Datasets:

ecthr_cases

like 9

[ "3. The applicants were the main shareholders of Demirbank, established in 1953. In 1999 Demirbank was ranked the fifth largest private bank in Turkey, with 193 branches and 3,885 employees.", "4. By a decision dated 6 December 2000 (no. 123), the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu – hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tassarruf Mevduat Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter “the Fund”), pursuant to section 14 (3) of the Banking Activities Act (Law no. 4389). In its decision, the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank’s management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank.", "5. On 2 February 2001, the applicant company brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the decision of 6 December 2000 regarding the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund.", "6. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court.", "7. In its submissions before the Supreme Administrative Court, the applicant company claimed that its property rights had been violated. It also raised a plea of unconstitutionality under section 14 of the Banking Activities Act. The applicant company further stated that prior to November 2000, Demirbank had never encountered major financial problems. It was pointed out that pursuant to section 14 (2) of the Act, a bank with financial difficulties should first be given a warning to strengthen its financial structure and be allowed time to take specific measures. However, no such warning had been given in the instant case. Secondly, the Board had not claimed that Demirbank’s financial situation was so weak that it could not be strengthened even if specific measures were taken. Lastly, the applicant company stated that following the transfer of the bank to the Fund, a General Assembly composed of the Fund’s officials had exonerated the former managers of Demirbank, holding that they had not been at fault in the incident leading to the bank’s transfer.", "8. After examining the file, on 3 June 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the case. It held that the takeover of the bank by the Fund had been in accordance with section 14 (3) of the Banking Activities Act. The applicant company lodged an appeal.", "9. On 18 December 2003 the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court decided to quash the decision of 3 June 2003. In its judgment, the court held that prior to ordering the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, the Board should have carried out an objective evaluation of the bank’s financial situation. The court also concluded that the Board should first have ordered Demirbank to take specific measures in accordance with section 14 (2) of the Banking Activities Act before applying section 14 (3) of the Act.", "10. On 29 April 2004 a request for rectification lodged by the Agency was refused.", "11. The case was remitted to the Supreme Administrative Court, which delivered its decision on 5 November 2004, upholding the decision of the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court. In its decision the Supreme Administrative Court held that:\n“... Demirbank did not have any serious financial problems until the economic crisis in November 2000. The amount of the bank’s risky credit in Government Bonds for Domestic Borrowing aimed at securing Treasury debt was not too high compared to its total credit, its asset quality was high due to its five affiliate banks abroad, and furthermore, the major shareholders had not targeted the resources of the bank. Although Demirbank had been able to resolve its liquidity problem and it had fulfilled all obligations towards individual and corporate clients using its own assets, it was decided that it fell within the scope of section 14 of the Banking Activities Law. It is therefore understood that the administrative act pertaining to the taking over of Demirbank by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund based on paragraphs (b) and (d) of section 14 of the Banking Activities Act, without investigating any further possible options or specific measures to enable the Bank to establish a balance of liquidity, was unlawful.\n...\nIn the light of the foregoing, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board’s decision of 6 December 2000 ordering the takeover of Demirbank by the Fund is unanimously annulled.”", "12. A further appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. The final decision was served on the applicant company’s representative on 13 March 2006.", "13. In the meantime, while the proceedings against the Agency were still pending, on 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with the HSBC bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter for 350,000,000 US Dollars.", "14. On 20 September 2001 the second applicant brought administrative proceedings against the Fund in the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC.", "15. Given that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be unlawful by the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court, on 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement entered into by the Fund and HSBC on 20 September 2001. In its decision the Ankara Administrative Court held that:\n“... It can be seen that, given the shareholding structure of Demirbank before the transfer, 72,55 % was owned by Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., that the claimant who owned shares in this company was a shareholder of the aforementioned bank, that all shares of Demirbank were taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund pursuant to section 14 of the Law no. 4389, that the claim requesting the annulment of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board’s decision dated 6 December 2000 regarding this taking over was dismissed by a judgment on 3 June 2003 delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court, and that this judgment was subsequently quashed by the judgment of 18 December 2003 of the Joint Administrative Chambers of Supreme Administrative Court.\nIn its judgment, the Joint Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court held that the taking over of Demirbank by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund based on Section 14 paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Banking Activities Act was unlawful and it accordingly declared the act as null and void. It was decided that the decision regarding the taking over of the bank had been adopted without investigating the possible options to enable the bank to establish a balance of liquidity and taking the relevant precautions, given that it would have been possible for the bank to continue its banking activities since it did not have any serious financial problems until the financial crisis of November 2000, the amount of the bank’s risky credit in Government Bonds for Domestic Borrowing aimed at securing Treasury debt was not too high compared to its total credit, its asset quality was high compared to the five affiliate banks based abroad, the majority shareholders had not targeted the resources of the bank, the bank had been included within the scope of section 14 of Law no. 4389 to enable it to the resolve its liquidity problem and it had fulfilled all obligations towards individual and corporate clients using its own assets.\nIt is therefore understood that, pursuant to the annulment of the decision pertaining the taking over of Demirbank by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund by the Joint Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court, the subsequent sale of Demirbank to HSBC Bank has also become unlawful and the decision that is the subject of these proceedings is therefore unlawful. This act is therefore declared null and void.”", "16. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected on 3 June 2005 and 24 February 2006 respectively.", "17. On 11 May 2006 the second applicant requested the Agency to comply with the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgments and to enforce them. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, she requested that Demirbank be returned to its previous owners.", "18. On 10 July 2006 the Agency informed the second applicant that it would be impossible to enforce the judgments as, following its sale to HSBC, Demirbank had been struck off the commercial register." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 8, 10, 12, 14, 15 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Kallithea-Attaki, Greece.", "7. The applicant is one of the heirs of Mr Serkis Gövderelioğlu, who used to live in Istanbul. On 7 July 1988 Mr Gövderelioğlu purchased movable and immovable goods from the bankrupt estate of a company by way of a public tender.", "8. On 5 February 1996 the sale in question was annulled by a court order on the ground that the instalments had not been paid in time. The decision annulling the sale became final on 3 October 1997 and on 14 November 1997 Mr Gövderelioğlu was requested by the Istanbul Bankruptcy Office to return the purchased goods within seven days. He did not comply with that request.", "9. On 10 August 2000 Mr Gövderelioğlu died.", "10. Due to his non-compliance with the Bankruptcy Office’s order to return the goods, on 5 June 2001 the bankrupt estate of the aforementioned company filed an action against Mr Gövderelioğlu’s heirs, including the applicant, before the Şişli Court of First Instance (hereinafter “the Şişli Court”) for the recovery of the goods or their equivalent value.", "11. A lawyer acting on behalf of the applicant and the other heirs of Mr Gövderelioğlu submitted a petition to the Şişli Court on 3 December 2001, arguing, inter alia, that the case had been lodged outside the statutory time-limit and thus had to be rejected. The lawyer submitted that the statutory one-year time-limit had started to run on 14 November 1997 but that the plaintiffs had not lodged their action until 2001.", "12. On 15 April 2002 three experts appointed by the Şişli Court submitted their opinion on the value of the goods. Two of the experts considered the value to be approximately 245,000 euros (EUR), whereas the third expert considered it to be in the region of EUR 45,000.", "13. On 11 June 2002 the Şişli Court issued an interim decision, rejecting a request to hear two witnesses who, according to the applicant, would have provided pertinent information about the value of the goods in question. The Şişli Court considered that the existence of the expert reports made it unnecessary to hear the applicant’s witnesses.", "14. In its decision of 13 December 2002 the Şişli Court ordered Mr Gövderelioğlu’s heirs to return the goods which were still in their possession and to pay a certain sum of money corresponding to the value of the goods which had been disposed of in the meantime. The amount of money ordered was based on the calculations made by the two experts. The Şişli Court further awarded statutory interest on this amount accruing from 21 November 1997, the original due date for the return of the goods. No response was given by the Şişli Court in its decision to the applicant’s objection concerning the issue of the time-limit.", "15. The applicant appealed against the judgment and argued, inter alia, that the action for recovery should have been dismissed by the Şişli Court as it had been instituted outside the statutory time-limit. He also submitted that the Şişli Court had acted unlawfully by ordering the payment of interest on the amount due, given that no request for interest had been made by the plaintiff. He also added that the Şişli Court had failed to hear the witnesses he had proposed. The applicant asked the Court of Cassation to hold a hearing before rendering its decision.", "16. On 10 July 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Şişli Court without holding a hearing and without providing any answers to the applicant’s objections.", "17. On 22 December 2003 the Court of Cassation rejected a request by the applicant for rectification of its previous decision." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 5, 8 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Zurich.", "6. The applicant is a Polish national. He married M.S., another Polish national, in 1994. Shortly afterwards they moved to Switzerland where the applicant works as a software specialist. In 1998 their son P. was born and in 2002 their daughter J.", "7. In autumn 2007 the applicant began an affair with H.", "8. In February 2008 the applicant and M.S. decided to separate and he moved to another flat. However, the applicant’s flat was located opposite the flat of his family and he kept regular contacts with his children.", "9. On 24 September 2008 M.S. filed a petition for divorce with the Kraków Regional Court. M.S. applied for an interim order granting her temporary custody over P. and J. for the duration of the divorce proceedings. She had also informed the court that she would be in Kraków between 4 and 28 October 2008.", "10. On 4 October 2008 M.S. took the children to Poland for school holidays. She promised to return on 20 October 2008. The applicant was informed about the trip and consented to the travelling dates.", "11. On 15 October 2008 the Regional Court granted the request of M.S. for an interim custody order. The applicant was neither informed of nor summoned to the court session concerning this order.", "12. Subsequently, on 24 October 2008 the applicant lodged a request for return of his children under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) (see paragraphs 20-30 below).", "13. On 12 November 2008 the applicant requested the Kraków Regional Court to stay the execution of the interim custody order of 15 October 2008. He also appealed against that order.", "14. On 11 December 2008 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for stay of the execution of the interim order and instead stayed the divorce proceedings. The court referred to the pending proceedings under the Hague Convention (see below). The applicant’s appeal against this decision and against the interim custody order was dismissed by the Kraków Court of Appeal on 26 February 2009.", "15. On 3 March 2010 the Kraków Regional Court gave an interim order and determined the applicant’s contacts with P. and J. for the duration of the divorce proceedings.", "16. On 6 May 2011 the Kraków Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny) submitted an expert report to the Kraków Regional Court. According to the report, M.S. should continue to exercise custody of the children as she had always been more involved in their upbringing. Moreover, the experts considered that another separation from a parent and another change of environment would be detrimental to the children. They further noted that the applicant should be allowed to have contacts with his children outside the territory of Poland as long as there was no risk of destabilisation of their situation. He should have the right to spend with them half of summer vacation, holidays and weekends and to visit them 1-2 times a month.", "17. On 24 July 2012 the Kraków Regional Court dissolved the applicant’s marriage. It found that the applicant had been at fault in the breakdown of the marital relationship. It further held that full parental authority was to be exercised by M.S., whereas the parental rights of the applicant were limited to decisions regarding the children’s upbringing, health and education. He was authorised to have contacts with P. and J. two afternoons per week and two weekends per month. He was further ordered to pay child maintenance and alimony.", "18. The applicant appealed. He argued, in particular, that, due to the fact that he resided in Switzerland, his visiting rights during holidays and summer vacation should have been regulated by the court.", "19. On 15 March 2013 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first instance’s judgment.", "20. On 24 October 2008 the applicant lodged with the Swiss Central Authority a request concerning the return of the children to Switzerland under the Hague Convention. It was transmitted to the Administrative Division of the Kraków Regional Court on 25 November 2008.", "21. Subsequently, in a letter of 13 March 2009 the Swiss Central Authority confirmed that the applicant and M.S. had exercised joint custody over P. and J. The authority expressed the view that since the Swiss authorities had not been aware of any decision of Swiss courts or authorities limiting the applicant’s custody rights, the fact that the children stayed in Poland after 20 October 2008 without their father’s consent constituted a wrongful removal under Article 3 of the Hague Convention.", "22. Meanwhile in Kraków, on 9 December 2008 a local assessment (wywiad środowiskowy) was conducted at the home of M.S. by a court‑appointed guardian with a view to establishing the children’s situation. The report confirmed that the children’s living conditions with their mother were very good and that they continued their education in private schools.", "23. On 17 December 2008 the Kraków District Court held the first hearing in the proceedings under the Hague Convention. The court also gave an interim order and allowed the applicant to visit the children on that day in the afternoon.", "24. On 5 January 2009 the court requested a psychologist to prepare a report concerning the children’s mental and emotional maturity and their capacity to express views on the matter of their return to Switzerland.", "25. On 9 January 2009 another hearing took place.", "26. On 21 January 2009 the expert submitted his report to the court.", "27. On 27 January 2009 the District Court allowed the applicant another exceptional contact with his children. They were to stay with him from 30 January until 1 February 2009. However, the applicant was not allowed to leave Poland with the children.", "28. On 11 February 2009 the Kraków District Court gave a decision and refused to grant the applicant’s request for the children’s return to Switzerland. The court referred to the applicant’s and M.S.’s consistent testimonies and the information included in the divorce file.\nThe court established that on 4 October 2008 M.S. had come to Poland together with P. and J. and the applicant had consented to this trip. On 20 October 2008 M.S. had not returned to Switzerland and stayed in Poland together with the children. The applicant had not accepted this decision.\nThe court subsequently stressed that in the proceedings under the Hague Convention it should be firstly established whether wrongful removal or retention took place. It further held that in the case at issue there had been no wrongful removal since the applicant had agreed to P and J’s trip to Poland on the 4 October 2008. With reference to the fact that M.S. failed to return on 20 October 2008 (the date agreed with the applicant), the court noted that she had been granted temporary custody over her children for the duration of the divorce proceedings. When the interim order was delivered, that is between 4 and 20 October 2008, the children remained in Poland with their father’s consent. Consequently, M.S. could have decided to stay in Poland also after 20 October 2008 and there had been no wrongful retention in the case.\nThe court also considered that the interim custody order was not contrary to Article 16 of the Hague Convention, since the applicant’s request for return of his children had been received by the Kraków Regional Court only on 25 November 2008 while the custody order had been delivered on 15 October 2008.\nLastly, the court held that the refusal to grant the request for return was not contrary to Article 17 of the Hague Convention, since that provision concerned custody decisions delivered after the removal of a child.", "29. On 24 March 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first‑instance decision. He argued that the contested decision was in breach of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. He further argued that Article 17 of that Convention was also breached as the first-instance court had relied on a decision which was merely of a temporary character, whereas this provision expressly prohibited to refuse an application for return on the basis that a decision on custody was given in the country to which children were abducted.", "30. On 2 June 2009 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court first refused to accept as evidence the document from the Swiss Central Authority since that document failed to refer to the interim custody order of 15 October 2008. It its decision, the Kraków Regional Court referred in particular to the events leading to the breakdown of the applicant’s marriage. It also noted that when M.S. had discovered that the applicant’s new partner had been pregnant, she had decided to institute divorce proceedings. However, she had been informed by a Swiss lawyer that in view of the applicant’s lack of consent to a divorce, she could only have filed a petition in Switzerland after two years of separation. For these reasons she had decided to file a petition for divorce with the Polish courts. The court further noted that on 4 October 2008 M.S. had arrived in Kraków with her children in order to spend two weeks of school holidays there, after having obtained the applicant’s consent for their trip. The court further stressed that M.S. decided to stay in Poland permanently only when she was granted temporary custody. Consequently, in the court’s opinion the removal of the children was not a wrongful removal within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.\nThe decision was served on the applicant on 28 July 2009. It is final." ]

[ "8" ]

[]

[]

[ "10. The applicant, who is of Kurdish origin, was born in 1979 in Syria and is currently living in Northern Iraq. He is married with three children.", "11. The applicant left Syria on 7 January 2005 and entered Cyprus illegally on 10 February 2005 after travelling from Turkey.", "12. He applied for asylum on 17 February 2005.", "13. On 15 October 2007 the applicant married in Cyprus a Kurdish woman from Turkey. His wife had applied for asylum in 2004 when she came to Cyprus with her parents and siblings.", "14. The Asylum Service held an interview with the applicant on 1 August 2008.", "15. His application was dismissed by the Asylum Service on 13 August 2008 on the ground that the applicant did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2004 (as amended up to 2004), namely, he had not shown a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion or a well-founded fear of serious and unjustified harm for other reasons. The Asylum Service noted that the reason for which the applicant had left Syria was not at all relevant to the conditions set out in Article 3 of the Refugee Law and Article 1 of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). Further, the Asylum Service considered that there was no possibility that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if he returned to Syria. It observed that contradictions had been identified between the applicant’s written application and the statements he had made during his interview which affected the credibility of his claims. In particular, he had given different reasons for leaving Syria in his interview from those given in his application.", "16. On 2 September 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees against the Asylum Service’s decision.", "17. It appears that on 20 May 2009 the applicant applied for a temporary residence permit.", "18. On 5 June 2009 the Asylum Service’s decision was upheld and the appeal dismissed.", "19. The Reviewing Authority observed that the applicant had not given the same reasons for leaving Syria in his written application and in his interview. In the former he had stated that he had come to Cyprus “for living” whereas in his interview he claimed that he had left Syria because he had been persecuted by the family of a girl with whom he had eloped and had a sexual relationship. She had been killed by her family and they were after him. The applicant had also claimed that someone else had filled in the asylum application form on his behalf but then had stated that he had filled it in himself. He had also stated that he did not remember the contents of his application. The Reviewing Authority considered that if the applicant’s life was in danger he would have remembered the reasons for which he left Syria and thus what he had written in his application form. As the Reviewing Authority considered that the applicant’s claims were not credible they did not accept the documents he submitted concerning his claim of persecution by the girl’s family. It therefore found that the application was unsubstantiated.", "20. The Reviewing Authority concluded by observing that the applicant had not established that he was at risk of persecution if he returned to Syria. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds.", "21. It appears that his wife’s asylum application was also rejected by the authorities and her appeal thereto was dismissed by the Reviewing Authority on 5 August 2009.", "22. On 13 August 2009 the applicant brought a recourse before the Supreme Court (first-instance revisional jurisdiction) under Article 146 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Reviewing Authority.", "23. On 28 August 2009 deportation and detention orders were issued against the applicant and his wife pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) and (l) of that Law (see M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872/10, §§ 62-63, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). The applicant was arrested and detained on the basis of these orders. However, as at the time, the applicant had two children that were still infants, his wife was not arrested on humanitarian grounds and the deportation order against her was suspended.", "24. On 12 October 2009 instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of the applicant and his family.", "25. By a letter dated 15 October 2009, the Civil Registry and Migration Department informed the applicant that following the negative decision of the Reviewing Authority, his application of 20 May 2009 for a residence permit (see paragraph 17 above) had been rejected and that he was requested to proceed to all necessary arrangements so as to depart from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus at once.", "26. By a letter dated 29 October 2009 the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Larnaca Police requested instructions from the Ministry of the Interior concerning the deportation of the applicant and his family as it transpired, following consultation with the Syrian Embassy, that it was not possible to issue a permit to the applicant’s wife to enter Syria due to the fact that she did not have a passport.", "27. By letter dated 13 November 2009, the NGO “Future World Centre”, complained to the Minister of the Interior and the Director of Social Services, of the living conditions of the applicant and his family and requested that a temporary residence permit be granted to them so they could receive benefits and have access to health care, at least until the Supreme Court gave judgment in the applicant’s recourse. According to the documents in the file this request was rejected.", "28. On 10 December 2009 the Minister of the Interior revoked the deportation and detention orders and the applicant was released. According to the documents in the file, it appears that the applicant was requested to formalise his residence in Cyprus but he did not take any steps in this respect.", "29. On 7 May 2010 the applicant applied to the Reviewing Authority for the reopening of his file.", "30. By letter dated 11 May 2010 the Reviewing Authority informed him that it did not have the competence to take a decision as to the reopening of the file as the recourse proceedings concerning its decision of 5 June 2009 were still pending before the Supreme Court. The applicant had to wait for the Supreme Court to give judgment in those proceedings.", "31. The applicant lodged an application with the Court on 14 June 2010. In his application form he stated that on 13 March 2004 he had taken part in a demonstration in his village in Derit. The purpose of the demonstration was to go to Qamishli to show solidarity with the Kurdish demonstrators following the events of 12 March 2004. Following the intervention of the authorities this had not been possible. The applicant stated that the police had attacked the demonstrators killing two persons. After going into hiding for a month in a neighbouring village, the applicant was arrested in Qamishli. He was detained for fourteen days and subjected to ill-treatment. He was subsequently transferred to the central prison of Damascus where he was detained for two and a half months. After bribing the authorities he was released on the condition that he would present himself to the authorities in Damascus every fifteen days. He did not do so, however, out of fear of being detained and tortured again. He subsequently found out that an arrest warrant had been issued against him. He submitted that after these events he had asked the girl he loved to marry him but her family had not consented. She then left her family to be with him. On 29 December 2004 the family managed to track her down. They killed her because she had dishonoured the family and were looking for him. The applicant decided to leave Syria as he feared that he would either be detained or ill-treated by the police or killed by the girl’s family.", "32. It appears subsequently that the Reviewing Authority decided to examine the applicant’s request for the reopening of his asylum application despite the ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court. In his application the applicant relied on a document in Arabic which had been translated into Greek by the Government’s Press and Information Office (“PIO”). The translation had a stamp that the PIO could not guarantee the authenticity of the document. According to the Government, the document was a copy. The applicant, however, stated that he had submitted the original document to the Reviewing Authority the day after his interview. According to the contents of the document, it was from the Department of Civil Security of Al-Hasakah of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior. It was dated 15 May 2005 and was addressed to the Directorate of Immigration and Passports in Damascus. It instructed the latter Service to arrest and surrender four individuals, including the applicant. It stated that all immigration departments and border check controls should be mobilised to prevent these four persons, who were sought by the authorities, from fleeing.", "33. The Reviewing Authority held an interview with the applicant on 11 May 2011 and on 26 May 2011 it dismissed the application.", "34. In its decision the Reviewing Authority noted that the applicant had stated that the above document had made its way to him from Syria through Lebanon and that he had received it on 10 May 2010. He claimed that it referred to the Qamishli events and that the persons named in it were sought by the authorities for their participation in those events. The Reviewing Authority, however, pointed out that the document made no reference to these events. It considered that the applicant was not aware of the actual contents of the document and had not produced the original document. Furthermore, the translation of the document had been certified by the PIO on 5 May 2010 and therefore had been in the applicant’s hands before 10 May 2010. In addition, the Reviewing Authority noted the contradictions between the first interview with the Asylum Service and his second interview. In the former he had stated that he had left Syria legally but in the latter that he had left illegally, after having bribed officials to secure a passport and leave the country. Furthermore, the applicant had not claimed that he risked political persecution in his asylum application, interview or appeal. Overall, the Reviewing Authority held that the applicant’s claims lacked coherence, were inconsistent and therefore were not credible.", "35. The Reviewing Authority concluded that the applicant had not been able to show that he risked persecution on political grounds or that he was eligible for complementary protection. Nor did he satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds.", "36. On 31 January 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s recourse. The Supreme Court upheld the Reviewing Authority’s decision of 5 June 2009. The court noted, inter alia, that the Reviewing Authority’s conclusions as to the lack of credibility of the applicant’s claims mainly due to the existence of significant contradictions were reasonable. As the applicant’s claims were not plausible, the documents he submitted could not stand alone and substantiate his asylum application. There was therefore no need to give any weight to these documents. Further, the applicant had left Syria for personal reasons and that these did not fall within those provided by the relevant law for granting refugee status. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had failed to substantiate that he was at risk of persecution if returned to Syria.", "37. No appeal was lodged against the first instance judgment.", "38. In the meantime, on 17 May 2010 the Yekiti Party and other Kurds from Syria organised a demonstration in Nicosia, near the Representation of the European Commission, the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and the Government Printing Office. They were protesting against the restrictive policies of the Cypriot Asylum Service in granting international protection. About 150 Kurds from Syria, including the applicant, remained in the area around the clock, having set up about eighty tents on the pavement. According to the Government, the encampment conditions were unsanitary and protesters were obstructing road and pedestrian traffic. The encampment had become a hazard to public health and created a public nuisance. The protesters performed their daily chores on the pavement, including cooking and washing in unsanitary conditions. The sewage pits had overflown, causing a nuisance and offensive odours. The public lavatories were dirty and the rubbish bins of the Government buildings were being used and, as a result, were continuously overflowing. Furthermore, the protesters were unlawfully obtaining electricity from the Printing Office. Members of the public who lived or worked in the area had complained to the authorities. The Government submitted that efforts had been made by the authorities to persuade the protesters to leave, but to no avail. As a result, the authorities had decided to take action to remove the protesters from the area.", "39. On 28 May 2010 instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers in the normal way.", "40. On 31 May 2010 the Minister requested the Chief of Police, among others, to take action in order to implement his instructions. Further, he endorsed suggestions made by the competent authorities that deportation and detention orders be issued against Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers who had passports and did not have Ajanib or Maktoumeen status and that the police execute the orders starting with the ones issued against the leaders of the protesters. The police were also directed to take into account the policy guidelines and to use discreet methods of arrest.", "41. According to the Government, letters were sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to a number of failed Syrian-Kurdish asylum-seekers informing them that they had to make arrangements to leave Cyprus in view of their asylum applications being turned down (see M.A., cited above, § 32)", "42. From documents submitted by the Government it appears that from 31 May until 7 June 2010 the authorities kept the area under surveillance and kept a record of the protesters’ daily activities and of all comings and goings. In the relevant records it is noted that invariably, between 1.30 a.m. and 5.30 a.m., things were, in general, quiet, and everyone was sleeping apart from those keeping guard. During the above-mentioned period a large-scale operation was organised by the Police Emergency Response Unit, “ERU” (“ΜΜΑΔ”), and a number of other authorities, including the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, for the removal of the protesters and their transfer to the ERU headquarters for the purpose of ascertaining their status on a case-by-case basis.", "43. In the meantime, between 28 May 2010 and 2 June 2010 orders for the detention and deportation of forty-five failed asylum seekers were issued following background checks. Letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, containing a short paragraph with information as to the immigration status of each person. This information included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service, the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority, where lodged, and the date some of those concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). The letters recommended the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The Government submitted copies of two such letters with information concerning thirteen people.", "44. On 2 June 2010, letters were also prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing those concerned of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted that, at the time, the authorities did not know whether those individuals were among the protesters.", "45. The removal operation was carried out on 11 June 2010, between approximately 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. with the participation of about 250 officers from the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, the ERU, the Nicosia District Police Division, the Traffic Division, the Fire Service and the Office for Combating Discrimination of the Cyprus Police Headquarters. The protesters, including the applicants, were led to buses, apparently without any reaction or resistance on their part. At 3.22 a.m. the mini buses carrying the male protesters left. The women, children and babies followed at 3.35 a.m. A total of 149 people were located at the place of protest and were transferred to the ERU headquarters: eighty-seven men, twenty-two women and forty children. Upon arrival, registration took place and the status of each person was examined using computers which had been specially installed the day before. The Government submitted that during this period the protesters had not been handcuffed or put in cells but had been assembled in rooms and given food and drink. It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that by 6.40 a.m. the identification of approximately half of the group had been completed and that the whole operation had ended by 4.30 p.m.", "46. It was ascertained that seventy-six of the adults, along with their thirty children, were in the Republic unlawfully. Their asylum applications had either been dismissed or their files closed for failure to attend interviews. Those who had appealed to the Reviewing Authority had had their appeals dismissed. Some final decisions dated back to 2006. A number of people had also been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. Deportation orders had already been issued for twenty-three of them (see paragraph 43 above).", "47. The authorities deported twenty-two people on the same day at around 6.30 p.m. (nineteen adults and three children). Forty-four people (forty-two men and two women), including the applicant, were arrested. The persons against whom deportation and detention orders had been issued on 2 June 2010 were detained under these orders. The remaining persons, including the applicant, were charged with the criminal offence of unlawful stay in the Republic under section 19(2) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see M.A., cited above, § 65). They were all arrested and transferred to various detention centres in Cyprus. The applicant was placed in the Larnaca Police Station Detention facility. Further, on humanitarian grounds, thirteen women whose husbands were detained pending deportation and who had a total of twenty-seven children between them were not arrested themselves.", "48. According to the Government the applicant and his co-detainees were informed orally that they had been arrested and detained on the basis that they had been staying in the Republic unlawfully and were thus “prohibited immigrants” (see M.A., cited above, § 62). They were also informed of their rights pursuant to the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained Law 2005 (Law 163(I)/2005) (see M.A, cited above, § 93) and, in particular, of their right to contact by phone, in person and in private, a lawyer of their own choice. The applicant submitted that he had not been informed of the reasons for his arrest and detention on that date.", "49. On the same day letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, recommending the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The letters contained a short paragraph in respect of each person with information as to his or her immigration status. This included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service and the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority where lodged. Some letters also referred to the date the asylum application had been lodged and the date some of the individuals concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. The Government submitted copies of letters concerning thirty-seven people (most of these letters referred to groups of people).", "50. Deportation and detention orders were also issued in Greek on the same day in respect of the remaining fifty-three people detained (see paragraph 46 above), including the applicant, pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of that Law. These were couched in identical terms. In respect of two people the orders also mentioned sections 6(1)(i) and 6(1)(l) of the Law.", "51. Subsequently, on the same date, letters were prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing all the detainees individually, including the applicant, of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted thirty-seven copies of these letters, including that addressed to the applicant, the text of which was virtually identical, a standard template having been used.\nThe text of the letter reads as follows:\n“You are hereby informed that you are an illegal immigrant by virtue of paragraph (k). section 1, Article 6 of the Aliens and Immigration law, Chapter 105, as amended until 2009, because you of illegal entry [sic]\nConsequently your temporary residence permit/migration permit has been revoked and I have proceeded with the issue of deportation orders and detention orders dated 11th June 2010 against you.\nYou have the right to be represented before me or before any other Authority of the Republic and express possible objections against your deportation and seek the services of an interpreter.”", "52. The only differences were that some letters referred to illegal stay rather than illegal entry and that the letters issued earlier referred to 2 June 2010 as the date of issuance of the deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 44 above).", "53. On the copy of the letter to the applicant provided by the Government, there is a handwritten signed note by a police officer stating that the letter was served on the applicant on 18 June 2010 but that he had refused to receive and sign it. The other letters had a similar note or stamp on them with the same date, stating that the person concerned had refused to sign for and/or receive the letter. In a letter dated 7 September 2010 the Government stated that the applicant had been served on 18 June 2010. In their subsequent observations the Government submitted, however, that this was the second attempt to serve the letters, the first attempt having been made on 11 June 2010, that is, the day of the arrest.", "54. The applicant submitted that he had never refused to receive any kind of information in writing. He claimed that it had only been on 14 June 2010 that he had been informed orally that he would be deported to Syria on the same day but that the deportation and detention orders were not served on him on that date or subsequently. He submitted that he had eventually been informed by his lawyer, following the receipt of information submitted by the Government to the Court in the context of the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that deportation and detention orders had been issued against him.", "55. From the documents submitted by the Government, it appears that at least another fourteen of the detainees were to be deported on 14 June 2010 (this figure is stated in documents submitted by the Government with no further details).", "56. On 10 March 2011 the applicant escaped from Larnaca Police Station Detention facility. The applicant submitted that he fell during his escape and suffered injuries. He went to hospital for treatment and then gave himself up to the police. The Government submitted that the applicant had been found on the same day and was taken to hospital as he had suffered injuries. The applicant remained in hospital until 31 March 2011 and was then transferred back to Larnaca Police Station Detention facility. The police investigation file concerning the applicant’s escape was sent to the Attorney-General who decided not to bring criminal proceedings against him. The applicant submitted that in the context of the investigation, the authorities arrested and detained his wife at the above facility and that their children were placed under the care of the Welfare Services.", "57. The applicant was released on 20 April 2011 following revocation of the deportation and detention orders of 11 June 2010 by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. The applicant submitted that his wife had been released on the same day. The applicant also submitted that he had not been given any information as to his residence status or the conditions of his release apart from having to report to the police once a month. The applicant’s representative sent a number of letters to the authorities in this connection.", "58. In the meantime, on 17 January 2011 the applicant filed a habeas corpus application with the Supreme Court claiming that his continued detention from 11 June 2010 had violated Article 15 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, “the EU Returns Directive”. The applicant, relying on the Court’s judgment in Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) and the Commission’s report in Samie Ali v. Switzerland (no. 24881/94, Commission’s report of 26 February 1997) also claimed that his detention had breached Article 11 (2) of the Constitution and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The application was made on the same grounds as those made by M.A., § 50, cited above).", "59. The Supreme Court set the application for directions for 25 January 2011. On that date the Government asked for leave until 1 February 2011 to file, if they decided to do so, an objection to the application. The habeas corpus application was set for directions for the above date. In the end, the Government filed an objection and the application was set for hearing on 10 February 2011. On that date the Government requested the hearing to be postponed as three other similar habeas corpus applications filed were pending before another judge before the Supreme Court and judgment had been reserved (see M.A., cited above, §§ 50-51 and A.H. and J.K v. Cyprus, nos. 41903/10 and 41911/10, § 51, 21 July 2015). The applicant objected. The Supreme Court accepted the request and postponed the hearing until 24 February 2011. Although it acknowledged that this type of application should be tried as quickly as possible, it held that it was in the interests of justice in view of the applications pending before another judge with similar issues, to give some time in the event judgment was given in the other cases. It noted, however, there would be no more adjournments and if the judgments in the other applications were not given by the above date it would proceed with the hearing of the application before it.", "60. On 24 February 2011 the parties appeared before the court. Although judgments had been delivered on 23 February 2011 dismissing the other applications, the applicant decided to go ahead and maintain his application. The parties submitted their written addresses and the hearing of the application was held. Judgment was reserved on the same day.", "61. On 8 March 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the application. It adopted the reasoning in the judgments given by the Supreme Court on 23 February 2011 in the other applications (see M.A; cited above, §§ 50-53 and A.H. and J.K., §§ 48-54).", "62. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appellate jurisdiction) on 17 March 2011. Another three appeals were lodged at the same time (see M.A., §§ 54 and A.H. and J.K., cited above, § 55).", "63. The applicant sent a letter along with the other appellants dated 13 April 2011 to the Registrar of the Supreme Court requesting that the appeals be fixed for pre-trial within a “short period of time” and then for hearing.", "64. The applicant was released on 20 April 2011 (see paragraph 57 above).", "65. On 15 July 2011 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that his appeal had been set down for hearing for 12 September 2011.", "66. On 7 September 2011 the applicant’s lawyer filed an application for joining the four appeals (see paragraph 62 above).", "67. On 12 September 2011 the Supreme Court issued an order joining the appeals and also instructed the parties to file their written addresses. The applicant submitted that on this date the court was informed that he had been released.", "68. On 8 November 2011 the applicant filed an application requesting an extension of twenty days for filing his written address. This was filed on 28 November 2011.", "69. On 17 March 2012 the appeals were set for directions.", "70. On 18 July 2012 the Government filed an application requesting the parties to appear before the Supreme Court and requested a forty-day extension for filing their written address. This was granted and the appeals were set down for hearing on 11 September 2012.", "71. In the meantime, the Government filed their written address on 28 August 2012.", "72. On 11 September 2012 the hearing was held and judgment was reserved.", "73. The appeals were dismissed on 15 October 2012. The Supreme Court held that as the applicant had, in the meantime, been released, the application was without object (see M.A., cited above, § 55).", "74. In the meantime, on Saturday, 12 June 2010, the applicant, along with forty-three other persons of Kurdish origin, submitted a Rule 39 request in order to prevent their imminent deportation to Syria.", "75. On 14 June 2010 the President of the First Section decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the respondent Government that the detainees should not be deported to Syria until the Court had had the opportunity to receive and examine all the documents pertaining to their claim. The parties were requested under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court to submit information and documents concerning the asylum applications and the deportation.", "76. On 21 September 2010 the President of the First Section reconsidered the application of Rule 39 in the light of information provided by the parties. He decided to maintain the interim measure in respect of five cases, including the present one. Rule 39 was lifted with regard to the thirty-nine remaining cases (for further details see M.A., cited above, § 58).", "77. By letter dated 12 June 2012 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had left Cyprus with his family and was living in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq.", "78. On the basis of the above information, on 14 June 2012, the President of the Section, decided to lift the measure indicated under Rule 39.", "79. By letter dated 29 June 2012 the applicant’s representative notified the Court that she had established contact with the applicant and that he had informed her that he wished to pursue the application.", "80. By fax dated 6 November 2012 the applicant confirmed that he had left Cyprus with his family and was in Northern Iraq. He provided an asylum certificate from UNCHR in Iraq dated 23 September 2012.", "81. Rule 39 was also lifted with regard to another two cases in the course of the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 76 above)." ]

[ "5", "13", "3", "P4-4" ]

[ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 46, 66, 69 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicants were born in 1989 and 1984 respectively. They are currently serving prison terms in the Dubnica nad Váhom and Hrnčiarovce nad Parnou Prisons, respectively.", "7. On 4 August 2009 a criminal investigation was opened into suspected trafficking in drugs within the meaning of Article 172 § 1 (c) of the Criminal Code (Law no. 300/2005 Coll., as amended – “the CC”), an offence with which the applicants would later be charged. The offence was considered an ordinary criminal offence (zločin), which carried a penalty of four to ten years’ imprisonment and did not require mandatory legal assistance.", "8. On 4 November 2009 a warrant was issued for the search of non‑residential premises situated in a factory complex, which the applicants were renting and using as a music studio.", "9. At 6.10 p.m. on 7 November 2009 the warrant was served on the second applicant on the premises. The search was then carried out by the police between 6.30 p.m. and 7.40 p.m.\nAccording to the search report, the police seized a pair of digital scales, various items used for the consumption and packaging of drugs, and what would later be established to be 11.724 grams of cannabis.\nNo lawyer representing the applicants or any other of the parties concerned was present.", "10. The police also found the first applicant and four other individuals on the premises.", "11. At 6.40 p.m. the applicants were taken to the police station (predvedení) where it was decided that they would be detained and subsequently questioned by the police as suspects (podozriví). The first applicant was thus detained at 9.15 p.m. the same day, while the second applicant was detained at 1.10 a.m. the following day.\nNo lawyer was involved on behalf of the applicants.", "12. The questioning of the first applicant took place between 9.30 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. the same day and that of the second applicant between 1.10 a.m. and 2.00 a.m. the following day.", "13. The applicants’ police statements were transcribed on pre-printed forms, the relevant part of which was filled in to indicate, inter alia, that the applicants were suspected of trafficking in drugs within the meaning of Article 171 §§ 1 and 2 of the CC.\nOn the first page of the forms there was a pre-printed message stating, inter alia, that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer. That page, as well as the subsequent pages, was signed by the applicants.\nThe applicants made their statements without a lawyer and the transcript contains no mention of the issue of legal representation.", "14. In his statement, the first applicant described his arrangement with the second applicant concerning the sale to third parties of cannabis sourced by the second applicant and their profit sharing. He identified five individuals as his customers and described how he was selling the drug to them and what he was doing with the profit.", "15. The second applicant’s statement was along the same lines, except that he identified three individuals as his customers and added that cannabis had been smoked on the premises by all those present before the arrival of the police.", "16. Around the same time, the police also questioned as witnesses the other four individuals found on the premises. No lawyer for the applicants or those four individuals was present at the questioning. Two of those individuals, A. and B., gave statements incriminating the applicants.", "17. On 8 November 2009 the applicants were charged with conspiracy to possess and traffic in drugs within the meaning of Article 20 § 1 and Article 172 § 1 (c) and (d) of the CC. The parameters of the offence were in line with those of the offence into which a criminal investigation had previously been opened (see paragraph 7 above).", "18. The document containing the charge relied on the results of what was termed a “preliminary expert analysis” of the material seized (see paragraph 9 above) and the police statements of the applicants and the four other individuals questioned. It was observed that the applicants had been engaging in the illicit conduct “from the beginning of summer 2009 until the present” and that the number of their customers had not yet been established.", "19. Following the bringing of charges against the applicants, they were again questioned by the police, this time as accused (obvinení).", "20. Neither applicant was assisted by counsel. Their statements were transcribed on a pre-printed form, which contained a pre-printed message stating, inter alia, that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer. That page, as well as all the other pages of the document, was signed by the applicants.", "21. According to the transcript, the first applicant stated that he waived his right to study the investigation file and his right to appeal against the charges. He made a confession in general terms and conceded that the evidence on which the charge against him was based was accurate. He also declared that he had no wish to appoint a lawyer; that he had been selling the drug because he was unemployed; that he regretted his actions; and that, if released, he would stop selling the drug and limit himself to its consumption.", "22. As for the second applicant, according to the transcript he stated that he waived his right to appeal against the charges and maintained his previous statements in full (see paragraph 15 above). He made a confession in general terms, conceded that the elements on which the charge against him was based were true, and expressed his remorse.\nHe also declared that he did not wish to appoint a lawyer; he had been selling the drug because he had lost his job; he was willing to cooperate with the authorities; he would not flee; and he would be prepared to enter into a plea bargain.", "23. On 9 November 2009 the applicants were brought before a judge of the Martin District Court (Okresný súd) to be heard in connection with the request by the public prosecution service (“the PPS”) that they be remanded in custody.", "24. According to the minutes of those hearings, both applicants stated that they had neither appointed a lawyer nor had any wish to appoint one.\nIn addition, the second applicant submitted that he had commenced the trafficking in the summer of that year, that the drugs found on the premises had belonged to him and the first applicant. He said that he was sorry for his wrongdoing and was ready to cooperate with the authorities.\nThe first applicant, for his part, admitted possessing the quantities of cannabis as established by the police. He had been trafficking in it since April 2009, taking on average ten bags every three days from the second applicant, selling it and keeping the profit of some 15-20 euros every three days.", "25. At the conclusion of their respective hearings on 9 November 2009, the applicants were remanded in custody pending trial on the ground that, if left at liberty, they might continue their criminal activities within the meaning of Article 71 § 1 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 401/2005 Coll., as amended – “the CCP”). Following an appeal lodged by the second applicant, the decision to remand him in custody was upheld by the Žilina Regional Court (Krajský súd) on 24 November 2009.", "26. By virtue of the applicants being remanded in custody, it became mandatory for them to be assisted by a lawyer under Article 37 § 1 (a) of the CCP.", "27. On 11 November 2009 the applicants’ respective mothers appointed a lawyer to represent them in the proceedings. The applicants endorsed that appointment on 13 November 2009.", "28. On 2 December 2009 the applicants’ lawyer inspected the investigation file.", "29. On 9 December 2009 the police questioned the applicants again. Assisted by their lawyer, they submitted that they wished to avail themselves of their right to remain silent.\nNevertheless, the first applicant added that when he had been questioned on 8 and 9 November 2009 and had confessed and expressed remorse, he had already stated everything he considered relevant. In a similar fashion, the second applicant referred to his confession of 8 November 2009 and stated that he had made it without any pressure and that he had not been under the influence of psychotropic substances.", "30. On 22 December 2009 the police heard A., B., and eight other witnesses in the presence of the applicants’ lawyer. The depositions of A. and B. as well as of C. and D. may be understood as incriminating the applicants.", "31. On 27 January 2010 the first applicant’s mother appointed a new lawyer to represent him in the proceedings. The first applicant then dismissed his first lawyer. The second applicant’s father appointed the same lawyer for his son on 12 February 2010.", "32. Meanwhile, by letters of 29 January and 16 February 2010, the investigator had informed the applicants that, on the basis of information obtained during the investigation, the charge against them would be reclassified as an aggravated form of the same offence within the meaning of Article 172 § 2 (c) of the CC. That provision applied to instances where the offence had been committed “in a more serious manner”. Such an aggravated form of the offence carried a penalty of imprisonment for ten to fifteen years and, as such, it amounted to a particularly serious criminal offence (obzvlášť závažný zločin). Such a charge required mandatory legal assistance under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the CCP.", "33. On 16 and 23 February and 5 March 2010 the police heard five more witnesses in the presence of the applicants’ lawyer. Of their depositions, those of a certain E. may be understood as incriminating the first applicant.", "34. On 8 March 2010 the investigator informed the applicants’ lawyer that she rejected his proposals for further evidence to be taken consisting of face-to-face interviews (konfrontácia) between the first applicant and witnesses A. to E. She considered that, on the relevant points, there had been no discrepancies between the accounts of the applicants and those of the witnesses named. She referred to Article 138 (b) and (j) of the CC, which provided that an offence was deemed to have been committed in “a more serious manner” if it had been committed “over a longer period of time” or perpetrated against “several persons”. The term “several persons” was in turn defined in Article 127 § 12 of the CC as at least three persons. The investigator observed that the submissions of both the applicants and the witnesses in question had indicated that the offence had been committed over a period of at least five months and perpetrated against several persons.", "35. On 22 March 2010 the applicants’ lawyer inspected the investigation file together with the first applicant.", "36. On 29 March 2010, acting in their name, the applicants’ lawyer requested that a plea bargain procedure be initiated. In his request, he referred to the original charge, the decision to reclassify it to the aggravated form of that charge, and the applicants’ confessions in their interviews by the police. It was added that the applicants were aware of the wrongfulness of their behaviour and were sorry for it.", "37. On 27 April 2010 the applicants met with the PPS for the purposes of negotiating the plea bargain. However, they stated at the outset of the meeting that, having consulted with their counsel, they no longer wished to pursue the matter.", "38. On 4 May 2010 the applicants were indicted to stand trial on the aggravated charge before the District Court.\nThe indictment was based on the statements the applicants had made on 7, 8 and 9 November 2009, the results of the search of 7 November 2009, an expert analysis of the material seized during the search, and – without any indication of the dates when they had been made – statements from five witnesses, A. to E. It was also noted that the applicants each had a previous conviction: the first applicant for robbery, for which he had been sentenced to five months’ imprisonment suspended for a year; and the second applicant for fraud, for which he had been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment suspended for two years.", "39. The District Court heard the case on 17 August, 31 August, 19 October and 23 November 2010.", "40. On 7 December 2010 the court found the applicants guilty and sentenced them to six years and eight months imprisonment.\nIt observed that the applicants had pleaded not guilty before the court, arguing that they had merely consumed the drug but had not been selling it. As to the discrepancy between that version and the version submitted by them in their pre-trial statements of 7, 8 and 9 November 2009, the applicants had submitted before the court that the pre-trial questioning had been conducted in a manipulative fashion and the police had coerced them by promising that they would not be remanded in custody. In addition, the second applicant had submitted that, in the initial questionings, he had still been under the influence of the cannabis he had consumed earlier.\nThe District Court observed further that the five prosecution witnesses had also changed their testimony before it as compared with their statements made in the pre-trial phase, in that, before the court, they had given no evidence incriminating the applicants.\nIn so far as the applicants and those witnesses had sought to explain the discrepancies in their versions by alleging that they had been put under pressure by the police at the pre-trial stage, the District Court heard the officers in question and dismissed the allegation as unfounded.", "41. The applicants lodged an appeal (odvolanie), as did the PPS, against the District Court’s decision. The applicants subsequently also appealed on points of law (dovolanie). Their line of argument may be summarised as follows.", "42. In addition to the arguments already presented, they objected that the record of the search of 7 November 2011 was vague, in particular as to the quantity and content of the dried material that had been seized.\nFurthermore, they claimed that, during the questioning sessions of 7 and 8 November 2009, they had not been properly informed of their procedural rights, including the rights to remain silent and to choose a lawyer. Their signatures on the relevant pages of the pre‑printed forms on which the statements had been transcribed were of no relevance – in particular given that there was no mention of their having been informed of those rights in the transcript.\nThose statements had thus been made contrary to the applicable procedural rules. As they were the basis for the decisions to charge and detain them, their trial had taken an unlawful course from the very outset.\nIn addition, there had been no relevant grounds – for example a substantial change in the evidence – to justify the reclassification of the charge against them from an ordinary criminal offence to a particularly serious criminal offence. Therefore, in the applicants’ submission, from the beginning the charge against them had actually been that of a particularly serious criminal offence, in which case legal assistance should have been mandatory. The fact that they had not been informed accordingly at the critical initial stages of the proceedings had had a fatal and irreversible impact on the choice of their defence strategy and had in practice negated their defence rights. This had been manifested, inter alia, in that they had been remanded in custody without having appointed a lawyer.\nMoreover, a number of further pieces of evidence originating from the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, in particular the witness statements, had also been manipulated. The court should therefore have examined only the evidence taken during the trial and refrained from taking into account the pre-trial statements of the witnesses.", "43. The PPS challenged the sentence handed down by the first-instance court on the grounds that they saw no reason for imposing a sentence below the lower end of the penalty scale.", "44. In a judgment of 9 March 2011 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 7 December 2010; adjusted the District Court’s findings of fact as to the applicants’ conduct which formed the basis of the offence; found them guilty of the offence in its aggravated form; and sentenced them each to ten years’ imprisonment. Subsequently, on 10 November 2011, the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) declared the applicants’ appeal on points of law inadmissible. The relevant part of the reasoning of both courts may be summarised as follows.", "45. It was acknowledged that it had been an error for the District Court to take into account the applicants’ pre-trial statements of 7 and 8 November 2009, respectively, when they had been questioned as suspects prior to being charged. Those statements therefore did not constitute lawful evidence and had to be excluded.\nHowever, the applicants’ statements of 8 November 2009 when, having already been charged, they had made a confession in general terms, and their further statements taken on 9 November 2009, which contained a more specific confession, could be taken into account, as could the evidence from the five prosecution witnesses.", "46. On 9 January 2012 the applicants lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional law no. 460/1993 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd), advancing essentially the same arguments as mentioned above, and alleging that their rights to liberty and a fair trial had been violated.", "47. On 15 February 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. In so far as it was directed against the Regional Court and the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as manifestly ill-founded, quoting extensively from the contested decisions and endorsing them. The Constitutional Court found that the remainder of the complaint was outside its jurisdiction.\nThe Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicants on 9 March 2012." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 26 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Kharkiv, Ukraine.", "6. The applicant lived with her partner, a dual Georgian-Ukrainian national, Mr G. Ch., in Kharkiv. On 29 July 2004 their first child, L., was born; he was registered in Ukraine at the applicant’s address and acquired Ukrainian citizenship.", "7. Some time in mid-2005 G. Ch. left Ukraine for Russia. L. continued to live with his mother and attended a pre-school educational institution in Kharkiv.", "8. In 2005 and 2006 G. Ch. visited the applicant and L. twice. In September 2006 the applicant gave birth to another child of the couple, T.", "9. On 22 July 2010 T. died in an accident. She fell from an open window of an apartment. L., who had apparently witnessed the tragic incident, started receiving psychological help in the form of dolphin-assisted therapy.", "10. On 30 July 2010 the applicant allowed G. Ch. to take their son for the first time to Georgia for the summer holidays. She signed a document authorising G. Ch. to travel with L. to Georgia and Russia between 30 July 2010 and 28 February 2011. According to the applicant, L. was expected to return to Kharkiv by the end of August in order to start in September at a primary school in which he had been pre-enrolled.", "11. On 13 August 2010, the applicant learned when talking on the telephone with her son that the latter would not be returning to Ukraine and would be staying in Georgia. For two months the applicant tried to persuade her former partner to allow their child to return to Ukraine, to no avail however. It appears that soon after this G. Ch. left for Russia, while L. stayed in Georgia with his uncle, G. Ch.’s brother, and his grandfather. G. Ch. travelled occasionally to Georgia to see his son.", "12. On 16 November 2010 L. was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder and began having outpatient treatment.", "13. On 22 March 2011 the Kievskiy District Court of Kharkiv ordered L.’s return to Ukraine. The court ruled that L.’s place of permanent residence should be that of the applicant.", "14. G. Ch. was not apparently informed of the institution of the above proceedings. He did not accordingly appeal against that decision.", "15. In October 2010 the applicant initiated child return proceedings under the Hague Convention via the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. On 18 November 2010 the latter contacted the Ministry of Justice of Georgia and requested legal cooperation on the matter. On 2 December 2010 the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, acting as the central authority responsible for the obligations established by the Hague Convention, instituted proceedings on behalf of the applicant before the Tbilisi City Court.", "16. On 10 February 2011 two social workers went to see L. at the request of the Tbilisi City Court. They visited him at his uncle’s apartment, where he was living with his cousins. According to the report drawn up thereafter, L. was being looked after by his uncle, since his father was mainly based in Russia. The boy spoke Russian, although he had started attending a Georgian school. L.’s uncle told the social workers that L.’s sister had died as a result of their mother’s lack of attention; hence it was dangerous for L. to live with his mother. The social workers also had a short conversation with L. during which he stated that he was happy with his uncle and cousins, and did not want to go back to Ukraine. In conclusion, the social workers noted that L. was living in appropriate living conditions, and that his basic needs were being met.", "17. In April 2011 the social workers set up and attended three meetings between the applicant and her son. In the report drawn up thereafter they concluded the following:\n“On the basis of our intervention, which included visits, conversations with L. and observation of his behaviour, we consider his behaviour to be problematic. In particular, although L. wants to see his mother, and when seeing her expresses his love, warm feelings and happiness, he refuses subsequently to talk to her on the telephone. It should be underlined that when communicating with his mother he is following his father’s prompting and is stressed. Given that L. is living in the family of his uncle and grandfather, he lacks relationship with his parents (since neither of the parents lives with him). In order for a child to develop into a contented and healthy individual, and to have his interests protected, it is necessary for him to communicate with his parents.”", "18. In the same report the social workers noted that during one of the meetings they noticed that the boy, prompted by his father, had stopped hugging his mother. This happened twice, until one of the social workers warned G. Ch. to stop doing this.", "19. In April L. additionally underwent a psychological examination, which concluded that the boy was suffering from insufficient emotional relationship with his parents. It was noted that L. had a clearly positive attitude towards his father and the paternal family, while with respect to the mother his attitude was twofold: love and warm feelings on the one hand, and anxiety on the other. L. indicated to a psychologist that he wanted to live with his father and his father’s family and wanted his mother to be with them too. In her conclusions about his emotional condition the psychologist noted that the boy’s nervousness, aggression, distrust, and irritability, as well as low self-esteem, were caused by psychological trauma he had suffered in the past, as well as by his current complicated and barely comprehensible situation.", "20. On 16 May 2011 the Tbilisi City Court refused the applicant’s request. The court concluded, having regard to the boy’s age and other circumstances of the case, that his return to Ukraine would expose him to psychological risk. It stated in this connection that it would be inappropriate to order the boy’s return to Ukraine, since the applicant had failed to show that she could create a stable environment for her son in which he could be protected from psychological risks related to the separation from his father. The court further noted the following:\n“The court considers that in the current case, having regard to a psychologist’s report which categorically states that L. suffered a serious psychological injury, it is with high probability that if returned to Ukraine the child would be exposed to “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place[d] in an intolerable situation” (Article 13 of the Convention).”", "21. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument that her son was suffering from an adjustment disorder and lacked communication with his parents. It noted in this connection the following:\n“In view of a psychological examination the court particularly stresses the following – “L. Ch. has revealed ... high level of anxiety ... and fear of the future”, “twofold attitude towards his mother, which implies love and warm feelings as well as strong anxiety,” according to the same report, it was established that [he suffers from] “lack of emotional relationship with both parents” and “positive attitude towards his father and the paternal family” especially towards the grandfather (N. Ch.).\nThe court further particularly underlines the fact that minor L. Ch. expresses the wish to live with his father and the paternal family. At the same time, he wants his mother (G. S.) to stay with them ...\nThe court cannot accept the argument of the requesting party that the child is having adaptation difficulties because of the separation from his mother and because he is being kept in Georgia. The above opinion is not supported by any evidence and is not substantiated ... There is an attempt on the father’s side to take every possible measure ... to treat [the boy’s] psychological condition.”", "22. As to the risks related to the boy’s return to Ukraine, the court stated:\n“Hence, the court considers that the return of L. Ch. to Ukraine (in view of his current condition) would imply his return to an uncomfortable situation, which would result in his psychological stress and would place him at psychological risk, even if he returned to Ukraine with his father. Separation from his father and the paternal family and his return to Ukraine (at this stage) would cause mental deterioration of the child and from a psychological point of view would inevitably create a risk [for the boy]. (The requesting party failed to prove the opposite).“", "23. That decision was overturned on 27 October 2011 by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, which ordered L.’s return to Ukraine. The appeal court observed that L. had been born and had lived in Kharkiv, so he had adapted to the situation in Ukraine. Further, according to the psychological and social welfare reports, the boy was suffering from adaptation difficulties and lacked sufficient communication with his parents. In this connection, the court stressed that L. had indeed suffered psychological trauma as a result of the accidental death of his sister; but, according to the very same reports, he was also suffering because of the situation he was currently in. Hence, it was within the best interests of the child to be reunited with his mother. The court further noted:\n“The above-mentioned conclusions confirm that the current situation for [the boy] is complicated and hardly comprehensible. Accordingly, in view of the interests of L. Ch., since there is no obvious risk of a negative impact on his mental state if he were returned to his mother, it would be appropriate that he be returned to his parent (the applicant G. S.) and to his habitual place of residence.”", "24. As to the death of L.’s sister, the appeal court noted that related criminal proceedings had been dropped, as it had been concluded that it had been a tragic accident. It further noted in connection with the psychological trauma the boy suffered as a result, that\n“... already traumatised child should not be separated from his parents. This should be viewed as a decision taken in the interests of the child. As was noted in the appealed decision, L. before his arrival in Georgia had been having dolphin-assisted rehabilitation treatment. At the same time, his stay with his mother cannot be harmful to him, since she has been doing an internship at the psychiatric hospital ...”", "25. G. Ch. appealed against this decision on points of law, alleging that the court of appeal had incorrectly interpreted the Hague Convention and the facts of the case. On 22 August 2012, without holding an oral hearing, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on points of law, thus reversing the judgment of 27 October 2011. On a general note, in connection with the purpose of the initiated proceedings the court noted the following:\n“The subject matter of the pending application is the return to Ukraine of a child (L. Ch.) wrongfully retained in Georgia ... The cassation court pays attention to the analysis developed in the preamble of the Convention concerning its aims, according to which the interests of the child are of paramount importance when examining childcare-related issues. At the same time, the High Contracting Parties to the Convention undertook an obligation to provide international protection to children against any harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention. Accordingly, it implies that the procedures provided for by the Convention which aim at the speedy return of a wrongfully removed or retained child to his or her habitual place of residence serve the main purpose of protecting children’s interests. In view of all the above-mentioned, the cassation court when considering the lawfulness of the request to end wrongful retention of a child considers it appropriate within the scope of the appeal on point of law to also examine the issue as to what extent the child’s interests would be protected in the event of his return which together with other factors implies the creation of a safe environment for a child. The above analysis of the cassation court finds its basis in the exceptional clauses of the Convention which in individual cases allow the relevant bodies of the receiving state to refuse the return of a child (Article 13 of the Convention).”", "26. The Supreme Court further considered that the applicant had failed to show that the return of L. to the pre-abduction situation would be possible without damaging his interests. Notably, the court concluded:\n“The cassation court wholly shares the view of the appeal court, according to which L. is suffering from lack of relationship with his parents; accordingly, in order for the child to develop into a contented and healthy individual and to have his interests protected it is necessary for him to communicate with his parents. However, as was noted above, when dealing with this type of case particular attention should be given to the consideration of exceptional circumstances ... The appellant alleges a violation of Article 13 § b of the Convention (there is a serious risk that if returned the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation) and considers that the impugned decision omits the primary reason for L. Ch.’s leaving Ukraine, namely the tragic death of T. Ch. in July 2010, which fact had a negative impact on the psychological condition of L. Ch. ...\nThe cassation court notes the results of the available psychological examination, in which the psychologist along with other issues stressed the high level of traumatisation in L. Ch. as a result of the death of his younger sister. At the same time, the psychologist considers the psychological features observed to be the boy’s reaction to the psychological trauma which he had suffered and to the current barely comprehensible situation. It is noteworthy that even the court of appeal could not omit the fact that as a result of the death of T. Ch. (the sister of L. Ch.) the latter had suffered mental trauma and is as of 16 November 2010 registered at a ... psychiatric institution .... However, the above-mentioned circumstances were not sufficient [for the appeal court] to refuse the return of the boy.\nThe cassation court considers that there is no evidence in the case file which would lead the court to believe that it would be possible to return the child to his pre-abduction environment without damaging his interests. In the opinion of the cassation court, the appellant validly substantiated, on the basis of relevant evidence, the risk factors which are inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention, while the respondent failed to show a higher purpose which could have been achieved by putting an end to the unlawful situation and [she had also] failed to demonstrate that in the event of the child being returned to Ukraine his interests and rights would not be even more violated. Accordingly, bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is the protection of the interests of a child, the cassation court considers that the appellant has lodged a substantiated complaint.”", "27. To conclude, in reference to Article 13 § b of the Hague Convention, the Supreme Court observed that the main purpose of the Hague Convention was the protection of the best interests of a child, and that accordingly, given the well-substantiated risks that L. was facing upon his return to Ukraine, the exception clause should have been invoked.", "28. The case file indicates that G. Ch. did not take part in the relevant court proceedings, as he was not in Georgia at the material time. L., according to the case file, is currently living with his uncle and grandfather in Tbilisi." ]

[ "8" ]

[ 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Riga.", "6. He is currently on trial in criminal proceedings instituted on 30 December 2005 for an attempt to take a bribe, together with A.B. and A.S. At the time the applicant was the head of a division in the Economic Crime Bureau (Ekonomikas policijas birojs) in the Main Police Department in Riga (Rīgas galvenā policijas pārvalde).", "7. According to the applicant, during his trial before the appellate court, he learned that an operational investigation (operatīvās uzskaites lieta) had been opened in respect of his co-defendant A.S.", "8. According to the Government, on 27 December 2005 the operational investigation had been opened on the basis of information provided by a private person. On 28 December 2005 the relevant authority, the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs – the “KNAB”), had informed the prosecutor’s office about this. On the same date, a Supreme Court judge had authorised the interception of A.S.’s telephone conversations and the prosecutor’s office had authorised an undercover operation (operatīvais eksperiments). On 29 December 2005 the Head of the KNAB had authorised the interception of A.B.’s telephone conversations on the basis of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, and they included conversations with the applicant. On 30 December 2005 the KNAB had informed the prosecutor’s office about the operational measures under the same provision. The Government did not adduce any evidence in this connection.", "9. On 22 January 2009 a judge of the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Krimināllietu tiesu palāta), in the context of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, requested information about the operational investigation.", "10. On 18 February 2009 a specialised prosecutor, having examined the material in accordance with section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities, replied that the operational investigation had been opened on 27 December 2005. In respect of the applicant, no interception of telephone conversations had been carried out in the context of that operational investigation. However, she noted that “his conversations were recorded if he was speaking to [a person], whose conversations were intercepted in accordance with the Law on Operational Activities”. According to the applicant, he learned about this information during the appellate court hearing on 22 October 2009.", "11. On 22 October 2009 the applicant requested the prosecution authorities to review the lawfulness of the operational measures which had been carried out and asked specific questions concerning these measures.", "12. On 4 November 2009 the specialised prosecutor replied, among other things, that on 28 December 2008 an undercover operation had been approved on the basis of section 15(3) of the Law on Operational Activities in the context of the operational investigation to record the manner in which the sworn attorney A.S. would proceed upon receipt of 19,500 Latvian lati (LVL), to be handed over to the officials of the economic crime police, to find out whether he would continue arranging for a bribe and to ascertain his possible accomplices. She also noted that the domestic law did not provide for independent judicial supervision of operational activities; such supervision was carried out by the Prosecutor General and specially authorised prosecutors in accordance with section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities. Finally, she noted that the operational investigation measures in respect of the applicant and his co-defendants had not been illegal and that there had been no breaches of the general principles governing operational activities contained in section 4 of that Law.", "13. On 6 November 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint about the specialised prosecutor’s reply.", "14. On 27 November 2009 a higher-ranking specialised prosecutor rejected the applicant’s complaint. She referred to section 35(1) and section 5 of the Law on Operational Activities. By reference to section 7(5) the prosecutor also explained that the authorities had learned during the interception of telephone conversations of A.S. that an offence was being planned for 30 December 2005 – the act of arranging for and taking a bribe – which would also involve officials from the State Police. In order to prevent further participation of officials in corruption-related offences, a decision was taken to intercept the telephone conversations of A.B. on the basis of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities. The competence of the prosecution authorities did not include examination of whether that or other provisions were compatible with the Latvian Constitution; these issues could be determined by the Constitutional Court.", "15. The applicant lodged a further complaint with the Prosecutor General, which was rejected by a final decision of 29 December 2009. With reference to sections 35(1) and 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it was reiterated that no breaches of that Law had been found.", "16. On 29 June 2010 the applicant lodged an individual constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Satversmes tiesa). He alleged that (i) section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities was incompatible with Articles 89 (protection of human rights) and 96 (right to private life) of the Constitution (Satversme) and also with Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention, and (ii) the first and second sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities were incompatible with Article 89 and the first sentence of Article 92 (right to a fair trial) of the Constitution and also with Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention.", "17. On 16 July 2010 the Constitutional Court initiated proceedings in case no. 2010-55-0106 with regard to the compatibility of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities with Article 96 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the Convention and the compatibility of the first sentence of section 35(1) of that Law with Article 92 of the Constitution alone. The Constitutional Court rejected the remainder of the applicant’s complaint.", "18. On 6 September 2010 a judge dismissed the applicant’s request, among other things, to see the case materials, since it was contrary to the procedure laid down in the Law on the Constitutional Court. It was for the judge to take the necessary steps to prepare a case for adjudication (lietas sagatavošana izskatīšanai) in accordance with section 22 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. He also referred to section 22(9), section 24 and 22(2)(1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 34-35 below) to explain that the parties were entitled to see the case materials after the decision concerning adjudication had been taken and that it was for the judge to decide which institutions or officials were to be requested to submit additional information or documents.", "19. On 5 November 2010 the judge dismissed the applicant’s request to see the written submissions filed by the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) in the proceedings on the grounds that such request had already been dismissed given that these submissions formed part of the case materials.", "20. On 2 December 2010 the applicant requested permission to see at least the judge’s preliminary opinion (atzinums par lietas sagatavošanu izskatīšanai) before the preparation of the case was completed and before the preparatory meeting had taken place. The applicant sought the possibility of expressing his opinion on the proceedings and, in particular, on whether or not the case could be decided by means of an oral procedure, which was his preference.", "21. On 17 December 2010 the President of the Constitutional Court replied to the applicant that the parties could see the case materials only after the decision concerning adjudication had been taken. That decision had been taken on 14 December 2010. Consequently, the applicant could see the case material. As regards the possibility of the proceedings being conducted orally or in accordance with a written procedure, he explained that this issue was to be determined by the Constitutional Court in accordance with section 22(8)-(10) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. This issue was first to be considered by the relevant judge, then by the President of the Constitutional Court and, subsequently, by all other judges in the preparatory meeting. The parties could express their opinion on this matter after they had seen the case materials.", "22. On 21 January 2011 the applicant filed an opinion with the Constitutional Court and noted, among other things, that the case could not be decided through a written procedure and that an oral hearing should be held. He admitted that the written procedure before the Constitutional Court as such did not infringe his rights to be heard, but submitted that it had to be examined in each particular case and that the court was not allowed to reject a request in connection with the gathering of evidence without examining its necessity, significance or procedural legal grounds.", "23. On 25 January 2011, in a closed preparatory meeting, the Constitutional Court examined the case materials and found that the documents contained therein were sufficient for the purposes of examining the case by means of a written procedure (sections 22(10) and 281 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). On 26 January 2011 the applicant was informed about this decision and was given 15 days to see the case materials and to give his opinion in connection with them (section 281(2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court). The applicant used this possibility.", "24. On 11 May 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling in case no. 2010-55-0106 and held that the contested legal provisions complied with the Constitution and the Convention. The relevant part reads as follows:\n“11. ...\nIt follows from the case materials that, on 27 December 2005, the KNAB opened an operational investigation. Interception of the Applicant’s telephone conversations was carried out from 29 to 31 December 2005, that is, for three days under section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 85 – 86). There is no dispute that the Applicant also participated in the telephone conversations which were intercepted.\n... 13. The Applicant and the Ombudsman argue that the restriction of rights established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear. It is impossible to understand the meaning of ‘to prevent’. Nor can it be understood what preconditions need to be fulfilled in order to take operational measures under the special procedure where immediate action is required. Therefore, the restriction of rights established in the above-mentioned legal provision has not been provided for by a properly adopted law (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 7 – 8, and Vol. 3, pp. 46‑48).\n... 13.2. The Applicant argues that the provisions of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be applied only when necessary to prevent serious or especially serious crimes. Consequently, the operational measures contained in this provision cannot be performed for the purpose of detecting (atklāt) a criminal offence.\n...\nThe first sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that ... operational activities may be carried out to react immediately to threats of criminal offences as referred to in this provision and [that] corresponding operational measures [may be taken] to prevent these offences. However, the fact that detection of criminal offences has not been mentioned expressis verbis in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, does not exclude the obligation to observe the purpose of operational activities. [The Constitutional Court] can agree with the arguments of Parliament and the KNAB, namely, that when carrying out activities mentioned in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, a criminal offence can be prevented and detected as well. When taking operational measures to prevent criminal offences, some [other] criminal offence may also be detected. For instance, in the case of the taking of a bribe, operational measures may prevent a criminal offence, as well as identifying the persons involved in giving such a bribe. Therefore, it can be concluded that the term ‘to prevent’ in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities includes not only prevention of crime, but also detection of other criminal offences. 13.3. ...\n[The Constitutional Court] does not agree with the opinion by the Ombudsman that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear as it fails to establish preconditions which are necessary to allow immediate action to be taken in the form of operational measures under the special procedure. Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes two preconditions which allow ... operational measures.\nFirst, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities enumerates specific circumstances ... Operational measures may be taken when required to prevent acts of terrorism, murder, banditry, riots, or other serious or especially serious offences. They are permissible also in circumstances of a real threat to the life, health or property of an individual. [The Constitutional Court considers that] this enumeration ... is exhaustive and sufficiently precise. Consequently, it excludes any possibility of operational measures under the special procedure in relation to the prevention of such criminal offences which are not indicated in the legal provision.\nSecond, operational measures ... may be taken ... only when an immediate action is required.\nInterpreting this legal provision in conjunction with section 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, [the Constitutional Court] concludes that covert interception of non-public conversations is allowed only when [there is] reliable information (pamatotas ziņas) about persons’ involvement in a criminal offence, as well as a threat to important interests of the State, its security or defence. Consequently ... operational measures ... may be taken if [there is] reliable information regarding the involvement of an individual in a criminal offence.\nSection 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for an exceptional procedure, namely, it allows ... immediate operational measures to be taken because any delay might significantly influence their results. Taking into account the seriousness of the offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it is important to provide a timely and effective response to prevent all threats related to such crimes.\nSection 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes the preconditions for its application [with sufficient precision]; consequently, the restriction on the fundamental rights has been established by law.\n... 17. The Applicant indicates that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities does not provide an obligation ... to receive approval by a judge in cases where operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 26 – 27). 17.1. Sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Law on Operational Activities establish two procedures for taking operational measures, namely, under the general and special procedures. Such classification is closely related to the nature of operational measures and their impact on the fundamental rights of persons. In the cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, operational measures must be taken under the special procedure as they significantly impinge on the fundamental rights of persons.\nThe Constitutional Court considers that the grammatical wording of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities [does not clearly indicate] whether it is necessary to obtain approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge in cases when operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours. 17.2. In order to determine the content of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of the same section regulating operational measures to be taken under the special procedure.\nSection 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains a reference to section 7(4) setting out the operational measures to be taken under the special procedure. These measures, including monitoring of correspondence and covert interception of non-public conversations, must be taken with the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.\nAlthough section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for exceptional circumstances where ... immediate action may be taken, it also establishes the obligation ... to obtain the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge for operational measures under section 7(4). Already when the draft of the Law on Operational Activities was being drawn up ... the need to receive a judge’s approval was emphasised in cases where operational measures would be taken under the special procedure (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 171 and 173).\nThe third sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities indicated that the operational measures had to be discontinued where no approval by a judge was obtained. According to the KNAB, this indication confirms that a judge’s approval must be sought only in cases where operational measures have not been terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 45). However, the Ministry of Justice and the Ombudsman indicate that such an interpretation ... would not comply with the essence of the Constitution (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 48 and 54 – 55).\nSection 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains no reference to the fact that no approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge is necessary for operational measures to be taken under section 7(4) in the event that it is planned to terminate them within ... 72 hours. Consequently, [the Constitutional Court] cannot agree with the opinion by the KNAB that a judge’s approval does not have to be obtained if operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours.\n... 17.3. ... Consequently, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that a prosecutor must always be informed of the operational measures taken; this provision also obliges ... [the seeking of] approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.\nThe restriction established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded as the most lenient measure for fulfilling the legitimate aim because monitoring by a prosecutor and subsequent judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of operational measures ensures effective protection of the rights of persons. 18. ...\nIt is not possible to agree with the Applicant’s statement to the effect that the infringement of his right is greater than the benefit gained by society. By means of a lawful restriction of a person’s right to respect for his or her private life, the State helps to combat crime and permits ... immediate reaction to threats of criminal offences that are particularly dangerous for society, serving to prevent them and identifying the persons involved. When intercepting non-public conversations in the cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, the protection of public safety is ensured.\nConsequently, operational measures taken to prevent criminal offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded as proportionate and compliant with Article 96 of the Constitution only if approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge has been obtained irrespective of the time when the operational measures are terminated. 19. The Applicant indicates that the [prosecutor’s office] cannot be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of his rights within the meaning of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 17 – 18).\nThe Constitutional Court has already established in its case-law that [an application to] the prosecutor’s office in Latvia may be regarded as an effective and available remedy, because the status and the role of the prosecutor in the supervision of law secures independent and impartial review of cases in compliance with Article 13 of the Convention (see Judgment of 11 October 2004 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2004-06-01. Para 19).\nIn the present case it is necessary to examine whether section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides a person with protection compliant with Article 13 of the Convention in cases where the right to the inviolability of private life and correspondence guaranteed in the Convention is infringed.\nThe Constitutional Court concludes that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes circumstances ... where operational measures may be taken immediately, as well as the procedure in accordance with which this has to be notified to a prosecutor and approval by a judge is to be obtained. However, this provision is not related to the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Consequently, the compliance of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities with Article 13 of the Convention must be assessed in conjunction with the first sentence of section 35(1) of that Law, the latter establishing a mechanism for monitoring operational measures and being contested by the Applicant as to its compliance with Article 92 of the Constitution. 20. The Applicant indicates that the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities fails to comply with Article 92 of the Constitution because it has no legitimate aim and it is not necessary in a democratic society. The provision fails to establish a procedure according to which the supervision and monitoring of performance of operational measures would be carried out. In the monitoring of operational measures, the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities confers on the prosecutor’s office a broad margin of appreciation (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 20 – 21). 21.1. ...\nThe Constitutional Court has already concluded in paragraph 17 above that [there is] an obligation to request, in any event, the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge in relation to operational measures. Consequently, the legislature has established such a regulatory framework for operational measures that requires not only monitoring by a prosecutor but also judicial supervision or at least subsequent judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of the measures taken and their compliance with the requirements of the law. 20.2. ...\nThe Constitutional Court has already indicated in its case-law that the prosecutor’s office, as a judicial institution, has a twofold nature. On the one hand it is a single, centralised three-level institutional system, under the management of the Prosecutor General, but – on the other – prosecutorial functions are carried out independently and solely by officials of the prosecutor’s office, that is, the individual prosecutors (see Judgment of 20 December 2006 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2006-12-01, Para 12.2).\n... As to the taking of operational measures referred to in section 7(4) of the Law on Operational Activities, in cases established in section 7(5), ... a prosecutor, that is, the Prosecutor General or specialised prosecutors, must be notified within ... 24 hours (see Kavalieris A. Operatīvās darbības likuma komentāri. Rīga: Raka, 2002, pp. 26). Consequently, the Prosecutor General or specialised prosecutors also supervise the lawfulness of operational measures.\nPursuant to section 22(2) of the Law on Operational Activities, operational proceedings (operatīvā izstrāde) are opened by a decision approved by a head or deputy head of the operational activities authority and a prosecutor is informed about this. Consequently, operational measures established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities ... must be notified to the Prosecutor General or a specialised prosecutor. The Constitutional Court indicates that in the event of receipt of such notice, the public prosecutor must monitor the compliance of the investigative operational measures with the requirements of the law, thus ensuring the observance of the rights of the person concerned. 20.3. The Applicant indicates that the possibility of securing protection for one’s rights is limited in cases where one’s telephone calls are intercepted (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 10, 13, 18 and 22).\n...\nIt follows from the afore-mentioned that the Prosecutor General and specialised prosecutors review operational activities and, based on the results of such review, provide an opinion on the lawfulness of operational activities ... Review is necessary for the Prosecutor General and specialised prosecutors to ensure that operational measures have been lawful. However, the effective regulatory framework also establishes judicial supervision, including subsequent scrutiny. Consequently, [the Constitutional Court does not] agree with the opinion that the effective regulatory framework fails to provide independent subsequent scrutiny in respect of operational measures.\nPursuant to section 29(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, if in the course of operational activities the rights and interests of persons have been unlawfully infringed and damage has been caused, the obligation of the relevant officials (prosecutor or court) shall be to restore such rights and to compensate for or avert the inflicted pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in accordance with the law. Consequently, it can be concluded that the Law on Operational Activities establishes the responsibility of the officials of [the relevant body] in the case of any infringement of fundamental rights.\n...\nConsequently, the investigating authority and the court ensure the review of the admissibility of information obtained by means of operational measures. However, the Prosecutor General and specialised prosecutors, by monitoring the conformity of operational activities with the law, as well as the court in carrying out subsequent scrutiny, ensure effective protection of a person’s rights.\n...”" ]

[ "13", "8", "6" ]

[ 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant is a taxi cab company from Chişinău. At the time of the events it employed approximately ninety persons and was functioning on the basis of a licence issued by the Licensing Chamber (Camera de Licențiere din Republica Moldova) in July 2005.", "6. On 13 December 2007 the Licensing Chamber issued decision no. 4891 by which the applicant company’s licence was withdrawn in view of irregularities. In particular, the applicant company failed to request the inclusion of the names of two new persons employed in administrative positions and of new cars in its licence within the ten-day time-limit provided for by law.", "7. On 18 January 2008 the applicant company initiated court proceedings against the Licensing Chamber seeking the annulment of its order of 13 December 2007. The applicant company submitted, inter alia, that the sanction applied to it had been disproportionally harsh and in breach of the company’s right to property. It argued that ninety persons employed by the company had lost their jobs as a result of the measure applied to it and that the company had suffered losses of approximately 170,000 Euros (EUR). The applicant company submitted that it could not comply with the requirement of including all fifty-two new cars in the licence in ten days because of new regulations instituted by the Government according to which all taxi cabs had to be equipped with receipt printing machines. The company did not have sufficient time to equip all new cars because of the lengthy bureaucratic procedure and because all the taxi cab companies were attempting to do that at the same time. The company submitted that it only managed to equip twenty-eight of its cars with the new equipment.", "8. On 9 April 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal found in favour of the applicant company. Referring to the alleged breach by the applicant company of the ten-day time limit to inform the authorities about the new cars, the Court of Appeal found inter alia that the formalities linked to the equipment of those cars with receipt printing machines made it impossible for the applicant company to comply with the time-limit. In that context the Court of Appeal found that all the taxi cab companies were doing the same thing at the time, which created lengthy delays. As to the applicant company’s failure to inform the Licensing Chamber about two new employees at the company, the Court of Appeal held that that breach was minor and could not justify such a severe sanction. Relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova (no. 21151/04, 8 April 2008) and Bimer S.A. v. Moldova (no. 15084/03, 10 July 2007) the Court of Appeal found that the interference with the applicant company’s right to respect for its possessions had not been proportionate with the legitimate aim pursued and, thus, that the withdrawal of the applicant company’s licences had been in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.", "9. On 23 September 2008 the Licensing Chamber lodged an appeal against the above judgment. It does not appear that the applicant company lodged written pleadings with the Supreme Court of Justice.", "10. On 12 February 2009, after an oral hearing, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the appeal lodged by the Licensing Chamber, quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and dismissed the applicant company’s action. The Supreme Court held that that according to the law in force, the breaches committed by the applicant company were sufficient ground for withdrawing its licence." ]

[ "6", "P1-1" ]

[]

[]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1977. He is currently being detained in the Belgrade Central Prison.\nIt would appear that the applicant’s criminal record predates the events complained of, and that he was arrested pursuant to an international arrest warrant in the Netherlands in 2003 for crimes other than those at issue in the present case.", "8. On 5 December 2006 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody in Austria, pursuant to an international arrest warrant.", "9. On 20 December 2006 the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Serbia (Министарство правде Републике Србије; “the Ministry of Justice”) requested the applicant’s extradition for the purpose of conducting several sets of criminal proceedings against him unrelated to the present case.", "10. On 11 January 2007 the investigating judge of the Belgrade District Court (“the District Court”) opened an investigation against the applicant, who was suspected of having participated in aggravated murder with unauthorised use of another person’s vehicle and forgery. The offences had allegedly been committed on 24 March 2006.", "11. On 29 January 2007 the Ministry of Justice extended its extradition request to include the above-mentioned criminal proceedings (see paragraph 10 above), which are the subject of the present case.", "12. In the meantime, on 16 April 2007 the competent court in Austria found the applicant guilty of possession of an unlicensed firearm, which had been found on him at the time of his arrest, and sentenced him to seven months’ imprisonment.", "13. On 6 July 2007 the applicant was extradited to Serbia.", "14. On 31 December 2007 the public prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and two other persons, V.S. and B.A, who were at large.", "15. On 7 May 2008 the first hearing was held before the District Court. It was decided that V.S. and B.A. would be tried in absentia.", "16. Subsequently, forty-one hearings were scheduled, of which nineteen were adjourned: four at the request of the applicant’s defence counsel and fifteen for various procedural reasons, such as the absence of the co-accused’s defence counsel, the absence of duly summoned witnesses and/or experts, erroneous delivery of summons, and delays concerning experts’ opinions. Furthermore, the trial had to start anew six times because the presiding judge and/or the composition of the trial chamber changed. From March 2010, following a reform of the domestic judicial system, the Belgrade High Court (“the High Court”) took over the case.", "17. On 1 April 2014 the High Court found the applicant guilty of complicity in aggravated murder, unauthorised use of another person’s vehicle and forgery. It sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment.", "18. On 4 and 17 July 2014, respectively, the applicant and the public prosecutor appealed against the High Court judgment.", "19. On 31 October 2014 the Belgrade Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), quashed the High Court judgment of 1 April 2014 and remitted the case for a re-trial.", "20. On 11 January 2007 the investigating judge issued a detention order against the applicant in his absence, on the following grounds: (1) the risk of absconding; (2) the risk of obstructing the course of justice by exerting pressure on witnesses and his co-accused; (3) the risk of reoffending; and (4) the gravity of the criminal offences of which he was accused and the sentence that might be imposed on him. The one-month period of detention was to be calculated from the date of the applicant’s arrest. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“After committing the alleged criminal offences [and when preliminary criminal proceedings were initiated] the accused was at large. He was not available to the law-enforcement authorities until recently ... which justifies the fear that if released he would abscond.\nA number of witnesses are to be heard in the investigation, including the two co-accused ... this indicates that, if released, the accused would obstruct the course of justice by influencing the witnesses ...\nThe accused had previously been convicted ... and committed several criminal acts within a short period of time ... the court considers that these facts represent special circumstances which justify the fear that, if released, he would reoffend.\nThe accused has been charged with criminal offences punishable by imprisonment for more than ten years, and in view of the manner in which the offences were committed and the severity of their consequences, it is justified to order his detention also ... on the basis of the nature of the offences alleged and the severity of the penalty that could be imposed.”", "21. After his extradition to Serbia on 6 July 2007, the applicant was detained pursuant to the above order.", "22. On 6 August and 4 October 2007, respectively, the District Court and the Supreme Court of Serbia (“the Supreme Court”) further extended the applicant’s detention, relying on the same grounds as before. They noted in particular that he had already been in hiding and had been arrested pursuant to an international warrant.", "23. Thereafter, the applicant’s detention was regularly examined and extended every two months by the District Court, the Supreme Court and, following a reform of the domestic judicial system, by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. In addition to those automatic reviews, the applicant repeatedly challenged his detention.", "24. After issuing the indictment (see paragraph 14 above), the courts held that the second ground for detention, the risk of the applicant influencing the witnesses, had ceased to exist. Thus, from 4 January 2008 onwards his detention was extended on the following three grounds: (1) the risk of absconding; (2) the risk of reoffending; and (3) the gravity of the criminal offences of which he was accused and the sentence that might be imposed on him.", "25. On 15 October 2013, although it rejected the applicant’s appeal, the Court of Appeal accepted his argument concerning the third ground for detention and decided that it had ceased to exist. Hence, the applicant’s detention was further extended only on the grounds that he might abscond and reoffend. The court held in particular:\n“... for this legal ground [for detention to be satisfied] the cumulative existence of two conditions is necessary: that the criminal offence in question is punishable by a sentence of more than ten years’ imprisonment and [that there are] particularly aggravating circumstances. The conclusion of the first-instance court that the first condition exists is justified. However, this court considers that in the present case the second condition does not exist... [T]he reasons given in the contested order, which had previously justified the accused’s detention on this ground, have now, more than seven years after the alleged offences were committed, ceased to exist ... [I]n the absence of other relevant elements, they do not in themselves justify detention on this ground, because these facts are contained in the factual description of the criminal acts in question and represent the [constituent] elements of those criminal acts.\nTherefore, the Court of Appeal holds that the reasons given in the contested order do not justify the extension of detention under Article 142 § 2 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...”", "26. On 31 October 2014, in a decision by which it quashed the High Court’s judgment of 1 April 2014 and remitted the case for a re-trial (see paragraph 19 above), the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s detention on the grounds that he might abscond and reoffend.", "27. On 29 December 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining that his pre-trial detention was unlawful and its length had become excessive. He also complained about the length of the criminal proceedings and alleged that his right to be presumed innocent had been violated.", "28. On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. As regards the lawfulness of his detention, the court held that the domestic courts had referred to the specific facts of the case and the applicant’s personal circumstances, and had not used general or abstract arguments to justify his continued detention. There was a reasonable suspicion, from the documents in the file, that the applicant had committed the criminal offences imputed to him. The court held in particular:\n“The conclusion [of the lower domestic courts] that the ground for detention provided for by Article 142 § 1(1) [the risk of absconding] of the Code of Criminal Procedure still exists, is justified in view of the fact that ... the accused was arrested in Austria and extradited to Serbia on 6 July 2007... the above circumstances justify the fear that if released he would abscond ...\nThe conclusion [of the lower domestic courts] that the ground for detention provided for by Article 142 § 1(3) [the risk of reoffending] of the Code of Criminal Procedure still exists is justified in view of the fact that the accused had already been convicted for criminal offences involving physical force [robbery] ... and bearing in mind the nature and number of criminal offences imputed to him [in the present case] which were committed in a short period of time ... [the court considers that] these facts represent special circumstances which justify the fear that, if released, he would reoffend.\nThe conclusion [of the lower domestic courts] that the ground for detention provided for by Article 142 § 1(5) [the serious nature of the offences with which he had been charged and the severity of the penalty which could be imposed on him if found guilty] of the Code of Criminal Procedure still exists is justified in view of the fact that he had been charged with ... criminal offences punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment, and in view of the manner in which the offences were committed ... in particular, according to the indictment, the accused had shown singular brutality and determination towards the victim.”\nAs regards the length of detention, the Constitutional Court concluded that it had been reasonable in view of the complexity of the case: it concerned three co-accused, several criminal offences and complex legal and factual issues.\nAs regards the complaint about the length of the criminal proceedings, the Constitutional Court noted that the case at issue was a complex one; the case file contained more than one thousand pages and extensive photographic documentation. Furthermore, the court proceedings had had to start anew several times because of changes of presiding judge. Many procedural steps had been taken, numerous witnesses had been heard and a few expert testimonies had been taken.\nLastly, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint concerning the presumption of innocence as unsubstantiated.", "29. The applicant’s subsequent constitutional appeals, containing the same complaints, were rejected on 26 and 27 September, and 10 October 2012 and 20 November 2013 for the same reasons as before." ]

[ "5", "6", "34" ]

[ 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1982. His current whereabouts are unknown.", "6. On 29 December 2012 the applicant fled Syria and on an unspecified date entered the Russian Federation. It appears that he applied for asylum, but on 4 May 2013 he left the country before his application was examined.", "7. On 4-5 May 2013 the applicant crossed the Latvian border on foot. On 5 May 2013 the State Border Guard Service (Valsts roberžsardze) stopped him near the border.", "8. On 7 May 2013 the State Border Guard Service completed an asylum application form and the applicant signed it in the presence of an Arabic-speaking interpreter.", "9. On 7 May 2013 an initial interview (sākotnējā aptauja) with the applicant was conducted with the assistance of an Arab-speaking interpreter. The applicant explained that he could speak, read and write in English and Arabic.", "10. On 16 May 2013 a personal interview (pārrunas) with the applicant took place. The applicant was assisted by an Arab-speaking interpreter.", "11. On 22 May 2013 the closed facility in which the applicant was being held (see paragraph 23 below) received a parcel addressed to him. The sender was unknown. The parcel contained the applicant’s identity card and military service certificate in Arabic. Their translation was requested and on 24 May 2013 it was received.", "12. On 28 May 2013 those documents, together with their translations into Latvian, were sent to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde). The latter was also informed that it would receive certified translations as soon as possible. On 21 June 2013 the State Border Guard Service received the certified translations and, on the same date, sent them to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.", "13. On 31 May 2013 authenticity of the applicant’s identity card was confirmed by two forensic experts. On 21 June 2013 the State Border Guard Service received their report and, on the same date, sent it to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs.", "14. On 28 June 2013 the applicant appointed a lawyer to assist him in the administrative proceedings. The same lawyer continued to represent him before the Court (see paragraph 2 above).", "15. On 4 July 2013 the Asylum Affairs Division (Patvēruma lietu nodaļa) of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs informed the applicant that they had received his application for asylum and would examine it within three months.", "16. On 3 October 2013 the Asylum Affairs Division decided to refuse the applicant’s asylum application. However, they granted him subsidiary protection status (alternatīvais statuss) and issued a temporary residence permit for one year. It was noted that that decision would take effect from the time the applicant had been informed of it. A reference was made to section 70(1) of the Administrative Procedure Law and section 8(3) of the Notification Law (see paragraph 38 below).", "17. On 4 October 2013, which was a Friday, a letter was sent to the State Border Guard Service in Daugavpils informing them of the decision and stating that the applicant was to be informed of it immediately. They also asked that one copy of the decision be handed over to the applicant and that the second copy be sent back to the Asylum Affairs Division with the applicant’s signature confirming that he had been informed of it. The letter, together with two copies of the decision, was received in Daugavpils on Monday 7 October 2013 (see paragraphs 29-30 below) and the applicant was informed of it. Accordingly, the decision took effect on 7 October 2013.", "18. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision with the administrative courts, as he wished to be granted asylum; he considered that the subsidiary protection status was not sufficient.", "19. On 6 November 2013 administrative proceedings were instituted.", "20. On 19 December 2013 the Administrative District Court issued summonses and scheduled a hearing for 27 January 2014. That hearing was postponed as the applicant did not appear. Another hearing was scheduled for 25 February 2014, but the applicant failed to appear again.", "21. On 26 February 2014 the Administrative District Court left the applicant’s appeal without examination for repeated failure to appear without good reason.", "22. On 5 May 2013 the applicant was detained under section 51(2)(1) of the Immigration Law (see paragraph 35 below), but he refused to sign the detention record. At that time, he had no personal identification or valid travel document. He identified himself as “Adnan Haiiak”, born on 20 October 1983. He was informed (in English) of his rights to appeal against the detention order, receive legal aid, acquaint himself with the detention records and communicate in a language understood by him. The following day several documents were found in the place where he had been arrested: a document testifying that an application for short-term asylum had been made by a Syrian national, Mr Nassr Allah, born on 18 September 1982, and was being examined in Russia; a torn train ticket; and other documents in Arabic. The applicant explained that he had hidden those documents in order to avoid being sent back to Russia.", "23. On 7 May 2013 the applicant was detained under section 9(1)(1) (undetermined identity) and 9(1)(2) (misuse of the asylum procedure) of the Asylum Law, but he refused to sign the detention record. He was informed (in Arabic) of his rights to appeal against the detention order, receive legal aid and communicate in a language understood by him. He was also informed about the reasons for his detention. He was placed in a closed facility in Daugavpils – an accommodation centre for foreign detainees and asylum seekers (Aizturēto ārzemnieku un patvēruma meklētāju izmitināšanas centrs – “the Daugavpils accommodation centre”).", "24. On 10 May 2013, following a hearing in the applicant’s presence, a judge of the Daugavpils (City) Court (Dauvgavpils tiesa) ordered his detention for two months. The judge examined the material brought before him and, with the assistance of an Arab-speaking interpreter, heard evidence from the applicant. The applicant explained that he had applied for asylum in Russia, but had left as he realised that he would not receive it. He had crossed the border illegally and had identified himself by giving another name in order not to be deported back to Russia. The applicant was not assisted by a lawyer. The judge concluded that there were grounds to detain him as his identity had not been determined and there were reasons to consider that he had misused the asylum procedure. He had arrived in Latvia from a country, where his life had not been endangered and where he had applied for asylum; these facts evidenced that he misused the asylum procedure. On the same date, the applicant lodged an appeal (one page) against that decision in English, stating in simple terms that he had received the court’s decision and wished to appeal against it. He submitted that he had been in danger in Russia and had been ill; he expressed the wish to be granted refugee status in Latvia and undertook to provide all his documents as soon as possible. On 13 May 2013 his appeal was sent for translation; on 7 June 2013 a translation was received. On the same date, the appeal, its translation and the case file were forwarded to the Latgale Regional Court (Latgales apgabaltiesa) and the applicant was informed that a single judge would examine his appeal following a written procedure; the applicant could submit further observations within forty-eight hours. That information was handed to him by the State Border Guard Service and he signed to acknowledge receipt of it on 13 June 2013. On 25 June 2013 the applicant was informed that examination of his case had been rescheduled to 5 July 2013; it would be decided by a single judge following a written procedure. That information was handed to him by the State Border Guard Service and he signed to acknowledge receipt of its translation on 25 June 2013.", "25. On 5 July 2013 a judge of the Latgale Regional Court examined and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. He relied on largely the same factual and legal grounds for detaining the applicant as the first-instance court judge. The judge concluded that there were grounds to consider that the applicant attempted to misuse the asylum procedure. It was evidenced by the facts surrounding his arrival and application for asylum in Latvia. He had crossed the border illegally. He had not arrived directly from the country where his life or liberty was endangered. He had spent several months in Russia, where he had applied for asylum, but had left illegally; without awaiting for a final decision. It was impossible to predict his further actions in case of release. The decision was drafted in Latvian, but its contents were explained to the applicant, for which he signed on the same date.", "26. On 8 July 2013, following a hearing in the applicant’s presence, the judge of the Daugavpils (City) Court authorised the extension of his detention for a further two months; the applicant was assisted by an interpreter. The applicant’s lawyer was not present, but the judge examined her written request to release the applicant on account of the fact that he had provided his identity documents and had not misused the asylum procedure. She argued that the applicant could be placed in an open and specialised institution – an accommodation centre for asylum seekers in Mucenieki. The judge disagreed and concluded that there were grounds to detain the applicant under section 9(1)(2) of the Asylum Law. The fact that his application for asylum was accepted for examination did not indicate that he would comply with the requirements arising from the asylum procedure as he testified that he would again apply for an asylum in another European country in case he received a negative decision in Latvia, which was contrary to the applicable procedure. In such circumstances, it was impossible to predict his further actions if placed in an open accommodation centre; there was a possibility that he might leave Latvia and thereby obstruct the asylum procedure as he had already done in a safe third country (see paragraph 6 above). On the same date, the applicant lodged an appeal (one page) against that decision in Latvian, stating that there was no evidence that he had misused the asylum procedure, might leave the country or obstruct the asylum procedure. He disputed the relevance of the fact that he had applied for asylum in Russia as it was not a safe third country. His appeal was forwarded to the Latgale Regional Court together with the case file. On 15 July 2013 the applicant was informed that his case would be examined on 30 July 2013 by a single judge following a written procedure; it was explained that the applicant could submit further observations within forty-eight hours. That information was handed to him by the State Border Guard Service and he signed to acknowledge receipt of its translation on 18 July 2013.", "27. On 30 July 2013 another judge of the Latgale Regional Court examined and dismissed the applicant’s appeal, upholding the decision to detain him under section 9(1)(2) of the Asylum Law. She referred to the findings of the city court to the effect that there were grounds to believe that the applicant might misuse the asylum procedure. There was evidence that he had left Russia after several months and without awaiting a final decision in response to his application for asylum. Upon arrival in Latvia, he had withheld his real identity. It was due to diligent work of border guards that his identity could be established. Moreover, the applicant admitted that he had left Russia because he believed that his application for asylum would be refused; he also admitted that he would attempt to obtain asylum in another European country if it was refused in Latvia. Therefore, the judge upheld the conclusion of the lower court that it was impossible to predict the applicant’s further actions upon release. The decision was drafted in Latvian, but its contents were explained to the applicant. On 6 August 2013 he signed the decision, confirming that it had been explained to him in English; he respected the decision and agreed with it.", "28. On 6 September 2013 the judge of the Daugavpils (City) Court authorised the applicant’s detention for a further two months, again on the grounds of section 9(1)(2) of the Asylum Law. During the hearing, the applicant explained that he would continue to pursue the asylum proceedings; he was aware of the relevant procedures and duties, he would not leave Latvia until the end of the asylum procedure. The judge concluded that the applicant misused the asylum procedure on the same grounds as indicated in the previous decisions and that he should remain in detention. With reference to section 9 (3) of the Asylum Law, the judge noted that the time-limit for his detention had not yet expired. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision, as the Asylum Affairs Division was due to make a decision in less than one month and his previous experience had shown that detention appeals took about one month to be examined.", "29. On 4 October 2013 the State Border Guard Service informed the applicant that he had been granted subsidiary protection status but that they could not release him until they received the original version of that decision; the relevant authority had sent it by post (see paragraph 17 above).", "30. The State Boarder Guard Service ordered the applicant’s release at around 4 p.m. on 7 October 2013. In the release order, a reference was made to the fact that the applicant had been granted subsidiary protection status and that grounds for his detention had ceased to exist.", "31. On 13 August 2013 the applicant complained to the Ombudsman about his prolonged detention.", "32. On 21 August 2013 the Ombudsman replied [in English] as follows:\n“In your complaint you request Ombudsman’s assistance in obtaining order for your release as well as assistance with contacting your family in Syria.\nIn the process of examining your complaint I have contacted the centre for detained foreigners and asylum seekers ‘Daugavpils’ (hereinafter – the Centre). According to information provided by the Centre, your application for asylum is currently under examination in the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs. The expected date of decision is 4 October 2013.\nAccording to the decision of Daugavpils (City) Court from 8 July 2013, as well as Latgale Regional Court you are currently detained on the basis of [section 9(1)(2)] of the Asylum Law. The next periodical review of your detention is due before 6 September 2013. [Section 9(1)(2)] of the Asylum Law states that ‘the State Border Guard [Service] has the right to detain an asylum seeker for a period up to seven days and nights if there are reasons to believe that the asylum seeker is attempting to use the asylum procedure in bad faith.’\nThe decision of Daugavpils (City) Court is based on the fact that you have crossed the Latvian border under the name of Adnan Haiik having previously requested temporary asylum in the Russian Federation with your established identity as Aladdin Nassr Allah. In the court hearing you have also indicated that in case of a negative decision you will proceed to seek asylum in another European country, which would be contrary to the procedure and regulations of requesting asylum in the European Union. Thus the court has established reasons to believe that you are attempting to use asylum procedure contrary to its objective and purpose.\nHaving reviewed the decision of Daugavpils (City) Court and Latgale Regional Court, it is established that you have been detained according to the procedures prescribed by law. Your rights to periodical review of detention have also been observed according to Latvian law. Furthermore, the decisions ordering your detention contain sufficient motivation to establish legal and factual grounds for such detention. Therefore, there has been no violation of your right to liberty and security under the [Convention] and Article 94 of the Constitution of Latvia.\nWith regard to the possibility to contact your family from the detention facility, I would like to inform you that upon your request, you have the right to contact your family on your own expense. The Latvian law does not grant detained asylum seekers a possibility to contact their families free of charge.”", "33. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “CPT”) visited the Daugavpils accommodation centre during its 2011 visit to Latvia and noted the following (see report CPT/Inf (2013) 20):\n“33. The delegation was informed at the outset of the visit that recent amendments to the Immigration Law (passed in June 2011) had brought it into full conformity with the EU Return Directive and defined more clearly the grounds for detention of irregular migrants. In particular, new time-limits for the detention of foreign nationals awaiting deportation had been introduced (i.e. the initial custody of a maximum of ten days upon the decision of the Border Guard, which can be prolonged by court decision for a maximum of three consecutive two-month periods, and – if the irregular migrant refuses to co-operate with the immigration authorities or when delays occur in obtaining the necessary documents from another country – for a further twelve months).", "34. [Daugavpils accommodation centre] was opened in May 2011, following the closure of the immigration detention facility at Olaine. The Centre is managed by the State Border Guard [Service] under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is currently the only detention centre for foreign nationals in Latvia. It is located in a refurbished two-storey building (the premises of former military barracks) not far from the centre of Daugavpils and has an official capacity of 70 places. At the time of the visit, the Centre was accommodating 33 foreign nationals, including 32 asylum seekers and one irregular migrant who was awaiting deportation (there were no unaccompanied minors). The average length of detention in the establishment was said to be two months.", "35. The CPT’s delegation received no allegations of ill-treatment of foreign nationals by staff at the Centre. All the inmates interviewed by the delegation stated that they were treated correctly. Further, the vast majority of inmates seemed to have no communication problems with staff since all staff members spoke Russian, and some also English and French.", "36. The delegation noted that staff openly carried truncheons in the two male units; in the CPT’s opinion, this is clearly not conducive to the development of positive relations between staff and inmates. The CPT recommends that steps be taken to ensure that staff working in the Centre do not openly carry truncheons in detention areas; if it is deemed necessary for staff to possess such equipment, it should be hidden from view.", "37. The material conditions in the Centre were very good. The establishment had two male units and a unit for women and families. Each unit comprised several rooms for two to four inmates, a recreation room and a well-equipped kitchen. The rooms were spacious (e.g. some 25 m2 for four persons), had good access to natural light and artificial lighting, and were well ventilated and clean. They were also properly furnished (beds with full bedding, wardrobes and a fully partitioned internal sanitary annexe including toilet and shower). The female unit also contained a pleasant play-room for children.", "38. The foreign nationals benefited from an open-door regime – being able to move about freely inside their respective units – and could go to a spacious outdoor courtyard for at least two hours per day (and longer in good weather). Further, during the day they had ready access to a recreation room where they could watch television and play board games. As for sports, a fitness room was accessible several times per week and, weather permitting, outdoor sports activities were also offered.\nHowever, the CPT invites the Latvian authorities to expand the range of activities for any foreign nationals held for prolonged periods at the Centre. The longer the period for which persons are detained, the more developed should be the activities which are offered to them.", "39. Arrangements for health care at the Centre were generally adequate. A feldsher or nurse was present every day from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. The delegation noted that every newly admitted foreign national was examined by a member of the health-care staff, usually within 24 hours, and had a medical file opened. The medical facilities and equipment at the Centre were of a very good standard, and supply of medication was satisfactory. Further, it appeared that emergency medical care and transfers to outside medical establishments were arranged whenever necessary.", "40. Upon arrival at the Centre, foreign nationals were provided with written information about their rights and duties during their stay in the establishment; this information was available in various languages.\nThat said, no written information (i.e. leaflets) was provided to them setting out their procedural rights and legal situation. A number of foreign nationals interviewed by the delegation did not appear to be aware of the legal proceedings to which they were subjected; in this connection, many complaints were also received about the quality of interpretation during court proceedings. Further, some inmates complained that court decisions authorising their detention in the Centre had not been translated into a language they understood and that they were de facto deprived of the possibility to lodge an appeal against their detention. Moreover, no arrangements had been made to establish a legal counselling service at the establishment.\nThe CPT would like to receive the observations of the Latvian authorities in relation to the above-mentioned issues.", "41. The existing arrangements at the Centre for contacts with the outside world were generally satisfactory. Foreign nationals were allowed to send and receive letters and to have short-term visits. Further, there were no restrictions on making or receiving telephone calls during the day.", "42. The CPT understands that the internal regulations of the Centre are currently under preparation. The Committee would like to receive a copy of these regulations once they have been adopted.” 34. The relevant domestic law provisions on the detention of asylum seekers and their rights have been described in Longa Yonkeu v. Latvia (no. 57229/09, §§ 81-82, 84-86, 89-90, 15 November 2011). In particular, the following provisions of the Asylum Law are of relevance in the present case:\nSection 9 – Detention of asylum seekers (as in force at the material time and until 20 November 2013)\n“1. The State Border Guard Service has the authority to detain an asylum seeker for an initial period of up to seven days, if at least one of the following conditions is met:\n1) the identity of the asylum seeker has not been determined;\n2) there is reason to believe that the asylum seeker is attempting to misuse the asylum procedure;\n3) the competent State authorities, including the State Border Guard Service, have reason to believe that the asylum seeker poses a threat to national security or public order and safety. 2. The State Border Guard Service shall detain and the judge shall authorise [further] detention of an asylum seeker in accordance with the Immigration Law. 3. The time-limit laid down in paragraph 1 may be extended; however, the overall period of detention may not exceed the length of time taken to complete the asylum procedure ...”\nSection 9 – Detention of asylum seekers (as from 21 November 2013)\n“1. The State Border Guard Service has the authority to detain an asylum seeker for an initial period of up to seven days, if at least one of the following conditions is met:\n1) the identity of the asylum seeker has not been determined;\n2) there is reason to believe that the asylum seeker is attempting to misuse the asylum procedure and it is necessary to find out the facts on which the application is based and which can be ascertained only by detention, especially if there is risk of absconding;\n3) the competent State authorities, including the State Border Guard Service, have reason to believe that the asylum seeker poses a threat to national security or public order and safety. 1.1 An asylum seeker shall be released, if the grounds on basis of which he or she has been detained have ceased to exist. 2. The State Border Guard Service shall detain and the judge shall authorise [further] detention of an asylum seeker in accordance with the Immigration Law. 3. The time-limit laid down in paragraph 1 may be extended; however, the overall period of detention may not exceed the length of time taken to complete the asylum procedure ...” 35. In addition, as from 16 June 2011 the Immigration Law empowers the State Border Guard Service to detain aliens if there are reasons to believe that they will avoid the deportation procedure or impede its preparation, that they might flee and if there are grounds to consider that they are concealing their identity, providing false information or otherwise refusing to co-operate (section 51(2)(1)). 36. Under section 54(1) of the Immigration Law the corresponding detention order can be issued for up to ten days. An appeal lies against such a detention order. 37. In accordance with section 55(7) of the Immigration Law, a district (city) court must immediately proceed with examination of a complaint concerning an alien’s detention. The regional court’s decision in this regard is final. 38. Section 70 of the Administrative Procedure Law determines the point in time when an administrative act takes effect. It reads as follows:\n“(1) Provided that it is not otherwise stipulated in an external legal instrument or the administrative act itself, an administrative act shall come into effect at the time the addressee is notified of it. The manner in which the addressee is notified of the administrative act – in writing, orally or otherwise – shall not affect its coming into effect.\n(2) The addressee is notified of an administrative act pursuant to the Notification Law. If an administrative act unfavourable to the addressee is sent by mail, it shall be sent in the form of registered mail.\n(3) An administrative act shall be in effect until it is revoked, is executed, or may no longer be performed because of a change in the actual or legal circumstances.”\nSection 8(3) of the Notification Law provides as follows:\n“A document which has been notified as a registered postal item shall be deemed notified on the seventh day after handing it over to the post office.”" ]

[ "5" ]

[ 9, 19, 20, 21, 22, 32 ]

[]

[ "9. The details concerning the applicants may be found in the Annex.\nThe background to the case", "10. In July 2008 these two applicants, who were in a committed stable relationship with each other, declared their intention to marry, and requested the Civil Status Office of the Trent Commune to issue the relevant marriage banns.", "11. On 25 July 2008 their request was rejected.", "12. The two applicants challenged the decision before the Trent Tribunal (in accordance with Article 98 of the Civil Code). They argued that Italian law did not explicitly prohibit marriage between persons of the same sex, and that, even if that were the case, such a position would be unconstitutional.", "13. By a decision of 24 February 2009 the Trent Tribunal rejected their claim. It noted that the Constitution did not establish the requirements to contract marriage, but the Civil Code did and it precisely provided that one such requirement was that spouses be of the opposite sex. Thus, a marriage between persons of the same sex lacked one of the most essential requirements to render it a valid legal act, namely a difference in sex between the parties. In any event there was no fundamental right to marry, neither could the limited law provisions constitute discrimination, since the limitations suffered by the applicants were the same as those applied to everyone. Furthermore, it noted that European Union (“EU”) law left such rights to be regulated within the national order.", "14. The applicants appealed to the Trent Court of Appeal. While the court reiterated the unanimous interpretation given to Italian law in the field, namely to the effect that ordinary law, particularly the Civil Code, did not allow marriage between people of the same sex, it considered it relevant to make a referral to the Constitutional Court in connection with the claims of unconstitutionality of the law in force.", "15. The Italian Constitutional Court in judgment no. 138 of 15 April 2010 declared inadmissible the applicants’ constitutional challenge to Articles 93, 96, 98, 107, 108, 143, 143 bis and 231 of the Italian Civil Code, as it was directed to the obtainment of additional norms not provided for by the Constitution (diretta ad ottenere una pronunzia additiva non costituzionalmente obbligata).", "16. The Constitutional Court considered Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, which provided that the Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, as an individual and in social groups where personality is expressed, as well as the duties of political, economic and social solidarity against which there was no derogation. It noted that by social group one had to understand any form of community, simple or complex, intended to enable and encourage the free development of any individual by means of relationships. Such a notion included homosexual unions, understood as a stable cohabitation of two people of the same sex, who have a fundamental right to freely express their personality in a couple, obtaining – in time and by the means and limits to be set by law – juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties. However, this recognition, which necessarily requires general legal regulation aimed at setting out the rights and duties of the partners in a couple, could be achieved in other ways apart from the institution of marriage between homosexuals. As shown by the different systems in Europe, the question of the type of recognition was left to regulation by Parliament, in the exercise of its full discretion. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court clarified that without prejudice to Parliament’s discretion, it could however intervene according to the principle of equality in specific situations related to a homosexual couple’s fundamental rights, where the same treatment of married couples and homosexual couples was called for. The court would in such cases assess the reasonableness of the measures.", "17. It went on to consider that it was true that the concepts of family and marriage could not be considered “crystallised” in reference to the moment when the Constitution came into effect, given that constitutional principles must be interpreted bearing in mind changes in the legal order and the evolution of society and its customs. Nevertheless, such an interpretation could not be extended to the point where it affected the very essence of legal norms, modifying them in such a way as to include phenomena and problems which had not been considered in any way when it was enacted. In fact it appeared from the preparatory work to the Constitution that the question of homosexual unions had not been debated by the assembly, despite the fact that homosexuality was not unknown. In drafting Article 29 of the Constitution, the assembly had discussed an institution with a precise form and an articulate discipline provided for by the Civil Code. Thus, in the absence of any such reference, it was inevitable to conclude that what had been considered was the notion of marriage as defined in the Civil Code, which came into effect in 1942 and which at the time, and still today, established that spouses had to be of the opposite sex. Therefore, the meaning of this constitutional precept could not be altered by a creative interpretation. In consequence, the constitutional norm did not extend to homosexual unions, and was intended to refer to marriage in its traditional sense.", "18. Lastly, the court considered that, in respect of Article 3 of the Constitution regarding the principle of equality, the relevant legislation did not create unreasonable discrimination, given that homosexual unions could not be considered equivalent to marriage. Even Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not require full equality between homosexual unions and marriages between a man and a woman, as this was a matter of Parliamentary discretion to be regulated by national law, as evidenced by the different approaches existing in Europe.", "19. In consequence of the above judgment, by a decision (ordinanza) lodged in the relevant registry on 21 September 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicants’ claims in full.", "20. In 2003 these two applicants met and entered into a relationship with each other. In 2004 Mr Felicetti decided to undertake further studies (and thus stopped earning any income), a possibility open to him thanks to the financial support of Mr Zappa.", "21. On 1 July 2005 the couple moved in together. In 2005 and 2007 the applicants wrote to the President of the Republic highlighting difficulties encountered by same-sex couples and soliciting the enactment of legislation in favour of civil unions.", "22. In 2008 the applicants’ physical cohabitation was registered in the authorities’ records. In 2009 they designated each other as guardians in the event of incapacitation (amministratori di sostegno).", "23. On 19 February 2011 they requested their marriage banns to be issued. On 9 April 2011 their request was rejected on the basis of the law and jurisprudence pertaining to the subject matter (see Relevant domestic law below).", "24. The two applicants did not pursue the remedy provided for under Article 98 of the Civil Code, in so far as it could not be considered effective following the Constitutional Court pronouncement mentioned above.", "25. In 2002 these two applicants met and entered into a relationship with each other. In the same year they started cohabiting and since then they have been in a committed relationship.", "26. In 2006 they opened a joint bank account.", "27. In 2007 the applicants’ physical cohabitation was registered in the authorities’ records.", "28. On 3 November 2009 they requested that their marriage banns be issued. The person in charge at the office did not request them to fill in the relevant application, simply attaching their request to a number of analogous requests made by other couples.", "29. On 5 November 2009 their request was rejected on the basis of the law and jurisprudence pertaining to the subject matter (see Relevant domestic law below).", "30. Mr Perelli Cippo and Mr Zacheo challenged the decision before the Milan Tribunal.", "31. By a decision (decreto) of 9 June 2010 lodged in the relevant registry on 1 July 2010 the Milan Tribunal rejected their claim, considering that it was legitimate for the Civil Status Office to refuse a request to have marriage banns issued for the purposes of a marriage between persons of the same sex, in line with the finding of the Constitutional Court judgment no. 138 of 15 April 2010.", "32. The applicants did not lodge a further challenge (reclamo) under Article 739 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it could not be considered effective following the Constitutional Court pronouncement." ]

[ "8" ]

[ 7 ]

[]

[ "10. The applicants, A.H. (“the first applicant”) and J.K. (“the second applicant”), who are wife and husband, are Syrian nationals of Kurdish origin and were born in Syria in 1985 and 1979 respectively. They live in Paphos.", "11. The second applicant left Syria on 25 August 2004 and entered Cyprus illegally on 9 September 2004 after travelling from Turkey.", "12. He applied for asylum the next day.", "13. The first applicant left Syria at a later date in order to join the second applicant in Cyprus as they had been engaged to be married. She entered Cyprus illegally on 29 November 2007 after travelling from Turkey.", "14. The applicants married in Cyprus on 4 December 2007 and the first applicant applied for asylum on 6 February 2008.", "15. The applicants’ asylum applications were examined jointly by the Asylum Service.", "16. The Asylum Service held an interview with the applicants on 3 March 2009.", "17. Their applications were dismissed on 26 March 2009 on the ground that they did not fulfil the requirements of the Refugee Law of 2000-2007 (as amended up to 2007), in that they had not shown that they had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion or a well-founded fear of serious and unjustified harm for other reasons. The Asylum Service noted that there had been contradictions in the account of facts given by the second applicant with regard to his participation in a demonstration concerning the Qamishli events which raised doubts as to his credibility. Furthermore, it considered that there was no possibility of the second applicant being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Syria. Consequently, it held that the asylum applications had not been substantiated.", "18. On 24 April 2009 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority against the Asylum Service’s decision.", "19. On 26 March 2010 the Asylum Service’s decision was upheld and the appeal dismissed.", "20. The Reviewing Authority underlined the contradictions and inconsistencies in the second applicant’s claims. It pointed out that he had not given the same reasons for leaving Syria in his written application and in his interview. In the former he had stated that he had come to Cyprus to find work whereas in his interview he claimed that he had left Syria because he feared arrest following his participation in a demonstration. Further, the Reviewing Authority gave weight to the fact that the second applicant had stated that following the demonstration he had allegedly participated in, nothing had actually happened to him and that he had not been sought by the authorities. In his asylum application he had stated that he had not been arrested, detained, harassed, persecuted or wanted by the Syrian authorities. He had also been able to leave Syria legally. The second applicant’s claims were therefore unsubstantiated. No issue arose in respect of the first applicant as she had stated that she had left Syria in order to join the second applicant and marry him and had admitted that she did not face any problems in Syria.", "21. The Reviewing Authority concluded by observing that the applicants had not established that they were at risk of persecution if they returned to Syria. Nor did they satisfy the conditions for temporary residence on humanitarian grounds.", "22. On 15 May 2010 the second applicant brought a “recourse” (judicial review proceedings) before the Supreme Court (first-instance revisional jurisdiction) under Article 146 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the Reviewing Authority. A subsequent application to amend the recourse by adding the first applicant as a complainant was withdrawn as the time-limit of seventy-five days had in the meantime expired (see paragraph 89 below).", "23. On 14 June 2010 the applicants filed the present applications with the Court. The second applicant, in his application form stated that on 13 March 2004 he had taken part in a demonstration in his village in Derit. The purpose of the demonstration was to go to Qamishli to show solidarity with the Kurdish demonstrators following the events of 12 March 2004. Following the intervention of the authorities this had not been possible. The second applicant stated that the police had attacked the demonstrators killing two persons. After going into hiding for a month in a neighbouring village, the second applicant was arrested in Qamishli. He was detained for fourteen days and subjected to torture. He was subsequently transferred to the central prison of Damascus where he was detained for two and a half months. After bribing the authorities he was released on the condition that he would present himself to the authorities in Damascus every fifteen days. He did not do so, however, out of fear to be detained and tortured again.", "24. On 8 October 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the second applicant’s recourse. It upheld the Reviewing Authority’s decision of 26 March 2010 after examining all the grounds of annulment put forward by the second applicant. The court noted, inter alia, that the main ground for which the second applicant’s asylum claim had not been accepted was the lack of plausibility of his principal allegations and the existence of significant contradictions and omissions which had undermined his credibility. The second applicant had not substantiated that he was at risk of persecution if returned to Syria because he had allegedly participated in a demonstration. Furthermore, the fact that the second applicant was of Kurdish origin was not sufficient in itself to justify the granting of refugee status. The Supreme Court also held that new grounds and allegations concerning his detention, arrest and ill-treatment following the events could not be taken into account. Its jurisdiction under Article 146 of the Constitution was limited to reviewing his claim as it had been made before the Asylum Service and the Reviewing Authority (see paragraph 89 below). Grounds for annulment that had not been put before the Reviewing Authority could not be examined for the first time by the court.", "25. No appeal was lodged against the first instance judgment.", "26. In the meantime, on 17 May 2010 the Yekiti Party and other Kurds from Syria organised a demonstration in Nicosia, near the Representation of the European Commission, the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and the Government Printing Office. They were protesting against the restrictive policies of the Cypriot Asylum Service in granting international protection. About 150 Kurds from Syria, including the applicants, remained in the area around the clock, having set up about eighty tents on the pavement. According to the Government, the encampment conditions were unsanitary and protesters were obstructing road and pedestrian traffic. The encampment had become a hazard to public health and created a public nuisance. The protesters performed their daily chores on the pavement, including cooking and washing in unsanitary conditions. The sewage pits had overflown, causing a nuisance and offensive odours. The public lavatories were dirty and the rubbish bins of the Government buildings were being used and, as a result, were continuously overflowing. Furthermore, the protesters were unlawfully obtaining electricity from the Printing Office. Members of the public who lived or worked in the area had complained to the authorities. The Government submitted that efforts had been made by the authorities to persuade the protesters to leave, but to no avail. As a result, the authorities had decided to take action to remove the protesters from the area.", "27. On 28 May 2010 instructions were given by the Minister of the Interior to proceed with the deportation of Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers in the normal way.", "28. On 31 May 2010 the Minister requested the Chief of Police, among others, to take action in order to implement his instructions. Further, he endorsed suggestions made by the competent authorities that deportation and detention orders be issued against Syrian-Kurdish failed asylum seekers who had passports and did not have Ajanib or Maktoumeen status and that the police execute the orders starting with the ones issued against the leaders of the protesters. The police were also directed to take into account the policy guidelines and to use discreet methods of arrest.", "29. According to the Government, letters were sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to a number of failed Syrian-Kurdish asylum-seekers informing them that they had to make arrangements to leave Cyprus in view of their asylum applications being turned down (see M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872/10, § 32, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). They submitted a copy of such a letter which was dated 1 June 2010 and addressed to the applicants.", "30. From documents submitted by the Government it appears that from 31 May until 7 June 2010 the authorities kept the area under surveillance and kept a record of the protesters’ daily activities and of all comings and goings. In the relevant records it is noted that invariably, between 1.30 a.m. and 5.30 a.m., things were, in general, quiet, and everyone was sleeping apart from those keeping guard. During the above-mentioned period a large-scale operation was organised by the Police Emergency Response Unit, “ERU” (“ΜΜΑΔ”), and a number of other authorities, including the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, for the removal of the protesters and their transfer to the ERU headquarters for the purpose of ascertaining their status on a case-by-case basis.", "31. In the meantime, between 28 May 2010 and 2 June 2010 orders for the detention and deportation of forty-five failed asylum seekers were issued following background checks. Letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, containing a short paragraph with information as to the immigration status of each person. This information included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service, the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority, where lodged, and the date some of those concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). The letters recommended the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The Government submitted copies of two such letters with information concerning thirteen people.", "32. On 2 June 2010, letters were also prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing those concerned of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted that, at the time, the authorities did not know whether those individuals were among the protesters.", "33. The removal operation was carried out on 11 June 2010, between approximately 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. with the participation of about 250 officers from the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit, the ERU, the Nicosia District Police Division, the Traffic Division, the Fire Service and the Office for Combating Discrimination of the Cyprus Police Headquarters. The protesters, including the applicants, were led to buses, apparently without any reaction or resistance on their part. At 3.22 a.m. the mini buses carrying the male protesters left. The women, children and babies followed at 3.35 a.m. A total of 149 people were located at the place of protest and were transferred to the ERU headquarters: eighty-seven men, twenty-two women and forty children. Upon arrival, registration took place and the status of each person was examined using computers which had been specially installed the day before. The Government submitted that during this period the protesters had not been handcuffed or put in cells but had been assembled in rooms and given food and drink. It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that by 6.40 a.m. the identification of approximately half of the group had been completed and that the whole operation had ended by 4.30 p.m.", "34. It was ascertained that seventy-six of the adults, along with their thirty children, were in the Republic unlawfully. Their asylum applications had either been dismissed or their files closed for failure to attend interviews. Those who had appealed to the Reviewing Authority had had their appeals dismissed. Some final decisions dated back to 2006. A number of people had also been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. Deportation orders had already been issued for twenty-three of them (see paragraph 31 above).", "35. The authorities deported twenty-two people on the same day at around 6.30 p.m. (nineteen adults and three children). Forty-four people (forty-two men and two women), including the applicants, were arrested. The persons against whom deportation and detention orders had been issued on 2 June 2010 were detained under these orders. The remaining persons, including the applicants, were charged with the criminal offence of unlawful stay in the Republic under section 19(2) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 86 below). They were all arrested and transferred to various detention centres in Cyprus. The applicants were placed in the immigration detention facilities in the Nicosia Central Prisons (Blocks 9 and 10 respectively). Further, on humanitarian grounds, thirteen women whose husbands were detained pending deportation and who had a total of twenty-seven children between them were not arrested themselves.", "36. According to the Government the applicants and their co-detainees were informed orally that they had been arrested and detained on the basis that they had been staying in the Republic unlawfully and were thus “prohibited immigrants” (see paragraph 84 below). They were also informed of their rights pursuant to the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained Law 2005 (Law 163(I)/2005) (see paragraph 113 below) and, in particular, of their right to contact by phone, in person and in private, a lawyer of their own choice. The applicants submitted that they had not been informed of the reasons for their arrest and detention on that date.", "37. On the same day letters were sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Nicosia Police to the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service and the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, recommending the issuance of deportation and detention orders. The letters contained a short paragraph in respect of each person with information as to his or her immigration status. This included the date of rejection of the asylum application or the closure of the asylum file by the Asylum Service and the date of dismissal of the appeal by the Reviewing Authority where lodged. Some letters also referred to the date the asylum application had been lodged and the date some of the individuals concerned had been included on the authorities’ “stop list”. The Government submitted copies of letters concerning thirty-seven people (most of these letters referred to groups of people).", "38. Deportation and detention orders were also issued in Greek on the same day in respect of the remaining fifty-three people detained (see paragraph 34 above), including the applicants, pursuant to section 14 (6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that they were “prohibited immigrants” within the meaning of section 6(1)(k) of that Law. These were couched in identical terms. In respect of two people the orders also mentioned sections 6(1)(i) and 6(1)(l) of the Law.", "39. Subsequently, on the same date, letters were prepared in English by the Civil Registry and Migration Department informing all the detainees individually, including the applicants, of the decision to detain and deport them. The Government submitted thirty-seven copies of these letters, including those addressed to the applicants, the text of which was virtually identical, a standard template having been used.\nThe text of the letter reads as follows:\n“You are hereby informed that you are an illegal immigrant by virtue of paragraph (k). section 1, Article 6 of the Aliens and Immigration law, Chapter 105, as amended until 2009, because you of illegal entry [sic]\nConsequently your temporary residence permit/migration permit has been revoked and I have proceeded with the issue of deportation orders and detention orders dated 11th June 2010 against you.\nYou have the right to be represented before me, or before any other Authority of the Republic and express possible objections against your deportation and seek the services of an interpreter.”", "40. The only differences was that some letters referred to illegal stay rather than illegal entry and that the letters issued earlier referred to 2 June 2010 as the date of issuance of the deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 32 above).", "41. On the copy of the letters to the applicants provided by the Government, there is a handwritten signed note by a police officer stating that the letters were served on the applicants on 18 June 2010 but that they refused to receive and sign for them. The other letters had a similar note or stamp on them with the same date, stating that the person concerned had refused to sign for and/or receive the letter. In a letter dated 7 September 2010 the Government stated that the applicants had been served on 18 June 2010. In their subsequent observations the Government submitted, however, that this was the second attempt to serve the letters, the first attempt having been made on 11 June 2010, that is, the day of the arrest.", "42. The applicants submitted that they had never refused to receive any kind of information in writing. They claimed that it had only been on 14 June 2010 that they had been informed orally that they would be deported to Syria on the same day but that the deportation and detention orders were not served on them on that date or subsequently. They submitted that they had eventually been informed by their lawyer, following the receipt of information submitted by the Government to the Court in the context of the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that deportation and detention orders had been issued against them.", "43. From the documents submitted by the Government, it appears that at least another fourteen of the detainees were to be deported on 14 June 2010 (this figure is stated in documents submitted by the Government with no further details).", "44. On Saturday, 12 June 2010, the applicants, along with forty-two other persons of Kurdish origin, submitted a Rule 39 request in order to prevent their imminent deportation to Syria.", "45. On 14 June 2010 the President of the First Section decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the respondent Government that the detainees should not be deported to Syria until the Court had had the opportunity to receive and examine all the documents pertaining to their claim. The parties were requested under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court to submit information and documents concerning the asylum applications and the deportation.", "46. On 21 September 2010 the President of the First Section reconsidered the application of Rule 39 in the light of information provided by the parties. He decided to maintain the interim measure in respect of five cases, including the present ones. Rule 39 was lifted with regard to the thirty-nine remaining cases (for further details see M.A., cited above, § 58).", "47. Rule 39 was subsequently lifted with regard to three cases, but remained in force in the present two applications.", "48. On 24 January 2011 the applicants filed habeas corpus applications with the Supreme Court claiming that their continued detention from 11 June 2010 had violated Article 15 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Members states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, “the EU Returns Directive”. The applicants, relying on the Court’s judgment in Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, (Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V) and the Commission’s report in Samie Ali v. Switzerland (no. 24881/94, Commission’s report of 26 February 1997) also claimed that their detention had breached Article 11 (2) of the Constitution and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see M.A., § 50, cited above).", "49. The Supreme Court set the applications for directions for 31 January 2011. On that date the Government asked for a few days so they could file an objection to the applications. They were given until 4 February 2011 and the habeas corpus applications were set for hearing on 9 February 2011. The parties were also requested to prepare a short note with the issues they would address and to produce it on the day of the hearing.", "50. The Government filed their objection on 4 February 2011.", "51. On 10 February 2011 the parties appeared before the court and submitted their written addresses. The hearing of the applications was held. Judgment was reserved on the same day.", "52. On 23 February 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applications. With regard to the preliminary issues raised, the Supreme Court first of all held that it had the competence to examine the applications as it was called upon to examine the lawfulness of the applicants’ protracted detention and within the context of a habeas corpus application, examine the conformity of their detention with Article 15 (3) of the EU Returns Directive and Article 11 (2) not the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders. The applicants were not estopped from bringing a habeas corpus application just because they had not challenged the deportation and detention orders issued against them. Even if the lawfulness of the detention was assumed, detention for the purpose of deportation could not be indefinite and the detainee left without the right to seek his release. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the applicants were estopped from bringing the application because their continued detention had been brought about by their own action, that is, by their application to the Strasbourg Court for an interim measure suspending their deportation.", "53. The Supreme Court then examined the substance of the applications. It noted that the EU Returns Directive had direct effect in the domestic law, as the period for transposition had expired and the Directive had not been transposed. It could therefore be relied on in the proceedings. However, it went on to hold that the six-month period provided for in the Directive had not yet started to run. The applicants had been arrested on 11 June 2010 with a view to their deportation but had not been deported by the Government in view of the application by the Court on 14 June 2010 of Rule 39 and the issuing of an interim measure suspending their deportation. Consequently, the authorities had not been able to deport them even though, as they stated before the court, they had been ready to do so from 18 June 2010. As the applicants themselves had taken steps to suspend their deportation, the ensuing time could not be held against the Government and could not be taken into account for the purposes of Article 15 (5) and (6) of the Directive. The six-month period would start to run from the moment that the interim measure had been lifted. From that moment onwards the Government had been under an obligation in accordance with Article 15 (1) of the Directive to proceed with the applicants’ deportation with due diligence. The situation would have been different if the deportation had not been effected owing to delays attributable to the authorities.", "54. In so far as the applicants’ complaints under Article 11 (2) of the Constitution and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention were concerned, the Supreme Court distinguished the applicants’ situation from those in the cases they relied on and in which responsibility for the protracted detention lay with the authorities. Further, it held that it had not been shown that the continued detention of the applicants had been arbitrary, abusive and contrary to the Court’s case-law (see paragraph 48 above).", "55. The applicants lodged two separate appeals with the Supreme Court (appellate jurisdiction) on 17 March 2011. Another two appeals were lodged at the same time by M.A. (see M.A., §§ 54, cited above) and another Syrian of Kurdish origin (see K.F. v. Cyprus, no. 41858/10, § 62, 21 July 2015).", "56. The applicants sent a letter dated 13 April 2011 to the Registrar of the Supreme Court requesting that the appeals be fixed for pre-trial within a “short period of time” and then for hearing.", "57. The applicants were released on 20 May 2011 following revocation of the deportation and detention orders of 11 June 2010 by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. They were informed on 17 May 2011 by a letter dated 10 May 2011 that they would be issued with a special residence/employment permit under the Aliens and Immigration Law and the relevant Regulations for a period of six months from the date of their release with a possibility of further renewal. However, prior to the issuance of this permit they were obliged to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated and approved by the Department of Labour. The applicants were also asked to report to the police once a month.", "58. On 15 July 2011 the Supreme Court informed the applicants that one of the other appeals that had been filed at the same time as theirs was set down for hearing for 12 September 2011.", "59. On 7 September 2011 the applicants’ lawyer filed an application for joining the four appeals (see paragraph 55 above).", "60. On 12 September 2011 the Supreme Court issued an order joining the appeals and also instructed the parties to file their written addresses. The applicants submitted that on this date the court was informed that they had been released.", "61. On 8 November 2011 the applicants filed an application requesting an extension of twenty days for filing their written addresses. These were filed on 28 November 2011.", "62. On 17 March 2012 the appeals were set for directions.", "63. On 18 July 2012 the Government filed an application requesting the parties to appear before the Supreme Court and requested a forty-day extension for filing their written address. This was granted and the appeals were set down for hearing on 11 September 2012.", "64. In the meantime, the Government filed their written address on 28 August 2012.", "65. On 11 September 2012 the hearing was held and judgment was reserved.", "66. The appeals were dismissed on 15 October 2012. The Supreme Court held that as the applicants had, in the meantime, been released, the application was without object (see M.A., cited above, § 55).", "67. The applicants submitted that following their release on 20 May 2011 the authorities did not grant them residence permits. The applicants were not able to fulfil the terms and conditions imposed by the Ministry of Interior in order to have residence permits. Their issuing was subject to finding an employer approved by the Department of Labour and to present to the immigration authorities an approved contract of employment. The applicants could not find and/or were not referred by the Department of Labour to an approved employer despite their numerous attempts to that effect. Their situation was explained to the competent authorities in a letter dated 28 July 2011 to which they never received a reply. As a result they were not able to regularise their stay in Cyprus and had no access to any rights apart from a tolerated residence status.", "68. On 24 November 2012, at 9.45 a.m., the applicants, along with another Syrian couple who had three children, were stopped at Paphos airport while they attempted to take a flight to Bergamo-Milano in Italy by using false Bulgarian passports. During passport control, the police officer in charge suspected that their passports were false because the colour of the page containing the biometric data differed to that used in genuine passports. The applicants were then requested to give a sample of their signatures. These did not correspond to those in the passports they had presented. After having being questioned by the officer they admitted that the passports were not their own and revealed their true personal details. An immigration officer carried out a search of their immigration status and ascertained that they were failed asylum seekers as their appeal to the Reviewing Authority been dismissed and they did not have valid residence permits.", "69. According to the statement of the police officer taken on the same date, the applicants were arrested for committing the flagrant offences of personation and unlawful stay in the Republic (see paragraphs 86 and 114 below). The second applicant was arrested at 1 p.m. and the first applicant at 1.05 pm. In his statement the police officer stated that he had drawn their attention to the law and that the second applicant replied “I made a mistake”. The officer also noted that their legal rights had been explained to them in the Arabic language by an interpreter. The other couple was also arrested and the social welfare office was contacted concerning the children. Around 2 p.m. they were all taken to the Paphos Criminal Investigation Department (CID).", "70. The second applicant along with the other man, was then arrested by virtue of an arrest warrant issued by the District Court of Paphos at 2.20 pm the same day pursuant to section 18 of Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155; see paragraph 116 below) on the ground that there had been reasonable suspicion based on evidence that he had been involved in a conspiracy to commit a felony, forgery, circulation of a forged document, personation and unlawful stay in the Republic between 15 September 2009 and 14 November 2012. There is a handwritten signed note on the warrant by the arresting police officer stating that he arrested the second applicant at 2.40 p.m. at Paphos CID and that with the assistance of an interpreter he had informed him of the reasons for his arrest, had drawn his attention to the law and that the second applicant had replied “I did it for a better life”.", "71. The second applicant also signed a document containing his rights to communication as set out in sections 3 and 4 of Law 163(I)/of 2005 (see paragraphs 36 above and 113 below). The copy of the document signed by him was in Arabic.", "72. The second applicant was then questioned by a police officer with the assistance of an interpreter and gave a written statement. The statement was then translated into Arabic. The first part of the statement contains the information given to him by the police officer which reads as follows:\n“I inform you that I am investigating a case of conspiracy to commit a felony, forgery, uttering false documents and personation and unlawful stay on the territory of the Republic, offences that were committed between 26 March 2010 and 24 November 2012 in Paphos, for which I have evidence which gives me reasonable suspicion that you are implicated. I wish to question you and to take your statement. You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but anything you say may be written down and used as evidence”.", "73. The second applicant signed next to this paragraph.", "74. In his statement the second applicant stated that he had decided to leave Cyprus, as following his release and the expiry of the six-months, he was not given another residence and work permit (see paragraph 57 above). He also admitted that he had bought the passports from a Kurdish national for the amount of 1100 euros (EUR) and explained how these were secured. The applicants intended to leave Cyprus and go to Germany through Italy. He also apologised for what happened “today” and that he had done it because he could no longer live in Cyprus. The statement was read to the applicant by the interpreter; he confirmed it and signed it. A statement was also given by the interpreter.", "75. According to the relevant police report of Paphos CID, the first applicant and the other woman stated that they did not know anything about the passports and that their husbands had organised everything.", "76. At around 4.10 p.m. both women were released from custody as they were both pregnant and the one also had three children.", "77. The following day, 25 November 2012, the second applicant was taken to the Paphos District Court and was remanded in custody for four days for the purposes of further investigation of the alleged commission of a number of offences by the applicants under the Criminal Code and the Aliens and Immigration Law; in particular, the offences of conspiracy to commit a felony, forgery, uttering false documents and personation (sections 371, 331, 333, 334, 337, 339 and 360 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154) and unlawful stay in the Republic (section 19 (l) (l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law)(see paragraphs 86, 114 and 115 below).", "78. On 28 November 2012, following the conclusion of the police investigation, the case file was transmitted to the office of the Attorney-General for the purposes of deciding whether the applicants would be subject to criminal prosecution. The Attorney-General at the time, decided not to prosecute the applicants because of the particularity of their cases. He gave instructions to the police to proceed with the deportation of the applicants when the situation in Syria would allow it.", "79. On 29 November 2012, upon expiry of the second applicant’s remand, detention and deportation orders were issued pursuant to section 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the ground that the second applicant was a prohibited immigrant within the meaning of section 6 (1) (k) and (l) of that law (see M.A., § 62, cited above). On the same day the second applicant was served with a letter informing him of the decision to detain and deport him on the ground that he was an illegal immigrant as he had stayed unlawfully in the Republic. It also informed him that he had the right to file a recourse against these orders before the Supreme Court.", "80. The Government submitted that on the same day the execution of the deportation order was suspended as “it transpired” that the Court’s interim measure under Rule 39 was still in force.", "81. The second applicant was detained at Paphos Police Station Detention Facility until 21 December 2013 when he was released following a decision by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior to revoke the deportation and detention orders. The conditions attached to his release were set out in a letter dated 20 December 2013 given him on the date of his release. In particular, the second applicant was requested to hand over his passport to the Aliens and Immigration police. He would be given a certified copy of the passport which would allow the issuance of a residence permit or any other permit. A special residence/employment permit would then be issued for a period of six months. Prior to the issuance of this permit, however, the second applicant would have to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated and approved by the Department of Labour. The second applicant was also obliged to report to the nearest police station once a month and to inform the authorities of a change of address.", "82. The second applicant submitted that although he found employment he was informed by the Department of Labour that the employer in question did not fall within the categories entitled to employ him. The Department of Labour did not refer him to an eligible employer. The first applicant submitted that she was not given any terms or conditions of residence. They both therefore remained in an irregular situation." ]

[ "5", "3", "P4-4" ]

[ 7, 9, 10, 14 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Maryland (the United States of America).", "6. In 1999 the applicant married A., a Slovak national. There were three children of the marriage: B., born in 1999, C., born in 2002, and D., born in 2004.\nThe children are all Slovak nationals, while B. is also a Peruvian national, and C. and D. also have the United States nationality.", "7. For about eight years, until July 2010, the family lived together in one household in Maryland. A. then moved to stay with friends, took the children with her, the couple agreed on alternating custody, and they started receiving marriage counselling. Nevertheless, A. filed for divorce, but then withdrew her petition.", "8. On 25 August 2010 A. left the United States for Slovakia, taking the children with her. The following day she informed the applicant that they had left and that she had no intention of coming back.", "9. In September 2010 A. filed for divorce in Slovakia and requested that the children be entrusted to her custody by way of an interim measure. The status and outcome (if any) of these proceedings is not known.", "10. On 14 October 2010 the applicant filed an application for the return of the children to the United States as the country of their habitual residence, relying on the (Slovakian) International Private and Procedural Law Act (Law no. 97/1963 Coll., as amended), the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, and the Hague Convention.", "11. On 25 November 2010 the applicant’s Hague Convention application was transmitted to the Bratislava I District Court, through the intermediary of the Slovak Central Authority responsible for implementing the Hague Convention.", "12. On 21 January 2011 the District Court ordered the children’s return to the United States, having found that it was the country of their habitual residence, that they had been removed from there wrongfully, and that no obstacles to the return had been established.", "13. On 28 April 2011 the Bratislava Regional Court dismissed an appeal filed by A. and upheld the return order. The matter thus became resolved by force of a final and binding decision on 9 May 2011.", "14. On 31 May 2011 the applicant filed for judicial enforcement of the return order.", "15. Upon several unsuccessful attempts at having A. comply with the order voluntarily, the Komárno District Court acceded to the petition on 28 November 2011 by issuing a warrant for the order’s enforcement.", "16. On 29 June 2012 the Nitra Regional Court quashed the enforcement warrant following an appeal by A. It observed that, meanwhile, A. had challenged the decision of 28 April 2011 by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) to the Constitutional Court; that on 15 December 2011 the Constitutional Court had declared that complaint admissible; and that, at the same time, it had suspended the enforceability of the return order pending the outcome of the proceedings on the merits of the complaint of A. (see paragraphs 20 and 21 below).\nThe Regional Court concluded that, in those circumstances, an essential prerequisite for the enforcement of the return order had lapsed.\nConsequently, the matter was remitted to the District Court for a new decision to be taken in the light of the outcome of the constitutional complaint of A.", "17. The applicant challenged the decision of 29 June 2012 by way of an appeal on points of law. He pointed out that there had been no hearing before the Regional Court and that it was only from the Regional Court’s decision that he had learned of the Constitutional Court’s decisions underlying it and of other new relevant facts, such as that the applicant had applied for the enforcement proceedings to be stayed.\nAs the Constitutional Court’s decisions had not been served on him and he had had no knowledge of those facts, he had been deprived of an opportunity to comment and to consider the taking of other legal steps.\nThis was contrary to the principles of adversary proceedings and equality of arms and, in the applicant’s submission, he had thereby been “prevented from acting before the court”, which constituted an admissibility ground for his appeal under Article 237 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended – “CCP”).", "18. On 6 December 2012 the Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It observed that the Regional Court had of its own motion obtained a copy of the Constitutional Court’s decision to suspend the enforceability of the return order, that it had based its decision on it, and that a copy of the Constitutional Court’s decision had never been served on the applicant.\nHowever, the Supreme Court also noted that the Constitutional Court’s decision was binding upon the Regional Court and considered that, therefore, having it served on the applicant and having allowed him to comment could not have had any impact on the Regional Court’s decision.\nTherefore, in the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the ground invoked by the applicant for the admissibility of his appeal had not been given.", "19. In consequence, it became incumbent upon the District Court to rule on the applicant’s enforcement petition anew, which it did on 18 January 2013 by dismissing it.\nThe District Court observed that on 16 May 2012 the Constitutional Court had quashed the decision upholding the return order and that it had remitted the appeal of A. against that order to the Bratislava Regional Court for a new determination (see paragraph 23 below). The return order was thus pending on appeal and, as such, it was no longer enforceable.\nThe District Court’s decision became final and binding on 8 February 2013.", "20. On 6 July 2011 A. challenged the decision of 28 April 2011 to uphold the return order (see paragraph 13 above) by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court. It was directed against the Regional Court and, in it, she submitted that the applicant had filed observations in reply to her appeal against the return order; that she had not been served a copy of these observations; that her appeal had been determined without a hearing; and that she had accordingly been deprived of the opportunity to comment on those observations, which was contrary to her rights under Articles 46 § 1 (right to judicial protection), 47 § 3 (equality of parties to judicial proceedings) and 48 § 2 (right to comment on the evidence assessed) of the Constitution, as well as Article 6 § 1 (fairness) of the Convention.\nIn addition, A. requested that the Constitutional Court indicate an interim measure to the effect that the enforceability of the contested decision be suspended.", "21. On 15 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible and ruled that the enforceability of the decision of 28 April 2011 should be suspended pending the outcome of the constitutional proceedings on the merits.\nAs to the latter ruling, the Constitutional Court found (i) that the suspensive measure was not contrary to any important public interest, (ii) that not having the enforceability of the return order suspended could lead to an irreversible situation and “cause detriment to the property sphere” of A. in potential violation of her fundamental rights and freedoms, and (iii) that having the enforceability suspended “gave rise to no risk of damage to any party concerned”.", "22. In the ensuing proceedings on the merits, the Bratislava Regional Court as the defendant of the complaint submitted, inter alia, that there was no statutory requirement for observations in reply to an appeal to be communicated to the appellant for further observations, unless the former observations had a substantial impact on the determination of the appeal. However, the applicant’s observations in reply to the appeal by A. had had no such impact.", "23. In a judgment of 16 May 2012 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the rights of A. as identified above (see paragraph 20), quashed the decision of 28 April 2011, remitted the case to the Regional Court for a new determination of the appeal of A. against the return order, and awarded her legal costs. In principle, the Constitutional Court fully embraced the line of argument advanced by A.", "24. The Constitutional Court also noted that the applicant had sought leave to intervene in the proceedings as a third party.\nIn that respect, it observed that constitutional proceedings were conducted in the procedural framework laid down in the Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 38/1993 Coll., as amended), as a lex specialis, and in the CCP, as a lex generalis. The Constitutional Court Act however envisaged no standing for third parties to intervene in proceedings on individual complaints, and its quality of a lex specialis excluded the application of the third-party-intervention rules under the CCP.\nFor that reason, the Constitutional Court observed specifically that it had taken no account of the submissions made by the applicant.", "25. The applicant obtained a copy of the Constitutional Court’s judgment on 16 August 2012.", "26. On 28 February 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, alleging inter alia a violation of his rights under Article 46 § 1 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (fairness) in the enforcement proceedings, in particular in their phase before the Regional Court and the Supreme Court, and raising in substance the same arguments as in his appeal on points of law (see paragraph 17 above). The applicant pointed out, in addition, that that it had been for substantially the same reasons that the Constitutional Court itself had found a violation of the rights of A. in relation to her appeal against the return order.", "27. On 5 November 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It fully endorsed the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision of 6 December 2012 (see paragraph 18 above) and concluded that, accordingly, the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.\nThe decision was served on the applicant on 9 December 2013.", "28. Following the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 16 May 2012, on 21 September 2012, the Bratislava Regional Court decided again on the appeal by A. against the return order of 21 January 2011 by quashing that order and remitting the case to the Bratislava I District Court for a new determination.", "29. In the subsequent period a number of hearings were held at first instance and courts at two levels of jurisdiction dealt with various procedural matters such as translations of documents into a language the applicant understood, court fees and costs of the translations, the applicant’s visiting rights in relation to his children pending the outcome of the proceedings on the merits, an injunction prohibiting A. to leave and remove the children form the territory of Slovakia, admission of the mother of A. to the proceedings as a third party, two procedural fines on A., her challenges to the first-instance judge for bias, her request for a legal-aid lawyer and establishing her whereabouts. There is no indication that any of the fines and interim rulings were actually enforced.", "30. No decision on the merits was taken and the District Court decided to terminate the proceedings on 28 November 2014. It referred to Article 12 (last sentence) of the Hague Convention, which permits termination of the proceedings if there is an indication that the child in question has been taken to another State, and observed that A. and the children had moved to Hungary and had established residence there.", "31. On 7 January 2015 the applicant appealed and his appeal appears to be still pending." ]

[ "8" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Schrobenhausen, Germany. Through the German stock market, he purchased six hundred and fifty German Certificates in Demirbank, which at the time was identified as the fifth largest private bank in Turkey.", "6. By a decision dated 6 December 2000 (no. 123), the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu, hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tassarruf Mevduat Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter “the Fund”), pursuant to section 14 (3) of the Banking Activities Act (Law no. 4389). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank’s management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank.", "7. On 31 January 2001 all equities of the bank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund. Subsequently, on 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with the HSBC bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter for 350,000,000 United States dollars (USD). As a result, on 14 December 2001 Demirbank’s legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register.", "8. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the decision of 6 December 2000 regarding the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund.", "9. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court.", "10. In its submissions before the Supreme Administrative Court, the plaintiff claimed that its property rights had been violated. It also raised a plea of unconstitutionality under section 14 of the Banking Activities Act. The company further stated that prior to November 2000 Demirbank had never encountered major financial problems. It was pointed out that pursuant to section 14 (2) of the Act, a bank with financial difficulties should first be given a warning to strengthen its financial structure and be allowed time to take specific measures. However, no such warning had been given in the instant case. Secondly, the Board had not claimed that Demirbank’s financial situation was so weak that it could not be strengthened even if specific measures were taken. Lastly, the company stated that following the transfer of the bank to the Fund, a General Assembly composed of the Fund’s officials had exonerated the former managers of Demirbank, holding that they had not been at fault in the incident leading to the bank’s transfer.", "11. After examining the file, on 3 June 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the case. It held that the takeover of the bank by the Fund had been in accordance with section 14 (3) of the Banking Activities Act.", "12. On 18 December 2003 the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court decided to quash the decision of 3 June 2003. In its judgment, the court held that prior to ordering the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, the Board should have carried out an objective evaluation of the bank’s financial situation. The court also concluded that the Board should first have ordered Demirbank to take specific measures in accordance with section 14 (2) of the Banking Activities Act before applying section 14 (3) of the Act.", "13. On 29 April 2004 a request for rectification lodged by the Agency was refused.", "14. The case was remitted to the Supreme Administrative Court, which delivered its decision on 5 November 2004, upholding the decision of the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court. It accordingly annulled the Board’s decision of 6 December 2000 ordering the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, holding that the takeover had been illegal. A further appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively.", "15. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC.", "16. Given that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court, on 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement entered into by the Fund and HSBC on 20 September 2001. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected on 3 June 2005 and 24 February 2006 respectively.", "17. Following the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund, the applicant applied to the Board and claimed compensation. He did not receive any reply.", "18. Subsequently, on 31 May 2002, the applicant brought compensation proceedings against the Agency before the Supreme Administrative Court. He argued that he had lost his shares in Demirbank as a result of its transfer to the Fund, and requested the annulment of the Board’s implied rejection of his compensation claim.", "19. On 24 June 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case. On the basis of a previous judgment it had rendered on 3 June 2003 (see paragraph 11 above), the court found that the takeover of the bank by the Fund had been in accordance with section 14 § 3 of the Banking Act.", "20. The applicant lodged an appeal.", "21. On 21 October 2004 the Joint Administrative Chambers of the Supreme Administrative Court decided to quash the judgment. It indicated that the previous judgment dated 3 June 2003, which had constituted the basis of the latter, had been quashed on 18 December 2003 (see paragraph 12 above).", "22. The Agency’s rectification request was rejected on 26 May 2005.", "23. On 20 September 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae, as the applicant’s case merely concerned an implied rejection by the Board, which should be assessed by the Ankara Administrative Court.", "24. On 30 December 2005 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the case as out of time. The court held that the applicant should have initiated proceedings within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank’s equities had been transferred to the Fund’s account at the Stock Exchange (see paragraph 7 above).", "25. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment on 12 September 2006.", "26. Following the annulment of the decision regarding the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 8-14 above), on an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant initiated another set of administrative proceedings. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, he claimed that the Agency should enforce the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, and that his rights as a shareholder of Demirbank should be reinstated.", "27. On 27 September 2007, after indicating the administration’s obligation to execute judgments which are enforceable, the Ankara Administrative Court held that the enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court judgment in the instant case was legally impossible as, following its sale to HSBC, Demirbank had been struck off the commercial register.", "28. On 16 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld that judgment. The court indicated that the execution of the judgment dated 5 November 2004 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank’s shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank’s shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its merger with HSBC.", "29. The Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s request for rectification of the judgment on 17 September 2009.", "30. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC (see paragraphs 15-16 above), on 30 April 2006 the applicant applied to the Fund for compensation for the loss of his shares resulting from the bank’s unlawful sale to HSBC. The Fund rejected that request on 15 June 2006.", "31. On an unspecified date in 2006, the applicant accordingly brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund, claiming compensation for his lost shares on the basis of the annulment of Demirbank’s sale to HSBC.", "32. On 15 April 2008 the Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the case as out of time, indicating that the sixty-day time-limit for the initiation of administrative proceedings had started running on 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank’s equities had been transferred to the Fund’s account at the Stock Exchange.", "33. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Istanbul Regional Administrative Court on 21 January 2009. The decision is final under national law." ]

[ "6", "P1-1" ]

[ 10, 11, 25 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1957, 1984, 1989 and 1991, respectively, and live in Novi Pazar.", "6. The applicants’ late wife and mother, Ms Sadija Ljajić was employed by “Raška” Holding kompanija AD Novi Pazar (hereinafter “the debtor”), which was, at the relevant time, a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital.", "7. On 14 December 2005 the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Novi Pazar ordered the debtor to pay Ms Sadija Ljajić certain amount on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings.", "8. On 10 October 2006, upon Ms Ljajić’s request to that effect, the Municipal Court in Novi Pazar ordered the enforcement of the judgment of 14 December 2005 by means of a bank transfer and ordered the debtor to pay Ms Ljajić the enforcement costs.", "9. On 24 April 2013 Ms Sadija Ljajić passed away. On 9 September 2013 the Novi Pazar First Instance Court issued a decision declaring Mr Fuad Ljajić as the sole inheritor of late Sadija Ljajić.", "10. In view of these facts, the applicants’ representative informed the Court that Ms Alma Ljajić, Mr Ertan Ljajić and Ms Samra Ljajić no longer intend to pursue their application before the Court.", "11. On 25 October 2013 the Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud) in Kraljevo opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 17/2013). On 5 January 2014 Mr Fuad Ljajić submitted his claims for the payment of the amount ordered by the judgment of 14 December 2005. The insolvency proceedings are still pending." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Ljubljana.", "5. On 29 July 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Ljubljana District Court against the State claiming non-pecuniary damages inflicted on her by involuntary confinements in the Ljubljana Psychiatric Hospital in December 1999 and between July and September 2000.", "6. At the first hearing held on 3 May 2005 the applicant lodged a request to delegate territorial jurisdiction to another court.", "7. On 24 June 2005 the Supreme Court upheld her request and delegated jurisdiction to the Kranj District Court.", "8. On 16 March 2006 the Kranj District Court held the first main hearing.", "9. On 26 March 2006 the applicant lodged a request with the Kranj District Court a motion to have the presiding judge excluded.", "10. On 5 May 2006 the Vice-President of the District Court upheld the applicant’s request.", "11. Between August 2006 and March 2008 the court held further four hearings.", "12. On 12 May 2007 the applicant lodged a second request to have the then presiding judge excluded and a request to transfer the case to another court with the subject-matter jurisdiction.", "13. On 31 May 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request to transfer the case to another court.", "14. On 28 September 2007 the President of the District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for the exclusion of the presiding judge.", "15. On 18 March 2008 the applicant lodged a request to have the president of the District Court and the presiding judge excluded.", "16. On 9 April 2008 the President of the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s request to have the President of the Kranj District Court excluded.", "17. On 21 April 2008 the President of the Kranj District Court dismissed the applicant’s request to have the presiding judge excluded.", "18. In the meantime, on 5 April 2008, the Kranj District Court imposed a fine of 500 euros (EUR) on the applicant for abuse of her procedural rights by having lodged the requests concerning the exclusion of the presiding judge. The applicant appealed.", "19. On 5 November 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the applicant’s appeal and annulled the order to fine the applicant. The court held that the district court failed to establish that by lodging the requests the applicant had abused her procedural rights.", "20. On 16 September 2009 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal. On 6 October 2009 the President of the Kranj District Court replied that a hearing would be scheduled for 22 October 2009.", "21. A further hearing was held on 22 February 2010.", "22. On 9 March 2011 the Kranj District Court issued a judgment in which it upheld the applicant’s claim in part. Both parties appealed.", "23. On 18 January 2012 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the appeals, quashed the judgment of the lower court and modified it by dismissing the claim in respect of the confinement in December 1999 as time-barred and decided that the claim for non-pecuniary damages in respect of the confinement between July and September 2000 was well-founded but that the first instance court needed to decide on the amount of compensation in a new set of proceedings.", "24. The applicant lodged a motion for leave to file an appeal on points of law in respect of the question whether her claim for damages due to the December 1999 confinement was time-barred.", "25. On 19 July 2012 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law.", "26. On 31 January 2013 the Supreme Court granted the applicant’s appeal on points of law and quashed the respective part of the decision of the higher court.", "27. On 13 March 2013 the Ljubljana Higher Court quashed the decision of the district court in respect of the 1999 confinement and remitted the case back to the district court.", "28. On 30 January 2014 the applicant lodged a further supervisory appeal which was dismissed on 14 February 2014.", "29. On 10 February 2014 the Kranj District Court held the first main hearing after the remittal and postponed the hearing for an indefinite period in order to obtain an expert opinion on the applicant’s mental health at the time of the confinement.", "30. On 14 March 2014 the applicant lodged a motion for a deadline with the Ljubljana Higher Court.", "31. On 25 March 2014 the Ljubljana Higher Court granted the applicant’s motion for a deadline and ordered the district court to deal with the case with priority.", "32. The proceedings are still pending before the Kranj District Court which still needs to decide on the applicant’s claim in respect of the confinement in 1999 and on the amount of compensation in respect of the 2000 confinement.", "33. On 24 March 2006 the applicant amended her claim in the above proceedings by claiming further non-pecuniary damages due to the length of proceedings. This part of the claim was separated from the main claim and referred to the Ljubljana District Court.", "34. On 18 March 2009 the applicant raised the claim to EUR 5,000.", "35. On 21 May 2009 the Ljubljana District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as premature since the main proceedings were still pending. The applicant appealed.", "36. On 20 January 2010 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged a motion to file an appeal on points of law.", "37. On 30 September 2010 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of law in respect of the question whether it was possible to claim compensation for a violation of one’s right to a trial without undue delay before the termination of the main proceedings.", "38. On 27 September 2012 the Supreme Court held that even though the proceedings had been instituted before 1 January 2007 when the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”) became operational, the latter was applicable to the applicant’s case and therefore it was not possible to claim compensation before the termination of the main proceedings. It further held that since the appeal on points of law was explicitly excluded as a legal remedy in the proceeding under the 2006 Act, the applicant’s appeal on points of law should be rejected on procedural grounds as not allowed. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint.", "39. On 27 December 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint by reference to Section 55.b of the Constitutional Court Act." ]

[ "13", "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Volzhskiy, Volgograd Region.", "6. On 1 October 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug offences.", "7. On 2 October 2010 he was charged with two episodes of attempted drug trafficking, allegedly committed on 7 and 8 September 2010 in conspiracy with others.", "8. On 3 October 2010 Kirovskiy District Court, Astrakhan, (“the District Court”) granted the investigator’s request to place the applicant in detention until 1 December 2010. The District Court held as follows:\n“It follows from the evidence provided by the investigator in support of his request for application of a measure of restraint that Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with particularly serious criminal offences which represent a significant danger to society and are punishable by deprivation of liberty for a period of five to twelve years.\nThe charges against the applicant are justified by the report on the detection of the crime, operational search materials, search records, expert reports, and the testimony of Mr A.C. Filenko, which directly implicates Mr Shevchenko in those criminal offences.\nHaving regard to the above, and also taking into account the circumstances of the case and information on the implication of Mr Shevchenko in the criminal offences, as well as the personality of the defendant, who is not registered as resident in the Astrakhan region and has no job and no dependents, the court has come to the conclusion that at liberty he might abscond and thereby interfere with the proceedings.\nTaking into account information about the personality of the defendant and the criminal offences with which he is charged, it is impossible to apply a more lenient measure of restraint.”", "9. On 8 October 2010 a further set of criminal proceedings was initiated against the applicant on suspicion of drug offences allegedly committed between the beginning of September and 1 October 2010.", "10. On 9 October 2010 those proceedings were joined to the first set of proceedings against the applicant.", "11. On 23 November 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 January 2011. The District Court held as follows:\n“Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with particularly serious criminal offences punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment.\nIn taking a decision on this request, the court considers that the investigating authorities reasonably argue that it is impossible to finalise their investigation for objective reasons, such as there being a large number of witnesses and defendants and it being necessary to finish the investigation. The character of the case, its circumstances and the charges [brought against the co-defendants] indicate that the case is particularly complex; this is also due to there being a large number of co‑defendants.\nThe circumstances which served as the grounds for choosing the measure of restraint in the form of placement in detention have not changed in view of the legal characterisation of the criminal offence. The personality of Mr Shevchenko, his engagement in illegal distribution of narcotic drugs which, as indicated by the evidence, constituted the source of his income, and the absence of any other income, allow the conclusion that the investigator’s request is well founded and that it is necessary to place Mr Shevchenko in isolation from society.\nMr Shevchenko’s term of detention expires on 1 December 2010. This is too short a period of time to carry out planned investigative actions and to take a decision on the charges, and therefore the term of detention of the defendant should be extended.”", "12. In his appeal against that detention order the applicant submitted that the District Court had based its decision on negative assumptions about his future behaviour, and had not taken into account his personality, positive references and permanent place of residence.", "13. On 3 December 2010 the Astrakhan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the detention order of 23 November 2010.", "14. On 14 January 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 March 2011. The District Court held as follows:\n“The court takes into account that Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with particularly serious criminal offences ... punishable exclusively by deprivation of liberty for up to twelve years, and therefore the court comes to the conclusion that the investigating authorities’ argument, that if released the defendant, fearing punishment, might abscond, since he has no registration or permanent place of residence in the Astrakhan region, is well founded.\nThe court also takes into account that the criminal case is particularly complex, since it involves several co-defendants, and there should be individual investigations in respect of each co-defendant. In addition, there is a large volume of planned investigating activities.\nHaving regard to the above, the court comes to the conclusion that there exist no grounds for quashing or altering the measure of restraint.\nIt has not been established in the court hearing that there exist any factors preventing the applicant from being kept in a remand prison. The grounds on which the measure of restraint was initially applied and extended have not changed.\nThe court also takes into account that the term of the defendant’s detention is set to expire, whereas the investigation is not yet complete and it is necessary to carry out a number of investigating activities which would require additional time.”", "15. On 17 January 2011 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 14 January 2011 to the Astrakhan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). The applicant submitted that the court’s conclusion regarding the risk that he would abscond was not supported by specific evidence. The court had not taken into account his positive references, permanent place of residence and his argument that the investigation of the case was delayed intentionally.", "16. On 13 March 2011 the prosecuting authorities terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of 2 October 2010 of two episodes of attempted drug trafficking, in the absence of corpus delicti. They considered that the applicant’s actions had to be qualified as illegal purchase and storage of narcotic drugs without purpose of sale.", "17. On 15 March 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 May 2011. The District Court held as follows:\n“The court takes into account that Mr A.N. Shevchenko is charged with offences ... which are punishable by deprivation of liberty for a period of up to twelve years. The court comes to the conclusion that the investigating authorities’ argument, that Mr Shevchenko might abscond because of fear of punishment, is well founded. In addition, Mr Shevchenko has no family or dependents; he has no official employment, and therefore no permanent source of income. Mr Shevchenko has no place of residence nor registration in the territory of Astrakhan or Astrakhan region. Mr Shevchenko has previous convictions, and has an outstanding conviction, all of which characterise him as a person disposed to commit crimes. At present the investigation of the criminal case has not been completed.\nThe evidence before the court allow the conclusion that there exist no grounds for altering or changing the measure of restraint applied to the defendant.\nIt has not been established in the court hearing that there are grounds which would prevent the defendant from being held in detention in the remand prison.\nThe argument submitted by the defence and the defendant, that the defendant had no intention of absconding, are not sufficient to alter the measure of restraint to a preventive measure not involving pre-trial detention.\nHaving regard to the above, the court comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to apply other measures of restraint, including a written undertaking, personal surety, or bail.\nThe court also takes into account that a number of investigating activities have been planned in the present case. In addition, within fourteen days of the arrival of the case at the trial court ... a judge has to take a decision about the existence or otherwise of grounds for further extension of the detention ... therefore the court finds it necessary to extend the pre-trial detention in respect of Mr Shevchenko.”", "18. In his appeal against the detention order of 15 March 2011 the applicant submitted that the detention order had not been based on relevant and sufficient reasons.", "19. On 16 March 2011 the applicant was charged with illegal purchase and storage of narcotic drugs without intent to sell.", "20. On 18 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 14 January 2011.", "21. On 23 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 15 March 2011.", "22. On 12 May 2011 the applicant was presented with the final version of the charges against him. He was charged with illegal purchase and storage of particularly large quantities of narcotic drugs without intent to sell.", "23. On the same date the investigation was terminated and the applicant and his co-defendants familiarised themselves with the evidence in the criminal case.", "24. On 17 May 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 June 2011. The District Court held as follows:\n“The court has established that the grounds which were taken into account when the measure of restraint was chosen in respect of defendant A.N. Shevchenko ... have not changed, and therefore the court is not able to change or cancel the measure of restraint. Mr Shevchenko is charged with involvement in a serious crime ... which presents a significant danger to society and is directed against public health and morals. The court finds well founded the investigating authorities’ argument whereby the applicant might abscond because of fear of punishment, since he has no registration or permanent place of residence in Astrakhan or the Astrakhan region. He has no permanent job, family or dependents.\nThe fact that the charges against Mr Shevchenko were modified and that at present he is charged with illegal drug trafficking without intent to sell cannot serve as a ground for the release of Mr Shevchenko, since that criminal offence also represents a significant danger to society.\nThe term of the detention of Mr Shevchenko expires on 20 May 2011. This period of time is not sufficient to carry out the investigating and procedural activities referred to by the investigator in his request. Therefore, taking into account the volume and complexity of the criminal case, which involves several co-defendants charged with particularly serious crimes, the court considers that the term of detention should be extended.\nThere are no grounds to cancel or alter the measure of restraint.\nHaving regard to the circumstances of the case, the nature of the criminal offence with which Mr Shevchenko is charged, and his personality, the court comes to the conclusion that the term of detention of Mr Shevchenko should be extended for one more month, thus bringing the total length of his detention to eight months and nineteen days, until 20 June 2011.”", "25. On the same date the investigating authorities referred the criminal case to the prosecutor’s office of the Astrakhan region for approval.", "26. In his appeal against the detention order of 17 May 2011 the applicant and his counsel submitted that the court had not supported its conclusions with specific evidence, and that the investigating activities referred to in the decisions had already been carried out. Furthermore, the court had not taken into account the information about his personality and the fact that he had a permanent place of residence in the Volgograd region.", "27. On 25 May 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 17 May 2011.", "28. On 14 June 2011 the Deputy Prosecutor returned the criminal case to the investigating authorities. He indicated that there were a number of shortcomings in the investigation which needed to be corrected.", "29. On 16 June 2011 the investigation was reopened in order to remedy those shortcomings.", "30. On the same date the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 16 September 2011, referring to the same grounds as before.", "31. On 24 June 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 16 June 2011.", "32. In the first half of July 2011 the investigation was terminated and the applicant familiarised himself with the evidence in the case.", "33. However, on 15 July 2011 the investigation was again reopened in order to correct the personal details of one of the applicant’s co-defendants in various procedural documents.", "34. On 9 August 2011 the investigation was terminated and the case was referred to the Regional Prosecutor, who approved it on 25 August 2011.", "35. On 31 August 2011 the criminal case against the applicant and his co-defendants was referred to the District Court for trial.", "36. On 5 September 2011 the District Court set the preliminary hearing of the case for 12 September 2011. By a decision adopted on the same date the District Court extended the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention until 29 February 2012, referring to the seriousness of the charges against them.", "37. On 8 September 2011 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 5 September 2011. He submitted that the charges of attempted drug trafficking had been abandoned, that he was now charged with illegal purchase and storage of narcotic drugs without purpose of sale, that the investigation had been completed and it was now impossible for him to interfere with the proceedings.", "38. On 20 September 2011 the District Court referred the criminal case for examination on the merits to the Sovetskiy District Court, Astrakhan, on the grounds that the majority of criminal offences impugned to the defendants had been committed in the Sovetskiy District.", "39. On 20 October 2011 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 5 September 2011.", "40. On 14 February 2012 the Sovetskiy District Court extended the applicant’s and his co-defendant’s detention until 29 May 2012, referring to the same grounds as in the previous detention orders.", "41. On 18 February 2012 the applicant appealed against the detention order of 14 February 2012. He submitted, in particular, that the Sovetskiy District Court had issued a collective detention order without analysing his individual situation, and had not supported its conclusions with specific evidence.", "42. On 2 April 2012 the Sovetskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of purchase and storage of drugs, and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment.", "43. On 12 April 2012 the Regional Court upheld the detention order of 14 February 2012.", "44. On 21 June 2012 the Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction.", "45. On 13 February 2013 the Tagilstroyevskiy District Court, Nizhniy Tagil, granted the applicant’s request for early release." ]

[ "5" ]

[ 14, 17 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sisak.", "6. The applicant, a person of Serbian ethnic origin, lived in the town of Sisak. During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about one third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the so-called “Serbian Autonomous region of Krajina” (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter the “Krajina”). The town of Sisak was close to the border of Krajina. There were targeted killing of Serbian civilians by members of the Croatian police and army in the Sisak area during a prolonged period in 1991 and 1992 (see Jelić v. Croatia, no. 57856/11, § 78, 12 June 2014). In July 1991 the applicant left the town of Sisak, fearing for his personal safety.", "7. At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced a campaign of military action with the aim of regaining control over the Krajina. The action was codenamed “Storm” and lasted from 4 to 7 August 1995.", "8. In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the “UNTAES”). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began.", "9. On 26 September 1999 the applicant lodged a civil action against the Sisak Municipality and the Sisak Market in the Sisak Municipal Court, seeking payment of a sum of money on account of his investments in certain premises. The applicant stated that in July 1991 he left the town of Sisak fearing for his personal safety. He returned to Croatia in 1996. As a result, he was not able to lodge his claim within the five-year statutory time-limit. In his oral evidence given on 19 February 2002 the applicant said that after having left the town of Sisak, he had first moved to Glina, in the territory of the Krajina, and soon afterwards to the Netherlands.", "10. On 30 January 2006 the Sisak County Court dismissed the claim on the grounds that it had become time-barred. It held that the applicant had left the town of Sisak of his own free will, that the town of Sisak had never been occupied and that the courts had been operational there at all times. Therefore, there had been no “insurmountable obstacles” for the applicant to lodge his civil claim within the statutory limitation period. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n“... the defendant’s objection concerning the statutory limitation period is well founded since the plaintiff brought his civil action on 26 September 1999 and the lease agreement had ceased on 6 September 1991. Therefore, under section 371 of the Obligations Act ... the plaintiff’s claim had become statute-barred after five years.\n...\nThe plaintiff’s submissions under section 383 of the Obligations Act concerning insurmountable obstacles which had prevented him from seeking judicial protection of his rights have not been accepted by this court because he had left the town of Sisak of his own free will and the courts [in Sisak] have been operational at all times.”", "11. This judgment was upheld by the Sisak County Court on 8 January 2009. The relevant part of its judgment reads:\n“Under section 383 of the Obligations Act the statutory limitation period is suspended during the time in which a creditor is unable, owing to insurmountable obstacles, to seek the fulfilment of an obligation [from a debtor].\nThe conclusions of the first-instance court that the plaintiff had not proved the existence of any such obstacles; that the plaintiff had left the town of Sisak of his own free will since that town had never been occupied by the enemy army during the period relevant for the statutory limitation; and that the courts [in Sisak] functioned at all times; are correct and therefore fully endorsed by this court.”", "12. On 20 May 2009 the lower courts’ judgments were upheld by the Supreme Court. The relevant part of its judgment reads:\n“The [lower] courts assessed all relevant circumstances and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that there were insurmountable obstacles preventing him from lodging his action and that section 383 of the Obligations Act was applicable.\nContrary to the plaintiff’s allegations that he could not go to the town of Sisak and lodge his civil action owing to insurmountable obstacles, the courts established that the courts in the town of Sisak had been operational at all times; that the town of Sisak had not been occupied by the enemy army at any time during the period relevant for the statutory limitation; that the plaintiff had not proved the existence of obstacles preventing him from going to Sisak; and that he had left Sisak of his own free will.\nSince these are well-known facts, the conclusion of the lower courts that there were no insurmountable obstacles preventing him from lodging the claim in due time ... is correct.\nThis court is also of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot rely on insurmountable obstacles of an objective nature within the meaning of section 383 of the Obligations Act since the town of Sisak was not occupied by the enemy army, none of its citizens has the status of refugee or displaced person and the lodging of a civil action was possible during the entire period of war because the courts remained operational.”", "13. The applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed on 5 October 2011. The Constitutional Court endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts." ]

[ "5", "6", "3" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Kumanovo. He was a surgeon at Kumanovo Hospital.", "6. On 17 September 2004 the applicant parked his car in a street in Kumanovo. After he returned, he found a notice of illegal parking under the windscreen wiper. He started his car and went looking for a police officer in order to discuss the issue regarding the ticket (the applicant alleged that there had been no sign there that parking was illegal). When he saw a police car he started following it until it stopped. Two police officers, M.A. and P.J., were inside the car. P.J. was a neighbour with whom the applicant was not on good terms. The parties presented rather conflicting versions of events as to what happened on that occasion. The Government’s account was based on the version of events which had been “correctly and fully established” by the national courts in the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraphs 19-38 below).", "7. While following the police car, the applicant signaled to it by flashing his lights. He did not sound the car horn. When he approached the police car, he addressed M.A. However, the two police officers started insulting him. P.J. said “I’ve been looking forward to this ...” P.J. opened the front passenger’s door “hard” and hit the applicant on the legs. Both officers left the car, grabbed the applicant by the shoulders and neck, and started punching him on the back. P.J. kicked and punched him all over the body. He was also hit on the back of the head. As a result, he slumped forward, which allowed P.J. to knee the applicant in the back, causing a fracture of two spinal vertebrae. M.A. also kicked him in the lower part of the back. He was then handcuffed, and while he was putting him into the police car P.J. kneed him in the lower back. During the incident, the applicant asked the officers to stop beating him, because he was in poor health: notably he had a weak heart and had had heart surgery. The incident was witnessed by many people. The applicant was then taken to Kumanovo police station, where the beating continued until he lost consciousness.", "8. After an hour, an emergency ambulance was called, which took the applicant to Kumanovo Hospital. He was then transported to Skopje Clinic and subsequently to Skopje City Hospital, where he remained until 28 September 2004.", "9. On 17 September 2004 Dr Z.T. from the Kumanovo Hospital examined the applicant and issued a medical report, which stated that the applicant had the following injuries: head contusion, concussion, bruises on the chest and back, and bruises on both arms. The medical report also noted that the applicant was in post-heart-attack condition, and that he had had heart surgery.", "10. On the same day, an investigating judge of the Kumanovo Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) agreed to a request from the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”) and ordered an external examination of the applicant’s body (телесен преглед). The order was issued in the context of criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant. The examination was carried out by the Forensic Institute (Институт за Судска Медицина). It took place on 18 September 2004, while the applicant was in Skopje City Hospital. As indicated in the medical report, the applicant stated that he had signaled by flashing his lights and had sounded the car horn to attract the police car’s attention so that it would stop; also that the police officers had beaten him up during his arrest and while they were taking him out of the police car to take him into the police station. The applicant further stated that he had been taken to the cardiology unit at Skopje Clinic and then, in a wheelchair (because he had numbness in his legs), to the emergency unit, where an X-ray examination was carried out on his chest, head and spinal column. He was then discharged from Skopje Clinic. Not satisfied, he went to Skopje City Hospital where, on admission, he complained of headache, other pain and nausea. During the examination by experts of the Forensic Institute, the applicant complained of pain in the back, head and chest. The report noted contusions on the applicant’s head, nose, chest, back, hip and both arms and legs.", "11. According to a discharge notice issued by Skopje City Hospital, the applicant was hospitalised between 17 and 28 September 2004. It indicated that the applicant had sustained, inter alia, the following injuries: a compressive fracture of two vertebrae on the lower part of the spinal column as shown by the X-ray examination, concussion, head trauma and contusions on his back, right shoulder and wrist. According to the notice, the applicant had been examined in three hospitals, which had all established the same diagnosis and recommended that he be examined in that hospital. He was advised to remain in bed for four to six weeks. It was also indicated that the applicant was unfit to work.", "12. On 8 February 2005 Dr Z.T. (see paragraph 9 above) issued, on the basis of available documentary medical evidence, a medical certificate indicating, inter alia, the following injuries: concussion; head trauma; fracture of two vertebrae; and contusions on the back, chest, and right wrist. In conclusion, the certificate stated:\n“I think this is a serious bodily injury under the Criminal Code, with permanent reduction of the activities of daily living, as well as consequences of a permanent nature, which would certainly affect the victim’s capacity to work ...”", "13. On 10 July 2006 the Forensic Institute submitted to the trial court another expert report that the investigating judge had requested in relation to the applicant’s criminal complaint lodged against P.J. and M.A. (see paragraphs 39-68 below). The Forensic Institute was required to give an opinion about the applicant’s injuries and the way in which they had been inflicted. The opinion was based on extensive medical documentary evidence from the medical examinations that the applicant had undergone between 17 September 2004 (in Kumanovo Hospital, the cardiology and emergency units of Skopje Clinic, and Skopje City Hospital) and 12 October 2005. The Forensic Institute concluded that:\n“... on the basis of the medical evidence and the examination we carried out [the external examination of 18 September 2004, see above], [the applicant] sustained the following injuries in the fight with the two accused which took place on 17 September 2004: concussion, head trauma, bruises (and/ or lesions) on the nose; chest; hip; right shoulder, forearm and hand; left forearm, elbow and hand; right thigh and lower leg; left lower leg and fracture of the first vertebrae on the lumbar vertebral column ...\nAs a result of the injuries he had sustained (the applicant) was hospitalised between 17 and 28 September 2004. During this time he received conservative treatment.\nThe injuries that [the applicant] sustained ... to the head, body and extremities have been caused as a result of multiple dynamic impacts from a blunt object in the areas mentioned above, and these injuries represent, from the legal point of view, a bodily injury ... it can be concluded that the injuries sustained by (the applicant), notably concussion, vertebral fracture, contusions and bruises to the head, body and limbs, taken in view of their overall impact on the body of the victim, qualify as serious bodily injury that had a considerable, but not permanent, negative effect on vital parts of the body.”", "14. On 8 October 2008 a private health institute, M., confirmed certain degenerative changes in the applicant’s spinal column, which were due to two vertebrae having been fractured.", "15. On 19 September 2004 P.J. and M.A. submitted to the Ministry reports concerning the force used against the applicant. M.A. stated, inter alia,:\n“... we were provoked by (the applicant), who used offensive language and kicked the police car ... he spat at us and used offensive language. We asked him to identify himself, but he continued to insult us. We tried to put handcuffs on him, but he resisted actively. He grabbed the fingers of my left hand and bit me. My colleague pushed him away and we handcuffed him.”", "16. As regards the force used against the applicant, M.A. noted that “both arms were twisted and the applicant’s leg was kicked.”", "17. P.J. stated, inter alia, the following: “both arms were twisted so that handcuffs could be put on, and when the colleague was bitten, (the applicant) was punched in the head”.", "18. On an unspecified date, the applicant informed the Department for Control and Professional Standards within the Ministry of the Interior (DCPS) about the incident, and complained that he had been subjected to acts of police brutality. In a reply dated 17 December 2004, the DCPS informed the applicant that he had been reported as having assaulted a police officer on duty. P.J. and M.A., as well as S.H. and V.V., who had been eyewitnesses to the incident of 17 September 2004, were also interviewed. On the basis of evidence obtained from them, the DCPS established that the applicant had used offensive language against P.J. and M.A., had resisted arrest, and had bitten M.A. on the right thumb. As regards the force used against him, the report noted that this had concerned the twisting of his arms and the use of handcuffs, which, as determined by a superior in the Ministry, had been necessary and justified. Accordingly, the DCPS concluded that the police officers concerned had acted in accordance with the law and the rules of the Ministry.", "19. On 18 September 2004 the Ministry lodged a criminal complaint with the Kumanovo public prosecutor, accusing the applicant of assaulting police officers in the course of their duties during the incident of 17 September 2004. The Ministry alleged that the applicant, after receiving a parking ticket, had started following the police car, sounding his horn and flashing his lights. After the police car had stopped, he had approached it and started insulting the police officers and kicking the car. The applicant did not comply with the orders of the police officers to calm down, and actively resisted when they tried to arrest him. The applicant also bit M.A. on the right thumb, which was a serious bodily injury. In respect of the thumb injury a medical report of 17 September 2004, signed by Dr M.D., was attached to the criminal complaint.", "20. The complaint further stated that the applicant had been examined in Kumanovo police station by Dr Z.L., who had recommended he be sent to Kumanovo Hospital. It was further stated that the medical report of the Forensic Institute that the investigating judge had ordered on 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), medical reports issued by the cardiology and emergency units of Skopje Clinic, Skopje City Hospital, and medical reports attesting to the injury sustained by M.A., would all be submitted later. The Ministry further asked the court to hear oral evidence from S.H. and V.V.", "21. Between 21 and 28 September 2004 the investigating judge heard oral evidence from the applicant, P.J, M.A., S.H., V.V., and Dr Z.T.", "22. S.H. stated, inter alia, that:\n“I know (the applicant), [at the relevant time] he was very upset and he was shouting in a loud voice ... I didn’t hear him use offensive language. The police (officers) left the car and asked (the applicant) to identify himself, but he did not produce any documents. The police officers tried to handcuff him, but he resisted ... I didn’t see the applicant bite the police officer. The police did not use force ... police officers managed to put handcuffs on the applicant, two pairs, they placed him on the rear seat and left. No force was used either by (the applicant) against the police or by the police against (the applicant). He was only resisting ... I emphasise that when I arrived, the door of the police car had been opened ... (the applicant) was not hitting the police car. Because there were a lot of people, I couldn’t see, and don’t know whether the applicant bit the police officer.”", "23. V.V. stated, inter alia:\n“... because the police officers were inside the car, (the applicant) started shouting and hitting the car. The police officers left the car and asked him to identify himself. He said that he was not in possession of an ID, and then the police tried to handcuff him. He started shouting ‘People, help me, look what the police are doing, I have heart problems’. They did not let him go, they managed to handcuff him with two pairs of handcuffs. They put him in the car and brought him to the police station ... there was no hitting on either side, just (the applicant) was shouting ... I didn’t see, and I was standing close by, the applicant bite the police officer.”", "24. P.J. stated, inter alia:\n“... (the applicant) was following us in his car ... he was sounding the car horn continuously and we stopped ... he was banging on the window and kicking the car ... when I opened the door, he spat at me and used offensive language ... M.A. got out of the car and asked him to identify himself. He continued shouting. Then I got out of the car. My colleague grabbed his left arm and twisted it behind his back ... then (the applicant) bit my colleague’s finger ... I grabbed (the applicant) and pulled him towards me ... he continued to kick my colleague; he kicked me as well ... I hit him with my lower arm, but not hard. We managed to handcuff him, he was resisting all the time ... when we placed him on the rear seat of the car, he was kicking, jumping, and moving from one side of the car to the other, because his hands were handcuffed behind his back. He constantly used offensive language, he was very arrogant, aggressive ...”", "25. M.A. stated, inter alia:\n“... (the applicant) bit me on the left index finger (показалец) ... P.J. punched him on the right shoulder and the back of his head, hard, so that there was no need for me to hit him ... then (after they had handcuffed him) I hit him on the left knee and we put him in the car ...(the applicant) was alone on the back seat and he was swaying from one side to another saying that he was ill, that he had had three heart bypasses ... (the applicant) used offensive language against P.J. ... when I left the car, he kicked me on the thigh ...”", "26. The applicant stated, inter alia:\n“... I note that while driving (following the police car) I flashed my lights to get (the police car) to stop, and I sounded the car horn ... P.J. opened the door, which hit me on the knees, and when both [P.J. and M.A.] got out of the car they started hitting me on the neck and shoulder ... I was hit in the chest ... they kicked me all over my body, when they handcuffed me and wanted to push me on to the back seat of the car, one of the police officers said that he had hurt his finger - it seems that he caught his finger in the handcuffs when they tried to put them on me. I didn’t bite him, and a bite cannot provoke a fracture. ... while I was inside the car, they hit me on the legs. When we got to the police station, they literally dragged me ... and started punching me on the back and kicking me ... they put me in a room with my hands tied and they hit me. In that room, I was hit very hard, as a result of which I fell down and lost consciousness ...”", "27. Dr Z.T. stated that the available medical evidence indicated that M.A. had a bite wound and a fracture of his left thumb. He further stated:\n“It is possible that the bite did not cause the fracture, because the typical cause of that type of fracture is a fall on to the finger or a blow.”", "28. On the basis of the available evidence, the investigating judge opened an investigation regarding the applicant, but refused to remand him in custody, finding that the applicant could not interfere with the investigation. He noted that the applicant was in poor health, notably that he had had heart surgery, and that two doctors had indicated that the applicant had sustained concussion and a fracture of the spinal column.", "29. On 9 November 2004 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant for assault on a police officer in the course of his duties. On 15 December 2004 the applicant objected to the act of indictment, denying that he had assaulted the police officers, hit the police car or used offensive language towards them. He stated that he had been severely beaten in the incident for no reason, and that he had sustained bodily injuries which were confirmed by medical evidence.", "30. On 15 November 2004 the public prosecutor requested information from the DCPS as to whether there had been any internal inquiry regarding the use of force against the applicant.", "31. On 14 January 2005 the DCPS replied that the force used against the applicant during the incident of 17 September 2004 consisted of twisting his arms behind his back and using handcuffs to subdue him. It also forwarded a copy of the report in which the use of force had been regarded as justified by a superior within the Ministry. Copies of written statements by S.H. and V.V., made to the police on 17 September 2004, were also attached.", "32. At a hearing held on 1 June 2005 before the trial court, the applicant stated, inter alia:\n“... when the police officers handcuffed me, I did not resist ... after they took me into the police station ... P.J. punched me on the back of the head, which had also been done in front of the police station. I was also hit in the eye ... when I approached the police car at the critical moment I noticed that P.J. was sitting in the driving seat. When he opened the window I addressed the other police officer ... [when the trial judge brought the applicant’s attention to his statement given before the investigating judge as to which police officer he had addressed on that occasion, the applicant stated] what I’m saying today is true. The investigating judge probably did not understand what I had said and my health was poor and I was in a difficult psychological state ... During the incident, I neither saw that M.A. was injured nor did I hear him say that he had been injured. I did not take any physical action against him, nor did I assault him.”", "33. On that occasion M.A. confirmed that he had been bitten on the left thumb, as he had stated before the investigating judge (see paragraph 24 above). He did not know why the record of his questioning before the investigating judge indicated differently. The applicant objected to M.A.’s statement.", "34. During a hearing on 19 October 2005, the trial court rejected the applicant’s request for oral evidence to be taken from Dr M.D. (see paragraph 18 above) as to whether M.A. had sustained an injury to the left or the right hand. The trial court found that an examination of Dr M.D. would not contribute to the establishment of the truth, given that both the hospital records and the medical certificate recorded an identical diagnosis.", "35. Following the hearing of 19 October 2005, the trial court found the applicant guilty of assaulting a police officer in the course of his duties, and sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The court established that the applicant had used offensive language against P.J. and M.A. during the incident of 17 September 2004, and had kicked the police car. When P.J. had opened the door of the car, the applicant had spat at him. M.A. had asked the applicant to produce an identity card, which the latter had refused to do. Then M.A. had twisted the applicant’s arm to get him into the car. The applicant had bitten M.A. on the left thumb. P.J. had punched the applicant on the right shoulder and the back of the head, which had caused the applicant to release the thumb. The applicant had then been handcuffed with two pairs of handcuffs. The court also established that the applicant had continued to resist in the police car during his transfer to the police station, by kicking the interior of the car.", "36. The applicant appealed, arguing that the evidence regarding the alleged injury sustained by M.A. was inconsistent; that the medical evidence attesting to the alleged thumb injury had been issued in respect of another person with a similar name to M.A., and that the expert evidence regarding M.A.’s alleged injury had been produced on the basis of photographs of the victim’s thumb, without M.A. being examined in person. Lastly, the applicant complained that the trial court had disregarded the medical evidence supporting the injuries that he had sustained in the incident.", "37. On 24 March 2006 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s judgment and confirmed the applicant’s conviction, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and reasoning given by the trial court.", "38. By decisions of 16 March and 5 May 2009 respectively, the trial court and the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request for reopening of the proceedings.", "39. On 3 February 2005 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the State Prosecutor, charging P.J. and M.A. with several offences: physical assault, serious bodily harm, abuse of office, false testimony, and degrading treatment. On 8 February 2005 the complaint was transmitted to the Kumanovo prosecutor’s office for consideration.", "40. On 16 February 2005 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint seeking an indictment of P.J. and M.A. by the Kumanovo public prosecutor for assault and serious bodily harm, as well as for abuse of office. He submitted that during the incident of 17 September 2004 he “had been brutally attacked, insulted and brutally beaten by P.J. and M.A. in the presence of hundreds of people on the street, as well as in front of and inside Kumanovo police station”. He also requested that evidence be obtained from S.H. and V.V. In support, the applicant submitted the medical certificate issued by Dr Z.T. on 8 February 2005 (see paragraph 12 above).", "41. On 3 March 2005 the applicant asked the public prosecutor to examine the criminal complaint as soon as possible, together with all evidence that had become available during the investigation of the case. He further enquired why the public prosecutor had not initiated proceedings to have the police officers concerned suspended or fined.", "42. On 11 March 2005 the public prosecutor contacted the emergency unit at Skopje Clinic to obtain information as to whether the applicant had undergone an X-ray examination, and if so whether the examination had revealed a spinal fracture. On 6 April 2005 the emergency unit replied that the X-ray examination report had been handed over to the applicant.", "43. On 7 April 2005 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that the appropriate authorities had been consulted with a view to obtaining relevant information about the case.", "44. The applicant further addressed the public prosecutor on three occasions, alleging obstruction and seeking to have appropriate measures taken.", "45. On 20 May 2005 the public prosecutor contacted the director of the emergency unit of Skopje Clinic, asking for an official note to be drawn up by the doctor who had carried out the X-ray examination of the applicant as to whether that examination had revealed a double fracture of the spinal column and whether the applicant had sustained concussion or it had just been a subjective feeling of which he had complained. The letter further requested that the emergency unit submit copies of all relevant medical reports to the public prosecutor. The Government did not indicate whether the emergency unit of Skopje Clinic had complied with this request.", "46. On 25 May 2005 the Kumanovo public prosecutor rejected the criminal complaint, finding no grounds that the accused had committed the alleged offences, namely aggravated bodily harm and abuse of office. In the decision, the public prosecutor relied on the statements of S.H. and V.V. given in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and the report of the DCPS of 14 January 2005 (see paragraph 31 above). This decision was served on the applicant on 30 May 2005.", "47. In the meantime, without knowing about the rejection of his complaint, on 26 May 2005 the applicant informed the Kumanovo public prosecutor that all relevant evidence, including the discharge notice from Skopje City Hospital, the medical report of his outpatient examination carried out by the Forensic Institute on 18 September 2004, as well as the statements of the accused, the witnesses and the applicant, had already been brought to the attention of the public prosecutor.", "48. On 7 June 2005 the applicant, represented by R.C., a lawyer practising in Kumanovo, informed the trial court that he would take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor, and applied to the investigating judge for an investigation against P.J. and M.A. The applicant described the incident of 17 September 2004 as follows:\n“... when (the applicant) approached (the police car) ... P.J., who was in the driving seat, pushed the door open hard and hit (the applicant) in the lower part of both legs, then both accused left the car in order to arrest (the applicant). P.J. started punching and kicking (the applicant) all over his body, inflicting numerous injuries, the hardest blow being the one to the back of his head, which caused (the applicant) to lose consciousness and slump down. He was thus in a position that enabled P.J. to knee him in the back, as a result of which he sustained compressive fractures of (two vertebrae), while M.A. kicked him in the lower back. Then they handcuffed his hands behind his back and took him into Kumanovo police station, where they continued to beat him, as a result of which (the applicant) lost consciousness. Medical assistance was required, and (the applicant) was transported to Kumanovo Hospital, from where he was transferred to Skopje Clinic, where he remained for eleven days, following which he was a patient at home and was on sick leave for over five months.”", "49. In support of the criminal complaint, the applicant submitted, inter alia, copies of the discharge notice from Skopje City Hospital and of the Forensic Institute report dated 18 September 2004, as well as of “other medical material”. He further requested the court to hear evidence from the accused, S.H., V.V., his wife and son.", "50. On 11 July 2005 the trial court forwarded the criminal complaint and supporting documents to the public prosecutor for further consideration, given that the charges concerned serious injury, a crime which was subject to State prosecution. By letter on 14 September 2005 the public prosecutor informed the trial court that the Kumanovo prosecutor’s office had already examined and rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint against the accused, for lack of suspicion that they had committed the alleged offence. Similar information was forwarded on 14 October 2005 to the State prosecutor’s office.", "51. In the meantime, on 12 September 2005, the investigating judge, after hearing oral evidence from the applicant, his wife and son and the accused, opened an investigation against P.J. and M.A. on account of reasonable suspicion that they had caused serious bodily injury punishable under the Criminal Code. On 29 September and 13 October 2005 the trial court dismissed appeals by the accused.", "52. On 29 September 2006 the applicant, through his lawyer, submitted to the trial court a subsidiary indictment (супсидијарен обвинителен акт) accusing P.J. and M.A. of inflicting grievous bodily harm on him; this was supported by the Forensic Institute medical report of 10 July 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). In the indictment, the applicant reiterated that he had been beaten up by the accused when he had approached their car to discuss the issue of the parking ticket, and that the assault had continued inside the police station.", "53. During a hearing held on 22 October 2007, Mr Z.J., a lawyer practising in Kumanovo, whom the applicant had meanwhile appointed to represent him in the case, stated that the applicant’s allegations of police brutality were supported by the medical report of the Forensics Institute, which designated the applicant’s injuries as serious. Since charges of serious bodily injury were subject to State prosecution, he asked for the case file to be transmitted to the public prosecutor for the latter to take over the prosecution. On the same date, the trial court contacted the public prosecutor’s office with a view whether it would take over the prosecution, which that office, by letter of 29 November 2007, refused to do.", "54. On 31 January 2008 the trial court heard oral evidence from the accused and the applicant.", "55. P.J. stated, inter alia:\n“... we noticed that (the applicant) was flashing his lights ... and then he started sounding the horn ... the applicant started banging on the window of (the car) and kicking it ... he spat at me ... continued to use offensive language ... we asked him to produce his identity card ... (the applicant) started kicking me and M.A. ... there were people who obviously knew (the applicant), they approached him asking him to calm down, but he pushed them away, as he was not paying attention to them, his behaviour was ferocious ... at one moment (the applicant) pressed M.A. hard against the rear door [of the car] with his body ... and M.A. screamed loudly. I thought it was due to the pressure, but then I saw that M.A.’s thumb was in (the applicant’s) mouth ... I pulled (the applicant) hard towards me to get him away from M.A., and I tried to hit him with my right arm on the back of the head, but (the applicant) slumped forward and my fist and elbow slipped next to his head, which I cannot consider as a blow, but we specified it in our official records as such ... we handcuffed him with two pairs of handcuffs behind his back ...(the applicant) did not stop resisting and assaulting us, kicking us. Handcuffed behind his back, he leaned on (the car) again as before, throwing himself [at the car] and leaning on the car, he was kicking us, we managed to put him in the car with his back on the rear seat of the car. Then he started kicking out hard at the door of the car, and we couldn’t close the door. Then, he lay on the rear seat and hit his head against the other door. He did that intentionally ... the interior of the car was badly damaged. While he was hitting his head against the right rear door and kicking the left door ... [which] we managed to close, he continued kicking the front seats and intentionally banged his head against the front seats and ... the rear seats. When we were trying to arrest him we were aware of his age and tried not [to allow] him to hurt us or himself; we refrained from using more drastic means of coercion, despite the fact that we had batons and we were trained in restraint techniques .... Then we brought him to Kumanovo police station ... and during the whole time he was furiously agitated in the rear seat. Although he was handcuffed, he was banging his head and other parts of his body against the interior of the car ... I did not punch, kick or use any other force [against the applicant] except as I have described in my statement ... My colleague M.A. did not hurt (the applicant), he was just holding him by the arm.”", "56. M.A. stated, inter alia:\n“... My colleague P. and I got out of the car and I asked (the applicant) to produce a driving licence, an ID card or any other document bearing his photo. He continued using offensive language against us and kicked the car. At that moment I took out the handcuffs ... (the applicant) resisted, kicked the car ... jumped up at the car and us, he was acting, so to say, like a lunatic. At that time, my colleague and I did not use any other force apart from twisting his arms and using the handcuffs ... [while they tried to handcuff the applicant], he was moving constantly left and right and throwing himself against the car ... he was kicking the car and hitting his head against the roof of the car, we could hardly manage to put him on to the back seat of the car and close the door. From that moment and until we brought him into the police station ... (the applicant) was throwing himself to left and right inside the car ...”", "57. In his statement, the applicant alleged that he had been beaten by P.J. and that M.A. had beaten him during his arrest and immediately before and after they had brought him into the police station. He further stated, inter alia:\n“... (P.J. and M.A.) stopped the car ... until then, there was no ... communication with the police car, nor were any signals used... [after he was brought into the police station] it took about forty-five minutes before the ambulance arrived ... Then, they immediately transferred me to Kumanovo Hospital ... Then, from Kumanovo Hospital I was taken by ambulance to the cardiology clinic in Skopje ... a doctor instructed that I should be transferred to the surgical clinic in Skopje, because she had noticed bruises on my body ... then I was taken to the emergency unit ... they instructed that I should be taken to Skopje City Hospital. Police officers and inspectors accompanied me at all times ...”", "58. On 19 February 2008 the State prosecutor inquired as to why the Kumanovo prosecutor’s office had refused to prosecute, given that the applicant’s injuries were designated as serious by the Forensics Institute. By letter of 7 April 2008 the Kumanovo prosecutor replied that the medical report of the Forensics Institute dated 18 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above) had not designated the applicant’s injuries as serious. The medical certificate of 8 February 2005 by Dr Z.T. (see paragraph 12 above) had been drawn up much later than 17 September 2004, the date of the incident.", "59. At a hearing on 12 November 2008 the applicant’s representative sought a definitive answer from the public prosecutor as to whether he would take over the prosecution. In that connection he stated that it was not an option but a duty of the prosecutor to step into the proceedings, given the fact that the alleged offence was subject to State prosecution. On 18 November 2008 the public prosecutor informed the court that for the same reasons as outlined in its letter of 7 April 2008 (see paragraph 58 above), it would not take over the prosecution against P.J. and M.A.", "60. On 24 March 2009 the trial court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant, his representative, the accused and their lawyers. According to the court record of that date, signed by the trial judge and the clerk, the applicant stated:\n“... I withdraw the subsidiary indictment of 20 September 2006 against the accused (Го повлекувам супсидијарниот обвинителен акт од 20 септември 2006 година провив обвинетите ...) ...”", "61. On the same day the trial court stayed (запира) the proceedings, since the applicant had stated, in the presence of his legal representative, that he withdrew the subsidiary indictment.", "62. The following day, on 25 March 2009, the applicant objected to the trial court’s decision to withdraw the indictment, and stated:\n“... I, as a lay person (неука странка), did not understand what the judge asked me, so I said that I withdrew the indictment, since I considered that the prosecution should be taken over by the public prosecutor. I wanted to maintain that right, namely ex officio prosecution through the public prosecutor, given the fact that the case concerns serious bodily injury, an offence punishable under Article 131 (1) of the Criminal Code, which is prosecutable ex officio by the public prosecutor. I therefore ask the court to reinstate the proceedings and to decide on my subsidiary indictment.”", "63. In submissions of 26 March 2009 before the trial court, the applicant contested the validity of the statement for withdrawal of the indictment. He stated, inter alia:\n“... I underline that as a subsidiary complainant, I do not withdraw the subsidiary indictment of 20 September 2006 against the accused...\nI believe that the prosecution should be taken over by the public prosecutor, I maintain the right [to seek] that the prosecution be taken ex officio because it concerns an offence of causing serious bodily injury ... because the perpetrators of the crime are officials who overstepped their duties.\nFor these reasons, I ask the court to reinstate the proceedings to their previous state and to continue to examine the subsidiary indictment.”", "64. On 27 March 2009 the applicant complained to the Macedonian Bar about inactivity on the part of Mr Z.J., his legal representative, at the hearing of 24 March 2009, and asked the Bar to respond so that his case could be reinstated. He further stated:\n“While I was explaining, specifically while I was complaining about the way in which the trial was being conducted, the trial judge wrote in the court record that I was withdrawing the subsidiary indictment. At that time, I emphasised that I disagreed with that decision noted in the court record. My representative, Mr Z.J., did not react at all to the decision noted in the record [although] I’m a lay person (неук во правото и законите).”", "65. Submissions with similar contents were sent on 27 March 2009 to the State Judicial Council (Судски Совет).", "66. On 11 May 2009 the applicant, who was no longer represented, appealed against the trial court’s decision, arguing that he had never withdrawn the indictment against the accused. He reiterated that his statement concerned, in substance, his determination that the prosecution should be taken over by the public prosecutor. He further argued that he had complained aloud to the trial judge about the contents of the minutes, but to no avail. He stated that “I am shocked by the flagrantly incorrect interpretation of my statement”.", "67. On 24 September 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated, and upheld the trial court’s decision. Relying on the court record of 24 March 2009, the court concluded that the applicant, in the presence of his legal representative, had withdrawn the indictment against the accused. In such circumstances, the trial court had correctly decided to stay the proceedings. This decision was served on the applicant on 20 October 2009. The proceedings were accordingly finally concluded. On 29 June 2010 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s request for extraordinary review of the decision.", "68. By a decision of 15 October 2009 the trial court ordered the applicant to pay the equivalent of 1,400 euros (EUR) for the legal representation of the accused and travel costs. The applicant did not appeal against that decision." ]

[ "3" ]

[]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1976 and is detained in correctional colony no. 2 in the Tatarstan Republic.", "7. Since 1999 the applicant has been suffering from progressive multiple sclerosis. He was designated with Category 1 disability as a result of that condition.", "8. On 22 February 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of active membership of an organised criminal group between 1995 and 2005 and the murder or attempted murder of several people in 1999.", "9. The applicant’s health deteriorated significantly and rapidly in the detention facility, where his health complaints were not addressed in any way, as the facility did not have any medical specialists. In August 2012 the prison authorities recorded that the applicant’s movement was impaired and that he was unable to walk without a cane.", "10. In September 2012 the applicant suffered an epileptic seizure which resulted in paralysis of the left side of his body. Several days later an investigator authorised a forensic medical examination of the applicant to determine whether he was fit to stay in a detention facility. A medical examination, based, inter alia, on the results of an MRI exam performed by civilian experts from the Tatarstan Republic medical institute, led to the conclusion that the applicant was suffering from “a serious condition preventing his detention”. In particular, experts diagnosed him with progressive multiple sclerosis, left-sided hemiplegia (paralysis) in the cerebral spinal form, acute right-sided hemiparesis (muscle weakness of the right side of the body) with the persistent astheno-depressive syndrome, memory deterioration, partial atrophy of the visual nerves, symptomatic epilepsy with polymorphic partial motor and generalised attacks three to four times a month, arterial hypertension of the first degree, and light myopathy of both eyes. On 25 September 2012 the applicant was released from detention.", "11. On 29 May 2013 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment, to be served in a correctional facility under a strict regime. The trial court, however, decided that the applicant should not be placed in custody pending appeal proceedings. On 3 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal.", "12. On 17 September 2013 the applicant asked the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic to order a medical examination for him with a view to confirming that he was not fit for detention. The request was not processed.", "13. The applicant was taken into custody on 8 October 2013. He was placed in a prison hospital in correctional colony no. 2 in the Tatarstan Republic.", "14. In November 2013 the applicant underwent an MRI test and was examined by several doctors, including by a neurologist, from the prison hospital in correctional colony no. 2. Their decision issued on 23 November 2013 indicated that given the negative prognosis for and the severity of the applicant’s condition, he should be sent for a forensic medical examination to determine whether he could be released early on health grounds. The doctors relied, inter alia, on the results of the MRI examination, which had shown that in comparison to the results of the previous MRI exam in September 2012 the applicant’s illness had progressed significantly and demonstrated further negative dynamic. The applicant was informed by the prison administration that they would seek his immediate release on health grounds.", "15. However, a week later the applicant was notified that an additional expert examination was to be performed. Two medical experts visited the applicant, spoke with him and informed him that his condition did not warrant release. On 20 January 2014 the applicant was served with a copy of an opinion by the two medical experts who had concluded that he did not suffer from any condition listed in Government Decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004 on illnesses warranting release on health grounds, as his condition had not yet reached the crucial stage which required early release.", "16. Relying on a number of medical certificates and reports issued by medical specialists from civilian medical facilities, who had either treated him following his release from detention in September 2012 or had studied his medical history in 2013, the applicant argued that he was unable to care for himself and that he required constant assistance, care and medical treatment which the Russian penal system was not able to provide. In particular, a report issued in September 2013 by a neurologist from the Tatarstan Republican hospital indicated that the applicant had no movement on the left side of his body and could only partly move the fingers of his right hand and his right leg; he could not walk or sit without assistance; and he required assistance even if placed in a wheelchair. Another report indicated that the applicant was suffering from urethral dysfunction leading to involuntary urination, an additional element calling for constant care. The civilian doctors concluded that the stage of development of the applicant’s illness was 9 (with death expected to occur according to that scale at stage 10).", "17. Having provided copies of his complaints to various Russian authorities, the applicant submitted that his requests for an independent medical examination to determine whether he could remain in detention, as well as his complaints about the lack of proper medical assistance, had gone unanswered.", "18. The applicant argued that he spent his entire day in bed. Prison doctors, who had no proper training to deal with patients in his condition, came to see him only once every few days. He had not been bathed for months. He could not eat or drink unaided, so he received food once a day. He suffered from severe pain, as he could not defecate and the medical personnel only gave him an enema once every two weeks. He did not receive any treatment, and had not been seen in detention by specialists such as a neurologist.", "19. On 12 February 2014 the Court, in response to the applicant’s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, decided to indicate to the Government that the applicant should be examined immediately by medical experts independent of the penal system, including by a neurologist and an epileptologist. The experts were to be asked whether the treatment and physical care the applicant was receiving was adequate for his condition, whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a correctional colony or a prison hospital, and lastly whether the applicant’s current condition required him to be admitted to a specialised hospital or released. The Russian Government were also asked to ensure the applicant’s immediate transfer to a specialised hospital if the medical experts concluded that he required to be admitted to such a hospital.", "20. In response to the Court’s request, the Government provided the Court with a typed copy of the applicant’s medical history prepared by the detention authorities; certificates issued by the head of the applicant’s correctional colony and the head of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic; and a copy of the report drawn up on 25 December 2013 by a medical panel comprising the head, deputy head and senior inspector of the medical unit of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic and a deputy head of the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 2, where the applicant was detained. Relying on those documents, the Government argued that the applicant was receiving adequate medical assistance and that the medical panel of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic had concluded that “the degree of the manifestation of the applicant’s condition (multiple sclerosis) did not [reach the level] which could be described as bodily function impairment” warranting release in compliance with the Government’s decree of 6 February 2004 which laid down a list of illnesses calling for inmates’ early release.", "21. The applicant commented on the Government’s information, insisting that the medical assistance afforded to him was virtually non‑existent. He relied on his medical record, and stated that prior to the application of the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court he had been prescribed over twenty different drugs, of which, as indicated in the record, he had only received five. At the same time the applicant argued that the medical record was a forgery, as he had in fact only received one drug. Following the application of the interim measure he had been allowed to obtain certain medication from his wife to treat the epilepsy. He further submitted that the prison hospital where he was an inmate did not have the necessary medical equipment. He had usually been taken to another hospital for examinations, or a specialist with the proper equipment had been allowed to visit him in the prison hospital. The prison hospital only employed a neurologist, a specialist who, according to her own assessment, did not have the skill to treat the applicant’s complex condition. Despite the fact that the applicant’s condition was progressing and that the prognosis for him was negative, the authorities had not taken any steps to alleviate his sufferings and safeguard his life and limb.", "22. The applicant submitted that since March 2014 he had developed new health problems, but the medical staff of the prison hospital had failed to address the ongoing deterioration of his health. In particular, he had begun suffering from kidney pain, but no nephrologist was available in the prison hospital. On 18 March 2014 the applicant was diagnosed with urinary tract infection, but no appropriate treatment followed. Several days later the applicant complained to an otolaryngologist of a purulent discharge from his left ear and severe pain. However, medical staff failed to comply with the otolaryngologist’s recommendations.", "23. At the request of the applicant’s wife, on 18 April 2014 he was examined by a panel consisting of the deputy head of the prison hospital and several prison doctors. The commission found that the applicant did not suffer from bodily function impairment warranting his release.", "24. On several occasions the applicant’s wife complained to the Prosecutor General and to the prison authorities, requesting an independent medical assessment. In their replies the authorities informed her that allegations of lack of adequate medical assistance had not been confirmed, and thus there were no grounds to order the applicant’s medical examination.", "25. However, on 29 July 2014 a medical panel of the prison hospital, having confirmed the applicant’s earlier diagnosis, recommended his early release. In August 2014 the applicant’s wife lodged a motion for his release before the Privolzhskiy District Court of Kazan.", "26. At the hearing held on 14 November 2014 the District Court heard the applicant’s attending prison doctor who stated that he had not and could not receive adequate treatment in respect of his multiple sclerosis in detention and that such treatment could only be provided in a specialised hospital, in particular in the Republican diagnostic centre of demyelinised illnesses. On the same day the District Court dismissed the motion for release. The applicant’s lawyer appealed.", "27. In the meantime, on 15 December 2014 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 9 in the Chuvashia Republic to continue serving his sentence. Three days later, following a visual medical examination, he was admitted to medical unit no. 21 in the colony which was to determine the issue whether the applicant’s condition called for his early release. According to the applicant, colony no. 9 did not employ a neurologist and had no means to deal with a patient of his health.", "28. On 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic quashed the decision of 14 November 2014 and sent the matter for a new examination to the District Court.", "29. During the re-hearing on 19 February 2015 the Povolzhskiy District Court took note of the applicant’s transfer to a new colony and decided that it no longer had territorial jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s motion for release. The case was sent to the Tsivilsk Town Court in the Chuvashia Republic for further examination.", "30. On 13 January 2015 a medical commission comprising three specialists from medical unit no. 21 issued a report finding that the applicant’s condition made him eligible for an early release. That report was filed with the Tsivilsk Town Court which on 26 February 2015 authorised the applicant’s release, having relied on the report of 13 January 2015 and statements by the head of medical unit no. 21. The latter had testified to the gravity of the applicant’s condition and the impossibility to provide him with adequate treatment or permanent general care and assistance in detention. The applicant was released on 11 March 2015 and taken by an ambulance to a hospital in Kazan.", "31. The applicant provided the Court with expert opinions issued on 21 March and 5 August 2014 by neurologist M. from the Republican Medical Institute. Having examined the applicant and studied his medical file, the expert recorded negative dynamics in the applicant’s neurological condition, and found that he had not received the drugs necessary to treat his multiple sclerosis. The doctor recommended that the applicant undergo specific treatment in the Institute or in foreign hospitals, and noted that the lack of such treatment could lead to irreversible deterioration of the applicant’s health and eventually to his death.", "32. The Government produced, in addition to the documents submitted by them in response to the Court’s Rule 39 request, a number of certificates signed by the staff and administration of the prison hospital, as well as by a fellow inmate. According to those certificates, the applicant was provided with the necessary care in the hospital. Medical staff fed him three times a day, washed his face and ears every morning, cut his hair and nails, changed his bedding, and showered him once a week. Nurses gave him enemas and changed his catheter bag as often as necessary." ]

[ "13", "3", "34" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Kharkiv.", "6. On 16 May 2008 the applicant was arrested by police officers G. and B. of the drug crimes unit and taken to the Kharkiv City Police Department (“the police station”).", "7. Officer G. drew up a report following the search of his personal effects, according to which a package containing a substance, later determined to be marijuana, was found on the applicant. The report, indicating that it was drawn up at 6.25 p.m. on 16 May 2008, was signed by the applicant and attesting witnesses L. and T.", "8. According to the Government, when officers G. and B. began drawing up the above-mentioned report at the scene of the applicant’s arrest, the applicant attempted to escape. The officers then handcuffed him. The applicant was then taken to the police station where he and the attesting witnesses were questioned. At 10.05 p.m. the applicant was released having signed a note affirming that he had no complaints against the police.", "9. According to the applicant, at the police station he was ill-treated to make him confess. In particular, he alleged that he was threatened with rape, kicked and hit on the head and torso, and threatened with weapons. He was subjected to a “Palestinian hanging”; with his hands cuffed behind his back he was raised to the height of one or one and a half metres and then dropped face down on the floor. He lost consciousness several times. When she arrived at the police station, the applicant’s mother found him with bruises on his face, a swollen chin and marks of handcuffs on his wrists.", "10. At the police station the applicant wrote two notes addressed to the police dated 16 May 2008. In an “explanatory note” the applicant stated that he had acquired some marijuana for personal use and had had it when the police had stopped him. The applicant further stated that he had not been physically or psychologically pressured. In a separate note he stated that he had no complaints against the police and undertook to appear when summoned.", "11. At 11.10 p.m. on 16 May 2008 an ambulance arrived at the police station and the applicant was examined by a paramedic, F. The paramedic noted in her report that the examination was completed at 11.40 p.m. According to the report, the applicant had no complaints and nothing abnormal was detected. According to the applicant, the head of the drug crimes unit, officer O.D., was present during this examination and spoke with the paramedic afterwards.", "12. Following the applicant’s examination at the police station he and his mother went to the Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Regional Directorate”), where they arrived at about 11.45 p.m. on 16 May 2008, and where the applicant lodged a complaint accusing police officers of ill-treatment.", "13. Officer O.D. followed the applicant to the Regional Directorate and arranged for him to be examined by the medical expert on duty there.", "14. At 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008 forensic medical expert A.P. examined the applicant at the Regional Directorate. According to his report, finalised on 29 May 2008, the expert had been called upon to determine the presence and seriousness of any bodily injuries. The applicant said to the expert that the police had grabbed him by the neck and arms at the time of the arrest and had handcuffed him. He complained of a headache and pain in his shoulders. The report recorded a haematoma of 1.5 cm in width on the applicant’s neck, a haematoma of 2 x 1.5 cm on the inner side of his left shoulder, and two strip-like bruises on his left wrist. The expert took the view that the injuries could have been inflicted on the date and under the circumstances described by the applicant, and that the bruises on his wrist could have been caused by handcuffs.", "15. At 3.46 p.m. on 17 May 2008 the applicant sought medical aid at the Kharkiv City Hospital (“the hospital”) where he was diagnosed with concussion and contusion of the soft tissues of the head and the rib cage. Hospitalisation was recommended but the applicant refused.", "16. On 19 May 2008 the applicant was examined by Dr M. at the Neurology, Psychiatry and Drug Addiction Institute of the Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine. He was diagnosed with a brain concussion of medium seriousness and numerous bruises on his arms, shoulder blades and spine.", "17. On 17 May 2008 the applicant’s mother lodged a criminal complaint with the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office (“the KRPO”) against the police officers. She alleged that excessive force had been used to arrest her son and that he had then been tortured, humiliated and threatened with rape at the police station.", "18. On 21 May 2008 the KRPO requested an examination of the applicant and his medical documentation by forensic medical experts. On 29 May 2008 medical experts I.D. and I.P. examined the applicant and his medical documentation.", "19. In the course of pre-investigation enquiries in respect of the allegations of ill-treatment, the KRPO obtained statements (written explanations) from a number of individuals. In particular, in his written explanation, Mr S.D., who had witnessed the applicant’s arrest, stated that at about 6.15 p.m. on 16 May 2008 a stranger, without introducing himself, had grabbed the applicant by the scruff of his neck or by the shirt collar and, threatening him with a gun, pulled him to a car. He and another stranger had then grabbed the applicant by the arms, searched him and put him into their car. Officers G. and B. stated that at the time of arrest the applicant had attempted to flee and had been handcuffed. They and officer O.D. insisted that the applicant had not been ill-treated in any way. Attesting witnesses L. and T. confirmed the statements by the police and stated that the applicant had attempted to flee while the search report was being drawn up. He had then been caught and handcuffed.", "20. In his written explanation given to the KRPO on 28 May 2008 the applicant stated, in particular, that immediately after having stopped him a police officer had hit him on the head, stomach and ribs with the handle and muzzle of his gun. He had then been pulled by the arms to a police car. At the police station the police officers had pulled down his trousers and threatened him with rape, had subjected him to a “Palestinian hanging”, and dropped him to the floor, causing him to lose consciousness. When his mother had arrived at the police station entrance hall she had seen him with a bruised and swollen chin, haematomas and bruises on his head, arms and body.", "21. On 6 June 2008 the KRPO, referring to the above-mentioned evidence, refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. The KRPO found that the applicant’s handcuffing was the only instance of the use of force in respect of the applicant and that it had been lawful under the Police Act of 20 December 1990 (“the Police Act”). The applicant’s injuries recorded at 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008 were consistent with the police officers’ statements concerning the applicant’s arrest and handcuffing. The KRPO also stated that the applicant’s and his mother’s allegations were not supported by any objective data other than their own statements. The applicant’s mother appealed.", "22. On 24 June 2008 the applicant, in a written explanation to the Kharkiv Moskovskyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the MDPO”), largely confirmed his earlier statements and added that in the police car on the way to the police station the police officers had repeatedly hit him on the head and torso.", "23. On 4 July 2008 forensic medical experts completed their report requested by the KRPO on 21 May 2008 and based on their examination of the applicant on 29 May 2008. They noted that the applicant had complained to them that he had been hit with a gun on the head and torso during his arrest and then ill-treated at the police station. The experts recapitulated that at the time of previous medical examinations the applicant had had a brain concussion, haematomas on his neck and left shoulder, and bruises on his left wrist. They were of the opinion that the injuries were consistent with the applicant’s statements as to their origin.", "24. On 12 August 2008 the Kharkiv Chervonozavodskyy District Court set aside the KRPO’s decision of 6 June 2008 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court held, in particular, that the KRPO’s enquiries had failed to explain the applicant’s injuries recorded at 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008.", "25. On 19 January 2009 the Kharkiv Moskovskyy District Court (“the District Court”), in the course of examination of a criminal case against the applicant for possession of drugs, ordered the MDPO to conduct, by 19 February 2009, an investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.", "26. On 16 February 2009 (apparently due to a clerical error the text of the decision indicates 16 February 2008 as its date) the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers on grounds similar to the KRPO’s decision. The applicant’s mother appealed.", "27. On 30 March 2009 the District Court set aside the decision of 16 February 2009 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court found, in particular, that the MDPO’s decision had fully replicated the KRPO’s decision of 6 June 2008, had not explained the reasons for which the MDPO had accepted the police officers’ version of events and had failed to explain how the applicant’s handcuffing could explain all his recorded injuries.", "28. On 22 October 2009 the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings on grounds similar to the earlier decisions. It informed the District Court that by this decision it complied with the court’s ruling of 19 January 2009. The applicant’s mother appealed.", "29. On 27 November 2009 the District Court set aside the decision of 22 October 2009 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court held, in particular, that the pre-investigation enquiries had collected sufficient information that a crime had been committed. Further investigation into the origin of the applicant’s injuries required such investigative steps as a confrontation between the applicant and the police officers and a reconstruction of events, which could not be conducted within the framework of pre-investigation enquiries without the institution of criminal proceedings.", "30. In the course of the subsequent round of pre-investigation enquiries the MDPO again obtained written explanations from the police officers and the attesting witnesses, who largely repeated their previous statements.", "31. On 12 May 2010 the MDPO, referring to the evidence gathered, refused to institute criminal proceedings on grounds similar to the earlier decisions. The applicant’s mother appealed.", "32. On 14 June 2010 the District Court set aside the decision of 12 May 2010 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry, holding that the MDPO had failed to comply with the court’s previous instructions.", "33. In the course of the subsequent round of pre-investigation enquiries the MDPO obtained written explanations from several individuals. Dr M. stated, in particular, that the applicant’s injuries she had recorded on 19 May 2008 could have been sustained from 16 to 18 May 2008. The applicant’s mother largely repeated her allegations and stated that she and the applicant had travelled from the police station to the Regional Directorate in a neighbour’s car which had been followed by officer O.D.’s car.", "34. On 25 June 2010 the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers on grounds similar to the earlier decisions, referring in addition to the explanations collected in the course of the latest round of pre-investigative enquiries. The MDPO stated that the District Court’s rulings of 27 November 2009 and 14 June 2010 had been impossible to comply with since investigative actions indicated by the court could only be conducted once criminal proceedings had been initiated and not at the stage of pre-investigation enquiries. The applicant’s mother appealed.", "35. On 27 August 2010 the District Court set aside the decision of 25 June 2010 and remitted the materials for additional inquiry. The court held in particular that the MDPO had failed to resolve the contradictions in the medical evidence. The MDPO had also failed to resolve the contradictions between the applicant’s, witness S.D.’s, and the police officers’ accounts of the circumstances of the use of force during the applicant’s arrest, which, in the court’s opinion, could explain the documented injuries.", "36. In the course of the subsequent round of pre-investigation enquiries the MDPO obtained written explanations from paramedic F. She stated that she had not seen any signs of injury on the applicant on 16 May 2008. She had not been pressured by the police. The applicant himself had not voiced any complaints, but his mother had said that her son had been beaten up. She also stated that she was not a specialist in forensic medicine and could not speculate as to the origin of injuries which had been documented later.", "37. On 18 October 2010 the MDPO requested an opinion of a forensic medical specialist on a number of questions concerning the applicant’s injuries, in particular whether his injuries, as recorded in the available medical documentation, could have been inflicted between 11.50 p.m. on 16 May 2008 and 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008.", "38. On 25 October 2010 the MDPO refused to institute criminal proceedings. The MDPO noted, in particular, that the District Court, in the rulings of 27 November 2009, 14 June and 27 August 2010, had indicated the need to conduct certain investigative actions, namely confrontation between the applicant and the police officers and reconstruction of events with the participation of the applicant and forensic experts. The MDPO stated that these instructions had been impossible to comply with since such actions could only be conducted once criminal proceedings had been initiated and not at the stage of pre-investigation enquiries. The MDPO also stated that the applicant’s injuries recorded at 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008 were consistent with the police officers’ statements concerning the applicant’s arrest and handcuffing.", "39. On 15 February 2011 the KRPO informed the MDPO that its decision of 25 October 2010 had been a “mere copy” of the decision of 25 June 2010 and had failed to comply with the District Court’s ruling of 27 August 2010. The KRPO directed the MDPO to fully comply with the District Court’s instructions. According to the Government, the MDPO had then conducted a new round of pre-investigation enquiries and as a result the decision of 25 October 2010 was allowed to stand.", "40. On 28 February 2011 a forensic medical expert produced a report in response to the MDPO’s request of 18 October 2010 and based on the medical evidence available in the case file. The expert stated, in particular, that it could not be ruled out that the applicant’s documented injuries could have been inflicted between 11.50 p.m. on 16 May 2008 and 00.47 a.m. on 17 May 2008. The expert also took the opinion that the diagnoses of contusion of the soft tissues of the head and of the rib cage, numerous bruises of arms, shoulder blades and spine which had been noted by the hospital staff on 17 May 2008 and by Dr M. on 19 May 2008 had not been confirmed by objective forensic medical information or the results of any tests, and for these reasons could not be taken into account in the forensic medical analysis.", "41. According to the applicant, he had first learned about the MDPO’s decision of 25 October 2010 from the Government’s observations in the present case.", "42. On 23 July 2012 the applicant’s mother challenged the decision of 25 October 2010 before the District Court.", "43. At the time of the most recent communication from the applicant the proceedings before the District Court were pending." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 6, 16, 29, 33 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1977, 1937 and 1938 respectively and live in Moscow. The second and third applicants are the parents of the first applicant.", "6. In 2004 the first applicant, who was suffering from tachycardia and severe headaches, was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia. In 2004‑05 he underwent treatment in various hospitals in Moscow, without any tangible result.", "7. In April 2005 his illness worsened.", "8. On 25 May 2005 he called an ambulance and was taken to the neurology unit of Moscow City Clinical Hospital no. 6 (Московская городская клиническая больница № 6). The doctor in the admissions unit, however, refused to admit him, finding no pathology, and recommended outpatient treatment in a district polyclinic.", "9. Desperate for relief, on the same day the first applicant cut the veins on his forearm. Another ambulance was called for him by the second and third applicants, and he was taken to N.V. Sklifosovsky Research Institute of Emergency Medicine (НИИ скорой помощи им. Н.В. Склифосовского). After the first applicant was provided with emergency medical aid at the surgical unit, he was taken to somato‑psychiatric unit no. 2 (ПСО-2, “the psychiatric hospital”) of the Institute with a diagnosis of “chronic somatoform pain disorder, personality disorder, continuous sluggish schizophrenia, cutting of left forearm, attempted suicide”.", "10. On 26 May 2005 the first applicant contacted his parents, asking them to take him home. When the parents arrived, they were not allowed to take him home and were asked to leave.", "11. During the night of 26 to 27 May 2005 the first applicant alleged that he was beaten up. According to him, three nurses held his arms and two recovering patients hit him on the face and body. He was taken to his ward, and one of the nurses allegedly threw him on the bed with such force that his head hit the bedside table, following which he lost consciousness. When the first applicant recovered he found himself bleeding and strapped to the bed with a gag in his mouth. He was given no medical assistance.", "12. The first applicant was subsequently allegedly warned by a doctor, L., that his parents would not be allowed to see him and that it would be put on record that he had himself initiated a brawl. Furthermore, he was allegedly warned that any complaints to the authorities, including the police, would be futile as he would be given a diagnosis which would show that his allegations could not be taken seriously.", "13. The first applicant remained hospitalised until 9 June 2005. He alleged that he was subjected to scientific research by being treated with Seroquel (a then new antipsychotic medication) and forbidden all contact with the outside world. He had blood tests every other day.", "14. Some hours after the first applicant’s discharge from the psychiatric hospital on 9 June 2005, an ambulance was called for him at home due to his state of health. The ambulance doctor saw a haematoma under the first applicant’s right eye, and bruises and contusions around his chest and waist. The first applicant was further diagnosed with hypertensive crisis and severe tachycardia. He was immediately hospitalised in Moscow City Clinical Hospital no. 67 (Московская городская клиническая больница № 67), where he remained until 5 August 2005 and was diagnosed with “depressive hypochondriasis against the background of traumatic encephalopathy”. The diagnosis of personality disorder was not confirmed.", "15. In October 2005 the applicants complained to the Russian Federation Ombudsman that the first applicant had been unlawfully committed and treated in the psychiatric hospital, and that he had been beaten by the hospital nurses with the assistance of two hospital patients. The applicants’ complaint was referred to the Meshchanskiy District Prosecutor’s Office, Moscow, from where it was referred on to the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior.", "16. After two refusals to institute criminal proceedings, on 2 November 2006 criminal proceedings were instituted (criminal case no. 82906) under Article 116 of the Russian Criminal Code (Beatings).", "17. On 15 November 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings.", "18. On 16 March and 25 June 2007 an investigator from the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior investigation department suspended the proceedings on the grounds of an impossibility of identifying the alleged perpetrators.", "19. On 19 March and 1 July 2007 respectively the Meshchanskiy Inter‑District Prosecutor’s Office quashed the above decisions and remitted the case for additional investigation.", "20. On 11 August 2007 the investigator discontinued the proceedings on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.", "21. On 30 August 2007, however, the above decision was set aside and the proceedings were reopened.", "22. The proceedings were subsequently suspended on 14 January 2008 and 16 March 2009 and resumed again on unspecified dates.", "23. In 2012 the applicants were informed that the proceedings had been discontinued on 25 November 2010 on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.", "24. On an unspecified date the decision of 25 November 2010 was set aside and the proceedings were reopened.", "25. On 22 December 2012 the proceedings were again discontinued.", "26. On 9 January 2013 the above decision was set aside and the case file material referred to the investigation department for additional investigation, which appears still to be pending. 2. Criminal proceedings in connection with the first applicant’s placement in a psychiatric hospital and his stay there (criminal case no. 401966)", "27. On 5 March 2007 the complaints concerning the first applicant’s placement in the psychiatric hospital were removed from criminal case no. 82906 for separate examination.", "28. On 24 March 2007 an investigator from the Meshchanskiy Inter‑District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings.", "29. On 3 May 2007 the Moscow Preobrazhenskiy District Court found the above decision unlawful and groundless.", "30. On 6 July 2007 the acting prosecutor of the Meshchanskiy Inter‑District Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 24 March 2007 and ordered an additional inquiry.", "31. On 12 October 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted (criminal case no. 401966) under Article 128 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (Unlawful Placement in a Psychiatric Hospital).", "32. On 12 January, 5 March and 27 April 2008 the proceedings were suspended on the grounds of an impossibility of identifying those responsible.", "33. However, on 5 February, 27 March and 27 April 2008 respectively the above decisions were quashed and additional investigations ordered.", "34. In the meantime, on 18 April 2008 a forensic psychiatric examination was conducted which established that the first applicant’s involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation on 25 May 2005 had been justified (psychiatric pathology of an acute character accompanied by expressed depression with attempted suicide). It was further established, however, that his subsequent stay in the psychiatric ward had been unlawful. In particular, contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (the Psychiatric Treatment Law of 2 July 1992), no report had been drawn up by a panel of psychiatrists in the forty-eight hours following the first applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation on the need for a further stay in the psychiatric hospital, and no application had been made to the court by the head of the psychiatric hospital on the need for the first applicant’s continued involuntary stay in the psychiatric hospital. It was further noted that the first applicant’s mental health episodes between 27 May and 9 June 2005 did not fall under the definition of a “severe” mental disorder or any other acute mental condition, and did not require involuntary psychiatric treatment.", "35. In the absence of any meaningful investigation since the institution of the criminal proceedings, the applicants challenged the investigator before the court for failure to take action.", "36. On 7 May 2008 Preobrazhenskiy District Court found the investigator’s failure to take action unlawful (failure to identify and question witnesses and carry out other relevant investigative actions).", "37. On 28 October 2008 the head of the psychiatric hospital, D., was involved in the proceedings as a defendant.", "38. On the same day D. was questioned, and made the following statement:\n“... [Somato‑psychiatric] unit no. 2 was staffed [at the material time] by only two attending doctors: a scientific associate, L., and an attending doctor whose last name I cannot remember. The question of assigning patients to a specific attending doctor was decided by E. E., who assigned [the first applicant] to L. as a scientific thematic patient (научный тематический больной) for research on the effects of the Seroquel medication ...\nScientific associates monitor only scientific research patients to study scientific subjects which involve research into new methods of treatment and the use of new drugs approved by the Ministry of Health, with a view to later disseminating these throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. Following the results of their research, a scientific associate writes an article about the work done and defends a dissertation based on their research material.”", "39. On 31 October 2008 the preliminary investigation was completed, and on 28 November 2008 a bill of indictment was submitted for approval to the Meshchanskiy Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office.", "40. On 9 December 2008, however, the case was returned for an additional investigation, as the prosecutor considered the charges brought against D. unsubstantiated.", "41. On 5 February 2009 the qualification of the crime with which D. was charged was changed to Article 127 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty). The case-file material was sent to the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior for further investigation.", "42. On 19 July 2009 an investigator from the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior discontinued the proceedings on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.", "43. It appears that subsequently the proceedings were reopened.", "44. In 2012 the applicants were informed that on 26 November 2010 the proceedings had again been discontinued as time-barred." ]

[ "5", "3" ]

[ 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 29 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1943 and 1957 and live in Zabbar and Birkirkara respectively.", "6. The applicants own, in equal shares, a property built in the 1960s in Zabbar and which is known today as the Cressi-Sub Store. According to the applicants, the property is used as a storage facility for a nearby shop. At first, this was not contested by the Government, but at a later stage in the proceedings, they submitted that the property had been abandoned and was not in use.", "7. The applicants inherited the property from their uncle on 7 October 2000. At the time, the property was already leased to E., a company registered in Malta, for 185 Maltese lira (MTL) (equivalent to 431 euros (EUR)) every six months, that is, EUR 862 a year on the basis of a voluntary lease agreement. Although there was no evidence of the parties’ ever having signed a lease agreement, it appears that the lease commenced in 1971. Rent is payable every six months in advance, and in accordance with the law the lease is renewed automatically every six months.", "8. In such circumstances, the Reletting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance (hereinafter “the Ordinance”), Chapter 69 of the Laws of Malta, (see Relevant domestic law below) provides that the eviction of a tenant or a change in the conditions of a lease requires the authorisation of the Rent Regulation Board (“the RRB”).", "9. In 2002, the applicants undertook a valuation of the property with a view to making a request for an increase in the rent. The architect who carried out the valuation indicated that the current rental value of the property was EUR 7,000 a year.", "10. In accordance with legal requirements (see Relevant domestic law below), on 22 April 2002, the applicants informed E. by means of a judicial letter that they intended to raise the rent to EUR 7,000 a year with effect from 1 July 2002.", "11. By means of a judicial letter dated 17 May 2002, E. replied that it did not agree to the request. It failed, however, to apply to the RRB for the rejection of such an increase or for new conditions, as required by law (see Article 14 of the Ordinance).", "12. As from the second term of 2002 the applicants stopped accepting rent for fear it would prejudice their claim. In consequence, company E. continued to pay the rent by means of a schedule of deposit filed with the domestic courts.", "13. On 27 March 2003 the applicants brought an action before the Civil Court, requesting it to impose on E. an obligatory time-limit within which to make an application to the RRB. They considered that in default of such action by E., the increase in rent requested should be deemed to have been agreed. E. having eventually filed the said application (see below), the applicants’ action was dismissed.", "14. On 31 May 2004 E. applied to the RRB, requesting it to dismiss the claim for the increase in rent. The applicants responded, arguing that the rent should reflect market values.", "15. In a report dated September 2006 two court-appointed architects concluded that the rent of EUR 862 was already more than 40% over and above the rent level at which the premises were or could have been leased before 4 August 1914 (Article 4 (1) (b) of the Ordinance, see Relevant domestic law below). It followed that in the light of Article 4 (1) (b) of the Ordinance, the increase in rent could not be recommended.", "16. By a note filed on 30 November 2006 the applicants submitted that an unfavourable decision would breach their rights under the Convention.", "17. On 9 January 2008 the RRB dismissed the applicants’ request on the basis of the opinion of the two court-appointed architects. It noted that it had no jurisdiction to determine the human rights issue raised by the applicants, who had not made a request for a constitutional referral.", "18. On 25 January 2008 the applicants appealed. They argued that the RRB’s decision had breached their rights under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They requested the court to refer the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions.", "19. By decree of 13 May 2008 the Court of Appeal referred the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions. Following the constitutional proceedings (described below) and the applicants’ lodging of an application with the Court, on 4 October 2013 the Court of Appeal adjourned the case sine die, pending the outcome of the present proceedings.", "20. By a judgment of 7 July 2010 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, upheld the applicants’ claim, holding that their rights under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention had been breached. Referring to the Court’s case-law, it considered that the applicants had not had an effective remedy, in so far as they had been constrained by the capping of rent levels set out in the law. In relation to their property rights, it upheld the finding of a violation, on the basis of the reasoning in the case of Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, § 63, 15 September 2009) – namely the low level of the rent, the applicants’ state of uncertainty as to the possibility of recovery of the property, the lack of procedural safeguards, and the rise in the standard of living in Malta over the past decades – coupled with the applicants’ argument that the interference had been disproportionate, as it had caused them to bear an excessive burden, given that the property was used for a commercial purpose. Indeed, the lessor could have used other property it had owned, but had preferred to sell that other property for EUR 350,000 and to continue to rent from the applicants at a low rate.", "21. On appeal, by a judgment of 5 July 2011, the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment. It considered that although when the parties had concluded the contract they had been aware of the law as it stood (and had stood for a number of years), they had nevertheless opted to enter into that contract. Therefore, they and their legal successors could not now complain of a breach of their human rights. Indeed, the original lease agreement had neither stipulated a low level of rent nor envisaged future increases in rent. Given that the original owner had opted to lease the premises, knowing the legal consequences attached, the impact on their property rights had been neither unforeseen nor arbitrary; nor had there been a state of legal uncertainty. Moreover, recent amendments to the law had improved their position from 2010 onwards (Act X of 2009; see Article 1531D of the Civil Code below).", "22. As mentioned above (see paragraph 12) as soon as they inherited the property, the applicants refused to accept the rent to avoid prejudicing their legal position. In consequence, it transpires from the documents provided to the Court that from 2002 to 2010 the tenants deposited in court by means of schedules of deposit the sum of EUR 431 every six months (EUR 862 annually). For the subsequent years those deposits amounted to EUR 496 and EUR 570 in 2011, and EUR 656 every six months until 2013.", "23. In 1995 Article 46 of the Ordinance was amended to stipulate that the impugned restrictions would not apply to leases entered into after 1 June 1995.", "24. While the above-mentioned constitutional proceedings were pending, a new law was enacted, stipulating that with effect from 1 January 2010 the rent applicable to commercial leases was to be increased by 15% per year, and that an increase at that level should also take place for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 (Section 1531 D of the Civil Code).", "25. Thus the amounts of rent payable to the applicants in those years were as follows: in 2010 EUR 990; in 2011 EUR 1,138; in 2012 EUR 1,309; and in 2013 EUR 1,505. For the years 2014 onwards the rent would increase by 5% a year." ]

[ "P1-1" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. On 13 October 2008 the applicant’s son, Mr Ry., was found dead in the pond which he had been guarding as a night watchman.", "6. On the following day a post-mortem examination was completed. It concluded that Mr Ry. had drowned. A number of bruises and sores were discovered on his chest. The expert assessed those injuries as insignificant and considered that they had been inflicted by blunt hard objects.", "7. During the period from October 2008 to February 2013 the police refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the death fifteen times. All those rulings were quashed by the prosecution authorities or the courts for superficiality and incompleteness of the investigation undertaken.", "8. On 7 February 2013, following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in November 2012, the case was registered in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations.", "9. Thereafter the police terminated the criminal investigation twice having found that there was no indication of a homicide. Both those decisions were quashed.", "10. As of April 2014 the pre-trial investigation was ongoing." ]

[ "2" ]

[ 2, 3, 4 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Samara.", "6. At the material time the applicant was an employee of a municipal company, Arsenal (“the Arsenal company”, «Муниципальное предприятие «Арсенал») and worked as a store keeper at a car park operated by the company.", "7. The company was founded in 1996 by the administration of the Oktyabrskiy District of Samara. It was created as a result of the re-organisation of a “self-supporting enterprise S. at the [local] Department of the Interior” («хозрасчетное предприятие ... при УВД ...»). According to an extract from the company’s articles of association (§§ 1.3 and 1.4) submitted by the Government, the company exercised the right of operational and financial control («право хозяйственного ведения») in respect of the assets allotted to it. It was responsible for the entirety of its assets. The founder of the company was not liable for the company’s debts, and the company was not liable for the founder’s debts.", "8. In reply to a specific request by the Court as regards the functions performed by the company, the Government submitted that, according to its articles of association, the Arsenal company was competent to provide a wide range of services, including the organisation of car pounds and car parks, as well as legal, medical and tourism services. It could operate in the areas of scientific, agricultural or consumer-goods production, and participate in commercial and other activities. It was competent to plan its activities on its own (§§ 2.1 and 7 of the articles of association).", "9. According to the applicant, the company only operated a car park at Novo‑Vokzalnaya Street in Samara and did not perform any of the other activities mentioned in the articles of association. It had the same legal address as the local Road Traffic Safety Inspectorate (“the Road Inspectorate”). The car park consisted of a car pound – a secure storage area for vehicles that had been stolen, abandoned, or parked illegally or had been involved in an accident or a crime. The company’s only function was to ensure storage of vehicles that had been impounded pursuant to the Road Inspectorate’s orders. The company’s employees registered the cars on arrival using the official forms of the inspectorate. The tariffs for storing the vehicles were determined by the inspectorate. The company could return an impounded vehicle to its owner only if authorised to do so by a road inspector. Free parking spaces could be rented for a daily tariff. The applicant submitted a reorganisation agreement of 1996, a sample of a “vehicle return” form containing a road inspector’s authorisation to return a car, extracts from local authorities’ decisions designating the car park as a pound, extracts from local newspapers and other documents in support of his submissions. According to an information note of 21 February 2002 drawn up by the Samara Committee of the Federal Land Registry Service («Федеральная служба земельного кадастра»), between 1996 and 29 November 2001 the Arsenal company had rented three more car pounds.", "10. On 3 December 1998, pursuant to a decision by the head of the town administration, the Committee for the Administration of Property of the Town of Samara (“the Committee”) ordered the liquidation of the company. The decision of the head of the town administration was dated 13 November 1998 and concerned several municipal companies operating in Samara. It cited as reasons for the liquidation the “unsatisfactory results of the [companies’] economic activity, inefficient use of the municipal property ... as well as the absence of social importance of the municipal companies ... for the town’s population”.", "11. On 22 June 2000 the Committee decided to withdraw the assets operated by the company, namely the car park where the applicant worked and a VAZ car, and ordered the transfer of those assets to another municipal company, “the Housing Exchange Bureau”. By an agreement dated 1 August 2000 that legal entity accepted the transfer of financial responsibility for the car park from the Arsenal company.", "12. On 31 July 2000 the applicant was dismissed from his job in view of the liquidation of the company. He brought proceedings against his former employer seeking damages in connection with his dismissal.", "13. By a judgment of 9 November 2001 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara (“the District Court”) established that the company had still not been wound up and therefore the applicant’s dismissal had been unlawful. The court then granted the applicant’s claims in part and awarded him 15,644 Russian roubles (RUB). On 22 January 2002 the Samara Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the judgment of 9 November 2001 on appeal, having increased the award in his favour to RUB 18,033.70 (667 euros (EUR)).", "14. At some point the local branch of the federal tax office applied to the commercial court with a request to declare the company insolvent. On 24 January 2002 the Commercial Court of the Samara Region declared the Arsenal company insolvent within the special simplified insolvency procedure applicable to the de facto absent debtors (see paragraph 29 below). Liquidation proceedings were instituted for a period of six months and a liquidator was appointed.", "15. A list of the claims made by the company’s creditors was drawn up. It consisted of creditors’ claims at the second, fourth and fifth level. The applicant’s claims were listed as second-level claims.", "16. On 8 February 2002 the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 9 November 2001, as upheld on 22 January 2002, were commenced. The bailiffs sent several requests to the domestic authorities in order to verify whether the debtor company had any assets and also issued a written warning urging the company to comply with the domestic judgment.\nIn February 2002 they established, after inspection of the premises at the company’s legal address, that the company had no assets at that address. On 26 February 2002 the local department of the Road Inspectorate informed the bailiffs that the company did not have any cars in its possession. On 12 March 2002 the bank where the company had set up its business account replied to the bailiffs that the company’s balance was RUB 0.", "17. On 14 March 2002 the Commercial Court of the Samara Region informed the bailiffs’ service of the decision of 24 January 2002 to set the liquidation procedure in motion. On 27 March 2002 the bailiffs forwarded the writs of execution to the liquidator.", "18. On 29 March 2002 the applicant requested the District Court to order an injunction of a VAZ car in order to ensure the execution of the judgment in his favour. He argued that in accordance with the decision of 22 June 2000 (see paragraph 11 above) the car should have been transferred to the different company along with the other assets of the Arsenal company. However, the car had not been included in the list of assets accepted on 1 August 2000 by the “Housing Exchange Bureau”. Therefore, he concluded, the car should have remained with the Arsenal company and could be subject to an injunction. On 4 April 2002 the District Court accepted the complaint. According to the applicant, no reply followed.", "19. On 12 September 2002 the Commercial Court of the Samara Region established that the liquidation of the Arsenal company had been accomplished. No assets had been revealed. The overall amount of the company’s debt totalled RUB 556,648.40. The defendant’s assets were insufficient to satisfy the creditors’ claims, including the applicant’s ones. They were therefore considered as settled.", "20. On 24 October 2002 the District Court, following the bailiffs’ request under Article 439 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force at the material time (see paragraph 30 below), ordered that the enforcement proceedings be discontinued. On 25 October 2002 the bailiffs terminated the proceedings. On 4 February 2003 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 24 October 2002 since it had been taken in the applicant’s absence and remitted the case for a fresh examination.", "21. On 19 March 2003 the District Court took a decision reproducing in essence that of 24 October 2002. In particular, the court observed that on 12 September 2002 the insolvency proceedings in respect of the municipal company had been discontinued, no assets of the company had been revealed and the company had been declared insolvent. Referring to Article 439 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court again ordered that the enforcement proceedings be discontinued. The parties were present. The bailiffs’ maintained their position and the applicant left the issue to the discretion of the first-instance court.", "22. The applicant appealed against the decision arguing, in particular, that the Committee (see paragraph 10 above) should be involved in the case as a respondent, and that his request for an injunction had remained unanswered.", "23. On 20 May 2003 the Regional Court examined and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court reiterated that by the decision of 12 September 2002 the Commercial Court had ordered the termination of the insolvency procedure in respect of the company. The court further reproduced the Commercial Court’s findings as regards the debtor company’s lack of assets and confirmed that in those circumstances the enforcement proceedings were to be discontinued. The court examined the applicant’s request to summon the Committee as a respondent and rejected it because the proceedings in question had not concerned the Committee in any way. It accordingly upheld the first-instance decision.", "24. According to the applicant, he was only informed of the outcome of his appeal in a letter from the District Court dated 3 November 2003. Enclosed, he found a letter of 21 April 2003 by which he had been notified that the examination of his appeal had been scheduled for 20 May 2003. Allegedly, he did not receive the letter of 21 April 2003 until 3 November 2003.", "25. From several replies the applicant received from the authorities between 2003 and 2006 to his numerous complaints, it followed that on 21 April 2003 he had been duly notified of the hearing of 20 May 2003 by letter no. 1861. He was also provided with a copy of a handwritten note from the District Court’s registry confirming that the summons had been duly sent to him.", "26. By letter of 13 June 2006 the District Court acknowledged that on 21 April 2003 the disputed notification had been sent to the applicant by ordinary mail but to the wrong flat and therefore had not been received by the addressee. The court specified that it was not in a position to send notifications by registered mail, due to a shortage of relevant funds." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 4, 9, 10, 14, 16, 18, 19 ]

[]

[ "11. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Rome.", "12. In 2002 she had recourse to assisted reproduction techniques, undergoing in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment with her partner at the Centre for reproductive medicine at the European Hospital (“the centre”) in Rome. The five embryos obtained from the IVF treatment were placed in cryopreservation.", "13. Before the embryos could be implanted the applicant’s partner died, on 12 November 2003, in a bomb attack in Nasiriya (Iraq) while he was reporting on the war.", "14. After deciding not to have the embryos implanted, the applicant sought to donate them to scientific research and thus contribute to promoting advances in treatment for diseases that are difficult to cure.", "15. According to the information provided at the hearing before the Grand Chamber, the applicant made a number of unsuccessful verbal requests for release of the embryos at the centre where they were being stored.", "16. In a letter of 14 December 2011, the applicant asked the Director of the centre to release the five cryopreserved embryos so that they could be used for stem-cell research. The Director refused to comply with her request on the ground that this type of research was banned and punishable as a criminal offence in Italy under section 13 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004 (“Law no. 40/2004”).", "17. The embryos in question are currently stored in the cryogenic storage bank at the centre where the IVF treatment was carried out." ]

[ "34", "8" ]

[ 3 ]

[]

[ "5. The first applicant was born in 1976 and the second applicant in 2001 and they live in Zadar.", "6. On 23 June 2001 the second applicant married I.M.", "7. On 4 September 2001 the second applicant gave birth to the first applicant.", "8. Relations between the spouses deteriorated, and in 2006 the second applicant brought a civil action against her husband seeking divorce, custody of, and maintenance for the first applicant. Her husband, I.M., filed a counterclaim, seeking custody of the first applicant.", "9. In the period between 5 July 2006 and 7 March 2008 a total of eight criminal complaints were filed against the second applicant and I.M. Most of these complaints were filed against each other directly, but some were filed at the initiative of the police. Three of those eight complaints resulted in criminal proceedings being instituted (two against I.M. and one against both I.M. and the second applicant), the outcome of which is unknown. The remaining five criminal complaints were dismissed, including three in which it was alleged that criminal offences of child abuse and domestic violence had been committed against the first applicant.", "10. By a judgment of 24 August 2007, the Zadar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zadru) (a) granted the second applicant and I.M. a divorce; (b) awarded I.M. custody of the first applicant; (c) granted the second applicant access (contact) rights; and (d) ordered the second applicant to make regular maintenance payments for the first applicant. In so deciding the court relied on the opinion of forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology obtained during the proceedings and on the recommendation of the Zadar Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Zadar, “the local social welfare centre”) which participated in those proceedings as an intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the first applicant’s interests. The judgment became final on 2 January 2008.", "11. Previously, by a decision of 7 November 2006 the local social welfare centre had ordered a child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in respect of the first applicant. The measure was imposed with a view to improving communication between the second applicant and I.M. regarding the first applicant, and also with a view to preventing her from being drawn into their conflict. The measure lasted until 31 August 2008, when it was discontinued. In its decision of 2 September 2008 the local social welfare centre stated, inter alia, the following:\n“The measure only partly achieved its goal, in that contact with the mother has stabilised. The parents still do not communicate with each other and it is evident that the mother intends to continue with such behaviour. Furthermore, the mother’s cooperation with the supervising officer is not adequate and it is evident that the measure has become futile.”", "12. The applicants submit that on 1 February 2011 the first applicant’s father I.M. hit her in the face and squeezed her throat while verbally abusing her.", "13. The next day the second applicant took the first applicant to the police to report the incident. The police instructed them to see a doctor and accompanied them to the local hospital, where the first applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist, who diagnosed her with bruising of the eyeball and eye socket tissue. In particular, the ophthalmologist noted:\n“Clinically discrete haematoma of the left lower eyelid, in resorption. The motility of the eyes is normal, no diplopia [double vision], no clinical signs of orbit fracture.\nPupils are normal, lenses [are] in place, transparent, fundus [is] normal on both sides.\nDg.: Contusio oc.sin.\nHaematoma palp.inf.oc.sin.\nTreatment: cold wraps [compresses] ... Into the eye: Effludimex sol ...\nDg:\nS05.1. Bruising of the eyeball and the eye socket tissue”", "14. After examining the first applicant the ophthalmologist filled in a standard form to be submitted to the police, in which he indicated that the injury had been inflicted by a hard blow to the left eye, gave bruising of the left eyelid (haematoma palp.inf.oc.sin.) as his diagnosis, and described the injury as light.", "15. The applicants then returned to the police, where they both gave statements. In her statement the first applicant mentioned other instances of physical and psychological violence by her father in the past three years. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with the first applicant reads as follows:\n“This interview was conducted regarding the violent behaviour of the [child’s] father I.M.\n[The child] stated that yesterday around 4 p.m., when she was getting ready to visit her mother D.M., she wanted to take a picture frame containing a lock of her hair which her mum had had framed when she had had her first haircut. She put the picture frame underneath her jacket because she knew that her dad would not allow her to take that picture frame to her mum. Then his girlfriend I.P. saw that she had something under her jacket and asked what it was. She replied that it was nothing. Then her father came and took the picture frame from under her jacket and told her that they would talk about it when she came home in the evening.\n... In the evening, around 8 p.m., mum took her back to her dad, who brought her into the room and called her a thief, hit her with his hand on the left eye, and started squeezing her neck and pushing her. During this she fell, but did not hurt herself because she fell on a bag which was on the floor. Then she vomited saliva because she felt nauseous from her father’s squeezing her neck. Then [her father’s partner] I.P. came and told her father to calm down, otherwise she [the first applicant] would vomit ... He then left and sat in the living room. She was very afraid and was crying, but nevertheless went to her room and did her homework for the next day. When she woke up in the morning she greeted her father with ‘good morning’ but he did not even look at her and just turned his head away. In the morning she felt slight pain under the left eye where her father had hit her. When she arrived at school she mentioned it to her teacher and her friends P. and A., because she felt the need to confide in someone.\nToday she went to her mum and told her everything that happened that evening. She was also very hurt when her dad rudely [swore at] her. He often does that, and did so [also] yesterday evening. He also called her a ‘cow’ and told her she was stupid. Because of his rude language she cried a lot thereafter. Dad tells her from time to time [to go to hell] and she does not like swearing, especially when he mentions her mum while doing so. A few months ago the father told her that through his friends he would ensure that she never heard from or saw her mum. She is therefore very afraid of her dad because he can be dangerous. She had seen her dad beating her mum and was therefore afraid that he might beat her the same way too. She states that her father is often rude to her, yelling at her, forcing her to eat food she does not like, and when she does not, grabs her chin and shoves the food into her mouth, which makes her feel sick. He often takes away her mobile phone so she cannot call her mum, and she would like to be in contact with her mum. Once he hit her on the leg with a hairbrush when she would not allow him to brush her hair. He also grabs her arm and squeezes it so hard that she has bruises afterwards. She states that she is very afraid of her dad and would like to live with her mum. Tonight she definitely does not want to go with her father but wants to stay with her mum. She is afraid that her father will beat her and yell at her. He often threatens her by waving his hand at her and saying ‘look at it, look at it’, with the intention of hitting her if she does not listen to him. The father also threatens to cut off her hair, knowing that she likes [her] long hair. He threatens her with that when she is crying for her mum, bites her fingernails or asks for a mobile phone. Dad often tells her that she must not love her [maternal] grandmother, [her mother’s partner] N. or his mum, whereas she loves them all.\nShe further states that each time her mum or [her mother’s new partner] N. buys her something and she brings it to her father’s home he throws all those things into the rubbish. Therefore, she wears the things her mum bought her only when she goes to her mum’s place, as she is not allowed to wear them when she is at her dad’s home.\nLastly, she states that she is very afraid of her dad and [particularly] ... that he might do something bad to her mum, because he constantly threatens to do so.\nThe interview was conducted in the presence of a social worker from the Zadar Social Welfare Centre V.C.”", "16. The same day the police interviewed I.M. and his partner I.P. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with I.M. reads as follows:\n“The interview was conducted in the presence of his advocate B.Z., regarding the complaint that he had hit his minor daughter ... In that connection he stated the following:\n...\n[He says that his former wife] does not regularly pay maintenance for [their] daughter ... amounting to 800 Croatian kunas (HRK) per month and up to the present day owes [him] HRK 15,000.\n[He submits that], sadly, [his former wife] manipulates their daughter ... and uses her so that she rejects everything that bears [his] surname. She even created a Facebook page for her under ... the surname of her current partner ...\nAs regards his relationship with his daughter ..., [he] states that he, as a parent who wants to teach his child to respect work and discipline, has his duties, and that the child has to have certain discipline, [for example] she must not lie to her parents, and may not do whatever she pleases. When [his daughter] comes back from school ... he requires her to do her homework and study. As regards food, [he] states that he wishes [his daughter] to eat healthy and varied food, with fruit and vegetables, rice and meat, and that she does not only eat pizzas, sandwiches and sweets. He also does not like to throw away food and prefers that it is eaten.\nOn 1 February 2011 around 3.50 p.m. [his daughter] was preparing to go to her mother and came into the kitchen to say goodbye. On that occasion [his partner] I.P. noticed that she had something under her jacket ... and asked what it was. [The daughter] replied that it was nothing, even though there was visibly something underneath it. He asked her to open her jacket. [Then they realised] that she had taken a glass picture frame containing the locks of her hair cut off when she was still a baby. [He] then asked her why she had not asked to take it instead of doing it the way she did, stealing from her own house. [The daughter] said that it was for her mum and that if she had asked him if she could take it he would not have allowed it. Then he told her to go to her mum and that they would talk about it later, when she came home.\n[The daughter] came home at 8 p.m. and they continued their conversation because he wanted to tell her that what she had done was bad and that she should have asked instead of stealing things from the house and taking them to her mother. [His daughter] replied that she wanted [the picture frame] to be at her mother’s place. [He] then reprimanded her for lying to him, saying that what she had done was sad or bad and that she always had to tell the truth because he did not tolerate lies and that all problems would be solved the way they had been solved so far. He admits that he is sometimes a strict parent but that he always behaves in a measured way and with [good] reason, and it is only ever exclusively done with a view to making her behave [better].\nToday, on 2 February 2011 [his daughter] was at school in the morning and in the afternoon was having fun with [him] and his [partner] ... Nothing suggested that [she] was in any way distressed by the previous evening’s events.\n[He] emphasises that all this was fabricated by her mother ... who has a negative influence on [their daughter].”", "17. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with I.M.’s partner I.P. reads as follows:\n“The interview was conducted regarding a complaint that I.M. had hit his minor daughter ... In that connection she stated the following:\nOn 1 February 2011 around 3.50 p.m. [her stepdaughter] was preparing to go to her mother and came into the kitchen to say goodbye to them. On that occasion [I.P.] noticed that she had something under her jacket ... and asked her what it was. [Her stepdaughter] replied that it was nothing, even though there was visibly something underneath her jacket. I.M. asked her to open her jacket. [Then they realised] that she had taken a glass picture frame containing locks of her hair cut off when she was a baby. [He] then asked [his daughter] why she had not asked to take it instead of doing it the way she did, stealing from her own house. [The stepdaughter] said that it was for her mum, and that if she had asked him for it he would not have allowed it. Then he told her to go to her mum and that they would talk about it later, when she came home.\n[The stepdaughter] came home at 8 p.m. and she and her father continued their conversation, because he wanted to tell her that what she had done was bad and that she should have asked instead of stealing things from the house and taking them to her mother. [The stepdaughter] replied that she wanted [the picture frame] to be at her mother’s place. I.M. then reprimanded her for lying to him, by saying that what she had done was sad or bad and that she always had to tell the truth because he did not tolerate lies and that all problems would be solved the way they had been solved so far. I.P. firmly states that on that occasion I.M. did not hit [his daughter], nor has she ever seen him hitting [her]. She says that I.M. has a temper and sometimes shouts when he considers that something is wrong, but that he is really not prone to physical violence or hitting the children. I.P. notes that [her stepdaughter] is generally very sensitive about her mother and immediately starts crying as regards anything related to her.”", "18. After the interviews, the first applicant was returned to her father I.M., following the intervention of an employee of the local social welfare centre.", "19. On 19 February 2011 the first applicant was, at the initiative of the second applicant, examined by a psychiatrist at the Psychiatric Hospital for Children and Young People in Zagreb. The relevant part of the psychiatrist’s observations reads as follows:\n“The child was with the mother at the police station and reported the incident [of 1 February 2011] because the mother, and also the child, claim that this was not the first time that the father has mistreated [the child], although not so much physically as psychologically ...\nDuring the interview with the girl it is evident that the child gets very upset at the mention of the father, she is afraid of him, ‘constantly thinks that he will hit her again and would like to stay with mum’. Dad is allegedly constantly threatening that he will ‘cut off her hair if she keeps crying and mentioning mum ...’ he often swears and utters vulgar expressions against the mother;all this was allegedly reported to the police ... (the interview was conducted first with the mother alone and then with the girl, also alone; [the child] talks about it all through tears and while biting her fingernails) ....\nThe girl says that she remembers that ‘she was asked when she was little with whom she wished to live and that she said with dad because she was told that she had to say that, now she regrets it’ (she is crying all the time).\nThe girl otherwise appears to have good intellectual capacity; she functions well outside the family, and is an A-grade pupil. There are no signs of psychotic disorder, and the girl is emphatic in contact except when she gets upset and talks rapidly when the topic of the father and his relationship with her is raised (thus there is an impression of strong fear of the father).\nGiven the complexity of the family situation (the father has remarried and [the child] lives with him, his new wife, her daughter from her first marriage and two small half-sisters, while the mother also has a new partner with whom she has a small son) and the evident traumatisation of the child which has probably already lasted a long time, a psychiatric assessment of the child is recommended.\nUntil then ... I recommend taking the girl to a psychologist ...\nDg. Abused child, T 74.8”", "20. On 5 March 2011 the second applicant took the first applicant to a psychologist in Zagreb, who, inter alia, made the following observations:\n“The interviews, which were conducted with the mother alone and separately with the girl, indicate that the child is afraid of her father because he psychologically and sometimes physically abuses her ...\nThe girl ... says that she would gladly live with mum if she could, and that dad speaks badly of mum ...\nThe results show that [the child] is emotionally attached to her mum and thinks that her dad does not love her, is afraid of him, does not trust him, and thinks that it is not fair that dad constantly yells at her even when she is not at fault. Her biggest wish is to live with her mum and her family, and she finds it difficult to return to her dad’s home. She identifies with her mother and thinks that they are very much alike.\nFindings: [The girl] is a traumatised child with well above-average mental abilities, strong self-control, neuroticism, depressive affect, hypersensitive, anxious with strong inferiority complex. Discrete tremor is diagnosed.\nI recommend psychological and, if need be, psychiatric counselling.”", "21. On 30 March 2011 the Zadar Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zadru, hereafter “the State Attorney”) informed the second applicant that on the same day it had, concerning the incident of 1 February 2011, indicted I.M. before the Zadar Municipal Court for the criminal offence of bodily injury defined in Article 98 of the Criminal Code (for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 35-51 below).", "22. On the same day, 30 March 2011, the second applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court seeking reversal of the custody arrangements set forth in that court’s judgment of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above; for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 60-81 below).", "23. On 22 April 2011 the second applicant took the first applicant back to the same psychologist (see paragraph 20 above). The psychiatrist made the following observations:\n“... The interview with [the child] was conducted without her mother’s presence.\nIn contact silent, with depressive affect, cooperative, bites her fingernails, occasionally cries. We again had a conversation about the events of 1 February 2011 during which the child was psychologically and physically abused by her father, and which she in her mother’s presence reported to the police.\n[The child] says that that was not an isolated incident and that she is afraid of her father because she has continuously, from the moment she started living with him, been exposed to psychological and, from time to time, also physical abuse. She says that on multiple occasions he has threatened that he would hit her if she kept biting her fingernails and that he would take her mobile phone away. Previously she was more afraid of her father’s physical violence than now, but her mother encourages her by telling her not to be afraid and to ‘endure difficult moments’. The child states that she does not like living with her father because he threatens her and tells her that he will beat her. She says that mum loves her more, does not threaten her and is good to her. She uses suppression and ‘forgetting’ as defence mechanisms ...\nThe child states that the father yells at her almost every day, swears, tells her that she is a ‘stupid cow, pig, goat, thief, that she constantly defies him’. She says that this offensive behaviour by her father is rarer since she reported him to the police.\n[The child] says that the father has threatened her that he will, through ‘his people’, take care that she does not hear from or see her mother. He threatens her that he will cut off her hair if she cries for her mother.\nThe child alleges that her father forces her to eat so that she has to eat everything he puts on her plate and that she sometimes vomits because of that. If she refuses to eat everything the father holds her chin and ‘shoves’ the food in her mouth. If she resists, he smears the food over her face.\nAfter she reported him to the police, the father controlled himself for a couple of days, and then again started yelling but then to a lesser degree. He no longer shoves food in her mouth, but she has to eat everything he puts on her plate. Sometimes she has to eat something that she does not like, which the mother never does to her.\n[The child] is lonely at her father’s home, because she spends time only with her half-sisters; her friends are not allowed to visit in case [the younger half-sister] gets sick. After school the father allows her to meet with friends for half an hour only. She visited one of her friends only once and she did not dare to ask the father for more visits. She thinks that her father is stricter with her than with her older half-sister.\nI found out that the father speaks badly of the mother and her new partner in front of the child, that she has different clothes at her mother’s and her father’s places, and that the father threw the sneakers she got as a birthday present from her mother and her partner into the rubbish.\nAsked about her father’s wife, she says that she is better to her than her father: does not force her to eat, has never hit her, helps her with homework, and brushes her hair.\nThe child shows a strong desire to live with her mother because she is emotionally closer to her, and because the mother supports her in difficult moments. She has many friends in her mother’s neighbourhood and is encouraged to spend time with them; she has fun and feels safe with her mother. Asked about [the behaviour of] her mother’s partner towards her, the child says he is good to her and tries to cheer her up, buys her presents, and is fun and pleasant to talk to.\nTo the question whether, if she were to live with her mother, she would be allowed to see her father outside the visiting schedule ordered by the court, she says that it is certain that her mum would allow her to see her father whenever she wished to and states that ‘she would like to move to her mum’s [place] right away and forever’.\nFindings and recommendations: In order to prevent the development of irreversible psychopathological consequences due to continuous abuse, it is recommended that the child be immediately removed from the family where she currently lives and that custody be awarded to the mother.\nPsychological and if need be, psychiatric follow-up is also recommended.”", "24. On 4 May 2011 the second applicant again took the first applicant to the police to report another instance of abuse by her father, who had allegedly pressured her to change her earlier statements made before the police and the experts. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with the first applicant on that occasion reads as follows:\n“This interview was conducted regarding inappropriate behaviour of the [child’s] father I.M.\n[The child] stated that a couple of days ago her dad’s girlfriend I. asked her whether she had visited a certain lady in Zagreb with her mum. She had replied that she had, whereupon I. had asked her what she had talked about with that lady in Zagreb and why she had not said anything about [it] to her dad. She replied that she had forgotten to mention it. After that her father had called her on her mobile phone and asked her to come to his café ... immediately. When she had arrived there he had started yelling at her and asking why she had been saying bad things about him and why she had not told him that she had been in Zagreb ... After that he had told her that she was lying like a dog and told her to get out of his sight.\n... Afterwards her dad had kept asking her whether she really wanted to live with her mum and she always replied that she did. A couple of days ago he had told her that she would not live with her mum until she was eighteen years old.\n[The child] also states that he said that he would report her mum for taking her to a doctor in Zagreb, and that she [the mother] would receive a criminal complaint for [having done] that. He [also] told her that he would now take her to a psychologist and to some other people where she would have to say that he had not hit her and that he was good to her.\nToday he had again asked her whether she really wanted to live with her mum and she had again replied to him that she did want to live with her mum.\nThis interview was conducted in the presence of the [child’s] mother ...”", "25. On 7 May 2011 the first applicant’s father took her to a psychiatrist at the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in Zagreb, who, after studying the opinions of 19 February, 5 March and 22 April 2011 (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 and above) and interviewing the first applicant, in his observations noted, inter alia, the following:\n“It is evident that [the child] is very burdened by her parents’ conflict and the inadequacy of their mutual communication, which frequently goes through her. The girl shows affection towards, rather than fear of, her father. However, when asked what happened [on 1 February 2011] she did not want to talk about it; she was visibly emotionally burdened so I did not insist on it. She freely expresses her dissatisfaction by saying that she does not like it when her father raises his voice. Asked when that happens, she replies: ‘when I do something bad’.\nShe is functioning well at school, says that she has many friends ... that at her mother’s place she also has friends and likes to go there, but that she feels comfortable at home with her father because she gets on well with ... the daughter of her father’s new partner ...\nHer mental state is dominated by the emotional burden of her parents’ conflict, high emotional tensions, the need to be close to her mother (whom she wishes to please by being with her) and, in her relationship with her father, by the conflict of loyalties she has been placed in.\nI am of the opinion that the girl has been drawn into a conflict of loyalties and is very burdened by her parents’ disagreements and conflict, which has resulted in high emotional pressure, anxiety and hypersensitivity.\nI recommend that the parents undergo family counselling and possibly afterwards also family therapy together with [their daughter].”", "26. On 6 June 2011 the father took the first applicant back to the same psychiatrist who, in so far as relevant, noted:\n“The interview with the girl was conducted alone. [The child] states that she feels good, that she cannot wait for school to end but that she has no difficulties in school. She gets on well with both her father’s wife and her mother’s partner, and regards her half-brother and half-sisters as real siblings. She is still sad about her parents’ differences and their inability to adequately communicate [with each other] and their different parenting styles.”", "27. In the course of the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above) the court ordered a combined expert opinion from experts in psychiatry and psychology. Accordingly, the applicants and the first applicant’s father were examined by forensic experts of this type at the Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Popovača. As part of the preparation of their opinion each expert conducted interviews, inter alia, with the first applicant. In particular, on 1 July and 28 September 2011 the first applicant was interviewed by each expert; on 2 September 2011 she was interviewed only by the expert in psychiatry. The interviews of 1 July 2011 were conducted without the first applicant’s parents being present, that of 2 September 2011 in the presence of her mother (the second applicant), and those of 28 September 2011 in the presence of her father.", "28. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 1 July 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows:\n“[The child] states that she always tells the truth, literally always, and that she feels her worst when she is told that she is a liar like her mum.\n... She very clearly articulates her emotional bond and closeness with her mother and her wish to live with her. ...\n[The child] states that she once attempted to talk with her father about living with her mother, but that the conversation ended quickly with him telling her that there would be no discussion about that and that she would stay with him until she was eighteen ... She says that her father is very strict and that he often shouts at and insults her, which makes her embarrassed and scared. The last time he attacked her, because of the picture [frame], I. [her father’s partner] stopped him, and she felt nauseous ...\nShe says that she complained to her mother about her father, which was why she went to the police with her. She was particularly struck when the social worker came to the police [station] and talked to her mother; she heard the social worker say that unless they agreed on where [their daughter] was going to live she would be placed in a children’s home. (The girl cries for a long time afterwards).\nWhen asked how it is to live with her father, she states that she would prefer to live with her mother as she is closer to her ...”", "29. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 1 July 2011 with the expert in psychology reads as follows:\n“Dad is so- so. When he is in a good mood, he is good. When he is not [in a good mood] he is not [good]. Once when he forced me to eat I vomited.’ ...\n‘Mum is great. Good, fair and does not hit me. She does not threaten me. I do not fight with her that much. I am calmer when I am with my mum, there are not that many fights, I am more relaxed.’\n... She said that she came to the expert assessment ‘because of what dad did to me and because I want to live with my mum. I wanted ... He threatened me ...’ She cried and indistinctly through tears says that her dad smeared food over her face as a joke so she felt ugly and embarrassed. ‘He hit me once ... He said that he did not but that he only made a [threatening] gesture with his finger ...’\nAfter she calmed down we cameng back to the traumatic incident.\nYou started crying?\n‘... He did this to me (she demonstrates with her hand round her neck). Dad hit me and I always cry so I almost vomited. [He squeezed me] this hard (she is touching her throat and chin) so that I almost vomited ...’\n ‘[He called me a thief] and I said I was not and then he hit me near the eye (she shows the left temple) ... He asked me if I would do that again (she needs to be interrupted because she is speaking indistinctly while sobbing) ... [The next day] ... I told my mum what he had done to me. She told me that we could go to the police and there I told [them what happened] ... The first lady [the policewoman] there was good. The other [the social worker] pulled my hand while saying that I have to go to my dad. I did not want [to go]. She then told me that if mum gets into a fight with dad she will go to jail and I will go into a children’s home (she is sobbing). I had to go with my father. Dad said that we would not talk about that ...’\n‘Yesterday he told me that he had never hit me and that he had not done anything to me and that I should tell the truth. But he did hit me. He also told me that when he smeared the food over my face it was a joke, but I felt embarrassed. He also told me that if I mentioned it he would call [the stepmother and stepsister] to say that it was a joke, which would make me look like a liar. I felt embarrassed and ugly then ...\n‘He threatened to cut off my hair if did not stop biting my nails, and to take my mobile phone away.’\n‘Once we were in the car together ... he saw mum with [her new partner] in the next lane. He said that he would put both of them to jail and kill them. He swore at them a lot. He told them many bad things ... The next day or shortly afterwards he said that through his people he would ensure that my mum and me did not see or hear from each other.’\n‘I was at a doctor’s in Zagreb some time ago. He asked me something about school but he seemed bad to me and I did not want to talk to him and I did not tell the truth. After a month we went to him again. I said I wanted to live with my mum but I did not mention that my dad had hit me. Then I was afraid of my dad, and still am because I knew he would say that he had not hit me ...’\n‘Once he hit me when I was little, I do not remember, once ...’\n‘He gets upset when I cannot eat something. When I say something [to justify myself] he asks why I defy him. He used to insult me. He called me a cow, stupid goat. He swore at me. He told me to go to hell ... he said that to me many times. He also told me to fuck off many times ... He told me that my mum was a whore (she is crying) ...\n‘Mum tells me that I cannot do certain things. She does not threaten me. Sometimes she raises her voice, but she does it rarely and then I do not do it any more.”", "30. The relevant part of the record of the interview conducted on 2 September 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows:\n“This interview was conducted with the girl and the mother together in order to observe their mutual interaction. During the interview it is noticeable that the girl is somewhat more withdrawn and serious than during the previous interview ...\nAt some point the girl has a strong emotional reaction. The girl states (while crying) that she would like to celebrate her forthcoming birthday at her mum’s place ... given that she celebrated her last birthday with her father. The mother did not manage to calm the girl completely or ease her frustration. Instead, she herself looked anxious and frustrated, almost lost.”", "31. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 28 September 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows:\n“This interview was conducted with the girl and the father together in order to observe their mutual interaction. During the interview it is noticeable that the girl is somewhat more withdrawn and deep in her thoughts, and seems restrained ... Asked if she would like to change something, she says that she would like to live with her mum and that she wishes to be able to extend the time she spends with one parent when she wants to stay with that parent longer. While saying that the girl reacts emotionally (she is crying). In the course of it there is no mutual contact between the girl and her father; there is no eye contact, nor is the father trying to calm her. Each [keeps] to themselves, with their eyes fixed forward.”", "32. The relevant part of the record of the interview of 28 September 2011 with the expert in psychology reads as follows:\n“She states in her father’s presence: ‘I would like to live with my mum and decide when visits should take place, to go with my mum or my dad (she is crying). Dad adds: ‘That would be the best ...’\nTo the direct question whether she asked her dad about it, she replies that she did not. She adds that once she asked her dad [about it] and that he said that she could not go to her mum ...”", "33. On 27 October 2014 the first applicant wrote the following in her school essay:\n“...they all think that they know me but they don’t know even a third of me. They judge me by my success in school, but that isn’t me. They don’t know what is happening, they see me as a happy girl, but I am the opposite of that. I have lived with my dad since I was six years old, and from day one I wanted to go to [live with] my mum ... Dad tells me he won’t let me go until I am 18 ... For some time already I have found comfort in cutting myself ... the scars are no longer visible, only when I play volleyball or some other ball game and when my arm turns red, then they are visible.”", "34. Alarmed by the first applicant’s admission of self-harm in the school essay, on 22 November 2014 the second applicant took her to the same psychologist who had examined her on 5 March and 22 April 2011. In her observations the psychologist noted the following:\n“[The girl] came accompanied by her mother because the mother had learned of [her daughter’s] self-harm, which [the girl] had written about in a school essay ... of 27 October 2014.\nInterview:\nDepressive, anxious at the beginning ... verbally fluent. We are talking in the absence of the mother.\nAfter the her parents’ divorce, [the girl] lived with her mother. She says that was the happiest period in her life. She had lived with her father since she was six [years old] ... Relations in the family she described as conflictual, she is afraid of her father. She describes emotional blackmail by her [paternal] grandmother and threats and emotional blackmail by her father, as well as occasional abuse by the father, on which there are medical and police reports. She states that when she was six, she [because of being] manipulated and intimidated by her father, stated during the [forensic] expert examination [in the course of divorce proceedings] that she wanted to live ‘fifty-fifty’ [when asked which parent she would like to live with]. She says that her dad told her to say that but that she did not know what it meant. Since the divorce became final she has lived with her father, and has suffered because she has a close and trusting relationship with her mother and her mother’s partner. From that time on she has been expressing the wish to live with her mother, but despite all her statements [to that effect] ... the [relevant] authorities pay no heed ... Thanks to her mother’s support and understanding she is still functional [that is she manages to live normally] but is unhappy because she cannot live with her mother.\nShe says that she is unhappy, that she does not understand why the [relevant] authorities are ignoring her, and that they do not understand how much they are abusing her by not taking appropriate measures.\nIn her school essay (which was presented) she mentions that she cut herself on the arms. Her friend helped her to deal with the scars. When asked why she did that, she replies that it was because she felt helpless in enduring the constant pressure in her father’s family, constant conflicts, inability to manage her own time, and refusal to let her live with her mother, which would make her happy. Other behaviour mentioned in the essay points to the development of an obsessive-compulsive disorder, fear of the dark, anxious-depressive symptomatology, and emotional control disorder. These are not related to puberty but indicate post-traumatic stress symptomatology, emotional disorders caused by constant frustrations, and child abuse ...\nThe girl has for years been burdened by expert examinations, judicial proceedings, interviews at the social welfare centre, and the hope that someone will finally listen to her plea to live with her mother, because since the age of six she has been unhappy because she has to live with her father. She enjoys her mother’s and her mother’s partner’s company, and they are supportive, but she is afraid that she will not be able to live with them for a long time yet. She is unhappy because her father constantly fights with her and does not want her to be happy (as she would be if she lived with her mother). She ‘hates the situation she is in, where she is forced to live with her dad. She wants to become an advocate and she would never allow her child to suffer as she does because she is not allowed to choose with whom ... to live.’\nShe is introverted, anxious ... Emotional suffering, distrust, depression, fear, guilt, reduced impulse control and problems with facing stress are diagnosed. These symptoms are related to inability to control her desires and to plan and organise. Despite previously established above-average cognitive capacities, a reduced level of openness and a need for new experiences is detected. This is probably because of continuing obstruction of her freedom of action. Despite constant obstructions she is still willing to fight for herself. She is empathic.\nShe has very developed defence mechanisms. However, symptoms of post-traumatic stress are also detected.\nConclusion:\nElements of strong psychological trauma are diagnosed (post-traumatic stress), which are, according to her statements, the result of frustration caused by the abuse by her father and the authorities who are ignoring her wish to live with her mother, and [which serve] to protect her from suffering and the feeling of helplessness, which she reduces by obsessive-compulsive disorder and by harming herself.”", "35. As already mentioned above (see paragraph 21), on 30 March 2011 the State Attorney indicted the first applicant’s father before the Zadar Municipal Court for having committed the criminal offence of bodily injury defined in Article 98 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 86 below) during the incident of 1 February 2011.", "36. On 19 April 2011 the court issued a penal order (kazneni nalog), finding him guilty as charged and imposing a fine of HRK 1,820.", "37. On 4 May 2011 the first applicant’s father challenged the penal order, arguing that the basis on which it had been issued was false. The court accordingly set aside the penal order, and the proceedings resumed under the rules of summary criminal procedure.", "38. The hearing scheduled for 7 May 2013 was adjourned because neither the accused nor the summoned witnesses attended it.", "39. At the hearing held on 6 June 2013 the first applicant’s father pleaded not guilty and made a statement. He also proposed that several witnesses be heard. The applicants proposed that they themselves be heard.", "40. At the hearing held on 23 July 2013 the court heard the second applicant, one of the police officers who had interviewed the applicants following the incident of 1 February 2011, the first applicant’s schoolteacher, and Z.M., a psychologist who had acted as supervising officer during the implementation of the first child protection measure in respect of the supervision of the exercise of parental authority (see paragraph 11 above).", "41. The police officer stated that she had not noticed any visible injuries on the first applicant during the interview with her the day after the incident of 1 February 2011. The first applicant’s schoolteacher had not seen any injuries either. He also testified that he had noticed that the first applicant had seemed sad the day after the incident and that he had talked to her about this; the first applicant had told him on that occasion that her father had not hit her. Z.M., who said that he had spoken with the first applicant some time after the incident in the capacity of a private individual and at her father’s request, testified that the first applicant had told him that her father had yelled at her and that she had been afraid that he would hit her but that he had not. He also stated that as a school psychologist he knew very well how to recognise signs of abuse in children and that the first applicant had not shown such signs.", "42. On 25 July 2013 the court decided to obtain an expert opinion from a medical expert on the first applicant’s injuries.", "43. The hearing scheduled for 18 September 2013 was adjourned because the summoned witnesses failed to attend it.", "44. On 23 September 2013 the expert submitted his opinion, which stated that it was possible, but could not be determined with certainty, that the first applicant’s injury had been sustained during the incident of l February 2011. The relevant part of his opinion states as follows:\n“The following injury was established [at the time] by medical examination:\nsmall haematoma of the left lower eyelid.\nThis injury constitutes a bodily injury.\nThe injury was inflicted by some hard and blunt object. It was inflicted by a single blow of low intensity.\nThe mechanism of the injury could correspond to the course of events as they were described to the doctor by the injured party during the examination (a blow with the hand to the eye).\n However, it is to be noted that the injury was described by the doctor who performed the examination as a haematoma in resorption, thus in [the process of] disappearing, fading. That normally happens after a certain period of time, for example, several days, after an injury. It would not be common for resorption to already be visible the day after the injury.\nIt follows from the above that the injury could have been inflicted during the incident in question, but that a causal link cannot be established with certainty.”", "45. At the hearing held on 24 October 2013 the court heard the other police officer who had interviewed the first applicant on 2 February 2011, the social worker who had been present during the interview with the police, and the doctor who had examined her on that day.", "46. The police officer testified that the first applicant did indeed not want to return to her father and that the social worker from the local social welfare centre had indeed told her that they would have to temporarily place her in a children’s home if she refused. She also testified that she had not seen any signs of injury on the first applicant. The social worker testified that she had not noticed any signs of injury on the first applicant either. She also stated that while it was true that the first applicant had not wanted to return to her father, she had changed her mind after they spoke, in the course of which she had not mentioned the alternative of sending the first applicant to a children’s home. The doctor who examined the first applicant stated that resorption of a haematoma occurred more quickly in children and young people. While he excluded the possibility that the injury could have been caused by crying and rubbing the eyes he did not rule out the possibility that it had been caused by, for example, the first applicant being hit by the ball during her volleyball practice. The applicants’ representative reiterated their proposal that the first applicant be heard.", "47. In order to decide on that proposal, the court decided to consult the case file concerning the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above and 60-81 below). Eventually, the court decided to hear the first applicant via video link on 1 July 2014.", "48. However, that hearing was adjourned because on 30 June 2014 the first applicant’s father sought withdrawal of the trial judge; that application was dismissed by the court’s president on 3 July 2014.", "49. Since none of the courts in Zadar was equipped with a video link device, the court asked the police authorities to provide it. The police informed the court that it would make available a video-link device on 16 October 2014. Accordingly, the examination of the first applicant was scheduled for that date.", "50. However, on 14 October 2014 the police authorities informed the court that they would not be able to provide the device on 16 October 2014.", "51. According to the Government, the proceedings are still pending, depending on the availability of the video link device.", "52. Meanwhile, on 27 April 2011 the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the State Attorney against the first applicant’s father accusing him of the criminal offence of child abuse as defined in Article 213 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 86 below). In particular, the second applicant argued that he had physically and psychologically abused the first applicant by: (a) in the period between February 2008 and April 2011, inter alia, swearing at her and calling her names, frequently forcing her to eat food she did not like, and force-feeding her when she refused, threatening to hit her, cut off her long hair and ensure that she never saw or heard from her mother, hitting her with a hairbrush on one occasion, among others, and (b) on 1 February 2011 hitting the first applicant several times in the face and squeezing her throat while verbally abusing her, as a result of which she was later diagnosed by an ophthalmologist with bruising of the eyeballs and eye-socket tissue.", "53. On 20 June 2011 the State Attorney asked the of the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru) investigating judge to: (a) question the suspect, (b) take statements from his partner and from the second applicant and her partner, and (c) order a combined expert opinion from experts in psychiatry and psychology.", "54. On 29 September 2011 the State Attorney’s Office itself ordered a combined expert opinion from certain court experts in psychiatry and psychology. On 4 October 2011 it set that order aside after finding that such a combined expert opinion had already been obtained in the context of the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above and paragraphs 60-81 below).", "55. On 16 January 2012 the State Attorney dismissed the second applicant’s criminal complaint, finding that there were not sufficient grounds to suspect that the first applicant’s father had committed the criminal offence the second applicant had accused him of. In so doing the State Attorney’s Office addressed only the part of her complaint concerning the alleged abuse of the first applicant in the period between February 2008 and April 2011, and not the part concerning the incident of 1 February 2011. After examining the statements made to the police by the suspect and his partner, the second applicant and her partner, psychiatrists’ opinions of 19 February and 7 May 2011, the psychologist’s opinion of 5 March 2011, and the combined expert opinion of 29 December 2011 (see paragraphs 16-17, 19-20 and 25 above and paragraphs 69-70 below), the State Attorney gave the following reasons for his decision:\n“Analysing the above facts, it follows that the suspect I.M.’s conduct or the conduct of [the second applicant] cannot be regarded as conscious and deliberate emotional or physical child abuse, but rather as inadequate child-rearing practice [ parenting style] and reaction caused by parental conflict over child custody, persistence of long-lasting mutual unresolved conflicts, and limited parenting capacity ...\nIn view of the foregoing ... there is no reasonable suspicion that the suspect I.M. committed the criminal offence he is accused of ...”", "56. The first and second applicants then decided to take over the prosecution from the State Attorney as injured parties in the role of (subsidiary) prosecutors. As the Criminal Procedure Act requires that an accused be questioned before being indicted, on 25 January 2012 the applicants asked an investigating judge (sudac istrage) of the Zadar County Court to question the first applicant’s father.", "57. By a decision of 9 February 2012 the investigating judge dismissed the applicants’ request, holding that the facts adduced by the applicants did not constitute the criminal offence of child abuse. In so doing he relied on the combined expert opinion of the forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology of 29 December 2011 obtained in the custody proceedings (see paragraphs 69-70 below). The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n“... the conduct cannot be regarded as abuse [because the combined expert opinion] did not confirm the diagnosis of child abuse. This is very strongly indicated by the recommendation that changing the child’s residence is not advisable. Had that diagnosis been established, the recommendation concerning the child’s residence would have certainly been very different.”", "58. On 21 February 2012 a three-member panel of the Zadar County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants against the decision of the investigating judge. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n“[The child is under supervision] by the [local] social welfare centre. It is therefore evident that if the suspect had behaved in an unseemly or inappropriate manner towards her as a parent that the centre would have reacted. There must have been reasons why the father was awarded care of the child. If there is any change in circumstances that decision could also be changed. According to the expert opinion no elements of abuse were found ...”", "59. On 24 May 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared inadmissible a subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicants. It held that the contested decisions of the Zadar County Court were not susceptible to constitutional review. The Constitutional Court served its decision on the applicants’ representative on 3 July 2012.", "60. Meanwhile, on 30 March 2011 the second applicant brought a civil action in the Zadar Municipal Court against the first applicant’s father with a view to altering the custody and contact arrangements ordered in the judgment of the same court of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). In particular, she sought custody of the first applicant. At the same time the second applicant asked the court to issue a provisional measure whereby it would temporarily grant her custody of the first applicant pending the final outcome of the principal proceedings.", "61. The court regarded the second applicant’s civil action as an application for non-contentious proceedings, as it considered that the rules on non-contentious procedure rather than those on regular civil procedure should apply in such matters. It held hearings on 29 April and 16 May 2011.", "62. The local social welfare centre participated in those proceedings as an intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the first applicant’s interests.", "63. At the hearing held on 29 April 2011, the second applicant’s representative insisted on the provisional measure being issued. The representative of the local social welfare centre stated that the situation in the first applicant’s family was very complex, that her parents had made numerous criminal complaints against each other, and that both parents should be assessed by forensic experts. He also stated that the centre could not at that time make a recommendation as regards the provisional measure requested, because such a recommendation could only be made after completion of the family-assessment procedure by a team of professionals employed at the centre. The second applicant’s representative replied that the centre had been aware of the incident of 1 February 2011 but had taken no action to address the situation in the first applicant’s family. She therefore insisted on pursuing the application for a provisional measure.", "64. On 12 May 2011 the local social welfare centre submitted its report and recommendation to the court. In the course of their preparation of this report the centre interviewed the second applicant and the first applicant’s father on 3 and 4 May 2011, visited their homes and requested an opinion from the first applicant’s school. The relevant part of the centre’s report reads as follows.\n“The allegations of the [child’s parents] who accuse each other of child abuse are impossible to verify, nor can a straightforward conclusion be made only on the basis of interviews with them or on the basis of visits to their families.\nThere is an impression that the parents, burdened by their permanently strained relationship and their own need to live with the child, consciously or subconsciously place themselves and their needs first while disregarding the welfare and the needs of the child.\nThe child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority was previously ordered in respect of the parents during the divorce proceedings, from 7 November 2006 to 31 August 2008.\nGiven that the already poor communication between the parents has worsened again, which brings about negative tensions which could be harmful for the child’s emotional development, and having regard to the fact that they are again facing court proceedings, the centre is in the process of imposing the same measure with a view to protecting the rights and welfare of [the child] through which [the centre] shall monitor the mother’s and the father’s relationship with the child and [in the implementation of which] they will be advised how to improve communication between them and strengthen their parenting competencies.”", "65. The local social welfare centre recommended a combined expert assessment (psychiatric and psychological) of the first applicant and her parents with a view to establishing their parenting abilities and the possible consequences of their behaviour for her physical and mental development. They added that the first applicant’s family situation was complex but that at that moment there was nothing to suggest that it was life-threatening. The relevant part of the local social welfare centre’s recommendation reads as follows.\n“After conducting the family-assessment procedure ... it was established that the parents express opposing views as regards abuse and neglect of [their child]. [The mother] accuses the father of child abuse [in that] he is abusing the child physically and emotionally, obstructing her contact with the mother, and using inappropriate child-rearing methods. [The father] accuses [the mother] of neglecting the child’s interests by her behaviour [in that] she does not pay child maintenance, does not come to school to consult with teachers or to parents’ meetings and that the child is being manipulated by the mother ...\nHaving regard to the medical documentation at the disposal of the centre, the parties’ submissions, visits made to [the father’s and the mother’s] homes and interviews with them, we recommend that the parents and the child undergo a combined [psychiatric and psychological] expert assessment in order to assess their fitness for further care of [their daughter] and the possible consequences of their behaviour for her psycho-physical development.\nIt is true that the family situation is complex. However, there is no impression that at present [the child’s] life is at risk in her father’s family.”", "66. By decisions of 16 May and 6 and 16 June 2011, the court ordered a combined expert opinion from forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology who were to assess (a) the parenting capacities of the second applicant and the first applicant’s father, (b) the first applicant’s condition, and (c) whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse and, if so, by whom.", "67. By a decision of 7 June 2011, the court refused to issue a provisional measure sought by the second applicant (see paragraph 60 above). In so deciding the court examined the ophthalmologist’s report of 2 February 2011, psychiatrists’ opinions of 19 February and 7 May 2011, and psychologist’s opinions of 5 March and 22 April 2011 (see paragraphs 13‑14, 19-20, 23 and 25 above). It also consulted the case file of the criminal proceedings in respect of the bodily injury, and examined the report and recommendation of the local social welfare centre of 12 May 2011 (see paragraphs 64-65 above). It found, in view of the conflicting opinions of the psychiatrists, the penal order against the first applicant’s father which never became final, and the recommendation of the local social welfare centre, that at that point the allegations that the first applicant had been abused by her father were not plausible enough to justify her immediate temporary removal from his custody. In particular, the court held as follows:\n“... the case was not sufficiently plausibly made that such a measure was necessary to prevent violence or the risk of irreparable harm from materialising, given that at present it remains uncertain and disputed whether [the child] was subjected to abuse by her father or was being manipulated by her mother ...”", "68. On 2 March 2012 the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru) dismissed an appeal by the second applicant and upheld the first-instance decision.", "69. On 29 December 2011 the forensic experts submitted their opinion (see paragraph 66 above) to the Zadar Municipal Court. In their opinion the experts found that both the second applicant and the first applicant’s father had limited parenting abilities and suffered from personality disorders (both of them were emotionally unstable and the first applicant’s father was also narcissistic). As regards the first applicant, the experts found that she was emotionally traumatised by her parents’ separation and their mutual conflict and lack of communication. Instead of shielding her from that conflict, her parents had placed her at the centre of it and manipulated her, sometimes up to the level of emotional abuse. The experts therefore recommended that the first applicant and her parents receive appropriate therapy. They further found that the first applicant was ambivalent towards her father and idealised her mother, whom she viewed as a “friend”, and expressed the wish to live with her. The experts were of the opinion that this desire to be close to her mother could be achieved through (more) extensive contact between the first and the second applicant. If after one year of recommended therapy the first applicant still wished to live with her mother, they recommended that another combined expert opinion be obtained.", "70. The experts did not reply to the court’s question whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse and, if so, by whom (see paragraph 66 above). Their conclusions were (a) that the first applicant should nevertheless continue living with her father for the time being while maintaining extensive contact with her mother; (b) that she and both her parents should undergo treatment and counselling; (c) that the supervision of the exercise of parental authority (the child protection measure imposed by the local social welfare centre, see paragraph 82 below), should be continued; and (d) the first applicant and her parents should be reassessed after a year. In particular, the experts concluded as follows.\n“We do not find [any] contraindications to [the child’s living with her father. [Our] recommendation is that, for the time being it is not necessary or desirable to change the child’s place of residence, that is to say [the child] should continue living with her father.”", "71. Following a request by the second applicant, by a decision of 27 July 2012, the Zadar Municipal Court appointed G.Š., a lawyer practising in Zadar, to act as a special representative for the first applicant and represent her interests in the proceedings, as required by Article 9, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (see paragraph 98 below).", "72. Following an appeal by the first applicant’s father, on 26 October 2012 the Zadar County Court quashed that decision and remitted the case. It held that the first-instance court had failed to establish whether the interests of the first applicant were indeed in conflict with the interests of (one of) her parents, which was a necessary precondition for the appointment of a special representative.", "73. By a decision of 13 November 2012, the local social welfare centre also appointed G.Š. to act as the first applicant’s guardian ad litem pursuant to section 167 of the Family Act (see paragraph 84 below).", "74. The Zadar Municipal Court held further hearings in the case on 6 September and 11 December 2012 and 8 March 2013.", "75. At the last-mentioned hearing the court heard the experts who had prepared the combined expert opinion of 29 December 2011. Those experts stated, inter alia, (a) that their expert opinion had in the meantime become obsolete, because a year and two months had passed since they had prepared it; (b) that they had not replied to the court’s question whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse because it was the task of the judicial authorities and not theirs to make that assessment; and (c) that it would be irrelevant which parent the first applicant should live with if her parents both behaved better.", "76. By a decision of 30 April 2013, the Zadar Municipal Court dismissed the second applicant’s application for the custody and contact arrangements stipulated in the judgment of 24 August 2007 to be reversed. The second applicant and the first applicant’s guardian ad litem appealed.", "77. On 15 November 2013 the Zadar County Court quashed the first-instance decision for incomplete facts and remitted the case to the lower court. It instructed the first-instance court to (a) inquire whether the first applicant’s father’s conviction for the criminal offence of bodily injury against her had become final; (b) assess whether the first applicant was able to understand the importance of the proceedings and, if so, allow her to express her opinion and take her testimony; (c) assess the need to appoint a special representative to the first applicant; and (d) obtain an opinion and recommendation from the local social welfare centre.", "78. In the resumed proceedings, on 18 November 2013 the Zadar Municipal Court discontinued the non-contentious proceedings and decided that the proceedings would be continued under the rules of (regular) civil procedure. The court explained that the second applicant’s application for reversal of the custody and contact arrangements set forth in its judgment of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above) would, if agreed, necessarily entail a new decision on the payment of maintenance by the non-custodial parent, which was an issue that could not be decided in non-contentious but only in regular civil proceedings. That did not mean that procedural acts undertaken thus far had lost their validity or become irrelevant.", "79. On 27 February 2014 the second applicant lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, complaining of the length of the proceedings.", "80. On 9 July 2014 the President of the Zadar Municipal Court dismissed the first applicant’s request.", "81. It would appear that the proceedings are currently again pending before the Zadar Municipal Court as the court of first instance.", "82. Following the incident of 1 February 2011, on 22 September 2011 the local social welfare centre again (see paragraph 11 above) issued a decision ordering the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in respect of the first applicant. The measure was imposed for a period of one year and was, by the centre’s decision of 1 October 2012, further extended for another six months, until 31 March 2014, when it was discontinued.", "83. In her final report of 30 March 2014 the supervising officer (a psychologist) summarised the results of the measure in the following terms:\n“The aim of the measure was to encourage appropriate parental behaviour with a view to preventing and minimising the negative effects of [their] conflictual relationship on the child’s psycho-physical development ... in that sense it was only a question of creating preconditions for adequate communication between the parents, so that currently there is no open conflict (but only because the parents avoid it). In particular, the parents are observing the visiting schedule. They have made concessions to each other from time to time. However, the parents are still in conflict, they still do not communicate, and the majority of their communication goes through the child or through text messages. It is precisely in this way that they are disregarding [her] needs and forcing [her] to deal with something with which she should not be dealing at her age (or at any other age for that matter). Both parents think they are doing what is best for their child, while forgetting that their conflict is the major obstacle to the normal psycho-physical development and functioning of their child ... [The mother] thinks that the child should be with her and that the wish of the child, who also expresses the wish to be with her, should be respected. [The father] thinks that that his role is to protect the child from the mother’s negative influence and ensure stability for her. Those views are O.K., but the only question is how much each of them negatively affects the child by fighting for their own position? For a compromise people need to be ready to partially abandon their position, but they are not ready to do so. In my view, both parents have a good relationship with the child; they [both] try to spend quality time with her. They differ to some extent in their methods and parenting styles ([the mother’s] is permissive and directed at [developing] a friendly relationship with her daughter, which may also be a strategy for ‘winning’ the child, whereas [the father] is more impulsive, with a tendency to give in, and is oriented towards the traditional role of the father, which would not be a problem if the two parents would cooperate ... Neither of them disputes that the role of the other parent is also important for the child, but they both find it important that the child lives with them, believing that in that way they would diminish the harmful influence ‘the other parent has on the child’. This means that the main problem is unresolved parental conflict, and the parents should probably work on that outside the [social welfare] centre. When they are able to talk to each other, and when they realise why and which of their actions are harmful for [the child] (and stem from their personal conflict) then they will be able to function better. In that regard I think that the supervision measure cannot provide a better solution to the problems they have.”" ]

[ "3", "8" ]

[ 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1987 and is currently in the specialised hospital centre (CHS) of Sevrey.", "6. On 12 September 2007 the applicant, who was 20, went to the workplace of C.G., who had been his girlfriend and who had told him, following threats and violence on his part, that she no longer wanted to see him. The applicant inflicted several stab wounds on C.G., who died from a massive haemorrhage, having been wounded in the throat and thorax, and on two other individuals. On 14 September 2007 the applicant was placed under judicial investigation, charged with the premeditated murder of his former girlfriend and the intentional wounding of the other two people, and remanded in custody. On the same day the Prefect ordered his compulsory admission to the Sevrey CHS.", "7. The applicant was examined by two boards of expert psychiatrists who found that, at the material time, he was suffering from a mental disorder which had impaired his discernment and the ability to control his actions within the meaning of Article 122-1 of the Criminal Code ....", "8. On 8 September 2008 the public prosecutor asked the investigating judge at the Dijon tribunal de grande instance to refer the case to the Investigation Division for a ruling as to the applicant’s lack of criminal liability, in accordance with Article 706-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, derived from the Law of 25 February 2008 on preventive detention and declarations of criminal insanity (hereafter “the 25 February 2008 Act”, ...).", "9. In a decision of 30 September 2008 the investigating judge found that it transpired from his investigation that there was sufficient evidence against the applicant to show that he had committed the offences as charged and that there were plausible reasons to apply Article 122-1, first paragraph, of the Criminal Code. He ordered the transmission of the case file by the public prosecutor to the Principal Public Prosecutor for the purposes of referral to the Investigation Division.", "10. On 18 November 2008 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Dijon Court of Appeal made his submissions calling for referral to the Investigation Division for a ruling as to the applicant’s lack of criminal liability on grounds of criminal insanity, in accordance with the procedure set out in new Article 706-122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided in particular for a public hearing ...", "11. In a decision of 25 November 2008 the President of the Investigation Division noted that it was impossible for medical reasons for the applicant to appear at the hearing. At the hearing of 27 November 2008, his representative argued in particular that the decision of 30 September 2008 had breached the principle that harsher criminal legislation could not be applied retrospectively. He indicated that under the above-mentioned Article 706-122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Investigation Division was required to rule on the commission of the offences by the applicant when deciding on compulsory psychiatric treatment, for an indefinite duration, and that this was tantamount to conviction for an offence and to the imposition of a sentence which had not been applicable at the material time.", "12. In a judgment of 18 February 2009 the Investigation Division stated that there was sufficient evidence to show that the applicant had “intentionally killed C.G.” and that he lacked criminal liability for those acts on the ground that he was suffering from a mental disorder which had impaired his discernment and ability to control his actions. It ordered his compulsory hospitalisation pursuant to Article 706-135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, derived from the 25 February 2008 Act ..., on the grounds that “it transpire[d] from the proceedings that [the applicant’s] mental disorder represent[ed] a risk for the safety of others and require[d] long-term care which [could] only be provided in a hospital”. The court also prohibited him, for a period of twenty years, from having any contact with the complainants and from possessing or carrying a weapon, those being preventive measures provided for under new Article 706-136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... It sent the case back to the Dijon Criminal Court for a judgment on the applicant’s civil liability and on the claims of damages. The Investigation Division had previously ruled on the procedural objections raised by the applicant’s representative, including argument concerning the immediate application of the provisions of the 25 February 2008 Act and the alleged violation of Article 7 of the Convention:\n“... The declaration of the existence of sufficient evidence that the person has committed the offence as charged does not constitute a conviction but a finding that there is a factual situation which could have legal consequences ...\n... contrary to the pleadings and contrary to the rules on preventive detention, the Investigation Division does not rule on judicial confinement of unlimited duration but orders the compulsory hospitalisation of the individual in an institution mentioned in Article L. 3222-1 of the Public Health Code, which provides for hospitalisation arrangements specifically in such contexts, and the Prefect is immediately informed of the decisions. Thus the person concerned will be subject to the compulsory hospitalisation arrangements solely under the auspices of the medical and administrative authorities, depending on the evolution of his state of health.\nAccordingly, this measure cannot be regarded as a penalty but as a preventive measure. ... The Law of 25 February 2008 and the Decree of 16 April 2008 are thus applicable.”", "13. The applicant appealed against that judgment on points of law. In his grounds of appeal he argued, relying on Articles 6 § 1 and 7 of the Convention, that the principle of “no punishment without law” precluded the immediate application of a procedure which had the effect of rendering him liable for penalties that his mental state would not have entailed under the former legislation in force at the material time. He contended that the declaration of his criminal insanity could not be accompanied by court-ordered sanctions or coercive measures, as this would breach the principle of the non-retrospective application of harsher criminal legislation.", "14. Before the Court of Cassation, the public prosecutor, in his opinion, took the view that it was impossible to find that there was sufficient evidence against the applicant to show that he had “intentionally” committed the offences as charged, since “legally speaking, a state of criminal insanity related to a loss of discernment preclude[d] a court from ruling on the mental element of the offence and consequently on the question whether the offences were made out under the law”. He pointed out that the legislature had sought to ensure that the investigating judge would anticipate the declaration of criminal insanity and confine his assessment to the facts: “as a result of such anticipation only the material element will stand, devoid of its punitive connotation, together with its ‘objective imputation’ to an individual, which would serve as a basis for granting redress to the ‘victims’ and was in itself the focus of the legislative intent”. On this point he called for the setting-aside of part of the judgment, namely the replacement of the operative part in order to delete the word “intentionally”.", "15. In a judgment of 14 April 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law:\n“... The person under judicial investigation submitted that there could be no immediate application of the Law of 25 February 2008, as the provisions of Article 706-136 [of the Code of Criminal Procedure] derived therefrom would enable the judge to order, against the person declared criminally insane, measures which, by their effects, would be ‘quasi-criminal sanctions’, being listed in the person’s criminal record.\nTo dismiss those arguments, the judgment uses the above-mentioned reasoning.\nAs those grounds stand, the judgment does not warrant the alleged complaint in so far as the provisions of Article 112-1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that the only penalties that may be imposed are those legally applicable on the date of the offence, do not apply to the preventive measures that are prescribed in cases of criminal insanity under Articles 706-135 and 706-136 ...\n... there is sufficient evidence [against the applicant] to show that he committed the offences of premeditated murder and wounding ...”", "16. In a decision of 23 February 2011, produced by the applicant with his observations, the Prefect of Saône-et-Loire denied his requests to go outside the institution unescorted. The Prefect’s letter to the responsible psychiatrist of the Sevrey CHS reads as follows:\n“... In a letter dated 12 August 2010, I informed you that I had requested two assessments to ascertain whether I would be able to grant such leave.\nThose assessments reached me today. One states as follows: ‘In view of Mr Berland’s current state of health we can envisage allowing him to go outside unescorted in the context of a trial period with a process of social rehabilitation, which seems indispensable’. The other one reads: ‘his current state of health allows the possibility of unescorted leave to be envisaged. We should gradually move towards trial arrangements to consolidate the rehabilitation plans’.\nMoreover, in accordance with his instructions, issued following the judgment against Mr Berland, I have contacted the public prosecutor of Dijon to inform him of the findings of the assessments which could lead me in the future to authorise Mr Berland to leave the hospital unescorted.\nThe public prosecutor drew my attention to the prohibitions ordered by the Dijon Court of Appeal on 18 February 2009 against Mr Berland, pursuant to Articles 706-135 to 706-140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...\nIn those circumstances, even though the assessments tentatively allow for the possibility of granting Mr Berland such unescorted leave, it appears impossible to me to guarantee that he would not come into contact during such leave, if therefore alone, with the complainants. Consequently I wish to inform you of my decision ... to grant Mr Berland permission in the future to leave the hospital exclusively if escorted, depending on any assessment data that you may wish to transmit to me.”" ]

[ "7" ]

[ 7, 9, 11 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Berlin.", "7. The proceedings at issue in the present application are part of a large number of proceedings which have been brought before the Liechtenstein courts since 2001. All of these proceedings concern, in substance, questions relating to the property rights to considerable assets (more than 14 million Swiss francs (CHF)) which the applicant had brought into five different foundations (including the H. foundation) set up by him in 1999 in Liechtenstein and of which he was the beneficiary. The applicant’s mother G.B., represented by her guardian, and the applicant’s sisters R. and K. claimed in different sets of proceedings that the applicant had not been the owner of the assets he had brought into the foundations, but that these assets had partly belonged to G.B. and partly to their deceased husband and father.", "8. On 30 August 2001 the Regional Court, on a request lodged by the applicant’s sisters R. and K. in interlocutory proceedings, prohibited the H. foundation and the applicant from disposing of assets amounting to more than three million euros (EUR) deposited with the P. bank.", "9. By submissions dated 27 September 2001, received by the Regional Court on 28 September 2001, the applicant’s two sisters brought an action for payment of some EUR 3,3 million against both the H. foundation and the applicant (file no. 2 CG.2001.317).", "10. On 12 November 2003 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid as he had not given sufficient information on his financial condition despite the court’s repeated requests. That decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal on 3 March 2004, which found that the Regional Court had been obliged to investigate further into the applicant’s financial condition on its own motion.", "11. On 21 July 2004 the Regional Court, having received further information from the applicant, granted the latter legal aid.", "12. On 28 July 2004 R. and K. withdrew the action against the applicant and maintained it only against the H. foundation.", "13. On 30 December 2004 the Regional Court, having questioned the parties and ten witnesses and having inspected numerous documents, ordered the H. foundation to pay R. and K. some EUR 240,000 each and dismissed the remainder of their claim. It found that the applicant’s allegation that he had received the assets he had brought into the H. foundation as a gift from his mother had not been proven. The applicant had therefore not been authorised to bring the assets of the estate of his deceased father into the H. foundation. The amounts payable to R. and K. corresponded to their respective rights to a share in the deceased’s estate.", "14. On 8 February 2005 both R. and K. and the H. foundation lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment.", "15. On 7 March 2005 the applicant, being the beneficiary of the H. foundation, requested leave to intervene in the proceedings as a third party and applied for legal aid.", "16. On 14 June 2005 the Regional Court granted the applicant legal aid and appointed him a lawyer. On 26 August 2005 the applicant joined the proceedings as an intervening third party.", "17. On 7 September 2005 the Court of Appeal, granting the H. foundation’s appeal, quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and dismissed the action brought by R. and K. as inadmissible. It found that the plaintiffs, two of several statutory heirs, had not been authorised to claim assets from the H. foundation for their own account.", "18. On 4 May 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision and remitted the case to that court. It found that, having regard to the principle of good faith, the plaintiffs had standing to sue the H. foundation as the Court of Appeal had accepted that the applicant had unlawfully brought assets from his deceased father’s estate into the foundation, of which he was the beneficiary. It ordered the Court of Appeal to decide upon the plaintiffs’ and the H. foundation’s appeals in the light of its findings.", "19. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court (file no. StGH 2006/56; decision of 26 March 2007) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 26 May 2006 against the Supreme Court’s decision of 4 May 2006. It found that the complaint was inadmissible as the Supreme Court’s impugned decision to remit the case to the lower court did not terminate the proceedings by a final decision on the matter in dispute.", "20. On 21 September 2006 the Court of Appeal, following the remittal of the case to it by the Supreme Court on 4 May 2006, granted the H. foundation’s appeal. It quashed the judgment of the Regional Court dated 30 December 2004, finding that the latter had not sufficiently investigated the facts relevant in order to determine the property of the assets in question, remitted the case to the Regional Court and ordered that court to further investigate the facts of the case.", "21. On 21 November 2007 the Regional Court, granting the applicant’s request, quashed its decision of 14 June 2005 to appoint the applicant a lawyer. The applicant was from then on represented by his wife.", "22. On 10 June 2008 the Regional Court, having examined ten witnesses, essentially by letters of request, and having inspected numerous documents, again ordered the H. foundation to pay R. and K. some EUR 240,000 each (new file no. 02.CG.2006.315-415). The facts it established and the grounds it gave corresponded to those given in its judgment of 30 December 2004.", "23. On 28 June 2008 the applicant and on 9 July 2008 the H. foundation, R. and K. appealed against the Regional Court’s new judgment.", "24. On 25 March 2009 the Court of Appeal, allowing the H. foundation’s and the applicant’s appeal, quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and dismissed the action brought by R. and K. Contrary to the Regional Court and to the courts in parallel sets of proceedings, the Court of Appeal, having taken evidence, found that the assets at issue had belonged to the applicant’s mother alone, and not jointly to her and to the applicant’s deceased father. The applicant had received these assets as a gift from his mother in 1993. R. and K. did not, therefore, have a claim against the applicant as the assets at issue were not part of their deceased father’s estate.", "25. On 1 October 2009 the Supreme Court, allowing the appeal on points of law lodged by R. and K., quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 25 March 2009 and remitted the case to that court. The Supreme Court considered that the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently established the facts which had led it to the conclusion – which ran counter to the conclusions reached by all other courts before in different sets of proceedings – that there had been a valid contract of donation between the applicant and his mother on the assets in question.", "26. On 19 October 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision of 1 October 2009 with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, he claimed, inter alia, that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated.", "27. On 21 May 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s motion for bias against the judges of the Constitutional Court as abusive. It further dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. StGH 2009/177).", "28. The Constitutional Court found that the complaint was inadmissible as the Supreme Court’s impugned decision of 1 October 2009 to remit the case to the lower court did not terminate the proceedings by a final decision on the matter in dispute.", "29. As to the alleged breach of the right to be heard within a reasonable time, the Constitutional Court found that it could still rule on the alleged human rights violation after the Supreme Court had handed down a final decision. In any event, in cases of excessive delays in proceedings the problem arose that the fundamental rights violation caused thereby could not be effectively redressed. The Constitutional Court could only declare that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable, but could not undo the delays. It noted in this context that in proceedings before the administrative authorities, a complainant could assume the rejection of the request made by him to that authority when the latter had remained inactive for more than three months and could pursue his case on appeal (see Article 90 § 6a of the National Administrative Justice Act (Gesetz über die allgemeine Landesverwaltungspflege)). However, this did not apply to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court.", "30. As regards costs and expenses, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant to pay R. and K. lawyer’s costs in the amount of CHF 3,087.05 and declared the court costs uncollectible, referring to its practice in previous proceedings brought by the applicant before it.", "31. It emerged from a letter dated 17 July 2013 from the Court of Appeal to the applicant’s wife that the Court of Appeal had stayed the proceedings before it pending the proceedings before this Court having regard to a proposal made by the applicant to that effect.", "32. By decision of 2 April 2014 the Court of Appeal declared that the proceedings were terminated and that the court costs were to be borne in accordance with the Court Fees Act (Gerichtsgebührengesetz). It noted that by submissions dated 29 January 2014 the applicant, who had revoked his wife’s power of attorney to represent him in the proceedings before that court, the applicant’s sisters R. and K. and the H. foundation had informed the court that they had agreed on a settlement of the case and requested that the proceedings be stayed perpetually (ewiges Ruhen). This Court has not been informed of the content of the settlement. The proceedings were thus stayed ex lege. The Court of Appeal further explained that the proceedings before it had not been continued following the remittal of the case to it by the Supreme Court’s decision dated 1 October 2009 because the applicant had lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision with the Constitutional Court and subsequently an application with the European Court of Human Rights. None of the parties to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal had requested that the proceedings be continued while the complaint and the application were pending before the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights respectively." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 6, 9, 13, 15, 22, 23, 24 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Tartu.", "6. Estonia lost its independence as a result of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (also known as “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”), concluded on 23 August 1939, and the secret additional protocols to it. Following an ultimatum to set up Soviet military bases in Estonia in 1939, a large-scale entry of the Soviet army into Estonia took place in June 1940. The lawful government of the country was overthrown and Soviet rule was imposed by force. Interrupted by the German occupation in 1941-1944, Estonia remained occupied by the Soviet Union until its restoration of independence in 1991 (see Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (dec.), nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04, ECHR 2006‑I, and Penart v. Estonia (dec.), no. 14685/04, 24 January 2006). After the independence of the Republic of Estonia was restored on 20 August 1991, Soviet troops remained in the country. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation assumed jurisdiction over the Soviet armed forces. On 26 July 1994 Estonia and Russia concluded a treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and the conditions under which they could reside temporarily in Estonia. Under the terms of the treaty, the Russian Federation undertook to withdraw from Estonia, by 31 August 1994, all military personnel who were in active service with the Russian armed forces (see Nagula v. Estonia (dec.), no. 39203/02, ECHR 2005‑XII (extracts); Mikolenko v. Estonia (dec.), no. 16944/03, 5 January 2006; and Dorochenko v. Estonia (dec.), no. 10507/03, 5 January 2006) .", "7. After the regaining of independence Estonia carried out comprehensive legislative reforms for transition from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system and for rectifying injustices. On 28 June 1992 the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus) and the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Implementation Act (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse rakendamise seadus) were adopted by a referendum. The Constitution Implementation Act provided that until 31 December 2000, persons standing in elections or seeking certain high positions, such as those of ministers or judges, or any other elected or appointed position in an agency of the national government or a local authority, had to take a written oath of conscience (süümevanne) affirming that they had not been in the service or agents of security, intelligence or counterintelligence services of countries which had occupied Estonia. On 8 July 1992 the Riigikogu (the Estonian Parliament) adopted the Procedure for Taking Oath of Conscience Act (Seadus süümevande andmise korra kohta).", "8. In order to ensure national security of the Republic of Estonia, persons having been in the service of or having collaborated with the security, intelligence or counterintelligence services of the countries which had occupied Estonia, had to be ascertained. Such a security authority was first and foremost the Committee for State Security of the USSR and its local arm, the Estonian SSR Committee for State Security (also known as “the KGB”). However, the most sensitive of the KGB materials were removed from Estonia and the government committee set up by the Estonian authorities to liquidate the KGB managed to get hold of documents of mainly historical value.", "9. On 10 March 1994 the Riigikogu adopted the Procedure for the Collection, Recording, Preservation and Use of the Materials of Other States’ Security and Intelligence Authorities which Have Operated in Estonia Act (Eestis tegutsenud teiste riikide julgeoleku- ja luureorganite materjalide kogumise, arvelevõtmise, säilitamise ja kasutamise korra seadus) which established the obligation to hand over for preservation to the Estonian National Archives the materials in question.", "10. On 1 June 1994 the Riigikogu Temporary Committee for the Investigation of the Activities of the Security and Intelligence Authorities of the USSR and Other States in Estonia submitted to the Riigikogu a draft decision proposing the Government to initiate, by 15 September 1994 at the latest, a Draft Act on the Procedure for Registration and Disclosure of Persons who Have Served in or Co-operated with Security Organisations or Intelligence or Counterintelligence Organisations of Armed Forces of States which Have Occupied Estonia. On 28 June 1994 the Riigikogu adopted the proposed decision.", "11. As the Government did not submit the Draft Act by the time requested by the Committee, on 5 December 1994 the Riigikogu Temporary Committee itself decided to initiate the Draft Act in issue.", "12. On 6 February 1995 the Riigikogu passed the Procedure for Registration and Disclosure of Persons who Have Served in or Co-operated with Security Organisations or Intelligence or Counterintelligence Organisations of Armed Forces of States which Have Occupied Estonia Act (Eestit okupeerinud riikide julgeolekuorganite või relvajõudude luure- või vastuluureorganite teenistuses olnud või nendega koostööd teinud isikute arvelevõtmise ja avalikustamise korra seadus) (“the Diclosure Act”). According to the Disclosure Act, the persons in question were to be registered by the Estonian Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet). Information about such persons’ service or co-operation was to be made public unless they themselves made a pertinent confession about that to the Estonian Internal Security Service within one year from the entry into force of the Disclosure Act. The Disclosure Act entered into force on 28 March 1995.", "13. According to the information provided by the Government, 1,153 persons submitted a confession under the Disclosure Act by 1 April 1996. For the first time, names of the persons subject to disclosure were published in Riigi Teataja Lisa (Appendix to the State Gazette) on 30 January 1997. From 1997 until 2009, on thirteen occasions, the names of a total of 647 persons were published in Riigi Teataja Lisa. Among them there were 42 drivers, of whom at least seven had advanced to higher positions during their career in the KGB.", "14. On 18 June 2002 the Riigikogu made a statement declaring the Soviet communist regime which in its view committed crimes – including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – during the occupation, as well as the bodies of the Soviet Union, such as NKVD, NKGB, KGB and others, which forcefully executed the regime, and their activities to be criminal. The statement emphasised that this did “not mean collective liability of their members and employees. Each individual’s liability [was determined by] his or her specific activities, an ethical assessment of which should be made first and foremost by each person himself or herself”. Riigikogu also noted that the threat of the repetition of such crimes had not disappeared and that the regimes relying on extremist ideologies threatened the World peace and free development of the people until their criminal nature was fully disclosed and condemned.", "15. On 17 December 2003 the Riigikogu passed the Persons Repressed by Occupying Powers Act (Okupatsioonirežiimide poolt represseeritud isiku seadus) aimed at alleviating the injustices committed against persons who were unlawfully repressed by the States that occupied Estonia between 16 June 1940 and 20 August 1991. Certain pension rights and other benefits were foreseen to the persons who fell under the Act in question.", "16. From 1980 to 1991 the applicant was employed as a driver by the Committee for State Security.", "17. On 27 February 2004 the applicant was invited to the Estonian Internal Security Service and presented with a notice according to which he had been registered pursuant to the Disclosure Act. It was stated in the notice that a pertinent announcement would be published in Riigi Teataja Lisa and the text of the announcement was set out. Furthermore, it was mentioned in it that the person concerned had the right, within one month of the receipt of the notice, to have access to the documents proving his or her links to the security, intelligence of counterintelligence organisations, and to contest the information contained in the notice before the Estonian Internal Security Service or a court. The applicant signed a document stating that he had received the notice.", "18. According to the applicant his request to be shown the material gathered in respect of him was not met whereas he was told that he could lodge a complaint against the notice with an administrative court within one month. According to the Government the applicant’s argument, that he could not examine the documents on which the notice had been based, was declaratory, unproved and wrong.", "19. On 16 June 2004 an announcement was published both in the paper and Internet version of Riigi Teataja Lisa. It read as follows:\n“ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE ESTONIAN INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICEabout persons who have served in or co-operated with security organisations or intelligence or counterintelligence organisations of armed forces of States which have occupied Estonia\nHereby the Estonian Internal Security Service announces that pursuant to section 5(1) of the Procedure for Registration and Disclosure of Persons who Have Served in or Co-operated with Security Organisations or Intelligence or Counterintelligence Organisations of Armed Forces of States which Have Occupied Estonia Act the Estonian Internal Security Service has registered the following persons.\n...\nAnnouncement no. 695 of 27.02.2004\nMIHHAIL SÕRO (born on 12.12.1948, Estonia, Põlva County, Värska rural municipality) – AS Tarbus bus driver", "20. In the Internet version, which had legal force equal to that of the paper version, the announcements of the Estonian Internal Security Service were published under the following section title: “Copies of announcements of the Estonian Internal Security Service about persons who have served in intelligence or counterintelligence organisations of the former USSR to be published in Riigi Teataja Lisa.”", "21. The applicant raised the issue with the Chancellor of Justice (Õiguskantsler) who, having analysed the matter and sought additional information from the Estonian Internal Security Service, addressed the Riigikogu with a report, dated 12 July 2005, where he concluded that the Disclosure Act was unconstitutional in so far as all employees of the security and intelligence organisations were made public with no exception made in respect of the personnel who merely performed technical tasks not related to the main functions of the organisations. He further found that the Disclosure Act was unconstitutional in that the person’s place of employment at the time of the publication of the announcement was also made public.", "22. The Constitutional Law Committee of the Riigikogu disagreed with the assessment of the Chancellor of Justice.", "23. After the applicant had again addressed the Chancellor of Justice, the latter replied by a letter of 31 January 2006 that he had not deemed necessary to initiate constitutional review proceedings in respect of the Disclosure Act. The Chancellor of Justice had in the meantime been briefed by the Estonian Internal Security Service about the practice according to which the persons who had performed merely technical tasks were not being made public.", "24. On 20 June 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tallinn Administrative Court. He asked that the court declare the text published in Riigi Teataja Lisa unlawful and oblige the Estonian Internal Security Service delete the word okupant (occupier, invader) and add the word endine (former). In that way the information that he had been a foreign invader occupying Estonia from 1980-1991 could be disproved. He noted that he had never been accused of or provided with any evidence showing that he had participated in the forceful occupation of the Estonian territory as a member of the armed forces of a foreign country or participated in the exercise of the occupation powers. He disagreed having been associated with the crimes committed by the employees of security organisations of the Nazi Germany and the Stalinist regime and argued that a person could only be held individually accountable for his own acts but that principle was ignored by the Disclosure Act. He asserted that he had only worked for the Committee for State Security as a driver and knew nothing about gathering information. As a result of the publication of the announcement the applicant had lost his work and he had been a victim of groundless accusations by third parties. He was being called an occupier (okupant) and an informant (koputaja) and it was being said that “he [was] not a proper man” if the Estonian Internal Security Service dealt with him.", "25. At the Tallinn Administrative Court hearing on 15 January 2007 the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he had in the meantime changed his employment but was, at the time of the court hearing, back in the bus company where he had previously worked.", "26. By a judgment of 29 January 2007 the Tallinn Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It noted that the applicant had failed to contest the notice which he had been presented with by the Estonian Internal Security Service on 27 February 2004. Accordingly, the notice had been made public pursuant to the Disclosure Act. The Administrative Court concluded that the publication of the announcement had become possible because of the applicant’s inaction as he had failed to contest the notice and disprove the information it contained. The information contained in the published announcement corresponded to the information which the applicant had previously been presented with.", "27. The Administrative Court further verified that in the Internet version of Riigi Teataja Lisa the announcements of the Estonian Internal Security Service were published under the section title “Copies of announcements of the Estonian Internal Security Service about persons who have served in intelligence or counterintelligence organisations of the former USSR to be published in Riigi Teataja Lisa” and, thus, the notion “former” (endine) also applied to the announcement concerning the applicant. Furthermore, the word “occupier” (okupant) had not been used in respect of the applicant. The Administrative Court did not establish that the publication of the announcement was unlawful or violated the applicant’s rights.", "28. The Administrative Court found that the applicant’s request for the review of the constitutionality of the Disclosure Act would have been pertinent in case he would have contested the notice issued on 27 February 2004. The applicant had been informed that pursuant to the Disclosure Act he had the right, within a month, to familiarise himself with the documents and contest the information contained in the notice before the Estonian Internal Security Service or a court. Thus, the law had given him a possibility to immediately counter the information gathered. If a court then would have reviewed the issue of the constitutionality of the Disclosure Act, the Estonian Internal Security Service would have been obliged to proceed with the publishing or to refrain from it, depending on the results of the review. In the circumstances at hand, however, the announcement had been published and the notice no. 695 of 27 February 2004, which it had been based on, was lawful.", "29. The Administrative Court also noted that the applicant had not produced any evidence to disprove the information published. The applicant himself had confirmed that he had worked as a driver of the former Committee for State Security of the Estonian SSR.", "30. The applicant appealed arguing that after the publication of the announcement he had become a victim of groundless mocking and had to quit his work. He had sustained substantial pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. He pointed out that the notice of 27 February 2004 had not caused him any negative results. Rather, what had been of importance was the publication of the announcement in Riigi Teataja Lisa on 16 June 2004. He maintained that in the published announcement he had been depicted as an occupier of the Estonian State. It remained unclear, however, which acts he had committed against Estonia and in what way these acts had been criminal. His work as a driver of the Committee for State Security had been of a merely technical nature and had in fact not been directed against the Estonian State.", "31. By a judgment of 22 November 2007 the Tallinn Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal considered that the fact that a person did not contest the initial notice before its publication did not deprive him of a right to lodge a complaint against the publication of the announcement in Riigi Teataja Lisa. It also considered that the implementation of the Disclosure Act could in some circumstances involve indirect interference with a person’s fundamental rights caused by the acts of third parties as the person’s reputation could be damaged as a result of the disclosure of his relations with the Soviet security organisations. However, in the case in question the interference was in conformity with the Constitution.", "32. The Court of Appeal found as follows:\n“10. ... The Chancellor of Justice established in his proceedings that according to the defendant’s administrative practice information about the merely technical employees was not, by way of exception, disclosed. According to the assessment of the Court of Appeal, the [applicant] cannot demand an exception to be made in respect of him. According to the assessment of the defendant, drivers of the security and intelligence organisations were related to the performance of the organisations’ substantial tasks ... The court has no ground to take a different position in this question relating to the security risks. The Estonian State cannot establish decades later with absolute certainty whether a specific driver performed merely technical or also substantial tasks. Thus, one has to proceed from the possibility that a KGB driver may also pose a potential security risk and the disclosure of the information about him may be in the public interests. Therefore, it is proportionate to apply the [Disclosure Act] in respect of the persons who worked as drivers in the security or intelligence organisations. Thereby account must be taken of the fact that the publication of the announcement and the indirect interferences caused by that were not inevitably foreseen by law; the [applicant] could have prevented these consequences by making a confession pursuant to ... the [Disclosure Act].”", "33. In respect of the applicant’s complaint about the use of the language in the text of the announcement the Court of Appeal noted that the word “to occupy” had not referred to the applicant but rather to a State (former Soviet Union). Nor had the applicant been treated as a person co-operating with the Committee for State Security (an informant or a sneak) but rather as its staff member. In the announcement the period of the applicant’s employment had also been indicated. There was nothing to imply that he was accused of continuous contact with an intelligence or security organisation of a foreign country. The defendant was not responsible for arbitrary conclusions that third parties may have drawn from the announcement. Lastly, the Court of Appeal considered that it was proportionate to publish the current places of work of the persons concerned, inter alia, in order to avoid confusion in the public that might otherwise arise in respect of persons with identical or similar names.", "34. On 14 February 2008 the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal lodged by the applicant." ]

[ "8" ]

[ 18, 26 ]

[]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1988.", "8. On 27 December 2011 the applicant applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden and claimed that she had arrived in Sweden on 11 December the same year. In an interview with the Migration Board (Migrationsverket), at which she was informed that a search in the European asylum fingerprint database EURODAC had revealed that she had applied for asylum in the Netherlands in December 2006, the applicant stated that she had arrived in Sweden in 2007 from the Netherlands and had remained illegally in Sweden since then. She had been afraid to contact the Swedish authorities since she did not want to be returned to the Netherlands as she would be sent onwards to Italy where she had no housing or opportunity to support herself. She wanted to remain in Sweden where cousins of hers were living.", "9. As the applicant had applied for asylum in the Netherlands – under a different name and birth date – the Migration Board requested that that country take her back in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. The Dutch authorities refused, however, as she had previously applied for asylum in Italy, under a slightly different name than that given to the Board. The Italian authorities were then requested to take back the applicant. The Italian authorities did not reply to the request within the prescribed time-limit and were consequently, under Article 20(1)(c) of the Regulation, considered to have agreed to receive her. Accordingly, on 24 April 2012, the Migration Board dismissed the asylum application and decided to transfer the applicant to Italy.", "10. However, the decision became time-barred before the transfer could be realised. On 30 November 2012 the applicant therefore applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden again. At an asylum interview in January 2013, which lasted for two and a half hours, she submitted essentially the following. In November 2004 her family had forced her to marry an older man against her will. At the time she had for about a year had a secret relationship with a boy from school. This relationship was revealed a few days after the forced marriage when the applicant and her boyfriend had tried to escape from Mogadishu together. They had been detected by her uncles when they had been sitting on the loading platform of a truck. Both she and her boyfriend had been beaten and thrown off the truck. She had sustained injuries to her hips and had been hospitalised for a few months. Thereafter she had lived at home until August 2005 when her father had considered that her health condition permitted her to move in with her husband. She had then contacted her boyfriend and they had fled together, first to Ethiopia and then to Sudan and eventually to Libya in order to take a boat to Italy. However, the boat had sunk and the boyfriend had died. Later, while in Sweden, she had learned that her father had died in 2010 and her mother in 2011. If returned to Somalia, the applicant claimed that she would have to return to the man whom she had been forced to marry, unless she were sentenced to death for fleeing the marriage and the country. These threats would be carried out by her uncles. The applicant further asserted that she lacked a male support network in Somalia and therefore risked being sexually assaulted. As a single woman, she would further not be able to rent accommodation or otherwise organise her life and would risk becoming a social outcast. She also invoked the generally dire humanitarian situation in Somalia and, in particular, claimed that she was unlikely to find the help still needed for her injured hips.", "11. On 8 March 2013 the Migration Board rejected the applicant’s application for asylum and ordered her deportation to Somalia. At the outset, the Board found that she had failed to substantiate her identity, noting in particular that she had not submitted any identification papers and had previously applied for asylum in the Netherlands and Italy under different identities. However, it found it plausible that the applicant originated from Mogadishu. Noting that she had arrived in Sweden in 2007 but had not applied for asylum until the end of 2011 – and had thus not reported a need for protection during a period of more than four years – the Board called into question whether she had felt a real need for protection. Turning to the substantive allegations presented by the applicant in support of her application, the Board considered that they were marred with credibility issues. For example, in her initial asylum application in 2011, she had stated that she was unmarried. Only during the asylum investigation following her renewed application in November 2012 had she claimed that she had married in Somalia in November 2004. The Board found that the applicant had failed to provide a sufficient explanation for this, particularly given that this was a crucial part of her story. Furthermore, in 2011 she had only invoked the armed conflict in the country as grounds for asylum and had stated that she could not remember how she had sustained the hip injury since she had been very young at the time. She had then also said that she had stayed with a female friend in Mogadishu before leaving the country whereas she later claimed that she had lived with her parents and siblings.\nThe Board concluded that the applicant had failed to make plausible that she had been subjected to any ill-treatment by her relatives in Somalia and consequently had failed to show that she would lack a male support network there. It noted that, according to the applicant, her brother and uncles still lived in Mogadishu. Moreover, the Board examined the general situation in Mogadishu and the particular situation of women, based on information gathered at a fact-finding mission to the city in June 2012 and further information obtained thereafter, and considered that the circumstances were not of such severity that the applicant would be unable to return there, taking into account the finding that she had a male network to protect her. In this connection, the Board also noted that the applicant had not lived in a refugee camp before leaving the country and had not claimed that she would risk doing so upon return.", "12. The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrations-domstolen), maintaining her claims and adding, inter alia, the following. The security situation in Mogadishu was still very unstable and the particular situation of women in Somalia was extremely severe. She further asserted that, as her situation in Italy had been difficult, it was understandable that she had decided to apply for asylum under another identity in the Netherlands, in order to avoid being sent back. This had also been the reason why she had decided to stay illegally in Sweden. Moreover, she stated that the Migration Board had misunderstood her; she had stayed with a female friend in Sweden, not in Somalia where she had lived with her family. Furthermore, in her view, she was not married since she had not consented to the marriage or been present at the marriage ceremony. She submitted an x-ray image of her hip prostheses to show that she had been assaulted and injured.", "13. On 4 June 2013 the Migration Court rejected the appeal, agreeing with the Migration Board’s reasoning and findings. The court subscribed to all the misgivings concerning credibility expressed by the Board. It added that, whereas the applicant initially had claimed to have been forcibly married in 2004, in a later submission to the Board she had stated that this had been decided by her father and her uncles in 2010. Since the applicant was in general not credible, the court did not believe her statement that she lacked a male support network in Somalia. Moreover, it considered that the submitted x-ray image did not show that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in her home country.", "14. By a decision of 15 July 2013 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) refused leave to appeal.", "15. Subsequently, the applicant requested that the Migration Board re-examine her case, claiming that there were impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order. She stated that she had recently found out that her uncle, who had previously physically assaulted her, had now joined al-Shabaab, and that he had killed her sister and forced her brother to join al-Shabaab. Thus, if returned to Somalia, she would risk being stoned to death by her uncle.", "16. On 7 September 2013 the Migration Board rejected the petition, finding that no new circumstances justifying a reconsideration had been presented. It held that the alleged threats stemming from the applicant’s uncles had already been examined by the Board and the Migration Court and that, given her lack of credibility, a mere statement from her about her uncle’s actions was not sufficient to assume that she would risk being stoned upon return. The applicant did not appeal against the Board’s decision." ]

[ "3" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were spouses born in 1952 and 1954 respectively. In 2013 the first applicant died, following which the second applicant expressed the wish to continue the application both in her own name and in the name of her late husband. The second applicant lives in Bratislava.", "6. On 11 October 2002 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint with the Bratislava V District Office of Investigation alleging that an individual, A., had obtained an amount of money from them in return for the promise of arranging for the renovation of the flat in which they lived, that she had failed to keep that promise, and that she had not even been in the possession of the appropriate business licence for so doing. They considered that the criminal offence of fraud could have been committed in that connection, alleged that they had suffered the equivalent of some 7,300 euros worth of damage, and submitted that A. had refused to compensate them.", "7. On 3 December 2002 the second applicant was questioned by an investigator. According to the transcript of the questioning, she inter alia referred to Article 43 of the 1961 Code of Criminal Procedure (Law 141/1961 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time – “the 1961 CCP” – see paragraph 19 below), submitted that she wished to join the proceedings as a civil party claiming damages, and proposed that the amount of the compensation be determined by a sworn expert.", "8. On 23 January 2003 a criminal investigation was opened into the suspicion of the offence of fraud having been committed by one or more persons unknown in connection with the events mentioned above.", "9. On 13 March 2003 the investigator appointed a sworn expert to establish the value of the pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the applicants. The expert filed his report on 22 May 2003.", "10. On 4 November 2004 A. was charged but the charges were quashed by the Bratislava V District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) on 10 January 2005. The matter was thus remitted to the investigation stage.", "11. Meanwhile, on 3 January 2005, the District Office of the PPS had informed the applicants that unjustified delay had been established in the proceedings, that it was due to the existing caseload and the staffing situation, and that the investigator’s attention had been brought to the need to accelerate the proceedings.", "12. In a letter of 5 February 2005 the Bratislava Regional Office of the PPS responded to the applicants’ repeated complaint by accepting that there had been unjustified delay in the proceedings, which had been repeatedly indicated to the investigator. However, except for flagging up the delays to the investigator, notifying the investigator’s superior, and changing the investigator, the PPS had no means of ensuring acceleration of the proceedings.", "13. On 21 January 2008 the District Office of the PPS responded to a further complaint from the applicants by again accepting that the investigation was in general vitiated by significant delays. This had repeatedly been indicated to the investigator’s superior, but had not produced the expected improvement. The case had not been reassigned to another investigator because this did not appear to be efficient in view of the staff shortage. However, the investigator had again been reminded of the delays and if no improvement was to be seen, a new investigator would be appointed.", "14. On 14 January 2010 the investigator decided to terminate the proceedings. Referring to evidence from the second applicant, five witnesses and the expert, as well as to documentary evidence, he concluded that there was no criminal case to answer. This decision was upheld by the District Office of the PPS on 1 February 2010, following the applicants’ interlocutory appeal. No further appeal was available.", "15. Meanwhile, on 6 October 2009, the applicants had lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court. They challenged the length of the proceedings on their third-party claim for damages attached to the above criminal proceedings and alleged a violation of the reasonable-time requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and its constitutional equivalent.", "16. On 25 March 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. As to the facts, it observed that the second applicant had attached their third-party claim for damages to the proceedings orally in the interview of 3 December 2002. As to the law, the Constitutional Court referred to the Court’s judgment in the case of Krumpel and Krumpelová v. Slovakia (no. 56195/00, 5 July 2005) and acknowledged that an aggrieved party (obeť) of a criminal offence who attached a third-party claim for damages (adhézny nárok) to the criminal proceedings was entitled to the guarantees of the civil limb of Article 6 of the Convention. However, referring to unspecified practice of the ordinary courts and to the nature of things, the Constitutional Court held that it was a condition for the aggrieved party to benefit from the guarantees in question to have made the claim against a specific person and that that person could be identified no earlier than when charges were brought against him or her. The Constitutional Court further referred to its previous case-law on the subject and held specifically that the aggrieved party claiming damages in the criminal proceedings only benefited from the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 after a charge had been brought against a specific person. In that regard, the Constitutional Court noted that the charges against A. of 4 November 2004 had been quashed on 10 January 2005 (see paragraph 10 above). Therefore, at the time of the constitutional complaint, the applicants had no longer benefited from the constitutional guarantees relied on.\nThe decision was served on 12 May 2010 and no appeal lay against it." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 1, 2, 6, 11 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Chişinău.", "6. On 13 June 1999 the applicant’s seventeen-year-old daughter (C.) was found dead in P.’s office in a gas company.", "7. On 14 June 1999 a forensic medical report concluded that C.’s death had resulted from medicinal intoxication. The following lesions were also found on the victim’s body: an ecchymosis on her left leg and a haemorrhage on the anal mucous membrane and on the vestibule of vagina, caused by a blunt and hard object at least several but not more than 30-40 minutes before death.", "8. On 26 October 1999 criminal proceedings were instituted to investigate the crime of incitement to commit suicide under Article 94 (1) of the Criminal Code, which was in force at the time of the events.", "9. Six persons were heard as witnesses. Three of them confirmed that C. had spent the night from 12 to 13 June 1999 at a party and that she feared punishment from her parents because she had not informed them she was going there. They confirmed that at 8 a.m. on 13 June 1999 C. had come to the company’s office together with P. and M. and had decided to wait there for a friend before going home. P. and M. had left the premises soon afterwards. A security employee of the company, I., stated that C. had looked tired and that she had gone to sleep in an office after P. and M. had left. He also stated that he had gone into the office twice to see how C. was. The first time he had been able to hear her breathing, but when he had come back after another thirty minutes, C. had already stopped breathing and had had no pulse. He then called upon V., an unqualified fellow worker, to assist him and to call an ambulance. All the witnesses denied having had sexual intercourse with C. and stated that there was no outsider on the company’s premises who could have had intercourse with her.", "10. On 24 December 1999 the Centru District prosecutor closed the criminal investigation, finding as follows:\n“Having investigated the suicide, and also the theory that C. had committed suicide after having been raped, it was found that:\n- according to witness statements, from 8.30 a.m. to 11.00 a.m. on 13 June 1999 no outsider other than C. was on the company’s premises;\n- according to the medical forensic examination report no. 881 of 14 June 1999, no traces of semen were found in C.’s cavities;\n- according to the same forensic report there were no injuries on C.’s body or face.\n... It was impossible to establish when C. had obtained and used the medication. The investigation did not reveal any reasons or causes which would determine C.’s death as violent; it concludes that this was a fatal accident: that C., being very worried about her unexplained absence from home on the night from 12 to 13 June 1999, tried to avoid punishment from her parents by getting hospitalised with \"poisoning\", but due to the negligent use of medication, had died of an overdose.\nTherefore ... there are no elements of a crime under article 94 (1) of the Criminal Code. ”", "11. In 2005 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office that she had never been informed about the prosecutor’s decision of 24 December 1999 and had found out about it only in December 2004. She argued that the investigation had been superficial and inefficient, and requested that the investigation be reopened. She alleged in particular that the investigation had essentially pursued the suicide theory and had failed to establish the circumstances which had resulted in the lesions on her daughter’s body or the time when the medication could have been ingested.", "12. On 17 March 2005 the First Deputy Prosecutor General annulled the decision of 24 December 1999 and ordered the reopening of the criminal investigation, finding, inter alia:\n“...the proceedings were closed after a superficial and incomplete investigation... No forensic medical expert examination of the body was ordered, the active substance with which [C.] was poisoned or overdosed herself was not established, the investigation did not answer how [C.] had obtained the medication and in what circumstances 30-40 minutes before her death the injuries on her left leg, anal mucous membrane and vestibule of the vagina were caused; the investigation did not investigate the possible complicity of P., M., I, and V. in committing a crime.”", "13. On 4 May 2005 the applicant was acknowledged as her deceased daughter’s successor and as an injured party in the criminal proceedings.", "14. On 22 September 2005 the First Deputy Prosecutor General transferred the criminal file from the Centru police to the Chisinau prosecutor’s office, citing the undue delay and the unprofessional conduct of the investigation.", "15. On 17 October 2005 a forensic medical expert report was issued, according to which death from a 40-pill overdose would have occurred at the latest within two hours of ingestion.", "16. On 20 February 2006 the applicant obtained an answer to her complaint about the ineffective investigation into C.’s death, which stated:\n“...the investigation has been delayed because certain persons who need to be questioned are out of the country.”", "17. On 20 May 2008 the Prosecutor General’s Office suspended the criminal investigation for failure to establish whether a crime had been committed and if so, the identity of the alleged perpetrators. The decision referred to a forensic medical expert report of 21 June 2005 which concluded that death had resulted from medicinal intoxication with the sedative Dimedrol. The same decision stated that a request to carry out other investigative and operative search measures had been addressed to the police. According to the Government, a copy of this decision was sent to the applicant’s home address. The applicant denied having received this decision before it was presented by the Government in the proceedings before the Court.", "18. On 3 June 2012 the investigation was resumed on the ground that “the reasons for suspending the investigation had disappeared and it became possible to conduct certain investigative actions”.", "19. On 12 June 2012 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General about the inefficient investigation and about not having been informed of its progress. On 10 July 2012 the applicant obtained the following answer:\n“...the investigation is still pending... you will be further informed once a decision is taken on the case; you will be summoned if a need for your participation in the investigation arises.”", "20. On 2 August 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office suspended the investigation on the same grounds as before. According to the Government, a copy of this decision was sent to the applicant. The applicant denied having received this decision before it was presented by the Government in the proceedings before the Court.\n21 On 22 October 2012 and 1 March 2013, the applicant submitted renewed complaints about the inefficient investigation, about not being informed of the progress of the investigation and thus being unable to exercise her procedural rights under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Those complaints remained unanswered.", "22. On 18 March 2014 the applicant appealed to the Prosecutor General against the decision of 2 August 2012 to suspend the investigation. The proceedings are still pending." ]

[ "2" ]

[ 7, 8, 11 ]

[]

[ "5. In March 2002, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in absentia for being a member of the PKK (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan), an illegal armed organisation. In the indictment, the public prosecutor relied on, among others, incriminating statements by certain accused persons who, in their statements to the police, had maintained that the applicant had been involved in a number of terrorist activities since 1991. A Red Notice was accordingly issued in respect of the applicant via Interpol.", "6. On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested in Syria. After being detained in the Damascus Security Headquarters, allegedly for twenty-three days, the applicant was handed over to the Turkish authorities on 15 August 2003. The medical report issued at the beginning of the applicant’s custody indicated no signs of ill-treatment.", "7. On 18 August 2003 the applicant was questioned at the Erzurum Gendarmerie Command, in the absence of a lawyer. According to a form explaining arrested persons’ rights, which the applicant had signed, he had been reminded of the charges against him, his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent. The applicant refused legal assistance, and gave a detailed statement regarding his activities in the illegal organisation. He admitted that he had been a member of the PKK since 1989, maintained that he had been involved in several armed attacks and gave details about such events. He also stated that he had been acting as the Paris representative of the illegal organisation since 1994 and signed his statement as such.", "8. On the same day, the applicant was examined at the hospital; no signs of ill-treatment were noted on his body. Subsequently, he was questioned by the Erzurum Public Prosecutor. The applicant refused legal assistance and confirmed this in his statement given to the gendarmerie. In this connection, he admitted to being a member of the PKK and participating in several terrorist activities between 1990 and 1998 and also being the Paris representative of the illegal organisation since 1999. He further admitted that he had been involved in some of the armed attacks with which he had been charged. These events were indicated by their location, nature and dates, which were between 1990 and 1998.\nThe applicant denied his participation in five terrorist attacks which had happened in 1992.", "9. Later on the same day, the applicant was taken to the Erzurum State Security Court. Before the court he expressed the wish to be represented by a lawyer, and stated that he would make further submissions once a lawyer had been appointed. The court remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention and allowed him time for the assignment of a representative until the next hearing to be held on 7 October 2003.", "10. On 20 August 2003 the Erzurum Public Prosecutor lodged an additional indictment, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the constitutional order and unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State’s control.", "11. On 9 December 2003, at the fifth court hearing, in the presence of his three lawyers, the applicant retracted the statements he had made to the gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, alleging that he had been under psychological pressure during his interrogation. He confessed to being a member of the PKK, but only in charge of the instruction of the members, and claimed that he had never taken part in any armed attack. He further submitted that he had been injured during an armed clash in November 1992 and since then had been unable to use his right hand. In this connection he requested a medical report establishing that he was not able to hold a gun with his right hand. The prosecutor opposed this request by referring to the applicant’s healthy physical appearance.", "12. During the hearing the applicant’s representatives contested the testimonies of other accused persons in different criminal proceedings indicating the applicant’s involvement or responsibilities as a team leader, by alleging that such testimonies had been given only in order to benefit from legal provisions allowing reduction of sentences. The cross‑examination of these witnesses was not requested at any stage of the proceedings.\nAgain on the same day, the applicant made written submissions to the court and stated that he had signed his statement in custody without reading it.", "13. On 27 February 2004 the Forensic Medicine Department of Erzurum Atatürk University issued a report. It found loss of function in the applicant’s right hand and concluded that the applicant would have serious difficulty in using a firearm with one hand. However, it was further reported that if his right hand were supported by other parts of his body he would be able to use a firearm.", "14. On 4 May 2004, at the ninth hearing, the applicant objected to the medical report, requesting a new report from the Istanbul Forensic Institute. The trial court refused this request, holding that a new medical report would not have any effect on the merits of the case and therefore was not necessary. In this connection, the court held that the illegal acts admitted by the applicant, which had been committed prior to November 1992, thus before his hand was injured, would suffice for charges to be brought against the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. It accordingly held that an additional expert report was not required.", "15. At a hearing held on 24 August 2004, the applicant repeated his request for an additional medical report, and stated that during his interrogation by the gendarmes and the prosecutor he had felt fearful and anxious and had given his statements under pressure as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained in Syria. He repeated that the testimonies against him by persons accused of terrorism in different proceedings had been made only for collaborating and benefiting from lenient criminal provisions and could be dismissed once the medical report concerning his incapacity was established. The applicant’s lawyers also based their arguments on the establishment of a new report.", "16. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004. Accordingly, the case was transferred to the Erzurum Assize Court.", "17. On 21 September 2004 the Erzurum Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. In a reasoned judgment, the court found it established that the applicant had been involved in at least 15 armed attacks committed prior to 1992, among the 59 incidents of which he was accused. It enumerated the acts to which the applicant had confessed while being questioned by the gendarmes and subsequently by the prosecutor, such as setting fire to three primary schools, the robbery of several village guards and clashes with security forces. These acts also corresponded chronologically with each other and with the numerous official documents related to these events. The court further held that these acts would suffice to convict the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and underlined that only after several hearings had he contested his initial statements, while choosing to accept his involvement in armed attacks in which terrorists had been killed and denying his implication in those in which members of the security forces had been killed. The court pointed out that the applicant’s argument could not be considered credible in view of the chronology of the events. The court further stated that throughout the criminal proceedings the applicant had consistently and proudly stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation to the point of making propaganda for the organisation, and he had shown no remorse which would indicate the likelihood that he would not repeat such crimes. Finally, it indicated that the applicant even refused the possibility of using Law no. 4959 for rehabilitation (certain paragraphs of Article 4 of the cited law foresee sentences varying between 12 and 19 years of imprisonment in replacement of an “aggravated life sentence”, according to the authenticity of information provided about the structure of a terrorist organisation or its activities) and accordingly sentenced him to “aggravated life imprisonment”.", "18. On 7 January 2005 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction." ]

[ "6", "3" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1957 and is detained in Dąbrowa Górnicza.\nThe applicant’s refusal to undergo body searches and the disciplinary punishments imposed on him", "6. The applicant was detained on remand in 2007 and 2008. He was subsequently convicted and served his sentence in various detention centres and prisons.", "7. From 24 May 2011 the applicant was imprisoned in the Sosnowiec Remand Centre and from 17 May 2012 until 10 June 2013 in Wojkowice Prison.", "8. On 20 October 2011 the applicant was transported to another location for the purpose of executing some procedural measures (doprowadzenie na czynności proceduralne) and was therefore asked to undergo a body search, however he refused to undress. He addressed the public officers in a vulgar fashion and displayed an unrepentant manner. His rehabilitation supervisor (wychowawca) therefore lodged a request for disciplinary punishment.", "9. On 26 October 2011 the applicant went to the doctor to have his nails cut and behaved offensively towards the doctor, whereupon another request for disciplinary punishment was lodged against him. According to the reasoning supporting the request, the applicant admitted committing an act warranting disciplinary punishment but his attitude was unrepentant.", "10. On 27 October 2011 the Director of the Sosnowiec Detention Centre examined both requests simultaneously and issued a reprimand (nagana) to the applicant by way of disciplinary penalty.", "11. The applicant appealed.", "12. On 17 January 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the challenged decision, finding that it had been issued in accordance with the relevant legal provisions.", "13. On 18 May 2012 the applicant again refused to undergo a body search in Wojkowice prison.", "14. On 23 May 2012 the Director of Wojkowice Prison imposed a disciplinary penalty on the applicant for his refusal to undergo a body search. The applicant was forbidden to receive food parcels for two months.", "15. On 28 May 2012 the applicant appealed against this decision to the court.", "16. On 18 July 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the challenged decision. The court did not examine the reasons for which the applicant had been required to undergo body searches. It found that the decision in question had been given in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.", "17. On 26 June 2012 the applicant again refused to undergo a body search in Wojkowice prison. From the written request for imposition of a disciplinary punishment on the applicant, it appears that he refused to take off his underwear. The rehabilitation supervisor requested that the applicant be placed in solitary confinement for a period of 7 days by way of punishment.", "18. On 27 June 2012 the Director of Wojkowice Prison imposed on the applicant a disciplinary penalty of solitary confinement for a period of 7 days. The applicant served this penalty between 27 June and 4 July 2012.", "19. The applicant appealed against this decision.", "20. On 3 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the challenged decision, finding that it had been issued in accordance with the law and had been justified in the circumstances of the case, namely that the applicant had refused to undergo a body search, which constituted a disciplinary offence.", "21. On 27 June 2012 the applicant refused to undergo a body search when being admitted to a hospital ward, and again on 30 June 2012 after coming back from a walk. From the written request for imposition of the disciplinary penalty it appears that the applicant had tolerated the search “to the extent which he found appropriate”.", "22. On 4 July 2012 the Director of Wojkowice Prison imposed on the applicant the disciplinary penalty of solitary confinement for a period of 7 days. The applicant served the penalty between 4 and 10 July 2012. The decision of 4 July 2012 stated that it could be challenged within seven days by lodging an appeal with the penitentiary court. The applicant failed to appeal against this decision.", "23. The reasoning supporting the written requests of 20 October and 26 December 2011 and of 27 and 30 June 2012 for imposition of disciplinary penalties also states that the applicant was unrepentant in his attitude.", "24. On 10 June 2013 the applicant finished serving his sentence and was released from prison." ]

[ "3", "8" ]

[ 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17 ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Istanbul. He is a professional writer and journalist, and states that he is a human rights activist.", "5. He published an article on the front page of issue 84 of the weekly magazine Türkiye’de Cuma (“Friday in Turkey”), which came out on 29 August 2003. His article, which was entitled “If the pashas [the generals] refuse to obey”, contained criticisms of high-ranking officers who were about to retire. He hinted that some generals in the armed forces were wont to sound false alarms concerning an alleged advance of fundamentalism and anti-secularism, which they then used as a pretext for interfering in the country’s general politics, and that they appeared to have links with certain business circles, the media, senior civil servants and even the Mafia, endeavouring to create a political atmosphere that tallied with their worldview. He suggested that the high-ranking officers in question should set up a political party on retirement and present their political projects to the people, instead of “deciding on the future of the nation on their own, in the name of the nation”. He added that in his view the army generals who he claimed were interfering in the country’s general politics were far removed from social realities and that in their approach to social affairs they lacked any empathy with and sensitivity towards the various social strata.", "6. By an indictment of 9 January 2004, the Military Prosecutor’s Office with the Third Army Corps in Istanbul applied to the Military Court within that Corps for the applicant’s prosecution under Article 95 §§ 4 and 5 of the Military Criminal Code, which, in the Prosecutor’s view, penalised acts vis-à-vis high-ranking military officers geared to damaging hierarchical relations within the army and undermining confidence in commanding officers.", "7. The applicant submitted an objection as to the jurisdiction of the Military Court to try him, on the grounds of his civilian status and relying on the Convention and his right to freedom of expression.", "8. By a decision of 12 July 2004 the Military Court declined jurisdiction in favour of the Bakırköy Assize Court on the grounds that the offence at issue was not military in nature and the applicant should be tried by the non-military courts for denigration of the State armed forces, which offence was punishable under Article 159 of the former Criminal Code. The Military Court noted that by claiming that the armed forces were led by commanding officers who appeared to have links with certain business circles and even the Mafia, and to be far removed from social realities, the applicant had tarnished the image of the whole armed forces. It emphasised that the commanding officers who had been criticised were plenipotentiary representatives of the armed forces empowered to act on behalf of the latter.", "9. On 9 August 2004 the commanding officer of the Third Army Corps lodged an appeal on points of law against the aforementioned decision to decline jurisdiction. He submitted that the impugned article constituted an act which had to be assessed under Article 95 § 4 of the Military Criminal Code. He argued that the military criminal provision in question constituted a lex specialis vis-à-vis Article 159 of the Criminal Code.", "10. The Military Prosecutor also lodged an appeal on points of law on the same grounds, submitting that the Military Courts should have jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, and that the applicant had not targeted all the armed forces but had undeniably tarnished the image of two Generals, which was liable to undermine the confidence of the rank-and-file in these officers and thus damage hierarchical relations within the armed forces.", "11. The applicant was not apprised of the appeals on points of law lodged by the commanding officer and the Military Prosecutor, both of which were added to the case file.", "12. On 3 May 2005 the Military Court of Cassation, which assessed the appeals on points of law, quashed the decision declining jurisdiction and referred the case back to the Military Court. In its reasoning the Court of Cassation mentioned the need to reclassify the facts and to assess them under Article 95 § 4 of the Military Criminal Code. It specified that the provisions of Article 95 § 4 of the Military Criminal Code and (the former) Article 159 of the Criminal Code shared the same substantive and moral elements, but differed in providing protection for individuals (Article 95 § 4) and the Institution itself (Article 159), respectively. The Military Court of Cassation held that even though the applicant’s article had comprised elements of both the aforementioned criminal offences, the general tenor of the impugned article had apparently concentrated on the behaviour of two specific Generals rather than the overall armed forces. Therefore, the accusation that the officers were disobedient, that is to say that they lacked discipline, was liable to undermine the lower ranks’ confidence in them and thus damage hierarchical relations within the armed forces.", "13. By a judgment of 1 March 2006 the Military Court of First Instance, having reconsidered the case, once again decline jurisdiction in favour of the non-military courts. It stated that new legislation on the press attributed to the non-military criminal courts jurisdiction to hear and determine offences committed via the press and specified that such offences no longer came under special legislation.", "14. On 24 March 2006 the commanding officer of the Third Army Corps lodged a fresh appeal on points of law against the Military Court’s decision declining jurisdiction. He pointed out that the 3 May 2005 judgment of the Military Court of Cassation had been delivered after the amendment to the legislation in question and that the provisions of the Military Criminal Code (Law No. 353) enabling civilians to be tried by military courts had not been amended.", "15. While the case was still pending before the Military Court of Cassation, Law No. 5530 of 29 June 2006 made a series of amendments to the Military Criminal Code, inter alia abolishing military court jurisdiction for trying civilians for offences such as those with which the applicant was charged. The Prosecutor with the Military Court of Cassation therefore referred the applicant’s file to the Military Court of First Instance, accompanied by an opinion to the effect that the military courts had no jurisdiction in such matters.", "16. By a judgment of 14 November 2006 the military court once again decline jurisdiction and referred the case to the Bağcılar 2nd Criminal Court.", "17. Meanwhile, following the merger of the Bağcılar and Bakırköy judicial districts, the case was referred to the Bakırköy 24th Criminal Court. By a judgment of 11 March 2008, the latter court declined jurisdiction and referred the case to the Bakırköy 2nd Criminal Court, which held jurisdiction for offences committed via the press. By a judgment of 26 May 2008, the Bakırköy 2nd Criminal Court referred the case to the Bakırköy 16th Criminal Court on the grounds that that court was the former Bağcılar 2nd Criminal Court. By a judgment of 12 March 2009 the Bakırköy 16th Criminal Court referred a jurisdictional dispute to the Bakırköy Assize Court. Finally, the Bakırköy Assize Court decided in favour of the Bakırköy 2nd Criminal Court in the jurisdictional dispute, and referred the case to that court.", "18. By a judgment of 9 June 2010 the Bakırköy 2nd criminal court declared the proceedings statute-barred under Article 95 § 4 of the Military Criminal Code.\n..." ]

[ "10", "3", "6", "34" ]

[ 0 ]

[]

[ "5. The first applicant, Mr Kovyazin, was born in 1986 and lives in Kostino, Kirov Region. The second applicant, Mr Savelov, was born in 1979 and lives in Moscow. The third applicant, Mr Gushchin, was born in 1988 and lives in Khimki, Moscow Region.", "6. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which had to end at 7.30 p.m. Numerous clashes between the police and protesters occurred when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square. At 5.30 p.m. the police declared the early closure of the meeting and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors away from the square.", "7. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate the suspected mass disorders and violent acts against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was remitted to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 the investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorders (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day.", "8. All applicants took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. They were arrested on later dates indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorders; the second and the third applicants were also charged with having committed violent acts against the police officers. They were detained and tried on these charges, and the second and the third applicants have been convicted as charged, while Mr Kovyazin had been exempted of liability under the Amnesty Act.", "9. The complaints to be examined in the present case concern various aspects of the applicants’ pre-trial detention.", "10. From 2006 to 2012 the applicant studied culture and history at the Vyatskiy State University in Kirov while working part-time as a video‑operator for a newspaper “Vyatskiy Nablyudatel”. On 1 May 2012 he dropped out of the university.", "11. On 4 May 2012 the applicant received an assignment from the newspaper to attend the “March of Millions” on 6 May 2012 and to take video footage of the event.", "12. The applicant claimed that on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square, filmed the event and did not take part in any disorders or clashes with the police.", "13. On 15 May 2012 the applicant submitted the footage to the newspaper and it was published on its website.", "14. Until 5 September 2012 the applicant continued working and living at his usual address. On the latter date he was detained and charged under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorders). He was accused of having breached public order during the demonstration on 6 May 2012, in particular, of having turned over portable toilet cabins and having piled them on the road to build a barrier obstructing the riot police.", "15. On 7 September 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 5 November 2012 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and for the following reasons:\n“Having regard to the circumstances of the offence under investigation, the personality of the accused, the information objectively put forward by the investigating authority, the court concludes that [the applicant], if at liberty, after being charged with a grave criminal offence will prefer, out of fear of sanctions, to abscond the investigation and trial, [or] may act in person or through proxy with the aim of avoiding criminal liability, continue [his] criminal activity, destruct the evidence and otherwise obstruct the investigation.\nOperational-search activities are now underway, aimed at establishing [the applicant’s] possible connections with other active participants of the mass disorders which took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and the adjacent territory, therefore, if at liberty, [he] may co-ordinate his position with unidentified accomplices whose identities are still being established by the investigation.\n...\n... selecting in respect of [the applicant] another, milder, preventive measure is not possible because it cannot rule out the very possibility for the suspect to obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, and to abscond from the bodies of criminal prosecution and trial.\n...\nNo factual information excluding the detention of [the applicant] on health grounds has been submitted to the court ...”", "16. On 1 October 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 7 September 2012.", "17. On 30 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow examined a request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant requested to select another preventive measure pending trial. He offered a bail of 750,000 Russian roubles (RUB), or four personal guarantee signed by his professors and colleagues. His request for an alternative preventive measure was supported by six petitions signed by 45 journalists and editors of newspapers, periodicals and on-line media: “Novaya Gazeta”, “Esquire”, “Kommersant”, “Vyatskiy Nablyudatel”, “Afisha” and “Grani.ru”. The applicant also requested release on health grounds.", "18. On the same day the court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 March 2013, having noted that the applicant was likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to threaten witnesses, or to otherwise obstruct the course of justice.", "19. On 28 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 30 October 2013.", "20. On 4 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 July 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before.", "21. On 3 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 4 March 2013.", "22. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of the criminal charges.", "23. On 6 June 2013 the latter court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2013. This decision concerned eleven defendants and read in so far as relevant as follows:\n“... the court concludes that the preventive measure in respect of [all defendants] ... is to remain unchanged because the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...\n... [the defendants] are accused of [grave crimes punishable by prison sentences] ...\nHaving regard to all information about the personality of [the defendants] and the nature of the crimes imputed to each of them, the court still has sufficient grounds to believe that the said defendants, if at liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges.\n... no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings.”", "24. On 2 July 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 6 June 2013.", "25. On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of charges. It held, in particular, as follows:\n“[The defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which belongs to the category of grave crimes punishable by a prison sentence of over three years. Furthermore, [some defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code, also punishable by a prison sentence of over three years.\nDespite the defendants being registered as having permanent residence addresses in the Russian Federation, the analysis of the overall information about [the defendants’] personalities, and the nature of the offences imputable to them, give the court sufficient grounds to consider that the defendants, if the preventive measure is changed to another one unconnected with the deprivation of liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges ... the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...”", "26. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 19 November 2013.", "27. On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act which concerned persons charged with offences punishable with prison sentences of up to five years.", "28. On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.", "29. At the time of arrest he applicant was unemployed and lived with his parents. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. According to the applicant, at one point a stampede occurred and he was accidentally pushed through the police cordon and was arrested without any resistance on his part. On the same day he was charged with non‑compliance with a lawful order by a police officer, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and he was released, having committed to attend the court hearing of the administrative case on 8 May 2012.", "30. On 8 May 2012 the applicant was convicted of non-compliance with a lawful order by a police officer, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was sentenced to a 24-hour’ detention.", "31. On 11 June 2012 the applicant was detained on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders on 6 May 2012. He was charged with the offences provided for by Articles 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorders) and 318 § 1 (violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of having attempted to break through the police cordon and of having pulled a police officer on the hands and wrists towards the crowd. On the same day the Basmannyy District Court authorised the applicant’s 72-hours’ detention.", "32. On 14 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined and granted the request to detain the applicant pending criminal investigation. It dismissed the applicant’s request for an alternative preventive measure, including a RUB 150,000 bail, a personal guarantee or a house arrest, and ordered the applicant’s detention on remand until 11 August 2012 for the following reasons:\n“Assessing the circumstance under investigation, the submitted materials and the indicated information in their integrity, as well as the personality of [the applicant], who is suspected of having committed criminal offences characterised as grave, punishable by up to two years of deprivation of liberty, give sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant is likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to destruct evidence, or to otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.\n... selecting another, milder, preventive measure is not possible because it cannot rule out the very possibility that the suspect will abscond from the bodies of criminal prosecution and trial, or obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.”", "33. On 18 June 2012 the applicant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 11 July 2012.", "34. On 9 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant objected, having reiterated his request for an alternative preventive measure. On the same day the court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 November 2012, having noted that there remained sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant was likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to threaten witnesses, or to otherwise obstruct the course of justice.", "35. On 10 August 2012 the applicant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 10 September 2012.", "36. On 2 November 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds and having noted that the circumstances which had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 28 November 2012.", "37. On 28 February 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 11 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before and having noted that the circumstances which had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 April 2013.", "38. On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant’s detention and granted it until 6 July 2013. It held, in particular, as follows:\n“The materials presented [by the investigator] reveal that the grounds for choosing the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] were not only the gravity of the charges but also the information about the personality of [the applicant] who could abscond the investigation and trial, threaten witnesses or otherwise obstruct the proceedings in the case, if released.\nThe aforementioned grounds ... have not changed, have not lost their relevance to date, and the circumstances of the case [and] the nature of the crime committed by [the applicant] lead the court to conclude that the need for the [pre-trial detention] has not, at this stage, ceased to exist.\n...\nThis term is reasonable, [it] is justified by the objective circumstances, it is not in conflict with the term of the pre-trial investigation, also extended on the same grounds.\n...\nIn accordance with the Constitutional Court’s [case-law], the proportionality of the preventive measure to the [gravity of the] charges imputed to [the applicant] show that in this case the public interests, in particular those related to the criminal investigation, override the importance of the principle of respect of individual liberty.”", "39. On 27 June 2013 the Moscow City Court acting as appeal instance upheld the same court’s extension order of 23 April 2013.", "40. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court for the determination of the criminal charges.", "41. On 6 June 2013 the latter court extended the pre-trial detention of all eleven defendants, including the applicant, until 24 November 2013 (see paragraph 23 above). This decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 2 July 2013.", "42. On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant, until 24 February 2014 (see paragraph 25 above). This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 December 2013.", "43. On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to two years and seven months of imprisonment. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was counted towards the prison term.", "44. On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.", "45. In December 2014 the applicant was released after having served his prison term.", "46. At the time of his arrest the applicant was a student, working part‑time. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, and after that date until 6 February 2013 he continued living at his usual address and pursued his usual activities.", "47. On 6 February 2013 the applicant’s flat was searched and his travel passport was seized. The applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders and of having used violence against the police during the demonstration of 6 May 2012. He was charged with the offences provided for by Articles 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorders) and 318 § 1 (violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of having snatched a police officer’s uniform and pulling him away to prevent him from arresting another protestor.", "48. On 7 February 2013 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 April 2013, having dismissed the applicant’s request for an alternative preventive measure, such as house arrest. The court reasoned as follows:\n“In assessing the circumstances of the offence under investigation, the personality of the accused , who is suspected of having committed criminal offences one of which is characterised as grave and the other – of medium gravity, the court concludes that [the applicant], if at liberty, after being charged with a grave criminal offence, will prefer, out of fear of sanctions, to abscond the investigation and trial, [or] may act in person or through proxy with the aim of avoiding criminal liability, continue [his] criminal activity, destruct the evidence and otherwise obstruct the investigation.\nOperational-search activities are now underway, aimed at establishing [the applicant’s] possible connections with other active participants of the mass disorders which took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and the adjacent territory, therefore, if at liberty, [he] may co-ordinate his position with unidentified accomplices whose identities are still being established by the investigation.\nThe aforementioned circumstances are corroborated by the operational-search materials submitted to the investigator and the court under the procedure provided for by law.\nTaking into account that ... [the applicant] has been [previously] charged with an administrative offence ... and that [he] has a travel passport and thus has no obstacles to travelling abroad ... the house arrest may not be granted.”", "49. On 27 February 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 7 February 2013.", "50. On 1 April 2013 the Basmannyy District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 August 2013, on the grounds that the circumstances that had justified the detention – the gravity of charges and the risk of obstructing the course of justice – had not changed.", "51. On 24 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 1 April 2013.", "52. On 1 August 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the following grounds:\n“The investigator’s request indicates that ... during the investigation [the applicant] was making contradictory statements thus obstructing the investigation of the criminal case. Moreover, during the investigation it was found out that [the applicant] has acquaintances outside Moscow and the Moscow Region. Therefore, if [he] is subjected to a preventive measure other than detention in custody he may flee the investigation and trial.\n... the victim and eye-witnesses have indicated [the applicant] as the perpetrator ...\n...\n[He] is charged with criminal offences one of which is of medium gravity and another is a grave one, punishable by over three years of deprivation of liberty.\n...\nThese circumstances are substantiated, real, corroborated by the information about the defendant’s personality, including [the information] obtained through operational-search activities.”", "53. On 28 August 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 1 August 2013.", "54. On 1 October 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant’s detention, until 6 February 2014. In its reasoning it stressed the complexity of the case, reiterated the grounds given in the previous orders and noted that the circumstances which had justified the detention order had not changed. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 23 October 2013.", "55. On 20 November 2013 the indictment was issued to the applicant, with the final charges defined under Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code.", "56. On 3 February 2014 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant’s detention and granted it, until 6 June 2014. The court justified this extension as follows:\n“The extension of the [applicant’s] pre-trial detention is necessary because of the need to allow him and his counsel sufficient time for access to the investigation case file, which has not been finished.\n... the [applicant’s] partners in crime have not all been identified and have not been arrested, he knows the personal details of the victims and the witnesses accusing him of being the perpetrator. Taking into account the total of the aforementioned circumstances, the court considers that [the applicant] is likely to flee the investigation and trial, to continue his criminal activity, to put pressure on the victims and witnesses, to induce them to give false evidence, to destruct evidence or to otherwise obstruct the course of justice in the criminal case.”", "57. On 27 February 2014 the Moscow City Court acting as appeal instance upheld the same court’s detention order of 3 February 2014.", "58. On 14 April 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of three defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 30 September 2014 on the following grounds:\n“The reasons taken into account by the court for selecting the preventive measure... have not changed [and] have not lost their relevance to date.\n...\nThe Court takes into account the nature, the gravity and the factual circumstances of the offence imputable to the defendants, the existence of the unidentified perpetrators of the mass disorders, as a real ground for the defendants’ possible unlawful conduct.\nConsidering the foregoing, it is obvious that the defendants [M.,], [the applicant] and [G.], if at liberty, may abscond or otherwise obstruct the course of criminal procedure”", "59. On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to two years and six months of imprisonment. The applicant’s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence.", "60. The applicant is currently serving the remainder of the prison term.", "61. From 8 September 2012 to 9 June 2013 the first applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-77/4, consecutively in five different cells. In each cell the applicant had at least four square metres of personal space and an individual bed at all times; he had one hour of daily outdoor exercise.", "62. According to the Government, the applicant underwent a medical examination on his admission to IZ-77/4; on his request he received medical assistance on 8 November 2012, 9 January 2013 and 20 May 2013 and on 4 December 2012 he had a specialist consultation with an ophthalmologist.", "63. On 9 June 2013 the applicant was transferred to IZ-77/2. According to the Government, the cell allowed the applicant at least four square metres of personal space and he had an individual bed at all times; the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell in order to ensure the necessary privacy; the cells were treated for disinfection and pest-control once every three month and whenever necessary; the applicant was entitled to one-hour outdoor exercise per day; the cell was cleaned and the beddings were changed once a week; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through the hinged window pane. The artificial light was provided at 100 watt by day and at 75 watt by night. The glazed windows let in daylight.", "64. On 7 October 2013 and 20 October 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/2. The applicant made no complaints about the conditions of his detention." ]

[ "5" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Prilep.", "6. The applicant was a taxi driver. On 25 July 2007 his car was parked on a taxi post at the Prilep bus station. As established in the course of the subsequent criminal proceedings (see paragraph 9 below), P.K., accompanied by S.O. and G.F., all Albanian nationals (“the migrants”), asked the applicant to drive them to the village of Vitolište, Mariovo. Only P.K., who was fluent in Macedonian, told the applicant that they were going to Vitolište to work. S.O. and G.F. did not speak during the journey. At around 4 p.m. they were stopped by the police at a place called Sliva. The migrants had no travel documents. The applicant and the migrants were arrested. The applicant’s car was also seized. A receipt for temporarily seized objects was issued to him.", "7. On 26 July 2007 an investigating judge of the Prilep Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) opened an investigation against the applicant and P.K. on grounds of a reasonable suspicion of migrant smuggling, punishable under Article 418-b of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 15 below).", "8. On 8 August 2007 the public prosecutor withdrew the charges against the applicant for lack of evidence. In a written statement of that date the public prosecutor indicated that there was no evidence that the applicant had known or had reasonable grounds to believe that he had transported illegal migrants. He had met them for the first time at the Prilep bus station. He had never had any contact with them before. Since P.K. was fluent in Macedonian, the applicant could not have suspected that he (P.K.) was a migrant. The other two migrants had not spoken during the journey. Furthermore, P.K. had confirmed that he had misled the applicant, since otherwise nobody would have driven them. For that reason, he had advised S.O. and G.F. not to speak. When the police had stopped them, he had apologised to the applicant. That had been confirmed by S.O. and G.F. and two police officers who had stopped them on the day in question. On the same day, the investigating judge discontinued the investigation concerning the applicant. The latter decision indicated that the applicant had no previous criminal record.", "9. On 3 September 2007 the trial court convicted P.K. of migrant smuggling and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment. The court established that P.K. had told S.O. and G.F., illegal migrants from Albania, that he could transfer them illegally into Greece. They had paid him 270 euros (EUR). They had crossed the Macedonian-Albanian border illegally; they had used a taxi to travel to several cities in the respondent State and to arrive ultimately at the Prilep bus station. There, P.K. had agreed with the applicant, who participated in the proceedings as a witness, to transport them to the village of Vitolište, from where all the migrants had intended to cross the border on foot.", "10. The trial court also ordered, under Articles 100-a and 418-b of the Criminal Code 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 below) confiscation of the applicant’s car, as the means by which the criminal offence had been committed (“the confiscation order”). The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n“According to Article 100-a(2) and (3) taken in conjunction with Article 418-b(5) of the [Criminal Code], the court confiscated ... from [the applicant] the vehicle which had been used for transportation of [S.O. and G.F.], because [the applicant] could have known that [they] were migrants, since both of them – the witnesses [,] had not talked, had not had any equipment with which they would work as construction workers or lumberjacks, and also the time in the afternoon when he had transported them to Mariovo indicated that they were not going to work, but [had intended] to cross the Macedonian-Greek border illegally at night, which should have been known to the [applicant] as an experienced taxi-driver. [The applicant] also stated that he had been suspicious about one of the witnesses, because he had been thin, which meant that he could have known that they had been migrants and not (ordinary) persons who were going to Vitolište to work, as he himself had known that the border was illegally crossed near the villages Vitolište, Canište and Bešište.”", "11. The applicant appealed, arguing that the confiscation order had not been based on any fact. He had not been convicted of any crime and the trial court was not entitled to order confiscation of his car. P.K., who was convicted, had been travelling in the car as a passenger. The fact that the public prosecutor had withdrawn the charges against him confirmed that he had not known that he was transporting illegal migrants. No evidence had been adduced to prove otherwise. Lastly, he had never been involved in migrant smuggling.", "12. On 7 November 2007 the Bitola Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the confiscation order. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“It is true that the first-instance court, in the operative part and in the reasoning of the impugned judgment concerning the confiscation of the [car], provided reasons, [i.e.] referred to Articles 100-a (2) and (3) in conjunction with Article 418-b (5) of [the Criminal Code], which constitute an incorrect application of the substantive law, and an incorrect application of [the Code]. Article 100-a of [the Code] concerns the confiscation of objects, and paragraph (3) refers to objects used for the commission of a criminal offence. When those objects are owned by a third person, they may be confiscated only if third persons knew or could and ought to have known that the objects are being used or are intended to be used to commit an offence. In the present case there is no need for the application of this rule, because the rule contained in Article 418-b (5) necessarily requires the confiscation of the objects and the means of transport used to commit the offence, irrespective of whom they belong to, whom they are for, or whom they come from.\nIn such circumstances, coupled with the fact which was established beyond any doubt, (namely) that this offence was committed by the accused with the [applicant’s] vehicle, the court was correct to confiscate the vehicle by its decision contained in the operative provision of the judgment.”", "13. On 23 January 2008 the public prosecutor notified the applicant that there were no grounds to institute legality review proceedings (барање за заштита на законитоста)." ]

[ "P1-1" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Pirna.", "6. The applicant had been employed as head of the sub-division in charge of sanctioning misuse of housing property (Zweckentfremdung) in the Housing Office of the Municipality of Dresden since 1993.", "7. On 9 December 1998 a meeting of the staff of the Housing Office took place in the presence of the Deputy Mayor for Economy and Housing, W., an elected official who, inter alia, governed the Housing Office, and of a number of staff and trade union representatives. Following a short address on the issue of the expiry of the regulation on misuse of housing property by 31 December 1998 given by W., the applicant took the floor and accused W. of having committed perversion of justice (Rechtsbeugung) by ordering the issue of an unlawful demolition permit for a block of flats in 1995/1996.", "8. On 11 December 1998 the applicant’s head of division requested the applicant to substantiate his allegations in writing.", "9. On 17 December 1998 the applicant submitted several pages of written comments, in which he repeated several times (using bold characters) his allegations that W. had committed perversion of justice by ordering the issue of a demolition permit in 1995/1996 without, at the same time, imposing compensation payments for the loss of housing space caused by the demolition. According to the applicant, W. had “ruthlessly pursued politico-economic interests”. He further submitted that all staff members of his sub-division considered that W. had deliberately discredited their work. Furthermore, W. had unlawfully attempted to dissolve the sub-division, thus putting at risk its staff’s employment. The statement made by W. during the staff meeting had been degrading and cynical and had contained half‑truths and lies. W. had not assumed any personal responsibility and did not show any concern for finding a socially acceptable solution to the problems arising from the dissolution of the sub-division.", "10. By letter of 24 March 1999 the Municipality of Dresden dismissed the applicant with effect from 30 June 1999. The dismissal was primarily based on the applicant’s statement during the staff meeting. According to the letter of dismissal, the applicant’s accusations against W. had been unjustified. By making these accusations in front of a large number of staff members and representatives of the staff committee and of the trade union, the applicant had damaged his superior’s reputation and thus irrevocably destroyed the mutual trust which was necessary for effective cooperation. It was further observed that the applicant had not availed himself of the possibility of submitting his concerns to his superior or to the Mayor. Finally, it was noted that the applicant had been reprimanded for disloyal conduct on two previous occasions.", "11. On 17 July 1999 a local newspaper published a letter to the editor in which the applicant expressed the opinion that the Deputy Mayor W. lacked any competence for resolving problems relating to housing issues.", "12. By judgment of 24 May 2000 the Dresden Labour Court (Arbeitsgericht) established that the employment contract had not been terminated by the dismissal since this could not be justified under section 1 of the Unfair Dismissal Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz, see relevant domestic law, below). The Labour Court did not find it necessary to decide whether the applicant’s allegations had been correct, as they were, in any event, covered by the applicant’s right to freedom of expression.", "13. On 8 January 2002 the Saxon Labour Court of Appeal (Landesarbeitsgericht) dismissed the appeal lodged by the Municipality of Dresden.", "14. On 6 November 2003 the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), upon the Municipality’s appeal on points of law, quashed the judgment of 8 January 2002 and remitted the case to the Labour Court of Appeal (no. 2 AZR 177/02). Under the case-law of the Federal Labour Court, gross insults directed against the employer or the employer’s representative, which constituted a serious violation of the concerned person’s honour, could justify dismissal on grounds relating to the employee’s conduct. In order to establish the seriousness of the violation of honour, it had to be established whether the applicant’s allegations were based on objective facts. Account also had to be taken of whether the criticism had been made among staff members or whether other persons had been present. Finally it had to be considered that employees of the public service had to respect specific obligations under their Code of Conduct.", "15. The Federal Labour Court confirmed that the right to freedom of expression always had to be taken into account when assessing inappropriate language in a workplace context and that the applicant’s allegations fell within the scope of his right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, the court had to weigh this right against the protected legal interest with which there had been an interference.", "16. The Federal Labour Court considered that the Court of Appeal, when weighing the competing interests, had failed to establish correctly the seriousness of the applicant’s allegations and of the violation of the Deputy Mayor’s personality rights. Under the Criminal Code, perversion of justice was a crime subject to up to five years’ imprisonment. In case of a criminal conviction under this provision, a deputy mayor would automatically lose his office. The conduct of a public service employee had to be measured against a stricter yardstick than that of an employee in the private sector. In particular, the employee was under an obligation to behave in such a way as not to interfere with his public employer’s reputation. Under the Professional Code of Conduct, the employee had to exercise special restraint when openly criticising a superior’s decisions. A public allegation of perversion of justice directed against a superior, in particular if it was unfounded, very seriously violated the superior’s personality rights and interfered, as a rule, with the employee’s professional duties.", "17. Accordingly, in order duly to weigh the competing interests in the light of the right to freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal would have to examine whether the applicant’s allegations had been justified or not. It had further to be taken into account that the allegations had been made during a staff meeting. While it was true that criticism made in this context could occasionally be exaggerated or polemic without giving the employer a ground for dismissal, this right was limited by the obligation not to disturb peace in the office. It had to be taken into account in the applicant’s favour that the staff meeting concerned the suppression of the applicant’s field of work and that the atmosphere had been rather tense. However, this did not justify neglecting the fact that the allegation of perversion of justice did not concern the subject matter of the staff meeting, but a single incident which dated back several years and had not been mentioned by the applicant since 1997. The applicant did not make use of the possibility of informing the Mayor about his legal concerns regarding the Deputy Mayor’s decision. At the time of the staff meeting, the decision dated back such a long time that an attempt to put the decision into question must have lacked the prospect of success. Accordingly, it appeared that the applicant’s statement was rather aimed at attacking the Deputy Mayor.", "18. It had also to be taken into account that the statement was made in the presence of persons who were not necessarily bound by confidentiality. Accordingly, there was the risk that the applicant’s allegations would leak out of this close circle and be made known to a wider public. The Federal Labour Court finally observed that the applicant’s statement had to be seen in the wider context of his conduct and that the applicant had further exacerbated the conflict by the content of his written comments.", "19. On 16 November 2004 the Saxon Labour Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the Labour Court dated 24 May 2000 and dismissed the applicant’s action.", "20. The Labour Court of Appeal considered that the applicant’s dismissal had been justified because the applicant, in his statement at the staff meeting and in his subsequent written submissions, had seriously insulted and slandered the Deputy Mayor by accusing him of perversion of justice. Based on a detailed examination of the factual and legal situation in 1995/1996, the Labour Court of Appeal considered that the decision taken by the Deputy Mayor at that time had been lawful. The applicant’s written submissions of 17 December 1998 demonstrated that he was not willing to accept and implement politically legitimate decisions, if they concerned sanctions for misuse of property by house owners. The content of the letter to the editor (see paragraph 11, above) contained value judgments which did not amount to insult. However, the Deputy Mayor could not be expected to maintain daily co-operation with the applicant after reading this letter in which he had been described as incompetent. The Labour Court of Appeal further observed that the applicant had not revised his opinion during the proceedings.", "21. The Labour Court of Appeal further considered that the employer did not have any milder means at its disposal. In particular, it would not have been sufficient to reprimand the applicant and to transfer him to another working position. The court observed that the applicant was currently working in the Public Procurement Office and that there was no negative information about his conduct. This was temporary employment which the applicant had obtained by court order in separate proceedings. The applicant had expressed his readiness to accept employment even at a lower level. However, the Labour Court of Appeal considered that the applicant would not have changed his attitude without his dismissal from office. The Municipality could reasonably expect that the applicant would have carried on with his self-righteous attitude if he had not been dismissed. The Labour Court of Appeal finally considered that the applicant’s chances of finding new employment were low. Nevertheless, the employer’s interest in terminating the employment outweighed the applicant’s interests.", "22. On 15 March 2005 the Federal Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s request to be granted leave to appeal on points of law.", "23. On 25 August 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant’s constitutional complaint (no. 1 BvR 947/05), without providing reasons." ]

[ "10" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Bersenevka, Republic of Mordovia.", "6. On 5 March 2009 the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation in response to S.’s complaint that two policemen had extorted money from him by threatening to open a criminal case against him on charges of drug possession.", "7. On 23 March 2009 the investigator received information implicating the applicant in said crime. On 30 March 2009 the investigating authorities established where the applicant was officially registered as living.", "8. On 2 April 2009 the applicant was charged in absentia with kidnapping (Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code) and extortion (Article 163 of the Russian Criminal Code). Noting that the applicant might abscond or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice, the investigator considered that the applicant should sign an undertaking not to leave his place of residence and to abstain from improper behaviour.", "9. On 3 April 2009 the applicant’s name was put on the list of wanted persons. It was not elucidated in the relevant decision whether any effort had been taken on the part of the investigating authorities to establish the applicant’s whereabouts. On the same day the police informed the investigating authorities of the addresses where the applicant and his father were registered.", "10. On 6 May 2010 the investigating authorities established the applicant’s temporary address.", "11. On 24 June 2010 the applicant voluntarily went to see the investigator. He was questioned and released on his own recognisance. The next interview was scheduled for 1 July 2010. On that day the applicant duly appeared at the prosecutor’s office where he was arrested. When questioned, he claimed that the authorities had had no grounds to put his name on the list of wanted persons. In particular, he submitted that the investigating authorities had failed to verify his whereabouts or to issue a request for him to appear for questioning.", "12. The following day, 2 July 2010, the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 1 August 2010. In particular, the court noted as follows:\n“... the court ... considers that, in view of the [applicant’s] character and the nature of the charges, if released, he might again abscond or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. [The applicant] is charged with offences entailing a custodial sentence in excess of two years. As is apparent from the evidence submitted, he has absconded before and his name was put on the list of wanted persons. The court concludes that it is impossible to apply more lenient restrictions, such as release on bail.\nThe court considers that there were grounds for the [applicant’s] arrest. It follows from the evidence submitted to the court that [the applicant] could have committed the crime he is charged with. As regards the fact that on 24 June 2009 the applicant voluntarily appeared for questioning, the court does not consider it sufficient to dismiss the [investigating authorities’] request for the [applicant] to be remanded in custody. [The applicant] did not deny that even though his name was on the list of wanted persons, he did not appear for [questioning] for two months.”", "13. On 3 July 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the court order of 2 July 2010. He addressed it to the Moscow City Court. On an unspecified date the City Court forwarded it to the District Court for processing. According to the Government, on an unspecified date the President of the District Court returned the statement of appeal to the applicant on the grounds that it had been lodged after the deadline. The applicant received the President’s decision on 27 July 2010 and asked the District Court to renew the time allowed for appeal.", "14. On 28 July 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 1 October 2010. The court noted as follows:\n“When extending the [applicant’s] pre-trial detention, the court has taken into account [his] character. Nevertheless, it does not discern any grounds to cancel or replace the preventative measure previously imposed on [the applicant] ... given that the circumstances underlying the [applicant’s] detention pending trial have not altered. [The applicant] is charged with offences entailing a custodial sentence in excess of two years. Regard being had to the seriousness of the charges and to the fact that he absconded and that his name was put on the list of wanted persons, the court is convinced that [the applicant] might abscond or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.\nThe court dismisses as unsubstantiated the [applicant’s] allegations that he was unfit for detention because of his state of health. There are no documents in the case file [to the contrary]. Furthermore, the court notes that all persons detained in a remand prison receive the necessary medical assistance as provided for in the applicable legislation.”", "15. According to the Government, on 17 August 2010 the District Court reset the time-limit for the applicant’s appeal against the court order of 2 July 2010.", "16. On 18 August 2010 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 28 July 2010 on appeal.", "17. On 25 August 2010 the applicant’s lawyer filed an additional statement of appeal against the court order of 2 July 2010.", "18. On 6 September 2010 the City Court adjourned the hearing of the applicant’s appeal against the court order of 2 July 2010 owing to his lawyer’s failure to appear. On 8 September 2010 the City Court held the hearing and upheld the decision of 2 July 2010 on appeal.", "19. On 29 September 2010 the District Court further extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 1 December 2010 noting as follows:\n“... the court considers that there are no grounds justifying the lifting or changing of the restrictive measure imposed on [the applicant] ... in the court’s view, the defence’s request to release [the applicant] on bail will not have a restraining effect on the defendant as regards the possibility of him interfering with the administration of justice. Regard being had to the particular complexity of the case and to the scope of the pending investigation, the court considers the investigator’s request to extend the [applicant’s] pre-trial detention well-founded. Accordingly the court rejects the request for bail lodged by [the applicant] and his defence.\nRegard being had to the above and the seriousness of the charges against [the applicant], the court does not consider it possible to apply a restrictive measure other than to remand the accused in custody ... ”", "20. On 25 October 2010 the City Court upheld the decision of 29 September 2010 on appeal.", "21. On 29 November 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 1 January 2011. The court reasoned as follows:\n“... the grounds underlying the [applicant’s] detention pending trial have not altered. [He] is charged with a grievous offence entailing a custodial sentence in excess of two years; he previously absconded and his name was put on the list of wanted persons; he is not employed and does not have an official source of income; he used to be a policeman and has relevant knowledge and experience; he is privy to the personal data of the victim and a witness. The evidence, the circumstances and the [applicant’s] character presented to the court lead it to believe that, if released, [the applicant] might abscond, continue criminal activities, threaten the victim and the witness, put pressure on them or otherwise interfere with the investigation of the case.”", "22. On 27 December 2010 the City Court upheld the decision of 29 November 2010 on appeal.", "23. On 28 December 2010 the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow fixed the trial for 12 January 2011. The applicant asked for release on bail in the amount of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB) to be paid by his cousin. The court further extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other defendant until 17 June 2011, noting as follows:\n“Defendant M. is charged with grievous offences. [The applicant] is charged with grievous offences. Accordingly, [the court] considers that there are grounds to believe that, if released, M. and [the applicant] might abscond or otherwise interfere with the proceedings. The court does not discern any circumstances justifying lifting or changing the restriction. The release of defendant M. or [the applicant] might significantly complicate the comprehensive, complete and objective assessment of the circumstances of the case. The court also dismisses the [applicant’s] request for release on bail as unsubstantiated.”", "24. On 9 February 2011 the City Court upheld the decision of 28 December 2010 on appeal.", "25. On 13 April 2011 the District Court found the applicant guilty of extortion and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. On 25 July 2011 the City Court upheld in substance the applicant’s conviction on appeal but reduced his sentence to three years and nine months.", "26. On 2 July 2010 the applicant was placed in remand prison no. IZ‑77/4 in Moscow. He was held there until 8 September 2011 except for one period between October and November 2010 when he underwent medical treatment in remand prison no. IZ-77/1.", "27. The applicant was detained in cells nos. 913 and 914 which measured 6 metres by 5.5 metres. The cell was equipped with eight bunk beds, a table, two benches and a metal cabinet used for food storage. The toilet was located some 1.4 metres away from the living area of the cell and offered no privacy.", "28. The applicant suffers from chronic gastritis and post-traumatic brain dysfunction. Because of his condition, he was eligible for a special food regime, which was allegedly not provided. His relatives sent him medicine and food while he was in detention.", "29. In October-November 2011 the applicant underwent medical treatment in the hospital of remand prison no. IZ-77/1 in Moscow.", "30. In response to the applicant’s complaint, the Moscow City Ombudsman made an enquiry as to the medical care provided in the remand prison. The inquiry did not confirm the applicant’s allegations that he had been refused due medical care. The applicant was informed accordingly on 12 November 2010.", "31. The Government’s submissions as regards the conditions in which the applicant was transported may be summarised as follows:\n \nDate of transport\nTime in transit from the remand prison to the court-house / van type used / number of inmates transported, including the applicant\nTime in transit from the court-house to the remand prison / van type used / number of inmates transported, including the applicant\n2 July 2010\n40 minutes / GAZ 22171 / 1\nNo data available\n28 July, 29 September and 29 November 2010\nNo data available (documents destroyed)\n28 December 2010\n40 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 16\n1 hour 30 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 23\n12 January 2011\n1 hour 25 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 15\n3 hours 50 minutes / KAMAZ / 26\n20 January 2011\n1 hour 50 minutes / KAMAZ / 17\n3 hours 20 minutes / GAZ 326535 / 17\n26 January 2011\n2 hours 30 minutes / KAMAZ / 23\n3 hours 45 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 8\n3 February 2011\n1 hour 30 minutes / ZIL 4331/ 27\n30 minutes / KAMAZ / 10\n11 February 2011\n1 hour 40 minutes / KAMAZ / 25\n1 hour 25 minutes / KAMAZ / 25\n25 February 2011\n2 hours / KAMAZ / 17\n25 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 18\n9 March 2011\n55 minutes / KAMAZ / 31\n2 hour 20 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 14\n22 March 2011\n1 hour 20 minutes / KAMAZ / 25\n3 hours / KAMAZ / 24\n30 March 2011\n1 hour 30 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 26\n30 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 20\n12 April 2011\n1 hour 5 minutes / KAMAZ / 24\n3 hours 5 minutes / KAMAZ / 19\n13 April 2011\n1 hour 20 minutes / ZIL 4331 / 23\n2 hours 40 minutes / GAZ 326035 / 17", "32. The Government did not specify the type of compartment the applicant was placed in during the transfer to and from the court-house. According to the documents submitted, on 11 February 2011 during the journey from the remand prison to the court-house, the applicant was placed in a single compartment with another inmate.", "33. The Government submitted the following information as regards the measurements and capacity of the prison vans:\n \nType of the prison van\nSingle compartment measurements (two in each van)\nCollective compartment measurements (two in each van)\nVan capacity\nZIL 4331", "34. The vans were ventilated by an opening in the door and by vents in the compartments. They were equipped with heating and lighting. They were cleaned and disinfected daily. The vans were in good working order at all times. During the journey, it was not possible for the inmates to use a toilet. They could use the toilet at the court-house, if necessary.", "35. According to the photographs submitted by the Government, each compartment was equipped with two benches located along the longer walls and facing each other. There was no access to natural light. The Government also submitted excerpts from standards for service vehicles intended for the transport of suspects and defendants in criminal cases, which set forth that the seating space per person in the prison van should be at least 0.45 by 0.35 m.\n(b) Description submitted by the applicant", "36. According to the applicant, he was transported in a single-occupancy compartment only on two occasions. For the rest of the time, he was transported in a collective compartment which held up to eighteen detainees and measured 3.8 m by 2.35 m by 1.6 m. There were not enough seats for everyone and some people had to stand or sit on someone else’s lap. During the winter the vans were not heated. The ceiling and the walls were covered with ice. The floor in the van was extremely dirty. It was covered with cigarette butts, food crumbs, plastic bottles and bags of urine. The natural ventilation of the van through the hatches was insufficient. All the detainees smoked in the van and the applicant was exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke. The light was off all the time.", "37. On the days of the trial, the applicant was placed in a holding cell at the court-house measuring 2.5 by 1.5 metres. It was, according to the applicant, dirty, poorly lit and unventilated. In the winter, the temperature did not exceed +140C. The cell held two or more detainees. There was no toilet in the cell. The applicant spent about eight hours in such conditions." ]

[ "5", "3" ]

[ 2, 4, 5 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently being detained in Târgu Jiu Prison.", "6. In 1998 the applicant started serving a twenty-five-year sentence for murder. On 23 July 1998 he was placed in Târgu Jiu Prison. Except for short periods of time when he was transferred to other prisons in order to appear before the courts and three occasions when he was hospitalised for a maximum of one day in prison hospitals, the applicant was held in Târgu Jiu Prison.", "7. The applicant alleged that the conditions of his detention in Târgu Jiu Prison since his incarceration in 1998 amounted to torture. More specifically, he alleged that he was being held in severely overcrowded cells with thirty-five to forty prisoners, with worn-out furniture and without natural light or ventilation. He further submitted that the cells were full of bed bugs and the food was insufficient and of very poor quality. The applicant also alleged that he was being held in cells with smokers.", "8. The applicant lastly alleged that he had become sick as a result of the inhuman conditions to which he had been subjected. He submitted in that connection a medical certificate issued by the prison doctor on 17 March 2014, according to which he was suffering from: chronic cholecystitis, fatty liver disease, chronic venal insufficiency of the legs, type-II diabetes, chronic pancreatitis, gastroduodenitis, lumbar discopathy and impulsive personality disorder.", "9. The Government submitted that the applicant had been held for unspecified periods of time in three different cells of the Târgu Jiu Prison infirmary block, which are described below.", "10. Cell E 2.2 measured 22.62 sq. m, of which 2.41 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (20.21 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had five rows of bunk beds and accommodated eight prisoners (2.52 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring 0.97 by 1.45 m. The bathroom had its own window measuring 40 by 45 cm.", "11. Cell E 2.3 measured 21.75 sq. m, of which 3.85 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (17.92 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had four rows of bunk beds and accommodated five prisoners (3.5 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring 0.97 by 1.45 m. The bathroom had its own window measuring 40 by 45 cm.", "12. Cell E 2.4 measured 24.05 sq. m, of which 3.36 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (20.69 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had four rows of bunk beds and accommodated four to six prisoners (between 3.44 and 4.13 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). Ventilation was ensured by a window measuring 0.97 by 1.45 m. The bathroom had its own window measuring 40 by 45 cm.", "13. For the rest of the time the applicant was held in non-smoking cells, a description of which is set out below.", "14. Cell E 2.5 measured 49.8 sq. m, of which 7.31 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (42.49 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had twenty-seven beds and accommodated twenty-five to twenty-six prisoners (an average of 1.63 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). The cell had three windows measuring 90 by 109 cm and the bathroom had a window measuring 40 by 45 cm.", "15. Cell E 3.4 measured 36.15 sq. m, of which 5.55 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom (30.6 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had eight rows of bunk beds and usually accommodated twenty prisoners (1.53 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). The cell had a window measuring 118 by 158 cm. The bathroom had its own window measuring 110 by 50 cm.", "16. Cell E 1.13 measured 48.40 sq. m, of which 9.25 sq. m were occupied by a bathroom and 2.17 sq. m by a storage room (36.98 sq. m of remaining space). The cell had eleven rows of bunk beds and accommodated twenty-five to twenty-nine prisoners (between 1.47 sq. m and 1.27 sq. m of personal space, including the space occupied by the beds). It also had three windows measuring 100 by 125 cm and 100 by 150 cm. The bathroom had its own window measuring 60 by 50 cm.", "17. The Government submitted that all of the cells contained adequate furniture and that disinfection operations took place whenever the presence of insects was reported." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Moreni.", "6. On 17 July 2000, R.C.A. was hired as an inspector by the Moreni City Council on the recommendation of the applicant and another person, G.A. She had a contract for a limited period of time, namely three months, which was extended for another three months. In order to obtain a permanent contract she took part in a competition organised by the City Council in February 2001. She succeeded, being the only candidate. After a few months, the atmosphere at the workplace became tense. R.C.A. was on probation in her new post and was therefore monitored and kept under close scrutiny.", "7. According to R.C.A.’s statements, she was persecuted by her superiors and even sexually harassed by the mayor. Therefore, she asked for the protection of the applicant, to whom she allegedly gave 1,000 German marks (DEM).", "8. According to the applicant’s statement, the money was given to her as a loan with no prearranged date of reimbursement in the summer of 2001. The applicant also stated that another colleague, C.M., had borrowed money from R.C.A., and that the practice of borrowing money from each other was common in their workplace. The applicant’s statements were confirmed by her colleague, who was heard as a witness before the court.", "9. On 24 January 2002 R.C.A. denounced the applicant to the police for influence peddling. She claimed that the applicant had asked her for DEM 1,000 in order to persuade the mayor to give her a permanent position within the City Council.", "10. On 29 January 2002 R.C.A. obtained the authorisation of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Ploiești Court of Appeal to record conversations between herself and the applicant. Subsequently, all the conversations that took place between the applicant and herself between 29 January and 2 February 2002 were recorded. The recording was carried out using two recording devices, one belonging to R.C.A. and the other to a police officer.", "11. Following a request by R.C.A. for the return of the money, the applicant and R.C.A. met in a cake shop close to the applicant’s home on 2 February 2002. The applicant stated that she was accompanied by a colleague, D.C. According to R.C.A.’s version, the applicant was alone, while she herself was accompanied by her husband and brother, who waited outside the cake shop. The applicant handed over to R.C.A. 400 United States dollars (USD) (the equivalent of DEM 1,000).", "12. On 4 April 2002 a criminal investigation was initiated against the applicant on the charge of influence peddling.", "13. On 12 June 2002 R.C.A. was invited to the prosecutor’s office attached to the Dâmbovița County Court to give clarification on the recordings. After some discussion of the transcripts of the conversations she said she had a headache and left, promising to come back the same day. However, she never came back to continue the discussion with the prosecutor. This was mentioned in the record of the meeting drafted by the prosecutor.", "14. On 24 September 2002 the Ploiești Division of the National Anti‑Corruption Directorate decided to discontinue the investigation against the applicant on the ground that the actus reus of the offence was missing.", "15. On 9 December 2002 the chief prosecutor decided to reopen the criminal investigation against the applicant. He noted that the investigation had been incomplete and that there were several aspects to be clarified in connection with the charges against the applicant. He also ordered a preliminary investigation against the mayor of Moreni.", "16. On 27 March 2003 R.C.A. enquired the chief prosecutor about the progress of the investigation. She expressed concern about the integrity of the transcripts of the recordings, as she had noted that the parts of the conversations had been erased.", "17. The file was presented to the applicant on 5 June 2003. The minute certifying the taped conversations was drafted afterwards, on 13 June 2003.", "18. By a bill of indictment of 20 June 2003, the prosecutor’s office committed the applicant for trial on a charge of influence peddling in violation of Article 257 § 1 of the Romanian Criminal Code and Articles 1 (a) and 6 of Law no. 78/2000. By the same decision the prosecutor decided not to open a criminal investigation against the mayor, without giving any reasons.", "19. Several hearings were held before the Dâmbovița County Court.", "20. According to a witness statement given by the mayor of Moreni before the county court on 4 November 2003, R.C.A. was well known as a person who recorded her private conversations at work, about which many colleagues had complained. A similar aspect was revealed by another witness, G.A. She stated that R.C.A. had changed her behaviour at work after she had obtained a permanent contract. As G.A. was the person who had recommended R.C.A. for the job, other employees informed her that R.C.A. was leaving her office during working hours. G.A. had tried to advise R.C.A. to change her behaviour; she noted that the latter was recording their conversation.", "21. On 16 December 2003 the court granted a request by the applicant for a technical report on the contents of the tape recordings. On 4 January 2004 the applicant’s lawyer asked to see the authorisation for the recording of the conversations and the minute drafted of the occasion when R.C.A. handed over the recordings. She also lodged a written request for an expert assessment of the authenticity and integrity of the recordings.", "22. On 4 February 2004 the National Institute for Forensic Expert Opinions, which was in charge of the preparation of the report, asked the court to send it all the technical equipment used for the recording of the audio tapes.", "23. On 30 March 2003 R.C.A. submitted written notes by which she informed the court that on 12 June 2002 she had refused to confirm that the transcripts of the recorded conversations presented by the prosecutor corresponded to the recordings performed by her (see paragraph 17 above).", "24. On 11 May 2004, the court imposed a fine on R.C.A. as she had refused to provide the court with the original tapes and equipment used for recording the applicant.", "25. As R.C.A. refused to attend the court hearings or to submit the original tapes, two orders for her to be brought before the court were issued by the county court.", "26. By a judgment rendered on 2 July 2004, the Dâmbovița County Court acquitted the applicant on the ground that the elements required for the offence were not present.", "27. The county court held that R.C.A.’s version of events was supported only by the testimony of her husband and brother and by the taped conversations, whose authenticity and integrity could not be established by an expert, mainly because R.C.A. had refused to provide the expert with the technical equipment used for the recording. Moreover, R.C.A.’s statements contained many contradictions. In this respect the county court stated:\n“... although R.C.A. stated that the money was given to the applicant before the competition which was to take place on 6 February 2001, during the proceedings before the court she stated that it was given later, after the competition, then she changed her previous statement only when she was asked by the prosecutor attending the hearing about the logic of such an action ...\nIn conclusion, the statements mentioned above are not corroborated by the facts or circumstances resulting from all the evidence adduced in the case, and cannot be confirmed by the audio recording of the conversations, since these were not executed in accordance with the provisions of Article 911 or with the Code of Criminal Procedure (in force until 1st January 2004, in accordance with Law 281/2003) ...\nContrary to the above-mentioned legal provisions, in the case file there are three minutes, all dated 13 June 2003, which mention only that the conversations between R.C.A. and the defendant were authorised under no.502 on 29 January 2002 (although the transcripts from pages 75-78 of the file indicate a previous date, namely 22 January 2002), and after the tapes had been heard it was confirmed that their contents were mentioned in the transcripts.\nMoreover, according to the letter of 8 April 2004 from the Dâmbovița Police Department and the statements of R.C.A. and the witness B.M., the recording of the conversations was made by devices belonging to R.C.A., who submitted to the criminal investigation body recordings made before she had made her accusations, and thus before she had obtained authorisation from the prosecutor.\nDespite the fact that a forensic report intended to establish the contents of the audio tapes was ordered at the request of the defendant ... it could not be adduced before the court in the absence of the technical equipment (microphone and tape recorder) used for the recording of the tapes. The Dâmbovița Police Department stated in the above‑mentioned letter that the police officer’s recording device had been lost, and the other one was in the possession of R.C.A., who had refused to hand it over.”", "28. The prosecutor’s office appealed against the judgment rendered by the Dâmbovița County Court. It argued that the applicant’s guilt was proved by the statements of the accuser, R.C.A., and confirmed by the audio recordings of the conversations between R.C.A. and the applicant.", "29. On 14 October 2004 the Ploiești Court of Appeal ordered an expert technical report on the authenticity or otherwise of the tape recordings. At the hearing held on 7 March 2005 the court revoked that order on the ground that “R.C.A. no longer has the originals of the audio tapes”.", "30. On 15 March 2005, the Ploiești Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the applicant could not be convicted on the basis of recordings obtained in breach of the applicable legal provisions. It noted that the prosecutor had not observed the legal provisions concerning the attestation of the authenticity of the recordings, and considered that the correct procedures for telephone tapping had not been observed. With respect to R.C.A.’s statements the Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusion as the first-instance court. It held that most of her statements were contradictory and were corroborated only by her husband and brother. However, the applicant’s statement that she had received the money from R.C.A. as a loan was confirmed by the statements of four other colleagues. Two of them stated that they had heard R.C.A. threatening the applicant that she would claim that the money given as a loan was in fact a bribe.", "31. The appeal on points of law submitted by the prosecutor was allowed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 14 October 2005. That court quashed the decisions of the first two domestic courts and convicted the applicant of influence peddling, sentencing her to two years’ imprisonment, suspended, with probation. Without hearing evidence directly from the applicant, R.C.A. or any witnesses, the court arrived at the conclusion that R.C.A.’s statements were not contradictory and that in fact the applicant’s statements were corroborated only by the testimony of one witness, C.M., a colleague of the applicant and one of the individuals who had also persecuted R.C.A.", "32. It mainly based its decision on the statements of R.C.A., the testimony of R.C.A.’s husband and brother and the audio tapes containing the conversations between R.C.A. and the applicant." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 8, 11, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1950 and 1987 respectively and live in Makhachkala. The applicants are the mother and the wife of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov (in the documents submitted also written as Abdurashidov), who was born in 1985.", "6. The second applicant and her husband Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov have lived in Moscow since 2008. In the middle of June 2010 the second applicant went to Makhachkala to visit her relatives. On 24 June 2010 her husband Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov arrived from Moscow, and on the same date they went to visit Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov’s sister Ms F.Sh. at 29 Sovetskaya Street in Kaspiysk, Dagestan.", "7. The first applicant and her husband, a federal judge of the Leninskiy District Court in Makhachkala, lived at 11 Gadzhiyeva Street, Makhachkala.\n(b) Events in Makhachkala", "8. At about 8 p.m. on 25 June 2010 a group of five officers from the Sovetskiy district department of the interior in Makhachkala (the Sovetskiy ROVD) arrived at the first applicant’s house. One of them, who identified himself as Shamil, showed the first applicant arrest warrant no. 6/3-3726 issued in the name of her son Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov and signed by Captain A. Plugin, the investigator of the Investigative Committee of the Federal Security Service (the FSB). According to the warrant, Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov was suspected, amongst other things, of involvement in terrorist activities.\n(c) Events in Kaspiysk", "9. Meanwhile, on 25 June 2010 the second applicant and her husband Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov were visiting their relative Ms F.Sh. in Kaspiysk. At about 9 p.m. on that date, a group of five to seven men, some of whom were in black masks, arrived at the house of Ms F.Sh. in a black VAZ-2107 (‘Приора’) car with the registration number containing the numbers 256 or 259 and the letters PH. One of them told the second applicant that they were from the police. The men abducted Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov next to the house, in the street. First they fired shots at his feet, then they knocked him down, dragged him into the car and drove off. The abduction took place in broad daylight and in the presence of a number of witnesses, including neighbours and the applicants’ relatives.", "10. Shortly after the abductors’ departure, several police officers in uniform and plain clothes arrived at the scene of the shooting in two police cars; without giving any explanation they collected the cartridge cases left after the incident.", "11. The Government did not dispute the applicants’ account of the circumstances of the abduction, stating that it “does not contradict the information collected by the authorities during the course of the investigation”.", "12. At about 9 p.m. on 25 June 2010, immediately after the incident, the second applicant in Kaspiysk called the first applicant in Makhachkala and informed her about the abduction.", "13. In the morning of 26 June 2010 the first applicant complained about the abduction to the Dagestan FSB and the Dagestan Prosecutor’s office. She stated that on the date of the abduction she had been visited by a group of five officers from the Sovetskiy ROVD who had showed her a warrant for her son’s arrest issued by the FSB Captain A. Plugin; that shortly after their visit the second applicant had called her from Kaspiysk and told her about the abduction of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov by a group of armed men who had opened fire and that shortly after the incident a group of police officers had collected the cartridge cases left at the scene.", "14. On 28 June 2010 the Dagestan FSB replied to the first applicant that they had forwarded her complaint to the Dagestan Prosecutor’s office. On 29 June 2010 the latter informed her that they had forwarded the complaint to the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office.", "15. On 28 June 2010 the first applicant complained about the abduction to the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior (the MVD), and provided a detailed description of the circumstances surrounding the abduction, including the police officers’ visit to her house and the collection of the cartridge cases after the abductors’ departure. On 5 August 2010 the Dagestan MVD informed her that they had forwarded her complaint to the Kaspiysk town department of the interior (the GOVD).", "16. On 6 July 2010 the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that they had forwarded her complaint to their investigations department for a preliminary inquiry.", "17. Between 13 and 19 July 2010 the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office forwarded eleven requests to various law-enforcement agencies, asking them to establish the whereabouts of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov and inform them about his possible detention and the reason for it. They also asked for a copy of the arrest warrant used by the police officers from the Sovetskiy ROVD and for information on whether Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov had been involved in extremist or illegal activities.", "18. On 15 July 2010 the first applicant complained about the abduction to the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office and asked whether a criminal case had been opened to investigate the incident, and if so what was the progress of the proceedings.", "19. On the same date, 15 July 2010 the first applicant again lodged a complaint about her son’s abduction with the investigations department of the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office. The complaint stated, amongst other things, that the abduction had been perpetrated by police officers in broad daylight and in the presence of numerous witnesses. The applicant asked the authorities to take urgent steps to investigate and to protect her son. In particular, she requested the investigators to take the following measures: granting her victim status in the criminal case; questioning a number of eyewitnesses to the abduction, including the second applicant, Ms F.Sh., Ms D.A., Ms S.G., and Ms R.A.; establishing whether any criminal charges had been pending against Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov and whether he had been on the authorities’ wanted list; identification of the five police officers who had visited the applicant in Makhachkala on 25 June 2010 and seizure of the warrant signed by Captain A. Plugin; identification of the latter and of the abductors’ car.", "20. On 16 July 2010 the first applicant requested the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office to take additional investigative steps to establish her son’s whereabouts. In particular, she asked them to request information from various detention centres in Dagestan in case Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov had been detained there, and to initiate a criminal investigation into the abduction.", "21. On 16 July 2010 the applicants’ lawyer complained to the FSB investigator Captain A. Plugin about the abduction and the warrant used by the police officers from the Sovetskiy ROVD. The complaint gave a detailed description of the incident and stated that the officers had showed the first applicant a warrant allegedly signed by him. On 23 August 2010 Captain A. Plugin replied stating “... no orders to detain Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov have been given to the Sovetskiy ROVD ...” and that the applicants should complain about the abduction to the prosecutor’s office.", "22. On 17 July 2010 the first applicant again complained to the head of the Dagestan FSB and the Dagestan Prosecutor (see paragraph 13 above). She asserted that Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov had been abducted by police or FSB officers from Dagestan, and requested the law-enforcement agencies to assist her in establishing his whereabouts.", "23. On 19 July 2010 the first applicant complained to the Russian Prosecutor General. She provided a detailed description of the circumstances surrounding the abduction and stressed that the warrant under outgoing no. 6/3-3726 allegedly signed by Captain A. Plugin could have been forged by the police officers. She also stated that the abductors had told the second applicant that they were from the police and that all her efforts to establish her son’s whereabouts by complaining to local law‑enforcement agencies had not produced any tangible results. The applicant further stated that she had learned from an unidentified source that on 25 June 2010 a special operation had been conducted by the police or the FSB officers against her son, and requested the authorities to carry out an effective investigation of the incident.", "24. On 21 July 2010 the first applicant again complained about the abduction to the Dagestan FSB. On 30 July 2010 they replied to her that her complaint had been forwarded to the Dagestan Prosecutor’s office.", "25. On 5 August 2010 the first applicant complained to the head of the Russian FSB. She stated that her son had been abducted by members of law-enforcement agencies and that the responses received by her from the Dagestan FSB had not provided any meaningful information. The applicant asked whether any criminal proceedings were pending against her son, whether he was suspected of a crime, and whether Captain A. Plugin had issued the order for her son’s arrest. She also requested to be informed about her son’s whereabouts and the reasons for his detention. On an unspecified date in August 2010 the Russian FSB replied to the applicant stating that her son had not been charged with any offence and that they had not ordered the Sovetskiy ROVD to detain him.", "26. On 11 August 2010 the first applicant complained to the Russian Prosecutor General, the head of the Russian FSB and the head of the Russian MVD about the unlawful detention of her son Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov by members of law-enforcement agencies. She also requested to be informed whether her son was a suspect in criminal case no. 17822, and if so what charges had been brought against him.", "27. On 13 August 2010 the applicants’ lawyer requested information from the Dagestan Prosecutor’s office concerning the criminal charges against Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov and the place of his unlawful detention.", "28. On 20 August 2010 the applicants again complained about the abduction to the Dagestan Prosecutor and the Dagestan MVD. They stated that local law-enforcement agencies had consistently denied any involvement in the abduction of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov, but the head of the Sovetskiy ROVD had told them that their relative had been detained by ROVD officers and handed over to the Dagestan Centre for Terrorism Counteraction (the CTC) (“Центр по противодействию экстремизму и терроризму МВД РФ по РД”). However, according to the applicants, the latter agency had denied detaining Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov.", "29. On an unspecified date in August 2010 the Dagestan Council of Judges complained on the applicants’ behalf to the head of the Russian FSB and the Russian Minister of the Interior. The complaint stated that the abduction of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov had most probably been perpetrated by members of law-enforcement agencies, officers of the Sovetskiy ROVD in particular, and that the criminal investigation into the incident was ineffective.", "30. On 24 August 2010 the Judicial Department of the Russian Supreme Court informed the Dagestan Council of Judges that they had forwarded the complaint about Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov’s abduction to the prosecutor’s office.", "31. In reply to the Court’s request for a copy of the investigation file on the abduction of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov the Government produced the relevant documents, which ran to seventy-eight pages. Their contents can be summarised as follows:", "32. On 28 July 2010 the Kaspiysk prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal investigation into the abduction of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 006210.", "33. On 29 July 2010 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected.", "34. On the same date, 29 July 2010, the investigators granted the first applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her. She provided a detailed description of the circumstances surrounding the abduction, including the police officers’ visit to her house in Makhachkala, and stated that she had learned from unidentified sources that her son had been detained at a base of the Dagestan CTC.", "35. On 30 July 2010 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative Ms F.Sh., who stated that she had witnessed Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov’s abduction by a group of seven men in plain clothes, five of whom were masked. According to the witness, the abductors had opened fire and forced Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov into a black VAZ‑2107 (‘Приора’) car with the registration number either E256 or E259. The numerous neighbours who had also witnessed the abduction had later told her that the abductors had used two black VAZ-2107 cars.", "36. On 30 July 2010 the investigators questioned Ms R.A. and the second applicant, whose statements about the events were similar to that of Mr F.Sh. The second applicant added that about 15-20 minutes after the abduction two police cars had arrived at the place of the skirmish. A group of police officers, both uniformed and plain clothes, had searched the ground with flash lights looking for the spent bullet cartridges.", "37. On 2 August 2010 the head of the criminal search division of the Kaspiysk ROVD informed the investigators that they had been unable to identify any witnesses to the abduction.", "38. From the documents submitted it follows that on 12 August 2010 the head of Police Station no. 1 in Makhachkala sent the investigators letter no. 2/4298, stating that on 25 July 2010 four of their police officers, M.D., D.M., M.Z. and M.A., following the order of the Russian FSB no.6/3‑3726 of 16 June 2010 given as part of the investigation of criminal case no. 171822, had arrived at the house of the judge of the Leninskiy district of Makhachkala Mr Sh.A. to establish the whereabouts of his son Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov. The police officers had questioned the first applicant who had told them that her son and his wife were in Moscow. The police officers had not participated in Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov’s arrest.", "39. On 2 September 2010 the head of the Supervision and Control Department of the Dagestan Investigations Committee examined the criminal case file opened into the abduction. He criticised the investigators for their failure to take a number of steps, and ordered that remedial measures be taken. In particular, the document stated the following:\n“... The case file examination demonstrated that the investigation is being conducted without purpose, that most important circumstances of the crime are not being established and clarified, and that the necessary steps to establish them are not being taken ...\n[The applicant] Ms Abdurakhmanova stated that at about 8 p.m. on 25 July 2010 five men had arrived at her house. They had introduced themselves as servicemen from the Sovetskiy ROVD in Makhachkala. One of them named Shamil had shown her an arrest warrant for her son Mr A. Abdurakhmanov signed by the FSB investigator A. Plugin ...\nLater on the same day she had learnt of her son’s abduction in Kaspiysk by unknown masked persons ... who fired weapons during the incident and absconded from the crime scene. Shortly afterwards policemen had arrived at the scene and, according to the neighbours, had collected the cartridge cases and left.\nTo verify Ms Abdurakhmanova’s statements it is necessary to take the following steps:\n- identifying the policemen who had visited her house as well as the investigator from the Sovetskiy ROVD named Shamil ...\n- questioning all the policemen in Kaspiysk who were on duty on 25 June 2010 to find out whether they were called to a scene of shooting and abduction at 29 Sovetskaya Street ...\n- questioning all the witnesses, including the neighbours in Sovetskaya Street, about the events, and finding out the registration numbers of the cars used by the policemen who had arrived at the scene after the abduction ...\n... in the letter from the Dagestan FSB of 4 August 2010 it is stated that the FSB had sent a letter to the Investigations Committee (no. 5/3170 of 3 July 2008) concerning Mr A. Abdurakhmanov, in which it was stated that the Dagestan Investigations Committee had been investigating case no. 6021567 concerning ... a bandit group which had planned murders of policemen in Makhachkala as well as terrorist attacks. One of that group’s members was Mr A. Abdurakhmanov ... who had maintained close contact with active members of the bandit subversive movement and had aided and abetted them. In particular, Mr A. Abdurakhmanov had sheltered in his flat armed members of the bandit subversive movement who were hiding from the authorities ...\nThe investigation of criminal case no. 171822 opened by the Russia FSB obtained information concerning activities of an organised armed group in Dagestan and Moscow which was aiding and abetting the armed bandit subversive movement in Dagestan ... the investigation received information concerning Mr A. Abdurakhmanov’s involvement in the activities of that group ...\nIn connection with the above, it is necessary that the investigators:\n- write to the FSB investigator A. Plugin concerning the operational search measures to be taken against Mr A. Abdurakhmanov ...”", "40. On 20 September 2010 the FSB Investigations Department informed the investigators of the following:\n“... the FSB investigations department is investigating criminal case no. 171822 concerning ... members of the illegal armed group “Imarat Kavkaz”.\nMr R.A. and Mr R.M. have been charged in the criminal case with membership of illegal armed groups ... Mr A. Abdurakhmanov is a witness to their criminal activity. In this connection, a request for operational search measures (outgoing no. 6/3-3726 of 17 June 2010) to establish his whereabouts and question him has been forwarded to the Dagestan FSB ...”", "41. On 28 September 2010 the investigators requested the Internal Security Service of the Dagestan MVD to oblige police officers M.D., D.M., M.Z. and M.A. to provide statements for the investigation concerning the abduction. The letter stated, amongst other things, that the first applicant had insisted that her son’s abduction had been perpetrated by police officers from the Dagestan CTC.", "42. On the same date, 28 September 2010, the investigation of the criminal case was suspended. The applicants were not informed thereof.", "43. On an unspecified date in October 2010 the applicants complained to the Kaspiysk Prosecutor about the investigators’ failure to take basic steps to investigate the abduction. On 14 October 2010 the applicants were informed by the Kaspiysk Prosecutor that an investigation into the abduction was in progress.", "44. On 15 November 2010 the applicants requested the investigators to take a number of actions, including questioning the heads of the Kaspiysk Town Department of the Interior (the GOVD) to find out whether any special operations had been carried out in the settlement on 25 June 2010 and the reason for the collection of the cartridge cases from the crime scene after the shooting; questioning the head of the Sovetskiy ROVD to establish the reason for the police officers’ visit to the first applicant’s house on 25 June 2010; and questioning the head of the Dagestan CTC to establish whether Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov had been taken to their premises and if so why this had been done.", "45. On 22 November 2010 the head of the Kaspiysk Investigations Department criticised the investigators for an unlawful and premature suspension of the investigation, and ordered that the investigation be resumed and a number of steps be taken.", "46. On 23 November 2010 the investigators questioned police officers M.D. and M.Z., both of whom stated that on 25 June 2010 they had visited the first applicant’s house to establish the whereabouts of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov on suspicion of his membership of illegal armed groups. The first applicant had told them that her son was not at home. The witnesses had then left the house and had subsequently learnt of the abduction from a local newspaper.", "47. On 24 November 2010 the applicants complained to the head of the Kaspiysk Investigations Department, the Dagestan Investigations Department, the Kaspiysk Prosecutor and the Dagestan Prosecutor about the investigators’ failure to take basic steps to investigate the abduction in spite of numerous pieces of evidence implicating law-enforcement officers in the crime. They requested that the investigators be ordered to expedite the investigation and identify the perpetrators.", "48. On 30 December 2010 the deputy head of the Kaspiysk Investigations Department rejected the applicants’ complaint as groundless.", "49. From the documents submitted it follows that the proceedings are still pending.", "50. On 19 July 2010 the first applicant complained to the Sovetskiy District Court of Makhachkala (the district court). She provided a detailed description of the circumstances surrounding her son’s abduction and alleged that he had been abducted by members of law-enforcement agencies. The applicant requested the district court to order the prosecutor’s office to take a number of essential investigative steps and to provide her with information concerning the whereabouts of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov.", "51. On 29 July 2010 the court requested the Dagestan MVD to inform it whether the police officers had arrested the applicants’ relative.", "52. On 12 August 2010 the Dagestan MVD replied to the court, stating the following:\n“... on 25 June 2010 ... a group of officers from the ROVD, including Major M.D., Senior Lieutenants D.M. and M.Z. and Lieutenant M.A., following the investigator’s order no. 6/3-3726 of 17 June 2010 issued as part of the criminal case no. 171822 opened under Articles 186 § 1 (money counterfeiting) and 205 § 1 (terrorist activity) of the Criminal Code, visited [the first applicant’s house in Makhachkala] in order to establish the whereabouts of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov, who was suspected of committing the above crimes ...”\nThe letter further stated that no further information about the visit was available.", "53. On 24 August 2010 the district court rejected the applicant’s complaint of 19 July 2010. The decision stated, amongst other things, the following:\n“... from the letter of the head of the Dagestan FSB Mr A.G., outgoing no. 13465 dated 2 July 2010, it follows that order no. 6/3 dated 17 June 2010 was issued by the Investigations Department of the Dagestan FSB as part of criminal case no. 171822, to establish the whereabouts of Mr Abdurakhman Abdurakhmanov ... Following this order the officers of the Sovetskiy ROVD visited the home of [the first applicant] Ms A. Abdurakhmanova and took a statement from her concerning her son’s whereabouts. Their actions do not contravene Article 6 of the Federal Law “On Operational and Search Activity”....”" ]

[ "5", "13", "2", "3" ]

[ 8, 10, 14, 16, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1984, 1974 and 1985 respectively and currently reside in Bicske, Hungary.", "6. Originally coming through Greece, the applicants entered Hungary via Serbia and were intercepted and arrested by the border police on 5 (Mr Nabil) and 6 (the other two applicants) November 2011. They were transferred to the border station in Röszke, Hungary, since they could not prove either their identities or their legal residence in Hungary.", "7. On 6 November 2011 the applicants were interviewed with the assistance of an interpreter.\nOn the same day the Csongrád County Police Department ordered the applicants’ expulsion to Serbia and a ban on entry to the territory of Hungary for three years, pursuant to section 43 (2) (a) of Act no. II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third Country Nationals (the “Immigration Act”). With regard to the requirement of non-refoulement, it was considered that there was no such obstacle to the expulsion.\nThe execution of the expulsion order was simultaneously suspended for a maximum period of six months or until the expulsion became feasible, noting that “the Serbian party failed to reply before the expiry of the “retention time” (visszatartási idő)”.\nAt the same time, that is, on 6 November 2011, the applicants’ detention was ordered by the Csongrád County Police Department until 9 November 2011 under section 54(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, on the ground that “[they] refused to leave the country, or for other substantiated reasons it can be assumed that [they] are delaying or preventing the enforcement of expulsion or transfer”. In the findings of fact it was noted that the applicants were not in possession of any travel documents; that they had crossed the border illegally via Serbia; that they said that their travel destination was [Western] Europe, Germany in particular; and that they had not applied for asylum.", "8. The applicants were first detained at Bács-Kiskun County Police Department’s guarded accommodation (őrzött szállás).", "9. On 9 November 2011 the applicants applied for asylum, claiming that they were persecuted in their home country by the terrorist organisation Al‑Shabaab.\nOn 10 November 2011 the applicants were transferred to the guarded accommodation of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Police Department in Nyírbátor.", "10. Preliminary asylum proceedings were put in place on 10 November 2011, and the immigration authorities were notified thereof. On 9 December 2011 the applicants were interviewed by the Citizenship and Immigration Authority (hereinafter: “asylum authority”)\nOn 12 December 2011 their case was admitted to the “in-merit phase” by a decision of the asylum authority, in view of the fact, among other things, that there existed no “safe third country” in their respect.", "11. Meanwhile, on 8 November 2011 the Kiskunhalas District Court had heard the applicants, assisted by a guardian ad litem and an interpreter, and had extended their detention until 5 December 2011. Relying on section 54(1) b) of the Immigration Act, it endorsed in essence the decision of 6 November 2011 of the Csongrád County Police Department, saying that the applicants, in a state of illegal entry, were likely to frustrate their deportation.\nOn 29 November and 30 December 2011 the detention was extended again by summary decisions of the Nyírbátor District Court, referring to the immigration authority’s renewed requests to have the applicants detained for the same reasons as before and stating that the circumstances had not changed. These latter decisions made no reference to the on-going asylum proceedings.\nOn 1 February 2012 the same court again extended the applicants’ detention on the same basis, mentioning that their expulsion was suspended due to their pending asylum applications.", "12. On 17 January 2012 the applicants’ lawyer requested their release, but in vain. (The date as of which they obtained legal representation is not known.) A subsequent request for judicial review of their detention under sections 54(6)(b) of the Immigration Act was to no avail either.", "13. On 3 March 2012 the Nyírbátor District Court again prolonged the applicants’ detention, holding that there were substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would hinder or delay the implementation of the expulsion order. Having heard the applicants, the court held as follows:\n“The expulsion order cannot be considered unenforceable on the ground that the asylum procedure has not been concluded. Under section 51(2) of the Immigration Act, a first asylum application has suspensive effect on the enforcement of the expulsion order, although this does not mean that the expulsion order is not enforceable. Unenforceability refers to a permanent state and not to a temporary period such as the term of the asylum procedure.\n...\nUnder section 54(6) of the Immigration Act (Act no. II of 2007), detention ordered under the immigration laws shall be terminated if (a) the expulsion or transfer has become viable; (b) when it becomes evident that the expulsion or transfer cannot be executed; or (c) the detention has exceeded six ... months.\nNone of the reasons for the termination [of the detention] listed in the above-cited paragraph exists. The expulsion or transfer is [actually] not viable because of the pending asylum application; furthermore, there will be [at last] no reason preventing the execution of the expulsion or transfer if the foreign national [eventually] receives no protection in the asylum procedure, since the procedure has failed to prove that Serbia is no safe third country, [and Serbia], according to the information provided by the immigration authority, is ready to re-admit the foreign national pursuant to the Agreement between Serbia and the European Union. Lastly, the time that has elapsed since the beginning of the detention is less than six or twelve months ...\nOn the basis of the information available to the court, the foreign national, according to his statement made during the first interview, intended to travel to Western Europe to find employment. He did not admit to this during the hearing but the court has no information which would support the foreign national’s [statement departing from the earlier one].\nIn view of this, it is reasonable to assume that the foreign national would delay or prevent the enforcement of the expulsion order. He is unwilling to comply with the expulsion order voluntarily, therefore it can be established that the expulsion order cannot be enforced by way of applying sections 48 (2) or 62 (1) of the Immigration Act [that is, seizure of travel document or designated residence].\nThe court has found that the conditions for the continuation of the detention lawfully ordered under section 54 of Act no. II of 2007 continue to be met.”", "14. After interviews on the merits of their applications on 28 February 2012, on 19 March 2012 the applicants’ asylum applications were dismissed, but they were granted subsidiary protection (“oltalmazott”) under section 12 (1) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 (the “Asylum Act”). This decision was delivered and became final on 23 March 2012.\nThe applicants’ detention ended on 24 March 2012." ]

[ "5" ]

[ 2 ]

[]

[ "9. The applicants were born in 1986 and 1979 respectively and live in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode (a district of the Brussels-Capital region).", "10. The applicants are brothers who live with their parents, their brother and two sisters next to the local police station of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode. They both complained that they had been slapped in the face by police officers – which allegation is disputed by the Government – one on 8 December 2003 and the other on 23 February 2004. They submitted that those events had taken place against a background of tense relations between their family and certain officers in the police station.", "11. The applicants submitted that on 8 December 2003, at around 4 p.m., the first applicant had been standing with a friend in the street outside the door of the building where he lived with his family and, since he had forgotten his keys, had been ringing the bell so that his parents would let him in, when a plain-clothes policeman, A.Z., had asked him to show him his identity card. The first applicant had refused to comply, asking the officer to show him his credentials. The officer had then grabbed him by his jacket – tearing it – and taken him to the police station. The first applicant had been placed in a room and, while he was alone with A.Z., the officer had slapped him in the face as he was protesting about his arrest.", "12. The applicants provided a certificate issued at 7.20 p.m. on the same day by a general practitioner attesting that the first applicant had been “in a state of shock” and had presented the following injuries: “erythema on the left cheek (disappearing)” and “erythema on the left-side external auditory canal”.", "13. The Government submitted that, on account of the first applicant’s refusal to show him his identity card, Officer A.Z. had had no choice but to take him to the police station for identification. The first applicant had then caused a scene, claiming to have suffered an injustice and been subjected to an unlawful identity check, and had insulted an officer who was telling him to calm down. He had been allowed to leave the police station once his identity had been verified and after being informed by A.Z. that a police report would be filed against him for forceful resistance to a public officer, abusive behaviour and verbal threats. He had returned to the police station a few minutes later with his parents, accusing A.Z. of having struck him, but the officer had always denied this.", "14. At 6 p.m. A.Z. had lodged a criminal complaint against the first applicant, alleging forceful resistance to a public officer, abusive behaviour and verbal threats. The record drawn up on that occasion showed that A.Z. had notified his superiors of the events at 5.30 p.m., as well as a certain Superintendent K.", "15. The applicants indicated that on 23 February 2004, between 9.44 a.m. and 10.20 a.m. (as shown by the record of the second applicant’s questioning), while the second applicant was at the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police station and Officer P.P. was interviewing him about an altercation involving him and his mother together with a third party (and about which the latter had filed a complaint), P.P. had slapped him in the face after asking him not to lean on his desk. He had then forced him to sign his statement by threatening to put him in a cell.", "16. The applicants provided a medical certificate issued on the same day by a general practitioner, who observed “bruising [on the] left cheek” of the second applicant. The certificate did not specify the time at which it had been drawn up, although it must have been before 11.20 a.m., the time at which it was presented to the Standing Committee for the oversight of police services (known as “Committee P” – see paragraph 25 below).", "17. The Government explained that the second applicant had been very arrogant during his interview: slouching in his chair, leaning casually on P.P.’s desk, laughing without any reason and giving pithy answers to questions. He had also had his statement changed several times, saying that the police were paid to do that, and had threatened the officers on leaving by shouting that they would be hearing from him again. The Government emphasised that, in spite of the attitude shown by the second applicant, who had clearly been intent on conflict, P.P. had remained calm and patient.", "18. In the applicants’ submission, their family had been harassed by the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force. They stated that the problems had begun in 1999, when one of the officers had suspected N. of deliberately scratching his car. N. had subsequently been charged with threatening the same officer and committing robberies, on which charges he had been acquitted by the Brussels Youth Court on 21 April 2000. According to the applicants, the case against him had been entirely fabricated by members of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force by way of reprisal.", "19. They added that on 24 June 1999 the first applicant, then aged 13, had been “beaten” by another police officer in the police station, where he had been taken following a fight in the street. He had sustained a perforated eardrum. His mother and one of his sisters, who had been in the waiting room, had been shaken and manhandled by police officers.", "20. On 25 November 1999 one of their sisters had been verbally abused by an officer of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force, and on 11 March 2000 their brother, N., had been searched, jostled and verbally abused by police officers.", "21. They further stated that in 2000 a “case ... initiated by the Saint‑Josse-ten-Noode police force had been opened against N. and entrusted to an investigating judge”, but the proceedings had been discontinued. In the same year the second applicant had been “wanted for questioning” and, even though the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force had announced on 23 July 2002 that he was being taken off the relevant “wanted” list, he had still had to make various applications to the prosecutor’s office and wait until March 2005 for the process to be completed, causing him a great deal of inconvenience.", "22. On 6 April 2001 and 12 July 2001 respectively, N. and the second applicant had been verbally abused by officers of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force.", "23. The applicants explained that they had systematically reported to the judicial authorities or police all the incidents of which they had been victims, and had filed complaints.", "24. At 9.42 a.m. on 9 December 2003 the first applicant filed a complaint with Committee P and was interviewed by a member of the investigation department. A copy of the medical certificate drawn up the previous day was appended to the initial record.", "25. The second applicant followed suit at 11.20 a.m. on 23 February 2004. He indicated in particular that he considered that the “general attitude of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force vis-à-vis [his] family [had become] absolutely intolerable and excessive to the point [where they had envisaged] moving house”. A copy of the medical certificate drawn up the same day was appended to the initial record.", "26. The applicants’ mother was also interviewed on 23 February 2004 by the investigation department of Committee P in relation to the second applicant’s complaints. She pointed out that as soon as they had returned home she had called Superintendent K. (see paragraph 14 above) to ask him to persuade P.P. to apologise. Superintendent K. had immediately come to their house, where he had found himself in the company of the physician who had drawn up the medical certificate. The applicants’ mother also filed a complaint, indicating, moreover, that she herself had been treated with scant respect by Officer P.P.", "27. On 5 May 2004 Officer P.P. was interviewed by the director of internal oversight of the local police force in relation to the complaints by the second applicant and his mother. P.P. stated in particular that the second applicant had been particularly disrespectful towards him during his interview and that, although he had grabbed the youth by the arm to make him leave the office, he had not slapped him in the face.", "28. On 17 June 2004 the applicants applied to intervene as civil parties in respect of charges of harassment, arbitrary interference with fundamental freedoms, abuse of authority, arbitrary arrest and wounding with intent. They gave an overview of all their difficulties with the Saint‑Josse‑ten‑Noode police force, and expressly stated that they wished to intervene as civil parties in relation to the events of 8 December 2003 and 23 February 2004.", "29. Officers A.Z. and P.P. were charged with using violence against individuals in the course of their duties and, in particular, with intentional wounding or assault, and with engaging in arbitrary acts in breach of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.", "30. On 26 June 2004 an investigating judge of the Brussels Court of First Instance gave directions to the investigation department of Committee P asking it to take note of the applicants’ civil-party application, to interview them in order to ascertain the details of their complaint, to draft a report on the conduct of the Bouyid family, to draw up a list of the cases brought against them and complaints filed by them, and to explain what action had been taken in that connection.", "31. Having regard to the fact that it had already taken testimony from the applicants when they had filed their respective complaints (see paragraphs 24-25 above), the investigation department of Committee P decided not to interview them again. On 26 July 2004 it forwarded a report to the investigating judge, based on the documents from the internal oversight department of the police district covering Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, describing developments in the relations between the applicants’ family and the local police force. The report then listed the cases against the family, noting in this connection that the first applicant had been implicated in proceedings opened in December 2003 for abusive and threatening behaviour and for obstructing a police officer, and N. in seven sets of proceedings opened between October 1997 and June 1999. It then noted that, in addition to the applicants’ complaints in issue in the present case, three judicial complaints had been filed by members of their family (two with Committee P, in June 1999 and July 2001, and one with the “Youth Division” in 1999) and two complaints had been dealt with by the internal oversight department of the police district covering Saint-Josse-ten-Noode. Lastly, citing a report drawn up in the context of a case against the first applicant and the findings of administrative inquiries, it noted the problematic nature of the relations between the local police and the Bouyid family and commented on the “general behaviour” of the latter, observing as follows.\n“In sum, according to the police officers, the Bouyid family (especially the women and the mother in particular) apparently refuse to admit that the children of the family bear any responsibility for the abusive conduct in question. The children are thus supported in their behaviour by this protective attitude. More generally, the family members are said to behave aggressively and provocatively towards the police.\nFollowing the incidents involving police officer [B.], a dialogue facilitator apparently failed in an attempt at reconciliation, owing to an intransigent attitude on the part of the women in the Bouyid family.\nIn 1999 and 2000 the situation required the appointment of a police cadet as a mediator for this family.”", "32. On 3 August 2004 the investigating judge decided to close the investigation and sent the file to the prosecuting authorities.", "33. On 16 November 2004 Officer A.Z. was interviewed by a member of the investigation department of Committee P about the events of 8 December 2003. He stated in particular that he had not previously known the first applicant when he had taken him to the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police station that particular day.", "34. In an application of 10 November 2005, the Crown Prosecutor called for the discontinuance of the case on the ground that “the judicial investigation [had] not established that the facts constituted a serious or petty offence and [had] not adduced any evidence that would justify the taking of further measures”.", "35. The applicants were informed that the case file would be finalised before the Committals Division of the Brussels Court of First Instance on 2 March 2006. On 1 March 2006 they sent an application to the investigating judge seeking twenty additional investigative measures. That request resulted in the adjournment sine die of the case before the Committals Division.", "36. On 7 March 2006 the investigating judge ordered two of the requested measures and rejected the remainder of the application on the grounds that it concerned facts that predated the events referred to him and that the measures sought were not necessary for establishing the truth. Consequently, recapitulating all their complaints against the Saint‑Josse‑ten‑Noode police force, the applicants and other members of their family sent the investigating judge a request for an “extension of civil-party status”, but it was rejected. The two additional measures were put into effect on 25 April, 15 May and 24 May 2006.", "37. In an order of 27 November 2007, the Committals Division, endorsing the grounds set out in the Crown Prosecutor’s application, discontinued the proceedings.", "38. The applicants appealed against that order.", "39. In an application of 3 December 2007, the Principal Crown Prosecutor requested that the discontinuance order be upheld.", "40. On 5 February 2008 the applicants and other members of their family filed a complaint as civil parties in respect of all the facts that the investigating judge had considered not to have been referred to him (see paragraphs 43-44 below).", "41. On 9 April 2008 the Indictments Division of the Brussels Court of Appeal, after refusing to join the case concerning the events of 8 December 2003 and 23 February 2004 to the new case that had been opened after the civil-party complaint of 5 February 2008, upheld the discontinuance order in a judgment that read as follows.\n“...\nThe facts of the case can be summarised as follows:\n– On 8 December 2003 the defendant [A.Z.] is alleged to have engaged in illegal police conduct against the civil party Saïd Bouyid, described by the latter as follows: police officer [A.Z.], on stopping him outside his house, allegedly grabbed him by his jacket and tore it; he was then taken to the police station close by, where the same officer allegedly slapped him on the face with his right hand.\n– On 23 February 2004 the defendant [P.P.] is alleged to have engaged in illegal police conduct against the civil party Mohamed Bouyid, described by the latter as follows: on stopping his car in front of his house so that his mother could take out her shopping, he had a row with the driver of the car behind; he was summoned to the police station following a complaint by that driver; during the interview, Mohamed Bouyid was allegedly slapped by the defendant [P.P.] (see the medical certificate issued by Dr ...), who threatened to put him in a cell if he did not sign his statement, when in fact he wanted to change it.\n– The Bouyid family have apparently encountered great difficulties with certain members of the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police force since March 1999, when police officer [B.] suspected [N.] Bouyid of having scratched his car, giving rise to a certain degree of tension and to persecution of this family by the police.\n– There is said to be constant provocation on the part of the police of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode making the life of the Bouyid family unbearable.\nBoth the police’s internal oversight department for the police district [concerned] and the investigation department of Committee P conducted an in-depth investigation into the facts complained of by the civil parties.\nIt transpires from all the findings of the judicial investigation, and in particular from the inconsistent statements of the parties in question, that there is no evidence against the defendants such as to justify their committal on the charges listed in the submissions of the Principal Crown Prosecutor, in respect of the period in which the offences were said to have been committed.\nThe statements of the defendants, who deny the charges, are consistent; it is appropriate in this connection to refer to the detailed report concerning the general conduct of the civil parties’ family drawn up by Committee P, which sheds light on the general context of the case.\nThe civil parties have not adduced before the court, sitting as the Indictments Division, any new, relevant and convincing information not previously brought to the attention of the court below and capable of revealing the slightest evidence against the defendants that might justify their committal for trial.\nMoreover, the judicial investigation did not bring to light sufficient evidence to show that a criminal offence had been committed by the defendants at the time of the incidents in which they were allegedly implicated.\nIn addition, it does not appear from the case file that the provisions of section 37 of the Law of 5 August 1992 on police duties have not been complied with.\nAs emphasised by the submissions of both the Crown Prosecutor of 10 November 2005 and those of the Principal Crown Prosecutor, and by the decision of the Committals Division, the facts of the present case do not constitute a serious or petty criminal offence.\n...”", "42. An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants – relying in particular on Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention – was dismissed on 29 October 2008 by the Court of Cassation.", "43. On 5 February 2008 six members of the Bouyid family, including the two applicants, had filed a civil-party complaint with an investigating judge of the Brussels Court of First Instance concerning all their accusations against the Saint-Josse-ten-Noode police officers, in particular relating to facts that predated the events of 8 December 2003 and 23 February 2004.", "44. The civil-party complaint led to the appearance of six officers before the Brussels Court of First Instance, hearing the case on the merits. In a judgment of 30 May 2012, the court declared that the prosecution of the relevant offences was time-barred. It does not appear from the file that an appeal was lodged against that judgment.", "45. The Preamble to the 26 June 1945 Charter of the United Nations affirms the determination of the peoples of the United Nations “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”. The concept of dignity is also mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, the Preamble to which states that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”, and Article 1 of which provides that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.", "46. Many subsequent international human rights texts and instruments refer to this concept, including:\n(a) the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 20 November 1963, which “solemnly affirms the necessity of speedily eliminating racial discrimination throughout the world, in all its forms and manifestations, and of securing understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human person”, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which refers to that Declaration;\n(b) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966 (both ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which states that the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Furthermore, Article 10 of the former provides that “all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”, and Article 13 of the latter states that the “States Parties ... recognize the right of everyone to education ... [and] agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ...”;\n(c) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which emphasises in particular that discrimination against women “violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity”;\n(d) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which points out that the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family ... derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”;\n(e) the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which states that “the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the UN Charter, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity” (see also Articles 23 § 1, 28 § 2, 37, 39 and 40 § 1);\n(f) the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Articles 19 § 2 and 24 § 5 (c)) (ratified by Belgium);\n(g) the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which states that “discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person”, and the aims of which include promoting respect for the “inherent dignity” of persons with disabilities (Article 1), this being also one of its general principles (Article 3 (a)) (see also Articles 8 (a), 16 § 4, 24 § 1 and 25);\n(h) the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the abolition of the death penalty of 15 December 1989 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which expresses the conviction that “abolition of the death penalty contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights”;\n(i) the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure of 19 December 2011 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which reaffirms “the status of the child as a subject of rights and as a human being with dignity and with evolving capacities”;\n(j) the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 10 December 2008 (ratified by Belgium) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 6 October 1999 (ratified by Belgium).", "47. Several regional human rights texts and instruments also refer to the concept of dignity, including the following:\n(a) the American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969 (Articles 5 § 2, 6 § 2 and 11 § 1);\n(b) the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1 August 1975, which stipulates that the States “will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development” (Principle VII);\n(c) the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, Article 5 of which lays down that “[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status”;\n(d) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine of 4 April 1997 (which Belgium has not signed), the Preamble to which affirms, inter alia, “the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and ... the importance of ensuring [his] dignity”;\n(e) the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, the Preamble to which affirms that being “[c]onscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”, and Article 1 of which states that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable [and] must be respected and protected” (see also Article 31 on “Fair and just working conditions”);\n(f) Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances of 3 May 2002 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which points out that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of everyone’s right to life and for the full recognition of the “inherent dignity of all human beings”;\n(g) the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 16 May 2005 (ratified by Belgium), the Preamble to which emphasises that “trafficking in human beings constitutes a violation of human rights and an offence to the dignity and the integrity of the human being” (see also Articles 6 and 16).", "48. In a document entitled “CPT standards” (CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015), the CPT stated the following.\n“97. Bearing in mind its preventive mandate, the CPT’s priority during visits is to seek to establish whether juveniles deprived of their liberty have been subjected to ill-treatment. Regrettably, deliberate ill-treatment of juveniles by law-enforcement officials has by no means been eradicated and remains a real concern in a number of European countries. CPT delegations continue to receive credible allegations of detained juveniles being ill-treated. The allegations often concern kicks, slaps, punches or blows with batons at the time of apprehension (even after the juvenile concerned has been brought under control), during transportation or subsequent questioning in law-enforcement establishments. It is also not uncommon for juveniles to become victims of threats or verbal abuse (including of a racist nature) whilst in the hands of law-enforcement agencies.\n... 126. ... In a number of [juvenile detention centres] visited by the CPT, it was not uncommon for staff to administer a so-called ‘pedagogic slap’ or other forms of physical chastisement to juveniles who misbehaved. In this regard, the CPT recalls that corporal punishment is likely to amount to ill-treatment and must be strictly prohibited.”\nThe CPT also noted the following in its ninth general activity report (CPT/Inf (99) 12), dated 30 August 1999:\n“24. In a number of other establishments visited [where juveniles were deprived of their liberty], CPT delegations have been told that it was not uncommon for staff to administer the occasional ‘pedagogic slap’ to juveniles who misbehaved. The Committee considers that, in the interests of the prevention of ill-treatment, all forms of physical chastisement must be both formally prohibited and avoided in practice. Inmates who misbehave should be dealt with only in accordance with prescribed disciplinary procedures.”", "49. In its report to the Belgian Government on its visit to Belgium from 18 to 27 April 2005 (CPT/Inf (2006) 15, 20 April 2006) the CPT stated, among other things.\n“11. On the basis of all the information obtained during the visit, the CPT has come to the conclusion – as it did following its first three visits to Belgium – that the risk of a person being ill-treated by law-enforcement officers while in detention cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, the CPT recommends that the Belgian authorities continue to be vigilant in this area and make a special effort in the case of juveniles who have been deprived of their liberty.\nThe CPT further recommends that law-enforcement officers be given an appropriate reminder at regular intervals that any form of ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty – including insults – is unacceptable, that any information regarding alleged ill-treatment will be properly investigated, and that anyone responsible for such treatment will be severely punished. 12. More specifically, concerning allegations of ill-treatment by law-enforcement officers when arresting a suspect, the CPT has repeatedly noted that this process undeniably represents a difficult and dangerous task at times, in particular when the person concerned resists or the law-enforcement officers have good reason to believe that the person poses an imminent threat. However, the use of force when making an arrest must be kept to what is strictly necessary; furthermore, there can never be any justification for striking apprehended persons once they have been brought under control.”\nThe CPT’s report on its visit to Belgium from 28 September to 7 October 2009 (CPT/Inf (2010) 24, 23 July 2010) contains the following passage in particular:\n“13. In the course of its visits to police stations, the CPT delegation met only a few people who were deprived of their liberty. Nevertheless, while visiting prisons, it met a large number of people who had recently been in police custody.\nThe majority of the detainees who spoke to the delegation did not report any instances of deliberate physical ill-treatment during their time in police custody. However, the delegation heard a limited number of allegations of excessive use of force (such as blows inflicted after the person had been brought under control, or excessively tight handcuffing) in the course of an arrest (particularly in Brussels, Charleroi and Marcinelle). As the CPT has often acknowledged, arresting a suspect is undeniably a difficult and dangerous task at times, in particular when the person concerned resists or the police have good reason to believe that the person poses an imminent threat. Nevertheless, the CPT recommends that police officers be reminded that when making an arrest, the use of force must be kept to what is strictly necessary; furthermore, there can never be any justification for striking apprehended persons once they have been brought under control.”", "50. In its Recommendation Rec(2001)10 on the European Code of Police Ethics adopted on 19 September 2001, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated its conviction that \n“public confidence in the police is closely related to their attitude and behaviour towards the public, in particular their respect for the human dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual as enshrined, in particular, in the European Convention on Human Rights”. \nIt recommended that the governments of member States be guided in their internal legislation, practice and codes of conduct of the police by the principles set out in the European Code of Police Ethics appended to the Recommendation, with a view to their progressive implementation and the widest possible circulation of the text.", "51. The Code states in particular that one of the main purposes of the police is to protect and respect the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, in particular, in the Convention (paragraph 1). In the section on “Guidelines for police action/intervention” it stipulates that “[t]he police shall not inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under any circumstances” (paragraph 36) and that they “may use force only when strictly necessary and only to the extent required to obtain a legitimate objective” (paragraph 37). Furthermore, “in carrying out their activities, [they] shall always bear in mind everyone’s fundamental rights” (paragraph 43) and “police personnel shall act with integrity and respect towards the public and with particular consideration for the situation of individuals belonging to especially vulnerable groups” (paragraph 44).", "52. The Preamble to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (“child” being defined in Article 1 as being “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”) of 20 November 1989 (ratified by Belgium) refers to the above-mentioned declarations and emphasises that the need to afford special protection to the child has been recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (particularly in Articles 23 and 24), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (particularly in Article 10) and the relevant statutes and instruments of the specialised institutions and international organisations concerned with child welfare.", "53. Several subsequent international and regional texts are based on recognition of the need to take account of the vulnerability of minors. For instance, the Preamble to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 25 October 2007 (ratified by Belgium) states that “every child has the right to such measures of protection as are required by his or her status as a minor, on the part of his or her family, society and the State”, the child being defined as “any person under the age of 18 years” (Article 3 (a)). Reference might also be made to Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)11 on the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures and Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)10 on integrated national strategies for the protection of children from violence, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 5 November 2008 and 18 November 2009 respectively. The former instrument emphasises the extreme vulnerability of juveniles deprived of their liberty (Appendix to the Recommendation, § 52.1).The latter emphasises that “children’s fragility and vulnerability and their dependence on adults for the[ir] growth and development call for greater investment in the prevention of violence and protection of children on the part of families, society and the State”. Very recently the CPT highlighted the particular vulnerability of juveniles in the context of detention (24th General Report of the CPT, 2013-2014 (CPT/Inf (2015) 1), January 2015 – see paragraph 3 and, under “Juveniles deprived of their liberty under criminal legislation”, paragraphs 98 and 99)." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44 ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Budapest.", "5. The applicant was serving as a judge at the Budapest Labour Court and at the Pest Central District Court. In September 2003 the employer pursued the applicant’s appraisal which resulted in the applicant’s inadequacy for judicial service. From 1 July 2004 the applicant continued working as judicial secretary. The employer ordered further appraisals of the applicant in the forthcoming months. The applicant contested the grounds and the results of these appraisals.", "6. The applicant initiated labour lawsuit against her employer on 25 March 2005. On 15 December 2008 the Székesfehérvár Labour Court partly found for the applicant, however, it dismissed the overwhelming part of her claim.", "7. On appeal, the Fejér County Court upheld the judgment on 30 September 2009.", "8. The applicant challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court which upheld the judgment on 17 January 2011." ]

[ "6" ]

[]

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[ "4. The applicants were born in 1948 and live in Budapest.", "5. The applicants have had a long-lasting legal dispute with a housing cooperative and two individuals in respect of ownership right to a real property. The applicants’ several claims for title were dismissed by the competent courts.", "6. The applicants lodged an action in damages against the housing cooperative and the two individuals on 15 October 2002.", "7. The procedure was suspended on 17 December 2004 for eighteen months due to other pending proceedings before the land registry authority.", "8. Subsequently, after several hearings, the first-instance court partly found for the applicants on 9 March 2010.", "9. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and dismissed the applicants’ claim on 30 November 2010." ]

[ "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Komló.", "5. On 19 February 2003 the applicant was interrogated as suspect of forgery of private documents.", "6. The Public Prosecutor preferred a bill of indictment on 8 October 2004. Subsequently, on 27 June 2005 the Public Prosecutor extended the charges against the applicant with charge of fraud.", "7. In the ensuing criminal proceedings on 23 March 2010 the Komló District Court acquitted the applicant in respect of fraud and found him guilty in forgery of private documents.", "8. On appeal of the Public Prosecutor, the Baranya County Court reversed the judgment and acquitted the applicant in respect of all charges on 20 May 2011." ]

[ "6" ]

[]

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[ "4. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Győr.", "5. The applicant’s ex-husband initiated civil lawsuit before Győr District Court against the applicant for dissolution of marital property and for return of present on 21 February 2003.", "6. The court separated the claim to two proceedings and dismissed the claimant’s claim in respect of the return of present.", "7. Subsequently, after several hearings, the first-instance court delivered the judgment in respect of dissolution of the marital property on 13 January 2010.", "8. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal delivered the final and binding judgment on 7 July 2011 amending the first-instance judgment in several aspects.", "9. Both the applicant and the claimant challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court which upheld the judgment on 2 October 2012." ]

[ "6" ]

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[ "6. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Lüneburg.", "7. The applicant is an anti-nuclear and environmental activist. She has repeatedly used her climbing skills to draw public attention to her protest.", "8. On 6 November 2008 around 11 a.m. the applicant and three further persons belonging to the Robin Wood organisation, an environmental protection group, climbed on the arch of a railway bridge. The group fixed banners expressing protest against the transport, by train, of radioactive waste from La Hague, France, to the interim storage facility in Gorleben, scheduled from 7 to 9 November 2008. The members of the group refused to have themselves roped down by the police, who had dissolved their assembly. They were finally roped down by Federal Police’s mountain rescue team. The police then arrested only the applicant at 2.40 p.m. while the other three participants remained at liberty. They further seized the banners and the climbing equipment.", "9. On 6 November 2008 at 5.30 p.m. the Lüneburg District Court, having heard the applicant and the Lüneburg police, ordered the applicant’s detention for preventive purposes under section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act (Niedersächsisches Gesetz über die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung, see paragraph 42 below). That detention was to last until the arrival of the “castor”[1] containers in Dannenberg train station and until 10 November 2008, 0.00 p.m. at the most.", "10. The District Court found that the applicant, who had been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings before the domestic courts, and three further persons had let themselves down on a rope on a railway bridge. They had unrolled banners protesting against the castor transport. A commuter train had to be stopped because its passage would have put the protesters at risk.", "11. The District Court considered that the applicant’s detention was indispensable in order to prevent the imminent commission of a regulatory offence of considerable importance to the general public, as required by section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act. There was a risk that the applicant would block the forthcoming transport of the castor containers scheduled from 7 to 9 November 2011 by a climbing action. Thereby, she would commit regulatory offences under the Railway Construction and Operation Act (Eisenbahn-Bau- und Betriebsordnung) and the Assembly Act (Versammlungsgesetz) which would be dangerous to the public. That risk was also imminent in the applicant’s case as she was known for expressing political protest, including protest against the transport of castor containers, by climbing actions and for being ready to breach the law in that context.", "12. On 7 November 2008 at 9.15 p.m. the Lüneburg Regional Court, having heard the applicant in person at 2.10 p.m., dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision.", "13. On 9 November 2008 at 5.25 p.m. the Lüneburg District Court quashed the order of 6 November 2008 for the applicant’s detention for preventive purposes and ordered the applicant’s immediate release.", "14. The District Court found that, having regard to the applicant’s deteriorating state of health, there was no longer a risk that the applicant would commit a criminal or regulatory offence of considerable importance to the general public, as required by section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act, in the context of the transport of castor containers to Gorleben. Moreover, her continued detention was no longer proportionate in these circumstances. The District Court noted that medical doctor C., who had visited the applicant in detention on the latter’s request, had confirmed that the applicant suffered from serious rheumatism which necessitated her to move continuously and was in a poor mental condition. Her detention in Braunschweig Police Station, with little possibility to move, had already led to her joints having stiffened. The doctor had explained that she was not in a position to assess the applicant’s fitness for detention, but that it appeared excluded that the applicant would be capable of carrying out a climbing action in the days to come.", "15. The applicant was released on the same day at 6.32 p.m.", "16. Following her arrest on 6 November 2008 at 2.40 p.m. the applicant, having been found by a doctor of the Federal Police not to suffer from any health problems, was brought before the Lüneburg District Court which ordered her detention at 5.30 p.m. Following the District Court’s decision, the applicant was accompanied home by the police officers from 5.45 p.m. to 6.45 p.m. in order to enable her to take her own clothes and medication. She was detained in a cell in the Lüneburg Police Station from 7 p.m. onwards until 7 November 2008 at approximately 1.40 p.m., when she was brought to the Lüneburg Regional Court. The applicant’s small cell, equipped with a mattress and a chair, was lighted at least via a ventilation slot and by electric light.", "17. Between the end of the hearing of the applicant by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 7 November 2008 at around 3 p.m. and its decision at 9.15 p.m. on that day, the applicant essentially stayed in the office area of the Lüneburg Police Station. She went outside for a walk on the banks of the Ilmenau river with the police officers three times during that period.", "18. Following the Regional Court’s decision, the police decided to transfer the applicant to the Braunschweig Police Station which was considered being better equipped for police custody. When the applicant complained about breathing problems during the journey, the police called an ambulance. When both the ambulance crew and a police doctor had found that the applicant did not suffer from health problems, the transfer was continued in the ambulance.", "19. The applicant was detained in the Braunschweig Police Station from 8 November 2008, 2.10 a.m. until her release on 9 November 2008 at 6.32 p.m. Her cell was equipped with a bed, an empty desk, a chair and an open cupboard and had a barred window with frosted glass. In the corridor of the detention wing, which she had to pass to go to the toilet, photographs of shackled persons were exposed. These included a picture of a person subject to ankle and hand cuffs, with both cuffs being tied together by a chain in the person’s back lying on a mattress on the ground.", "20. During the applicant’s detention in the Braunschweig Police Station, the light in her cell remained switched on throughout the applicant’s first night in that cell. The applicant had climbed on the cupboard in her cell and passed the night thereon, failing to comply with the police’s order to descend. The applicant was taken out for a walk on the premises of the Braunschweig Police Station, which did not dispose of a closed courtyard, on 8 November 2008 from 2.20 p.m. until 3.02 p.m., being loosely shackled to a female police officer. On 9 November 2008 the applicant was allowed to stay outside on those premises from 12.22 p.m. until 12.35 p.m., without being shackled; she climbed on a tree on that occasion. The applicant was supplied with writing material on 8 November 2008. She was further allowed to receive three visits from a friend and two from her doctor C. She was also allowed to telephone her lawyer and her partner several times.", "21. On 15 July 2009 the Lüneburg District Court dismissed the applicant’s action of 8 November 2008 under section 19 § 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 43 below) against the Lüneburg police for a finding that both the order for her detention and the conditions of its execution had been unlawful.", "22. As regards the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention the District Court, endorsing the findings of fact made by the Regional Court in its decision of 7 November 2008 (see paragraph 12 above) as well as its reasoning, confirmed that the detention had complied with section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act.", "23. As regards the execution of the detention order against the applicant, the District Court considered that the manner in which the detention had been enforced had been lawful and had complied, in particular, with the provisions of the Police Custody Regulations (Polizeigewahrsamsordnung, see paragraph 45-49 below).", "24. The District Court noted that the detention order was executed in the detention wing of the Lüneburg Police Station until 7 November 2008 and subsequently in the detention wing of the Braunschweig Police Station.", "25. As to the applicant’s complaint that her detention cells did not have windows, but only ventilation slots, the District Court considered that the equipment of the detention cells had complied with no. 15 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 49 below) and that there had been enough light. The recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) were irrelevant here. The photographs of shackled persons exposed in the detention wing of the Braunschweig Police Station may have been tasteless, but did not render the applicant’s detention unlawful as a result of intimidation.", "26. Moreover, there had not been a breach of the right to sufficient night’s rest provided by no. 12 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 48 below). In Lüneburg, some noise made by a ventilator may have made it more difficult for the applicant to fall asleep, but the police was not obliged to be considerate of individual sensitivities. The fact that the light had remained switched on all night in Braunschweig had been a consequence of the applicant’s own behaviour. She had insisted spending the night on the cell’s cupboard the height of which was 1.90 metres. The light had therefore been necessary for her own protection. It had not been possible for the police to guarantee that, in case the applicant had fallen down from the cupboard, they would notice it immediately otherwise. According to the District Court, the applicant could ask herself whether she would have preferred having been shackled for her protection instead.", "27. Furthermore, the court noted that on 8 November 2008 the applicant had been outside on the premises of the Braunschweig Police Station from 2.20 p.m. until 3.02 p.m. She had to be shackled as, being an excellent climber, there had been a risk that she would climb on trees or buildings and abscond. The applicant had not, therefore, been “taken for a walk like an animal” on the parking. On 9 November 2008 the applicant had been outside from 12.22 p.m. until 12.35 p.m. She had not been shackled and had been allowed to climb on a tree. She had not objected to returning to the detention wing afterwards.", "28. The District Court further considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate that her state of health in detention had deteriorated in a manner so as to render her detention disproportionate already prior to the District Court’s decision of 9 November 2008 ordering her release. There had not been a written and impartial medical report proving the applicant’s allegation in that respect. The doctor who had visited the applicant in detention and had persuaded the then competent District Court judge to order her release had probably been a sympathiser.", "29. On 28 October 2009 the Lüneburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision of 15 July 2009.", "30. As to the legality of the applicant’s detention, the Regional Court, endorsing the findings in its decision of 7 November 2008, confirmed that the applicant’s detention as such had complied with section 18 § 1 no. 2 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act.", "31. The Regional Court further confirmed that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, albeit onerous for the applicant, had complied with the applicable legal provisions and had not been so unacceptable as to render the execution of her detention unlawful.", "32. As regards the applicant’s detention during the first night in the detention cell in the Lüneburg Police Station, the Regional Court found that the cell had been uncomfortable, but had complied with no. 15.1 of the Police Custody Regulations in the version then in force (see paragraph 49 below). In that police station there were no detention cells suitable for a deprivation of liberty lasting several days. Despite this, the police had convincingly explained that transporting the applicant to and back from Braunschweig for the hearing before the Regional Court the following day would have restricted her even more in her liberty of movement. Furthermore, she had not complained to the police about the noise at night emanating from a ventilator.", "33. Moreover, the Lüneburg police had taken care of the applicant’s well-being after her hearing before the Regional Court (on 7 November 2008 from 2.10 p.m. until 2.50 p.m.) while they waited for the Regional Court’s decision until approximately 9 p.m. with the applicant in an office in the Lüneburg Police Station in that they had taken her outside three times.", "34. As regards the applicant’s subsequent detention in the Braunschweig Police Station, the Regional Court noted that the applicant arrived at that station on 8 November 2008 at 2.10 a.m. after the crew of the ambulance called by the police and a police doctor had confirmed her fitness for detention despite the breathing difficulties she had informed the police of. The Regional Court further confirmed the District Court’s finding that the pictures of shackled persons in the corridor of the detention wing – which included a photograph of a person subject to ankle and hand cuffs – may have been tasteless. However, it had neither been shown that the pictures had been put up to intimidate prisoners nor that the applicant had been intimidated in a considerable manner by them. Moreover, the court considered that it had been lawful for the police to leave the light switched on during the night. It noted that the applicant had climbed on a cupboard measuring 1.90 metres and had failed to descend on the police’s request. By choosing not to descend her by force and by leaving the light on instead the police had respected as much as possible the applicant’s right to liberty.", "35. As regards the applicant’s right to stays outside during her detention in Braunschweig, the Regional Court, endorsing the findings of the District Court in this respect, found that the right provided by no. 10 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 46 below) to be allowed to stay outside for 45 minutes per day in so far as the staffing and infrastructural situation permitted had not been breached. Shackling the applicant to a female police officer on 8 November 2008 had been necessary in order to prevent the applicant from absconding. The applicant, an excellent climber, had previously shown that she was not ready to comply with the police’s orders and there had not been a closed courtyard as in prison. On 9 November 2008 the applicant had not been shackled during her time outside and had been allowed to climb on a tree. She had also been able to move within her cell in order to alleviate ailments resulting from her rheumatism.", "36. As regards the applicant’s right to receive visits in detention, the Regional Court observed that under no. 11 of the Police Custody Regulations (see paragraph 47 below), such visits were permitted in so far as they did not endanger the purpose of the detention and were authorised by the police. The said provision had to be read in conjunction with section 20 § 4 of the Lower Saxony Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 44 below). The Regional Court noted that the Braunschweig Police had received some 200 telephone calls of sympathisers of the applicant, some of whom had insulted the police, which had considerably disturbed the execution of the applicant’s detention. It had not been unlawful in these circumstances for the police not to permit visits by persons who had presented themselves at the police station without having lodged a request for a visit. In any event, the applicant had been visited by three persons while in detention, in addition to the two visits by her doctor, C., who had prescribed her necessary medication and had brought a couple of magazines. Her right to receive visits had not been unlawfully restricted in these circumstances.", "37. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 6 November 2009.", "38. By submissions dated 1 December 2009 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decision of the Lüneburg District Court of 6 November 2008, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 7 November 2008, and against the decision of the Lüneburg District Court of 15 July 2009, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 28 October 2009. She argued, in particular, that her right to liberty, the principle of proportionality and her right to freedom of assembly and of expression had been violated by her long illegal detention in unreasonable conditions in order to prevent insignificant regulatory offences. Her complaint was registered under file no. 2 BvR 2794/09.", "39. In a letter dated 18 August 2010 addressed to the applicant in person, the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that her constitutional complaint of 1 December 2009 against the decisions of the Lüneburg District Court of 15 July 2009, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 28 October 2009, in so far as the decisions concerned the conditions of her detention, had been registered under file no. 2 BvR 1779/10.", "40. On 24 August 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the above‑mentioned four decisions in so far as these decisions concerned the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 2794/09). The Federal Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 21 September 2010. In her letter to the Federal Constitutional Court dated 3 October 2010 the applicant’s counsel, referring to the two file numbers assigned to the applicant’s constitutional complaint, the letter of 18 August 2010 and the decision of 24 August 2010, asked for a progress report; she was informed that it was not possible to indicate when a decision on the complaint under file no. 2 BvR 1779/10 would be taken.", "41. On 30 May 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Lüneburg District Court dated 15 July 2009, confirmed on appeal by the Lüneburg Regional Court on 28 October 2009, without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 1779/10). The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 18 June 2012." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 2, 10, 12, 14, 28 ]

[]

[ "7. Although the present case primarily relates to the anti-riot operation of 26 September 1999, that operation in fact constituted the climax of a series of long-standing conflicts between the Ulucanlar prison staff and some of the 170 male and female prisoners convicted of belonging to illegal extreme left-wing organisations (“the leftist prisoners”).\nIt transpires from old classified documents exchanged among the office of the prosecutor attached to Ulucanlar Prison (“the prosecutor’s office”), the Governor of Ankara (“the Governor”) and the various regional gendarmerie commands, including the Ankara Gendarmerie Command (“the CDGA”), that the hostilities between the prison authorities and the prisoners dated back to 1996 (see paragraph 8 below). Since that time the authorities had been aware of the problems, particularly relating to overcrowding and the age and inadequate facilities of the Ulucanlar complex, which, moreover, had been intended as a short-term prison and should never have housed convicted prisoners. It transpires from the various information sources that the exiguity of the living area in the “dormitories”[4] was central to the leftist prisoners’ complaints and actions, which they conducted together despite their political differences and personal conflicts of interest.\nA clearer picture might be gained of the present dispute by recapitulating the factors mentioned in the above-mentioned exchange of documents and the facts noted by the five-MP sub-commission set up under the Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights in the Turkish National Assembly (“the Sub-Commission”) in order to investigate and ascertain the circumstances under which the impugned incidents had occurred.", "8. On 5 January 1996, under the Governor’s supervision, the prosecutor’s office, the CDGA, the gendarmerie unit on duty at Ulucanlar (“CGP”) and the other gendarmerie commands drew up their so-called “Anti-Prison Riot Action Plan No. 1”. The authorities in question were convinced that the leftist prisoners were planning a mass break-out, that they would therefore probably engineer an internal clash among the various extreme left-wing fractions in the prison and would dig tunnels, knock down walls, occupy the roofs, start fires and, finally, trigger an insurrection against the prison authorities. The authorities considered that as the CGP lacked the operational capacities to deal with such eventualities, they had to work together in order to identify the ringleaders and ensure durable security in the prison.\nOn 16 January 1996 the Governor ratified the plan, under which the CGP would be backed up by auxiliary forces, that is to say two senior officers and twenty gendarmes, to be seconded from other commands, accompanied by the local police.", "9. However, that plan was not implemented as foreseen.\nAccordingly, on 31 July 1996 the authorities met to reassess the situation and draw up a new Action Plan in accordance with the Prime-Ministerial Directive of 12 November 1993 concerning the suppression of rioting in prisons.\nOn 2 August 1996 the Secretary General of the National Security Council urged the relevant ministries and several decision-making bodies, as well as the Governors’ Offices, to implement that new plan promptly, drawing on some more specific coercive measures. In substance, the parts of the plan relevant to the assessment of the present case were based on short- and medium-term actions, as follows[5]:\n– refusing any compromise with the “terrorist” organisations, as this would encourage them to make impossible demands;\n– reaffirming the State’s determination to combat such propaganda-based movements;\n– endeavouring to restore the State’s authority in prisons and to reform the legislation on internal prison surveillance;\n– transferring the leaders of the “terrorist” organisations to other appropriate prisons;\n– preparing television programmes involving specialists capable of analysing and assessing the mental state of insurgent prisoners and the difficulties encountered by the security forces in combating terrorism;\n– conducting counter-propaganda vis-à-vis sections of the media being used by the “terrorist organisations” in relation to conditions of detention;\n– making public declarations conducive to reducing the impact of propaganda sullying the reputation of and demoralising members of the security forces, and emphasising the determination of the ministries, political parties and senior officials to combat any form of insurrection in prisons.", "10. Nevertheless, no practical action was taken until two years later, because of an escalation in criminal activities in Ulucanlar between 1 January and 1 August 1998, including one murder involving the use of a firearm, one murder by stabbing, one case of arson, one attempted escape, one case of hostage-taking of prison officers and four cases of infliction of serious bodily harm.\nOn 7 August 1998 the CDGA alerted the authorities (by letter, HRK no.: 0621-3094-98/ ASYŞ [7476]) to the risks arising from the aforementioned situation, which, it said, had robbed the prison staff of all their authority. According to the CDGA, although security outside the prison premises was duly guaranteed by the gendarmerie, “it was only a matter of time before the volcano inside the building erupted”.\nHaving received that information, the Governor drew the attention of the Justice and Interior Ministers and the prosecutor’s office to the following findings, which he considered called for urgent action:\n– Ulucanlar is an old prison which no longer meets current standards, and its structure encourages prison breaks via tunnels, given that the prison premises, and in particular the living areas, contain vegetation and trees blocking the prison guards’ view, which facilitates the digging of such tunnels and concealment of the earth extracted;\n– the passages between dormitories run through the living areas, thus hampering any necessary intervention by the guards; the fact that the dormitories are adjacent to each other promotes the hierarchisation of the prisoners, ideological indoctrination, racketeering and all modes of communication with the outside;\n– under pressure exerted by leftist prisoners, the prison doctors use dietary pretexts to bring all kinds of foodstuffs and medicines into the prison; the prison staff are also unscrupulous; some of them act as messengers and smugglers; and the prison guards can only inspect the dormitories if the prisoners authorise it;\n– the leftist prisoners post up ideological placards around the living areas; the doors to the dormitories and living areas are left open between presence checks, the prisoners are free to move around the premises as they wish, including the female dormitory, and they even stand guard over various parts of the prison;\n– it is common knowledge that the prisoners in Ulucanlar have weapons, mobile telephones, shovels, picks, iron bars, cudgels and stones, ready to be used during riots; during the most recent searches, three handguns, two mobile phones and five SIM cards were discovered on the premises.", "11. From September 1998 onwards the leftist prisoners gradually took over Ulucanlar Sector 3. That sector comprised male dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory, where virtually no routine inspections had been carried out since 1996.\nAccording to the authorities, no concessions were to be made to those individuals, whose complaints concerning, in particular, inadequate living space in the dormitories, were pure fabrication.\nThe main developments during that period can be summarised as follows.", "12. On 4 September 1998, at the request of the Ankara public prosecutor’s office (see letter no. 119083), the gendarmerie issued an order (HRK no.: 3590-553-98/ASYŞ [8221]) to carry out the hitherto impeded searches and transfers of the leftist prisoners.", "13. At about 5 am on 6 September 1998 a search operation was instigated in Ulucanlar Prison. However, under explicit instructions from the Directorate General of Prisons attached to the Ministry of Justice (“DGPM”) and the prosecutor’s office, dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory, as well as the dormitory exclusively housing former MPs, were excluded from the searches. The reasons behind those instructions are still unknown.\nFollowing that operation, 104 prisoners were transferred, and the authorities discovered, in particular, 19 skewers and stilettos, 5 large nails, 24 fruit knives, 7 Stanley knives, 1 packet of Stanley knife blades, 2 daggers, 2 penknives, 5 cudgels, 5 grams of cannabis and 2 mobile phones, complete with accessories.", "14. On 9 September 1998 the Governor sent the Ministers of Justice and the Interior a confidential letter from the CDGA (HRK no.: 0621-3356-98/ ASYŞ 8373) listing the dysfunctions observed at Ulucanlar during the 6 September operation and the results of the latter, which can be summarised as follows:\n– at the end of the operation, the prisoners convicted of terrorist offences forced the windows and doors of their dormitories open and began to move freely around the building, with a view to protesting against the search and the transfer of their cellmates;\n– on 7 September the same individuals installed barricades in the corridors with banners proclaiming “the revolutionary prisoners shall never be slaves”; some prisoners smashed through the dormitory ceilings and climbed on to the roofs, while others began to prowl around in small groups, armed with cudgels;\n– on 8 September the prisoners demanded to talk to the authorities, which was not authorised as they refused to submit to body searches and twice intentionally set off the prison alarm bell;\n– continuing overnight until the next morning, the prisoners set up further barricades with beds and pieces of wood from doors and windows; they also plundered the kitchens, the dispensary and the canteen, purloining all the food items and also all the sharp instruments and storing them in dormitories nos. 4 and 5.", "15. The talks mentioned in that letter finally took place at around 10 a.m. on 9 September. A delegation made up of a CDGA lieutenant-colonel, the public prosecutor, the Prison Director and the CGP commander heard the spokesmen for dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the spokeswoman for the female dormitory, namely the applicants Sadık Türk, Halil Türker and Fatime Akalın, respectively. Complaining that they had been given no advance notice of the search operation, those persons, in particular:\n– demanded the return of their leader, K.Ç., who had been transferred to the Eskişehir E-type prison;\n– requested that the prison staff involved be spared any disciplinary sanctions in respect of the incidents which had occurred;\n– requested leave to talk to their lawyers, Z.R. and K.B., and the families to be designated by the latter;\n– denounced the ill-treatment inflicted and the visiting restrictions imposed by the gendarmes on their comrades in hospital, as well as the body searches, which they claimed had gone far beyond external inspection of clothing.\nThe case-file contains no mention of the authorities’ reaction to those demands.", "16. A second series of searches was scheduled for 2 p.m. on 10 September 1998.\nAt the request of the Prison Director and the prosecutor’s office, dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory were once again excluded from the search on the grounds that the prison guards would take charge of that part of the operation. However, none of those dormitories was in fact inspected.\nAt the end of that second operation, the gendarmes confiscated the following items discovered in other parts of the premises:\n– 1 7.65-mm semi-automatic Browning pistol (series no. 999666), 1 7.65-mm semi-automatic Browning pistol (no series number) complete with magazine and seven bullets and 1 7.65-mm pistol marked “Fovmar Harsformp Polcon Faoil Sotm”[6] (series no. 4443) with twenty-five 7.65-mm bullets;\n– 1 large dagger, 6 knives, 1 flick knife, 6 home-made blades and 10 skewers;\n– 3 cudgels, 2 metres of cabling and serum bottles containing mixtures for Molotov cocktails and pieces of iron;\n– 5 SIM cards and 2 mobile phones, complete with accessories.\nMoreover, the record of the search which was drawn up by the gendarmes mentioned the following facts:\n– the skylights leading to the roofs had been dismantled,\n– cudgels and stones had been strewn along the corridors,\n– preparations had been made for manufacturing Molotov cocktails in the attic,\n– barricades had been erected close to the entrances, using stovepipes and old cupboards, and\n– the empty tanks on the roofs had been disconnected and moved to block access.\nOn 28 October 1998 the CDGA alerted, in vain, the Ministries of Justice and the Interior to the absolute necessity of acting to counter the situation whereby Ulucanlar had become a “terrorist training centre”.", "17. In January 1999 the local gendarmerie unit began receiving complaints to the effect that the prisoners were still in possession of firearms and had started digging a tunnel in the female dormitory. The complaints continued until July 1999, when a number of prison guards were taken hostage for a few hours.\nThe gendarmerie had offered to intervene on several previous occasions, but the administrative authorities had consistently turned them down as regards dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory.\nThe main information on that episode are summarised below.", "18. On 19 February 1999 the CDGA wrote to the authorities concerned to inform them of the following:\n– in the absence of effective surveillance at Ulucanlar, the prisoners convicted of terrorism were free to do as they wish;\n– during the inspection of the drains in the female dormitory, heaps of gravel had been discovered, and the authorities were duly informed; on 21 January 1999 an 18m-long tunnel was discovered and blocked;\n– there was reason to suspect that similar works had also been conducted in dormitories nos. 4 and 5;\n– it was well-known that “terrorists” housed in different prisons communicate via mobile phones which had been smuggled in, and that this was how they planned their joint actions;\n– moreover, messages faxed from official machines showed that those persons also had access to standard office applications in order to devise their strategies.", "19. There were no further incidents until 4.45 pm on 19 July 1999, when the prisoners from dormitories nos. 1 to 3, having declared that they had ended their protest actions, allowed the Deputy Governor of Ulucanlar and the Head Warden in, and then held them as hostages until 5.15 p.m. There were no injuries.", "20. On 20 July 1999 the CGP informed the CDGA and the regional commands (via message HRK no.: 0621-2533-99) of that incident, following which the rebels had allegedly attempted to occupy the roofs, having climbed up through the ventilation shafts and forced the duty guards to back off; they had also reportedly stolen a gas cylinder and concealed iron bars and cudgels in their dormitories, probably, according to the CGP, in order to riposte to any possible intervention by the security forces.\nStill on 20 July 1999, the CDGA reported (message HRK no.: 0621-2540-99) that Sector 3 for leftist prisoners housed 32 individuals in dormitory no. 4, 81 in dormitory no. 5 and 43 in the female dormitory, that is to say a total of 156 convicted prisoners, including 47 PKK members. According to the CGP, the latter had not supported the actions of the other prisoners and had disassociated themselves from them vis-à-vis the security forces, nor did the prisoners in dormitories nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10 and 14 and the “officials’ dormitory” pose any kind of threat. On the other hand, according to the CGP, the leftist prisoners were potentially dangerous, because it was well-known that on a number of occasions they had obtained solvents, glue, fuel oil and bottles of serum in order to manufacture Molotov cocktails for use should the gendarmes raid their dormitories.", "21. On the following day the CGP once again wrote to the CDGA (message HRK no.: 0621-752-99) to inform it that when the prison guards had recently been taken hostage, the attackers had stolen their victims’ uniforms and that they could therefore be expected to attempt to escape wearing the uniforms. That message was forwarded (HRK no.: 0621-2548-99) to all the officials and concerned.", "22. Between 1 August and 1 September 1999 the CGP kept the CDGA informed every day (via telegrams HRK nos.: 0621 et seq.) of the continued refusal by the prisoners in dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory to answer the presence checks and to respect the curfew and the compulsory closing of doors. Each message was immediately forwarded to all the other bodies concerned.", "23. On 2 September 1999, according to the faxes distributed by the CDGA (messages HRK nos.: 0621-3128-99 et seq.) and the CGP (messages HRK nos.: 0621-879-99 and 880-99), the leftist prisoners demolished the wall of dormitory no. 7 adjacent to their own dormitory, expelled its occupants and took over the premises. Following this takeover, they refused even more vehemently to comply with the presence checks, disrupted the prison rounds and impeded the prison guards in the exercise of their duties. That situation continued for about twenty days.", "24. Still on 2 September 1999 the Director of Ulucanlar, backed up by the DGPM, once again complained of the criminal activities of the leftist prisoners in dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and requested the intervention of the gendarmerie to restore order (letter no. M-1999/2-12).\nNevertheless, immediately after that request, the Minister for Justice ordered that no such operation should be instigated.\nThe CGP then informed the CDGA (telegram no. 1999/2-12) that the operation had been cancelled, even though the leftist prisoners were still occupying dormitory no. 7 and continuing to refuse to comply with the evening presence checks. The prison guards and gendarmerie patrols at Ulucanlar were reinforced as a precaution.\nOn 3 September 1999 the CDGA informed all the authorities concerned of that cancellation (message HRK no.: 0621-3138-99).\nOn 4 September 1999 the gendarmerie intelligence department informed the CDGA (message ISTH no.: 3590-747-99) and the regional commands that prisoners convicted of terrorism in all the Turkish prisons were planning to initiate various insurrectional actions should the State attempt to intervene in any of the prisons housing such prisoners.", "25. Up until 20 September 1999 the CGP continued to keep the CDGA abreast of the situation in Ulucanlar with daily updates, and the telegrams in question were consistently transmitted to all the authorities concerned. It transpires from those messages that throughout the whole period in question the prisoners in dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory had continued to occupy dormitory no. 7 and to refuse to submit to presence checks, and that the entrance doors to the dormitories, the exercise yards and the living areas had remained open and unguarded.", "26. On 20 September 1999 the Prison Director submitted to the Ankara public prosecutor’s office a request for a search of dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory, which had so far been exempted from such inspection. On the same day the Deputy Director, Ş.D., was attacked with a makeshift flame-thrower while removing cardboard boxed placed by the prisoners in the ventilation zones on the roof.\nFive days later the authorities reached the conclusion that the situation in Ulucanlar was no isolated case: the ringleaders in the different prisons were freely communicating via mobile phone and planning a series of riots and simultaneous break-outs. The facts relating to that episode are set out, in particular, in the internal reports of 7, 13 (report, HRK no.: 0627-926-99/877) and 21 September 1999 as drawn up by the CGP and CDGA and then forwarded, inter alia, to the Ministry of Justice and the Ankara public prosecutor’s office.", "27. According to those reports, in the leftist prisoners’ dormitories, which had long remained unsupervised, there were two pistols of an unknown model and in dormitory no. 2, a 9-mm Astra-type pistol; all the other relevant parts of the prison contained large quantities of cannabis, brought in by prison guards D.S., F.D., H.U., A.D., D.A., P.G., S.K. and G.Ç., who had allegedly hidden them in their undergarments; lastly, the SIM cards had been provided by the prison guard G.S. The CGP and CDGA recommended that those members of the prison staff be immediately removed from their current duties and transferred to other prisons.", "28. Still according to those reports, surveillance of dormitory no. 7 – which had been under the control of the insurgents since 2 September 1999 – was no longer possible and the persons occupying it were now in a position to instigate all kinds of actions. Furthermore, since Sector 3 was a no-go area for the authorities (see paragraph 11 above), according to the reports the prisoners would probably resume their tunnelling work with a view to a mass break-out.\nIn this connection, the reports pointed out that of the prisoners in the “terrorist dormitories”, 73 were prisoners who had been transferred to Ankara for medical treatment. Obeying instructions from the illegal organisations, of which they were still members, those individuals had managed to avoid returning and had congregated in Sector 3. The reports stated that it was absolutely vital and urgent that those 73 prisoners be transferred back to the prisons where they were supposed to be, otherwise insurrection and confrontation could be expected at any time.", "29. On 25 September 1999, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Director of Ulucanlar Prison requested the CDGA’s assistance to protect the prison staff members who had been tasked with inspecting the three dormitories housing the leftist prisoners.\nIn that regard, Action Plan no. 15541, classified secret, was drawn up and forwarded to the regional commands, the Governor, the prosecutor’s office, the Ankara Security Directorate and the National Directorate of Secret Services. Under the plan, at 4 a.m. on 26 September 1999 Ulucanlar Prison would be raided and subjected to a general search, and, if so requested by the public prosecutor, the transfers of leftist prisoners to other prisons, which had so far been blocked, would also be carried out.", "30. The relevant parts of the plan might be summarised as follows:\n– the task force would comprise ten CGP gendarmes, five commando squads, one riot squad, one special operations squad and sixteen officers, twenty-two junior officers and twenty-one sergeants on contract, and 201 gendarmes from the regional gendarmerie commands;\n– within each command providing manpower, the gendarmes would be trained in frisking procedure and identification of prohibited items;\n– the prison guards detailed to take part in the operation would be under the orders of the gendarme commanders;\n– in order to guarantee the safety of the search teams and to act in the event of armed resistance, gendarme officers would operate with their official weapons and would take the requisite precautions to ensure that they could not be disarmed;\n– during the searches, the passages between dormitories would be blocked, all outside access to the prison and all means of communication would be supervised, and no one would be allowed in or out, apart from the prosecutors and commanders;\n– the searches would concerntrate on dormitories nos. 4, 5 and 7 and the female dormitory;\n– no one would speak with the prisoners or let the latter persuade them to take any type of action, and a firm, strict attitude would be maintained in order to keep up the psychological pressure;\n– in the dormitories, the prisoners known as “group leaders” would be kept under particular surveillance and prevented from inciting the others;\n– all the prohibited items discovered on the premises would be inventoried and placed in safekeeping;\n– any prisoners sustaining injuries during the operation would receive initial treatment in the prison dispensary and then transferred to hospital if necessary.", "31. The plan also provided for an auxiliary force comprising one officer, four junior officers, four sergeants on contract and fifty gendarmes, as well as one gendarmerie commando squad, accompanied by an adequate number of police officers, specifying that all those forces would assemble at CGP HQ ready to spring into action.\nMoreover, the plan also provided for the presence of two teams from the gendarmerie intelligence service equipped with one camera and two video cameras; one of the cameramen would work on tower no. 3, and the other cameraman and the photographer would operate inside the building. The personnel in situ was also to include four squadrons from the Special Forces Department, one bomb disposal team and the entire staff of the forensic and anti-drugs departments.", "32. The instructions for the operation were as follows:\n– personnel involved in the operation should be fully equipped and have all the necessary service weapons, ammunition and other requisite equipment, such as truncheons, shields and glass-fibre helmets;\n– each unit should also have as many torches available as possible and at least one sledgehammer, one pick and one chisel;\n– the commands in question were required to provide equipment such as handcuffs (at least ten pairs per command), shields and gas-masks, as well as fire extinguishers (at least two per command) in case of fire;\n– since the operation was likely to be protracted, an adequate quantity of food rations was to be provided;\n– one hour before the operation, an ambulance with a doctor and medical assistants was to be placed at the disposal of the provincial command.", "33. At around 4 a.m. – or, according to some of the prisoners, at around 3.30 a.m. – on 26 September 1999 the gendarmerie units, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel A.Öz., entered Ulucanlar prison. The police officers remained outside in order to secure the outside of the building.\nDespite the warnings – although there is still disagreement among the parties on whether and how those warnings were in fact given – informing the prisoners about the searches scheduled for dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory, the violence escalated, quickly turning into a riot.\nUlucanlar was the scene of confrontations between the gendarmerie units and the leftist prisoners, particularly those who were cornered in dormitory no. 4. The account given below is a summary of the information provided, albeit with a number of uncertainties, in the five reports drawn up after the operation, between 5 and 6 p.m.\na) Entry into the prison", "34. Once inside the building, at around 2.15 p.m., the gendarmes took up position in the watch towers located between the roofs of dormitories nos. 4, 5 and 6; they spotted two “terrorists” on the lookout at the end of each corridor; on seeing the gendarmes the latter shouted “traitor!” at the prison guard who had opened the door to the gendarmes and then ran off towards their dormitories.\nThe “terrorists” locked behind them the entrance gates to the central corridor, the female “terrorist” dormitory and the inside areas of dormitories nos. 4, 5 and 7. The gendarmes tried in vain to explain to the rioters that they would not be harmed if they allowed them to carry out the searches. The latter responded by chanting “the revolutionary prisoners will never give in! – Come on if you have the guts! – Long live our independence struggle!”\nArriving at the second gate, the gendarmes tasked with protecting the search units were attacked with Molotov cocktails and lumps of concrete. Junior officer M.E.’s uniform caught fire (although no such name is included in the list of injured persons in Appendix II).\nIn view of the deteriorating situation, the whole prison staff took shelter behind the gendarmerie units.\nThe “terrorists”, ignoring Commander A.Öz.’s warnings, continued to chant: “The prisoners will never give in – we will resist or die.” Half-an-hour later they attacked the gendarmes with flame-throwers made out of gas cylinders. The gendarmes responded to the attack with force.\nb) Control of the female dormitory", "35. Under a hail of stones, logs and pieces of coal, the gendarmes first of all dismantled the barricades in the central corridor and then broke down the entrance door to the female dormitory with sledgehammers.\nWhile the gendarmes were preparing to go into the dormitory living area, four or five rioters lunged at them with iron bars and then aimed a home-made flame-thrower at them, which started a fire. The security forces used tear gas to drive the rioters back into their dormitory. Once they had taken control of the area, the gendarmes heard female prisoners shouting slogans from the upper floor. Those prisoners refused to comply with orders, and riposted with Molotov cocktails.\nThe gendarmes dismantled all the barricades in that zone and inspected the premises before heading towards the stairs to the upper floor. The rioting female prisoners, who had barricaded the staircase with cupboards, threw stones at them. Using their shields to ward off the stones, the gendarmes managed to clear the staircase. When they attempted to enter the dormitories, they were doused with bleach and pelted with stones, broken glass and porcelain and food jars.\nThe female prisoners, who had blocked the entrance with chairs, tables and bedsteads, continued throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. They set fire to the mattresses piled up outside the dormitory, which led to a massive blaze, completely filling the area with smoke. The gendarmes brought in the firemen stationed on the roofs to deal with the fire.\nAt that moment an official told the gendarmes that there were four PKK members inside who had to be evacuated, but that the female rioters were refusing to release them. The warnings issued were once again ignored and the female “terrorists” became more aggressive; they began to take direct aim at the gendarmes’ faces with the flame-throwers, skewers and broken glass through the door opposite the staircase. During that episode, junior officer S.D., who was responsible for video-recording the events, was injured on the hand by a glass fragment. The gendarmes broke down the door of the adjacent room in order to reach the room in a corner of which the female rioters were grouped, having been driven back by the tear gas and the fire hoses; when the gendarmes entered the room the rioters launched a final assault with iron bars, stones and skewers, still ignoring the calls to surrender.\nThe gendarmes resorted to force to neutralise the attack. Some of the women were slightly injured, as was gendarme conscript[7] K.Uça., who was wounded in the hip by a skewer, and conscripts A.Gök. and M.Ayd., who were injured in the abdomen and the right hand, respectively.\nAt about 7.15 a.m. the female prisoners were forced to exit one by one. Several knives were discovered in their dormitory and filmed. According to the documents on file, during this episode neither the prisoners nor the gendarmes used firearms.\nc) Control of dormitories nos. 4, 5 and 7", "36. The other operational units met with extremely violent resistance when they attempted to remove the barricades behind the doors to dormitories nos. 4, 5 and 7. While the gendarmes made their way towards the area of dormitory no. 7, “terrorists” behind the barricades opened fire, threw Molotov cocktails and stones and then retreated into dormitory no. 4. This withdrawal enabled the gendarmes to evacuate 29 prisoners who were PKK members[8] from dormitory no. 5; those prisoners had previously informed the prison authorities that they dissociated themselves from the rioters.\nThe rioters, thus cornered in dormitory no. 4, tried to climb on to the roofs, but were prevented from doing so by truncheon blows from the gendarmes. They nevertheless managed to start a fire in the dormitory by burning mattresses. Some of the gendarmes almost died of asphyxiation, and reinforcements were called in to take control of the area; several tear-gas canisters were thrown in, forcing a group of “terrorists” to take refuge in the aforementioned dormitory. Despite the calls to surrender, the surrounded “terrorists” opened fire, chanting: “Fascists, we’ll kill you! – bring on the flame-throwers, torch them!” Specialist sergeant M.İ. was hit in the abdomen.\nThe gendarmes stationed on the roofs of dormitories nos. 6 and 7 and in watch tower no. 3 riposted with tear gas and their official weapons, while the firemen used high-power hoses and carbon dioxide foam. Subsequently, the gendarmes saw “terrorists” going back and forth between the living area and the dormitory to fetch their comrades’ bodies; the prisoners who were severely affected by the gas and the foam and were squatting in various parts of the area were easily apprehended.\nDespite low visibility due to the tear gas, the gendarmes saw some of the “terrorists” approaching the exit in order to surrender; at the same time shouts of “Traitors! Shoot the cowards!” were followed by “bursts of gunfire” inside the dormitory. Only two or three “terrorists” managed to get out; six or seven others were gunned down by their own comrades.\nThe remaining rioters, who were once again barricaded behind the door to dormitory no. 4, attempted to reach the gendarmes with stones, iron bars, cudgels and flame-throwers, and they picked up and threw back tear-gas canisters. During the confrontations junior officers E.A. and N.K. were injured on the arm and the nose, respectively, by stones; sergeant C.D. was hit on the right eyebrow, and conscripts A.Ö. and M.A. sustained a fracture of the right auricular and a traumatic injury to the right eyebrow, respectively.\nPositioned in front of the aforementioned door, the gendarmes saw a rioter pointing a gun at them at one of the upstairs windows. When the gendarmes went up to the first floor and approached the door, the “terrorists”, including the person later identified as Mu.Gök., opened fire indiscriminately from the windows. During that attack one bullet seriously injured junior officer Ü.S. and another went through sergeant A.E.’s helmet, leaving him in a state of shock; the “terrorists” also shot and injured captain Z.E. and sergeant H.S.\nAt around 10 a.m. the gendarmes took control of dormitory no. 4, just as the rioters were trying to flee the area; prisoner A.D. died at around 11.30 a.m., following – according to the prisoners – a burst of gunfire.\nThe operation ended with that incident.", "37. During the first ten minutes of the raid on dormitory no. 4, prisoners Halil Türker and Abuzer Çat (relatives of the applicants Selame Türker and Hasan and Hüseyin Çat) were killed; their bodies were found in the dormitory no. 4 living area. Ümit Altıntaş (a relative of the applicant Melek Altıntaş) died about half-an-hour later inside the same dormitory.\nAccording to the statements by the applicants and the prisoners, Under Gençaslan (the son of applicant Ali Gençaslan), Mahir Emsalsiz (the son of applicant Mehiyet Emsalsiz) and Zafer Kırbıyık (the brother of applicant Firdevs Kırbıyık) later died of their wounds, during the ensuing mayhem.", "38. According to the official version, Nevzat Çiftçi (the husband of applicant Hanım Çiftçi), who was shot in the leg, died later in hospital. According to the applicant and witness statements, Mr Çiftçi and İsmet Kavaklıoğlu[9] (the son of the applicant Șaban Kavaklıoğlu) were beaten up and executed in an isolated room after the operation; several prisoners claimed to have heard İsmet Kavaklıoğlu’s screaming in the shower room. A certain A.S., who displayed no bullet wounds, had allegedly suffered the same fate, having also been dragged into the showers.\nThe Government contested those allegations, adhering to the aforementioned official version of events.", "39. The result was as follows: ten prisoners dead and about seventy injured, four of whom had sustained life-threatening injuries; and fifteen gendarmes injured, one seriously.\nAccording to the official version, once the situation was completely under control, the unharmed prisoners were placed in cells. The gendarmes took eighteen injured “terrorists” (no names are given) to the prison dispensary. The others, including several applicants (List B), were retained for six hours in the shower room, where they were given first aid before being transferred to various hospitals.\nAccording to the injured applicants, however, it was in that shower room and the 200-m long corridor leading to it that they were dragged, stamped on and beaten up by the gendarmes and prison guards lined up on either side of them. In the said room they had been forced to strip and lie on the floor, under a rain of blows, particularly concentrating on their injuries, and making comments such as “why is this guy not dead yet? – we shot three of your mates, it’s your turn now! – no hospital for him, we’ll finish him off here!” The gendarmes allegedly pushed injured prisoners down the stairs or laid them out on stretchers only to immediately drop them. The torturers included officers from the Ankara police department’s anti-DHKP-C office with whom the convicts, as members of the DHKP-C, were well acquainted.\nAt the end of the operation, the transfers of the other prisoners to other prisons were also carried out.", "40. The medical information on the officers injured during the operation is summarised in Appendix II.\nIt transpires from the case file that in the instant case the gendarmes, instead of being taken to the Ankara Forensic Medicine Institute – which was the usual practice – were examined at the GATA military hospital, which issued their medical reports.\nAccording to those reports, the condition of gendarmes M.İşl., H.Sar. and Ü.Soy., who had bullet wounds, necessitated convalescence leave for ten, ten and twenty-five days respectively, on the understanding that Ü.Soy.’s life was in danger.\nContradicting the findings of the medical report concerning the conscript Z.Eng., indictment no. 1999/79635 of 1 December 1999 (see paragraph 136 below), identifies this person as one of the officers suffering from a gunshot wound.\nAccording to the same reports, the condition of conscripts A.Er., A.Gök. and K.Uça. did not necessitate sick leave. The number of days’ unfitness for work prescribed for the other gendarmes was three for C.Doğ., M.Abd. and M.Ayd., five for N.Kar., S.Dağ. and Ş.Süm., and seven for E.Ayd. and M.Özk.", "41. All the relevant medical data on the applicants’ eight deceased relatives (List A) are summarised in Appendix III.\nThose data show that the eight persons in question all died of wounds caused by bullets from various types of firearms. In view of that fact, the Sub-Commission (see paragraph 7 in fine below) tasked a committee of five forensic scientists to assess the appropriateness of the autopsy and pathological exploration procedures followed in the present case. That committee found that there had been no major shortcomings attributable to the medical staff involved in the said examinations, having regard, in particular, to the shortage of personnel and the poor working conditions. However, it noted that, in breach of the principles set out in the “Minnesota Autopsy Protocol”, the forensic experts had omitted to dissect the corpses’ skin and sub-cutaneous tissue and to take samples from the traumatic and burn injuries in order to conduct histopathological research on them. Expressing doubts as to the origin of those burns, which had, on the face of it, been caused by chemicals, the committee regretted that more specific necropsies had not been considered, especially since some of the injuries observed on the corpses corresponded to acts generally classified as lethal acts or acts of torture.", "42. As regards the applicants who were injured (List B), and whose clinical pictures are provided in Appendix IV, it should be noted that there is no medical evidence relating to Ms Fatime Akalın, Ms Sibel Aktan (Aksoğan), Ms Şerife Arıöz, Ms Gönül Aslan, Ms Esmahan Ekinci, Ms Zeynep Güngörmez, Ms Başak Otlu, Ms Fadime Özkan, Ms Derya Şimşek, Ms Edibe Tozlu, Mr Aydın Çınar, Mr Murat Ekinci, Mr Murat Güneş, Mr Gürhan Hızmay, Mr Ertuğrul Kaya and Mr Cemaat Ocak. Furthermore, the medical report on Mr İnan Özgür Bahar, which was obtained further to a complaint lodged on 9 June 2000, some eleven months after the events (see paragraph 110 below).\nThe Forensic Medicine Institute’s findings concerning those applicants also prompted a number of comments from the aforementioned committee (see paragraph 41 above):\n“... 1. Some of the traumatic injuries displayed by the injured persons resemble lesions resulting from trauma caused by a blunt instrument; having regard to their distribution and orientation on the body, as well as their shape and extent, some of those lesions might have been caused during the confrontations and captures, but it is medically inconceivable that they all appeared during the operation; some of the lesions consist of ‘parallel lines of bruising’ and, having regard to their length, they characterise injuries resulting from direct blows struck with one or more long, blunt, convex or round instrument(s); 2. As the healing process for injuries depends on their nature and their position on the body, as well as the individual’s physical peculiarities, no medical opinion can be provided on which came first, the firearm injuries or the traumatic damage ...”", "43. Appendix IV also sets out seven categories of applicant (List B) broken down by the number of days sick leave prescribed, as follows:\n– one day for Halil Doğan and Veysel Eroğlu;\n– five days for Mustafa Selçuk, Özgür Soylu, Cem Şahin, Sadık Türk, Kemal Yarar and Yahya Yıldız;\n– seven days for Cenker Aslan, Resul Ayaz, Songül Garip, Aynur Sız, Cemile Sönmez, Sevinç Şahingöz, Barış Gönülşen (annotated “getting better within ten day”) and Devrim Turan;\n– ten days for Gürcü Çakmak, Bülent Çütçü, Yıldırım Doğan (fifteen days according to the indictment of 25 December 2000 – see paragraph 113 below), Filiz Gülkokuer, Hayriye Kesgin, Mehmet Kansu Keskinkan, Önder Mercan (three days according to the aforementioned indictment), Duygu Mutlu and Filiz Uzal (Soylu);\n– fifteen days for Ercan Akpınar, Serdar Atak, Küçük Hasan Çoban, İlhan Emrah, Erdal Gökoğlu, Savaş Kör, Behsat Örs and Ertan Özkan; and\n– twenty-five days for Haydar Baran and Enver Yanık, in a condition described as life-threatening, and for Nihat Konak and Özgür Saltık.", "44. It transpires from the first two search resorts that, in view of the large haul, it had been decided to film the prohibited items found in the dormitories with a view to subsequently inventorying them, and that the officers had reprimanded the prison guards, accusing them of having brought the weapons into the Ulucanlar Prison. The inventory in question listed the following items:\n– 1 AMD-65 assault rifle[10] (series no. EO 3841) with a magazine containing four bullets, 1 16-mm short-barrelled shotgun with eight cartridges (three of them empty), 1 “ Saddam Baretta” pistol[11] (series no. 31302622) with two magazines, 1 “14-shot Baretta pistol”[12] (series no. 245PY74657) with 1 magazine, 1 semi-automatic Mab pistol (series no. D 561777) with 3 magazines, 2 home-made pen guns, 2 “silencers”[13], 76 Kalashnikov cartridges, 113 bullets for 9-mm pistol, 56 of them spent, 90 G-3 gun cartridges, 25 7.65-mm bullets, 10 of them spent, 3 8-mm blank bullets, 35 projectiles and 2 magazine cases;\n– 29 knives, 24 Stanley knives, 73 stilettos, 2 machetes, 1 wooden dagger, 97 miscellaneous blunt instruments, 1 iron bar, 1 wooden sledgehammer, 2 cudgels and 15 catapults;\n– 3 unused Molotov cocktails, 7 gas cylinders, 18 home-made gas masks, 15 packets of explosive powder, 1 home-made tear-gas canister, and miscellaneous solvents and combustible liquids;\n– 1 welding machine, 1 drill, 10 wood chisels, 30 nails, 6 chisels, 39 different-sized saws, 1 screwdriver and one, 1 trowel;\n– 15 firearms (Kalashnikov, M-16 and revolvers) and 17 bombes, 1 telescope, 2 truncheons and 3 fake training batons;\n– 3 mobile portables with accessories, 1 hollowed-out book and 7 master-keys.", "45. The third and fourth reports, which were drawn up later the same day specified that the aforementioned “Tarıq” semi-automatic pistol (series no. 31302622) had been used by prisoner Mu.Gök., who, having fired seven or eight shots, had retreated to dormitory no. 4 (see paragraph 36 in fine above). Two more reports drawn up the next day mentioned the discovery of a 9-mm Star semi-automatic pistol with one bullet in the magazine.", "46. Four further searches were conducted between 2 and 6 October 1999, revealing:\n– 1 hunting knife with a 21-cm blade, complete with sheath (2 October);\n– 20 500 to 1,000 g bags of cement, 8 packets of floor tiles, 2 packets of plaster, and 4 blades and iron casts;\n– 20 m of telephone cable (4 October); and\n– 4 54-cm iron tubes soldered to 19-cm blades, to be used as picks or axes (5 October).", "47. In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is important to reiterate the following statements made to the Sub-Commission by Colonel K.B., the commanding officer of the CDGA:\n“... We drew up our plan and arrived at Ulucanlar on the morning of 26 September; the prisoners riposted with firearms and flame throwers, and we were attacked with knives; so we also used our arms in accordance with the powers conferred by Act No. 2803 [on the organisation of the National Gendarmerie]. My men were injured, and unfortunately on the other side prisoners were also injured or lost their lives. Their deaths have greatly saddened me. I am sad because there should not have been any weapons there. If there had been no weapons there would have been no confrontation and these people would not have died, and my men would not have been injured ... After those events the Ministry of Justice issued the directive of 5 October 1999[14]. Prior to that date, we (gendarmes) were not empowered to search prison guards entering the prison; the prison guards were searched by other prison guards. Imagine two prison guards who have links with the ... prisoners. What sort of links might these be? They might be material, pecuniary or ideological, or be based on fear. Therefore, if the ‘terrorist’ organisation told those two guards that someone would be bringing a gun from outside and that they had to hand it over to [a given prisoner], they would be certain to obey. The prison guard goes into the prison and [one of his colleagues] searches him, not a gendarme. A lawyer arrives and no one searches him. He has a private conversation with the detainee or prisoner and leaves, after which the detainee or prisoner is taken back to his cell, still without any body searches. Normally no such items should have been brought into the prison ... The prison in question has one more special feature: it is next to the open prison section, where individuals come and go, stroll around and do whatever they want, and they could easily throw whatever objects they wish over the wall. There have been lots of incidents of this kind. We drew up a report and informed the prison authorities that a package had been thrown inside; [the guards] searched the premises but found nothing. After all, we could never have interfered in the running of the prison! ...”", "48. Lieutenant-Colonel A.Öz., the commanding officer of the task force, had stated the following:\n“No search had been carried out in the section housing prisoners convicted of terrorist offences for six or seven years ... No request to that effect was ever submitted, and we did not act because the public prosecutor had never called on our services. As you know ... we can only act inside the prison if the prosecutor or Prison Director so requests ...”", "49. The statement by Captain D.Y., commander of the CGP, on that matter can be summarised as follows:\n“This affair did not begin on 2 September [1999]; its origins go back into the distant past. In Ulucanlar, but also in all the other prisons housing ‘terrorists’, the prison authorities had no control over the sections reserved for such prisoners; this is a well-known fact. In those sections ... the ‘terrorists’ ruled the roost ...; TV and the other media covered this: the State Prosecutor sitting down with the prisoners and negotiating with them, and the latter then taking hostages and obtaining everything they had been demanding. Despite all the denials, whole pages of such agreements have been published in the newspapers ...; it was obvious that a lot of weapons and mobile phones were circulating in the prison; during ordinary body searches, even where prison guards felt a weapon, they were all too scared to confiscate it ... An incident was sure to occur if gendarmes raided the ‘terrorists’’ dormitories ... because no gendarme had ever entered those premises to conduct a search for six or seven years ... Many staff have been caught red-handed smuggling weapons and drugs into the prison ...”", "50. On 2 October 1999 the gendarmes discovered a 50 cm², 10-15-cm deep hole in the middle of the concrete floor of dormitory no. 5, at a distance of 135 cm from the wall, which the gendarmes identified as the entrance to a future tunnel. The hole was filled with pieces of wood and blankets.\nOn 4 October 1999 the gendarmes inspected the floor of dormitory no. 7. In the kitchenette, underneath the worktop, they noted that an 85 x 35-cm area had been bricked up and replastered to merge in with the colour of the walls. The gendarmes broke through the bricks and found that the floor had been dug up to a depth of 20 cm. They deduced that what they had found was the beginnings of a tunnel.\nOn 6 October 1999 the floor of the dormitory no. 5 living area was inspected. The gendarmes dug into the ground around two poplar trees, and discovered a 45 x 75 cm plywood trapdoor covering a 50 cm x 100 cm tunnel entrance. The entrance led to an approximately 7-m long tunnel running towards the aforementioned hole inside dormitory no. 5. The tunnel was found to contain four home-made iron picks, a bag containing 15-20 kg of dug-out rubble and a bag with 15-20 kg of gravel.", "51. Before the Sub-Commission, the ministerial authorities submitted that the occupation of dormitory no. 7 had been solely aimed at facilitating the preparation of a mass break-out; that had also been the aim pursued by the rioters in hitherto blocking the access of prison guards to the dormitories and preventing presence checks, as allegedly proved by the incipient tunnel discovered after the operation. According to those authorities, between 2 and 26 September 1999 the prison authorities had unsuccessfully attempted to put an end to the said occupation of the dormitory. In view of the failure of these attempts and the increasing number of leaks concerning an imminent prison break-out, an anti-riot operation had become inevitable.\nAlthough the Sub-Commission accepted that the leaks concerning the tunnelling activities had played a major role in the decision to raid the premises in question, it considered that there was some doubt as to the real nature of the sites identified in the area of dormitories nos. 5 and 7 as incipient tunnels. The Sub-Commission pointed out that the first alleged tunnel, which was 7 m long, began in the living area of dormitory no. 5 and ended inside that dormitory. It took the view that it was implausible that the prisoners had ventured to dig a tunnel in an open yard which was overlooked by watch towers. Furthermore, the Sub-Commission considered that the second digging site found behind the worktop in the dormitory no. 7 kitchen did not really match the profile of an attempted escape tunnel.", "52. Between 14 October and 2 November 1999 the Sub-Commission was sent to Ulucanlar, where it held talks with a number of prisoners – including some of the applicants – prison staff, officers and other governmental and non-governmental officials. The Sub-Commission’s report covered 120 pages, 79 of which concerned the impugned operation, and comprised a plethora of damning observations.", "53. The Sub-Commission began by enumerating the obstacles encountered during the investigations. The Ankara Public Prosecutor responsible for investigating the case had failed to attend the scheduled meeting, and, furthermore, the forensic medical team and the prison authorities had refused to hand over specific items of physical evidence such as the video recordings made during the operation and the photographs taken during the autopsies. It noted that although the gendarmerie authorities – which merely presented a few photographs taken long after the events – had denied the existence of such audiovisual material, several of the individuals questioned had affirmed that the operation had indeed been filmed and that, in fact, “the junior officer responsible for the video recording had sustained an injury to his hand”.\nAccording to the Sub-Commission, this situation had reinforced the suspicions of concealment of evidence, particularly since the authorities had refused to grant the victims’ lawyers leave to attend the autopsies, which refusal they alleged was in breach of the requirement to reassure the general public in such a sensitive case.", "54. The report included several specific chapters, converging on an overall assessment of the impugned situation based on witness statements and other relevant evidence.\na) Occupation of dormitory no. 7", "55. According to prisoners who did not actively participate in the riot, the occupation of dormitory no. 7 was intended, in particular, as a protest against overcrowding in the dormitories after the failed attempts to negotiate that issue with the prison authorities.", "56. The Sub-Commission held that the prisoners in dormitories nos. 4 and 5 had certainly violated the law, infringed the rights of their cellmates in dormitory no. 7 and contributed to the escalating tensions by refusing to terminate their actions. However, the Sub-Commission pointed out that of the nineteen dormitories available in Ulucanlar, only five were exclusively earmarked for leftist prisoners, and that there was a real overcrowding problem liable to goad those concerned into action.\nThe Sub-Commission considered that if dormitory no. 7 had been raided on 2 September 1999, it was inexplicable why the authorities had waited for twenty-four hours before instigating an operation on that scale, with attempting beforehand to act in one way or another. It added that there was also no explanation for the fact that, at the height of the tension, the prison prosecutor had gone on leave or that the operation had been launched on the day of the Prime Minister’s departure on an official visit to the United States.\nb) The underlying aim of the security forces’ reaction", "57. According to the official version, before entering the dormitories the gendarmes had duly ordered the rioters to surrender, but the latter had riposted with guns, home-made bombs, gas cylinders transformed into flame-throwers and various sharp tools. The non-rioting prisoners explained that there had indeed been shouted orders such as “surrender! If you surrender you will be well treated!”, but that those orders had been drowned out by the noise of the gunfire. The security forces said that they had attempted to contain the attacks with tear-gas canisters and high-pressure foam sprays, but that that had not stopped the prisoners, who were wearing home-made gas masks.", "58. According to the Sub-Commission, and contrary to the official version, the incidents of 26 September could not just be put down to the resistance of prisoners occupying a dormitory to prison officers assisted by the security forces. Similarly, the ten deaths which had occurred could not have been the result of an improvised reaction by the gendarmes.\nThe Sub-Commission explained that a plan had been drawn up twenty days beforehand, that the premises had been inspected on a number of occasions and that the situation had been discussed in detail with the prison guards and the administrative staff. The Sub-Commission held that the operation had even been prepared in such a way as to include special strike forces. In the light of the number of dead and injured, it should have been obvious that, owing to the absence of prior measures to protect the lives of the prisoners, who were incarcerated under the State’s responsibility, that operation had been a serious failure.", "59. The Sub-Commission took the view that the real reasons for the operation lay elsewhere; there had been a serious longstanding problem of mutual confidence between the prisoners and those responsible for Ulucanlar Prison at all levels, including with the gendarmes on duty at the prison. Accordingly, all the officials questioned had begun by acknowledging that “the State was no longer in control of the prisons”.\nNevertheless, the Sub-Commission noted that the meaning of the word “control” was unclear. “Control” could not mean preventing escapes – such cases being extremely rare – or carrying out regular searches and presence checks; nor could control be aimed at preventing freedom of movement by the prisoners between dormitories, monitoring the prison activities of members of the “terrorist” organisations, undermining the authority of their leaders or preventing large quantities of foodstuffs from being smuggled into the prison.\nAll such aims could have highlighted only the structural inadequacy of the prisons, the shortage of public funds and a deficient prison regime, and not any legitimate need for control of prison life.", "60. On that subject, the Sub-Commission reported that the prisoners interviewed had complained of the denial of their rights under a “protocol of understanding” which they claimed to have signed with the officials of the prison and the Ministry of Justice.\nIt pointed out that, whereas that Ministry had officially denied the existence of any such document, many of the prisoners and the prison administrators had confirmed its existence, explaining that before the operation the said protocol, which comprised 22 articles, had been deposited with the public prosecutor’s office, but that the document had been missing since the operation.\nAccording to the Sub-Commission, in view of the difficulties encountered in effectively applying the prison rules, which situation would in fact have been difficult to reconcile with current human rights requirements, it was clear that the officials, who had already been under media pressure, had concluded agreements with the leaders of the leftist prisoners in order to define the terms and conditions of prison life. The Sub-Commission took the view that even though such agreements could be seen as useful for protecting prisoners’ rights, in the instant case it was precisely the issue of implementing the agreement in question which triggered the events at Ulucanlar. The Sub-Commission explained that when there had been changes in the management of a given prison or when government policy had changed, the rights afforded to prisoners under such agreements had been denied, with the successive authorities proclaiming the unlawfulness of such privileges and the prisoners refusing to give up rights which they now took for granted.", "61. It added that one illustration of the feeling of powerlessness experienced by the prison staff (many of whom had a rather low standard of education) on this matter was their interpretation, for example, of the signs and tags which had been observed in the dormitories inspected following the operation as showing the prisoners’ belonging to an illegal organisation. The prisoners interviewed had firmly denied that the premises had ever been used as “terrorist” cells; they had said that in the dormitories they had considered themselves entitled to conduct activities of a strictly cultural and intellectual nature. The Sub-Commission considered that the reaction of the authority’s vis-à-vis the nature of those activities and the fact that they had sought to ban them as illegal had only exacerbated the situation.\nFurthermore, the Sub-Commission highlighted the statement by Lieutenant-Colonel A.Öz., who had directed the operation, to the effect that the men had acted to “restore the State’s authority”, and emphasised that the CDGA had on several occasions invited the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior to take action to “restore the State’s authority and prevent Ulucanlar Prison from becoming a ‘terrorist’ training centre ...”.", "62. In the Sub-Commission’s view, however, those facts alone were insufficient to explain the above-mentioned feeling of powerlessness; behind the “desire to control persons” above and beyond their physical confinement there also lurked a wish to stigmatise prisoners convicted of political or terrorist acts vis-à-vis the other inmates.\nc) Necessity of the force used", "63. The Sub-Commission took the view that although it was incontrovertible that in cases of absolute necessity the security forces could resort to firearms within the limits of the law, inflicting death out of frustration at a loss of authority was clearly inadmissible. The deaths and injuries in Ulucanlar Prison had revealed an intention to kill, rather than an intention to put an end to the occupation of dormitories or to break down resistance. It analysed the existence of mutual resentment powerful enough to induce individuals to take the risk of killing or being killed as a sign that the prisoners and gendarmes had viewed each other as enemies.\nIn that regard, it emphasised that the military-style training given to members of the gendarmerie had been inappropriate for such an operation because, to a “soldier”, any “adversary” would have become an “enemy” whom he had a mission to destroy. That was why, according to the Sub-Commission, no ordinary gendarmes should have been involved in situations such as that pertaining in the present case, unless the personnel to be sent in had received appropriate training for such missions, in the knowledge that their duty was not solely to prevent the prisoners from escaping, but also to protect their lives and ensure respect for human rights.\nThe Sub-Commission observed, however, that, in the present case the gendarmes had behaved as if they were facing a group of terrorists who had taken to the mountains, “whereas there were sixty or so prisoners suffering from the effects of gas and foam and confined to an area of some one hundred square metres, who could neither escape nor remain barricaded in for ever”.", "64. It explained that it had asked a number of officers whether any methods other than firearms could have been used and why the forces involved had not concentrated more on the use of tear gas and carbon dioxide foam in order to bring the situation under control.\nThe officers had allegedly replied that they had begun by using all possible non-lethal methods, in particular tear gas, until the gendarmes wearing military gas masks had themselves been affected by the gas, as had all the persons inspecting the dormitories several days after the incident. Moreover, according to one colonel, it would have been pointless to wait or to fire off more tear-gas canisters because the rioters had protected themselves with masks.\nAccording to the Sub-Commission, the only possible conclusion was that the tear-gas canisters in question had proved their efficacy in terms of their quantity and power. But since they had been insufficient to contain the rioters, should it not have been accepted that the prisoners, with their home-made masks, had been better protected from the gas than the gendarmes with their professional masks?", "65. The Sub-Commission further recounted the explanations given by another captain, to the effect that “since we already had four wounded gendarmes and were facing violent resistance, we could no longer decide to retreat, to halt the combat; we had no say in the matter”. The Sub-Commission pointed out that Lieutenant-Colonel A.Öz. (see paragraph 48 above) had also acknowledged that he could not have called off an operation without undermining the morale of the troops and allowing the “adversary” to regain confidence. It quoted that officer’s words as follows:\n“... In my view, it was impossible to restrain [the rioters] by any other means because they had larges stores of food in the dormitories. Furthermore, we had no ‘paralysing’ gas, and to my knowledge there is no such gas. We have tear-gas canisters ... We could not opt to ‘wait and see’ because that would have raised the problem that a long period of waiting would have enabled the other side to prepare better and step up their resistance ... Once the armed confrontation has begun it can no longer be stopped. I am glad that my next-in-command and my lieutenant survived, thanks be to God, but if one of them had been martyred, how could we have explained that to people? ... In the past, when we came here on an operation, we only searched the ordinary convicts’ dormitories, not those of the prisoners convicted of terrorism. When the operation was instigated the latter prisoners resisted to the death. Firearms were the last resort, and we held back until our personnel began to sustain injuries ... That is when you have to react; the longer you hold off the worse the eventual losses [in your own ranks] will be ...; if you wait too long before riposting you will allow the ‘terrorists’ to adjust their aim and erect barricades ... They even began killing each other; there were burst of gunfire inside the dormitory ... I shouted down from the first floor ‘but that’s automatic gunfire!’ and the reply came ‘we know, sir ... we have no hunting rifles, we don’t use them ...”\nFinally, the Sub-Commission quoted Captain D.Y. on that specific issue (cf. paragraph 49 above), who had considered it unfair to ask them how they could have avoided “killing ten individuals”:\n“... We didn’t kill them ... Honestly, if I had wanted to kill someone, why would I have chosen ordinary guys like A.S. or Mahir Emsalsiz, instead of shooting the group leaders? Those two were about to be released ... and pulled no weight in the organisation. Those were the kind of people who were killed. Didn’t you notice that [the first persons who died] did not include any of the leaders? It was because to begin with the other guys had wanted to surrender that many of them were executed by those [leaders] ... We do not deny that we used firearms, but it wasn’t us who killed those ten individuals; it should be realised that if we had intended to shoot to kill we would have targeted the group leaders, or else we would already have eliminated them in the past, during quieter times ...”", "66. The Sub-Commission considered that those arguments were strictly military in nature and had, moreover, highlighted a lack of authority on the officers’ part over the actions of the men under their command.\nd) Proportionality of the force used", "67. The Sub-Commission considered that more information was required on the nature of the “violent resistance” which had to be “broken” by the security forces.\nAccording to the official version, a Kalashnikov, seven pistols and a hunting rifle had been found in the dormitories. Of the ten fatalities, three had been the result of shots from that hunting rifle: in short, according to the gendarmes previous quarrels had induced the “terrorists” to kill each other.\nThe Sub-Commission observed that the prisoners questioned had admitted having seen some of their comrades using guns, but that none of them had seen any Kalashnikov-type automatic weapon or a hunting rifle. No such Kalashnikov (see paragraph 44 in limine above) had ever been mentioned before or discovered during the initial search, but it had been found later on, after a prisoner had told the prosecutor that “the first shot had been fired from an automatic weapon”. And the hunting rifle, which had also never been previously mentioned, had also only emerged after the operation.\nGiven that the only injuries noted by the gendarmes had been caused by gunshots, the Sub-Commission wondered why, if the rioters had indeed been in possession of such a powerful weapon as a Kalashnikov, they had not used it against the gendarmes, and also why, if they had actually used a hunting rifle to kill three of their comrades, they had not also turned it against the gendarmes.", "68. Nevertheless, the Sub-Commission held that the main question was how so many firearms had been smuggled into Ulucanlar. They considered the official line that they had been hidden in food packages or thrown over the prison wall unconvincing in view of the existence of electronic alarm systems and the guards keeping watch on the towers.\nNor did the Sub-Commission consider it conceivable that the firearms could have been supplied with the assistance of a number of corrupt officers; only a major organisation could have managed such a feat by infiltrating the prison, which would have involved huge sums of money.", "69. Furthermore, the Sub-Commission noted that since only 41 cartridges had been found in the dormitories, the shooting attributed to the rioters could not have been as intense as had been claimed; it therefore considered that the account of a violent exchange of fire in the dormitories could not be taken at face value and that consequently there was no proof that the force used by the gendarmes in response had been strictly proportionate to the danger, especially since the bullet impacts on the inside walls of the dormitories suggested that the shots fired by the gendarmes had been directly aimed at individuals.", "70. The Sub-Commission also stated that the other argument, to the effect that the rioters had used gas cylinders as flame-throwers to prevent the gendarmes from entering the dormitories, could not be described as very convincing: the doors to the premises in question had not displayed any scorch marks and none of the gendarmes had sustained any serious burns.", "71. The Sub-Commission further pointed out that according to the officers involved, the gendarmes had also been attacked with sharp instruments; still according to the officers, it was only to be expected that the deceased prisoners had displayed traces of blows and injuries because there had been “clashes and confrontations with the prisoners, who had attacked the gendarmes with iron bars and stilettos, and the latter had had to riposte with truncheons”.\nNevertheless, the Sub-Commission observed that it was unclear whether any knife wounds had been found on the gendarmes, nor was there any evidence that any such hand-to-hand fighting had ever taken place, never mind a confrontation lasting for five or six hours.\nOn the other hand, the Sub-Commission noted that many of the prisoners had claimed to have been beaten up, dragged along the floor and stamped on for no reason. It added that those allegations had been confirmed by forensic reports and that the forensic experts had established that some of the traces of violence observed on the injured prisoners and the corpses had indeed only been explicable by blows from blunt instruments and bodies being dragged across a hard floor (see paragraph 42 in fine above).\nMoreover, the doctors responsible for providing first aid in the shower room prior to the transfer of the injured to hospital had also reported that the prisoners had begged them not to leave them alone, explaining that as soon as there were no witnesses, the gendarmes tortured them by exerting pressure on their wounds.", "72. The Sub-Commission considered that the traces of blows and the injuries noted on the bodies of the prisoners and the corpses did not appear to have resulted from clashes and confrontations, and that the most likely scenario was that during and after the operation the security forces had resorted to excessive force and beaten the rioters. Furthermore, as regards the burns found on the bodies of the injured and dead prisoners, it pointed out that according to the forensic experts which it had appointed, they might have been caused by nitric or sulfuric acid, the presence of which chemicals it deemed unexplained.\ne) The Sub-Commission’s conclusions", "73. Having regard to all the foregoing observations, the Sub-Commission issued the following opinion.\nIn the absence of a constructive attitude on the part of the Ulucanlar and Justice Ministry officials, the impugned operation had ultimately been characterised by a level of violence surpassing its original aim, the commanding officers concerned having discharged the mission without preventing deaths and widespread injuries.\nClearly, sole responsibility for all those incidents could not be attributed to the gendarmes, the prison staff or the Ministry in question. However, the Ministry’s differentiated policy depending on prison type and the prison staff’s excessive zeal in “controlling” the prisoners convicted of political offences by inflicting penalties in addition to the sentences which they were already serving had certainly been the main factor in the escalating tension and the lack of trust between both sides.\nBeyond the arguments put forward by the authorities, the real reason for such violence had boiled down to a longstanding dispute between the prison administration, which had been determined to impose its authority, and the prisoners, who had been demanding rights which they considered wholly legitimate.\nThe officials involved in that dispute had ended up calling in the gendarmerie, who had proved unsuited to managing that kind of situation and who, in the absence of appropriate instructions, had inflicted ill-treatment on the prisoners and used disproportionate force.", "74. On 27 September 1999, at the request of the Justice Ministry’s Disciplinary Board, inspectors initiated an administrative investigation against R.Cin., the Director of Ulucanlar Prison, and his four deputies, M. Çel., U.Sal., A.Gür. and T.Yıl., on the grounds, inter alia, of the discovery of weapons and various prohibited objects and substances on the prison premises (see paragraphs 10 and 27 above).\nThe five officials were charged with failing in their obligation to control and supervise the prisoners under their responsibility.", "75. They argued in their defence that it was impossible to identify the prison guards involved in smuggling weapons and ammunition into the prison. They added that even though visitors passed through metal detectors, the prison regulations prohibited body searches, and that the old and dilapidated state of Ulucanlar Prison made it easy to hide prohibited items, which were sometimes even thrown over the prison wall from the outside.\nThe officials further submitted that in practice it was impossible to impose disciplinary sanctions on prisoners for such offences since the deputy directors were not on the Disciplinary Board and, moreover, the impugned occupation of dormitory no. 7 had in fact been brought to the attention of the Ministry of Justice and the public prosecutor’s office, but no action had been taken before the date on which the risk of a break-out had become imminent.", "76. After the investigations, the inspectors had agreed on the need for sanctions. They stated that the officers in question should be declared responsible for:\n– bringing prohibited items into the prison through the intermediary of certain officials who had acted unsupervised and with complete impunity;\n– the failure to conduct body searches of detainees and convicted prisoners being transferred between Ulucanlar Prison and hospital;\n– the absence of X-ray checks on lawyers and their personal effects;\n– the absence of targeted or general searches throughout the prison premises in order to seize prohibited items;\n– the failure to impose deterrent disciplinary sanctions on prisoners;\n– the de facto tolerance, between August 1999 and 2 September 1999, of the prisoners’ unlawful actions, including their occupation of certain premises;\n– the absence of presence checks in dormitories nos. 4 and 5 and the female dormitory; and\n– the inability to block the access between those dormitories opened up by the prisoners.", "77. On 7 December 1999, departing from the aforementioned opinion, the Director General of Prisons decided that no sanctions were required, giving the following reasons:\n“... for years the prisons housing persons detained and convicted for acts of terrorism have been one of the main problems facing our country, and the incidents which have occurred in them has attracted a high level of public interest. We cannot overlook the fact that in prisons of this category searches are never properly carried out, presence checks raise problems and there are periods when no presence checks are carried out for days on end; the detainees and convicted prisoners control the opening and closing of the doors to the dormitories, and when groups of them take over the corridors it is impossible to intervene; even visits by and interviews with lawyers are arranged and controlled by the organisation leaders; the net result is that the prison staff are overwhelmed and struggling, or even failing, to discharge their duties.\nConsequently, as regards such incidents, which stem from a number of issues which have been building up for years into a problem facing all the ‘anti-terrorist’ prisons in our country, not just [Ulucanlar], it would be unfair to say that the [Ulucanlar] staff, who are under pressure ... from the detainees and prisoners convicted of terrorism and are in a way being forced to work in breach of the regulations and instructions, were at fault or acted intentionally; in other words, it is unfair to attribute sole responsibility for these incidents to the [Ulucanlar] prison staff on the grounds that they acted negligently.\nMoreover, even the investigation report of 25 September 1999 [sic – see paragraph 74 above] accepted that the staff had not been guilty of negligence, wrongdoing or intentional mischief, because, despite all their efforts, it would have been impossible to prevent the situation from reaching such a pitch ...”", "78. Finally, the Disciplinary Council concluded that no professional negligence was imputable to the Ulucanlar administrative staff.\nb) Criminal proceedings", "79. At an unspecified date, a mandatory criminal investigation was instigated against head prison officers H.A. and S.B. and prison officers Ş.A., Ç.Y., L.A., A.Ka., U.Y., N.Şa. and G.Ş., who were stationed at the Ulucanlar security checkpoint, for negligence in the exercise of their duties. In view of the number and type of weapons and ammunition discovered after the operation, those officers had been suspected of having internationally or accidently failed to carry out the requisite checks and searches on persons passing through the checkpoint, on 15 March 1999, in particular.\nThe suspects contested the accusations on the grounds that the gendarmes had received the same orders as the prison officers in terms of checking individuals entering the building, including ensuring security at the checkpoint. They submitted that although, occasionally, no checks had been carried out, that fact alone did not warrant any presumption of guilt.", "80. By order of 2 December 1999 the prosecution discontinued the proceedings for lack of evidence. In support of that decision, the prosecution pointed out that it had been impossible to determine the dates or periods of time when the prohibited items in question had been smuggled into Ulucanlar Prison. They added that in the light of the architecture and organisation of the building, “light weapons” could quite easily have been thrown over the outside walls or else from the open area of the prison, or that they might have been brought in by other means or with the assistance of officers other than those who had been charged.", "81. On 26 September 1999, immediately after the operation, the lawyers representing applicants Mehmet Kansu Keskinkan, Veysel Eroğlu, Behsat Örs, Erdal Gökoğlu, Sadık Türk, Enver Yanık, Aynur Sız, Devrim Turan, Haydar Baran, Resul Ayaz, Songül Garip, Filiz Uzal (Soylu) and İsmet Kavaklıoğlu applied to the Ankara State Prosecutor (“the Prosecutor”) for authorisation to be present during the autopsies should one of their clients die in the meantime, which was in fact the case of Mr İsmet Kavaklıoğlu.\nThe Prosecutor rejected that request.\nConcurrently, Mr Bayraktar and seven fellow lawyers lodged a formal complaint on behalf of applicants Küçük Hasan Çoban, Savaş Kör, Nihat Konak, Fadime Özkan, Behsat Örs, Cenker Aslan, Veysel Eroğlu, Cemile Sönmez, Başak Otlu, Yıldırım Doğan and Hayriye Kesgin (List B), as well as on behalf of the deceased prisoners Zafer Kırbıyık, Nevzat Çiftçi, Önder Gençaslan and Mahir Emsalsiz (List A). Mt Bayraktar requested, also unsuccessfully, leave to be present during Mr Nevzat Çiftçi’s autopsy.\nOn the same date Mr Ayhan and Çıtak, defence counsel, lodged a first collective complaint on behalf of all the “prisoners who had been attacked”.", "82. Both those complaints were added to mandatory investigation file no. 1999/101539. A preliminary investigation had already been instigated against 150 members of the gendarmerie for unjustified used of lethal force against Mahir Emsalsiz, Halil Türker, Abuzer Çat and Ümit Altıntaş (List A) and for bodily injury against 47 prisoners, including some of the applicants (List B) and excluding those set out below, who did not appear on the list of complainants: Fatime Akalın, Sibel Aktan (Aksoğan), Şerife Arıöz, Gönül Aslan, İnan Özgür Bahar, Aydın Çınar, Esmahan Ekinci, Murat Ekinci, Murat Güneş, Zeynep Güngörmez, Gürhan Hızmay, Ertuğrul Kaya, Cemaat Ocak, Başak Otlu, Fadime Özkan, Derya Şimşek and Edibe Tozlu.", "83. On 29 September 1999 the applicants Mustafa Selçuk, Cem Şahin, Barış Gönülşen, Erdal Gökoğlu and Sadık Türk – who had meanwhile been transferred to Burdur Prison – joined the complainants. They complained about the members of the security forces and the prison authorities, who they submitted had been responsible for the tragic events of 26 September. Those complaints were also added to the aforementioned file no. 1999/101539.\nThe applicant Murat Ekinci was questioned by the Prosecutor on 15 October 1999 (see paragraph 99 above), when he accused the gendarmes of having beaten and injured him.\nStill on 29 September 1999, two of the lawyers for the applicants acknowledged receipt of the autopsy reports. They requested communication of the other necropsy reports, the documentation in support of the post-mortem examinations conducted in the present case and histopathological analyses of the tissue samples taken.\nOn the same date the morgue personnel replied that tissue samples had been taken and sent for analysis.", "84. On 1 December the lawyers lodged a second collective complaint which did not include the names of Ms Kırbıyık (List A) or Mr Murat Ekinci (List B).\nOn the basis of a detailed statement of the facts, the lawyers accused the prison staff and members of the gendarmerie of premeditated murder, serious bodily injury and acts of torture. That complaint was recorded in a second file (no. 1999/107587).", "85. On 13 March 2000 counsel for Ms Kırbıyık lodged a formal complaint against 47 gendarmes and officers who had taken part in the operation. That complaint, recorded in a third file (no. 2001/16237), was followed by further complaints lodged separately on 9 June 2000 by Veysel Eroğlu and İnan Özgür Bahar.\n(b) First investigative measures", "86. According to a report drawn up at the end of the operation, one of the first investigative measures implemented by the Prosecutor had been to visit Ulucanlar at around 11.15 a.m., as soon as he had been alerted, in order to attempt to determine which clothes recovered during the searches had belonged to deceased persons and which to injured persons, before ordering ballistic reports. The report stated:\n“[at the site of the incident] it was impossible to detect, on the dead persons’ clothing, any traces of stabbings or projectile entry holes, because the corpses had been laid out side by side on the wet, blood-soaked floor; furthermore, the clothing removed from the injured prisoners had been mixed with the clothes from the dead prisoners ...”\nWith the help of the photographs taken of the corpses before they had been stripped and thanks to the memory of prison officer N.Yar., the Prosecutor managed to identify the clothing of Önder Gençaslan, Ümit Altıntaş, Halil Türker, Mahir Emsalsiz, Nevzat Çiftçi and Abuzer Çat. The clothing of the first five dead persons displayed one, five, one, eight and two holes respectively, some of them resembling bullet holes. There were no holes in Abuzer Çat’s clothes. The clothing belonging to İsmet Kavaklıoğlu (see paragraph 38 above) and Zafer Kırbıyık was not to be found.\nStill on 26 September 1999, the authorities checked the deceased prisoners’ criminal records. Mahir Emsalsiz and Önder Gençaslan had been former members of the illegal organisation TKP (ML) TİKKO, Abuzer Çat of MLKP, Ümit Altıntaş of TİKİP and Zafer Kırbıyık of Turkish İHT.KOM.BİRL., all three being extreme left-wing fractions.\nAll the ensuing investigative measures, including the numerous expert appraisals carried out, are summarised below, accompanied by references to the annexes, as appropriate.", "87. Between 26 and 28 September 1999 the Prosecutor took statements from several (non-applicant) complainant prisoners, that is to say from Mu.Ö., E.G., M.M., V.Ç., Z.A.D., A.Ç., R.K., Me.Ö., A.Kan., H.E., M.E., R.T., A.K., B.Ö., Z.A.K., C.S., T.S., Ş.B., İ.B., F.K., M.B., F.A., İ.G., B.H.Y., A.Y., U.K., İ.E., S.S., N.U., H.G., Y.Z., H.K., Z.M. and K.B.\nThe latter confirmed the substance of the applicant party’s version.", "88. On the other hand, two other (non-complainant) escaped prisoners, namely İ.D. and E.D. (from dormitories nos. 5 and 4 respectively) levelled accusations at some of the current and former applicants.\nİ.D. explained that he had been kidnapped and interrogated under threat of death by the applicants Nihat Konak (whom he described as the boss of his dormitory), Halil Türker, Savaş Kör and Aydın Çınar. On the day of the operation, Savaş Kör had been instructed to prevent him from leaving dormitory no. 5. At one point Savaş had dragged him by the scruff of the neck towards dormitory no. 4, threatening him with a stiletto; when the gendarmes began spraying the premises with foam, Savaş had tried to throw a home-made bomb at them, but it had exploded in his hands. Taking advantage of the panic, İ.D. had run and taken refuge with the gendarmes. İ.D. added that he had heard that one of the guns had been used by Habib Gül[15] and that some of the prison officers had been on friendly terms with the extreme leftist prisoners. Finally, İ.D. had requested police protection.", "89. For his part, E.D. stated that on 26 September 1999, in Ulucanlar Prison, the prisoners occupying dormitories nos. 4 and 5 had joined forces; the dormitory no. 4 “boss” had been Sadık Türk, while dormitory no. 5 had been led by someone known as Nevzat Çiftçi (alias Habib Gül). Habib Gül, C.Ç., Sadık Türk and Erdal Gökoğlu had had real handguns, and during the operation they had opened fire on the gendarmes. The first shot had been fired from a handgun, and Habib Gül had, a priori, been holding that handgun. Subsequently, Habib Gül, C.Ç., Sadık Türk and Erdal Gökoğlu had moved towards the dormitory no. 4 exercise area; they had been unable to climb over the barricades, but Habib Gül had nevertheless fired at the gendarmes on the watch tower. E.D. asserted that he had heard C.Ç. shout “fire at will at the towers!”. He continued:\n“The prisoners who triggered this incident were therefore Habib Gül, under the identity of Nevzat Çiftçi, C.Ç., Sadık Türk and Erdal Gökoğlu, who all had handguns ... Subsequently, Habib Gül and Erdal Gökoğlu brought along something which looked like a gun roiled up in a blanket; Habib Gül was carrying it, but I didn’t see him using it. It could have been a hunting rifle.”", "90. On 30 September 1999 E.D. had sent the Prison Director a second statement which he had written the day before, submitting that the first statement might have been incomplete because it had been written while he was still “in shock”. His second submissions had diverged somewhat, particularly as regards the afore-mentioned hunting rifle. Having pointed out that during the operation some of his fellow prisoners had wanted to surrender, E.D. continued as follows:\n“but the bosses shot at them to stop them surrendering. There were several firearms and knives in the dormitory; there was even a hunting rifle. Apart from that there was some bomb-making equipment. I know that Habib Gül, the former leader of the Ekim organisation ... had a very much frowned-upon romantic relationship with the prisoner Fatime [Akalın] and that there were conflicts between the members of different organisations. Habib didn’t want to compromise and had been excluded from his own community ... At 11.30 p.m. on the evening before the operation they brought Habib to our dormitory, no. 4. C.Ç., İsmet Kavaklıoğlu, Enver Yanık, Sadık Türk and a few others whose names I do not know yelled at him that they were at war and he was fighting over a whore ... İsmet even told Cemal: ‘F... it, we should just put a bullet in his head ... it would be better to execute him.’ ... I saw that İsmet Kavaklıoğlu, Enver Yanık, C.Ç., Erdal Gökoğlu, Sadık Türk and C.T.B. [who was this time identified as the dormitory no. 5 ‘boss’] and a few other members of the organisation were armed. Me and a few of my comrades managed to escape, but those who didn’t get away were hit. I know this because they had also shot at us, but missed ... One month before the operation we had been forced into training in the use of explosives and how to react to an ‘enemy attack’ ... Everyone except İsmet wanted to be transferred, but Enver Yanık opposed the move. Erdal Gökoğlu and Veysel Eroğlu were also constantly wrangling over a ‘command’ post.”\nAt around 10.30 a.m., having read the above document, the Prosecutor once again questioned E.D., who provided the following details:\n– Habib Gül and C.Ç. had always carried handguns in their back pockets in the dormitory;\n– on the morning of the operation Habib Gül and C.Ç. had barricaded the entrance gate to the dormitory no. 4 area and then smashed the lights in the dormitory;\n– when the gendarmes ordered us to surrender, Habib Gül riposted by firing a shot at the gate; some prisoners wanted to surrender; Enver Yanık then fired in our direction and the directly at Aziz Dönmez; a few seconds before the gendarmes had also fired a few shots, but Aziz Dönmez might have been killed by Enver;\n– C.Ç. was holding something in his hands rolled up in a blanket; when the blanket was removed I saw that it was a hunting rifle; I think it was C.Ç. who used it, but I didn’t actually see him firing it.”", "91. Some of the applicants were also questioned that day. Their statements are summarised in Appendix V.", "92. On 26 and 27 September 1999 the corpses of Mahir Emsalsiz, Önder Gençaslan, A.D., Halil Türker, Abuzer Çat, Nevzat Çiftçi and İsmet Kavaklıoğlu were the subject of post-mortem examinations, first in situ in Ulucanlar (apart from Nevzat Çiftçi and İsmet Kavaklıoğlu) and then at the Ankara Institute of Forensic Medicine.\nOn 28 September 1999 conventional autopsies were carried out at the Institute of Forensic Medicine. A report signed by the forensic team and a prosecutor mentioned that the bodies had been photographed and filmed, that the films had been sent to the Institute, that the video cassette had been stored at the Mortuary Department, and that the photographs and films previously taken by the staff of the open area of Ulucanlar Prison should be transmitted to the prosecutor concerned.\nOn the same day counsel for the applicant party asked the Prosecutor for copies of the autopsy reports concerning Mahir Emsalsiz, Önder Gençaslan, Halil Türker, Abuzer Çat, Nevzat Çiftçi, Ümit Altıntaş, Zafer Kırbıyık and İsmet Kavaklıoğlu. That request was accepted.\nThe content of all those reports is summarised in Appendix III.", "93. On the previous day, having questioned the Deputy Director of Ulucanlar Prison, the Prosecutor had visited the hospitals to which the injured prisoners had been transferred, including the applicants Haydar Baran, Resul Ayaz, Küçük Hasan Çoban, Barış Gönülşen, Veysel Eroğlu, Halil Doğan, Ertan Özkan, Behsat Örs, Yıldırım Doğan, Cenker Aslan, Erdal Gökoğlu, Mehmet Kansu Keskinkan, Savaş Kör, Bülent Çütçü, Özgür Saltık and İlhan Emrah.\nThose prisoners declared that they would give statements after their recovery, and complained about the poor quality of the hospital treatment and intrusions by gendarmes into their rooms. The Prosecutor took note of their complaint and ordered the gendarmes stationed at the hospital to refrain from disturbing the prisoners.\nOn the next day two deputy prosecutors inspected the premises at Ulucanlar Prison in order to identify the damage caused to public property there.\nc) Forensic and ballistic expert reports", "94. On 6 October 1999 the Criminology Department of the Gendarmerie General Command with the Ministry of the Interior (“the DC”) issued two detailed reports on the expert assessments of the weapons and ammunition discovered on the site of the incident (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above).\nAccording to the first ballistic examination of the bullets and lead shot extracted from the bodies of A.D., Ümit Altıntaş, Önder Gençaslan, Halil Türker and Zafer Kırbıyık, the two 9-mm projectiles which hit Önder Gençaslan had come from the same weapon, as had the two 7.62-mm projectiles which killed Halil Türker and Ümit Altıntaş.", "95. The second ballistic assessment conducted by the DC found that the firearms, which were deemed in working order, corresponded to the spent cartridges and ammunition discovered during the searches of the dormitories. The results were as follows:\n– batch no. 1: 10 x 7.62-mm calibre projectiles, 1 deformed, and 63 spent 7.62 x 39-mm cartridges[16], including 52 of military origin;\n– batch no. 2: 8 Cheddite 16-mm cartridges and 4 spent cartridges;\n– batch no. 3: 15 bullets and 10 spent cartridges, calibre 7.65 mm;\n– batch no. 4: 47 bullets and 10 9-mm projectiles, 2 pieces of bullet jacket and 56 spent 9 x 19 mm cartridges[17];\n– batch no. 5: 90 spent 7.62 x 51 mm cartridges[18], of military origin, and 3 8-mm blank bullets, 3 more pieces of bullet jacket and 10 projectile cores;\n– exhibit no. 1: 1 7.62-mm calibre AMD-65 assault rifle (series no. EO 3841), corresponding to 11 spent cartridges in batch no. 1;\n– exhibit no. 2: 1 16-mm calibre hunting rifle, engraved with the name “Original”, corresponding to 3 of the Cheddite cartridges in batch no. 2;\n– exhibit no. 3: 1 7.65-mm calibre semi-automatic Mab pistol (series no. D 561777) corresponding to 3 spent cartridges in batch no. 3;\n– exhibit no. 4: 1 7.65-mm calibre home-made gun (numbered 555), corresponding to 7 spent cartridges in batch no. 3;\n– exhibit no. 5: 1 9-mm calibre Browning semi-automatic pistol (series no. 245 PY74657), corresponding to 37 spent cartridges, 7 9-mm projectiles and 1piece of bullet jacket in batch no. 4;\n– exhibit no. 6: 1 9-mm calibre Star B semi-automatic pistol (series BILA, model CAL 9M/M), corresponding to 2 spent cartridges in batch no. 4;\n– exhibit no. 7: 1 9-mm calibre Tarıq semi-automatic pistol[19] (series no 31302622), corresponding to 13 spent cartridges, 3 9-mm projectiles and 1 piece of bullet jacket in batch no. 4;\n– exhibit no. 8: 2 white home-made pen guns.", "96. On 14 October 1999 the DC issued two more reports. The first concerned the examinations conducted of thirty-three pieces of clothing, fourteen of them having belonged to the deceased prisoners Önder Gençaslan, Ümit Altıntaş, Halil Türker, Abuzer Çat, Mahir Emsalsiz, A.S., A.D. and H.G. It established the entry and exit holes of specific projectiles and the distances from which the fatal shots had been fired. It concluded as follows :\n– Önder Gençaslan: the gunshot to the hip had been fired close up (between 4 and 100 cm) and that to the abdomen at long distance (100 cm or more);\n– Ümit Altıntaş: the three gunshots to the lower limbs had been fired at long distance (100 cm or more);\n– Halil Türker: the two gunshots to the lower limbs had been fired at long distance (100 cm or more);\n– Abuzer Çat: no trace;\n– Mahir Emsalsiz: the gunshots to the lower limbs had been fired at long distance (100 cm or more).\nThose conclusions were only partly corroborated by the autopsies (Appendix III).", "97. The second report concerned the chemical analyses of the explosive substances discovered in the dormitories after the operation. According to that report the explosive material had consisted of fuel, matches, home-made fireworks, window sealing, a Smith Wesson tear-gas cylinder dating from 1990, and cement.", "98. On 1 December 1999 the DC issued the findings of the ballistic examination carried out on the 184 official weapons (29 pistols, 31 machine guns, 124 HK G3 assault rifles (Kalashnikovs) used by the gendarmerie units, as well as on the 26 spent cartridges found in situ. According to the reports, the projectiles extracted from the bodies of Halil Türker and Ümit Altıntaş had been fired from Kalashnikov no. 69 Y 4422. Moreover:\n– 20 shots had been fired from Kalashnikov no. 1975 228278;\n– 4 shots from Beretta pistol no. F 92381 Z;\n– 42 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A4 703675;\n– 16 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A4 648358;\n– 11 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A4 648359;\n– 7 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A4 756654;\n– 4 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A4 648356;\n– 5 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A3 541586; and\n– 42 shots from G3 assault rifle no. A4 648358.\nFinally, 11 7.62 x 51-mm projectiles, 25 7.62 x 39-mm projectiles and 3 7.62-mm projectiles had been shot from 9 different weapons, other than those covered by the expert assessment.\nd) Subsequent hearings of witnesses and complainants", "99. On 15 October 1999 the applicants Behsat Örs, Ercan Akpınar, Cenker Aslan and Özgür Soylu were heard pursuant to letters rogatory. However, they refused to give evidence before speaking to their lawyers.\nOn the other hand, applicant Murat Ekinci stated the following:\n“... I am from dormitory no. 14 ... At around 3. 30 - 4 a.m. I was woken up by shouting before hearing gunshots; ... I could hear gendarmes yelling into their walky-talkies; ... I could make out that heavy artillery had been used and that people had been killed; at about 4.30 a.m. I heard a colonel ordering his men to open fire on anyone who resisted arrest ...; furthermore, tear-gas canisters were thrown in the dormitory no. 4 area ...; the gas also reached our dormitory; ...at about 6.30 - 7 a.m. the prison officers opened the door to the living area where we were holed up. ... At about 2.30 p.m. a captain and his men came into dormitory no. 14; they ordered me to collect my things and get out immediately, which I did; I had gone a few metres towards the corridor when hundreds of gendarmes and prison officers started hitting me; the whole way along the corridor, right up the showers, they kicked me and beat me with truncheons and cudgels; ... they had set up a special unit in the showers; they forced me in; there were 20 or 30 naked prisoners lined up; ... they had been tortured, even though they were already severely injured ...; they forced me to sing the national anthem and shout fascist and fundamentalist slogans, while they deliberately hit the most sensitive parts of my body; ... on the way to the prison vans we were beaten and forced to stumble over four corpses lying outside, while they threatened us with ending up like the corpses; ... in the van the four or five gendarmes who had got in with us continued to hit us; one of them cut strips out of my clothes with his bayonet; we were taken to Ermenek Prison ...; I got a report from the Ermenek civilian hospital confirming the abuse I had suffered ...”.", "100. Between 18 and 28 October 1999 some of the applicants (List B) and gendarmes were heard either by the Prosecutor or pursuant to letters rogatory. Those witness statements, which are summarised in Appendix VI-A, did not provide any new evidence. Similarly, the prisoner/complainant R.E. and prisoners H.E. and İ.D., during a fresh hearing on 25 October 1999, reiterated their statements (see paragraphs 87 to 90 above).\nMeanwhile, on 21 October 1999, S. Aslan, the father of the applicant Cenker Aslan, and the families of certain prisoners who had been killed or injured during the operation had lodged a collective application with the Balıkesir public prosecutor’s office, for purposes unknown. On 25 October 1999, However, S. Aslan, referring to that application, complained to the Balıkesir public prosecutor’s office that his son had been transferred to Yozgat Prison without having received medical treatment, despite a series of requests to that effect.", "101. On 28 October 1999 the prisoner E.K. and the applicants Veysel Eroğlu, Ertuğrul Kaya and Hayriye Kesgin were heard, as was another applicant whose name is unknown (List B). The hearings continued until 26 November, embracing the applicants Halil Doğan and Filiz Gülkokuer, prisoners M.Ö. and H.D., officer D.Yıl. and the three gendarmes N.Özk., E.Gün. and M.Akç.\nThose statements, which are in keeping with the versions of events given by the applicant party and the authorities, are reproduced or summarised in Appendix VI-B.\ne) Application to the Governor of Ankara pursuant to Act No. 4483 on the prosecution of civil servants", "102. On 26 November 1999 three Ankara deputy prosecutors responsible for investigating the first case (no. 1999/101539) brought against State agents (see paragraphs 82 and 83 above), declined jurisdiction ratione materiae. On 1 December 1999 they transmitted the case file to the Governor of Ankara, who was competent to determine the expediency of criminal investigations pursuant to the Law on the prosecution of civil servants.\nOn 8 December 1999 the Prosecutor followed suit as regards the other complaints which had been lodged against the said agents and were subsequently joined to the second case (no. 1999/107587) (see paragraph 84 above). In so doing he declined jurisdiction ratione materiae and, in turn, referred the case to the Governor of Ankara, requesting that it too be joined to the aforementioned first case (no. 1999/101539).", "103. On 17 December 1999, at the request of the Governor of Ankara, the Gendarmerie General Command set up a preliminary investigation committee consisting of three Gendarmerie officers, namely Colonels Ö.K. and F.Y. and Captain M.K. (“the investigation committee”), mandated to determine the expediency of prosecuting the agents in question (see paragraph 107 below).\nf) First series of interrogations of members of the security forces", "104. On 11 October 1999 the Prosecutor questioned five gendarmerie officers who had been involved in the operation: Z.Eng., C.Doğ., N.Kar., E.Ayd. and S.Dağ. Their statements were based on repetitive elements which would be reprised later on before the investigating officers.\nBetween 21 and 28 December 1999, that is to say three months after the operation, some of the gendarmes who had taken part in the operation were once again questioned by the investigation committee.\nThe committee first of all re-heard the above-mentioned officers Z.Eng., C.Doğ., N.Kar. E.Ayd. and S.Dağ., and also A.Gök. and D.Yıl.\nSubsequently, it questioned the following gendarmerie officers, for the first time: T.Akb., Y.Akt., C.Ala., A.Ali., Ş.Alt., F.Apa., M.Arı., S.Ata, M.Ate., N.Atm., H.Ayd., İ.Ayd., C.Ayg., M.Ayh., B.Bal., M.Bib., D.Bil., İ.Bil., H.Bil., C.Boz., Ş.Cab., A.Can, C.Can., B.Cey., M.Cey., M.Cih., M.Çağ., Ş.Çak., Y.Çav., B.Çiç., Ö.Çiv., İ.Dem., K.Dem., İ.Ede, A.Eme., M.Erk., D.Ert., A.Gem., T.Gid., A.Güç., H.Güm., M.Gür., T.Güz., M.Hak., K.İbi., A.İna., M.Kar., N.Kes., A.Kıl., M.Kıl., N.Kıl., S.Kıl., M.Kılı., Ö.Koç., A.Köy., H.Kul., İ.Ofl., H.Ok, M.Olu., B.Öna., Ö.Öre., A.Öz, G.Öza., M.Öze., K.Özm., U.Özm., G.Özt., O.Özt., B.Pal., E.Par., H.Sal., H.Sar., B.Say., Ü.Soy., E.Sub., Y.Sus., B.Tan., T.Tar., A.Tit., B.Usl., C.Üna., S.Ünl., S.Yağ., A.Yan., M.Yap., F.Yed., Y.Yed., Ö.Yıl., S.Yıl., M.Yüc., İ.Yük. and M.Yün.", "105. In their statements, those officers provided the following details, in very similar terms:\n– from the outset of the operation, the security forces constantly shouted orders to the prisoners, every three to five minutes, to surrender without resistance, so that no one would be hurt;\n– during the operation, a team took photographs of the premises and the prohibited items discovered in situ, under the direction of junior officer M. Hak.; the photos were then transmitted to the intelligence services;\n– the prisoners were singing anthems and chanting slogans such as “You should give up, Turkish fascist soldiers”, “The revolutionary prisoners will never surrender”, “The honour of humankind will win out over torture”, “Ulucanlar will be the tomb of the soldiers of the Fascist Republic of Turkey”, “No one will overcome the revolutionary movement, kill any traitors attempting to surrender”, “No capitulators will be left alive”;\n– the prisoners set fire to the roof with flame-throwers made out of gas cylinders, and also torched their mattresses and blankets in the dormitories; the firefighters sprayed the premises with foam and water from the roofs; tear-gas canisters were also thrown;\n– the gendarmes were accompanied by a few prison officers;\n– after the intervention by the fire brigade, there was intermittent gunfire from inside the dormitories; a certain E.G. had fired the shots[20];\n– the prisoners threw Molotov cocktails and wielded iron bars, stilettos and handguns ; some of the gendarmes had also noticed a long-barrelled gun wrapped in cloth; the prisoners in the female dormitory had no firearms, but did have some home-made flame-throwers;\n– when the gendarmes broke down the dormitory door with sledgehammers and cranks, the prisoners threw Molotov cocktails, used flame-throwers and threw stones and pieces of metal, glass and brick which they had probably picked out of the rubble of the wall which they had demolished in dormitory no. 7;\n– the commanding officers had used their walky-talkies to order their men not to ill-treat the prisoners and only to use weapons against persons who were themselves armed, exclusively targeting such persons;\n– force was used exclusively within the framework of the law, when it was unavoidable in order to break the armed resistance and restore the State’s authority in the prison;\n– firearms were used, in particular, by the gendarmes deployed on the roofs; inside the building the gendarmes only used anti-riot equipment, that is to say helmets, truncheons, shields, tear gas canisters and carbon dioxide foam;\n– the gendarmes were also affected by the tear gas because some of them had no masks;\n– behind the doors to their dormitories the prisoners had used mattresses, bedsteads and cupboards as barricades;\n– one group of prisoners had been willing to surrender, but only two of them managed to do so; the others had probably been executed by their comrades for betraying the cause;\n– at the end of the operation each prisoner was taken outside by at least four gendarmes holding them by the arms and legs;\n– no one was ill-treated, dragged along the ground or sexually abused during the operation or during the transfer of prisoners to other establishments.\ng) Outcome of the branch of the complaint of 1 December 1999 concerning the prison staff", "106. On 30 December 1999, when the administrative proceedings before the Governor of Ankara were still pending, the Prosecutor gave an unreasoned discontinuance decision in respect of the 34 civil servants, members of the prison staff, who had been cited in the second case (no. 1999/107587) (see paragraphs 84 and 102 in fine above).\nThe Governor observed that those staff members had not been actively involved in the operation as they had been strictly ordered to wait outside the building and, moreover, none of them had been injured, nor had any action taken by them had been mentioned in the official documents.\nOn 16 February 2000, before that decision was served separately on the lawyers concerned[21], the applicant party had directly appealed against it to the President of the Kırıkkale Assize Court, which finally dismissed that appeal on 21 February 2000.\nh) Continued proceedings pursuant to Act No. 4483 on the prosecution of civil servants", "107. On 30 December 1999 the investigation committee (see paragraph 103 above) submitted its report to the Governor of Ankara, expressing the opinion that the persons in question could not be charged with any kind of wrongdoing or negligence.\nOn 3 January 2000 the Governor of Ankara followed that opinion and prohibited the prosecution of the 150[22] members of the gendarmerie in respect of the incidents impugned in the first two cases (nos. 1999/101539 and 1999/107587) (see paragraph 102 above). The following reasons were given for that decision:\n“On 26 September 1999, in dormitories nos. 4 and 5 housing prisoners convicted of terrorist offences, as well as in the female ‘terror’ dormitory in Ulucanlar Prison ... the prisoners rebelled against the searches and opened fire; on 3 January 2000, therefore, I decided, pursuant to sections 3 and 6 of Act No. 4483 on the prosecution of civil servants, not to authorise the prosecutions, considering that the personnel stationed in the prison had only had recourse to the powers vested in them by Act No. 1721 on the administration of prisons and Act No. 2803 on the organisation of the national gendarmerie.”", "108. On 1 March 2000 the decision of the Governor of Ankara was served on counsel for the applicants, who appealed to the Ankara Regional Administrative Court.\nIn their memorial, counsel submitted, in particular, that the Governor’s decision was not based on any cogent reasoning and was thus in breach of section 6 of Act No. 4483; they added that the laws on which the decision had been based were completely immaterial to the actions attributable to the gendarmerie forces and that the impugned decision had not established any facts capable of justifying the use of firearms in the particular circumstances of the case.\nBy judgment of 17 May 2000 the Regional Administrative Court set aside the Governor’s decision and ordered the referral of the case to the Prosecutor with a view to instigating a criminal investigation against the members of the gendarmerie.\nThat decision was served on the appellants on 29 June 2000, and additional investigative measures were implemented.\n(i) Final complaints lodged by the applicants for ill-treatment (List B) and re-hearing of the persons in question", "109. On 9 June 2000 the applicant Veysel Eroğlu lodged a formal complaint with the Ceyhan (Adana) public prosecutor’s office concerning, inter alia, ill-treatment which he had sustained during the impugned operation. On 7 July 2000 the Ceyhan public prosecutor’s office decided to transmit the case file to the Prosecutor inasmuch as it concerned the acts allegedly committed in Ulucanlar Prison.", "110. Still on 9 June 2000, the applicant İnan Özgür Bahar lodged a complaint with the Ceyhan public prosecutor’s office and the Sub-Commission regarding the abuse which he had suffered. The Prosecutor invited the Ceyhan public prosecutor’s office to arrange for the applicant to be examined by a doctor in order to verify his claims.\nOn 6 July 2000 both applicants were questioned by the Ceyhan public prosecutor’s office regarding their complaints.", "111. Between 25 July and 13 December 2000 the Prosecutor again interrogated many of the officers who had already been heard by the investigation committee (see paragraph 104 above), that is to say D.Yıl., A.Öz, İ.Ede, M.Kar., K.Özm., Ş.Alt., H.Sar., M.Olu., Ü.Soy., M.Hak., H.Ayd., İ.Kar., A.Güç., A.Ali., N.Kes., C.Ayg., T.Güz., A.İna., F.Apa., S.Yıl., İ.Ofl., M.Cih., A.Köy., T.Akb., M.Cey., B.Tan., Y.Çav., K.İbi., G.Özt., Y.Akt., G.Öza., Ö.Çiv., Y.Yed., S.Ünl., N.Atm., H.Güm., M.Çağ., A.Yan., M.Yap., A.Gem., B.Cey., Ş.Çak., H.Ok, B.Çiç., B.Öna., N.Kıl., A.Can, M.Bib., M.Arı., B.Bal., H.Kul., C.Boz., S.Yağ., B.Say., M.Öze., Ö.Yıl., C.Üna., A.Eme., S.Ata, Ş.Cab., M.Yüc., M.Yün. B.Usl., Ö.Öre., A.Tit., H.Sal., O.Özt., M.Kıl., S.Kıl., D.Bil., C.Ala., İ.Bil., C.Can., T.Güz. and Y.Sus.\nMost of the latter reiterated their statements and contested any accusation of disproportionate use of lethal force.\nFurthermore, gendarmes Y.Baş., C.Uçu., M.Yıl., A.Er, Ü.Şah., A.İma., M.Çet. and S.Erb. were questioned for the first time.\nj) Proceedings against the members of the gendarmerie", "112. Unlike the prison staff, who had benefited from a final discontinuance decision (see paragraph 106 above), the members of the gendarmerie were placed under formal investigation after the close of the administrative proceedings before the Governor of Ankara (see paragraph 108 above).\nOn 25 December 2000 the consequent additional criminal investigation led to the commencement of proceedings under indictment no. 2000/5455.\nThe Prosecutor accordingly referred 161 gendarmes to the 6th Division of the Ankara Assize Court (“the AAC”) on charges of the murder of Mr Ümit Altıntaş, Mr Halil Türker, Mr Abuzer Çat and Mr Mahir Emsalsiz (List A), and bodily injury against 69 prisoners, including all the injured applicants (List B).\nThat being the case, in his indictment the Prosecutor requested that no penalty be imposed on the gendarmes in question on the grounds that they had acted quite legitimately for the sole purpose of executing their superior officers’ orders, and that in any case the perpetrators of the impugned acts were unidentifiable.", "113. Several applicants, who had meanwhile been heard pursuant to letters rogatory, joined those proceedings as intervening parties, which gave rise to the opening of case no. 2001/13.\nOn 4 April 2001 the Prosecutor decided to take no action on the complaint lodged on 13 March 2000 by Ms Kırbıyık and registered under the third case no. 2001/16237 (see paragraph 85 above). Referring to the two sets of proceedings which were pending before the AAC and the 5th Division concerning the same facts (cases nos. 2001/13 and 2000/175 respectively), he considered it sufficient to include that complaint in the case files currently under examination.\nMs Kırbıyık appealed against the decision to drop her complaint, arguing that the case pending under file no. 2001/13 only concerned members of the gendarmerie, whereas her complaint had also targeted the prison staff.\nThat appeal was dismissed by the President of Kırıkkale Assize Court.", "114. The most important facts in relation to that judicial episode before the AAC are set out below.\nThe remainder of the information largely concerned procedural questions relating to amendments to the court records necessitated by changes to the composition of the bench, complementary witness and defence statements, determination of the addresses of certain appellants and defendants and the enforcement of warrants of escort or arrest warrants against defendants who were untraceable or had absconded.\nThose subsidiary elements are summarised in Appendix VII.", "115. At the 14 May 2001 hearing the applicant Hüseyin Çat lodged a fresh complaint on behalf of his late son Abuzer Çat, accompanied by a request to join the proceedings as an intervening party. A similar application was lodged on behalf of the applicant Sadık Türk and Şaban Kavaklıoğlu, the father of the late Mr İsmet Kavaklıoğlu.\nThe trial judges accepted Sadık Türk as an intervening party, but on the other hand, they pointed out that Kavaklıoğlu was not one of the complainants in the proceedings.\nCounsel for Sadık Türk, joined by counsel for Yıldırım Doğan, sent several questions to be put to the defendants, asking, inter alia, which gendarmes had had firearms during the operation and which of them had actually used those firearms. Some of the defendants requested more time before answering, whereas A.Öz. immediately admitted having used an injured gendarme’s assault rifle; Z.Eng. pointed out that he had been in the midst of the operation and had used both his official handgun and a gendarmerie assault rifle; for his part, Ö.Yıl. said that he had used two weapons in addition to his official assault rifle.\nThe intervening parties also questioned M.Yüc. about the video recording which had been made from the watch tower where he had been stationed. The defendant denied the existence of any such recording.", "116. On 6 June 2001 the prisoner/complainant H.E. was once again questioned pursuant to letters rogatory at Afyon Prison. He confirmed, in particular, that he had seen guns in the hands of İsmet Kavaklıoğlu and Nevzat Çiftçi.", "117. On 9 July 2001 the complainants/applicants Melek Altıntaş and Filiz Uzal appeared in court. The latter identified C.Üna. as one of his torturers. Questioned by the complainant party, the defendants stated that they had only been informed about the operation the day before it was launched and that they did not know whether it had been planned earlier. They explained that they had all been carrying weapons in order to ward off any armed attacks, but that they had not used them, adding that they had seen prisoners killing two of their comrades who had wanted to surrender. Finally, they stated that they knew nothing about the circumstances under which the deceased prisoners had been stripped of their clothing.", "118. During the proceedings on 17 October the complainants/applicants present set out their allegations in detail, complaining of the violent acts committed during and after the operation, and their lawyers requested a face-to-face meeting between their clients and their assailants, considering that they were capable of describing the latter.\nThe AAC adjourned the question of the expediency of such face-to-face meetings.", "119. On 24 April 2002 some of the complainants’ lawyers appeared, as did, for the first time, the applicants Cemaat and Ocak, Esmehan Ekinci, and the defendant A.Eme., who contested all the accusations.\nThe applicants described their allegations in detail and provided a description of some of the presumed torturers.\nThe judges also heard H.M., an eye-witness from dormitory no. 7. He confirmed the substance of the applicants’ submissions, specifying that he had seen Abuzer Çat, Halil Türker and Ümit Altıntaş being killed while they were attempting to evade the bullets, but that he had not seen İsmet Kavaklıoğlu, who had allegedly been executed in the shower room after having been tortured.", "120. At the hearing on 27 June 2002 the applicants stated that they had been unable to identify those responsible from the photographs on file, firstly because of the poor quality of the images and secondly because some of the gendarmes had been wearing masks during the operation.", "121. On 25 December 2002 the applicants Melek Altıntaş and Hayriye Kesgin appeared, as did counsel for the defendants. In order to assist with the identifications, some twenty additional photographs had been put on file; having examined the latter, Ms Kesgin was unable to affirm that she recognised any faces, explaining that most of the members of the security forces in question had been wearing balaclavas and had raised their shields.\nThe AAC concluded that it would be unrealistic to try to use childhood portraits or pictures taken in a civilian context to identify fully equipped gendarmes operating in a gas- and smoke-filled environment. The judges therefore decided to exclude such evidence.", "122. On 4 March 2003 the applicant Cem Şahin was heard. He reiterated his complaint, explaining that the persons who had beaten had included a head prison officer, one “Yusuf”, and a prison officer, one “Mehmet”.", "123. On 9 June 2004 the applicant Şerife Arıöz was heard pursuant to letters rogatory in Isparta. Complementing her previous statements, she explained that the manner of quelling the prison riot in question had been unacceptable because the operation had been launched on an impromptu basis, without prior warning; she pointed out that previously it had been the prisoners in the female dormitory themselves who had called on the prison officers to carry out the presence check, which they had generally refused to do because they feared for their safety, even though, unlike the male dormitories, the female ones posed no problems. She added that she had fainted during the operation and could therefore not have committed the offences with which she had been charged.", "124. On 1 February 2006 the judges took note of a letter in which the Gendarmerie Command stated that no video recordings had been made or photographs taken during the operation. The judges ordered that that matter should be clarified in consultation with the prison authorities.", "125. Two more years passed before the case was ready for trial. The AAC delivered judgment on 24 September 2008. It found that, pursuant to Article 49 of the former Criminal Code, the defendants should be acquitted given that they had acted strictly within the framework of their duties, in accordance with the orders issued by their senior officers.\nThe applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation on points of law.", "126. On 14 March 2012 the State Prosecutor with the Court of Cassation issued the following opinion:\n– the appeals on points of law lodged by certain of the applicants (applicants nos. 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 35, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 50, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 63 and 64 on List B) through the intermediary of their lawyers were inadmissible, since the latter had no power of attorney;\n– nevertheless, all the provisions of the impugned judgment should be invalidated on the grounds that the present case no. 2001/13 should have been examined in conjunction with case no. 2002/76 before the 5th Division of the AAC (“the 5th Division”), that is to say after assessment of all the evidence included in both case files.", "127. The case is still pending before the Court of Cassation.", "128. Concurrently with their criminal appeals, all the applicants (List A and List B) filed claims for damages with the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, seeking compensation for the damage which they had sustained during and after the impugned operation.\nIn the absence of a reply from the authorities, amounting to a tacit refusal, some of the applicants brought proceedings against the State before various chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court.", "129. It transpires from the case file that despite the dismissal of their prior claims, the following applicants (List B) failed to apply to the administrative courts: Ms Songül Garip, Ms Hayriye Kesgin, Ms Fadime Özkan, Mr Serdar Atak, Mr Aydın Çınar, Mr Küçük Hasan Çoban, Mr Bülent Çütçü, Mr İlhan Emrah, Mr Ertuğrul Kaya, Mr Ertan Özkan and Mr Özgür Saltık.", "130. Moreover, some of the claims were discontinued as not having been lodged:\n– on the grounds of non-payment of court fees despite reminders (applicants Şerife Arıöz, Filiz Uzal (Soylu), Zeynep Güngörmez, Ercan Akpınar, Fatime Akalın, Aynur Sız, Edibe Tozlu, Sibel Aktan (Aksoğan), Derya Şimşek, Filiz Gülkokuer, Sevinç Şahingöz, Esmahan Ekinci, Gürcü Çakmak, İnan Özgür Bahar, Gürhan Hızmay, Cem Şahin, Behsat Örs, Veysel Eroğlu, Cemaat Ocak, Özgür Soylu, Erdal Gökoğlu, Duygu Mutlu, Murat Güneş et Yahya Yıldız);\n– on the grounds that the applicants were not accompanied by copies of the previous claims for compensation and/or because the full court fees had not been paid (applicants Gönül Aslan, Devrim Turan, Sadık Türk, Mehmet Kansu Keskinkan, Önder Mercan and Halil Doğan);\n– in the absence of locus standi, the persons concerned having acted without the prior leave of their legal guardians (applicants Haydar Baran, Mustafa Selçuk and Enver Yanık);\n– on unidentifiable grounds (applicants Kemal Yarar and Cemile Sönmez).\nInformation on the decisions given to that end, which had meanwhile become final, is provided in Appendix VIII-A.", "131. On the other hand, applicants Şaban Kavaklıoğlu, Mehiyet Emsalsiz, Selame Türker, Ali Gençaslan, Hanım Çiftçi, Hasan et Hüseyin Çat, Firdevs Kırbıyık et Melek Altıntaş (List A), as well as applicants Resul Ayaz, Nihat Konak, Savaş Kör, Barış Gönülşen, Murat Ekinci, Başak Otlu and Cenker Aslan (List B) applied successfully and were awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.\nIn all those cases, the relevant Chambers of the Ankara Administrative Court based their decisions on the following reasons:\n“The right to life is the most fundamental individual right. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 19 of the Constitution, which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to personal liberty and security’, that right is guaranteed by the Constitution, exceptions to which right are listed in the subsequent provisions of the same article. It transpires from those exceptions that custodial sentences passed by the courts are indeed cases in which a restriction of individual rights may be justified. However, where an individual must serve a custodial sentence ... it is always incumbent on the State to protect that individual’s fundamental right to life while in prison and, throughout his prison term, to take all the necessary action and precautions to that end. In the present case, it is clear that the authorities must account for official shortcomings as regards the events in question and the consequent loss of life; because the reason why prisoners were able to obtain the stones, iron bars, cudgels and firearms with which they attacked the security forces and were able so easily to organise a riot was that inadequate measures had been taken [to prevent such eventualities].”", "132. The respondent party challenged all those judgments before the State Council, whose 10th Chamber subsequently set them aside on the following grounds:\n– failure to answer the question whether, and to what extent, the authorities had been involved in the occurrence of the events giving rise to the alleged damage (applicants Resul Ayaz, Cenker Aslan and Barış Gönülşen [List B]);\n– lack of a causal link between the injuries complained of and any act attributable to the State agents (applicant Başak Otlu [List B]);\n– the first-instance court had not had jurisdiction ratione personae, since the person concerned had not obtained prior authorisation from his guardian to seek locus standi (applicant Murat Ekinci [List B]);\n– the break of the causal link between the damage and the act which the authorities had allegedly committed, as the persons concerned had played an active role in the incidents at issue and had only themselves to blame for their injuries (applicants Nihat Konak and Savaş Kör [List B] and the nine applicants on List A).", "133. As regards the applicant Yıldırım Doğan (List B), his case was dismissed at first instance by the 8th Chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court on the grounds of his presumed involvement in the impugned incidents. Nevertheless, the State Council also quashed that judgment, on the grounds that the mere fact that a military operation had had to be launched in order to impose discipline and order in a prison demonstrated that gross official negligence attributable to the State had been the root cause. The respondent authority’s application for rectification of the judgment was dismissed.\nThe 8th Chamber insisted that its initial judgment should be upheld, being convinced that “the injuries complained of in the instant case had been attributable to Mr Doğan himself, which broke the causal link between the alleged damage and the act allegedly committed by the authority”.\nThe case was therefore sent back to the plenary State Council. The Court has not been informed of the outcome of those proceedings.", "134. The known developments in the above-mentioned proceedings are summarised in Appendix VIII-B. They are still pending before the relevant courts, and the applicants still concerned by them are Melek Altıntaş, Hüseyin and Hasan Çat, Hanım Çiftçi, Mehiyet Emsalsiz, Ali Gençaslan, Şaban Kavalıoğlu, Selame Türker and Firdevs Kırbıyık (List A), and Resul Ayaz, Başak Otlu, Yıldırım Doğan, Cenker Aslan, Barış Gönülşen, Murat Ekinci and Savaş Kör (List B).", "135. It should be recalled that before the State Council adjudicated, the authority found against at first instance had apparently made payments to the successful applicants (see paragraph 131 above). Once those judgments had been set aside, the authority instigated enforcement procedures in order to recover those sums, which were no longer payable.\nIt transpires from the case file that since 2011, some of the applicants have reimbursed the sums in question in part or in full.", "136. Initially, the criminal case against 86 prisoners, including all the applicants on List B, had been registered under file no. 2000/47 before the 5th Chamber pursuant to indictment no. 1999/79635 of 1 December 1999.\nThe victims/complainants in that case were, on the one hand, the 15 gendarmes injured during the operation (Appendix II), and on the other, the late prisoners A.D., Nevzat Çiftçi (alias Habib Gül), Zafer Kırbıyık, İsmet Kavaklıoğlu and Önder Gençaslan (relatives of the applicants on List A).", "137. On 1 December 1999, however, the Prosecutor – who had issued indictment no. 1999/79635 – concurrently gave a discontinuance decision. That decision concerned the deceased Mr Çiftçi (alias Habib Gül), Mr Kırbıyık, Mr Kavaklıoğlu, Mr Gençaslan, Mr Altıntaş, Mr Çat, Mr Emsalsiz and Mr Türker (relatives of the applicants on List A) in their capacity as “victims/defendants”, as well as 27 non-applicant prisoners, in their capacity as “defendants”. The latter included İ.D. and E.D., whose submissions (see paragraphs 88 to 90 above) had played a major role in establishing indictment no. 1999/79635. In short, the Prosecutor decided to cancel the prosecution of the deceased persons on grounds of death, and he discharged the 27 prisoners in question on grounds of lack of evidence as regards the charges linked to the impugned riot.", "138. Initially, by decision of 22 February 2000, the 5th Chamber declined jurisdiction in favour of the 2nd Chamber of the Ankara State Security Court, considering that the impugned acts had amounted to terrorist offences. On 3 April 2000, however, the latter court also declined jurisdiction ratione materiae and sent the case file back to the 5th Chamber.\nAfter that clash of jurisdiction was settled by the Court of Cassation, the case was finally reassigned to the 5th Chamber, under a new file number (no. 2000/175).\nThe main stages in those proceedings may be summarised as follows. The other relevant information is to be found in Appendix IX, bearing in mind that the information goes no further than 5 July 2007.", "139. The indictment included in the new case file closely followed that of 1 December 1999 (see paragraph 136 above), and its content is therefore mainly based on the statements of prisoners E.D. and İ.D. (see paragraph 137 above).", "140. According to the Prosecutor, applicants Enver Yanık, Sadık Türk and Erdal Gökoğlu and former applicants Cemal Çakmak and Cafer Tayyar Bektaş had used firearms; during a quarrel between the rioters and the prisoners wishing to surrender, Enver Yanık and Cemal Çakmak had allegedly shot at the other three, considering them as traitors; Cemal Çakmak had brought a hunting rifle rolled up in a blanket, and fired it at A.D., Zafer Kırbıyık, İsmet Kavaklıoğlu, Küçük Hasan Çoban and Nevzat Çiftçi.\nConsequently, in addition to the charges of serious bodily injury of the fifteen gendarmes against all the applicants, the Prosecutor accused Cemal Çakmak of having killed A.D., Zafer Kırbıyık and İsmet Kavaklıoğlu and injured Küçük Hasan Çoban with a hunting rifle. Still according to the Prosecutor, Önder Gençaslan had been killed by a bullet from handgun no. 245PY74657 (see paragraph 44 above), which had been subsequently found in dormitory no. 4; the person responsible for that crime was allegedly one of the five rioters Enver Yanık, Cemal Çakmak, Sadık Türk, Erdal Gökoğlu and Cafer Tayyar Bektaş; Nevzat Çiftçi had allegedly been killed later on by a bullet in the back following indiscriminate shots fired by the five aforementioned rioters.", "141. On 5 December 2000 the 86 defendants challenged and lodged complaints against the judges of the 5th Chamber; they withdrew from the case pending the decision of the 6th Chamber of the same court, which had been called upon to adjudicate.\nOn 25 December 2000 the 6th Chamber dismissed the grounds for challenging the judges but recorded its agreement to their withdrawal from the case in order to protect the court’s impartiality. A new bench of judges took over the case.", "142. Following the failure of the attempt to join that case no. 2000/175 with case no. 2001/13 (see paragraph 126 above) – which had led to a temporary adjournment of proceedings – the present case had to be re-registered with the 5th Chamber under the new file number 2002/76.\nThe parties to proceedings remained the same, and the records of the hearing in 2000 of some of the defendants/applicants pursuant to letters rogatory had meanwhile been added to the case file. All the latter had demanded leave to appear before the trial judges in order to defend themselves. Indeed, it transpires from the case file that initially, most of the applicants had acted in concert and submitted similar requests.", "143. On 13 March 2002 the proceedings were reopened before the 5th Chamber, which ordered some twenty procedural measures geared to summoning and hearing the defendants/applicants and the complainants.\nPrior to 25 January 2006 the hearings had mainly served to relaunch those same measures and to add the few new statements obtained to the case file.\nOn 25 January 2006 the judges took note of the reply from the CDGA, explaining that it had been unable to accede to the request for urgent transmission of the video recordings made and the photographs taken during the impugned operation on the grounds that it was not in possession of the material in question.", "144. According to the latest information, the 5th Chamber had scheduled a hearing for 4 October 2007. The Court has no documentation on the progress of the proceedings in question, which is being conducted under file no. 2002/76 and has not yet been concluded because not all the defence statements of the persons involved have been collected, nor have all the measures ordered by the judges been enforced.\n..." ]

[ "P1-1", "3", "2" ]

[ 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 79, 81, 87, 88, 91, 98, 99, 101, 104, 105, 110, 114, 120, 121, 127, 129, 136 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Chișinău.", "6. The applicant lived with her four-year-old daughter, A., and with her mother, G.", "7. Following a call from C.I., on 22 September 2011 the police removed A. from her home and placed her in the care of the Municipal Children’s Hospital “V. Ignatenco”. A medical report drawn up on the same day found that the applicant had severe alcohol intoxication.", "8. C.I. later stated to the police that, as a salesman in a shop on a street near the applicant’s house, he would regularly see the applicant and her mother drinking alcohol and failing to take care of A., who often had an unkempt appearance and would wander around without adult surveillance, asking for food. He called the police on the evening of 22 September 2011 after A. had asked him to call for an ambulance because her mother and grandmother had been fighting.", "9. On an unspecified date the Ciocana Police Office reported to the Ciocana Child Protection Service the circumstances of their intervention on 22 September 2011:\n“On 22 September around 8.45 p.m. [a call] was registered about domestic violence occurring at [the applicant’s address]. At the scene [the applicant and her mother], both visibly drunk, were found exhibiting aggressive behaviour and were unkempt in their appearance. Physical and psychological violence was exercised in the presence of the child.\nA child was found in the yard ... she looked unkempt and said that she had not eaten anything the whole day.\nFrom discussions with the neighbour who had called the police, it was established that the child had been without surveillance for a week, in an unkempt state and sometimes asking for food. Subsequently the child was identified as A.\nAt the scene it was also established that the child lives in unsanitary conditions, without electricity. The child does not have the basic requirements for her physical and intellectual development, and is not enrolled in any pre-school institution. ... [S]he does not have a healthy diet [because she] begs food from neighbours.\n...[The applicant] was directed to undergo an examination in order to assess the level and the nature of her intoxication.\n...On 22 September 2011 the child inspector who was present at the scene called for an ambulance which took the child to [hospital] for medical investigation and appropriate medical assistance ....\nThe Ciocana Police Office is currently investigating whether [the applicant] had committed an offence under Article 63 (2) of the Code of Administrative Offences. ...\n[We request] ... adoption of a decision on the placement of the child in a special institution and the lodging of an action in court seeking withdrawal of [the applicant’s] parental authority”.", "10. On 23 September 2011 a social worker and a psychologist from a non-governmental organisation visited the applicant’s home and found that the house was in disorder and lacked running water, electricity and gas.", "11. On 27 September 2011 the applicant was interviewed by a Ciocana police officer. On the same day a police report concluded that the applicant was failing to duly fulfil her parental duties of educating and caring for her child because her abuse of alcohol, quarrelling or fighting with her mother in the child’s presence, and at times using physical violence towards her mother. The report concluded that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 63 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences and took into account the applicant’s personal and family circumstances as a mitigating factor. On 19 October 2011 the Ciocana prosecutor confirmed the police’s finding that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 63 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced her to an administrative fine in the amount of 200 Moldovan lei (MDL) (equivalent to 12.5 euros (EUR)).", "12. Also on 27 September 2011, the Ciocana Child Protection Committee examined A.’s situation. When the applicant appeared before the committee she was allegedly intoxicated. The applicant disputed that allegation. Based on the findings of this meeting, on 28 September 2011 the Ciocana Child Protection Committee concluded that A.’s return to her biological family would put her life and health in danger. The Committee decided to place her in the Municipal Children’s Centre and to initiate proceedings to withdraw the applicant’s parental authority.", "13. A. stayed in hospital from 22 to 30 September 2011. She was diagnosed with “residual encephalopathy with delayed motor skills, mild leg movement disorder, thyroid gland disease, decreased need for sleep (“hyposomnia”), urinary insufficiency and disorder of the function of the pancreas.” She was prescribed treatment.", "14. On 30 September 2011 A. was transferred to the Municipal Children’s Centre. A psychological evaluation dated 14 February 2012 described A. as displaying “well-developed gross motor skills, corresponding to her age, at a slow tempo. Free, balanced and directional walking. Weak fine motor skills. ... Balanced and quiet behaviour, delayed development of cognitive processes and of communication abilities, with chances of recovery. Psycho-social deprivation.”", "15. On 20 December 2012 the Municipal Child Protection Service approved A.’s placement with the family of C., a professional parental social worker. On 22 January 2013 C. took A. from the Municipal Children’s Centre and noted that A. was physically healthy, clean and without any skin eruptions.", "16. On 29 September 2011 the Ciocana Child Protection Service instituted proceedings seeking the withdrawal of the applicant’s parental authority. They relied on four grounds for the withdrawal of authority under Article 67 of the Family Code: neglect of a child, a parent’s immoral conduct, a parent’s chronic alcoholism, and other reasons taking into account the interests of the child. They relied on the information provided by the police (see paragraphs 8-11 above) and the conclusions of the committee meeting of 27 September 2011 (see paragraph 12 above).", "17. In a note dated 7 November 2011 the Municipal Children’s Centre informed the Ciocana District Court that on 30 September 2011 A. had been transferred to the centre and that on 7 October 2011 she had been registered as a child in difficult circumstances. The note also stated that the applicant had neither visited nor inquired about A. since her placement in the centre.", "18. In the course of the proceedings, the Ciocana Child Protection Service submitted the applicant’s character assessment drawn up by the Ciocana Police Office on an unspecified date, which read:\n“...[The applicant’s] family has been classified as a family unfit to educate (“needucogenă”) since 26 September 2011. It was found that [the applicant] drank alcohol at home with her mother, followed by violent behaviour in the child’s presence. Before the child’s placement in the centre, she was often seen without any parental surveillance and looked unkempt. The child did not attend any pre-school institution. [The applicant’s] family does not have electricity, water or gas in their house.”", "19. It also submitted a letter dated 2 November 2011 in which the Ciocana polyclinic stated that A. was registered with that medical institution and that “P.E. (the applicant’s first name is N.), the child’s mother, abused alcohol, and did not look after the child’s health; a neighbour accompanied the child on medical visits.”", "20. At the hearing on 24 January 2012 the representative of the Ciocana Child Protection Service submitted that during the visit to the applicant’s home on 23 September 2011 the applicant and G. had been intoxicated and displayed signs of physical violence. The applicant had been behaving inappropriately and had an unkempt appearance. The neighbours reported that A. was not attending any pre-school institution, was generally neglected by her family, was usually dirty, and often asked for food. She also alleged that the applicant had been intoxicated when she appeared before the Child Protection Committee at the meeting on 27 September 2011.", "21. In court the applicant argued that she was a single parent and was receiving no support from anyone, including social services. She had financial difficulties, which prevented her from improving her living conditions, which were very basic. She explained that they used wood for heating and that the electricity had been cut off six months previously after an electrical accident. She contended that she cared for her child, supplying her with toys, clothes and shoes, and that A. had been provided with medical assistance by a medical institution other than the local polyclinic, submitting a copy of A.’s immunisation record. She stated her wish to be with A. and her commitment to discharge her parental responsibilities. She referred to the letter of 27 October 2011 (see paragraph 31 below) as evidence that she had requested access to her child, but to no avail. She argued that the incident of 22 September 2011 had not been typical and could not constitute grounds for the removal of her parental authority. She submitted that she had left in order to work in Turkey for a period of only two weeks, after which she had returned to unofficial employment in different jobs, and supplied confirmation that after the incident she had found official employment in Moldova. She also supplied confirmation that she had obtained the documents necessary to enrol A. in a pre-school institution. She denied having been intoxicated at the Committee meeting on 27 September 2011 and stated that she consumed alcohol only occasionally.", "22. The court file also contained a statement signed by fifteen persons living in the applicant’s neighbourhood, according to which A. had never been seen wandering around dirty and hungry, or begging.", "23. The applicant attended the first three hearings. She did not appear in court at the fourth and last hearing.", "24. On 14 February 2012 the Ciocana District Court decided to withdraw the applicant’s parental authority, relying essentially on the arguments of the Child Protection Service. The court found, inter alia, the following:\n“The representative of the [Municipal Children’s Centre] submitted that A. had been transferred from the [hospital] and was undergoing treatment for residual encephalopathy with delayed motor skills, mild leg movement disorder, thyroid gland disease, decreased need for sleep (“hyposomnia”), and urinary insufficiency.\n...[the applicant] lives together with her daughter A. ... in unsanitary conditions. She is unemployed and claims to leave periodically in order to work in Turkey. ... On 22 September 2011... the police found [the applicant] drunk and... quarrelling violently in the presence of A., who was dirty, crying, hungry and scared.\nAccording to the representative of the [Ciocana Child Protection Service], during her visit [on 23 September 2011] she had found [the applicant] and her mother drunk, aggressive and with an unkempt appearance, the house and the yard disorderly and in a completely unsanitary condition. Citing neighbours, [the representative of the Child Protection service submitted that] A. was neglected by her mother and grandmother, was not enrolled in a pre-school institution, was often seen wandering around dirty and asking for food. ...[The applicant] was drunk at the meeting on 27 September 2011 of the Child Protection Committee. The Committee concluded that the child’s return to the family would put her life and health in danger.\n... [The applicant] had neither visited nor asked about [A.] since her removal from home, which was evidence of [the applicant’s] indifference towards [A.], and her immoral life style and inappropriate behaviour prove that she is unfit to raise a child.\nOn 22 September 2011 a medical examination confirmed [the applicant’s] severe alcohol intoxication. ... On 19 October 2011 the Ciocana prosecutor’s office found [the applicant] guilty, under Article 63 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, of failing to discharge her parental duties and fined her 200 Moldovan lei (12.5 euros).\n... [A.’s] psychological assessment reported balanced and quiet behaviour, delayed development of cognitive processes and of communication abilities, introversion, and a positive emotional state.\n... [The applicant] neglected her parental duties, did not appear in court to object, did not take care of the child, did not provide material or emotional support, and had a negative influence on the child through her immoral conduct.”", "25. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that she had been in legitimate employment since 4 October 2011, was making significant efforts to improve her life and wished to be with A. She referred to the evidence in the file that she had repeatedly attempted to visit her daughter but had been allowed to do so on only two occasions. She referred to the statements of a social worker before the court, according to which there had not previously been any reason to remove the child from the family or to withdraw the applicant’s parental authority and no family support measures had been undertaken. The applicant submitted that she had not attended the last hearing due to health problems.", "26. In the appellate proceedings, the representative of the Ciocana Child Protection Service stated that the applicant had been warned on several occasions that she needed to bring order to her house. She also submitted that A. had described to social services “horrifying” (“de groază”) moments experienced with her mother, entire days spent without eating anything and that she had expressed her wish not to be returned to her mother.", "27. On 24 October 2012 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded, reiterating the reasons relied upon by the district court.", "28. The applicant appealed again, arguing, inter alia, that her rights under Article 8 of the Convention had been violated. She submitted that in 2012, while the proceedings were ongoing, she had cleaned up her house and improved the living conditions. She submitted that she had regularly visited A. at the Municipal Children’s Centre and had brought parcels for her. She denied having been intoxicated at the meeting on 27 September 2011 of the Child Protection Committee and noted that no evidence to support this allegation had been presented. She agreed that, in the light of her difficult material situation, A.’s placement was an appropriate solution if applied in conjunction with measures to provide her with the necessary support, with a view to reuniting the family as soon as possible. She did not agree that the withdrawal of her parental authority was a proportionate measure under Article 8 of the Convention.", "29. On 8 May 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the previous judgments for identical reasons. That judgment was final.", "30. The applicant complained to the Ciocana prosecutor’s office about A.’s removal from her home on 22 September 2011. On 7 October 2011 the Ciocana prosecutor’s office informed her that A. had been lawfully removed from home and sent to the hospital for medical examination, given that on 22 September 2011 the Ciocana police officers had found the applicant and her mother intoxicated and aggressive, their house in an unsanitary condition and the child A. hungry and looking unkempt. The applicant was informed that A. had been placed in the Municipal Children’s Centre under the care of the Ciocana Child Protection Service and that proceedings had been instituted on 29 September 2011 to withdraw her parental authority.", "31. On 27 October 2011 the applicant submitted a request to visit A., stating that she had not been kept informed about A.’s fate and that all her previous verbal enquiries had been refused. On 23 November 2011 the Ciocana Child Protection Service refused the request and informed her that visits were prohibited while court proceedings concerning the withdrawal of her parental authority were pending.", "32. In a letter dated 17 January 2013 the head of the Municipal Children’s Centre stated that the Ciocana Child Protection Service had placed A. in the care of the centre on 30 September 2011 and had prohibited any visits by the applicant until the end of the court proceedings. The letter confirmed that the applicant had requested visits. Even though her requests had been refused, the applicant had managed to see her child on 1 and 12 August 2012. During the winter holidays, she had brought several parcels with sweets and toys and had asked for further meetings. The applicant had been redirected to the Ciocana Child Protection Service to obtain an authorisation to visit A. before the end of the court proceedings.", "33. In a letter addressed to the Municipal Child Protection Service dated 22 August 2013, the Ciocana Child Protection Service submitted that it was inappropriate to examine the applicant’s request of 1 August 2013 to visit A. because the applicant’s parental authority had been withdrawn, the child was to be placed under a relative’s guardianship and it was for that guardian to decide on the frequency of contact between A. and her biological mother.", "34. On 31 October 2013 H., an aunt, was appointed as A.’s guardian and the beneficiary of her child-care allowance. The applicant’s requests to visit A. were refused by H. on the grounds that she no longer had any parental rights.", "35. Following the applicant’s repeated requests to visit A., on 26 December 2013 the Municipal Child Protection Service allowed visits on Saturdays in the presence of A.’s guardian.", "36. On 20 February 2014 the applicant gave birth to her second child. Four days later, citing the lack of a home or resources to take care of the child, she declared her consent to the child’s adoption." ]

[ "8" ]

[ 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Istanbul.", "6. The applicant was the director of the Eminönü district branch of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – the People’s Democracy Party) in Istanbul at the time of the events giving rise to the application.", "7. On 24 June 2000 a number of trade unions organised a demonstration in Istanbul. During the demonstration, some participants carried signs and chanted slogans in support of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an illegal armed organisation. These demonstrators were identified by the police as members of HADEP.", "8. On 26 June 2000 the public prosecutor at Istanbul State Security Court applied for a warrant to search the offices of four branches of HADEP to obtain incriminating evidence concerning the PKK.", "9. On the same date the Istanbul State Security Court issued a search warrant.", "10. That same evening police officers from the Istanbul police headquarters conducted a search of the Eminönü branch office of HADEP. The search protocol, which was signed by the applicant, indicated that illegal publications and flags and symbols of the PKK had been found there, together with pictures, articles and books pertaining to Mr Öcalan.", "11. On the same date the applicant was taken to the Istanbul police headquarters for questioning. The police officers informed the applicant of his right under Article 135 (3) of the former Code of Criminal Procedure to request a lawyer. However, the applicant did not ask for a lawyer. In his statement, the applicant contended that, although he was the director of the Eminönü district office of HADEP, he was not always present at the office and that he had not been aware of the existence of the pictures and symbols regarding Mr Öcalan and the PKK found in the office. He similarly denied responsibility for the illegal publications and books which had been found on the premises, which he claimed had been brought in by publishers or other persons visiting the office without his knowledge. He claimed that whenever he came across similar pictures and symbols, he requested their removal. This statement was signed by the applicant.", "12. On 27 June 2000 the applicant was questioned by the Istanbul public prosecutor, to whom he repeated the statement he had previously made to the police. The applicant also waived his right to request a lawyer before the public prosecutor.", "13. On 30 June 2000 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, charging him with praising and condoning acts punishable by law under Article 312 § 1 of the former Criminal Code.", "14. On 19 January 2001 the Istanbul Criminal Court held the first hearing. At the end of the hearing, to which the applicant attended, the court decided to hold the next hearing on 15 June 2001.", "15. On 15 June 2001, at the second hearing, the Istanbul public prosecutor presented his opinion (esas hakkında mütalaa) to the first‑instance court in the absence of the applicant. In his opinion, the public prosecutor advised that the court should find the applicant guilty as charged. The Istanbul Criminal Court accordingly convicted the applicant at the end of the hearing, and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 91,260,000 old Turkish liras (TRL)[1]. In its judgment the domestic court held that the applicant’s defence lacked credibility and that the display of symbols and pictures pertaining to the PKK and Mr Öcalan in the party building amounted to the offence of praising and condoning acts punishable by law.", "16. Through his lawyer the applicant appealed against this judgment. He claimed that he had not been duly reminded of his right to request a lawyer under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure during his questioning. He further argued that he had missed the hearing as he was delayed in traffic and the first‑instance court had taken its decision in his absence without giving him the opportunity to defend himself against the allegations of the public prosecutor.", "17. On 5 June 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the fine imposed, but upheld the remainder of the judgment. On 11 July 2002 this decision was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court.", "18. On 31 January 2003 the applicant started serving his sentence. On 13 April 2003 he was released on parole." ]

[ "10" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Szczecin.", "6. The applicant and her husband married in 1979 under the statutory regime of common marital property, provided for by the provisions of the 1994 Family and Custody Code. Under the applicable provisions of that Code they had equal shares in their common property.", "7. By an administrative decision of 20 November 1989 the Szczecin Town Council (Urząd Miejski) held that the applicant’s husband, Mr Henryk Żuk, was determined a candidate to purchase two plots of land, nos. 184/3 and 187/3, owned at that time by the State Treasury and managed on its behalf by the State Land Fund (Państwowy Fundusz Ziemi). The Town Council, representing the State Treasury at that time, was obliged to sell the land to him on the basis of that decision. The administrative body established a three-month time-limit for the sale contract to be concluded.", "8. J.S., W.K. and W.H., who had also applied to purchase the plots of land concerned, appealed against this decision. On 21 March 1990 the Director of the Regional Land Management Office in Szczecin (Urząd Wojewódzki) dismissed the appeal brought by J.S. It further confirmed the entitlement to purchase the land created by the contested decision, considering, inter alia, that the plots concerned were adjacent to a farm owned and run by the applicant and her husband and that therefore they were natural candidates for the purchase. The authority referred to the Act on Selling State-Owned Properties 1958 (ustawa o sprzedaży nieruchomości Państwowego Funduszu Ziemi).", "9. By letters of 27 April 1990 and 23 July 1990 the Mayor of Szczecin (Prezydent m. Szczecina) informed the applicant and her husband that the decision of 20 November 1989 confirmed by the decision of 21 March 1990 could not be executed because W.K. had also contested it. The proceedings had therefore been re-opened ex officio. It was further stated that after the finalization of the appellate proceedings, the documents would be forwarded to the Cooperative Bank in Szczecin in order for the contract to be concluded. The three-month time-limit for the conclusion of the contract would start to run only after the decision became final.", "10. On 16 April 1993 the Szczecin Governor (Wojewoda) upheld the validity of the decision of 20 November 1989. On 6 June 1994 the Minister of Agriculture dismissed the appeals referred to in paragraph 8 above. On 16 October 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court in Warsaw dismissed the appeal brought by W.K.\nAccordingly, the contested decision became final on an unspecified date in early 1996.", "11. On 16 May 1994 a new local land development plan (plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego) was adopted by the Szczecin municipality.", "12. On 27 March 1998 the Szczecin Governor (Wojewoda) gave an administrative decision transferring ownership of the land concerned to the Agency of Agricultural Property of the State Treasury (Agencja Własności Rolnej Skarbu Państwa) in order for the 1989 decision to be executed. The Agency appealed. On 10 January 2002 the Minister of Agriculture quashed this decision. He found that under the provisions of the Szczecin land development plan of 1994 the lands situated within the administrative limits of the municipality and intended for agricultural purposes were not to be owned by the State Treasury and therefore not subject to transfer to the resources of the Agency.", "13. The Szczecin Town Council, when subsequently called by the applicant and her husband to execute the 1989 decision by selling the land to them, refused to do so. In letters dated 13 June and 31 July 2002 and 14 February 2003 addressed to the applicant and her husband, the municipality’s executive board (Zarząd miasta) refused to transfer ownership to them essentially because the land concerned, situated within the administrative limits of the Szczecin municipality, had been designated for non-agricultural purposes under the 1994 land development plan.", "14. In 2003 the applicant called on the Zachodniopomorskie Governor (Wojewoda Zachodniopomorski) to issue an administrative decision transferring ownership rights from the State Treasury to the Szczecin municipality, but to no avail.", "15. On an unspecified date the Szczecin Mayor (representing the municipality) requested the Governor (representing the State Treasury) to take over the ownership of the plots of land concerned. On 30 September 2003 the Governor refused to do so, relying on the Act of 19 October 1991 on the management of State-owned agricultural property (ustawa o gospodarowaniu nieruchomościami rolnymi Skarbu Państwa oraz o zmianie niektórych ustaw). It was noted that under the 1994 land development plan adopted by the Szczecin municipality, the plots no longer constituted agricultural land either within the meaning of the Civil Code nor under the local land development plan. It could therefore not be transferred to the Agency representing the State Treasury in the management of agricultural properties it owned as the agency had jurisdiction only in respect of land designated for agricultural uses. The Mayor appealed. On 8 June 2005 the Minister of Agriculture upheld the contested decision. No appeal to the administrative court against this decision was lodged.", "16. As a result, the land remained municipal property.", "17. On 17 April 2003 the applicant and her husband lodged a civil action against the Szczecin municipality. They requested the court, relying on Article 64 of the Civil Code, to oblige the defendant municipality to sell the property concerned to the applicant’s husband on the basis of the 1989 decision (roszczenie o złożenie oświadczenia woli). In response to the claim the defendant municipality asked for the action to be dismissed. It submitted that it did not own the land concerned. It was at that time owned by the State Treasury. As the Governor had refused to give a decision on the transfer of ownership of that land to the municipality (see paragraph 15 above), the latter could not sell it. The municipality further argued that the claim to have the property sold to the applicants had become prescribed.", "18. The Szczecin District Court, by a judgment of 28 November 2003, dismissed the claim. The applicant and her husband appealed.", "19. On 15 April 2004 the Szczecin Regional Court allowed the appeal, amended the contested judgment and allowed the claim. It dismissed the prescription objection. The court was of the view that the ten-year prescription period provided for pecuniary claims under the provisions of the Civil Code had started to run only in 1996 when the 1989 decision had become final (see paragraph 10 above).", "20. The court further obliged the municipality to sell the land concerned to the applicant and her husband. It was of the view that the first-instance court had erred in finding that neither the provisions of the 1958 Sale of the National Land Fund Act (ustawa o sprzedaży nieruchomości Państwowego Funduszu Ziemi) nor the decision given in 1989 and 1990 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above) on the basis of that Act provided for an obligation on the part of the municipality to sell the land to the addressee of that decision. That decision created on the claimants’ part a claim of a pecuniary nature to have the sale contract concluded with them. They were not therefore obliged to participate in a tender which was simply another procedure for buying the land owned by the State, not applicable to their situation. The fact that the proceedings lasted until 1996 because other persons had contested that decision did not affect the validity of their claim. Nor did the fact that the applicable provisions changed in 1991 and the ownership of the land had thereby been transferred ex lege from the State Treasury to the municipality (see paragraphs 34-35 below) affect the existence and validity of the claim to have the purchase contract concluded or the corresponding obligation on the part of the public authorities.\nIn the operative part of the judgment the court expressly formulated the essential provisions of the sale contract to be concluded by the Szczecin Municipality with the applicants, including the price of PLN 11,015 to be paid for the plots. The court further ordered the municipality to cover the legal costs borne by the applicant and her husband in the amount of PLN 4,496.", "21. The defendant municipality appealed. Its appeal was rejected on 9 September 2004 by the Szczecin Regional Court for having been lodged out of time.", "22. On 17 March 2005 the applicant and her husband paid PLN 6,519 to the municipality, the amount being the difference between the price of PLN 11,015 as determined by the judgment and PLN 4,496, the amount of court costs they had borne in the connection with the civil proceedings.", "23. In 2005 and 2006 the applicant and her husband, referring to this judgment, called the municipality to sell the property to them, but to no avail.", "24. By a judgment of 14 May 2007 the Szczecin District Court held that the statutory conjugal property of the applicant and her husband created ex lege by their marriage on 6 January 1979 had been replaced by a separate marital property regime as from 1 January 2004.", "25. On 29 February 2008 the applicant and her husband lodged a civil action against the Szczecin Municipality with the civil court requesting that steps be taken by that court to put right the discrepancies between the entry in the land register and the actual ownership of the plot (powództwo o uzgodnienie ksiçgi wieczystej z rzeczywistym stanem prawnym). They referred to the judgment of the Regional Court, summarised in paragraphs 19 and 20 above and requested that the State Treasury be listed as owner of the land concerned.", "26. The applicants also submitted an alternative claim asking the court to order the State Treasury represented by the Mayor of Szczecin to sell the property to them. The Mayor was invited to participate in the proceedings.", "27. The municipality argued before the court that it did not own the land. As the land was owned by the State Treasury, the municipality could not sell it.", "28. On 15 September 2008 the Szczecin District Court dismissed the claim. Subsequently, on 27 March 2009 the Regional Court quashed this judgment on formal grounds and ordered that the case should be re-examined.", "29. On 30 July 2009 the Szczecin District Court dismissed the claim against the State Treasury – the Mayor of Szczecin (pko Skarbowi Państwa – Prezydentowi Miasta Szczecina) and against the municipality of Szczecin (pko Gminie Miasto Szczecin). It noted that the relevant land register listed the State Treasury as the owner of the plot. The land register could only be amended on the basis of an administrative decision issued by the Governor on the basis of section 18(1) of the Local Self-Government Act of 10 May 1990 (\"the 1990 Act\") confirming the ex lege transfer of ownership from the State Treasury to the local municipality on the basis of that Act (see paragraph 36 below). The Governor had never given a relevant administrative decision. The civil court had no jurisdiction to order administrative bodies to issue administrative decisions. In the absence of such a decision the ex lege transfer of ownership to the municipality provided for by law could not become operative. In the absence of such a transfer certified by a decision, the State Treasury remained the land’s owner. It was therefore impossible for the court to order the municipality to sell the plot to the claimant or to amend the land register in such a manner as to list the municipality as the owner. The judgment given in 2004 was not res iudicata towards the State Treasury as it was the municipality who had been the defendant in these proceedings.", "30. The claimants appealed. They argued that they had already specified before the first-instance court that the claim was directed against both the State Treasury and the municipality of Szczecin.", "31. During the hearing before the appeal court the lawyer representing the applicant and her husband stated that he had corrected the content of the alternative claim (as regards the entity who was supposed to make a declaration of intent) already during the proceedings before the court of first instance.", "32. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed on 4 March 2010 by the Szczecin Regional Court. The court shared the conclusions of the lower court. It was of the view that the claimants had not made it sufficiently clear that the alternative claim had been directed against both the State Treasury and the municipality. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had pointed out the mistake in their statement of claim which had been addressed against the State Treasury, the court could not rectify that mistake ex officio.", "33. The Supreme Court refused to entertain the cassation appeal against this judgment by a decision of 23 February 2011." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 1, 3, 10, 19 ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant company is a shipping company in liquidation incorporated under Greek Law in 1991, with its legal seat in Kallithea, Greece.", "5. On 13 March 1995 the Vlora District Court decided that the applicant company’s vessel had been unlawfully seized. This decision was upheld on appeal and it became final at the latest on 1 August 1995.", "6. On 1 December 1995 the applicant company brought a civil action against the local Treasury office (“Seksioni i Financës - Dega e Thesarit Vlorë”), the district prosecutor’s office (“Prokuroria e Rrethit Vlorë”) and the local Customs Administration (“Dogana e Rrethit Vlorë”), seeking compensation in respect of the damage caused by the unlawful seizure. The Customs Administration lodged a counter action requesting payment of expenses for keeping the vessel.", "7. On 4 July 1996 the Vlora District Court dismissed both civil actions.", "8. On 14 November 1996 the Tirana Court of Appeal quashed that decision. It ordered the local Treasury office to pay the applicant company 1,621,575 United States dollars (“USD”) for damages. It further ordered the applicant company to pay the Customs Administration USD 333,120 to cover the expenses incurred for the keeping of the vessel.", "9. On 30 July 1997 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. After this had become final, on 27 October 1997 an enforcement writ was issued at the request of the applicant company.", "10. On 22 April 1999 the Customs Administration and the district prosecutor lodged a request for supervisory review (“rekurs në interes të ligjit”) against the Supreme Court’s decision. On 29 March 2000 the Supreme Court requested the appellants to resubmit the request as well as supplementary documents. On 28 April 2000 the appellants resubmitted the request. It would appear that the request was never examined by the Supreme Court.", "11. On three occasions, namely on 10 November 1999, in 2003 and on 21 June 2006 the applicant company requested the bailiff to enforce the Court of Appeal’s decision, as upheld by the Supreme Court. It accordingly paid the bailiff tax in part.", "12. On 8 August 2000 the bailiff discontinued the enforcement proceedings, having regard to the impossibility of the Savings Bank to freeze the local Treasury’s bank account.", "13. On 3 February 2005 the applicant company withdrew its enforcement request.", "14. From 2006 to 2008 the bailiff unsuccessfully sought the enforcement of the decision from the local Treasury office and the Ministry of Finance. The bailiff further fined the director of the local Treasury office for failure to enforce the decision. On 10 March 2008 it discontinued the enforcement on the grounds that the enforcement writ did not specify the nature of the obligation that had to be enforced and the applicant company had failed to pay the bailiff tax in full.", "15. To date, the final decision remains unenforced." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 6 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1942 and 1943 respectively and live in Warsaw.", "6. The applicants are legal successors of the former owners of a property in the vicinity of Warsaw, called Willa Janówka, composed of a number of plots owned by several individuals.", "7. In 1971 the then owners of the property, including E.P., the applicants’ mother, were obliged by an administrative decision to transfer their land to the State Treasury without compensation within the framework of a larger expropriation scheme.", "8. On 30 December 2005 the Local Self-Government Board of Appeal (Samorządowe Kolegium Odwoławcze w Warszawie) gave a decision concerning the applicants and three other persons, legal successors of the other former owners expropriated by the 1971 decision. It declared that that decision had been issued in flagrant breach of the law in force at the material time. The parties were further informed that the corrective decision gave rise to a compensation claim on their part for damage caused by the original unlawful decision.", "9. On 28 August 2006 the applicants sought compensation for damage caused by the decision given in 1971.", "10. On 15 May 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the applicants’ claim and awarded 64,487 Polish zlotys (PLN) to each of them, corresponding to the value of the expropriated land. It held that the conditions determining civil liability in tort, namely a tortious event which caused damage and the establishment of a causal link between the event and the damage, were met in the case. In respect of tort committed by the State Treasury and caused by unlawful administrative decisions compensation could be sought only after a subsequent decision declared that the original administrative decision was unlawful. Such a corrective decision (decyzja nadzorcza) had been given in the applicants’ case in 2005 (see paragraph 8 above).", "11. The court went on to state that it was necessary to determine which provisions of substantive law were applicable to the circumstances of the case. The choice of substantive provisions determined, in turn, the beginning and the length of the time-limit within which the compensation claim had to be brought before the courts. The court noted that the original administrative decision had been given before 1 September 2004. On that date the Law of 17 June 2004 amending the Civil Code had entered into force. This law had fundamentally changed the legal framework concerning civil liability of the State Treasury. It abrogated, inter alia, Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure and enacted Article 417 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 22-24 below). The court was of the view that it was the latter provision which should be applied to the circumstances of the case. Under this provision, read together with the provisions of the Civil Code on liability in tort, the prescription period started to run only when the decision of 30 December 2005, confirming the unlawfulness of the original expropriation decision, became final. The prescription period of three years had not therefore expired.", "12. The defendant State Treasury, represented by the mayor of Warsaw, appealed.", "13. On 26 November 2009 the Warsaw Court of Appeal examined the appeal and dismissed the applicants’ claim. It endorsed the findings of fact made by the lower court as to the existence of pecuniary damage and the causal link between the 1971 decision and that damage. However, it was of the view that the provisions concerning the State’s civil liability in tort should have been interpreted differently by the first-instance court, in particular as to the determination of the prescription period. The court observed that under the communist regime it was practically impossible, essentially for political reasons, to vindicate claims originating in unlawful administrative decisions or to seek compensation from the State Treasury for damage in tort caused by such decisions. The earliest date on which it was possible to do so was 4 June 1989, when the first partially free parliamentary elections were held in Poland. It was from that date that the prescription period of ten years provided for by Article 442 of the Civil Code started to run. The applicants should have availed themselves of the available remedy, namely they should have obtained a decision declaring the original expropriation decision unlawful prior to 4 June 1999 when the ten-year prescription period came to an end.", "14. The applicants appealed on points of law. They argued that the contested judgment was in breach of Article 77 of the 1997 Constitution in so far as it guaranteed the right to compensation for damage caused by the State. Neither the damage caused by the 1971 decision nor its unlawfulness were in dispute between the parties.\nThey further submitted that the case raised a significant legal issue in so far as there were divergent strands of case-law regarding the interpretation of legal provisions governing the State’s civil liability for administrative decisions made prior to 1 September 2004 and declared unlawful after that date. These differences in the judicial approach to similar cases, both as to the determination of the beginning of the prescription period and as to its length, had a decisive influence on the outcome of compensation cases brought by victims of unlawful administrative decisions and on the applicants’ case.", "15. On 21 October 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera as a single judge, refused to hear the applicants’ appeal on points of law, holding that it did not raise any significant legal issue.", "16. Parallel to the applicants’ case, A.C., a successor of another owner expropriated by the same expropriation decision given in 1971 and covered by the same corrective decision of 30 December 2005 (see paragraph 8 above), sought compensation in civil proceedings for damage caused by the original decision. She lodged her claim with the Warsaw Regional Court on 30 August 2006.", "17. By a judgment of 30 September 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed her claim and awarded her compensation in the amount of PLN 110,187, corresponding to the value of the plot of land owned by A.C.’s legal predecessor. It recounted briefly the divergent views expressed by the civil courts, including the Supreme Court, in cases concerning claims for pecuniary damage caused by administrative decisions declared unlawful after 1 September 2004. It noted that the manner in which the provisions concerning the State’s liability in tort for unlawful administrative decisions were interpreted had given rise to serious difficulties and differences of opinion in judicial practice. It disagreed with the view expressed in certain judicial decisions that the ten-year prescription period for bringing compensation claims before the courts had started to run when the unlawful decision had been given, but its running was subsequently stayed until 4 June 1989. The Regional Court was of the view that the three‑year prescription period, referred to in the former Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, was applicable to the circumstances of the case. It further held that this period had started to run when the corrective decision of 30 December 2005 declaring the 1971 decision unlawful had become final.", "18. On 5 September 2006 R.W., another legal successor of the original owners, brought a compensation case before the Warsaw Regional Court, claiming compensation from the State Treasury, represented by the mayor of Warsaw, for damage originating in the 1971 decision. He also referred to the corrective decision of 30 December 2005.", "19. By a judgment of 10 July 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed his claim and awarded him PLN 82,988, corresponding to the value of the land concerned. The court stressed that it was not in dispute that the original administrative decision had been unlawful. Nor was it in dispute that that decision had caused damage to the claimant. The court referred to the resolution given by the Supreme Court on 31 March 2011 (see paragraph 27 below). It shared the view expressed by the Supreme Court in this resolution that it was not justified to interpret the applicable provisions in a way imposing on the applicant an obligation to seek a declaration of unlawfulness of the original administrative decision within ten years after 4 June 1989." ]

[ "P1-1" ]

[ 3 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod.", "6. In August 2007 the body of a man with multiple injuries was found in a public garden in Nizhniy Novgorod and an investigation started into the murder.", "7. On 14 September 2007 the applicant was arrested by police officers of the Kanavinskiy district police department of Nizhniy Novgorod (управление внутренних дел Канавинского района Нижнего Новогорода – “the Kanavinskiy RUVD”) at a house in the village of Druzhkovo in the Nizhniy Novgorod region. He was taken to the Kanavinskiy RUVD with Mr M.K., Ms N. and Ms S., who had been at the house with him at the time. They arrived at about 8 p.m. and were interviewed by the same officers about the murder.", "8. According to the applicant, M.K. was beaten up and gave statements implicating him in the murder, which he confirmed during a confrontation with the applicant in the presence of an investigator in the murder case. He subsequently retracted them.", "9. At about 2.30 a.m. the next morning the officers interviewed the applicant, demanding that he confess to the murder. He refused to do so and was allegedly beaten up.", "10. At 5.55 a.m. an official record was drawn up of his arrest as a suspect in the murder case.", "11. The applicant’s ill-treatment allegedly lasted until the arrival of an investigator from the Kanavinskiy District Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office (“the Investigative Committee”), who was in charge of the murder case. The investigator arrived at about 6.30 a.m. and questioned the applicant in the presence of a lawyer. He refused to confess.", "12. At 9.20 a.m. the applicant was placed in the Kanavinskiy RUVD’s temporary detention facility (“the IVS”). According to its records, he wrote two statements concerning the origin of his injuries, notably an abrasion on his chin and bruising to his chest. One of the statements read that he had received the injuries “before [arriving] at the IVS”, while the other said “on 14 September on Sovetskaya Street in the village of Druzhkovo”.", "13. At about 7.30 p.m. the applicant was taken to pre‑trial detention facility SIZO-52/1. He was examined by a doctor on duty, who reported the following injuries to the head of administration: haemorrhages on the upper chest up to 7cm in size, a haematoma on the left shoulder, an abrasion on the chin and an oedema on the back of the head. The applicant wrote to the head of the SIZO explaining that he had been beaten up by police officers of the Kanavinskiy RUVD on 15 September 2007 and requested that an inquiry be carried out. The information about his alleged ill‑treatment was communicated to the Kanavinskiy district prosecutor’s office, which transferred it to the Investigative Committee on 26 September 2007.", "14. In November 2007 two police officers visited the applicant in SIZO‑52/1 and allegedly demanded under threat that he confess to the murder. He signed a confession which he later retracted. He subsequently stood trial for the murder. There is no information in the case file about the outcome of those proceedings.", "15. An investigator of the Investigative Committee carried out a pre‑investigation inquiry, in the course of which he interviewed operative officer K. of the Kanavinskiy RUVD, who had arrested the applicant and taken him to the police station for questioning by the investigator in the murder case. K. asserted that no physical violence had been used by the police against the applicant.", "16. On 3 October 2007 the investigator, relying on K.’s explanation and referring to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”), refused to institute criminal proceedings under Article 286 § 1 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power) on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were missing.", "17. On 8 April 2008 the head of the Investigative Committee revoked the investigator’s decision on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete and the decision premature. He ordered, in particular, that the applicant be interviewed, along with the other police officers who had arrested him, the investigator in the murder case and the IVS officers. He also ordered that the IVS records concerning the applicant’s state of health be obtained and the gravity of harm to the applicant’s health be assessed.", "18. Ms N. stated in the course of an additional inquiry that she had not noticed any injuries on the applicant at the police station. Police officer M. said that the police had been in possession of information that the applicant may have been involved in the murder, so his whereabouts had been established and he had been taken to the police station and interviewed. The investigator in the murder case and M. both stated that they had not noticed any injuries on the applicant, maintaining that no violence had been used against him.", "19. On 17 April 2008 the investigator, referring to Article 24 § 1 (1) of the CCrP, decided that no criminal case could be opened under Article 286 of the Criminal Code since no crime had been committed. That decision was revoked on 27 May 2008 on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete.", "20. In the course of an additional inquiry the investigator interviewed operative officers K. and A., who both gave statements similar to those of M. (see paragraph 18 above).", "21. On 2 June 2008 the investigator again decided that no criminal case could be opened as no crime had been committed. The applicant’s allegations were refuted by the statements of the investigator in the murder case, police officers K. and M. and Ms N., as well as the one he had made on his arrival at the IVS that he had received the abrasion on his chin and bruising to his chest “on 14 September on Sovetskaya Street in the village of Druzhkovo” (see paragraph 12 above).", "22. On 3 October 2008 a judge of the Kanavinskiy District Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the investigator’s decision of 2 June 2008, holding that it could not be examined in review proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP as it concerned matters to be examined at the hearing of the applicant’s case which had been referred for trial and was now pending before the District Court.", "23. On 1 December 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court quashed that decision and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that an examination of the applicant’s appeal against the investigator’s decision in proceedings separate from his trial could have prejudiced the legal assessment of his confession as evidence. Such an assessment had to be carried out at the hearing of the applicant’s criminal case.", "24. The applicant’s representative obtained the following medical experts’ opinions regarding the applicant’s injuries on the basis of the description recorded in SIZO-52/1 on 15 September 2007.", "25. Doctor M. stated on 16 February 2009 that the oedema on the back of the applicant’s head could have been caused as a result of being hit by a hard object. It could not be excluded that all the injuries had been caused on 14 or 15 September 2007.", "26. Forensic medical expert Y. from the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Forensic Medical Bureau concluded in a report of 13 March 2009 that the haemorrhages on the chest, haematoma on the left shoulder and abrasion on the chin could have been inflicted by a blunt object on 14 or 15 September 2007." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 7, 8 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Ukhta, the Komi Republic.", "6. In April 2005 a jewellery shop and other premises in a commercial centre in the Sosnogorsk district of the Komi Republic were robbed; in the course of those events, a woman guard was attacked and suffered injuries. Investigator A., from the investigation unit of the Sosnogorsk police department, opened a criminal case into the robbery. On 15 June 2005 the criminal proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of a person to be charged.", "7. On 25 August 2005 a certain R. reported to the police that her boyfriend B. had committed the robbery together with Zh. and the applicant. On the same day investigator A. reopened the criminal proceedings.", "8. On 26 August 2005 the police arrested B., Zh. and the applicant. Investigator A. was present at the time of the arrest. The three men were taken to the Sosnogorsk police department of the Komi Republic (отдел внутренних дел г. Сосногорска Республики Коми).", "9. Police officers, in particular Z., the head of the criminal police division of the Sosnogorsk police department, interviewed the applicant about his involvement in the robbery. According to the applicant, they demanded that he confess to the robbery and G., an operative officer in the criminal investigation unit of the police department, punched and kicked him on different parts of his body. Fearing new violence, the applicant confessed to having participated in the crime as requested, and signed a record of his “surrender and confession” (явка с повинной) that had been drawn up by operative officer G. at Z.’s request.", "10. According to that record, on 26 August 2005 in office no. 12 of the Sosnogorsk police department police officer G. obtained from the applicant his confession to the crime, in accordance with Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (“CCrP”). In particular, the record stated that the applicant had assisted B. and Zh. by loading the property stolen from the shops into his car and transporting it; that he had confessed without any physical or psychological pressure being exerted on him; and that he had been informed of Article 51 of the Constitution. The record did not indicate the exact time when the confession was obtained and did not explain the meaning of Article 51 of the Constitution (concerning self-incrimination, see paragraphs 28, 47 and 49 below).", "11. At Z.’s request, the applicant wrote in the police station visitors’ registration log that he had struck his own head against a wall, and that he had no complaints against the police officers.", "12. At 2.57 p.m. on the same day investigator A. drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect in the case.", "13. On the same day the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility (IVS) at the Ukhta police department. According to the IVS records, on arrival he had bruises under his eyes, his lips were burst, his lower jaw was swollen on the left side, and he had bruises on his back and abrasions on his knees.", "14. On 27 August 2005 the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer. He retracted the confession statement that he had given on the previous day, and explained that he had made the statement as a result of ill‑treatment by the police officers.", "15. On 30 August 2005 a judge of the Sosnogorsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. In reply to the judge’s question about the origin of his facial injuries, the applicant stated that he had been beaten up by operative officers from the police department. On the same day the applicant’s legal-aid counsel, who was representing the applicant at the court hearing, lodged an application with the Sosnogorsk prosecutor in which he requested that an inquiry be conducted into the applicant’s complaint and that those responsible for his ill‑treatment be prosecuted.", "16. On 31 August 2005 the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention facility SIZO 11/2, where he was examined by a doctor and found to have bruising beneath his eyes, a swollen nasal bridge, two-centimetre abrasions on the right side of his forehead, hematoma on the left side of his lower jaw and abrasions on the small of his back and right knee (as recorded in a certificate of that detention facility dated 29 September 2005).", "17. On 5 September 2005 the applicant’s counsel requested investigator A., who was in charge of the robbery case, to order a forensic medical examination (судебно‑медицинская экспертиза) of the applicant. The investigator rejected the request as irrelevant to the robbery case.", "18. Following the application by the applicant’s counsel (see paragraph 15 above), investigator V. of the Sosnogorsk prosecutor’s office carried out a pre‑investigation inquiry into the alleged ill‑treatment of the applicant.", "19. On 5 September 2005 the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant; this was carried out by the Ukhta Forensic Medical Bureau on 7 September 2005. The expert’s report stated that the applicant had the following injuries: bruises measuring up to 1 to 3.5 centimetres on the lower eyelids of both eyes, two abrasions measuring 4 to 0.6 and 1.5 to 0.2 centimetres on his back; and an abrasion measuring 0.6 to 0.5 centimetres on his right knee. The injuries could have been caused by impacts from blunt hard objects with a limited contact surface, in the period 8-12 days before the examination. They could not have been caused by a single impact as a result of a fall against a flat surface.", "20. The investigator received “explanations” (объяснения) from investigator A. (responsible for the robbery case) and from the police officers who had taken the applicant to the police station and interviewed him about his involvement in the robbery. In particular, police officer G. stated that in the course of a “conversation” (беседа) which he had had with the applicant, the latter had suddenly jumped to his feet and hit his head against the wall, as a result of which his nose had started bleeding. Police officer K. also stated that he had seen the applicant hitting his own head against the wall. Police officer Z. explained that in the course of his “conversation” with the applicant the latter had recounted the details of the robbery committed by him; that the applicant had explained that he had hit his own head against the wall and that he had no complaints against police officers; and that the applicant had entered this explanation in the police station visitors’ registration log.", "21. On 9 September 2005 investigator V. held that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, in particular the claims that he had been struck “in his kidneys” and pushed so that his face had hit the wall and he had fainted, had not been based on real facts and that no criminal case was to be opened against police officers G., Z., Ku., B. and M., pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP (lack of the elements of a crime in the impugned acts).", "22. On 5 December 2005 the Sosnogorsk prosecutor set aside the investigator’s decision of 9 September 2005 as unlawful and unfounded, on the ground that the circumstances in which the applicant had received his injuries had not been reliably established. He referred to the description of the applicant’s injuries on his arrival in the IVS (see paragraph 13 above) and the SIZO (see paragraph 16 above) and his examination by the forensic medical expert (see paragraph 19 above). He stated that the expert’s suggestions as to how the injuries had been sustained made it doubtful that the applicant could have received his injuries as a result of a one-off impact by his face against a wall. The prosecutor further noted that the applicant had explained that he would most likely be able to identify the police officer who had beaten him at the police station. However, it was not possible to carry out an identification parade and a confrontation in a pre‑investigation inquiry. The prosecutor considered that it could not be ruled out that, after his arrest, the applicant had been subjected to acts of violence in order to make him confess to the crime. The applicant’s version of his ill‑treatment by the police officers could only be verified by way of a full investigation. In order to do so it was necessary to open a criminal case, given that there was sufficient information disclosing elements of a crime under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (official misconduct with the use of violence). The prosecutor ordered that a criminal case be opened.", "23. In the course of the ensuing investigation the police officers who had arrested the applicant were questioned as witnesses. The applicant was questioned as a victim. An additional forensic medical expert’s report was obtained on 15 February 2006. It reiterated the conclusions in the previous report (see paragraph 19 above).", "24. On 4 March 2006 an investigator from the Sosnogorsk prosecutor’s office terminated the proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the acts of the police officers, pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP.", "25. On 30 June 2006 a deputy prosecutor of the Komi Republic set aside the investigator’s decision and reopened the criminal proceedings. Three further decisions to terminate the proceedings were subsequently taken and then set aside as unfounded and based on an incomplete investigation. In one of the decisions, dated 24 November 2006, the deputy prosecutor ordered that the inconsistencies between the statements of the police officers and that of the applicant be eliminated and that identification parades and confrontations be held, if necessary. When questioned again as a victim, the applicant stated, inter alia, that he remembered that police officer G. had hit his head against the wall and started punching him “in the kidneys” (as stated in a decision to terminate the proceedings of 4 January 2007).", "26. The most recent decision to terminate the proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code in the acts of police officers G., Ku. and B. was taken on 1 April 2007. The investigator concluded that the applicant’s allegations had been refuted by police officers G. and K., who stated that the applicant had hit his own head against the wall; by the record of his surrender and confession and the forensic medical report of 15 February 2006, in that the applicant’s injuries could have been sustained as a result of impacts from blunt hard objects with a limited contact surface. It does not appear from the decision that investigative acts such as identification parades and confrontations with the applicant’s participation were carried out.", "27. At a preliminary hearing held by the Sosnogorsk Town Court on 13 April 2006 the applicant’s counsel requested that the record of the applicant’s surrender and confession of 26 August 2005, on which the prosecution relied, be excluded from evidence pursuant to Article 75 § 2 (1) of the CCrP, as it had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. The Town Court dismissed the request.", "28. At his trial, the applicant pleaded his innocence and submitted that he had written his confession statement on the instructions of police officer Z. as a result of physical and psychological coercion by the police officers; in particular, police officer G. had beaten him “in the kidneys and liver” and his head had been struck against the wall so that he had fainted. He had not been informed of his right under Article 51 of the Constitution not to give self‑incriminating statements, as that part of the record had been added by police officers at a later stage. The applicant asserted, in particular, that on the night of the robbery he had arrived at the commercial centre, by car and at B.’s request, and had towed B.’s car until its engine started, without knowing anything about the robbery. Two months later B. had offered him gold jewellery, allegedly belonging to B.’s acquaintance, for sale. The applicant had returned some of the jewellery to B. and kept the rest for himself. He had understood from police officer Z. that the gold which he had received from B. had been stolen from the Sosnogorsk district commercial centre. He had therefore told Z. about the gold he had kept at his home.", "29. The applicant’s co-defendant Zh. pleaded his innocence, asserting that he had given self-incriminating statements as a result of his ill‑treatment by police officers, in particular by G., who had allegedly beaten him up, kicked him and burned his fingers with a cigarette; he also stated that after his arrest on 26 August 2005 he had seen the applicant, on his knees and bleeding, at the police station.", "30. The applicant’s co-defendant B. admitted before the trial court that he had committed the robbery together with a certain Ch., and stated that the applicant and Zh. were innocent. In particular, B. stated that on the night of the robbery he had called the applicant, asking him for help because his car had broken down; the applicant had arrived by car as requested, towed B.’s car (with the stolen property inside) until the engine started and then left without knowing anything about the robbery. Two or three months later, since he was experiencing difficulties with storing and selling the stolen property, B. had asked the applicant to look after the gold jewellery and to buy some of it if he wished. The applicant had agreed. B. also stated that he had not given any self‑incriminating statements during the preliminary investigation, in spite of the physical violence used against him by the police officers, in particular by G.", "31. The applicant’s wife stated, among other things, that on the day of his arrest the applicant had been taken back to their home by the police officers in order for their flat to be searched. He had had an abrasion on his head, his lip was burst and his nose was swollen.", "32. Police officer Z., examined by the trial court as a witness, stated that he and other police officers had arrested the applicant and his two co‑defendants after B.’s girlfriend had reported their involvement in the robbery. At the police station he had talked to the applicant about the robbery several times. The applicant had confessed, named his accomplices and expressed his readiness to surrender the stolen gold. Z. had suggested that the applicant write a statement of his surrender and confession. The applicant had agreed and Z. had asked his subordinates to prepare the necessary document. No violence or threats had been used against the applicant.", "33. Police officer G. stated that after the applicant’s arrest he had taken the applicant to the police station. The applicant had been taken to Z.’s office and later Z. had requested G. to obtain from the applicant a statement of his surrender and confession. The applicant had written down his statement and signed it. G. had not used any violence against the applicant. G. had come out of his office to register the statement with an officer on duty, while the applicant had stayed with police officer K. On returning to his office, G. had seen the applicant suddenly jump to his feet and strike his head against the wall. The applicant had fallen to his knees and started bleeding, “probably from his nose”. K. had given him a towel and asked whether he needed a doctor. The applicant had answered negatively. Z. had then taken the applicant to his office again.", "34. Police officer K. stated that the applicant had jumped to his feet and struck his forehead against the wall once and then had fallen to his knees. K. had wanted to call a doctor but the applicant had refused. He had given the applicant a towel because the applicant was bleeding. K. denied any violent behaviour on the part of the police officers.", "35. Investigator A. stated that she had investigated the robbery case and had given instructions (отдельные поручения) to the police officers in the criminal investigation unit of the Sosnogorsk police department. She had not instructed them to question the applicant or to collect a statement of his surrender and confession. Police officer G. had obtained the applicant’s statement of his surrender and confession as a result of the applicant’s free will. When questioning the applicant as a suspect (on 27 August 2005, see paragraph 14 above) she had noticed his injuries and asked if he had needed medical assistance, but he had refused.", "36. The applicant’s counsel maintained before the trial court that the applicant’s statement of his surrender and confession, which he had retracted on the following day when questioned for the first time in the presence of a lawyer, should be declared inadmissible evidence. She noted that investigator A. had drawn up the record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect on 26 August 2005. However, for unknown reasons she had not questioned him as a suspect on the same day. Instead, the police officers had obtained the statement of his surrender and confession on their own initiative, without any such instruction from the investigator. They had done so using psychological and physical coercion, as confirmed, inter alia, by the statements of Zh. and the applicant’s wife (see paragraphs 29 and 31 above), the certificate from detention facility IZ-11/2 (see paragraph 16 above) and the forensic medical expert report of 7 September 2005 (see paragraph 19 above). Furthermore, his confession statement had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. Under Article 142 § 1 of the CCrP, a statement of one’s surrender and confession was meant to be voluntary. Therefore, if obtained from a person arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, any such statement should be subjected to particular scrutiny. Its voluntary nature was ensured through procedural guarantees under Articles 46 (“The suspect”) and 51 (“Compulsory participation of counsel for the defence”) of the CCrP. Otherwise, such a confession statement should be declared inadmissible evidence in accordance with Article 75 § 2 (1) of the CCrP.", "37. In its judgment of 6 December 2007 the Town Court held that the applicant’s allegation that the statement of his surrender and confession had been given under duress was unsubstantiated. It relied on the statements by the police officers, denying any wrongdoing on their part (see paragraphs 32-34 above), the investigative authority’s most recent decision to terminate the criminal proceedings against them which, as the Town Court noted, had been taken in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and had not been revoked or quashed (see paragraph 26 above), and a report from an internal police inquiry which had dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment.", "38. The Town Court held that it had critically assessed the applicant’s statements at the trial and concluded that they represented the position of the defence, in that they were aimed at evading criminal responsibility. Those submissions had been refuted by his and Zh.’s statements of surrender and confession, as well as by the statements by the following witnesses: B.’s girlfriend, who had provided hearsay evidence about the applicant’s involvement in the robbery; five police officers who had participated in the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ arrest or the operative follow-up, in particular Z., G., and K.; investigator A., in charge of the robbery case; Z.A., who had denied seeing the applicant in the porch of his building on the night of the robbery (where, according to her former boyfriend who had been heard by the court as a witness for the defence, she had spent time that evening), and her mother Z.E., who had stated that Z.A. had not gone out after 9 p.m.; and Kh., who had been an attesting witness during the search at the applicant’s home during which certain items were seized.", "39. The Town Court held that it had based its judgment on the statements of surrender and confession given by the applicant and Zh., along with statements by the victims, the prosecution witnesses and other evidence. It found that on 12 April 2005 B., Zh. and the applicant had entered into a conspiracy to commit theft from the shops in the commercial centre. According to the roles agreed on between them, the applicant had remained on guard in his car outside the commercial centre, while B. and Zh. had entered while the centre was still open and had hidden there. During the night they had attacked a woman guard and tied her up. Then they had forced locks and stolen property, in particular jewellery and mobile phones. The applicant had helped them to carry the stolen property out and load it into his car, in which they all had left.", "40. The Town Court convicted the applicant of high-value theft with unlawful entry, committed in conspiracy by a group of persons, and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. In sentencing the applicant the Town Court took into account information about his personality, in particular that he had received positive character references from his places of residence and employment, and that he had no criminal or administrative offences record. It considered his statement of surrender and confession, the fact that he had two minor children and that he had voluntarily surrendered the stolen gold jewellery, as well as his health condition, as mitigating circumstances. B. and Zh. were convicted of robbery with the use of violence and sentenced to nine years’ and eight and a half years’ imprisonment respectively. The Town Court granted the victims’ civil actions and ordered the applicant and his co-defendants to pay 396,800 Russian roubles (RUB) jointly in respect of pecuniary damage. The victims’ remaining claims were to be examined in separate civil proceedings.", "41. The applicant and his counsel appealed against the judgment. His counsel argued, inter alia, that the trial court had based its judgment on inadmissible evidence, in particular the statement of the applicant’s surrender and confession of 26 August 2005, which had been given by him as a result of ill-treatment by the police officers and in the absence of a lawyer. She reiterated the arguments put forward before the trial court (see paragraph 36 above).", "42. On 6 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic examined the case on appeal. It endorsed in full the trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of the statement of the applicant’s surrender and confession. It held, in particular, that the statement had been obtained in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Article 142 § 1 of that Code, a statement of surrender and confession was a voluntary statement by a person about a crime committed by him. It had not therefore been necessary to have an instruction from an investigator in order to obtain it. The law did not provide for any additional requirements to such a statement, save that the individual concerned was to be warned of his or her criminal responsibility for deliberately giving false information. Therefore, the absence of a lawyer had not rendered the statement unlawful and had not violated the applicant’s right to defend himself. He had been informed of his right under Article 51 of the Constitution, as confirmed by his signature on the record of his surrender and confession.", "43. The Supreme Court of the Komi Republic further noted that the trial court had examined as witnesses all of the police officers who had seen the applicant at the police station with a view to verifying their implication in the alleged crime. They had all denied any wrongdoing. It had been established that, having written his confession, the applicant had suddenly jumped to his feet and hit his head against a wall. The Supreme Court also referred to the most recent decision by the investigative authority, dated 1 April 2007, by which the criminal proceedings against the police officers had been terminated (see paragraph 26 above), and to the results of the internal police inquiry dismissing the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment (see paragraph 37 above). It upheld the judgment.", "44. The applicant’s counsel unsuccessfully raised the issue of the admissibility of the record of the applicant’s surrender and confession in her requests for supervisory review of the case before the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The former court rejected it for the same reasons as before (decision of a judge of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic of 5 September 2008 dismissing the request, as endorsed by the President of that court on 27 October 2008).", "45. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation similarly stated that the applicant’s argument – that the statement of his surrender and confession had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer – lacked a basis in domestic law, and that the allegation of the applicant’s ill‑treatment at the hands of the police was unsubstantiated, as shown through its examination by the trial court which had heard the police officers, particularly Z., G. and B. (decision of a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 22 December 2008 dismissing the request for supervisory review, as endorsed by a Deputy President of the Supreme Court on 10 March 2009)." ]

[ "6", "3" ]

[ 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20, 21, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants, daughter and mother, were born in 1949 and 1921, respectively, and live in Ajdovščina.", "6. On 2 February 1989 the Ajdovščina Municipality Land Consolidation Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) adopted a land consolidation programme concerning, inter alia, land owned by the first applicant’s legal predecessor and a separate piece of land owned by the second applicant.", "7. On 4 March 1989 the first applicant’s legal predecessor and the second applicant appealed against the Commission’s decision before the Slovenian Surveying and Mapping Authority (“the Authority”), arguing that they had not been duly compensated for the plots which they had owned and which had been transferred to the land consolidation programme.", "8. On 6 November 1990 the Commission amended the land consolidation programme by assigning the second applicant a different plot of land. The second applicant appealed against the decision.", "9. On 21 December 1990 the first applicant’s predecessor lodged an appeal for the failure of the Authority to adopt a decision within the prescribed time-limit.", "10. On 1 February 1991 the Authority granted the first applicant’s legal predecessor’s appeal, remitting the case to the Commission for further consideration. The Authority found that the operative part of the decision lacked clarity and that the Commission had misapplied the law.", "11. On 28 June 1994 the Convention became operational in respect of Slovenia.", "12. On 16 November 1994 the Authority granted the second applicant’s appeal against the decision of 6 November 1990, finding that the operative part of the decision was inconsistent with its reasoning. The case was remitted to the Commission for further consideration.", "13. On 15 December 1994, 15 March 1996, 24 April 1996 and 20 February 1997 the first applicant’s predecessor and the second applicant lodged informal motions before the Commission, asking that the proceedings be expedited.", "14. On 10 April 1997 – the Commission having failed to undertake further examination of their cases – the first applicant’s legal predecessor and the second applicant each lodged a separate appeal with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food (“the Ministry”) alleging that the Commission had failed to adopt a decision within the prescribed time-limit. Moreover, on 30 June 1997 they both appealed to the Ministry to expedite the resolution of their respective land consolidation decisions.", "15. On 25 September 1997 – the Ministry not having responded to their appeal – the first applicant’s legal predecessor and the second applicant brought an action before the Administrative Court for the failure of the Ministry to adopt a decision within the prescribed time-limit.", "16. On 24 September 1999 the Administrative Court allowed those actions and ordered the Ministry to decide on the matter at issue within thirty days from the date on which its judgment became final.", "17. Meanwhile, on 16 August 1999 the Ajdovščina Administrative Unit (previously the Commission, hereinafter “the Administrative Unit”), which had acquired competence to decide on matters of land consolidation, adopted new decisions on the land at issue.", "18. On 23 September 1999 the first applicant’s legal predecessor and the second applicant appealed before the Ministry against those decisions.", "19. On 25 August 2000 their appeals were allowed by the Ministry, which again assigned them different plots of land to compensate them for the loss of their original plots.", "20. On 10 November 2000 the first applicant’s legal predecessor and the second applicant brought actions for judicial review (administrative action) before the Administrative Court against the Ministry’s decisions of 25 August 2000 on the grounds that the Ministry had failed to properly consider the criteria applicable to the land consolidation programme and had thereby violated their right to equality before the law.", "21. On 23 January 2001 the first applicant’s legal predecessor died and the first applicant inherited a part of his land including plots subject to land consolidation proceedings. She then intervened in the proceedings as the heir.", "22. On 11 April 2003 and 9 May 2003, respectively, the Administrative Court allowed the applicants’ actions for judicial review and annulled the Ministry’s decisions of 25 August 2000 on the grounds that the applicants had not been acquainted with the expert opinion on which the Ministry had based its decisions and that no reasons had been provided for the dismissal of the objections to the distribution of land. The Administrative Court remitted the cases to the Ministry for further consideration.", "23. On 15 May 2007 the Ministry adopted new decisions concerning the distribution of land in respect of the first and second applicant.", "24. On 17 June 2007 the applicants each brought another action for judicial review (administrative action) against those new decisions before the Administrative Court.", "25. On 11 February 2008 and 3 March 2009 the applicants each lodged an informal motion before the Administrative Court to expedite the resolution of their action.", "26. On 19 June 2009 and 23 October 2009, respectively, the Administrative Court allowed the first and second applicants’ actions for judicial review, annulling the Ministry’s decisions of 15 May 2007, and again remitted the cases to the Ministry for further consideration.", "27. On 23 November 2009 and 10 May 2010 the first and second applicants lodged informal motions before the Ministry, asking that the proceedings be expedited. Moreover, three other similar motions were lodged before the Ministry by the first applicant on 27 August 2012, 4 December 2012 and 27 January 2013.", "28. On 5 April 2013 the Ministry issued a decision annulling the Administrative Unit’s decision of 16 August 1999 (see paragraph 17 above) and remitted the cases to it.", "29. On 20 May 2014 and 2 June 2014 the Administrative Unit scheduled oral hearings for 12 June 2014 and 19 June 2014, respectively. Prior to the hearings, the first applicant informed the Administrative Unit that she was unable to participate in the hearing due to medical treatment and that the second applicant could not participate as she was seriously ill and bedridden.", "30. On 28 August 2014 the Administrative Unit held an oral hearing regarding the applicants’ cases. Land survey and agriculture experts were appointed to consider the first applicant’s requests regarding the land and an agriculture expert was appointed in connection with the second applicant’s requests.", "31. The land consolidation proceedings were still pending on the date of the Government’s last communication with the Court.\nII." ]

[ "13", "6" ]

[ 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1960, 1963, 1988 and 1986 respectively and live in Zonguldak. The first two applicants are the parents, the third applicant is the brother and the fourth applicant is the fiancée of Mr Toğay Gültekin.", "6. Toğay Gültekin was born in 1983 and started doing his compulsory military service on 22 August 2003 in the city of Kırklareli. At that time he had no known health problems.", "7. On 17 March 2004 Toğay Gültekin was examined by a doctor at his regiment and the doctor decided to refer him to a hospital specialising in infectious diseases. On 22 March 2004 a doctor who examined him at his regiment’s infirmary referred him to Trakya University Hospital (“The University Hospital”) for suspected hepatitis or meningoencephalitis. The following day Toğay Gültekin was sent to the hospital in Edirne where, after a number of examinations were conducted, he was diagnosed with fulminant hepatitis (acute liver failure). A decision was taken on 24 March 2004 to send him to the Haydarpaşa GATA Hospital in Istanbul for a liver transplant operation. On arrival at the hospital in Istanbul the same afternoon he was put in the intensive care unit.", "8. At 5.15 p.m. on 27 March 2004 he died at the GATA Hospital. No autopsy was performed.", "9. An investigation was carried out at the military unit where Toğay Gültekin had been doing his military service. On 30 and 31 March 2004 a total of eleven military personnel who knew or had had dealings with Toğay Gültekin were questioned by their superiors.", "10. The eleven military personnel all stated that Toğay Gültekin had spoken to his commanding officer on 16 February 2004 and told him that a friend of his had hepatitis and that he had suspected that he might also have contracted the same disease. His superior had then transferred him to the regiment’s infirmary where tests had been conducted, establishing that he did not have hepatitis.", "11. One of the eleven military personnel was the doctor who had examined Toğay Gültekin in the regiment’s infirmary on 22 March 2004 (see paragraph 7 above). The doctor stated that on 22 March 2004 Toğay Gültekin had come to see him because he had been feeling unwell and the colour of his urine had been darker than usual. He had then sent Toğay Gültekin for a urine examination and when he had got the results back he had noticed a problem. The same day he had asked for Toğay Gültekin to be referred to the University Hospital.", "12. The military officers who carried out the investigation concluded, on the basis of the statements referred to above, that the military authorities had acted in accordance with their duties when providing medical assistance to Toğay Gültekin and that there had been no fault attributable to them in his death.", "13. On 28 September 2004 the applicants initiated compensation proceedings against the Ministry of Defence before the Supreme Military Administrative Court (“the Military Administrative Court”). They argued, in particular, that Toğay Gültekin had not received prompt or adequate medical care in his regiment.", "14. The applicants submitted in their petition that, according to the official documents in their possession, Toğay Gültekin had been examined by a doctor attached to his regiment on 17 March 2004 and that the doctor had recommended his transfer to a hospital specialising in infectious diseases. Nevertheless, the military authorities had not followed that recommendation. When his condition had deteriorated he had been examined by another doctor at the regiment on 20 March 2004. However, that doctor had not sought to obtain blood or urine tests and had sent him back to his military unit. When Toğay Gültekin’s condition had deteriorated even further on 22 March 2004, he had been examined once again and this time a urine test had been carried out. The doctor who had evaluated the results of the test had considered that Toğay Gültekin might have hepatitis or meningoencephalitis and had asked for him to be referred to hospital. Nevertheless, Toğay Gültekin had still not been transferred to the hospital promptly and only the following day had he been put on a bus and sent to the hospital. The applicants argued that it had been these inordinate delays that had caused Toğay Gültekin’s death. They pointed out that Toğay Gültekin had been performing his military service and had thus not had the opportunity to leave his military unit and seek medical assistance of his own volition. Therefore, the authorities had been under an obligation to protect his well-being and to ensure timely medical treatment for him.", "15. On 14 January 2005 the Ministry of Defence submitted its observations to the Military Administrative Court. Based on the testimonies of the soldiers from the same regiment (see paragraphs 9-11 above), it argued that on 16 February 2004 Toğay Gültekin had seen his superior and told his commanding officer that his friend had contracted hepatitis and that he suspected that he himself might have been infected as well. A blood test had been conducted, but the results had not revealed any abnormalities.", "16. The Ministry of Defence alleged that Toğay Gültekin had not gone to the infirmary between 16 February 2004 and 20 March 2004, but accepted that he had been examined by a doctor at the regiment’s infirmary on 20 March 2004 and then sent back to his military unit. It maintained that the military authorities had not acted in a negligent fashion when dealing with Toğay Gültekin’s medical problems.", "17. In their replies to the Ministry of Defence the applicants submitted that there was no evidence to show that a blood test had been carried out on 16 February 2004. They also referred to the medical reports and stated that it had been clearly indicated in the records that Toğay Gültekin had seen the doctor at the infirmary on 17 March 2004 and that his referral to an infectious diseases clinic had been decided by that doctor.", "18. During the proceedings the Military Administrative Court appointed three medical experts, namely two professors and an associate professor from the infectious diseases department of the Gazi University Medical School, in order to clarify whether the military authorities had acted negligently. The medical experts reached the following conclusion in their report of 20 September 2005:\n“... An examination of the documents and other information in the file shows that Toğay Gültekin started his military service on 22 August 2003. On 2 January 2004 he was treated for a retractile testicle at Çorlu Military Hospital. On 5 January 2004 he was prescribed medication at the regiment’s infirmary for an upper respiratory tract infection. On 17 March 2004 the regimental infirmary doctor decided to refer him to the Çorlu Military Hospital’s infectious diseases department, but that was not done. On 20 March 2004 he was diagnosed with and treated for an infection of the upper respiratory tract. On 22 March 2004 he was referred to the University Hospital with suspected hepatitis and he was sent there. On 23 March 2004 he was diagnosed with fulminant hepatitis. On 24 March 2004 he was transferred to the GATA Research Hospital in Haydarpaşa where he died on 27 March 2004 as a result of fulminant hepatitis.\nTwo of the causes of fulminant hepatitis are hepatitis A virus and hepatitis B virus. Hepatitis A may be contracted by drinking contaminated water and by eating raw vegetables and fruits. Hepatitis B spreads through sexual contact, or by coming into contact with infected blood by sharing personal items such as toothbrushes, razors, or needles. Military service, in itself, does not pose a special risk for hepatitis contamination.\nHaving examined the medical reports in the file, we consider it very likely that the first symptoms regarding Toğay Gültekin’s disease became obvious on 20 March 2004 and his condition then deteriorated for one week until his death. The first symptoms of the liver disease (acute liver failure) which is caused by hepatitis A and hepatitis B viruses include tiredness and general complaints which are not specific to any of the organs. They can be similar to the symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection. Only after developing typical symptoms, such as jaundice, does it become easier to diagnose.\nThe disease caused by these two viruses (hepatitis) can be more serious in adults. According to the medical reports in the file, Toğay Gültekin was contaminated with both hepatitis A and hepatitis B viruses within a short period of time and his liver was infected with both viruses at the same time. This is a condition which worsens the damage to the liver and increases the risk of fulminant hepatitis (fast-deteriorating acute liver failure). The mortality rate of fulminant hepatitis is 70% within the first week; a liver transplant is the sole method of ensuring patient survival. Normally, the patient would be kept in hospital under close observation.\nHaving taken cognisance of the documents in the file, we have not established any delays, fault or negligence in the medical treatment provided to Toğay Gültekin at the infirmary of his regiment, at the University Hospital or at the GATA Hospital in Haydarpaşa.”", "19. The applicants lodged an objection to this report. They maintained that the authorities had acted negligently as they had delayed Toğay Gültekin’s transfer to hospital. Referring to the medical reports in the file, the applicants stated that although the doctor at the regiment had decided to refer Toğay Gültekin to an infectious diseases clinic on 17 March 2004, the military authorities had failed to comply with the doctor’s decision until 23 March 2004. The applicants also asked the Military Administrative Court to obtain an additional medical expert report.", "20. On 26 October 2005 the Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ claim. In its decision the court relied on the medical expert report summarised above (see paragraph 18), and concluded that no fault could be attributed to the authorities for Toğay Gültekin’s death. No mention was made in the decision of the applicants’ complaint regarding the failure to transfer Toğay Gültekin to hospital on 17 March 2004.", "21. The applicants lodged a request for rectification of the Military Administrative Court’s decision and argued, inter alia, that if, as alleged, Toğay Gültekin had told his commanding officer on 16 February 2004 that he might have been infected with hepatitis (see paragraphs 9-11 above), his superior should have taken it seriously and referred him to hospital. However, there were no records showing that any action had been taken. They also pointed out that their complaints did not relate to the period following Toğay Gültekin’s transfer to the hospital, but to the authorities’ negligence in failing to refer Toğay Gültekin to hospital between 17 and 23 March 2004.", "22. On 28 December 2005 the Military Administrative Court refused to entertain the rectification request lodged by the applicants." ]

[ "2" ]

[ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Braşov.", "6. At the time of the events in question the applicant was occasionally working for M.V. and also providing information on the latter’s business activities to S.S., an operative officer of the Romanian Intelligence Service (“the SRI”).", "7. In the evening of 25 September 2002 E. paid a visit to M.V. at the latter’s business headquarters in Braşov and asked him to return 50,000 United States dollars (USD) which E. had allegedly lent him to help him start his activity. M.V. had previously refused to pay the money back. That evening, an argument broke out among them. M.V. and four other individuals kidnapped E. and beat him severely to induce him to give up the debt demand. Later that night M.V. called the applicant and asked him to come by car to the headquarters to transport someone to Bacău.", "8. The applicant arrived later in the evening, and found E. severely beaten and begging M.V. to spare him. The attackers tied the victim up and put him in the boot of his own car. They drove away, murdered E. and staged a road accident as cover-up. The applicant arrived at the scene by car and drove the attackers back to their homes.", "9. On 5 October 2002 the applicant contacted S.S., who was away on holiday, to tell him what had happened. They met a few days later, upon S.S.’s return, and on 23 October 2002 S.S. transmitted the information to the police via his superiors.", "10. There was no criminal investigation of the events until a year later, when one of the participants confessed to the police.", "11. On 27 October 2003 the applicant was informed that accusations had been brought against him, and made a statement to the prosecutor’s office. A lawyer of his choice was present at that meeting.", "12. On 18 January 2004 the applicant and the others involved in the events of 25 September 2002 were committed for trial on charges of illegal deprivation of liberty and extremely aggravated murder.", "13. Throughout the proceedings the applicant argued that he had infiltrated M.V.’s group as an informant on the behalf of the SRI. He also stated that M.V. had forced him to participate in the events by threatening him and his family.", "14. On 10 November 2004 he was convicted by the Braşov County Court of aiding and abetting illegal deprivation of liberty and extremely aggravated murder. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and removal of certain rights.", "15. The court based the conviction on a whole body of evidence, consisting of witness testimony, the statements made by the accused persons during the proceedings, expert examinations and police reports. Based on the evidence in the file, the County Court established that the fact for the applicant to come to the M.V.’s business headquarters at M.V.’s request and to drive alongside the car where the victim was transported and to drive the culprits back with his car constituted the crimes he was accused of; the court considered that he had helped the other culprits to commit their crimes.", "16. As for the applicant’s connection with the SRI, the County Court acknowledged that he was transmitting information on M.V.’s group to officer S.S. It also took note that the SRI denied that the information about the murder provided by the applicant had been the result of collaboration with the Service. The County Court heard testimony from F.B., who confirmed that both he and the applicant had infiltrated M.V.’s group on behalf of the SRI. F.B. had been informed by S.S. that after September 2002 it had become too dangerous for the applicant to stay in direct contact with M.V., because of certain information in the applicant’s possession.", "17. The County Court considered the Prevention and Combat of Organised Crime Act (see paragraph 37 below) and decided that the applicant could not benefit from any status as an SRI informant, for the following reasons:\n“Under Article 21 of the Prevention and Combat of Organised Crime Act, in exceptional situations, when there are indications that a crime has been committed or is being planned by members of an organised criminal group, and neither the crime nor its perpetrators can be identified by other methods, informants may be used in order to gather data concerning the commission of crimes and the identification of the perpetrators. No such indication ... existed in the present case and [the applicant] was not an informant used for gathering data concerning the crimes of illegal deprivation of liberty and extremely aggravated murder.”", "18. The court also examined and discarded as unfounded the applicant’s allegations of coercion and considered that the applicant could have refused to help or informed the authorities about what was happening. It maintained as follows:\n“[The applicant] had the option to leave when, after arriving at the [scene], he realised what was going on, but at no point during the events had he expressed the intention to leave the group. Even assuming that he had only remained in order to collect data for the SRI, he had had an obligation to inform immediately the police or the SRI about what was happening. From the statements given by the participants, including the applicant himself, it appears that on several occasion [during that night, the applicant] remained alone and could have used his mobile phone to call the police but he did not do it, claiming that the mobile phone keyboard was blocked. However, the court cannot accept this explanation, as it is notorious that calling the police phone number is free of charge.”", "19. The judgment was upheld by the Braşov Court of Appeal on 26 January 2006.", "20. S.S. gave testimony in the appeal proceedings, and confirmed that he had been informed about the murder by the applicant. He reiterated in detail the events described by the applicant. As for the nature of the collaboration between him and the applicant, S.S. explained as follows:\n“My collaboration with [the applicant] was based on friendship and I confirm that he is an exceptional man. Our friendship goes back some twenty years. I knew that [the applicant] had relations with a certain group, but the members of the group and its activity was of no interest for the SRI, as it did not concern threats to the national security.\n...\nI expressly declare that I cannot give any information about specifically infiltrating [the applicant] in [M.V.]’s group, because at that point, the group was not of interest for the national security.”", "21. S.S. refused to give details about where he had met with the applicant, asserting that the information requested by the court was classified.", "22. The Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant had taken on his own initiative the role of an SRI informant:\n“[The applicant] claimed that he had been infiltrated in M.V.’s criminal group by the SRI, in order to gather data about its activities.\nHowever, the SRI informed the court, by address no. 49,538 of 15 April 2004 ... that the information presented by [the applicant] to S.S. was not the outcome of any collaboration between that Service and [the applicant].\nMoreover, the witness S.S. (an SRI officer), declared that M.V.’s criminal group did not constitute threats to national security ..., that being the reason why [the applicant] was not requested to gather intelligence about M.V. group.\nIt follows that [the applicant] took on his own initiative the role of “informant”, without being officially requested to do so, and without being granted permission to participate in crimes for the purpose of gathering intelligence.”", "23. The decision by the Braşov Court of Appeal was upheld by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 24 October 2006. The High Court increased the sentence to ten years in prison. This decision was final.", "24. The applicant asked for a revision of the final decision. He reiterated that it was impossible to prove before the ordinary courts that he was an SRI informant, as on the one hand the information was classified at the time, and, on the other S.S. risked losing his job if he divulged such information. He requested that the information be declassified. Furthermore, he pointed out that, as the police had failed to act upon the information he had transmitted through the SRI, he could not even benefit from a more lenient sentence, as had been the case with the other participant who had confessed to the crimes.", "25. On 25 July 2007 the request was granted in principle by Braşov County Court. It considered that the information could constitute relevant evidence which had not been available to the ordinary courts.", "26. The County Court heard a fresh statement from S.S., who reiterated his previous statements. He further explained that he could not reveal whether the applicant had infiltrated M.V.’s group as an informant, nor could he discuss the nature or content of the information which the applicant had given him, as the law considered it classified information. Nor could he clarify whether, as a general rule, an informant who committed an offence would benefit from protection.", "27. On 12 September 2007 the SRI informed the County Court that it declassified partially the report drafted by S.S. based on the information given by the applicant concerning the crimes (the report, which contained a description of the facts as presented by the applicant, was adduced to the criminal file). It further explained that the document drafted by the applicant himself for S.S. had been destroyed after verification of the information contained and communication of that information to the police. It lastly reiterated that the information concerning collaboration with the SRI was classified under Law no. 182/2002, “the Protection of Classified Information Act”, and, if revealed, could “severely affect national security”.", "28. The County Court made an extensive examination of the evidence in the file and the applicable laws. It acknowledged that the applicant had failed to provide it with conclusive evidence of his status as an SRI informant, but also considered that that situation was not imputable either to him or to the courts. It noted that declassification of documents was left to the discretion of the SRI, which, claiming “national security”, refused to reveal relevant information in the case at hand. Moreover, declassification followed a lengthy and cumbersome procedure, which undermined the rights of the defence as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.", "29. For these reasons, the court considered that given the difficulty of obtaining unequivocal evidence as to the applicant’s status, the incomplete information provided by the SRI and by S.S. should be given increased significance in favour of the applicant.", "30. It thus concluded that the applicant had participated in the events solely as an SRI informant, and that the representation of his own role and his feelings of fear, horror, despair and repugnance at the scene of the abuse against E. removed his criminal responsibility.", "31. Consequently, on 20 November 2008, the County Court quashed the previous decisions in part and acquitted the applicant on both counts.", "32. On 22 October 2009, acting upon an appeal lodged by the prosecutor’s office, the Braşov Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and dismissed the request for revision. It considered that that remedy could not be used solely to adduce new evidence, and that the ordinary courts had already examined the theory according to which the applicant had been a SRI informant who had infiltrated M.V.’s group:\n“Article 394 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning revision does not refer to newly discovered evidence, because if it were so, revision would become another [ordinary] level of jurisdiction ...\nThe new facts of circumstances [required by Article 394 above as reason for allowing the revision] will be confirmed by new evidence, but it is not the evidence that constitutes the reason for revision ...”", "33. The court also considered that the fact that the status of an SRI informant was not regulated by law made it impossible for the courts to establish the extent of such activities, thus leaving room for abuse of that status. However, reliance of such status could not exonerate from criminal responsibility:\n“As there is no legal frame for regulating the status of an informant for an intelligence service, we cannot establish the scope of such a mandate, and thus the opportunity for abusing this status exists.\nThe fact that [the applicant]’s activity as an informant would have benefitted the SRI does not exonerate [the applicant] from criminal responsibility for criminal acts.”", "34. On 28 October 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant and upheld the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeal, on similar grounds to those given by the lower court." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 4, 6, 18, 20, 29 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Sulejówek.", "7. In April 2007 the applicant’s wife left the matrimonial home and moved to Zakopane with the couple’s son M., who was born on 1 July 2004.", "8. On 22 November 2007 the applicant lodged an application with the Zakopane District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for the establishment of contact.", "9. On 7 February 2008 he withdrew the application in the light of the parties’ agreement to establish the contact arrangement by way of a friendly settlement. On the same date the Zakopane District Court discontinued the proceedings.", "10. On 4 July 2008 the applicant again requested that the Zakopane District Court regulate his contact with his child. On 22 August 2008 he asked the same court to issue an interim contact order in that regard.", "11. On 3 September 2008 the Zakopane District Court issued an interim contact order. It ruled that the applicant was allowed to visit the child at the mother’s home on the first and third Saturday of each month from 2 to 7 p.m. The applicant was also allowed to take the child outside his place of residence accompanied by his mother. The court noted that the applicant had encountered difficulties in having regular contact with his son and that he had not seen his child since July 2008. The court further observed that at the material time it had not been established whether the applicant could be granted access without the child’s mother’s presence.", "12. Meanwhile, on 29 August 2008 the applicant’s wife brought an action for separation before the Nowy Sącz Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on the basis of the applicant being the party at fault. She requested that she be granted custody of her son and that the child have his place of residence with her. She also requested that the court hear evidence from nine witnesses.", "13. On 20 October 2008 the applicant filed for separation on the basis of his wife being the party at fault. He asked that the court hear evidence from twenty-two witnesses.", "14. On 21 October 2008 the case was transferred to the Siedlce Regional Court.", "15. On 23 February 2009 the applicant lodged a petition for divorce with the Siedlce Regional Court on the basis of his wife being the party at fault. He also requested that the court grant him custody of his son and rule that the child’s place of residence was to be with him. On the same date he asked the court to issue an interim order for contact for the duration of the divorce proceedings.", "16. The cases for separation and for divorce were subsequently joined and the first hearing was scheduled for 30 June 2009. At the request of the applicant’s wife, the hearing was adjourned until 25 August 2009. The court instructed the court’s guardian (kurator sądowy) to conduct a local assessment (wywiad środowiskowy) at the child’s place of residence.", "17. The first hearing in the divorce case was held by the Siedlce Regional Court on 25 August 2009. The court heard evidence from the parties.", "18. On the same date the Siedlce Regional Court issued an interim contact order pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings. The applicant was allowed to have contact with his son every second and fourth weekend of the month and every Wednesday, outside the child’s place of residence but in the presence of the child’s mother.", "19. Both the applicant and his wife lodged appeals against this decision.", "20. On 14 December 2009 the applicant requested that the court authorise him to contact his son by phone three times a week.", "21. On 29 December 2009 the Siedlce Regional Court issued an interim contact order and granted the applicant the right to two thirty-minute phone calls with his son per week. The phone calls were to take place every Wednesday and Friday, between 6.30 and 7 p.m.", "22. Meanwhile, on an unspecified date in 2009 the applicant’s wife moved to Warsaw and subsequently, in 2010, to Poznań.", "23. On 19 January 2010 the Siedlce Regional Court rejected the applicant’s wife’s appeal against the decision of 25 August 2009.", "24. On 9 March 2010 the Lublin Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) examined the applicant’s appeal against the same decision and decided to amend the interim contact order, allowing the applicant to have contact with his son without the presence of the mother.", "25. The hearing scheduled for 23 March 2010 was adjourned due to legitimate absence of the applicant’s wife’s lawyer.", "26. On 29 April 2010 the Siedlce Regional Court held a hearing in the divorce proceedings. The court heard one witness of the eight who had been called. The applicant withdrew his application regarding the taking of evidence from all but three witnesses.", "27. The hearing scheduled for 28 May 2010 was cancelled due to the absence of both the applicant’s wife and the witnesses.", "28. On 8 July 2010 the Siedlce Regional Court held another hearing. It heard the witnesses and the parties. It also instructed the Poznań Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno‑Konsultacyjny) to prepare an expert report as regards the family’s situation.", "29. Meanwhile, on 21 June 2010 the applicant requested that the interim contact order be varied. On 21 July 2010 the Siedlce Regional Court decided to grant the applicant contact every second and fourth weekend of the month from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 7 p.m. on Sunday outside the child’s home and without the mother’s presence. He was also authorised to spend one day with his son at Christmas and Easter, one week of the winter holidays and two weeks of the summer holidays.", "30. On 26 July, 12 August and 24 September 2010 the Siedlce Regional Court issued requests for the witnesses in the divorce proceedings to be heard under the courts cooperation scheme (pomoc sądowa) by the Łódź District Court, the Poznań District Court and the Wrocław District Court, respectively.", "31. On 27 January 2011, in reply to a letter urging it to submit the expert report, the Family Consultation Centre informed the Regional Court that, due to the high volume of cases, the report would only be prepared some time during the following five months. The Regional Court issued further requests for acceleration of the preparation of the report on 17 March and 7 June 2011. By letter of 15 July 2011 the Family Consultation Centre informed the court that the report could not be finalised due to the failure of the applicant’s wife to attend either an appointment scheduled for 15 May 2011, or further appointments that were scheduled for 29 June and 8 July 2011.", "32. On 8 August 2011 the Family Consultation Centre experts issued a report on the family’s situation for the purposes of the divorce proceedings. They recommended that the decision given in July 2010 should remain in force and should be respected. M. did not have any emotional problems in having contact with his father, but he was well aware that the mother reacted negatively to such contact and he wanted to obtain her approval. Both parties challenged the report’s conclusions.", "33. On 12 September 2011 the Siedlce Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s wife’s request for the interim access arrangements to be varied. Her appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Lublin Court of Appeal on 23 January 2012.", "34. On 10 March 2012, in response to applications from the parties, the Family Consultation Centre experts submitted a supplementary report on the family’s situation. Both parties challenged the supplementary report.", "35. On 16 May 2012 the experts submitted their replies to further questions from the parties.", "36. On 12 June 2012 the Siedlce Regional Court held a hearing. It decided to instruct the Siedlce Family Consultation Centre to prepare a new expert report.", "37. On 3 December 2012 the Siedlce Family Consultation Centre returned the case file to the Regional Court. It informed the court that it had not been possible to prepare the requested report due to applicant’s wife’s failure to attend the scheduled appointments.", "38. On 3 January 2013 the Siedlce Regional Court scheduled a hearing for 14 February 2013. At the applicant’s wife’s request the hearing was postponed until 26 March 2013.", "39. On 26 March 2013 the Siedlce Regional Court dissolved the applicant’s marriage. It found that both parties had been at fault in the breakdown of the marital relationship. It further held that full parental authority was to be exercised by the applicant’s former wife, whereas the parental rights of the applicant were to be limited. The child’s place of residence was to be with the mother. The court authorised the applicant to have contact with his son without the presence of his mother every second and fourth weekend of the month and to spend one day at Christmas and Easter, one week of the winter holidays and two weeks of the summer holidays with him. The applicant was also authorised to contact the child by phone every Thursday and Friday between 6.30 and 7.30 p.m.", "40. Both parties lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment.", "41. On 24 October 2013 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals.", "42. On 20 February 2009 the applicant applied to the Warsaw-Wola District Court for the imposition on his wife of a fine in the amount of 1,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) for failure to comply with the access arrangement of 3 September 2008 (see paragraph 11 above). He alleged that M.’s mother had repeatedly refused to comply with the access arrangement and had obstructed his contact with the child, in particular, by arranging the meetings in unsuitable places.", "43. On 28 April 2009 the Warsaw-Wola District Court imposed on the child’s mother a fine in the amount of PLN 500 for her failure to respect the decision of the Zakopane District Court of 3 September 2008.", "44. On 7 August 2010 the applicant notified the police that the child’s mother had refused to open the door when he had come to visit his son.", "45. On 2 September 2010 the Warsaw-Wola District Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings concerning the decision of 3 September 2008 in the light of subsequent decisions regulating the applicant’s contact with his son pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings (see paragraphs 18, 24 and 29 above).", "46. On 30 December 2010 the applicant requested that the Poznań-Nowe Miasto and Wilda District Court assist him in the effective enforcement of the interim contact order of 21 July 2010 issued by the Siedlce Regional Court. He asked the court to impose on the child’s mother a fine in the amount of PLN 10,000 due to her failure to comply with this order. He also requested that the court impose a fine in the same amount for the mother’s failure to comply with the decision of 29 December 2009 of the Siedlce Regional Court setting out his right to contact his son by phone. He submitted that the child’s mother had repeatedly failed to respect his access rights and had obstructed his contact with his son.", "47. On 21 February 2011 the court returned the applicant’s application as regards the enforcement of the decision of 29 December 2009.", "48. On 23 May 2011 the applicant resubmitted his application in this regard.", "49. The proceedings were joined on 16 June 2011.", "50. Meanwhile, at the applicant’s request, the hearing scheduled for 19 May 2011 was postponed until 24 May 2011. Neither of the parties attended the hearing. The applicant submitted that he had not attended this hearing because he had been informed of his wife’s intended absence.", "51. The parties filed their written submissions on 30 June 2011.", "52. The Government submitted that the hearing scheduled for 6 September 2011 had been postponed until 20 October 2011 at the applicant’s request. The applicant submitted that the hearing had taken place on that date and that he had been present.", "53. Due to the applicant’s absence, the hearing scheduled for 20 October 2011 was postponed until 1 December 2011.", "54. On 6 December 2011 the Poznań-Nowe Miasto and Wilda District Court gave a decision. The court set a fourteen-day time-limit for the mother to allow the applicant access to M. on the terms set out by the interim order of 21 July 2010 on pain of a fine in the amount of PLN 1,000. It further held that she was to observe the same time-limit in respect of the decision concerning telephone contact on pain of a fine of PLN 500.\nThe court had no doubt that M.’s mother had failed to respect the access arrangements as regards the applicant’s personal contact with M. The weekend visits had almost never taken place in accordance with the access arrangement. The applicant’s wife had enrolled M. in fencing classes and had organised other activities for him on Saturdays, when the applicant was due to pick up the child, meaning that the applicant had been unable to collect his son and spend time with him alone. At the same time the court noted that the applicant had failed to visit his son regularly on Saturdays. However, the child’s mother had also not respected the applicant’s rights as regards spending parts of Christmas, Easter and summer holidays with M.\nThe court also found that M.’s mother had failed to respect the court’s decision concerning the telephone contact between the applicant and his son. The court established that the applicant had only rarely been able to contact M. by phone.", "55. On 12 March 2012 the Poznań Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s wife’s appeal against this decision.", "56. On 29 March 2013 the Poznań-Nowe Miasto and Wilda District Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings regarding the decision of 21 July 2010 due to the applicant’s inactivity in the proceedings.", "57. Meanwhile, on 8 February 2012 the applicant lodged a further request for enforcement of his contact rights as set out in the decision of 21 July 2010 under the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 66 below). The hearing in those proceedings was scheduled for 24 September 2013. On 9 January 2015 the Poznań Regional Court discontinued the proceedings as the applicant’s contact rights had meanwhile been regulated in the final divorce judgment (see paragraphs 39 and 41 above). No further information about the course of the proceedings concerning this latest request has been submitted by the parties.", "58. On 5 October 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Lublin Court of Appeal under the Law of 17 June 2004 on a complaint about a breach of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”). He submitted, in particular, that the last hearing in the divorce proceedings had been held in July 2010 and that the court had been powerless in the face of his wife’s efforts to protract and obstruct the proceedings.", "59. On 9 November 2011 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It acknowledged that the proceedings had been ongoing since August 2008, but was of the view that their length had essentially been caused by the parties’ attitude, while the court could be held responsible only for its own conduct. Both parties had repeatedly submitted numerous pleadings and applications which the court had been obliged to examine. No delays on the part of the court in examining these applications had been established. The parties had appealed against various interlocutory decisions on six occasions. Furthermore, as a result of the attitude of both parties, the issue of access to the child had become the main problem in the case. This had further protracted the proceedings." ]

[ "6", "8" ]

[ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 15, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 ]

[]

[ "6. According to the applicants, at the relevant time the first three applicants were leaders, the fourth, fifth and seventh applicants were members, and the sixth applicant was a supporter of the Ukrainian National Assembly (“the UNA”), a nationalist party. At the relevant time, the UNA was associated with an unregistered organisation known as the Ukrainian National Solidarity Organisation or Ukrainian National Self-Defence Force (“the UNSO”).", "7. In late 2000 and early 2001 a group of politicians and organisations who were in opposition to the then President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma launched a series of large-scale rallies and demonstrations and a civil campaign known as “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement.", "8. According to media reports, on 8 March 2001, the organisations engaged in the movement publicly announced that protesters were planning not to let President Kuchma come to the monument to Taras Shevchenko, a famous Ukrainian poet, in Kyiv (“the Shevchenko monument”) and lay flowers there the next day, 9 March 2001, the 187th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko’s birth.", "9. On 9 March 2001 at about 8 a.m. the applicants and other UNA and UNSO supporters participated in a political rally near the Shevchenko monument announced by the opposition forces on 8 March 2001. As established by the domestic courts, the organisers failed to give advance formal notice to the authorities about the rally, as provided by Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine (see paragraphs 60 and 86 below).", "10. Prior to the arrival of protesters, the police and troops of the Ministry of the Interior (“the police”) formed a cordon, and for some time did not allow the participants of the rally to approach the monument. The cordon had been formed to allow President Kuchma and other State officials to lay flowers at the monument. As established by domestic courts, the protesters attempted to break through the cordon to disrupt the flower-laying ceremony and attacked the police (see paragraph 52 below). The police moved on protesters seeking to control and break up the crowd. No information has been provided by the parties as to whether the police explicitly ordered the protesters to disperse. It is undisputed that clashes between the police and protesters ensued and as a result of the events a number of police officers were injured.", "11. In the course of events near the Shevchenko monument several protesters were arrested. At around 2 p.m. the same day a column of protesters, including the applicants, marched to the Ministry of the Interior building to demand their release. They dismantled a wooden barrier nearby, pelted the building with eggs and then left.", "12. At about 3 p.m. the same day a group of protesters, including the applicants, marching away from the Ministry of the Interior building to the center of the city arrived at Bankova Street, where they clashed with police officers who had cordoned off the street to block access to the President’s Administration building located there. The police officers were attacked with stones and a metal street barrier, and a Molotov cocktail was thrown at them. As the domestic courts established in convicting the applicants, as a result of the clashes forty-nine police officers were injured, including fourteen with concussion.", "13. According to the findings of the domestic courts, the first three applicants played a leading role in inciting and directing attacks on the police near the Shevchenko monument and Bankova Street. The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants participated in the attacks on police on Bankova Street (see paragraphs 51-57 below). According to the applicants, they participated in the protests but behaved peacefully.", "14. According to the applicants, more than 200 individuals were arrested in connection with the events.", "15. Between 9 and 14 March 2001 the first six applicants were arrested. On various dates they were remanded in custody pending investigation and trial. On 16 March 2001 the seventh applicant was arrested and on 19 March 2001 released on an undertaking not to abscond pending investigation and trial. It appears that none of the applicants was arrested at the scene of the events of 9 March 2001.", "16. The applicants were charged with organising and participating in mass disorder.", "17. A number of law enforcement officers who had participated in crowd control on the day in question, and had been assaulted or injured as a result, were later recognised as aggrieved parties in the proceedings against the applicants.", "18. On 1 October 2001 the case against the applicants and their co-defendants was referred to the Golosiyivsky District Court of Kyiv (“District Court”) for trial before a panel composed of Judge V. as the presiding judge and two other judges.", "19. In the course of the trial and subsequent proceedings before the Kyiv Court of Appeal thirteen defendants, including the first six applicants, were kept in a metal cage.", "20. According to the Government, the presiding judge issued warnings to the second applicant in connection with his conduct in the courtroom on ten occasions between 18 December 2001 and 14 March 2002.", "21. On 16 May 2002 all the defendants unsuccessfully challenged Judge V. because he had disallowed a question that defendant Z. sought to put to one of the aggrieved parties. The other judges sitting on the panel were also challenged without success on the grounds that Judge V. and the prosecutor had allegedly been in the deliberations room with the other judges when they had decided on the previous challenge.", "22. On 19 June 2002 the defendants challenged Judge V. on the grounds that he had allegedly disallowed certain questions the defence had sought to put to the aggrieved parties and a witness. The other two judges on the panel rejected the challenge, stating that the disallowed questions had been irrelevant, repetitive or leading.", "23. On the same day the trial court found that the second applicant was behaving disruptively and decided to exclude him from the courtroom. According to the applicant, on the basis of that ruling he was also excluded from hearings held on 20 and 21 June 2002.", "24. On 20 June 2002 lawyer Ya. unsuccessfully challenged Judge V. on the grounds that he had allegedly disallowed certain questions put to witnesses, rejected other evidentiary requests by the defence, and held meetings with the prosecutors in his chambers. No details as to the nature and circumstances of the alleged meetings were provided.", "25. On 8 July 2002 witness I.Tr. addressed a letter to the trial court, claiming that the statement he had given to the investigating authorities during the pre-trial investigation was untrue and given under pressure from the authorities. He sought to be examined during the applicants’ trial, indicating that he was being held at the Kherson Pre-Trial Detention Centre.", "26. On 24 July 2002 Mr Nikolenko, then acting as a lawyer for the defence, unsuccessfully challenged Judge V. mainly on the grounds that in his remarks he, as the lawyer believed, had insulted the sixth applicant by implying that his health problems had been related to drug use.", "27. On 15 August 2002 lawyer Ya. unsuccessfully challenged all the judges of the panel, complaining about the rejection of the defence’s request to extend the examination of a witness, other evidentiary requests by the defence, and the court’s decision to keep the defendants in the metal cage.", "28. According to the first applicant, from 2 to 4 September 2002 the trial court decided to appoint a legal aid lawyer for him and a number of the other defendants. The appointed lawyers were then frequently replaced until the end of the trial.", "29. On 2 September 2002 the trial court considered removing the second applicant from the courtroom for laughing. Another defendant stated that it was he, and not the second applicant, who laughed.", "30. According to the Government, on 3 September 2002 the trial court granted the second applicant’s request for a recess to allow him to consult his lawyer.", "31. On 5 September 2002, in the course of examination of video recordings of the events of 9 March 2001, the second applicant stated that he could not recognise himself on the video and added that the person on it looked like Judge V. The court considered this remark disrespectful and decided to remove the second applicant from the courtroom for the duration of the trial, until the parties’ closing statements.", "32. On 9 September 2002 some of the defendants and their lawyers unsuccessfully challenged Judge V. on the grounds that he had excluded the second applicant from the courtroom and allegedly stated that the defendants’ behaviour in the courtroom would be taken into account in sentencing.", "33. According to the Government, on 17 September 2002 the first applicant’s lawyer, M., had informed the trial court that he would be unable to attend any hearings and did not appear before the trial court until 22 November 2002.", "34. During the trial, the sixth applicant pleaded guilty in part, admitting that he had been in the crowd on Bankova Street and thrown an egg at the police. The other applicants pleaded not guilty. They testified that they had been at the scene of the events and participated in a peaceful political rally and march, but had not committed any acts of violence. The first, second and third applicants testified that in the course of the events of 9 March 2001 they had attempted to prevent some of the other protesters from acting violently. The second applicant also testified, in particular, that he had indeed chanted “UNSO on the attack, UNA to power!” and “Impale the traitors!”, but not on Bankova Street.", "35. According to the trial court judgment, in the course of the trial the court read out the statements of several individuals given during the pre-trial investigation. In justifying its decision to admit these statements as evidence, the trial court stated that they had “valid reasons” for failing to appear in court.", "36. In particular, as regards the events of 9 March 2001 in general, I.Tr. stated during the pre-trial investigation that on 27 February 2001 the UNA leader A.Sh. had offered him a financial reward to come to the events of 9 March 2001 with as many UNA and UNSO supporters as possible. O.Dm. stated that when President Kuchma had arrived at the Shevchenko monument, the column of UNA and UNSO protesters had moved towards the police cordon and had tried to break through, pulling away the street barriers separating the crowd from the police. R.Tk., a protester, stated that he had seen the crowd dismantle a street barrier and throw it, as well as stones, wooden boards and other objects, at the police on Bankova Street.", "37. As regards the second applicant, M.Sh. stated during the pre-trial investigation that a group of protesters near the Shevchenko monument had attacked the police line in which he had been standing, and had hit him, pulled him from the line, pushed him to the ground and kicked him. M.Sh. identified the second applicant as the leader of the crowd, giving them instructions to move towards the police, telling them to move “Forward!” and offering a reward for any riot gear seized or police officer beaten up. S.Ko. stated that the second applicant had been an organiser and active participant in the riots. He commanded the crowd to move towards the police line near the Shevchenko monument. In the course of the attack he had shouted “UNA to power, UNSO on the attack!” and “Impale the traitors!” According to S.Ko., he had then shouted the same slogans during the clashes on Bankova Street, as the protesters were trying to break through to the President’s Administration building. According to the witness, these slogans were interpreted by the crowd as a call to action and to attack the police. V.Du. stated that the second applicant had lined up a column of UNA members near the Shevchenko monument. Somebody had then shouted “Forward!” and the column had attacked the police.", "38. As regards the third applicant, R.Py. stated during the pre-trial investigation that the UNA leader A.Sh. and the third applicant had directed the UNA and UNSO column to try to break through the police cordon near the Shevchenko monument and on Bankova Street. He had also seen people from the crowd kick a police officer lying on the ground. On Bankova Street he had seen UNSO members throw stones, eggs and a street barrier at the police. D.Ko. stated that the third applicant had told him before the events that the UNA and UNSO were gathering their members for a rally on 9 March 2001, that participants would be remunerated, and that it was important to ensure a large turnout. V.Ma. stated that his travel expenses for his return trip to Kyiv on 9 March 2001 had been paid. He also stated that the third applicant had given the command to line up near the Ministry of the Interior building and from time to time shouted “UNA to power, UNSO on the attack!” and slogans directed against President Kuchma. V.Ku. stated that the third applicant had been at the front of the UNA and UNSO column during the riots. M.Pe. stated that the UNA had paid the travel expenses of its members travelling to Kyiv on 9 March 2001, and that when the crowd had seen the police cordon on Bankova Street it had turned in the direction of the cordon and the third applicant had then lined up UNSO members there.", "39. As regards the fourth applicant, I.Gl. stated during the pre-trial investigation that he had been standing in the police cordon on Bankova Street when it had been attacked by a group of protesters. He stated that he in particular had been attacked by a man armed with a wooden stick and a shield, whom he had identified as the fourth applicant.", "40. According to the trial court judgment, in the course of the trial the court had also examined more than sixty aggrieved parties, namely officers who had participated in maintaining order during the events of 9 March 2001. They had testified in general terms that the protesters, many of whom had been wearing UNSO armbands and had had their faces covered, had behaved violently.", "41. In particular, S.Sy. had identified the second applicant as the individual who had given commands to the crowd and had been at the front of the crowd on Bankova Street, shouting “Forward!” and “On the attack!” At least three officers had identified the first applicant, two had identified the third applicant, three had identified the fourth applicant, two had identified the fifth applicant and one had identified the sixth and seventh applicants as individuals who had attacked the police on Bankova Street.", "42. According to the trial court judgment, in the course of the trial the court had also examined over thirty other eyewitnesses and a number of other witnesses who had recognised the defendants on video recordings of the events or had testified to the defendants’ character.", "43. In particular, N.Ma., a protester, had testified that the goal of the rally near the Shevchenko monument had been to prevent President Kuchma from being able to lay flowers there and that she had seen a column of about 150 people, almost all with UNSO armbands, run towards and attack the police cordon. S.Po. had testified that he had taken part in organising the rally near the Shevchenko monument and that the plan had been to form a circle around the monument to prevent President Kuchma from laying flowers there. When the protesters had arrived at the monument, they had discovered that it was already cordoned off by the police, and the third applicant had given the command to try to break through the police cordon, but “this could have been interpreted in various ways”. Shortly afterwards, the police had attacked the protesters. V.Ch., one of the organisers of the rally, testified that the protesters had planned to express their disagreement with President Kuchma, who on that day had planned to lay flowers at the Shevchenko monument. On Bankova Street he had seen the third applicant with a cut on his hand and the second applicant with a loudspeaker. As regards the third applicant, Gre., a police officer, testified that he had seen him direct the crowd on Bankova Street and organise it to try to break through the police cordon. Gro., a protester, testified that he had seen the third applicant direct the crowd to break the street barrier on Bankova Street and participate in the attack on the police there. Y.Yu., an officer of the Security Service of Ukraine (“the SBU”), testified that he had seen him attack the police on Bankova Street.", "44. On 25 December 2002 the District Court found the applicants guilty of offences defined in Article 71 of the Criminal Code:\n(i) the first and third applicants of organising and actively participating in mass disorder;\n(ii) the second applicant of organising mass disorder; and\n(iii) the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants of actively participating in mass disorder.", "45. The court also convicted eleven other defendants in connection with the same events.", "46. In convicting the applicants, the court relied on the statements of aggrieved parties and witnesses made during the pre-trial investigation and read out during the trial (see paragraphs 36-39 above), and on the testimony of a number of aggrieved parties and other witnesses heard and examined viva voce during the trial (see paragraphs 41 and 43 above).", "47. The trial court rejected witness I.Tr.’s letter of 8 July 2002 seeking to be questioned during the trial, on the grounds that his signature had not been certified.", "48. It relied on its own identification of the applicants in a number of video recordings of the events of 9 March 2001, filmed both by the law enforcement agencies and television channels.", "49. It also relied on medical evidence of injuries suffered by law enforcement officials on the day in question and on expert reports identifying several of the applicants on the video recordings. It also referred to physical evidence found at the scene of the events: stones, broken up pavement slabs, sticks and various other objects which could have been used to attack the police; as well as the applicants’ clothes which, according to the trial court, matched the clothes worn by the rioters on the video recordings.", "50. The court made the following findings regarding the events of 9 March 2001.", "51. As regards organisation of the rally, on 7 and 8 March 2001 UNA leaders including the first three applicants had organised the arrival of UNA and UNSO members and supporters in Kyiv and their gathering near the Shevchenko monument on 9 March 2001.", "52. As regards the events near the monument, the second and third applicants had organised a column of UNA and UNSO supporters and had called on them to attempt to break through the police cordon. As a result of these actions, clashes with the police had ensued, in the course of which acts of violence and resistance towards the police had been committed. The second applicant had incited disorder among the participants, in particular by chanting the slogans: “Form a column of six in line”, “There will be a reward for each trophy!”, “Impale the traitors!”, “UNSO on the attack, UNA to power!” The third applicant had actively taken part in the attempt to break through the police cordon, and had thrown a riot helmet at it, previously seized from the police. At least three times he had punched M.Sh., who had been pulled away from the police line by the protesters.", "53. As regards the events on Bankova Street, the first three applicants had organised the mass disorder there. The protesters had attacked the police cordon with the aim of breaking through to the President’s Administration building throwing stones at the police and attacking them with sticks. They had also pulled away the metal street barrier separating them from the police line and had thrown it at the police.", "54. The first applicant had chanted “On the attack!”, “UNSO on the attack!” and had directed the crowd which had pulled the street barrier away and attacked the police. He had taken part in dismantling the barrier, had attempted to take away riot shields, had hit and kicked the police, had pulled from the police line and repeatedly hit officer O.Ma., and had thrown a piece of wire at the police.", "55. The second applicant had directed and helped the protesters pull the metal street barrier away from the police cordon and had chanted “Forward!”, “UNSO on the attack, UNA to power!”.", "56. The third applicant had chanted “UNSO on the attack, UNA to power!” and had helped pull the street barrier away from the police cordon, which he had thrown at the police twice. He had also hit police officers, and had attempted to take away riot shields and truncheons.", "57. The fourth applicant had thrown a street barrier at the police four times, as well as stones and a wooden stick. He had also kicked and hit officers with a wooden stick and pipe. The fifth applicant, acting with others, had thrown the street barrier at the police twice, and had attempted to take away a riot shield and truncheon. The sixth applicant had thrown the street barrier and an egg at the police, had hit officers, and had attempted to take away a riot shield. The seventh applicant had helped pull the street barrier away from the police line and had thrown it at the police.", "58. The court found the applicants’ arguments that the events had been provoked unsubstantiated. While it acknowledged that the third applicant in particular had been observed trying to stop violent protesters on Bankova Street, in the trial court’s view this only occurred at the end of the clashes once the protesters had realised they could not break through the police line.", "59. The applicants received the following sentences: four years and six months (the first applicant), five years (the second applicant), four years (the third and fourth applicants), three years (the fifth applicant), and two years (the sixth applicant). The seventh applicant was sentenced to two years, suspended for two years with probation.", "60. In convicting the applicants the trial court observed that Article 11 of the Convention did not apply to manifestations which were not peaceful and observed that the participants in the mass disorder on 9 March 2001, including the applicants, had not behaved peacefully. The court further observed that the actions of the police on 9 March 2001 had not breached Article 11 of the Convention because police cordons had only been installed temporarily, to allow the President and other State officials to lay flowers at the Shevchenko monument and to protect the public buildings on Bankova Street. The trial court went on to find that the applicants’ right to peaceful assembly under the Constitution of Ukraine had not been breached by the police because the authorities had not been notified about the manifestations planned for 9 March 2001, as required by Article 39 of the Constitution (see paragraph 86 below).", "61. On 27 January 2003 lawyer Ya., acting on behalf of the first two applicants, submitted to the trial court a number of proposed corrections to the trial record. The case file does not indicate what decision was made pursuant to this request.", "62. All the applicants appealed, arguing in particular that the trial court had erred in the assessment of evidence and that, in fact, the evidence did not support the finding of their guilt. They also argued that the trial court had relied on the statements of absent witnesses, depriving the applicants of the opportunity to confront them, and had breached procedural rules in admitting video evidence.", "63. In their appeals, the first two applicants also argued that the trial court had not been impartial and had been biased towards the prosecution, had removed the second applicant from the courtroom without sufficient grounds, and had refused the second applicant’s request to discontinue his and other defendants’ confinement in the metal cage. They also argued that the authorities had provoked the protesters by placing large police contingents in riot gear in their path. In his appeal, the second applicant also complained that he had been ill-treated by the police after his arrest, and that he saw his sentence as recognition of his role in the struggle of the Ukrainian nation against President Kuchma’s “criminal regime” engaged in the “genocide” of Ukrainians.", "64. On 16 May 2003 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“Court of Appeal”) upheld the applicants’ conviction, striking out certain statements from the judgment, and reduced the first applicant’s sentence to three years and six months, the second applicant’s sentence to four years, the third and fourth applicant’s sentences to three years, and the fifth applicant’s sentence to two years and six months.", "65. The first two applicants appealed in cassation, arguing in particular that the trial court had not been impartial and had been biased towards the prosecution, expressing this by denying the second applicant’s request to discontinue his and other defendants’ confinement in the cage and removing him from the courtroom on 19 June 2002. They further stated that the trial court had relied on the statements of absent witnesses, depriving the applicants of the opportunity to confront them, and had breached procedural rules in admitting video evidence.", "66. The remaining applicants also appealed in cassation, arguing in particular that the trial court had not been impartial, had relied on the statements of absent witnesses, depriving the applicants of the opportunity to confront them, and had breached procedural rules in admitting video and physical evidence.", "67. On 4 March 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2002 and ruling of 16 March 2003, finding the applicants’ appeals unsubstantiated. It reduced the first applicant’s sentence to two years and six months. The Supreme Court stated, among other things, that the planned and organised nature of the events of 9 March 2001 had been proven by the testimony of a number of witnesses, including D.Ko., V.Ma., M.Pe. and N.Ma. (see paragraphs 38 and 43 above)", "68. On an unspecified date the Deputy Prosecutor General (“the DPG”) requested that the Supreme Court review the applicants’ conviction and sentences by way of extraordinary review proceedings. He argued that the authorities had neglected to investigate the possibility that the clashes between the participants of the rally had been provoked by the law enforcement agencies or third parties, and that this information had not been known to the courts which had examined the case. The DPG also pointed to certain evidence which had been in the possession of the investigating authority, the SBU, but had not been examined during the pre-trial investigation or trial. In particular, he referred to video recordings which, in his opinion, could have shed light on the possibility of provocateurs, and to other evidence that prior to the events of 9 March 2001 the UNA and UNSO headquarters had been wiretapped, possibly with the aim of disrupting the rally.", "69. On 7 April 2006 the Supreme Court decided not to reopen the proceedings, holding that it had no jurisdiction to quash the judgment based on the arguments put forward by the DPG. Those facts had to be considered newly discovered circumstances, which first had to be investigated by the prosecutor’s office and then brought to the attention of the trial court and Court of Appeal, in accordance with the procedure for review of final judgments in such circumstances. The case file shows no steps to follow up on the matter.", "70. According to the second applicant, following his arrest on 9 March 2001 he received serious injuries as a result of ill-treatment by the police and was taken to hospital.", "71. Between 9 and 15 March 2001 he underwent inpatient treatment for his injuries, in particular concussion and a fractured rib.", "72. On 17 March 2001 an SBU investigator ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention, a decision endorsed by a prosecutor. The applicant was placed in SBU Pre-Trial Detention Centre (SIZO) and then transferred to Kyiv SIZO.", "73. On 18 June 2001 an SBU investigator decided to disjoin the ill‑treatment complaint from the criminal case against applicants and send the material concerning the complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office for investigation. The case file does not indicate whether the matter was followed up in any way.", "74. On 22 May 2003 the second applicant was transferred to a correctional colony to serve the rest of his sentence.", "75. From 20 June 2003 until his release the second applicant was treated for tuberculosis.", "76. On 3 October 2003 he was released from serving the remainder of his sentence by virtue of an amnesty law." ]

[ "11", "6" ]

[ 14, 30, 31, 32, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 61, 62 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Focșani.", "6. As administrator of four commercial companies, the applicant concluded several contracts with different commercial companies for the supply of merchandise. In payment for the merchandise the applicant issued several cheques.", "7. On an unspecified date a criminal investigation was initiated against the applicant for fraud in connection with the cheques issued for the payment of the merchandise.", "8. On 24 June 2003 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Vrancea County Court informed the applicant, in his capacity as administrator of one of the four companies, that the criminal investigation initiated against him was going to be discontinued because the elements of the offence of fraud were missing.", "9. On 3 July 2003 one of the sellers lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, accusing him of fraud (înşelăciune) under Article 215 of the Criminal Code (as in force at the material time) for having issued cheques and promissory notes without holding the necessary funds in the companies’ accounts and after the companies’ accounts had been frozen.", "10. On 8 September 2003, the prosecutor ordered criminal proceedings to be instituted against the applicant on charges of fraud. The investigation took place in the absence of the applicant, who had left the country on 25 June 2003.", "11. According to documents submitted by the applicant, his wife instituted divorce civil proceedings against him. By a final judgment of 20 October 2003 the Focșani District Court allowed her claim and pronounced the divorce.", "12. On 13 November 2003, the prosecutor issued an indictment for aggravated fraud under Article 215 § § 1, 3 and 4 of the Criminal Code. The case was registered with the Vrancea County Court.", "13. The proceedings before the first-instance court took place in the applicant’s absence on the grounds that the applicant’s domicile abroad was unknown. The applicant was represented by I.B., a lawyer assigned by the court. In his final submissions before the court the latter maintained that the bill of indictment contained many errors because the investigation had been carried out in the applicant’s absence. His main argument was that the applicant had not committed the acts with the intention of deceive his business partners. In this respect he added that the applicant had continued to pay his debts. He contested the allegation that the cheques had been issued after his companies’ accounts had been frozen. Moreover, several cheques had been issued while the applicant was abroad. He also contested the amounts that the applicant allegedly had to reimburse to different creditors.", "14. On 13 May 2005 the Vrancea County Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and imposed a three-year prison sentence suspended on probation. It found that the applicant, in his capacity as administrator of four commercial companies had issued cheques after the companies’ accounts had been frozen and without holding the necessary funds in the companies’ accounts.", "15. Both the applicant and the prosecutor’s office appealed against the judgment. The applicant claimed, inter alia, that his defence rights had not been observed as he had not been notified about the accusations against him and had not been summoned by the investigating authorities to attend the hearing. In this respect, the applicant claimed that he had been unaware that criminal proceedings were pending against him. He admitted that his criminal file contained several reports stating that police officers had tried to find his whereabouts but he further contended that he had never been officially summonsed or informed about the charges against him. He also stressed that he had not intended to deceive his business partners and that his difficult financial situation had been the result of the cancellation of a public procurement contract with the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, he had continued to make payments to his creditors after leaving the country.", "16. During the appeal proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his choosing, namely I.B., the same lawyer who had been assigned by the first-instance court.", "17. The last hearing before the appeal court was held on 30 November 2005.", "18. As the applicant did not return from Italy until 5 December 2005, he did not attend any of the hearings before the appeal court.", "19. By a decision of 23 December 2005 the Galați Court of Appeal partly allowed the appeal lodged by the prosecutor’s office and increased the applicant’s sentence to four years’ imprisonment. It dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded. The appeal court acknowledged that the applicant had not been officially notified of the charges against him and he had likewise not been heard by either the investigating authorities or by the first‑instance court. It further held that this situation was the fault of the applicant, who had left the country on 25 June 2003 deliberately seeking to escape trial. The court noted that the investigating authorities had repeatedly visited his known domicile in Romania and had informed his wife about the criminal complaint lodged against him. Written reports had been issued on 2 and 4 August, 9, 15 and 16 September and 14 October 2003 in this respect.", "20. On 28 December 2005 the applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that his defence rights had been infringed on account of his absence during the investigation stage and the proceedings before the courts at the first two levels of jurisdiction. He claimed that he had not been aware of the proceedings because he had left the country for Italy before the criminal complaint had been lodged against him. He alleged that all the procedural steps taken by the investigating authorities and the courts had been null and void because they had been undertaken in his absence, and he therefore asked for the case to be referred to the investigating authorities for a re‑opening of the proceedings in his presence. He also claimed that fourteen out of twenty-seven cheques that he had allegedly issued without having the necessary funds in the companies’ accounts had been issued after 25 June 2003, while he had been abroad. He also contended that he had issued the cheques and the promissory notes before the companies’ accounts had been frozen and contested other elements of fact considered by the court of appeal in its decision of 23 December 2005, such as the date on which the public procurement contract had been cancelled. He alleged that the incorrect conclusions formulated by the appeal court had been based on the findings of the expert who had produced a technical report attached to the file.", "21. The applicant was present and was assisted by a lawyer of his choosing during the proceedings before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He attended all the hearings but he was not heard by the court.", "22. At the last hearing the High Court of Cassation and Justice was addressed by the defence counsel and the prosecutor. It allowed the defendant to address it before the end of the hearing (ultimul cuvânt al inculpatului).", "23. On 18 October 2006 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as unfounded. It acknowledged that the applicant “was not heard, was not informed about the charges against him and that he was not given the prosecution documents”. It held that the applicant could not rely on his absence from the proceedings by way of defence, because he had left the country on 25 June 2003 in order to avoid the investigation and the trial against him.", "24. The applicant served his prison sentence between 25 October 2006 and 3 December 2008, when he was released from prison on probation.", "25. In another set of criminal proceedings against the applicant for fraud in connection with similar acts – namely the issuance by the applicant of cheques after the companies’ accounts had allegedly been frozen – the Bacău Court of Appeal acquitted him. It noted that direct intent was an essential element of the offence of fraud under Article 215 § 4 of the CCP and from the evidence in the file it was apparent that the applicant had not acted with a direct intent to obtain an unjust advantage from the company in favour of which he had issued a cheque on 17 June 2003. It also held that the inability to pay for the merchandise bought by him from the company had been caused chiefly by circumstances arising after he had issued the cheque, namely the cancellation of the public procurement contract he had signed with the Ministry of Defence to provide food to a military unit. In its decision of 11 May 2006, the appeal court noted, among other things, the following:\n“The fact that the applicant had left the country on 25 June 2003 is not enough to support the conclusion that he was trying to avoid the criminal investigation or the trial. On the contrary, the fact that the applicant had acted diligently in order to cover the damage caused by his acts and that he came back before the end of the criminal trial asking the appeal court to allow him to be heard, supports his defence that he had left for Italy to find work so that he could pay off the company’s debts.”", "26. On 22 May 2007 and in January 2008 the applicant lodged two criminal complaints against the expert who had prepared a technical expert report in the criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 20 above). He alleged that the expert had made false allegations which had resulted in his conviction for fraud. On 24 December 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Focșani District Court concerning the prosecutor’s decisions of 22 December 2009 and 29 November 2013 by which the criminal complaints against the expert had been discontinued.\nIt appears that the proceedings are still pending." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 20 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Ruše.", "6. On 11 November 2006 K.R. sent a letter to the applicant by registered mail. In the letter, she asked the applicant to repay a loan which she had given to her in 2004 within thirty days of receipt of the letter, and stated that she would institute court proceedings if the applicant failed to pay.", "7. Following the applicant’s refusal on 13 November 2006 to accept the letter and sign the notice of receipt, K.R. resent it by ordinary mail.", "8. On 20 November 2006 the applicant replied to K.R. with a letter, the relevant parts of which read:\n“I do not owe you anything!\nIt is true that you gave me some money as a gift. I did not want to take it, but you literally forced me, saying that you did not have anyone to whom you could give it and that I had helped you a lot... Those were your words, remember!\nFor the time being, I do not have any money. I have a loan that I have not yet repaid; therefore, for now, I cannot return your gift.\n...\nWhen I have it, I will gladly return your gift!”", "9. On 13 December 2006 K.R. brought an action against the applicant, claiming repayment of the loan (totalling 14,000 euros (EUR)) which she had allegedly given to her in July and August 2004, on the basis of oral agreements. In order to prove that the loan existed, K.R. attached to her claim the letter written by the applicant on 20 November 2006 (see paragraph 8 above), as the only evidence in support of her claim.", "10. On 22 January 2007 the applicant, allegedly unaware of the claim which had been brought against her, travelled to Vienna in order to obtain a visa for a trip to Namibia. She stayed in Vienna until 26 January 2007, when she obtained a visa, and flew to Namibia on the same day.", "11. On 24 January 2007 the Maribor District Court forwarded K.R.’s claim to the applicant, advising her that she had thirty days to file her observations. Referring to section 277 of the Civil Procedure Act, the District Court warned the applicant that, in the event that she failed to reply within the given time-limit, it would grant the claim by default judgment.", "12. On 25 January 2007 the postman tried (unsuccessfully) to serve the applicant with the court documents, including the claim, at her home address. He left in her mailbox a standard official delivery slip used in registered mail deliveries, which was printed on a thin piece of paper measuring 7.3 cm by 10 cm. The slip informed her that he would return the following day.", "13. The following day, having not located the applicant at her address, the postman left another delivery slip of identical dimensions in her mailbox, informing her that she could collect the relevant correspondence at the post office within the next fifteen days. The delivery slip included a reference to sections 140 and 141 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 26 below).", "14. As the applicant did not collect the mail from the post office within fifteen days, the letter in question was returned to the Maribor District Court by the post office, with a note indicating that the correspondence had not been collected, and that a delivery slip had been left in the applicant’s mailbox. Service was deemed to have been effected on 26 January 2007, when the delivery slip was left in her mailbox; therefore, the deadline for her to file any observations expired on 26 February 2007.", "15. The applicant claims that, upon her return from Namibia on 24 March 2007, she did not find either of the two delivery slips allegedly left by the postman in her mailbox, and that she was entirely unaware of the proceedings which were pending.", "16. On 14 September 2007 the Maribor District Court issued a default judgment, allowing K.R.’s claim and ordering the applicant to pay her EUR 14,000 with default interest within fifteen days. The relevant reasoning of the District Court was as follows:\n“The court had to establish from the facts which were submitted with the claim whether or not the claim was well-founded, and whether or not the facts on which the claim was based contradicted the evidence submitted by the plaintiff herself, or facts which are generally known.\nThe plaintiff submitted with the claim a letter from the defendant dated 20 November 2006 (A3), from which it appears that she received ‘some money’ as a gift.\nThe submissions of the defendant in the letter dated 20 November 2006 – that she received some money as a gift – do not, of themselves, negate the plaintiff’s submissions that the plaintiff gave the money as a loan, yet the defendant was given the opportunity and the right to defend her position in the proceedings before the court by submitting a response to the claim [and] has failed to do so.\nIn addition, the submissions of the defendant in the letter dated 20 November 2006 that she would return the money which had been given to her (‘When I have it, I will gladly return your gift!’) cannot be ignored either.”", "17. The default judgment was served on the applicant on 19 September 2007.", "18. On 28 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s default judgment and an application to reinstate the proceedings. She explained that she had failed to respond to the claim owing to her absence from Slovenia, submitted that she had not received the delivery slips allegedly left in her mailbox, and asked the court to set aside the decision and order the reservice of K.R.’s claim. As proof of her absence, she attached to both the appeal and the application to reinstate the proceedings a document issued by a travel company, L., confirming that she had been issued with a plane ticket for a flight from Munich to Windhoek on 26 January 2007 and a return ticket for 24 March 2007. She also attached copies of pages from her passport which contained a valid tourist visa for Namibia for the period between 26 January 2007 and 21 April 2007, and Namibian border control stamps confirming her entry to Namibia on 27 January 2007 and her departure on 24 March 2007.", "19. On 13 December 2007 the Maribor District Court rejected the applicant’s application to reinstate the proceedings, on the basis that the application had been lodged outside the three-month time-limit. It held that the applicant should have found the delivery slips left in her mailbox by the end of March at the latest after she had returned from Namibia. Therefore, she should have lodged an application to reinstate the proceedings within three months of her return. The applicant appealed.", "20. On 9 September 2008 the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the 14 September 2007 and 13 December 2007 decisions of the District Court. It held that it could not accept the applicant’s submissions that there had been no delivery slips in her mailbox, as it had been noted on the notice of delivery that they had been left there. It further dismissed the applicant’s submissions that the evidence used by the plaintiff (namely the letter of 20 November 2006) contradicted the facts alleged.", "21. On 4 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law.", "22. On 11 November 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the conditions for issuing a default judgment had been fulfilled. In respect of the issue of whether or not the evidence used by the plaintiff contradicted the submissions set out in the claim, the Supreme Court held as follows:\n“It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff attached to the claim [the applicant’s letter of 20 November 2006 – see paragraph 8 above] that the letter referred to a gift as well as to the return of a gift. It should be stressed that, for the purpose of issuing a default judgment, it is not important that the evidence submitted confirms the plaintiff’s allegations (in the present case, allegations concerning a loan). It is only important that the allegations contained in the claim do not contradict either the evidence which has been submitted or generally known facts. Since it cannot be concluded from the letter that [the money] was not a loan but a gift, the issuing of the default judgment was correct.”", "23. On 17 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint.", "24. On 22 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint by referring to section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 30 below).", "25. On an unknown date after the decision of 14 September 2007 became final, K.R. instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant. She later withdrew the application for enforcement after the applicant paid her the sum of EUR 4,000." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 1, 3, 9, 12, 13 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Orel. At the time of the events the applicant, a Ph.D. in Physics and Mathematics, was a tenured professor in the physics department of the Orel State Technical University.", "6. By Order no. 383 of 14 December 2006, the president (ректор) of the Orel State Technical University convened a university-wide conference for the election of the university’s academic senate (ученый совет), its standing governing body. The date of the conference was fixed for 26 December 2006. According to the Regulation on the Composition of the Academic Senate of the Orel University, candidates to the senate were to be nominated at staff meetings in structural entities by open majority vote (section 3 of the Regulation of 12 December 2006).", "7. Unhappy about the fact that neither he nor his colleagues in the physics department had been consulted or informed about the nomination and discussion of candidates to the academic senate, the applicant took the floor at the above public conference and spoke as follows:\n“... the elected academic senate may not be considered a legitimate body and its decisions likewise cannot be considered legitimate. All of them can be challenged in courts. The problem is that the staff or departments did not know anything about the candidates to the academic senate or of their academic achievements; no one nominated those candidates. This is some kind of a private party that is going on, some people have gathered and elected themselves. My rights have been violated: I, as a member of the faculty, have been excluded from the procedure which is of great importance both for me and for the university as a whole – the election of the academic senate. My rights have been breached, and I will complain to courts about the breaches of my rights. The rights of ordinary university employees, ordinary lecturers, have been breached, too: they were removed from the election to the academic senate, this is discrimination. Any discrimination is a form of war; you have declared war to the people, and sooner or later you will get the results of this war in some way or another, in your own families.”", "8. The Orel University sued the applicant in defamation, claiming that his speech had undermined the professional reputation of the university and of its academic senate. The statement of claim was signed by the university president.", "9. The Sovetskiy District Court of Orel reviewed the university statutes and regulations on the procedure for the election of the academic senate and took oral evidence from witnesses. Four witnesses testified that the physics department had not held a meeting for the election of delegates to the conference or nomination of candidates to the senate because the delegates and candidates had been elected and nominated at the meeting between the heads of departments. The staff had been informed about the meeting several days in advance and anyone could attend it.", "10. By judgment of 27 February 2007, the District Court found the applicant liable for defamation of the Orel University and its academic senate. According to the judgment, the applicant “publicly accused [them] of a violation of applicable laws [and] commission of a dishonest act”. It also held as follows:\n“The court cannot agree with the respondent party’s argument that the statements [he had] disseminated at the conference were an expression of an opinion. The statements were made in the affirmative form which is apparent from the minutes of the conference of 26 December 2006, the audio recording of the conference, and testimony by witnesses. The witnesses K. and Sh. who had attended the conference on 26 December 2006 explained that they understood the statements as an affirmation which produced a negative impression on them ...\nEvery legal entity has the right to require that a public appraisal of its activities reflect the real state of affairs. Any negative appraisal of the activities of a legal entity affects its reputation and undermines it. The activity of a legal entity can only be potentially successful if its business reputation in the eyes of other organisations and ordinary citizens is maintained at a certain level, especially in a market economy.”", "11. The District Court awarded the Orel University 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages and RUB 2,000 in court fees and directed that the applicant read the refutation at the following university conference.", "12. The applicant filed an appeal, relying in particular on Article 10 of the Convention. He also pointed out that the award in respect of damages exceeded his monthly salary.", "13. On 11 April 2007 the Orel Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment on the merits but partly amended it. Firstly, it considered that the sentences “All of them can be challenged in courts ... Any discrimination is a form of war; you have declared war to the people, and sooner or later you will get the results of this war in some way or another, in your own families.” did not contain any statements about the plaintiff and could not therefore be damaging for its reputation. Secondly, it noted that the sentence “no one nominated those candidates [in the departments]” was actually true because candidates had been nominated at the meetings of department heads. Thirdly, the Regional Court considered it appropriate that the operative part of the District Court’s judgment be read out at the following conference by the president rather than by the applicant. Finally, it offered a more nuanced characterisation of the disputed phrases as a statement of fact:\n“Mr Kharlamov’s speech contained a statement of fact: the elected academic senate may not be considered a legitimate body and all of its decisions are likewise illegitimate, in other words, the academic senate was unlawfully elected and its decisions are unlawful. This is a verifiable statement. Accordingly, this information is not a subjective opinion of the defendant but a factual allegation.”" ]

[ "10" ]

[ 1, 4, 5, 8 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Krasnoyarsk.", "6. On 13 August 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having attempted to sell a large quantity of heroin. Two days later the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk authorised his placement in custody for two months. The District Court reasoned that the applicant was being charged with a particularly serious criminal offence, which he had allegedly committed not long after having served a prison sentence after a previous conviction for a similar crime. The court also took into account the lack of a stable income as the applicant worked as an estate agent. These circumstances were interpreted by the District Court as evidence of the likelihood that the applicant might abscond, re-offend or pervert the course of justice. The applicant’s arguments that he was employed, that he was the breadwinner for a child who was still a minor and that he had a permanent place of residence did not convince the court. Nor did the court find that the applicant’s poor health warranted his release, given that he was able to receive professional medical assistance in detention.", "7. The applicant did not appeal against the detention order.", "8. On 15 August 2012, the applicant was admitted to detention facility no. IZ-24/1.", "9. On 12 October 2012 the Sverdlovskiy District Court accepted the investigator’s request for an extension of the applicant’s detention until 12 December 2012. The court again found that, given his criminal history and the gravity of the charges, the applicant was likely to abscond, re-offend or tamper with witnesses. The District Court did not find any evidence indicating that the applicant was not fit to remain in custody or was not receiving the necessary medical assistance in detention.", "10. The extension order of 12 October 2012 was upheld on appeal by the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court, which fully endorsed the District Court’s arguments. The Regional Court also noted that the applicant and his lawyer failed to submit any evidence in support of their arguments alleging a lack of medical assistance in detention.", "11. Another extension of the applicant’s detention until 12 February 2013 followed on 11 December 2012, when the Sverdlovskiy District Court found that the circumstances warranting his arrest persisted. The court once again dismissed the argument concerning the applicant’s poor health and lack of proper medical assistance in detention.", "12. On 10 January 2013 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal, having been fully convinced by the District Court’s reasoning. As to the applicant’s argument about his poor state of health, the Regional Court reasoned:\n“Despite the accused’s argument, [the court] did not establish any circumstances related to his health or any other personal grounds precluding his detention in the conditions consistent with a temporary detention facility. Amongst the case-file materials there is no medical report showing that [the applicant] was suffering from a serious illness included in the List of Serious Illnesses precluding Detention of Suspects and Accused Persons, as adopted by decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on 14 January 2011. The [District Court] did not examine any such report when it issued its decision [of 11 December 2012].\nMoreover, [the applicant’s] argument that he was suffering from a serious life-threatening illness was not supported by any evidence contained in the file, even though the defence would have had ample opportunity to provide such evidence if it had existed.\nIf a medical commission issues a medical report examining the necessity for [the applicant’s] continued detention, an investigator will immediately examine that issue.”", "13. On 21 January 2013 the applicant was served with the bill of indictment, having been charged with the sale, on a number of occasions, of a particularly large quantity of drugs within an organised group for the purpose of subsequent resale.", "14. On 5 February 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk extended the applicant’s detention until 11 May 2013, finding that the circumstances which had warranted the applicant’s arrest had not changed. The Court once again found that, given his criminal history and the gravity of the current charges, the applicant was likely to abscond, re-offend or tamper with witnesses.", "15. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, but this was dismissed on 2 July 2013.", "16. On 8 May 2013, the detention was further extended by the Leninskiy District Court until 11 July 2013. The court once again dismissed the argument concerning the applicant’s poor health and relied on the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s criminal record to support the finding of a risk of the applicant’s re-offending.", "17. On 10 July 2013 the Leninskiy District Court extended the detention until 13 August 2013. The reasoning employed by the court was similar to that of the previous detention orders.", "18. On 7 August 2013 the applicant was released against an undertaking not to leave his town, having regard to the fact that the investigation was closed, the applicant completed the reading of the file and the case was remitted to the trial court. On 24 March 2014 he was convicted of four counts of drug trafficking committed with an organised group and involving a particularly large amount of drugs.", "19. In 2001 the applicant was diagnosed with an HIV infection.", "20. A medical certificate issued on 18 October 2012 by a physician from detention facility no. IZ-24/1 where the applicant was detained indicated that the applicant was suffering from HIV infection in stage 4A, penile cancer of the first degree and chronic hepatitis C (HCV).", "21. The applicant argued that upon his arrest on 13 August 2012 antiretroviral drugs had been taken from him. The Government disputed that allegation.", "22. The Government provided the Court with handwritten and typed versions of the applicant’s medical records, setting out the applicant’s medical history and, in particular, the development of his HIV infection. On 16 August 2012, that is on the day following his admission to detention facility no. IZ-24/1, the applicant had been examined by a medical panel which had found him HIV-positive. On the following day the applicant had been prescribed Combivir, a fixed dose combination of the drugs lamivudine (Epivir) and zidovudine (Retrovir), and Kaletra, a fixed dose combination of lopinavir and ritonavir. The handwritten medical records show that during the entire period of his detention the applicant regularly received those drugs. He was also prescribed a special diet.", "23. During his detention the applicant had been monitored regularly in relation to his HIV infection. The CD4 cell count tests carried out on 24 October 2012, 28 March and 2 July 2013 had revealed a slight, but steady increase of CD4 cells to 579, 618, and 644 cells/mm3, respectively.", "24. On an unspecified date the applicant informed the medical personnel of the detention facility that in 2010 he had been diagnosed with penile cancer. On 25 April 2013 he was examined by the head of the medical department with regard to this complaint. The doctor did not detect any visible symptoms. However, the applicant was referred for examination by an oncologist and an infectious disease specialist at regional tuberculosis hospital no. 1.", "25. On 17 May 2013 the applicant was seen by the head of the oncological department at regional tuberculosis hospital no. 1. The doctor suggested a biopsy, which the applicant refused to undergo.", "26. The case file contains no information as to whether the applicant received any treatment in relation to his hepatitis C.", "27. On 16 November 2012 the applicant complained to the Regional Prosecutor that antiretroviral drugs had been taken from him upon his arrest on 13 August 2012.", "28. The applicant also sent a written request to the Investigating Department of the Krasnoyarsk Region seeking a forensic medical expert examination to determine whether he was suffering from a condition which, under Russian penitentiary rules, would preclude his detention on remand.", "29. On 6 December 2012 a deputy prosecutor of the Sverdlovsk District prosecutor’s office sent a letter to the applicant informing him that the courts had already examined his arguments pertaining to his state of health while determining the issue of his further detention on remand. The deputy prosecutor pointed out that the courts had not established that the applicant was suffering from any serious illness precluding his detention on remand.", "30. On 28 December 2012 the deputy prosecutor sent another letter to the applicant. The content of the letter was similar to that of the previous one." ]

[ "5", "13", "3" ]

[ 1, 7, 8, 13, 17, 19, 23, 24 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1985 and lived in Sarov, in the Nizhniy Novgorod region.", "7. An all-terrain vehicle and a car were stolen from private garages in Sarov in February and April 2008, respectively. An investigation unit at the Sarov police department (управление внутренних дел г. Саров, “the Sarov UVD”) instituted criminal proceedings into the thefts. The police had information about the applicant’s involvement in the thefts.", "8. At about 10.40 a.m. on 5 May 2008, V., an operative agent of the Sarov UVD, contacted the applicant by telephone and requested him to come to office no. 320 at the Sarov police station at 2 p.m. for questioning. At 2 p.m. on the same day the applicant arrived at the police station, as requested. He was accompanied by K., F., Zh. and P., who stayed outside awaiting his return. A police officer on duty registered the applicant’s arrival at the police station at 2 p.m.", "9. The applicant provided the following account of events at the police station. In office no. 320 police officer V. and the chief of the criminal investigation unit of the Sarov UVD, B., demanded that he confess to the thefts. Following his refusal, he was taken to a nearby office, shackled and beaten up by B., who kicked and punched him in the head, torso and extremities and jumped on his head, while V. was shouting threats at the applicant. Afterwards the applicant was kept in different offices of the criminal investigation unit. He was given no food or drink. He felt unwell and vomited blood. No medical help was provided to him despite his requests.", "10. On 6 May 2008 the applicant’s wife lodged an application with the Sarov town prosecutor and the head of the Sarov town police department, complaining that the applicant was being held at the police station unlawfully, that he had a serious stomach ulcer condition and that a lack of food could cause bleeding. A lawyer appointed by the applicant’s family was unable to locate him at the police station.", "11. According to the police records, at midday on 6 May 2008 investigator K. of the Sarov UVD questioned the applicant as a witness in the theft case.", "12. According to documents prepared by investigator K. and police officer V., at an unspecified time on the same day the investigator requested that the applicant, who was suspected of having committed the theft, be brought to the police station for investigative measures. Police officer V. reported that he had found the applicant in the street at 8 p.m. and taken him to the police station at 8.15 p.m. on 6 May 2008.", "13. At 8.20 p.m. on 6 May 2008 the investigator drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect in the criminal proceedings concerning the theft of the all-terrain vehicle.", "14. At 8.55 p.m. the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility at the Sarov UVD (“IVS”). The applicant’s cellmate C. saw injuries on the applicant’s head and learned from him that he had been beaten up by police officers in order to force him to confess to a crime.", "15. At 9.15 p.m. an ambulance was called. An ambulance doctor diagnosed the applicant with a stomach ulcer. According to the IVS records, the applicant had abrasions on his arms.", "16. On 7 May 2008 the applicant’s lawyer visited the applicant in the IVS and photographed the injuries on his body. According to the applicant, he had bumps and bruises on his head and neck and was unable to hear well, and he also had bruises on his torso and extremities.", "17. On 8 May 2008 the applicant was brought before a judge, who ordered that he be remanded in custody.", "18. The applicant and a number of other persons were charged with the theft of the all‑terrain vehicle and the car.", "19. On 7 May 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Sarov town prosecutor, alleging that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty on 5 and 6 May 2008 and ill-treated in police custody. He claimed that he could identify the police officers responsible for his ill-treatment. Similar complaints were also lodged by the applicant’s mother, his wife and his lawyer.", "20. On 8 May 2008 the prosecutor’s office forwarded the complaints to the Sarov Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office (the “Sarov Investigative Committee”). On the same day the applicant’s lawyer lodged a similar application with the Sarov Investigative Committee.", "21. On 12 May 2008 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. According to the expert’s report (акт судебно-медицинского освидетельствования) no. 572, the applicant had a bruise on his back measuring 3 to 4 cm, an abrasion measuring 4 to 10 cm on his left forearm and an endermic haemorrhage on his chest. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted by blunt objects on 5-6 May 2008.", "22. On 14 May 2008 an investigator of the Sarov Investigative Committee received explanations by the applicant, who maintained his complaints. The applicant stated, in particular, that N.P., who had been held in the same office with his hands shackled, had witnessed the applicant’s ill‑treatment by police officer B. on 5 May 2008. According to explanations by police officers B. and V., in the course of operative-search activities the police had obtained information about the applicant’s involvement in the theft of the all-terrain vehicle. V. had called the applicant on 5 May 2008 and requested him to come to the police station for questioning by the investigator. They denied the applicant’s allegations about his unlawful detention and ill-treatment, stating that he had been brought to the police station on 6 May 2008 at the investigator’s request (see paragraph 12 above). V. also stated that in the evening of 6 May 2008 N.P., another suspect in the thefts case, had been brought to the police station at the same time as the applicant, and that N.P. and the applicant had been held separately. N.P., whose explanations were also received by the investigator, stated that on the evening of 6 May 2008 he had gone to the police station for questioning and that he had not seen the applicant there.", "23. On 22 May 2008 the investigator of the Sarov Investigative Committee ordered that no criminal proceedings be instituted in respect of the applicant’s complaints of unlawful detention and ill-treatment in view of the lack of constituent elements of a crime in the acts of police officers B. and V. and investigator K., pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”). He stated that there were no reasons to believe that the injuries recorded by the forensic medical expert had been sustained while the applicant had been held at the police station, as this had been denied by the police officers and N.P.", "24. On 22 July 2008 that decision was revoked by the Sarov Investigative Committee as the inquiry on which it was based was considered incomplete. The following day, a new decision not to open a criminal case was taken and on 6 August it was revoked for the same reason. Among those whose explanations were received by the investigator in the course of an additional inquiry were K. and F. (see paragraph 8 above). They stated that on 5 May 2008 they had gone to the police station with the applicant, Zh. and P. in the applicant’s car, that they had seen the applicant, who had had no injuries at that time, enter the police station at 2 p.m. and had waited for him outside. At 3 or 4 p.m. on 5 May 2008, while waiting for the applicant, who had still not returned, F. had seen N.P. enter the police station at the request of police officer V. and another person.", "25. A new decision not to open a criminal case was taken on 6 October 2008. It was revoked on 20 October 2008 and a similar decision was taken on 6 November 2008. The applicant, whose explanations were again sought by the investigator, stated that his ill-treatment by police officer B. on 5 May 2008 had lasted for about an hour, between 4.30 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. On 25 May 2009 the higher investigative committee at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office set aside the decision of 6 November 2008 on the grounds that it was based on an incomplete inquiry.", "26. The most recent decision not to open a criminal case on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime in the acts of police officers B. and V. and investigator K. were missing was taken on 10 June 2009 pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP. The same reasoning was given as in the initial decision of 22 May 2008 and in the decisions which had been taken in the meantime. It was mainly based on the denial by the police officers and investigator K. that the applicant had been ill-treated and detained before 8.20 p.m. on 6 May 2008.", "27. The applicant appealed against the investigator’s decision of 22 May 2008 to the Sarov Town Court under Article 125 of the CCrP. On 1 August 2008 the Town Court ruled that the application should not be examined, and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that on 22 July 2008 the Sarov Investigative Committee had revoked the investigator’s decision.", "28. Court appeals lodged by the applicant against the investigator’s subsequent decisions of 23 July and 6 October 2008 were not examined for the same reason (the Town Court’s decisions of 7 August and 20 October 2008).", "29. On 6 March 2009 the Town Court examined the applicant’s complaint seeking to have the failure by the head of the Sarov Investigative Committee to carry out an inquiry into an application lodged by the applicant’s counsel on 22 January 2009 declared unlawful. It was alleged in that application that investigator K., police officer V. and others had forged the documents concerning the time at which the applicant had been taken into custody. The Town Court granted the applicant’s request and declared the inactivity on the part of the head of the Sarov Investigative Committee unlawful.", "30. On 3 August 2009 the Sarov Town Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Sarov Investigative Committee’s decision of 10 June 2009 (see paragraph 26 above), holding that the decision was lawful and well-grounded. On 15 September 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and fully endorsed the first‑instance court’s decision." ]

[ "5", "34", "3" ]

[ 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Ljubljana.", "6. He suffers from progressive spinal muscular atrophy and needs twenty-four hour assistance with all his daily activities.", "7. In 2006 the Pensions and Disability Insurance Institute of the Republic of Slovenia (“the Institute”) awarded the applicant an assistance and attendance allowance (hereinafter “the allowance”) of 70% of the reference amount.", "8. On 28 May 2009 the applicant’s general practitioner applied for an increase in the allowance due to the applicant’s worsening condition, referring in particular to the deterioration of the applicant’s respiratory functions. In the application the general practitioner indicated that the applicant needed twenty-four hour assistance by a family member or a lay care assistant, along with permanent professional assistance. At that time the applicant organised his care by hiring students to assist him in his daily activities and to provide the necessary aid. He also relied significantly on the assistance of his family members.", "9. On 9 July 2009 the first-instance disability commission of the Institute (“the commission”) reported that the applicant did not need permanent, professional, medical assistance. The commission was composed of F.V., an internal medicine specialist, and M.F.B., an occupational medicine specialist. It gave its opinion on the basis of an examination of the medical documentation provided by the applicant, specifically opinions of a doctor of internal medicine, a pulmonologist and a clinical neurologist. They also examined the applicant.", "10. On 20 July 2009, the Ljubljana unit of the Institute, relying on the opinion of the commission, dismissed the request for an increase in the allowance.", "11. On 28 July 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal.", "12. On 23 September 2009 the second-instance disability commission (“the second-instance commission”) of the Institute examined the applicant’s file and again reported that he did not need permanent professional assistance and that he could be cared for by a combination of care assistants without specific medical knowledge and by members of his family. The second-instance commission was composed of L.S., an occupational medicine specialist, and M. G., a specialist neuropsychiatrist.", "13. On 24 September 2009 the Institute, referring to the conclusions of the second-instance commission, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Institute further referred to the 1998 Decision on Assistance and Attendance Allowance for Beneficiaries Suffering from a Severe Disability (see paragraph 23 below), according to which beneficiaries were only entitled to a higher allowance if they were in need of twenty-four-hour assistance by family members and further professional medical assistance.", "14. On 22 October 2009 the applicant instituted court proceedings against the Institute before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court, requesting the appointment of an independent expert to examine his medical file.", "15. On 30 September 2010 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court heard the applicant’s testimony and reviewed the case file. Subsequently it dismissed the applicant’s claim. The court rejected the applicant’s request for the input of an independent expert, concluding that the opinions of the first- and second-instance disability commissions of the Institute together with other evidence sufficed to establish that the applicant did not need professional assistance. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“The court therefore fully accepts the opinions of the first- and second-instance disability commissions that the [applicant] did not require permanent professional care because the opinions of the disability commissions were in accordance with the other evidence adduced (the general practitioner’s request and the reports submitted by specialists).”", "16. On 2 November 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal, challenging the conclusions of the court that he did not need professional assistance, and complaining that the court had failed to appoint an independent medical expert. The applicant highlighted that the court itself lacked the expertise to assess on its own the kind of assistance he was provided with and the kind he needed.", "17. On 24 January 2011 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that the first-instance court had based its decision on the opinions of the disability commissions of the Institute which had been composed of experts capable of assessing whether the applicant needed professional assistance. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“The appeal is unfounded in claiming that the [first-instance court] had concluded, without outside reference, despite the fact that it had no medical knowledge, that the care received by the [applicant] had been adequate. The court based its decision on the above cited opinions of the disability commission that had been assembled for the purposes of the pre-judicial proceedings. The [applicant] was examined by the first-instance disability commission; in giving their opinions both commissions also took into consideration the medical records submitted by his general practitioner.”", "18. On 9 March 2011 the applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law. He, inter alia, challenged the position of the lower courts that there had been no need to appoint an independent medical expert as being contrary to the established case-law of the Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court the opinions of the Institute’s Disability Commissions could not be considered independent in proceedings instituted against the decisions of the Institute and thus should not be used as evidence in these proceedings (see paragraph 29 below).", "19. On 17 May 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s application, holding that the challenged decisions had not departed from the established case-law.", "20. On 28 July 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint.", "21. On 11 June 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint with reference to section 55.b of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 30 below)." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 3, 10, 12 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1975, 1957 and 1955 respectively and live in Baku.", "6. The applicants stood as candidates for the opposition parties in the parliamentary elections of 7 November 2010 in the single-mandate Khatai First Electoral Constituency No. 33. Mr Fuad Gahramanli was nominated by the coalition of the Popular Front and Musavat parties, Mr Zalimkhan Mammadli by the Classic Popular Front Party and Mr Namizad Safarov by the Karabakh electoral bloc.", "7. The constituency was divided into thirty-five electoral precincts, with one polling station in each precinct. It is apparent that there were a total of eight candidates running for election in the constituency.", "8. According to the official election results, Mr H.M., the candidate nominated by the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party, won the election with 9,805 votes. Mr Zalimkhan Mammadli finished second with 1,893 votes, Mr Fuad Gahramanli third with 1,571 votes and Mr Namizad Safarov last with 157 votes.", "9. On 10 November 2010 the applicants, together with one other candidate, jointly lodged nearly identical complaints with the Constituency Electoral Commission (the “ConEC”) and the Central Electoral Commission (the “CEC”). They complained that the election results had not reflected the true opinion of the voters because there had been numerous instances of electoral fraud and irregularities on election day, and they requested the annulment of the election results in their constituency. They alleged that:\n(a) In all the constituency polling stations, employees of the Khatai District Executive Authority and people affiliated with Mr H.M. had, in an organised manner, brought a number of persons not registered as voters into constituency polling stations to cast voting ballots;\n(b) There had been instances of ballot-stuffing in numerous polling stations;\n(c) The number of ballots cast in all the polling stations had been more than three times higher than the number of voters who had come to cast votes in all the polling stations;\n(d) In one polling station, observers and consultative members of precinct electoral commissions (“PECs”) (commission members with no voting rights) had been prevented from participating in the vote-counting process.", "10. The applicants also requested that their presence be ensured at the commission hearings concerning their complaints.", "11. In support of their allegations, the applicants submitted to the electoral commissions more than a hundred statements (akt) made by election observers documenting specific instances of the irregularities complained of.", "12. The applicants submitted copies of approximately fifty of the above‑mentioned statements to the Court concerning alleged irregularities in Polling Stations nos. 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34 and 35. Some examples of those statements are summarised below.", "13. Two observers in Polling Station no. 34 claimed to have witnessed an incident of ballot-box stuffing by two PEC members. They noted that, although fewer than 240 voters had been counted throughout the day, a total of 534 ballots had been found in the ballot box and officially counted.", "14. Three observers in Polling Station no. 9 witnessed an incident where the PEC chairman had given a stack of several pre-marked ballots to a voter, who then accidentally dropped them on the floor near the ballot box. Despite this, the ballots were gathered up and put into the ballot box in plain view of all those present. In a separate statement, the same three observers noted two other incidents of similar ballot-box stuffing allegedly initiated by the PEC chairman.", "15. Three observers in Polling Station no. 19 noted that, although a total of only 259 voters had been counted throughout the day, the number of ballots found inside the ballot box at the end of the day had exceeded 400.", "16. One consultative member of the PEC and two observers in Polling Station no. 18 noted that they had been prevented from standing at a place where they could observe, in an unobstructed manner, the checking of voters’ forefingers for election ink. This had presumably been done by persons in charge in the precinct,", "17. Three observers in Polling Station no. 25 noted that, although a total of only 235 voters had been counted throughout the day, 496 ballots had been found in the ballot box. The ballot box contained clumps of ballots, suggesting that ballot-box stuffing had taken place.", "18. Observers in a number of other polling stations had also noted similarly significant differences between the numbers of ballots in the ballot boxes and the numbers of voters who had been observed casting votes throughout the day.", "19. According to the applicants, they did not receive any reply from the ConEC and their complaint had been examined by the CEC only.", "20. On 13 November 2010 the CEC extended the statutory three-day period for examining the complaint for an indefinite period of time, noting that “additional enquiries” were required.", "21. On 21 November 2010, R.I., the member of the CEC’s expert group who had been charged with dealing with the complaint delivered his opinion, stating that the complaint should be dismissed as unsubstantiated.", "22. By a decision of 21 November 2010, the text of which was essentially a repetition of the opinion delivered by the expert R.I., the CEC dismissed the applicants’ complaint as unsubstantiated. It appears that the applicants were not present at the CEC hearing.", "23. In its decision, the CEC noted that the applicants should first have taken their complaints to the relevant PECs. They could then have appealed against the decisions of the various PECs to the ConEC, and only then should they have complained to the CEC, whereas ‒ in breach of the above procedure ‒ they had applied directly to the CEC. The CEC nevertheless decided to examine the complaint on the merits.", "24. As to the merits of the complaint, the CEC found, in particular, that “the majority of the observers’ statements [as submitted by the applicants] were of a general character and did not reflect the principle that an observation must be based on fact”. It furthermore found that a number of the statements contained an assessment of the alleged irregularity based solely on observers’ “subjective opinions”. As an example of this, the CEC mentioned the statement of three observers from Polling Station no. 25 (see paragraph 17 above).", "25. Furthermore, the CEC noted that the information in the observers’ statements which the applicants submitted ‒ of which there were more than hundred ‒ was refuted by the statements of over one hundred other observers from “all thirty-five polling stations” who had not registered any breaches of electoral law that could affect the election results. According to the CEC, some of those observers represented the opposition. In particular, the CEC mentioned the names of a number of observers from Polling Stations nos. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 15 who, according to the CEC, “had confirmed that no breaches of the electoral legislation had been observed”. Moreover, the CEC noted that PEC members in all the polling stations had stated that, on election day, they had not received any statements or complaints by any observer or candidate concerning any election irregularities and that the election process in their respective polling stations had been lawful and conducted under adequate conditions.", "26. In conclusion, the CEC found that the examination of the written evidence refuted the allegations made by the applicants and that no grounds for invalidating the election results could be established.", "27. On 25 November 2010 the applicants, together with one other candidate, lodged an appeal against the CEC decision with the Baku Court of Appeal. In the appeal, they reiterated the complaints made to the CEC about the alleged irregularities on election day. They also complained that ‒ contrary to the requirements of Article 112-1.7 of the Electoral Code ‒ their presence at the CEC hearing had not been ensured and that the CEC had deliberately not investigated the serious allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities.", "28. By a judgment of 26 November 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal, mostly reiterating the CEC’s reasoning. In particular, it noted that the applicants and their observers had not immediately complained of the alleged irregularities directly to the relevant PECs on election day. It furthermore found that the CEC had properly investigated the allegations and had found that they had been refuted by a number of other observers representing various political parties, including opposition parties, who had stated that no serious irregularities had taken place in any polling station.", "29. A copy of the Baku Court of Appeal’s judgment was made available to the applicants on 30 November 2010.", "30. In the meantime, on 22 November 2010 the CEC had sent its final election results record and other relevant documents for review and final approval by the Constitutional Court. On 29 November 2010 the Constitutional Court confirmed the country-wide election results, including the election results in the applicants’ constituency, as final.", "31. On 1 December 2010 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the Baku Court of Appeal’s judgment. They reiterated the complaints and arguments raised before the CEC and the Baku Court of Appeal. They also complained of the following:\n(a) as to the CEC’s and the appellate court’s remark that the irregularities allegedly observed on election day had not been communicated to the PECs immediately on that same day, the applicants noted that it had been precisely the conduct of the PECs ‒ which had created a hostile environment for opposition observers and had themselves been largely responsible for those irregularities ‒ that had made it impossible or difficult for the applicants and their observers to attempt to deal with the irregularities at the PEC level;\n(b) both the CEC and the Baku Court of Appeal had given more weight to the statements of pro-Government observers, which had assessed the election process positively, than to those of the applicants’ observers. The CEC and the Baku Court of Appeal did not explain the reasons for doing so. Moreover, while the CEC noted that positive statements about the conduct of the election had been made even by some observers from opposition parties, the applicants claimed the CEC had simply fabricated the existence of such statements by purported pro-opposition observers.", "32. On 6 December 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, agreeing with the lower court’s reasoning. It also added that the applicants’ appeal and the Baku Court of Appeal’s judgment had to be assessed in the light of Article 63.4 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, which stated that the Constitutional Court’s decisions were final and could not be subject to quashing, amendment or official interpretation by any authority or person. In this regard, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows:\n“The results of the [parliamentary] elections of 7 November 2010 were recognised as valid by [the CEC’s] election results record of 22 November 2010 and the candidates elected as members of parliament from all 125 electoral constituencies were determined.\nThe aforementioned results record was approved by the CEC decision of 22 November 2010, and [on the same date] the final election results record, together with the [ConEC] results records and additional documents, were submitted to the Constitutional Court for verification and approval of the election results.\nBy a decision of the Plenum of the Constitutional Court on the results of the [parliamentary] elections of 7 November 2010 ..., dated 29 November 2010, the CEC’s final results record of 22 November 2010 was deemed compliant with the requirements of Articles 100.2, 100.12, 108.2 and 171.2 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the election results concerning 125 electoral constituencies, including Khatai First Electoral Constituency no. 33, were approved, that decision becoming final at the moment of its delivery.\nIt follows from that decision that the Constitutional Court did not establish any circumstances that may have taken place during the voting or the determination of the election results that could have prevented the establishing of the will of the voters in Khatai First Electoral Constituency no. 33.\nTaking into account the fact that the aforementioned decision [of the Constitutional Court] is final and not subject to quashing, amendment or official interpretation by any authority or person, the court considers that the judgment of the appellate court [dismissing the applicants’ complaints] must be upheld.”" ]

[ "P1-3" ]

[ 12, 19, 20 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving his prison sentence in Kemerovo.", "6. On 19 November 2008 the applicant was convicted of several counts of attempted drug trafficking. He was sentenced to ten years and six months’ imprisonment and sent to correctional colony no. 43 in Kemerovo.", "7. Prior to his arrest the applicant was diagnosed with hepatitis C.", "8. Following his arrival at the correctional colony, the applicant underwent a medical check-up, which did not reveal any diseases.", "9. Sometime later the colony administration received a certificate from a civil hospital attesting that the applicant was suffering from hepatitis C. On the following day he was prescribed hepatoprotectors.", "10. In December 2009 the applicant started experiencing severe pain in the knees. Following a large number of complaints, he was examined on 29 June 2010 by a colony doctor. The doctor suspected that he might have rheumatoid polyarthritis and deforming osteochondrosis of the knee joints and recommended an X-ray examination.", "11. In August 2010 the applicant was transferred to a prison hospital in correctional colony no. 5. Following medical examinations by a physician, a neurologist and an ophthalmologist, and an X-ray, he was diagnosed with an articular syndrome which the doctors concluded was linked to his hepatitis C. No serious pathology was detected. The applicant was prescribed treatment with hepatoprotectors. His complaints of severe pain in the joints were not addressed.", "12. The applicant and his relatives complained to various prison authorities of the lack of proper medical assistance. The replies received by the applicant were almost identical in wording: the officials stated that the medical examinations of the applicant, including an X-ray examination, and his consultations in the prison hospital, had not revealed any articular pathology. They stressed that the prison medical personnel were trained and equipped to address the applicant’s health problems. They also said that an in-patient check-up in the prison hospital of colony no. 5 had been scheduled for the applicant in December 2010 or early 2011.", "13. The applicant asked the administration of his colony to authorise a forensic medical examination or to admit him to a prison hospital for an in‑depth examination and treatment. He also complained that the medical unit of the correctional colony was not equipped to address his health problems. The applicant’s relatives supported his request, having also asked that he be held in the colony in Rostov, close to his home. They argued that they had been unable to travel across the country to see him and could not provide him with assistance or medicines as the colony in which he was detained was too far away. They requested the applicant’s transfer to a hospital in view of his poor state of health.", "14. On 9 April 2012 the applicant was taken from the correctional colony in Kemerovo to a temporary detention facility in Rostov-on-Don to take part in court hearings related to a supervisory review of his conviction. His transfer from Kemerovo to Rostov lasted two months and included several transit destinations: the towns of Mariinsk, Chelyabinsk, Samara, Saratov and Voronezh. On arrival at each of those towns the applicant was taken from the train to a temporary detention facility. According to the applicant, he spent hours on the road carrying a heavy bag with his belongings. He also had to wait for hours for admission to each facility, in great pain but without any opportunity to rest, sit or lie down. His condition started to deteriorate following the transfer. According to the Government, the distance that the applicant had to walk carrying his bag never exceeded 15 metres. During the transfer the applicant was always provided with a sleeping place and never asked for medical assistance.", "15. In response to complaints from the applicant’s relatives, on 1 August 2012 the head of detention facility no. 1 in Rostov sent a letter to the applicant’s mother informing her that a request for admission to tuberculosis hospital no. 1 had been sent by the medical unit of the detention facility. However, three days later the applicant was transported back to correctional colony no. 43 in Kemerovo. The long transit once again led to the deterioration of the applicant’s condition. On arrival at the colony the applicant complained of severe pain, but his complaints were to no avail.", "16. On 4 October 2012 the applicant was seen by a prison doctor. On the same day, he was placed in a punishment cell because a mobile phone had allegedly been found in his cell and he had been declared “a persistent offender of the internal order”. The applicant submitted that it had been extremely cold in the punishment wing and that he had not been given any warm clothes. He stressed that that situation had led to a further deterioration in his health, with the pain in his joints becoming unbearable. His requests for medical assistance were ignored.", "17. The applicant and his relatives complained to a large number of authorities that the applicant was not being provided with any medical attention. One of those complaints brought a response from the Kemerovo regional prosecutor’s office. In a letter of 12 November 2012 a senior prosecutor from the office informed the applicant’s mother that an examination in the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 5 had been scheduled for the applicant at the end of 2012 to determine whether he was suffering from an illness affecting the joints. The Kemerovo Regional Ombudsman sent a similar response.", "18. At the end of October 2012, in response to the applicant’s continuous complaints of pain in the joints, his admission to the colony medical unit was authorised. He started receiving an anti‑inflammatory drug to relieve the pain in his joints and to ameliorate his condition. The applicant submitted that the drug had had no effect.", "19. On 6 December 2012 the applicant was transferred to the therapy ward of the regional prison hospital. He was seen by a surgeon, an ophthalmologist, a cardiologist and a neurologist. The Government insisted that specialists from the regional ophthalmological hospital and the regional cardiology clinic, as well as from the Regional Centre for Protection from AIDS “were involved in the consultations”. A complex examination including an ultrasound scan revealed that he was suffering from multi-level osteochondrosis, which was chronic and recurrent and at a moderately acute stage. He was also diagnosed with osteoarthrosis of the knee joints, a soft tissue disorder of the shoulder, and lumbodynia (pain in the lumbar area). It was recommended that he receive active supervision in the detention facility and treatment, twice a year, with vitamins, metabolites, anti-inflammatory drugs and chondroprotectors. He was also prescribed exercise therapy and self-massage with various ointments. The doctors recommended that the applicant should avoid lifting heavy objects and should not be subjected to the cold. In addition, they compiled a complex chemotherapy regimen in the event that his illness reached an acute stage.", "20. The applicant submitted that while at the hospital he had also complained of pain in his pelvis, elbows and ankles. However, no examination of those areas was conducted.", "21. Having undergone treatment in the hospital, on 21 December 2012 the applicant was discharged in a satisfactory condition. Upon his arrival at colony no. 43 he was prescribed a chondroprotector, a hypotensive drug and vitamins.", "22. Three weeks after his discharge from hospital the applicant was sent back to Rostov. He was forced to take the same route as in April-May 2012. The applicant stressed that he had been unable to follow any of the recommendations made by the doctors of the prison hospital. He had to carry a heavy bag with his personal belongings and had to stay for hours in cold premises or outside without any possibility of lying down or sitting, save for directly on the ground. According to the Government, the distance that the applicant had to walk carrying his bag never exceeded 15 metres. During the transfer the applicant was always provided with a sleeping place and never asked for medical assistance.", "23. The applicant again started experiencing severe pain in the joints. He also had pain during urination. His requests for medical care were ignored by the doctors of temporary detention facility no. 61/1 of Rostov. Late on 20 February 2013 the applicant was taken to a prison hospital for an urgent consultation with an urologist. However, given the late hour he could only be seen by the on-duty doctor, who recorded his complaints, diagnosed acute prostatitis and recommended his examination by a specialist. The applicant was sent back to the detention facility.", "24. Two days later the applicant was transported back to the correctional colony in Kemerovo, despite his mother’s requests to postpone the transfer on account of his poor state of health. Throughout the month-long trip from Rostov to Kemerovo the applicant persistently complained of the deterioration in his health and his inability to bear the pain caused by the cold and the requirement to carry a heavy load. No measures were taken.", "25. On 27 March 2013, following the applicant’s arrival at correctional colony no. 43, he was prescribed a chondroprotector, a hepatoprotector, a hypotensive drug and vitamins. On 15 April anti-ulcer and anti‑inflammatory drugs were added to his regimen.", "26. Between 22 May and 13 June 2013 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment at the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 5. The doctors confirmed the earlier diagnosis and also found the applicant to be suffering from first-degree coxal osteoarthritis.", "27. On 18 June 2013 following his return to the colony the applicant was prescribed vitamins, hypotensive drugs, a chondroprotector and a hepatoprotector.", "28. On 4 December 2013 the applicant was examined by a medical panel, which found that his diseases posed no risk to his life.", "29. On 23 December 2013 the doctors suspected that the applicant might have infiltrative tuberculosis in his left lung. Between 23 December 2013 and 5 February 2014 he was kept in a quarantine ward together with two other infected prisoners without receiving any treatment. He was then sent to prison hospital no. 16 in Kemerovo, where he has remained ever since. Referring to the hospital’s poor reputation as regards respect for prisoners’ rights, the applicant’s representative requested that the applicant be sent to another facility, but to no avail.", "30. On 28 November 2013 the applicant complained to a court, under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of the lack of medical care in correctional colony no. 43. He claimed that his health complaints had been systematically ignored, that his condition had deteriorated in detention and that he had not been receiving the treatment prescribed to him in December 2012. He also submitted that he had not been allowed to take the medication provided to him by his relatives.", "31. On 22 January 2014 the claim was dismissed. Having cited in detail a copy of the applicant’s medical file provided by the administration of the colony, the court briefly concluded that the applicant’s claims were unsubstantiated. Relying on a statement by the colony’s representative, the court found that the applicant had never asked the administration to allow him to take drugs other than those he was provided with by the prison staff.", "32. The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 22 January 2014 was rejected on 2 July 20014 by the Kemerovo Regional Court.", "33. The applicant provided the following description of his current condition, corroborated by written statements from two of his fellow inmates. He stated that his illness was at an acute stage, and he was suffering from constant severe pain in the joints. He was rapidly losing weight: he weighed 58 kg while being 174 cm tall. The pain was affecting all of his joints, making movement almost impossible. He could not sleep or walk without painkillers. The only medicaments provided (an anti‑inflammatory drug and a chondroprotector) were ineffective for the treatment of an illness such as his, especially given its advanced stage. His request for a copy of his medical record in order to consult an independent specialist had been refused by the administration of the correctional colony, who said that they had no means to pay for a copy of his record." ]

[ "13", "3" ]

[ 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28 ]

[]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Graz.", "8. On 7 March 1997 she married Mr S.V. in Vienna (Austria). They lived in Vienna until January 2006, when they decided to move to Komletinci (Croatia).", "9. Meanwhile, on 3 January 1999 the applicant gave birth to their daughter, E.V, on 6 June 2001 to their son, F.V., and on 21 January 2006 to their second daughter, L.V.", "10. On 6 January 2009 the applicant and S.V. separated. He remained in Croatia, whereas the applicant returned to Austria.", "11. Following her arrival in Austria the applicant collected the children from her husband’s parents, who lived in Vienna and with whom the children had been spending the Christmas holidays, and took the children with her to Graz.", "12. When the applicant did not return to Croatia, S.V. went to Austria with a view to taking the children back to Croatia. However, the applicant opposed that. The children therefore remained in Graz where the applicant enrolled the two older children in school and the youngest child in kindergarten. S.V. maintained contact with the children by talking to them over the phone and by visiting them occasionally. It would appear that the applicant and S.V. eventually agreed that the children would remain in Austria but would spend holidays with their father in Croatia.", "13. In August 2010, after the summer holidays, which the children spent with their father and paternal grandparents in Croatia, the father refused to return them to the applicant, claiming that the children had refused to go back to Austria.", "14. In September 2010, relying on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter: “the Hague Convention”, see paragraph 54 below), the applicant asked the Austrian Ministry of Justice, as the Austrian Central Authority within the meaning of that Convention, to return her children. The Ministry of Justice immediately contacted the Croatian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi) as the Croatian Central Authority.", "15. By a letter of 23 September 2010 the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare forwarded the applicant’s request to the Vinkovci Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Vinkovcima).", "16. A copy of the Ministry’s letter of 23 September 2010 was sent to the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Vinkovci). Pursuant to Article 10 of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 53 below), the latter was invited to mediate with the father the voluntary return of the children to Austria, and to inform the Vinkovci Municipal Court and the Ministry of the results thereof.", "17. The Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre interviewed S.V., talked to the children without his presence and carried out an on-site inspection of his home. On 28 October 2010 it replied to the Ministry’s request. The relevant part of that reply reads as follows:\n“S.V. states that his actions were in accordance with the wishes of his children, who wanted to remain living with him in Croatia. He justifies his current actions by the wish to afford his children a happy life. During the interview on the [premises] of the Centre S.V. did not try to portray [the applicant] as a bad or irresponsible mother ... S.V. verbalises the wish that in the divorce proceedings the custody of the children be awarded to him primarily because he wants the children to be happy. He states that the children wish to remain living with him. He does not want to restrict his wife’s contacts with the children. ... During the conversation S.V. leaves the impression of an emotionally warm person. He does not appear to be a parent who would physically punish or behave inappropriately towards the children.\n... by an on-site inspection it was established that the father had secured adequate housing and other conditions. He has a permanent source of income ... as he has a bar on the ground floor of the house [where he and the children live], where he works. [Thus] while working he stays [physically] very close to his family, which gives the children [a sense of] security.\nIt was further established that E.V. and F.V. had frequently changed school and that they had started the new school year by going to an elementary school in Komletinci where, according to the father, they had adapted well. It is not in the children’s interest to frequently change school, schoolmates and teachers. The children should have stability. Every removal of the children from their habitual environment (family or school setting) is stressful and leaves consequences on the children. It requires them to make additional efforts to adapt to the new environment and the school and to make new friends.\nGiven that the children’s mother had in the meantime lodged an application for the return of her wrongfully retained children from Croatia, the Centre conducted an interview with the children on its premises without the presence of the father. Their wish is that their parents live together, as most children in their situation do. They are aware that the parents are divorcing. They are not taking the side of [either] the father or the mother. E.V. and F.V. understand the family situation whereas L.V. is at an age when her parents’ situation is still not clear to her. The children express the wish to live with their father. They see their relationship with the father as closer and [consider that] they are more emotionally attached [to him]. They like the life in the countryside, in Komletinci. The life in Austria is very different from the life in Komletinci. In Komletinci they have more free time, and meet and play with other children of their age. The pace of life in Austria makes that impossible. Here they are very well accepted in school. They know their neighbours and other children of their age.\nIn the light of the foregoing [the Centre] found that it would be in the children’s interest to continue living with their father in Komletinci. In accordance with that [view] the Centre has submitted the opinion of a psychologist and a social worker to the Vinkovci Municipal Court.”", "18. Non-contentious proceedings for the return of the children were instituted on 7 October 2010, that is, on the date the Ministry’s letter of 23 September 2010 forwarding the applicant’s request under the Hague Convention to the Vinkovci Municipal Court (see paragraph 15 above) was received at that court. The Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre participated in those proceedings as an independent intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the children’s interests.", "19. During the proceedings the court decided to obtain and consult the report of the social welfare centre prepared for the purposes of deciding on the custody of the children in the parallel civil proceedings for divorce and child custody (see paragraphs 33-35 below). On 4 November 2010 the report was received at the court.", "20. At a hearing held at 11 a.m. on 19 November 2010 the applicant’s representative argued that the retention of the three children by their father in Croatia had been wrongful and that they should be returned forthwith. She averred that the fact that the social welfare centre had submitted a report in the parallel civil proceedings for divorce and child custody should have no bearing in the present proceedings as the Hague Convention did not provide for exceptions from the obligation to promptly return the children. She also stated that the applicant’s right to equality in the proceedings had been breached because, even though she was fluent in Croatian as her parents were of Croatian origin, she had not been invited by the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre to participate in the family assessment procedure leading to its report.", "21. S.V.’s representative invited the court to dismiss the applicant’s request. She argued that the retention of the children had not been wrongful and that in any event S.V. could not have forced the children to return to their mother against their wishes. In particular, the children had clearly communicated their wishes not to return to Austria to the employees of the social welfare centre and had even told their father that they would run away if returned, which suggested that the return would have caused them psychological trauma. Furthermore, while it was true that the report of the social welfare centre was prepared in the context of the parallel civil proceedings for the purposes of deciding on custody of the children, its findings, which had suggested that the children did not want to return to Austria, could not be ignored in the present proceedings.", "22. The representative of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre agreed with S.V.’s representative that the applicant’s request should be dismissed and that the children’s retention had not been wrongful. She submitted that the children had been interviewed by the employees of the centre first together and then individually, and that they had stated that they did not like the life in Austria and wanted to live in Croatia.", "23. In her reply the applicant’s representative stated as follows:\n“... especially the youngest child of the parties L.V., who is only four years old, is very attached to her mother, and has expressed a wish to return with her to Austria. As regards the two older children, what should primarily be taken into account, given their age, are their [best] interests and not just where they wish to live. In any event, this cannot have an impact on the decision making in this case having regard to Article 16 of the [Hague] Convention.”", "24. At the same hearing the court heard both parties. The applicant in her testimony stated that in mid-August 2010 S.V. had called her to tell her that he would not be returning the children to Austria because they did not want that. The applicant further testified that on that occasion she had spoken with the children over the phone and that the two older children had told her that they indeed did not want to return to Austria, whereas the youngest child had expressed the wish to return. The applicant also stated that she had not seen her children from the time their father had retained them in Croatia until the day before the hearing.", "25. From S.V.’s testimony it followed that the youngest child, L.V., was indecisive as to which parent she wanted to live with. In his own words:\n“L.V. is [still] small and at times she wants to live with her mother, and every now and then with me.”", "26. At the same hearing, on 19 November 2010, the Vinkovci Municipal Court delivered a decision whereby it dismissed the applicant’s request. In so doing it relied on the report of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre, which included the opinions of a social worker and a psychologist employed with the centre and which had been prepared for the purposes of deciding on the custody of the children in the parallel civil proceedings for divorce and child custody (see paragraphs 19 and 33-35 below). The relevant part of that decision read as follows:\n“The petitioner ... maintains her request that her children be returned to Austria where they had the last domicile, that is, their habitual residence and where they went to school. The fact that the social welfare centre gave its opinion in the [parallel] civil proceedings for divorce [and child custody] is of no relevance for reaching a decision in these [return] proceedings because the Republic of Croatia, as a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, is bound to honour the provisions of that Convention.\nThe counterparty ... in his reply opposes the [petitioner’s] request, considering that the conditions prescribed in the Hague Convention had not been met in the present case. In particular, in order for the Hague Convention to apply, the children had to have been wrongfully removed or wrongfully retained and the right of custody had to have been breached. The law did not attribute the right of custody to the petitioner, nor had she been awarded that right by a judicial or administrative decision or an agreement equal to such decisions. Hence, the petitioner herself does not have the right of custody any more than the counterparty himself, given that the divorce proceedings, where [the issue of] custody is being examined, are still pending before this court.\nHe also invokes Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) [of the Hague Convention] which provides that the court is not bound to order the return of a child if it establishes that the return would expose the child to, inter alia, psychological harm, and that it may also refuse to do so if the child objects to being returned.\nThe representative of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre in her observations considers that the present case does not concern wrongful retention of children because the Centre had, even before the petitioner submitted her request, been involved in the social anamnesis of the family [i.e. family assessment]. Namely, the children’s father had addressed the Centre when in 2009, during a visit of the children to his parents in Austria, the spouses had separated, that is to say, when the petitioner had left [him], gone to Austria, taken the children, retained them and enrolled them in a school in Austria. The father, in order to protect the interests of the children, had decided not to take certain steps [to return them] but had instead visited the children in Austria as much as he could. When the children this summer had come to Croatia with his parents, they had not wanted to go back to Austria. The father had then sought advice from the Centre, which had advised him that he should not return the children to their mother by force. After that, he had filed for divorce, whereas the petitioner had lodged a request for the return of wrongfully retained children.\nIn the proceedings conducted before the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre, the children were heard, all three of them together and then individually, and they expressed the wish to live in Croatia. Therefore, the representative of the Social Welfare Centre considers that, in order to protect the children’s interests and well-being, it is necessary to dismiss the petitioner’s request as unfounded.\n...\nIn these proceedings, instituted following the request of the petitioner for the return of the children, the court has to apply the Ratification of the Hague Convention (Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction) Act.\nSection 12(2) of that Act provides that the court will refuse to order the return of a child if he or she is settled in the new environment.\nAccording to evidence taken, it was established that the parties married on 7 March 1997 in Austria, in Vienna. During the marriage, E.V. was born on 3 January 1999, F.V. on 6 June 2001 and L.V. on 21 January 2006. The parties came with their three children to live in Croatia, in Komletinci.\nIn the acrimony during the [2008] Christmas holidays [the petitioner] verbalised the wish to end their life together. [She] left the common household and went to live in Austria. At that time the children were in Austria, visiting their paternal grandparents. Upon her arrival in Austria the petitioner immediately went to collect the children and did not allow the father to take them back to Croatia, even though the children wanted to go to Croatia and had to finish another school term [there].\n[In] summer [2010] the children, together with their paternal grandparents, came to [Croatia to] spend three weeks of their summer holidays at the seaside. After returning from the seaside, the children came to live in Komletinci. According to the counterparty’s statement, which the petitioner acknowledged, the two older children had refused to return to Austria, expressing the wish to stay in Komletinci.\nFrom the enclosed certificates of domicile issued by the [police authorities] it was established that all three children have registered domicile on the territory of Croatia, at the address ... in Komletinci ... as of 17 October 2006. Therefore, the petitioner’s arguments that the children have registered domicile only in Austria are incorrect.\nIn the present case the court has not yet rendered a final decision in the [parallel civil] proceedings [for divorce and child custody]. However, that does not affect the adoption of the decision on the request for the return of the children on the basis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.\nIt is the opinion of this court that the father did not, without the knowledge and approval of the mother, abduct the children from the living environment in which they were settled. It is to be noted that the children have previously lived in Komletinci, that E.V. finished the second grade of the elementary school in Komletinci where she went to school until the first semester of the third grade, and that F.V. also attended the first grade in the school in Komletinci. It therefore follows that the children were retained in the place where they previously used to live. This school year E.V. and F.V. are again attending the elementary school in Komletinci.\nFrom the opinion of the psychologist at the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre it undoubtedly follows that it is not in the children’s interests to change school again because they would have to re-adapt to [new] teachers, curriculum, schoolmates, etc. From the opinion submitted it is evident that the children have adapted to their current living environment and school setting, and that they have verbalised the wish to live with their father.\nGiven all the aforementioned [considerations], this court, relying on Article 12 paragraph 2 and Article 13 paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, refuses to order the return of the children, finding that the children have adapted without any problems to the environment in which they had previously lived and that, in the given circumstances, returning them to the mother in Austria would place them in an unfavourable position and expose them to psychological trauma, which certainly cannot be to their benefit.\nIt is also to be noted that the children themselves, especially the two older children, object to being returned to Austria.\nHaving regard to all the above, this court decides as [indicated] in the operative part.”", "27. On 30 November 2010 the applicant appealed against the first-instance decision.", "28. On 24 February 2011 the Vukovar County Court (Županijski sud u Vukovaru) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision, which thereby became final. The second-instance decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 17 March 2011. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n“The appellant claims that the aim of the [Hague] Convention is the prompt return of children to the country of their habitual residence, and that what is protected is the last status of the children.\nIn the appellant’s opinion it was necessary to apply exclusively Article 12 paragraph 1 of the said Convention and order the children’s return forthwith.\n...\nThe appeal is unfounded.\n...\nIt was established that all three children have registered domicile on the territory of Croatia, at the address ... in Komletinci ... as of 17 October 2006.\nThe first-instance court correctly found that the father did not without the knowledge and approval of the mother abduct the children from the living environment where they were settled because the children have previously lived in Komletinci, [where] E.V. finished the second grade of elementary school ... and F.V. attended the first grade ...\nThe first-instance court relied on Article 12 paragraph 2 and Article 13 paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the [Hague] Convention.\nAs rightly pointed out by the appellant, the first-instance court had erred in relying on Article 12 paragraph 2 of that Convention because the children had been brought to Croatia at the beginning of July 2010, whereas the proceedings [for the return of children] were instituted in September 2010, that is, before the expiration of the period of one year referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the [Hague] Convention.\nHowever, this second-instance court finds that the first-instance court correctly applied Article 13 paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the [Hague] Convention, and, in the opinion of this court, also paragraph 2 of that Article because the two older children, whose views it is appropriate to take into account given their age, object to being returned.\nSince the children have already adapted to life in the environment (in which they have previously lived – before going to Austria) there is a grave risk that their return would expose them to psychological trauma. The change of school would have traumatising effects on the two older children if, during the school year, they were to be transferred to Austria, where the curriculum is completely different.\nFor these reasons the appeal is dismissed and the first-instance decision upheld.”", "29. On 15 April 2011, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging, inter alia, that her constitutional right to a fair hearing and to respect for her family life, guaranteed by Article 29 paragraph 1 and Article 35 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 51 below), had been violated. On 25 January 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint and served its decision on her representative on 15 February 2012. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n“[The complainant] considers that the [constitutional] rights guaranteed in Articles 14 paragraph 2, 16, 26, 29 paragraph 1, 35, 62, 63 and 140 of the Constitution have been breached by the contested decision of the lower-instance courts.\n...\nHaving regard to the arguments raised in the constitutional complaint the Constitutional Court examined the contested decisions under Article 29 paragraph 1 and Article 63 of the Constitution.\n...\nHaving regard to the opinion of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre ... and the fact that both older children ... (E.V. and F.V.) expressed the wish as to where and with which parent they wanted to continue living after [their parents’] divorce, and that they refuse to be separated from their father, the Constitutional Court finds that the competent courts rendered the contested decisions by correctly assessing all the particular circumstances of the present case.”", "30. Meanwhile, on 27 August 2010 S.V. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Vinkovci Municipal Court seeking: (a) divorce; (b) the right to have their children living with him (hereafter: “custody”); and (c) maintenance for the children. As in the above-mentioned proceedings for the return of children (see paragraph 18 above), the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre also participated in these proceedings as an independent intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the children’s interests.", "31. On 30 August 2010 the court invited the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre to submit a report on the financial and family situation of the parties and to give its opinion on the issue of which parent the children would prefer to live with and on the contacts with the other parent.", "32. On 17 December 2010 the applicant responded to S.V.’s action. In her response she agreed to the divorce, contested S.V.’s claim for custody and proposed instead that she be granted custody.", "33. After having interviewed the children and S.V., and having carried out an inspection of his home on 20 October 2010, the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre submitted its report to the court on 28 October 2010. The report consisted of the opinion of a social worker and the opinion of a psychologist, who were both employed at the centre.", "34. The relevant part of the opinion of the social worker reads as follows:\n“[S.V.] justifies his current actions by his wish to afford his children a happy life. During the interview he repeatedly stated that after spending the summer holidays in Croatia, the children expressed the wish not to return to Austria any more. He did not stop his wife coming and seeing the children but she never came ... During the interview he did not try to portray [her] as a bad or irresponsible mother ... S.V. verbalises the wish that in the divorce proceedings the custody of the children be awarded to him primarily because he wants the children to be happy. He stated that that the children wished to remain living with him. He did not want to restrict his wife’s contacts with the children. ... During the conversation S.V. leaves the impression of an emotionally warm person. He does not appear to be a parent who would physically punish or behave inappropriately towards the children.\n... by an on-site inspection it was established that the father had secured adequate housing and other conditions. He has a permanent source of income ... as he has a bar on the ground floor of the house [where he and the children live] where he works. [Thus] while working he stays [physically] very close to his family, which gives the children [a sense of] security.\nIt is evident that E.V. and F.V. have frequently changed school and that they started the new school year by going to the elementary school in Komletinci where, according to their father, they have adapted well. It is not in the interest of the children to frequently change school, schoolmates and teachers. The children should have stability. Every removal of the children from their habitual environment (family or school setting) is stressful and has consequences on the children. That requires additional efforts from the children to adapt to the new environment, [the new] school and to make new friends.\nGiven that the children’s mother lives in Austria ... employees of this Social Welfare Centre had no possibility to examine and establish [her] housing conditions and family situation and assess [them] and [thus] could not give an opinion on the possibility of contacts between the mother and the children at her place of residence in Austria.\nHaving regard to the foregoing, I am of the opinion that E.V., F.V. and L.V. should continue living with their father ...”", "35. The relevant part of the opinion of the centre’s psychologist reads as follows:\n“This opinion was prepared on the basis of a psychological interview with S.V. as well as on the basis of psychological examination of the children and the perusal of the documents available at the Centre.\n...\nAn interview with the children was conducted. Their wish is that their parents live together, as most children in their situation do. They are aware that their parents are divorcing. They are not taking the side of [either] the father or the mother. E.V. and F.V. understand the family situation whereas L.V. is at an age when her parents’ situation is still not clear to her. The children express the wish to live with their father. They see their relationship with the father as closer and [consider that] they are more emotionally attached [to him]. They especially like the life in Komletinci, that is, in a smaller community. The life in Austria differs to a significant degree from the life here. They have more free time, [and] meet with children of their age. They spend their free time playing, which is not the case in Austria, not because one of the parents would prohibit or prevent them from doing so but because the pace of life is such. The parents and the children are not at home during the day because they work and the children go to school, so they spend very little time together, which means a lot to the children. Here they are well accepted in school, they know the neighbours and generally the social network (teachers, neighbours, children of their age) works better. Moreover, it is not in the children’s interest to change school anew, which is stressful because the children have to re-adapt to teachers, the curriculum and [find new] friends.\nI am of the opinion that the children should remain living with their father given that S.V. adequately takes care of their needs as well as of their education and upbringing. At the same time, the children verbalise their wish to live with their father.”", "36. As the applicant did not oppose the divorce, at the hearing held on 18 November 2010 the court ruled that S.V.’s civil action was to be considered a joint petition for divorce. At the same hearing the applicant and S.V. asked the court to adjourn the hearing so that they could agree on the issues of child custody, access rights of the non-custodial parent and maintenance.", "37. At the hearing held at 1 p.m. the next day, 19 November 2010, that is, two hours after the hearing in the above-mentioned proceedings concerning the return of children (see paragraph 20 above), the parties informed the court that they had agreed that the two older children would live with their father but that they could not reach an agreement on custody of their youngest child, L.V.", "38. The applicant’s representative stressed that it was in L.V.’s interest, as she was only four and a half years old at the time, to live with her mother, to whom she was emotionally attached and with whom she had expressed the wish to live. She added that at that age the role of the mother was very important. Lastly, the applicant’s representative reiterated that the applicant had not been involved in the family assessment procedure carried out by the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre, resulting in its report. In particular, she had not been interviewed or otherwise examined by its staff (see paragraph 20 above). She therefore invited the court to obtain a joint expert opinion from a psychologist and a psychiatrist with a view to establishing whether it was in L.V.’s best interests to live with her mother or with her father.", "39. The representative of the social welfare centre stated that the applicant had not been involved in the family assessment procedure because she was a foreign national who lived abroad. After reiterating the findings made in the centre’s report (see paragraphs 33-35 above), she added that the children were very emotionally attached to each other and it was therefore not advisable to separate them.", "40. S.V.’s representative argued that the court should respect the professional opinions expressed in the social welfare centre’s report and that the children should not be separated. She added that her client was willing to allow the applicant to have longer and more frequent contacts with L.V., given that she was not burdened by school obligations. Lastly, S.V.’s representative opposed the proposal to obtain a joint expert opinion (see paragraph 38 above) as it was not disputed between the parties that they were both capable of adequately taking care of the children.", "41. After hearing the representatives of the parties and of the social welfare centre as the intervener, the Municipal Court at the same hearing first rejected the proposal by the applicant’s representative to obtain a joint expert opinion, and then pronounced a judgment whereby it: (a) divorced the marriage between the applicant and S.V.; (b) decided that all three children were to live with S.V.; (c) granted the applicant access (contact) rights; and (d) ordered the applicant to regularly pay a certain amount of money as maintenance for their children. In particular, the court decided that the applicant should exercise her access rights by taking the children to her home in Austria on the last weekend of every month (or any other weekend if the parties agreed otherwise), as well as during the seven days of the winter holidays, fifteen days of the summer holidays and during other holidays interchangeably.", "42. In deciding on the issue of child custody, the court relied on the report of the social welfare centre (see paragraphs 33-35). The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n“The court rejected the second petitioner’s [the defendant’s] proposal to take evidence by obtaining a joint expert opinion from experts in psychology and psychiatry because it is undisputed between the parties that they both satisfy the conditions for assuming parental responsibility, with which the court agrees. Given that on the basis of the evidence taken it can reach a decision on the merits even without the proposed evidence, which would indicate whether the parents are fit to take care of the children, the court considered [obtaining] the opinion of an expert in psychiatry unnecessary and [thus] rejected that proposal, having regard to section 10(1) of the Civil Procedure Act which requires that [the civil] proceedings be conducted without delays and with the least cost.\n...\nAs regards their minor children, E.V. and F.V., the parties reached an agreement that they would live with their father. However, the mother argued that it was in the [best] interests of [their younger daughter] L.V., who is four years old, to live with her as she was emotionally attached to her [mother].\nFrom the report of the social welfare centre it follows that the children wish, as do most children in their situation, the parents to live together in a harmonious relationship, that they are aware of the fact that their father and mother are divorcing, and that they are not taking the side of [either] the father or the mother. However, they expressed the wish to live with their father because they see their relationship with their father as much closer and are more emotionally attached to him. Furthermore, it follows from the report that the children like their life in Komletinci, that is, [a life] in a smaller community where they have more free time, socialise with other children of their age [and] spend their free time playing, which is not the case in Austria. It further follows from the report that the children are well accepted in school and that it is not in the children’s best interests to change school again, which is considered stressful as they would again have to adjust to [new] teachers, curriculum and schoolmates. Therefore, in the opinion of the social welfare centre, the children should remain living with their father given that he adequately takes care of their needs, their upbringing and education and that, at the same time, the children have verbalised the wish to live with their father.\nAt the hearing ... the representative of the social welfare centre stated that she maintained the opinion provided [in the report of the social welfare centre] and reiterated that the children were very attached to each other and that it would not be advisable to separate them.\nThe first petitioner [the plaintiff] stated at the same hearing that he did not dispute that the mother met the conditions to be awarded custody of the children but that he considered that it would be in the best interests of the children to live together, which was what the children wanted, and that he was willing to allow the second petitioner [the defendant] to maintain more extensive contact with L.V. given that she was not burdened by school obligations.\nWhen awarding custody it has to be taken into account that brothers and sisters with existing emotional connections should not be separated unless that is their wish or in their best interests. Given that according to the report of the social welfare centre the children have verbalised the wish to live together, the court, promoting the best interests of the child within the meaning of Article 3 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and [in accordance with] the basic principles of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, has decided to award custody to their father.\nWhen deciding on the mother’s access (contact) rights, the court has, having regard to the agreement of the parties that the mother shall exercise those rights in the manner proposed by the social welfare centre, but so that the mother takes the children to her home in Austria, [decided] that [she should have contact with the children] on the last weekend of every month or any other weekend if the parties agree otherwise, as well as during the seven days of the winter holidays, fifteen days of the summer holidays and during other holidays interchangeably.”", "43. On the same day the applicant and S.V. signed a written agreement (hereinafter: “interim custody agreement”) regulating the applicant’s access rights in the period until the first-instance judgment became final. They agreed that in that period the applicant would exercise her access rights according to the visiting schedule set forth in the first-instance judgment. In addition, the parties agreed that the applicant would immediately take their youngest daughter, L.V., with her to Austria and return her to S.V. on 9 January 2011. However, on 9 January 2011 the applicant did not return their youngest child to S.V., but retained her in Austria.", "44. Meanwhile, on 17 December 2010 the applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. She argued that: (a) under Article 16 of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 54 below) the first-instance court was not allowed to proceed until the adoption of the final decision in the proceedings for the return of children; (b) the first-instance court had not referred S.V. and her to the mandatory mediation procedure before divorce, contrary to section 44 of the Family Act (see paragraph 52 below); and (c) she had not participated in the family assessment procedure carried out by the social welfare centre. The applicant also reiterated her earlier argument that her younger daughter, L.V., was emotionally attached to her and was at an age when it was in her best interests to live with her mother, as her separation from the mother would be more detrimental than separation from her siblings. As regards her two older children, the applicant emphasised that if they really wanted to remain living with their father in Croatia, she was prepared to respect that wish. However, the decision on their custody should not have been made before the decision in the return proceedings.", "45. By a judgment of 23 February 2011 the Vukovar County Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final. The second-instance judgment was served on the applicant’s representative on 16 March 2011. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n“In her appeal the appellant argues that ... the [first-instance] court was not allowed to proceed in these [civil] proceedings until the final resolution of the [non-contentious] proceedings for the return of wrongfully retained children pending before the same court, in accordance with Article 16 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The purpose of that Convention was that children were returned to the State from which they had been abducted. Only then should proceedings for custody have been conducted, given that the children had been uprooted from the milieu in which they had lived hitherto.\n[The appellant] also argues that she did not participate in the [family assessment] carried out by the Vinkovci Social Welfare centre. She considers that the youngest child L.V. was very emotionally attached to her and that the [first-instance] court should have taken that into account.\n...\nAs the parties, however, did not agree on custody in respect of their youngest child, L.V., the court, deferring to the opinion of the social welfare centre and respecting the wishes of the children, decided that she should remain living with her father, brother and sister in Komletinci.\nIn particular, during an interview with the expert team of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre the children expressed the wish to live with their father because they considered their relationship with the father closer, they liked the life in Komletinci [that is] in a smaller community where they had more free time, spent time with children of their age, spent free time playing which was not the case in Austria, and also because they went to school here where they were well accepted.\nFrom the report of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre it follows that the children are very attached to each other and that it would not be wise to separate them and change their environment, which corresponds to the children’s wishes.\nSince the children verbalised the wish to live together and given that L.V. did not yet have school obligations – which made it possible for her to maintain more extensive contacts with her mother, if the parents agreed – the first-instance court, endorsing the best interests of the child within the meaning of Article 3 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and [in accordance with] the basic principles of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, correctly decided that the children should remain living with their father [while] leaving open the possibility that this decision could be altered if circumstances change.\n...\nThe case file also contains certificates of domicile in respect of all the parties’ children from which it is evident that their registered address is in Komletinci since 17 October 2006. In any event, the whole family previously lived together in Komletinci.\nHaving regard to the above, the appellant’s argument that she was prevented from participating in the assessment carried out by the social welfare centre is unfounded because she participated in the proceedings before the [first-instance] court, as did the father, where the representative of the social welfare centre was present and where the parents reached an agreement on the custody [of the children] except L.V. Given that an agreement was reached as to where the children would live, even if they go to Austria on weekends to maintain contact with their mother, it could not be said that they were abducted or uprooted from the milieu in which they were living, particularly taking into account the wishes of the children and the fact that the two older children go to school in Komletinci.”", "46. The applicant then, on 15 April 2011, lodged a constitutional complaint alleging, inter alia, that her constitutional rights to a fair hearing and to respect for her family life, guaranteed by Article 29 § 1 and Article 35 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 51 above) had been violated.", "47. On 25 January 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint and served its decision on her representative on 15 February 2012. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:\n“... the report of the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre of 20 October 2010 and the opinion of a psychologist are enclosed with the case file of the first-instance court. Both [documents] come to the same conclusion that the children of the parties should continue living with their father after the divorce.\nAt the main hearing held in the case on 19 November 2011 both parties proposed that the two older children (E.V. and F.V.) remain living with their father and that [the youngest child] L.V. remain living with her mother – who lodged the constitutional complaint. At that hearing the complainant as the defendant did not ask for the application of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.\n...\nThe Constitutional Court considers that in every [set of] proceedings concerning custody of children the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration.\n...\nThe Constitutional Court finds that ... the Vinkovci Social Welfare Centre undertook the necessary steps before adopting the report concerning custody of the children.\nThe proposal expressed in the report of the Social Welfare Centre that all three children should continue living with their father after the divorce is, after all, in line with the opinion of the psychologist.\nThe proposal was based on the fact that both older children (E.L. and F.L.) had expressed the wish as to which parent they wanted to live with, whereas as regards the [youngest child] L.V. it was established that she was ‘still at an age where she does not completely understand her parents’ situation, that all three children were very emotionally attached to each other and that, [while] accepting the fact that their parents were divorcing, they wanted to continue living together, with at least one parent.\n...\nIn view of the above, the Constitutional Court considers that the constitutional rights provided for in Article 29 paragraph 1 and Article 35 of the Constitution, and the rights guaranteed by Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights were not breached by the contested decisions.\nThe Constitutional Court also notes that the legal views expressed in the contested judgments ... are primarily based on the best interests of the child and are also founded on the established principles of international law.\n...\nAs regards the complainant’s arguments that the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was applicable in the instant case, the Constitutional Court finds correct the ... reasoning expressed in the contested judgment of the Vukovar County Court, which ... reads:\n‘... Given that an agreement was reached as to where the children would live, even if they go to Austria on weekends to maintain contacts with their mother, it could not be said that they were abducted ...’ ”", "48. Given that the applicant did not respect the interim custody agreement of 19 November 2010 (see paragraph 43 above) and did not return L.V. to Croatia on 9 January 2011 but retained her in Austria, on 13 April 2011 S.V., relying on the Hague Convention, requested the Croatian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, as the Croatian Central Authority, to contact the Austrian Ministry of Justice, as the Austrian Central Authority, with a view to returning L.V.", "49. On 11 May 2011 the Graz First-Instance Court instituted proceedings relating to the applicant’s request for return of the children.", "50. On 22 September 2011 the Graz First-Instance Court, relying on Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 54 below), dismissed S.V.’s request. It held that returning L.V. to Croatia would expose her to psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation. In so deciding it relied on the opinion of an expert in psychology which suggested that separating L.V. from her mother would have devastating consequences. The court added, obiter dictum, that the Vinkovci Municipal Court had breached the Hague Convention when it had decided on custody of the applicant’s three children before a final decision had been delivered on her request for the return of the children." ]

[ "8" ]

[ 6, 19, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 43 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Arad.", "6. At around 4 a.m. on 8 August 2010, the applicant and his friends were involved in a fight with a group of people outside a bar. S.L., who was inside the bar, called the police. When the police arrived the group of aggressors ran away. The applicant and his friends were taken to the police station to give statements and possibly complain against their aggressors.", "7. While he was waiting inside the police station, the applicant saw a police officer who was behaving roughly with an arrestee who had just been brought in. He commented loudly that the police officer represented the State authority and should not hit people. D.C.I., the police officer in question, became angry and asked a colleague, M.C., to “take him [the applicant] to the toilets to teach him how to speak”. The applicant, who resisted entering the toilets, was taken outside and then into a back office where the two police officers, D.C.I. and M.C., handcuffed him to a radiator and started punching and kicking him. Alerted by the applicant’s screaming, another police officer entered and put an end to the hitting. At that point, one of the officers who had assaulted the applicant warned him not to say anything or he would find him and beat him again. The applicant and his friends were then escorted home by police officers.\n(b) The Government’s account of the events", "8. On 8 August 2010 the police were called in order to stop a fight between several people on a street in Arad. By the time the police arrived, the applicant and his friends had had their clothes torn and had already been injured. They were accompanied to the police station to make statements. The police officers took statements from S.L. and D.V.", "9. S.L. declared that he had been in a bar when he had seen that his brother, S.N., was involved in a fight outside. He called the police emergency number and then went outside to help his brother. He and his brother received blows to their bodies. He further stated that he did not wish to lodge a complaint against the aggressors at that time but reserved his right to do so later. D.V. stated that when he had left the bar he had seen some people fighting. Someone was throwing stones, one of which hit him in the leg. He stated that he did not wish to lodge a complaint.", "10. Afterwards the applicant and his friends were all escorted home by the police in order to avoid further violent incidents.", "11. An investigation was opened nonetheless in order to clarify the circumstances surrounding the incident. However, after a discussion on 20 August 2010 with the bar attendant and a sales woman at a nearby store, who said they had not seen or heard anything, the case was closed on 23 August 2010.", "12. Later on 8 August 2010, the applicant went to the emergency unit of Arad County Hospital, where he was diagnosed with maxillofacial trauma, and contusion of the lower lip and of the thorax. His injuries were treated.", "13. On 9 August 2010 a forensic medical certificate was issued by the Arad County Forensic Service at the request of the applicant. According to the certificate, the applicant had a sutured cut on the lower lip and bruising on the upper lip, bruising on the left side of the chest, two excoriations on the left side of the back, grazes and bruising on the right elbow, right leg and the left knee. The applicant also had two excoriations covered with brown scabs measuring 1 by 0.2 cm to 2 by 0.2 cm on the back of each wrist. The injuries may have been caused by an impact with or on a hard object on 8 August 2010. The injuries would require nine days of medical treatment if no complications developed.", "14. On 15 September 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against the two officers who had assaulted him, accusing them of abusive investigative conduct and bodily harm. He lodged his complaint with both the Arad Police and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Timişoara Military County Court. He requested that S.L., S.N. and K.E., who had been taken to the police station with him, be called to testify as witnesses.", "15. On 23 September 2010 the applicant was heard at the Timişoara Military Prosecutor’s Office. He declared that he had been taken to the police station after a street brawl. Once inside the police station, the applicant drew an officer’s attention to his disrespectful behaviour towards someone else. The police officer in question and another colleague of his became angry with him and tried to drag him into the toilets, but he resisted. They then told him to go outside, where one of them, officer D.C.I., punched him in the mouth. He was then handcuffed with his hands behind his back and taken to a room where he was punched and kicked. The applicant further stated that he had suffered severe injuries, for which he was submitting a forensic medical certificate and claiming civil damages from his aggressors.", "16. On 27 September 2010 the Timişoara Military Prosecutor’s Office decided that the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court should deal with the case because the two police officers in question were not members of the military.", "17. In February 2011 the applicant, S.L. and S.N. were heard by a prosecutor from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court. In a statement dated 1 February 2011, handwritten in front of the prosecutor, S.L. stated that he had been taken to the police station on 8 August 2010 following a dispute with a group of people in the street. Once inside the police station he was taken to the second floor together with his brother. Half an hour later, he overheard through an open window a person screaming with pain outside the building and recognised the applicant’s voice. Afterwards he was taken home together with his brother in a police car. Later that day they met the applicant in front of his house and he told them that he had been handcuffed and beaten up by police officers. The applicant showed them his injuries and the marks on his hands. S.L. declared that he knew for sure that the applicant had been beaten up at the police station because he had seen him when they were leaving the police station. On 8 February 2011 S.L.’s statement was typed on a witness statement form bearing the heading of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court and S.L. signed it. In addition to the facts described in the previous handwritten statement, the typewritten statement included the following phrase: “... one of my friends, V., came to me and told me that some ... were beating up my brother and Miclea Alexandru.” In that statement S.L. also mentioned that, after he had heard the applicant shouting outside the police station, he had received on his mobile phone a message from the applicant who was telling him that he was being “beaten by policemen”. At that point he wanted to go outside but he was not allowed to and one hour later he was taken home in a police car together with his brother.", "18. On 1 February 2011 S.N. also gave a handwritten statement in front of the prosecutor. He declared that he had been taken to the police station following a street fight. The applicant was with him. After his arrival at the police station, while he was upstairs to give a statement, he heard the applicant screaming outside. Approximately one hour later he was taken home in a police car together with his brother. Later that day he met the applicant in front of his house. The applicant told him and his brother that he had been beaten up by police officers. He showed them the injuries on his lips and hands. Like his brother, S.N. also stated that he knew the applicant had been beaten inside the police station because he had seen him when they were taken home. That statement was subsequently typed on a witness statement form bearing the heading of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court and was signed by S.N. on 17 February 2011.", "19. On 8 February 2011 the applicant declared that he maintained the account he had given in his initial complaint as well as in his statement of 23 September 2010.", "20. On 15 March 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court decided to join the applicant’s complaint to two complaints lodged by other individuals who claimed that they had been physically assaulted by the same police officers on a previous date. Subsequently, the prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings for abusive investigative conduct as requested by the applicant, since he had not been under investigation at the relevant time. Lastly, the prosecutor held that the investigation for the three counts of abusive behaviour of which D.C.I. and M.C. were accused would be continued by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court, which was the competent authority in view of the defendants’ functions within the police force.", "21. On 22 June 2011 an officer in charge of internal affairs at the Arad County Police took statements from the two police officers who had allegedly physically assaulted the applicant. D.C.I. stated that in the early hours of 8 August 2010 he had taken an arrested person to the police station. When he entered the waiting room he saw a group of six people who were drunk, had had their clothes torn and were visibly injured. They were arguing and swearing at each other. When he asked them politely to wait outside, one of them swore at him. M.C. stated that he had accompanied D.C.I. on the night of the incident. When he saw a group of people in the police station waiting room, he asked what had happened to them and they replied that they had been beaten up by some people on the street and were waiting to give statements. Then he asked them to wait outside.", "22. On 22 July 2011 the police officer in charge of the investigation took statements from T.I., G.S.S. and B.I.M., three of the police officers who had responded to the emergency call.", "23. Officer T.I. stated that he had gone to the scene of the incident accompanied by two police patrols. He found a group of people who claimed to be the injured parties. Amongst them was the applicant. They said that they wished to lodge a criminal complaint against their aggressors, so he accompanied them to the police station. There he took statements from S.L. and D.V., but he did not know whether any of the police officers physically assaulted any of the above-mentioned people. T.I. also stated that after statements had been taken, the applicant had been taken home by officer G.S., while he had accompanied the others home in order to avoid further possible conflicts if they decided to go back to the scene of the incident.", "24. G.S. stated that he was a member of one of the police patrols that had been called to the scene of the incident. When he arrived S.L. told him that he had been physically assaulted by a group of people who had then run away. He maintained that he did not recognise any of the aggressors. The officer further stated:\n“... I accompanied to the police station the person who had been assaulted [S.L.] and Mr D.V., who was also at the scene when the incident took place. The accompanied people had injuries on their bodies, probably caused by the stones with which they had been aggressed and their clothes had also been torn as a result of the incident. ... Subsequently, I was asked by T.I. to accompany home another person involved in the incident in order to avoid other unpleasant incidents, this person was Miclea Alexandru. While I was with Miclea Alexandru and until reaching his home ..., he did not tell me that he had been beaten by a police officer, he had traces of violence on his face, his tee-shirt was torn but I did not ask him where this came from, I assumed it had come from the street fight.”", "25. B.I.M. declared that the applicant could not have been assaulted by police officers since he was one of the people who had been injured in the street fight.", "26. On 12 January 2012 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court decided not to pursue the criminal proceedings with respect to the three counts of abusive behaviour for which officers D.C.I. and M.C. had been investigated. As for the applicant’s complaint, the prosecutor held that the statements given by the applicant and the two persons accompanying him on the day of the incident had been contradicted by the statements of the officers under investigation as well as by those of three other police officers, namely T.I., G.S. and B.I.M. Therefore, it could not be established with certainty that the applicant had been assaulted by the two police officers.", "27. The applicant complained against that decision, claiming that the statements of the two police officers and their colleagues were subjective and should have been corroborated by other evidence. He requested again that K.A. (referred to as K.E. in the initial complaint) be called as a witness and gave his address. He added that K.A.’s testimony would have been relevant, since he had witnessed the applicant receiving a punch from D.C.I. outside the police station.", "28. On 7 February 2012 the applicant’s complaint against the decision not to bring charges was dismissed by the head prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court with the same reasoning, namely that the statements of the injured party had not been corroborated by the statements of the alleged perpetrators and their colleagues.", "29. The applicant contested the prosecutor’s decision before the court, requesting non-pecuniary damages for the injuries sustained. In his submission before the court, the applicant emphasised that as he had been escorted to the police station by only two officers, the statement of the third officer should not have been taken into consideration. In addition, the applicant complained that the prosecutor had overlooked important evidence. The only pieces of evidence he had taken into account were the statements of the two officers under investigation and the statements of their colleagues, who could not have been impartial. The applicant argued that K.A., who had accompanied him to the police station on the day of the incident, should also have been heard by the prosecutors, as he had partially witnessed the alleged ill-treatment.", "30. The applicant’s complaint, together with the other two complaints against the two police officers, were analysed jointly and rejected as manifestly ill-founded by a final decision of the Arad District Court on 18 April 2012.", "31. The court considered that the evidence administered during the criminal investigation had sufficed to conclude that “it had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that on 8 August 2010 the defendants had physically abused [the applicant]”. The court based its verdict on the discrepancies found between the applicant’s account of the events and the statement given by S.L. More specifically, S.L. declared that he had heard the applicant screaming outside the police station, whereas the applicant claimed that he had been beaten inside. S.L. also declared that the applicant had told him that he had been handcuffed with his hands behind his back, whereas the applicant stated that he had been handcuffed to a radiator. In addition, the injuries on the applicant’s body may very well have been caused during the street brawl. That fact had been confirmed by the three police officers who had intervened at the scene, namely T.I., G.S. and B.I.M., as well as by the witness, S.L., who had declared in his statement of 8 February 2011 that he had been told when he was inside the bar that a group of people were “beating up my brother and Miclea Alexandru”." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 26 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Istanbul.", "6. On 24 May 2001 the applicant started his compulsory military service in Şırnak. On 25 July 2001 he contacted the infirmary of his regiment, complaining of severe pain in his left eye. According to the applicant, the military doctor was absent and he was given eye drops by a soldier who had no medical qualifications. According to the Government, the records of the infirmary (which were not made available to the Court) showed that the applicant had been examined by a military doctor and given eye drops by that doctor and not by a soldier.", "7. The following day the pain became persistent, so the applicant contacted the infirmary once again. He was told that he should go to his dormitory and rest. According to the applicant, despite the pain he was in, he was not relieved of his sentry duties during that period. On 2 August 2001 he was referred to the Cizre State Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a corneal ulcer.", "8. On 6 August 2001 the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Military Hospital, where his treatment started. However, he completely lost the sight in his left eye. According to the applicant, the doctors informed him that he had lost his eyesight because of the delay in starting the treatment, as in corneal ulcer cases it was essential to start treatment immediately.", "9. On 13 August 2001 the applicant was transferred to Ankara GATA Military Hospital for further treatment. He stayed there until 25 September 2001, during which time he underwent several operations. He returned to the hospital for a number of additional operations from 9 November 2001 to 7 February 2002, 10 to 21 March 2002, 2 to 10 May 2002, and lastly, 15 to 18 July 2002.", "10. A medical report issued on 17 July 2002 concluded that the applicant was no longer medically fit for military service and that he was eligible for an ocular prosthesis. On the basis of that report, the applicant was formally discharged from the army.", "11. On 15 October 2002 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Supreme Military Administrative Court, seeking compensation from the Ministry of the Interior for the damage he had suffered to his eye during his compulsory military service as a result of the delay in his treatment. He claimed 30,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL[1]; approximately 19,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRL 30,000,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued that for a period of one week after the start of his eye problem, he had been unable to see a doctor because there had been no doctor present at his regiment infirmary during that time. He gave the administrative court the names of a number of his fellow conscripts who had witnessed the fact that he had not been provided with medical treatment by a doctor in the first week but had instead been told to rest and use eye drops, and asked the court to question them.", "12. In the written defence submissions that it sent to the administrative court, the Gendarmerie High Command argued that on 25 and 26 July 2001 the applicant had been examined at the infirmary of his regiment by military doctor İ.H.Ş., who had prescribed medication for him.", "13. In his observations submitted to the administrative court on 6 January 2003 in response to those of the Gendarmerie High Command, the applicant maintained his allegation that on his first visit to the infirmary he had been examined by a soldier because the military doctor, İ.H.Ş., had been temporarily dispatched to another regiment. He repeated his request that witnesses be summoned to testify before the administrative court and asked the administrative court also to summon and question Dr İ.H.Ş.", "14. During the proceedings the administrative court appointed three university professors from the ophthalmology department of Gazi University’s Faculty of Medicine as experts with a view to clarifying whether there had been any medical malpractice in the applicant’s case. Their expert report drawn up on 6 April 2005 concluded:\n“Our medical opinion, based on our examination of the plaintiff’s allegations, is as follows: 1. It is understood that, although the problem in the patient’s eye is described in the medical reports as a ‘corneal ulcer’, the cause of the corneal ulcer (Herpes virus? Fungal infection? Bacterial infection?) is not known. Furthermore, it is considered that it was not possible to establish with certainty the infection factor at the hospitals where the patient was observed and treated. For this reason, it is not possible to decide whether the eye problem was related to his military service or whether it was idiosyncratic. 2. Similarly, because the problem could not be fully diagnosed, it was not possible to determine the outcome [of the applicant’s symptoms] within one to two weeks. 3. [We are of the opinion that] there were no delays, shortcomings, mistakes or negligence in the steps taken in transferring the patient to the hospital, diagnosing the problem, treating the problem or treating the patient.”", "15. The applicant submitted a written statement to the administrative court on 29 April 2005, arguing that the medical report contained contradictory conclusions. He pointed out that, although the experts had indicated in the report that the problem had not been fully diagnosed, they had then gone on to conclude that there had been no shortcomings in the diagnosis of the problem. He further argued that the conclusion reached by the experts, namely that “because the problem could not be fully diagnosed, it was not possible to determine the outcome [of the applicant’s symptoms] within one to two weeks”, fully supported his allegations. His contention was also that, precisely because the problem had not been diagnosed properly, the treatment had not started in a timely manner. The applicant asked the administrative court to take steps to eliminate the inconsistencies by requesting and obtaining additional reports from a different set of experts.", "16. In his written opinion submitted to the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the public prosecutor stated that the applicant should be awarded compensation either for the authorities’ negligence if such negligence was established, or on the basis of the no-fault strict liability of the military administration.", "17. On 18 May 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court, on the basis of the expert report of 6 April 2005 (see paragraph 14 above), dismissed the applicant’s claim by a majority of four to one and held that no fault could be attributed to the military authorities in the treatment of the applicant.", "18. In its decision the Supreme Military Administrative Court did not deal with the applicant’s allegation that between 25 July and 2 August 2001 he had been unable to see a doctor in the regiment infirmary because there had not been a doctor there during that time, other than stating that the applicant had “contacted the infirmary of the regiment on 25 and 26 July 2001 and started receiving medical treatment there”. Nor did the administrative court respond to the applicant’s requests to have his witnesses heard.", "19. A dissenting judge stated in his separate opinion that issues such as the cause of the problem, whether or not it had been as a result of the applicant’s military activities, and what bearing the one-to-two week delay had had on the outcome had not been established in the expert report of 6 April 2005. The dissenting judge thus considered that the administrative court should not have decided the case without having obtained a new report and clarified those points.", "20. The applicant requested a rectification of the administrative court’s decision. He claimed, in particular, that his arguments had not been examined adequately by the court and repeated his arguments regarding the contradictions in the expert report of 6 April 2005.", "21. On 21 September 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court refused the applicant’s rectification request by a majority of four to one.", "22. According to a medical report of 9 October 2009 issued by the Haseki Hospital, the applicant was deemed to be suffering from a permanent disability as a result of the loss of sight in his left eye. It was indicated that his ability to work had been reduced by 41% as a result of the disability, and that the applicant was entitled to receive a disability pension." ]

[ "3" ]

[ 1, 9, 13, 14 ]

[]

[ "5. The first applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Siófok. The second applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Lepsény.", "6. On 6 August 2012 the applicants were on an excursion to Lake Balaton. In the evening, they decided not to return home, but to spend the night in their car, a Fiat Punto, parked in a car park next to a pizzeria in Zánka. Waking up, they noticed that a car was passing by theirs, coming back and forth several times. They found this frightening and drove on to the village of Tagyon, where they stopped their car in the parking lot of a private house.", "7. At the same time, around 3.05 a.m., an unknown person telephoned Mr S., a volunteer law enforcer, to tell him about a Fiat Punto suspiciously moving around in the neighbourhood, near a local grocery store. Mr S. informed off-duty police officer K., who was serving with the Balatonfüred Police Department.", "8. Subsequently, officer K., driving his private car and taking a self-defence pistol, went to inspect the grocery store, together with Mr S. Not having found any trace of a criminal offence, they notified the duty officer of Balatonfüred Police Department about the sighting of the suspicious car. They were informed about the identity of the owner of the Fiat Punto, following which they continued to look for the vehicle in the surrounding area.", "9. At about 3.30 a.m., they noticed the Fiat Punto parked in front of a private house. Officer K. stopped his vehicle, a black Ford Mondeo, perpendicularly to the applicants’ car, about a metre away. Both officer K. and the volunteer law enforcer started to run towards the applicants’ car, approaching from the back. The police officer shouted: “Police! Get out!” and held up his police identification card.", "10. Ms Haász, sitting at the steering wheel, only noticed two people getting out of a dark civilian car and running towards them in civilian clothes. Finding this frightening, she attempted to drive away, forcing the garden gate of the adjacent property and driving into its yard. Inside the garden, the dimensions of which were 67 x 17.6 metres, and noticing that there was no other way to exit, she turned the car around and drove back towards the gate.", "11. When the car was on its way out, officer K. waved at the car shouting “Police! Stop!” and fired a warning shot. As it appears from the case file, at this time Mr S. was standing in front of the police officer’s car, rather than in the prospective way of the applicants’ car. When the car passed officer K., he shot twice more, at the car. The first shot was fired downwards from about 6 metres’ distance, hitting the mudguard of the car on the left side at the level of the lights. The other shot was fired from about 4-4.5 metres following a downward trajectory. It went through the rear window, which fell into the car, missed the head of Ms Szabó by 5-10 centimetres and then went through the window of the right front door.", "12. Ms Haász continued to drive, trying to leave the garden by passing around the police officer’s car to the left. She finally hit the officer’s car at its right side, at the passenger front door. At this moment Mr S. was standing next to the police officer’s car, at its left side, next to the open driver’s door.", "13. Officer K. again called on the applicants to get out of the car, which they did. He put his gun away, presenting his police ID. Since the two men wore plain clothes and neither they nor their car had any police signs, the applicants realised that officer K. was a police officer and his associate a volunteer law enforcer only at this point in time.\nThereupon it became clear that the incident was based on a misunderstanding, since the applicants had only been frightened but had had no intention whatsoever of countering a police measure.", "14. Subsequently the Veszprém District Investigating Prosecutor’s Office (Veszprémi Nyomozó Ügyészség) initiated proceedings against officer K. on charges of attempted manslaughter (the charge being later on re-characterised as intentional endangerment committed by a public official). The applicants were questioned several times as witnesses, and a confrontation took place. Other witnesses were also heard and the opinion of a forensic firearms expert was obtained.", "15. Simultaneously, officer K.’s superior, the Head of Balatonfüred Police Department, investigated the use of a firearm by officer K. He found that the officer had had no intention of endangering human life – his purpose had been to halt the applicants’ car, which had represented a danger for him and his associate – but that the officer’s action, although not criminal, had been unprofessional. According to the superior’s internal report, following a first warning shot, a second, intentional shot had been directed at the car, while the third one had been accidental, endangering the life of Ms Szabó. The supervisor initiated disciplinary proceedings, which were suspended pending the criminal proceedings.", "16. The applicants also lodged a complaint formally challenging the lawfulness of the police measures with the Balatonfüred Police Department. These proceedings were suspended on 8 October 2012 pending the outcome of the criminal investigation.", "17. On 3 July 2013 the Veszprém District Investigating Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the investigation. It found that officer K.’s use of firearms was lawful in the face of the danger represented by the conduct of the applicants, namely driving, at a speed of 14-16 km/h, in the direction of his associate.\nThe Prosecutor’s Office accepted officer K.’s statements, according to which he had given a warning before shooting and had first shot on perceiving a danger to the life of his associate. It also accepted the police officer’s account of the events, namely that at the material time he could believe that his associate was standing between his car and the car of the applicants, which was approaching rather fast. Nonetheless, relying on the evidence furnished by a ballistic expert, the Prosecutor’s Office dismissed officer K.’s statement that the second shot following the warning had been accidental.\nThe decision also relied on the report of the Chief of the Balatonfüred Police Department stating that officer K.’s conduct had been unprofessional as regards the second shot fired at the applicants’ car.\nThe applicants’ lawyer filed a complaint against the discontinuation.", "18. On 22 July 2013 the Veszprém County Public Prosecutor’s Office (Veszprém Megyei Főügyészség) dismissed the complaint, holding that the danger caused by the applicants had directly concerned the life and limb of officer K.’s associate. Relying on section 56 (2) of the Act on the Police, the Prosecutor’s Office found that the risk that the associate might be hit by their car had justified the shots by officer K. even if they had not been preceded by the requisite procedure, in particular a warning about the use of firearms, since any delay caused by the warning could have compromised the success of the measure. According to the decision, the applicants’ behaviour had constituted a direct threat to the life and limb of both Mr S. and officer K.\nThe applicants were informed that the complaint had been dismissed under section 199 (2) point b) of the Criminal Procedure Code and that they had the possibility of filing a motion for prosecution, acting as substitute private prosecutors, under sections 229-230 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\nThe decision was served on the applicants on 29 July 2013.", "19. On 15 August 2013 the Veszprém County Public Prosecutor’s Office rejected the applicants’ renewed complaint. The County Public Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicants that the prosecution authorities would not deal with any further complaint unless it disclosed relevant new facts.\nIn a letter of 27 June 2014 the Attorney General’s Office informed the applicants that there was no legal ground to quash the decisions on the discontinuation of the investigation in respect of officer K.", "20. Meanwhile, on 14 October 2013 the Head of Balatonfüred Police Department dismissed, in its resumed proceedings (see paragraph 16 above), the applicants’ complaint about the actions of officer K. He concluded that although the latter’s conduct had been unprofessional because of the way he had halted the applicants’ car and the use of a self-defence pistol rather than a service pistol, it had not been unlawful. The applicants’ appeal was dismissed by the Veszprém County Chief Police Department on 19 December 2013.\nSince the incident, the applicants have been suffering from psychological troubles." ]

[ "2" ]

[ 2, 6, 12, 13 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1992.", "6. On 8 May 2013 he was arrested on suspicion of sexual abuse and indecent behaviour towards two children.", "7. On 10 May 2013 an investigating judge of the Z. County Court (Županijski sud u Z. –“the County Court”) ordered his pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1(2) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and reoffending).", "8. On 17 May 2013 the applicant appealed. On 21 May 2013 a three-judge panel of the County Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, upholding the decision of the investigating judge.", "9. On 6 June 2013 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 123 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending) on the grounds that he might commit the same offences against the victims again if at large.", "10. The applicant appealed on 12 June 2013, arguing that there was no reason to suspect that he had committed the offences at issue and alleging numerous procedural flaws when his pre-trial detention was extended.", "11. On 14 June 2013 a three-judge panel of the County Court dismissed the appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the view of the investigating judge. The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 26 June 2013.", "12. On 5 July 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the decision of 14 June 2013, challenging the decisions on his pre-trial detention. He argued, in particular, that they lacked the relevant reasoning, and that the procedure for ordering and extending pre-trial detention had not been duly complied with.", "13. On 8 July 2013 the applicant was indicted in the Z. Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Z. –“the Municipal Court”) on charges of sexual abuse and indecent behaviour towards two children.", "14. On the same day a three-judge panel of that court extended his pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 15 July 2013.", "15. On 10 July 2013 the applicant challenged the decision by lodging an appeal with the County Court, arguing that it lacked the relevant reasoning and alleging procedural flaws in the Municipal Court’s conduct.", "16. On the same day the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint of 5 July 2013 (see paragraph 12 above) inadmissible, on the grounds that a new decision on his detention had since been adopted (see paragraph 14 above) and he was no longer being detained in connection with the decision complained about.", "17. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 18 July 2013.", "18. On 19 July 2013 a three-judge panel of the County Court, in its examination of the applicant’s appeal of 10 July 2013 (see paragraph 15 above), quashed the decision of 8 July 2013 extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention and remitted the case to the Municipal Court for re-examination.", "19. On 22 July 2013 a three-judge panel of that court released the applicant from detention, imposing a number of conditions on his release." ]

[ "5" ]

[ 7, 9, 11 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Sacile.", "6. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.", "7. The applicant is the mother of three children, R., P. and J., who were born in 2005, 2006 and 2008 respectively.", "8. At the material time the applicant was living with the children’s father, was suffering from depression and was undergoing a pharmacological treatment.", "9. In August 2009 the social services informed the Rome Youth Court (hereafter “the court”) that the children had been hospitalised several times following the accidental ingestion of medication, and emergency proceedings were commenced before the court. By decision of 11 August 2009 the court ordered the children’s removal from their family and their placement in an institution, and instructed the social services to draw up a support project for the children.", "10. On 20 October 2009 the applicant and the children’s father were heard by the court. They admitted that owing to the applicant’s state of health and the side-effects of the medication she was taking to treat her depression they had had difficulties looking after the children. They affirmed, however, that they could take proper care of the children with the help of the social services and the children’s grandfather. The applicant pointed out that she was undergoing treatment and that the side-effects initially caused by the medication had ceased. Both parents requested that the social services put in place a support project so that the children could return home.", "11. On 3 December 2009 the psychiatrist submitted her report on the applicant. The report stated that the latter was undergoing pharmacological treatment, that she was willing to have psychotherapy and to accept the assistance of the social services and that she had a very strong emotional bond with her children.\nOn the same day the Integrated Working Group on Adoption (the “GIL”) submitted its report, pointing out that despite the family difficulties, the parents had reacted positively, had taken part in the meetings and were prepared to accept the support of the social services. Consequently, the GIL proposed returning the children to their parents and introducing a family support project.", "12. By decision of 19 January 2010 the court, having regard to the expert reports and the fact that the paternal grandfather was available to help his son and the applicant to look after their children, ordered the children’s return to their parents.\nOn 24 March 2010, however, the parents’ reunion with their children was interrupted and the children were once again removed from the family home on the grounds that the applicant had been hospitalised owing to an aggravation of her illness, that the father had left the family home and that the grandfather had fallen ill. The court established visiting rights for both parents as follows: for the applicant, one hour per fortnight, and for the children’s father, two hours per week.", "13. In March 2010 the prosecutor requested the opening of a procedure for declaring the children available for adoption.", "14. On 10 June 2010 the parents were heard by the court. The applicant submitted that she was undergoing treatment, that the children’s father was available to look after them and that they had therefore not been abandoned. The father emphasised that even if he was working he could take proper care of the children with his father’s help, and that he had recruited a home help.", "15. In October 2010 the court ordered an expert assessment of the applicant’s and the children’s father’s capacity for exercising their parental role. On 13 January 2011 the expert submitted his report, which concluded:\n- that the father displayed no psychiatric illness and that despite his fragile personality he was capable of shouldering his responsibilities;\n- that the applicant suffered from a “borderline personality disorder which interfered, to a limited extent, with her ability to shoulder responsibilities linked to her role as a mother”;\n- that the children were hyperactive, largely as a result of the family’s difficulties.\nIn his conclusions, the expert pointed out that both parents were willing to accept any intervention required to improve their relationship with their children, and he made the following proposals: extending the children’s placement in public care, introducing a programme of bringing the parents and the children together, and intensifying encounters. He also suggested that the situation of the family should be reassessed six months later.", "16. By decision of 1 March 2011, however, the court declared the children available for adoption, and the meetings between the parents and the children were discontinued.\nIn its reasoning, the court stated that no reassessment of the family’s situation was necessary in the present case. It highlighted the parents’ difficulties in exercising their parental role, as indicated by the expert, and referred to the statements of the Director of the institution to the effect that the applicant had “serious mental disorders”, the father “was unable to show affection and spent his time arguing with the welfare assistants” and the parents “were incapable of providing their children with the care and treatment which they needed”. Having regard to those facts, the court declared the children available for adoption.", "17. The applicant and the children’s father appealed against that decision and requested a stay of execution. They submitted:\n– that the court had erroneously declared the children available for adoption in the absence of any “abandonment”, a precondition for such a declaration under Law No. 184 of 1983;\n– that the declaration of availability for adoption should only be used in the last resort and that in the present case it was unnecessary because their family difficulties, which stemmed, in particular, from the applicant’s illness, were temporary and could be overcome with the welfare assistants’ support.\nFinally, they emphasised that the court had not taken into account the January 2011 expert report ordering the establishment of a programme of support and gradual reunion of the children with their parents.", "18. In July 2011 the court ordered that each child be placed in a different foster family.", "19. By decision of 7 February 2012 the Rome Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the declaration of availability for adoption.\nThe Court of Appeal observed that the competent authorities had expended the requisite efforts to provide support to the parents and prepare the children’s return to their family. However, the project had failed, which showed the parents’ incapacity for exercising their parental role and belied the temporary nature of the situation. With reference to the social services’ findings, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the failure of the project had had negative consequences for the children and that the declaration was geared to protecting their interest in being fostered in a family capable of properly caring for them, which their family of origin was incapable of doing owing to the mother’s state of health and the father’s difficulties. The Court of Appeal noted that there had been some positive developments in the situation, such as the mother’s realisation of her health problems and her determination to undergo treatment, as well as the father’s efforts to find resources in order to look after his children and the availability of the grandfather to help out. However, the Court of Appeal held that those factors were insufficient to assess the two parents’ capacities for exercising their parental responsibilities. Having regard to those factors, and with an eye to safeguarding the children’s interests, the Court of Appeal also confirmed their availability for adoption.", "20. The applicant and the children’s father lodged an appeal on points of law. By judgment deposited in the registry on 22 January 2014, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that:\n– the Court of Appeal had correctly assessed the existence of a situation of psychological abandonment of the children and the irreversibility of the parents’ incapacity for exercising their role, having regard to the failure of the first support project put in place by the social services;\n– the declaration of availability for adoption had duly taken into account the children’s interest in being fostered by a family capable of looking after them effectively.", "21. In February 2014 the applicant requested the Rome Youth Court to cancel the declaration of the children’s availability for adoption (on the basis of section 21 of Law No. 184 of 1983). In support of her request, the applicant presented various medical documents attesting that her state of health had improved in the meantime, in order to prove that the conditions set out in section 8 of Law No. 184 of 1983 for issuing a declaration of availability for adoption has since lapsed.\nBy a decision of 14 May 2014 the Rome Youth Court dismissed the applicant’s request.", "22. The outcome of the adoption procedure concerning the children is unknown." ]

[ "8" ]

[ 10, 14 ]

[]

[ "5. On 19 September 1974 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cyprus approved the introduction of a scheme of aid for displaced persons and war victims. Under the scheme, displaced persons were entitled to refugee cards. The holders of such cards were (and still are) eligible for a range of benefits including housing assistance. For the purposes of the scheme the term “displaced” was determined as being any person whose permanent home was in the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces, in an inaccessible area, or in an area which had been evacuated to meet the needs of the National Guard.", "6. To implement the scheme, the Director of the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons Service (“SCRDP”) issued a circular on 10 September 1975. The circular provided that non-displaced women whose husbands were displaced could be registered on the refugee card of their husbands. It also provided that children whose fathers were displaced could be registered on the refugee card of their fathers (see paragraph 20 below). No provision was made for the children of displaced women to be registered on the refugee cards of their mothers.", "7. Although the term “displaced” was extended by the Council of Ministers on 19 April 1995 (see paragraphs 23 and 24 below), at the time of the facts giving rise to the present application it had not been extended to allow children whose mothers were displaced but whose fathers were not, to qualify for refugee cards.", "8. The applicant’s mother has been a refugee since 1974. Her mother is the holder of a refugee card.", "9. In September 2002, the applicant married and began looking for a house for her family in Kokkynotrimithia. She wished to obtain housing assistance and so, on 27 February 2003, applied to the Civil Registry and Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior for a refugee card with occupied Skylloura, the place from which her mother was displaced, as her place of displacement.", "10. By letter dated 6 March 2003 the request was rejected on the basis that the applicant was not a displaced person because, while her mother was a displaced person, her father was not.", "11. The applicant filed a recourse before the Supreme Court challenging the above decision. She claimed, inter alia, that the decision was in violation of the principle of equality safeguarded by Article 28 of the Constitution and in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She claimed that it also breached Article 13 of the Convention.", "12. A single judge of the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse on 12 May 2004, finding that, on the basis of the relevant case-law, the extension of the applicable criteria so as to cover the children of displaced women was not possible. The question of extending the term “displaced” to cover the children whose mothers were displaced but whose fathers were not had been repeatedly discussed before the House of Representatives’ Committee for Refugees. A proposal to change the law to that effect had been placed before the Committee but was never approved. Furthermore, because of the consequences which would ensue from such an extension of the term “displaced”, the Minister of the Interior had referred the question to the Council of Ministers for its consideration and, on 19 April 1995, the Council of Ministers had decided not to extend the term in this manner (see the relevant domestic law and practice set out at paragraphs 23 and 24 below).", "13. On 23 June 2004 the applicant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.", "14. By judgment of 3 March 2006 a five-judge panel of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the first instance court.", "15. The Supreme Court held as follows:\n“[In the present appeal] an attempt was made to demonstrate that we must depart from the above [first instance] decision, since the Supreme Court can, in the present case, proceed to the so-called “extended interpretation” and, by invoking the principle of equality, widen the application of the criterion to the children of displaced mothers as well.\n...\nThe proposed extension of the plan was placed before the Council of Ministers in Proposal no. 1852/92, which was submitted by the Ministry of the Interior to amend the criteria for providing assistance to displaced persons. However the decision taken refers only to amendments which do not concern the present case. Despite the fact that, on 19 April 1995, by decision no. 42.465 of the Council of Ministers, further amendments were made by which the term ‘displaced’ was extended and now includes other categories of those entitled, the point which concerns us in this case remains unchanged.\n...\nIn accordance with the case-law (Dias United Publishing Co Ltd v. The Republic, [1996] 3 A.A.D. 550), the non-existence of a legislative provision cannot be remedied by judicial decision because, in such a case, the constitutional control which the Supreme Court exercises would be turned into a means of reshaping or supplementing the legislation.\n...\nWe have given this matter very serious consideration in view also of the position that, in the case of an arrangement favouring one sex only, the extended application of the provision also finds support in European Community Law ...\nHowever this may be, we cannot depart from the prevailing case-law. Dias United Publishing Co Ltd v. The Republic, cited above, fixed the framework of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has, in accordance with Article 146(4) of the Constitution, the power to uphold in full or in part the decision appealed against or to declare the act or omission invalid. It does not have jurisdiction to legislate by extending legislative arrangements which did not meet with the approval of parliament. This would conflict with the principle of the separation of powers. We note that the House of Representatives cannot of its own accord enact legislation which would incur expenditure. If the House of Representatives, the constitutionally appointed legislative organ, does not have such a right, the Supreme Court has even less of a right.\nIn agreement with the principles set out above, we conclude that the Supreme Court does not have the competence to proceed to an extended application of a legislative arrangement.”", "16. The same issue of the non-extension of refugee cards to the children of displaced women was also considered by the Supreme Court in Anna Giagkozi v. the Republic (case no. 291/2001). That challenge was rejected at first instance on 30 April 2002 ((2002) 4 A.A.D. 405), the court finding that, while it was difficult to understand why there should not be uniform treatment between the children of displaced men and displaced women, on the basis of Dias United, cited above, it was unable to grant the relief sought. This was because Ms Giagkozi was, in effect, asking the court to extend the relevant legal framework so that the benefits provided to children of displaced fathers would be provided to children of displaced mothers. An appeal against that judgment was dismissed on 3 March 2006 by the same bench which dismissed the present applicant’s appeal (the appeal judgment in Giagkozi is reported at (2006) 3 Α.Α.D. 85)." ]

[ "14", "P12-1", "13" ]

[]

[]

[ "6. The applicant company runs logistics services. On 23 June 2007 one of the company’s lorries was stopped for inspection at the Yambol customs post. The Bulgarian authorities discovered and seized the following substances from the cabin and trailer: 500,060 tablets (with a total value of 24,584.2 Bulgarian levs (BGN) or 12,200 euros (EUR)); 3,564 grams of white tablets (with a total value of about EUR 40) which included ephedrine hydrochloride; and, 6,880 pills which included testosterone enanthate (with a total value of about EUR 15,000). The lorry was also seized as material evidence. Criminal proceedings were opened against the driver of the lorry.", "7. On 26 June 2007 the applicant company, as the owner of the lorry, asked the Yambol Regional Prosecutor to return its vehicle. The prosecutor rejected the request on the grounds that the lorry had to be retained as material evidence until the end of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 23 below).", "8. On 3 August 2007 the applicant company again applied to the Yambol Regional Prosecutor’s Office asking that the lorry be returned in accordance with Article 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, the applicant company claimed that: there had been no hidden compartment in the lorry; the driver had abused his position; the holding of the lorry was no longer justified as a forensic expert report had already been prepared; the lorry’s value (around EUR 83,000) was over three times the value of the drugs and therefore the lorry could not be confiscated under Article 242 § 8 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 16 below); and, lastly, the company faced significant losses because of the lorry’s seizure. At the time of this request the case file was no longer with the prosecution service as it had been transferred to the courts, so the Yambol Regional Prosecutor’s Office did not reply to the request.", "9. In the meantime the lorry driver concluded a plea bargain agreement with the prosecutor. The terms of the agreement included a one-and-a-half-year prison sentence for the driver and the forfeiture of the lorry.", "10. On 8 August 2007 the applicant company asked the criminal court competent to approve the plea bargain agreement not to confiscate its lorry. The applicant company emphasised in particular its inability to participate in the criminal proceedings against the driver and to state its position. It further pointed out that as the value of its lorry was three times higher than the value of the smuggled goods, according to the relevant national law the vehicle should not be forfeited (see paragraph 16 below).", "11. On 14 August 2007 the Yambol Regional Court confirmed the plea bargain agreement in accordance with Article 382 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 22 below). In the agreement the driver confessed that he was guilty of smuggling under Articles 242 § 1 (d) and 242 § 3 of the Criminal Code and accepted the forfeiture of the transported drugs and the lorry under Article 242 §§ 7 and 8 of the Criminal Code. The decision was not subject to appeal and became enforceable on the same day.", "12. On 26 May 2008 the applicant company brought proceedings before the Istanbul Second Enforcement Office (“the Office”) against the lorry driver, seeking damages. The Office found that the driver was liable to pay EUR 110,116.75 to the applicant company for the damage his actions had caused. However, the applicant company could not collect any of this amount as the lorry driver had no assets at the time." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 4, 6 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Belgrade.", "7. On 7 July 2008 the applicant was arrested in Croatia on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population.", "8. On 9 July 2008 an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku, hereinafter “the County Court”) ordered his pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 (1), (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding, risk of collusion and the seriousness of the charges).", "9. After the completion of the investigation, the applicant was indicted in the County Court on charges of war crimes against civilians. He was remanded in detention during the proceedings. The period of his detention was extended several times by the decisions of a three-judge panel of the County Court and by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske).", "10. On 15 March 2011 the County Court found the applicant guilty on charges of war crimes and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.", "11. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, and on 22 February 2012 it quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the County Court on the grounds of procedural flaws during the trial.", "12. At the same time, the Supreme Court extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding) on the grounds that he lived in Serbia and had Serbian nationality, and therefore posed a flight risk if at liberty.", "13. On 2 April 2012 the Supreme Court extended the maximum period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a further year.", "14. On 18 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the decision of 2 April 2012 challenging the lawfulness of and grounds for his continued pre-trial detention.", "15. On 1 June 2012 the County Court, after a retrial, found the applicant guilty on charges of war crimes against civilians and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.", "16. On the same day the County Court extended the applicant’s detention until the first-instance judgment became final.", "17. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision extending his detention, and on 15 June 2012 it dismissed his appeal as ill-founded.", "18. On 20 July 2012 the applicant challenged the decision of the County Court on his detention of 1 June 2012, upheld by the decision of the Supreme Court of 15 June 2012, before the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 16-17 above).", "19. On 8 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed as ill-founded the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decisions extending his detention until the first-instance judgment became final (see paragraphs 15-18 above).", "20. On 14 January 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 18 April 2012 (see paragraph 14 above) inadmissible on the grounds that a new decision on his detention had been adopted in the meantime on 1 June 2012 (see paragraph 16 above). The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 17 January 2013." ]

[ "5" ]

[ 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 ]

[]

[ "6. The 101 applicants, whose names are appended, are Bulgarian nationals of Turkish origin and/or of Muslim faith who live or have lived in Turkey. They all exercised their right to vote at the 2009 Bulgarian general elections in 17 of the polling stations set up in Turkish territory, the election results in which were subsequently contested by the RZS political party and nullified by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court.", "7. According to the official statistics from the census carried out in Bulgaria in 2011, 588,318 persons stated that they were ethnic Turks, amounting to 8.8% of the persons who answered that question, and 577,139 persons stated that they were of Muslim religion. Since the late 1980s, the members of those communities have been involved in major migrations leading many of them to settle in Turkey. The Court has no official information on the exact number of Bulgarian citizens who are ethnic Turks or Muslims living temporarily or permanently in Turkey. Estimates of that number vary considerably, generally ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 individuals, in all the age brackets.", "8. The DPS was founded in 1990. Its statutes define it as a liberal political party endeavouring to help unite all Bulgarian citizens and to protect the rights and freedoms of minorities in Bulgaria as guaranteed by the Constitution and national legislation, as well as by the international instruments ratified by the Republic of Bulgaria.", "9. The DPS has put up candidates for all general and local elections in Bulgaria since its inception. It has won seats in the national Parliament in all the general elections held since 1990. Between 2001 and 2009 it took part in two successive coalition governments. Several of its leaders and members belong to the Bulgarian Turkish and Muslim minorities.", "10. Mr Riza was born in 1968 and lives in Sofia. A DPS member, he is also one of its Vice-Presidents and a member of the party’s central executive bureau. He is currently a DPS deputy of the National Assembly.", "11. These two applicants submit that most of the Bulgarian citizens currently living in Turkey have voted for the DPS at all the general elections held over the last twenty years.", "12. By Decree of 28 April 2009 the Bulgarian President set 5 July 2009 as the date of the elections to the 41st National Assembly. The electoral law laid down a new hybrid electoral system: 31 deputies were to be elected on a first-past-the-post basis in single-member constituencies, and 209 deputies were to be elected on a proportional basis at national level in 31 multiple-member constituencies.", "13. Bulgarian citizens living abroad were entitled to vote in the general elections, but only for parties and coalitions, and their votes were taken into account in the proportional distribution of sears among the different political formations at the national level ... Having obtained the consent of the competent authorities in the countries concerned, the Bulgarian diplomatic representations opened 274 polling stations in 59 countries, 123 of them in Turkey.", "14. On 20 May 2009 the Central Electoral Commission registered the DPS as participating in the general elections. The DPS presented lists of candidates in several single- and multiple-member constituencies. It was also included on the ballot paper designed for voting by Bulgarian citizens living abroad. Mr Riza was included in second position on the list of his party’s candidates for the 8th multiple-member constituency (Dobrich).", "15. Thirteen of the 101 applicants (see appended list) (nos., 13, 17, 21, 26, 30, 39, 51, 59, 74, 75, 89 and 94) submitted that they had all personally submitted prior declarations of intention to vote to the Bulgarian diplomatic representations in Turkey. The Bulgarian diplomates has asked them to take part in local electoral committees in Istanbul, Bursa, Çerkezköy, Çorlu and İzmir as presidents, secretaries or ordinary members, which they had agreed to do. On 4 July 2009 they had been invited to the offices of the Bulgarian diplomatic and consular representations, where Bulgarian diplomats had informed them about the formalities to be complied with on election day, and in particular how to draw up the electoral rolls. Some of the applicants affirmed that they had only been given one instruction on that subject, to the effect that persons attending the polling station on election day without preregistration should be included on the additional pages of the electoral roll, and that the last name added on election day should be suffixed with a “Z”.", "16. The 13 applicants submitted that their names had not been included on the list at the polling station where they were to function as members of the electoral committee. They had all voted in their respective polling stations by registering on election day and signing opposite their names and forenames. Furthermore, they submitted that they had carefully indicated their choices on their ballot papers, without any other type of indication, and slotted the papers into the ballot box.", "17. The 13 applicants also pointed out that there had been no particular problems on election day. Their respective electoral committees had been made up of Bulgarian nationals living in their respective towns and representatives of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some of the polling stations had been visited by the Bulgarian Ambassador and Consul General, and others had been reported on by Bulgarian public television and radio teams, and no irregularities had been noted. At the close of polling on election day the local committees had counted the votes, filled in the requisite report forms and submitted the electoral documents to the Bulgarian diplomatic representatives.", "18. The other 88 applicants submitted that at the material time they had been living in Turkey. Some of them had sent prior statements of intention to vote to the Bulgarian diplomatic representations, but they had never been informed in return of which polling stations to vote in. On election day all the applicants in question had attended the nearest polling stations in their respective towns. Their names had been handwritten into the electoral rolls, and after voting they signed opposite their names.", "19. According to information available on the Central Electoral Commission website (http://pi2009.cik.bg), following the 5 July 2009 elections, six political parties and coalitions garnered more than the minimum 4% of votes cast and were included in the process of proportional distribution of seats in the National Assembly: the GERB party, the Coalition for Bulgaria, the DPS, Ataka, the Blue Coalition and the RZS party.", "20. The DPS obtained a total of 610,521 votes, or 14.45% of the valid votes, which made it the country’s third political party. It garnered 61.18% of the out-of-country voting, that is to say 93,926 votes, 88,238 of which were cast in polling stations in Turkish territory. It came out well ahead in the 17 polling stations – in Istanbul, Bursa, Çerkezköy, Çorlu and İzmir – in which the 101 applicants had voted. By decision of 7 July 2009 the Central Electoral Commission assigned the DPS 33 parliamentary seats under the proportional representation system, together with a further five seats won in the first-past-the-post constituencies.", "21. Following the apportionment of seats won by the DPS at the national level in the 31 multiple-member constituencies, the party won only one seat in the 8th constituency. However, another political formation, the Blue Coalition, having appealed to the Constitutional Court and the votes cast in a polling station in the 19th constituency having been recounted, the Central Electoral Commission conducted a reassignment of the seats won at the national level among the 31 multiple-member constituencies. This gave the DPS a second seat in the 8th constituency, where Mr Riza was in second place on his list of candidates, and removed one of the two seats initially won in the 19th multiple-member constituency. On 12 October 2009 Mr Riza was declared elected to the National Assembly. He was sworn in as a deputy and became a member of his party’s parliamentary group. On 20 January 2010 he was elected member of the Parliamentary Commission on Ethics and the Fight against Corruption and Conflicts of Interest.", "22. On 21 July 2009 the President and three other members of the RZS (Red, Zakonnost, Spravedlivost – “Order, Law and Justice”), a right-wing conservative party, requested the Attorney General to lodge with the Constitutional Court the appeal provided for in section 112 of the Electoral Law in order to annul the election of seven DPS deputes on the grounds of several irregularities which had occurred in the 123 polling stations operating in Turkish territory. The four appellants complained of several breaches of electoral legislation in connection with the setting up of the said polling stations and their handling of the voting: they claimed that the rule requiring a polling station to be opened for every one hundred prior statements of intention to vote had been flouted in Turkish territory; some electors had exercised their voting rights once in Bulgarian national territory and again in a polling station in Turkish territory; incorrect information had been included in the reports drawn up by the electoral committees concerning the number of voters in the polling stations in question; 23 of them had allegedly dealt with over 1,000 voters, which would have been a practical impossibility in view of the opening hours of the polling station and the time required to complete the requisite formalities for each voter, and the electoral committees attached to those polling stations had, in certain cases, reportedly allowed persons into the voting booths without valid Bulgarian identity papers. The appellants invited the Constitutional Court to verify the authenticity of the prior voting requests issued in Turkish territory, to check the electoral rolls drawn up in the region of Bulgaria where the individuals wishing to vote in Turkey had their permanent addresses, and to declare null and void the records drawn up by the electoral committees responsible for the polling stations opened in Turkish territory. According to the appellants, the large number of irregularities committed in the voting procedure in the 123 polling stations in question necessitated the annulment of the votes cast in them, which annulment would have changed the election results and led to the ousting of seven DPS deputies from their seats.", "23. On 22 July 2009 the Attorney General transmitted the request submitted by the President and three other members of the RZS party to the Constitutional Court.", "24. On 11 August 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the appeal admissible and designated as parties to proceedings the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Electoral Commission, the National Department responsible for Citizens’ Civil Status Data and two non-governmental organisations. It sent copies of the request and the relevant documents to the parties to proceedings and gave them a deadline of twenty days to submit their observations on the merits of the case. That court asked the National Department responsible for Citizens’ Civil Status Data to ascertain how many voters had voted in the national territory and then again in Turkish territory, and invited it to submit certified copies of the lists of persons having voted and the reports on voting drawn up by the polling stations in Turkish territory. The President of the Constitutional Court, R.Y., and Judge B.P. signed the admissibility decision, while issuing a separate opinion. They argued that the Attorney General should have submitted a reasoned request to the Constitutional Court rather than merely transmitting the request for annulment lodged by the RZS political party.", "25. On 18 September 2009 the DPS parliamentary group of the National Assembly presented its written observations on the case. It first of all disputed the admissibility of the appeal lodged by the four appellants, arguing that the Attorney General had failed to conduct a prior assessment of the merits of the said request, merely transmitting it to the Constitutional Court, that the appeal had been lodged belatedly, after the deputies in question had been sworn in, and that the seven DPS deputies mentioned in the request had been designated randomly since the out-of-country votes had been used solely to apportion the seats among the various parties at the national level and not for the benefit of any given list of candidates. Secondly, the DPS parliamentary group submitted that the request had been ill-founded for the following reasons: the legal conditions for setting up the 123 polling stations in question had been fulfilled; there had been very few cases of double voting, and voting secrecy precluded determining for which party exactly those persons had voted; the number of persons included on the additional electoral rolls on election day had been higher than that of preregistered voters because the number of persons wishing to exercise their voting rights had far exceeded the number of voters having previously declared their intention to vote outside the country; and in several of the out-of-country polling stations the number of persons voting had exceeded one thousand, and that had not been the case only in the polling stations in Turkey.", "26. On 6 October 2009, at the request of the RZS party, the Constitutional Court ordered a threefold expert assessment to provide the answers to the following questions: (i) how many prior statements of intention to vote were submitted for the territory of Turkey, from which towns were they sent, and did their number correspond to the number of polling stations set up? (ii) were the identity papers of electors voting in the 123 polling stations valid? (iii) did the numbers of electors voting recorded in the minutes drawn up on election day correspond to the total number of preregistered electors and persons registered on the rolls on election day, and were there any polling stations in which none of the preregistered persons exercised their right to vote? (iv) what was the maximum number of persons who could vote in a polling station over election day? The three experts were given leave to consult all the documents on elections in Turkish territory which the diplomatic service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had submitted to the Central Electoral Commission.", "27. The expert report was submitted to the Constitutional Court some time later. It indicated that there had been a total of 27,235 prior declarations of intention to vote in respect of the territory of Turkey: 5,127 of those declarations had been received at the Bulgarian Embassy in Ankara, 15,556 at the Consulate General in Istanbul and 6,552 at the Consulate General in Edirne. The Bulgarian diplomatic services had opened 28 polling stations in the Ankara region, 72 in the Istanbul region and 23 in the Edirne region. The experts had noted that some polling stations had been opened without the threshold of 100 declarations of intention to vote having been reached.", "28. The experts were unable to answer the second question, on the validity of the Bulgarian identity papers of those voting in Turkey. They pointed out that it would have been very time-consuming to carry out the necessary verifications and would have required access to the population database administered by the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, in several cases the local electoral committees had merely mentioned the type of document presented, i.e. an identity card or passport, without recording the document number.", "29. As regards the third question, the experts replied that there had been some very slight differences – between one and five persons – between the numbers of persons voting recorded in the polling station minutes and the numbers of voters included in the electoral rolls. According to the experts, that might have been due to inadvertent omissions. Moreover, they observed that the additional electoral lists in 116 polling stations, which had been drawn up on election day and contained data on the persons who had turned out without having been preregistered, had not been signed by the chair or secretary of the local electoral committee. The experts noted that the personal data on electors contained in those lists had been handwritten, apparently unhurriedly, and those entries would have taken a considerable length of time to write. Furthermore, in some of the polling stations none of the preregistered persons had turned out to vote. In some other polling stations there had been no minutes on file, or else the first page of the minutes had been missing.", "30. As regards the fourth question put by the Constitutional Court, the experts concluded, from a reconstitution of the requisite formalities in dealing with voters and their ballot papers, that the minimum time required for voting would have been about fifty seconds. Having regard to the total duration of election day, that is to say thirteen hours, the experts estimated that a polling station could deal with a maximum of 936 voters. The maximum number of persons voting as thus calculated had been exceeded in 30 of the polling stations operating in Turkey.", "31. The National Department responsible for Citizens’ Civil Status Data presented the Constitutional Court with the results of its inquiry into cases of double voting. The department pointed out that 174 persons had voted several times and that 79 cases of double voting had been noted in Turkey.", "32. On 27 January 2010 the Constitutional Court decided to ask the three experts to examine an additional point: it asked them to recalculate the election results after deducting all the votes cast in 23 polling stations and some of those cast in another polling station, all located in Turkish territory. The court’s request covered: (i) all the votes cast in 18 polling stations where none of the preregistered voters had voted and where the additional lists of those voting had not been signed by the members of the local electoral committees and therefore lacked the probative value of official documents; (ii) all the votes cast in a polling station in which the minutes on voting were missing; (iii) all the votes cast in two other polling stations where the first page of the minutes was missing; (iv) all the votes cast in a polling station where the list of preregistered voters was missing; (v) 86 votes cast for the DPS by persons included in the unsigned additional list at another polling station where that party had garnered all the votes and where 124 preregistered persons had voted; (vi) all the votes cast in another polling station where the list of preregistered voters had not been put on file and where the additional electoral list had not been signed by the members of the local electoral committee.", "33. On 2 February 2010 the experts submitted their supplementary conclusions to the Constitutional Court. In the introductory section of the report they pointed out that they had been mandated to deduct from the outcome of the election the votes cast in polling stations where: (i) none of the preregistered voters had voted and where the additional lists of those voting had not been signed by the members of the local electoral committees; (ii) the minutes were not put on file; (iii) the first page of the minutes was missing. The report presented estimates of the votes cast in 23 polling stations: (i) in 18 of those stations, none of the preregistered voters had voted and the additional list of voters had not been signed; (ii) in the case of another polling station, no minutes had been put on file and the additional list of voters had not been signed; (iii) for three other stations, the first page of the minutes was missing and the additional list of voters had not been signed; (iv) in another polling station, the first page of the minutes had not mentioned the number of persons having voted and none of the preregistered voters had voted. The experts considered that a total of 18,351 votes should be deducted from the election results, 18,140 of which had been case for the DPS. The Central Electoral Commission conducted the provisional reassignment of seats among the political parties on the basis of the expert report.", "34. On 9 February 2010 the parliamentary group of the DPS submitted supplementary observations challenging the Constitutional Court’s choice of criteria for excluding the votes cast in the aforementioned polling stations from the vote count. The DPS deputies pointed out that the outcome of the voting had been based on the data set out in the polling station minutes, and not on the electoral rolls. They added that electoral legislation did not require the chairs and secretaries of out-of-country local electoral committees to sign below the additional lists of voters drawn up on election day. At all events, in the deputies’ opinion, the shortcomings of members of the electoral administration could not lead to the annulment of electors’ votes.", "35. On 15 February 2010 the Central Electoral Commission presented its findings to the Constitutional Court. It pointed out that according to mathematical projections, the annulment of the votes cast in the 23 polling stations mentioned in the experts’ supplementary conclusions would deprive the DPS of one seat which would be assigned to the GERB political party and that in the 8th multiple-member constituency the DPS candidate concluded in second place on the party’s list, Mr Riza, would lose his parliamentary seat.", "36. The Central Electoral Commission presented the Constitutional Court with observations made by five of its twenty-five members on the merits of the case. Those five members voiced the opinion that the arguments put forward by the appellants and the experts’ conclusions could not be used to justify annulling the votes cast in the polling stations in question. They explained in particular that the lists of persons voting in the out-of-country polling stations had been drawn up by the Bulgarian diplomatic representatives accredited on the basis of the prior declarations of intention to vote which they had received. They nevertheless stated that no prior information had been given on the distribution of the voters in question around the various polling stations, as they could attend any polling station or choose not to vote at all, which in their view explained why in some stations none of the voters on the main list had voted. The members of the Electoral Commission considered that that should not lead to the invalidation of the ballots of other electors who had voted in the same polling station. They pointed out that under domestic legislation the election documents had to be packaged and sealed by the local electoral committees and then sent to the Central Electoral Commission. However, when the election documents had arrived from Turkey, it had been noted that the packages containing the documents had already been opened and then re-sealed by the diplomatic services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At all events, the absence, attributable to the Bulgarian diplomatic services or the local electoral committees, of election documents from out-of-county polling stations could not have justified annulling votes cast in those stations, given that the election results from outside the country had been based on data transmitted via diplomatic telegrams to the Central Electoral Commission. Finally, the members of the Electoral Commission, referring to domestic legislation, submitted that the fact that a member of the Electoral Commission had not signed minutes of voting or the accompanying documents did not invalidate them and did not constitute grounds for annulling the votes cast in the station in question. They considered that the recalculation of the election results was based on arguments which had not been mentioned in the request to the Constitutional Court.", "37. On 15 February 2010 the DPS and six of its deputies applied to the Constitutional Court for leave to join the proceedings in question as a party. In that application the DPS stated that it fully endorsed the observations submitted by its parliamentary group on 18 September 2009 and 9 February 2010. On 16 February 2010 Mr Riza requested leave to join the proceedings as a party. In order to demonstrate his interest in taking part in the proceedings he referred explicitly to the additional expert report ordered by the Constitutional Court and the reapportionment of seats effected by the Central Electoral Commission on the basis of the experts’ findings. All those requests remained unanswered.", "38. On 16 February 2010 the Constitutional Court, sitting in private session, adopted its decision in the case in question. It delivered its judgment on the same day.", "39. The Constitutional Court dismissed the pleas of inadmissibility put forward by the DPS parliamentary group in its observations of 18 September 2009 (see paragraph 25 above). It considered, first of all, that the procedure for applying to the court had been respected. Secondly, it observed that the case concerned the contestation of election results rather than the eligibility of an individual candidate, which enabled it to assess the case even though the deputies in question had been sworn in and were already in office. It joined to the merits of the case the third plea of inadmissibility concerning the lack of a direct link between the out-of-country votes and the election of the seven DPS deputies named in the initial request. Judges R.N. and B.P. set out separate opinions on the admissibility of the request for annulment of the election results. They considered that the Attorney General had merely transmitted the request submitted by the RZS party instead of himself lodging a reasoned application for the annulment of the elections.", "40. Considering that it should begin by clarifying the scope of the case, the Constitutional Court pointed out that it had been invited to find unlawful the election of a number of DPS deputies owing to several alleged irregularities in the polling stations operating in Turkish territory. Having regard to the specific mode of functioning of the Bulgarian electoral system, in which votes cast by Bulgarian citizens living abroad were taken into account solely for the proportional distribution of seats among political parties at the national level, it was impossible to determine in advance which deputies would be affected by the invalidation of some or all of the votes cast in Turkish territory. Thus, in the framework of that case, the Constitutional Court considered that it had been called upon to determine whether there had been any serious irregularities in the voting procedure in the 123 polling stations in Turkey. It held that a finding of such irregularities could lead to a change in the election results, a fresh apportionment of seats among the political parties and the annulment of the seats of deputies who had not been explicitly targeted by the initial application lodged by the leader and a number of candidates of the RZS party in the general elections.", "41. The Constitutional Court rejected all the arguments put forward in the initial statement of claim. It first of all noted that section 41 (8) (3) of the Electoral Law gave Bulgarian diplomatic representatives outside the country carte blanche to open as many polling stations as they considered necessary for the proper conduct of the elections.", "42. Secondly, it considered that the question whether a given voter had voted without a valid Bulgarian identity card was immaterial to the outcome of the proceedings, since voting secrecy ruled out ascertaining which party the person had voted for.", "43. The Constitutional Court stated that the experts had noted that in some polling stations none of those on the main electoral roll had voted, while in other stations only a few of those on the roll had voted. It pointed out that according to the experts the names added on election day had been written clearly and apparently unhurriedly, which would seem rather unlikely given the large number of such additions and the pressure under which the members of the electoral committees would have been working on election day. However, the Constitutional Court considered that such considerations were mere suspicions which had not categorically demonstrated that the results of voting in those polling stations had been manipulated.", "44. The Constitutional Court also noted that the experts had reached the conclusion that the maximum number of persons who could vote in one polling station was 936. However, it considered that in the absence of precise information on the alleged irregularities in the voting procedure in the polling stations with more than 1,000 persons voting, that finding did not provide grounds for invalidating the election results. At all event voting secrecy precluded determining for whom the persons registered after number 936 on the list of voters had cast their vote.", "45. For those reasons the Constitutional Court dismissed the application for the annulment of the seats of the seven deputies explicitly covered by the initial request submitted by the leader and candidates of the RZS party.", "46. However, it decided to deduct from the results obtained by each of the political parties respectively all the votes cast in 23 polling stations in Turkey, that is to say a total of 18,358 votes, 18,140 of which had been cast for the DPS. It pointed out that in those polling stations none of the voters preregistered on the main electoral rolls had voted, or else the first page of the minutes of the voting, certifying that the preregistered persons had voted, was missing. The court pointed out that in the 23 polling stations in question the additional lists of voters drawn up on election day did not bear the signatures of the chairs and secretaries of the local electoral committees, which deprived them of the probative value of official documents. The Constitutional Court accordingly considered that they could not be used in evidence to demonstrate that the registered persons had voted. That approach had allegedly also enabled it to determine how many votes had been deducted from the election results of each party or coalition and to reallocate the deputies’ seats in the National Assembly.", "47. The Constitutional Court rejected the additional objections raised by the DPS parliamentary group on 9 February 2010 (see paragraph 34 above). It considered that the irregularities noted in the electoral rolls in the various polling stations had also affected the legitimacy of the minutes drawn up by the electoral committee on completion of the voting because they contained data on the exact number of persons having voted in the polling station in question and the election results had been determined on the basis of the minutes. Even though domestic legislation did not explicitly require the members of the out-of-country local electoral committees to sign additional electoral lists, the module additional electoral list approved by the President of the Republic pursuant to the Electoral Law provided for such signatures. The Constitutional Court therefore took the view that such signature was a legal condition for the validity of such official documents. At all events, the signature was one of the fundamental and obvious components of any official document. The lack of those signatures on the additional voter lists drawn up in the 23 polling stations thus deprived them of their official probative value in respect of the fact that the registered persons had actually cast their votes.", "48. The Constitutional Court declared that the votes in question had been valid under domestic legislation but that they had been deducted from the election results owing to the irregularity of the voter lists and the voting minutes. It considered that the seats in the National Assembly had to be reallocated. For those reasons, and having taken into account the prior calculations submitted by the Central Electoral Commission, the Constitutional Court annulled the parliamentary seats of three deputies, including Mr Riza. It ordered the Central Electoral Commission to reapportion the seats in the National Assembly by deducting from the election results the 18,358 votes cast in the 23 polling stations in question.", "49. By decision of 19 February 2010, pursuant to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, the Central Electoral Commission declared three other candidates elected. Consequently to that redistribution of seats, the DPS was the only party to have lost a parliamentary seat and the GERB party, which had won the general elections, obtained an additional seat.", "50. On 4 March 2010 the DPS and three of its deputies in the National Assembly in turn lodged the appeal provided for in section 112 of the Electoral Law and contested the lawfulness of the election of the three deputies which the Central Electoral Commission had declared elected by decision of 19 February 2010. Mr Riza lodged the same appeal in his own name.", "51. On 31 March and 27 April 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the two appeals inadmissible on the grounds that the dispute in issue had already been the subject of proceedings before it, leading to its judgment of 16 February 2010.", "52. The 41st National Assembly constituted following the general elections of 5 July 2009 sat until 15 March 2013, when it was dissolved by Presidential Decree.", "53. The elections to the 42nd National Assembly were held on 12 May 2013. At those elections the DPS obtained 400,460 votes, that is to say 11.31% of the validly cast votes. It obtained 51,784 votes in Turkish territory. It sent 36 deputies to the National Assembly, where it was the third biggest parliamentary group. Mr Riza was elected deputy of the 8th multiple-member constituency, where he headed his party’s list.", "54. The lawfulness of those general elections, particularly as regards the polling stations opened in Turkish territory, was disputed before the Constitutional Court by a group of 48 deputies from the GERB party. The deputies requested the annulment of the elections in the 86 polling stations operating in Turkey owing to several alleged irregularities in the voting procedures: they submitted that the polling stations had been set up on the basis of forged prior declarations of intention to vote; they had opened despite their electoral committees lacking the minimum number of members; unidentified persons had canvassed the areas inhabited by Bulgarian citizens in Turkey, had obtained Bulgarian identity papers from various electors and had returned them to their owners the day before the elections telling them that they had voted; several voters had not shown any valid Bulgarian identity papers; the number of persons voting in some of the polling stations had exceeded, which was unrealistic in view of the time required to complete the formalities linked to the voting procedure; there had been several cases of double voting; the lists of electors registered on election day had not been properly drawn up and had not been signed by the chair and the other members of the electoral committee. The request referred explicitly to the reasoning of the judgment delivered by the Constitutional Court on 16 February 2010.", "55. By judgment of 28 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the 48 GERB deputies. It considered and rejected, on the basis of the evidence gathered, all the allegations of breaches of electoral legislation advanced by the appellants. It noted, inter alia, that the relevant members of all the electoral committees set up in Turkish territory had signed at the bottom of the lists of voters added on election day, which gave those documents the probative value of official documents.", "56. During the 42nd legislature the DPS took part in a coalition government which resigned in July 2014. Following those events the 42nd National Assembly was dissolved on 6 August 2014 by Presidential Decree.", "57. The elections to the 43rd National Assembly were held on 5 October 2014. The DPS obtained 487,134 votes, that is to say 14.84% of all valid votes cast, and sent 38 deputies to Parliament. No admissible appeal was lodged before the Constitutional Court against those election results. The DPS is currently the third biggest political party in the country and the second biggest opposition party.", "58. Mr Riza was elected as deputy in the 8th constituency, where he headed the DPS list.\n... 91. At its 51st and 52nd sessions on 5 and 6 July and 18 and 19 October 2002, the Commission European for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) adopted its guidelines in electoral matters and an explanatory report on those guidelines. These two documents together constitute the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Conduct in Electoral Matters, which was approved by the Parliamentary Assemblée and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe in 2003. 92. The relevant parts of the Code read as follows:\nGuidelines\n“2. Equal suffrage\nEqual suffrage entails: ... equal voting rights ...; ... equal voting power ...; equal opportunities ... 3.3. An effective system of appeal\na. The appeal body in electoral matters should be either an electoral commission or a court. For elections to Parliament, an appeal to Parliament may be provided for in first instance. In any case, final appeal to a court must be possible.\nb. The procedure must be simple and devoid of formalism, in particular concerning the admissibility of appeals.\nc. The appeal procedure and, in particular, the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies should be clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction (whether positive or negative). Neither the appellants nor the authorities should be able to choose the appeal body.\nd. The appeal body must have authority in particular over such matters as the right to vote – including electoral registers – and eligibility, the validity of candidatures, proper observance of election campaign rules and the outcome of the elections.\ne. The appeal body must have authority to annul elections where irregularities may have affected the outcome. It must be possible to annul the entire election or merely the results for one constituency or one polling station. In the event of annulment, a new election must be called in the area concerned.\nf. All candidates and all voters registered in the constituency concerned must be entitled to appeal. A reasonable quorum may be imposed for appeals by voters on the results of elections.\ng. Time-limits for lodging and deciding appeals must be short (three to five days for each at first instance).\nh. The applicant’s right to a hearing involving both parties must be protected.\ni. Where the appeal body is a higher electoral commission, it must be able ex officio to rectify or set aside decisions taken by lower electoral commissions.”\nExplanatory report\n“2. Equal suffrage 10. Equality in electoral matters comprises a variety of aspects. Some concern equality of suffrage, a value shared by the whole continent, while others go beyond this concept and cannot be deemed to reflect any common standard. The principles to be respected in all cases are numerical vote equality, equality in terms of electoral strength and equality of chances. On the other hand, equality of outcome achieved, for instance, by means of proportional representation of the parties or the sexes, cannot be imposed. ... 92. If the electoral law provisions are to be more than just words on a page, failure to comply with the electoral law must be open to challenge before an appeal body. This applies in particular to the election results: individual citizens may challenge them on the grounds of irregularities in the voting procedures. It also applies to decisions taken before the elections, especially in connection with the right to vote, electoral registers and standing for election, the validity of candidatures, compliance with the rules governing the electoral campaign and access to the media or to party funding. 93. There are two possible solutions:\n- appeals may be heard by the ordinary courts, a special court or the constitutional court;\n- appeals may be heard by an electoral commission. There is much to be said for this latter system in that the commissions are highly specialised whereas the courts tend to be less experienced with regard to electoral issues. As a precautionary measure, however, it is desirable that there should be some form of judicial supervision in place, making the higher commission the first appeal level and the competent court the second. 94. Appeal to parliament, as the judge of its own election, is sometimes provided for but could result in political decisions. It is acceptable as a first instance in places where it is long established, but a judicial appeal should then be possible. 95. Appeal proceedings should be as brief as possible, in any case concerning decisions to be taken before the election. On this point, two pitfalls must be avoided: first, that appeal proceedings retard the electoral process, and second, that, due to their lack of suspensive effect, decisions on appeals which could have been taken before, are taken after the elections. In addition, decisions on the results of elections must also not take too long, especially where the political climate is tense. This means both that the time limits for appeals must be very short and that the appeal body must make its ruling as quickly as possible. Time limits must, however, be long enough to make an appeal possible, to guarantee the exercise of rights of defence and a reflected decision. A time limit of three to five days at first instance (both for lodging appeals and making rulings) seems reasonable for decisions to be taken before the elections. It is, however, permissible to grant a little more time to Supreme and Constitutional Courts for their rulings. 96. The procedure must also be simple, and providing voters with special appeal forms helps to make it so. It is necessary to eliminate formalism, and so avoid decisions of inadmissibility, especially in politically sensitive cases. 97. It is also vital that the appeal procedure, and especially the powers and responsibilities of the various bodies involved in it, should be clearly regulated by law, so as to avoid any positive or negative conflicts of jurisdiction. Neither the appellants nor the authorities should be able to choose the appeal body. The risk that successive bodies will refuse to give a decision is seriously increased where it is theoretically possible to appeal to either the courts or an electoral commission, or where the powers of different courts – e.g. the ordinary courts and the constitutional court – are not clearly differentiated. ... 98. Disputes relating to the electoral registers, which are the responsibility, for example, of the local administration operating under the supervision of or in co-operation with the electoral commissions, can be dealt with by courts of first instance. 99. Standing in such appeals must be granted as widely as possible. It must be open to every elector in the constituency and to every candidate standing for election there to lodge an appeal. A reasonable quorum may, however, be imposed for appeals by voters on the results of elections. 100. The appeal procedure should be of a judicial nature, in the sense that the right of the appellants to proceedings in which both parties are heard should be safeguarded. 101. The powers of appeal bodies are important too. They should have authority to annul elections, if irregularities may have influenced the outcome, i.e. affected the distribution of seats. This is the general principle, but it should be open to adjustment, i.e. annulment should not necessarily affect the whole country or constituency – indeed, it should be possible to annul the results of just one polling station. This makes it possible to avoid the two extremes – annulling an entire election, although irregularities affect a small area only, and refusing to annul, because the area affected is too small. In zones where the results have been annulled, the elections must be repeated. 102. Where higher-level commissions are appeal bodies, they should be able to rectify or annul ex officio the decisions of lower electoral commissions.”" ]

[ "P1-3", "6", "34" ]

[ 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 ]

[]

[ "7. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Strathfield in Australia.", "8. At the material time he had been a correspondent with an Australian newspaper in Turkey. He had also been working voluntarily for a bookshop specialising in books on Christianity.", "9. On 24 June 1997 he appeared in a television documentary broadcast in the framework of the programme Son çare (“Last Resort”), hosted by Ms Hülya Koçyiğit.", "10. During the programme the hostess introduced the documentary by pointing out that it concerned covert activities conducted in Turkey by “foreign pedlars of religion” (yabancı din tüccarları).\nThe ensuing documentary was along the following lines:\nOver footage of mosques and then Christian religious ceremonies, a voice stated that everyone, whether a member of the Muslim majority or a religious minority, had the right to belong to the religion of his or her own choosing and the freedom to practise that religion. According to the voice-over, it was strange that some proselytising activities were being carried out in a covert manner, despite the freedom of conscience and religion.\nAgainst a background of images of a dhikr ceremony performed by a Muslim brotherhood, showing followers in a state of trance, the voiceover asked whether, “in order to combat such instances of bigotry (yobazlık), an attempt was being made to set up groups of Christian converts, plunging the country into chaos”.\nThe voiceover explained that the aim of the programme was not to judge any specific religion but to show that whatever their nationalities or religious beliefs, the pedlars of religion all used the same methods.", "11. The voiceover explained that the programme producers had been contacted by a certain A.N., who lived in Samsun. This person had been intrigued by an advertisement asking “would you like to read books free of charge?”, and had replied. In return, he had received a number of books by mail, all of them concerning Christianity. He had written back and had once again received books on the same subject. The second dispatch had been accompanied by a letter thanking him for his interest in the subject.", "12. There had subsequently been a telephone exchange between A.N. and the sender, who had proved to be the applicant.", "13. After that exchange it had been agreed that the applicant would travel to Samsun to meet A.N.", "14. It was at that point that A.N. had decided to inform the programme producers and to invite them to make a documentary on the subject.", "15. On 17 June 1997 the applicant had travelled to Samsun to meet A.N. and some of his “friends [purportedly] interested in Christianity” for the first time, in a restaurant. The conversation had been filmed by a hidden camera.", "16. According to the voiceover, the applicant had then presented the teachings of the Bible. He had continued by comparing Christianity with other religions, emphasising his own beliefs. However, that sequence was not shown, on the grounds that the aim of the documentary was not to discuss the merits of specific beliefs but to expose the methods used.", "17. A.N. and the applicant had arranged to meet up again the next day in an apartment, again accompanied by a group of A.N.’s friends purportedly desirous of learning about the Christian religion.", "18. During that second meeting the applicant had explained that he was not alone but was part of a group working throughout Turkey. He had said that premises could be rented in Samsun for the converts, but that he would have to talk to his “boss” about that. The question of where the money would come from was difficult, but an open, intelligent attitude had to be adopted to such matters because converts could be accused of having changed religions thanks to pecuniary considerations rather than conviction.", "19. The documentary then showed the following dialogue between the applicant and one of the participants:\n“Participant:\n- Have you read the Koran?\nApplicant: \n– Yes.\nParticipant:\n– What did you think of it?\nApplicant:\n– I liked it. Some of the verses are good, but...\nParticipant:\n– ... but there is also some nonsense?\nApplicant:\n– No, I wouldn’t say that, but it cannot save me, because I know I am a sinner.\n...\nApplicant:\n– The knowledge which God has sent us is set out in the Bible, the Torah and the Book of the Psalms of David. [That knowledge] is complete in itself. We need no other prophet, because Jesus is divine in essence ...”", "20. Just as the applicant was apparently preparing, with the help of a bowl of water, to explain to the participants the ritual of baptism, the person hosting the programme, Hülya Koçyiğit, burst into the room with a camera and a microphone.", "21. She told the applicant that she had heard about the meeting and had come to make his acquaintance. She asked him who he was and where he came from.", "22. The applicant replied that he was Australian and held an identity card up to the camera. He added that he was a journalist, and was involved in explaining the Christian faith on a voluntary basis.", "23. Asked why the latter activity was covert, he answered that it was not covert, and that he had come to Samsun with full trust in the person who had contacted him.", "24. The documentary then presented an interview between Ms Koçyigit and an academic from the Istanbul Faculty of (Islamic) Theology. The latter explained that Muslims were duty-bound to respect and believe in the divine nature of the holy books of all the monotheistic religions, pointing out that Islam was a religion of tolerance. However, he voiced his surprise at the covert nature of the activities shown in the documentary.", "25. At the end of the programme the applicant was shown walking along carrying a bag. The voiceover described him as “Dion, the pedlar of religion, on his way to the police station to give a statement”.", "26. According to the applicant, the hostess of the TV programme had been accompanied by police officers when she had burst into the room, and the officers had remanded him in custody after the discussions.", "27. He had been released the following day, after having given his statement.", "28. On 25 June 1997 the Samsun prosecutor’s office brought criminal proceedings against the applicant for insulting Allah and Islam.", "29. On 28 April 1998 Samsun Criminal Court found the applicant innocent given that no evidence had been provided of a criminal offence.", "30. On 24 June 1998 the applicant filed an action for damages against the programme presenter and producers.", "31. Istanbul Regional Court (“IRC”) dismissed that action by judgment of 18 March 2003 on the grounds of the public interest of dissemination of information.", "32. By judgment of 15 June 2004 the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation set aside the latter judgment, by four votes to one.\nIn its reasoning the Chamber noted that the case concerned a conflict of rights between freedom of expression, on the one hand, and personality rights on the other. Having reiterated the fundamental importance of freedom of the press, it pointed out that that freedom nevertheless had its limits. It considered that the claimant had not committed any unlawful act but had merely exercised his rights to freedom of expression and freedom of conscience, which two rights were secured under both the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. That being the case, the claimant’s right to respect for his private life had suffered a twofold violation, first of all when he had been filmed by a hidden camera, and secondly when the images had been broadcast, accompanied by such expressions as “pedlar of religion” and “bigotry”.", "33. On 18 March 2003, ruling on the case referred back to it, the TGI decided not to follow the reasoning of the 4th Civil Chamber and instead to maintain its previous judgment.", "34. In the face of such resistance from the IRC, the case was referred ex officio to the Assembly of Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation. By judgment of 7 December 2005, that Assembly upheld the finding of the first-instance court by thirty-five votes to eleven.\nIn their reasoning, the judges of the superior court held that the impugned images had not concerned details of the applicant’s private life, but had been part of a documentary on a topical issue of interest to the general public. They considered that there had been a major public interest in broadcasting the documentary at issue and that the documentary-makers had struck a fair balance between the merits and the formal aspects of the subject.", "35. According to the case file that judgment was served on the applicant on 28 February 2006.", "36. The applicant submitted that the owner of the apartment which he had rented had ended his lease following the transmission of the documentary for security reasons.", "37. He added that he had been expelled to Bulgaria.\n..." ]

[ "8" ]

[]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in the town of Artyom, in the Primorye Region.", "7. The applicant is a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin. He originally lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan.", "8. In June 2010, which was a time of mass disorders and interethnic clashes in the region, the applicant had been the head of the territorial board of a municipal authority in which most residents were ethnic Uzbeks. He was, according to him, considered as a leader of the local Uzbek community.", "9. After the clashes, the applicant had repeatedly been invited by the Kyrgyz investigative bodies for questioning as a witness.", "10. In June 2011 the applicant learned that criminal proceedings had been opened against him (see paragraph 12 below). The applicant submits that law-enforcement officers started to extort money from him, threatening him with imprisonment. Due to this he moved to a different city in Kyrgyzstan, to his sister’s home, where he stayed for several months.", "11. Afterwards, in March 2012, the applicant left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. He settled in the Primorye Region, and after obtaining a work permit, worked as a sports instructor.", "12. On 16 June 2011 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant with the commission of violent crimes in June 2010 (attempted murder, participation in mass disorders and unlawful firearms trafficking) and ordered his arrest. It appears that when the authorities eventually tried to execute the arrest order, the applicant had left the country (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). The applicant was therefore put on the international wanted list.", "13. On 14 March 2013 the applicant was arrested in Russia and detained in custody pending extradition", "14. On 5 April 2013 the Kyrgyz authorities lodged an extradition request with the Prosecutor General of Russia, asking that the applicant be extradited to Kyrgyzstan for prosecution and trial.", "15. On 16 September 2013 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office granted the extradition request and ordered the applicant’s extradition.", "16. The applicant appealed, arguing that due to his Uzbek ethnic origin the aforementioned decision would expose him to a serious risk of torture. The applicant supported his appeal through reference, inter alia, to various UN sources, NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no. 49747/11, 16 October 2012).", "17. On 1 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the extradition order, giving the following reasoning:\n“The charges pressed against [the applicant] [by Kyrgyz authorities] are criminal offences liable to punishment in Russia ... They are not time-barred ...\nPursuant to Article 464 § 1 (1) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, an extradition request lodged by a foreign state in respect of a Russian citizen should be denied ...\nIt is apparent from the conclusions of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for the Primorye Region that [the applicant] is not a Russian citizen. ... He holds a Kyrgyz passport ... and is a Kyrgyz national. ...\nOn 28 June 2013 the FMS for Prymorye Region rejected a request from [the applicant] for refugee status in Russia.\n[The applicant’s] allegations of persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities on false criminal charges on the basis of his [Uzbek] ethnic origin were addressed [within the refugee status procedure].\nThe lawfulness of the refusal [to grant the applicant refugee status in Russia] was confirmed by Russia’s FMS on 24 September 2013 ...\n[The applicant’s] argument [that] the decision to extradite him was taken before any judicial review of the refusal to grant him refugee status is groundless.\nIt is apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] arrived in Russia ... for employment purposes and that he had not been persecuted in Kyrgyzstan on racial, national or religious grounds ...\nIt is likewise apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] lodged his request for refugee status on 16 April 2013, while being held in custody following his arrest in Russia ... , [therefore] his appeal against the decision of the FMS did not prevent the Prosecutor General’s Office from taking a decision concerning extradition, in line with ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012 of the Plenary Session of the Russian Supreme Court ...\n[The applicant] does not have immunity from prosecution [and] there are no grounds preventing his extradition.\nThe Prosecutor General’s Office of Kyrgyzstan provided assurances that [in the event of extradition] [the applicant] would have the benefit of [legal assistance]; that he would not be extradited to a third State; that he would be prosecuted only for the offence for which he was being extradited; that [he] would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; that he was being prosecuted for an ordinary criminal offence devoid of any political character or discrimination on any grounds; that he would be able to freely leave Kyrgyzstan after he had stood trial and served a sentence; and that Russian diplomats would be allowed access to him.\nIt is apparent from the above guarantees that [the applicant] is being prosecuted for ordinary criminal offences; his prosecution is not politically motivated and is not connected with his [ethnic origin].\n[The applicant’s] allegations concerning his persecution on political grounds, lack of fair trial in Kyrgyzstan, and persecution of his family members by law-enforcement bodies in Kyrgyzstan are not supported by any objective data.\nThe court has established that [the applicant’s] wife and daughter live in Kyrgyzstan, [that there is] no substantiated information concerning their alleged persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities, [and] that they do not travel outside the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. [The applicant himself] did not apply for refugee status until his arrest.\n... The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have any information that would prevent [the applicant’s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan.\nTherefore, there are no grounds ... preventing [the applicant’s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan for criminal prosecution.\nThe argument of [the applicant’s] lawyer referring to international sources (report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on technical assistance and cooperation on human rights for Kyrgyzstan, report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, International Crisis Group Kyrgyzstan report) to the effect that after the interethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 the law‑enforcement bodies had subjected ethnic Uzbeks to torture and that there are grounds to believe that [the applicant] might be subjected to torture in the event of his extradition, is unsubstantiated. The aforementioned international documents describe the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, are unspecific and unsupported by evidence, and are countered by the guarantees offered by Kyrgyz Republic, which relate directly to the applicant and are sufficient to eliminate the risk of [the applicant’s] being subjected to inhuman treatment.\n[As to] the reference by the defence to ... the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev, [the case] has no connection with [the applicant’s] case and cannot be taken into consideration.\n...”", "18. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia.", "19. In the meantime, on 28 January 2014 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Kyrgyzstan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.", "20. On 30 January 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 1 November 2013 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court:\n“The court has taken into consideration the arguments of the defence and the documents submitted, including the concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture [dated December 2013] on Kyrgyzstan’s second periodic report, in which the Committee expressed its deep concern with regard to apparent impunity regarding widespread acts of torture and ill-treatment that remained uninvestigated by the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic ... and the report that the investigations, persecutions, convictions and punishments in connection with the events of June 2010 are mainly directed at persons of Uzbek ethnic origin.\nAt the same time, these circumstances cannot in themselves be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing to extradite [the applicant] to the Kyrgyz Republic ...\nPursuant to Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, no State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture. For the purpose of determining whether such grounds exist, the competent authorities must take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.\n...\nThe provisions of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture imply that it is necessary not only to verify the existence in the State concerned of gross and mass violations of human rights, but also the existence in that State of the likelihood that the individual concerned would personally be at risk of torture if returned to his or her country. That risk must be real, immediate and foreseeable.\nAccording to the legal position of the UN Committee against Torture as outlined in a number of its decisions (...), the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced showing that the individual concerned would be personally at risk ...\nThe Committee ... noted that it is necessary to establish the existence of substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of torture if returned, and that such risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard the Committee has determined, in previous decisions, that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal.\nThe evidential material submitted by the Prosecutor General’s Office – on the basis of which the decision to extradite [the applicant] was taken – does not contain any information demonstrating that [the latter] personally would be at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the event of his extradition.\n[A long passage on the guarantees provided by the Kyrgyz authorities].\nNeither [the applicant] nor his lawyers provided any substantial evidence showing that [the former] was at risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the Kyrgyz authorities, or that he might be persecuted on grounds [such as] race, religion, national or social origin, or political opinion.\n... [The applicant] does not belong to any political or other party, organisation or group that opposes [the present government of Kyrgyzstan].\nWhile living in Kyrgyzstan [the applicant] was not subjected to any torture, inhuman or degrading treatment by the authorities; he arrived in Russia in March 2012, that is to say a year and nine months after the crimes of which he stands accused had been committed in June 2010. [The applicant’s] wife and daughter remain in the Kyrgyz Republic.\nNo evidence has [therefore] been provided showing that [the applicant] or his relatives were persecuted by [the Kyrgyz] authorities.\n[The applicant’s] statement to the effect that he is a “leader of Uzbek diaspora” and belongs to the ethnic Uzbeks – which allegedly gives him reason to believe that he would be subjected to repressive criminal prosecution and unfair conviction – is an assumption unsupported by any evidence. It cannot therefore be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for concluding that he is personally at risk of being subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan.\n...”", "21. On 16 March 2013 the Artyom Town Court in the Primorye Region ordered the applicant’s detention pending extradition until 23 April 2013.", "22. On 22 April 2013 the same court extended the applicant’s detention until 14 September 2013. On the same day the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. On 12 July 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal.", "23. On 13 September 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok extended the applicant’s detention until 13 March 2014. On 19 September 2013 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. The appeal was dispatched by post on 20 September 2013. The Leninskiy District Court received the applicant’s appeal on 21 October 2013. On 23 October 2013 a copy of the appeal was forwarded to the applicant and the local prosecutor’s office, and the latter was invited to submit comments by 28 October 2013. On 31 October 2013 the Leninskiy District Court forwarded the case file to the Primorye Regional Court for examination. On 6 November 2013 an appeal hearing was scheduled for 7 November 2013 and the parties were informed accordingly. On 7 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order of 13 September 2013 on appeal.", "24. On 7 March 2014 the deputy Prosecutor of the Primorye Region decided to release the applicant in the light of the decision of the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the present case. The applicant was released on the same day.", "25. On 16 April 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status with Russia’s FMS, alleging persecution on the grounds of ethnic origin.", "26. On 28 June 2013 the FMS for the Primorye Region rejected the applicant’s request, having found that the applicant had left his country of nationality for reasons falling outside the scope of section 1(1)(1) of the Refugee Act.", "27. On 24 September 2013 Russia’s FMS upheld the refusal of 28 June 2013.", "28. The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision before the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow. In his appeal he referred to reports concerning the widespread ill-treatment of Uzbek detainees in Kyrgyzstan, as confirmed by various UN sources, NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev.", "29. On 22 January 2014 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant’s appeal against the FMS’s decisions. The District Court considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution in Kyrgyzstan and that his allegations that the criminal charges against him were unlawful fell outside the scope of the refugee status proceedings. The District Court pointed out that his application for refugee status contained no indications that he had been previously accused or convicted of a criminal offence, or that he had been a member of any political, religious or military organisations. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status until after his placement in detention.", "30. In his appeal against the judgment of 22 January 2014 the applicant requested a rigorous examination of his arguments regarding the risk of ill‑treatment. He again referred to various reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs to support his position.", "31. On 20 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal, reiterating the conclusions of the migration authorities and the first‑instance court.", "32. On 25 April 2014 the FMS for the Primorye Region issued a decision granting the applicant temporary asylum in the Russian Federation until 25 April 2015, referring to the existence of circumstances preventing the applicant’s extradition, namely the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the applicant’s case before the Court and the impossibility of foreseeing the duration of those proceedings.", "33. On 10 April 2015 the FMS for the Primorye Region extended the term of the temporary asylum granted to the applicant until 25 April 2016, with reference to the same grounds." ]

[ "5", "3" ]

[ 11, 14, 18, 26, 27 ]

[]

[ "6. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in the town of Feodosiya, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.", "7. On 19 September 2000 the Prosecutor’s office of the North‑Western Administrative District of the city of Moscow (“the Prosecutor’s office”) opened a criminal investigation into the murder of a businessman.", "8. By a decision of 30 October 2000 the Prosecutor’s office ordered the applicant to appear as a witness in this case. Since at that time the applicant resided in the town of Feodosiya in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the prosecutor also ordered the police to take measures with a view to ensuring the applicant’s attendance. It appears that the relevant summons was sent to the applicant’s only known address in Russia, that of his sister, who resided in Moscow. The applicant denied having received the summons at that time.", "9. On 1 and 2 November 2000 the Prosecutor’s office ordered the applicant’s apartment in Feodosiya to be searched, requested the cooperation of the Ukrainian authorities in conducting the search, and also dispatched a team of police officers from the Department of Criminal Investigations of the Moscow City Department of the Interior to Ukraine. In his letter dated 1 November 2000 a prosecutor from the Prosecutor’s office specifically mentioned that he had decided to send two police officers from that Department to Feodosiya for “operative follow-up”.", "10. Two Russian police officers, Ti. and Go., were entrusted with this operation and at once sent to Ukraine. It appears that they had secured the support of the head of the Department of Criminal Investigation of the Feodosiya Department of the Interior, lieutenant‑colonel Mir., who had apparently instructed his subordinate, police officer Kov., to assist the Russian police officers in their task. The exact mandate of police officer Kov. is unclear.", "11. On 3 November 2000 police officer Kov. and the two Russian police officers, Ti. and Go., located and arrested the applicant. He was handcuffed and his apartment was searched. The search took place in the presence of the applicant’s mother, B.N., and her neighbours K.M. and P.N. acting as witnesses; it was documented in a report drawn up by Kov. on 3 November 2000. The report stated that the applicant had been given a copy of the report on the day of the search.", "12. According to the applicant, after the search he remained in the custody of the Ukrainian and Russian police, who the next day escorted him to a local airport. The Russian officers and the applicant took the first flight to Moscow. On arrival, the applicant was formally arrested by the same two officers and detained on suspicion of murder.", "13. The applicant submitted a copy of the passenger manifest for Aeroflot flight Su-200 dated 4 November 2000. The document showed that the applicant and police officers Go. and Ti. had travelled on the same flight and occupied seats nos. 5 (Go.), 6 (the applicant) and 7 (Ti.).", "14. According to the Russian Government, after the search the applicant had been taken to the Ukrainian police and shortly thereafter had been released. The next day he had bought a ticket and took a flight to Moscow. Two police officers, Ti. and Go., had been tipped off about the applicant’s decision to buy a ticket and managed to buy tickets for the same flight. When the applicant arrived at a Moscow airport, he had been arrested by Ti. and Go. and brought before an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office.", "15. The Ukrainian Government did not submit their own version of these events.", "16. After the events of 3 and 4 November 2000 the applicant’s parents made a number of complaints to various Ukrainian officials and bodies about the actions of the Ukrainian policemen and requested assistance from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in repatriating the applicant to Ukraine from Russia.", "17. More specifically, on 25 November 2000 the applicant made a criminal complaint to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office, alleging abuse of power and the unlawfulness of the search, arrest and detention.", "18. In response to one of the complaints of the applicant’s parents’, on 8 December 2000 a prosecutor from the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s office initiated administrative proceedings regarding the events of 3 November 2000 against the Ukrainian officials involved. The decision stated that:\n“... On 3 November 2000 police officers from the Moscow department of criminal investigations arrived at the town of Feodosiya with a warrant to carry out a search at [the applicant’s home address], this decision having been authorised by [a] prosecutor from the Moscow North-Western District.\nThe head of the criminal investigation department of the Department of the Interior ... police lieutenant-colonel Mir., seriously breached the requirements of Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine and Article 80 of the Minsk Convention ... according to which contact concerning questions of extradition, criminal prosecution, and the execution of investigatory missions ... is to be made by the Prosecutor General’s offices of the respective parties. He directed his [subordinates] to render assistance [to the Russian police] in carrying out their search.\nBefore the start of the search the Moscow police officers, in the presence of Ukrainian police officers Kov., Ga., and Bol., arrested [the applicant] and handcuffed him: this was confirmed by [the applicant’s parents and witnesses] K.M. and P.N.\nAfter the search, a Ukrainian national [the applicant] was apprehended by the Russian police and taken to an unknown location ...”", "19. On 9 December 2000 the head of the Feodosiya Department of the Interior, lieutenant-colonel Mir., issued order no. 478, in which he reprimanded police officer Kov. who had taken part in the events of 3 November 2000, for “incorrect and unathorised actions while assisting the police of other states”.", "20. On 22 December 2000 the same official from the Feodosiya Department of the Interior issued order no. 501, in which he mentioned that the initial authorisation given to police officer Kov. had only included the instruction “to locate [the applicant] and indicate that location to the police officers from Moscow”.", "21. By a letter dated 30 December 2000 the Ukrainian authorities informed the applicant’s mother that police officer Kov. had been reprimanded and that the question of the disciplinary liability of lieutenant‑colonel Mir. would be decided when he returned from holiday.", "22. On 22 January 2001 a prosecutor from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office wrote a letter to the applicant’s father and informed him that they “had requested legal assistance [from the Russian authorities] in resolving [the applicant’s complaint] about his unlawful arrest ... and his ... subsequent transfer to [Russia]”. By the same letter the applicant’s father was informed that the applicant’s complaint about unlawful actions on the part of the Ukrainian policemen had been forwarded to a prosecutor’s office for further investigation.", "23. By a letter dated 23 April 2001, in response to one of the complaints from the applicant’s family, a prosecutor from the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the Russian law‑enforcement bodies had never formally asked the Ukrainian authorities to conduct a search at the applicant’s address in Ukraine.", "24. By a letter dated 7 February 2002 a prosecutor from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office informed the applicant’s mother that the inquiry into the events conducted by the Prosecutor’s office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea revealed that officers from both the Russian and the Ukrainian police had been present during the search. The inquiry resulted in the decision to bring administrative proceedings in respect of the Ukrainian police officers who had breached the rules of criminal procedure and the Minsk Convention.", "25. In July 2004 the applicant’s mother lodged a complaint about the events of 3 November 2000 with the Feodosiya Town Court. This complaint remained unexamined and on 19 August 2004 it was forwarded instead to the Feodosiya Town Prosecutor’s office. A covering letter signed by the President of the Feodosiya Town Court explained to the applicant’s mother that the complaint had been forwarded to the Prosecutor’s office for examination.", "26. The applicant’s parents appealed against the Town Court’s failure to examine his mother’s arguments on the merits before the Appeal Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on 29 November 2004.", "27. On 8 December 2004 the President of the Appeal Court explained that on 6 April 2001 an investigator had already refused to bring criminal proceedings in respect of the events of 3 November 2000.", "28. It is unclear whether the applicant or his family received a copy of the decision of 6 April 2001. According to a certificate submitted by the Ukrainian Government, the inquiry case file was destroyed owing to expiry of the retention period on 4 May 2006.", "29. On 6 December 2000 the applicant lodged a similar complaint with the Russian Prosecutor General, stating that his arrest in Ukraine, subsequent transfer to Moscow and detention in custody by the Russian authorities had been unlawful.", "30. On 22 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office questioned officer Ti. in connection with the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest in Ukraine. Ti. stated:\n“... on 1 November 2000 the prosecutor’s office of the Northern Western Administrative District issued an international request for the search of [the applicant’s apartment] and the applicant’s arrest. Whether it reached the police of Feodosiya I am not sure, but as far as I understood it [did].\nIn order to execute the request, [officer] Go. and I set off for Feodosiya in possession of a copy of the international request.\nHaving arrived in Feodosiya, we contacted the Department of the Interior of Feodosiya and asked them to be present during the search and other activities within the framework of the request. On 3 November 2000 we attended the search at [the applicant’s] place of residence. The search of [the applicant’s] apartment was conducted by the [Feodosiya] police officers and they drew up a record in this respect. Go. and I were present at the search, but did not actively participate in it. After the search [the applicant] was invited by the [Feodosiya] police officers to the premises of the Department of the Interior for questioning.\nI was informed by one of the [Feodosiya] police officers that [the applicant] refused to answer any questions concerning the matter. No documents were given either to me or to Go. We were only given a copy of the search record.\nI knew that we had no right to carry out any operative search activities on the territory of Ukraine, and therefore we did not personally participate in the verbal exchanges with [the applicant]. Having refused to make any statements, [the applicant] was released.\nThe next day, 4 November 2000, the [Feodosiya] policemen – I don’t remember who exactly – informed Go. and myself that [the applicant] had bought a ticket for a plane to Moscow and told us the flight and seat number. At once we set off for the sales office and, since very few tickets were sold, managed to buy tickets for seats close to [the applicant] so as to be able to observe him. The plane was not full, since few people were flying to Moscow. We did not show any interest or attention towards [the applicant]. I don’t know whether [the applicant] recognised us. In any event, had he had any concerns, he could have expressed them to the officers [of the law enforcement agencies in the airport]. [The applicant] did not do this, from which I deduce that he was not aware of either me or Go., nor had he recognised [us], and he expected to go into hiding in Moscow.\nWe knew about the investigator’s decision to arrest [the applicant] because he had no place of residence in Moscow. Upon his arrival in Moscow, we decided to arrest [the applicant] and bring him [to the police station of the Northern Western Administrative District] for investigative actions ...”", "31. On 22 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office questioned officer Go. in connection with the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest in Ukraine. Go. repeated word for word the statements given earlier by Ti.", "32. By a decision of 26 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office rejected the applicant’s complaint on the grounds that the applicant had travelled to Moscow of his own free will and had been detained on arrival in accordance with domestic law. The prosecutor relied principally on the evidence given by the two Russian police officers, who explained that they had happened by mere chance to be on the same plane to Moscow as the applicant. They denied that they had taken an active part in the events in Ukraine and stated that the applicant had been released after the search and had then bought a plane ticket to Moscow on his own. The officers had been tipped off by an undisclosed source within the Ukrainian police and had managed to buy tickets for the same flight, “sitting not very far from the applicant’s seat”. On arrival in Moscow the officers arrested the applicant in the airport terminal and took him to the investigating authorities.", "33. On 28 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office questioned the applicant in connection with the circumstances of his arrest in Ukraine. The applicant stated:\n“... I was arrested on 3 November 2000 in the town of Feodosiya, in the Krym Region. The arrest was carried out by five police officers from the Feodosiya Town Police and two other police officers, who I later learned were from Moscow. Once the policemen had identified me I was handcuffed. Thereafter they conducted a search of my home. I was shown a search warrant signed by the Prosecutor from the Northern-Western Administrative District of Moscow but no other documents were provided. After the search I was brought to the police station in Feodosiya. I was not shown any documents justifying my arrest. I was refused a phone call. After that I was transported to hotel “Sailor” in Feodosiya where the policemen from Moscow were staying and where I was handcuffed to a radiator. We spent about an hour in the hotel but after that I was taken to the police station because the hotel manager objected to the presence of three men in a room designed only for two. The rest of the night I spent in an office belonging to the police, attached by handcuffs to the radiator. The next morning the policemen from Moscow took me to the passport office of Feodosiya Police Station to collect my ID card and thereafter we went by car to the airport. At the airport I was in the car with the policemen from Feodosiya. The policemen bought a ticket in my name. Then we took flight 200 from Simferopol to Moscow. Before boarding we went through the customs and border control. As we were passing it, my handcuffs were removed and the policemen showed their licences to use special devices. Upon landing in Moscow, the policemen and I did not go through the border and customs control, but went out through [a special] exit. Thereafter I was put in a car and brought to the [police station] of the Northern-Western Administrative District of Moscow ...”", "34. In decisions of 16 February and 16 April 2001, in response to further complaints by the applicant, the prosecutor reiterated his earlier findings.", "35. By a judgment of 2 September 2002 the Khoroshevskiy District Court of the city of Moscow confirmed the prosecutor’s decision to dispense with criminal proceedings in respect of the allegedly unlawful arrest, search and detention. Among other things, the court referred to the Minsk Convention.", "36. The Moscow City Court quashed this judgment on 31 October 2002 on the grounds that the questions of the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and the search of his apartment were inextricably linked to the merits of the applicant’s criminal case and could not be decided before the trial court judgment.", "37. The case was remitted for fresh examination at first instance and on 27 November 2002 the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant’s appeal. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 9 January 2003.", "38. It appears that the applicant subsequently tried to institute court proceedings in respect of the same questions before the domestic courts. By a judgment of 18 July 2003, given in the applicant’s absence, the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow rejected these arguments. The court held, in particular, that:\n“... as is apparent from the case file, [the applicant] was arrested by the [police officers] Go. and Ti. on 4 November 2000 at Sheremetyevo airport as ordered by the investigator in his decision of 30 October 2000 ...\nWhen questioned in this connection, Go. and Ti. stated that they did not arrest [the applicant] in Ukraine and did not take any part in the search of his apartment, but were simply in attendance.\nAccording to the search record of 5 November 2000, the search was carried out in [the applicant’s] apartment in Feodosiya by the local police and the request to carry it out had been made to the Feodosiya prosecutor by the prosecutor of the North Western Administrative District of Moscow.\nThe order to execute the request is defined by the party to which the request is addressed. In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code of RSFSR and the Law on Operative and Search Activities, the said norms applied only on the territory of RSFSR but they did not contain any rules preventing [investigation and operative] activities on the territory of another state. The [Minsk] Convention sets out the possibility of legal assistance and does not contain a ban on procedural actions on the territory of Contracting States, recognising the lawfulness of such actions if they are authorised by the law of the party to which the request was addressed (Article 6 of the Convention). According to part 3 of Article 8 of the Convention, the presence of officers acting for the requesting party during such actions is possible.\nIn the view of the above, the court considers that the search was carried out fully and properly. In the present case the prosecutor’s office was only competent to assess the events which took place on the territory of Russia, as the norms of the code of criminal procedure of RSFSR only applied there, and any decision concerning events which took place on the territory on Ukraine could only be taken by the competent body in Ukraine and the corresponding investigation could only be initiated upon a request from the party to which the request was addressed, that is to say Ukraine. However, no such request was ever made, and, as is apparent from the letter from the Feodosiya prosecutor, the request to bring a criminal case in this connection had been refused ...”", "39. According to the applicant, he received only a copy of the judgment on 28 July 2003 and tried to appeal against it on 30 July 2003. His request for restoration of the time-limits for appeal, submitted on 31 October 2003, was refused by the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow on 19 November 2003 for the applicant’s failure to justify the filing of the appeal outside of the ten days’ statutory time-limit. The Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 19 November 2003 on 13 January 2004.", "40. After the Court had communicated the case to the Russian Government on 30 November 2005, police officers Ti. and Go. wrote explanatory reports to their superiors dated 13 March 2006 concerning the events of 3 and 4 November 2000, with the following content:\n“... After the search had been carried out, [the applicant] went to the Police Department along with [the Ukrainian police officials] to give further explanations about the circumstances of the case. Subsequently [the Ukrainian police officials] explained to us that the applicant had refused to give any further comments and had been released from the Police Department.\nThe next day officer Go. and I departed for Moscow by air. We were told by one of the Ukrainian police officers that [the applicant] had bought a ticket to Moscow; we managed to buy tickets for the same flight.\nUpon arrival in Moscow, after going through customs and border control in the airport terminal, we ... approached [the applicant and arrested him].\nNo physical or psychological pressure was exercised on [the applicant] ...”", "41. At around 9 p.m. on 4 November 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s Office in Moscow drew up a report on the applicant’s arrest, having ascertained that the applicant was wanted on suspicion of murder. The report noted that the applicant had the status of an accused in the case and confirmed that he had been notified of his rights.", "42. It appears that the applicant’s detention was first authorised by a decision of 7 November 2000 taken by the District Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s office in Moscow. The decision stated that the applicant had been detained on 4 November 2000. It further referred to the gravity of the charge against him, the risk of his fleeing or interfering with the course of the investigation, and the fact that he had no permanent residence in the Moscow region. The decision neither specified the term of the applicant’s detention nor commented on the lawfulness of his arrest in Ukraine, his transfer to Moscow and his subsequent detention in custody by the Russian authorities.", "43. The detention was subsequently extended by order of the prosecutor on 7 December 2000. The order described the course of the investigation into the case and mentioned the progress achieved so far. More specifically, the investigation identified and located Sm. and Ko., two other persons allegedly directly implicated in the murder of the businessman in question. It also included a number of expert examinations, a forensic examination of the body of the businessman, two ballistic examinations and a dactylographic examination. The investigator had mentioned that he still needed to study the network of the applicant’s and Ko.’s connections and to bring new versions of charges against the applicant, as well as against Sm. and Ko. The order extended the applicant’s detention until 2 February 2001.", "44. By order of 23 January 2001 the applicant’s detention was extended until 19 March 2001. It was based on the same reasoning as the detention order of 7 December 2000.", "45. On 22 March 2001 the prosecution concluded the investigation and remitted the case for examination on the merits. It does not appear that there was any procedural decision authorising the applicant’s detention between 19 March and 4 April 2001.", "46. On 4 April 2001 the Moscow City Court conducted a preliminary examination of the applicant’s case and, without examining the question of the lawfulness of his detention between 19 March and 4 April 2001, further remanded the applicant in custody. No time-limit was indicated.", "47. Thereafter the court again extended the applicant’s detention on 24 July, 2 August, 4 September and 17 December 2001 as well as on 1 July 2002, without specifying any time-limit for his detention. All these decisions were taken with reference to the gravity of the charge against the applicant and the fact that the proceedings in the case had not been completed.", "48. The applicant and his counsel were not invited to attend the hearing of 1 July 2002.", "49. It does not appear that the applicant lodged any complaint about the repeated extension of his detention by the prosecutor or by the court prior to the decision of 1 July 2002. The applicant’s complaints of 1 and 22 July 2002 against that decision were rejected by the Supreme Court on 24 October 2002.", "50. According to the applicant, he and his counsel were not invited to attend the hearing of 24 October 2002. However, the Government submitted that the applicant and his counsel had been informed about the hearing of 24 October on 15 October 2002. The applicant’s counsel had not given the appeal court any reasons for her failure to appear, and did not ask for the hearing to be postponed. At the same time, the applicant’s request to attend in person remained unexamined.", "51. It appears that on 16 September and 16 December 2002 the trial court extended the applicant’s detention once again. The applicant submits that he challenged these decisions on 17 September and 17 December 2002 respectively but received no reply.", "52. According to the Government, the applicant’s appeals against the decision of 16 September 2002 were dated 30 December 2002 and 22 January 2003, whilst the decision of 16 December 2002 was appealed against on 13 January 2003. The Government were unable to specify the reasons for the domestic courts’ failure to examine these appeals.", "53. On 22 March 2001 the preliminary investigation was concluded and the prosecutor remitted the applicant’s criminal case to the Moscow City Court for trial.", "54. On 4 April 2001 Judge N. listed the case for a hearing on 16 April 2001.", "55. On 16 April 2001 the court adjourned the hearing until 21 June 2001. On the latter date the hearing was adjourned until 25 July 2001 since a lawyer for one of the co-accused failed to appear.", "56. Judge M. took over the case on 24 July 2001 and scheduled the hearing for 1 August 2001.", "57. On 1 August 2001 the court adjourned the case until 2 August 2001, when the case was again suspended until 3 September 2001 because of the failure of some witnesses to appear.", "58. On 4 September 2001 the hearing was postponed until 8 October 2001 for the same reasons.", "59. By a decision of 8 October 2001 the court fixed the next date of the hearing for 30 November 2001.", "60. Between 30 November and 17 December 2001 hearings were held regularly.", "61. On 17 December 2001 the case was adjourned on grounds of witnesses’ absence and the need for a psychiatric examination of the applicant. The examination was carried out on 4 April 2002.", "62. In July 2002 the case was transferred to Judge Z. The next hearing took place in August 2002, when the case was yet again postponed until 17 October 2002 due to witnesses’ failure to appear.", "63. On 30 January 2003 the Moscow City Court convicted the applicant of conspiracy to murder and sentenced him to eight years and six months’ imprisonment. The court did not address the question of the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and detention until his arrival in Moscow on 4 November 2000.", "64. On 27 November 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal." ]

[ "5", "8" ]

[ 12, 43, 44, 45, 46 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Baku.", "6. The opposition group Ictimai Palata was planning a demonstration to be held on 19 June 2011 in Baku. On 9 June 2011 the organisers – consisting of several members of that group – gave prior notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), informing it of the date, time, place and purpose of the demonstration. According to the notice, the assembly was scheduled to take place from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. on 19 June 2011 at the square in front of the Narimanov Cinema in Baku.", "7. The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed another location on the outskirts of Baku.", "8. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration in one of the central areas of Baku, namely, near the Puppet Theatre on Seaside Boulevard.", "9. According to the applicant, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding free and fair elections, democratic reforms, freedom of assembly, and the release of persons arrested during some previous demonstrations.", "10. The applicant attended the demonstration, but shortly after it had started the police started to disperse it. The applicant was arrested at around 6.10 p.m. during the dispersal operation. He claimed that he had been arrested and taken to a police car by plain-clothed persons. According to the official records, he was arrested by police officers Z.H. and J.M. He was taken to police station No. 9 of the Sabail District Police Office.", "11. Police officers Z.H. and J.M. stated the following in a report (raport) submitted to a superior police officer:\n“... at around 6.10 p.m. we were on duty ... when Mammadov Gafgaz Suleyman oglu, whose identity was established later, was attempting to hold an unlawful demonstration. We demanded that he stop his illegal actions, [he] deliberately disobeyed [and] continued his actions, and for that reason we brought him to the [police station] ...”", "12. According to the applicant, he was questioned at the police station.", "13. At 6.50 p.m. on the day of the arrest, an “administrative-offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued by police officer H.H. in respect of the applicant. The report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with the lawful order of the police during the demonstration, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”).", "14. The applicant refused to sign the report, which contained a pre‑printed text declaring that “[the arrested person] was familiarised with the report, the reasons for his or her arrest and his or her rights under Articles 371, 400.2, 401.1.6, 401.1.7 of the CAO of the Republic of Azerbaijan were explained”.", "15. Subsequently, police officer H.H. prepared an “administrative-arrest report” (inzibati qaydada tutma haqqında protokol), stating that:\n“... the [applicant] was subjected to administrative arrest at 8 p.m. on 19 June 2011 ... in order to ensure issuance of an administrative-offence report, to ensure a correct and timely examination of the case, [and] to ensure the execution of decisions, in accordance with Articles 396.1.2 and 398 of the CAO.”", "16. According to the applicant, he was never served with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents in his case file. He was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was kept in police custody.", "17. On 20 June 2011, the day after his arrest, the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court.", "18. According to the applicant, he refused the assistance of a State‑funded lawyer and insisted on hiring a lawyer of his own choice, but the judge disregarded his request. His representation by that lawyer was ineffective and of a formalistic nature. The hearing was very brief and members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public.", "19. The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer and that he had participated in the demonstration because he had a constitutional right to freedom of assembly.", "20. According to the record of the hearing provided by the Government, in response to the judge’s question whether the police officers, before arresting him, had issued a relevant notice about dispersal of the demonstration, the applicant gave the following answer:\n“There were a lot of police officers and they were demanding that we disperse. But their demand was not lawful because we were exercising our right. Instead of calling on us to disperse, the responsibility of the police should have been to ensure our security.”", "21. The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer Z.H., who testified as follows:\n“At around 6.10 p.m. on 19 June 2011 ... we noticed that [the applicant], together with a group of other people, was attempting to hold an unauthorised demonstration by shouting out slogans, and ... asked them to observe silence. However, [the applicant] continued his actions, disobeying our requests ...”", "22. According to the record of the hearing, the State-funded lawyer stated that the applicant was not guilty and asked the court to take into consideration the applicant’s age and the fact that he had children.", "23. The court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in the unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted him under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to five days’ “administrative” detention.", "24. The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was in violation of his rights because the demonstration in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He urged the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court’s decision.", "25. The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice.", "26. On 24 June 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct." ]

[ "11", "5", "6" ]

[ 6, 18 ]

[]

[ "12. The first applicant, Mr Arūnas Kudrevičius (“A.K.”), was born in 1970 and lives in Vaitkūnai village, Utena region; the second applicant, Mr Bronius Markauskas (“B.M.”), was born in 1960 and lives in Triušeliai village, Klaipėda region; the third applicant, Mr Artūras Pilota (“A.P.”), was born in 1973 and lives in Ožkasviliai village, Marijampolė region; the fourth applicant, Mr Kęstutis Miliauskas (“K.M.”), was born in 1959 and lives in Jungėnai village, Marijampolė region; and the fifth applicant, Mr Virginijus Mykolaitis (“V.M.”), was born in 1961 and lives in Varakiškė village, Vilkaviškis region.", "13. On 15 April 2003 a group of farmers held a demonstration in front of the Seimas (the Lithuanian Parliament) building to protest about the situation in the agricultural sector with regard to a fall in wholesale prices for various agricultural products and the lack of subsidies for their production, demanding that the State take action. On 22 April 2003 Parliament passed a resolution on reinforcing the competitiveness of agriculture, providing for an increase in subsidies for the agricultural sector. According to the applicants, this resolution was not implemented by the government.", "14. On 16 May 2003 the Chamber of Agriculture (Žemės ūkio rūmai), an organisation established to represent the interests of farmers, met to discuss possible solutions to the issues. If no positive changes in legal regulation were forthcoming, the measures foreseen included addressing complaints to the administrative courts. In the meantime, it was decided to organise protests, in three different locations next to major highways (prie magistralinių kelių), to draw attention to the problems in the agricultural sector.", "15. In May 2003 the Kalvarija municipality issued a permit to hold peaceful assemblies in Kalvarija town “near the marketplace” from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. between 13 and 16 May 2003, from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. on 17 May 2003 and from 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. on 19 and 20 May 2003. The organisers had been warned about possible liability under the Code of Administrative Law Offences as well as under the Criminal Code, including under Article 283 of the latter (see paragraph 62 below). According to the Government, similar permits, accompanied by the same warnings, were issued for 21 to 23, 24 and 26 to 30 May 2003.", "16. On 8 May 2003 the Pasvalys municipality issued a permit to hold a demonstration “at the car park at the sixty-third kilometre of the Via Baltica highway and next to that highway”. The farmers were also authorised to display agricultural machinery for ten days from 15 to 25 May 2003. On 12 May 2003 the organisers of the gathering were informed about possible liability under the Code of Administrative Law Offences as well as under the Criminal Code, including under Article 283 of the latter.", "17. On 19 May 2003 the Klaipėda municipality issued a permit to hold an assembly in an “area in Divupiai village next to, but not closer than twenty-five metres from, the Vilnius-Klaipėda highway” from 11 a.m. to 11 p.m. between 19 and 25 May 2003. The permit specified that it granted the right to organise a peaceful assembly in compliance with the provisions set forth, inter alia, in the Constitution and in the Law on Assembly. It was also indicated therein that the organisers and the participants were to observe the laws and to adhere to any orders from the authorities and the police; failure to do so could engage their administrative or criminal liability. The second applicant, B.M., who was indicated as one of the organisers of the gathering, signed a receipt for the notification of the permit.", "18. The Klaipėda police received information about the demonstrators’ possible intention to overstep the limits established by the permits. B.M. was therefore contacted by telephone and a meeting with him was organised in order to avoid unlawful acts being carried out during the demonstrations.", "19. The demonstrations started on 19 May 2003. The farmers gathered in the designated areas.", "20. On 21 May 2003 the farmers blocked and continued to demonstrate on the roads next to Divupiai village, on the Vilnius-Klaipėda highway, at the sixty-third kilometre of the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway, and at the ninety-fourth kilometre of the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway.", "21. The Government pointed out that the police had not received any prior official notification of the demonstrators’ intention to block the three major roads of the country. They described as follows the behaviour of the farmers and of the applicants during the demonstrations.\n(a) On 21 May 2003 at around 12 noon, a group of approximately 500 people walked onto the Vilnius-Klaipėda highway and remained standing there, thus stopping the traffic.\n(b) On 21 May 2003 at 12 noon, a group of approximately 250 people walked onto the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway and remained standing there, thus stopping the traffic. The blockade remained in place until 12 noon on 23 May 2003. The first applicant encouraged the demonstrators to move from the car park onto the highway.\n(c) On 21 May 2003 at 11.50 a.m. a group of 1,500 people walked onto the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway and remained standing there, thus stopping the traffic. In addition, on the same day between 3 and 4.30 p.m. the third, fourth and fifth applicants drove tractors onto the highway and left them there. The blockade remained in place until 4 p.m. on 22 May 2003.", "22. On 22 May 2003 the farmers continued negotiations with the government. The next day, following a successful outcome to those negotiations, the farmers stopped blocking the roads.", "23. The parties disagreed as to the extent of the disruption to traffic created by the farmers’ demonstrations.", "24. According to the applicants (see paragraph 121 below), knowing that blockades were likely to occur, the police had prepared alternative road itineraries in the vicinity of the places where the demonstrations were held, so that the roadblocks would not disrupt the flow of goods. Indeed, on the days in question the latter had been “even better than usual”. This could be proven by the “data from posts where the roadblocks took place”.", "25. In a letter of 24 August 2004 addressed to the applicants’ lawyer, the State Border Guard Service indicated that several queues of lorries (ranging from 2 to 10 kilometres long) had formed from 21 until 23 May 2003 in both directions in the proximity of the Kalvarija border crossing between Lithuania and Poland. According to the same letter, “there were no queues of passenger cars”. Moreover, no queues had formed at the Lazdijai State border post (another post on the Lithuanian-Polish border).", "26. The Government observed, firstly, that the Vilnius-Klaipėda highway was the main trunk road connecting the three biggest cities in the country, while the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway (otherwise known as Via Baltica) and the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway were transitional trunk roads used to enter and leave the country. According to the Government, all three roads were blocked at locations next to the customs post for approximately forty-eight hours.", "27. The Government alleged, in particular, that owing to the blocking of the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway, which prevented vehicles from passing through border control, queues of heavy goods vehicles and cars formed in Lithuania and Poland at the Kalvarija border crossing. The heavy goods vehicles were forced to drive along other routes in order to avoid traffic jams. As the functioning of the Kalvarija customs post was disrupted, the Kaunas territorial customs authority was obliged to re-allocate human resources as well as to prepare for a possible reorganisation of activities with the State Border Guard Service and the Polish customs. As a consequence, the Kaunas territorial customs authority incurred additional costs; however, the concrete material damage had not been calculated.", "28. According to a report of the Kalvarija police, the road was blocked on 22 May 2003. The lorries returning to Lithuania from Poland were directed by the police to a car park at the Kalvarija border crossing. At around 11.40 a.m. the lorry drivers approached the farmers. They demanded an end to the roadblocks, under threat of physical force. The police urged the parties to the conflict to calm down and to wait for the outcome of the negotiations between the farmers and the Prime Minister. According to the Government, the farmers and the lorry drivers had a few arguments, but more serious confrontations were avoided. At around 4.15 p.m. the farmers received a telephone call regarding the positive outcome of the negotiations and moved one tractor off the road. The traffic then resumed in both directions.", "29. The Government also noted that, owing to the blocking of the Vilnius-Riga highway on 22 May 2003 from 2 until 4 p.m., heavy goods vehicles could not cross the border and queues of traffic of 1,600 and 700 metres respectively appeared in both directions. Cars took diversions along a gravel road.", "30. On 1 September 2003 the Pasvalys police issued a certificate stating that between 19 and 23 May 2003 the farmers had held a demonstration in the car park at the sixty-third kilometre of the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway. On 21 May 2003 at around midday the farmers had gone onto the highway and had stopped the traffic. They had only allowed through passenger vehicles and vehicles carrying dangerous substances. Goods vehicles and cars were allowed to go through ten at a time on each side of the road once every hour. In order to improve the situation, the police had attempted to let the traffic bypass the blockade through neighbouring villages. However, owing to the poor condition of those neighbouring roads, not all goods vehicles were able to drive on them and they had to remain on the highway until the farmers had left. Some lorries became stuck in sand and special machinery was necessary to pull them out. The police indicated that the farmers had unblocked the highway at 4 p.m. on 23 May 2003.", "31. As can be seen from the documents submitted to the Court, in May and September 2003 four logistics companies informed the police and Linava, the Lithuanian National Road Carriers’ Association, that they had sustained pecuniary damage in the sum of 25,245 Lithuanian litai ((LTL) – approximately 7,300 euros (EUR)) as a result of the roadblocks during the farmers’ demonstrations. The companies stated that they would institute court proceedings in respect of those claims.", "32. The Government alleged that, notwithstanding the fact that only one claim for pecuniary damage was ultimately lodged (see paragraph 40 below), more than one carrier company incurred material loss owing to the disruption of traffic. As submitted by Linava, Vilniaus Dobilas incurred damage amounting to LTL 6,100 (approximately EUR 1,760); Rokauta incurred damage amounting to LTL 4,880 (approximately EUR 1,400); and Immensum incurred damage amounting to LTL 3,600 (approximately EUR 1,050). Moreover, in a letter of 26 May 2003, the company Ridma indicated that the loss incurred by them owing to the roadblocks amounted to LTL 10,655 (approximately EUR 3,000).", "33. Pre-trial investigations against the applicants and a number of other persons, on suspicion of having caused a riot, were initiated. In July 2003 B.M., V.M., A.P. and K.M. were ordered not to leave their places of residence. That measure was lifted in October 2003.", "34. On 1 October 2003 the police imposed a fine of LTL 40 (approximately EUR 12) on a farmer, A.D. According to the applicants, it was established in the police record relating to the fine that on 21 May 2003 A.D. had taken the farmers to block the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway in the Kalvarija municipality; he had walked in the middle of the road, pushing a cart in front of him, thus obstructing the traffic. By such actions A.D. had breached paragraph 81 of the Road Traffic Regulations (see paragraph 67 below) and thus committed an administrative-law violation, as provided for in Article 131 of the Code of Administrative Law Offences (see paragraph 66 below).", "35. The Government noted that the criminal proceedings against A.D. were discontinued on 1 August 2003 as he had not organised or provoked a gathering to seriously breach public order; his act (walking in the middle of the road pushing a cart in front of him) was not considered to fall under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 62 below). The Government further noted that the criminal proceedings had been discontinued on similar grounds in respect of three other persons. In respect of a fourth person the criminal prosecution was discontinued owing to his immunity as a member of parliament.", "36. On 4 December 2003 an indictment was laid before the courts. B.M. and A.K. were accused of incitement to rioting under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code.", "37. The prosecutor noted that B.M. had taken part in the farmers’ meeting of 16 May 2003, at which the farmers had decided to hold demonstrations near major highways on 19 May and, should the government not satisfy their requests by 11 a.m. on 21 May, to blockade those highways. On 19 May B.M. had told the farmers to blockade the roads on 21 May. As a result, at 12.09 p.m. on that date around 500 farmers had gone onto the Vilnius-Klaipėda highway. The farmers had refused to obey police requests not to stand on the road. Consequently, traffic had been blocked until 1 p.m. on 23 May. Traffic jams had occurred on neighbouring roads and road transport in the region had become impossible.", "38. With regard to A.K., the prosecutor claimed that he had also incited the farmers to blockade the highway. As a result, at midday on 21 May 2003 approximately 250 people had gone onto the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway, refusing to obey police orders not to block the highway. The road had remained blocked until 10.58 a.m. on 23 May. The roads in the vicinity had become clogged. The normal functioning of the Saločiai-Grenctale border-control post had been disrupted.", "39. V.M., K.M. and A.P. were accused of a serious breach of public order during the riot, under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor maintained that on 21 May 2003, at around 11.50 a.m., approximately 1,500 people had gone onto the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway at the ninety-fourth kilometre. At about 3 or 4 p.m. the above-mentioned applicants had driven three tractors onto the highway and had left them on the carriageway. The three applicants had refused to follow police instructions not to breach public order and not to leave the tractors on the road. The tractors had remained on the road until 4.15 p.m. on 22 May 2003. As a result, the highway had been blocked from the eighty-fourth to the ninety-fourth kilometre. Due to the resulting increase in traffic on neighbouring roads, congestion had built up and road transport in the region had come to a halt. The normal functioning of the Kalvarija and Marijampolė State border-control posts had been disrupted.", "40. Within the criminal proceedings, a logistics company brought a civil claim against A.K., as the person who had incited the farmers to block the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway, seeking damages of LTL 1,100 (approximately EUR 290) for the loss allegedly incurred by it owing to the blockading of that road.", "41. Several hearings, during which a number of witnesses testified, took place before the Kaunas City District Court.", "42. On 29 September 2004 the Kaunas City District Court found the applicants guilty of incitement to rioting or participating in them, under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code.", "43. In convicting B.M., the District Court relied on video-recordings of the events, documentary evidence and the testimony of one witness. The court concluded that B.M. had organised a gathering with the aim of seriously breaching public order, namely by rioting. B.M. had been one of the leaders of the farmers’ meeting on 16 May 2003, at which the farmers had decided to attempt to achieve their goals by organising protests next to major highways. The District Court noted that B.M. had coordinated the actions of the farmers and as a consequence, on 21 May 2003, approximately 500 people had gone on to the Vilnius-Klaipėda highway and had blocked it. As a result, traffic had been blocked until 23 May 2003. The ensuing serious breach of public order had been deliberate and had to be characterised as a riot. The District Court dismissed B.M.’s claim that he and other farmers had acted out of necessity because the roadblock had been their last opportunity to draw the government’s attention to their problems. The farmers had had an alternative, namely, they could have brought complaints before the administrative courts. The farmers had themselves mentioned that alternative during the meeting of 16 May 2003 (see paragraph 14 above). The District Court further noted that a person who created a dangerous situation by his or her actions could only rely on the defence of necessity when a dangerous situation arose through negligence (Article 31 § 2 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 65 below). However, the actions of B.M. had been deliberate and it was therefore appropriate to find him guilty of organising the riot.", "44. The District Court found it established, mainly on the basis of video-recordings and documentary evidence, that A.K. had also organised a gathering with the aim of seriously breaching public order. He had taken part in the farmers’ meeting of 16 May 2003 and had known about the decision to hold protests next to the roads. When a crowd of farmers had blocked the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway on 21 May 2003, public order had been seriously breached. Traffic had been stopped on that part of the road, causing inconvenience to drivers and goods carriers. The District Court held that \n“during the blockade of 21 and 22 May, A.K. coordinated the actions of the crowd, that is to say he gave orders that some of the vehicles should be let through, incited [the farmers] to hold on and not to move away from the highway, was in contact with the participants in the protests in the Kalvarija municipality and the Klaipėda region, [and] was negotiating with the authorities by mobile phone in the name of the farmers”. \nThe District Court emphasised that the farmers who had gathered (approximately 250 people) “obeyed the actions of A.K. and followed his orders”. For the District Court, the actions of A.K. were to be characterised as organising a riot under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code.", "45. On the basis of written evidence submitted by Linava, the District Court also found that by organising the blockade of the Panevėžys-Pasvalys-Riga highway, A.K. had caused pecuniary damage to three carrier companies. As one of the carriers had submitted a civil claim for the sum of LTL 1,100 (approximately EUR 290 – see paragraph 40 above), the District Court deemed it proper to grant that claim.", "46. In finding V.M., K.M. and A.P. guilty of causing a serious breach of public order during a riot, the District Court, on the basis of documentary evidence, audio-visual material and the testimony of two witnesses, established that on 21 May 2003 between 11.50 a.m. and 4.15 p.m. the three of them had driven tractors onto the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway at the ninety-fourth kilometre. They had refused to obey lawful orders by the police not to breach public order and not to park the tractors on the road (ant važiuojamosios kelio dalies) and had kept the tractors there until 4.15 p.m. on 22 May 2003. As a consequence, and because about 1,500 people had gathered on the road, the traffic had been blocked from the eighty-fourth to the ninety-fourth kilometre of the Kaunas-Marijampolė-Suvalkai highway, traffic jams had occurred and the normal functioning of the Kalvarija and Lazdijai border-control posts had been disrupted.", "47. The five applicants were each given a sixty-day custodial sentence (baudžiamasis areštas). The District Court also noted that all the applicants had positive characteristics and that there were no circumstances aggravating their guilt. Accordingly, there was reason to believe that the aim of the punishment could be achieved without actually depriving them of their liberty. Consequently, the District Court suspended the execution of their sentences for one year. The applicants were ordered not to leave their places of residence for more than seven days without the authorities’ prior agreement. This measure was to last for one year, while execution of the sentence was suspended.", "48. The District Court also acquitted, for lack of evidence, two other individuals charged with organising the riots.", "49. On 18 October 2004 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Kaunas Regional Court. They noted, inter alia, that another farmer, A.D., had been punished only under administrative law for an identical violation (see paragraphs 34-35 above).", "50. The applicants further argued that in European Union member States, roadblocks were accepted as a form of demonstration, and that the right to demonstrate was guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. They referred, inter alia, to Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 (see paragraph 77 below) and to a report of 22 March 2001 by the Commission of the European Communities (COM(2001) 160) on the application of that Regulation, as well as to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) in Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria (see paragraphs 73-76 below).", "51. On 14 January 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court found that the District Court had thoroughly and impartially assessed all the circumstances of the case. The Regional Court observed that the offence of rioting endangered public order, public safety and public health, human dignity and the inviolability of property. The objective aspect of the offence was the organising of a gathering of people for a common goal – namely, to breach public order – and the implementation of their decision which, in the instant case, had been to organise the roadblocks. To constitute an offence, the actions also had to be committed deliberately, that is to say, the persons charged had to understand the unlawfulness of their behaviour. In relation to B.M. and A.K., the Regional Court observed that during the demonstrations the two applicants had told others that it had been decided to block the roads. It had been established that B.M. and A.K. had understood that the roadblocks would be illegal and that they had been warned about their liability as organisers. Even so, they had continued to coordinate the farmers’ actions and had insisted that the farmers maintain the roadblocks. As a direct result of the actions of B.M. and A.K., on 21 May 2003 a crowd had gone onto the highways and had blocked them, thereby stopping the traffic and breaching the constitutional rights and liberties of others to move freely and without restriction, causing damage to goods carriers and thus seriously breaching public order.", "52. The Regional Court also shared the District Court’s conclusion as to the reasonableness of convicting V.M., K.M. and A.P. It noted that by driving tractors onto the highway, thus causing traffic congestion and disturbing the work of the State border-control service, and by refusing to obey lawful requests by the police not to park their tractors on the road, the three applicants had seriously breached public order. The fact that after the highway had been blocked the police and the drivers had negotiated with the farmers, with the result that some of the drivers had been let through, did not diminish the danger caused by the offence or its unlawfulness. The Regional Court also emphasised that the blockading of a major highway had had dangerous consequences and could not be considered to have been a mere administrative-law offence such as a traffic violation. As to the applicants’ argument that their offences were identical to that for which another farmer, A.D., had been given a mere administrative sanction for a traffic violation (see paragraph 49 above), the Regional Court indicated that it was not an administrative tribunal and thus could not comment on the administrative offence.", "53. While noting that the applicants had the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, the Regional Court nevertheless observed that such right was not without restrictions, should the interests of public order and prevention of crime be at stake. Analogous limitations to freedom of expression were listed in Article 25 of the Lithuanian Constitution (see paragraph 61 below). On this issue, the Regional Court emphasised that the behaviour of B.M. and A.K., in guiding the actions of the other individuals involved in the protest, could not be regarded as a non-punishable expression of their opinion, because they had breached public order, thus engaging criminal liability.", "54. The Regional Court further noted that the criminal offence had not lost its element of danger to the public merely because the government had refused to raise wholesale prices or had allegedly failed to take the necessary action.", "55. On 2 March 2005 the applicants appealed on points of law.", "56. On 4 October 2005 the Supreme Court, composed of an enlarged chamber of seven judges (see paragraph 70 below), dismissed the appeal. In providing an explanation as to the substance of the offence of rioting, as defined in Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 62 below), the Supreme Court referred to its classification as an offence against public order, which was the objective aspect of the crime (nusikaltimo objektas). In describing the scope of the offence, the aforementioned provision stipulated the following features: the organisation of a gathering with the aim of causing public violence, damaging property or otherwise breaching public order, or the commission of those actions during a gathering. For the Supreme Court, a riot was to be characterised as a situation where a gathering of people deliberately and seriously breached public order, caused public violence, or damaged property. The subjective aspect of the crime was that of direct intent (kaltė pasireiškia tiesiogine tyčia). The guilty person had to (i) be aware that he or she was performing an action that was listed as an offence in Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code; and (ii) wish to act accordingly.", "57. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Supreme Court found that the courts below had been correct in characterising the applicants’ actions as falling under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code. In particular, the trial court had properly established all the prerequisites for the application of Article 283 § 1, namely that there had been a crowd and that public order had been breached by blocking the highways, stopping traffic and disturbing the work of the State border-control service. The applicants had been sentenced for their offences under a law in force at the time they were committed and their sentences had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Code. It followed that the applicants’ convictions had been in accordance with the law and not in breach of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention.", "58. The Supreme Court also stated that the applicants had not been sentenced for expressing their opinion or imparting ideas, actions which were protected by the guarantees of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention, but for actions by which they had seriously breached public order.", "59. Lastly, the Supreme Court shared the Regional Court’s view that the applicants could not be regarded as having acted out of necessity (see paragraph 54 above). The fall in milk purchase prices and other problems with subsidies for agriculture had not constituted a clear or present danger to property, because the property in question had not yet materialised. The State had not deprived the applicants of their property, and their dissatisfaction with the government’s agricultural policy had not justified the acts for which the applicants had been convicted.", "60. By court rulings of 17, 18, 20, 21 October and 7 November 2005, the Supreme Court discharged the applicants from their suspended sentences." ]

[ "11", "7" ]

[ 3, 5, 44, 45, 46, 47 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ohrid.", "6. The applicant is suffering from multiple sclerosis.", "7. On 1 April 1994 the Ministry of Health (“the Ministry”) issued a certificate allowing a bank, in which the applicant’s father had a foreign currency savings account, to transfer 20,000 United States dollars into the account of a hospital in the United States, in order to cover medical expenses related to treatment which the applicant was expected to undergo. It was given on the basis of a medical report (конзилијарно мислење) issued by the Skopje Neurology Clinic which stated, inter alia:\n“... [the applicant] is suffering from multiple sclerosis, which requires further medical examination and treatment in a medical institution abroad, given the fact that all possibilities for her treatment in the State are exhausted ...”", "8. Between 17 May and 28 June 1994 the applicant underwent medical treatment in the hospital H.H.I. in the United States.", "9. On 12 July 1994 the Skopje Neurology Clinic issued another medical report (конзилијарно мислење, “the report of 12 July 1994”), the relevant part of which reads as follows:\n“It is impossible to treat the disease in the State due to the critical state of [the applicant’s] health and the Clinic’s calendar of events. [The applicant] should leave immediately or by the middle of the month at the latest ...”", "10. The report was signed by three doctors, who confirmed that it was impossible to treat the disease in the respondent State. As stated in the report, it was expected that the treatment abroad would prevent the progressive deterioration of the applicant’s health.", "11. On 29 November 1994 the applicant requested that the Health Insurance Fund (“the Fund”) issue ex post facto a decision referring her to be treated in hospital H.H.I. (решение за упатување на лекување во странство). This request did not contain a claim for reimbursement of the expenses for the treatment that she had undergone.", "12. On 8 December 1994 the Fund dismissed the applicant’s request after an expert commission set up within the Fund (“the Fund’s commission”) had provided an opinion that the applicant could have been treated in the respondent State.", "13. On 21 March 1995 the applicant appealed against the Fund’s decision to the Ministry, arguing that the Fund’s expert commission had not taken into account the report of 12 July 1994 (see paragraph 9 above). She also requested that the Ministry approve further check-ups and treatment in hospital H.H.I.", "14. On 30 November 1995 the Ministry, as the second-instance administrative body, dismissed the applicant’s appeal after obtaining an opinion from the Second-Instance Medical Commission for Treatment Abroad (“the Second-Instance Commission”). The Ministry found that the possibilities for treatment in the State had not been exhausted.", "15. The applicant initiated administrative-dispute proceedings before the Supreme Court. On 14 January 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Ministry’s decision. It found that it had not been clear whether the applicant was supposed to undergo a medical check-up or prolonged treatment abroad and that there was a contradiction in the medical reports as to whether the possibilities to treat the applicant’s condition domestically had been exhausted.", "16. On 9 July 1999 the Ministry again dismissed the appeal by the applicant against the Fund’s decision of 8 December 1994.", "17. In so far as can be established from the available material, on 7 July 1995 the applicant lodged a separate request with the Fund for reimbursement of the expenses for the treatment that she had undergone in hospital H.H.I.", "18. On 21 September 1995 the Fund ordered a partial reimbursement of the medical expenses in the amount of 278,311 Macedonian denars (MKD), or 20% of the expenses actually incurred. On 12 November 1995 the decision was adjusted to 10%. It appears that on 13 November 1995 the awarded amount was increased to MKD 313,100.", "19. On 11 November 1996 the Ministry examined the applicant’s appeal and increased the award by an additional MKD 50,215.", "20. The applicant challenged the latter decision with an administrative-dispute claim before the Supreme Court.", "21. On 25 March 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 11 November 1996. It found that the Fund and the Ministry had failed to assess whether the applicant could have been treated in the State, in accordance with the Rules on the Conditions and Manner of Referral of Insured Persons for Treatment Abroad (see paragraphs 38-41 below). It further found that these bodies interpreted section 15 of the Rules to signify that a person was not entitled to reimbursement of expenses if he/she had not obtained a prior decision referring him/her for treatment abroad (решение за упатување на лекување во странство). In the court’s view, such an interpretation would be contrary to the Health Protection Act.", "22. On 6 January 1999 the Ministry reached an identical decision to that of 11 November 1996.", "23. The applicant initiated administrative-dispute proceedings against the Ministry’s decision.", "24. On 22 November 2000 the Supreme Court quashed both the decision of 6 January 1999 (see paragraph 22 above) and the decision of 9 July 1999 (see paragraph 16 above). It found that the Ministry should have joined the proceedings for reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred in hospital H.H.I. with the proceedings for referral for treatment abroad. It should have decided in the first place the request for referral to treatment abroad, the outcome of which was decisive for the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of the medical expenses. It again instructed the Ministry to assess whether the applicant could have been treated in the State.", "25. On 23 February 2001 the Ministry quashed the decision of 21 September 1995 (see paragraph 18 above) and decided that the applicant’s treatment abroad could not be recognised as treatment abroad based on a decision of the Fund. Nevertheless, the applicant was to be reimbursed the expenses for treatment abroad not based on such a decision, in the amount of MKD 378,741. The Ministry came to its conclusion on the basis of an opinion of a medical commission of 14 December 2000 which found that the applicant could be treated in the respondent State.", "26. The applicant again challenged the Ministry’s decision before the Supreme Court.", "27. On 13 November 2003 the Supreme Court quashed the decision, finding that the administrative bodies had not established whether at the time of the treatment the possibilities for treatment in the respondent State had been exhausted.", "28. On 5 November 2004 the Ministry again dismissed the appeal against the decision of 21 September 1995, this time based on a conclusion of the Second-Instance Commission of 3 November 2004 that the applicant could have been treated in the respondent State in 1994.", "29. On 14 December 2006 the Supreme Court again quashed the decision of the Ministry. The court found that there had been conflicting medical evidence as to whether the applicant could have been treated in the respondent State at the relevant time. It further requested that the doctors who had drawn up the report of 12 July 1994 give evidence as to whether the possibilities for treatment of the specific condition in the State in 1994 had been exhausted.", "30. After having consulted the doctors, on 8 October 2007, the Ministry again dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 21 September 1995. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“The Minister of Health ... on the basis of all the documents in the file established that the [applicant’s] treatment in the [H.H.I. hospital] cannot be considered as treatment abroad based on a decision of the [Fund] in accordance with sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Rules for Referral for Treatment Abroad (Official Gazette nos. 3/92, 11/92, 32/92 and 48/92) and in accordance with sections 5, 7 and 8 of the subsequently adopted Rules on the Manner of Using Health Services Abroad (Official Gazette no. 111/2000) because under the provisions of both sets of Rules the medical opinion of the respective clinic is merely a proposal for referral for treatment abroad of an insured person, and the assessment and the opinion on the need for treatment abroad is provided by the [Fund’s commission], which assesses whether the possibilities for treatment in the State are exhausted and whether there are possibilities for successful treatment abroad, in which State and in which foreign medical facility.\nThe insured person obtains the right to treatment abroad only by a decision of the [Fund] on the basis of a finding of the [Fund’s commission]. It is a fact that the [applicant] went for treatment abroad without [having obtained] a decision of the [Fund] on her own assessment, given that at that moment there was not even a medical report [by the clinic] which is only a proposal of the clinic for referral to treatment abroad.\nIn the entire proceedings the first- and second-instance bodies acted in accordance with the provisions of the Rules for [Referral to Treatment Abroad] and, in line with section 15 of the Rules, they decided to reimburse expenses as if the treatment had been performed in the [respondent] State, for the reason that the [applicant] had not obtained a right to be treated abroad because the competent commission had found that that condition had been treatable in the State ...\n... That the Supreme Court in its last judgment requests that the members who provided the medical report of 1994 [give evidence] ... is irrelevant, given that the medical report is an initiative – a proposal for initiating certain proceedings – but [it does] not [confer] a right to be treated abroad.\nIf, in the court’s view, the medical report was decisive in the present case, a question arises as to what the competence of the [Fund’s commission] is and why there are provisions in the Rules ... and prescribed proceedings for obtaining the right to treatment abroad.\nHaving in mind the fact that the [Fund’s commission] for referral for treatment abroad, in the present case, had on multiple occasions found that the possibilities for treatment in the existing health institutions at the Skopje Clinic had not been exhausted ... the case is considered under section 15 [of the Rules of 1992], that is section 20 [of the Rules of 2000] ... , and it was decided that expenses for the treatment be reimbursed to the [applicant] in line with the price list for health services in the [respondent State].”", "31. The applicant challenged the Ministry’s decision seeking under the Administrative Disputes Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below) that the Supreme Court hold an oral hearing in order to take evidence from the doctors who had drawn up the 1994 report, the Chairman of the Ministry’s Second-Instance Commission and Dr R.L., the doctor who had treated her. She referred to the certificate of 1 April 1994 (see paragraph 7 above) and the medical report that it had been based on. She argued that, in view of her condition at that juncture and the short period of available time, she had not lodged a request to the Fund before leaving as she had considered that she could have done it after her return to the State. She further argued that the Ministry had failed to decide her claim for referral for treatment abroad and had only decided the claim for reimbursement of expenses.", "32. On 22 January 2009 the Administrative Court, which had meanwhile become competent to decide administrative disputes, held a private session and finally dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It did not in its decision address the applicant’s request for an oral hearing.", "33. The court referred to section 10 § 1 (14) and section 30 of the 2000 Health Insurance Act, as well as sections 20 of the Rules on the Manner of Using Health Services Abroad (see paragraphs 37, 41 and 42 below). It ruled that the administrative bodies had correctly applied the applicable law in awarding the applicant partial compensation for the medical expenses for her treatment in hospital H.H.I. in 1994. The relevant parts of the judgment stated as follows:\n“... In the present case, [the applicant] went for treatment abroad without [having obtained] a decision of [the Fund], on her own assessment, and without a medical report, which she obtained after she had returned from the U.S.A. from the Skopje Neurology Clinic on 12 July 1994, contrary to section 30 of the 2000 Health Insurance Act.\nThe court considers that the [administrative] bodies in the proceedings correctly established that the [applicant’s] treatment in the [H.H.I.] hospital in the U.S.A. cannot be considered as treatment abroad based on a decision of [the Fund] in accordance with sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Rules for referral for treatment abroad (Official Gazette nos. 3/92, 11/92, 32/92 and 48/92) and in accordance with sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Rules on the Manner of Using Health Services Abroad (Official Gazette no. 111/2000), because under the provisions of the two [sets of] Rules the medical report of the relevant clinic is only a proposal for referral for treatment abroad of an insured person, and the assessment and the opinion on the need for treatment abroad is provided by the [Fund’s commission], which assesses whether the possibilities for treatment in the State are exhausted and whether there are possibilities for successful treatment of the condition abroad and in which country or in which foreign medical institution.\nIn deciding, the court assessed [the applicant’s] arguments that in [the respondent State] there had been no possibility of a successful continuation of her treatment and that there had been a need to continue the treatment abroad, but found them groundless since, according to the expert opinion of the Neurology Clinic, all cases of multiple sclerosis have always been treated in the State wherein the therapeutic procedures for these diseases are in accordance with international medical standards. Hence, the court considers that the [administrative] bodies acted in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instructions and removed the breaches in the proceedings in terms of clarification of the contradictions which had existed before, deciding to award expenses as if the treatment had been conducted in the State, under the terms of section 15 of the Rules for Referral to Treatment Abroad, given that [the applicant] had not obtained the right to be treated abroad because the competent [Fund’s commission] had provided its opinion that the condition had been treatable in the State.”", "34. This judgment was served on the applicant on 6 March 2009." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[ 2, 28 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Zakan-Yurt, Chechnya.", "6. The facts of the case are connected to Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005, and Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065/05, 2 December 2010. These two applications were lodged by residents of Katyr-Yurt, Chechnya, who alleged that their relatives had been killed or wounded, and that they had suffered injuries and lost their property during the attack on the village from 4-7 February 2000. In the Isayeva case, cited above, the applicant and her relatives were trying to flee the fighting on 4 February 2000 when an aviation bomb exploded near their minivan, wounding the applicant and killing three of her relatives. In the Abuyeva and Others case, cited above, the applicants described how they had been trapped in the village during intense shelling and had tried to leave through what they had perceived to be a safe exit route. The Court has established a number of facts relevant to the present case, which can be summarised as follows.", "7. Ever since the start of operations by the Russian military and security forces in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999, the village of Katyr-Yurt, situated in the Achkhoy-Martan district, had been considered a “safe zone”. By the beginning of February 2000 up to 25,000 persons were living there, including local residents and internally displaced persons from elsewhere in Chechnya. In the period leading up to 4 February 2000 the residents of Katyr-Yurt were not informed by the State authorities about the possible advance of illegal fighters into the village, even though such information was available to the military commanders. On 4 February 2000 the village was captured by a large group of Chechen fighters escaping from Grozny. The Russian military forces carried out an assault, using indiscriminate weapons such as heavy, free-falling aviation bombs, artillery, missiles and other weaponry. Although the operation was not spontaneous and involved the use of indiscriminate and highly lethal weaponry, the residents of the village were provided neither with sufficient time to prepare to leave nor with safe exit routes to escape the fighting. The two exits from the village were controlled by the military by means of roadblocks. The residents were allowed to leave through the roadblock on the road leading towards the district centre of Achkhoy-Martan, but the other one, on the road leading towards Valerick, remained closed during most of the fighting. The shelling of Katyr-Yurt continued until 7 February 2000 inclusive (see Abuyeva and Others, cited above, §§ 8 and 197-201).", "8. The applicant and her family had been living in the village of Zakan‑Yurt, situated about thirteen kilometres from Katyr-Yurt. In November 1999 the applicant turned eight years old. She had lived with her mother, father, two elder brothers and a younger sister. She could remember the events of winter 1999-2000 when the hostilities erupted. On 1 February 2000 a large group of insurgent fighters entered Zakan-Yurt, walking into houses and asking for clothes and food. On the same day airstrikes started. The applicant’s family went into hiding in a cellar.", "9. On 2 February 2000 the applicant’s family decided to travel to Katyr‑Yurt, which the applicant’s father described as a “peace zone”. The applicant’s father drove his black Volga car; her mother and brother Magomed sat in front, while the applicant, her sister Madina and brother Ruslan, as well as two cousins, Khava and Luiza Abakarovy, were in the back seat. On the same day they arrived in Katyr-Yurt and stopped in the centre of the village.", "10. According to the applicant, they did not know anyone in the village and an unknown man invited them to stay at his house, as did many other villagers. The family stayed with this man for two nights and everything was calm. On the morning of 4 February 2000 airstrikes started, and there were a lot of explosions. The applicant’s family went into the cellar under their host’s house. Many other people also arrived, including relatives and acquaintances from Zakan-Yurt. They stayed in the cellar throughout the day, while the shelling of the village continued.", "11. Later in the afternoon the applicant’s father said that it was too dangerous to stay in Katyr-Yurt and that they would drive to Achkhoy‑Martan. The applicant’s father, mother, two brothers and two cousins, as well as the applicant herself, got into the car. The applicant remembered seeing a lot of people on cars, tractors and on foot trying to get out of Katyr‑Yurt. There were explosions.", "12. At some point the applicant lost her conscious awareness of what was happening and found herself lying in the road. Their car was burning. She could see her sister Madina, brother Ruslan and cousin Luisa. They were all alive but wounded and burned. The applicant could not see her parents. An old man brought the applicant into the courtyard of a house. Sometime later the applicant, her sister, brother and cousin were put on a bus. The applicant lost consciousness and woke to find herself in hospital in Urus-Martan. Her legs were covered with plaster, and her face and hands were burned. She also saw her sister Madina in the same room.", "13. On 5 February 2000 the applicant and her sister were brought by ambulance to Nazran, Ingushetia. The following morning the applicant did not see her sister and she did not know at that time where her family was.", "14. On 4 March 2000 the applicant was discharged from the Nazran hospital, with her legs still in plaster. She was diagnosed with fractures of the left hip and right shin, and thermal burns. The circumstances of the wounding were indicated as “shelling, direct hit on the car in which the family was travelling”. The applicant went to live with her grandmother in Zakan-Yurt. There she learnt that her whole family had died. As a result of the air-strike, the following relatives of the applicant were killed:\n- Mr Mansur Abakarov, born in 1955, the applicant’s father;\n- Mrs Khava Zaumayeva, born in 1954, her mother;\n- Mr Ruslan Abakarov, born in 1987, her brother;\n- Mr Magomed Abakarov, born in 1985, her brother; and\n- Mr Madina Zaumayeva, born in 1994, her sister.", "15. The applicant’s cousin Ms Khava Abakarova was also killed.", "16. In March and April 2000 the Achkhoy-Martan district civil registration office recorded the deaths of the applicant’s mother, father and three siblings which had occurred in Katyr-Yurt on 4 February 2000. The cause of death was recorded as splinter wounds and burns. 1. Information about the investigation from the cases Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, and Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065/05", "17. On 16 September 2000 the prosecutor’s office of the Achkhoy‑Martan district (the district prosecutor’s office) initiated an investigation into the events of 2-7 February 2000 in Katyr-Yurt in response to a complaint by the applicant in the Isayeva case, cited above.", "18. On 19 February 2001 the investigation into the criminal case was transferred to the military prosecutor’s office of the North-Caucasus Military Circuit (the military prosecutor’s office). The case file was assigned number 14/00/0004-01.", "19. It appears that in 2000-2001 the investigation questioned most of the applicants in application no. 27065/05, as well as other individuals who had been in Katyr-Yurt at the time.", "20. At that time the investigation found it established that 43 civilians had been killed and 53 wounded as a result of the operation. 62 individuals were granted victim status in the proceedings. The applicant’s relatives and the applicant herself were not listed among the victims.", "21. On 13 March 2002 the military prosecutor’s office terminated the proceedings in criminal case no. 14/00/0004-01. The decision referred to a large quantity of documents and statements from dozens of witnesses, including local residents, servicemen from various units, and commanding officers. The decision also referred to the results of the military experts’ report of 11 February 2002, which established that the actions of officers from the Internal Troops involved in the special operation in Katyr-Yurt on 4-6 February had been appropriate to the circumstances and in line with the applicable legal provisions. On this basis the investigation concluded that command corps’ actions were absolutely necessary and proportionate to the resistance put up by the insurgent fighters. It found an absence of corpus delicti in the actions of the servicemen. By the same decision the victim status of 62 individuals was withdrawn. The individuals in question were to be informed of the possibility of seeking redress through civil proceedings.", "22. It appears that the victims were not informed by the prosecutor’s office about the termination of the proceedings and nothing happened until January 2005, when they learnt that the proceedings had been terminated.", "23. Between January and March 2005 the applicants in application no. 27065/05 contacted the military prosecutor’s office in writing, seeking information about the progress of the investigation in case no. 14/00/0004‑01. They referred to the circumstances of the deaths and wounding of their family members and asked to be granted formal status of victims in the proceedings.", "24. In response to these requests, between January and April 2005 the military prosecutor’s office informed the applicants of the results of the military experts’ report, the termination of proceedings in criminal case no. 14/00/0004-01 and the withdrawal of victim status in 2002. The letters also confirmed that the investigation had established the deaths and injuries of which they had complained and informed them that they could apply to a civil court to obtain compensation. Some of these letters contained the decision of 13 March 2002 as attachment.", "25. On 6 June 2005 26 applicants in Abuyeva and Others case lodged a claim with the military court of the North-Caucasus Military Circuit. They complained about the ineffectiveness and incompleteness of the investigation. In particular, the applicants noted that some of their relatives’ deaths had not been recorded by the investigation and that these persons had not been listed amongst those who died in Katyr-Yurt in February 2000. They asked the court to quash the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings and to oblige the military prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation in the criminal case, to grant each of them the status of victim in the criminal proceedings, and to issue them with copies of the relevant decisions. These complaints did not directly refer to the situation of the applicant’s family.", "26. The applicants’ request was granted and the case was reopened in 2007 under the number 44/00/0026-05. However, on 14 June 2007 the investigation was closed, with the same conclusions as in March 2002, on the basis of Article 39, part 1 of the Criminal Code. The decision confirmed the deaths of 46 and the wounding of 53 local residents, without listing their names. An additional expert report was produced by the Military Academy of the Armed Forces in June 2007, which found that the actions of the command corps in planning and executing the operation had been reasonable and in line with domestic law. No copy of that report has ever been disclosed to the applicants or submitted to the Court. The decision stated in this respect:\n“... The actions of the fighters (the occupation of Katyr-Yurt by a group of fighters numbering three to four thousand persons, the fighters establishing strongholds in the houses, [their] fierce resistance and their using local residents as a “human shield”) ... represented a real danger to the lives and health of the local residents, and could have entailed unnecessary losses by the federal forces ...\nThese circumstances required the taking of adequate measures by the command corps in order to prevent the danger of armed assault against the citizens and their lives and property (residents of Katyr-Yurt and military servicemen), in addition to [the need to safeguard] the interests of society and the State which are protected by law (the reinstatement of the constitutional order in Chechnya). After issuing a preliminary notification and giving the civilians a real opportunity to leave the village, the subsequent extermination of pockets of the fighters’ resistance by means of artillery and attack aircraft, employing area-point method (“зонально-объектовый метод”), did not exclude deaths among civilians. At the same time, the use of such means of extermination was consistent with the circumstances and with the measures taken in order to minimise losses among civilians. The actions of the command corps (commanders) during the preparation and carrying out of the special operation aimed at the liberation of Katyr-Yurt between 4 and 7 February 2000 were in line with the requirements of relevant field manuals, internal regulations and instructions, were lawful and did not contain elements of criminally ”.", "27. The decision to grant victim status to 95 people was quashed. The military prosecutor of the United Group Alliance in the Northern Caucasus (UGA) forwarded the decision to the head of the Government of Chechnya, asking it to identify the victims’ places of residence and to inform them of the closure of the investigation, as well as the possibility of seeking compensation through the civil courts.", "28. The name of the applicant in the present case was not listed among the 95 individuals who had been granted victim status.", "29. After discharge from hospital, the applicant had to keep plaster on her legs for three months. Because the hostilities in Chechnya were still ongoing, her relatives took her to the Volgograd Region to continue her treatment. In 2002 the applicant was taken to Norway for treatment for one week. In 2002 her paternal grandmother, with whom she had been living after her parents’ deaths, died. After that the applicant lived with her maternal grandparents in Zakan-Yurt.", "30. In their observations of September 2010, the Government stated that in 2001 a witness had told the investigators about the deaths of six people in a Volga car (see Isayeva, cited above, § 56) but their identities were unknown at that time. It was not until the applicant’s questioning in March 2007 (see below) that the investigation obtained this information.", "31. In December 2006 a distant relative of the applicant’s took her to a human rights organisation, at her request, where she found out for the first time that a criminal investigation had been opened into the attack at Katyr‑Yurt.", "32. On 18 December 2006 the applicant wrote a letter to the military prosecutor of the UGA and informed him about the deaths of her five relatives and the injuries she suffered on 4 February 2000 in Katyr-Yurt. She attached five death certificates and her discharge papers from the Nazran hospital dated 4 March 2000.", "33. On 19 March 2007 the applicant was questioned and granted the status of victim in criminal case no. 34/00/0026-05. At that time the applicant was a minor but the questioning took place in the absence of legal guardian or representative. According to the parties, there is no information indicating the establishment of guardianship over the applicant up to the age of majority.", "34. She was not informed of the decision to close proceedings of 14 June 2007 (see paragraphs 26–28 above). The Government submitted in their observations that this had been an omission on the part of the investigator which had been due to the large number of victims in the case.", "35. As is apparent from subsequent documents submitted by the applicant, the investigation into the attack upon Katyr-Yurt was reopened in September 2012. The investigators commissioned an additional expert report into the lawfulness and reasonableness of the military intervention. Neither party submitted to the Court the decision to commission the expert report, the questions put to the experts, or a copy of the report itself, nor is it clear which documents were made available to the experts. The applicant’s knowledge of and involvement in this procedural step has not been clarified. It appears that the document, as most other documents in the file, has been classified. A summary thereof and summaries of other documents are contained in a twenty-page-long extract from the decision to close the criminal investigation issued by a senior investigator of the Military Investigations Unit of the Investigative Committee in the Southern Federal Circuit on 9 March 2013 (extract dated 16 March 2013).", "36. The aforementioned extract opens by stating the factual circumstances of the case as established at that time. According to the text, on the night of 3 to 4 February 2000 a group of between three and four thousand fighters under the command of field commander Gelayev had entered Katyr-Yurt (also spelled Katar-Yurt). They were armed with automatic firearms, large-calibre machine guns, flame-throwers, portable anti-aircraft launchers and armoured vehicles. On 4 February 2000 the head of the operations centre (OC) of the Western Zone Alignment in Chechnya gave orders to block the village to carry out a special operation. By that time, most inhabitants had left the village and others were hiding in their houses. The decision to evacuate the civilians was taken between 7 and 11 a.m. on 4 February. The population had been informed of this possibility through the head of the administration and by means of a loudspeaker device mounted on a helicopter. Following skirmishes on the outskirts of Katyr-Yurt and casualties suffered by the security forces, at 9 a.m. artillery started to carry out pin-point strikes aimed at clusters of fighters in the centre and on the periphery of the village. After sustaining casualties, a reconnaissance group retreated from Katyr-Yurt on the morning on 4 February, following which attack aircraft were called in. Due to the fierce fighting and the artillery and air strikes upon the clusters of fighters, the residents started to leave, and by midday on 4 February “their outflow had become significant”. The extract stated that the special operation had continued for two days, although the strikes continued until 7 February. On the third night [presumably the night of 6 to 7 February] a significant proportion of the fighters, numbering about 800 in all, had left the village under cover of poor visibility and escaped into the mountains; 386 had been killed during the operation. The commanders of the special operation had taken measures to arrange the evacuation of civilians but their plans had been upset by the fighters, especially in the initial stages of the operation. Many residents trying to leave the village had been caught in the crossfire between the fighters and the security forces. Most residents had been killed or injured in the initial stages of the operation, in the central part of the village where the most intense fighting had taken place. No conclusive figure of injured or dead civilians, fighters or security forces was given in the extract.", "37. The extract then states that the latest decision to terminate proceedings had occurred on 28 September 2012. That decision was quashed on 9 October 2012 and the investigation was extended until 9 March 2013.", "38. The extract goes on to cite statements from various military and civilian witnesses, without indicating their names or ranks or the dates when these statements were taken (see Isayeva, cited above, §§ 42-92).", "39. The document also refers to an additional operational-tactical expert report (“дополнительная комиссионная оперативно-тактическая судебная экспертиза”) produced on 24 September 2012 by unnamed “external experts from the military faculty of the Southern Federal University” (“внештатные эксперты факультета военного обучения Южного федерального университета”) based in Rostov-on-Don. As summarised in the extract, the experts’ conclusion did not differ from the findings reached by the previous expert reports commissioned by the investigation (see paragraphs 21-27 above). The expert report is cited as follows:\n“In early February 2000 the operational situation in the area of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was extremely tense and difficult. ... After the defeat suffered in the plains of Chechnya and in Grozny, [the illegal insurgents] attempted to move into harsh southern mountainous regions where they would be able to take rest and recover, in order to organise further military action. ... A very difficult situation developed in the area covered by the Western Zone Alignment. Their main task was to prevent the illegal insurgents from breaking through from the mountainous areas of Chechnya to the plains, to identify, disarm and detain members of the illegal armed groups, and to destroy them in the event of armed resistance ...\n... In early February 2000 reconnaissance information was received about the taking of Katyr-Yurt by a large group of fighters. The exact number of fighters was unknown. In order to prevent any further gathering of the fighters, it was decided to surround the village and carry out a special operation there ... A plan for the special operation was worked out. The plan detailed the detachments responsible for blocking and searching, the order of fire contact in the event of armed resistance by the fighters, the location of the command headquarters and control points ... The artillery targets were established in advance along the lines of the fighters’ possible escape routes from Katyr-Yurt and potential arrival of reinforcements, outside of the village. Two control points (roadblocks) were established at the two ends of the village to ensure the exit of civilians – one towards Achkhoy-Martan and the other towards Valerik. The civilians left the village through the two roadblocks, along ‘humanitarian corridors’.\nThe head of Katyr-Yurt was informed of the decision to carry out a special operation. He requested postponement in order to ascertain the situation with his own resources and to drive the fighters out of the village. The special operation was postponed for one day. However, the following morning the fighters attacked OMON [special police forces] based in Katyr-Yurt and attempted to break through the lines of the security forces. The security forces sustained casualties. As became apparent during the clashes, the fighters were armed not only with firearms, but also with grenades and fire-launchers, large calibre machine guns, mine-launchers and anti-tank rocket launchers. The fighters were well prepared and were able to use artificial and natural hiding places in order to deliver combat in a populated area. The number of fighters greatly exceeded the security forces (by 4-6 times).”", "40. The decision goes on to cite the report’s conclusion that the use of fighter jets, artillery and mine-launchers upon fortified positions had been justified and that the refusal to employ them would have resulted in heavy losses among the security forces and failure to achieve the goals as set. Over a period of three days most fighters present in the village were killed (one military unit had reported 386 killed fighters).", "41. The report cited military field manuals and concluded that the actions of the commanders had been in full compliance with those acts. The commanders had organised and planned the enforcement of the objectives set. The pin-point air strikes upon previously agreed targets, the direct strikes by artillery and anti-tank rocket launchers, and the tank and anti-tank guns had been directed by forward air controllers and artillery pointers upon clearly established and observed targets.", "42. Page 12 of the extract contains the following citation from the decision: “the evidential material in the criminal investigation file ... shows that over 1,000 fighters who entered Katyr-Yurt were armed with automatic firearms, large-calibre machine-guns, grenade-launchers and armoured vehicles; fortified firing points had been established in the captured houses. [In such circumstances] the use of artillery and airborne weapons between 4 and 7 February 2000 was justified ...”", "43. As cited in the extract, the experts focused on the use of artillery and aircraft. From the operative military documents referring to the use of artillery it was impossible to discern where and when exactly, and at what targets the artillery had been employed, since all the documents reviewed by the experts were judged by them as either irrelevant to the operation in question or not containing any relevant information. As to the aircraft, they had used aviation bombs and unguided and guided missiles of undisclosed types. The number of aircraft involved and the number and timing of the mission sorties, as well as the number of missiles and bombs used, was not specified. As cited, the report established that during the mission sorties the pilots had received information from the forward controllers, because the missions were taking place in the vicinity of, or within, the populated area. The target selection was done using smoke pods or by reference to clearly identifiable topographical “highpoints”. There was no evidence of provocations by fighters or mistakes in selecting targets. The document went on to state that the identification of targets had occurred on the basis of information received prior to departure, from the forward air controllers during the flight, and from the observed activity. Since their use by illegal insurgents could not be verified, attacks on vehicles were ruled out unless very precise and distinguishable directions had been received from the ground. The aircraft attacked from a height of about two kilometres and from a distance of about two kilometres; from that distance details such as clothing and the presence of firearms could not be distinguished. For that reason, contact with the air controllers was necessary before and after hitting the selected target.", "44. In the cited extract, the experts concluded that “such engagement of artillery and aviation munitions practically ruled out the likelihood of casualties to civilians, except those who were with the fighters in houses occupied by the latter”.", "45. They further concluded that the “employment of a minimal amount of artillery, the choice of the most accurate target direction possible, and the use of the minimum amount of shells necessary ... guaranteed safety from injuries by splinters both for the civilians and security forces. ... Having examined the criminal investigation file, the experts concluded that the OC of the Western Zone Alignment and the head of the special operation in Katyr-Yurt had taken all possible measures in order to prevent losses among civilians while planning and carrying out the operation”.", "46. Turning to the situation of the civilians, the experts judged that they had been able to leave the village along “humanitarian corridors” through two roadblocks. The information about the corridors had been communicated by means of a helicopter and an armoured personnel carrier (APC). The head of the administration had been properly informed of the beginning of the special operation and, at his request, its start had been postponed for a day. The civilians had been informed of the need to evacuate and two roadblocks had ensured safe and unhindered passage. The civilians had been accorded the time necessary for the evacuation and the transport carrying the civilians was able to travel back and forth through the roadblocks.", "47. While the report, as cited in the extract, conceded that an unspecified number of civilians had been killed during the operation through the use of weapons under the control of the operation’s commanders, such measures had been in compliance with the appropriate order of decision-taking in the choice of targets and means employed during the special operation.", "48. On the basis of this report, the investigator concluded that the measures resulting in civilian casualties had been absolutely necessary within the meaning of Article 39, part 1 of the Criminal Code (as in the previous decisions of 13 March 2002 and 14 June 2007 – see Abuyeva and Others, cited above, § 159).", "49. The extract ended by listing the names of the 47 individuals who had been killed, but Mr Z. M. Isayev (a son of the applicant in the Isayeva case, cited above) was listed twice. It did not contain the names of the applicant’s five family members, nor of her cousin Khava Abakarova (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). Nor did it contain the names of five relatives of applicants 2 and 24 in the Abuyeva and Others case (see Abuyeva and Others, cited above, § 156). The non-exhaustive list of the wounded included the applicant; however no separate list of victims has been drawn up; nor does it appear that a copy of that decision was sent to them.", "50. On 26 September 2013 a lawyer representing Mrs Marusa Abuyeva, another victim in criminal investigation no. 14/90/0092-11, appealed to the Grozny Garrison Military Court against the decision of 9 March 2013 to close the criminal investigation and to terminate Mrs Abuyeva’s victim status in the proceedings. The statement of appeal was based on the following grounds: the decision had not been based on the established facts, no proper collection and examination of evidence had taken place and legal classification of the events had been incorrect.", "51. Firstly, it was argued that the investigation had failed to establish the following pertinent facts: the number of illegal fighters in Katyr-Yurt; the timing and conditions of the transmission of information about the operation and evacuation of civilians; the purpose of the roadblocks at the two extremities of the village; and the details of the aircraft bombings. As to the number of fighters, the statement of appeal referred to various figures cited in the extract and emphasised the fact that the source of this information had not been identified. Likewise, there was a lack of clarity as to the number of fighters killed, nor were there any indications as to any names, identification procedures etc. The appeal statement also pointed out that the number of the security force personnel involved had not been given; it was therefore difficult to evaluate the numerical superiority of the fighters and the need to employ massive weapons. Furthermore, the victim challenged the statement that the administration and population of Katyr-Yurt had been informed about the operation in advance, pointing to the absence of any clear evidence in the case-file to that effect. Turning to the roadblocks set up by the security forces, the appeal statement pointed out that there were no grounds for concluding that this measure had facilitated the exit of civilians from Katyr-Yurt and reiterated the findings made in this respect by the Court in the judgments in the Isayeva and Abuyeva and Others cases (both cited above, §§ 194 and 199, accordingly). As to the details of aircraft bombing, it was argued that the investigators had accepted two mutually incompatible versions and no steps had been taken in order to clarify whether the pilots, or the aviation controllers who had coordinated the fire, had been able to observe and distinguish legitimate targets (members of illegal armed groups) from civilians. It was also pointed out that the employment of unguided missiles and free-falling general purpose bombs in any event ruled out the possibility of limiting the impact to the selected targets.", "52. As regards the incompleteness of the investigation, it was stressed that the investigators had failed to collect the information necessary to evaluate the threat to the civilian population and the appropriateness of the use of selected weapons and ammunition, and to compile an exhaustive list of victims and damage caused. On the last point, it was emphasised that no list of those who had been killed, both civilians and fighters, had ever been compiled and that the information in this regard remained incomplete.", "53. Finally, it was argued that the legal classification of the commanders’ actions had been incorrect and that the application of Article 39 part 2 of the Criminal Code had been unjustified without the prior establishment of all the circumstances of the case, including those listed above.", "54. On 6 December 2013 the Grozny Military Garrison Court examined and dismissed the appeal. The court referred to the conclusions of the expert report of 24 September 2012, according to which the actions of the operational commanders had been in accordance with the relevant field manuals and other instructions and were justified in view of the numerical superiority of the fighters. The court also found that the evidence collected by the investigation justified the conclusions reached as regards each of the points raised by the appeal. As to execution of the Isayeva and Abuyeva and Others judgments, the court stressed that in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, and in line with the Resolution of the Plenary of the Supreme Court No. 21 of 27 June 2013, the investigation had been reopened in 2012 and a number of relevant steps had been taken. In particular, a new expert report had been commissioned and carried out. The Court’s position on the ineffectiveness of the previous investigation had therefore been taken into account and the failings had been rectified.", "55. The victim appealed. In her appeal of 23 December 2013 it was stressed that the breach of procedural obligations under Article 2 in this case had taken on a lasting character. Pointing to the relevant passages in the Isayeva and Abuyeva and Others judgments, both cited above, the appeal argued that the following fundamental defects of the investigation, as identified by the Court, had not been corrected in the new round of proceedings: there had been no independent evaluation of the proportionality and necessity of the lethal force used; no individual liability had been established for the aspects of the operation which had led to civilian losses, and these aspects had not been studied and evaluated by an independent body, preferably a judicial one. It was reiterated that the expert report of September 2012, as cited in the decision of 9 March 2013, had simply repeated the findings of two previous expert reports which had already been examined by the Court. Like the previous two, it had not been based on the pertinent facts of the case. Finally, the important question of the total number of victims had still not been resolved, as demonstrated by the failure to include some of the victims’ deceased relatives in the total.", "56. On 6 March 2014 the Rostov Circuit Military Court examined the appeal. During the hearing, the victim’s representative submitted a number of additional points. He concentrated on the relevant precepts of international humanitarian law and the practice of international criminal tribunals which, he argued, should have guided the investigator in his examination of the case. In his view, the decision of 9 March 2013 had failed to take into account the relevant interpretation of these provisions in so far as it concerned the definition of victims as civilians, and the widespread, systematic, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on them.", "57. The Circuit Military Court dismissed the appeals. It found that the Garrison Court had examined all the relevant evidence and had applied a comprehensive and consistent interpretation thereto. At this stage, the judge was unable to analyse the substance of the question of guilt or innocence, or to evaluate the correctness or sufficiency of the evidence collected. The Circuit Court stressed that the victim’s arguments regarding both the incompleteness of the investigation and the failure to take into account the European Court’s binding judgments had been thoroughly examined and dismissed.", "58. As is apparent from subsequent documents, the victim’s Supreme Court cassation appeal was unsuccessful. On 25 September 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court refused to accept the request for review, in view of the detailed and well-reasoned decisions of the military courts. The victim’s argument that the legal position of the Court in the new round of proceedings had not been taken into account was judged to be unfounded." ]

[ "13", "46", "2" ]

[ 9, 10, 11, 25, 29, 44 ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Zsámbék.", "5. The applicant lodged a compensation claim for medical negligence against a hospital on 10 October 2006.", "6. The Pest Central District Court dismissed the action.", "7. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court upheld the first‑instance decision on 29 November 2011.", "8. The applicant lodged a petition for review. The Kúria upheld the decision on 13 March 2013. The judgment was served on the applicant on 30 May 2013." ]

[ "46", "2", "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest.", "5. On 14 March 1997 the applicant was interrogated as suspect of breach of duty and other offences.", "6. In the ensuing criminal proceedings, after a remittal, the Budapest Regional Court acquitted the applicant on 5 November 2008.", "7. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal on 26 November 2009.", "8. The applicant lodged a petition for review; but the Supreme Court rejected the motion on 13 December 2010." ]

[ "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Novaj.", "5. In the context of the protraction of a former administrative procedure concerning a land dispute, the applicant brought an official liability action on 12 May 2003.", "6. The Heves Regional Court rejected the action but, on appeal, the second-instance court quashed the decision and remitted the case to it.", "7. The first-instance court dismissed the claim again on 13 September 2007.", "8. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court of Appeal considered the first-instance judgment as an interlocutory decision and reversed it.", "9. The second-instance court found for the applicant by pronouncing the liability of the administrative authority on 31 January 2008.", "10. Concerning the amount of damages, the first-instance court delivered a judgment on 23 December 2009.", "11. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal essentially upheld this decision on 3 June 2010." ]

[ "13", "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "6. The applicants are Syrian nationals or had their habitual residence in Syria. At the time of lodging their applications they were detained at a detention centre for foreign nationals in the town of Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga Region (ОСУСВИГ – “the detention centre”), run by the local Federal Migration Service (“FMS”).", "7. The applicant L.M. (application no. 40081/14) was born in 1988. He entered Russia on 9 February 2013. He was detained on 14 April 2014. He is a stateless Palestinian who had his habitual residence in Syria. He was not in possession of a valid national ID at the time of detention, and his identity was established by an immigration officer in Russia in 2014.", "8. The applicant A.A. (application no. 40088/14) was born in 1987. He entered Russia on 21 April 2013. He was detained on 15 April 2014.", "9. The applicant M.A. (application no. 40127/14) was born in 1994. He entered Russia on 21 April 2013. He was detained on 15 April 2014 and has a brother, Mr Akhmad A., who received temporary asylum in Russia and is married to a Russian national, Albina A.", "10. On 14 and 15 April 2014 (see Appendix) the applicants were detained by the police and officers of the FMS at a clothing factory in Maloyaroslavets.", "11. On 15 and 16 April 2014 (see Appendix) the Maloyaroslavets District Court (“the District Court”) examined the applicants’ administrative files, found them guilty of administrative offences (breach of immigration rules and working without a permit) and ordered them to pay fines of between 2,000 and 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and their expulsion to Syria, in line with the procedure under Article 3.10 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicants all stated in court that they feared for their lives if returned to Syria and referred to information about the ongoing and widespread conflict there. The court found these statements to be general in nature and unsupported by any relevant evidence. The applicants also referred to the absence of work in Syria and the fact that in Russia they had been able to work illegally. The District Court then focused on the economic motives of their arrival and illegal stay. Pending expulsion the court ordered their detention at the detention centre.", "12. The lawyer representing the applicants before the Court lodged appeals for all three of them, describing in detail the general situation in Syria and the danger of returning there, and citing and attaching the relevant country reports produced by the UNHCR and FMS. She also cited a circular letter issued by the Federal Bailiff Service on 30 August 2013 to its regional branches, according to which no entry was possible into Syrian territory in view of the hostilities and problems that would arise with the execution of court judgments ordering expulsion there. The lawyer argued, in detail, that the decisions to expel the applicants could not be implemented; in such circumstances their detention lost any purpose and became indefinite. The lawyer further cited an FMS circular letter of 23 January 2013 entitled “On the situation in Syria and the work with persons originating from Syria”, which stated that “in the current difficult political situation, when the Syrian authorities are unable to provide effective protection of their citizens from the illegal actions of the armed opposition ... most of the applicants ... have fled the country as a result of the armed conflict. ... Individuals who cannot not safely return [to Syria] and have a well-founded fear of ill-treatment, including torture, should be given temporary asylum”. The statements of appeal further referred to the fact that the applicants had sought asylum in Russia; their expulsion would therefore be contrary to the relevant legislation. The UNHCR Office in Moscow produced a letter to the Kaluga Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) in respect of L.M., reiterating its position in respect of returns to Syria and arguing that any decision relating to expulsion there while his asylum request was pending would be in breach of domestic and international legislation. Similar letters were produced in respect of the two other applicants. The applicants also referred to a decision of the Leningrad Regional Court taken earlier in 2014 relating to a Syrian national in a similar situation (see paragraph 72 below).", "13. The Kaluga Regional Court rejected all three appeals on 27 May 2014, following which the expulsion orders entered into force. It stressed the applicants’ illegal stay in Russia and their reference to economic difficulties as their reason for departure from their home country. It found that the alleged danger to the applicants’ lives as a result of the ongoing conflict did not in itself constitute sufficient grounds to exclude expulsion in respect of those guilty of administrative offences in the sphere of immigration.", "14. In respect of L.M., in a separate decision of the same date, the Regional Court refused to amend the expulsion order. The court noted that he had not applied for asylum in Russia until 21 May 2014, a fact which “did not affect the lawfulness of the decision taken by the District Court concerning the applicant’s administrative offence and expulsion”.", "15. On 17 June 2014 the Kaluga Federal Bailiff Service asked the District Court to stay execution in respect of M.A., pointing out that the European Court of Human Rights had applied Rule 39 and therefore the expulsion could not be carried out at that time. On 30 June 2014 the District Court found that the Code of Administrative Offences did not provide for stays of expulsion as opposed to the payment of fines and dismissed the request.", "16. On 4 July 2014 the District Court issued a similar decision in respect of L.M., pursuant to a request by the Bailiff Service on 1 July 2014. None of the parties were present at the hearing, including L.M.", "17. It appears from the letter of 8 July 2014 sent by the Kaluga Federal Bailiff Service to the applicants’ lawyer that it was unaware at that date of the District Court’s decisions. From the same letter it appears that a similar request had been made for a stay of execution in respect of A.A.", "18. Since 15 and 16 April 2014 the applicants have been detained at the detention centre.", "19. According to the Government’s observations received in December 2014, A.A. escaped on 25 August 2014. An internal report was prepared by the head of the Kaluga FMS the same day, describing the events as follows:\n“In the early hours of 25 August 2014, between 3 and 4 a.m., a group of foreign nationals and stateless people detained pending administrative deportation from the [detention centre] escaped from the premises ... The group included ... [A.A.], a Syrian national, born on 15 January 1987 ... An investigation has established that the people used an unfinished ventilation shaft located between the ground and first floors of the building. Having reached the first floor, the people jumped out of the window onto a pile of construction rubbish and, having covered the surveillance devices ... with a blanket, left the grounds of the centre with the aid of construction materials stored in the courtyard.\nThe exact circumstances of the escape are being established. An internal investigation is being held in respect of the staff who had allowed the seven foreign nationals to escape.\nThe local police have been told to organise a search for the people who have escaped.”", "20. The applicants’ representative claimed to have had no knowledge of the escape prior to receiving the Government’s observations, expressing her concern that they had not submitted the information earlier, for example when making their observations of 2 September 2014.", "21. In reply to the Court’s further questions in this regard, in their observations of 24 April 2015 the Government explained that no administrative or criminal proceedings had been initiated, as an escape from a detention centre for foreign nationals pending deportation was not an offence under any legislation. While the police continued to search for the detainees, their whereabouts, including those of A.A., remained unknown.", "22. The Government further submitted that since their observations had been based on the replies of the competent State authorities prepared on 4 and 8 August 2014, no information about A.A.’s escape had been provided at that stage. They also submitted that the detention centre had been under no obligation to inform detainees’ representatives of the escape, hence why it had not done so in A.A.’s case.", "23. The applicants’ representative confirmed that she had not been aware of A.A.’s escape prior to the meeting with the two other applicants on 17 December 2014 and submitted that she had no knowledge of A.A.’s current whereabouts.", "24. From the documents submitted by the Government in December 2014, it appears that A.A. sought refugee status in Russia on 5 March 2014 by applying to the Moscow Region FMS. On 11 March 2014 this request was accepted for consideration on the merits and the applicant was questioned and issued with an appropriate document.", "25. On 26 March 2014 A.A.’s application for refugee status was dismissed. The decision of the FMS stated that he had submitted no information to support his claims of persecution in Syria. His family remained in that country and he could have used the “internal flight alternative” to another part of Syria, or claimed asylum in a transit country. He reasoned his request to remain in Russia by his wish to work there and did not therefore fall under the definition of refugee.", "26. The applicant did not obtain a copy of that decision and did not appeal against it.", "27. After their arrest the three applicants applied for refugee status. They submitted the relevant applications to the local FMS in Kaluga; M.A. and A.A. on 14 May 2014 and L.M. on 21 May 2014.", "28. On 28 May 2014 the three applicants also submitted requests for temporary asylum in Russia, which were drawn up in Russian and translated by Z.A.", "29. In June 2014 the three applicants were questioned by the Kaluga FMS. They indicated that the reasons for their departure from Syria were the war and danger to their lives. A.A. stated that he was from Aleppo and had lost contact with his family, parents and siblings after his departure in 2013. M.A. stated that he had fled Aleppo after his neighbourhood had been taken over by “terrorists” who had killed dozens of people there, including his close male relatives, which he had witnessed. He had also lost contact with his family after December 2013. L.M. had been in Damascus but had no right of return as he was a stateless Palestinian. He had also lost contact with the members of his family who had remained in Syria. All applicants stressed that they were afraid to go back because of the hostilities which had caused their departure, and said that they feared being forcibly drafted into the armed forces.", "30. On 16 June 2014 the Kaluga FMS decided that their applications for refugee status should be considered on the merits and issued appropriate certificates to them.", "31. In parallel proceedings, also in June 2014, the three applicants were questioned by the FMS in order to obtain temporary asylum in Russia.", "32. On 17 July 2014 L.M. signed a paper in Russian stating that he had asked for his request for “temporary asylum in Russia dated 28 May 2014” not to be considered since he “intended to return to his home in Syria”. The paper was also signed by a translator, Z.A.", "33. On the same date a similar paper was signed by A.A. which stated that “he and his wife intended to go to Turkey”. The paper was also signed by Z.A.", "34. According to the Government’s observations of 3 December 2014, these requests served as the basis of the FMS decisions to terminate the proceedings in respect of these two applicants, both in respect of their request for refugee status and temporary asylum. No documents were submitted in this regard.", "35. On 16 September 2014 the Kaluga FMS decided to refuse M.A.’s request for refugee status. It considered that he faced no threat of persecution on the grounds set out in the Law on Refugees. On 17 September 2014 the Kaluga FMS, for the same reasons, refused him temporary asylum.", "36. On 28 November 2014 the Regional Court reviewed M.A.’s appeal against the decision not to grant him temporary asylum. He was not taken to the trial even though the decision stated that he had been notified, and he did not have a representative. A representative of the FMS appeared before the court, which briefly restated the reasons for the FMS decision to refuse the applicant both refugee and temporary asylum status and confirmed that there were no reasons to regard him as in need of protection. Neither the general situation in Syria nor the applicant’s submissions about the situation in Aleppo had been raised or discussed. This decision was sent to M.A. on 5 December 2014. It is unclear if he appealed against it.", "37. On 30 September 2014 M.A. and L.M. submitted new written requests for refugee status, which were accepted for consideration by the Kaluga FMS on 7 October 2014. On 15 October 2014, however, both applicants signed papers in Russian stating that they had asked for their requests for “temporary asylum in Russia dated 28 September 2014” not to be considered. The papers stated that they had been translated and written by Z.A.", "38. The Government, in their observations of 2 December 2014, explained that the contradictory position taken by L.M. prevented the FMS from considering his new application on the merits. M.A.’s new application was not considered either.", "39. The applicants submitted that severe restrictions had been placed on them meeting with their representatives. As a result, despite numerous attempts and complaints, M.A. and L.M. only had one meeting with them on 17 December 2014. M.A. had one meeting with his brother and Albina A. on 22 October 2014, which lasted about ten minutes. A.A. did not meet with a representative prior to his escape from the detention centre (see paragraphs 20-23 above).", "40. The applicants submitted copies of their exchange with various officials in the Kaluga FMS and prosecutor’s office regarding their detention and access to representatives. From these letters it appears that on several occasions the applicants’ two lawyers, Ms Golovanchuk and Ms Yermolayeva, a lawyer of the Kaluga Bar Association, Mr P.K., a member of the Kaluga branch of the Human Rights Centre Memorial who had assisted the applicants with their complaints, Ms Lyubov M.-E., as well as M.A.’s brother and his wife, wrote to these agencies regarding a lack of access to the detention centre and the conditions of detention of people detained there. Their exchanges may be summarised as follows.", "41. On 3 March 2014 the head of the detention centre responded to Ms Lyubov M.-E., stating that visits by lawyers and human rights defenders were possible daily between 11.30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. On 14 April 2014 the Kaluga FMS informed the regional prosecutor’s office that visits by representatives, relatives and human rights defenders were possible upon the written request of detainees, or upon the written request of their representatives or human rights defenders if accompanied by a written request by the detainee for legal assistance from them. Visits outside of normal visiting hours had to be agreed in advance with the detention centre administration, to ensure the proper functioning of the centre. If a detainee requested in writing to be represented by anyone, the centre would consider the issue of ensuring a visit from the representative, accompanied by a notary, to certify a power of attorney.", "42. On 25 April 2014 L.M.’s lawyer wrote to the Kaluga regional prosecutor’s office. She pointed out that the applicant had been refused access to his representatives, and that the conditions of detention at the detention centre were harsher than for people who had been detained on criminal charges. Detainees were kept in their rooms for most of the day; they had no means of communication with anybody and could not contact each other or their representatives. The letter further stressed the absence of any flight connection with Syria and the impossibility of expelling the applicant there.", "43. On 17 May 2014 the Kaluga FMS informed the regional prosecutor’s office that on 24 April 2014 Ms Lyubov M.-E. had asked to be allowed to meet with the three applicants and an Uzbek national, T. The staff of the centre had refused to allow her to meet with the applicants, since she had not had an interpreter present and could not communicate with them. She had attempted to pass documents in Russian to the applicants (complaints against the domestic court decisions) through T., but they had been found by the detention centre staff. Ms Lyubov M.-E. had been reminded to come back accompanied by an interpreter. Furthermore, the detainees had signed documents refusing to meet with Ms Lyubov M.-E. since she had asked them for money for her services.", "44. On 26 May 2014 the head of the NGO Civic Assistance wrote to the Moscow FMS. She pointed out that the applicants’ confinement in the detention centre appeared unlawful in the absence of any time-limit or purpose, since the expulsion could not be carried out. She further pointed to the fact that the applicants had submitted applications for temporary asylum, and that their conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading, since the food was of poor quality and they had little access to fresh air, outdoor exercise, meaningful activities or information. The letter further stated that the detention centre staff had threatened and harassed detainees, and that the applicants had been pressed to withdraw their applications for asylum. The letter also referred to the difficulties in meeting the inmates.", "45. On 10 June 2014 the applicants’ lawyers submitted a letter to the Prosecutor General’s Office, with copies to the Kaluga regional prosecutor’s office and FMS. They pointed out that the applicants’ conditions of detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. M.A. had been diagnosed with pneumonia, but had not received adequate medical help. The applicants had been unable to meet with their relatives and representatives. The food was of poor quality, consisted mostly of cereals and was often served cold. The applicants complained that they had been harassed and threatened by the staff, threatened with reprisals if they complained, and encouraged to withdraw their applications for asylum and discharge their representatives. In the absence of any real possibility of expelling the applicants to Syria, their detention had turned into an open-ended punishment without any possibility of review.", "46. On 11 June 2014 the Kaluga FMS wrote to the Kaluga regional ombudsman, noting that on 27 May 2014 the Regional Court had rejected the applicants’ appeals (see paragraph 13 above) while they were assisted by a lawyer and interpreter. In their letter of 29 July 2014 the Kaluga FMS informed the regional prosecutor’s office that the detainees’ rights had not been infringed. The court hearing of 30 June 2014 relating to staying execution of the expulsion order (see paragraph 15 above) had not required the applicants’ presence, and an interpreter had been invited to the detention centre on 17 July 2014, who had translated the court decision to the applicants. On the same day M.A. had decided to withdraw his application for temporary asylum and refuse any further assistance from Ms Lyubov M.-E., signing the relevant documents.", "47. Writing to the applicants’ lawyer on 29 July and 12 August and the regional prosecutor’s office on 30 July 2014, the Kaluga FMS provided information about the medical assistance given to the applicants. In respect of M.A., the letters stated that he had been examined by a doctor upon arrival, that an interpreter had assisted him on 9 June 2014 in communicating with the detention centre doctor, who had administered treatment, and that on 14 and 25 June he had again been examined by a doctor and sent for a chest X-ray. His condition had been described as “satisfactory” and improved. The letters went on to state that the detention rooms had a ventilation system installed, that the shower and toilets, although not in the rooms, were undergoing renovation so that they would all be on one floor, that there was a courtyard for walks, and that the detention centre staff had treated detainees with respect and never allowed any behaviour which could escalate into arguments. The staff included a doctor, a psychologist and a medical disinfection specialist. On 17 July 2014 M.A. had signed a paper refusing any further assistance from Ms Lyubov M.-E. On the same day the remaining two applicants had also expressed their wish to withdraw their requests for asylum.", "48. On 22 October 2014 M.A. signed a letter in Russian addressed to the Kaluga FMS stating that its officers had forced him to sign documents in Russian he could not understand and which, as it turned out, had cancelled his asylum request and prevented him meeting with his representative, Ms Lyubov M.-E. As a result, he had not met with her, and the only meeting he had attended had been with his brother and sister-in-law on 22 October 2014, which had only lasted about ten minutes. The applicant further stated that he and L.M. were under constant surveillance, had received threats from the staff and were unable to write and send letters or make complaints. The treatment was allegedly because of their application to the Court. The papers signed by the applicants about their unwillingness to have their asylum requests considered had been obtained under duress and they had had no idea what they had signed. The applicant’s requests to meet with his relatives and representatives had not been granted. He further complained that he had not been given any personal hygiene products and could not shave or cut his hair, and that he and L.M. were being kept in isolation and had very little contact with other detainees, allegedly because they had applied to the Court. They had also been told that their expulsion to Syria would take place anyway and that their complaints would have no effect. The letter ended with a request to be allowed unrestricted meetings with his relatives and representatives, including Ms Lyubov M.-E.", "49. On 27 October 2014 Albina A., M.A.’s sister-in-law, wrote to the Moscow-based human rights NGO Civic Assistance. On the same day she and her husband Mr Akhmad A., M.A.’s brother, produced affidavits to the applicant’s lawyers in Moscow. From these documents it appears that both brothers had left Aleppo in Syria because of the hostilities there, that their neighbourhood had been destroyed, that many of their relatives had been killed, and that they had no contact with the surviving family members. They had been unable to meet with M.A. at the detention centre, with the exception of one brief visit on 22 October 2014. The visit had lasted about ten minutes and a detention centre officer had been present. When M.A. had started to write down a complaint in Arabic, it had been taken away by the officer who had said that it was not allowed. M.A. had not been aware that he had signed a withdrawal of his asylum request prior to the meeting with his relatives. He had said that he had signed the papers under pressure from the FMS staff. His brother had managed to covertly obtain his signature on a complaint and a request to be allowed visit from his relatives and representative, Ms Lyubov M.-E. M.A. had also told them that on 21 October he had been visited by an FMS officer from Kaluga (Ms Marina Vladimirovna), accompanied by an interpreter, who had told him that he would be expelled to Syria as soon as his travel documents were issued by the Syrian Embassy.", "50. On 27 October 2014 Mr P.K. of the Kaluga Bar Association submitted a complaint to the Kaluga regional prosecutor’s office. He stated that he had arrived at the detention centre and had produced an order for representing M.A. and a copy of his bar membership card that day; however, its staff had refused to allow him to meet with his client, referring to the absence of any signed agreement to represent him or permission for the meeting issued by the Kaluga FMS. The FMS had further informed him that the review of his request would take a month. Mr P.K. referred to the provisions of domestic legislation which permitted a lawyer to meet with his client and asked for his client’s right to legal aid to be restored.", "51. On 17 December 2014 lawyers Ms Golovanchuk and Ms Yermolayeva met with the two applicants and took affidavits from them regarding their detention and asylum request situation.", "52. L.M. stated that he was detained in a spacious room with three other detainees; it had a toilet and running cold water. A hot shower could be taken daily on another floor upon request. The room was clean and had sufficient natural and artificial lighting, which was switched off during the night. There were no hygiene problems with insects and the bed linen was changed once a week. Detainees spent their time in their rooms, day and night, except when they went for walks. There were four nurses who administered medical treatment as necessary. He insisted that he wanted his asylum claim to be considered and unrestricted access and the ability to communicate with his representative, including in writing. When asked, L.M. stated that he had been assaulted by the staff on 27 August 2014 after some of the detainees had escaped; one of the wardens had twisted his hand painfully.", "53. M.A. stated that while at the detention centre, he had been beaten twice, in July 2014, when the staff had found him to be in possession of the Koran, and on 25 August, when one of the Syrian detainees had escaped. He had been beaten so that he would disclose details about the escape. After the beatings he had stayed in bed for three days and could not eat. He stated that he had not been allowed to make complaints or send letters, and had been denied access to his representatives and relatives. He had not been allowed to attend the court hearing on 28 November 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) even though he had asked to. He also confirmed that he had wanted to meet with his representatives, including Ms Lyubov M.-E. and had expected his claim for asylum to be processed. He stated that the FMS staff had threatened him and told him that his complaints would not help and that he would be spending two years in prison anyway.", "54. Following these submissions, on 17 December 2014 the applicants’ lawyers wrote a letter to the Kaluga regional prosecutor’s office pointing at the illegal nature of the applicants’ detention, since their expulsion could not be carried out and there were no terms or possibility of review of the detention. They also stressed that the applicants’ conditions of detention were similar to people in pre-trial detention, while the restrictions on visits and correspondence were illegal and in direct contradiction to the information contained in the letters from the detention centre administration. The letter stressed that the absence of contact with relatives, lawyers and representatives amounted in itself to inhuman treatment since it had serious psychological effects on the applicants.", "55. On the same day M.A. signed a request addressed to the Kaluga FMS to be allowed meetings with his representatives, Ms Golovanchuk, Ms Yermolayeva and Ms Lyubov M.-E., as well as his brother Mr Akhmad A. and sister-in-law Ms Albina A.", "56. In reply to the Court’s additional questions, in April 2015 the Government submitted more detailed information about the applicants’ conditions of detention.", "57. On 30 March 2014 the head of the Kaluga FMS ordered that meetings with people detained in the detention centre could be authorised for close relatives by its head upon presentation of documents proving they were related. Visits by representatives and human rights defenders could be authorised by the head of the Kaluga FMS, and the detainee could submit a written request to the head of the detention centre.", "58. According to the detention centre’s daily routine issued by its head on 15 November 2014, daily walks were to last no less than an hour per inmate. An hour a day was set aside for telephone contact and another hour between 11.30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. for meetings with visitors and receiving parcels. An hour every day was set aside for meetings with the administration.", "59. The Government submitted extracts from the applicants’ medical files, from which it appears that they had been examined upon arrival at the centre and found to be in good health. A.A. had been treated for bronchitis and pneumonia in June 2014, and on 14 July 2014 his health was improving. He had also had an incident of high blood pressure on 10 June, which had been successfully treated. L.M. had been diagnosed with pulpitis and gastric problems and had received treatment. He had seen the doctor on five occasions between 10 May 2014 and 17 February 2015. M.A. had not consulted the medical staff.", "60. According to the Government, L.M. and M.A. were detained in room no. 15 on the first floor of the two-storey building, which measured 47 square metres and accommodated six people. A toilet was accessible from the room, and there was a shared bathroom on the ground floor. The outdoor exercise yard measured 180 square metres. The Government provided photos of the rooms, sanitary facilities, canteen and the yard." ]

[ "5", "3", "46", "2", "34" ]

[ 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 33, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54 ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Mozzhukha, Kemerovo Region.", "5. On 15 July 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of large-scale embezzlement.", "6. On 16 July 2009 he was formally charged with the crime.", "7. On 17 July 2009 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Kemerovo remanded the applicant in custody pending investigation. The judge found that (1) the applicant was suspected of a serious crime, (2) his involvement in embezzlement was confirmed by the evidential material in the case file, (3) he might put pressure on witnesses or (4) he might interfere with investigation.", "8. On 10 November 2009 the Zavodskoy District Court of Kemerovo extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court referred to the gravity of the charges and reiterated that the applicant might threaten witnesses or interfere with investigation. It also observed that the applicant might re‑offend or abscond.", "9. On 26 November 2009 the Kemerovo Regional Court upheld the detention order of 10 November 2009 on appeal.", "10. The applicant remained in custody pending investigation and trial until his release on 24 June 2010.", "11. On 5 November 2013 the applicant was found guilty of the charge." ]

[ "5" ]

[]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Csengőd.", "5. After the death of the applicant’s father, his second wife brought an action about the inheritance against the applicant on 13 February 2004.", "6. At first instance, the court partly found for the applicant on 21 December 2007 but, on appeal, the Szeged Court of Appeal quashed the decision and remitted the case.", "7. In the resumed proceedings, the second-instance court quashed a decision again on 22 February 2010, as confirmed by the Supreme Court on 8 December 2010.", "8. In the proceedings resumed again, the Bács-Kiskun County Regional Court partly found for the applicant on 27 May 2010. The judgment became final on 4 September 2010." ]

[ "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Vladičin Han.", "6. The applicant was employed by “DPPK Delišes”, a socially-owned company based in Vladičin Han (“the debtor”).", "7. On 7 October 2003, 28 January 2004 and 21 September 2004 the Vladičin Han Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified sums in respect of salary arrears, social security contributions and procedural costs.", "8. These judgements became final on 6 November 2003, 15 March 2004 and 26 October 2004, respectively.", "9. On 12 August 2011, 2 September 2011 and 17 August 2011, respectively, the Vladičin Han Municipal Court issued enforcement orders with regard to the said judgements.", "10. On 6 March 2013 the Vranje Court of First Instance, acting now as an enforcement court instead of the Vladičin Han Municipal Court, found, with respect to the judgments of 28 January 2004 and 21 September 2004, that the debtor had no assets against which the enforcement could be carried out and requested the applicant to propose a new inventory of the debtor’s assets within 45 days. The said court also warned the applicant that should he fail to do so, or if during the new inventory no assets were to be found, the court could decide to stay the enforcement proceedings.", "11. The applicant did not propose a new inventory of debtor’s assets and by decision of the Vranje Court of First Instance of 10 May 2013 the enforcement proceedings were stayed in respect of the judgments of 28 January 2004 and 21 September 2004.", "12. The enforcement proceedings instituted on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Vladičin Han Municipal Court on 7 October 2003 continued and are still pending." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Vardenis. She worked as a judge at Gegharkunik Regional Court.", "6. On 17 February 2004 the Minister of Justice filed a motion with the Council of Justice seeking to have the applicant dismissed from her post under Section 30 (8) of the Law on the Status of a Judge. The motion stated that the applicant had been severely reprimanded on three occasions, namely in 1997, 2000 and 2001, for various gross violations of the rules of criminal procedure and another set of disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against her on the same grounds in December 2003.", "7. On 2 March 2004 the Council of Justice examined the motion and decided to form a three-member commission to examine the factual basis of the motion and to report back to the Council.", "8. On 27 April 2004 the Council of Justice adopted a conclusion recommending to the President of Armenia that the applicant be dismissed.", "9. On 30 April 2004 the President of Armenia issued a decree dismissing the applicant from her post.", "10. On 15 March 2005 the applicant lodged a claim with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to annul the President’s Decree of 30 April 2004 as unlawful. She argued that her dismissal from work had been in violation of a number of provisions of domestic law and various European instruments relating to the status of a judge. In particular, the motion for dismissal filed by the Minister of Justice on 17 February 2004 had been based upon matters which had been the subject of earlier disciplinary proceedings and in respect of which penalties had already been imposed. The motion did not contain any reasoning and was not accompanied by any supporting documentation and was, therefore, unsubstantiated. She further argued that judicial decisions were not supposed to be subject to a review other than by way of an appeal procedure prescribed by law. Thus, the commission of gross violations of the law (the alleged grounds for her dismissal) could only have been found by a higher court (which had not happened in her case) and not by non-judicial bodies and officials, such as the Council of Justice or the Minister of Justice. Finally, she claimed that the question of her dismissal had been examined by the Council of Justice in her absence, in violation of the relevant rules.", "11. On 26 May 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided under Article 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure to terminate the proceedings on the ground that the applicant’s claim was not subject to examination by the courts of general jurisdiction. In doing so, the District Court referred, inter alia, to Article 100 (1) of the Constitution, Article 15 § 2 of the Civil Code and Article 160 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CCP).", "12. On 7 June 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal.", "13. On 13 July 2005 the Civil Court of Appeal examined and dismissed the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.", "14. On 5 August 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law.", "15. On 23 September 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and decided to terminate the proceedings on the same grounds as the District Court.", "16. On 16 November 2006, in proceedings unrelated to this case, the Constitutional Court found the second paragraph of Article 160 § 1 of the CCP to be unconstitutional." ]

[ "6" ]

[]

[]

[ "6. At the time of the facts set out below the applicants resided in the United Kingdom on student visas. Their details are set out in the appendix.", "7. On 8 April 2009 the applicants were arrested, along with nine others, under the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended (“the 2000 Act”), in various locations in the North West of England. The arrests occurred in the context of Operation Pathway.", "8. Mr Sher was arrested at 6.35 p.m. on 8 April under section 41 of the 2000 Act (see paragraph 91 below) on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism. According to the custody record, his detention was authorised to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by way of questions.", "9. At around 10 p.m. a review of Mr Sher’s detention was carried out by a senior police officer. Mr Sher made no representations. His continued detention was authorised as necessary in order to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by questioning.", "10. At 7.40 a.m. on 9 April a notice (“TACT 5 form”) was served on the applicant’s solicitor, Mr Yousaf. The notice set out, inter alia, the following:\n“You are hereby informed that\n...\nSULTAN SHER\nhas been arrested under the provisions of Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as it is reasonably suspected that he is or has been involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.”", "11. Mr Yousaf confirmed that he was happy for further reviews of detention to take place in his absence and that he had no representations to make at that time.", "12. At 9.35 a.m. a further review of Mr Sher’s detention took place. Mr Sher was advised that his continued detention was believed to be necessary to obtain relevant evidence by questioning; to preserve relevant evidence; to await the results of examination or analyses of relevant evidence; and to secure the examination/analysis of anything with a view to obtaining evidence.", "13. At around 4 p.m., Mr Yousaf was provided with a copy of a pre-interview briefing document (“brief”). The third paragraph of the brief said:\n“Your client has been arrested on suspicion of being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism contrary to section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Your client was informed that the arrest was necessary to allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence. After caution your client made no reply. The arrest followed an Intelligence Operation conducted by the North West Counter Terrorism Unit.”", "14. It went on to list twelve names of people under arrest at different locations and said that their homes and associated premises were the subject of search, recovery and forensic scrutiny. Ten properties were the subject of such searches, although it was said that this was likely to increase “as further intelligence associating individuals to various premises come to the attention of the investigative team”. It added:\n“Your client should be made aware that such examinations of scenes will include searches for bomb-making equipment, devices, explosives, composite material, recipes, documentary evidence, computers and IT storage devices and mobile telephones ...”", "15. It concluded:\n“Your client will be asked questions relating to his access and association to various properties and individuals subject of this investigation. Your client will be asked about computer usage and methods of communication but most significantly, he will be asked questions relating to his knowledge or any information he might have in relation to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism ...”", "16. At around 5 p.m. a further review of Mr Sher’s detention took place. His continued detention was deemed necessary for the reasons previously set out.", "17. Shortly after 6 p.m. a first police interview began. Mr Sher was asked detailed questions about other people arrested, the various premises being searched and his knowledge of bomb-making equipment. He made no comment in response to these questions. The interview lasted for around one and a half hours in total.", "18. Shortly before midnight, a further review of Mr Sher’s detention took place. His continued detention was deemed necessary for the reasons previously set out.", "19. Mr Sharif was arrested at 5.37 p.m. on 8 April under section 41 of the 2000 Act on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism. According to the custody record, his detention was authorised to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by way of questions and the applicant was informed.", "20. At 11 p.m. a review of Mr Sharif’s detention was carried out by a senior police officer. Mr Sharif made no representations. His continued detention was authorised as necessary to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by questioning.", "21. At 7.40 a.m. on 9 April, a TACT 5 form was served on Mr Yousaf in respect of Mr Sharif in the same terms as the form served as regards Mr Sher (see paragraph 10 above). Again Mr Yousaf confirmed that he was happy for further reviews of detention to take place in his absence.", "22. At 9.50 a.m. a further review of Mr Sharif’s detention took place. Mr Sharif was advised that his continued detention was believed to be necessary to obtain relevant evidence by questioning; to preserve relevant evidence; to await the results of examination or analyses of relevant evidence; and to secure the examination/analysis of anything with a view to obtaining evidence.", "23. At 4.50 p.m. a further review of Mr Sharif’s detention took place. His continued detention was deemed necessary for the reasons previously set out.", "24. At some point in the afternoon, Mr Sharif received a brief in almost the same terms as that received by Mr Sher (see paragraphs 13-15 above). He was subsequently interviewed for around half an hour and was asked in particular about other people arrested. He made no comment.", "25. At 11.45 p.m. a further review of Mr Sharif’s detention took place. His continued detention was deemed necessary for the reasons previously set out.", "26. Mr Farooq was arrested at 5.35 p.m. on 8 April under section 41 of the 2000 Act on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism. According to the custody record, the reasons for his detention were explained to him.", "27. At around 9.45 p.m. a review of Mr Farooq’s detention was carried out by a senior police officer. Mr Farooq made no representations. His continued detention was authorised as necessary in order to secure and preserve evidence and to obtain evidence by questioning.", "28. On 9 April, a TACT 5 form was served on Mr Yousaf in respect of Mr Farooq in the same terms as the form served as regards Mr Sher (see paragraph 10 above). Again Mr Yousaf confirmed that he was happy for further reviews of detention to take place in his absence.", "29. At 9.15 a.m. a further review of Mr Farooq’s detention took place. Mr Farooq was advised that his continued detention was believed to be necessary to obtain relevant evidence by questioning; to preserve relevant evidence; to await the results of examination or analyses of relevant evidence; and to secure the examination/analysis of anything with a view to obtaining evidence.", "30. At 5.40 p.m. a further review of Mr Farooq’s detention took place. His continued detention was deemed necessary for the reasons previously set out.", "31. At some point in the afternoon, Mr Farooq received a brief in almost the same terms as that received by Mr Sher (see paragraphs 13-15 above). A subsequent police interview lasted for around half an hour and Mr Farooq and was asked in particular about other people arrested. He made no comment.", "32. Shortly before midnight, a further review of Mr Farooq’s detention took place. His continued detention was deemed necessary for the reasons previously set out.", "33. Meanwhile, on 8 April 2009, the police applied for and were granted search warrants by the Manchester Magistrates’ Court in respect of a number of addresses connected with the applicants. The police officer making the application indicated that he had reasonable grounds for believing that the material was likely to be of substantial value to a terrorist investigation and that it had to be seized in order to prevent it from being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.", "34. The relevant material was defined as:\n“Correspondence, leaflets, posters, magazines, subscription forms, identification documents, travel documents, passports, maps, sketches, plans, telephone records, accommodation details, literature/books, vehicle documents in relation to use/control, correspondence in relation to other properties/lock ups/garages and their keys, receipts for purchased goods, records of religious/political beliefs, handwritten notes, receipts, invoices, order forms, delivery notes, adverts, travel information land sea and air. Computers, computer equipment, PDA’s software, hardware, digital storage, faxes, printers, scanners, copiers, printer paper, DVDs, CDs, CD Roms, video/audio cassettes, memory sticks, mobile phones, sim cards, evidence of purchase of mobile phones and registration and billing, credit cards, top-up cards, cash, cheque books, money transfer documents, financial documents, cameras/video equipments, photographs/negatives, communication devices, chemical or pre cursor materials, memorabilia/ornaments/flags, items to conceal or transport items, any item believed to be connected to terrorism ...”", "35. Search warrants were granted in those terms. The warrants included these words:\n“Authority is hereby given for any constable, accompanied by such person or persons as are necessary for the purposes of the search, to enter the said premises on one occasion only within one month from the date of issue of this warrant and to search the premises ...”", "36. The search of Mr Sher’s home address was conducted over a ten-day period between 8 April and 18 April. The search at his place of work was conducted between 11 and 14 April.", "37. Mr Sharif and Mr Farooq shared an address. Their residence was the subject of a search between 8 April and 19 April.", "38. In relation to all of the properties that were searched, the police went to the property first thing in the morning and worked in shifts until about 7 p.m. They then closed up the property and it was cordoned off. They resumed their work at the property again the next morning, and worked in this way until the search was concluded.", "39. On 9 April the applicants were informed that an application would be made at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court for a warrant of further detention for the period of seven days beginning with their day of arrest; and that a hearing would take place on 10 April. The notice of the application and the hearing went on to explain:\n“\"Both yourself and your legal representative may make written or oral representations and attend a hearing, subject to the provision of Schedule 8 para 33(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides that the judicial authority may exclude you or your legal representative from any part of the hearing. Your legal representative has been informed by written notice of his, and your, right to attend the hearing, subject to the provision mentioned above. Police are seeking a Warrant of Further Detention for the period of seven days beginning with the time of your arrest because it is necessary in order to obtain or preserve relevant evidence or pending the result of an examination or analysis of any relevant evidence or of anything the examination or analysis of which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining relevant evidence relating to the commission of an offence or offences under the provisions of Section 40(1)(a) or which indicates you are a person who falls within the provisions of Section 40(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000.”", "40. The application to the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court contained, at section 9 under a heading “Further Enquiries to be made”, a lengthy description of the police operation and the current state of play in the ongoing investigation. The section 9 material was not provided to the applicants or Mr Yousaf.", "41. The hearing was fixed for 9.30 a.m. on 10 April 2009. Part of the hearing was closed to allow the District Judge to scrutinise and ask questions about the material in section 9. The applicants and Mr Yousaf were therefore excluded from this part of the hearing. They made no complaint about the procedure at that time.", "42. At the open part of the hearing, a senior police officer made an oral application for further detention which was reduced to writing and a copy of the note was provided to the applicants and to Mr Yousaf. The written note explained why the section 9 material was being withheld and provided some details about the police operation. It also gave details of all the property seized so far and explained that the investigation contained:\n“intelligence and evidence that support[ed] the premise that [the applicants] through significant association with other detained persons [were] conspiring to plan a terrorist attack within the UK.”", "43. Mr Yousaf cross-examined the police officer during the hearing and did not complain about the applicants’ detention or suggest that they should not be further detained.", "44. At 1.20 p.m. the District Judge granted the warrants for further detention until 15 April. The formal notification of the decision explained:\n“On application by a police officer of at least the rank of Superintendent, and having taken account of representations made by or on behalf of the person named above concerning the grounds upon which further detention is sought, I am satisfied that in accordance with paragraphs 30 and 32 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, that:\n...\n(ii) the investigation in connection with which the person is detained is being conducted diligently and expeditiously;\n(iii) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the further detention of the person named above is necessary to obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him or otherwise or to preserve relevant evidence, or pending a result of an investigation or analysis of any relevant evidence or of anything the examination or analysis of which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining relevant evidence...”", "45. On 10 April 2009 Mr Sher was provided with a second brief. It indicated that one of the other arrested suspects had said that he had lived with Mr Sher at two addresses and that he had knowledge of another arrested suspect. This document formed the basis of an interview with Mr Sher which began shortly after 6 p.m. and concluded one and a half hours later. During the interview, Mr Sher was asked about his acquaintance with some of the other arrested suspects and his familiarity with some of the searched premises. He made no reply to the questions put.", "46. No interviews were carried out over 11 and 12 April, which was the weekend of Easter.", "47. On 13 April Mr Sher received a third brief which contained details of material found at various searched properties which could allegedly be linked to him. The brief was used as the basis of a further series of interviews which began at around 1 p.m. and lasted for about four hours in total. Again Mr Sher answered no comment to the points put to him.", "48. On 14 April 2009 Mr Sher and his solicitor were provided with a fourth brief. It identified a number of items which were said to be “areas of interest” to the investigation, including: text messages between detainees; maps outlining designated areas of interest which significant numbers of the public would be expected to frequent; a detailed handwritten document depicting a militaristic zone abroad; access to and movements around the security industry including access to airports; mobile telephone use; international travel, including visits to Pakistan, and the purpose of travel; suspected reconnaissance at public locations; meetings of significance; and money transfers abroad. The document went on to say:\n“Evidence exists linking your client to persons currently in custody. Direct evidence exists of the detainees meeting on a number of occasions both in Liverpool and Manchester. Mobile telephone pictures exist illustrating further associations between those persons arrested on this operation.\nThe purpose of this briefing is to broadly outline the police investigation and its strong belief that preparatory acts for an attack plan were in place. A significant amount of exhibits are still currently being assessed and may form part of further pre-interview briefing.”", "49. Again, the document provided the basis of an interview with Mr Sher which began shortly before 1 p.m. and lasted for about an hour and twenty minutes. Mr Sher declined to comment.\n(b) Mr Sharif", "50. On 10 April 2009 Mr Sharif was provided with a second brief. It was based on information provided by some of the other detainees and concerned his acquaintance with them. It formed the basis of an interview with Mr Sharif which began at around 4 p.m. and concluded one and a half hours later. During the interview, Mr Sharif was asked about his acquaintance with some of the other arrested suspects and made no reply to the questions put.", "51. Again, no interviews were carried out over the Easter weekend of 11 and 12 April.", "52. On 13 April Mr Sharif received a third brief. It provided details of material found at his place of residence. The document was used as the basis of a further series of interviews which began at around 1.30 p.m. and lasted for about three hours in total. Mr Sharif answered no comment to the points put to him.", "53. On 14 April 2009 Mr Sharif was provided with a fourth brief. It contained details of information provided by other detainees and otherwise reproduced the content of Mr Sher’s fourth brief (see paragraph 48 above). It provided the basis of an interview with Mr Sharif which lasted for about three hours. Mr Sharif declined to comment.\n(c) Mr Farooq", "54. On 10 April 2009 Mr Farooq was provided with a second brief. It was based on information provided by some of the other detainees and concerned his acquaintance with them. It formed the basis of an interview with Mr Farooq which began at around 4 p.m. and concluded just over an hour later. During the interview, Mr Farooq was asked about his acquaintance with some of the other arrested suspects and made no reply to the questions put.", "55. Again, no interviews were carried out over the Easter weekend of 11 and 12 April.", "56. On 13 April Mr Farooq received a third brief which set out details of exhibits recovered from properties linked to him. The briefing document was used as the basis of a further series of interviews which lasted for just over two hours. Again Mr Farooq answered no comment to the points put to him.", "57. On 14 April 2009 Mr Farooq was provided with a fourth brief in terms almost identical to that provided to Mr Sharif (see paragraph 48 above). It provided the basis of an interview with Mr Farooq which lasted for just over an hour. Mr Farooq declined to comment.", "58. On 14 April 2009 the applicants and Mr Yousaf were informed that an application had been made to the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to extend the warrants of further detention for a further seven days. Notification of this application was in similar terms to the earlier notice. Section 9 of the application, which was withheld from the applicants, contained detailed information about the background to the investigation, the associations of the applicants, the scenes that had been searched, the forensic analysis, and the phones, computers, DVDs and documents that had been recovered. Under section 10, there was a list of bullet points under the heading “Reason Detention is Necessary Whilst Enquiries Made”, which included the need to await the conclusion of forensic searches and examination and the outcome of analyses instructed and the need to question the applicants concerning items found in their possession or at premises linked with them.", "59. The application was heard on 15 April at around 9.30 a.m. and the applicants attended by video link. The hearing was entirely open. A senior police officer made the oral application, which had again been reduced to writing and provided to the applicants and Mr Yousaf. He said that the police operation in question was the most significant counter-terrorism investigation since a plot in 2006 to cause explosions on aeroplanes through the use of liquid bombs; and that the North West Counter Terrorism Unit had never undertaken an investigation of this size. He explained that searches had taken place at various properties and that only one scene had been completed and released. Three were awaiting results of forensic results and seven scenes were still being searched. A total of 3,887 exhibits had been recovered to date. Priority was being given to exhibits such as documents, computers, mobile phones, sim cards and data storage devices. A large number of computers were being searched as well as DVDs and CDs. 127 phone or sim cards had been recovered and were being forensically examined, some with large memories. The application concluded by seeking the extension to the warrant on the grounds that it was necessary to obtain relevant evidence by questioning, to preserve relevant evidence, and pending the result or analysis of any further evidence.", "60. At around 10.15 a.m. the Senior District Judge granted the extensions sought. The formal notification in relation to each applicant confirmed in writing that the judge was satisfied that the investigation was being conducted diligently and expeditiously and that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the further detention of the applicants was necessary to obtain relevant evidence. The warrants were extended by seven days, until 22 April 2009.", "61. Mr Sher was not interviewed on 15, 16, 17 or 18 April. However, on 18 April, further briefs were provided. The documents referred to his arrest on 8 April on suspicion of commission, preparation and instigation of terrorism and continued:\n“... It has been made apparent throughout the interview process, including safety interview conducted ... and in warrant applications, that we strongly believe that your client was involved in an attack plan.”", "62. The document referred specifically to a wordpad document recovered from a pen drive (“the Buddy email”), which appeared to be a personal email discussing the weather and plans for an Islamic wedding “after 15th and before 20th of this month”. The police believed this to be code and considered that it suggested an imminent attack. The document continued:\n“Specifically we believe that your client has been part of a conspiracy with others currently in custody to murder with explosives. He is also suspected of possessing articles considered to be of use in terrorist activity.”", "63. It identified various maps found with locations highlighted and photographs of public places in the North West of England. There was also a reference to a mobile phone belonging to another of the suspects which was found to contain Mr Sher’s telephone number.", "64. The briefing formed the basis of a series of interviews on 19 April in which specific questions were put as to Mr Sher’s knowledge of these documents and the other materials. No answers were forthcoming. The total duration of the interviews was about four and a half hours.", "65. On 20 April there was a final round of briefing documents, again referring to emails and computer communications, in particular via a specific and identified user name belonging to Mr Sher. In a subsequent interview lasting around one and a quarter hours, Mr Sher made no comment.\n(b) Mr Sharif and Mr Farooq", "66. Neither Mr Sharif nor Mr Farooq was interviewed on 15, 16 or 17 April. A further brief was provided on 18 April to each. The document summarised information provided by some of the other detainees; set out details of significant text messages received and sent from mobile telephones which were either in the applicants’ possession at the time of their arrest or discovered during the search of his residence; and gave details of other documents found during the searches, including maps of Manchester with locations highlighted. The briefing formed the basis of interviews with Mr Sharif and Mr Farooq on 18 April lasting for a total of almost three hours and one and half hours respectively. At the beginning of the interviews, Mr Sharif and Mr Farooq were told that the police believed that they had been conspiring with others to cause explosions. No responses were forthcoming during the interviews.", "67. On 19 April the applicants and their solicitor received a final briefing document in similar terms in each case. The document referred to their arrest on 8 April on suspicion of commission, preparation and instigation of terrorism and continued:\n“... It has been made apparent throughout the interview process, including safety interview conducted ... and in warrant applications, that we strongly believe that your client was involved in an attack plan.”", "68. The document referred to the Buddy email (see paragraph 62 above) and continued:\n“Specifically we believe that your client has been part of a conspiracy with others currently in custody to murder with explosives. He is also suspected of possessing articles considered to be of use in terrorist activity.”", "69. In subsequent interviews with each applicant lasting around one and a quarter hours, neither made any comment.", "70. No interviews took place on 20 April.", "71. On 21 April 2009 the applicants were released without charge and were served with deportation orders. They were then detained under immigration legislation and on 22 April 2009 were transferred into immigration service custody pending deportation.", "72. On 26 June 2009 the applicants commenced two sets of judicial review proceedings. In one (“the first action”), they sought to challenge the deportation orders. That action does not form the basis of their application to this Court. The other (“the second action”) was lodged against five defendants: (1) Greater Manchester Police (“GMP”); (2) West Yorkshire Police (“WYP”); (3) the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court; (4) Manchester Magistrates’ Court; and (5) the Home Secretary. In their claim form, the applicants sought to challenge the legality of their treatment between 8 and 21 April. They contended in particular that their rights under Articles 5 §§ 2 and 4 and 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached because they had not been provided with sufficient information at the time of arrest or detention as to the nature of the allegations against them; and because of the closed procedure permitted in hearing applications for warrants of further detention. They further argued that the searches of their homes were unlawful because the search warrants had been granted in terms that were too wide; because the terms of the warrants had been breached in that although the police had permission to undertake a search on one occasion they had actually occupied the premises for many days; and because of the seizures themselves.", "73. On 21 July 2009 permission to apply for judicial review in the second action was refused by the Divisional Court. The judge summarised the remedies sought:\n“3. The remedies sought by the claimants are extensive. They are set out in section 6 of the Claim Form in these terms:\n‘(1) A declaration that the arrest of all three claimants by the first defendant was unlawful.\n(2) A declaration that the detention of all three claimants authorised by the second defendant was unlawful.\n(3) A declaration that the detention of all three claimants authorised by the warrants of further detention, and the extension of those warrants, issued by the third defendant was unlawful.\n(4) A declaration that the procedure under Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the hearing of applications for warrants of further detention is incompatible with Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights.\n(5) An order quashing the search warrants at the home addresses of the claimants.\n(6) A declaration that ...the issuing of ... [search warrants for the home addresses of the applicants] by the fourth defendant was ... unlawful.\n(7) A declaration that the entry search and seizures at home addresses of the claimants was unlawful.\n(8) A mandatory order requiring the return of all items seized in execution of the search warrants forthwith together with any copies howsoever made or held by the defendants and their agents, and that no use be made of any knowledge obtained as a result of any examination or material unlawfully seized.\n(9) Any other relief the court considers appropriate.\n(10) Damages.\n(11) Costs.’”", "74. As regards the applicants’ complaints concerning the provision of information from the police about the reasons for their arrest and detention, the police argued that a private law remedy for wrongful arrest and wrongful imprisonment was open to the applicants and should have been pursued. The applicants insisted that judicial review was an appropriate remedy in respect of their complaints.", "75. The judge held that judicial review was not the appropriate forum. The issues which arose where questions of fact which were not appropriate for judicial review proceedings. He explained:\n“79. First, there is a pre-existing private law remedy available to these claimants against GMP and WYP. This is not a case where, if the claimants were not entitled to pursue judicial review proceedings, they would be left without a remedy. There can be no question of injustice if these proceedings were transferred to the QB [Queen’s Bench Division]: indeed, it is only if such a transfer occurred that the defendants could exercise their right to trial by jury. 80. Secondly, these claims involve potentially complex disputes of fact ... [S]uch fact-sensitive issues are wholly inappropriate for judicial review proceedings. 81. Thirdly, the claims being made by the claimants are historic ... There is therefore no reason for these proceedings to take up the judicial resources of the Administrative Court, which are required for the numerous urgent and prospective judicial review proceedings issued in the High Court every week. And although it is said that these issues are of public importance, that is not, without more, a reason to keep a fact-sensitive dispute, where there are obvious alternative remedies, in the Administrative Court. 82. I do not consider that the claimants’ complaint that there would be difficulties of public funding if the matter was transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division, or that the claimants may then be the subject of an application for security for costs, can have any relevance to the question of the proper forum for these claims. Judicial review proceedings do not exist in order for claimants to circumvent the usual rules relating to civil litigation and the funding and costs thereof. It would be wholly inappropriate to allow judicial review proceedings to become some sort of ‘costs-free’ civil jurisdiction, which gets a claimant to the same result as his private law remedies (regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute), but without the usual costs risks. I note too that the claimants say that public funding has not been readily available for these proceedings either, so that does not appear to be a material consideration in any event. The claimants would not have to return to the UK to give evidence in their private law action, which could instead be provided by way of video-link ...”", "76. He concluded that the matters raised ought to be addressed in an ordinary private law action in which the potentially complex factual arguments could be properly determined. However, he added the following caveat:\n“84. I make plain that this conclusion is subject to one point. If the claimants were able to demonstrate that there were other parts of these claims which were arguable, and in respect of which judicial review proceedings offered them their only remedy, then in circumstances where the underlying issue was the same – namely, whether or not the claimants were given sufficient information – it may be a pragmatic and flexible solution for all such matters to be dealt with together in one set of judicial review proceedings. Accordingly, it is important in the subsequent sections of this Judgment to identify whether or not there are any such arguable judicial review claims.”", "77. He turned to consider the arguability of the judicial review claims against the police, in the event that he was wrong as to the appropriate forum. In that case, he said, the issue was whether, on the material before the court, permission to seek judicial review should be granted on the basis that no-one properly directing himself as to the relevant law could reasonably have reached the decision to arrest and detain the applicants (what he called a typical Wednesbury argument).", "78. The judge referred, inter alia, to this Court’s judgment in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182. He examined the lawfulness of the decision to arrest and commented as follows:\n“91. Each claimant was told that he was being arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 because the officer arresting him reasonably suspected that he was a terrorist. In my judgment, nothing more was required at that moment. As the decision in Fox and Others makes plain, a general statement of that sort will not usually amount to a breach of Article 5.2, provided of course that, thereafter, further information as to how and why such suspicions are held is promptly given to the suspect. For the reasons given in the next section of this Judgment, I am in no doubt that, on the material available to the court, such further information was given promptly to the claimants.”", "79. In the judge’s view, the applicants could only challenge the lawfulness of their actual arrest by way of judicial review proceedings if their case was that the arresting officers did not honestly suspect them of being terrorists or that such belief was unreasonable. Since the applicants did not allege the absence of reasonable suspicion, the lawfulness of the arrests could not be impugned and the application to seek judicial review of the decision to arrest them was “hopeless”.", "80. Concerning the lawfulness of the decisions to detain the applicants for the first forty-eight hours, the judge said:\n“94. The custody logs demonstrate that, during the first 38 hours of the claimants’ detention, the reviews were carried out at 12 hourly intervals and that all the appropriate and relevant information was taken into account. The records also reveal that neither the claimants nor their solicitor took any point as to their continuing detention during this period of 38 hours or so. On the face of the documents, therefore, I consider that it is impossible to say that any sustainable Wednesbury case as to absence of information emerges at all. 95. That view is confirmed by a consideration of the documents provided to the claimants during this early period ... [O]n 9th April 2009 the claimants were given [the first brief] and, having had a chance to consider the material there contained, they were interviewed at length about it. From this information, the claimants would have been in no doubt that they were being detained under suspicion of being involved, with other named conspirators, in a plan to plant a terrorist bomb. In all the circumstances, it seems to me that this was sufficient information to satisfy Article 5.2 and Article 5.4, at least at that early stage.”", "81. In response to the applicants’ allegation that their detention after 10 April was unlawful because it was on the basis of information solely derived from closed hearings, the judge emphasised that only part of the hearing on 10 April was closed and that the hearing on 15 April was entirely open. He considered that the applicants were being provided with sufficient information during this period to justify their continuing detention. He therefore viewed this part of the claim for judicial review as “fundamentally flawed”. He noted that counsel for the applicants repeatedly asserted that the basis for the applicants’ detention had never been explained to them, without ever attempting to engage with or address the contents of the various documents which had been provided to them. The judge continued:\n“98. ... [I]t is plain from all that material that the allegations being made, and the questions being asked, were becoming more and more specific as the days passed, and that by the end of the 13 day period of detention, the claimants were each aware that they were being detained on suspicion of being involved, with other named co‑conspirators, to cause imminent bomb explosions at certain specified public locations in the North West of England. 99. [Counsel for the applicants] submitted that the claimants should have been given detailed information at the outset of their detention, with a level of specificity that was akin to the information in an indictment ... I consider that that submission is wrong in principle. The whole purpose of those parts of the ... [2000 Act] is to allow suspects to be detained after arrest without being charged because, at the time of their arrest, and perhaps for many days thereafter, it may not be possible to formulate charges against them as specifically as would appear on an indictment. That is precisely why Parliament has said that suspects can be detained without charge for up to 28 days, in order to allow further information as to the proposed charges to be obtained. Provided that sufficient information is provided to allow those detained under the [2000 Act] to challenge the lawfulness of that detention, if that is what they wish to do, then that is sufficient to satisfy both Article 5.2 and Article 5.4. 100. Of course ... the time will always come when more specific details of the suspected offences must be provided to the detainees. In this case, for the reasons that I have given, I consider that sufficient information was provided to the claimants to allow them to know why they were being detained and to challenge the lawfulness of the decision to detain them. They knew who the other conspirators were alleged to be, what the suspected crime was (intending explosions in particular public places in the North West), and what at least some of the evidence was ... that directly linked them to these allegations.”", "82. The judge concluded in respect of the provision of information that if, contrary to his view, judicial review proceedings against the police were appropriate, he would refuse permission as the claim was not arguable on the material provided. He accepted that the question whether the decisions of the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court to issue warrants of further detention were unlawful because inadequate information had been provided to the applicants about the reasons for their continued detention was potentially a matter of public law. However, he was satisfied that the claim was “fanciful” and unarguable since sufficient information was provided in the documents and the open hearings for the applicants to know why they were being detained.", "83. In respect of allegations that the police had gone outside the terms of the search warrant by executing it over a number of days and of complaints about the seizures themselves, the police again argued that judicial review proceedings were not appropriate and that private law proceedings should have been pursued by the applicants. The judge found this submission to be unarguably correct.", "84. In any event, the judge held that even if these were matters for judicial review, there was no basis for concluding that the claim was arguable. He considered that the words “on one occasion” in the warrant authorised the police go to the property in question, undertake the search, and, when they had concluded that search, restore the property to the control of its occupiers. That was precisely what had happened here. The fact that the “occasion” lasted for more than one calendar day was irrelevant since there was nothing temporal about the word “occasion”. Further, the complaint that certain seized items had not been returned could and would have been resolved had the applicants followed the judicial review pre‑action protocol. Again, the judge concluded that if, contrary to his view, judicial review proceedings were appropriate, he would refuse permission as the claim was “hopeless”.\n(b) The scope of the search warrants", "85. As to the complaint that the warrants were too wide, a complaint which the judge found was amenable to judicial review, he observed that the criticism appeared to be that because the warrants contained a lengthy list of references to common household items, such a list must, of itself, be too extensive or onerous. He rejected that submission for three reasons. First, he considered the assertion to be too general since a list that was too onerous in one case might be entirely appropriate in another. He continued:\n“109. Secondly, in a situation like this, the police will be unlikely to know precisely what they are looking for. So they will identify those sorts of items which, in the past, have been relevant to searches such as this. Thus there are specific references to travel documents, computers, books, DVDs and the like. But it would be unrealistic for this court now to say, over a year later, that one or two of these items might, with hindsight, have been irrationally included in a list produced at the outset of a major terrorism investigation. 110. Thirdly, the court must recognise, in undertaking these urgent investigations, the police are not hamstrung by an artificially restricted list of items that they can investigate and/or seize. It would be contrary to the public interest if, on a search of premises in the context of an ongoing and urgent terrorism investigation, the police were inhibited because item A was on the list but item B was not. There is a clear public interest in ensuring that, within properly defined limits, the list is not restricted.”", "86. He concluded that it was “inevitable” that in cases like this the warrants would be in relatively wide terms, explaining that the need to ensure public safety under the Terrorism Act 2000 required nothing less. He accordingly rejected the submission that the warrants were in terms that were too wide or that there was an arguable case that the decision to issue the warrants in those terms was unlawful or irrational.", "87. Finally, the judge addressed the claim that the procedure for hearing applications for warrants of further detention the 2000 Act was incompatible with section 5 § 4 of the Convention because although it allowed for a closed procedure, there was no system of special advocates in place. He found this to be a matter which, if it was appropriate to grant permission, would justify judicial review proceedings.", "88. However, he considered the claim to be unarguable. He referred to the judgment of the House of Lords in Ward (see paragraphs 104-105 below) which, he said, made clear that the closed hearing procedure was compatible with the Convention. He therefore rejected the submission that the provision of a special advocate was essential to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. He further noted that the applicants had not explained why the absence of express provision in the 2000 Act for a special advocate led inevitably to the conclusion that the scheme was incompatible with Article 5 § 4, since the District Judge could provide the necessary critical scrutiny in the interests of the person who was the subject of the proceedings. In any event, he held that such an advocate could have been appointed by the District Judge had such a course been considered necessary in the interests of justice. He noted that the applicants had not requested the appointment of a special advocate at either hearing. Finally, the judge considered the applicants’ case to be wrong on the facts since the warrants of further detention were not made entirely on the basis of closed information: only part of the 10 April hearing had been closed and the 15 April hearing had been entirely open. The claim for permission therefore failed both in principle and on the facts.", "89. In September 2009, all three applicants voluntarily returned to Pakistan." ]

[ "5", "8" ]

[ 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 52, 53, 67, 77, 82 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicant, a parent of two young children, is a homeless person in priority need of accommodation within the meaning of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”).", "6. Birmingham City Council (“the Council”) is a local housing authority within the meaning of the 1996 Act and is required, under Part VII of that Act, to perform statutory functions in relation to homeless persons in its area.", "7. The applicant applied as a homeless person to Birmingham City Council for assistance in October 2006. By letter dated 7 November 2006 the Council determined that the applicant was homeless, eligible for assistance, in priority need and not intentionally homeless. The authority therefore accepted that it owed the applicant the “main housing duty” to provide accommodation to her and her family. On 8 November 2006 the authority made the applicant an offer of accommodation which she refused because she was unhappy with the location. The authority told the applicant that in its view the accommodation was suitable but following a review of that decision, which was determined in the applicant’s favour, they agreed to make her another offer.", "8. On 14 March 2007 a Housing Officer informed the applicant by telephone that another offer was being made, that a viewing had been arranged and that a letter would follow. The authority claims that on that same day a written offer of accommodation at 16 Bromford Lane, Birmingham was sent to the applicant. That letter contained a statement to the effect that if the applicant refused the offer without good cause the authority would consider that it had discharged its duty to her under Part VII of the 1996 Act. However, the applicant denied receiving the letter; instead, she claimed that she had to telephone the housing office to obtain the address and arrange the viewing appointment. She viewed the property on 19 March 2007 but declined the offer as she was not happy with the condition of the communal area.", "9. By letter dated 21 March 2007 the Council notified the applicant that, by reason of her rejection of its offer, pursuant to section 193 of the Housing Act its duty to her under Part VII of the 1996 Act had been discharged. By letter dated 29 March 2007 the applicant notified the Council that she had not received an offer in writing and requested that the Council review its decision.", "10. While the applicant’s case was pending before the review panel, a further offer of accommodation was made to her pursuant to a different scheme, namely the scheme for the provision of housing accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act. She did not accept this offer.", "11. On 1 May 2007 a Homelessness Review Officer employed by the Council conducted a telephone interview with the applicant to establish her reasons for refusing the offer of accommodation at 16 Bromford Lane. The Officer claimed that in the course of this conversation the applicant accepted that she had in fact received the offer letter but refused the offer of accommodation because there was no lift and the entrance to the property was dirty, which could put her youngest son’s health at risk. However, the applicant claims that at the time she had thought she was being questioned about the subsequent offer of accommodation, in respect of which she did not deny having received a letter.", "12. By letter dated 2 May 2007 the Homelessness Review Officer upheld the decision that the applicant’s refusal of the offer of accommodation had discharged the Council’s main housing duty to her under section 193(2) of the 1996 Act. In particular, the Officer found that the applicant had been sent an offer letter from the Council which complied with the mandatory requirements of section 193 of the 1996 Act prior to her refusal and there was no reason to believe that she had not received it. In any case, she noted that the applicant had not refused the accommodation because she had not received a written offer but because she did not consider the accommodation to be suitable for her family’s needs.", "13. The applicant appealed to Birmingham County Court under section 204 of the 1996 Act, which allowed for an appeal on a point of law only. The jurisdiction exercised by the County Court under section 204 was that of judicial review. In her grounds of appeal the applicant claimed that the Council, in reaching its decision, had taken into account irrelevant considerations and/or acted under a fundamental mistake of fact; that the Council had acted unlawfully as it had failed to make adequate inquiries to enable it to reach a lawful decision; that its decision was one which no rational Council would have made; that it had fettered its discretion; and that it had acted in breach of natural justice.", "14. The appeal was heard on 29 August 2007, on which date the judge noted that the only ground of appeal argued before him was that the letter of offer had failed to arrive. The applicant submitted that the County Court should hear evidence on the matter so that it could determine it for itself. However, although the judge accepted that the Homelessness Review Officer was not an independent or impartial tribunal, he found that the decision whether or not the letter had been received was properly and fairly to be made by her and he declined to hear evidence on the point. Although it was not specifically stated in the correspondence between the Council and the applicant, the judge appeared to consider whether or not the Council had discharged its duty under section 193(7) (see paragraph 25 below).", "15. The applicant subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court. At each level, the grounds of appeal were that the decision taken by the Council’s Homelessness Review Officer had constituted a determination of the applicant’s civil rights for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; that the Officer had not been an independent or impartial tribunal as required by Article 6 § 1; that the decision of the Officer had turned on the resolution of a simple question of disputed primary fact, involving no application of specialist knowledge; that pursuant to Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom, no. 60860/00, 14 November 2006, Article 6 § 1 required that the applicant be able to appeal that simple factual determination; and, alternatively, that the restriction of all statutory appeals to points of law, no matter what the nature of the decision, was incompatible with Article 6 § 1.", "16. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court decision on the applicant’s appeal followed the decision of the House of Lords in Runa Begum v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5. In Runa Begum the House of Lords found that judicial review of a Homelessness Review Officer’s decision that a claimant had been unreasonable in rejecting the accommodation offered to her provided “sufficiency of review” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1. The House of Lords stressed that although the Officer had been called upon to resolve some disputed factual issues, these findings of fact were “only staging posts on the way to the much broader judgments” concerning local conditions and the availability of alternative accommodation, which the Officer had the specialist knowledge and experience to make. Although the Officer could not be regarded as independent, since she was employed by the Council which had made the offer of accommodation which the claimant had rejected, statutory regulations provided substantial safeguards to ensure that the review would be independently and fairly conducted, free from improper external influences. Any significant departure from the procedural rules would have afforded a ground of appeal.", "17. The applicant submitted that the present case could be distinguished from that of Runa Begum because it concerned the simple question of a finding of primary fact rather than an evaluative judgment, such as a qualitative assessment of “suitability”.", "18. On 7 November 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In doing so, it proceeded on the assumption that the case involved the determination of the applicant’s civil rights for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In relation to the question whether the decision of the Homelessness Review Officer had turned on the resolution of a simple question of primary fact, or whether it required the application of specialist knowledge, Thomas LJ stated that:\n“i) It is far from easy to draw the distinction advanced in practice. A finding of suitability is itself a finding based on conclusions of primary fact ...\nii) There would be considerable complexity in administering a scheme with these distinctions. A scheme which enabled certain factual issues to be subject to a full right of appeal and others which would not be so subject would be too uncertain and too complex ...\niii) ... [I]f the extent of the review by the court was determined by the answer to the questions of whether a finding of fact was a primary finding, or whether that finding required expertise or whether that finding was determinative, the room for argument and uncertainty would be considerable ...\n....\nv) The additional review which would be provided by the suggested full right of appeal on fact would not in practice be very wide ...\nvi) The full right of appeal sought from a review officer on fact might have to be significantly different from an appeal from a court ... the procedure adopted by the reviewing officer in reaching findings of fact is informal and there are no transcripts of evidence.\n....\nviii) There would therefore clearly be significant implications for not only the statutory scheme but for the court and tribunal system, if this court were to hold that a full right of appeal was required on findings of primary fact or on issues of primary fact where the finding was determinative ... The statutory scheme for housing and the statutory scheme for the method of appeals in respect of courts and tribunals are determined by Parliament; funds are provided for their finance by Parliament ...\nix) The present scope of the appeal provides a real measure of protection for homeless appellants. It is clear from the careful judgments of Judge MacDuff QC and Judge McKenna that both considered that the housing authority had fairly treated both appellants in cases where the determinative issue was a question of fact. This conclusion reinforces the view I have expressed that the review by the County Court in cases of this kind was sufficient and that there is no reason to attempt to find that it is outside the scope of the decision in Runa Begum. It demonstrates, as Lord Bingham observed at paragraph 11, that the scheme properly operated should ensure fair treatment. I consider that it does whether the decision turns on a simple issue of primary fact or a conclusion of fact based on primary facts (such as a conclusion on suitability).”", "19. Thomas LJ therefore concluded that the decision of the House of Lords in Runa Begum applied to all County Court appeals under section 204 of the 1996 Act, no matter whether the decision turned on a simple issue of primary fact or not. He further held that the decision in Tsfayo, which concerned the housing benefit scheme, did not affect appeals brought in homelessness cases:\n“34. ... In the first place the Strasbourg Court relied on the decision in Runa Begum in reaching its conclusion and said nothing that cast doubt on the correctness of the decision. Secondly, the decisions in Runa Begum and Tsfayo each turned on a careful examination of the whole of the statutory scheme relevant to the particular case. Thirdly, it is apparent from the details of the scheme considered in Tsfayo that whereas in the case of prospective benefit, central government reimbursed the local authority 95% of what it was required to pay, it only reimbursed 50% of backdated awards (see paragraph 19 of the decision); this fact had been heavily relied upon in argument (see paragraph 37 of the decision) for the powerful contention that the hearing had taken place before a tribunal consisting of members of an authority which would be required to pay 50% of the benefit if it made an award in the applicant’s favour; the HBRB was not independent of the parties. Finally when the housing benefits scheme was looked upon as a whole, it was readily apparent that a conclusion could be reached, in contradistinction to the scheme under Part VII of the Housing Act, that the particular scheme was not compliant with Article 6.1.”", "20. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the determination by the Council, that its duty to secure accommodation for the applicant had ceased, was not a determination of her civil rights within the meaning of Article 6. Lord Hope of Craighead with whom Baroness Hale and Lord Brown agreed, stated that:\n“... I would be prepared now to hold that cases where the award of services or benefits in kind is not an individual right of which the applicant can consider himself the holder, but is dependent upon a series of evaluative judgments by the provider as to whether the statutory criteria are satisfied and how the need for it ought to be met, do not engage article 6(1). In my opinion they do not give rise to ‘civil rights’ within the autonomous meaning that is given to that expression for the purposes of that article.”", "21. In supporting that conclusion Lord Hope looked to what the relevant provisions within Part VII of the 1996 Act were intended to achieve. He observed that:\n“... It provides a right to assistance if the relevant conditions are satisfied. But this is not a pecuniary right, nor is the benefit that is to be provided defined by the application of specific rules laid down by the statute. Even where the full homelessness duty arises under section 193, the content of the statutory duty lacks precise definition. There is no private law analogy. The duty is expressed in broad terms – to secure that ‘accommodation is available’ – which leaves much to the discretionary administrative judgment of the authority.”", "22. He continued, following a review of the jurisprudence of the Court, by noting that:\n“43. There are however ... a number of straws in the wind since Runa Begum that suggest that a distinction can indeed be made between the class of social security and welfare benefits that are of the kind exemplified by Salesi v Italy whose substance the domestic law defines precisely and those benefits which are, in their essence, dependent upon the exercise of judgment by the relevant authority ...”", "23. Later in his judgment, Lord Hope, for completeness, set out some observations on whether the scheme of decision-making was Article 6‑compliant. He commented that the possibility, foreshadowed in argument, of separating simple, formal questions of “gateway” facts, such as the letter issue, from the expert assessment of suitability would needlessly complicate a scheme which was designed to be simple to administer.", "24. The court went on to observe that the fact that a County Court did not have a full fact-finding jurisdiction when hearing an appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act did not mean that the applicant was deprived of what was required to satisfy the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention. In this connection, Lord Hope said this:\n“54. ... For ease of administration the review is entrusted to a single officer who is equipped to deal with issues as to the suitability of the accommodation that has been declined. An answer to the question whether or not the letters were received was incidental to a more searching and judgmental inquiry into the accommodation’s suitability. ... These cases are quite different from Tsfayo, where no broad questions requiring professional knowledge or experience had to be addressed once the question whether there was good cause had been answered. In these circumstances I would hold that the ratio of the decision in Runa Begum should be applied and that the absence of a full fact-finding jurisdiction in the court to which an appeal lies under section 204 does not deprive it of what it needs to satisfy the requirements of article 6(1).”", "25. Unlike the County Court, the Supreme Court appeared to consider whether or not the Council had discharged its duty to the applicant under section 193(5); however, it appeared to accept that a formal letter of offer was required by that subsection." ]

[ "6" ]

[ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 20 ]

[]

[ "4. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Kars.", "5. As the facts of the case are in dispute between the parties, they will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 5-9 below). The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 10-13 below). The documentary evidence submitted by the applicant and the Government is summarised in Section D (paragraphs 14-30 below).", "6. On 21 October 2006 the applicant and three of her friends were in the city of Kars, distributing leaflets prepared by TAYAD (Association for Solidarity with the Families of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty), in a residential neighbourhood.", "7. A man in plain clothes arrived and attempted to seize the leaflets without showing his identity documents demonstrating that he was a police officer. As the applicant and her friends refused to comply with the man’s demand, he held two of the applicant’s friends around their necks. Subsequently, around thirty police officers arrived at the scene and arrested the applicant and her friends. In the course of the arrest, the police officers used force and hit the applicant on various parts of her body before putting her in a police vehicle. In the vehicle, a police officer sat on her head and continued to hit her. A number of police officers also touched various parts of her body and made sexually suggestive comments.", "8. The applicant was taken to hospital, where she was examined by a doctor who observed skin erosions, red patches (erythema) and sensitive areas on the applicant’s head, face, shoulders, lower back, abdomen and wrist. He concluded that the injuries were not life-threatening and a simple medical procedure was sufficient to treat them.", "9. The applicant was then taken to a police station, where the beating continued and where she was threatened with rape by one of the police officers. The applicant’s requests for information about the reasons for her arrest and for a lawyer were refused. Each time the applicant repeated her requests the police officers used offensive language.", "10. A lawyer who arrived at the police station the same afternoon secured the applicant’s release.", "11. On 21 October 2006 at around 11 a.m. the police received information according to which TAYAD members were distributing leaflets in a residential area in Kars. Two police officers, V.G. and H.Ö., arrived at the scene of the incident at 11.15 a.m. in order to verify whether the content of the leaflets was legal. One of the officers, V.G., approached the applicant and her friends, told them that he was a police officer and requested to see the content of the leaflets and their identity cards. As the applicant and her friends refused to comply and began using offensive language and hitting him, a second police officer intervened. They subsequently asked for help from other officers, who also arrived at the scene of the incident. The police arrested the applicant and her friends and tried to put them in a police vehicle. The arrestees, however, resisted arrest. They also continued to hit the officers in the vehicle. During the physical struggle between the arrestees and the police officers, V.G., was injured.", "12. At 11.30 a.m. the applicant was examined by a doctor, who observed minor injuries on her head, shoulders and wrist. At 11.45 a.m. V.G. was also subjected to a medical examination by the same doctor. According to the medical report issued in respect of V.G., he had pain and sensitivity in his lower back and numbness in his feet. The doctor considered that a simple medical procedure was sufficient to treat both the applicant’s and V.G.’s injuries.", "13. At 1 p.m. the applicant and her friends were taken to the police station upon the instructions of the Kars public prosecutor. The applicant and her friends refused to make statements to the police.", "14. At 4 p.m. the applicant and her friends were released from police custody and taken to a hospital for a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant observed the same injuries noted in the report issued at 11.30 a.m. on the same day.", "15. The medical reports of 11.30 a.m. and 4 p.m. regarding the applicant contain information about the physical injuries sustained by the applicant and the doctors’ opinions as to the gravity of the injuries in the respective sections of the reports entitled “findings regarding the lesions” and the “conclusion of the examination” (see paragraphs 8, 12 and 14 above). The sections of the reports entitled “conditions of examination”, “information regarding the incident”, “the complaints of the person examined” and “findings of the psychiatric examination” were not completed.", "16. At 1.30 p.m. on 21 October 2006 an arrest report was drafted by the police. According to this report, police officers had arrived at the scene of the incident as they had received information that members of TAYAD were distributing leaflets. When the police asked them to show the leaflets, the applicant and her friends put the leaflets in their bags and refused to present their identity documents. The report further stated that applicant and her friends had to be arrested through the use of force as they resisted the police officers and continued their acts. According to the report, the arrestees attacked the police officers by way of throwing themselves on the ground and chanting slogans. They were then put in the police vehicle by force and injured themselves in the vehicle by hitting their heads on the car glass and the door.", "17. At 1.40 p.m. V.G.’s statements were taken by another police officer. He contended that he had been injured by the applicant and her friends and asked for an investigation to be conducted against them.", "18. At 4.10 p.m. the applicant’s and her friends’ personal belongings were searched by four police officers who drafted a search report. According to this report, two of the arrestees each had a copy of the leaflet in their bags. The police returned all items found during the search when the applicant and her friends were released from police custody at around 4 p.m.", "19. In November 2006 the Kars public prosecutor initiated an investigation against the applicant and her friends. Within the context of this investigation, on 17 November 2006 the public prosecutor took statements from V.G. and H.Ö. The documents containing the police officers’ statements refer to them as the “complainants”. The officers contended that they had been obliged to use force together with other police officers who had come to assist them, as the applicant and her friends had attempted to beat V.G. The police officers stated that they did not wish to lodge a complaint against the applicant and her friends.", "20. On 23 November 2006 the applicant was questioned by the Kars public prosecutor as a suspect. In her statement, she described the ill‑treatment and the sexual assaults, and asked the public prosecutor to prosecute the police officers responsible for her ordeal. She also noted that she and her friends had downloaded the leaflets from the web and printed them. She stated that the content of the leaflets in question had not been illegal and that they had not committed any offence. The applicant’s legal representative was also present in the room and told the public prosecutor that while distributing the leaflets his client had been exercising her right under Article 10 of the Convention to impart her ideas and opinions. He complained that the police officers who had arrested his client had not shown her their identity documents and had not informed her of her rights. He further complained that the police had committed the offence of abuse of office as they had used violence against his client.", "21. On the same day two of the applicant’s friends, S.P and B.K., also made statements before the Kars public prosecutor as suspects. They both contended that they had been ill-treated by the police and requested that an investigation be initiated against the officers who were responsible for their ill-treatment.", "22. On 13 August 2007 the Kars public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Kars Criminal Court and accused the applicant and her three friends of obstructing the police officers in the execution of their duties under Article 265 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The public prosecutor alleged that the applicant and her friends had called the police officers “fascists”, “killers” and “enemies of the people”, had refused to show the police officers their identity cards and had hit them with their handbags. A case file was opened and given the number 2007/220.", "23. On 4 December 2007 the Kars Criminal Court held the first hearing in the case.", "24. On 24 March 2008 the criminal court heard V.G., the complainant police officer, in the absence of the applicant and her co-accused. V.G. contended that the applicant and her friends had chanted slogans, resisted arrest and hit him with their bags.", "25. On 27 March 2008 the applicant made statements before the first‑instance court. She stated that they had not chanted slogans or beaten the officers. They had not known whether those persons were police officers and, in any event, V.G. had not asked to see the content of the leaflets. According to the applicant, V.G. had merely taken hold of one of her friends and asked for assistance from other officers in order to carry out the arrest. She noted that they had been attacked and arrested without being able to understand that V.G. was a police officer. During the same hearing, the applicant’s lawyer maintained that the applicant’s trial for distributing leaflets was in violation of her rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights and, in particular, her right to freedom of expression and demonstration.", "26. On various dates the applicant’s co-accused gave evidence before the Kars Criminal Court. They all contended that they had not been asked to show the leaflets or their identity cards but had been arrested through the use of force although they had not resisted arrest.", "27. On 17 March 2009 the Kars Criminal Court convicted the applicant of obstructing the police officers in the execution of their duties and insulting them under Article 265 § 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced her to eleven months and twenty days’ imprisonment. The first-instance court noted that the police had gone to the scene of the incident as they had received information that members of TAYAD were distributing leaflets. In the light of the statements of the officers who had signed the police report, the medical reports and the arrest report, the Kars Criminal Court found it established that the accused had insulted the police officers, shouted that they would neither show their identity cards nor give the leaflets and injured V.G. by way of hitting him with their bags. Taking into account the fact that the applicant did not have any criminal record, her personality traits and her conduct during the hearings, the first-instance court considered that the applicant would not commit any further offence. It therefore decided to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment against her (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması) for a period of five years, pursuant to Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271).", "28. On 26 May 2009 the decision of 17 March 2009 became final.", "29. Meanwhile, the Kars public prosecutor initiated an investigation against V.G. and H.Ö. on the charge of abuse of office, upon the complaints lodged against them by the applicant and her friends.", "30. On 11 August 2007 the Kars public prosecutor decided that no proceedings should be brought against the police officers. In the public prosecutor’s opinion the applicant’s injuries had possibly been caused when she and her friends had resisted the police officers, who had been performing their duties. The public prosecutor noted in his decision that some of the police officers had also been injured during the incident.", "31. On 4 December 2007 the applicant’s lawyer filed an objection against the public prosecutor’s aforementioned decision. In his petition, the lawyer noted that the decision in question had not been served on him or his client and that they had become aware of it when the lawyer went to the court-house to read the documents in the case file on the same day. The applicant’s lawyer also noted that the applicant had been subjected to violence by the police and that she had not hit the police officers.", "32. On 21 December 2007 the Ardahan Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s objection against the Kars public prosecutor’s decision following an examination on the merits. The Assize Court considered that the force used by the police officers had been no more than necessary to counter the applicant’s resistance. The applicant claimed that this decision was not communicated to her or her lawyer and was put in the investigation file. Her lawyer became aware of it when he consulted that file on 21 January 2008. There is no document in the investigation file, submitted by the Government, demonstrating the notification of the decisions of 11 August 2007 and 21 December 2007 to the applicant or her lawyer." ]

[ "10", "3" ]

[ 4, 8, 15, 16, 17, 23, 25, 26, 28 ]

[]

[ "5. The applicants were born in 1961, 1960 and 1949, respectively, and live in Novi Pazar.", "6. They were employed by DP “Raška Holding Kompanija” AD, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter “the debtor”).", "7. On 27 March 2003, 11 December 2003 and 3 October 2005 respectively, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. These judgments became final on 22 April 2003, 16 January 2004 and 1 January 2006 respectively.", "8. On 23 May 2003, 25 February 2004 and 20 April 2006 respectively, upon the first applicant’s request to that effect, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgments and further ordered the debtor to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs.", "9. On 5 November 2007, the Tutin Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 20 November 2007.", "10. On 19 October 2012, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Tutin Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs.", "11. On 12 May 2008, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the third applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 22 July 2008.", "12. On 13 June 2011, upon the third applicant’s request to that effect, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the third applicant the enforcement costs.", "13. On 5 January 2004 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the debtor.", "14. On 11 September 2013 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor.", "15. The applicants duly reported their respective claims based on the above-mentioned judgments to the insolvency administration.", "16. The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing." ]

[ "P1-1", "6" ]

[]

[]