload; Confusion

1870030

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Software and Automation

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

ADSB/GPS Outage in the Denver Metro area. At around XA:00Z D01 notified ZZZ1 that there are GPS (to include ADSB) anomalies within 50 miles of Denver. We immediately started broadcasting this on the ATIS. As traffic has picked up today (still relatively slow for ZZZ1); we've had numerous reports of aircraft losing ADSB; and numerous reports of aircraft losing GPS. We also lost all ADSB on our side for approximately an hour. This is problematic for our operation. Since the implementation of ADSB; we have had many controllers train and certify using this feature. I am currently the only controller on shift that certified prior to ADSB. If our traffic was moderate it would be a safety concern; especially during a VFR pop up arrival rush. As for the GPS outages; most of the aircraft reported losing their GPS on finals from as far out as 15 miles to within 1 mile final. Luckily today is VFR. However; this time of year through April are our heaviest precipitation months. Often strong frontal patterns move in quickly; with last minute changes in forecast. We provide service for pilots with little experience; and though today is VFR; many general aviation aircraft have returned to base due to GPS outages. We have logged aircraft reporting issues in our facility log. We currently have 11 reports. There are many that have inquired about outages; but did not report an outage themselves. We are not seeing all aircraft ADSB on our side. When we lose their ADSB in the pattern; we are full stopping them to keep the operation safe. We also have the concern for the aircraft that are losing their ADSB while flying under the Bravo airspace. I am simply passing along safety information. I have heard of a 'solar storm' and I am aware of the 5G implementation. I will not speculate on the cause of the outages today. I am hopeful you can find out what happened and fix it.

A Tower Controller reported GPS outage.

1061346

201301

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Situational Awareness

1061346

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

During an icing configuration takeoff; we received an EICAS message for BLD 2 VALVE CLS upon reaching 500 FT AGL. After referring to the Quick Reference Handbook; we were unable to have the displayed message remove for the duration of the flight. As per the guidance in the QRH; we were limited to an altitude of FL250. Icing was forecasted and expected along the route which would have limited us further to 15;000 FT. Because of the careful planning by Dispatch on our release fuel; we would not have enough fuel to reach destination at FL250; yet alone at 15;000 FT for that matter should we encounter icing conditions. Neither could we make our planned alternate. After informing Dispatch of our situation; they advised us to air return. We did so.The Captain and I had some foreknowledge of the possibility of the BLD 2 VALVE CLS occurring. As we arrived to the aircraft; the flight crew who brought the airplane in made an entry in the logbook for BLD 2 VALVE CLS. The crew had told us the message appeared in flight and that as soon as they landed; the message went away. Maintenance came on board to take a look. The first Mechanic that looked into it told us they were going to need another bleed valve. The Captain and I heard the Mechanic radio in to see if they had the part. However; the Mechanic was on his way out of the airplane as he made the radio call. The Captain and I never knew the 'status' of the part; nor did we ever see that Mechanic again. After a few minutes went by; a different Mechanic comes onboard and maybe even eventually a third to look into the situation. Finally; one of the Mechanics said it was fine and that he completed the logbook and we are good to go. I was suspicious of his tone; body language; and eye contact as he informed us and left the aircraft. The Captain and I discussed our thoughts on the matter. We felt operationally obligated to accept the aircraft. We understood; given the recent mechanical history; current weather and fuel requirement related issues; the possibility of returning if the Bleed 2 Valve should fail closed again. We had planned; and briefed for the possibility of an air return before pushing back from the gate. We were able to execute our plan as the situation became necessary.With the exception of refusing to take the aircraft; or working with Dispatch for more fuel further restricting the amount of passengers we could take; I'm not sure there was much more we as a crew could do to improve this situation. In working with other team members; we must respect their jobs and professional skills. In doing so; we must make sure that we comply with operational policies and regulations as they apply to us. I believe we did so. But above this; we must also be aware of the situation for what it is; and develop a plan should the foreseeable arise.

EMB145 First Officer experiences an EICAS message for BLD 2 VALVE CLS shortly after takeoff in icing conditions. With the restrictions this anomaly places on the aircraft the crew elects to return to the departure airport. This valve had been written up by the previous crew and Maintenance had signed it off as 'ground checks OK.'

1760239

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Haze / Smoke; 6

Daylight

12000

Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Taxi

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 840; Flight Crew Type 489

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1760239

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Horizontal 0; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

The occurrence happened taxiing back to the hangar after the flight was finished. We had been flying and had very marginal VFR because of smoke from wildfires. All tower directives were clear and normal as expected; landing was normal and departure from runway was normal. Ground directed me to taxi and hold short XXL approach. The XYL; XXR runway has been closed for several weeks due to construction; which is my normal runway. XYR was the active runway at the time; I cannot give you a reason why; except for maybe being tired from flying in marginal smoky conditions that I just blew through the approach at XXL and held short of the approach at XXR. As I reached that approach I realized I had made a big mistake. I called ground immediately to say what I had done and then called Tower after. I do believe that tiredness from flying in such conditions could have added to the mistake; and in hindsight maybe I should have waited another day before flying.

Pilot reported violating taxi clearance and crossing an active runway.

1350965

201604

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

100

Daylight

20000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Climb

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Climb

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1346; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1350965

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 200; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

While doing touch and go's another Cessna took off on the parallel runway. The tower advised Cessna [call sign] give way to the aircraft that just took off on [the parallel runway]. I did not listen to the instructions for my aircraft call sign was [different]. The Cessna turned crosswind in front of me and it was not until the same Cessna turned downwind that I realized that I might hit that plane. I took evasive action and went behind the aircraft and at the same time I called tower to let them know what was happening. The tower came back to me and told me did I not hear the instructions to follow the plane that I almost hit? My response was 'NO' I never received instructions. After reviewing the voice communications on ATC live I found that in fact we did nothing wrong and the controller was the one that issued instructions to an incorrect aircraft. [This] is a very busy airport and at times there are 5-8 planes in the pattern so I am sure the controller gets very busy. Per 14CFR part 91.3 it is the PIC responsibility of the safety of the flight. I exercised 91.3 to make sure that we did not end up on the local news.

A flight instructor reported a near mid-air collision due to miscommunication by ATC. Reportedly the incorrect; but similar; aircraft registration number was used by ATC to issue instructions.

1850025

202110

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

10000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class D ZZZ

Radio Altimeter

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1850025

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

On descent into ZZZ below 10;000 feet; I recall ATC last clearing us down to 8;000 feet which is what the altitude alert was set to. I was finishing up the approach checklist as Pilot Monitoring (PM). At 8;000 feet the Check Airman in the right seat told me to push vertical speed so he could keep up with the V PATH. I asked if we were cleared for the approach and he said; 'Yes'. I believed him because of his position and how quick the situation evolved. I should have queried ATC. When we reached 7;300 feet ATC told us to maintain at least 7;800 feet for terrain. We climbed and upon reaching 7;500 feet ATC told us to cross the next fix (can't remember the name) at or above 6;200 feet; cleared approach (RNAV 16). We then recaptured the V PATH and set the altitude alert to the field elevation per FSM and landed safely. ATC didn't say anything further regarding the event. There's a chance we were indeed cleared for the approach and if so; then I missed that radio call.I should have queried ATC regarding our approach clearance. I think the procedure of keeping the altitude alert at the last cleared altitude and only letting the PM adjust it keeps both pilots in check. If the Pilot Flying (PF) wants to descend then he needs the PM to lower the altitude alert first.

First Officer reported descending below approach altitude and was advised by ATC to climb and maintain minimum altitude for terrain clearance; which they did and continued the approach to landing.

1053831

201212

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Ramp EWR

Air Carrier

Heavy Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1053831

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Arrived to park at a Gate requires a 45 degree turn for 15 yards and then an arc turn and then final alignment. Ramp guys were situated to not have two guide men. [They] gave us lots of dirty looks and shrugs when we didn't move awaiting proper ramp personnel. One guy slid one of two wands to the other thinking I wasn't moving due to lack of wands. After 5 minutes of both engines running and us telling them by hand signals and radio to Operations they put persons in proper spots to park at a dog leg gate. Last marshaller commands were comical as when he received us for final guidance he actually commanded a turn opposite the direction we were in on the arc to the right. Amazing. Approaching stop point he wanted us to go left a bit and he commanded that by bending his upper body that way with his hands above he is head for stop point; kind of like he was a kicker on a field goal. This would be funny if it weren't so sad as to what ramp operations at EWR are. Pretty sloppy. Asked for a supervisor and he got on headset after blocking and commented his appreciation and said 'these guys need to take this more seriously.' I'm starting to wonder if he means the higher ups in addition to my guide man group. [We] wasted a lot of fuel for this charade.

A Captain reported EWR ramp personnel did not marshal his aircraft in to the gate in a safe manner.

1019562

201206

1801-2400

MMTO.TRACON

FO

15000.0

TRACON MMTO

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1019562

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1019572.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure

Our initial clearance had us arriving in Toluca at PTJ VOR for the approach and ILS to Runway 15. The sun was coming up behind us making the landscape visible. At about 30 miles from PTJ; we were told to go to Toluca Approach. We checked in at 15;000 MSL. MSA was 15;000 FT. After a short pause Approach Control told us to turn to a heading of 140. This took us off the arrival. I told the Controller that the heading he gave us put us directly on a collision course for the mountain. He insisted on the heading so I complied thinking there was a traffic conflict. We were about 20 miles from the mountain. At about 10 miles from the mountain he gave us another heading change to 135 heading. This put us smack in the middle of the mountain.At this point I told the Approach Controller negative; we were turning back to the right to PTJ to assume the approach and ILS for Runway 15. There was a pause and then the Controller said we were cleared as requested. After intercepting the localizer we were handed over to Tower and were cleared to land. Why were we taken off an approved arrival which has kept us out of harms way all these years? I have been flying down her for 5 years so I know the lay of the land. This is a very challenging airport and there is no room for error with the high terrain. We have to have safe and standard procedures to keep us safe.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported being vectored toward mountainous terrain on arrival to MMTO.

1226616

201412

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

20000.0

IMC

Icing

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Elevator Trim System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1226616

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1226307.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

I was pilot monitoring and while climbing out at FL200 we received an amber 'pitch trim' Annunciator. We followed the checklist and determined that something was wrong with a primary or secondary flight control system. The aircraft indicated full nose down trim but the plane was still climbing. The PIC requested my help with the flight controls; as they were very heavy. I notified ATC that we have an emergency and that I was unable to hold assigned altitude. I actually requested a climb as well to get us out of icing as well and get us into VMC. As this was happening; I also manually activated the tail deicing boots just to make sure that icing wasn't the problem. We requested vectors to nearest airport. Unfortunately the weather (wx) there was marginal VFR so we decided to go to ZZZ as the wx was better and it was about an equal time there. We did not want to do an ILS with flight control problems. I requested CFR be standing by at landing; and we then landed without further incident. I have had three emergencies in this type of aircraft; all three were for flight control malfunctions. I believe that there is a systemic problem with this type aircraft that needs to be addressed.

Climbing thru FL190 for FL200; we had a pitch trim annunciator. Upon disconnecting the autopilot; the aircraft pitched up aggressively. The pitch trim was full forward and would not move. I tried electric and manual trim. It was frozen. The elevator was shaking significantly. We both had to push full forward on the yoke to arrest the climb. It felt as if the elevator was also frozen. We [advised ATC] and reduced throttles as much as possible to descend. Upon reaching 8500 feet; the trim unfroze and we regained full control. We completed all appropriate checklists and landed uneventfully.What concerns me most is the fact that there was no more trim down available and the aircraft was trying to climb aggressively. The force required to stop the climb was [too much] for just one person. I believe the elevator itself was jammed and the autopilot was trying to compensate for the pitch up by moving the trim towards nose down. When it ran out of trim; we got the annunciator. The fact that the trim froze at that point is somewhat insignificant as trimming up would only aggravate the situation. The trim wheel wouldn't move in either direction until a warmer altitude thawed the cables. Cessna needs to evaluate all XL/XLS aircraft for issues with elevator and pitch trim reoccurring systemic problems. The temporary fixes they have come up with over the last 3 years just seem to mask a deeper issue.

CE560XL Flight Crew describes an apparent jammed elevator during climb passing FL200 with the Captain flying. A 'pitch trim' light is annunciated initially and the crew discovers the pitch trim is full nose down with the aircraft needing more to maintain a stable climb. The First Officer's aid is requested by the Captain to help control the aircraft pitch. The flight diverts to a suitable airport.

1348457

201604

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1348457

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1348458.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

OE Captain operating 1st leg as Captain after 3 years of downgrade was PF. Upon arrival in terminal area; runway assignment was changed. As PM; Check airman; after receiving runway change with less than 15 miles to airport; I was setting up radios and reviewing approach plate for PF. I acknowledged a clearance with a vector to join the localizer; descend 5000. Both were verified by PF/PM. I observed PF arm the A/P LOC (only) function. Subsequently ATC issued traffic at 11-12 o'clock 3-4 miles; below us; which was crossing our path to land on parallel runway. Traffic was descending. I called the 'traffic in sight' to the approach controller. As we joined the localizer; a number of events happened simultaneously. The glide slope became 'alive'. The PF called for gear and flaps. The PF commented on the close proximity of the traffic (~2.5 miles; ~1000 ft below us and descending). This generated a brief conversation regarding the TCAS display; as well as continued visual monitoring of the traffic. All occurred as we were approaching (descending to) 5000 ft. Apparently when I called the traffic in sight to ATC; the PF thought we had been cleared for the visual approach; and armed the autopilot Approach (GS) mode. I did not observe this; and the PF did not annunciate his action. At 5000 ft we joined the glide slope. We were both watching the traffic crossing in front of us. Separation was reasonable and certainly safe. I was unaware we had 'captured' the glide slope and left 5000 ft (altitude still in MCP window). Since the GS was armed; there was no altitude alert for leaving the MCP altitude. At approximately 4700 ft the Approach Controller told us to 'stop descent'; which we accomplished by 4600 ft. Vertical separation with the traffic appeared to be 1000-1100 ft; horizontal separation was ~3 miles on the TCAS. The Controller told us that our last assigned altitude was 5000 ft (which would have caused us to be considerably above the GS). I reiterated again to the Controller that we had the traffic in sight. Controller subsequently cleared us to 'maintain visual separation'; cleared for the Visual Approach. We continued our approach to a normal landing. Upon clearance for the Visual; the PF made some brief comments that he believed we had already (previously) been cleared for the Visual approach which is why he continued below 5000 ft; with visual separation with the traffic. I halted the conversation to protect sterile cockpit as it was not related to the current tasks. The traffic situation was unusual in the manner which the traffic crossed in front of us; tracking to a parallel runway. Also unusual was a clearance which restricted us to an altitude which would have caused a significant deviation above the glide slope. Workload was high due to the late runway change; ATC instructions; proximity to the traffic; and the fact the Captain was on his first flight. I do not believe we were cleared the Visual approach at the time we descended below 5000 ft; on the glideslope. The PF believes we had received an approach clearance. I would not have allowed us to Arm/join the glideslope if I had been aware of the PF's actions. We switched to Tower frequency almost immediately after we received our approach clearance so there was not time to clarify/follow up with the Approach controller. Their comment certainly made me think we had not received a clearance below 5000 ft. I do not believe there was a 'loss of separation'; nor was there a TCAS TA or RA; but there was an altitude deviation of 300-400 ft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767 flight crew reported descending on approach before being cleared by ATC. Traffic was crossing in front and below for a parallel runway.

1266437

201505

0601-1200

DFW.Airport

TX

IMC

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 35C

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B DFW

ILS/VOR

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

1266437

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1266445.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

In the weather on a heading to intercept [Runway] 35C LOC; during turn onto LOC; LOC signal failed. Pilot Flying (PF) overturned LOC and started correcting. RAPCON; gave a correction and LOC came back. LOC failed again as we were intercepting for a second time. LOC continued to fail 3-4 times causing us to weave left and right on final. At about 5-6 miles we stabilized; finished the approach and landed uneventfully.

In the weather; we were turning left to intercept 35C localizer about 10 miles out and the localizer failed. Pilot Flying (PF) overturned a little and started correcting. RAPCON (127.07) gave us a correction and the localizer came back. We were intercepting and it failed again. It failed 3-4 times for a second or 2; causing us to weave down final. About 5-6 miles out we stabilized; finished the approach; and landed uneventfully. Not sure if we exited our corridor. The ID on the localizer (at 10-12 miles) was weak but readable with a lot of static. Usually DFW localizers are loud and clear out to 20 miles or more. I spoke with a RAPCON supervisor and he flagged our conversation on a note. He was very informative and helpful. He said they had been having sporadic problems with some DFW antennas. Using a Navigation overlay could help; but it can be a little off; also; even under normal circumstances.

On an ILS final approach; the crew of a MD-80 crew experienced an intermittent localizer signal. The crew landed safely after the help of ATC headings.

1119064

201309

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

900.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Relief Pilot

Training / Qualification; Fatigue; Distraction

1119064

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Visual approach; airplane was configured for landing with full flaps; prior to selecting the landing gear down. This is a non-standard order and not done intentionally. Landing gear was selected down at 900 FT MSL after recognition that the landing gear was not down; prior to any aircraft warning but too late for a stabilized approach. Normally gear is selected down when selecting flaps 3 and occurs well above 1;000 FT. Contributing factors to why the event occurred were 1. A distraction on the FMS / Flight Director showing an altitude constraint of 3;300 FT on the ILS 8L while we were flying a hand-flown visual approach and 2. Fatigue after a long flight.

A fatigued and distracted A330 crew selected the gear down at 900 FT on a visual approach with landing flaps set.

1626947

201903

0601-1200

SEE.Airport

CA

0.0

Tower SEE

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Taxi

Facility SEE.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) .4

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1626947

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors

Aircraft X wanted to taxi from [FBO] located on the north side of the airport to his hangar located on the south side. Due to [FBO] offering the cheapest fuel on the airfield; multiple parallel runway crossings with Local North and Local South Controller occur during times of heavy traffic regardless of where their hangars are located. Aircraft X was instructed at first to taxi onto Charlie and hold short of Bravo while other aircraft were requesting taxi instructions. I then told Aircraft X to cross Runway 17 on Charlie and hold short of 27R on Alpha. I let Local North (27R) controller know that taxiway Alpha was blocked; due to an aircraft landing [27L] in case he needed to exit the runway onto Alpha. Local North could not get the instructions to aircraft out in time to continue taxiing down the runway. The landing aircraft exited on Alpha. I then told Aircraft X to hold short of 27L on Bravo to prevent a nose to nose situation. Aircraft X read back hold short 27L on Bravo and then questioned if he could cross Runway 27R. I was offline coordinating with Local North controller to request to cross 27R after departing traffic while other aircraft called requesting for taxi. I did not catch transmission right away and Aircraft X crossed 27R while departing aircraft was taxiing onto the runway for departure. I issued brasher warning to Aircraft X and he called the Tower saying he was instructed to hold short 27L on Bravo. He took that as permission to cross Runway 27R.I recommend that the FBOs come to an agreement on a general price of fuel range on the airfield. I understand it is a business and they are competing; but the ground traffic complexity is amplified due to the amount of opposite direction parallel runway crossings that happen during busy times of traffic. We try to use the first come; first serve basis but a lot of pilots become irate when they are waiting for long periods of time due to not being the priority. Also; if the pilot questions an instruction; maybe it is better to go back and verify than assume.

SEE Ground Controller reported a runway incursion attributed to aircraft taxiing to different FBO's for cheaper gas prices on the airport.

1079004

201304

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Medium

135.0

130.0

3.0

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 25; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 4; Flight Attendant Total 27; Flight Attendant Type 50

Safety Related Duties

Confusion; Training / Qualification

1079004

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

Our flying time was 1 hour 11 minutes. Aircraft MD-80; beverage service only in both cabins. The flight started out normally.The pilots were scheduled a meal. I served them when they were ready at cruise altitude; and shortly thereafter I retrieved their trays. I asked how much longer; and they said about 30 mins. (All of this happened about 25 minutes or less before landing. Some details are a bit fuzzy and I'm not sure if some details are out of order.)Flight Attendant #4 came up and we were chatting after the service; and she commented she was hearing some strange dings from the cockpit. I was not sure he was calling us; but I could hear them talking. The #4 Flight Attendant walked back to coach; and I put my ear to the cockpit door. At that moment I heard one of the pilots on the radio say 'we have lost all cabin pressure on the aircraft' (or something like that) I think; Oh; is that us? I think I had experienced a little ear popping. (I had just been through a bird strike 2 months earlier; and knew the pilots would be very busy for a few minutes) I decided on my own to (just in case) immediately prepare the cabin for landing- and did so. The worst that could happen would be that we were prepared early in case nothing happened. The flight attendants started picking up for landing. I immediately grabbed my tumbler insert and started grabbing glasses from passengers; no time for niceness! I dropped and broke one wine glass in the galley; picked up the biggest piece but left the rest. Flight Attendant #4 was mid-coach; she came up; and I whispered in her ear what I had overheard. I said; 'I am picked up; go back and finish coach'. Now we heard the 4 dings from the Captain. I'm not sure what he asked us- maybe about our ears popping. Flight Attendant #2 says there's a lot of ear popping and some people with ear pain. #4 is standing in front of me. Captain says we have a pressurization problem; that we will land in 15 minutes. (I signaled with my hands 15 minutes) Captain says he will drop the masks as a precautionary measure. (I think we were borderline altitude whether we needed them or not.) I told him the cabin was already picked up. (I'm not sure now if he said when on the ground we will assess conditions and get back to us.) I told the Captain the masks had not dropped. I immediately made a PA to the passengers and told them we had a pressurization problem; and when the masks drop; no smoking; make sure your seat belts are securely fastened; put the masks on; and continue using them until further notice. We do have a lot of ear popping now.I cleaned up the glass in the galley with safety cards just in case we have to evacuate; I don't want glass on the floor. The masks are still not down; I talked through the door and say that; then they drop. Everyone puts their masks on. I take my jumpseat; my mask does not drop. I think 'where's the little compartment with the pin hole?' I see it; reach up and start pushing on it; and it finally opens. The 2 masks fall; (mask hose is very long!) I put it on and think; 'Is it working?' I'm not getting much air. I feel just a little air; but not much. Do I have to pull like the passengers to trigger it; or will I pull it out of the wall if I pull too hard? I leaned forward to look at the passengers and to also look at lavatory; and thank goodness it's vacant. I see the Number 4 in the aisle checking passengers. I got up; opened up the Forward Entry storage space to retrieve the O2 walk-around bottle; checked my breathing; and its okay so I closed the compartment without getting it. I checked all of First Class and about 10 rows of coach; and everyone had their masks on. I could smell the 'heat' from the O2 cylinders while walking through the cabin. I went back to my seat and put my mask back on.The Captain called and asked how we were doing; and I heard Number 4 say that seats 32 AB O2 compartment didn't open. The Captain announced we are okay; and that O2 was not needed any longer. He also said that Crash and Rescue would meet the flight; and we would stop on the tarmac and assess our aircraft; and he would get back to us.I did not say to discontinue masks; but most passengers started taking them off. The aircraft got very cold. The Captain made an announcement to the passengers on our status. I could see that the passenger in 3E had a concerned look on her face. I signaled to her that the Captain had his O2 mask on while speaking as he sounds like Darth Vader. We landed without incident. The aircraft came to a complete stop; Crash and Rescue checked us out; and said we were okay. The Captain then made an announcement that they would follow us to the gate. Fire and Rescue personnel came onboard; checked with the Captain; and we deplaned normally. Some passengers commented that they weren't sure if this was an April Fools day trick.The Fire and Rescue personnel checked the O2 cylinders in the Passenger Service units; they were very hot; and the Number 4 Flight Attendant made an announcement about not touching the cylinders.What would I have done differently: I would have dinged the girls in the back and given them a heads up on the situation first before making the prepare for landing PA. (I didn't want to make a big to-do about something in case I was wrong.) I would have told passengers to help their seatmates. They all did anyway. (We had a blind man on this flight) I would have told them when to discontinue using the masks. (Oops) I should not [have] taken for granted that I was okay and checked the passengers without my O2 walk-around. (Even though I knew we were not that far from landing). I wish I was clearer about our jumpseat O2 masks. (Do we have that little black trigger pin like the passengers do?)

An MD-80 Number 1 Flight Attendant sequentially describes the events in the cabin following an in-flight decompression and the confusion encountered with activating the jumpseat O2 masks.

1564440

201807

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

Part 91

None

Personal

Direct

Main Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15.6; Flight Crew Total 2557.0; Flight Crew Type 2557.0

1564440

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

Other landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

Encountered heavy traffic while holding. Decided to divert to land and wait for better traffic conditions. AWOS reported 8 knot crosswind with some gusting. At roundout for landing sensed increasing sink rate. Applied full power to slow sink rate but experienced hard landing. At touchdown; the right main wheel assembly departed the aircraft. Aircraft veered to the right off the runway into soft ground and stopped. Two passengers and the pilot exited the aircraft through the right and left doors. No one was injured. In light of the high traffic and hot and humid weather conditions; flying a longer downwind leg would have given me more time to adjust to flight conditions and make a better landing. On inspecting the right main gear assembly; two days post event; there were signs of corrosion and what appeared to be fatigue fractures at the end of the gear strut. I believe the hard landing probably precipitated an already impending failure.

C182 pilot reported the right main wheel departed the aircraft after a hard landing in crosswind conditions.

1698196

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1698196

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1698170.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

On taxi into ZZZ from ZZZ1 today; we had a strong smell of 'stinky feet' on the Flight Deck. The APU was on MEL from a previous write up of the same nature and was not being used. We parked shortly after smelling this and contacted Maintenance to have the issue addressed. An AML entry was made and the form was completed when Maintenance arrived at aircraft. The flight attendants did not notice the smell; nor did the passengers; as far as we were told. I notified the Chief Pilot's office that I felt fine; but would be more comfortable having myself checked; and went to have a follow up medical visit done at the [company] clinic there in ZZZ. No medical issues were found at that time.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

A319 flight crew reported a strong odor of 'stinky feet' during taxi in at destination.

1682678

201909

1801-2400

ZAN.ARTCC

AK

15000.0

Center ZAN

Air Taxi

Super King Air 350

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class E ZAN

Facility ZAN.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1682678

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Airspace Structure

While conducting OJT for my trainee; I ensured separation between Aircraft X and a preceding aircraft using vertical separation. Aircraft X entered a known non-radar area and the trainee asked the preceding aircraft his altitude and they responded with level at 7;000 ft. The trainee then issued Aircraft X 8;000 ft. to which the replay was that he was already cleared to 4;000 ft. We asked his altitude and he told us 4;200 ft. The minimum IFR altitude in that area is 4;600 ft. and Aircraft X was climbed to 6;000 ft. but no warning was issued. We did not issue this altitude to this aircraft and confirmed it by reviewing the audio recording after our training session. I do not believe longitudinal separation was lost between Aircraft X and the preceding aircraft due to routings and issued holding instructions. Overall I feel that this was pilot error in a non-radar environment. Having and ADSB-GBT or WAM (Wide Area Multi-lateration) in the area would have given us enough radar coverage to have noticed the early descent out of 15;000 ft. and we could have corrected it before the aircraft descended below the minimum IFR altitude.

Center Controller reported that an aircraft descended below the minimum IFR altitude in a non-radar area; resulting in CFTT.

1685866

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Company

Other Cargo

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Situational Awareness

1685866

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

One package containing Dry Ice was loaded in Net Section 51. It was just standing there alone; not secured by lashing or by other load.

Airline Ground Personnel reported configuration errors during unloading at arrival.

1464242

201707

0601-1200

T51.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 10

Daylight

CTAF T51

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 18

Situational Awareness

1464242

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

Event: During landing and braking on turf runway; the aircraft drifted to the right of the runway. Correction for drifting was applied. The aircraft entered an uncut portion of the turf. The tall grass unknowingly concealed areas of untreated and rough ground. Outcome: No one was injured. The front castoring wheel snapped with the aircraft stopping and resting on the front landing strut. A propeller blade struck the ground and bent; and the engine stopped while at idle speed.Possible causes: Drifting possibly caused by hard surface grading (sloping to the right) and reduced traction of gear as the aircraft glided on grass. Castoring wheel snapping off caused by rough ground while soft-field technique applied. Prevention: Post a warning in the chart supplementals. Clear 50 ft obstacles on both ends of runway. Clear the uncut grass to expose dangers. Place warning signs for pilots and/or fence off unusable area to prevent pilots from entering.

GA pilot reported a turf runway excursion that led to damage from rough surface conditions concealed by tall grass.

1632579

201903

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

No Aircraft

Work Cards

Repair Facility

Air Carrier

Technician

Training / Qualification

1632579

Repair Facility

Air Carrier

Technician

Training / Qualification

1632580.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Equipment / Tooling

I was trunnioning the LPC [Low Pressure Compressor]. The balance arbor became detached from the LPC during the trunnion process and fell to the floor damaging 12 each 2.3 blades. The tooling work bolts used to attach the arbor to the LPC were provided by EGAT and were too short. Suggestion to add a caution to the JIC [Job Instruction Card] stating the minimum size bolts to use when attaching the arbor to the LPC.

Attachment of handling slings to balance arbor of LPC [Low Pressure Compressor]; bolts too short on end with sleeve on arbor. Going to vertical position - sleeve section slipped off/detached from rest or Arbor. LPC Disc was from a training engine from Pratt and Whitney. Working off Job Card training with Pratt representative/trainer. Sling tooling bolts too short. Trunnion LPC attached to arbor from horizontal work stand to upside down position (vertical) sleeve detached; LPC fell to ground on one end. Note in Job Card for minimum length of bolts to be used with tooling. Better holding compartment of sling tool bolts to be kept with sling tool - proper bolts kept together.

Technicians reported incorrect bolts used on device to lift engine compressor disc resulted in damage to blades.

1579260

201809

1801-2400

SNA.Airport

CA

3000.0

Night

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent

STAR OHSEA

Class C SNA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 409

Workload; Situational Awareness

1579260

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Flying the OHSEA 1 Arrival into SNA. The RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 20R was loaded into FMC. We were told to expect the RNAV (GPS) Y Runway 20R. At two-miles from KLEVR I programmed the FMC with the new approach. Then as I was cleaning up the LEGS page; the LNAV disconnect flashed in the scratch pad momentarily and the aircraft went straight instead of making the turn at KLEVR. We corrected the turn to get back on course. ATC asked our heading and we told them what happened. He gave us a heading and said no problem. He vectored us to final and we landed uneventfully.

B737-700 Captain reported a track deviation resulted when the flight crew tried to reprogram the FMC following a late clearance change from ATC.

1722338

202001

1801-2400

MEM.Tower

TN

VMC

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1722338

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Upon touchdown and landing with flaps 25; The nose aggressively pitched up when the spoilers deployed. The pitch attitude appeared higher than normal and increasing. I could not discern if we had become airborne again. The landing was normal; calm winds; landing behind a Boeing 767. At this point my First Officer stated...'watch your pitch'. I elected to go around. We carried out the procedure and were vectored back around to land.Suspect a flaps 25 landing/ spoiler deployment combined with possible wake from preceding 767. Flaps 30 landing to help prevent a higher pitch attitude upon landing.

B757 Captain reported experiencing a pitch-up after landing that led to a go-around.

1338464

201603

1201-1800

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Ground EWR

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Tower EWR

Helicopter

1.0

Takeoff / Launch

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 6068

1338464

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While taxiing out of Newark on Taxiway Z approaching Z3 a helicopter took off and went in front of our aircraft's nose with less than 10 feet of clearance. Had I not slammed on the brakes it could have been disastrous. I reported it to ground and dispatch.

Air carrier Captain reported they experienced a near collision with a helicopter while taxiing on Z near Z3 at EWR. The helicopter had apparently been cleared for takeoff from the helipad on Z3 but conflicted with the aircraft; requiring firm braking.

1336260

201602

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

8500.0

VMC

12

Night

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Turbo Commander 690 Series

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Descent

Direct

Class E ZZZ

AC Generation

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2640; Flight Crew Type 915

1336260

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I departed for a night VFR flight. An IFR flight plan at 10;000 feet had been filed for the flight but prior to departure; I requested the IFR clearance be changed to VFR flight following with a cruising altitude of 10;500 feet. The flight was anticipated to be around a 30 minute flight and there was approximately 3 hours of fuel on board. There were 3 souls on board; the pilot and two passengers. Takeoff and climb out were normal. While enroute at 10;500 feet; the low voltage light flickered once; there was a brief buzzing sound in the headsets and the right generator tripped offline. I did not attempt to reset the generator. I checked the load on the remaining (left) generator and it was under 100 amps. As a precaution; I turned off the pitot static heat and made sure the AC compressor was offline (it was). Approximately 5 minutes later; I began a descent from 10;500 to 3;500. At this point I was approximately 40 miles from [destination]. As I was descending through approximately 8;500 feet; the passenger in the rear of the plane alerted us that there were sparks coming out of the generator vents of the engine cowling. It appeared that there was a mechanical issue with the generator as well as electrical. I elected to shut down the right engine as a precaution and [advised ATC]. At this point I was approximately 10 minutes from [destination]. I elected to continue. [After landing] the emergency equipment followed the airplane to the ramp. I shutdown the engines and all of the occupants exited the airplane normally through the door on the left side of the plane. The firefighters inquired as to the situation and I informed them that it all appeared to be normal. There was no evidence of smoke or fire; so the fire equipment returned to their base and I put the plane in the hangar. I then notified the chief pilot of the situation so repairs could be initiated.

AC90 pilot reported shutting down the right engine after a passenger noticed sparks coming from the cowling following a generator failure.

1304596

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 3096; Flight Crew Type 3096

1304596

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Airport

Ambiguous

I just think this is worth reporting because in nearly 16 years on the 737 I have never seen the aircraft do this before and had just heard the same story from a different FO (First Officer) about another high altitude airport. Initially we were looking at an intersection departure; bleeds off; but we ended up almost 3000 pounds lighter than planned. We ended up Flaps 5; bleeds on from the intersection with a reduced power of 98.9 (max 100.7). Winds were 200 at 16 kts with a gust. I believe it was less than 20 kts. We elected to use the reduced setting. Aircraft accelerated normally with no airspeed deviations. V1 145; VR 146. FO noted groundspeed 180 kts near the end of rotation.I usually rotate to about 5 deg; hesitate and let the aircraft break ground then continue the rotation. The aircraft did not break ground until somewhere between 7 and 7.5 degrees. Once we broke ground; it did not climb. As I felt the end of the runway was getting too close; I continued the rotation to about 10 degrees. The aircraft recorder recorded 9.8 departure pitch similar to what I thought I did. That was when the aircraft started climbing.The FO and I discussed this at some length and felt we did everything correctly. He also said he noted nothing abnormal with the departure; power setting (it actually settled on 99.1- 02 above reduced) or any part of the takeoff roll except that he noted I kept pulling back farther and farther on the yoke and the aircraft was not climbing. Although we are aware of no mistakes we made on this takeoff; it is worth noting that had the aircraft not started climbing within a very short time after it did; I probably would have been firewalling the throttles and risking a tail strike with increased pitch.

During takeoff roll at a high-altitude airport; B-737 crew experienced an abnormally slow start of the aircraft climb after rotation. Crew felt that it took more nose up pitch than normal for the aircraft to break ground.

1112630

201308

0601-1200

SFO.Tower

CA

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 258

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1112630

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 154

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1112671.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

On the PORTE 5 Departure off of 28L in SFO; the normal procedure is to turn to a 330 degree heading at 420 MSL; however; the Captain pointed out an FDC NOTAM that stated to fly 014 degrees (runway heading) until 2;000 FT MSL. When we did this; ATC told us to turn left immediately; and that they had no knowledge of the NOTAM. After a discussion with Company ATC guys; we realized that it was an alternate climb gradient procedure that was poorly written in the weather packet and confusing.

Our clearance was the PORTE 5 Departure which requires a turn to 330 degrees at 420 FT MSL when departing on Runway 1L or 1R out of SFO. We reviewed the entire NOTAM group in the weather packet as there were a lot of NOTAMS for SFO. An FDC NOTAM had been issued that read:'Departure Procedures AMDT 8' CHANGE DEPARTURE PROCEDURE TO READ; RWYS 1L; 1R; CLIMB HEADING 014 TO 2000 THENCE...CONTINUE CLIMB ON COURSE; REST REMAINS AS PUBLISHED.' We read and reread this NOTAM several times to ensure that we were reading it correctly. When we departed; NorCal asked us why we hadn't turned yet and I advised him that there was an FDC NOTAM that modified the procedure. I read it to him verbatim. He advised there was no conflict and I told him that we would alert our Dispatch and others as to the potential problem. On arrival LAX; I contacted our Company ATC Specialists and alerted them to this confusion as well as Flight Dispatch. One of our Specialists contacted the Manager of NorCal; and after they reviewed the FDC; he agreed that it was confusing and poorly written. The other Specialist subsequently discussed it with them as well and they said it pertained only to obstacle climb gradient issues; not all 1L and 1R departures. There are required climb gradients on the PORTE 5; but nowhere on the FDC NOTAMs does it specify a particular departure procedure. Anyway; in trying to be conscientious; we ended up in a rather confusing situation with Departure Control. Whether or not they rewrite this particular FDC is to be determined; but it is extremely insidious in that you believe that it applies to all 1L/1R departures and at the very end of the NOTAM it says 'this is takeoff minimums and (obstacle) departure procedures AMDT 8A.' No traffic conflict resulted; but it definitely was confusing.

B737 flight crew notes an FDC NOTAM apparently instructing them to maintain runway heading to 2;000 FT departing Runway 1L at SFO on the PORT 5 departure. ATC advises this is not correct and that the procedure is a revision to the obstacle departure procedure only.

1023631

201207

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Tower ZZZ

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Takeoff / Launch

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Workload

1023631

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

I was working Local Control 1/Local Control 2 with high complexity due to construction closures and vehicles occasionally calling for clearances. Runway 11R and Runway 2/20 were closed to allow painting to occur; so Runway 11L was the single active runway for fixed wing aircraft. Traffic volume was increasing with multiple departures and aircraft inbound that were requesting pattern work to the single runway; with occasional helicopter operations. I remember that I had a Mooney inbound on a left base to 11L; with other inbounds and at least two other aircraft in the pattern for 11L; including a Skyhawk. There seemed to be multiple requests for additional services that I felt added to frequency congestion and made the situation more complex and frustrating at times. I honestly do not recall working this level of traffic in awhile to a single runway; so I was definitely 'rusty' for this operation. But I felt that I needed to take advantage of the situation to push some traffic to maintain my skills and controlling ability. I recall that my initial plan was to have another Mooney depart prior to the second Mooney arrival and communicated this to the arriving Mooney before clearing him to land. I also advised the Skyhawk to extend downwind to make room for the two departures; and that I would call his base turn. However; the Skyhawk did not appear to continue downwind and instead turned base from a position that would not allow space for the departures; and could conflict with the Mooney. When I told the Skyhawk to turn out to the west and square his base (reminding him that I said I would tell him when to turn base); I believe I lost awareness of where the Mooney was on final; and instead told a Skylane of the position of the Mooney upwind as I cleared him for take off without remembering that the Mooney was so close in on final! I thought I had a hole for the departure; but I did not. I saw the inbound Mooney short final and immediately issued a go around that was acknowledged by the pilot as he began a climb. After the Skylane was established upwind; he acknowledged that he had the Mooney ahead in sight. After the incident; I took steps to regain control of the pattern by restricting pattern work and holding aircraft outside Class D until I was confident that I regained full awareness of my traffic situation. In hindsight; I needed to take steps earlier to gain greater control of the pattern as traffic was building. This event is a sobering learning experience about my own personal signs of overload developing; and I will apply these personal lessons learned in the future. The bottom line was my scan; my scan of strip bays and out the window broke down and I lost situational awareness of the position of the Mooney on final. I fell behind the volume of traffic that was inbound to the airport at that time; and allowed a pilot's miscue (unplanned early base turn) distract me into inadvertently issuing a badly timed take off clearance.

Tower Controller described a very busy/complex traffic situation that resulted in a go around; the reporter noting multiple factors and distractors leading to the event.

1573150

201808

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Personal

J3 Cub

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 160; Flight Crew Type 7

Situational Awareness

1573150

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

After becoming frustrated and impatient from an engine not starting for 30 minutes or so I accidentally left the throttle on full while hand-propping a J3-Cub while solo. The airplane was chocked; however; it jumped over the chocks upon starting up. I was able to make it to the cockpit to bring the throttle to idle and turn the switch off; however; the plane had moved approximately 50 feet from its original position by the time I had stopped it. There was no damage to the airplane; myself; or anybody on the ramp.

J3 Cub pilot reported a loss of control while performing a hand prop start.

1029625

201208

1201-1800

FLL.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground FLL

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 258

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1029625

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

FLL's Taxiway T1 sign is missing along Taxiway Bravo eastbound approaching Taxiway T1 intersection. There has never been a sign along FLL's Taxiway Bravo eastbound approaching intersection T1. It would be helpful if FLL installed a T1 sign along Taxiway Bravo eastbound; which properly marks the T1 intersection.

Air carrier Captain reported the T1 sign on FLL Taxiway B approaching Taxiway T1 east bound is missing.

1743932

202005

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1743932

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1743943.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing

Ambiguous

Taxiing out for takeoff in ZZZ; Ground Control cleared us to taxi to Runway XXL. One minute later; ATC then said to change runway to XXR. We; as the crew; accomplished the runway change checklist and got all set for takeoff. ZZZ Tower cleared us for takeoff on Runway XXR. As we lined up on the runway; the Captain gave me control of the aircraft. I advanced the thrust levers and called 'Set Takeoff Thrust.' Approaching what I believe was the 80 knot call; I heard a transmission from ZZZ Tower saying 'Flight XX Cancel takeoff clearance if able.' The Captain resumed control of the aircraft and rejected the takeoff. We stopped on the runway; and turned off and queried ATC as to why we were asked to cancel the takeoff. We were informed that ZZZ Center was having staffing issues and they didn't want us in the air quite yet. We as a crew felt that was not an appropriate reason to reject given the phase of flight; and because of this we incurred a 30 minute delay and put excessive wear on the tires and brakes on the airplane. In the future; I would recommend that staffing issues of an air traffic control facility are not justified causes for rejected a takeoff in a heavy jet airliner and once a takeoff clearance is issued; unless there is an imminent emergency; the takeoff is not rejected.

Approaching 80 kts during the takeoff; ATC said 'Flight AB; if you can; cancel takeoff clearance.' The 80 knot call was missed and the reject was initiated around 95 knots. We cleared the runway to the right on XX taxiway and then held on XY taxiway for 20 minutes for the brake temps to decrease from 320 degrees to less than 150 degrees with the fans ON. As we were waiting; I asked ATC what the reason for the cancellation of the takeoff clearance. He said ZZZ Center was getting saturated with the current staffing issue. Runway XXL was closed at our departure time. We were cleared to cross XXL and cleared for takeoff XXR. From that clearance to the reject was maybe 2 minutes or so. While hearing ATC ask us to reject; I didn't know if someone had crossed XXR downfield; were we on fire; was there smoke; was there a vehicle or person on the runway. Had I known it was for ZZZ Center saturation; I would have elected to continue the takeoff. Had we continued the takeoff; would we have continued on course; maybe hold or been given vectors; or stay at a lower altitude until ZZZ Center accepted us. I don't know; but any of those would be a better option than a reject. If ATC was saturated; whether ZZZ1 or ZZZ Center; having us reject was not the best course of action. Had we been at a higher speed and still rejected this would have been a lot worse. Fuse plugs on the mains would have let go causing X flat tires; fire trucks rolled; we'd be unable to clear the runway; and the airport would have closed. In the future; if Center is busy and we are on the roll; ATC should not ask us to reject our takeoff.

Air carrier flight crew reported that Tower instructed them to abort the takeoff roll which was requested by the ARTCC facility due to traffic and staffing issues and could not yet accept the flight into their airspace.

1075482

201303

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1075482

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Captain instructed crew to prepare cabin for a normal arrival; as we were about to experience a decompression. As oxygen masks were deployed; passengers were instructed to 'Don Oxygen Masks and Fasten Seat Belts.' I sat at my assigned 3L door; donned my oxygen mask; and assisted passengers sitting nearby. I instructed a woman to use an oxygen mask for her infant; and told children not to pull on the masks; etc. Once Captain advised us that it was safe to walk around; flight attendants walked through the cabin assisting passengers. A young woman was hyperventilating; other passengers were shaken; but overall there were no major incidents. The flight deck crew communicated very well with the crew and kept the passengers informed throughout. Passengers complimented the crew on their professionalism and calm as they deplaned. I did notice upon walking through the cabin that several passenger masks had not deployed. These passengers were not within view of the flight attendants; so they remained without oxygen. Also; we did not have a French translator on the flight; therefore communication with the French speaking passengers was compromised.

A330 Flight Attendant describes a loss of cabin pressure during during descent. The cockpit crew was apparently aware that the masks were about to drop and informed the cabin.

1499390

201711

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 19

Training / Qualification

1499390

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

Ceiling was clear. Visibility was at least 10 miles. No precipitation. Upon landing I did not complete my flare and the main gear touched ground before I intended them to. I bounced and started porpoising. The plane went into the grass on the right side of the runway. When the plane stopped I taxied back onto the runway and [then] onto taxiway to clear the active. Tower asked if I needed assistance and I declined. I asked to taxi to the hangars; which they allowed. Upon inspecting the plane I saw a dent in the right flap. I figured the flap hit a raised runway light either during a bounce or more likely just by it hitting the underside of the flap when I rolled forward on the gear.I was able to get the phone number of the Tower from a local FBO. I called and spoke with the Controller with whom I was speaking during approach and landing. She confirmed that a runway light was hit but that it was somehow handled by maintenance. She reported no debris on the runway. I provided her with my name and phone number; so they could contact me further.Primary factor: Not responding correctly with control inputs to first bounce and onset of porpoising. I intend to spend time with a CFI to review this topic. Possible factor: Winds were reported by the Tower as coming from 220 at 10 knots gusting to 18 knots. I did include a gust factor in my landing airspeed. I did not perceive any gusting during final. Possible factor: The setting sun was low on the horizon. During final I adjusted the visor to just block the sun without blocking my view of the runway. It might have been the case that upon starting the flare; as the front of the plane angled up; the sun was no longer blocked by the visor.

PA32 pilot reported some wing damage resulted when he lost directional control on landing roll and struck a landing light.

1580085

201809

1201-1800

JAC.Airport

WY

Tower JAC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D JAC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Situational Awareness

1580085

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

Proceeding visually east of Moose Center at JAC Rwy 19. Daylight visual conditions; received GPWS caution/warning from Blacktail Butte. Was starting turn to right at the time to intercept final. Alert went away once turn was commenced. I never felt uncomfortable with the terrain separation; and was surprised that it was triggered.

Air carrier pilot reported receiving a short GPWS aural alert during the turn to final approach course to Runway 19 at Jackson Hole Airport.

1672464

201908

0001-0600

NCT.TRACON

CA

4200.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Military

Medium Large Transport

2.0

IFR

Training

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Airway V334

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.6

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1672464

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X departed IFR to the northeast. The aircraft checked on turning to a 090 heading and climbing to 3000 feet. I instructed the aircraft to join V334 and climb to 5000 feet. A few minutes later I realized I had pointed the aircraft out to SJC who was holding departures instead of handing Aircraft X off to the adjacent sector. I initiated the hand off and called the sector. They had me descend Aircraft X to 4000 feet and turn left heading 330. As the controller was saying this I observed two B737's westbound descending out of 6000 feet. I instructed Aircraft X to descend to 4000 feet and turn left to 330. I also called traffic on the first B737 which the pilot reported in sight. I instructed Aircraft X to maintain visual separation. I then observed Aircraft X at 3700 feet at which time I reiterated 4000 feet which the pilot read back. It appeared to me Aircraft X was correcting and was not in any danger with the terrain. I called traffic on a VFR aircraft at 3500 feet and shipped the aircraft. It did not occur to me to issue a low altitude alert.

A TRACON Controller reported they handed off an aircraft late and had to descend the traffic for converging traffic. The aircraft descended below the assigned altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude into conflict with a target.

1464335

201707

0601-1200

MCI.Airport

MO

1000.0

Marginal

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1464335

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 800

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1464724.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

We taxied out to the runway for takeoff and there were thunderstorms that had already moved through the area and another area was north of the airport. We taxied out to the runway and told the tower we were going to need time on the runway to look at the weather. When we lined up on the runway; the radar indicated a cell approximately 15 miles or so from the departure end. We told the tower we would need a right turn immediately after departure and they approved that. The First Officer was flying and I told him to be sure and follow the flight guidance after departure so that we would make the turn in time to avoid the weather. I also had the first officer select a non-flex takeoff due to the weather conditions that could occur just prior to entering the runway to look at the weather.The takeoff was normal and a turn was started at 400 feet when HDG was selected. As we were making the turn; the weather became moderately turbulent and we were turning inside the cell. At 1000 feet the first officer called for VNAV and I selected it. We continued to get bounced around and the aircraft was not accelerating. I stated several times to the first officer lower the nose to gain airspeed but he was somewhat hesitant to do it enough and deviate from the flight director. Also at the same time I checked to ensure the gear was up and it was. At some point following in the turbulence the stick shaker activated momentarily and I took control of the airplane and lowered the nose. At this point I continued to keep a level attitude and recover and accelerate the airplane and retract the flaps on proper airspeed. While doing this I noticed that the mode control panel had the speed control knob set to manual speeds and not FMS speeds. I commanded the switch to be set to FMS and then continued the climb up to our assigned attitude. At this point controls were transferred back to the First Officer and the flight continued.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-175 flight crew reported having trouble managing airspeed after takeoff in turbulent conditions.

990752

201201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

30.0

8000.0

Mixed

6

Daylight

800

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 180 Skywagon

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 500

990752

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

During IFR flight I experienced a loss of power in my C-180. I declared an emergency was declared and landed safely at the airport.

A C-180 pilot made a safe emergency landing at a nearby airport following an engine failure.

1690452

201910

1201-1800

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Ground EWR

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1690452

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

There was a taxi delay heading out to the runway as usual. After about 20 minutes of taxiing; I completed the before takeoff checks which includes a PA requesting the flight attendants to 'please be seated for departure.' We were number 2 for takeoff when suddenly we received a cascade of various EICAS messages. These included WINDSHEAR INOP; GPWS INOP; TERRAIN FAIL; E1 SHORT DISP; and RAD ALT 1 FAIL. We advised ATC that we needed to leave the queue and taxi somewhere to work on the problem. The Pilot in Command then contacted Maintenance and worked with them by phone on troubleshooting. In the meantime I advised the flight attendants that we were working on a problem and that we weren't sure yet if we'd need to return to the gate or not. I remained on Comm 1 in order to monitor ATC while the pilot in command was on the phone with Maintenance. It took only about 10 minutes to troubleshoot the issue. By this time it was around 30-35 minutes since we blocked out.After being unable to resolve the issue; Maintenance advised us to return to the gate. The Pilot in Command then made two separate PA calls to the passengers. The first PA call was made immediately after Maintenance told us to return to the gate. The second PA call was made a few minutes later as we taxied back to the gate. The Pilot in Command apologized to the passengers for the problem; explained that we tried to resolve it; but unfortunately needed to return to the gate for further inspection. Due to the heavy congestion on the airport; it took a while to return to the gate. We blocked in about 1 hour after we first blocked out. By this point everything seemed routine.However; upon arriving at the gate; two passengers became extremely irate. One in particular was the passenger sat in seat 1A. This passenger said he had 'two million miles' and promised 'to report the crew to the airline CEO for not communicating any information to the passengers.' They also stated that they did not appreciate 'waiting for over an hour on the airplane with no information'. We only knew of the problem for 10 minutes before making the decision to return to the gate and making our first return to gate PA call.This passenger's aggressive behavior rapidly became very erratic and it visibly upset our flight attendants. The anger that this passenger was expressing did not seem proportionate to the issue at hand. The Pilot in Command then got out from the cockpit to talk to the passenger personally in an attempt to deescalate the situation. Unfortunately; there was nothing the Pilot in Command could do to calm this passenger down. The gate agent eventually came down the jet bridge and we the crew remained on board the airplane for our own personal security. At first we were worried that the Pilot in Command's PA calls were not being heard; hence why the passengers felt they were left in the dark. But both the flight attendants as well as a deadheading pilot confirmed that there were indeed PA calls made that were loud and clear. We believe that the passengers were under the mistaken impression that the delay we experienced taxiing to the runway was the result of the maintenance issue; whereas it was due to normal delays at Newark.After deplaning the gate agent advised us that this irate passenger 'had left and was nowhere to be seen.' It was assumed he left to catch another flight. Because of this information we did not feel it was necessary to advise the gate agent to deny re-boarding of this passenger. However; after Maintenance resolved the issues and we began re-boarding. We were surprised to see that the same passenger was back and ready to take his seat. He was the first one to board no less. We then paused boarding to discuss this situation with both the flight attendants and the gate agent. Our primary concern was to ensure that the flight attendants felt safe. Although she was initially hesitant having this passenger on board she ultimately did agree that she would becomfortable with this passenger on board. The Pilot in Command then had a word with this passenger before he took his seat. The passenger was noticeably more calm; which somewhat assured us that he would not be disruptive again. We assured the flight attendants that if this passenger were to become disruptive after the main door was closed that we would promptly return to the gate. Fortunately; we completed an uneventful flight with no further disruptions by this passenger. In the future I think we should be more explicit with the gate agent when a passenger should be denied boarding; even if it's assumed or implied that said passenger has left.

ERJ First Officer reported receiving multiple EICAS messages prior to departure that resulted in a return to the gate; a maintenance action; and a passenger becoming unruly.

1201998

201409

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

27000.0

Icing

Daylight

Air Carrier

MD-82

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Testing

Ice/Rain Protection System

McDonnell Douglas/Boeing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1201998

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

On this flight; while level at FL270; we experienced a dual pack shutdown and as a result; declared an emergency in order to start a expedited descent to a lower altitude. At the time the packs shut down we had just finished deviating around rain showers; had just broken out into the clear and were in the process of securing the Anti-Ice System. Prior to the packs shutting down we had been in icing conditions with the complete Anti-Ice System turned on. The system had been turned on prior to entering the area of precipitation and had been on for at least 20-25 minutes by the time we exited icing conditions and this event occurred. We never had any indications of a problem with the system. After breaking out into the clear I ran the tail de-ice and at some point during the process I noticed the pressurization flow light had illuminated. Still with no indications of any issues with the Anti-Ice System I initially assumed the flow light had illuminated due to the system switching between the tail and wing; a temporary anomaly. It became obvious after a short period of time that the cabin was continuing to climb and both packs had inexplicably shut down. I immediately asked ATC for a descent and then decided to declare an emergency to make sure we got down before the cabin reached 10;000 feet. At approximately 16;000 feet I noticed the Left Pack had started working again and had the FO level the aircraft there. A short time later the Right Pack came back online. I told ATC that we were no longer an emergency aircraft and started a gradual climb back up to our cruising altitude of FL300. The cabin never climbed above approximately 7000-7500 feet. I called Dispatch on the phone to let them know of our situation and we agreed that since the Pressurization System had stabilized and we had enough fuel we would continue to ZZZ. We landed at ZZZ with just under 6000 pounds. The aircraft was taken out of service with the cause yet to be determined as I complete this report.

A Captain reports about a dual Air Conditioning Pack shutdown in flight at FL270; resulting in an emergency descent. The MD-82 aircraft had just exited icing conditions with the complete Anti-Ice System turned on. At approximately 16;000 FT the Left and Right Packs came back online. Aircraft was removed from service after arrival.

1167101

201404

1201-1800

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

35000.0

Daylight

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Confusion

1167101

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Procedure

Just like my report from yesterday. Aircraft X assigned routing SFO.OFFSHORE7.SXC... After MCKEY the aircraft starts heading off course. At MQO; which is five miles east of the assigned route; my trainee cleared the aircraft direct DAISY. I asked the aircraft what they showed as their next point of navigation and the pilot exclaimed that they were direct DAISY. I did not argue with the pilot; but they had to make a good right turn to head to DAISY. They were five miles east of course and heading further east. Yesterday's aircraft was a different carrier and this one was Aircraft X; but they were both off of SFO. I would start by checking the DATA LINK clearances and make sure that the Flight Management System is receiving the OFFSHORE7 SXC transition clearance. Until someone is able to fix this we are just briefing each other to anticipate the deviation.

ZLA enroute Controller reports problem that happened the day before happened this day that deals with incorrect routing being given to aircraft causing confusion and corrections having to be made by the Controller.

1090042

201305

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

Thunderstorm

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1090042

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Enroute; sent several ACARS messages to Dispatch; [planned destination] weather bad; [planned] alternate also bad; ZZZ weather good. No response except; while descending on [our destinations] arrival; 'stick with [the planned alternate];' if you go into holding; try to get a hold of me. My response was 'no.' On downwind; thunderstorm on short final approach; with only ten minutes of hold fuel; diverted to ZZZ. I also had attempted several phone calls to Dispatch on internet cockpit phone; but it did not work. We asked ATC Center to call Dispatch; they took the phone number; but wasn't sure if they had time to call. After a few minutes; still no response from Dispatch; so [we] declared emergency; per company policy of ZZZ not being filed alternate [and] not approved by Dispatch. Landed ZZZ; got fuel; continued to [our original destination]. We need a better means to contact Dispatch. [We] sent numerous ACARS messages; no response until arrival at [our destination]. Internet phone is unreliable. Of the five or six times I have tried to use it; it has only worked once.

Air carrier Captain reports inability to contact his Dispatcher directly to advise of a weather diversion to an airport other than the filed alternate.

1031256

201208

1201-1800

HTO.Airport

NY

2000.0

TRACON N90

Fractional

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D HTO

TRACON N90

Military

S-70/UH-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Pavehawk/Knighthawk

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Landing

Class D HTO

Facility N90.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1031256

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

HTO Tower is a temporary Tower that recently opened and since its rushed opening there has been a myriad of land line communication problems between the Tower and TRACON. We are currently communicating with the Tower via telephone line at the FLM desk to the single controller operated Tower. My loss of separation occurred when a UH60 was on the VOR A Approach to HTO and after being cleared for the approach and switched to the Tower he reversed his course and started heading outbound on the VOR. When I noticed the course reversal I turned a Citation V to a parallel course to avoid a loss of separation and advised the FLM to call HTO Tower and tell them to cancel the UH60's approach clearance and give him back to me. I then cleared the Citation V for the visual approach to Runway 28 and switched him to HTO Tower frequency. A few minutes later HTO Tower call the FLM and advised him they were on Runway 10 and he relayed that information to me; and at the same time I told the supervisor to tell the Tower to have the Citation V to go over the top of the airport and enter a left downwind to avoid the UH60 but the FLM advised that the Tower had hung up the phone. I then witnessed the Citation V enter a right downwind for Runway 10 and come in close proximity to the UH60. The HTO Tower should not be operational until they develop a suitable means of two way communication with the TRACON. When the communication system fails the airspace should be reverted back to Class G airspace as it is when the Tower is not open. A cell phone could be used in case of emergency however the controllers in the Tower were using as there main source of communication.

An N90 Controller described a conflict involving traffic at HTO. The reporter claims that flawed land line communications equipment between the two facilities was the primary causal factor.

1774342

202011

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 5294; Flight Crew Type 2399

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Other / Unknown

1774342

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

The First Officer was flying a visual approach to ZZZ Runway XXR with right traffic from ZZZZZ3 arrival. Radar vector to final; cleared to 3;000 feet from 4;000 feet and cleared the visual. First Officer was in vertical speed and I set 3;000 feet in the MCP window. He armed approach mode and captured the localizer. The aircraft leveled at 3;000 feet and did not capture the glide slope as we were too high. Gear was down; flaps 20 and speed was 163. First Officer disconnected the autopilot and dove down to capture the glide slope. I suggested speed brakes; which he used to get down. This rapid descent caused the Tower to issue an altitude warning. I then became very busy stowing speed brakes; landing flaps; checklists; and verifying stable approach parameters. We never did the 1;000 feet call for set M/A altitude and cleared to land check (which we were). The event; although satisfying the stable approach parameters; was highly irregular and borderline go-around scenario. The debrief included mostly what went wrong and why. We discussed and I noted the main errors. The First Officer said not flying for 7 months was the issue.

Air carrier Captain reported an unstabilized approach. The First Officer's lack of recent flying was cited as a contributing factor.

1344245

201603

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Wing Access Panel

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1344245

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1344247.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

First Officer (FO) was pilot flying; Captain was pilot monitoring. During the FOs thru flight walk-around; he noticed a large access panel missing on the underside of the left wing; just inboard of the number one engine. The FO stated that he did not notice any panels missing in that area during the previous pre-flight just a few hours before. Suspect the panel departed the aircraft in flight somewhere between ZZZ and ZZZ1. There were no abnormal indications in the cockpit during the flight that would indicate at which point in the flight the panel departed the aircraft. Maintenance history indicated that maintenance had just completed work on a number 1 pneumatic sensor; and it appeared that the missing panel provided access to the pneumatic ducting in that area of the wing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

The A300 crew noticed a missing panel during an intermediate walk-around.

1693399

201910

0601-1200

LAX.Airport

CA

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B LAX

Fan Reverser

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1693399

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Manuals

Aircraft

We pushed back and started engine 1 when we got an ECAM for ENG 2 REV MINOR FAULT. Called Maintenance and they had us start the number 2 engine and then bring back thrust levers into the reverse position momentarily to reset the fault. It worked and the message went away. We departed and were climbing on the SID (I think about 2;000 feet) when we then got an ECAM for ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT. There were no associated 'to-do's' on the ECAM which drove us to the QRH. The QRH starts with a bullet point 'If reverser position fault with reverser pressurized: LAND ASAP (AMBER).' It then directs us to bring the number 1 engine to idle. A big note here is that the ECAM did not have the AMBER LAND ASAP message whereas the QRH did. So we were receiving some conflicting information. All engine parameters and all system page parameters were indicating normal. We exercised the thrust lever into the idle position and back to climb and everything looked normal. So our big question was 'is the reverser pressurized?' and how to tell. We contacted Maintenance through Dispatch via ACARS. Maintenance eventually said they believed the reverser was not in threat of deployment. I asked if Dispatch if they wanted us to divert to ZZZ (along the route of flight) or ZZZ1 (home base for Maintenance) and they said to continue to LAX. The Pilot Monitoring and I believed it was not in threat of deployment as the ECAM did not have the associated AMBER LAND ASAP displayed. We did continue to LAX without incident and landed without using any reversers. Maintenance then MELed the reverser. I spoke with the Maintenance department when I landed in LAX and asked what it meant to have the reverser pressurized. And he told me that in the QRH that 'pressurized' meant 'deployed'. So the QRH was directing us to bring the thrust lever to IDLE and LAND ASAP only if the reverser were deployed. I'm not so sure I agree with that statement. From the time we first contacted Maintenance in the air via ACARS until we had a final direction from Maintenance that the reverser was most likely a fault and nothing physically wrong with it was about 40 minutes.I think the QRH needs to be reviewed and some better information put out there to the pilot group as to what is meant by a pressurized reverser. Also; we need to streamline the information process as 40 minutes is a long time to be flying around without good direction from maintenance as to what is meant by a pressurized reverser.

A320 pilot reported ECAM for ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT inflight.

1744325

202005

MCO.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

Tower MCO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Class B MCO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 84.72; Flight Crew Total 9501; Flight Crew Type 9501.00

1744325

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Chart Or Publication

Airport

Taxiway is very rough especially when expediting across 17R. [There should be] a note on the taxi chart to proceed extra slow. This could create an issue when trying expedite for 17R traffic.

Captain reported taxiway crossing MCO Runway 17R is very rough and should be noted in charting.

1047726

201211

1201-1800

S50.Airport

WA

100.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

CTAF S50

Personal

Super King Air 200

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Class G S50

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 160

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1047726

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 100

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

After entering the pattern at S50 there was a helicopter on downwind landing for Runway 34. I had the helicopter in sight and flew the pattern to it. As I turned final the helicopter seemed to be taking a lot of time and I couldn't tell if he was going to land on the runway or on the taxiway so I inquired if he was landing on the runway. He responded that he was going around. I continued with the approach. The aircraft I was flying has poor visibility forward during landing. In the round out I caught sight of the helicopter about 1/2 to 3/4 of the way down the runway between 50-100 feet AGL and apparently stationary. I executed a go-around; sidestepped to the left to avoid a potentially dangerous situation; and advised the helicopter to go right. After I landed I was met by an NTSB inspector [who had witnessed the event] who said that they had been having issues with helicopters and I should stop by the airport office and report this incident. I do believe FAR 91.126 instructs a helicopter to avoid the flow of fixed wing aircraft.

A King Air pilot executed a go-around when the helicopter on approach ahead of him was hovering at low altitude over the runway as he was in the flare.

1749282

202007

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Total 35

1749282

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was on my first solo cross-country after receiving my endorsement from my CFI. The actual cross-country went very well and I made it safely from my home airport to ZZZ. I made a successful landing are receiving clearance from Tower and once on the ground I was instructed to back taxi on runway XX to depart again and do one lap in the traffic pattern before I headed back to my home airport to finish my solo cross-country. I was lined up and received clearance to depart runway XX; the ATIS if I remember correctly was winds from 130 at 5 kts so little to none crosswind component on this takeoff. I was performing a normal takeoff and I noticed my aircraft had trouble staying on the centerline; wanting to veer left; up to the point where I was using full right rudder. I got up to about 20 kts groundspeed before the aircraft took a fairly sharp turn to the left and was on course to go off the runway into the grass. I immediately pulled throttle idle and tried to stop but I knew I wasn't going to stop on time and I didn't want to make a sharp hard right turn with my brakes because of the risk of flipping the aircraft so I opted to just let it ride out in the grass right off the runway XX. I immediately notified Tower and told them 'I went off the runway into the grass. I think I have a flat tire;' and he responded to stay put; shut down the aircraft and he'll send some of the FBO guys to come out and help me and I complied. There was no damage to me or the aircraft during this time. I then called my CFI and told him exactly what happened and told me to stay put and have maintenance check it out and that I did the right thing for owning up to what happened. The aircraft was then inspected and nothing was visibly wrong with it and so my CFI picked me up that day and then the A&P's from my flight school came and picked it up the next day. For precautionary measures; the flight school had me do a training flight with my CFI of just takeoffs and landings and that went satisfactorily and I'm being double-checked by a check instructor at my flight school to ensure I'm a safe pilot.

Student pilot reported a runway excursion.

1119182

201309

1201-1800

D98.Airport

MI

1800.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

CTAF D98

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Climb

None

Class E D98

Air/Ground Communication

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 205

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1119182

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 75; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I made a radio announcement that I was departing the airport heading north. Another aircraft flew in front and slightly above me during my initial climb; causing a near-miss in the traffic pattern. This aircraft made several other landings without using a radio and was not entering the traffic pattern mid-field as expected.

The pilot of a Piper Dakota reported that another pilot caused a near mid-air collision condition in the traffic pattern by failure to utilize his radio and the use of non-standard traffic pattern entry.

1278705

201507

1801-2400

WSSS.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

INS / IRS / IRU

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

1278705

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

Inverted the parking spot coordinates in the initial position to initialize the IRUs. The sign at gates XX and XY have the wrong coordinates. Signs read N122.4 E1040.04. The correct coordinates are N 1 22.4 E 104 00.4. This needs to be fixed. The Jeppesen 10-9C1 pages that list parking spot coordinates is correct; the sign at the gate is wrong. The decimal place on the longitude is in the wrong place. Our aircraft had been towed to the gate. When I initialized the FMS; the numbers were off so I used the coordinates off the gate sign to initialize. That position put the IRUs on the west coast of Africa. The GNS (Global Navigation System) RNP (Required Navigational Performance) began to climb after alignment and after some time; we received an unable RNP alert. Maintenance deferred the GNS and we proceeded without GNS and ADS-B.I realized what had happened on pushback from the gate and informed maintenance of the discrepancy in the gate sign. Wrong coordinates on the gate sign for gate XX and XY at WSSS. Fix the sign and always take the coordinates off the flight plan for FMS initial coordinates.

Air carrier First Officer reports entering IRU coordinates from the gate sign at WSSS which has a decimal point error. The east coordinate is entered as a 10.4 instead of 104 causing GPS error messages and a call for maintenance. The GPS is deferred and the actual cause of the anomaly is discovered during push back and corrected.

1710753

201912

0001-0600

3000.0

IMC

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1710753

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1710761.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft

IMC arrival. After several vectors for spacing; and speed changes; we were given a heading of 320 degrees to join the LOC; maintain 3;000 ft. and cleared the ILS. Sometimes; an Airbus Flight Director does not like large turns to join a LOC; this was one of those cases. Our aircraft indicated 'LOC STAR' meaning it was joining the LOC; yet the aircraft continued a right turn through the LOC course and a further 20 deg right. I immediately noticed the deviation; and directed the First Officer to disconnect the autopilot and turn left back on course. Our CDI indicated a max deviation of 1.5 dots right of course. When; while hand flying; we were centered on the LOC once again; we re-automated the aircraft. Remainder of the ILS was normal. Later that same night; I got a phone call from the [Chief Pilot] stating that TRACON wanted to speak with me; saying we had left an ILS and returned without clearance. I called TRACON and explained the situation above. Once I told him that our max deviation was 1.5 dots (meaning we were on the LOC at all times while correcting back to centerline) he was relieved and stated 'ok that's all I need to know.'I have experienced this problem with Airbus Flight Directors before and written them up; and the clearing action is always 'cannot duplicate the error'. Even the [Chief Pilot] said he has experienced this same problem.

While being vectored for an approach; a speed of 190 kts. and a heading of 310 degrees was given approximately 20 miles away from the runway. Subsequently; a clearance was given to intercept the localizer. Shortly after; A clearance was given to 'maintain 170 kts.; 3;000 ft. until established; cleared for the ILS.' The crew noticed the aircraft make excessive roll inputs while it was intercepting the localizer (LOC star). As the pilot flying; I placed my hands on the control wheel as it was now oscillating back and forth in a rolling fashion. A decision was made to disengage the autopilot and suppress the rolling tendencies. I quickly took control and noticed that the localizer deviation indexer was 1 1/2 dot off the localizer. This was corrected immediately and once corrected; I asked that the Captain re-automate the FCP. Once the runway was in sight (about 800 ft. AGL) the autopilot was disengaged and the remainder of the approach was hand flown; without incident.The parameters built into the A300 Honeywell suite are at times; overly sensitive. This creates over correcting/over controlling of the auto flight system. Generally; when this minor malfunction is written up; it results in a 'cannot duplicate' resolution or sign off.Flight crews are always ready to intervene and remove the automation on the Airbus.

A300 flight crew reported that an autopilot malfunction resulted in a course deviation.

1324218

201601

1801-2400

SUA.Airport

FL

1.0

3500.0

VMC

10

Night

10000

TRACON PBI

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

Part 91

VFR

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class D SUA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 211; Flight Crew Total 771; Flight Crew Type 743

Situational Awareness

1324218

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

I was doing a night VFR cross country to PBI with a part-141 student... My student used SUA as a checkpoint. Upon arriving over SUA; the airport was dark with no runway lights on. I used the pilot controlled lighting frequency and activated the runway lights to high intensity to show my student where SUA was as he could not find it... PBI approach then asked me if I was the one who turned on the runway lighting (SUA was asking PBI approach)... I was un-aware that SUA increased their operational hours to [later in the evening]. I admitted that it was me. I was then told my PBI tower that I was given a possible pilot deviation for said action of turning on the runway lights @ SUA. I then called SUA and proceeded to talk with them. We had a discussion and was told that no action would be taken and that they would appreciate if it was not done again. I can understand the possible consequences that could result of turning on the runway lights at both a controlled/uncontrolled airport at night without listening in on the frequency first to determine traffic status... I should also consult the AFD before turning on the runway lights at a controlled airport to verify operational time.

A flight instructor reported comments by ATC after he had activated the airport lighting while flying overhead as this could impact other traffic.

1693683

201910

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 91

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent; Cruise; Taxi

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1693683

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was the PIC and pilot flying Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1; and made numerous operational errors due to schedule pressures and not having had adequate sleep. Although; I'd had a large cup of coffee while waiting for the aircraft to be brought over to us after it was unloaded; I felt fine when signing the fitness for duty statement. The sleep issue was due to being 14 time zones from home and not acclimating like I used to when I was younger. I had two days in ZZZ before we flew but did not sleep more than 3 to 3.5 hours at a time; and took a few naps as well. The first error occurred prior to departure when I noticed the POAT (Planned Outside Air Temperature) of 28 degrees Celsius was below the ATIS OAT (Outside Air Temperature) of 32 degrees Celsius. I called Dispatch and requested an updated PMRTW (Planned Maximum Runway Takeoff Weight) based on using a POAT of 35 degrees Celsius; in compliance with [company policy]. The dispatcher did not seem to know what I was referring to; so I walked him through the process and recorded the updated information on my TLR (Takeoff and Landing Report); but failed to request an amendment to my release for the new lower PMRTW; thinking I would do that when I got the final release.The second error occurred at scheduled departure time when I was handed the logbook with three new ACIs (Administrative Control Items) in it. I called Dispatch and amended the release to reflect the addition of the new ACIs; and revised the Weight and Balance Load Manifest to reflect a total weight of 884 kg. versus 870 kg. as shown in the release. We were now past our scheduled departure time so I requested my release and a weather update via ACARS; but forgot to amend the release for the revised PMRTW. We completed our checklists; pushed back and started engines. We taxied out and departed without receiving our requested weather update from Dispatch; and I did not catch it until enroute.The third error occurred about 30 to 50 minutes into the flight when I was looking at the enroute wind data in cruise and made the mistake of entering a couple waypoints of winds while the PM (Pilot Monitoring) was heads down entering the departure report in ACARS. My error; I should not have been heads down at the same time as him. For some unexplained reason; the FMCS (Flight Management Computer System) sequenced past our active way point and the aircraft began a turn away from the course. The PM and I both noticed this at roughly the same time; and instead of merely selecting HDG SEL; and turning the aircraft back to the desired course; I disconnected the autopilot and manually turned the aircraft. In so doing; I began a gentle climb which I did not notice until I heard the aural altitude alert. I don't recall exactly how far off our altitude I was; but immediately began a descent back to 27;000 feet. I requested the PM to re-enter the correct active waypoint and reset the automation; which he did. This all occurred in less than 30 seconds; and nothing was mentioned to us by ATC. We were in [location] with no traffic in sight; or displayed on TCAS.The fourth error occurred on descent into ZZZ1 approximately 15 minutes before landing. ZZZ1 is not in the B757 FMCS navigation database in the airplane; and is surrounded by terrain. [Center] initially gave us direct to the ZZZZZ1 after ZZZZZ; so I created a fix 30 miles prior to ZZZZZ1 for descent planning purposes. After beginning our descent to 12;000 feet; we were handed off to ZZZ1 Approach; who attempted to give us three different fixes; ZZZZZ2; ZZZZZ3; and ZZZZZ4 for the approach to Runway XX. The ZZZZZ2 in our navigation database was the wrong ZZZZZ2; and was located 8;495 miles away. ZZZZZ3 wasn't in the database; but fortunately ZZZZZ4 was. We proceeded towards ZZZZZ4 and created another descent planning fix prior to ZZZZZ4 and were cleared to descend to 9;000 ft. The transition level was 11;000 ft. and as we passed 11;000 ft.; we reset the altimeters and completed the Descent and Approach checklist. At this time we were cleared to descend to 6;000 ft.; and as PF (Pilot Flying) I reset the altitude selector on the MCP (Mode Control Panel). As we descended through 10;000 ft.; I realized I hadn't started decelerating to 250 KIAS and erroneously selected the HDG HOLD button in lieu of the ALT HOLD button on the MCP in my attempt to arrest the descent. It took a few seconds to register in my foggy brain what I had done; and reselected ALT HOLD and LNAV. We decelerated to 245 KIAS and then continued the descent to 6;000 ft.The fifth error occurred after parking on shutdown. After setting the parking brake; I verified we had the APU running; shut down the engines; turned off the red anti-collision light; and as I turned off the SEATBELT sign; called for the Shutdown checklist. The PM apparently did not hear me; and then I noticed some apparent confusion among the ground crew. I gave them the chocks in hand signal and they proceeded to chock the aircraft. By this time I had let my guard down; failed to realize that we had not completed the Shutdown checklist and proceeded to complete our post-flight duties. The aircraft wasn't going to depart again for a few hours so the maintenance technicians fueled the aircraft; shut it down and then teased me about leaving the hydraulic pumps and fuel pumps on (they did turn them OFF when they depowered the aircraft). I was tired and embarrassed by my errors; having never screwed up like this before. Nothing was said by either ATC unit regarding the altitude and speed deviations; but I believed it best to self-disclose them rather than try to hide from them and hope nothing comes of them.Obviously; I need to slow down and ensure I check all of the boxes. I failed to do so on this flight; and will try to ensure I do so in the future. One thing which would be extremely helpful would be for Dispatch to automatically send us the weather update with our Release via ACARS without being asked. However; we as pilots should also be asking for that without a reminder. It would also be highly beneficial to have airports like ZZZ1 (into which we have operated numerous times) in the aircraft navigation database. Additionally; I obviously have a greater understanding now why there is a delineation between PM and PF duties with respect to the FMC. Finally; I'm not sure how to best address the fatigue issue (other than sleeping more). Obviously I need more sleep than I've been getting; and am open to guidance on being able to more accurately assess my fitness for duty.

B757 Captain reported errors made in preflight; cruise; descent and shutdown phases of flight due to fatigue and incomplete navigation database.

1180786

201406

1801-2400

SDF.Airport

KY

800.0

Tower SDF

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Climb

Class C SDF

Tower SDF

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class C SDF

Facility SDF.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1180786

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I was training a CPC/IT on Local Control; and he had Aircraft Y depart 17L; and then slotted Aircraft X into departure position; with the Aircraft Z on about a 3 mile close in visual approach. Aircraft Z checked in at about 2.5 mile final (due to a missed frequency change; I was told later) and I know he was caught off guard by the arrival; thinking that it was still on the downwind versus being on a really close in base leg; but instead of fixing the arrival; which I was anticipating; he told the arrival to continue; and then launched Aircraft X; with Aircraft Y just off of the departure end. We turned Aircraft Y to a diverging heading with plenty of time to spare; but that did not help us with the wake turbulence separation requirements. We ended up with 2.5 miles of lateral separation on the two departures. I believe this was caused by a reflex on the trainee's part that he was in the heat of the moment and knew he had enough separation with his departures. As a CPC from another facility; he is used to using the standard separation standards between these types of aircraft; and he reverted to that mindset when he realized he was in a tight spot. At SDF however; we have Wake Turbulence Recategorization Separation Standards; which allow us to run large and heavy aircraft closer together; but we have to have more separation with the small aircraft and anything else. This; along with the very quick nature of the event; and slower reaction time on my part; were all contributing factors to this event. After the operation; I and my trainee discussed all of the options we should have employed to prevent this situation; such as not slotting the second departure; or using visual separation; coordinating for another runway for the arrival to land; etc.I would love to see the Wake Recat standards allow for the benefit of the closer heavy separation requirements; along with keeping the same standards for smalls as we used to have; that would be a benefit to all facilities; nationwide; not just facilities that have a majority of heavy aircraft.

SDF Local Control Instructor reports of incident where he let the Developmental depart an aircraft too close to a previous departure because of aircraft on short final.

1276294

201507

0601-1200

LAX.Airport

CA

4000.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

1600

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25L

Final Approach

STAR RIIVR2

Class B LAX

TRACON SCT; Tower LAX

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

Final Approach

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1276294

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Cleared to 'descend via RIIVR Arrival; cleared ILS 25L approach.' Weather: Cloud top deck at 3700 FT MSL and ceiling 1600 FT MSL. Passing 4300 FT MSL on ILS glidepath/course and 240 knots; SoCal Approach pointed out another carrier on right base to 24L. We were asked if we had it in sight. We said yes; but would lose them when both aircraft entered the cloud deck. Told to respond when we lose sight in clouds. We respond that we were losing sight of the other aircraft as they were entering clouds. We were told to maintain 4000 FT MSL. We were not told to cancel approach clearance. Then we were told to maintain 3800 FT MSL. We had to climb from 3700 FT MSL back up to 3800 FT MSL. We queried the Controller about our approach clearance. He said to maintain localizer course. We were now well above glidepath. Then; we were told 'cleared ILS approach.' We were high. Then; we were told to slow further because of overtake of the aircraft in front of us. We were high at the FAF and fast trying to configure and get down. Broke out just inside FAF with runway in sight. High on glidepath; greater than 1000 FT Vertical Velocity Indicator descent; and fast. We were stabilized inside the slot and elected to land as the approach criteria were coming together.Factors attributed to this incident included poor ATC controlling and verbiage. Question: With field under IMC conditions and both aircraft under IMC approach criteria; why were we told to maintain visual after being given instrument approach clearance? And; then didn't have approach clearance cancelled after given altitude clearance while on ILS approach?

Pilot reports of marginal weather inbound to LAX and being asked if they could maintain visual with another aircraft. Pilot responded that they could; but would lose the aircraft when it went into the cloud deck. Controller told them to maintain an altitude; then cleared them for the ILS. Pilot wondered why controller would issue the visual when they were aware of the clouds and why did the Controller not issue a clearance cancellation.

1814291

202106

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

1814291

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

CA (Captain) on Aircraft X; ZZZ-ZZZ1 called and asked about NOTOC (Notice to Crew). He noticed that on walk around in ZZZ1 that human organs and dry ice was loaded on to the aircraft. ACARS was inoperative via MEL; but nowhere on the Load Closeout [documents] were restricted articles listed. I conference called the CA with CLP (Load Planning) and the CLP Supervisor said that there is nothing on their side they can do if the Crew Chief does not advise them. Also; usually a MEDEVAC notice from ATC would give us both a heads up about dry ice but they [did] not advise Dispatch. [Incomplete flight closeout documents issued due to] Missed SOP by Crew Chief. [Reporter recommends] not allow a flight closeout to be sent when a restricted item is loaded until CA acknowledges.

Air Carrier Dispatch reported a communications breakdown between Dispatch and Ramp Crew Chief regarding SOP to issue required Hazmat documents.

1577411

201809

1201-1800

D21.TRACON

MI

9000.0

TRACON D21

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B DTW

Facility D21.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Training / Qualification

1577411

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

METROPLEX Subject Matter Expert submitting report on behalf of a D21 [controller] working East Departure. This was his first session working 1E since the DTW/CLE Metroplex implementation. While observing the operation as a floor-walker; I overheard him; utilize the legit 7110.65 phraseology to 'climb via except maintain 17;000' upon initial radar identification off of DTW. I warned the controller to be vigilant about watching the corner where the RNAV SID procedure turns from the southeast to the southwest and are procedurally separated from RNAV STARs so long as the departure complies with an at/below 7;000-ft crossing restricting at LAZYI that coincides with the STAR traffic descending via to a bottom altitude of 8;000-ft on the downwind. Many pilots who are initially assigned a top altitude of 7;000-ft by DTW clearance delivery and subsequently instructed to 'climb via except maintain 17;000' by the Radar Controller seem to disregard and not comply with the at/below restriction at LAZYI. This particular pilot read back the revised climb via clearance and was subsequently observed climbing above 9;000-ft as they crossed LAZYI. Air carrier flight crews do not seem to understand how to comply with a 'Climb Via' clearance. It appears they read it back correctly but treat it as an arbitrary 'Climb and maintain' clearance; disregarding all subsequent altitude restrictions on the RNAV SID. As much as we want the pilot community to learn how to comply with the phraseology correctly; in the interim; we are advising radar controllers to avoid utilizing the 'climb via except maintain' phraseology and instead utilize standard 'climb and maintain' phraseology once clear of traffic conflicts. This option is safer but if we universally decide to avoid using the 'climb via' phraseology; the flight crews will never learn either. An education piece needs to be forced out to the airline pilot workforce at large.

D21 Subject Matter Expert training ATC personnel in the facility reported pilots often miss altitude restrictions when issued 'climb via' clearances.

1582618

201809

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1582618

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Upon landing in ZZZ1 an unsecured catering cart from the aft galley rolled down the center aisle of the aircraft and struck the back of seat 2C. This was a ferry flight being operated from ZZZ with no flight attendants on board. After taking over the aircraft in ZZZ both the First Officer and I performed a preflight check of the main cabin as per Standard Operation Procedure. We checked the cabin safety equipment and made sure the catering carts were present and secure. I then went to the cockpit to prepare for departure. During this time catering arrived and performed a full service of the aircraft. I was checking on a paperwork issue with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and I did not pay much attention to the caterers onboard. They performed their service and then left. Once we were ready to depart; I went to the back of the aircraft and armed the cabin doors for departure. I neglected to re-check the catering carts because I had already completed that task once and it did not occur to me to recheck them with the caterers having been onboard. I armed the front cabin doors and we departed the gate. The flight to ZZZ1 was normal and uneventful. Upon landing in ZZZ1; I did hear a noise that sounded like a collision but over the thrust reverse noise it didn't seem very loud. I assumed it was the maintenance log; which I had placed on the cockpit floor; hitting the back of the main pedestal. Once we parked the aircraft; I headed to the rear of the aircraft to disarm the cabin doors. On the way; I discovered a catering cart resting on the back of the aft first class seat; 2C. It had come loose during braking on the runway and collided with the back of the seat; bending the seat and the door of the catering cart. It also broke a piece of trim off another seat on the way down the aisle. This whole incident could easily have been prevented by a double check of SOP before departure instead of just using it to perform the preflight inspection. This is a good example of how tasks that aren't performed regularly can cause threats to safe operation. Thankfully no one was injured in this incident.

Air carrier Captain reported failing to secure galley carts on takeoff for a ferry flight.