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hu	wikipedia	N/A	Szent Regina (francia: Sainte Reine, eredeti neve: Klementína ) 3. századi francia szent. Élete Szent Regina 236-ban született Autunban, amely a mai Franciaországban található. Édesanyja a szüléskor meghalt, apja pedig egy keresztény dajka gondjaira bízta, aki megkereszteltette a kislányt. Mikor ezt apja megtudta, dühöngőrohamban tört ki, és végül megtagadta a saját lányát. Regina amikor 15 éves volt, Gallia kormányzójának, a római Olybriusnak megakadt a szeme rajta. Elhatározta, hogy mindenáron feleségül veszi Őt. Szembesült a lány nemeslelkűségével és keresztény hűségességével. Ez nagyon felbosszantotta, majd kísérletet tett arra, hogy a lány megtagadja a hitét, de a szentlelkű leány eltökélten visszautasította ezt a kérést (hogy lemondjon Istenhez való hűségéről a házasság érdekében) és a lánykérésre határozott nemet mondott. Dühében a veréshez, korbácsoláshoz, megperzseléshez folyamodott, tűzforró fogóval égette meg, majd vasgerebennel is megkínozta. Mindezek ellenére Regina folytatta Istenhez szóló imádságait és ellenszegült Olybriusnak. Nemsokára lefejezték Alesiában, Autun egyházmegyéjében, amit Alise-Sainte-Reine-nek neveztek el Szent Regina után. A mártírhalálának pontos ideje ismeretlen: Decius keresztényüldözése idején, 251-ben történt, vagy Maximianus idején, 286-ban. Halála után Autunban hamarosan szentként kezdték tisztelni. Szent Regina hódolata, tisztelete Számtalan mártirológiában említik, mint tisztelt szentet. Reginát a katolikus egyház szeptember 7-én ünnepli illetve a Paderborni főegyházmegye június 20-án. Régen körmenetet tartottak Dijon városában a tiszteletére. 827-ben az ereklyéjét a flavignyi apátságba helyezték el, ahol 864-ben az életrajzát is lefordították. Ő ezt (életszentségének hirdetését) csodákkal viszonozta. Több település található Franciaországban, amit róla Sainte-Reine-nek neveztek el. Források Szent Regina, szerző: Garay János Katolikus szentek, boldogok A 230-as években született személyek 200-ban született személyek Kivégzett személyek A 250-es években elhunyt személyek
es	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 32004D0023 2004/23/CE: Decisión de la Comisión, de 29 de diciembre de 2003, por la que se establece la apertura de una investigación con arreglo al apartado 2 del artículo 27 del Reglamento (CE) n° 2501/2001 del Consejo con respecto a la violación de la libertad de asociación en Bielorrusia Diario Oficial n° L 005 de 09/01/2004 p. 0090 - 0090 Decisión de la Comisiónde 29 de diciembre de 2003por la que se establece la apertura de una investigación con arreglo al apartado 2 del artículo 27 del Reglamento (CE) n° 2501/2001 del Consejo con respecto a la violación de la libertad de asociación en Bielorrusia(2004/23/CE)LA COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS,Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea,Visto el Reglamento (CE) n° 2501/2001 del Consejo, de 10 de diciembre de 2001, relativo a la aplicación de un sistema de preferencias arancelarias generalizadas para el período comprendido entre el 1 de enero de 2002 y el 31 de diciembre de 2004(1), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) n° 1686/2003 de la Comisión(2) y, en particular, el apartado 2 de su artículo 27,Considerando lo siguiente:(1) La Comisión ha recibido información sobre la presunta violación de la libertad de asociación en Bielorrusia. La información ha sido suministrada conjuntamente por la Confederación internacional de organizaciones sindicales libres (CIOSL), la Confederación europea de sindicatos (CES) y la confederación mundial del trabajo (CMT).(2) La letra b) del apartado 1 del artículo 26 estipula que las preferencias arancelarias podrán retirarse con carácter temporal, para todos o parte de los productos originarios de un país beneficiario, en caso de "violación grave y sistemática de la libertad de asociación, el derecho a la negociación colectiva o el principio de no discriminación en materia de empleo y trabajo, o recurso al trabajo infantil, tal como se define en los convenios de la OIT".(3) La Comisión ha examinado la información presentada en relación con la presunta violación de la libertad de asociación en Bielorrusia. Tal violación se refiere a las restricciones sobre el derecho de los trabajadores y de los empresarios a crear sus propias organizaciones sin la interferencia de los poderes públicos, a la interferencia de los poderes públicos en las elecciones sindicales, a la limitación de las actividades sindicales y la represión de los dirigentes sindicales y militantes, tal como se define en el Convenio n° 87 sobre la libertad sindical y la protección del derecho a organizar y el Convenio n° 98 sobre el derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. La Comisión considera que existen razones suficientes para llevar a cabo una investigación.(4) Las medidas establecidas en el presente Reglamento se ajustan al dictamen del Comité de preferencias generalizadas.DECIDE:Artículo únicoLa Comisión abrirá una investigación sobre la presunta violación de la libertad de asociación en Bielorrusia.Hecho en Bruselas, el 29 de diciembre de 2003.Por la ComisiónPascal LamyMiembro de la Comisión(1) DO L 346 de 31.12.2001, p. 1.(2) DO L 240 de 26.9.2003, p. 8.
de	wikipedia	N/A	Das Longieren mit Hund oder Longiertraining ist eine Trainingsform, bei der der Hund außen um einen Kreis läuft und dabei den Kommandos des Hundeführers folgt. Anhänger sehen darin eine Möglichkeit, die Bindung und Kommunikation zwischen Hund und Mensch (Hundeführer) herzustellen, zu verbessern und zu festigen. Herkunft Die Herkunft des Longiertrainings ist unbekannt, heute gibt es dazu mehrere Theorien: Möglicherweise stammt es aus dem Pferdetraining, wo beim Longieren das Pferd vom Menschen an einen langen Zügel im Kreis geführt wird. Alternativ ist eine Herkunft aus dem Hütetraining denkbar. Hier werden die Schafe bei Beginn der Ausbildung rund eingepfercht und der Hund lernt, diesen Pferch zu umkreisen. Ausführung Das Longieren erfolgt an einem abgesteckten Kreis, dessen Durchmesser je nach Größe des Hundes etwa 10 bis 30 Meter beträgt. Der Hundeführer bewegt sich im Inneren des Kreises, der Anfängerhund wird an einer Leine geführt. Im Verlauf des Trainings lernt der Hund, sich ausschließlich außerhalb des Kreises zu bewegen und dabei auf die – in erster Linie körpersprachlich gegebenen – Signale des Hundeführers zu achten. Zum Aufbau dieses Verhaltens existieren verschiedene Ansätze (restriktiv aufgebaute Tabuzone Innenkreis, Klickertraining). Bei allen Formen des Trainingsaufbaus wird Wert darauf gelegt, dass der Hund agiert und für richtiges Verhalten bestätigt wird (→ Konditionierung). In Erwartung der Bestätigung beginnt der Hund den Hundeführer genau zu beobachten. Er muss herausfinden, welches Verhalten für die Bestätigung nötig ist und wird nicht gelockt. Der Hundeführer begibt sich mit fortschreitendem Training immer näher zum Kreiszentrum. Ziel des Trainings ist es, dass der Hund lernt, auch auf Distanz auf Signale des Menschen zu achten und entsprechend zu reagieren. In fortgeschrittenen Trainingsphasen werden Kommandos eingebaut, wird die Leine weggelassen, sogar der sichtbare Kreis wird abgebaut (Freies Longieren). Auch die Arbeit an zwei Longierkreisen ist verbreitet. Es existieren auch sportliche Wettbewerbe. Effekte Anhänger des Longiertrainings machen geltend, dass es eine hohe Konzentration bei Hund und Hundeführer erfordere und schule. Beide lernen ihre Aktionen zu koordinieren und wechselseitig ihre Körpersprache zu beobachten und darauf zu reagieren. Auf diese Weise habe das Longiertraining eine hohe motivierende Wirkung, verbessere die Distanzarbeit und die Bindung. Es kann allerdings auch dazu führen, dass der Hund ohne Sichtkontakt zum Hundeführer nicht (mehr) selbständig arbeitet und ist deshalb beispielsweise für Rettungshunde als Training ungeeignet. Longiertraining stellt besonders für den Hund neben der geistigen auch eine körperliche Auslastung dar. Literatur Sami El Ayachi: Körpersprachliches Longieren mit Hund. Franckh-Kosmos, 2015, ISBN 978-3-440-14748-1. Einzelnachweise Hundesport
es	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31986D0332 86/332/CEE: Decisión de la Comisión de 24 junio de 1986 por la que se aprueba el programa relativo al acondicionamiento y comercialización de las patatas en Francia, de conformidad con el Reglamento (CEE) n° 355/77 del Consejo (El texto en lengua francesa es el único auténtico) Diario Oficial n° L 201 de 24/07/1986 p. 0039 *****DECISIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN de 24 junio de 1986 por la que se aprueba el programa relativo al acondicionamiento y comercialización de las patatas en Francia, de conformidad con el Reglamento (CEE) no 355/77 del Consejo (El texto en lengua francesa es el único auténtico) (86/332/CEE) LA COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Económica Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CEE) no 355/77 del Consejo, de 15 de febrero de 1977, relativo a una acción común para la mejora de las condiciones de transformación y comercialización de los productos agrícolas y de los productos de la pesca (1), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CEE) no 3827/85 (2), y en particular su artículo 5, Considerando que, el 6 de noviembre de 1985, el Gobierno francés comunicó un programa relativo al acondicionamiento y la comercialización de las patatas y que el 8 de abril de 1986 aportó datos complementarios; Considerando que dicho programa tiene por objeto racionalizar y desarrollar las instalaciones de acondicionamiento, almacenamiento y comercialización de las patatas, incluido su equipamiento informático y telemático, con objeto de reforzar la competitividad del sector y valorizar sus productos; que constituye, pues, un programa con arreglo al artículo 2 del Reglamento (CEE) no 355/77; Considerando que el programa incluye una cantidad suficiente de los datos mencionados en el artículo 3 del Reglamento (CEE) no 355/77, que demuestran que los objetivos del artículo 1 de dicho Reglamento pueden alcanzarse en el sector del acondicionamiento, almacenamiento y comercialización de las patatas; que el plazo fijado para la aplicación de la addenda no sobrepasa el período mencionado en la letra g) del apartado 1 del artículo 3 de dicho Reglamento; Considerando que las medidas adoptadas en la presente Decisión se ajustan al dictamen del Comité permanente de estructuras agrícolas, HA ADOPTADO LA PRESENTE DECISIÓN: Artículo 1 Queda aprobado el programa referente al sector del acondicionamiento y comercialización de las patatas, comunicado por el Gobierno francés el 6 de noviembre de 1985, y completado el 8 de abril de 1986, de conformidad con el Reglamento (CEE) no 355/77. Artículo 2 El destinatario de la presente Decisión será la República francesa. Hecho en Bruselas, el 24 de junio de 1986. Por la Comisión Frans ANDRIESSEN Vicepresidente (1) DO no L 51 de 23. 2. 1977, p. 1. (2) DO no L 372 de 31. 12. 1985, p. 1.
nl	wikipedia	N/A	Chertal is een langgerekte landtong, feitelijk een eiland, dat zich ten noorden van Luik bevindt. Deze landtong is gelegen in de gemeente Oupeye en wordt ingesloten door de Maas en het Albertkanaal. In 1963 werd er een groot staalbedrijf gevestigd van Espérance-Longdoz, tegenwoordig is het een productieeenheid van ArcelorMittal. Dit bedrijf verminderde haar activiteiten aanzienlijk en in 2014 was de toekomst ervan onzeker. Het gebied wordt per spoor bereikt via de goederenspoorlijn 214. Op Chertal wordt een industrieterrein van 290 ha ontwikkeld. Oupeye
de	caselaw	Germany	Tatbestand 1 I. Die Klägerin und Revisionsbeklagte (Klägerin) ist eine GmbH & Co. KG, die im Wesentlichen Präzisionsinstrumente herstellt und weltweit vertreibt. Am Vermögen der Klägerin ist A beteiligt. Komplementärin ist die A-GmbH. 2 Die Klägerin hielt seit Jahren in erheblichem Umfang Kapitalanlagen in ihrem Betriebsvermögen. Dabei handelte es sich grundsätzlich um Kassageschäfte. Im Jahr 2000 erwarb sie u.a. sog. "Index-Partizipationszertifikate", nämlich die Zertifikate "NEMAX 50 Direkt 2005" und "DAX Direkt 2005". Diese wurden am 20. Dezember 2000 zu einem Kaufpreis von (umgerechnet) 425.349 € (NEMAX 50 Direkt 2005) bzw. von 504.768 € (DAX Direkt 2005) mit Kapital der Klägerin über deren betriebliche Konten erworben, in der laufenden Buchführung erfasst und als Umlaufvermögen aktiviert. 3 Nach den Emissionsbedingungen des "NEMAX 50 Direkt 2005" gewährt der Emittent, die Deutsche Bank AG, jedem Inhaber eines Index-Partizipationszertifikats das Recht, von ihr nach Maßgabe der Zertifikationsbedingungen am Feststellungstag die Zahlung eines in Euro ausgedrückten Rückzahlungsbetrags zu verlangen, der aus dem Wert des Index am Feststellungstag ermittelt wird. Dabei entspricht ein Indexpunkt (oder ein Bruchteil davon) 0,001 € (bzw. dem entsprechenden Bruchteil davon). Als entsprechender Index wird der Neue Markt Blue Chip Index (NEMAX 50, sog. Performance-Index) ausgewiesen. Das Zertifikat wurde an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse und an der Stuttgarter Wertpapierbörse frei gehandelt. In den Emissionsbedingungen heißt es nach den Feststellungen des Finanzgerichts (FG) weiter: "Die Zertifikate verbriefen ein Recht auf Zahlung eines Rückzahlungsbetrages, dessen Höhe vom Wert des zugrunde gelegten Index am Fälligkeitstag abhängt. Während der Laufzeit der Zertifikate finden keine Ausschüttungen statt. ... ." 4 Die Emissionsbedingungen für den "DAX Direkt 2005" entsprechen im Wesentlichen den o.g. Bedingungen des "NEMAX 50 Direkt 2005". Dieses Wertpapier bezieht sich allerdings auf den DAX Index und wurde nur an der Frankfurter Börse gehandelt. 5 Bis zum 31. Dezember 2002 nahm die Klägerin auf die Zertifikate "NEMAX 50 Direkt 2005" Teilwertabschreibungen in Höhe von 374.349 € vor, während zum 31. Dezember 2003 eine Zuschreibung in Höhe von 31.500 € erfolgte. Auf die Zertifikate "DAX Direkt 2005" erfolgte zum 31. Dezember 2001 eine Teilwertabschreibung in Höhe von 92.688 €. Am 1. März 2002 wurden die "DAX Direkt 2005"-Papiere in das Privatvermögen entnommen, wobei aufgrund eines weiteren Kursverfalls ein Entnahmeverlust in Höhe von 29.360 € realisiert wurde. Die Teilwertabschreibungen und den Entnahmeverlust ermittelte die Klägerin nach dem zum jeweiligen Bilanzstichtag bzw. zum Entnahmezeitpunkt geltenden Börsenkurs der gehandelten Zertifikate. Die Abschreibungen auf die Index-Zertifikate resultierten dabei im Wesentlichen aus den Börsenkursentwicklungen der Jahre 2001 und 2002 (Streitjahre). Nach den Feststellungen des FG herrscht zwischen den Beteiligten Einigkeit darüber, dass die von der Klägerin auf der Grundlage der Börsenkurse am Bilanzstichtag vorgenommenen Abschreibungen nach dem zum Zeitpunkt der Bilanzerstellung jeweils geltenden Aktien- bzw. Indexkurs der Höhe nach zutreffend waren und die Voraussetzungen einer voraussichtlich dauernden Wertminderung vorlagen; ebenfalls sind die Beteiligten darin einig, dass die Klägerin auch den Entnahmeverlust zutreffend nach dem Kurswert zum Zeitpunkt der Entnahme angesetzt hat. 6 Im Rahmen einer Betriebsprüfung für die Jahre 1999 bis 2003 gelangte der Betriebsprüfer u.a. zu der Auffassung, dass die Verluste aus den Teilwertabschreibungen und der Entnahme den Gewinn nach § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 des Einkommensteuergesetzes in der in den Streitjahren geltenden Fassung (EStG) nicht mindern dürften. § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG regele, dass Zertifikate, die Aktien vertreten, als Termingeschäfte gelten. Dazu zählten auch Partizipationszertifikate. Nach § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG dürften Verluste aus Termingeschäften weder mit anderen Einkünften aus Gewerbebetrieb noch mit Einkünften aus anderen Einkunftsarten ausgeglichen werden. Der Begriff des Termingeschäfts sei insoweit ähnlich zu verstehen wie der des Termingeschäfts in § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG. Folglich gelte die in § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG enthaltene Fiktion ("Zertifikate gelten als Termingeschäfte") auch für den Bereich des § 15 Abs. 4 EStG. Auf Basis dieser Auffassung dürften die nachfolgenden Aufwendungen die Einkünfte aus Gewerbebetrieb nicht mindern: 7 2000 (DM) 2001 (€) 2002 (€) 2003 (€) Teilwertabschreibung "NEMAX 50 direkt 2005" 4.595,12 255.000,00 117.000,00 Teilwertabschreibung "DAX Direkt 2005" 92.687,97 Entnahmeverlust "NEMAX 50 direkt 2005" 29.360,00 ./. 31.500,00 Summe Korrekturen außerhalb der Bilanz 4.595,12 47.687,97 146.360,00 ./. 31.500,00 8 Der Beklagte und Revisionskläger (das Finanzamt --FA--) folgte dem und erließ am 23. Dezember 2005 gemäß § 164 Abs. 2 der Abgabenordnung geänderte Bescheide über die gesonderte und einheitliche Feststellung von Besteuerungsgrundlagen für die Jahre 2000, 2002 und 2003. Für 2001 erging ein entsprechender Änderungsbescheid am 2. Januar 2006. 9 Nach erfolglosem Einspruchsverfahren erhob die Klägerin gegen die Änderungsbescheide in Gestalt der Einspruchsentscheidung vom 5. November 2007 Klage, u.a. für die Streitjahre. Während des Klageverfahrens ergingen zu diesen Bescheiden --ohne Kenntnis des FG-- weitere Änderungsbescheide vom 29. April 2009 (für beide Streitjahre) bzw. vom 20. Juli 2009 (für 2001). 10 Mit seinem in Entscheidungen der Finanzgerichte (EFG) 2012, 49 veröffentlichten Urteil gab das FG der Klage statt, da das FA bei der Ermittlung der Einkünfte der Klägerin aus Gewerbebetrieb die geltend gemachten Teilwertabschreibungen und den Entnahmeverlust in Bezug auf die Index-Zertifikate zu Unrecht dem Ausgleichs- und Abzugsverbot des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG unterworfen habe. 11 Dagegen richtet sich die Revision des FA, die sich auf die Verletzung von Bundesrecht stützt. 12 Das FA beantragt, das Urteil des FG Köln vom 3. August 2011 7 K 4682/07 aufzuheben und die Klage abzuweisen. 13 Die Klägerin beantragt, die Revision als unbegründet zurückzuweisen. Entscheidungsgründe 14 II. Die Revision ist bereits aus verfahrensrechtlichen Gründen begründet, da das FG über die Gewinnfeststellungsbescheide 2001 vom 2. Januar 2006 und für 2002 vom 23. Dezember 2005, jeweils in Gestalt der Einspruchsentscheidung vom 5. November 2007, entschieden hat, obwohl unter dem 29. April und 20. Juli 2009 weitere Änderungsbescheide für die Streitjahre ergangen sind. Insoweit ist die Vorentscheidung aufzuheben. Die erneut geänderten Gewinnfeststellungsbescheide vom 29. April und 20. Juli 2009 sind nach § 68 der Finanzgerichtsordnung (FGO) Gegenstand des anhängigen Verfahrens geworden (vgl. Urteile des Bundesfinanzhofs --BFH-- vom 14. April 2011 IV R 36/08, BFH/NV 2011, 1361; vom 26. Juni 2014 IV R 51/11, BFH/NV 2014, 1716). Zwar liegen bezüglich der angefochtenen Feststellungen lediglich wiederholende Verfügungen vor, da sich die Änderungen der Gewinnfeststellungsbescheide jeweils auf anderweitige Sachanträge der Klägerin vom 14. Dezember 2007 und vom 29. Mai 2009 bezogen. § 68 FGO ist aber mit Rücksicht auf den Zweck der Vorschrift auch auf wiederholende Verfügungen anwendbar (BFH-Urteil vom 20. Mai 2010 IV R 74/07, BFHE 229, 71, BStBl II 2010, 1104, m.w.N.). Da das FG damit über Gewinnfeststellungsbescheide entschieden hat, die zum Zeitpunkt seiner Sachentscheidung nicht mehr Verfahrensgegenstand waren, kann das angefochtene Urteil keinen Bestand haben (vgl. BFH-Urteile vom 31. Mai 2006 II R 32/04, BFH/NV 2006, 2232, und vom 26. Januar 2011 IX R 7/09, BFHE 232, 463, BStBl II 2011, 540, m.w.N.). III. 15 Der Senat entscheidet aufgrund seiner Befugnis aus den §§ 121 und 100 FGO auf der Grundlage der verfahrensfehlerfrei zustande gekommenen und damit nach § 118 Abs. 2 FGO weiterhin bindenden tatsächlichen Feststellungen des FG gleichwohl gemäß § 126 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 1 FGO in der Sache, da die Änderungsbescheide hinsichtlich des streitigen Sachverhalts keine Änderungen enthalten und die Sache spruchreif ist (vgl. BFH-Urteile vom 23. Januar 2003 IV R 71/00, BFHE 201, 269, BStBl II 2004, 43, und vom 22. Januar 2013 IX R 18/12, BFH/NV 2013, 1094). In der Sache hat die Revision keinen Erfolg. Das FG hat zutreffend entschieden, dass bei der Ermittlung der Einkünfte der Klägerin aus Gewerbebetrieb die von ihr geltend gemachten Teilwertabschreibungen und der Entnahmeverlust in Bezug auf die Index-Partizipationszertifikate dem Grunde und der Höhe nach zu berücksichtigen waren (dazu 1. und 2.) und dem auch nicht das Ausgleichs- und Abzugsverbot des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG entgegenstand (dazu 3.). 16 1. Mit dem FG und den Beteiligten geht der Senat davon aus, dass die von der Klägerin erworbenen Index-Partizipationszer-tifikate in den Streitjahren zum gewillkürten Betriebsvermögen der Klägerin gehörten und sieht insoweit von weiteren Ausführungen ab. 17 2. Der Senat geht davon aus, dass die von der Klägerin in den Streitjahren vorgenommenen Teilwertabschreibungen sowie die gewinnmindernde Berücksichtigung eines Entnahmeverlusts im Jahr 2002 dem Grunde und der Höhe nach zutreffend waren, wie zwischen den Beteiligten unstreitig ist. 18 3. Der Berücksichtigung der von der Klägerin in ihrer Gewinnermittlung geltend gemachten Teilwertabschreibungen bzw. der Entnahmeverluste steht § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG nicht entgegen. 19 a) Nach § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG gelten die Sätze 1 und 2 der Vorschrift, wonach die dort genannten Verluste weder mit anderen Einkünften aus Gewerbebetrieb noch mit Einkünften aus anderen Einkunftsarten ausgeglichen noch nach § 10d EStG abgezogen werden dürfen, sondern nach Maßgabe des § 10d EStG die Gewinne mindern, die der Steuerpflichtige in dem unmittelbar vorangegangenen und in den folgenden Wirtschaftsjahren aus derselben Quelle erzielt hat oder erzielt, entsprechend für Verluste aus Termingeschäften, durch die der Steuerpflichtige einen Differenzausgleich oder einen durch den Wert einer veränderlichen Bezugsgröße bestimmten Geldbetrag oder Vorteil erlangt. Die Vorschrift ist zusammen mit § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG durch das Steuerentlastungsgesetz (StEntlG) 1999/2000/2002 vom 24. März 1999 (BGBl I 1999, 402, BStBl I 1999, 304) eingeführt worden. § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG umfasst allerdings --anders als § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG-- zwei Sätze: Nach Satz 1 sind private Veräußerungsgeschäfte (§ 22 Nr. 2 EStG) Termingeschäfte, durch die der Steuerpflichtige einen Differenzausgleich oder einen durch den Wert einer veränderlichen Bezugsgröße bestimmten Geldbetrag oder Vorteil erlangt, sofern der Zeitraum zwischen Erwerb und Beendigung des Rechts auf einen Differenzausgleich, Geldbetrag oder Vorteil nicht mehr als ein Jahr beträgt. Satz 2 regelt, dass Zertifikate, die Aktien vertreten, und Optionsscheine als Termingeschäfte im Sinne des Satzes 1 gelten. 20 b) Welche Geschäfte des Steuerpflichtigen als "Termingeschäfte" aufzufassen sind, bestimmt das Gesetz nicht. Dies ist durch Auslegung der Norm zu ermitteln. Insoweit ist maßgebend für die Interpretation eines Gesetzes der in ihm zum Ausdruck kommende objektivierte Wille des Gesetzgebers (vgl. z.B. Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 9. November 1988 1 BvR 243/86, BVerfGE 79, 106, m.w.N.; BFH-Urteile vom 1. Dezember 1998 VII R 21/97, BFHE 187, 177; vom 21. Oktober 2010 IV R 23/08, BFHE 231, 544, BStBl II 2011, 277). Der Feststellung des zum Ausdruck gekommenen objektivierten Willens des Gesetzgebers dienen die Auslegung aus dem Wortlaut der Norm (grammatikalische Auslegung), aus dem Zusammenhang (systematische Auslegung), aus ihrem Zweck (teleologische Auslegung) sowie aus den Gesetzesmaterialien und der Entstehungsgeschichte (historische Auslegung); zur Erfassung des Inhalts einer Norm darf sich der Richter dieser verschiedenen Auslegungsmethoden gleichzeitig und nebeneinander bedienen (z.B. BFH-Urteile in BFHE 187, 177, und in BFHE 231, 544, BStBl II 2011, 277). Insbesondere bei der Auslegung einer Norm aus ihrem Wortlaut ist zu berücksichtigen, dass diese nur eine von mehreren anerkannten Auslegungsmethoden ist, zu denen --wie ausgeführt-- auch die systematische Auslegung zählt. Nach Letzterer ist darauf abzustellen, dass einzelne Rechtssätze, die der Gesetzgeber in einen sachlichen Zusammenhang gebracht hat, grundsätzlich so zu interpretieren sind, dass sie logisch miteinander vereinbar sind; Ziel jeder Auslegung ist danach die Feststellung des Inhalts einer Norm, wie er sich aus dem Wortlaut und dem Sinnzusammenhang ergibt, in den sie hineingestellt ist (vgl. BFH-Urteil vom 9. April 2008 II R 39/06, BFH/NV 2008, 1529, m.w.N.). Gegen seinen Wortlaut ist die Auslegung eines Gesetzes nur dann ausnahmsweise möglich, wenn die wortgetreue Auslegung zu einem sinnwidrigen Ergebnis führt, das vom Gesetzgeber nicht beabsichtigt sein kann (vgl. z.B. BFH-Urteile vom 1. August 1974 IV R 120/70, BFHE 113, 357, BStBl II 1975, 12; vom 7. April 1992 VIII R 79/88, BFHE 168, 111, BStBl II 1992, 786; vom 17. Februar 1994 VIII R 30/92, BFHE 175, 226, BStBl II 1994, 938; vom 17. Januar 1995 IX R 37/91, BFHE 177, 58, BStBl II 1995, 410; vom 12. August 1997 VII R 107/96, BFHE 184, 198, BStBl II 1998, 131; vom 17. Mai 2006 X R 43/03, BFHE 213, 494, BStBl II 2006, 868; vom 17. Juni 2010 VI R 50/09, BFHE 230, 150, BStBl II 2011, 43) oder wenn sonst anerkannte Auslegungsmethoden dies verlangen (z.B. BFH-Beschluss vom 4. Februar 1999 VII R 112/97, BFHE 188, 5, BStBl II 1999, 430; BFH-Urteil in BFHE 231, 544, BStBl II 2011, 277). 21 c) Ausgehend von diesen Grundsätzen ist der in § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG enthaltene Begriff des "Termingeschäfts" dahingehend auszulegen, dass er Index-Partizipationszertifikate nicht umfasst (ebenso Intemann in Herrmann/Heuer/Raupach --HHR--, § 15 EStG Rz 1553, m.w.N.; Schmidt/Wacker, EStG, 33. Aufl., § 15 Rz 902; Schmidt/Weber-Grellet, a.a.O., § 20 Rz 132). 22 aa) Bereits nach dem Wortlaut des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG fallen die streitbefangenen Index-Partizipationszertifikate, also Schuldverschreibungen, die den Anspruch des Inhabers gegen den Emittenten auf Zahlung eines Geldbetrags verbriefen, dessen Höhe vom Stand des zugrunde gelegten Index am Ende der Laufzeit abhängt (vgl. Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs --BGH-- vom 13. Juli 2004 XI ZR 178/03, BGHZ 160, 58), nicht unter diese Norm. § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG stellt alleine auf den Begriff des "Termingeschäfts" ab. Dieser entstammt dem Wertpapier- und Bankrecht und ist dort --nach dem auch insoweit maßgeblichen BGH-Urteil in BGHZ 160, 58-- vom Kassageschäft abzugrenzen. Beim Kassageschäft hat der Leistungsaustausch durch Übertragung der Schuldverschreibung mit der darin wertpapiermäßig verbrieften Forderung Zug um Zug gegen Zahlung des Kaufpreises binnen der für diese Geschäfte üblichen Frist von zwei Tagen zu erfolgen. Durch die spätere Rückzahlung des Emittenten an den Erwerber wird nicht der Vertrag über den Erwerb des Zertifikats, sondern die durch die Schuldverschreibung begründete Forderung erfüllt. Demgegenüber zeichnet sich das Termingeschäft dadurch aus, dass der Erfüllungszeitpunkt hinausgeschoben wird, woraus sich die für Termingeschäfte spezifische Gefährlichkeit und damit das für die Qualifizierung als Börsentermingeschäft wesentliche Schutzbedürfnis des Anlegers ergibt (BGH-Urteil in BGHZ 160, 58). Termingeschäfte sind insoweit Verträge über Wertpapiere, vertretbare Waren oder Devisen nach gleichartigen Bedingungen, die von beiden Seiten erst zu einem bestimmten späteren Zeitpunkt zu erfüllen sind und die zudem eine Beziehung zu einem Terminmarkt haben, der es ermöglicht, jederzeit ein Gegengeschäft abzuschließen (BGH-Urteil vom 16. April 1991 XI ZR 88/90, BGHZ 114, 177). Indexzertifikate können nach diesen Vorgaben nicht den Termingeschäften zugeordnet werden, weil bei ihnen der Anleger nicht dazu verleitet wird, ohne oder mit verhältnismäßig geringem Einsatz eigenen Vermögens und ohne Aufnahme eines förmlichen Kredits auf Gewinn zu spekulieren, denn sein Verlustrisiko ist nach der Auffassung des BGH auf den Kaufpreis für die Schuldverschreibung begrenzt, den er sofort bei Vertragsschluss in voller Höhe bezahlen muss. Der Erwerb von Indexzertifikaten hat danach auch nicht die für Termingeschäfte spezifische Hebelwirkung und begründet zudem nicht die Gefahr des Totalverlusts in dem für Termingeschäfte typischen Maße. Vielmehr dient der Erwerb von Indexzertifikaten einem ähnlichen wirtschaftlichen Zweck wie der Direkterwerb von Aktien, weil diese Zertifikate die Möglichkeit eröffnen, an der Kursentwicklung des Index teilzunehmen, ohne alle in den Index aufgenommenen Aktien einzeln erwerben zu müssen (BGH-Urteil in BGHZ 160, 58). 23 bb) Auch aus der Entstehungsgeschichte und dem Zweck des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG ergibt sich nicht, dass der Gesetzgeber mit dem Begriff des "Termingeschäfts" --abweichend vom Zivilrecht-- auch Indexzertifikate hätte erfassen wollen. 24 (1) Im ursprünglichen Gesetzentwurf zum StEntlG 1999/2000/ 2002 (BTDrucks 14/23, S. 11 und 12) war durch geplante Regelungen in § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG einerseits und in § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 5 EStG andererseits vorgesehen, das Ausgleichs- und Abzugsverbot auf Verluste aus Differenzgeschäften nach § 764 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs zu erstrecken. Entsprechend sollte § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 5 EStG regeln, dass Spekulationsgeschäfte (§ 22 Nr. 2 EStG) "Differenzgeschäfte im Sinne des § 764 des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs" seien, während nach § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG das Verlustabzugs- und –verrechnungsverbot des § 15 Abs. 4 Sätze 1 und 2 EStG "analog für Verluste aus Differenzgeschäften nach § 764 BGB im betrieblichen Bereich" gelten sollte. Ausweislich der Begründung des Gesetzentwurfs (BTDrucks 14/23, S. 180) sollte dies im Bereich des § 23 EStG dazu dienen, Geschäfte, die lediglich auf die Differenz zwischen den Börsen- oder Marktpreisen eines Basiswerts zu bestimmten Stichtagen gerichtet waren und die nach der Rechtsprechung nicht der Spekulationsbesteuerung unterlagen, weil sie nicht die Lieferung von Wirtschaftsgütern zum Gegenstand hatten, der Spekulationsbesteuerung zu unterwerfen. Die Einführung des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG sollte als Folgeänderung zu derjenigen des § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 5 EStG sicherstellen, dass Verluste aus Differenzgeschäften im betrieblichen Bereich ebenfalls nur mit Gewinnen aus derartigen Geschäften verrechnet werden könnten (BTDrucks 14/23, S. 178). 25 (2) Die im Streitfall maßgebliche Gesetzesfassung war demgegenüber das Ergebnis der Beratungen im Finanzausschuss des Deutschen Bundestags, wonach in § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG einerseits und § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 1 EStG andererseits nunmehr auf "Verluste aus Termingeschäften" abgestellt und dem § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG ein Satz 2 angefügt wurde. Ausweislich der Begründung zu § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG (BTDrucks 14/443, S. 28 f.) sollte dadurch der bereits zivilrechtlich problematische Begriff des Differenzgeschäfts durch den aus Sicht des Gesetzgebers in § 2 des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes (WpHG) i.d.F. der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 1998 (BGBl I 1998, 2708) und § 1 des Kreditwesengesetzes (KWG) i.d.F. der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 1998 (BGBl I 1998, 2776) definierten Begriff des Termingeschäfts ersetzt werden. Anders als sich der Gesetzgeber dies vorgestellt haben mag, enthalten aber weder § 2 WpHG noch § 1 KWG in ihren vorgenannten Fassungen eine Definition des Termingeschäfts, denn alle entsprechenden gesetzgeberischen Versuche einer konkreten Begriffsbestimmung für Zwecke des Wertpapier- und Bankrechts waren zuvor fehlgeschlagen (vgl. Sorgenfrei, Deutsches Steuerrecht --DStR-- 1999, 1928, 1930; Haisch/Danz, DStR 2005, 2108, 2112; HHR/Intemann, § 15 EStG Rz 1541). § 2 Abs. 2 WpHG in der in den Gesetzesmaterialien des StEntlG 1999/2000/2002 angesprochenen Fassung enthält insoweit lediglich eine Definition der "Derivate" i.S. des WpHG und § 1 Abs. 11 KWG in der entsprechenden Fassung nur eine solche der "Finanzinstrumente" im Sinne dieses Gesetzes. Zu berücksichtigen ist allerdings, dass der Gesetzgeber mit dem Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz (FMRL-UmsG) vom 16. Juli 2007 (BGBl I 2007, 1330) mit Wirkung ab dem 1. November 2007 (Art. 14 Abs. 3 FMRL-UmsG) sowohl in § 1 Abs. 11 Satz 4 Nr. 1 KWG (aktuell: § 1 Abs. 11 Satz 3 Nr. 1 KWG) als auch in § 2 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 WpHG eine gleichlautende Legaldefinition des Termingeschäfts geschaffen hat, wonach Termingeschäfte solche Festgeschäfte oder Optionsgeschäfte sind, die zeitlich verzögert zu erfüllen sind und deren Wert sich unmittelbar oder mittelbar vom Preis oder Maß eines Basiswerts ableitet. Es ist nicht erkennbar, dass der Gesetzgeber im Jahr 2007 den Begriff des Termingeschäfts inhaltlich hätte ändern wollen, so dass die vorgenannte Definition bereits in Veranlagungszeiträumen vor 2007 zugrunde gelegt werden kann (BFH-Urteil vom 20. August 2014 X R 13/12, BFHE 246, 462). 26 (3) Selbst wenn der in den Materialien angesprochene Verweis auf das Zivilrecht von einer fehlerhaften Vorstellung des Gesetzgebers getragen sein sollte, wäre aber bei der Auslegung des Begriffs "Termingeschäft" zumindest von den allgemeinen Vorgaben des Zivilrechts auszugehen (so etwa Blümich/Bode, § 15 EStG Rz 655; HHR/Intemann, § 15 EStG Rz 1541, m.w.N.; zu § 23 EStG BFH-Urteile vom 17. April 2007 IX R 40/06, BFHE 217, 566, BStBl II 2007, 608; vom 26. September 2012 IX R 50/09, BFHE 239, 95, BStBl II 2013, 231; in BFHE 246, 462; BFH-Beschluss vom 24. April 2012 IX B 154/10, BFHE 236, 557, BStBl II 2012, 454). Ein weiter gehender Begriffsinhalt könnte nur dann zum Tragen kommen, wenn die wortgetreue Auslegung zu einem sinnwidrigen Ergebnis führen würde, das vom Gesetzgeber nicht beabsichtigt sein kann. Das ist indessen nicht der Fall, denn der Zweck des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG liegt ausweislich der zuvor zitierten Materialien zum StEntlG 1999/2000/2002 (BTDrucks 14/443, S. 27) darin, dass nicht alle "Differenzgeschäfte", sondern nur "verbindliche Termingeschäfte" von der Norm erfasst werden sollen. Das sind aber nur solche Verträge über Wertpapiere, vertretbare Waren oder Devisen, die von beiden Seiten erst zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt zu erfüllen sind, wobei die Konditionen schon bei Abschluss des Geschäfts festgelegt werden. Ob das Geschäft an einer Börse oder außerbörslich geschlossen wurde, ist demgegenüber ebenso unerheblich wie die Frage, ob mit ihm aus Sicht des Aufsichtsrechts besondere Risiken verbunden sind (vgl. Reiß in Kirchhof, EStG, 13. Aufl., § 15 Rz 418a; HHR/Intemann, § 15 EStG Rz 1541, m.w.N.). § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG liegt danach nicht der Zweck zugrunde, "Besteuerungslücken bei Spekulationsgewinnen im Betriebsvermögen" allgemein und unabhängig von den zivilrechtlichen Charakteristika eines Fest- oder Optionsgeschäfts zu schließen. 27 cc) Die Richtigkeit der vorgenannten Auslegung ergibt sich auch unter systematischen Gesichtspunkten. 28 (1) Soweit die Einführung des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG als "Folgeänderung zu § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG" verstanden und dessen Normzweck mittelbar in Bezug genommen wird (vgl. BTDrucks 14/443, S. 27), darf nicht unberücksichtigt bleiben, dass der Gesetzgeber in § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG gerade keine § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG entsprechende Regelung aufgenommen oder auf diese Regelung verwiesen hat. Anders als im Bereich des Betriebsvermögens hat es der Gesetzgeber im Bereich der privaten Veräußerungsgeschäfte für nötig befunden, Zertifikate den Termingeschäften durch eine ausdrückliche Regelung gleichzustellen. Einer solchen Regelung hätte es nicht bedurft, wenn Zertifikate generell als Termingeschäft aufzufassen wären. 29 (2) Dies entspricht auch der zu § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG ergangenen Rechtsprechung des IX. Senats des BFH (Beschluss in BFHE 236, 557, BStBl II 2012, 454), wonach die Norm Zertifikate "unabhängig davon, ob sie die Voraussetzungen eines Termingeschäfts erfüllen", erfasst. Der IX. Senat stellt mit dieser Aussage zum einen klar, dass § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG gegenüber dem Satz 1 ein eigenständiger Anwendungsbereich zukommt. Zum anderen macht er mit Blick auf den eindeutigen Wortlaut des § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG deutlich, dass davon nicht etwa Zertifikate auf einen Index im allgemeinen Sinne, sondern nur solche erfasst werden, die Aktien vertreten. Abweichendes ergibt sich danach auch nicht aus dem Schreiben des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen vom 27. November 2001 IV C 3 -S 2256- 265/01 (BStBl I 2001, 986, Rz 45). 30 (3) Hat der Gesetzgeber im Bereich des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG auf eine § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 2 EStG entsprechende Regelung verzichtet, so lässt das nur den Schluss zu, dass § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG ein gegenüber § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG partiell abweichendes Regelungskonzept zugrunde liegt und sich die in den Materialien befindliche Aussage, es handele sich bei der Einführung des § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG um eine "Folgeänderung zu § 23 EStG", nur auf § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 Satz 1 EStG bezieht (ebenso im Ergebnis HHR/Intemann, § 15 EStG Rz 1553). Wenn es insoweit in der Begründung zu § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG (BTDrucks 14/443, S. 28 f.) heißt, die Norm erfasse "z.B. nicht nur Waren- und Devisentermingeschäfte mit Differenzausgleich einschließlich Swaps, Index-Optionsgeschäfte oder Futures", sondern es sollten auch "Indexzertifikate und Optionsscheine zu den Termingeschäften i.S.d. § 23 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 EStG gehören", so beziehen sich diese Aussagen ebenso wie diejenige, § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG erfasse "allgemein Geschäfte, die ein Recht auf Zahlung eines Geldbetrags oder auf einen sonstigen Vorteil (z.B. die Lieferung von Wertpapieren) einräumen, der sich nach anderen Bezugsgrößen (z.B. der Wertentwicklung von Wertpapieren, Indices, Futures, Zinssätzen) bestimmt", auf die Gesamtregelung des § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG, also auf dessen Sätze 1 und 2. Dafür, dass der Gesetzgeber mit § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG einerseits und § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 4 EStG andererseits keine vollständig kongruenten Regelungen schaffen wollte, spricht im Übrigen auch, dass er im Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 2008 vom 14. August 2007 (BGBl I 2007, 1912) lediglich Änderungen im Bereich des Privatvermögens vorgenommen hat (vgl. § 20 Abs. 2 Nrn. 3 und 7 EStG i.d.F. des vorgenannten Gesetzes). 31 4. Da § 15 Abs. 4 Satz 3 EStG Indexzertifikate nicht umfasst, waren in der Gewinnermittlung der Klägerin die streitbefangenen Teilwertabschreibungen bzw. Entnahmeverluste zu berücksichtigen. Entsprechend war der auf die Berücksichtigung dieser Gewinnminderungen gerichteten Klage stattzugeben.
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Pueblo Nuevo är en ort i Mexiko. Den ligger i kommunen San Miguel Quetzaltepec och delstaten Oaxaca, i den sydöstra delen av landet, km sydost om huvudstaden Mexico City. Pueblo Nuevo ligger meter över havet och antalet invånare är . Terrängen runt Pueblo Nuevo är kuperad åt nordost, men åt sydväst är den bergig. Terrängen runt Pueblo Nuevo sluttar norrut. Den högsta punkten i närheten är Cerro Nopal, meter över havet, km söder om Pueblo Nuevo. Runt Pueblo Nuevo är det ganska glesbefolkat, med invånare per kvadratkilometer. Närmaste större samhälle är San Miguel Quetzaltepec, km norr om Pueblo Nuevo. I omgivningarna runt Pueblo Nuevo växer i huvudsak städsegrön lövskog. Årsmedeltemperaturen i trakten är °C. Den varmaste månaden är april, då medeltemperaturen är °C, och den kallaste är januari, med °C. Genomsnittlig årsnederbörd är millimeter. Den regnigaste månaden är juni, med i genomsnitt mm nederbörd, och den torraste är februari, med mm nederbörd. Kommentarer Källor Orter i Oaxaca
en	caselaw	US	The defendant, age thirty, was found guilty, after a jury trial, on one count of the charge of conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses involving the planning of a contrived automobile accident with several codefendants. He was sentenced to not less than two nor more than four years on this count. Later, he pleaded guilty to an additional count of conspiracy to obtain money arising out of another similar fraudulent plan and to a count of larceny of goods and merchandise (in excess of $250 but not more than $2000), being sentenced to not less than three nor more than five years on the former charge and one year on the latter. The effective sentence was therefore not less than three nor more than six years. The penalties provided by statute are $5000 or imprisonment for not more than fifteen years or both on each of the conspiracy counts and $500 or five years or both on the larceny count. The conspiracy counts concerned this defendant's participation in a "fake accident racket" of the lowest order in which he was one of the ringleaders. Neither the circumstances of the offenses charged nor his prior record, which included two convictions for pool selling and one for liquor law violation, all in 1960, indicates cause for considering the sentence imposed excessive. However, the two counts of conspiracy arose out of almost identical circumstances, and a plea of guilty to the second conspiracy count would appear to call for the imposition of no greater a penalty than the first, upon which there was a conviction after jury trial. Considering this aspect of the petition as well as the sentences which were imposed *Page 206 upon the coconspirators of the petitioner, it appears that some modification of the second sentence should be ordered. It is ordered that the defendant's sentence on the second conspiracy count be reduced from "not less than three nor more than five years" to "not less than two nor more than four years," to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the first count, so that his effective sentence on these three counts, including one of larceny, shall be not less than two nor more than five years. HEALEY, HOUSE and MacDONALD, Js., participated in this decision.
en	caselaw	US	88 F. Supp. 2d 690 (2000) William E. EDDINS, et al. v. EXCELSIOR INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Nos. 9:96-CV-107, 9:96-CV-108. United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Lufkin Division. March 15, 2000. William Eugene Parham, Parham's Law Office, Hempstead, TX, for Plaintiffs. David Feldman, Feldman & Rogers LLP, Jeffrey L. Rogers, Sheila Pimpler Haddock, Feldman & Rogers, Houston, TX, Wayne D. Haglund, Lufkin, TX, C. Robert Mace, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, Craig Carter, Attorney General's Office, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Defendants. ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION HANNAH, District Judge. These consolidated actions are referred to a United States magistrate judge with instructions to submit a written report and recommendation regarding dispositive motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge has submitted a report that recommends that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law tort claims. Plaintiffs timely objected to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations of the magistrate judge. On February 24, 2000, defendants responded to plaintiffs' objections. (See Docket No. 166.) Upon conducting a de novo review of the magistrate judge's report, plaintiffs' objections, 691 and defendants' response, the court concludes that the magistrate judge correctly determined that (a) there is no common nucleus of operative facts pertaining to the federal claim over which the court has original jurisdiction and plaintiffs' alleged state law tort actions; and (b) plaintiffs' alleged state law tort actions would predominate over the single federal claim over which the court has original jurisdiction. Moreover, defendants' response argues correctly that plaintiffs' formal pleadings do not allege state law claims. It is therefore ORDERED that plaintiffs' objections are OVERRULED. It is further ORDERED that the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. An order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' alleged state law tort claims will be entered separately. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION HINES, United States Magistrate Judge. These consolidated cases are referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for consideration of pretrial matters. The parties have raised the issue whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law causes of action over which it does not have original jurisdiction. This report addresses that issue. Nature of Suit These consolidated actions emerge from a dispute over educational rights of two children, "Mary W." and "Christy McD.," who resided in Excelsior Independent School District (Excelsior ISD). Both children allegedly have learning disabilities and require special education services. Excelsior ISD sought to provide those services through a cooperative known as Shelby County Special Education Cooperative. The original boundaries of the dispute were described previously. See Eddins v. Excelsior ISD, 1997 WL 470353 (E.D.Tex. Aug. 6, 1997).[1] Ultimately, plaintiffs requested administrative due process hearings wherein they challenged the children's placements and services provided by Excelsior ISD through the Shelby County Special Education Cooperative. See id. at 5. Plaintiffs also sought relief in the nature of monetary compensation and injunctive relief. See id. at 7. Specifically, plaintiffs sought a school funding cut-off; termination of personnel; a change of the executive administrator for the school; an apology from the school board at an open session; compensatory damages; and attorney's fees. See id. At a prehearing conference, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) hearing officer concluded that the compensation and injunctive claims of plaintiffs were outside her jurisdiction. See id. at 5-6. Thus, the formal administrative hearings concerned only appropriate educational classifications and services for the two children. Ultimately, the parties reached agreement on these issues and announced settlement. See id. at 5. 692 The TEA hearing officer entered judgments pursuant to the settlements. Each judgment required Excelsior ISD to make monetary payments to reimburse plaintiffs for expenses incurred, and to take prospective action regarding special education services.[2] Plaintiffs subsequently executed written settlement agreements and releases that acknowledge receipt of Excelsior's monetary payments. (See Def.'s Mot. for Summ.J., Exs. C, D, E, and F.) The releases executed by plaintiffs contained language limiting the scope of their releases to the confines of the TEA administrative orders. Thus, it was apparent from the outset that plaintiffs did not view the TEA judgments as complete relief. The present litigation ensued. In the instant cases, plaintiffs contend that Excelsior ISD did not honor its settlement agreements as embodied in the TEA judgments. Thus, they sue to enforce the provisions of the TEA administrative judgments. Second, they sue to enforce federally-guaranteed educational rights.[3] Third, they sue Excelsior ISD and other defendants for their alleged previous violations of plaintiff minors' federal civil rights, i.e., under general Reconstruction civil rights statutes.[4] Finally, plaintiffs seek to append various state law causes of action for breach of contract (settlement agreements), slander, wrongful death, lost wages, and injunctive relief requiring termination of school administrators, replacement of teaching personnel, and an open-meeting apology from one school defendant's Board of Trustees. Proceedings Although plaintiffs' amended complaints alleged multiple claims against multiple defendants, the court has narrowed issues 693 and parties for trial. In sum, all defendants except Excelsior ISD have been dismissed. (See Docket Nos. 86 and 109.)[5] All federal claims against Excelsior ISD have been dismissed except for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for enforcement of the TEA administrative orders. (See Docket No. 86.) Thus, the remaining claims are the single Section 1983 action just mentioned, and assorted state law claims that plaintiffs seek to append under the court's supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental Jurisdiction Title 28 United States Code Section 1367 provides that: "district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Section 1367 codified the judge-made doctrine of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that began with United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966).[6] Even when claims are so related to claims within the original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy, federal district courts are not always required to entertain them. Thus, the statute expressly provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under any of the following circumstances: (1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the court has original jurisdiction; (3) The court has dismissed all claims or which it had original jurisdiction; or (4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In this circuit, the general rule is to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed or eliminated prior to trial. See Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1989). However, this rule is neither mandatory nor absolute. See id. Rather, The Fifth Circuit reviews a district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. See Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir.1999); see also Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir.1998) ("[D]istrict court has wide discretion"). In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, the Fifth Circuit considers "both the statutory provisions of [Section 1376(c) ], as well as the Supreme Court's articulation of the scope and nature of district courts' discretion in exercising jurisdiction over pendent state law claims." McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir.1998). Thus, the Fifth Circuit considers both the provisions of Section 1376(c) and "the balance of the relevant factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity that the Supreme 694 Court outlined ..." Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227. To be sure, the district court does not have unfettered discretion in refusing to entertain claims under its supplemental jurisdiction. In Batiste, the governing circuit court of appeals, in an opinion written by Chief Judge King, held that the district court abused its discretion in not exercising supplemental jurisdiction. First, the district court erred by not balancing factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties. See id. The case had been pending in the district court for almost three years, and trial was scheduled to begin one month later. See id. The case had produced "more than sixteen volumes of record, numerous depositions and discovery disputes, and significant consideration by the district court of multiple motions to dismiss claims or grant summary judgment." Id. at 228. The familiarity of the district court with the merits of the claims demonstrated that further proceedings in the district court would prevent redundancy and conserve scarce judicial resources. See id. Second, Judge King noted that the absence of any "novel or complex" issues of state law weighs towards the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion.[7]See id. Discussion and Analysis In the instant cases, the court has dismissed all but one of the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. (See Docket No. 86.) That remaining claim, a Section 1983 action to enforce TEA administrative orders, has discrete boundaries whose parameters are easily defined by resort to the TEA orders. The factual issues are narrow; the relevant time period is confined to the period after entry of the orders. Here, plaintiffs' state law action for breach of contract (settlement agreements) is synonymous with plaintiffs' Section 1983 action to enforce TEA orders. Suit has been pending almost four years; discovery on this issue has been completed; the court is familiar with the merits of the claim; no novel or complex issues of state law are involved; and trial is scheduled imminently. Normally, under Batiste, the court would abuse its discretion in refusing to entertain plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. However, plaintiffs recently made an unequivocal assertion to the court that they have "never pursued enforcement of a contract or settlement agreement ..." (See Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ.J. at 4.) Therefore, it would be futile and a waste of judicial resources for the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law action for breach of contract. The issue thus becomes whether the court should entertain plaintiffs' remaining state law tort claims. As to these, Batiste does not dictate that the court exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. First, elements of tort causes of action are different in each instance, and share no common nucleus of operative facts with the Section 1983 enforcement of TEA judgment claims. Next, relevant time periods predate the 695 entry of the TEA administrative orders and settlement agreements. Third, trial of such issues would involve a broad, de novo review of the controversy from its inception, as opposed to a focused, specific review of Excelsior's compliance with TEA orders and private settlement agreements. Finally, no discovery has occurred with regard to the state tort causes of action. After considering the Section 1376(c) factors and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the court should not exercise its supplemental jurisdiction because the state tort claims substantially predominate over the single claim over which the court has original jurisdiction. A proper exercise of discretion is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. Recommendations The court should dismiss plaintiffs' state law causes of action because plaintiffs now declare that they do not want to pursue a breach of contract claim, and because plaintiffs' remaining tort claims substantially predominate over the single, limited claim over which the court has original jurisdiction.[8] Objections Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within ten days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED.R.CIV.P. 6(a), 6(b), and 72(b). A party's failure to object bars that party from (1) entitlement to de novo review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc). January 28, 2000. NOTES [1] Generally, plaintiffs maintain that Christy McD. was "provided no means by which to interact with children who were not special education children," and contend that the Shelby County Special Education Cooperative was not the least restrictive environment for her instruction. Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 1997 WL 470353 at 4 (E.D.Tex. Aug. 6, 1997). The crux of plaintiffs' complaint, therefore, is that the school district failed to "mainstream" Christy McD.'s education. See id. As for Mary W., plaintiffs complain that Excelsior ISD initially failed to test Mary McD. to determine whether she needed special education, even though she was held back to repeat pre-kindergarten. See id. Further, even after Mary W.'s special education requirements were known, her mother was not included in "ARD meetings," and Mary W. received less specialized attention than the ARD committee recommended for her individualized education program. See id. [2] In the case of Mary W., Excelsior ISD was ordered to: 1. Hire a consultant to do a comprehensive evaluation of the special education program at Excelsior ISD and the Shelby County Co-op; 2. Allow Petitioner full access to the consultant during the period of review; 3. Implement the changes recommended by the special education consultant by the 1994-95 school year as far as practicable; and 4. Provide extended year comprehensive services up to a total cost of $5,000.00 paid to Mary W.'s parent, Sandy W. Eddins, 1997 WL 470353 at *6. The judgment in Christy McD.'s case required that Excelsior ISD: 1. Hire a consultant to do a comprehensive evaluation of the special education program at Excelsior ISD and the Shelby County Co-op; 2. Allow Petitioners full access to the consultant during the period of review; 3. Implement the changes recommended by the special education consultant by the 1994-95 school year as far as practicable; 4. Reimburse Petitioners $16,260.40 for travel and transportation of Christy Renea McD. to Martinsville Independent School District for prior school years; 5. Reimburse Petitioners for all out-of-pocket attorney's fees paid to date; 6. Provide future transportation for so long as Christy Renea McD. is a resident of Excelsior ISD and for so long as she is enrolled as a special education student at Martinsville Independent School District. The manner of provision for future transportation would be left to the determination of Excelsior ISD, to either reimburse Petitioners for transportation costs or provide transportation directly by the Excelsior ISD. The obligation to provide future transportation would cease in the event that Petitioners move out of the Excelsior ISD and/or if Christy Renea McD. ceases to be enrolled as a special education student at Martinsville Independent School District; 7. Pay any cost of tuition to Martinsville Independent School District for Christy Renea McD.'s attendance as a special education student at Martinsville Independent School District, in the event that the Martinsville Independent School District imposes such a cost in the future. This requirement was further subject to Christy Renea McD.'s continued residence in the Excelsior ISD. Id. [3] Specifically, plaintiffs seek to bring direct actions under two federal statutes, viz., the Individuals with Disabilities Act ("IDEA"), see 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"). See 29 U.S.C. § 794. [4] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 - 1985. [5] A magistrate judge's report and recommendation calling for dismissal of defendant Texas Education Agency was submitted on September 7, 1999. (See Docket No. 109.) The court has not yet acted on that recommendation. [6] The Court held: Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim `arising under (the) Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ...,' U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but on constitutional `case.' ... The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. Id. [7] The court compared two cases indicating when the district court abuses its discretion and when it does not. See Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227-28. First, the court quoted Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., as an example when the district court abused its discretion: [A]fter four years of litigation produced 23 volumes and thousands of pages of record, the preparation of a pretrial order exceeding 200 pages, over a hundred depositions, and according to counsel nearly two hundred thousand pages of discovery production, the declining to hear this case on the eve of trial constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 941 F.2d 302, 307-08 (5th Cir.1991). The court then quoted Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, as an instance where the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion: When the single federal-law claim in the action was eliminated at an early stage of the litigation, the District Court had a powerful reason to choose not to exercise jurisdiction. 484 U.S. 343, 351, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988). [8] Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by proceeding in state court. Texas law provides that when an action is dismissed because of a want of jurisdiction of the federal district court, and within a specified period after the dismissal, the action is commenced in a court of proper jurisdiction, the period between the date of first filing and that of commencement in the second court is not counted as a part of the period of limitations, unless the opposite party shows in abatement that the first filing was in intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE Ann. § 16.064 (Vernon 1997).
es	wikipedia	N/A	Coates es una ciudad ubicada en el condado de Dakota en el estado estadounidense de Minnesota. En el Censo de 2010 tenía una población de 161 habitantes y una densidad poblacional de 44,24 personas por km2. Geografía Coates se encuentra ubicada en las coordenadas . Según la Oficina del Censo de los Estados Unidos, Coates tiene una superficie total de 3.64 km2, de la cual 3.64 km2 corresponden a tierra firme y (0%) 0 km2 es agua. Demografía Según el censo de 2010, había 161 personas residiendo en Coates. La densidad de población era de 44,24 hab./km2. De los 161 habitantes, Coates estaba compuesto por el 96.27% blancos, el 0% eran afroamericanos, el 0% eran amerindios, el 2.48% eran asiáticos, el 0% eran isleños del Pacífico, el 0% eran de otras razas y el 1.24% pertenecían a dos o más razas. Del total de la población el 2.48% eran hispanos o latinos de cualquier raza. Referencias Enlaces externos Ciudades de Minnesota Localidades del condado de Dakota (Minnesota)
en	caselaw	US	Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 1 of 21 Page ID #:191 1 THEANE EVANGELIS, SBN 243570 MICHAEL H. DORE, SBN 227442 2 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 333 South Grand Avenue 3 Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197 Telephone: 213.229.7000 4 Facsimile: 213.229.7520 5 KRISTIN A. LINSLEY, SBN 154148 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 6 555 Mission Street, Suite 3000 San Francisco, CA 94105-0921 7 Telephone: 415.393.8200 Facsimile: 415.393.8306 8 Attorneys for Defendant Reddit, Inc. 9 10 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 13 CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES JANE DOE on behalf of herself and all 14 others similarly situated, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 15 Plaintiff, BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO 16 v. STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE 17 REDDIT, INC., MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 18 Defendant. 12(b) 19 Before: Hon. James V. Selna Hearing: July 19, 2021 20 Time: 1:30 p.m. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 2 of 21 Page ID #:192 1 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 2 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, on July 19, 2021, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon 4 thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Courtroom 10C of the above-entitled court, 5 located at 411 West 4th Street, Santa Ana, California, 92701-4516, Defendant Reddit, 6 Inc. will and hereby does move the Court for an order staying discovery in this case, 7 including the parties’ discovery and disclosure obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 8 pending the Court’s ruling on any dispositive motions that Reddit may file under Fed. 9 R. Civ. P. 12(b). 10 This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached 11 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file in this action, 12 any argument in connection with the Motion, and such further evidence or arguments as 13 the Court may consider. 14 This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3, 15 which took place on June 7, 2021. During that telephone conference, Reddit discussed 16 with Plaintiff’s counsel its intention to file this motion and stated its grounds for doing 17 so. Reddit understands from the conference that Plaintiff will oppose this motion. 18 19 Dated: June 21, 2021 20 By: /s/ Theane Evangelis Theane Evangelis 21 22 THEANE EVANGELIS KRISTIN A. LINSLEY 23 MICHAEL DORE 24 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 25 Attorneys for Defendant 26 Reddit, Inc. 27 28 Gibson, Dunn & NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING Crutcher LLP RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 3 of 21 Page ID #:193 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 4 5 PROCEDURAL HISTORY .........................................................................................3 6 PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY REQUESTS ..................................................................4 7 LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................5 8 ARGUMENT...............................................................................................................6 9 I. Reddit’s Pending Motion Is Dispositive of The Entire Case.....................6 10 II. Reddit’s Pending Motion May Be Decided Absent Any Discovery .........9 11 12 III. The Relevant Remaining Factors Also Counsel in Favor of Staying Discovery ....................................................................................9 13 A. The Extent of Plaintiff’s Discovery Is Expansive ......................... 10 14 15 B. There Is A Clear Possibility That Reddit’s Motion to Dismiss Will Be Granted .............................................................12 16 C. The Litigation Is in Its Early Stages .............................................14 17 18 D. Other Relevant Factors Weigh in Favor of Staying Discovery.....................................................................................15 19 20 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................15 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -i- Gibson, Dunn & MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF Crutcher LLP DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 4 of 21 Page ID #:194 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page(s) 3 Cases 4 Aguirre v. Adamo, 474 F. App’x 604 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................7 5 Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 6 5 F.3d 378 (9th Cir. 1993)........................................................................................7 7 Amey v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 2013 WL 12143815 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) ..................................................... 6, 9 8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 9 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................9 10 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................12 11 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 12 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...............................................................................................11 13 Carafano v. MetroSplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 2, 6 14 Clark v. Zeiger, 15 210 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................5 16 Cox v. United States, 2018 WL 6039872 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2018) ...........................................................14 17 Doe v. Kik Interactive, 18 482 F. Supp. 3d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2020) ...................................................................14 19 Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................7 20 Ezra v. America Online, Inc., 21 1998 WL 896459 (D.N.M. July 16, 1998)................................................................7 22 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................. 1, 6 23 Garrett v. Finander, 24 2016 WL 8135548 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) ...........................................................9 25 Gavra v. Google Inc., 2013 WL 3788241 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013).........................................................13 26 Hall v. Tilton, 27 2010 WL 539679 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) ..............................................................8 28 -ii- Gibson, Dunn & MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF Crutcher LLP DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 5 of 21 Page ID #:195 1 J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, Inc., 2020 WL 4901196 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020) .......................................................14 2 Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 3 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................7 4 Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) .......................................................................... 12, 13 5 Little v. City of Seattle, 6 863 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) ............................................................................ 1, 5, 7 7 Lu v. Central Bank of Republic of China (Taiwan), 610 F. App’x 674 (9th Cir. 2015) ......................................................................... 2, 5 8 Mireskandari v. Daily Mail & Gen. Tr. PLC, 9 2013 WL 12129944 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) ................................................. 12, 15 10 Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................9 11 Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 12 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................ 2, 7 13 Newman v. San Joaquin Delta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2011 WL 1743686 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) ..........................................................11 14 Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 15 2021 WL 2284113 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2021)............................................... 10, 12, 14 16 Quezambra v. United Domestic Workers of Am. AFSCME Local 3930, 2019 WL 8108745 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2019) .................................................. 5, 8, 9 17 Rutman Wine Co. v. E.& J. Gallo Winery, 18 829 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1987) .......................................................................... 2, 9, 15 19 Torres v. Cate, 501 F. App’x 662 (9th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................... 2, 5 20 Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 21 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 7, 12 22 Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 1, 5 23 Statutes 24 47 U.S.C. § 230 ........................................................................................................1, 6 25 Rules 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ........................................................................................................15 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 ......................................................................................................3, 5 28 Gibson, Dunn & -iii- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 6 of 21 Page ID #:196 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 INTRODUCTION 3 On June 16, 2021, Defendant Reddit, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss all of 4 Plaintiff’s six claims. Dkt. 24. As outlined in the Motion, each of Plaintiff’s individual 5 claims suffers from fatal deficiencies, either because the complaint fails to allege facts 6 supporting an essential element of the claim or because it asserts claims under statutes 7 that do not provide a private right of action. Separately, all of Plaintiff’s claims are 8 barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which 9 provides Reddit immunity from exactly this kind of suit—where the claims seek to 10 impose liability on a platform “for failure to remove offensive content” of third parties. 11 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 12 banc). This Court will have the opportunity to address these issues in the near future 13 and potentially resolve this entire case. 14 In the meantime, Plaintiff’s counsel propounded 26 discovery requests and 5 15 interrogatories, seeking information about virtually every aspect of Reddit’s business. 16 None of these requests has any direct bearing on the events immediately involving 17 Plaintiff and her interactions with Reddit, which she alleges occurred around December 18 2019, Dkt. 1 ¶ 121. Rather, her requests seek information and materials stretching back 19 nearly a decade and that relate to Reddit’s business practices and revenues, reports to 20 law enforcement, and other sensitive and private information related to third parties 21 unaffiliated with Plaintiff. Reddit respectfully submits that discovery in this case should 22 be stayed pending the outcome of Reddit’s Motion, including, among other reasons, 23 because Section 230 creates an immunity from suit that would be compromised if Reddit 24 is subject to discovery pending a determination of the applicability of the immunity. 25 As the Ninth Circuit consistently has recognized, subjecting a defendant to the 26 burdens of discovery before the Court has even determined whether Plaintiff has pled 27 any viable claim is neither necessary nor efficient. See, e.g., Little v. City of Seattle, 863 28 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988); Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002); Gibson, Dunn & -1- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 7 of 21 Page ID #:197 1 Torres v. Cate, 501 F. App’x 662, 663 (9th Cir. 2012); Lu v. Central Bank of Republic 2 of China (Taiwan), 610 F. App’x 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2015). These concerns of 3 inefficiency and prejudice are heightened here. Reddit’s motion to dismiss raises 4 multiple threshold issues that should be definitively settled before any broad discovery 5 commences, including the applicability of immunity under Section 230, the lack of 6 statutory standing, and the availability of a private right of action. 7 As courts repeatedly have held, Section 230 is an “immunity from suit,” meaning 8 that its applicability should be decided before Reddit is required to respond to Plaintiff’s 9 premature and burdensome discovery. Carafano v. MetroSplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 10 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 11 F.3d 250, 255–58 (4th Cir. 2009). And the immunity issue, as well as the other 12 dispositive issues that Reddit has raised, can and should be decided without forcing 13 Reddit to engage in burdensome discovery. 14 It also is significant that the current scope of the case remains uncertain. In the 15 current version of their complaint, Plaintiff seeks to represent a vast class that would 16 include every individual who was the subject of a video or photo posted on Reddit within 17 the past ten years, so long as they were a minor when the video or photograph was taken. 18 Dkt. 1 ¶ 130. There is no qualification in the class description that the content have been 19 sexually explicit or otherwise questionable. Plaintiff’s counsel have since indicated that 20 they are intending to amend the complaint, and have requested that they be given until 21 August 6, 2021, to do so. It would be “sounder practice” to give the Court and the parties 22 time and opportunity to clarify the proper scope of the case. Rutman Wine Co. v. E.& J. 23 Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). For all of these reasons, this Court 24 should issue an order staying discovery pending the outcome Reddit’s pending motion 25 to dismiss, and, in the event Plaintiff amends her complaint, any subsequent motion to 26 dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 27 28 Gibson, Dunn & -2- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 8 of 21 Page ID #:198 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Plaintiff filed her complaint on April 22, 2021. Dkt. 1. She seeks to represent a 3 class of “all persons who were under the age of 18 when they appeared in a video or 4 image that has been uploaded” onto Reddit, id. ¶ 1, regardless of whether that video or 5 image was sexually explicit or otherwise improper in nature. 6 The parties agreed to extend Reddit’s deadline to respond to the complaint by 30 7 days, to June 16. Declaration of Michael Dore (“Dore Decl.”) ¶ 5. During discussions 8 around that agreement, Reddit advised Plaintiff’s counsel that it planned to move to 9 dismiss the complaint on grounds that included the statutory immunity provided by 10 Section 230. On May 10, the Court set an initial case management conference for July 11 19, the earliest date on which Reddit could notice the hearing on its motion to dismiss. 12 Dkt. 23. 13 Prior to the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference, on June 2, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed 14 Reddit’s counsel a broad set of discovery requests, including 26 document requests and 15 five interrogatories seeking a broad range of documents covering a period of over ten 16 years. Dore Decl., Ex. A. Under Rule 26(d), these document requests would be 17 “considered to have been served at the first Rule 26(f) conference.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 26(d)(2)(B). 1 On June 3, Reddit’s counsel proposed that discovery be postponed 19 pending the Court’s resolution of Reddit’s motion to dismiss, but the parties were unable 20 to reach agreement. Dore Decl. ¶¶ 8–9. This motion followed. 21 In addition to discovery matters, counsel for the parties also discussed Plaintiff’s 22 expansive class definition. Dore Decl. ¶ 11. Specifically, Reddit’s counsel indicated 23 that the definition appears overbroad, as it contains no clause limiting the class to those 24 who have had sexually explicit content uploaded to Reddit’s platform. Dkt. 1 ¶ 130. 25 1 As a general matter, Rule 26(d)(1) precludes a party from “seeking discovery from 26 any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).” Thus, unless 27 Plaintiff serves her requests for interrogatories after the conclusion of parties’ Rule 26(f) conference, Reddit will treat these requests as not having been served in accordance with 28 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Gibson, Dunn & -3- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 9 of 21 Page ID #:199 1 On June 21, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel advised that they intended to amend the 2 complaint in response to Reddit’s motion to dismiss. Dore Decl. ¶ 15. 3 As it stands, parties have until June 28 to complete their Rule 26(f) conference. 4 Upon completion of that conference, and absent a stay of discovery, the day for Reddit 5 to respond to Plaintiff’s document requests would be July 28, well before any likely 6 resolution of Reddit’s pending motion to dismiss, or any subsequent motion to dismiss 7 an amended complaint. 8 PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY REQUESTS 9 As noted above, Plaintiff’s discovery requests cover a period of over a decade, 10 well beyond the time when Plaintiff alleges that content depicting her was uploaded to 11 Reddit without her consent. Many of these requests are worded expansively to capture 12 documents and information unrelated even to the broadest allegations of child sexual 13 abuse material (“CSAM”), child sexual exploitation material (“CSEM”), or other child 14 trafficking content referenced in the complaint. Read literally, Plaintiff’s requests seek 15 information about a broad range of Reddit’s business, personnel, and financial 16 operations going back 10 years. Below is a sample of Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests 17 (emphases added): 18 RFP 4: “All Documents or communications concerning (i) the 19 hiring, appointment, designation, and training of Employees to review 20 content before or after it is uploaded or posted to Your site; and (ii) the 21 hiring, appointment, designation and training of Employees to moderate 22 Your site and field complaints or requests to remove CSEM or child sex 23 trafficking content.” 24 RFP 5: “All Documents and communications related to Your 25 systems for flagging, reviewing, and removing illegal material from Your 26 site, as well as your parental controls and automated detection technologies 27 to prevent, identify, and remove CSEM and child sex trafficking content.” 28 Gibson, Dunn & -4- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 10 of 21 Page ID #:200 1 RFP 6: “Any financial analyses, reports or discussion concerning 2 the impact of the presence of illegal, underage CSEM or child sex 3 trafficking content on Your site, or of removing such content from Your site 4 or modifying Your protocols concerning such conduct.” 5 RFP 7: “Documents sufficient to show how You benefit financially 6 from individual videos and/or photographs that are displayed on Your 7 site, including revenues attributable to CSEM or child sex trafficking content 8 on Your site.” 9 These requests are not limited to Plaintiff’s own experience, and would touch 10 upon matters—such as content moderation on Reddit’s platform—that fall squarely into 11 the statutory immunity provided by Section 230. 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 Federal courts have broad discretion to control the timing and sequence of 14 discovery and may stay discovery “to protect a party or person from annoyance, 15 embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” and “for the parties’ and 16 witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)–(d). 17 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly approved the practice of staying discovery pending the 18 resolution of a potentially dispositive motion, reasoning that such stays “further[] the 19 goals of efficiency for the court and litigants.” Little, 863 F.2d at 685; see also Wenger, 20 282 F.3d at 1077; Torres, 501 F. App’x at 663; Lu, 610 F. App’x at 675; Clark v. Zeiger, 21 210 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 Courts in this District apply a two-part test when evaluating a request to stay 23 discovery pending resolution of a dispositive motion, asking whether the pending 24 motion (1) will dispose of the entire case; and (2) can be decided absent additional 25 discovery. Quezambra v. United Domestic Workers of Am. AFSCME Local 3930, 2019 26 WL 8108745, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2019). Some courts also consider other factors, 27 such as (3) whether, on a preliminary review of the merits of the motion, there appears 28 to be an immediate and clear possibility that the motion will be granted, (4) the nature Gibson, Dunn & -5- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 11 of 21 Page ID #:201 1 and complexity of the action, (5) whether counterclaims and/or cross-claims have been 2 asserted, (6) whether other defendants, if any, have joined the stay request, (7) the 3 posture or stage of the litigation, and (8) the expected extent of discovery. Amey v. 4 Cinemark USA, Inc., 2013 WL 12143815, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (granting stay 5 where “no discovery is required for the court to decide the pending motions, and there 6 is no indication that either party will be injured by staying discovery”). 7 ARGUMENT 8 The relevant factors all point to the same conclusion—that a discovery stay is 9 appropriate here. In addition, the nature of the issues raised by Reddit’s pending motion, 10 or any future Rule 12(b) motion directed to an amended complaint, including the fact 11 that Section 230 provides an immunity from suit, not just from liability, strongly 12 supports the issuance of a stay. 13 I. Reddit’s Pending Motion Is Dispositive of The Entire Case 14 Reddit’s pending motion to dismiss, if granted, will dispose of this entire case, 15 both because it asserts immunity from suit under Section 230, which forecloses all of 16 Plaintiff’s claims, and because it identifies other fundamental defects in each of those 17 claims. As Reddit has shown in its motion to dismiss, Dkt. 24, Plaintiff’s flawed attempt 18 to hold Reddit liable for the acts and content posted by her ex-boyfriend suffers from 19 fundamental defects that should be resolved at the outset of the case, without forcing 20 Reddit to engage in burdensome and intrusive discovery, including into the very types 21 of matters—content moderation—that Section 230 is designed to protect. 22 Section 230 bars all of Plaintiff’s claims. Dkt. 24 at 18–25. It provides that “[n]o 23 provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 24 of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. 25 § 230(c). Section 230 is an “immunity from suit”—one that will be irretrievably 26 compromised if Reddit is forced to engage in discovery before its entitlement to 27 immunity is decided. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125. As the Ninth Circuit repeatedly has 28 emphasized, Section 230 is meant to shield internet service providers like Reddit not just Gibson, Dunn & -6- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 12 of 21 Page ID #:202 1 from the imposition of “ultimate liability” but also from the burdens of litigation, 2 including the expense of “costly and protracted legal battles.” Roommates.com, 521 3 F.3d at 1174–75; see also Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1095– 4 99 (9th Cir. 2019) (Section 230 protects platforms “not merely from ultimate liability” 5 but from the expenses of litigation); Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 255–58 (courts should 6 “resolve the question of [Section 230] immunity at the earliest possible stage of the 7 case”); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) 8 (“determinations of immunity under the CDA should be resolved at an earlier stage of 9 litigation”). 10 Forcing Reddit to respond to discovery before its entitlement to immunity is 11 resolved would undermine these principles. In similar circumstances involving other 12 types of immunity, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed stays of discovery “until the issue of 13 immunity was decided,” reasoning that such a stay “furthers the goals of efficiency for 14 the court and litigants.” Little, 863 F.2d at 685 (qualified immunity of government 15 officials); Aguirre v. Adamo, 474 F. App’x 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); Alaska 16 Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 5 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1993) (stay of 17 discovery appropriate pending disposition of motions based on Eleventh Amendment). 18 For similar reasons, federal courts across the country routinely grant stays of 19 discovery pending resolution of a claim of Section 230 immunity. In Universal 20 Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), the First 21 Circuit affirmed a discovery stay pending a motion to dismiss under Section 230, 22 reasoning that plaintiff had pointed to nothing but “sheer speculation” that they could 23 avoid Section 230 immunity through further discovery. Id. at 425–26 (“[P]laintiffs 24 should not be permitted to conduct fishing expeditions in hopes of discovering claims 25 that they do not know they have.”). Similarly, in Ezra v. America Online, Inc., 1998 26 WL 896459, at 2–3 (D.N.M. July 16, 1998), the court limited discovery pending a 27 dispositive Section 230 summary judgment motion, reasoning that the “congressional 28 Gibson, Dunn & -7- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 13 of 21 Page ID #:203 1 immunity provided by the Communications Decency Act” extends to immunity from 2 “the burdens of broad reaching discovery.” 3 Indeed, where a defendant raises the issue of Section 230 immunity in a motion 4 to dismiss, courts will routinely stay discovery pending resolution of the motion. See, 5 e.g., Gonzalez v. Twitter, No. 4:16-CV-03282, Dkt. Nos. 37, 47 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 6 2016) (minute order staying discovery pending Section 230 motion to dismiss); Fields 7 v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO, Dkt. Nos. 26, 28 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016) 8 (agreeing with internet platform defendant “that a discovery stay is appropriate” pending 9 resolution of issue of Section 230 immunity); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 02- 10 CV-1316 (E.D. Va. May 7, 2003), Dkt. No. 31 (minute order staying all discovery); 11 Blumenthal v. Drudge, No. 97-CV-01968 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 1997), Dkt. Nos. 15, 17 12 (minute order staying all discovery pending resolution of “dispositive motions”). 2 13 Even apart from Section 230, Reddit’s motion to dismiss is potentially dispositive 14 of the entire case because all of Plaintiff’s claims suffer from fundamental, fatal 15 deficiencies that should be addressed before Reddit is subject to discovery. For each of 16 her claims, Plaintiff fails plausibly to allege critical elements of each claim. Dkt 24 at 17 5–17. And apart from these general deficiencies, the complaint also fails to establish 18 threshold requirements for several of the claims. Count II, brought under 18 USC 19 § 2258A, is fundamentally deficient because § 2258A is a criminal statute that does not 20 provide a private right of action. Dkt. 24 at 11–12. And Count V claim, brought under 21 California’s Unfair Competition Law, suffers from a lack of statutory standing. Id. at 22 14–15. Count VI, for unjust enrichment, does not allege an independent cause of action 23 that entitles Plaintiff to any relief. Id. at 16. 24 Faced with dispositive motions raising this type of deficiency, courts routinely 25 stay discovery. Quezambra, 2019 WL 8108745, at 2 (staying discovery where motion 26 to dismiss raised issues of “Article III standing, the adequacy of [plaintiff’s] pleadings, 27 and [plaintiff’s] ability to state a claim based on her allegations”); Hall v. Tilton, 2010 28 2 Reddit is concurrently seeking judicial notice of these filings and orders. Gibson, Dunn & -8- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 14 of 21 Page ID #:204 1 WL 539679, at 1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (staying discovery pending resolution of 2 motion to dismiss based on dispositive statute of limitations issue); cf. Garrett v. 3 Finander, 2016 WL 8135548, at 5, n.3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (noting that the Court 4 “would be willing to ... stay broader discovery” pending resolution of threshold issue 5 whether plaintiff satisfied administrative exhaustion requirements). The same relief is 6 appropriate here. 7 II. Reddit’s Pending Motion May Be Decided Absent Any Discovery 8 A discovery stay is warranted for the additional reason that Reddit’s motion to 9 dismiss can be decided absent any discovery. Reddit’s motion accepts as true all of the 10 well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and argues that Plaintiff’s complaint, as 11 pled, fails to state a claim as a matter of law. Dkt. 24 at 2, n.2. Deciding the motion 12 before discovery will effectuate the purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “to enable 13 defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting 14 themselves to discovery.” Rutman Wine Co., 829 F.3d at 738. 15 Plaintiff’s counsel cannot argue that further discovery might give them 16 information to oppose the application of Section 230 and defeat Reddit’s motion to 17 dismiss because the Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff is not entitled to 18 “unlock the doors of discovery” on the basis of defective pleadings. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 19 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Reddit’s motion to dismiss demonstrates that Plaintiff’s 20 pleadings alone establish that Section 230 applies, and Plaintiff cannot use discovery as 21 a fishing expedition to avoid this fundamental pleading deficiency. See Mujica v. 22 AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 593 (9th Cir. 2014) (“plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading 23 requirements of Rule 8 before the discovery stage, not after it”). 24 III. The Relevant Remaining Factors Also Counsel in Favor of Staying Discovery 25 A straightforward application of the two-part test outlined above establishes that 26 a stay is warranted here. Quezambra, 2019 WL 8108745, at 2 (granting stay on 27 satisfaction of the two-part test). In addition, the other factors courts have identified also 28 weigh heavily toward a stay. Amey, 2013 WL 1243815, at 2. Suspending discovery Gibson, Dunn & -9- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 15 of 21 Page ID #:205 1 until Reddit’s motion to dismiss is resolved will avoid the prejudice to Reddit that would 2 result from having to prepare objections and respond to discovery seeking information 3 about broad aspects of Reddit’s business over the course of a decade, including activities 4 that are plainly the subject of Section 230 immunity, such as content moderation. A stay 5 also will avoid the burdens on the Court that inevitably will result from discovery 6 disputes arising from the broad scope of Plaintiff’s case as pled (and the appropriateness 7 of such sweeping discovery). And given Plaintiff’s stated intention to amend her 8 complaint, a stay is particularly reasonable because there is no urgent need for broad 9 discovery at this time, including discovery having no direct bearing on Plaintiff’s 10 allegations about her alleged harm and relating to an obviously overbroad class that has 11 no reasonable likelihood of being certified. 12 A. The Extent of Plaintiff’s Discovery Is Expansive 13 A discovery stay is appropriate when “requiring Defendant to engage in discovery 14 that may not be permitted or accepted later ... would be prejudicial to Defendant” and 15 when a stay would “allow the Court to avoid any potentially unnecessary judicial 16 expenditures such as discovery disputes that may or may not be relevant” later. Nguyen 17 v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2021 WL 2284113, at 4 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2021). Here, 18 Plaintiff seeks to engage in an unfocused fishing expedition, seeking materials over a 19 vast class definition going back ten years. Staying discovery until the Court resolves 20 Reddit’s motion to dismiss will avoid prejudicing Reddit and also avoid involving the 21 Court in unnecessary disputes about the scope of discovery. 22 As described above, Plaintiff’s discovery requests, which include 26 Requests for 23 Production and five Interrogatories, nowhere mention any of the events specifically 24 concerning Plaintiff, including her allegations that Reddit should have acted with greater 25 speed or diligence in removing content Plaintiff flagged as inappropriate. The requests 26 also reach back for a period of more than a decade—well beyond the December 2019 27 date that Plaintiff identifies as the first time photos and videos of her were posted online. 28 Dkt. 1 ¶ 121. And the requests sweep in documents and information having nothing to Gibson, Dunn & -10- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 16 of 21 Page ID #:206 1 do with Plaintiff’s broad allegations of CSAM or CSEM. Indeed, some of the requests 2 seek sensitive business, financial, and personal information completely unrelated to any 3 allegations of sex trafficking, as seen in the examples quoted above. 4 As shown by the broad wording of these requests, Plaintiff appears to seek all 5 documents related to Reddit’s appointment and employment of content moderators and 6 sensitive financial information relating to every individual post on the platform (which 7 Plaintiff’s own complaint recognizes is upwards of “303.4 million,” Dkt. 1 ¶ 29). Again, 8 these requests touch directly on matters as to which Section 230 provides immunity, 9 including content moderation practices and information relating to third-party posts. 10 Plaintiff’s counsel also has acknowledged the expansiveness of the current class 11 definition, which sweeps in content that could be entirely unconnected to any illegal 12 material. Supra p. 2. This leaves open the possibility that Plaintiff may serve additional 13 discovery requests seeking an even broader set of information and materials. 14 As the Supreme Court warned in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 15 559 (2007), when the “allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim 16 of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of 17 minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” A ruling in 18 Reddit’s favor on its motion to dismiss would obviate all discovery in this case, and 19 Reddit should not be compelled to expend the needless time, effort, and money that 20 would be required to prepare responses and objections to Plaintiff’s demands. Newman 21 v. San Joaquin Delta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2011 WL 1743686, at 4 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 22 2011) (granting protective order where it “is apparent ... that plaintiffs simply wish to 23 rummage around in [defendant’s records] in furtherance of an unfocussed fishing 24 expedition”). Given the breadth of Plaintiff’s requests, and the strong likelihood that 25 Reddit will be entitled to immunity from suit in this action, or at a minimum will have 26 strong objections to such broad discovery, a stay of discovery pending resolution of the 27 motion would “allow the Court to avoid any potentially unnecessary judicial 28 Gibson, Dunn & -11- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 17 of 21 Page ID #:207 1 expenditures such as discovery disputes that may or may not be relevant” later. Nguyen, 2 2021 WL 2284113, at 4. 3 Crucially, as noted, the discovery Plaintiff seeks is inextricably related to conduct 4 falling within the plain scope of Section 230. For example, Plaintiff seeks: 5 RFP 1: “All complaints or requests You received to remove material 6 containing CSEM or concerning child sex trafficking from Your site.” 7 RFP 2 “Documents sufficient to identify Your policies or procedures 8 concerning the elimination of CSEM or child sex trafficking material 9 from Your site, including but not limited to terms of service, moderation 10 policies, and other measures to prevent such content from being 11 uploaded or posted.” 12 Dore. Decl., Ex. A. But, Reddit’s activities relating to “reviewing, editing, and deciding 13 whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content” are precisely 14 what the Ninth Circuit consistently has held are protected by Section 230. Lemmon v. 15 Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 16 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, discovery on such matters, and Plaintiffs’ 17 related discovery requests going to claims that are barred by Section 230, should not 18 proceed while Reddit’s entitlement to immunity is pending. 19 Because Plaintiff does not seek discovery that “would support a viable claim 20 against [Reddit] that falls outside of Section 230 immunity,” a discovery stay pending 21 resolution of any dispositive Rule 12(b) motions by Reddit is particularly appropriate 22 here. Universal Commc’n Sys. Inc., 478 F.3d at 425. 23 B. There Is A Clear Possibility That Reddit’s Motion to Dismiss Will Be Granted 24 In considering a motion to stay pending a potentially dispositive motion, courts 25 also may take a “peek” at the merits of the underlying motion. Mireskandari v. Daily 26 Mail & Gen. Tr. PLC, 2013 WL 12129944, at 4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013). Here, there 27 is a clear possibility that Reddit’s motion to dismiss will be granted because the Ninth 28 Gibson, Dunn & -12- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 18 of 21 Page ID #:208 1 Circuit and other courts already have resolved several of the dispositive issues raised by 2 the motion, including Section 230 immunity. 3 Under clear Ninth Circuit precedent, and consistent with authorities from other 4 courts, the claims raised in this case are precisely the sort that Section 230 bars. In 5 Barnes, the plaintiff sued Yahoo for failing to remove nude photos of her (along with an 6 open solicitation for sexual intercourse) posted by her ex-boyfriend. 570 F.3d at 1102– 7 03. The plaintiff argued that Yahoo was negligent for failing to remove the content, but 8 the Ninth Circuit found the claim barred by Section 230 because it would treat Yahoo 9 as a publisher of third-party content. And in Gavra v. Google Inc., the plaintiff sued 10 Google for failing to remove unflattering videos of her posted on YouTube by a third 11 party. 2013 WL 3788241, at 2 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013). Here, Plaintiff’s claims are 12 premised on the same theory—that Reddit should be liable for its alleged failure 13 promptly to remove sexual content posted by a third party—and thus falls squarely 14 within the scope of Section 230 immunity. 15 The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th 16 Cir. 2021), is not to the contrary. There, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 did not 17 foreclose a “negligent design lawsuit” because (a) that products liability claim turned on 18 a duty that had “nothing to do with” the defendant’s “editing, monitoring, or removing 19 of the content that its users generate,” id. at 1092, and (b) the claim did not “rest on third- 20 party content,” id. at 1093. Here, any duty that Plaintiff seeks to impose on Reddit is 21 inextricably tied to the “editing, monitoring, or removing” of third-party content. Even 22 Plaintiff’s broadest allegations that Reddit should have implemented “age verification 23 systems” to prevent the posting of CSAM (Dkt. 1 ¶ 169) assume Reddit had a duty to 24 monitor the content posted by third parties on its platform. Accordingly, Section 230 25 applies with full force. 26 Federal courts also have addressed the exemptions to Section 230 immunity, and 27 have rejected assertions that an internet platform can be held complicit in sex trafficking, 28 and thus stripped of its Section 230 immunity, merely because it did not adequately Gibson, Dunn & -13- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 19 of 21 Page ID #:209 1 remove or police offensive third party content. In J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, Inc., 2020 WL 2 4901196, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020), the plaintiff alleged that an online classified 3 site facilitated her sex trafficking because it had general knowledge of trafficking content 4 on its platform but failed to monitor and remove that content. Judge Gilliam of the 5 Northern District of California dismissed the complaint after addressing the scope of the 6 statutory exemption for federal sex trafficking claims under 18 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). 2020 7 WL 4901196, at 8–9. He reasoned that holding an internet platform liable merely for 8 an alleged delay or inaction in removing third party content “necessarily suggests that 9 [the platform] enters into tacit agreements with all traffickers (or even all posters) that 10 use its website,” and held that there is “no indication that Congress intended to create” 11 such liability. Id. Similarly, in Doe v. Kik Interactive, 482 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1250 (S.D. 12 Fla. 2020), the court held that the plain language of the § 230(e)(5) statutory exemption 13 for federal trafficking claims requires that the plaintiff “establish that Defendants 14 knowingly participat[e] in the sex trafficking venture involving [plaintiff],” not merely 15 that “Defendants knew that other sex trafficking incidents occurred on [the defendants’ 16 website].” Plaintiff’s complaint—which admits that Reddit disabled her ex-boyfriend’s 17 account but then relies on broad allegations that Reddit should have known of general 18 trafficking activity on its website—is plainly insufficient. 19 In light of this robust body of case law, it is beyond dispute that there is a clear 20 possibility that Reddit’s motion to dismiss will be granted. 21 C. The Litigation Is in Its Early Stages 22 This litigation also is in its early stages, so a stay will not prejudice Plaintiff. 23 Nguyen, 2021 WL 2284113, at 4 (brief delay would not prejudice plaintiff where case 24 was pending for only six months). Plaintiff filed this case less than two months ago. 25 Dkt. 1. Notably, Plaintiff’s counsel have also stated that they plan to amend the 26 complaint in response to Reddit’s motion to dismiss. Given the lack of clarity as to the 27 scope of Plaintiff’s own allegations, there is no practical need to commence discovery, 28 and any such need would be outweighed by the benefits of allowing the Court and parties Gibson, Dunn & -14- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 20 of 21 Page ID #:210 1 to resolve the threshold legal issues and, if those go against Reddit, to refine the scope 2 of the case. Accordingly, a stay of discovery pending the Court’s resolution of a motion 3 to dismiss is appropriate. Cox v. United States, 2018 WL 6039872, at 2 (C.D. Cal. July 4 2, 2018) (staying defendants’ obligations to respond to discovery requests pending 5 resolution of a motion to dismiss given that “it would be premature to order responses 6 to discovery” before the defendants had responded to the operative complaint). 7 D. Other Relevant Factors Weigh in Favor of Staying Discovery 8 The nature and complexity of this action provides an additional reason for a stay. 9 Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of every minor who appeared in a video or image on 10 Reddit’s website—a definition that would include everything from family photos at 11 Disneyland to class photos taken decades ago that happened to have been posted to 12 Reddit in the last ten years. The breadth of this suit counsels in favor of allowing the 13 parties to narrow the issues before proceeding with discovery, even assuming all of 14 Reddit’s dispositive grounds for dismissal are rejected. Mireskandari, 2013 WL 15 12129944, at 4 (staying discovery where pending motion could dispose of at least two 16 of plaintiff’s thirteen claims); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (courts to decide scope of 17 any certifiable class “[a]t an early practicable time”). No counterclaims or cross-claims 18 have been asserted, so resolving Reddit’s dismissal motion may resolve the entire case. 19 Finally, there are no other parties to the action to join the request for the stay, so an order 20 granting Reddit’s dismissal motion will dispose of the entire action. 21 CONCLUSION 22 The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “sounder practice to determine whether there 23 is a reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs can construct a claim before forcing the parties 24 to undergo the expense of discovery.” Rutman Wine Co., 829 F.2d at 738. Reddit’s 25 motion to dismiss raises multiple threshold issues, including the Section 230 defense 26 that, if applicable, would mean that Reddit is immune from suit. For all of these reasons, 27 the Court should order a stay of discovery pending resolution of these issues. 28 Gibson, Dunn & -15- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES Case 8:21-cv-00768-JVS-KES Document 25 Filed 06/21/21 Page 21 of 21 Page ID #:211 1 Dated: June 21, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 2 3 4 By: /s/ Theane Evangelis Theane Evangelis 5 6 THEANE EVANGELIS KRISTIN A. LINSLEY 7 MICHAEL DORE 8 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 9 Attorneys for Defendant 10 Reddit, Inc. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Gibson, Dunn & -16- Crutcher LLP MOTION BY DEFENDANT REDDIT, INC. TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) CASE NO. 8:21-CV-00768-JVS-KES
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Olivette Otele (Camarões, 1970) é uma historiadora e pesquisadora francesa, nascida nos Camarões. Sua pesquisa foca nas ligações entre história, memória e geopolítica em relação ao passado colonial francês e britânico. Olivette é professora da Universidade Bath Spa, em Bath, Inglaterra, sendo a primeira mulher negra a ser indicada para a cadeira de História em uma universidade do Reino Unido. É autora do livro Afro-Europeans: A Short History. Biografia Olivette nasceu nos Camarões em 1970, sendo criada em Paris. Estudou na Universidade Paris-Sorbonne, trabalhando desde a graduação com a Europa Colonial e a história pós-colonial. Obteve o bacharelado em Literatura em 1998 e o mestrado em 2000. Seu doutorado foi obtido em 2005, com a tese Mémoire et politique: l'enrichissement de Bristol par le commerce triangulaire, objet de polémique, focando no papel da cidade de Bristol no comércio e escravidão negra transatlântica. A grande influência na pesquisa de Olivette é o historiador congolês Elikia M'Bokolo. Além de falar inglês, francês e alemão fluentemente, Olivette também fala três dialetos camaroneses, euondo, eton e bulu. Carreira Após o doutorado, Olivette se tornou professora associada da Universidade de Paris. Nesta época, trabalhou com identidade britânica em Gales e o que significa ser negro, britânico e galês. Em 2018, aos 48 anos, tornou-se a primeira mulher negra a chefiar a cadeira de história de uma universidade britânica. Sua promoção e reconhecimento no meio universitário foi atrasada por ser mãe de duas crianças e por ser uma mulher negra. Segundo o relatório Race, Ethnicity & Equality Report da Royal Historical Society, publicado em outubro de 2018, apenas 0.5% dos historiadores que trabalham em universidades do Reino Unido são negros. Até a promoção catedrática de Olivette, nenhuma mulher negra trabalhava como professora universitária em uma universidade britânica. Ela espera que sua indicação abra as portas para mais mulheres, especialmente as negras, no meio acadêmico. Na época de sua promoção, Olivette comentou que qualquer sucesso que seja usado apenas para melhorar sua própria vida, era um desperdício de possibilidades e que seu sucesso de nada significaria se isso não trouxe oportunidades para outras pessoas. Ela também ressaltou as dificuldades para se tornar professora e pesquisadora: A vice-reitora da Universidade Bath Spa, professora Susan Rigby, descreve Olivette como uma pesquisadora de primeira linha e mundialmente respeitada. Olivette participou de vários eventos e simpósios relacionados à Diáspora Africana. Seus estudos analisam o modo como as sociedades britânica e francesa definem cidadania, além de ter estudado o tráfico transatlântico de escravos. Olivette é membro da Royal Historical Society e membro da diretoria da associação dos Historias Against Slavery (Historiadores Contra a Escravidão). É membro executivo da Sociedade Britânica para Estudos do Século XVIII, membro da Associação Britânica de Estudos Culturais e membro do Centro Internacional de Pesquisa sobre Escravidão. Publicou artigos em vários meios da mídia, como a BBC e Times Higher Education. Escreveu e contribuiu em diversos livros. Seu livro Afro-Europeans: a Short History foi publicado em 2008. Seu segundo livro, Post-Conflict Memorialization: Missing Memorials, Absent Bodies, está programado para ser publicado em 2019. Reconhecimento Olivette foi nomeada pela lista da BBC de 100 grandes mulheres de 2018, que celebra mulheres inspiradoras e influentes ao redor do mundo; ela está na posição de número 69, junto de Abisoye Ajayi-Akinfolarin, Nimco Ali e Uma Devi Badi. Olivette acredita que sua indicação, sua carreira e reconhecimento influenciará outras pessoas e espera que elas busquem carreira acadêmica a partir de seu exemplo. Historiadores do Reino Unido !Mais Teoria da História na Wiki (Mulheres) !Mais Teoria da História na Wiki (Wikiconcurso de edição)
de	wikipedia	N/A	John Joseph „Johnny V.“ Vitale (* 17. Mai 1909 in St. Louis (Missouri); † 5. Juni 1982, ebenda) war ein US-amerikanischer Mobster der US-amerikanischen Cosa Nostra, drei Jahrzehnte Underboss und darauf folgend zwei Jahre bis zu seinem Tod, Familienoberhaupt der Giordano-Familie (St. Louis crime family), die mit ihrem Hauptsitz von St. Louis (Missouri) aus agiert. Frühe Jahre John Joseph Vitale wurde am 17. Mai 1909 in St. Louis (Missouri) als das älteste von acht Kindern geboren und von seinen Eltern Joseph Vitale, Sr. und Mary Theresa Bovacanti großgezogen, die ein paar Monate vor dessen Geburt aus Italien in die vereinigten Staaten emigriert waren. Während der Großen Depression arbeitete John als Platzanweiser im Ambassador Theater, wo er auch die Filmschauspielerin Ginger Rogers kennenlernte; die beiden wurden Freunde fürs Leben. Um 1929 heiratete er seine geliebte Fara Marie Sharamitaro. Gemeinsam bekamen sie vier Kinder. Nachdem Fara im Juli 1973 starb, heiratete John am 4. August 1973 in Las Vegas (Nevada) Mildred Joyce Allen. Kriminelle Laufbahn Die Vorstrafen Vitales reichen bis in die 1920er Jahre zurück. Zum Beispiel war er im Jahr 1934 ein Verdächtiger im Todesfall von Mike Palazzolo, einem assoziierten der New Yorker Genovese-Familie. Doch obwohl ein Haftbefehl gegen ihn ausgestellt wurde, wurde Vitale des Mordes freigesprochen. Nachdem Underboss Vincenzo „Vincent“ Chiapetta im Jahr 1950 kurzzeitig Boss der Familie wurde, übernahm Vitale dessen Posten und blieb bis zum Jahr 1980 Underboss. Von Vitales frühen Jahren im Syndikat ist im Allgemeinen sehr wenig bekannt. In den 1950er Jahren wurde John Vitale wegen einer Anklage bezüglich Betäubungsmitteln an das Bundesgefängnis überstellt. Im Jahr 1958 wurde er angeklagt und verurteilt, da er Waffen über die Staatsgrenze geschmuggelt haben soll. Vitale ging dagegen in Berufung. Im Februar 1959 wurde Vitale als Zeuge in Bezug auf von der Mafia kontrollierte Spielautomaten vorgeladen, doch berief er sich auf den „5. Zusatzartikel zur Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten“, um sich nicht eventuell selbst belasten zu müssen. 1977 wurde er wegen Körperverletzung verurteilt und im Jahr 1981 wurde er kurzzeitig verhaftet, da er 30.000 US-Dollar in seinem Portemonnaie mit sich führte. Am 29. August 1980 verstarb Familienoberhaupt Anthony Giordano an Krebs und John Vitale wurde der neue Boss der Familie, bis er am 5. Juni 1982 eines natürlichen Todes starb. Er wurde am 9. Juni 1982 auf dem Calvary Friedhof in St. Louis. beerdigt. Vitales Nachfolger als neuer Boss der Familie wurde Matthew M. Trupiano, Jr. Einzelnachweise Mafioso (Vereinigte Staaten) Italiener Geboren 1909 Gestorben 1982 Mann
en	caselaw	US	103 Ariz. 208 (1968) 439 P.2d 294 The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, the Honorable T.J. Mahoney, Judge thereof, and Ernest A. Miranda, real party in interest, Respondents. No. 9149. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. March 21, 1968. 209 Darrel F. Smith, Atty. Gen., James S. Tegart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner. Lewis, Roca, Beauchamp & Linton, Phoenix, for respondent, Ernest A. Miranda. STRUCKMEYER, Justice. On June 27, 1963, respondent Ernest A. Miranda was convicted in Maricopa County of the crime of robbery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Arizona State Prison. He appealed and we affirmed. State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 11, 401 P.2d 716. Two and one-half years later Miranda filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Pinal County. It appearing that the Honorable T.J. Mahoney, Judge thereof, was purporting to exercise jurisdiction, the Attorney General of Arizona applied to this Court for a writ of prohibition. We directed that the alternative writ issue the sole question being whether the superior court, or a judge thereof, had jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus based on grounds which occurred prior to the affirmance of the judgment and which either were or could have been raised on appeal. Nearly fifty years ago we held: "The fact that the superior courts and the judges thereof have concurrent jurisdiction with this court in habeas corpus proceedings does not authorize either of those courts or either of such judges to issue writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of reviewing the judgments of this court." State ex rel. Galbraith v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 22 Ariz. 452, 456, 197 P. 537, 538. (Emphases in original.) The statements of the Supreme Court of Illinois in People ex rel. Kerner v. Circuit Court of Will County, 369 Ill. 438, 440, 441, 17 N.E.2d 46, 47, aptly stress the principles controlling here. "It has been so frequently held by this court as to be plain and settled law in this State, of which all inferior courts must be held to have knowledge, that when a judgment is affirmed by this court all questions, whether raised by assignment of error or which might have been raised on the record, are finally adjudicated, and such judgment must be regarded as free from all error. People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84 N.E. 875, 14 Ann.Cas. 753; Gould v. Sternberg, 128 Ill. 510, 21 N.E. 628, 15 Am.St. Rep. 138. The adjudication of this court in People v. Karatz, supra, [365 Ill. 255, 5 N.E.2d 842] affirmed the conviction 210 of Karatz and pronounced the judgment against him a valid judgment. "While it is true that circuit and superior courts and the judges thereof have concurrent jurisdiction with this court in habeas corpus proceedings, that fact, as this court has held, does not authorize those courts or judges thereof to review a judgment of this court by a writ of habeas corpus. When this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has determined the validity of a judgment of the lower court, the judges of the circuit and superior courts are bound by that judgment and are without power or authority, by habeas corpus or otherwise, to pass upon its validity. This is not only well settled in this State but is so thoroughly founded on principles of orderly administration of the law that there ought not to be any judge who doubts or is unfamiliar with it." (Emphases in original.) The appropriate procedure was set forth in Rogers v. Ogg, 101 Ariz. 161, 416 P.2d 594, where, in speaking of a motion to vacate a judgment in the superior court under Rule 60, Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., after affirmance of a judgment on appeal, we said: "Although we have not faced the precise question before, the federal courts have long held that where the district court is asked under Rule 60(b), Arizona Rule 60(c), to vacate a judgment which has been affirmed on appeal, it has no power to proceed without leave of the appellate court if the requested action would be inconsistent with the previously entered appellate court mandate. The leading case is Butcher & Sherrerd v. Welsh (3rd Cir.) 206 F.2d 259 where the respondent persuaded the district court to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence though the circuit court had previously affirmed a judgment against respondent. The court said: "`* * * Where a judgment has been affirmed on appeal and the mandate handed down it is beyond the power of the lower court to disturb the judgment without leave of the appellate court. This procedure is required by long-settled principles.'" 101 Ariz. at 162, 416 P.2d at 595. We will consider any application to this Court which states sufficient facts to justify relief irrespective of its technical denomination. Article VI, § 5, ¶ 4, Constitution of Arizona, A.R.S. State v. Court of Appeals, Division Two, 101 Ariz. 166, 416 P.2d 599. The alternative writ of prohibition is made permanent. McFARLAND, C.J., UDALL, V.C.J., and BERNSTEIN and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Dhamal (), better known as dhamail (), is a form of folk music and dance prevalent in the Mymensingh and Sylhet regions of northeastern Bengal, in present-day Bangladesh and eastern India. History The word, dhamal or dhamail, can be traced back centuries. It can be found in the works of 15th-century poet Chandidas of Birbhum, 16th-century poet Dawlat Wazir Bahram Khan of Chittagong as well as 17th-century poet Daulat Qazi of Chittagong. The folk music composers Radharaman Dutta and Arkum Shah have been cited as having introduced the dhamail dance tradition to the Sylhet region. Encompassment It accompanies the use of mirdanga, kartals and many other musical instruments which are usually played by the males while the dance is being performed. This dance form is similar to musical chairs, where one by one the dancers are removed by the dancers who can dance very fast as the beats gear up the speed. This dance form mainly relates the love of Radha and Krishna and the inner significance of this dance form is that the newly wedded couple must unite their souls in such fashion. The song and dance is mainly performed by the womenfolk during marriages and other auspicious occasions. The ladies moves in circle, clapping their hands to the beat of the music. The songs are first sung by the leader and then the others join the chorus. The lyrics mainly relate to Shyam (Krishna) and Radha. Gradually the tempo and dynamics increase to a peak. Breaks are then given so that the ladies can have paan, areca nut and/or tea. References Indian folk dances Bangladeshi culture Music of Bengal
de	wikipedia	N/A	Theophilus von Caesarea († 195 in Caesarea Maritima) war Bischof von Caesarea und Heiliger. Theophilus ist vor allem bekannt durch seine Opposition gegen die Quartodezimaner im Osterstreit, in dem er die Position des Bischofs von Rom, Viktor I., verteidigte. Gedenktag des Heiligen ist der 5. März. Weblinks Eintrag in Vollständiges Heiligen-Lexikon (1858) Eintrag auf www.heiligenlexikon.de Heiliger (2. Jahrhundert) Bischof (2. Jahrhundert) Geboren im 2. Jahrhundert Gestorben 195 Mann
fr	wikipedia	N/A	En Suisse, une grande région est un regroupement d'un ou plusieurs cantons dans un but de comparaison statistique, régionale et internationale. Le pays est ainsi découpé depuis 1997 en sept grandes régions, qui sont équivalentes aux régions NUTS 2 d'Eurostat (office statistique de l'Union européenne). Correspondant à un échelon obligatoire pour la statistique suisse depuis leur création, elles ne représentent toutefois pas une unité institutionnelle en tant que telle. Liste Annexes Sources Notes et références Articles connexes Géographie de la Suisse
en	legislation	US	II 111th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 2416 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES October 29, 2009 Mrs. Hagan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance A BILL To suspend temporarily the duty on certain synthetic staple fibers that are not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning. 1.Certain synthetic staple fibers that are not carded, combed, or otherwise processed for spinning (a)In generalSubchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following new heading: 9902.01.00Acrylic staple fibers containing at least 85 percent by weight of acrylonitrile units and 2 percent or more but not over 3 percent of water, raw white (undyed), crimped, with average filament decitex of 1.3 (plus or minus 10 percent) and fiber length of 38 mm (plus or minus 10 percent) (provided for in subheading 5503.30.00)FreeNo changeNo changeOn or before 12/31/2011 . (b)Effective dateThe amendment made by subsection (a) applies to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Xie Molin (Chinese: 谢墨凛; born 1979) is a contemporary Chinese artist currently working and living in Beijing, China. He is best known for creating paintings using a tri-axial linkage painting machine. Background After living in Wenzhou, a city in the Zhejiang Province of China, Xie Molin moved to Beijing in 1995 to attend the attached school of the China Central Academy of Fine Arts (CAFA). He graduated from the Mural Department of CAFA and obtained an M.F.A from the painting department of the Edinburgh College of Art. Career Upon arriving back to Beijing Xie Molin participated in several group exhibitions including the CAFAM Future Exhibition at the CAFA Museum, ON/OFF: China's Young Artists in Concept and Practice at the Ullens Center for Contemporary Art (UCCA), Pull Left-Not Always Right at the Urban Arts Space at Ohio State University and at the Hillstrom Museum of Gustavus Adolphus College in Minnesota, 28 Chinese at the Rubell Family Collection in Miami, Focus Beijing: De Heus-Zomer Collection at the Museum Bojimans Van Beuningen in Rotterdam, Leaving Realism Behind at Pace Gallery in Beijing and A Victory Over Nothingness: Purse Snatch in Streetcar and Other Post Fevralist Absurdities at Intelligentsia Gallery in Beijing. Xie Molin's work has been featured in solo shows at Pace Hong Kong, the Beijing Commune, and at Space Station in Beijing. References External links Xie Molin – Pace Gallery Xie Molin – 北京公社 Beijing Commune Official Website 1979 births Living people Chinese contemporary artists Painters from Zhejiang Artists from Wenzhou Alumni of the Edinburgh College of Art
en	wikipedia	N/A	I Am a Thief is a 1934 American crime-drama film directed by Robert Florey. Plot Mary Astor portrays Odette as an undercover police agent who hopes to provoke, and catch, an international jewel thief, as he transports the famous Karenina diamonds from Paris across Europe to Istanbul on the Orient Express, along with a trainload of suspicious characters. Cast Mary Astor as Odette Mauclair Ricardo Cortez as Pierre Londais Dudley Digges as Colonel Jackson Robert Barrat as Baron Von Kampf Irving Pichel as Count Trentini Hobart Cavanaugh as Daudet Ferdinand Gottschalk as M. Cassiet Arthur Aylesworth as Francois Florence Fair as Mme. Cassiet Frank Reicher as Max Bolen John Wray as Antonio Borricci Oscar Apfel as Auctioneer unbilled cast members include Clay Clement and Gino Corrado External links 1934 films 1934 crime drama films American crime drama films Films directed by Robert Florey Warner Bros. films Films produced by Henry Blanke Films set on the Orient Express American black-and-white films 1930s American films Films scored by Bernhard Kaun
it	wikipedia	N/A	Biografia Dopo la licenza liceale si interessa di teatro e con varie compagnie recita dai primi anni dieci fino al periodo bellico. Nel cinema esordisce in età ormai matura (1936) con un piccolo ruolo in Pensaci, Giacomino! di Gennaro Righelli. Ha partecipato a diversi film di Totò facendo il ruolo del commissario nel film Letto a tre piazze e il conduttore del vagone letto in Totò a colori. Nel film Totò e i re di Roma Ferrara offre lo spunto a Totò per cimentarsi in varie gag mentre tenta di passare l'esame per la licenza elementare sotto lo sguardo severo di Alberto Sordi. Nel film Un eroe dei nostri tempi è alle prese con lo stesso Sordi, affetto da paure e manie di persecuzione; in qualità di commissario, Paolo Ferrara si vede costretto più volte ad ammonirlo per il suo comportamento ambiguo. Fino al 1965, anno della sua morte, appare in una cinquantina di film, sempre come caratterista. Filmografia Cinema Pensaci, Giacomino!, regia di Gennaro Righelli (1936) Il feroce Saladino, regia di Mario Bonnard (1937) Ettore Fieramosca, regia di Alessandro Blasetti (1938) Terra di fuoco, regia di Marcel L'Herbier e Giorgio Ferroni (1938) L'ultimo scugnizzo, regia di Gennaro Righelli (1938) Il barone di Corbò, regia di Gennaro Righelli (1939) Imputato, alzatevi!, regia di Mario Mattoli (1939) Non me lo dire!, regia di Mario Mattoli (1940) Ore 9: lezione di chimica, regia di Mario Mattoli (1941) Se non son matti non li vogliamo, regia di Esodo Pratelli (1941) I mariti (Tempesta d'anime), regia di Camillo Mastrocinque (1941) Noi vivi, regia di Goffredo Alessandrini (1942) Addio Kira!, regia di Goffredo Alessandrini (1942) Labbra serrate, regia di Mario Mattoli (1942) Il treno crociato, regia di Carlo Campogalliani (1942) Fuga a due voci, regia di Carlo Ludovico Bragaglia (1942) Spie tra le eliche, regia di Ignazio Ferronetti (1943) 4 ragazze sognano, regia di Guglielmo Giannini (1943) Inviati speciali, regia di Romolo Marcellini (1943) L'ultima carrozzella, regia di Mario Mattoli (1943) Torna a Sorrento, regia di Carlo Ludovico Bragaglia (1945) La primula bianca, regia di Carlo Ludovico Bragaglia (1946) Furia, regia di Goffredo Alessandrini (1947) Il corriere di ferro, regia di Francesco Zavatta (1947) Molti sogni per le strade, regia di Mario Camerini (1948) Il brigante Musolino, regia di Mario Camerini (1950) Vita da cani, regia di Steno e Monicelli (1950) È più facile che un cammello..., regia di Luigi Zampa (1951) Atto di accusa, regia di Giacomo Gentilomo (1951) Cameriera bella presenza offresi..., regia di Giorgio Pàstina (1951) Anna, regia di Alberto Lattuada (1951) Totò e i re di Roma, regia di Steno e Mario Monicelli (1951) La famiglia Passaguai fa fortuna, regia di Aldo Fabrizi (1952) Processo contro ignoti di Guido Brignone (1952) Totò a colori, regia di Steno (1952) Le infedeli, regia di Steno e Monicelli (1953) La lupa, regia di Alberto Lattuada (1953) Vortice, regia di Raffaello Matarazzo (1953) Torna!, regia di Raffaello Matarazzo (1953) L'età dell'amore, regia di Lionello De Felice (1953) L'uomo, la bestia e la virtù, regia di Steno (1953) Marsina stretta, episodio di Questa è la vita, regia di Aldo Fabrizi (1954) Vestire gli ignudi, regia di Marcello Pagliero (1954) Proibito, regia di Mario Monicelli (1954) Un eroe dei nostri tempi, regia di Mario Monicelli (1955) Amici per la pelle, regia di Franco Rossi (1955) Il bigamo, regia di Luciano Emmer (1955) Suor Letizia, regia di Mario Camerini (1956) Maruzzella, regia di Luigi Capuano (1956) Padri e figli, regia di Mario Monicelli (1957) Onore e sangue, regia di Luigi Capuano (1957) Mariti in città, regia di Luigi Comencini (1957) Amore e chiacchiere, regia di Alessandro Blasetti (1957) Adorabili e bugiarde, regia di Nunzio Malasomma (1958) Carosello di canzoni, regia di Luigi Capuano (1958) Carmela è una bambola, regia di Gianni Puccini (1958) Un militare e mezzo, regia di Steno (1959) Letto a tre piazze, regia di Steno (1960) Il gobbo, regia di Carlo Lizzani (1960) Totò diabolicus, regia di Steno (1962) L'ultimo rififi, regia di Juan Atienza (1964) Televisione Ragazze in vetrina, episodio di Aprite: polizia!, regia di Daniele D'Anza (1958) Il doppiaggio Dotato di una voce possente, Ferrara doppiò sempre attori di stazza robusta che necessitavano di un timbro vocale forte e autoritario, però a differenza di altri colleghi, l'attore diede molto raramente una inflessione dialettale alla propria voce durante l'attività di doppiaggio, esprimendosi sempre in italiano. Segue una lista parziale degli attori doppiati da Ferrara. Saro Urzì in Il cammino della speranza Ciccio Barbi in Bravissimo Fernand Sardou in I tartassati Fu doppiato a sua volta da: Mario Besesti in Le infedeli, Cameriera bella presenza offresi... Carlo Romano in La lupa Note Collegamenti esterni Attori teatrali italiani
en	wikipedia	N/A	Regina Leung Tong Ching-yee (; born 5 February 1957) is a former solicitor in Hong Kong. She is the wife of Leung Chun-ying, the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong. Early life and marriage Regina Tong was born at Tsan Yuk Hospital, the teaching hospital of University of Hong Kong in Sai Ying Pun, Hong Kong, on 5 February 1957 to a merchant Tong Chi-ming and mother Kwok Chor-gar. She changed her name to Regina Ching Yee Higgins, as appeared on the certificate of marriage with Leung Chun-ying. Lawyers speculated that Tong could be adopted by her British relative, Kwok Cheo One who also named Higgins Cheo One, during her study in Britain to avoid high tuition fees. She was also a British citizen. She studied law at the Bristol Polytechnic in 1978 and met Leung Chun-ying, a fresh graduate, at an alumni gathering. They married on 7 August 1981 and had three children: Leung Chuen-yan, Leung Chai-yan and Leung Chung-yan. In 1983, she received the qualifications to practice law in Hong Kong until she retired in 1999. In 1992, she formed an investment company with her mother and changed her name back to Regina Tong. She resided in London during the 2000s to take care of her children who all studied in Britain at the time. Spouse of Chief Executive Regina Leung became the Spouse of Chief Executive after her husband Leung Chun-ying won the 2012 Chief Executive election. As the spouse of the Chief Executive, Regina Leung took positions of patron and president of many non-governmental organisations, following former Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen's wife, Selina Tsang Pou Siu-mei, and Tung Chee-hwa's wife, Betty Tung Chiu Hung-ping. Leung is the president of the Community Chest of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Girl Guides Association. However, Hong Kong Red Cross had been also traditionally invite spouses of the Chief Executive to be president, decided not to invite Leung as the new president but invite retired judge Yang Ti-liang instead. Food waste organisation controversy In November 2012, Regina Leung founded the Food for Good, a non-profit organisation to redistribute leftover food from hotels, restaurants and bakeries to those in need and promote policy on reducing and recycling food waste. She was criticised after she used the Chief Executive Office to meet with the members of the Friends of Earth and Green Power for "using government resources to handle her private matters." Labour Party legislator Cyd Ho said it was not appropriate for Leung to be involved in a company which could make a profit her company was still registered as a company instead of a non-profit organisation. The Chief Executive Office later said Leung would quit her post as a director and switch to an honorary role once operations get under way. Daughter's Facebook post In 2014 when her 22-year-old daughter Leung Chai-yan published a Facebook post that depicted a slashed wrist captioned "Will I bleed to death?", Leung criticised the media for its coverage of her daughter and urged it to stop reporting on her situation. She went on and slammed Ivan Choy Chi-keung, a political science lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong Kong for his article in Ming Pao which criticised the Chief Executive who posted a family picture in Hyde Park after his daughter's Facebook posting with smiles and harmonious tone, in which his daughter later said it was her father idea to take the picture and she thought it was a poor PR stunt. Choy said Leung Chun-ying was exploiting his daughter and quoted the Chinese saying, "Even a vicious tiger will not eat its cubs". Regina Leung criticised Choy by saying that "Mr Choy based his article on fragmented information he obtained by himself and from the media and used mean words in his malicious criticism," she said. "Mr Choy's behaviour shows he is shallow, ignorant, cold-blooded and unfeeling ... I worry for his students for having such a 'teacher'." Choy hit back by saying that Leung did not have to shout insults in public and was inappropriate. Leung also said that her daughter had been dealing with health and emotional issues for a few years. Domestic violence allegation In March 2015, Leung's daughter Leung Chai-yan claimed that her mother hit her in a rage. "My mother literally just pushed me up against a wall slapped me and called me a [stupid ... whore ...] kicked me – I fell, hit my spine against corner of study table. Lovely," Leung wrote. She also claimed that her mother threatened to call the police and carpet-searched her room. She added, "I genuinely think if I were on the 20th floor of a building instead of being in [Government House], I [would've] jumped ... There is no way out." Ambulances were called to the Government House on 17 March and Leung Chai-yan said she had been "held against her will" at home. Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying declined to comment, apart from asking the public to "give her some room". A group of 10 college students organised a demonstration in support of Chai-yan and demanding government departments to take action against domestic violence. 2015 Halloween incident On 31 October 2015, Leung's daughter Leung Chai-yan celebrated Halloween at a number of nightclubs and parties in the Lan Kwai Fong area in Central and had a dispute with a taxi driver around 3 am on 1 November 2015. Her mother later arrived to the scene which enraged Leung Chai-yan. As Regina helped her daughter into the taxi, the latter was captured slapping Regina in the face twice, and her daughter refused to enter the vehicle. Regina was seen cradling her own cheek in shock. "You know this mum is not my actual biological mother," added Leung to the small crowd gathered at the scene. Leung later said she believed her daughter was "tipsy" at the time and had no intention of offending anyone. She also urged the media and internet users to give Chai-yan more space. Airport security "special arrangement" allegation On 7 April 2016, local Chinese newspaper Apple Daily reported that Leung Chun-ying allegedly requested over the phone that airline staff help his younger daughter, Leung Chung-yan, who had left a piece of luggage outside the restricted area when she was with her mother Regina Leung at the boarding gate for Cathay Pacific flight CX872 to San Francisco on 28 March. In an "internal document" allegedly detailing the incident published by Apple Daily, "Ms Leung asked us many times to claim her bag on her behalf from [Avseco] to boarding gate ... she did not want to waste time ... also she told us that she must be getting on the flight," the document said. Avseco is an aviation security firm. Secretary for Transport and Housing Anthony Cheung said that the Hong Kong Airport Authority is looking into allegations. The policy regarding luggage handling was changed subsequently to allow people like her to abuse airport security. Fashion sense Leung has been criticised for her fashion choices. Her clothing choices during first official trip in Beijing with husband Leung Chun-ying was criticised by fashion expert William Tang Tat-chi. She was nicknamed as "lobster" after having worn a red floppy dress in a public function. The bright red evening dress with long sleeves caught the public's imagination, and spawned numerous internet memes. Nicknames Besides "lobster", Leung was also nicknamed "Mrs. So and so" (乜太), a fictional character played by Liu Wai-hung in variety show Enjoy Yourself Tonight in the 80s. References 1957 births Living people Hong Kong investors Solicitors of Hong Kong Alumni of the University of the West of England, Bristol
sk	wikipedia	N/A	Baluan je najjužnejší ostrov súostrovia Ostrovy admirality, patriaceho pod správu Papuy-novej Guiney. široký ostrov je vulkanického pôvodu, predstavuje vrchol pleistocénneho stratovulkánu s pomerne zachovaným centrálnym kráterom s priemerom približne a viacerými parazitickými krátermi. Na rozdiel od horninového zloženia okolitých ostrovov súostrovia, ktoré sú tvorené prevažne kyslými vulkanitmi, v stavbe Baluanu prevládajú bazalty. Niektoré z parazitických kráterov pravdepodobne eruptovali v holocéne. Externé odkazy www.volcano.si.edu ostrov Baluan na Global Volcanism Program Ostrovy Papuy-Novej Guiney Sopky Papuy-Novej Guiney Stratovulkány Vyhasnuté sopky
nl	wikipedia	N/A	Krinkelt is een plaats in de deelgemeente Rocherath van de gemeente Büllingen en ligt in de Belgische provincie Luik. Krinkelt vormt samen met het er aan vastgegroeide Rocherath een dubbeldorp. Geschiedenis Krinkelt werd vermoedelijk al in de 8e of 9e eeuw gesticht. Van hier uit werd in de 12e eeuw het dorp Rocherath gesticht. Vooral in de 14e eeuw, toen de pest heerste, vestigden zich inwoners van Krinkelt in Rocherath. Tegenwoordig zijn de dorpen aan elkaar vastgebouwd. Bezienswaardigheden Sint-Jan-de-Doperkerk, de hoogst gelegen kerk van België. Monument ter gedachtenis van het 2e infanterieregiment uit de USA, zie ook: Slag bij Wahlerscheid. Externe link Geschiedenis van Rocherath-Krinkelt Nabijgelegen kernen Rocherath, Mürringen, Berg, Büllingen Plaats in de Duitstalige Gemeenschap Büllingen
en	other	N/A	415 U.S. 322 - National Labor Relations Board v. Magnavox Company of Tennessee 415 US 322 National Labor Relations Board v. Magnavox Company of Tennessee The MAGNAVOX COMPANY OF TENNESSEE. Employees have the right recognized in § 7 of the Act 'to form, join, or assist labor organizations' or 'to refrain' from such activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157. We agree that a ban on the distribution of union literature or the solicitation of union support by employees at the plant during nonworking time may constitute an interference with § 7 rights. The Board had earlier held that solicitation outside working hours but on company property was protected by § 7 and that a rule prohibiting it was 'discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.' In re Peyton Packaging Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843—844. We approved that ruling in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801—803, 65 S.Ct. 982, 987—988, 89 L.Ed. 1372. No contention is made here that considerations of production or discipline make respondent's rule necessary. The sole issue concerns the power of the collective-bargaining representative to waive those rights. The union may, of course, reach an agreement as to wages and other employment benefits and waive the right to strike during the time of the agreement as the quid pro quo for the employer's acceptance of the grievance and arbitration procedure. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917, 1 L.Ed.2d 972. Such agreements, however, rest on 'the premise of fair representation' and presuppose that the selection of the bargaining representative 'remains free.' Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280, 76 S.Ct. 349, 361, 100 L.Ed. 309. In that case we held that the waiver of the 'right to strike' did not embrace a waiver of the right to strike 'against unlawful practices destructive of the foundation on which collective bargaining must rest.' Id., at 281, 76 S.Ct., at 357. We dealt there with rights in the economic area. Yet, as the Fifth Circuit held in the Mid-States case, a different rule should obtain where the rights of the employees to exercise their choice of a bargaining representative is involved—whether to have no bargaining representative, or to retain the present one, or to obtain a new one. When the right to such a choice is at issue, it is difficult to assume that the incumbent union has no self-interest of its own to serve by perpetuating itself as the bargaining representative. 403 F.2d, at 705. The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to the employees. So long as the distribution is by employees to employees and so long as the in-plant solicitation is on nonworking time, banning of that solicitation might seriously dilute § 7 rights. For Congress declared in § 1 of the Act that it was the policy of the United States to protect 'the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.' 29 U.S.C. § 151. It is argued that the use of the bulletin board is a fair substitute. But as the Fifth Circuit said in the Mid-States case the bulletin board may be an adequate medium for 'preserving the status quo' and yet not give a union's adversaries 'equal access to and communication with their fellow employees.' 403 F.2d, at 705. Moreover, a limitation of the right of in-plant distribution of literature to employees opposing the union does not give a fair balance to § 7 rights, as the Board ruled in the present case. For employees supporting the union have as secure § 7 rights as those in opposition. The Board's position, as noted, has not always been consistent. But its present ruling is, we think, quite consistent with § 7 rights of employees. It is the board's function to strike a balance among 'conflicting legitimate interests' which will 'effectuate national labor policy,' including those who support versus those who oppose the union. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96, 77 S.Ct. 643, 648, 1 L.Ed.2d 676. Moreover, as respects employers, the rights of solicitation of employees by employees concerning § 7 rights are not absolute. As we noted in Republic Aviation Corp. the Board may well conclude that considerations of production or discipline may make controls necessary. No such evidence existed here and the trial examiner so found. Accordingly, this is not the occasion to balance the availability of alternative channels of communication* against a legitimate employer business justification for barring or limiting in-plant communications. To the extent the Court holds that a union cannot contractually waive the right of disaffected employees to distribute in nonwork areas and during nonwork time literature advocating the displacement of the incumbent collective-bargaining representative, I am in complete agreement. This is the essence of the Board's decision in Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246. But it seems to me wholly inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the National Labor Relations Act to relieve the union of its promise that its own self-serving literature will not be so distributed in the plant. '(T)he employees, by once selecting the union as their representative, do not forfeit their fundamental right to change their representative at appropriate times. When a union acts to abridge that right in the manner presented in this case, it is essentially benefiting the union qua union, to the detriment of the employees it represents.' Any such attempted waiver of the rights of others is so clearly in the union's self-interest of perpetuating its status as the bargaining agent, and at odds with the interests of the disaffected employees, that 'the premise of fair representation' underlying contractual waivers of § 7 rights is wholly undermined. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280, 76 S.Ct. 349, 361, 100 L.Ed. 309. Judicial nullification of contractual concessions, however, is contrary to what the Court has recognized as '(o)ne of (the) fundamental policies' of the National Labor Relations Act—'freedom of contract.' H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108, 90 S.Ct. 821, 826, 25 L.Ed.2d 146. 'The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.' NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45, 57 S.Ct. 615, 628, 81 L.Ed. 893. Contractual waivers against a union's own interests are seldom if ever gratuitously granted in the give and take of the collective-bargaining process. In return, the union typically exacts some form of quid pro quo from the management negotiators. Since it is usually impossible to identify the consideration given in return for a particular union concession, the result of nullifying a union's agreement to waive the § 7 rights of its supporters will necessarily be to deprive management of the benefit of its bargain and to leave the union with a windfall. This sort of invalidation of bargained-for concessions does not promote stability in the collective-bargaining process and must certainly have a negative effect on labor-management relations. For this reason, the Board and the courts should not relieve the parties of the promises they have made unless a contractual provision violates a specific section of the Act or a clear underlying policy of federal labor law. In Gale Products the Board correctly determined that the union could not waive the distribution rights of employees who sought to distribute literature advocating the ouster of the incumbent union; for the clear policy of federal labor law forbids either the union or the employer to freeze out another union or to entrench the incumbent union by infringing the § 7 rights of dissident employees. I see no justification, however, for the Board's extension of the Gale Products rule to prevent the union's waiver of the distribution rights of its supporters in the bargaining unit.* The considerations that distinguish the waiver of supporters' distribution rights from the waiver of opponents' distribution rights were cogently stated by the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, 403 F.2d 702, 705. 'Where union and employee interests are one it can fairly be assumed that employee rights will not be surrendered except in return for bargained-for concessions from the employer of benefit to employees. But the rationale of allowing waiver by the union disappears where the subject matter waived goes to the heart of the right of employees to change their bargaining representative, or to have no bargaining representative, a right with respect to which the interests of the union and employees may be wholly adverse. Solicitation and distribution of literature on plant premises are important elements in giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement of an incumbent union. We cannot presume that the union, in agreeing to bar such activities, does so as a bargain for securing other benefits for the employees and not from the self-interest it has in perpetuating itself as bargaining representative. 'A waiver of the right to solicit and distribute literature does not hamper the union as it does the union's adversaries. The union can communicate through the bulletin board, union meetings and the force of status as bargaining representative, enjoying an advantage in preserving the status quo. Its adversaries will not have equal access to and communication with their fellow employees.' In nullifying the union's promise to waive the literature-distribution rights of its own supporters, the Board and today the Court are upsetting the delicate balance achieved in the give and take of negotiations and presenting the union with an undeserved windfall. This nullification, at the behest of the union that made the promise, can only contribute to future instability in collective bargaining between labor and management. One can, of course, envision exceptional circumstances in which the union supporters' access to and communication with their fellow employees in the bargaining unit might be so restricted that it would be extremely difficult, in the absence of their § 7 distribution rights, for them to respond to the arguments made in literature distributed by their opponents. In such a case, the waiver of the supporters' rights might result in such a distortion of the labor political process as to prevent the balanced presentation of the issues to the employees that national labor policy seeks to promote. This concern was aptly expressed by the Board in its General Motors decision, 158 N.L.R.B., at 1726: '(W)e recogniz(e) the salutary purpose of refusing to disturb concessions yielded by either party through the processes of collective bargaining even where such a concession may infringe upon rights guaranteed employees under Section 7 of the Act. . . . (T)he validity of a particular concession or waiver must depend upon whether the interference with the employees' statutory rights is so great as to override any legitimate reasons for upholding the waiver, or would unduly hamper the employees in exercising their basic rights under the Act.' (Internal quotations omitted.) Thus, if in the absence of § 7 distribution rights the union supporters would be incapable of adequately presenting their position to the employees in a representation controversy, a strong argument could be made that the union's agreement was contrary to a basic policy of the National Labor Relations Act and that, despite the negative effect on the bargaining process, the union's promise could not be effective. In this case, however, there is no suggestion of such exceptional circumstances that would incapacitate the union's supporters in any dispute regarding the union's continued status as the collective-bargaining agent. It is clear from the record that the union supporters have access to the company bulletin boards; that they may still solicit support, although not distribute literature, in nonwork areas during nonwork time; and that they may distribute literature, and have done so in the past, at the gates of the plant. Thus, it is evident that the union supporters would not be disabled by this provision of thecollective-bargaining agreement from maintaining their end of the political discourse that national labor policy seeks to foster. I cannot agree to a general rule that allows the Board to nullify the union's promise, contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, that its supporters will not distribute literature in the plant. For this reason, I dissent from the judgment and the opinion of the Court insofar as they hold that the union could not validly waive the distribution rights of the employees who support it. IUE, in a brief supporting the Board's position, states there are some 2,300 employees in the bargaining unit who live scattered over a two-state area covering more than 100 square miles. The plant is located in Greenville, Tennessee. Some workers live 30 miles distant in Johnson City, Tennessee, and others live in Morrison, North Carolina. It claims that handing out leaflets at the plant gate is impracticable as cars enter or exit four abreast at fast speeds. We mention these statements not to resolve a controversy, but to indicate at least a part of the range of any inquiry into the need for inplant solicitation if § 7 rights are to be protected. The Board held, and I presume the Court agrees, that the union could waive any right that the employees might have to distribute union institutional literature. The only question in this case relates to the waivability of rights to distribute literature regarding the proposed selection, retention, or displacement of the collective-bargaining agent.
nl	wikipedia	N/A	9,10-bis(fenylethynyl)antraceen, is een polycyclische aromatische koolwaterstof met als brutoformule C30H18. De stof wordt gebruikt voor chemoluminescentie in bijvoorbeeld lightsticks. Ze zendt in aangeslagen toestand een groen licht uit. 9,10-bis(fenylethynyl)antraceen wordt ook gebruikt als dopering bij organische halfgeleiders, voor gebruik in organische LEDs. De in de aangeslagen toestand uitgezonden golflengte kan verlaagd worden door halogeen- of alkyl substitutie op het antraceengedeelte van de molecule. Andere gebruikte stoffen voor chemoluminescentie zijn dan ook bijvoorbeeld: 1-chloor-9,10-bis(fenylethynyl)antraceen (geel-groen licht, hoge intensiteit) 2-chloor-9,10-bis(fenylethynyl)antraceen (groen licht, lage intensiteit) 1,2-dimethyl-9,10-bis(fenylethynyl)antraceen 2-ethyl-9,10-bis(fenylethynyl)antraceen Polycyclische aromatische koolwaterstof Alkyn Benzeenderivaat
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Sami Ensio (s. 3. tammikuuta 1971, Oulu) on suomalainen yritysjohtaja, Innofactor Oyj:n toimitusjohtaja ja hallituksen jäsen sekä suomalainen IT-alan vaikuttaja. Hänen aikanaan Innofactorin johdossa vuodesta 2000 yhtiön liikevaihto on kasvanut 66,2 miljoonaan euroon (2020) ja listautunut käänteisellä hankinnalla Helsingin pörssiin vuonna 2011. Ensio omistaa yli viidenneksen Innofactorista ja on lisännyt omistustaan useaan otteeseen. Koulutukseltaan hän on diplomi-insinööri. Koulutus Ensio suoritti lukio-opiskelun Kastellin lukiossa Oulussa. Diplomi-insinöörin tutkinnon hän suoritti Teknillisessä korkeakoulussa teknillisen fysiikan koulutusohjelmassa, johon sisältyi vuoden ulkomaanopiskelujakso Yhdysvalloissa. Lisäksi Ensio on suorittanut oikeustieteellisiä opintoja Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteellisessä tiedekunnassa. Opiskeluaikanaan Ensio oli mukana opiskelijatoiminnassa ja toimi muun muassa Fyysikkokillan hallituksessa ja Teknillisen korkeakoulun ylioppilaskunnan edustajistossa. Opintojensa jälkeen Ensio oli perustamassa Fyysikkoalumnia ja toimi sen ensimmäisenä puheenjohtajana. Ura Ensio työskenteli valmistuttuaan muutaman vuoden televiestinnän konsultointitoimistossa Omnitelessä sekä piti tietotekniikan peruskursseja Teknillisessä korkeakoulussa. Innofactorin toiminta alkoi, kun Risto Linturi otti loppuvuonna 1999 yhteyttä Ensioon ja pyysi häntä uuden yrityksensä vetäjäksi. Yritys perustettiin Risto ja Kaija Linturin sijoitusyhtiö R. Linturin vuonna 1983 perustetun Yritysmikrot-nimisen tytäryhtiön pohjalle. Yrityksen nykymuotoinen toiminta käynnistyi 1. tammikuuta 2000. Innofactorin kansainvälistymisen osalta merkittävä askel oli tanskalaisen Bridgeconsulting A/S:n yritysosto vuonna 2012. Muita merkittäviä Innofactorin yritysostoja ovat olleet atBusiness Oy vuonna 2013, Cinteros AB vuonna 2015 sekä Lumagate-konserni vuonna 2016. Ensio on Innofactorissa toiminut toimitusjohtajan tehtävän ohella myös hallituksen puheenjohtajana,, talousjohtajana ja Ruotsin maajohtajana. Vuonna 2021 Innofactor toimi Suomessa, Ruotsissa, Tanskassa ja Norjassa, sen liikevaihto oli yli 60 miljoonaa euroa ja sillä oli yli 500 työntekijää. Luottamustoimet Ensio on toiminut lukuisissa luottamustehtävissä Teknologiateollisuudessa vuodesta 2013, muun muassa hallituksen jäsenenä, Tietotekniikan päätoimialaryhmän puheenjohtajana ja Yrittäjävaliokunnassa. Vuonna 2021 Ensio aloitti Teknologiateollisuus ry:n hallituksen varapuheenjohtajana ja Yrittäjävaliokunnan puheenjohtajana. Hän on toiminut myös Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitossa useissa luottamustehtävissä vuodesta 2016 alkaen. Vuonna 2018 Ensio valittiin jatkamaan Elinkeinoelämän keskusliiton Yrittäjävaltuuskuntaan sekä työvaliokunnan jäsenenä. Vuonna 2019 Ensio jatkoi edelleen Elinkeinoelämän keskusliiton Yrittäjävaltuuskunnassa ja sen työvaliokunnassa, ja vuonna 2021 hänestä tuli lisäksi EK:n hallituksen ja työvaliokunnan jäsen. Yrittäjävaltuuskunnan jäsenenä hän jatkoi kuudetta vuotta. Vuonna 2022 Ensio valittiin Yrittäjävaltuuskunnan varapuheenjohtajaksi. Tunnustuksia Vuonna 2005 Ensiolle myönnettiin Fyysikkokillan kultainen ansiomerkki. Ohjelmistoyrittäjät ry valitsi Ension vuonna 2011 vuoden ohjelmistoyrittäjäksi. Ensiolle myönnettiin vuonna 2020 Suomen Leijonan I luokan ritarimerkki. Yksityiselämä Ensio kuuluu oululaiseen yrittäjäsukuun. Hän on naimisissa ja asuu perheensä kanssa Espoossa. Lähteet Aiheesta muualla Innofactor - Hallinto ja johtaminen - Toimitusjohtaja Suomalaiset yritysjohtajat Vuonna 1971 syntyneet Elävät henkilöt
fr	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31999R1512 Règlement (CE) n° 1512/1999 de la Commission du 9 juillet 1999 relatif à la délivrance des certificats d'importation de bananes dans le cadre des contingents tarifaires et des bananes traditionnelles ACP pour le troisième trimestre de 1999 (deuxième période) (Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE) Journal officiel n° L 175 du 10/07/1999 p. 0034 - 0034 RÈGLEMENT (CE) N° 1512/1999 DE LA COMMISSIONdu 9 juillet 1999relatif à la délivrance des certificats d'importation de bananes dans le cadre des contingents tarifaires et des bananes traditionnelles ACP pour le troisième trimestre de 1999 (deuxième période)(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES,vu le traité instituant la Communauté européenne,vu le règlement (CEE) n° 404/93 du Conseil du 13 février 1993 portant organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur de la banane(1), modifié en dernier lieu par le règlement (CE) n° 1257/1999(2),vu le règlement (CE) n° 2362/98 de la Commission du 28 octobre 1998 portant modalités d'application du règlement (CEE) n° 404/93 du Conseil en ce qui concerne le régime d'importation de bananes dans la Communauté(3), modifié par le règlement (CE) n° 756/1999(4), et notamment son article 18, paragraphe 2,(1) considérant que l'article 2 et l'annexe du règlement (CE) n° 1293/1999 de la Commission(5) fixent, pour le troisième trimestre de 1999, les quantités disponibles en vue de la deuxième période de présentation des demandes prévues par l'article 18 du règlement (CE) n° 2362/98;(2) considérant que, en application de l'article 18, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) n° 2362/98, sur la base des demandes présentées au cours de la deuxième période, il y a lieu de déterminer sans délai les quantités pour lesquelles les certificats peuvent être délivrés pour les origines concernées;(3) considérant que le présent règlement doit être applicable immédiatement de sorte que les certificats puissent être délivrés le plus rapidement possible,A ARRÊTÉ LE PRÉSENT RÈGLEMENT:Article premierEn ce qui concerne les nouvelles demandes prévues à l'article 18 du règlement (CE) n° 2362/98, des certificats d'importation sont délivrés dans le cadre du régime d'importation de bananes, des contingents tarifaires et des bananes traditionnelles ACP, pour le troisième trimestre de l'année 1999, deuxième période:1) pour la quantité figurant dans la demande de certificat affectée, pour l'origine "Panama", du coefficient de réduction de 0,5776;2) pour la quantité figurant dans la demande de certificat, pour une origine autre que celle mentionnée au point 1.Article 2Le présent règlement entre en vigueur le jour de sa publication au Journal officiel des Communautés européennes.Le présent règlement est obligatoire dans tous ses éléments et directement applicable dans tout État membre.Fait à Bruxelles, le 9 juillet 1999.Par la CommissionFranz FISCHLERMembre de la Commission(1) JO L 47 du 25.2.1993, p. 1.(2) JO L 160 du 26.6.1999, p. 80.(3) JO L 293 du 31.10.1998, p. 32.(4) JO L 98 du 13.4.1999, p. 10.(5) JO L 153 du 19.6.1999, p. 60.
en	wikipedia	N/A	Steve Romeo, Jr. (June 1, 1971 – March 7, 2012) was an American ski mountaineer living in Jackson, Wyoming. Romeo was a prominent figure in the backcountry ski community of Jackson Hole, Wyoming. He founded and ran the popular ski blog "TetonAT.com" which covered backcountry skiing throughout the Tetons as well as extensive gear reviews. Romeo was killed on March 7, 2012 in a large slab avalanche on Ranger Peak in the northern part of the Teton Range of Wyoming. Some criticized Romeo's skiing as being somewhat reckless, yet most of the ski community saw Romeo as a preeminent American ski mountaineer who constantly pushed the boundaries of skiing in the Tetons. Others saw him as another self-promoting eastern transplant. Together with Cary Smith, Pete Swenson and Chris Kroger, he finished ninth in the relay event of the 2006 World Championship of Ski Mountaineering. He was also known as "Randosteve", "Randomeo", "Randobewan Skinobee", "Skeve", "Ex-Steve", "Stevester", and "Stelvester Stallone". Biography Romeo was originally from Manchester, Connecticut, and following graduation from Marist College in 1993, he moved to Jackson Hole to work as a lift operator at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort. Romeo started the backcountry ski blog TetonAT.com in 2006. The site had a daily audience of over 10,000 visitors. The popularity of TetonAT, coupled with Romeo's relatively high-profile within the ski community, led Romeo to eventually gain sponsorships with the following industry leaders: Black Diamond, Dynafit, Arc'teryx, Ortovox, GU Energy Labs, Nuun, and Mountain Khakis. Romeo skied across the globe, including notable stops throughout Europe, South America, New Zealand, Alaska, and Antarctica. Death On March 7, 2012, Steve Romeo and ski partner Chris Onufer left Colter Bay and crossed Jackson Lake over three miles of ice to the base of Ranger Peak in the northern Teton Range. Their tracks continued up the mountains toward Ranger Peak with their final intended destination probably being an unskied chute located in the Waterfalls Canyon area. It is impossible to know exactly what Romeo and Onufer's plans were for the day as they had not informed anyone of specific intended routes. "They chose to go up a known avalanche path ascending into an avalanche starting zone," noted Jenny Lake Park Ranger Rich Baerwald. Romeo and Onufer's skin tracks went up most of the mountain before disappearing in the avalanche slide path. This is likely where Romeo and Onufer triggered the avalanche, as search and rescue workers discovered the tell-tale signs of an avalanche trigger point as well as a three-foot avalanche crown. Park rangers estimated that the avalanche gained speeds of up to 80 miles an hour. The avalanche debris could be seen from a distance of 14 miles, giving some measure of the size of the slide and its destructive power. John Onufer, Chris's father, initially recognized that something was wrong when his son never showed up to meet him at the Jackson Hole Airport after flying in on the day of the avalanche. John Onufer contacted officials who quickly located the pair's car at Colter Bay. Romeo and Onufer's bodies were quickly located the day after the avalanche, as their bodies were not entirely buried in the avalanche debris that stretched for over a mile. The cause of death for both men was determined to be blunt force trauma by the Teton County Coroner. Though the avalanche danger was listed as moderate on the day of the avalanche by the Bridger-Teton Avalanche center, the risk of a slide was increased by wind blowing loose snow onto leeward faces and loading certain aspects with additional snow, creating dangerous windslabs in certain areas. The avalanche that killed Romeo and Onufer was on a slope that had been adversely affected by windblown snow. Some within the Jackson Hole ski community wondered if various avalanche safety equipment devices, such as an 'avalanche airbag', could have saved the two from death in the avalanche, but park rangers stated that the avalanche was unsurvivable and that no equipment could have saved them. "One piece of equipment wasn't going to have any effect on injuries," noted Buffalo Fork Ranger Rick Guerrieri. "Their best tool they had with them, they weren't using the most. That was their brain." Although Romeo may have agreed with Guerrieri's statement, many members of the skiing community felt it was hurtful and in poor taste. As one of Romeo's ski partners, Reed Finlay, reflected, "Even experts make mistakes. If you're a kid, it's a good lesson." Legacy Romeo's website TetonAT.com posted a memorial entry to Romeo and Onufer following their deaths, but has remained otherwise silent. The page continues to carry the sponsorship of many ski industry leaders. Romeo is survived by his parents, Elaine and Stephen Sr. Romeo, who live in Connecticut. Following the death of Steve, Elaine and Stephen Sr. went to Jackson Hole for a memorial, and they noted the amount of support from the community as a whole, pointing to Steve's impact in the area. External links Steve Romeo at skimountaineers.org 2008 USSMA Season Points TetonAT.com - Steve Romeo's website References 1971 births 2012 deaths American male ski mountaineers Natural disaster deaths in Wyoming Sportspeople from Manchester, Connecticut Deaths in avalanches Mountaineering deaths
en	contracts	US	Exhibit 10.1 RESPONSE BIOMEDICAL CORP. 2008 STOCK OPTION PLAN Effective Date: June 3, 2008 Approved by the Board of Directors on June 3, 2008. Approved by the Shareholders on June 3, 2008. Amendment approved by the Shareholders on June 19, 2012 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1 DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION 4 1.1 Definitions 4 1.2 Choice of Law 8 1.3 Headings 8 SECTION 2 GRANT OF OPTIONS 8 2.1 Grant of Options 8 2.2 Record of Option Grants 8 2.3 Effect of Plan 9 SECTION 3 PURPOSE AND PARTICIPATION 9 3.1 Purpose of Plan 9 3.2 Participation in Plan 9 3.3 Limits on Option Grants 9 3.4 Notification of Grant 9 3.5 Copy of Plan 9 3.6 Limitation on Service 10 3.7 No Obligation to Exercise 10 3.8 Agreement 10 3.9 Notice 10 SECTION 4 NUMBER OF SHARES UNDER PLAN 10 4.1 Committee to Approve Issuance of Shares 10 4.2 Number of Shares 10 4.3 Fractional Shares 10 SECTION 5 TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF OPTIONS 11 5.1 Exercise Period of Option 11 5.2 Number of Shares Under Option 11 5.3 Exercise Price of Option 11 5.4 Termination of Option 11 5.5 Vesting of Option and Acceleration 12 5.6 Additional Terms 13 5.7 U.S. Option Holders 13 SECTION 6 TRANSFERABILITY OF OPTIONS 14 6.1 Non-transferable 14 6.2 Death of Option Holder 14 6.3 Disability of Option Holder 14 6.4 Disability and Death of Option Holder 14 6.5 Vesting 15 6.6 Deemed Non-Interruption of Engagement 15 SECTION 7 EXERCISE OF OPTION 15 7.1 Exercise of Option 15 7.2 Issue of Share Certificates 15 7.3 No Rights as Shareholder 15 SECTION 8 ADMINISTRATION 16 8.1 Board or Committee 16 8.2 Appointment of Committee 16 8.3 Quorum and Voting 16 8.4 Powers of Committee 16 8.5 Administration by Committee 17 8.6 Interpretation 17 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SECTION 9 APPROVALS AND AMENDMENT 17 9.1 Shareholder Approval of Plan 17 9.2 Amendment of Option or Plan 17 9.3 Shareholder Approval 18 9.4 Disinterested Shareholder Approval 18 SECTION 10 CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ISSUANCE OF OPTIONS AND SHARES 19 10.1 Compliance with Laws 19 10.2 Obligation to Obtain Regulatory Approvals 19 10.3 Inability to Obtain Regulatory Approvals 19 10.4 U.S. Regulatory Approvals 19 SECTION 11 ADJUSTMENTS AND TERMINATION 19 11.1 Termination of Plan 19 11.2 No Grant During Suspension of Plan 20 11.3 Alteration in Capital Structure 20 11.4 Triggering Events 20 11.5 Notice of Termination by Triggering Event 21 SECTION 12 CALIFORNIA OPTION GRANTS 21 12.1 Application of this Section 21 12.2 Minimum Exercise Price 21 12.3 Minimum Vesting Schedule 21 12.4 Maximum Exercise Period 21 12.5 Minimum Post-Termination Exercise Period 21 12.6 Additional Shareholder Approval 21 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STOCK OPTION PLAN SECTION 1 DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION 1.1 Definitions As used herein, unless there is something in the subject matter or context inconsistent therewith, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below: (a) “Administrator” means such Executive or Employee of the Company as may be designated as Administrator by the Committee from time to time, if any. (b) “Associate” means, where used to indicate a relationship with any person: (i) any relative, including the spouse of that person or a relative of that person’s spouse, where the relative has the same home as the person; (ii) any partner, other than a limited partner, of that person; (iii) any trust or estate in which such person has a substantial beneficial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a similar capacity; and (iv) any corporation of which such person beneficially owns or controls, directly or indirectly, voting securities carrying more than 10% of the voting rights attached to all outstanding voting securities of the corporation. (c) “Black-Out” means a restriction imposed by the Company on all or any of its directors, officers, employees, insiders or persons in a special relationship whereby they are to refrain from trading in the Company’s securities until the restriction has been lifted by the Company. (d) “Black-Out Expiration Term” means the period of time that commences with the end of a Black-Out period and ends ten business days following the end of the Black-Out period. (e) “Board” means the board of directors of the Company. (f) “Change of Control” means an occurrence when either: (i) a Person or Entity, other than the current “control person” of the Company (as that term is defined in the Securities Act), becomes a “control person” of the Company; or (ii) a majority of the directors elected at any annual or extraordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company are not individuals nominated by the Company’s then-incumbent Board. (g) “Committee” means a committee of the Board appointed in accordance with this Plan or if no such committee is appointed, the Board itself. (h) “Company” means Response Biomedical Corp. 4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (i) “Consultant” means any individual who is engaged to provide ongoing consulting services and is permitted to receive Options under applicable Regulatory Rules in reliance upon an exemption from applicable prospectus requirements and includes: (i) a corporation of which the individual is an employee or shareholder or a partnership of which the individual is an employee or partner (a “Consultant Entity”); or (ii) an RRSP or RRIF established by or for the individual under which he or she is the beneficiary. (j) “Disability” means a medically determinable physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months, and which causes an individual to be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity, or any other condition of impairment that the Committee, acting reasonably, determines constitutes a disability. (k) “Disinterested Shareholder Approval” means disinterested shareholder approval as defined in the polices of the TSX. (l) “Employee” means: (i) an individual who works full-time or part-time for the Company or any Subsidiary and such other individual as may, from time to time, be permitted by applicable Regulatory Rules to be granted Options as an employee or as an equivalent thereto; or (ii) an individual who works for the Company or any Subsidiary either full-time or on a continuing and regular basis for a minimum amount of time per week providing services normally provided by an employee and who is subject to the same control and direction by the Company or any Subsidiary over the details and methods of work as an employee of the Company or any Subsidiary, but for whom income tax deductions are not made at source, and includes: (iii) a corporation wholly-owned by such individual; and (iv) any RRSP or RRIF established by or for such individual under which he or she is the beneficiary. (m) “Executive” means an individual who is a director or officer of the Company or a Subsidiary, and includes: (i) a corporation wholly-owned by such individual; and (ii) any RRSP or RRIF established by or for such individual under which he or she is the beneficiary. (n) “Exercise Notice” means the written notice of the exercise of an Option, in the form set out as Schedule “B” hereto, duly executed by the Option Holder. (o) “Exercise Period” means the period during which a particular Option may be exercised and is the period from and including the Grant Date through to and including the Expiry Time on the Expiry Date provided, however, that no Option can be exercised unless and until all necessary Regulatory Approvals have been obtained. 5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (p) “Exercise Price” means the price at which an Option is exercisable as determined in accordance with section 5.3. (q) “Expiry Date” means the date the Option expires as set out in the Option Certificate or as otherwise determined in accordance with the terms of this Plan. (r) “Expiry Time” means the time the Option expires on the Expiry Date, which is 5:00 p.m. local time in Vancouver, British Columbia on the Expiry Date. (s) “Grant Date” means the date on which the Committee grants a particular Option, which is the date the Option comes into effect provided however that no Option can be exercised unless and until all necessary Regulatory Approvals have been obtained. (t) “Insider” means an insider as that term is defined in the Securities Act; (u) “Market Value” means the market value of the Shares as determined in accordance with section 5.3. (v) “Option” means an incentive share purchase option granted pursuant to this Plan entitling the Option Holder to purchase Shares of the Company. (w) “Option Certificate” means the certificate, in substantially the form set out as Schedule “A” hereto, or in such other form or forms as may be adopted by the Committee from time to time, evidencing the Option. (x) “Option Holder” means a Person or Entity who holds an unexercised and unexpired Option or, where applicable, the Personal Representative of such person. (y) “Outstanding Issue” means the number of Shares that are outstanding (on a non-diluted basis) immediately prior to the Share issuance or grant of Option in question. (z) “Person or Entity” means an individual, natural person, corporation, government or political subdivision or agency of a government, and where two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities of an issuer, such partnership, limited partnership, syndicate or group shall be deemed to be a Person or Entity. (aa) “Personal Representative” means: (i) in the case of a deceased Option Holder, the executor or administrator of the deceased duly appointed by a court or public authority having jurisdiction to do so; and (ii) in the case of an Option Holder who for any reason is unable to manage his or her affairs, the person entitled by law to act on behalf of such Option Holder. (bb) “Plan” means this stock option plan as from time to time amended. 6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (cc) “Regulatory Approvals” means any necessary approvals of the Regulatory Authorities as may be required from time to time for the implementation, operation or amendment of this Plan or for the Options granted from time to time hereunder. (dd) “Regulatory Authorities” means all organized trading facilities on which the Shares are listed, including the TSX, and all securities commissions or similar securities regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the Company, this Plan or the Options granted from time to time hereunder. (ee) “Regulatory Rules” means all corporate and securities laws, regulations, rules, policies, notices, instruments and other orders of any kind whatsoever which may, from time to time, apply to the implementation, operation or amendment of this Plan or the Options granted from time to time hereunder including, without limitation, those of the applicable Regulatory Authorities. (ff) “Securities Act” means the Securities Act (British Columbia), RSBC 1996, c.418 as from time to time amended. (gg) “Share” or “Shares” means, as the case may be, one or more common shares without par value in the capital stock of the Company. (hh) “Subsidiary” means a wholly-owned or controlled subsidiary corporation of the Company. (ii) “Triggering Event” means: (i) the dissolution, liquidation or wind-up of the Company; (ii) a merger, amalgamation, arrangement or reorganization of the Company with one or more corporations as a result of which, immediately following such event, the shareholders of the Company as a group, as they were immediately prior to such event, are expected to hold less than a majority of the outstanding capital stock of the surviving corporation; (iii) a bona fide third party offer for Shares pursuant to which an offeror offers to purchase all or substantially all of the Shares of the Company; (iv) a Change of Control of the Company; (v) the sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company; or (vi) a material alteration of the capital structure of the Company which, in the opinion of the Committee, is of such a nature that it is not practical or feasible to make adjustments to this Plan or to the Options granted hereunder to permit the Plan and Options granted hereunder to stay in effect. (jj) “TSX” means the Toronto Stock Exchange. (kk) “United States” means the United States of America, its territories and possessions, any state of the United States, and the District of Columbia. (ll) “U.S. Eligible Consultant” means a Consultant that is a natural person that provides bona fide services to the Company, and such services are not in connection with the offer or sale of securities in a capital-raising transaction and do not directly or indirectly promote or maintain a market for the Company’s securities. 7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (mm) “U.S. Person” means a U.S. person within the meaning of Regulation S adopted pursuant to the U.S. Securities Act, which definition includes, but is not limited to, a natural person resident in the United States, a partnership or corporation organized or incorporated under the laws of the United States, or an estate or trust of which any executor, administrator or trustee is a U.S. person. (nn) “U.S. Securities Act” means the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended. (oo) “Vest” or “Vesting” means that portion of the Option granted to the Option Holder which is available to be exercised by the Option Holder at any time and from time to time. 1.2 Choice of Law The Plan is established under, and the provisions of the Plan shall be subject to and interpreted and construed in accordance with, the laws of the Province of British Columbia. The Company and each Option Holder hereby attorn to the jurisdiction of the Courts of British Columbia. 1.3 Headings The headings used herein are for convenience only and are not to affect the interpretation of the Plan. SECTION 2 GRANT OF OPTIONS 2.1 Grant of Options The Committee shall, from time to time in its sole discretion, grant Options to such Persons or Entities and on such terms and conditions as are permitted under this Plan. 2.2 Record of Option Grants The Committee shall be responsible to maintain a record of all Options granted under this Plan and such record shall contain, in respect of each Option: (a) the name and address of the Option Holder; (b) the category (Executive, Employee or Consultant) under which the Option was granted to him, her or it; (c) the Grant Date and Expiry Date of the Option; (d) the number of Shares which may be acquired on the exercise of the Option and the Exercise Price of the Option; (e) the vesting and other additional terms, if any, attached to the Option; and (f) the particulars of each and every time the Option is exercised. 8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2.3 Effect of Plan All Options granted pursuant to the Plan shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the Plan notwithstanding the fact that the Option Certificates issued in respect thereof do not expressly contain such terms and conditions but instead incorporate them by reference to the Plan. The Option Certificates will be issued for convenience only and in the case of a dispute with regard to any matter in respect thereof, the provisions of the Plan and the records of the Company shall prevail over the terms and conditions in the Option Certificate, save and except as noted below. SECTION 3 PURPOSE AND PARTICIPATION 3.1 Purpose of Plan The purpose of the Plan is to provide the Company with a share-related mechanism to attract, retain and motivate qualified Executives, Employees and Consultants, to incent such individuals to contribute toward the long term goals of the Company, and to encourage such individuals to acquire Shares of the Company as long term investments. 3.2 Participation in Plan The Committee shall, from time to time and in its sole discretion, determine those Executives, Employees and Consultants, if any, to whom Options are to be granted; provided, however, that no Option may be granted to a Consultant that is in the United States or that is a U.S. Person unless such Consultant is a U.S. Eligible Consultant. 3.3 Limits on Option Grants The number of Shares issuable to any one Option Holder under the Plan, together with all of the Company’s other previously established or proposed share compensation arrangements, shall not exceed 5% of the total number of issued and outstanding common shares in the capital of the Company on a non-diluted basis. The number of Shares which may be issued to Insiders under the Plan, together with all of the Company’s other previously established or proposed share compensation arrangements, in aggregate, shall not at any time exceed 10% of the Outstanding Issue. The number of Shares which may be issuable under the Plan, together with all of the Company’s other previously established or proposed share compensation arrangements, within a one-year period: (a) to Insiders in aggregate, shall not exceed 10% of the Outstanding Issue; (b) to any one Option Holder who is an Insider and any Associates of such Insider, shall not exceed 5% of the Outstanding Issue; and (c) to any non-employee director, shall not exceed 1% of the Outstanding Issue. For the purposes of this section, Options issued pursuant to an entitlement granted prior to the Option Holder becoming an Insider may be excluded in determining the number of Shares issuable to Insiders. 3.4 Notification of Grant Following the granting of an Option, the Administrator shall, within a reasonable period of time, notify the Option Holder in writing of the grant and shall enclose with such notice the Option Certificate representing the Option so granted. In no case will the Company be required to deliver an Option Certificate to an Option Holder until such time as the Company has obtained all necessary Regulatory Approvals for the grant of the Option. 9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.5 Copy of Plan Each Option Holder, concurrently with the notice of the grant of the first Option granted to the Option Holder, shall be provided with a copy of the Plan. Upon request from any Option Holder, a copy of any amendment to the Plan shall be promptly provided by the Administrator to the requesting Option Holder. 3.6 Limitation on Service The Plan does not give any Option Holder that is an Executive the right to serve or continue to serve as an Executive of the Company or any Subsidiary, nor does it give any Option Holder that is an Employee or Consultant the right to be or to continue to be employed or engaged by the Company or any Subsidiary. 3.7 No Obligation to Exercise Option Holders shall be under no obligation to exercise Options granted under this Plan. 3.8 Agreement The Company and every Option Holder granted an Option hereunder shall be bound by and subject to the terms and conditions of this Plan. By accepting an Option granted hereunder, the Option Holder has expressly agreed with the Company to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Plan. In the event that the Option Holder receives his, her or its Options pursuant to an oral or written agreement with the Company or a Subsidiary, whether such agreement is an employment agreement, consulting agreement or any other kind of agreement of any kind whatsoever, the Option Holder acknowledges that in the event of any inconsistency between the terms relating to the grant of such Options in that agreement and the terms attaching to the Options as provided for in this Plan, the terms provided for in this Plan shall prevail and the other agreement shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly. 3.9 Notice Any notice, delivery or other correspondence of any kind whatsoever to be provided by the Company to an Option Holder will be deemed to have been provided if provided to the last home address, fax number or email address of the Option Holder in the records of the Company and the Company shall be under no obligation to confirm receipt or delivery. SECTION 4 NUMBER OF SHARES UNDER PLAN 4.1 Committee to Approve Issuance of Shares The Committee shall approve by resolution the issuance of all Shares to be issued to Option Holders upon the exercise of Options, such authorization to be effective as of the Grant Date of such Options. 4.2 Number of Shares Subject to adjustment as provided for herein, the number of Shares which will be available for purchase pursuant to Options granted pursuant to this Plan will not exceed 24,200,000 Shares, less any Shares issued upon the exercise of options to acquire Shares granted under either the Company’s 1996 Stock Option Plan or its 2005 Stock Option Plan. 10 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4.3 Fractional Shares No fractional shares shall be issued upon the exercise of any Option and, if as a result of any adjustment, an Option Holder would become entitled to a fractional share, such Option Holder shall have the right to purchase only the next lowest whole number of Shares and no payment or other adjustment will be made for the fractional interest. SECTION 5 TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF OPTIONS 5.1 Exercise Period of Option Except as otherwise provided in this Plan, the Grant Date and the Expiry Date of an Option shall be the dates fixed by the Committee at the time the Option is granted and shall be set out in the Option Certificate issued in respect of such Option. 5.2 Number of Shares Under Option The number of Shares which may be purchased pursuant to an Option shall be determined by the Committee and shall be set out in the Option Certificate issued in respect of the Option. 5.3 Exercise Price of Option The Exercise Price at which an Option Holder may purchase a Share upon the exercise of an Option shall be determined by the Committee and shall be set out in the Option Certificate issued in respect of the Option. The Exercise Price shall not be less than the Market Value of the Shares as of the Grant Date. The Market Value of the Shares for a particular Grant Date shall be determined as follows: (a) for each organized trading facility on which the Shares are listed, Market Value will be the closing price of the Shares on such organized trading facility on the trading day immediately preceding the Grant Date; (b) if the Company’s Shares are listed on more than one organized trading facility, the Market Value shall be the Market Value as determined in accordance with subparagraph (a) above for the primary organized trading facility on which the Shares are listed, as determined by the Committee, subject to any adjustments as may be required to secure all necessary Regulatory Approvals; (c) if the Company’s Shares are listed on one or more organized trading facilities but have not traded during the ten trading days immediately preceding the Grant Date, then the Market Value will be, subject to any adjustments as may be required to secure all necessary Regulatory Approvals, such value as is determined by the Committee; and (d) if the Company’s Shares are not listed on any organized trading facility, then the Market Value will be, subject to any adjustments as may be required to secure all necessary Regulatory Approvals, such value as is determined by the Committee to be the fair value of the Shares, taking into consideration all factors that the Committee deems appropriate, including, without limitation, recent sale and offer prices of the Shares in private transactions negotiated at arms’ length. Notwithstanding anything else contained herein, in no case will the Market Value be less than the minimum prescribed by each of the organized trading facilities that would apply to the Company on the Grant Date in question. 11 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5.4 Termination of Option Subject to such other terms or conditions that may be attached to Options granted hereunder, an Option Holder may exercise an Option in whole or in part at any time and from time to time during the Exercise Period. Any Option or part thereof not exercised within the Exercise Period shall terminate and become null, void and of no effect as of the Expiry Time on the Expiry Date. Subject to Section 7.1, the Expiry Date of an Option shall be the earlier of the date so fixed by the Committee at the time the Option is granted as set out in the Option Certificate and the date established, if applicable, in paragraphs (a) or (b) below or sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, or 11.4 of this Plan: (a) Ceasing to Hold Office - In the event that the Option Holder holds his or her Option as an Executive and such Option Holder ceases to hold such position other than by reason of death or Disability, the Expiry Date of the Option shall be, unless otherwise expressly provided for in the Option Certificate, the 90th day following the date the Option Holder ceases to hold such position unless the Option Holder ceases to hold such position as a result of: (i) ceasing to meet the qualifications set forth in the corporate legislation applicable to the Company; (ii) a special resolution having been passed by the shareholders of the Company removing the Option Holder as a director of the Company or any Subsidiary; or (iii) an order made by any Regulatory Authority having jurisdiction to so order; in which case the Expiry Date shall be the date the Option Holder ceases to hold such position; OR (b) Ceasing to be Employed or Engaged - In the event that the Option Holder holds his or her Option as an Employee or Consultant and such Option Holder ceases to hold such position other than by reason of death or Disability, the Expiry Date of the Option shall be, unless otherwise expressly provided for in the Option Certificate, the 90th day following the date the Option Holder ceases to hold such position, unless the Option Holder ceases to hold such position as a result of: (i) termination for cause; (ii) resigning or terminating his or her position; or (iii) an order made by any Regulatory Authority having jurisdiction to so order; in which case the Expiry Date shall be the date the Option Holder ceases to hold such position. In the event that the Option Holder ceases to hold the position of Executive, Employee or Consultant for which the Option was originally granted, but comes to hold a different position as an Executive, Employee or Consultant prior to the expiry of the Option, the Committee may, in its sole discretion, choose to permit the Option to stay in place for that Option Holder with such Option then to be treated as being held by that Option Holder in his or her new position and such will not be considered to be an amendment to the Option in question requiring the consent of the Option Holder under section 9.2 of this Plan. Notwithstanding anything else contained herein, in no case will an Option be exercisable later than the Expiry Date of the Option. 5.5 Vesting of Option and Acceleration The vesting schedule for an Option, if any, shall be determined by the Committee and shall be set out in the Option Certificate issued in respect of the Option. The Committee may elect to accelerate the vesting schedule of one or more Options in connection with a Triggering Event in accordance with Section 11.4 of this Plan, and such acceleration will not be considered an amendment to the Option in question requiring the consent of the Option Holder under section 9.2 of this Plan. 12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5.6 Additional Terms Subject to all applicable Regulatory Rules and all necessary Regulatory Approvals, the Committee may attach additional terms and conditions to the grant of a particular Option, such terms and conditions to be set out in the Option Certificate. The Option Certificates will be issued for convenience only, and in the case of a dispute with regard to any matter in respect thereof, the provisions of this Plan and the records of the Company shall prevail over the terms and conditions in the Option Certificate, save and except as noted below. 5.7 U.S. Option Holders Any Option granted under the Plan to an Option Holder who is a citizen or resident of the United States (a “U.S. Option Holder”) within the meaning of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, (the “Code”), will be an incentive stock option (an “ISO”) within the meaning of Section 422 of the Code if so designated by the Company in the Option Certificate evidencing such Option. No provision of this Plan, as it may be applied to a U.S. Option Holder with respect to Options which are designated as ISOs, shall be construed so as to be inconsistent with any provision of Section 422 of the Code. Grants of Options to U.S. Option Holders which are not designated as an ISO in the Option Certificate evidencing such Option or otherwise do not qualify as ISOs will be treated as nonstatutory stock options for U.S. federal tax purposes. Notwithstanding anything in this Plan contained to the contrary, the following provisions shall apply to ISOs granted to each U.S. Option Holder: (a) subject to adjustment as provided for in this Plan, the number of Shares which will be available for granting ISOs will not exceed the number of Shares available for purchase pursuant to Options granted pursuant to the Plan set out in Section 4.2; (b) ISOs shall only be granted to individual U.S. Option Holders who are, at the time of grant, “employees” of the Company within the meaning of the Code (or of any “subsidiary” of the Company within the meaning of section 424(f) of the Code); (c) the aggregate fair market value (determined as of the time an ISO is granted) of the Shares subject to ISOs exercisable for the first time by a U.S. Option Holder during any calendar year under this Plan (and all other plans of the Company, any “subsidiary” of the Company within the meaning of Section 424(f) of the Code and any “parent” of the Company within the meaning of Section 424(e) of the Code) shall not exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars in U.S. funds (U.S.$100,000); (d) the Exercise Price per Share for each ISO granted to a U.S. Option Holder pursuant to this Plan shall be not less than fair market value of one Share on the Grant Date, as determined in good faith by the Committee at such time ; (e) the Exercise Period of an ISO shall not exceed ten (10) years from the Grant Date; (f) if a U.S. Option Holder who has been granted an ISO ceases to be an “employee” of the Company within the meaning of the Code (or of any “subsidiary” of the Company within the meaning of section 424(f) of the Code) for any reason other than the death, Disability or a reason described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of Section 5.4(a) or 5.4(b), such ISO may be exercised (to the extent such ISO was exercisable on the date of termination) by such U.S. Option Holder for a period of three (3) months after the date of termination (but in no event beyond the term of such ISO); 13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (g) if any U.S. Option Holder to whom an ISO is to be granted under the Plan at the time of the grant of such ISO is the owner, directly or constructively, of shares possessing more than ten percent (10%) of the total combined voting power of all classes of shares of the Company, then the following special provisions shall be applicable to the ISO granted to such Option Holder: (i) the Exercise Price per Share with respect to such ISO shall not be less than one hundred ten percent (110%) of the fair market value of one Share on the Grant Date, as determined in good faith by the Committee at such time; and (ii) the Exercise Period of such ISO shall not exceed five (5) years from the Grant Date; (h) no ISO may be granted hereunder to a U.S. Option Holder following the expiration of ten (10) years after the date on which this Plan is adopted by the Board or the date on which the Plan is approved by the shareholders of the Company, whichever is earlier; and (i) no ISO granted to a U.S. Option Holder under the Plan shall become exercisable unless and until the Plan shall have been approved by the shareholders of the Company. In the event that this Plan is not approved by the shareholders of the Company within twelve (12) months before or after the date on which this Plan is adopted by the Board, any ISO will automatically be deemed to be a nonstatutory stock option. SECTION 6 TRANSFERABILITY OF OPTIONS 6.1 Non-transferable Except as provided otherwise in this Section 6, Options are non-assignable and non-transferable. 6.2 Death of Option Holder In the event of the Option Holder’s death, any Options held by such Option Holder shall pass to the Personal Representative of the Option Holder and shall be exercisable by the Personal Representative on or before the date which is the earlier of six months following the date of death and the applicable Expiry Date. 6.3 Disability of Option Holder If the employment or engagement of an Option Holder as an Employee or Consultant or the position of an Option Holder as a director or officer of the Company or a Subsidiary is terminated by the Company by reason of such Option Holder’s Disability, any Options held by such Option Holder shall be exercisable by such Option Holder or by the Personal Representative on or before the date which is the earlier of six months following the termination of employment, engagement or appointment as a director or officer and the applicable Expiry Date. 6.4 Disability and Death of Option Holder If an Option Holder has ceased to be employed, engaged or appointed as a director or officer of the Company or a Subsidiary by reason of such Option Holder’s Disability and such Option Holder dies within six months after the termination of such engagement, any Options held by such Option Holder that could have been exercised immediately prior to his or her death shall pass to the Personal Representative of such Option Holder and shall be exercisable by the Personal Representative on or before the date which is the earlier of six months following the death of such Option Holder and the applicable Expiry Date. For purposes of this Section 6.4, with respect to any U.S. Participant holding ISOs, “Disability” means, with respect to any such U.S. Participant, that such U.S. Participant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months. The preceding definition of the term “Disability” is intended to comply with, and will be interpreted consistently with, sections 22(e)(3) and 422(c)(6) of the Code. 14 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6.5 Vesting Unless the Committee determines otherwise, Options held by or exercisable by a Personal Representative shall, during the period prior to their termination, continue to vest in accordance with any vesting schedule to which such Options are subject. 6.6 Deemed Non-Interruption of Engagement Employment or engagement by the Company shall be deemed to continue intact during any military or sick leave or other bona fide leave of absence if the period of such leave does not exceed 90 days or, if longer, for so long as the Option Holder’s right to re-employment or re-engagement by the Company is guaranteed either by statute or by contract. If the period of such leave exceeds 90 days and the Option Holder’s re-employment or re-engagement is not so guaranteed, then his or her employment or engagement shall be deemed to have terminated on the ninety-first day of such leave. SECTION 7 EXERCISE OF OPTION 7.1 Exercise of Option An Option may be exercised only by the Option Holder or the Personal Representative of any Option Holder. An Option Holder or the Personal Representative of any Option Holder may exercise an Option in whole or in part at any time and from time to time during the Exercise Period up to the Expiry Time on the Expiry Date by delivering to the Administrator the required Exercise Notice, the applicable Option Certificate and a certified cheque or bank draft payable to the Company in an amount equal to the aggregate Exercise Price of the Shares then being purchased pursuant to the exercise of the Option. Except where not permitted by the TSX, where an Option otherwise would expire during a Black-Out period or during a Black-Out Expiration Term, the Expiry Date of such Option will automatically be deemed to be extended to the end of the applicable Black-Out Expiration Term. 7.2 Issue of Share Certificates As soon as reasonably practicable following the receipt of the Exercise Notice, the Administrator shall cause to be delivered to the Option Holder a certificate for the Shares so purchased. If the number of Shares so purchased is less than the number of Shares subject to the Option Certificate surrendered, the Administrator shall also provide a new Option Certificate for the balance of Shares available under the Option to the Option Holder concurrent with delivery of the Share Certificate. 7.3 No Rights as Shareholder Until the date of the issuance of the certificate for the Shares purchased pursuant to the exercise of an Option, no right to vote or receive dividends or any other rights as a shareholder shall exist with respect to such Shares, notwithstanding the exercise of the Option, unless the Committee determines otherwise. In the event of any dispute over the date of the issuance of the certificates, the decision of the Committee shall be final, conclusive and binding. 15 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SECTION 8 ADMINISTRATION 8.1 Board or Committee The Plan shall be administered by the Board, by a Committee of the Board appointed in accordance with section 8.2 below, or by an Administrator appointed in accordance with subsection 8.4(b). 8.2 Appointment of Committee The Board may at any time appoint a Committee, consisting of not less than two of its members, to administer the Plan on behalf of the Board in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe, consistent with this Plan. Once appointed, the Committee shall continue to serve until otherwise directed by the Board. From time to time, the Board may increase the size of the Committee and appoint additional members, remove members (with or without cause) and appoint new members in their place, fill vacancies however caused, or remove all members of the Committee and thereafter directly administer the Plan. 8.3 Quorum and Voting A majority of the members of the Committee shall constitute a quorum and, subject to the limitations in this Section 8, all actions of the Committee shall require the affirmative vote of members who constitute a majority of such quorum. Members of the Committee may vote on any matters affecting the administration of the Plan or the grant of Options pursuant to the Plan, except that no such member shall act upon the granting of an Option to himself or herself (but any such member may be counted in determining the existence of a quorum at any meeting of the Committee during which action is taken with respect to the granting of Options to that member). The Committee may approve matters by written resolution signed by a majority of the quorum. 8.4 Powers of Committee The Committee (or the Board if no Committee is in place) shall have the authority to do the following: (a) administer the Plan in accordance with its terms; (b) appoint or replace the Administrator from time to time; (c) determine all questions arising in connection with the administration, interpretation and application of the Plan, including all questions relating to the Market Value of the Shares; (d) correct any defect, supply any information or reconcile any inconsistency in the Plan in such manner and to such extent as shall be deemed necessary or advisable to carry out the purposes of the Plan; (e) prescribe, amend, and rescind rules and regulations relating to the administration of the Plan; (f) determine the duration and purposes of leaves of absence from employment or engagement by the Company which may be granted to Option Holders without constituting a termination of employment or engagement for purposes of the Plan; (g) do the following with respect to the granting of Options: 16 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (i) determine the Executives, Employees or Consultants to whom Options shall be granted, based on the eligibility criteria set out in this Plan; (ii) determine the terms of the Option to be granted to an Option Holder including, without limitation, the Grant Date, Expiry Date, Exercise Price and vesting schedule (which need not be identical with the terms of any other Option); (iii) subject to any necessary Regulatory Approvals and section 9.2, amend the terms of any Options; (iv) determine when Options shall be granted; and (v) determine the number of Shares subject to each Option; (h) accelerate the vesting schedule of any Option previously granted; and (i) make all other determinations necessary or advisable, in its sole discretion, for the administration of the Plan. 8.5 Administration by Committee All determinations made by the Committee in good faith shall be final, conclusive and binding upon all persons. The Committee shall have all powers necessary or appropriate to accomplish its duties under this Plan. 8.6 Interpretation The interpretation by the Committee of any of the provisions of the Plan and any determination by it pursuant thereto shall be final, conclusive and binding and shall not be subject to dispute by any Option Holder. No member of the Committee or any person acting pursuant to authority delegated by it hereunder shall be personally liable for any action or determination in connection with the Plan made or taken in good faith and each member of the Committee and each such person shall be entitled to indemnification with respect to any such action or determination in the manner provided for by the Company. SECTION 9 APPROVALS AND AMENDMENT 9.1 Shareholder Approval of Plan If required by a Regulatory Authority, this Plan may be made subject to the approval of a majority of the votes cast at a meeting of the shareholders of the Company or by a majority of votes cast by disinterested shareholders at a meeting of shareholders of the Company. Any Options granted under this Plan prior to such time will not be exercisable or binding on the Company unless and until such shareholder approval is obtained. 9.2 Amendment of Option or Plan The Company retains the right to amend or terminate the terms and conditions of the Plan or Option, as applicable, by resolution of the Committee (the “Amendment Procedure”). Any amendment to the Plan shall take effect only with respect to Options granted after the effective date of such amendment, provided that it may apply to any outstanding Options with the mutual consent of the Company and the Option Holder to whom such Options have been granted. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Committee may use the Amendment Procedure without seeking shareholder approval when: 17 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (a) altering, extending or accelerating the terms and conditions of vesting of any Options; (b) accelerating the Expiry Date of Options; (c) amending the definitions contained within the Plan; (d) amending or modifying the mechanics of exercise of Options as set forth in Section 5, provided however, payment in full of the Exercise Price shall not be so amended or modified; (e) effecting amendments of a “housekeeping” or ministerial nature including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any amendment for the purpose of curing any ambiguity, error, inconsistency or omission in or from the Plan or any Option Certificate; (f) effecting amendments necessary to comply with the provisions of Regulatory Rules; (g) effecting amendments respecting the administration of the Plan; (h) effecting amendments necessary to suspend or terminate the Plan; and (i) any other amendment, whether fundamental or otherwise, not requiring shareholder approval under Regulatory Rules. 9.3 Shareholder Approval Shareholder approval will be required for the following types of amendments: (a) amendments that increase the number of Shares issuable under the Plan, except such increases by operation of Section 11.3 of the Plan; (b) any reduction in the Exercise Price of an Option if the Option Holder is not an Insider at the time of the proposed amendment; and (c) amendments required to be approved by shareholders under applicable law (including, without limitation, pursuant to Regulatory Rules). 9.4 Disinterested Shareholder Approval Disinterested Shareholder Approval will be required for the following types of amendments: (a) amendments to the Plan that could result at any time in the number of Shares reserved for issuance under the Plan to Insiders exceeding the limits set out in Section 3.3 of this Plan; (b) amendments to the Plan that could result at any time in the granting to Insiders, within a 12 month period, of a number of options exceeding 10% of the outstanding issue; (c) any reduction in the Exercise Price of an Option if the Option Holder is an Insider at the time of the proposed amendment; and (d) amendments requiring Disinterested Shareholder Approval under applicable law (including, without limitation, pursuant to the Regulatory Rules). 18 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SECTION 10 CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ISSUANCE OF OPTIONS AND SHARES 10.1 Compliance with Laws An Option shall not be granted or exercised, and Shares shall not be issued pursuant to the exercise of any Option, unless the grant and exercise of such Option and the issuance and delivery of such Shares comply with all applicable Regulatory Rules, and such Options and Shares will be subject to all applicable trading restrictions in effect pursuant to such Regulatory Rules and the Company shall be entitled to legend the Option Certificates and the certificates representing such Shares accordingly. 10.2 Obligation to Obtain Regulatory Approvals In administering this Plan, the Committee will seek any Regulatory Approvals which may be required. The Committee will not permit any Options to be granted without first obtaining the necessary Regulatory Approvals unless such Options are granted conditional upon such Regulatory Approvals being obtained. The Committee will make all filings required with the Regulatory Authorities in respect of the Plan and each grant of Options hereunder. No Option granted will be exercisable or binding on the Company unless and until all necessary Regulatory Approvals have been obtained. The Committee shall be entitled to amend this Plan and the Options granted hereunder in order to secure any necessary Regulatory Approvals and such amendments will not require the consent of the Option Holders under section 9.2 of this Plan. 10.3 Inability to Obtain Regulatory Approvals The Company’s inability to obtain Regulatory Approval from any applicable Regulatory Authority, which Regulatory Approval is deemed by the Committee to be necessary to complete the grant of Options hereunder, the exercise of those Options or the lawful issuance and sale of any Shares pursuant to such Options, shall relieve the Company of any liability with respect to the failure to complete such transaction. 10.4 U.S. Regulatory Approvals Section 10.2 of this Plan shall not be interpreted to require the Company to register the Shares issuable pursuant to this Plan under the U.S. Securities Act or under the securities laws of any state of the United States; provided, however, that no Options to purchase Shares may be granted in the United States or to or for the benefit of a U.S. Person, and no Options to purchase Shares may be exercised in the United States or by or on behalf of a U.S. Person, unless such Shares have been registered under the U.S. Securities Act and the securities laws of all applicable states of the United States, or exemptions from such registration requirements are available. The Company may require such additional information, representations, warranties and covenants from an Option Holder, in the Option Certificate, exercise form or otherwise, as the Company deems necessary or appropriate in order to establish compliance with all applicable provisions of the U.S. Securities Act and the securities laws of any state of the United States. SECTION 11 ADJUSTMENTS AND TERMINATION 11.1 Termination of Plan Subject to any necessary Regulatory Approvals, the Committee may terminate or suspend the Plan. 19 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11.2 No Grant During Suspension of Plan No Option may be granted during any suspension, or after termination, of the Plan. Suspension or termination of the Plan shall not, without the consent of the Option Holder, alter or impair any rights or obligations under any Option previously granted. 11.3 Alteration in Capital Structure If there is a material alteration in the capital structure of the Company and the Shares are consolidated, subdivided, converted, exchanged, reclassified or in any way substituted for or affected, the Committee shall make such adjustments to this Plan and to the Options then outstanding under this Plan as the Committee determines to be appropriate and equitable under the circumstances, so that the proportionate interest of each Option Holder shall, to the extent practicable, be maintained as before the occurrence of such event. Such adjustments may include, without limitation: (a) a change in the number or kind of shares of the Company covered by such Options; and (b) a change in the Exercise Price payable per Share provided, however, that the aggregate Exercise Price applicable to the unexercised portion of existing Options shall not be altered, it being intended that any adjustments made with respect to such Options shall apply only to the Exercise Price per Share and the number of Shares subject thereto. For purposes of this section 11.3, and without limitation, neither: (c) the issuance of additional securities of the Company in exchange for adequate consideration (including services); nor (d) the conversion of outstanding securities of the Company into Shares shall be deemed to be material alterations of the capital structure of the Company. Any adjustment made to any Options pursuant to this section 11.3 shall not be considered an amendment requiring the Option Holder’s consent for the purposes of Section 9.2 of this Plan. 11.4 Triggering Events Subject to the Company complying with section 11.5 and any necessary Regulatory Approvals and notwithstanding any other provisions of this Plan or any Option Certificate, the Committee may, without the consent of the Option Holder or Holders in question: (a) accelerate the vesting of all or any portion of the unvested Options then issued and outstanding under the Plan; (b) cause all or a portion of any of the Options granted under the Plan to terminate in connection with a Triggering Event; or (c) cause all or a portion of any of the Options granted under the Plan to be exchanged for incentive stock options of another corporation in connection with a Triggering Event in such ratio and at such exercise price as the Committee deems appropriate, acting reasonably. Any adjustment with respect to the Exercise Price for and number of Common Shares subject to an Option granted to a U.S. Participant pursuant to this section 11.4(c) will be made so as to comply with, and not create any adverse consequences under, sections 424 and 409A of the Code. 20 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Such acceleration, termination or exchange shall not be considered an amendment requiring the Option Holder’s consent for the purpose of section 9.2 of the Plan. 11.5 Notice of Termination by Triggering Event In the event that the Committee wishes to cause all or a portion of any of the Options granted under this Plan to terminate in accordance with Section 11.4, it must give written notice to the Option Holders in question not less than 14 days prior to the date on which such Options are to terminate so as to permit the Option Holder the opportunity to exercise the vested portion of the Options prior to such termination. SECTION 12 CALIFORNIA OPTION GRANTS 12.1 Application of this Section Notwithstanding any other provision of this Plan, the provisions of sections 12.2 through 12.6 of this Plan shall apply to any Option granted to a resident of the State of California if, on the Grant Date, (i) the Shares are not listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange or quoted on the Nasdaq National Market System, and (ii) such Option is not otherwise exempt from the registration requirements of the California securities laws. 12.2 Minimum Exercise Price If the Option is granted to an Option Holder that owns securities possessing more than 10% of the total combined voting power of all classes of securities of the Company or its parent or subsidiaries possessing voting power, the Exercise Price of the Option shall not be less than 110% of the Market Value of the Shares as of the Grant Date. 12.3 Minimum Vesting Schedule The Option must become vested and exercisable at a rate of at least 20% of the number of Shares underlying the Option per year, with the first 20% becoming vested not later than one year after the Grant Date. 12.4 Maximum Exercise Period The Expiry Date of the Option shall not be later than the tenth anniversary of the Grant Date. 12.5 Minimum Post-Termination Exercise Period If the Option Holder ceases to hold the position of Executive, Employee or Consultant, the Option shall continue to be exercisable until at least the earlier of the Expiry Date originally provided for in the Option, or the applicable date set forth below: (a) if the Option Holder is terminated for cause as defined by applicable law, the date of termination ; (b) if the Option Holder’s termination is caused by the Option Holder’s death or Disability, six months from the date of termination; or (c) in all other cases, thirty days from the date of termination. 12.6 Additional Shareholder Approval Unless the holders of a majority of the Company’s outstanding securities entitled to vote have approved this Plan within 12 months before or after the date this Plan is adopted, any Option granted to a resident of the State of California that is subject to the provisions of this Section 12 shall automatically be rescinded, without any liability to the Company. No Option granted subject to the provisions of this SECTION 12 shall be exercisable until such shareholder approval has been obtained. 21 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SCHEDULE “A” RESPONSE BIOMEDICAL CORP. 2008 STOCK OPTION PLAN - OPTION CERTIFICATE , This Option Certificate is issued pursuant to the provisions of the 2008 Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”) of Response Biomedical Corp. (the “Company”) and evidences that · [Name of Option Holder] is the holder (the “Option Holder”) of an option (the “Option”) to purchase up to · common shares (the “Shares”) in the capital stock of the Company at a purchase price of Cdn.$· per Share (the “Exercise Price”). This Option may be exercised at any time and from time to time from and including the following Grant Date through to and including up to 5:00 p.m. local time in Vancouver, British Columbia (the “Expiry Time”) on the following Expiry Date: (a) the Grant Date of this Option is ·, 200·; and (b) subject to sections 5.4, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.1 and 11.4 of the Plan, the Expiry Date of this Option is ·, 200·. This Option will not be exercisable unless and until it has vested and then only to the extent that it has vested. The Option will vest in accordance with the following: (a) · Shares (·%) will vest and be exercisable on or after the Grant Date; (b) · additional Shares (·%) will vest and be exercisable on or after · [date]; (c) · additional Shares (·%) will vest and be exercisable on or after · [date]; (d) · additional Shares (·%) will vest and be exercisable on or after · [date]; · [Insert any additional terms here – check to ensure they comply with TSX policies and applicable securities laws] To exercise this Option, the Option Holder must deliver to the Administrator of the Plan, prior to the Expiry Time on the Expiry Date, an Exercise Notice, in the form provided in the Plan, which is incorporated by reference herein, together with the original of this Option Certificate and a certified cheque or bank draft payable to the Company in an amount equal to the aggregate of the Exercise Price of the Shares in respect of which this Option is being exercised. This Option Certificate and the Option evidenced hereby is not assignable, transferable or negotiable and is subject to the detailed terms and conditions contained in the Plan. This Option Certificate is issued for convenience only and in the case of any dispute with regard to any matter in respect hereof, the provisions of the Plan and the records of the Company shall prevail. · [The following MUST be included if is an ISO option] [This Option is an ISO within the meaning of the Code.] A-1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This Option was granted to the Option Holder in his or her capacity as a ·[pick one: Director, Officer, Employee, Consultant] of the Company ·[, and shall continue in effect should his or her status change and he or she continue in a new capacity as a Director, Officer, Employee or Consultant of the Company]. RESPONSE BIOMEDICAL CORP. Per: Authorized Signatory The Option Holder acknowledges receipt of a copy of the Plan and represents to the Company that the Option Holder is familiar with the terms and conditions of the Plan, and hereby accepts this Option subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Plan. The Option Holder agrees to execute, deliver, file and otherwise assist the Company in filing any report, undertaking or document with respect to the awarding of the Option and exercise of the Option, as may be required by the Regulatory Authorities. The Option Holder further acknowledges that if the Plan has not been approved by the shareholders of the Company on the Grant Date, this Option is not exercisable until such approval has been obtained. Signature of Option Holder: Date Signed: Signature Print Name Address A-2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SCHEDULE “B” RESPONSE BIOMEDICAL CORP. 2008 STOCK OPTION PLAN NOTICE OF EXERCISE OF OPTION TO: The Administrator, Stock Option Plan [Address] The undersigned hereby irrevocably gives notice, pursuant to the Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”) of Response Biomedical Corp. (the “Company”), of the exercise of the Option to acquire and hereby subscribes for (cross out inapplicable item): (a) all of the Shares; or (b) of the Shares; which are the subject of the Option Certificate attached hereto (attach your original Option Certificate). The undersigned tenders herewith a certified cheque or bank draft (circle one) payable to “Response Biomedical Corp.” in an amount equal to the aggregate Exercise Price of the aforesaid Shares and directs the Company to issue the certificate evidencing said Shares in the name of the undersigned to be mailed to the undersigned at the following address (provide full complete address): The undersigned acknowledges the Option is not validly exercised unless this Notice is completed in strict compliance with this form and delivered to the required address with the required payment prior to 5:00 p.m. local time in Vancouver, B.C. on the Expiry Date of the Option. DATED the ______________day of ______________, 20___. Signature of Option Holder B-1
de	other	N/A	§ 56 LBDG 1997 (Burgenländisches Landesbeamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz 1997), Nachtarbeit - JUSLINE Österreich § 56 LBDG 1997 Nachtarbeit (2) Die Dienstzeit von Nachtarbeitern, deren Dienst mit besonderen Gefahren oder einer erheblichen körperlichen oder geistigen Anspannung verbunden ist (Nachtschwerarbeit), darf in einem 24-Stunden-Zeitraum, während dessen sie Nachtarbeit verrichten, acht Stunden nicht überschreiten. Die Landesregierung hat durch Verordnung zu bestimmungen, welche Tätigkeiten mit besonderen Gefahren oder einer erheblichen körperlichen oder geistigen Anspannung verbunden sind. (3) Der Gesundheitszustand von Nachtarbeitern ist auf deren eigenen Wunsch vor Übernahme der Tätigkeit und danach in regelmäßigen Zeitabständen von nicht mehr als drei Jahren ärztlich zu untersuchen. Die Kosten dafür trägt das Land. (4) Nachtarbeitern mit gesundheitlichen Schwierigkeiten, die nachweislich mit der Leistung der Nachtarbeit verbunden sind, ist im Rahmen der dienstlichen Möglichkeiten ein zumutbarer Arbeitsplatz ohne Nachtarbeit zuzuweisen, wenn sie für diesen geeignet sind. Die §§ 39 bis 42 sind in diesem Fall nicht anzuwenden. 0 Kommentare zu § 56 LBDG 1997 Sie können den Inhalt von § 56 LBDG 1997 selbst erläutern, also einen kurzen eigenen Fachkommentar verfassen. Klicken Sie einfach einen der nachfolgenden roten Links an! 0 Entscheidungen zu § 56 LBDG 1997 0 Diskussionen zu § 56 LBDG 1997 Sie können zu § 56 LBDG 1997 eine Frage stellen oder beantworten. Klicken Sie einfach den nachfolgenden roten Link an! § 46 LBDG 1997 Dienstpflichten gegenüber Vorgesetzten§ 47 LBDG 1997 Dienstpflichten des Vorgesetzten und des§ 48 LBDG 1997 Amtsverschwiegenheit§ 49 LBDG 1997 Befangenheit§ 50 LBDG 1997 Begriffsbestimmungen§ 51 LBDG 1997 Dienstplan§ 52 LBDG 1997 Höchstgrenzen der Dienstzeit§ 53 LBDG 1997 Ruhepausen§ 54 LBDG 1997 Tägliche Ruhezeiten§ 55 LBDG 1997 Wochenruhezeit§ 56 LBDG 1997 Nachtarbeit§ 57 LBDG 1997 Ausnahmebestimmungen§ 58 LBDG 1997 Reisezeit§ 59 LBDG 1997 Mehrdienstleistung§ 60 LBDG 1997 Bereitschaft und Journaldienst§ 61 LBDG 1997 Herabsetzung der regelmäßigen Wochendienstzeit§ 62 LBDG 1997 Herabsetzung der regelmäßigen Wochendienstzeit§ 63 LBDG 1997 Dienstleistung während der Herabsetzung der§ 64 LBDG 1997 Änderung und vorzeitige Beendigung der Herabsetzung§ 64a LBDG 1997 Pflegeteilzeit§ 65 LBDG 1997 Abwesenheit vom Dienst § 55 LBDG 1997 § 57 LBDG 1997
es	wikipedia	N/A	Para la Copa Mundial de Fútbol de 2010, la Confederación Asiática de Fútbol (AFC, por su sigla en inglés) contó con cuatro cupos directos y un quinto equipo que disputó una repesca frente a , ganadora del proceso clasificatorio de Oceanía. 43 equipos se inscribieron originalmente para participar en el torneo, es decir, la totalidad de los miembros de la AFC a excepción de , y . Además, marca la primera participación de en este tipo de competiciones tras su retiro de la OFC y su ingreso a la AFC. Los 43 equipos fueron divididos en tres grupos de acuerdo a su progreso en la clasificatoria para la Copa Mundial de Fútbol de 2006. Los cinco equipos que clasificaron a la fase final del Mundial de 2006 quedaron como cabezas de serie y clasificaron automáticamente a la tercera ronda del proceso clasificatorio. 19 parejas fueron formadas con un equipo del grupo A y otro del grupo B en un sorteo realizado el 6 de agosto de 2007 en Bukit Jalil, Malasia. Los once mejores ganadores de estos encuentros clasificaron directamente a la tercera ronda. Los ocho ganadores con la clasificación más baja en la distribución anterior jugarán una segunda ronda, en partidos de ida y vuelta, para determinar a cuatro clasificados para la tercera ronda. En la tercera ronda, todos los equipos aún en carrera se dividirán en cinco grupos de cuatro equipos y jugarán un sistema de todos contra todos. Los dos mejores equipos de cada grupo serán nuevamente divididos en dos grupos de cinco equipos; en este nuevo sistema grupal, los dos mejores equipos de cada grupo clasificarán a la Copa Mundial de Fútbol de 2010, mientras que los dos combinados que queden en la tercera posición se enfrentarán a dos partidos de repechaje para determinar el representante continental para la repesca ante el equipo ganador del torneo oceánico. Primera ronda Tras el sorteo, los equipos de y de se retiraron por lo que e , sus respectivos contrincantes, clasificaron a las rondas siguientes por walkover. Por motivos de seguridad, los partidos de local de las selecciones de , , , y se jugaron en cancha neutral. Segunda ronda De los diecinueve ganadores de la primera ronda, los ocho peor indexados en la clasificación de la FIFA deben enfrentar la segunda ronda. Los ocho equipos fueron emparejados en cuatro parejas que enfrentaron partidos de ida y vuelta entre los días 9 y 18 de noviembre de 2007. Tercera ronda Los veinte equipos clasificados a esta ronda fueron divididos en cinco grupos de cuatro equipos que jugarán un sistema de todos-contra-todos de dos vueltas y en el que los dos mejores equipos de cada grupo clasificarán a la siguiente ronda. Para ello, los equipos fueron divididos en cuatro bombos basados en su ranking mundial para posteriormente ser sorteados el 25 de noviembre de 2007 en Durban, Sudáfrica. Grupo 1 Grupo 2 Grupo 3 Grupo 4 Grupo 5 Cuarta ronda Los diez clasificados se dividen en dos grupos de cinco equipos y juegan una liguilla al igual que en la ronda anterior. Los dos mejores equipos de cada grupo avanzan a la Copa Mundial, mientras que los dos terceros juegan partidos definitorios para elegir al representante para la repesca intercontinental contra el ganador de la clasificación de Oceanía, Nueva Zelanda. Grupo 1 Grupo 2 Repesca por el quinto lugar Los dos países que finalizaron en el tercer lugar de los grupos A y B se enfrentaron entre sí para definir al quinto puesto de las eliminatorias, el vencedor fue , que empató ambos encuentros pero resultó favorecido por la regla del gol de visitante. Esta selección enfrentó posteriormente a por una plaza para la Copa Mundial de Fútbol, resultando favorecido el campeón de la OFC. Repesca contra Campeón de la OFC Clasificados Posiciones Finales Goleadores Galería Véase también Clasificación para la Copa Mundial de Fútbol de 2010 Referencias Enlaces externos Sitio oficial de la Copa Mundial de FIFA Sudáfrica 2010 - Asia Sitio oficial de la Copa Mundial de FIFA Sudáfrica 2010 - Lista de partidos y reportes oficiales Sitio oficial de la Copa Mundial de FIFA Sudáfrica 2010 - Tabla estadística Sitio oficial de la FIFA - Formato de la competición Clasificación de AFC para la Copa Mundial de Fútbol de 2010
en	caselaw	US	FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit January 11, 2012 PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT STUART T. GUTTMAN, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nos. 10-2167 and 10-2172 G.T.S. KHALSA; LIVINGSTON PARSONS; and THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants-Appellees. _______________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor-Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO (D.C. NO. 2:03-CV-463-MCA-KBM) Ian D. McKelvy, Sanders, Bruin, Coll & Worley, P.A., Roswell, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Dirk C. Phillips, Attorney, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division (Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, and Diana K. Flynn, with him on the briefs), United States Department of Justice, Washington, District of Columbia, for Intervenor-Appellant. Thomas C. Bird (Sean Olivas and Neil R. Bell, with him on the brief), Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellees. Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, and EBEL and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge. The question presented in this appeal is whether the Eleventh Amendment protects New Mexico from a suit for money damages under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65. We conclude it does. New Mexico has state sovereign immunity from a claim that it violated the ADA when it revoked the medical license of a physician whose practice the state claimed constituted an imminent danger to the public. As a result, we find the district court did not err by dismissing the ADA claim of the appellant, Dr. Stuart Guttman, against the State of New Mexico for revoking his medical license. We also conclude the state’s actions did not violate the United States Constitution. But after a careful review of the record, it appears that Guttman may still have extant claims for prospective injunctive relief. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further consideration of the claim for injunctive relief against the individual defendants on the basis of the alleged ADA violation. -2- BACKGROUND The factual and procedural background of this case is complex, and has been extensively recounted in four prior opinions. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D.N.M. 2003) (Guttman I); Guttman v. Khalsa, 401 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2005) (Guttman II); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2006) (Guttman III); Guttman v. New Mexico, 325 F. App’x 687 (10th Cir. 2009) (Guttman IV). Thus, we provide only a summary of the underlying facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal. I. Board of Medical Examiners Stuart Guttman is a physician with a history of depression and post- traumatic stress disorder. At the time he brought this case, he was practicing medicine in Truth or Consequences, New Mexico. Before that, he practiced in Gallup, New Mexico, and also in Mississippi and Texas. Because of his medical history, when he applied for a New Mexico medical license in 1993, the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners (the Board) initially granted him only a qualified medical license, subject to quarterly reports by his psychiatrist and other conditions. The Board removed these requirements in 1995. Four years later, after receiving many complaints about Guttman, the Board directed him to meet with an Impaired Physician Committee (IPC). The IPC consisted of an anesthesiologist and two psychiatrists. Before meeting Guttman, the IPC reviewed reports of his conduct in Truth or Consequences, which -3- indicated that his problems interacting with others had caused disruptions among healthcare providers. The IPC then interviewed Guttman. During that meeting, Guttman allegedly told the IPC that no complaints had been filed against him in either Gallup or Texas. Nevertheless, the IPC recommended the Board further investigate Guttman’s conduct in those locations. Two weeks later, the IPC received materials from Gallup indicating numerous complaints against Guttman by patients, their families, and hospital staff. The IPC also learned Guttman had been sued for malpractice and that a Gallup hospital had denied him staff privileges. In response, the IPC reported to the Board that Guttman’s interpersonal problems were serious and “certainly [had] a deleterious influence on his ability to diagnose and manage patients.” R. at 217. The IPC also concluded Guttman’s behavior was neither “situation nor place related.” Id. In March 2000, the Board summarily suspended Guttman’s license after finding clear and convincing evidence that “Guttman’s continuation in practice would constitute an imminent danger to public safety.” Id. at 303. Following the suspension, the Board conducted a three-day administrative hearing to take evidence on whether the suspension should be made permanent. Guttman participated in the hearing with the assistance of counsel. As an alternative to revocation, Guttman proposed more stringent stipulations on his license, but the -4- IPC members testified they could envision no restrictions that would enable Guttman to practice medicine safely. In February 2001, after recognizing an extensive pattern of disruptive and abusive behavior by Guttman in dealing with patients and healthcare professionals, the Board revoked his license. The Board also found that further treatment of his mental health problems was unlikely to succeed, and that Guttman’s inability to interact professionally with others posed a danger to his patients. II. State and Federal Court Proceedings Guttman challenged the Board’s findings in state court, asserting for the first time that the Board’s actions violated Title II of the ADA. Because Guttman had not raised an ADA claim before the Board, the state court refused to consider it and affirmed the revocation of his license. Guttman then petitioned both the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court for review, but they did not disturb the lower court’s holding. While his petition to the New Mexico Supreme Court was pending, Guttman filed a pro se complaint in federal district court against New Mexico and two individuals: G.T.S. Khalsa, the Board’s administrative prosecutor, and Livingston Parsons, the Board’s hearing officer. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment after finding (1) the individual defendants were entitled to absolute immunity, and (2) the Rooker-Feldman -5- doctrine prohibited consideration of Guttman’s Title II claim. 1 Guttman I, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. We affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated our judgment in light of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). Guttman II, 401 F.3d at 1170, vacated and remanded, 546 U.S. 801 (2005). On remand, after finding the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, we upheld the district court’s ruling that Khalsa and Parsons were entitled to absolute immunity. But we remanded the case to determine, in light of Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), and United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogated sovereign immunity in the area relevant to this controversy. Guttman III, 446 F.3d at 1027, 1035–36. After we issued Guttman III, Guttman filed an amended complaint, which contained the following claims under Title II and 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) an ADA claim, (2) an equal protection claim, (3) a procedural due process claim, (4) a First Amendment retaliation claim, (5) a “defamation and false data bank report” claim, which Guttman now calls a “stigma plus” claim, and (6) a claim for injunctive relief. The amended complaint’s principal alterations were the addition 1 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), prohibits “state-court losers” from bringing suit in federal court “complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before [parallel federal] district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). -6- of the injunctive relief claim and a reference to Khalsa and Parsons in their official capacities. The district court considered the claims against New Mexico and the individual defendants separately, in a series of memorandum opinions and orders. In October 2006, the court again granted the Board members’ motion to dismiss, holding they were entitled to absolute immunity for all claims under Title II and § 1983. R. at 69–88. But after a request to reconsider the dismissal, the court restored the stigma-plus claim and clarified that it was the only claim remaining against the individual defendants. Id. at 89–92. Finally, in June 2007, the court granted the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss in toto, holding they were entitled to qualified immunity on that last remaining claim. Id. at 100–17. With regard to Guttman’s Title II claim against New Mexico, the district court found he had alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a protected disability under Title II and concluded the sovereign immunity analysis would be “more appropriate for a decision at a later stage,” because “a decision will require some development of the facts.” Id. at 72. New Mexico timely filed an interlocutory appeal. We vacated the district court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and remanded for consideration of the sovereign immunity issue. Guttman IV, 325 F. App’x at 690–92. In March 2010, after finally considering New Mexico’s Eleventh Amendment claim, the district court concluded that Title II did not validly -7- abrogate state sovereign immunity because its remedy was not proportional to a pattern of unconstitutional state action in the area of professional licensing. Although the district court permitted Guttman to file a second amended complaint, the court later concluded the only remaining claim for which a ruling had not been made was Guttman’s First Amendment retaliation claim against New Mexico, which it dismissed. And after finding all of Guttman’s claims had been resolved, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. ANALYSIS Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See id. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a). -8- Two questions are before us in this appeal: (1) whether Guttman can proceed on his Title II claim against New Mexico, and (2) whether any claims against the individual defendants remain. I. Preclusion and Waiver Before addressing the merits of the sovereign immunity question, we must resolve two preliminary issues. First, New Mexico contends Guttman is collaterally estopped from bringing his Title II claim because the Board made a factual determination regarding his competency to practice medicine, and the state trial court affirmed the Board’s order. Second, Guttman claims New Mexico waived its defense of sovereign immunity when responding to the complaint. A. Collateral Estoppel We review de novo the district court’s application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is also known as issue preclusion. Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000). “[Collateral estoppel] means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Federal courts give state agency determinations the same preclusive effect that the forum state’s courts would afford them. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986). Under New Mexico law, collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of the same issue if -9- (1) the party to be estopped was a party to the prior proceeding, (2) the cause of action in the case presently before the court is different from the cause of action in the prior adjudication, (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior adjudication, and (4) the issue was necessarily determined in the prior litigation. Ideal v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 233 P.3d 362, 365–66 (N.M. 2010) (quoting Shovelin v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 850 P.2d 996, 1000 (N.M. 1993)). The state defendants contend the question of whether Guttman’s disability could be reasonably accommodated is necessarily precluded by the outcome of the Board’s factual determinations regarding his competency to practice medicine and the state trial court’s decision affirming the Board’s order. They argue these determinations prevent Guttman from establishing an essential element to an ADA claim—that he is a “qualified individual with a disability” under § 12131(2)—because “[a] physician whose mental condition poses a risk to the public cannot practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety.” Aple. Br. at 46 (citing Alexander v. Margolis, 921 F. Supp. 482, 488–89 (W.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d 98 F.3d 1341 (6th Cir. 1996)). The district court declined to dismiss Guttman’s complaint on collateral estoppel grounds after concluding the issue would be more appropriately addressed in the context of a summary judgment motion. R. at 372. We agree with the district court for two reasons. First, as far as we can tell from the record, the Board may not have established that Guttman was not a -10- qualified individual under the ADA. A qualified individual is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aides and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” § 12131(2). The Board may have established only that Guttman has a disability. Indeed, although the Board found “[p]rior therapeutic treatment has not been effective in changing [Guttman]’s behavior, and further treatment would not likely be effective in changing his behavior,” R. at 333, this is not the same as a finding that the behavior cannot be reasonably accommodated under the ADA. Rather, it may be possible to accommodate a disability without resolving the disability itself. For example, during the Board’s administrative hearing, Guttman proposed stipulations on his license that would restrict him to a solo practice in an outpatient, clinical setting. These restrictions were intended to accommodate Guttman’s disability not by changing his behavior, but by ameliorating its effect. As a result, we cannot conclude on this record the exact issue of accommodation was actually litigated in the prior adjudication. Factual questions regarding whether Guttman is a qualified individual who can be reasonably accommodated still preclude us from finding issue preclusion as a matter of law. And since Guttman did not raise his ADA claim in the revocation hearing—which would have alerted the Board that it -11- should address the possibility of reasonable accommodation under the statute—we cannot be sure this issue was necessarily determined when the Board revoked Guttman’s license. Given that the Board made no finding on the issue of accommodation, defendants may prevail on their collateral estoppel defense only if they can show that an individual with Guttman’s disability is unable to be accommodated as a matter of law. To this end, defendants point to Alexander, 98 F.3d at 1341, but that case provides no support on this issue. In summarily affirming the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit merely noted the plaintiff had failed to prove he met the statutory standard, without explaining why. See id. Likewise, Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995), provides no support for the fact that it would be categorically impossible to accommodate a person with Guttman’s disability. So even if we were to give preclusive effect to the Board’s finding that Guttman posed an imminent danger to public safety, this alone does not decide the issue of accommodation, and it would not prevent Guttman from filing a Title II claim. In summary, we agree with the district court that New Mexico has failed to establish in its motion to dismiss that Guttman is precluded from raising his Title II claim. B. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity New Mexico asserted its sovereign immunity defense in its first motion to -12- dismiss and in many subsequent pleadings. Nonetheless, Guttman contends New Mexico waived immunity by entering into a joint status report and provisional discovery plan. We see no waiver. Although a state may waive the sovereign immunity granted to it under the Eleventh Amendment, we require a showing of unequivocal intent to do so. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999). Although it has acceded to the reality of some discovery in the early stages of litigation, New Mexico continues to preserve its sovereign immunity defense. See Joint Status Report and Provisional Discovery Plan at 3 (“Defendants contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, absolute judicial or quasi- judicial immunity, and that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”) (Guttman v. Khalsa, No. 03-cv-463-MCA-KBM (D.N.M. Jan. 1, 2007), Doc. No. 49.). We find New Mexico did not waive its sovereign immunity defense. II. Sovereign Immunity Analysis Having determined no threshold issue allows us to resolve this case without addressing the sovereign immunity question, we now turn to the merits of that claim. A. Eleventh Amendment Legal Framework and the ADA The principle of state sovereign immunity is traceable to the earliest days of the Republic. For example, in Federalist No. 81, Alexander Hamilton wrote, -13- “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty [that a sovereign is] not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States . . . .” The Federalist No. 81, at 548–49 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis deleted); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting Federalist No. 81). Nevertheless, in 1793, the Supreme Court concluded the original states had surrendered much of their sovereign immunity. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The swift and immediate negative reaction to that decision led to its reversal through the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment grants immunity to the states from “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the Amendment “by its terms . . . applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State,” the Supreme Court has repeatedly held States are immune to unconsented suits brought by their own citizens as well. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Thus, as the Court has consistently recognized, “That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the -14- construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given.” Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). Nonetheless, “Congress may . . . abrogate [state sovereign] immunity in federal court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003). As it bears on the issues in this case, the Fourteenth Amendment provides: Section 1 . . . . No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. * * * Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The enforcement prerogative granted by § 5 gives Congress broad authority, such that it may enact “prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct,” so long as these measures do not work a substantive -15- change in the governing law. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727–28. The ADA is one such piece of prophylactic legislation. The Supreme Court closely scrutinizes prophylactic legislation under § 5 to ensure Congress does not overreach into core state governmental functions. For “private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress [such as the ADA] must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The Court has not arrived at a concrete definition of congruence and proportionality, but it is clear that Congress enjoys greater power under § 5 when it responds to a clearly discernible pattern of state encroachment on fundamental or other important constitutional rights. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 522, 529 (2004) (where a right is implicated that is subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, “it [is] easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations than in [cases that] concern[] legislation that target[s] classifications subject to rational-basis review”). Congressional regulation is less likely to be congruent and proportional if the rights at issue are not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. See id. This case centers on the ADA’s relationship to the Eleventh Amendment. Passed in 1990, the ADA seeks to vindicate the rights of the disabled. Title II of the statute forbids discrimination against the disabled in public services, -16- programs, and activities. 2 Title II specifies that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See id. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a). The Supreme Court has already addressed several Eleventh Amendment challenges to the ADA, with varying results. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Most relevant here, in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34, the Court held that “Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court, however, specifically declined to address the question “whether Title II’s duty to accommodate exceeds what the Constitution requires in the class of cases that implicate only [the] prohibition on irrational discrimination.” Id. at 532 n.20. Therefore, by its own terms, Lane does not resolve the specific question here: whether the accommodation requirement of 2 As the Supreme Court explained in Lane, 541 U.S. 522–23, Title II “also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review,” including the fundamental right of access to the courts, which was at issue in Lane. -17- Title II is a valid exercise of the § 5 authority, as it applies to cases involving professional licensing. To resolve this question, we apply the Court’s three-step analysis from United States v. Georgia. That analysis requires us to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. 546 U.S. at 159. Because we reach the third step of this analysis, we must also ask “whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity” and, “if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 517. Given this legal framework, we apply the test from Georgia to the Title II claims in this case. 1. Step One: The Alleged Title II Violation The first step from Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159, requires us to identify the state’s conduct that allegedly violated Title II’s prohibition against disability discrimination in the provision of state services or programs. This assessment is easy here: the alleged Title II violation is the Board’s decision to suspend and later revoke Guttman’s medical license. The parties have stipulated that Guttman stated a claim under Title II. -18- 2. Step Two: Fourteenth Amendment Claims The second step requires us to assess the asserted Fourteenth Amendment claims. Guttman alleges both procedural due process and equal protection violations. If these claims allege actual constitutional violations, then New Mexico cannot raise a sovereign immunity defense because “insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. If, however, the Board’s actions did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, then Guttman merely alleges violations of Title II’s prohibitions against disability discrimination, and we then must proceed to the final Georgia step to determine if Congress validly abrogated New Mexico’s sovereign immunity. Guttman raises three possible claims grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) a procedural due process claim based on the state’s failure to provide a predeprivation hearing; (2) a procedural due process claim based on procedural defects under New Mexico law; and (3) an equal protection claim based on the state’s decision to treat Guttman differently than other licensed professionals. -19- a. Procedural Due Process: Lack of a Deprivation Hearing Guttman’s first Fourteenth Amendment claim is that the Board violated his due process rights by not providing him a hearing before suspending his medical license. “To assess whether an individual was denied procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.” Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 52 F.3d 858, 862 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). In light of Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2007), New Mexico does not contest the district court’s finding that Guttman had a protected property interest in his medical license. The parties disagree, however, whether Guttman received an appropriate level of process. Ordinarily, “one who has a protected property interest is entitled to some sort of hearing before the government acts to impair that interest, although the hearing need not necessarily provide all, or even most, of the protections afforded by a trial.” Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “where a State must act quickly, or where it would be -20- impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997). Furthermore, “[a]n important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.” Id. at 930–31. “In matters of public health and safety, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the government must act quickly. Quick action may turn out to be wrongful action, but due process requires only a postdeprivation opportunity to establish the error.” Camuglia, 448 F.3d at 1220 (citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908)). The discovery that a physician constitutes an imminent danger to public safety is precisely the kind of circumstance where the government must act quickly. Here, the Board suspended Guttman’s license after finding “clear and convincing evidence that [his] continuation in practice would constitute an imminent danger to public safety.” R. at 303. A few months later, the Board conducted a three-day administrative hearing, in which Guttman participated via counsel. Because (1) the deprivation was supported by the important government interest of protecting the public, (2) clear and convincing evidence provided substantial assurance that the deprivation was not unwarranted, and (3) Guttman -21- was provided with adequate postdeprivation process, the Board’s failure to provide Guttman a predeprivation hearing did not violate the Due Process Clause. As a result, New Mexico is not prevented from raising a sovereign immunity defense on this basis. b. Procedural Due Process: Defects Under State Law Guttman next contends the Board lacked jurisdiction over his license because it failed to follow procedural requirements under state law, thereby voiding its decision. He identifies the following deficiencies that allegedly violated state law or governing procedural guidelines: (1) the medical license of one IPC member had expired; (2) the IPC held a second meeting outside of the two-week period from the time its members were appointed; (3) the IPC asked questions of the Board and the Board responded; (4) Parsons served as a hearing officer, despite having personal knowledge of Guttman and material facts; and (5) the IPC and Board relied on information dating back more than two years. Guttman relies on Lopez v. New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners, 754 P.2d 522, 524 (N.M. 1988), wherein the New Mexico Supreme Court held that violations of the 90-day time limit in rendering a decision under the Uniform Licensing Act, NMSA 1978, § 61-1-13— statute not at issue in this case—was jurisdictional. There are two major flaws with Guttman’s argument. First, as the district court recognized, “although the contours of a constitutional right can be defined -22- by state law, the question of whether a state has afforded sufficient process to protect a constitutional right is not a question of state law.” R. at 359 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1985)). Therefore, alleged state law deficiencies, even if we accept them as true, do not signify an unconstitutional denial of process. See Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 746 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of [federal] due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause.” (citation omitted)). Second, not every purported procedural defect forecloses jurisdiction under New Mexico law. In Lopez, 754 P.2d at 524, the particular defect was the failure to comply with a state law requiring the Board to render its decision within 90 days of its hearing. That type of deficiency is not at issue in this case. Furthermore, the Board in Lopez delayed nearly one and one-half years in rendering a decision—circumstances suggesting a more severe violation of state process than what Guttman alleges. Id. Guttman fails to identify any New Mexico case law finding procedural defects of the kind alleged here to be jurisdictional. More importantly, when examined solely from the perspective of federal law, the alleged deficiencies do not rise to level of a denial of process. Guttman’s only potentially meritorious claim is that, as an adjudicatory officer, Parsons was -23- biased through his personal knowledge of Guttman. But we have held that “a substantial showing of personal bias is required to disqualify a hearing officer or tribunal . . . .” Corstvet v. Boger, 757 F.2d 223, 229 (10th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a person claiming bias “must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Guttman has not met this burden. Parsons’s prior knowledge of Guttman’s disability—gained through Guttman’s quarterly visits before the Board between 1993 and 1995, when he practiced under a stipulated license—does not violate federal due process. “Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not . . . disqualify a decisionmaker” or demonstrate actual bias. Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976). Guttman does not allege any other facts that make a substantial showing of personal bias. In summary, the alleged violations of New Mexico law, standing alone, do not indicate a denial of procedural due process. c. Equal Protection Claims Finally, Guttman alleges the Board violated his equal protection rights by treating him differently because of his disability. He claims the Board handled the complaints against him differently than similarly situated physicians who came before the Board for disciplinary purposes. -24- The district court dismissed Guttman’s equal protection claim after concluding “a legitimate public safety concern—the protection of patients from a mentally unstable physician—is an abundantly rational basis for treating Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated physicians.” R. at 352–53. Although Guttman references his equal protection rights at several points in his brief, he fails to substantively challenge the district court’s holding that the Board did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, Guttman “waived this issue through [his] failure to adequately address it in [his] opening brief.” See Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). In any event, we agree with the district court that the state had a rational basis for treating Guttman differently from other physicians. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. Although certain classifications—such as race or national origin—are “subject to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest,” see id., the “States are not -25- required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. * * * Because we find the Board did not commit an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Guttman’s claims against New Mexico must rest solely on alleged Title II violations. In his ADA claims, Guttman contends New Mexico revoked his medical license on the basis of his mental disability without complying with Title II’s prophylactic protections. Thus, we must proceed to the final Georgia step to determine whether the purported abrogation of sovereign immunity is valid. 3. Step Three: Sovereign Immunity Analysis Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may be subject to a statutory suit under Title II of the ADA, even if there is no allegation of an actual Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 523. This is because, as the Supreme Court has explained, the scope of Congress’s power to enact remedial legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad. “Congress’ power ‘to enforce’ the [Fourteenth] Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct” than that which the Amendment itself proscribes. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). More importantly, -26- “[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quotation omitted). In line with these principles, the Supreme Court has held Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity if Congress (1) unequivocally indicates its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and (2) acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority under § 5. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. Here, there is no question Congress intended Title II to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The ADA specifically provides: “A state shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202. Thus, the remaining question is whether Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity is a valid exercise of its enforcement power under § 5. To arrive at an answer, City of Boerne requires us to consider (1) the nature of the constitutional right at issue; (2) the extent to which Congress’s remedial statute was passed in response to a documented history of relevant constitutional violations; and (3) whether the congressional statute is “congruent and proportional” to the specific class of violations at issue, given the nature of the -27- relevant constitutional right and the identified history of violations. 521 U.S. at 529–36; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 522, 529–30. Before proceeding, we emphasize that this is an as-applied challenge. The Supreme Court has instructed us to assess Eleventh Amendment abrogation on a case-by-case basis—“[w]ith respect to the particular [governmental] services at issue in [the] case.” Id. at 527 (considering the specific history of discrimination in the area of access to the courts); see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (the “as applied” test requires “identify[ing] with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue”). This case-by-case approach is especially important in the Title II context, because Title II “reaches a wide array of official conduct in an effort to enforce an equally wide array of constitutional guarantees.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 530. Accordingly, in Lane, see id. at 527, the Court did not consider Title II, “with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole”; rather, it considered the Title II remedy as it applied specifically to discrimination involving the fundamental right of access to the courts. The Court underscored the as-applied focus in Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159, where it directed lower courts to consider each state sovereign immunity case on a “claim-by-claim basis.” Given this framework, we approach each of the three prongs of the abrogation inquiry with respect to the specific right and class of violations at issue. Although some appellate courts read Lane to conclusively establish that Title II, taken generally, survives the first two prongs of the inquiry (which -28- address the scope of the right and the historical record) in all cases, see, e.g., Klingler v. Director, Dep’t of Revenue, State of Mo., 455 F.3d 888, 896 (8th Cir. 2006); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 487 (4th Cir. 2005); Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Florida Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2005); McCarthy ex rel. Travis. v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 423 (5th Cir. 2004), we agree with the First Circuit that the correct approach, as dictated by the Court’s approach in Lane, is to analyze all three prongs with regard to the particular right and class of state action at issue, Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2006). This approach is consistent with Lane, 541 U.S. at 527, where the Court, for each of the three prongs of the City of Boerne inquiry, expressly grounded its analysis in the specific right of access to the courts. For example, in analyzing the first prong, the Court highlighted its precedents establishing the right of access to the courts as a fundamental right. Id. at 522–23. And in analyzing the second prong, the Court reviewed Congress’s findings of unconstitutional discrimination “[w]ith respect to the particular services at issue in [the] case.” Id. at 527. Because we must undertake the same analysis, we find that Lane does not conclusively settle the first two prongs of the City of Boerne test for all classes of services. Indeed, there is no doubt the particular services at issue here are categorically different from the particular services at issue in Lane. With this in mind, we apply the three-part analysis. -29- a. Scope of the Constitutional Right Under the first element of the City of Boerne analysis, we determine the nature of the constitutional right at issue and the related class of state action. In Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23, the Supreme Court concluded Congress enacted Title II to “enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on irrational disability discrimination,” and also to “enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, . . . infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review.” The Court specifically identified the right at issue as the fundamental right of access to the courts. Id. This right can be infringed only if state action survives heightened judicial scrutiny. Here, the right at issue is a disabled individual’s right to practice in his chosen profession; this right, unlike the one at issue in Lane, does not invoke heightened scrutiny. Indeed, although “the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose one’s field of private employment,” this right is “subject to reasonable government regulation.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999); see also Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912) (the right to practice medicine is not a fundamental right). The same is true with disability discrimination: a state’s decision to treat the disabled differently than others “cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at -30- 366–67 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (persons with disabilities are not a suspect class). b. Historical Record of Constitutional Violations We next consider the extent to which Title II was “responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. With respect to Title II generally, Lane settles the issue. In Lane, 541 U.S. at 524, the Court found that Congress “enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs,” and that it specifically considered evidence of discrimination in areas such as education, access to the courts, transportation, communications, health care, and other public services. The Court noted the “sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services,” and concluded that it is “clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.” Id. at 528, 529. In light of this holding, we recognize that Title II may validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in some instances. Because this is an as-applied challenge, however, we also must follow the Court’s lead in Lane and consider the congressional record speaking to the history of unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled with regard to their right to practice in their chosen profession. 541 U.S. at 527 (considering Congress’s -31- historical findings “[w]ith respect to the particular services at issue in [the] case”). The problem for Guttman is that Congress did not identify a history of irrational discrimination in professional licensing when enacting Title II. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101; S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 pts. 1, 2, 3 & 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267; H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-558 (1990); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-596 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565; see also Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Based on our survey of the record, Congress has never specified a longstanding pattern of disability discrimination in professional licensing, much less any irrational discrimination that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Cf. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (with respect to Title I of the ADA, finding there were insufficient congressional findings to demonstrate a pattern of state discrimination in the employment of persons with disabilities). Guttman and the United States do point to isolated examples of discrimination in licensing teachers, see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 485, Pt. 1, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990); 2 Staff of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 101-336: The Americans with Disabilities Act 1040, 1611 n.9 (Comm. Print 1990), but Appellants do not identify anywhere that Congress addressed unconstitutional professional licensing directly, or at any length. For these reasons, Guttman’s case is categorically different than Lane. Whereas in Lane, Congress documented a lengthy history of discrimination in the -32- access to judicial services and facilities, here there is no such specific history. The historical testimony supporting abrogation is far removed from the discrimination in the administration of public programs and services—namely, the repeated infringement of fundamental rights and denial of access to public facilities—that Lane found in Title II’s congressional record. Therefore, we find the history of unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled regarding their right to practice in their chosen profession, as reflected in the congressional record, is minimal. This alone suggests Title II likely does not validly abrogate sovereign immunity in the area of professional licensing. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) (explaining that although “lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative,” the “expansive” remedial measure at issue did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity because the record “at best offer[ed] scant support for Congress’ conclusion that [states were violating the constitution].”). c. Congruence and Proportionality In any event, even “were it possible to squeeze out of [Appellants’] examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by [Title II] against the States would raise . . . congruence and proportionality [concerns].” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. In this third prong, the question is whether Title II is congruent and proportional to the specific class of -33- violations at issue, given the nature of the relevant constitutional right and the identified history of violations. The congruence and proportionality inquiry is a targeted one. We have already identified the scope of the constitutional right at issue: the right of the disabled to practice in their chosen profession. We also must identify the relevant class of state action at issue in this case. The parties disagree on this point. New Mexico contends, and the district court agreed, that Congress’s enforcement power should be considered only in relation to Congress’s authority to remedy discrimination in the area of “professional licensing.” In contrast, Guttman and the United States contend we should address Title II as it applies to the expansive category of “public licensing,” which implicates a broader array of state action, including the issuance of fishing and driving licenses. We agree with New Mexico that, because the right at issue is the right to practice in a chosen profession, “professional licensing” is the correct category of state action in this case. This narrower focus comports with the approach in Lane, 541 U.S. at 522. The plaintiffs in Lane could not enter a courthouse because the state did not accommodate their physical disabilities. Id. In determining whether Title II validly abrogated sovereign immunity, the Lane Court did not consider all disability discrimination or even all state-owned buildings; instead, it zeroed in on buildings that contain judicial functions. See id. at 530–31 (“[T]he question presented in this case is not whether Congress can -34- validly subject the States . . . [to] money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts.”). Thus, Lane identified a narrow category of state action that focused the analysis on a specific individual right—the right of access to the courts. The logic behind Lane suggests we focus on professional licensing as the proper category of state action. By tethering our analysis to state professional licensing decisions and an individual’s right to practice in a given profession, we may focus our analysis on a limited set of governmental rights, interests, and historical violations. If we were to instead focus on the general category of public licensing, we would need to address a heterogeneous set of state action—everything from regulating the fundamental right of marriage to the decidedly non-fundamental rights to fish or cut hair—so as to distract the inquiry from Congress’s § 5 enforcement authority, which is proportional to the importance of the right asserted. 3 Recognizing this, the district court correctly 3 The United States contends the range of governmental conduct implicit in public licensing is narrower than the range considered in Lane, but it does not explain how. In support of adopting this category, the government cites Toledo, 454 F.3d at 24, in which the First Circuit focused its analysis on “government conduct at all levels of public education,” as opposed to only higher education. But even this category is far narrower than public licensing; university and high school teachers share much more in common than licensed brides and licensed doctors. Furthermore, as noted below, the category chosen in Toledo is supported by a well-identified history of disability discrimination that is common to all levels of public education. See id. at 36–39. -35- concluded: “Lumping these licensing categories together eliminates the case- specific balancing that is necessary to resolve the question before the Court.” R. at 365–66. Thus, we ask only whether Title II is congruent and proportional in the context of the class of cases implicating disability discrimination in professional licensing. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 530. Our survey of Supreme Court cases fails to reveal precisely what it means for legislation to be congruent and proportional. In its first set of cases assessing congruence and proportionality, the Supreme Court struck down four separate pieces of § 5 enforcement legislation. First, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 535–36, the Court deemed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional. The Court held that RFRA—which prohibits the Government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability—was not a proper means to remedy the substantive constitutional violations it aimed to correct. Id. at 519; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The Court held, “Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508. In short, Congress impermissibly altered a substantive constitutional right, whereas § 5 grants Congress only the limited power to craft remedies for existing guarantees. -36- Then, in Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647, the Court found that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. In support of its holding, the Court pointed to the insufficient historical record of constitutional violations in the realm of state patent infringement and the overly broad sweep of the challenged legislation. Id. Similarly, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000), the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as applied to states, exceeded Congress’s authority under § 5. The Court reasoned Congress had exceeded its enforcement power by failing to identify “any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation.” Id. at 89. And in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, the Court found the provision of Title I of the ADA that permitted individuals to sue states for money damages exceeded Congress’s § 5 remedial authority. The Court was persuaded by the striking contrast between the sparse legislative record supporting Title I and Congress’s substantial historical findings with regard to the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 369. The Court found the “half-dozen examples” of state-sponsored disability discrimination fell “far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based.” Id. at 369, 370. Then, in two more-recent cases, the Court found Congress validly -37- abrogated state sovereign immunity. First, in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as applied to the states. The Court did so, in large part, because, with the FMLA—unlike with the statutes at issue in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett—Congress sought to prevent discrimination against a protected class of citizens. Id. at 730. The Court applied the same logic in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34, where it upheld Title II of the ADA as applied to claims by the disabled alleging they had been denied access to the courts on account of their disability. In Lane, the Court addressed the right of access to the courts—a fundamental right that may not be encroached upon unless the infringing provision survives strict scrutiny. The Court noted that the “unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability discrimination.” Id. at 531. Because both Hibbs and Lane involved rights implicating heightened scrutiny, “it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations than in Garrett or Kimel, both of which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to rational-basis review.” Id. at 529. Unfortunately, these cases shed limited light on what it means for a statutory remedy to be congruent and proportional to a class of constitutional violations. Nowhere has the Court set forth an easily administrable test for -38- determining proportionality or identified the factors that a court should consider in assessing congruence. Nevertheless, there is a lesson we can glean from the Court’s precedents. Whether a remedial provision is an appropriate response (i.e., congruent and proportional) to a purported class of constitutional violations depends on how well-tailored the congressional remedy is to the nature of the right and the history of violations. In undertaking this analysis, it is plain we must give Congress a wider berth where, as in Hibbs and Lane, the right it seeks to vindicate through a statutory remedy is subject to heightened scrutiny. When fundamental rights (like access to the courts) or suspect classes (such as racial or ethnic minorities) are implicated, Congress’s historical findings need not be as exhaustive, and the congruence and proportionality of the remedial measure need not be as precise. Conversely, when the relevant rights are less constitutionally significant, Congress has substantially less authority. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[w]hile § 5 authorizes Congress to enact reasonably prophylactic remedial legislation, the appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of the harm it seeks to prevent.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 523. “Difficult and intractable problems,” the Court explained, “often require powerful remedies,” but “[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.” Id. at 524 (quotations omitted). Therefore, to remedy infringement of non-fundamental rights, Congress must craft a comprehensive legislative -39- record and draft focused statutes. These principles are reflected in Garrett and Kimel, where the Supreme Court struck down federal provisions where the alleged state violations—which involved the rights to be free from disability and age discrimination in employment—were subject only to rational basis review. In line with these principles, there is a trend of courts holding that, absent the need to vindicate a fundamental right or protect a suspect class, Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity. Buchanan v. Maine, 377 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (D. Me. 2005) (“Absent a fundamental right, based on the law as it has been developed to date, Title II is not a proportional or congruent response to the recognized history of disability discrimination for mental health services.”); see also Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2004) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“It is therefore open to question whether Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity where no . . . fundamental right is at issue.”); see also Press v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 388 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Roe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 421 n.9 (“Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane, it would appear that there is no longer any basis to find the existence of a cause of action under Title II where no other fundamental right is implicated and the sole justification is the defendant’s level of scienter.” (citation omitted)); Johnson v. S. Conn. State Univ., No. 02-Civ-2065, 2004 WL 2377225, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004) (“[I]n the wake of Lane, it appears that a private suit for money damages under Title II of the ADA may be maintained -40- against a state only if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II violation involved a fundamental right.”). The bent of these cases has led at least one commentator to conclude that, when “the plaintiff is not alleging a constitutional violation and the case does not involve a type of discrimination or a right receiving heightened scrutiny, the state can be sued only if Congress found pervasive unconstitutional state conduct.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 477 (5th ed.). 4 In addition to these general principles, the Supreme Court has suggested the congruence and proportionality of a remedial statute depends, to some degree, on how costly it is for a state to comply with the statute. For example, in Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372, the Court concluded, under the rational basis test, that “it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities.” Similarly, in City of Boerne, the Court found that “[t]he substantial 4 We pause to note one exception to this trend: discrimination against students in public education. Several circuit courts have found Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in this context, even though education does not involve a fundamental right. See, e.g., Toledo, 454 F.3d at 39–40; Constantine, 411 F.3d at 490; Assoc. for Disabled Ams., Inc., 405 F.3d at 959. In reaching this conclusion, these courts have been persuaded by (1) the persistent pattern of exclusion and irrational treatment of disabled students in public education, (2) the gravity of the harm worked by such discrimination, and (3) the limited nature of the compliance costs imposed on states. See Toledo, 454 at 39–40. While the Supreme Court has yet to test the logic of these cases, the cases suggest the exceptionally well-documented history of irrational discrimination in schools is sufficient to compensate for the right’s limited value in the constitutional scheme. See id. at 36–39. Discrimination against students in public education is an exception that proves the rule. -41- costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the states and in terms of curtailing their traditional regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause.” And in Lane, 541 U.S. at 533, the Court was cognizant of the state’s cost considerations but nevertheless held, given the fundamental right at issue, “ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State’s failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts.” Costs are especially relevant when the state’s actions are subject only to rational basis review, given that conserving scarce resources may be a rational basis for state action. When no heightened scrutiny is implicated, a statute that forbids a state from implementing reasonable, cost-effective processes is unlikely to be congruent and proportional. Here, the area of professional licensing does not implicate a traditional category of fundamental rights. As the district court correctly noted, professional licensing decisions are subject only to rational basis review, and persons with disabilities do not compose a suspect class. Accordingly, the Constitution affords New Mexico significant discretion in the realm of professional licensing. The state’s licensing practices and regulations—which, in this case, were designed to prevent harm to patients of medical professionals—need only be rationally related -42- to a legitimate interest of the State. Thus, the nature of the right leans against abrogation. The lack of a historical record demonstrating discrimination in the area of professional licensing leans against abrogation as well. In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court explained that § 5 legislation “must be judged with reference to the historical experience . . . it reflects.” 521 U.S. at 525 (quotation omitted); see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (using the same language); Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (considering Congress’s historical findings in connection with the congruence-and-proportionality prong of the City of Boerne test). At best, the Appellants’ isolated examples of discrimination in this area are no more substantial than the “half-dozen examples” of state-sponsored disability discrimination identified in Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369, which the Court held fell “far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based,” id. at 370. Simply put, nothing in the congressional record suggests Title II was a response to pervasive discrimination in the area of professional licensing. Moreover, we find the Title II remedy, as applied to professional licensing, “far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses [to discrimination] that would be reasonable . . . .” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. Although Title II permits some flexibility by requiring only reasonable efforts at accommodation, the statute’s sweep is exceptionally broad. -43- The abrogation of sovereign immunity here would require states to justify a significant range of rational, everyday licensing decisions that would otherwise be constitutional. For example, despite the fact that Title II does not require a state to license a professional who poses “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3), it nevertheless places a substantial burden on the state to demonstrate the risk posed by a professional whose disability cannot be eliminated or mitigated. Finally, we emphasize the state’s strong interest in crafting reasonable, cost-effective medical licensing procedures. In contrast to many other public services, states have strong, historical interests in medical licensing, which touches on the core governmental function of promoting and protecting the general public welfare. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889); see also Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no question that the licensing and discipline of physicians involves important state interests.”); Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1936) (“The power of the state to protect its citizens against imposition by those purporting to practice the learned professions has been sustained without dissent for many generations.”). -44- Ultimately, we are presented with a right that is not fundamental, very little evidence of a widespread pattern of irrational state discrimination in professional licensing, and a wide-reaching statute that inhibits a state’s ability to safely and efficiently make professional licensing decisions. Title II prohibits a significant range of state action in this realm that would easily survive rational basis review. Accordingly, in this instance, Title II is “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. We conclude Title II does not validly abrogate New Mexico’s sovereign immunity in the context of professional licensing. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Guttman’s Title II claims against New Mexico. III. Claims Against the Individual Defendants We now turn to Guttman’s claims against Khalsa and Parsons. No doubt due to this case’s tangled procedural history, the parties disagree whether any claims remain. Guttman first contends the district court erred in dismissing his stigma-plus claim on the basis of qualified immunity. But as we explain, at the time New Mexico revoked Guttman’s medical license, it was not clearly established that an employment-related stigma-plus claim could be brought outside the context of a termination decision. Guttman also asserts that, because prior decisions have addressed only his claims for money damages, he still has live claims for prospective injunctive -45- relief. While the district court believed this claim had been resolved at an earlier stage in the litigation, we cannot conclude from our review of the record that the claim was in fact disposed of below. Consequently, we remand to the district court for further consideration of this claim. A. Stigma-Plus Claim Guttman alleges Khalsa and Parsons knowingly published false and stigmatizing information about him in the National Practitioner Data Bank, foreclosing his ability to practice medicine. After finding the individual defendants are protected by qualified immunity, the district court dismissed this claim. We agree. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established [federal] statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate on the facts alleged that (1) the defendant violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). There are two elements of a stigma-plus claim: (1) governmental defamation and (2) an alteration in legal status. Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d -46- 1152, 1167 (10th Cir.) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). When these two elements are present, the government may have “violate[d] a liberty interest that triggers a procedural due process protection.” Id. The stigma-plus authorities emphasize that “defamation, standing alone, [is] not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest.” Renaud v. Wyoming Dep’t of Family Servs., 203 F.3d 723, 726 (10th Cir. 2000). There must be a change of legal status as well. Therefore, in the employment context, “the defamation had to occur in the course of the termination of employment.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 (emphasis added). An employee has a “liberty interest in his good name and reputation as it affects his protected property interest in continued employment.” Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1994). But this liberty interest is only infringed by defamatory statements if a four-factor test is satisfied: (1) the statements must impugn the employee’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity; (2) the statements must be false; (3) the statements must occur in the course of terminating the employee or must foreclose other employment opportunities; and (4) the statements must be published. Workman, 32 F.3d at 481; see also Darr v. Town of Telluride, 495 F.3d 1243, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007). Guttman contends New Mexico’s allegedly defamatory report injured his professional reputation, foreclosing employment opportunities in the field of medicine. This claim fails, however, because at the time the allegedly defamatory -47- report was published, we had interpreted the stigma-plus doctrine, as applied in the area of employment, to be limited to claims of defamation occurring in the course of employment termination: At first blush, it appears that [the third factor] can be met either by statements made in the course of terminating an employee or, in the alternative, by any other statements that might foreclose other employment opportunities. Workman, [32 F.3d at 475,] which was decided on other grounds, did not examine this question. . . . While the language of Workman may be susceptible to another reading, we conclude that the Workman court did not intend to create a test under which a liberty interest might be infringed by any defamatory statement that might foreclose future employment opportunities. Renaud, 203 F.3d at 728 n.1 (relying on Paul, 424 U.S. at 710). Shortly after Renaud was decided, the Supreme Court confirmed our interpretation in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991), finding the former employee of a government hospital could not bring a stigma-plus claim against an ex-supervisor. The Court held that, because “[t]he alleged defamation was not uttered incident to the termination of [his] employment by the hospital,” the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for the denial of a constitutional right. Id. These cases preclude Guttman’s claim here. Since the individual defendants in this case did not employ Guttman in the first place, much less defame him in the context of terminating his employment, their conduct did not violate a clearly established right. -48- In short, the district court did not err in dismissing the stigma-plus claim against Khalsa and Parsons. B. Guttman’s Claim for Injunctive Relief One final claim remains to be resolved: Guttman’s demand for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young. To determine whether Guttman can proceed on his Ex parte Young claim requires us to review again both the nature of the asserted claim and the procedural history of this case. 1. Ex parte Young Doctrine “In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits against state officials seeking to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law.” Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1154 (10th Cir. 2011). By proceeding on the fiction that an action against a state official seeking only prospective injunctive relief is not an action against the state itself, the Ex parte Young doctrine enables “federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)). To determine whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies, “a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. -49- Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original). An individual can bring an Ex parte Young claim against a state official in federal court for an ADA or § 1983 violation. Roe No. 2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 2001). In Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an Ex parte Young ADA claim can proceed even if the state defendants are protected by sovereign immunity. Although Garrett involved a suit brought under Title I of the ADA, there is no relevant difference between Title I and Title II as far as the availability of prospective injunctive relief is concerned. See Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2003). In summary, neither a state official’s absolute immunity nor a state’s sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff from bringing an Ex parte Young claim for a violation of Title II of the ADA. 2. Guttman’s Ex parte Young Claim Guttman initiated this action in 2003 by filing a pro se civil complaint against New Mexico, Khalsa, and Parsons. The complaint contained two counts: an ADA violation and a violation of procedural due process. The complaint did not expressly request prospective relief or refer to the individual defendants in their official capacities. -50- Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a motion for dismissal or summary judgment. Responding to this motion, Guttman stated he was “asking this Court, under § 1983 and the ADA, to enjoin these Defendants in their individual and official capacities from their prospective and ongoing violations of the ADA and Dr. Guttman’s procedural due process rights.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. at 16, Guttman I, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D.N.M. June 16, 2003) (No. Civ. 03-463 LCS) (Doc. No. 9). 5 When the defendants replied that the pro se complaint did not contain an Ex parte Young claim, Guttman filed a surreply that argued “the contrary is true,” because “seeking relief under the ADA includes prospective injunctive relief.” Pl.’s Surreply to Defs.’ Reply to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or For Sum. J. at 2, Guttman I, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D.N.M. Aug. 8, 2003) (No. Civ. 03-463 LCS) (Doc. No. 16). Guttman also noted that the district court must liberally construe his complaint because it was filed pro se. Id. (citing Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1995)). As a result, Guttman argued, “[t]he factual allegations stated by the Plaintiff in his Complaint are sufficient to raise a claim under the ADA, seeking prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.” Id. 5 We recognize some documents filed in the district court are not part of the record on appeal. Nevertheless, we have authority to review them because we may take judicial notice of public records, including district court filings. See United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 768 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of district court record that was not part of the record on appeal). -51- Although the district court granted defendants’ motion, Guttman I, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1164, the court also appeared to agree with Guttman’s construction of his complaint, noting that “Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief and damages under the ADA.” Id. at 1168–69. Nonetheless, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all Title II and § 1983 claims, based on two alternative grounds: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and (2) the defendants were protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 1171. Guttman timely appealed. In addition to contesting the district court’s Rooker-Feldman and immunity decisions, he argued that a claim for prospective injunctive relief remained against individual state officials, as permitted by Ex parte Young. We affirmed the district court’s application of Rooker-Feldman, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded our opinion in light of Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 280. Guttman II, 401 F.3d at 1170, vacated and remanded, 546 U.S. 801 (2005). With the case back before us on remand, we asked the parties to file supplemental briefing. In his brief, Guttman argued, among other things, (1) his complaint contained a claim for prospective injunctive relief, (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity does not prohibit Ex parte Young claims, and (3) Garrett recognized the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity in the ADA context. Aplt.’s Supplemental Br. Following Remand from the U.S. Supreme Ct. -52- at 16, Guttman III, 446 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2005) (No. 03-2244). The brief’s conclusion reiterated that the defendants “possess no immunity against [Guttman’s] claims for injunctive relief in their official capacity . . . .” Id. at 25. Nonetheless, we decided Guttman III without mentioning or addressing Guttman’s claim for prospective relief. Instead, our decision contained the following conclusion and mandate: We AFFIRM the district court’s determination that both Parsons and Khalsa are protected by absolute immunity. However, we REVERSE the district court’s determination that New Mexico is protected against all suits under Title II of the ADA by sovereign immunity and REMAND for hearings consistent with this opinion. Guttman III, 446 F.3d at 1036. Back before the district court, Guttman filed an amended complaint, adding the following claims: (1) an equal protection claim, (2) a First Amendment retaliation claim, (3) a stigma-plus claim, and (4) a claim for injunctive relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Because Guttman III did not mention the Ex parte Young claim, but nonetheless remanded the case to the district court “for hearings consistent with this opinion,” the parties disagreed whether we affirmed the dismissal of that claim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss that argued Khalsa and Parsons were immune from suit without specifically mentioning the claims for prospective relief. -53- In response, Guttman “concede[d] that not only this Court, but the 10th Circuit has determined that Khalsa and Parsons are immune from suit under Dr. Guttman’s claims as reviewed.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 18, Guttman v. Khalsa, No. Civ. 03-463-MCA-KBM (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2006) (Doc. No. 33). Nonetheless, he argued, “that in no way precludes Dr. Guttman’s claims for prospective injunctive relief against the individuals in their official capacity. The Ex parte Young exception . . . would apply to Dr. Guttman’s claims against the individuals in their official capacity for injunctive relief under the ADA . . . . The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits.” Id. at 18–19. Granting in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court rejected Guttman’s Ex parte Young argument, holding that because both he and this court had granted immunity to Khalsa and Parsons on the basis of absolute immunity, they are not subject to suit under the ADA or § 1983. Despite this ruling, Guttman continued to press his Ex parte Young claim. At a motion hearing convened in response to his motion to reconsider, Guttman argued that, “[as] established in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, although absolute immunity and qualified immunity offer protection to officials from civil damages, they do not preclude or protect against a claim for prospective injunctive relief and the recovery of attorney’s fees for a successful plaintiff.” Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Stay and Mem. in Supp. at 2, Guttman v. Khalsa, No. Civ. 03-463-MCA-KBM (D.N.M. Mar. 14, 2007) (Doc. No. 63). -54- In June 2010, after separately considering Guttman’s ADA claim against New Mexico, the district court turned to his claims against the individual defendants. After reviewing the procedural history, the court made the following finding: In September 2003, the [District] Court issued a “final order,” which stated that “[s]ummary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants G.T.S. Khalsa, Livingston Parsons and the State of New Mexico on Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . .” Guttman I, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. The Tenth Circuit’s Guttman III opinion affirmed the grant of immunity to the Individual Defendants and did not address additional “official capacity” liability for prospective relief—leaving this Court to presume that the issue of prospective relief against Individual Defendants was not raised before the Circuit. R. at 382. [Mem. Op. & Order at 8, Guttman v. Khalsa, No. Civ. 03-463-MCA- KBM (D.N.M. June 6, 2010) (Doc. No. 150) (emphasis added).] Based on the silence of the appellate opinions on this issue, the court “conclude[d] that by failing to appeal [the district court’s] repeated dismissal of the Individual defendants, Plaintiff has waived any claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Individual Defendants.” Id. at 9. This statement is belied by the fact that Guttman did appeal the district court’s dismissal of the individual defendants, both in their individual and official capacities. In sum, our review of the procedural history leads to several conclusions. First, it remains unclear whether the district court construed Guttman’s original pro se complaint to include an Ex parte Young claim even though prospective -55- relief was not expressly requested. Second, despite the confusion, Guttman appears to have advocated a claim for prospective injunctive relief throughout the litigation. If that is the case, then the district court erred in Guttman I, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1171, when it held that the individual defendants’ absolute immunity barred the Ex parte Young claim. See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645. Finally, although Guttman raised Ex parte Young claims on appeal, our opinion in Guttman III does not address the claim, and the claims may have remained part of the case on remand. Given this procedural history, on this record we remain unclear as to the status of Guttman’s Ex parte Young claim. The claim appears to have been part of the initial district court proceedings, and it was specifically raised in Guttman’s first appeal to this court. But the issue does not appear to have been resolved one way or another in the many opinions addressing the claims in this case. With this uncertainty, we conclude the better approach is to remand to the district court to resolve whether the claim has been properly preserved. We express no view on the procedural or substantive merits of the remand. CONCLUSION We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Guttman’s Ex parte Young claim against the individual defendants on the basis of the alleged ADA violation, AFFIRM the dismissal of all other claims against the State of New Mexico and -56- the individual defendants, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this decision. -57-
de	caselaw	Switzerland	Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich Entscheid: IV.2008.00134 Drucken Zurück IV.2008.00134 Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich III. Kammer Sozialversicherungsrichter Spitz, Vorsitzender Sozialversicherungsrichterin Daubenmeyer Ersatzrichterin Condamin Gerichtssekretär Schetty Urteil vom 11. September 2009 in Sachen X._ Beschwerdeführer vertreten durch Rechtsanwalt Peter Bolzli Advokaturbüro Egg, Gwerder, Mona, Riedener, Spescha, Bolzli Langstrasse 4, 8004 Zürich gegen Sozialversicherungsanstalt des Kantons Zürich, IV-Stelle Röntgenstrasse 17, Postfach, 8087 Zürich Beschwerdegegnerin Sachverhalt: 1. Der im Jahre 1956 geborene X._ leidet seit 1964 an einer poliobedingten Gehbehinderung. Er studierte in "_" Volkswirtschaft und war in der Folge von 1980 bis 1999 bei der Y._ angestellt (Urk. 11/1). Er reiste am 4. Mai 1999 in die Schweiz ein und meldete sich erstmals am 7. Oktober 2000 bei der SVA, IV-Stelle, zum Leistungsbezug an (Urk. 11/1). Mit Verfügung vom 15. Dezember 2000 lehnte diese das Gesuch des Versicherten mangels Erfüllung der Beitragspflicht ab (Urk. 11/7). Wegen seit März 2003 zusätzlich aufgetretener psychischer Beschwerden meldete sich der Versicherte am 16. September 2004 erneut zum Leistungsbezug an (Urk. 11/9). Mit Verfügung vom 5. Januar 2005 lehnte die IV-Stelle das Leistungsbegehren erneut ab, da sich der Gesundheitszustand seit der Einreise nicht wesentlich verändert habe (Urk. 11/21). Wegen multipler somatischer und psychischer Beschwerden meldete sich der Versicherte am 10. Juli 2006 erneut zum Rentenbezug an (Urk. 11/27). Nach erfolgten Abklärungen - insbesondere in psychiatrischer Hinsicht - stellte die IV-Stelle mit Vorbescheid vom 14. Juni 2007 die Abweisung des Begehrens in Aussicht (Urk. 11/47) und hielt an diesem Entscheid mit Verfügung vom 27. Dezember 2007 fest (Urk. 11/65 = Urk. 2). 2. Dagegen erhob der Vertreter des Versicherten am 1. Februar 2008 Beschwerde und beantragte es sei die Sache zur Einholung eines neuen psychiatrischen Gutachtens an die Beschwerdegegnerin zurückzuweisen. Weiter sei dem Beschwerdeführer die unentgeltliche Prozessführung zu gewähren und ihm in der Person des Unterzeichnenden Rechtsanwalts ein unentgeltlicher Rechtsbeistand beizugeben; unter Kosten- und Entschädigungsfolgen zu Lasten der Beschwerdegegnerin (Urk. 1 S. 2). Nachdem die Beschwerdegegnerin mit Beschwerdeantwort vom 22. April 2008 die Abweisung der Beschwerde beantragt hatte (Urk. 10), wurde dem Beschwerdeführer mit Verfügung vom 24. April 2008 die unentgeltliche Rechtspflege bewilligt und der Schriftenwechsel geschlossen (Urk. 12). Das Gericht zieht in Erwägung: 1. 1.1 Die am 1. Januar 2008 in Kraft getretenen Änderungen des Bundesgesetzes über die Invalidenversicherung (IVG) vom 6. Oktober 2006 und der Verordnung über die Invalidenversicherung (IVV) vom 28. September 2007 (5. IV-Revision) sind nach den allgemeinen übergangsrechtlich Grundsätzen vorliegend nicht anwendbar (vgl. BGE 132 V 215 Erw. 3.1.1). Bei den nachfolgend zitierten Normen handelt es sich demnach um die bis Ende 2007 gültig gewesenen Fassungen. 1.2 Invalidität ist die voraussichtlich bleibende oder längere Zeit dauernde ganze oder teilweise Erwerbsunfähigkeit (Art. 8 Abs. 1 ATSG). Die Invalidität kann Folge von Geburtsgebrechen, Krankheit oder Unfall sein (Art. 4 Abs. 1 IVG). Erwerbsunfähigkeit ist der durch Beeinträchtigung der körperlichen, geistigen oder psychischen Gesundheit verursachte und nach zumutbarer Behandlung und Eingliederung verbleibende ganze oder teilweise Verlust der Erwerbsmöglichkeiten auf dem in Betracht kommenden ausgeglichenen Arbeitsmarkt (Art. 7 ATSG). Beeinträchtigungen der psychischen Gesundheit können in gleicher Weise wie körperliche Gesundheitsschäden eine Invalidität im Sinne von Art. 4 Abs. 1 IVG in Verbindung mit Art. 8 ATSG bewirken. Nicht als Folgen eines psychischen Gesundheitsschadens und damit invalidenversicherungsrechtlich nicht als relevant gelten Einschränkungen der Erwerbsfähigkeit, welche die versicherte Person bei Aufbietung allen guten Willens, die verbleibende Leistungsfähigkeit zu verwerten, abwenden könnte; das Mass des Forderbaren wird dabei weitgehend objektiv bestimmt. Festzustellen ist, ob und in welchem Umfang die Ausübung einer Erwerbstätigkeit auf dem ausgeglichenen Arbeitsmarkt mit der psychischen Beeinträchtigung vereinbar ist. Ein psychischer Gesundheitsschaden führt also nur soweit zu einer Erwerbsunfähigkeit (Art. 7 ATSG), als angenommen werden kann, die Verwertung der Arbeitsfähigkeit (Art. 6 ATSG) sei der versicherten Person sozial-praktisch nicht mehr zumutbar (BGE 131 V 50 Erw. 1.2 mit Hinweisen). 1.3 Gemäss Art. 28 Abs. 1 IVG (in der bis zum 31. Dezember 2003 gültig gewesenen Fassung) haben Versicherte Anspruch auf eine ganze Rente, wenn sie mindestens zu 66 2 / 3 Prozent, auf eine halbe Rente, wenn sie mindestens zu 50 Prozent, oder auf eine Viertelsrente, wenn sie mindestens zu 40 Prozent invalid sind. In Härtefällen besteht gemäss Art. 28 Abs. 1 bis IVG bereits bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 40 Prozent Anspruch auf eine halbe Rente. Die seit dem 1. Januar 2004 massgeblichen Rentenabstufungen geben bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 40 Prozent Anspruch auf eine Viertelsrente, bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 50 Prozent Anspruch auf eine halbe Rente, bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 60 Prozent Anspruch auf eine Dreiviertelsrente und bei einem Invaliditätsgrad von mindestens 70 Prozent Anspruch auf eine ganze Rente (Art. 28 Abs. 1 IVG in der seit dem 1. Januar 2004 in Kraft stehenden Fassung). 1.4 Bei erwerbstätigen Versicherten ist der Invaliditätsgrad gemäss Art. 16 ATSG (seit 1. Januar 2004: in Verbindung mit Art. 28 Abs. 2 IVG) aufgrund eines Einkommensvergleichs zu bestimmen. Dazu wird das Erwerbseinkommen, das die versicherte Person nach Eintritt der Invalidität und nach Durchführung der medizinischen Behandlung und allfälliger Eingliederungsmassnahmen durch eine ihr zumutbare Tätigkeit bei ausgeglichener Arbeitsmarktlage erzielen könnte (sog. Invalideneinkommen), in Beziehung gesetzt zum Erwerbseinkommen, das sie erzielen könnte, wenn sie nicht invalid geworden wäre (sog. Valideneinkommen). Der Einkommensvergleich hat in der Regel in der Weise zu erfolgen, dass die beiden hypothetischen Erwerbseinkommen ziffernmässig möglichst genau ermittelt und einander gegenübergestellt werden, worauf sich aus der Einkommensdifferenz der Invaliditätsgrad bestimmen lässt (allgemeine Methode des Einkommensvergleichs; BGE 130 V 349 Erw. 3.4.2 mit Hinweisen). 1.5 War eine Rente wegen eines zu geringen Invaliditätsgrades verweigert worden und ist die Verwaltung auf eine Neuanmeldung eingetreten (Art. 87 Abs. 4 IVV), so ist im Beschwerdeverfahren zu prüfen, ob im Sinne von Art. 41 IVG (seit 1. Januar 2003: Art. 17 Abs. 1 ATSG) eine für den Rentenanspruch relevante Änderung des Invaliditätsgrades eingetreten ist (BGE 117 V 198 Erw. 3a mit Hinweis). Ändert sich der Invaliditätsgrad einer Rentenbezügerin oder eines Rentenbezügers erheblich, so wird die Rente von Amtes wegen oder auf Gesuch hin für die Zukunft entsprechend erhöht, herabgesetzt oder aufgehoben (Art. 17 Abs. 1 ATSG). Anlass zur Rentenrevision gibt jede wesentliche Änderung in den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen, die geeignet ist, den Invaliditätsgrad und damit den Rentenanspruch zu beeinflussen. Eine Invalidenrente ist demgemäss nicht nur bei einer wesentlichen Veränderung des Gesundheitszustandes, sondern auch dann revidierbar, wenn sich die erwerblichen Auswirkungen des an sich gleich gebliebenen Gesundheitszustandes erheblich verändert haben (BGE 130 V 349 f. Erw. 3.5, 117 V 199 Erw. 3b, 113 V 275 Erw. 1a mit Hinweisen). Ob eine solche Änderung eingetreten ist, beurteilt sich durch Vergleich des Sachverhaltes, wie er im Zeitpunkt der letzten, der versicherten Person eröffneten rechtskräftigen Verfügung vorlag, welche auf einer materiellen Prüfung des Rentenanspruchs mit rechtskonformer Sachverhaltsabklärung, Beweiswürdigung und Durchführung eines Einkommensvergleichs (bei Anhaltspunkten für eine Änderung in den erwerblichen Auswirkungen des Gesundheitszustands) beruht, mit demjenigen zur Zeit der streitigen Revisionsverfügung respektive des Einspracheentscheides (BGE 133 V 108 Erw. 5.4). Dabei stellt die bloss unterschiedliche Beurteilung der Auswirkungen eines im Wesentlichen unverändert gebliebenen Gesundheitszustandes auf die Arbeitsfähigkeit für sich allein genommen keinen Revisionsgrund im Sinne von Art. 17 Abs. 1 ATSG und alt Art. 41 IVG dar (BGE 112 V 372 Erw. 2b mit Hinweisen; SVR 1996 IV Nr. 70S. 204 Erw. 3a; Urteil des Bundesgerichts in Sachen C. vom 3. November 2008, 9C_562/2000, Erw. 2.1 mit Hinweis). 1.6 Um den Invaliditätsgrad bemessen zu können, ist die Verwaltung (und im Beschwerdefall das Gericht) auf Unterlagen angewiesen, die ärztliche und gegebenenfalls auch andere Fachleute zur Verfügung zu stellen haben. Aufgabe des Arztes oder der Ärztin ist es, den Gesundheitszustand zu beurteilen und dazu Stellung zu nehmen, in welchem Umfang und bezüglich welcher Tätigkeiten die versicherte Person arbeitsunfähig ist (BGE 125 V 261 Erw. 4). Im Weiteren sind die ärztlichen Auskünfte eine wichtige Grundlage für die Beurteilung der Frage, welche Arbeitsleistungen der versicherten Person noch zugemutet werden können (BGE 125 V 261 Erw. 4 mit Hinweisen; AHI 2002 S. 70 Erw. 4b.cc). Das Gericht hat den Sachverhalt von Amtes wegen festzustellen und demnach zu prüfen, ob die vorliegenden Beweismittel eine zuverlässige Beurteilung des strittigen Leistungsanspruches gestatten. Hinsichtlich des Beweiswertes eines Arztberichtes ist entscheidend, ob der Bericht für die streitigen Belange umfassend ist, auf allseitigen Untersuchungen beruht, auch die geklagten Beschwerden berücksichtigt, in Kenntnis der Vorakten (Anamnese) abgegeben worden ist, in der Darlegung der medizinischen Zusammenhänge und in der Beurteilung der medizinischen Situation einleuchtet und ob die Schlussfolgerungen des Experten begründet sind (BGE 125 V 352 Erw. 3a, 122 V 160 f. Erw. 1c, je mit Hinweisen). 2. 2.1 Die Beschwerdegegnerin begründete die angefochtene Verfügung damit, dass aus psychiatrischer Sicht keine Einschränkung der Arbeitsfähigkeit bestehe. Hinsichtlich der körperlichen Beschwerden habe sich die Situation seit den Verfügungen vom 15. Dezember 2000 sowie 5. Januar 2005 nicht verschlechtert. Aufgrund des Gutachtens von Dr. med. Z._, Facharzt FMH für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, und Dr. med. A._, welches in allen Belangen den für ein derartiges Beweismittel geltenden Anforderungen genüge, seien keine weiteren medizinischen Abklärungen angezeigt (Urk. 2). 2.2 Demgegenüber machte der Vertreter des Beschwerdeführers im Wesentlichen geltend, dass auf das Gutachten von Dr. Z._ nicht abgestellt werden könne, da nicht von einer seriösen Ermittlung des Sachverhalts gesprochen werden könne. Als albanischer Bosniake sei sein Mandant vom Bund vorläufig in der Schweiz aufgenommen worden, da ihm die Rückkehr in den albanischen Kosovo nicht mehr zuzumuten sei. Trotzdem sei als Dolmetscher ein Albaner bestellt worden, was unerklärlich sei, habe doch der Beschwerdeführer vorgängig auf diesen Umstand hingewiesen. Dies habe den Gutachtern den Blick auf die objektiven Fakten verstellt. Das Gutachten sei denn auch nicht überzeugend ausgefallen; der Ton sei kurz angebunden, die Gründe, die für und gegen eine Arbeitsfähigkeit sprächen, würden nicht sorgfältig gegeneinander abgewogen und die der Auffassung der Gutachter widersprechenden ärztlichen Meinungen würden ohne ausführliche Begründung und ohne Rücksprache mit den behandelnden Ärzten vom Tisch gewischt (Urk. 1 S. 7, 10). 2.3 Beim vorliegenden Verfahren handelt es sich um eine Neuanmeldung, so dass zu prüfen ist, ob und inwieweit sich die gesundheitliche Situation seit der Verfügung vom 5. Januar 2005 verschlechtert hat. Dabei soll vorab geprüft werden, ob sich der medizinische Sachverhalt im Zeitpunkt der angefochtenen Verfügung aufgrund der vorliegenden Unterlagen überhaupt erstellen lässt. 2.4 2.4.1 Dr. med. B._, Oberärztin an der Klinik C._, Privatklinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, diagnostizierte in ihrem Bericht vom 8. August 2006 eine Wesensveränderung als Folge einer Anpassungsstörung mit vorwiegender Beeinträchtigung von anderen Gefühlen (ICD-10 F43.23), Probleme in der Verbindung mit der sozialen Umgebung sowie Veränderung der Lebensumstände (soziale Zurückweisung und Ablehnung). Der Beschwerdeführer stehe seit dem 3. September 2004 wegen depressiver Symptomatik in ihrer ambulanten Behandlung und leide an Schlafstörungen in Form von Alpträumen, sei im Affekt deprimiert, innerlich unruhig und latent suizidal (Urk. 11/37). 2.4.2 Dr. med. D._, Facharzt FMH für Allgemeine Medizin, diagnostizierte in seinem Bericht vom 16./22. November 2006 Hypertonie, Beinparese, Epididymitis, chronische Kopfschmerzen, taktile Halluzinationen, chronische Lumbalgien, Angststörung mit somatoformen und panikartigen Zügen sowie Status nach Hephrektomie. Der Beschwerdeführer klage seit Ende 2004 über elektrisierende Nierenschmerzen, Schlafstörungen und chronische Schmerzen in seinem Hoden. Anfangs 2005 sei es zu taktilen Halluzinationen gekommen, anfangs 2006 habe die Hypertonie zugenommen und im April 2006 sei es zu einer Kniedistorsion links gekommen, so dass der Beschwerdeführer aufgrund der Beinparese rechts nicht mehr habe gehen können. Neben den von Dr. B._ gestellten Diagnosen leide der Beschwerdeführer in einer kaum auszuhaltenden Art und Weise an seiner Lichtunverträglichkeit, auf die er gedanklich völlig fixiert sei. Er werte dies als einen Hinweis auf eine paranoide Störung. Wer länger mit dem Beschwerdeführer zu tun habe, dem werde bald klar, dass dieser zu 100 % arbeitsunfähig sei (Urk. 11/35). 2.4.3 Dr. A._ und Dr. Z._ diagnostizierten in ihrem Gutachten vom 4. April 2007 ohne Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitsfähigkeit einen Status nach Anpassungsstörung mit vorwiegender Beeinträchtigung von anderen Gefühlen (ICD-10 F43.23), einen Status nach Poliomyelitis (Kinderlähmung) 1962, einen Status nach operativer Nierenentfernung 2004, eine chronische Epididymitis (Nebenhodenentzündung) rechts, eine arterielle Hypertonie, einen Status nach Sturz am 19. April 2006 mit medialer Seitenbandruptur sowie Tibiaplateaufissur (ein Haarriss im Plateau des Schienbeins), einen Status nach Abszess (Eiteransammlung)-Operation 2003 sowie einen Status nach Harnblasen-Operation 1965. Zurzeit bestehe keine Störung gemäss ICD-10, welche sich auf die Arbeitsfähigkeit auswirken würde. Dies gelte insbesondere für eine Dysthymia (F34.1) sowie eine depressive Episode (F32). Die genannten Beschwerden wie zum Beispiel Schlafstörungen und Ängste seien durch externe Faktoren (schwierige Wohnverhältnisse mit Drogenhandel, Gewalt, Lärm) verursacht (Urk. 11/46). Die Diskrepanz zwischen der subjektiven und dem objektiven Abklärungsresultat sei Ausdruck einer "Alles ist schlecht"-Haltung des Versicherten, der bei der Untersuchung nur eine eingeschränkte Kooperation und Motivation gezeigt und viele Fragen unbeantwortet gelassen habe. 2.5 Auffallend ist, dass die in den Testverfahren zum Ausdruck gekommene Selbstbeurteilung des Beschwerdeführers, welche in weiten Teilen der Beurteilung von Dr. B._ und Dr. D._ entspricht, eine erhebliche Depressivität ergibt, während die Gutachter in ihrer Fremdbeurteilung, nach dem MADRAS-Testverfahren, das auch subjektive Momente berücksichtigt, sogar ein leichtes depressives Syndrom ausschlossen (Urk. 11/46 S. 7, S. 22 ff.). Es bleibt im Folgenden zu prüfen, inwieweit dieses Ergebnis nachvollziehbar und schlüssig ist. Im Bereich "Berichtete Traurigkeit" gehen die Gutachter von einer "vorübergehenden Traurigkeit je nach den Umständen" aus, was auf der Skala von 0 bis 6 Punkten einer Wertung von 0 Punkten entspricht. Diese Annahme wiederspricht klar den Angaben des Beschwerdeführers im BDI-Test, wonach er so traurig und unglücklich sei, dass er es kaum noch ertrage, wonach seinem Gefühl nach die Zukunft hoffnungslos sei und er sich umbringen würde, wenn er die Gelegenheit dazu hätte (Urk. 11/46 S. 20). Weiter gingen die Gutachter auch in den folgenden Bereichen von einer Wertung von 0 Punkten aus: Sichtbare Traurigkeit, Innere Spannung, Appetitverlust, Untätigkeit und Konzentrationsschwierigkeiten. Dazu ist festzuhalten, dass die Angaben in den Bereichen "Sichtbare Traurigkeit" und "Innere Spannung" den Berichten von Dr. B._ und Dr. D._ (Urk. 11/35, 11/37) deutlich widersprechen. Auch gibt der Beschwerdeführer selber im Testverfahren SCL-90-R beziehungsweise im BDI-Test an, stark unter schlechtem Appetit zu leiden beziehungsweise überhaupt keinen Appetit mehr zu haben (Urk. 11/46/17, 11/46/21). Zudem leide er sehr stark unter Nervosität und innerem Zittern, plötzlichem Erschrecken ohne Grund und unter Konzentrationsschwierigkeiten (Urk. 11/46/17-18). Des weiteren ist seinen Antworten im letztgenannten Test zu entnehmen, dass er überhaupt keine Entscheidungen mehr treffen könne und dass er arbeitsunfähig und zu müde sei, um etwas zu tun; er leide sehr stark unter Energielosigkeit oder Verlangsamung in den Bewegungen oder im Denken (Urk. 11/46/17, 11/46/21). Zu den Gründen, weshalb all diese Äusserungen unbeachtet bleiben, äussern sich die Gutachter nicht. Immerhin scheinen sie das Vorhandensein von Schlafstörungen und gewissen Ängsten anzuerkennen (Urk. 11/46/8-10). Wenn sie diese aber - ohne nähere, einer fachärztlichen Begutachten angemessene Auseinandersetzung mit der Symptomatik oder der Glaubwürdigkeit der Angaben des Beschwerdeführers in den verschiedenen Testverfahren - kurzerhand auf äussere Faktoren, die von ihm geschilderten schwierigen Wohnverhältnissen mit Drogenhandel, Gewalt und Lärm, zurückführen (Urk. 11/46/10), so mutet dies äusserst laienhaft an und stellt dies den Beweiswert des Gutachtens vollends in Frage. Insgesamt erscheint das Gutachten von Dr. A._ und Dr. Z._ somit nicht schlüssig und überzeugend, so dass nicht darauf abgestellt werden kann. Da auch der neuste Bericht von Dr. B._, der behandelnden Psychiaterin vom 8. August 2006 mangels Angaben zur Arbeitsfähigkeit und angesichts der auftragsrechtlichen Vertrauensstellung dieser Ärztin (vgl. BGE 125 V 353 Erw. 3b/cc) keine Entscheidungsgrundlage darstellt, erscheint eine erneute, nunmehr fachgerechte psychiatrische Begutachtung des Beschwerdeführers unumgänglich, wozu die Sache an die Beschwerdegegnerin zurückzuweisen ist. Bei diesem Ausgang des Verfahrens kann offen bleiben, ob das Gutachten von Dr. A._ und Dr. Z._ auch an weiteren Mängeln leidet (Frage des Dolmetschers). Unabhängig davon ist aber entsprechend den Ausführungen des Vertreters des Beschwerdeführers festzuhalten, dass gerade für die Erstellung eines psychiatrischen Gutachtens die Rolle des Dolmetschers als direkte Ansprechperson von erheblicher Bedeutung ist. 3. Zusammenfassend führt dies zur Aufhebung der angefochtenen Verfügung sowie zur Rückweisung der Sache an die Beschwerdegegnerin. 4. Da es im vorliegenden Verfahren um die Bewilligung oder Verweigerung von IV-Leistungen geht, ist das Verfahren kostenpflichtig. Die Gerichtskosten sind nach dem Verfahrensaufwand und unabhängig vom Streitwert festzulegen (Art. 69 Abs. 1 bis IVG in der seit dem 1. Juli 2006 in Kraft stehenden Fassung) und auf Fr. 800.-- anzusetzen. Entsprechend dem Ausgang des Verfahrens sind sie der Beschwerdegegnerin aufzuerlegen. 5. Die Rückweisung einer Sache kommt einem Obsiegen des Beschwerdeführers gleich (Zünd, Kommentar zum Gesetz über das Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich, Zürich 1998, N 9 zu § 34 GSVGer, mit Judikaturhinweisen). Ausgangsgemäss ist die Beschwerdegegnerin demnach zu verpflichten, dem unentgeltlichen Rechtsbeistand eine angemessene Prozessentschädigung zu bezahlen, welche in Anwendung von Art. 61 lit. g ATSG in Verbindung mit § 34 GSVGer, namentlich unter Berücksichtigung der Bedeutung der Streitsache und der Schwierigkeit des Prozesses sowie nach Einsicht in die Honorarnote vom 10. August 2009 zu bemessen ist. Dazu ist anzumerken, dass die Eingabe an die Beschwerdegegnerin (gegen den Vorbescheid) im vorliegenden Verfahren nicht zu vergüten ist (Urk. 16), was zu einem hier entschädigungspflichtigen Stundentotal von 6 Stunden und 40 Minuten führt. Die Entschädigung beläuft sich somit auf Fr. 1'433.25 (inklusive Barauslagen und Mehrwertsteuer). Das Gericht erkennt: 1. Die Beschwerde wird in dem Sinne gutgeheissen, dass die angefochtene Verfügung vom 27. Dezember 2007 aufgehoben und die Sache an die SVA, IV-Stelle, zurückgewiesen wird, damit diese, nach erfolgter Abklärung im Sinne der Erwägungen, über den Rentenanspruch des Beschwerdeführers neu verfüge. 2. Die Gerichtskosten von Fr. 800.-- werden der Beschwerdegegnerin auferlegt. Rechnung und Einzahlungsschein werden der Kostenpflichtigen nach Eintritt der Rechtskraft zugestellt. 3. Die Beschwerdegegnerin wird verpflichtet, dem unentgeltlichen Rechtsvertreter des Beschwerdeführers, Rechtsanwalt Peter Bolzli, eine Prozessentschädigung von Fr. 1'433.25 (inklusive Barauslagen und Mehrwertsteuer) zu bezahlen. 4. Zustellung gegen Empfangsschein an: - Rechtsanwalt Peter Bolzli - Sozialversicherungsanstalt des Kantons Zürich, IV-Stelle - Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen sowie an: - Gerichtskasse (im Dispositiv nach Eintritt der Rechtskraft) 5. Gegen diesen Entscheid kann innert 30 Tagen seit der Zustellung beim Bundesgericht Beschwerde eingereicht werden (Art. 82 ff. in Verbindung mit Art. 90 ff. des Bundesgesetzes über das Bundesgericht, BGG). Die Frist steht während folgender Zeiten still: vom siebten Tag vor Ostern bis und mit dem siebten Tag nach Ostern, vom 15. Juli bis und mit 15. August sowie vom 18. Dezember bis und mit dem 2. Januar (Art. 46 BGG). Die Beschwerdeschrift ist dem Bundesgericht, Schweizerhofquai 6, 6004 Luzern, zuzustellen. Die Beschwerdeschrift hat die Begehren, deren Begründung mit Angabe der Beweismittel und die Unterschrift des Beschwerdeführers oder seines Vertreters zu enthalten; der angefochtene Entscheid sowie die als Beweismittel angerufenen Urkunden sind beizulegen, soweit die Partei sie in Händen hat (Art. 42 BGG).
en	wikipedia	N/A	The Cocoanuts is a musical with music and lyrics by Irving Berlin and a book by George S. Kaufman, with additional text by Morrie Ryskind. Background The Cocoanuts was written for the Marx Brothers after the success of their hit Broadway revue I'll Say She Is (1924). The Cocoanuts is set against the backdrop of the 1920s Florida Land Boom, which was followed by the inevitable bust. Groucho is a hotel proprietor, land impresario, and con man, assisted and hampered by two inept grifters, Chico and Harpo, and the ultra-rational hotel assistant, Zeppo. Groucho pursues a wealthy dowager ripe for a swindle, played by the dignified Margaret Dumont. Produced by Sam H. Harris, the musical was given a tryout in Boston on October 26, 1925, then Philadelphia. The Broadway run opened at the Lyric Theatre on December 8, 1925 and closed on August 7, 1926 after 276 performances. The production was directed by Oscar Eagle, with musical staging by Sammy Lee. After the Broadway closing, the brothers took the show on tour. On June 10, 1926, four new songs and other changes were introduced in the show. The new version, referred to as the "1926 Summer Edition", featured the Brox Sisters, who sang the songs originally assigned to the character of Penelope. A brief Broadway revival played at the Century Theatre from May 16, 1927 to May 28, 1927 with the same creative team. The more famous film adaptation was released by Paramount Pictures in 1929, soon after the addition of synchronized sound permitted talking movies. Synopsis Act 1 Scene 1 – Lobby of The Cocoanuts, a hotel in Cocoanut Beach, Florida. The hotel guests love Florida, but not the hotel. Eddie, a bellhop, asks Jamison, a hotel desk clerk, when the staff will get paid. Jamison gives an evasive response and suggests that he ask Mr. Schlemmer, the hotel owner. Harvey Yates enters, followed shortly by Mrs. Potter. Mrs. Potter wants her daughter, Polly, to marry Harvey, since she has known his family for a long time. She exits as Penelope Martin enters. Penelope and Harvey know each other from their backgrounds in thievery. Penelope suggests to Harvey that he can strike it rich by marrying Polly, since Mrs. Potter has millions of dollars. Polly soon enters and makes it clear that she is romantically interested in Bob Adams, an architecture student who is currently the chief clerk of the hotel. But Mrs. Potter won't allow Polly to be seen with Bob. She comments, "One who clerks, Polly, is a clerk. And that settles it." After Mrs. Potter exits, Polly laments the restrictions placed on her ("Family Reputation"). The owner of the hotel, Henry W. Schlemmer, enters, and the bellboys go after him asking for their wages. Through fast double-talk he is able to distract them and send them on their way. He has his eyes on Mrs. Potter, trying unsuccessfully to convince her to buy the hotel. Meanwhile, Bob and Polly discuss their predicament. He has a plan to build housing on a particular lot in Cocoanut Manor. The bellhops try to convince Bob that he's fortunate ("Lucky Boy"). Schlemmer and Jamison are at the desk discussing business when Willie the Wop and Silent Sam enter and start to wreak havoc. After they leave, Harvey and Penelope discuss how she will steal Mrs. Potter's valuable necklace later that evening. Schlemmer explains to the girls why he is a "Hit With The Ladies". Detective Hennessy enters along with Willie and Sam and explains that he's looking for two wanted men whose descriptions they fit. Although he won't do anything yet, he warns them. After they leave, Bob asks Polly whether she could live on that lot in Cocoanut Manor ("A Little Bungalow"). Scene 2 – Before the Palms. Schlemmer tries to make amorous advances toward Mrs. Potter. "I don't think you'd love me if I were poor" she says, to which Schlemmer responds "I might, but I'd keep my mouth shut." To prove his interest, he tells her about "A Little Bungalow" (reprise). Scene 3 – Two adjacent rooms in the hotel. Penelope is getting ready to steal Mrs. Potter's necklace and waits for Harvey. Meanwhile, Sam sneaks in and hides under Penelope's bed. Harvey discusses with Penelope where they will put the necklace. He suggests a hollow tree stump on Cocoanut Manor and draws a map. After he leaves, Penelope studies the map and throws in the garbage, but Sam immediately retrieves it, unseen. As Penelope tries to enter Mrs. Potter's room, she and Mrs. Potter have to contend with a series of encounters with Schlemmer, Willie and Hennessey. Penelope finally succeeds in stealing the necklace and re-enters her own room, proclaiming "Alone at last," not realizing that Sam is still under the bed. Scene 4 – Before the Palms. The guests extol "Florida By The Sea". Meanwhile, Schlemmer explains to Willie how to bid in the upcoming property auction. After much misunderstanding, Willie agrees. Scene 5 – Cocoanut Manor. Frances Williams and the guest await the auction ("Monkey Doodle-Doo"). Schlemmer begins the auction. He starts the bidding, but Willie bids against himself. Lot after lot is "sold" to Willie, who seems to keep bidding higher and higher against his own bids. Finally Schlemmer reaches Lot 26, which is both the lot where Bob wants to build his house and the lot containing the hollow tree stump where Penelope and Harvey are hiding Mrs. Potter's stolen necklace. Bidding between Bob and Harvey becomes fierce. Willie knocks out Harvey, and Bob wins the auction for Lot 26. Just then, Mrs. Potter proclaims that her necklace has been stolen. Hennessey steps forward and tries to investigate. Sam produces the necklace from the hollow tree stump. Harvey suggests that Bob must know something about the necklace, since he won the lot in an auction. Penelope steps forward and fabricates a story in which she teases Bob for stealing the necklace. That's enough for Hennessey, who arrests Bob and takes him away. Mrs. Potter then announces the engagement of Harvey to Polly, to be celebrated with a dinner at the hotel that night. All exit except Polly who is left crying. Sam consoles Polly but winks at the audience. Act 2 Scene 1 – The Lounge of the hotel. Penelope and the guests have "Five O'Clock Tea". Polly asks Schlemmer for 2,000 dollars to get Bob out of jail. Schlemmer humorously discusses this with Willie and Sam, and eventually Mrs. Potter, without telling her what the money is for. Everyone dances ("They're Blaming the Charleston"). Harvey and Penelope worry about the map he drew, which would implicate them in the robbery. Willie enters, and they realize he has the map. They leave, and Schlemmer enters with Bob, whom he got out of jail for nineteen hundred dollars – "They had a sale," he explains. Willie shows Bob the map, and Bob realizes that the map is evidence. That makes him feel better, and together with Polly, they comment, "We Should Care". Mrs. Potter enters with Schlemmer to discuss the engagement dinner. Hennessey is conducting an investigation, hampered by Willie, Sam and Schlemmer. He asks to hear from Penelope ("Minstrel Days"). Hennessey continues the investigation, but Willie and Sam take his shirt. Hennessey wonders what happened to his shirt. Scene 2 – Before the Palms. Schlemmer introduces a musical specialty number played by the De Marcos, who he describes as not being Spaniards, but Span-Yids (i.e. Jewish musicians). Scene 3 – The Patio of the hotel. Penelope dances a tango ("Spain"). After agreement with Bob, Polly suggests to Harvey that they elope at midnight at Cocoanut Manor, and Harvey agrees. But since Polly doesn't know where it is, she gets Harvey to draw a map of how to get there. She thanks him, takes the map, and leaves. As more guests enter for dinner, Hennessey laments his lost shirt ("The Tale of a Shirt"; the melody combines the Habanera and Toreador song from Carmen). As master of ceremonies, Schlemmer makes a speech concerning the engagement of Harvey to Polly. He then introduces Mrs. Potter, who makes a few short remarks interrupted by constant interjections by Schlemmer, Willie and Sam. Harvey makes a short speech. Then Willie plays a piano number, followed by Sam playing the harp. Polly dashes in and proclaims that she has new evidence, showing the map that Harvey drew for her alongside the one he drew for Penelope. Hennessey sees for himself that the handwriting is identical. Bob enters and says that a millionaire from Miami wants to buy Cocoanut Manor, which will enable him to realize his architectural dreams. Polly shows the maps to her mother, who announces a "slight change" – that Polly will be engaged to Bob Adams. Everyone rejoices ("A Little Bungalow" reprise). Note: In the original script, Schlemmer, Willie, and Sam are identified as Julius, Chico and Harpo. Songs Act 1 Opening: The Guests - Jamison, Cocoanut Grove Girls, Boys Opening: The Bellhops - Eddie, 16 Stepping Bellhops Family Reputation - Polly, Cocoanut Grove Beauties Lucky Boy - Bob, Boys Why Am I a Hit with the Ladies? - Schlemmer, Girls A Little Bungalow - Bob, Polly, Cocoanut Grove Boys and Girls A Little Bungalow (reprise) - Schlemmer Florida by the Sea - Jamison, Cocoanut Grove Boys and Girls Monkey Doodle-Do - Frances Williams, Ensemble Finale: Lucky Boy (reprise) A Little Bungalow (reprise) - The Entire Company Act 2 Opening: Tea Dance - The Eight Teat Girls Five O'Clock Tea - Cocoanut Grove Ensemble; specialty dance by Antonio and Nina de Marco They're Blaming the Charleston - Frances Williams, Antonio and Nina de Marco, and Charleston Girls We Should Care - Bob, Polly, Eddie, Speer, Ensemble Minstrel Days - Penelope, Company Specialty - De Marco Orchestra Spain (Tango Melody) - Penelope; specialty dance by Antonio and Nina de Marco The Tale of a Shirt - Hennessy, Company piano specialty - Willie (Chico) harp specialty - Silent Sam (Harpo) Finale: A Little Bungalow (reprise) - Entire Company Characters and original cast Jamison, the desk clerk of The Cocoanuts, a hotel in Coconut Grove, Miami, Florida – Zeppo Marx Eddie, a bellhop – Georgie Hale Mrs. Potter, mother of Polly, a guest at the hotel – Margaret Dumont Penelope Martin, a confidence woman, accomplice of Harvey – Janet Velie Harvey Yates, a swindler, friend to Penelope - Henry Wittmore Polly Potter, daughter of Mrs. Potter, in love with Bob – Mabel Withee Robert Adams, a young architect, in love with Polly – Jack Barker Henry W. Schlemmer, the cynical, wise-cracking manager of The Cocoanuts hotel – Groucho Marx Willie the Wop, Italian-sounding thief – Chico Marx Silent Sam, mute thief, friend and partner of Willie – Harpo Marx Hennessey, a police Detective – Basil Ruysdael Frances Williams – Herself (Frances Williams) Differences between musical and 1929 film In addition to abridging the play for the film, there are a number of other differences: Groucho's character of "Henry Schlemmer" in the play, is renamed "Mr. Hammer" in the film. Chico and Harpo's own first names are assigned to their characters in the film's opening titles but not spoken aloud in the film. Chico is referred to as "Signor Pastrami" by both Groucho and Margaret Dumont in the film. "Wop" is an Italian ethnic slur, dropped for the film, although Chico retains his fake Italian accent, as he would throughout his career. (Note: Several times during the film, Groucho begins to call Chico "Ravelli" but stops himself; the Marxes were performing Animal Crackers on Broadway at the same time they were filming The Cocoanuts; Chico's character was "Ravelli" in that show.) The role of Penelope is more sharply characterized as a villain in the film; in the musical, she sings two songs which would detract somewhat from her role as a confidence woman. Florida by the Sea was made the opening musical number in the film. After musical numbers, the play opens with a sequence of dialogues between Eddie, Jamison, Mrs. Potter, Harvey, and Polly to establish their characters. These were all eliminated for the film, where the plot begins with the entrance of Mr. Hammer (Schlemmer). The larger role of Eddie, the bellhop from the show, is reduced to just a few lines at the beginning of the film. Harpo's harp specialty number was removed from the final scene of the film. Instead he plays a clarinet reprise of When My Dreams Come True, heard earlier in the film. The frequently reprised song A Little Bungalow was dropped from the film and was replaced by When My Dreams Come True. The melody of the verse of the latter song is derived from another song, We Should Care (which was also eliminated for the film). Off-Broadway revival and regional performances The Cocoanuts opened in June 1996 at the American Jewish Theatre in New York City, with Michael McGrath, Peter Slutsker and Robert Sapoff as Groucho, Chico and Harpo Marx respectively. It transferred Off-Broadway to the American Place Theatre on August 15, 1996 before closing on January 5, 1997 with Frank Ferrante starring as Groucho from October 1996 to closing in January 1997. The Oregon Shakespeare Festival staged a revival of The Coconauts in their 2014 season, adapting the original libretto and score with additional material from other Marx Brothers projects. In July 2018, The Cocoanuts was presented at the Heritage Theatre Festival in Charlottesville at the University of Virginia with Frank Ferrante reprising his role as Groucho, with Matt Roper and Seth Shelden joining as Chico and Harpo. References Sources The Cocoanuts : a musical comedy in two acts - original script in the Princeton University library; photocopy in the Billy Rose Theatre Collection of The New York Public Library for the Performing Arts. Krasker, Tommy. Catalog of the American musical : musicals of Irving Berlin, George & Ira Gershwin, Cole Porter, Richard Rodgers & Lorenz Hart. ([Washington, D.C.] : National Institute for Opera and Musical Theater, 1988. Stubblebine, Donald J. Broadway Sheet Music: A Comprehensive Listing of Published Music From Broadway and Other Stage Shows, 1918-1993. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1996. External links IBDB listing for the original Broadway production IBDB listing for the 1927 Broadway revival Lyric Theatre program and information - marx-brothers.org The Cocoanuts - Reviews - whyaduck Robert Wilfred Franson 2004 The Cocoanuts (1929) Film Review Musicals by Irving Berlin 1925 musicals Broadway musicals Musicals set in the Roaring Twenties Original musicals Marx Brothers Plays set in Florida Works set in hotels
sv	wikipedia	N/A	De tio budorden () är en amerikansk biblisk episk film i färg från 1956 i regi av Cecil B. DeMille. Detta var hans första film i vidfilmsformat och hans sista film. Filmen är en nyinspelning av DeMilles tidigare stumfilm med samma namn från 1923. I denna nya version lät ljudfilmen DeMille fokusera på dialog och drama. Den hade biopremiär i USA den 5 oktober 1956 och svensk premiär den 26 november 1960. Handling Filmen handlar om Moses och uttåget ur Egypten. Medverkande (urval) Charlton Heston – Moses Yul Brynner – Ramses II Anne Baxter – Nefretiri Edward G. Robinson – Dathan Yvonne De Carlo – Sippora Debra Paget – Lilia John Derek – Josua Sir Cedric Hardwicke – Sethi Nina Foch – Bithiah Martha Scott – Yoshebel Judith Anderson – Memnet Vincent Price – Baka John Carradine – Aron Olive Deering – Mirjam Babette Bain – Lilla Mirjam Douglass Dumbrille – Jannes Frank de Kova – Abiram Henry Wilcoxon – Pentaur Eduard Franz – Jetro Donald Curtis – Mered Lawrence Dobkin – Hur Ben Caleb H. B. Warner – Amminadab Julia Faye – Elisheba Lisa Mitchell – Jetros dotter (Lulua) Noelle Williams – Jetros dotter Joanna Merlin – Jetros dotter Pat Richard – Jetros dotter Joyce Vanderveen – Jetros dotter Diane Hall – Jetros dotter Abbas El Boughdadly – Rameses körsven Mimi Gibson – Liten flicka Fraser Heston – Moses som bebis John Miljan – Den blinde Francis J. McDonald – Simon Ian Keith – Ramses I Paul De Rolf – Eleazar Woodrow Strode – Kungen av Etiopien Tommy Duran – Gershom Eugene Mazzola – Rameses son Ramsay Hill – Korah Joan Woodbury – Korahs fru Esther Brown – Prinsessan Tharbis Referenser Noter Vidare läsning Se även Prinsen av Egypten Exodus: Gods and Kings Externa länkar Production design drawings for THE TEN COMMANDMENTS, Margaret Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Costume design drawings for THE TEN COMMANDMENTS, Margaret Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Filmer 1956 Filmer baserade på Bibeln Amerikanska dramafilmer Filmer i regi av Cecil B. DeMille Engelskspråkiga filmer Forntidens Egypten på film Amerikanska episka filmer 1200-talet f.Kr. på film Filmer bevarade i National Film Registry Slaveri på film Kulturella återgivningar av Mose Filmer från Paramount Pictures
fr	other	N/A	2D_72/2015 14.12.2015 2D_72/2015 Par arrêt du 3 novembre 2015, la Cour de justice du canton de Genève a rejeté le recours que A.X.________, B.X.________, C.X.________, D.X.________, ressortissants chiliens, ont déposé contre le jugement du Tribunal administratif de première instance du canton de Genève du 10 septembre 2014 confirmant le refus de l'Office cantonal de la population et des migrants du 23 juillet 2014 de leur accorder une autorisation de séjour pour cas de rigueur. Agissant par la voie du recours constitutionnel subsidiaire, A.X.________, B.X.________, C.X.________, D.X.________ demandent au Tribunal fédéral d'annuler l'arrêt rendu le 13 novembre 2015 par la Cour de justice du canton de Genève et de leur délivrer une autorisation de séjour pour cas de rigueur. Ils se plaignent de la violation de l'interdiction de l'arbitraire dans l'application de l'art. 30 LEtr. Ils demandent l'effet suspensif. Selon l'art. 83 let. c de la loi du 17 juin 2005 sur le Tribunal fédéral (LTF; RS 173.110), le recours en matière de droit public est irrecevable contre les décisions en matière de droit des étrangers qui concernent les dérogations aux conditions d'admission (ch. 5), parmi lesquelles figurent celles qui concernent les cas individuels d'une extrême gravité de l'art. 30 al. 1 let. b LEtr, dont la formulation potestative ("peut") ne leur confère du reste aucun droit. C'est donc à juste titre que les recourants ont déposé un recours constitutionnel subsidiaire (art. 113 ss LTF) pour violation des droits constitutionnels (art. 116 LTF). La qualité pour former un recours constitutionnel subsidiaire suppose un intérêt juridique à l'annulation ou à la modification de la décision attaquée (art. 115 let. b LTF). Les recourants ne peuvent toutefois se prévaloir d'aucune norme du droit fédéral ou du droit international leur accordant un droit à une autorisation de séjour (cf. consid. 3 ci-dessus) ni invoquer de manière indépendante l'interdiction de l'arbitraire. Par conséquent, sous cet angle, ils n'ont pas une position juridique protégée qui leur confère la qualité pour agir au fond (ATF 133 I 185). Le recours est ainsi manifestement irrecevable (art. 108 al. 1 let. a LTF) et doit être traité selon la procédure simplifiée de l'art. 108 LTF, sans qu'il y ait lieu d'ordonner un échange d'écritures. La requête d'effet suspensif est ainsi devenue sans objet. Succombant, les recourants doivent supporter les frais de la procédure judiciaire devant le Tribunal fédéral solidairement entre eux (art. 66 al. 1 et 5LTF). Il n'est pas alloué de dépens (art. 68 al. 1 et 4 LTF). Le présent arrêt est communiqué au mandataire des recourants, à l'Office cantonal de la population et des migrations, à la Cour de justice de la République et canton de Genève, Chambre administrative, ainsi qu'au Secrétariat d'Etat aux migrations.
en	wikipedia	N/A	South Morang is a suburb of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 21 km north-east of Melbourne's central business district, located within the City of Whittlesea local government area. South Morang recorded a population of 24,989 at the 2021 census. Originally known as Morang South, South Morang grew from a country area on the outskirts of Melbourne in the late 1990s/early 2000s to a suburban area with new estates being developed. History Before the arrival of European explorers and farmers, the area now called South Morang was inhabited by the Wurundjeri balug and Wurundjeri Willam clans. South Morang was originally known as 'Morang South' until Morang itself was renamed by the locals to Yan Yean South in 1893 - as it is the suburb lying directly below Yan Yean. ‘Morang’ is an ancient aboriginal word meaning ‘sky’ or ‘cloud’. In 1824, William Hovell and Hamilton Hume were the first Europeans to set foot in what is now the City of Whittlesea when they were going from Sydney to Port Philip Bay. On 14 December 1824, they wrote in their journals: ''Having passed through the first plain... myself and Mr Hume ascended a high but single hill. In front from which we saw a very gratifying sight. This was a very extensive plain extending from west to south east for several miles with patches of forest which appear to separate one plain from another. But the whole appeared in front, say south, to be level but in parts in the plains some hills arose of a conical shape, with only here and there a few trees upon them. And all the soil of best quality. The description showed that the land was good for farming, and it was settled by John Batman's pastoral group in the 1830s. Robert Hoddle surveyed the land in 1837. The land failed to sell at first and was opened to pastoral leases. It was leased by William Forlonge in 1846. By 1840, the area was owned by rich landowners. By the 1850s, the area was used for farming. Much evidence of the farming, such as dry stone walls, can still be seen today. In 1852, William Ford Cleeland bought 256 hectares and sundivided and sold the land, doubling his money. Individual land holdings have decreased in size over time. Morang South Post Office opened on 24 November 1873. The post office has now moved to Westfield Plenty Valley. The railway from Melbourne to here was finished in 1889. The old South Morang railway station served the Whittlesea steam railway line until the 1950s. It was further north than the current station. Facilities Mill Park Library is the nearest public library and is managed by Yarra Plenty Regional Library. The South Morang Farmers & Makers Market was launched in May 2019. Carome Homestead is home to Two Beans and a Farm cafe and the Mernda Community Garden at Carome. Today South Morang's ethnically diverse surrounding suburbs (such as Mill Park and Epping) have added to its ethnic diversity as residents of those suburbs move to South Morang. The most common ancestries in South Morang (According to the 2016 census) were Australian born 17.0%, English 16.3%, Italian 12.8%, Indian 6.2% and Macedonian 5.4%. South Morang is also home to many sites of historical and cultural significance and figures, such as Farm Vigano and Le Page Homestead at Plenty Gorge Park The Lakes South Morang P-9 School opened in 2007. Transport South Morang is served by South Morang, Middle Gorge, and Hawkstowe railway stations, all of which are located on the Mernda railway line. The suburb is also served by numerous bus routes. Sport South Morang Football Club, an Australian rules football team, competes in the Northern Football League and are based at Mill Park Lakes. Brownlow medallist Kevin Murray played football for South Morang after his retirement from the AFL. It is also home to the Northern District Softball Association with multiple clubs playing at its site in Mill Park. External links Two Beans and a Farm References Suburbs of Melbourne Suburbs of the City of Whittlesea
de	legislation	EU	Avis juridique important \| 31982D0083 82/83/EWG: Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. Dezember 1981, mit der festgestellt wird, daß das Gerät ,,Quanta Ray Nd : Yag laboratory laser system, model DCR-1A' ' nicht unter Befreiung von den Zöllen des Gemeinsamen Zolltarifs eingeführt werden kann Amtsblatt Nr. L 041 vom 12/02/1982 S. 0050 - 0050 ***** ENTSCHEIDUNG DER KOMMISSION vom 23. Dezember 1981, mit der festgestellt wird, daß das Gerät »Quanta Ray Nd: Yag laboratory laser system, model DCR-1A" nicht unter Befreiung von den Zöllen des Gemeinsamen Zolltarifs eingeführt werden kann (82/83/EWG) DIE KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN - gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, gestützt auf die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1798/75 des Rates vom 10. Juli 1975 über die von den Zöllen des Gemeinsamen Zolltarifs befreite Einfuhr von Gegenständen erzieherischen, wissenschaftlichen oder kulturellen Charakters (1), geändert durch die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1027/79 (2), gestützt auf die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2784/79 der Kommission vom 12. Dezember 1979 zur Festlegung der Durchführungsvorschriften zu der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1798/75 (3), insbesondere auf Artikel 7, in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: Deutschland hat mit Schreiben an die Kommission vom 19. Juni 1981 die Einleitung des in Artikel 7 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2784/79 vorgesehenen Verfahrens beantragt, um festzustellen, ob das Gerät »Quanta Ray Nd: Yag laboratory laser system, model DCR-1A", das zur Untersuchung chemilumineszenter Atomreaktionen und insbesondere zur Deaktivierung von angeregten Jodatomen durch chemisches und physikalisches Quentschen, zur Bildung von angeregten Jodmolekülen und zur Beobachtung der Chemilumineszenz verwendet werden soll, wissenschaftlichen Charakter besitzt und wenn ja, ob zur Zeit Geräte von gleichem wissenschaftlichem Wert in der Gemeinschaft hergestellt werden. Am 15. Dezember 1981 ist gemäß Artikel 7 Absatz 5 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2784/79 eine aus Vertretern aller Mitgliedstaaten bestehende Sachverständigengruppe im Rahmen des Ausschusses für Zollbefreiungen zur Prüfung dieses Falles zusammengetreten. Diese Prüfung hat ergeben, daß es sich um einen Laser handelt. Aufgrund seiner objektiven technischen Merkmale wie insbesondere der hohen Strahlqualität sowie seines Verwendungszwecks ist dieses Gerät für die wissenschaftliche Forschung besonders geeignet. Ausserdem werden vergleichbare Geräte überwiegend zur Durchführung wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten verwendet. Das Gerät ist somit als wissenschaftliches Gerät anzusehen. Nach Auskunft der Mitgliedstaaten werden jedoch in der Gemeinschaft zur Zeit Geräte von gleichem wissenschaftlichem Wert, die zu den gleichen Zwecken verwendet werden können, hergerstellt. Dies gilt insbesondere für das Gerät »Laser à Yag 10 Hz" der Firma »Quantel, 17, avenü de l'Atlantique, Z.I. 91400 Orsay/France" - HAT FOLGENDE ENTSCHEIDUNG ERLASSEN: Artikel 1 Das Gerät »Quanta Ray Nd: Yag laboratory laser system, model DCR-1A", das Gegenstand des Antrags Deutschlands vom 19. Juni 1981 ist, kann nicht unter Befreiung von den Zöllen des Gemeinsamen Zolltarifs eingeführt werden. Artikel 2 Diese Entscheidung ist an alle Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet. Brüssel, den 23. Dezember 1981 Für die Kommission Karl-Heinz NARJES Mitglied der Kommission (1) ABl. Nr. L 184 vom 15. 7. 1975, S. 1. (2) ABl. Nr. L 134 vom 31. 5. 1979, S. 1. (3) ABl. Nr. L 318 vom 13. 12. 1979, S. 32.
es	wikipedia	N/A	Nirvana es el quinto álbum de estudio de la cantante rumana Inna, lanzado el 11 de diciembre de 2017 por Global Records y UMG en conjunto con la cadena de supermercados Lidl. Para este disco, ella colaboró con varios productores, entre ellos Marcel Botezan, Sebastian Barac, Thomas Troelsen, Alex Cotoi y Vlad Lucan. Fue grabado en su totalidad en los estudios de Global Records en Bucarest, Rumania. Nirvana ha sido descrito como un álbum pop, con influencias que van desde la música EDM, el reguetón y el R&B hasta la música latina y tropical. Tras su lanzamiento, el álbum ha recibido reseñas positivas por parte de los críticos de música, quienes elogiaron a Inna por mostrar su versatilidad como artista, mientras que otros criticaron algunas canciones por carecer de innovación; similar a su material anterior. Para promover Nirvana, tres sencillos, «Gimme Gimme», «Ruleta» y «Nirvana», fueron lanzados en 2017, logrando éxito comercial en algunos países europeos. Antecedentes En abril de 2017, se anunció que Inna estaba trabajando con el DJ español Sak Noel, que previamente había remezclado su sencillo «Gimme Gimme» (2016). Las publicaciones también informaron que la cantante estaba trabajando en un próximo quinto álbum de estudio con el productor David Ciente y la cantante Irina Rimes, respectivamente. El 23 de noviembre de 2017, el título del disco y su portada se dieron a conocer durante una publicación en la cuenta oficial de Inna en Instagram. Durante una publicación en su blog, Inna explicó el nombre del disco: «Nirvana para mí tiene un significado muy simple. Significa 'cool', ¡porque mi nuevo álbum es reeeealmente genial! [...] Mi Nirvana es mi familia y mi equipo, cuando [...] actúo en el escenario y veo sus caras felices, [y] la música y la gente feliz. Mi esperanza para este álbum es ayudarte a encontrar alegría y tranquilidad en este caos llamado vida. ¡Aunque sea solo un poquito! Eso es Nirvana!» Entre los productores de Nirvana incluyen a Marcel Botezan, Sebastian Barac, Thomas Troelsen, Alex Cotoi y Vlad Lucan. Fue grabado en su totalidad en los estudios de Global Records en Bucarest, Rumania. La lista de canciones del álbum se reveló a través de Facebook el 27 de noviembre de 2017. Nirvana fue lanzado en Rumania el 11 de diciembre de 2017 por Global Records y UMG, junto con la cadena de supermercados Lidl. La edición japonesa del álbum se estrenó en septiembre de 2018, y también incluye la colaboración de Inna con Alexandra Stan y Daddy Yankee, «We Wanna» (2015). En 2020, la intérprete estrenó la edición completa del disco a través de SoundCloud, que incluye los sencillos «Heaven» (2016) y «No Help» (2018), así como el sencillo promocional, «Say It with Your Body» (2016). Composición Nirvana es un álbum de pop. Empieza con la colaboración de Inna con el cantante rumano Erik en «Ruleta», que es una canción EDM en inglés y español, con influencias del reguetón con toques de música india y caribeña. La segunda pista, «Gimme Gimme», es una canción pop con influencias de la música gitana e india. Una porción de la canción del grupo británico Touch and Go, «Would you ...?» (1998), fue usada para la tercera pista del álbum, «My Dreams». «Tropical», la cuarta canción de Nirvana, presenta una trompeta en su instrumentación junto con voces masculinas sin acreditar acompañadas con música reggae. Jonathan Currinn de CelebMix señaló la canción como una de las más destacadas del álbum. Partes de la canción del pop tropical «Hands Up» muestran la voz en falsetto de Inna, y sus letras abarcan temas de amor y contienen varias metáforas, mientras que «Nirvana» es una canción club con influencia latina acompañada con una porción de rap entregada en español durante su coro. La canción con elementos de R&B, «Don't Mind», presenta letras tanto en inglés como en español, y es sucedida por «Lights», una pista con influencias de la música africana. Currinn escribió que la canción le permitió a Inna mostrar su versatilidad como artista. Comparó «Lights» con «La Fuega» de la artista rumana Alexandra Stan de su tercer álbum de estudio Alesta (2016), escribiendo: «[será] una canción polarizada; a algunas personas les encantará, algunas personas la odiaran.» Raluca Chirilă de InfoMusic consideró la pista para un lanzamiento único e independiente. Nirvana termina con la canción de pop tropical «Dream About the Ocean», que «tiene un estilo de ola oceánica» y cuyas letras tratan sobre la confianza con uno mismo, y las baladas en idioma rumano «Nota de plată», con el proyecto rumano The Motans, «Cum ar fi?» y «Tu și eu», con la banda moldava Carla's Dreams. Recepción Tras su lanzamiento, Nirvana ha recibido reseñas generalmente positivas por parte de los críticos de música. Currinn de CelebMix le dio una crítica positiva y pensó que «cada pista es asombrosa pero diferente en sí misma». Continuó comparando la pista del álbum «Hands Up» con «Endless» (2011), «Nirvana» con «Bop Bop» (2015) y «Heaven» (2016), «Don't Mind» con el material de la cantante barbadense Rihanna, y «Dream About the Ocean» con «Walking on the Sun», canción de Inna de su álbum de estudio homónimo. Currinn elogió a la mayoría del material del disco como aspectos destacados, y concluyó: «Este álbum es completo; es una gran colección de pistas, que realmente muestran la versatilidad de Inna como artista. Ella realmente aturde a todos». Un editor del sitio web francés Just Focus elogió las pistas del álbum, seleccionando algunas de ellas como destacables, aunque criticó la falta de originalidad de otras canciones, escribiendo: «El resto es verdaderamente material reciclado de los trabajos antiguos de Inna sin ninguna originalidad. Este es el momento de evolucionar, como lo hacen la mayoría de los artistas ahora, incluyendo a Lady Gaga, Rihanna, Kesha, etc. La música de Inna siempre será bienvenida, pero su uso de la misma fórmula no es suficiente, especialmente en un período actual en el que los artistas se centran más en la innovación». Promoción Tres sencillos precedieron a Nirvana en 2017 («Gimme Gimme», «Ruleta» y «Nirvana») al éxito comercial en países de Europa, incluyendo Rumania y Turquía. «Ruleta» notablemente alcanzó el puesto número tres en su país natal, el número uno en Lituania, y el número cinco en Turquía. Mientras que «Gimme Gimme» apareció en el top 20 en Rumania, y «Nirvana» en el top 5 y el top 10 en Turquía Inna también ha sido incluida como artista invitada en las pistas del 2017 «Tu și eu» por Carla's Dreams, y «Nota de plată» por The Motans, que también fueron incluidas en Nirvana, junto al sencillo promocional del 2016 «Cum ar fi?». Todos los lanzamientos mencionados alcanzaron el top 60 en Rumania. Las canciones «Don't Mind», «Tropical», «Hands Up», «My Dreams», «Dream About the Ocean» y «Lights» estuvieron a su disposición para su descarga digital como sencillos promocionales a partir de diciembre de 2017 Lista de canciones Créditos «My Dreams» contiene elementos de «Would You...?» de la banda británica Touch and Go, escrita por David Lowe y producida por Lowe y Phil Cross. Lanzamiento Referencias Enlaces externos Sitio oficial de Inna (en inglés). Álbumes de 2017 Álbumes de Inna Álbumes de Global Records
pt	other	N/A	mobilidade especial nas autarquias locais - página 4 ..., o Capítulo III é especialmente dedicado à instalação e ...ários, prevendo que as autarquias possam restringir os períodos de ... competências das Autarquias Locais impõem uma atualização permanente ... garantida a segurança, a mobilidade, a tranquilidade, o ambiente e o ... ..., empenhado em potenciar a mobilidade sustentável e a prática de ... disponíveis em vários locais.Inserido num conjunto de políticas ...especial nas zonas turísticas e/ou próximas ... ..., mormente por pessoas de mobilidade condicionada; Pretende a presente ... conferido às Autarquias Locais pelo artigo 241.o da ... zonas de arruamento especialmente destinados a esse fim; b) Pelas ... ...ção de consultoria especializada em capacitar as nossas empresas para ... a preferência por produtos locais" e garantir a competitividade e inova\xC3"... promovidas pelas autarquias e ainda incubadoras temáticas. Os ..., pois tem por objetivo a mobilidade interna dos recursos humanos nos ... ...ção das vias distribuidoras locais, conforme indicadas na planta de enamento - sistema de mobilidade e transportes. Artigo 74.o [..] 1 - ...Artigo 104.o-A Regime especial" de regularização de atividade econ\xC3"... ... e competências para as autarquias locais, quer pela aplicação de ... e a coesão social, com especial enfoque nos idosos, crianças e ...ção de tarefas e a mobilidade dos recursos humanos, dentro de cada ... Edital n.o 1134/2019 ... destinadas a pessoas com mobilidade condicionada;d) "Parque Desportivo ... de estacionamento", os locais destinados ao estacionamento de ...é aplicável a legislação especial que regule a matéria.Artigo ... ... da União Europeia, com especial incidência no que se relaciona com ... necessidades das populações locais em ambientes económicos mais ... em articulação com as autarquias e com as associações regionais de ... programas que garantem a mobilidade juvenil dentro dos Açores e para ... ...ão de género nas políticas locais; d) Criar condições para uma ... da educação, cultura, mobilidade, habitação, saúde, emprego) para ... internacionais da especialidade; o) Acompanhar e promover o ... Geral das Taxas das Autarquias Locais; j) Acompanhamento em tempo ... ... vários sectores, para as autarquias locais, pressupõe uma organização ... de Urbanismo e Mobilidade (DUM); 2) Departamento de Desporto ... e saneamento e muito especial com a entidade reguladora; d) Manter ... ... de contabilidade e finanças locais; c) Assegurar a liquidação e ... um Plano Municipal de Mobilidade Sustentável; b) Valorizar o papel ... agentes económicos, em especial os que desenvolvem a sua atividade ...autarquias sempre que estas o solicitem, nos ... .../2009, de 23 de outubro, em especial no seu artigo 6.o e da Lei n.o ..., Ordenamento e Mobilidade (DPOM); v) Divisão de Cultura (DC); ...ção dos serviços das Autarquias Locais. Nos termos do proposto à ... Aviso n.o 12341/2017 ..., em regime de mobilidade interna na categoria, entre ... Vigiar os transportes urbanos locais, em coordenação com as forças de ...íficos de cidadãos especialmente de grupos mais vulneráveis; Guardar ... ... Recrutamento, Seleção, Mobilidade e Organização - SRSMO; s) Serviço ... da contabilidade e finanças locais; j) Assegurar a arrecadação das ... e financeira cabendo-lhe em especial a coordenação do exercício do ...ção e seleção das autarquias locais; h) Incorporar a ... ... iniciativas das comunidades locais e das populações. 6 - O Estado ... medidas de proteção especial dirigidas a: a) Jovens, com vista à ... condições de saúde e mobilidade, com respeito pela sua autonomia ...2 - As autarquias locais garantem a identificação ... ... com vista à criação de locais de estacionamento subterrâneo, ...ão de residente" - título especial" de estacionamento emitido pelo munic\xC3"... de deficiência com mobilidade reduzida, os residentes, ... ...ão de género nas políticas locais; d) Criar condições para uma ... da educação, cultura, mobilidade, habitação, saúde, emprego) para ... internacionais da especialidade; o) Acompanhar e promover o ... Geral das Taxas das Autarquias Locais. Artigo 52.o Gabinete de ... Aviso n.o 12928/2016 ... da Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais, de 15 de maio de 2014, ...ção internacional ou lei especial; b) Ter 18 anos de idade completos; ... Operacional em regime de mobilidade na categoria. Primeiro vogal ... ... ao domínio público das autarquias locais; r) Esplanada aberta - ... de pessoas com mobilidade reduzida; d) A qualidade das áreas ...ção de peões, especialmente dos cidadãos com mobilidade ... ... de dois técnicos especialistas de informática do grau 1, nível 2, ... da Direção-Geral das Autarquias Locais, procede-se às seguintes ... e, não se encontrando em mobilidade, ocupem postos de trabalho previstos ... Regulamento n.o 306/2018 ... conferido às autarquias locais pelo artigo 241.o da ... das pessoas que possuam mobilidade condicionada; O ordenamento do ... e sistematizada, em especial no que concerne à Vila de Melgaço, ... ... de outros fundamentos especialmente previstos no presente Código ... cultural, a paisagem, a mobilidade, o equilíbrio do espaço urbano, o ... geral das taxas das Autarquias Locais. ii) A Lei das Finanças ... ... outros resíduos fora dos locais para tal destinados;c) Instalação ... segurança, salubridade e mobilidade;c) Alterações ao relevo existente ...ções existentes, tendo em especial atenção a preservação do ...
es	other	N/A	Recurso para pedir inaplicación judicial de Orden tasas ilegal – Jiménez Shaw Abogados Inicio » Actualidad » Sin categoría » Recurso para pedir inaplicación judicial de Orden tasas ilegal P.O _______ AL JUZGADO DE PRIMER INSTANCIA No ___ DE ____ ante el Juzgado comparezco y, como mejor proceda en Derecho Que el día ____________________ha sido notificada a esta representación Diligencia de Ordenación del Sr. Secretario _____________________, en la que se requiere a la parte actora que subsane la omisión de la incorporación de la tasa en el término de 10 días, bajo apercibimiento de los previsto en el artículo 12-2 de la Orden HAP/2662/12 de 13 de diciembre del Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas. PREVIA- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. El objeto del presente escrito, dicho sea con todos los respetos y en estricto ejercicio de derecho a la defensa, es solicitar al Juzgado la inaplicación ex artículo 6 de la LOPJ, de la Orden HAP/2662/12 de 13 de diciembre del Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas por ser nula de pleno derecho. PRIMERA- SOBRE LA ENTRADA DE VIGOR DE LA LEY DE TASAS Y LA ORDEN QUE LA DESARROLLA. La Ley 10/2012 de 20 de noviembre, de Tasas Judiciales entró en vigor al día siguiente de su publicación en el BOE, es decir el 21 de noviembre de 2012. El día en que entró en vigor dicha norma, no se había dictado la Orden del Ministerio de Hacienda que regulara el pago de dicha tasa, ni formularios de autoliquidación al efecto. Es decir nos encontrábamos ante el supuesto de una Ley válida pero que no sería eficaz en tanto que no contara con el desarrollo reglamentario oportuno. El sábado 15 de diciembre de 2012, se publicó en el BOE la Orden HAP/2662/2012, de 13 de diciembre, por la que se aprueba el modelo 696 de autoliquidación, y el modelo 695 de solicitud de devolución por solución extrajudicial del litigio y por acumulación de procesos, de la tasa por el ejercicio de la potestad jurisdiccional en los órdenes civil, contenciosoadministrativo y social y se determinan el lugar, forma, plazos y los procedimientos de presentación, entrando está en vigor al día siguiente de su publicación es decir el 17 de diciembre de 2012. Esta representación procesal interpuso Demanda que inició el presente procedimiento, teniendo sello de entrada ________________ SEGUNDO- SOBRE LA MANIFIESTA ILEGALIDAD DE LA ORDEN QUE DESARROLLA LA LEY DE TASAS. La citada Orden Ministerial es una disposición administrativa general que ha de calificarse de reglamento de ejecución directa de una Ley, tal y como lo expresa el propio preámbulo: “La Orden se dicta en uso de la habilitación contenida en los artículos 8.1 y 9.2 de la Ley 10/2012, de 20 de noviembre, donde se faculta al Ministro de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas para regular los procedimientos y establecer los modelos oficiales de autoliquidación de la tasa.” Pues bien, este Reglamento de ejecución se ha dictado sin el preceptivo informe del Consejo de Estado, infringiendo de este modo el artículo 22.3 de la Ley Orgánica 3/1980, de 22 de abril, del Consejo de Estado, así como el artículo 24 de la Ley 50/1997, de 27 de noviembre del Gobierno. En refuerzo de lo anteriormente expuesto, citamos la constante doctrina del Tribunal Supremo, sobre la nulidad de las disposiciones reglamentarias, cualquiera que sea su rango, dictadas con omisión del Dictamen del Consejo de Estado, por ejemplo las de 21 septiembre 1987 (Ponente, Sr. Ruiz Pérez), de 18 de marzo de 1988 (Ponente, Sr. Jiménez Hernández), de 7 de febrero de 1989 (RJ 1.089, Ponente, Sr. Llorente Calama), de 24 de julio de 2003 rec. 1417/2000 (Ponente, Sr. Fernández Montalvo), de 23 de marzo de 2004, rec. 4469/2001 (Ponente, Sr. Martí García) etc. Así como la reciente STS de 6 de julio de 2.012, en el recurso 2/288/2.011, con Ponencia del Sr. González Rivas. Además hay falta de audiencia al Consejo General del Poder Judicial, a los Consejos Generales de Colegios de Abogados, Procuradores y Graduados Sociales, falta de información pública. De otro lado hay vicios que afectan a parte de su articulado, por ejemplo, los artículos 12 a 14, que carecen de habilitación legal, por lo que debieron aprobarse por Real Decreto; la obligación de utilizar aplicaciones informáticas e internet para pagar la tasa, sin tener en cuenta que hay procesos en que no es exigible la actuación de abogado o procurador, lo que coloca al justiciable ante la necesidad de contar con medios informáticos; o la exigencia de NIF, que dificulta y probablemente impida en muchos casos acudir en plazo a la justicia a los extranjeros Por todo lo expuesto, nos encontramos ante un Reglamento NULO de pleno derecho. En virtud del artículo 6 LOPJ los Jueces y Tribunales no están vinculados por los Reglamentos o cualquier otra disposición contraria a la Ley, y por lo tanto interesa a esta parte que no se aplique para este caso concreto la mencionada Orden HAP/2662/2012. Así las cosas, volvemos a encontrarnos ante una Ley que es válida pero ineficaz, hasta que no se dicte un Reglamento de ejecución que cumpla estrictamente con las formalidades que se exige la Ley. Por lo tanto, en el caso de que el Juzgado apreciara dicha nulidad e implicara la Orden, no procedería la autoliquidación de la tasa, pudiendo darse trámite a la demanda sin el pago de esta. TERCERO- SOBRE LA RESOLUCIÓN DEL RECURSO PLANTEADO. Esta parte es consciente de que el Secretario Judicial ha evacuado la diligencia de ordenación que ahora venimos a recurrir, en cumplimiento del artículo 12.2 de la Orden HAP/2662/2012. Dado que aquellos que pueden inaplicar un reglamento ilegal son los Jueces y Tribunales, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 6 LOPJ antes citado, solicitamos que en virtud del artículo 178.1 de la LEC se dé cuenta al Juzgador de lo contenido en el presente recurso de reposición para que sea éste quien se pronuncie expresamente al respecto. SUPLICO AL JUZGADO que tenga por realizadas las anteriores manifestaciones a los efectos legales oportunos, y a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 178.1 LEC se dé cuenta del presente recurso al Juez para que este sea quien acuerde la inaplicación de la Orden HAP/2662/2012, de 13 de diciembre, por ser nula de pleno derecho, y se admita y de trámite a la Demanda presentada el día ______________, sin que se exija la autoliquidación de la Tasa. Incendio forestal de Llutxent, Valencia, 2018. Fotografía cedida por Ferrán Dalmau IUF e incendios forestales. Regulación. I Pérez-Soba y C Jiménez Shaw El pasado 4 de mayo ha entrado en vigor una importante modificación de la Ley procesal contenciosa, aprobada por Ley 13/2009 La modificación de la Ley 29/1998, de 13 de julio, reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-administrativa por Ley 13/2009 que ha entrado en [...] Una idea sobre “Recurso para pedir inaplicación judicial de Orden tasas ilegal” 1[...] pronunciamiento de éste. (Un modelo de recurso en el que se recoge este planteamiento puede consultarse aquí). Y será... - ¿Podrían los jueces inaplicar la Orden de Tasas por ser un reglamento ilegal? \| ¿Hay Derecho? Entrada anterior EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL TAMBIÉN PODRÁ ACORDAR LA SUSPENSIÓN DE LA LEY DE TASAS ESTATAL Entrada siguiente Resumen de la STC 49/2013 sobre la Ley de Montes estatal (Ley 43/2003)
es	wikipedia	N/A	En filosofía, el conceptualismo es una doctrina que se encuentra a medio camino entre el nominalismo y el realismo. El conceptualismo mantiene que aunque los universales (abstracciones o ideas abstractas) no tienen existencia en el mundo externo, existen sin embargo como ideas o conceptos en la mente y que allí implican algo más que palabras. Esta teoría está en abierta oposición al nominalismo que defiende que los universales son simples ruidos guturales sin ninguna materialidad y que sólo los objetos individuales y concretos tienen existencia real. El conceptualismo fue adoptado por el filósofo escolástico francés Pedro Abelardo, entre otros muchos. Véase también Arte conceptual Idealismo Lógica Bibliografía Verneaux, Roger, Epistemología general o crítica del conocimiento, trad. Luisa Medrano, Herder, 1999. Doctrinas filosóficas
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Calasparra est une commune de la Région de Murcie en Espagne. Elle est traversée par la Segura et est connue pour la production de riz. Présentation Calasparra est située au Nord Ouest de la région de Murcie, dans une zone montagneuse où l’histoire et la culture se mêlent à la tradition et la nature. Calasparra bénéficie d’un riche passé, grâce notamment, à une situation géographique privilégiée. Dans une région aride, le territoire de Calasparra est parcouru par quatre cours d’eau, dont le rio Segura qui se jette dans la Méditerranée. Cette richesse aquatique a facilité l’installation de différentes civilisations tout au long de son histoire. De nombreux vestiges témoignent du passage des Romains, des Musulmans ou encore des Arabes. Le fleuve constitue surtout une ressource pour les habitants, notamment les agriculteurs locaux, qui bénéficient d’une véritable oasis, au cœur d’une région, où la rareté de l’eau en fait une richesse incommensurable. Ce mariage entre le soleil et l’eau permet la culture d’un riz de qualité, dont la renommée constitue la fierté de toute une région. Les Templiers et les Hospitaliers Calasparra a par ailleurs appartenu aux Templiers et est devenue ensuite une commanderie de l'ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem. Le riz de Calasparra Riz bomba, appellation d'origine protégée « » , également produite sur les communes de Moratalla et Hellín Sites et monuments Restes des remparts, . Église Saint-Pierre, . Sanctuaire de la Vierge d'Espérance, , creusé dans le roc. Tour de l'horloge, . Notes et références Voir aussi Articles connexes Liste des communes de la Région de Murcie Langue de Castille de l'ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem Liste des commanderies templières dans la région de Murcie Liens externes Site de la mairie de Calasparra Commune dans la Région de Murcie Ville dans la Région de Murcie Commune abritant une commanderie de l'ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem en Espagne Alleux, fiefs et seigneuries de l'ordre du Temple
en	caselaw	US	CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 1 of 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, Case No. 12-00026(1) (JRT/JSM) vs. DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION WAKINYAN WAKAN MCARTHUR, Defendant. __________________________________________________________________ PROCEDURAL HISTORY Wakinyan Wakan McArthur was charged in a Redacted Superseding Indictment with the following offenses: ▪ Count 1: Conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d); ▪ Count 2: Conspiracy to use and carry firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) and 18 U.S.C. §924(o); ▪ Count 3: Attempted murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. §2; ▪ Count 4: Assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. §2; ▪ Count 5: Use and carrying of firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (1)(A); CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 2 of 7 ▪ Count 7: Conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C. §846; ▪ Count 8: Aiding and abetting distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and §841(b)(1)(C); ▪ Count 9: Use and carrying of firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (1)(A); ▪ Count 10: Use and carrying of firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (1)(A); and ▪ Count 11: Use and carrying of firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (1)(A). The case came on for trial before the Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, beginning on January 24, 2013. On March 19, 2013, the jury returned its verdict finding McArthur not guilty of counts 3, 4, 5, and 9 but convicting him on counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, and 11. In his first appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, McArthur’s conviction on Count 11 was vacated. United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 943 (8th Cir. 2017) (McArthur I). After his resentencing on May 30 and 31, 2017, McArthur again appealed his sentence and his conviction on Count 10 to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. As to his remaining conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(c), Mc Arthur argued, inter alia, that as the predicate offense for Count 10, conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity in violation 2 CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 3 of 7 of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) as alleged in Count 1 of the Superseding Indictment was only a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B); and as the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015); and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018); his remaining §924(c) conviction was invalid and should be vacated. In the course of briefing before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the government agreed that the purported predicate crime of violence, the RICO conspiracy, was a residual clause offense. See United States v. Wakinyan Wakan McArthur, Case No. 17-2300, Brief of Appellee dated September 7, 2018, (hereafter “Government’s Brief”), at pp. 6, 8-9.1 While the government agreed that under the categorical approach, the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague, the government advocated that a case-specific approach be used to determine whether a predicate offense was a crime of violence under §924(c). Id. By agreement of the parties, McArthur’s second appeal was placed in abeyance pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 193 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). In Davis, the Supreme Court directly addressed the question whether the categorical approach applied to determine whether the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) was constitutionally void for vagueness. Davis, supra at pp. 2328, 2330, 2332-2336. The 1 As the government stated: “(t)he government further agrees that the particular predicate offense at issue in this case, conspiracy to violate RICO, depends upon application of §924(c)(3)(B). Government’s Brief at p. 9. The government also agreed that if the categorical approach is applied to determine whether an offense is a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(B), that provision is unconstitutionally vague. Id at pp. 8-9. 3 CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 4 of 7 Supreme Court held that the categorical approach did apply and that, under this approach, the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. Davis, supra at p. 2336. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that McArthur’s conviction on Count 10 was invalid and vacated this conviction. United States v. McArthur, 784 Fed. Appx. 459 (8th Cir. 2019) (McArthur II). This specific ruling of the Eighth Circuit was as follows: The Supreme Court...held [in Davis] that the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. We then directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to address the impact of Davis on McArthur’s appeal. McArthur now argues that his conviction under §924(c) must be set aside because §924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The government concedes that Davis renders McArthur’s §924(c) conviction invalid and that we must vacate the conviction. Id. McArthur now argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(o) is also invalid and must be vacated as it depends on the same predicate offense, conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity, which is no longer a crime of violence as §924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. ARGUMENT McArthur’s conviction to conspiring to use and carry firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence is invalid as the predicate offense, conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity, is not a crime of violence as a matter of law the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) having been declared unconstitutionally vague. 4 CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 5 of 7 Wakinyan McArthur is charged in Count 2 of the Redacted Superseding Indictment with conspiracy to use and carry firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(o). ECF No. 1060-4 at pp. 34-35. 18 U.S.C. §924(o) provides as follows: A person who conspires to commit an offense under subsection (c) shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both; and if the firearm is a machine-gun or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer, or muffler, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or life. 18 U.S.C. §924(o). As alleged in the Indictment, the “crime of violence” that McArthur knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to carry and use firearms during and in relation to was “conspiracy to violate Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d) as alleged in Count 1....” ECF No. 1060-4 at p. 35. This is the same predicate offense alleged in Count 10 of the Indictment, the §924(c) conviction which the Eighth Circuit declared invalid in McArthur II. ECF No. 1060-4 at pp. 42-43. The government agreed before the Eighth Circuit that the RICO conspiracy alleged in Count 1 of the Indictment is a residual clause offense. See Government’s Brief at pp. 6, 9. Under Davis, the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. Davis, supra at p. 2336. Because the RICO conspiracy is not a crime of violence, McArthur’s conviction on Count 2 can no longer be predicated on this offense. See United States v. Jones, 935 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that because a RICO conspiracy is not a crime of violence, §924 convictions, including a conviction under §924(o), could not be predicated on this offense after Davis). 5 CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 6 of 7 Declaring McArthur’s conviction on Count 2 invalid and vacating this conviction is compelled under the law of the case doctrine. The “law of the case” doctrine provides that an inferior tribunal is bound to honor the mandate of superior courts within a single judicial system. United States v. Castillanos, 608 F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010). “When an appellate court remands a case to the district court, all issues decided by the appellate court become the law of the case, and the district court on remand must ‘adhere to any limitations imposed on its function...by the appellate court.’ ” Castillanos, supra (quoting United States v. Bartsch, 69 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992))). Under McArthur II, the question of whether the RICO conspiracy alleged in Count 1 of the Indictment is a “crime of violence” is settled: it is not. Because the predicate offense alleged in Count 2, the RICO conspiracy, is not a crime of violence, McArthur’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(o) is invalid and must be vacated. The §924(o) conspiracy did not involve a crime of violence and McArthur’s conviction of this offense cannot stand as a matter of law. CONCLUSION McArthur’s conviction to conspiring to use and carry firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence is invalid as the predicate offense, conspiracy to participate in racketeering, is not a crime of violence as a matter of law the residual clause of §924(c)(3)(B) having been declared unconstitutionally vague. McArthur’s motion to 6 CASE 0:12-cr-00026-JRT-JSM Document 1953 Filed 12/05/19 Page 7 of 7 vacate his conviction on Count 2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(o) should therefore be granted. Dated this 5th day of December, 2019. Respectfully submitted, GOETZ & ECKLAND P.A. By: __s/Frederick J. Goetz __________ FREDERICK J. GOETZ Attorney Registration No. 185425 Banks Building 615 First Avenue N.E., Suite 425 Minneapolis, MN 55413 (612) 874-1552 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 7
en	wikipedia	N/A	Our Lady of the Wind, Saydet El-Rih in Arabic, was built in the Byzantine era in Enfeh, Lebanon. Even though the roof of the chapel has long collapsed, it still retains traces of wall paintings representing Saint George and Saint Demetrios, the Omnipotent Christ, two evangelists, some saints and the Virgin calming the wind. It is believed that sailors and fishermen from the village of Enfeh built the chapel so that the Virgin Mary would protect them as they sailed the Mediterranean. References Our Lady of the Wind Our Lady of the Wind Our Lady of the Wind Koura District
de	wikipedia	N/A	John George Warwick (* 23. Dezember 1830 im County Tyrone, Vereinigtes Königreich; † 14. August 1892 in Washington, D.C.) war ein US-amerikanischer Politiker. In den Jahren 1891 und 1892 vertrat er den Bundesstaat Ohio im US-Repräsentantenhaus. Werdegang John Warwick besuchte die öffentlichen Schulen seiner nordirischen Heimat. Um das Jahr 1850 wanderte er zusammen mit seinem Bruder nach Amerika aus. Für einige Zeit lebte er in Philadelphia. Dann zog er nach Navarre in Ohio, wo er Buchhalter in einem Kurzwarengeschäft wurde. Anschließend arbeitete er in der Stadt Massillon ebenfalls in einem Kurzwarengeschäft. Später stieg er auch in das Mühlengewerbe, den Kohlebergbau und die Landwirtschaft ein. Außerdem engagierte er sich bei der Eisenbahn, wo er den Ausbau des Schienennetzes förderte. Später wurde er Mitglied im Vorstand einer Eisenbahngesellschaft. Politisch schloss er sich der Demokratischen Partei an. Zwischen 1884 und 1886 war er Vizegouverneur von Ohio. Bei den Kongresswahlen des Jahres 1892 wurde Warwick im 16. Wahlbezirk von Ohio gegen den späteren US-Präsidenten William McKinley in das US-Repräsentantenhaus in Washington, D.C. gewählt, wo er am 4. März 1893 die Nachfolge von James W. Owens antrat. Dieses Mandat konnte er bis zu seinem Tod am 14. August 1892 ausüben. Er starb an den Folgen einer Lebensmittelvergiftung, die er sich auf einem Bankett einer Eisenbahngesellschaft in New York City zugezogen hatte. Weblinks Vizegouverneur (Ohio) Mitglied des Repräsentantenhauses der Vereinigten Staaten für Ohio Mitglied der Demokratischen Partei (Vereinigte Staaten) US-Amerikaner Geboren 1830 Gestorben 1892 Mann
en	caselaw	US	A. T. BURBRIDGE, plaintiff in error, seeks to review a judgment of the Denver district court affirming the findings and order of the Public Utilities Commission which found that Burbridge was "a motor vehicle or common carrier operating without a certificate of public convenience and necessity," and ordered: "That A. T. Burbridge, respondent, his agents, servants and employees, forthwith cease and desist from operating as a motor vehicle carrier as defined in Chapter 134, Session Laws of 1927, unless and until he shall have obtained from this Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity according to law. "It is further ordered, that respondent is hereby directed to file with this Commission within twenty days from date of this order reports of the freight actually transported by him over the public highways of this State since January 1, 1928, and to pay to the Commission as compensation for the use of said highways a mileage tax upon the goods so transported as provided by law." Under the evidence was Burbridge merely a private carrier or a "motor vehicle carrier" as defined by chapter 134, section 1 (d) Session Laws of 1927? This section provides: "(d). The term 'motor vehicle carrier' when used in this act means and includes every corporation, person, firm, association of persons, lessee, trustee, receiver or trustee appointed by any court, owning, controlling, operating or managing any motor vehicle used in serving the public in the business of transporting persons or property for compensation over any public highway between fixed points or over established routes, or otherwise, who indiscriminately accept, discharge and lay down either passengers, freight or express, or who hold themselves out for such purpose by advertising or otherwise." The evidence showed and the commission found that Burbridge was engaged in the transportation of freight for hire by motor vehicle; that he transported freight Page 136 between Denver and Greeley, Brighton and Eaton; that he operated four trucks with a combined capacity of nine tons; that he had as much hauling as he could handle with his equipment; that he operated regularly five days each week; that his average daily haul was ten tons and his maximum daily haul twenty tons; that he had one written and five oral contracts to haul for six business firms, one of the six contracts being with the MacMarr Stores; that under the MacMarr Stores contract alone he hauled goods regularly from Denver to four stores in Greeley, one store in Brighton and one store in Eaton; that the average daily tonnage moving into Greeley by truck was about 31 tons; that of the total tonnage moving into Greeley by truck, he hauled about one-third; that the MacMarr Stores received between one-third and one-half of all groceries moving into Greeley by truck, 98 per cent of which was hauled by Burbridge; that the four largest stores in Greeley are the MacMarr Stores which were served by Burbridge. Upon the request of said six firms, Burbridge accepted freight from numerous shippers, 91 of whom prepaid the freight. All of the freight so transported was ordered by, for use of, and delivered to, various branches of said six firms. The evidence fails to show that Burbridge did "indiscriminately accept, discharge and lay down * * freight" or held himself out for such purpose by advertising or otherwise. Upon denying the petition for a rehearing, a majority of the Public Utilities Commission held: "The evidence did not warrant us in finding, and we did not intend to suggest, that the respondent had been guilty of any conduct tainted with any attempt to conceal or misrepresent any of the facts relating to his operations. We believe he in good faith attempted so to line up his operations that he would not be a common carrier." [1] Chapter 134, Session Laws of 1927, was not intended to, and does not, regulate private motor vehicle carriers for hire. It purports to and does regulate only common carriers engaged in the business of transporting Page 137 by motor vehicle passengers or freight for hire. The act specifically defines such a common carrier. [2] In construing the act it might be held that Burbridge was serving the public, under the doctrine approved in the case of Davis v. People ex rel., 79 Colo. 642,247 P. 801, to the effect that a service by a carrier may affect so considerable a fraction of the public as to warrant it being considered public and that the public does not mean everybody all the time. It is true that Burbridge operated between fixed points and over established routes, but he did not "indiscriminately accept, discharge and lay down * * freight," nor did he hold himself out for such purpose by advertising or otherwise. Burbridge was not, therefore, a common carrier as defined by the act, and the commission and the court erred in determining the contrary and that he was subject to regulation as a "motor vehicle carrier" under the statute. We recognize the fact that in determining whether one is engaged as a common carrier by motor vehicle, a majority of the courts have liberalized the common law definition of a common carrier in many respects. In many instances, this broader rule has been forced upon the courts by motor vehicle carriers who have sought, by various methods of subterfuge, to evade regulation under the law while enjoying the benefits derived from the unrestricted use of public highways. We have no fault to find with the decisions in the numerous cases cited by counsel, but an enumeration and discussion thereof would appear to be unnecessary and unavailing here because none involves the construction of a statute, similar to ours, wherein the term "motor vehicle carrier" is specifically defined. Plaintiff in error not being subject to regulation under the act, other questions raised by the assignment of errors need not be determined. It should be noted that the definition of the term "motor vehicle carrier" in the act under which this Page 138 controversy arose has been amended by the legislature. S. L. 1931, c. 121, p. 481. Therein the words "who indiscriminately accept, discharge and lay down * * freight" are eliminated and a more stringent definition substituted which may have been intended to cover a situation such as here presented. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the district court with directions that it vacate its judgment and remand the cause to the Public Utilities Commission with directions that its finding and order of June 16, 1930, be set aside and the proceeding against plaintiff in error be dismissed. MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL and MR. JUSTICE BURKE dissent.
da	legislation	Denkmark	Den fulde tekst Bindende svar - Fælles indkøbscentral - moms og fradragsret Skatterådet bekræfter, at spørger kan fratrække momsen på indkøb af varer/ydelser, der indkøbes af spørger og viderefaktureres til et driftsselskab som led i en oprettet fælles indkøbscentral, i henhold til de almindelige gældende regler for momsfradragsret, og at spørger skal opkræve moms, når indkøbte varer/ydelser, som led i indkøbsfunktionen, viderefaktureres til den endelige køber (driftsselskabet). Skatterådet bekræfter endvidere, at spørgers udbud af sportsaktiviteter er fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5. Skatterådsmøde 25. august 2015 - SKM2015. 593. SR Spørgsmål 1. Kan Skatterådet bekræfte, at spørger kan fratrække momsen på indkøb af varer/ydelser, der indkøbes af spørger og viderefaktureres til et driftsselskab som led i en oprettet fælles indkøbscentral, i henhold til de almindelige gældende regler for momsfradragsret? 2. Kan Skatterådet bekræfte, at spørger skal opkræve moms, når indkøbte varer/ydelser, som led i indkøbsfunktionen, viderefaktureres til den endelige køber (driftsselskabet)? 3. Kan Skatterådet bekræfte, at spørgers udbud af sportsaktiviteter er fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5? 4. Kan Skatterådet bekræfte, hvis der svares nej til spørgsmål 3, at spørgers udbud af sportsaktiviteter er fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5, hvis spørger ikke stifter et driftsselskab? Svar 1. Ja 2. Ja 3. Ja 4. Bortfalder. Beskrivelse af de faktiske forhold X etablerer X-huse i større byer i Danmark i samarbejde med kommuner. Enten i form af nybyggeri eller ved at eksisterende idrætscentre omdannes til X-huse. Formålet med at etablere X-husene er at danne en kædedriftsorganisation, som gennem idræts-, event- og driftskoncepter optimerer driften af de enkelte centre og derved sikrer udvikling og bæredygtighed af husene til gavn for idrætsforeninger og idrætsudøvere i Danmark. Hvert af de etablerede X-huse er en selvstændig juridisk enhed. I nogen tilfælde ejer den juridiske enhed selv bygningerne, og i andre tilfælde er disse ejet af den pågældende kommune, hvor driften beror på en erhvervslejeaftale mellem kommunen og den juridiske enhed, som X har etableret i tilknytning til driften af det enkelte hus. Spørger er en almennyttig erhvervsdrivende fond med hjemsted i X Kommune. Ifølge vedtægterne er fondens formål at opføre, videreudvikle og drive X-huset i X, som er etableret som et moderne kultur- og idrætscenter, der lever op til borgernes ønsker og behov for deltagelse i idræt, motion og kulturelle aktiviteter. Det er X Kommune, som ejer bygningerne. X Kommune har således pr. 1. januar 2013 udlagt driften af X Hallen til spørger. Fra og med 1. januar 2013 er der mellem X Kommune og spørger indgået en driftsaftale omkring driften af X Hallerne. Driftsaftalen er bygget op omkring en fælles overordnet hensigtserklæring om at skabe mere liv i idrætscenteret ved: – Udvidelse af tilbuddene til den selvorganiserede idræt – Åbne centeret yderligere op for borgerne. Dette skal bl.a. ske gennem cafédrift og etablering af opholdsområdet for borgere i forskellige livsfaser – Større samarbejder med skoler og institutioner om tilbud til børn og unge – Skabe foreningszone, hvor foreningerne kan udvikles og hjælpes. Det fremgår af driftsaftalen, at spørger får det overordnede ansvar for hallerne og de tilhørende lokalers drift, herunder drift af restauration/café. Af aftalen fremgår endvidere, at kommunen selv disponerer over hallerne, idet skolerne har 1. prioritet til at bruge disse i skoletiden. Herudover anvender kommunen hallerne til foreninger, som får faciliteterne stillet til rådighed efter folkeoplysningsloven, ligesom kommunen har ret til at benytte faciliteterne i forbindelse med diverse valg, herunder kommune- og regionsvalg, som X Kommune skal stå for. I det omfang, at kommunen ikke selv anvender hallerne, må spørger som led i driftsaftalen disponere over faciliteterne i X-huset til en række nærmere fastsatte aktiviteter indenfor områderne idræt og kultur. Al kommerciel udlejning via X, herunder udlejning til professionel idræt, messer, udstillinger, konferencer mv. skal ske på markedsmæssige vilkår. Ved at indgå denne driftsaftale med X, som har stor erfaring med drift af idrætscentre, er kommunens udgift til drift af hallerne blevet reduceret, idet X via kædedriftsorganisation gerne skal opnå en større udnyttelse af faciliteterne ved at anvende faciliteterne til kommercielle aktiviteter, når kommunen ikke anvender faciliteterne til egne formål eller folkeoplysningslovens aktiviteter. I forbindelse med overdragelse af driften pr. 1. januar 2013 blev der iværksat en ombygning af de eksisterende haller. Denne udgift er afholdt af kommunen. Efter ombygningen er afsluttet i juni måned 2014, har X et ønske om at placere driftsaftalen med kommunen i et selvstændigt selskab, således at selve driften af bygningerne bliver isoleret i et selvstændigt selskab fra de øvrige aktiviteter, som X vil starte op efter færdiggørelse af byggeriet. Spørger påtænker derfor at stifte et driftsselskab, som skal overtage driftsaftalen med kommunen, således at X's udbud af sportsaktiviteter ikke bliver blandet med selve bygningsdriften. Efter ombygningen af faciliteterne forventer X at kunne udvikle de kulturelle aktiviteter og de forskellige idrætsgrene, således at der bliver tiltrukket mange nye brugere til faciliteterne. Da der skal udvikles mange nye tiltag, vil det ud fra et hæftelsesforhold være hensigtsmæssigt at adskille selve driften af bygningerne med de nye tiltag, som X vil starte op i forbindelse med færdiggørelse af byggeprojektet. Organisationsform I forbindelse med overtagelse af driften af X hallerne pr. 1. januar 2013, blev der etableret en erhvervsdrivende fond. Ved udskillelse af bygningsdriften og udlejningsaktiviteterne i de timer, hvor kommunen ikke benytter faciliteterne, i et selvstændigt selskab overvejes det at etablere følgende organisationsform. Driftsselskabet vil herefter varetage de i kontrakten beskrevne aktiviteter, herunder: – Udlejning af lokaler (selskabslokaler, haller, svømmehal og varmtvandsbassin) – Drift af hallerne. Al udlejning vil stadig ske på markedsmæssige vilkår, og selskabet vil anmode om en frivillig momsregistrering for udlejning af fast ejendom. De hos spørger tilbageværende aktiviteter vil herefter være: – Salg af alle typer af sportsaktiviteter, der ikke udføres i foreningsregi – Entreindtægter fra fitness og svømmehal - offentlig adgang – Udvikling af forskellige sportsaktiviteter – Reklameaktiviteter – Restaurationsdrift, herunder salg af mad til skolen – Udlejning af medarbejdere til driftsselskabet. Vedrørende de stillede spørgsmål Spørger råder over en række medarbejdere, som i dag både forestår afvikling af de daglige sportsaktiviteter, og som forestår den daglige drift af X-huset, herunder fx. : – Afvikling af undervisning på hold – Billetsalg – Overvågning af gæster i svømmehallen (livredder) – Sikring af og overholdelse af badevandskvaliteten i svømmehal og varmtvandsbassin – Klargøring af lokaler til udlejning – Oprydning – Rengøring af huset – Reparation af sportsudstyr og øvrigt løsøre – Diverse indkøb til huset – Indvendig vedligeholdelse og fornyelse af hele bygningsmassen og installationer – Godkendelse og betaling af indkøb – Udvikling af holdaktiviteter og idrætskoncepter – mv. Medarbejderne vil således i et vist omfang dagligt være involveret i aktiviteter, som fremover vil høre til hos spørger og i de aktiviteter, som påtænkes overflyttet til driftsselskabet. I den forbindelse påtænkes det at etablere en fælles indkøbsfunktion, som organisatorisk placeres hos spørger, hvor personalet er ansat. Alle indkøb vedrørende den daglige drift, herunder de ovennævnte funktoner, vil herefter blive faktureret til spørger, som har den fornødne kompetence og indsigt til at kunne godkende de fra leverandørerne fremsendte fakturaer. Efter godkendelse vil de indkøbte varer, materialer mv. sammen med arbejdslønnen blive tillagt en avanceprocent således, at der til enhver tid vil ske en viderefakturering til driftsselskabet til normal markedspris. Ønsket om en fælles indkøbsfunktion begrundes i mulighederne for at opnå en kædedriftsorganisation X husene imellem, hvorfor det skal være muligt at opnå større mængderabatter o. lign. X overtager netop driften af hallerne for at minimere de kommunale udgifter til driften af de mange haller rundt om i landet. Det er således vigtigt at opnå den kædedriftsfordel, der er ved en fælles indkøbsfunktion. Der er samtidig en forventning til, at der internt vil ske en optimering og sikring af, at de varer/ydelser, der indkøbes, lever op til de interne kvalitetskrav og forventningerne fra den fælles centrale ledelse. Øvrigt personale vil forblive samlet hos spørger med ansættelse her, da man ønsker at samle medarbejderne ét sted og dermed opnå en administrativ besparelse, herunder sikre, at medarbejderne ikke skal deltidsansættes i begge selskaber. Spørgers formål Spørgers formål er at opføre, videreudvikle og drive X-Huset X, der etableres som et moderne kultur- og idrætscenter, der lever op til borgernes ønsker og behov for deltagelse i idræt, motion og kulturelle aktiviteter. Det fremgår af § 1, stk. 4 i vedtægterne, at virkeområderne for spørger er følgende: – Mødested: X-Huset X skal være omdrejningspunktet for byens sociale liv og være stedet, hvor man mødes – Lokalområdet: X-Huset X skal opretholdes og videreudvikles som et mødested for erhvervs-, idræts- og kulturlivet i X Kommune – Laboratorium: X-Huset X skal etablere og udvikle nye muligheder, så huset til enhver tid lever op til borgernes ønsker og behov på idræts-, motions- og kulturområdet og fungerer som en dynamo for inspiration til resten af X Kommune – Trivsel og sundhed: X-Huset X skal anvise veje og muligheder til bedre folkesundhed. Huset skal give borgerne mulighed for at dyrke idræt og motion individuelt og fleksibelt, ligesom det skal være muligt at dyrke idræt og motion og andre kulturelle aktiviteter i sociale fællesskaber. – Kommerciel virksomhed: X-Huset X skal ved kommerciel virksomhed skabe den økonomiske baggrund for driften og videreudviklingen af spørger. Der skal i den forbindelse etableres og opretholdes et samarbejde med såvel myndigheder som erhvervsliv om aktiviteter og projekter inden for spørgers virkeområde. Der kan etableres særskilte juridiske enheder med særlige etablerings- eller driftsopgaver. Med henvisning til spørgers formålsbestemmelse, er det primære formål at inspirere borgerne til en sund og værdiskabende livsstil ved udøvelse af sport, herunder at understøtte den naturlige sammenhængskraft, der er i X og omegn med alle dets foreninger og erhvervsdrivende. Anvendelse af opsparet overskud Det fremgår af § 2, stk. 4 i vedtægterne, at eventuelt opsparet overskud på den løbende drift skal anvendes til virkeliggørelse af de i § 1, stk. 4 anførte virkeområder, som er beskrevet ovenfor. Fondens opløsning Det fremgår af § 7, stk. 2, at eventuel opsparet formue skal anvendes til idrætslige- og kulturelle formål i X Kommune efter nærmere bestemmelse fra bestyrelsen. Sportsaktiviteter X Huset X er et topmoderne sportsaktivitetskompleks med et bredt udvalg af sportsaktiviteter til alle aldersgrupper og alle niveauer. Som det fremgår af spørgers hjemmeside, er der tale om udbud af sport i form af løb, cykling, svømning, styrketræning i forskellige variationer og undervisning i legemsøvelser i form af forskellige holdtræningsprogrammer. I motionscentret er der både mulighed for at deltage i holdtræning eller træne på egen hånd. Udbuddet er bredt og omfatter bl.a. styrketræningsmaskiner samt kredsløbsmaskiner i form af løbebånd, cykler, stepmaskiner og cross trianer. Herudover tilbydes også vægttrænings-, indoor cykling- og udspændingsrum samt gymnastik, yoga, dans og lignende. I X badet udbyder spørger den offentlige svømning. Holdtræning udbydes i foreningsregi, hvor kommunen stiller faciliteterne til rådighed for de enkelte svømmeklubber. X hallerne består dels af idrætshallen indrettet med tribuner, kommentatorboks og måltavle, som kan anvendes til alt fra fodbold og håndbold til badminton mv. Herudover omfatter X hallerne en gymnastiksal med springgrav. Ud over spørgers udbud af træning i motionscentret og svømmebadet, arrangerer spørger en række events, som eksempelvis motions-/maratonløb, yoga, sommer camp for unge mellem 9 og 14 år, triatlon mv. Spørgers opfattelse og begrundelse Ad spørgsmål 1 og 2 Den påtænkte oprettelse af den fælles indkøbscentral er begrundet i de erhvervsmæssige overvejelser, der ligger i at kunne samle og optimere mulighederne for større mængderabatter, samt de interne strategiske overvejelser, der ligger i en højnelse af kvaliteten af det udførte arbejde. Herudover vil en samling af indkøbsfunktionen sikre en administrativ besparelse, da alt vedr. indkøb, godkendelse, betaling mv. kun vil foregå ét sted og ikke fordelt over 2 eller flere virksomheder. Samtidig vil personalet blive ansat ét sted, og dermed vil lønindberetningen for dette personale også være samlet i samme selskab. Herved vil der kunne opnås yderligere administrative fordele og besparelser. Det er vores opfattelse, at spørger med varetagelse af indkøbsfunktionen for driftsselskabet driver økonomisk virksomhed og herved optræder som afgiftspligtig person efter momslovens § 3, stk. 1. Det er tillige vores opfattelse, at spørger ved viderefakturering af varer/ydelser og materialer, som er indkøbt af spørger, og som videresælges til administrationsselskabet, skal opkræve moms efter momslovens § 4, stk. 1. Da videresalget har karakter af momspligtige leverancer efter momslovens § 4, stk. 1, vil spørger have adgang til momsfradrag for de indkøbte og videresolgte varer efter momslovens § 37, stk. 1. Efter vores opfattelse, kan der derfor svares "ja" til spørgsmål 1 og 2. Vi kan oplyse, at SKAT i et tidligere bindende svar vedrørende X og X fra 2013 har taget stilling til lignende spørgsmål. I dette bindende svar bekræfter SKAT, at X kan fratrække momsen på de varer og ydelser, som indkøbes og viderefaktureres til X, og at viderefaktureringen er momspligtig. (SKATs bemærkninger: Det bindende svar er ikke offentliggjort.) Ad spørgsmål 3 og 4 I henhold til momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5 er ydelser i nær tilknytning til udøvelsen af sport eller fysisk træning, der præsteres af virksomheder, der ikke drives med gevinst for øje, til fordel for sports- og idrætsudøvere samt opkrævning af entre ved sportsarrangementer fritaget for moms. EU-domstolen har endvidere udtalt, at en forening ikke kan antages at arbejde med gevinst for øje, selvom den systematisk tilstræber at skabe overskud, når overskuddet bruges til at udføre foreningens tjenesteydelser, jf. C-174/00 Kennemer Golf & Country Club. Da spørger er organiseret som en fond, vil der ikke være nogen ejerkreds at udlodde et eventuelt overskud til. Derfor vil udbud af sportsydelser være fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5. Det vil efter vores vurdering ikke have betydning for den momsmæssige vurdering af X's udbud af sportsydelser, om spørger udskiller driftsaftalen omkring driften af bygningerne med kommunen i et selvstændigt selskab eller ej. Driftsaftalen med kommunen er baseret på en synergieffekt, som forventes at blive etableret ved X's mulighed for at udnytte faciliteterne til andet end kommunens eget brug samt de normale aktiviteter, som kommunen yder støtte til gennem folkeoplysningslovens bestemmelser. Denne driftsaftale kan ikke få indflydelse på X's udbud af sportsaktiviteter. SKATs indstilling og begrundelse Lovgrundlag – Momsloven, jf. lovbekendtgørelse nr. 106 af 23. januar 2013 om merværdiafgift med senere ændringer – Momssystemdirektivet, jf. Rådets direktiv 2006/112/EF af 28. november 2006 om det fælles merværdiafgiftssystem med senere ændringer. Momsloven " § 3. Afgiftspligtige personer er juridiske eller fysiske personer, der driver selvstændig økonomisk virksomhed. (. . .). § 4. Der betales afgift af varer og ydelser, der leveres mod vederlag her i landet. Ved levering af en vare forstås overdragelse af retten til som ejer at råde over et materielt gode. Levering af en ydelse omfatter enhver anden levering. (. . .). § 13. Følgende varer og ydelser er fritaget for afgift: (. . .) 5) Ydelser i nær tilknytning til udøvelsen af sport eller fysisk træning, der præsteres af virksomheder, der ikke drives med gevinst for øje, til fordel for sports- og idrætsudøvere samt opkrævning af entré ved sportsarrangementer. Fritagelsen omfatter dog ikke arrangementer, hvor der deltager professionelle sports- og idrætsudøvere, fodboldkampe dog kun, når der deltager professionelle på begge hold. (. . .). § 37. Virksomheder registreret efter §§ 47, 49, 51 eller 51 a kan ved opgørelsen af afgiftstilsvaret som indgående afgift, jf. § 56, stk. 3, fradrage afgiften efter denne lov for virksomhedens indkøb mv. af varer og ydelser, der udelukkende anvendes til brug for virksomhedens leverancer, som ikke er fritaget for afgift efter § 13, herunder leverancer udført i udlandet, jf. dog stk. 6. (. . .)." Momssystemdirektivet " Artikel 9 1. Ved »afgiftspligtig person« forstås enhver, der selvstændigt og uanset stedet udøver økonomisk virksomhed uanset formålet med eller resultatet af den pågældende virksomhed. Ved »økonomisk virksomhed« forstås alle former for virksomhed som producent, handlende eller tjenesteyder, herunder minedrift og landbrug, samt virksomhed inden for liberale og dermed sidestillede erhverv. Ved økonomisk virksomhed forstås navnlig udnyttelse af materielle eller immaterielle goder med henblik på opnåelse af indtægter af en vis varig karakter. (. . .). Artikel 132 1. Medlemsstaterne fritager følgende transaktioner: (. . .) m) visse former for levering af ydelser med nær tilknytning til udøvelsen af sport eller fysisk træning, der præsteres af organer, som ikke arbejder med gevinst for øje, til fordel for personer, der deltager i sport eller fysisk træning (. . .)." Praksis C-174/00, Kennemer Golf & Country Club EU-domstolen udtalte, at momsfritagelsen skal fortolkes således, at et organ kan antages ikke at arbejde med gevinst for øje, selvom det systematisk tilstræber at skabe overskud, som det derefter anvender til udførelse af sine tjenesteydelser. Den juridiske vejledning 2015 - 1 D. A. 5.5.2 Ydelser i nær tilknytning til sportsaktiviteter "Det er kun sports- eller idrætsaktiviteter, der er omfattet af momsfritagelsen. Når man vurderer, hvad der kan regnes for sportsaktiviteter, kan man bl.a. lægge vægt på, om den pågældende klub eller forening, hvor aktiviteten udøves, er tilknyttet Dansk Idræts Forbund (DIF), Danske Gymnastik- og Idrætsforeninger (DGI) eller tilsvarende sports- eller idrætsforbund. (. . .). Det er kun ydelser i nær tilknytning til sportsaktiviteter eller fysisk træning, der kan være omfattet af momsfritagelsen. I henhold til EU-domstolens faste praksis betyder dette, at kun ydelser, som er uomgængeligt nødvendige for grundydelsen i form af sportsaktiviteter, er omfattet af momsfritagelsen. Ydelser, der tager sigte på at give virksomheden (klubben m.fl.) yderligere indtægter i konkurrence med andre virksomheder, er derfor momspligtige. (. . .). D. A. 5.5.3 Gevinst for øje Momsfritagelsen er begrænset til det ikke-kommercielle udbud af sportsaktiviteter, fx. amatørsports- og idrætsforeningers salg til medlemmer af adgang til at benytte bowlingbaner, motionsredskaber, deltagelse i tilrettelagt træning og kampe mv. I disse tilfælde vil betalingen til klubben m.fl. typisk bestå i medlemmernes kontingentbetaling. (. . .)." Spørgsmål 1 Det ønskes bekræftet, at spørger kan fratrække momsen på indkøb af varer/ydelser, der indkøbes af spørger og viderefaktureres til et driftsselskab som led i en oprettet fælles indkøbscentral, i henhold til de almindelige gældende regler for momsfradragsret. Begrundelse Spørger har oplyst, at den påtænkte oprettelse af indkøbsfunktionen er begrundet i ønsket om at opnå mængderabat, en administrativ besparelse, da alt vedrørende indkøb, godkendelse, betaling mv. kun vil foregå et sted, og yderligere administrative fordele og besparelser ved at personalet kun er ansat et sted. Det er SKATs opfattelse, at der herved foreligger en forretningsmæssig begrundelse for etablering af indkøbsfunktionen. Spørger har i øvrigt oplyst, at det overvejes at etablere driftsselskabet som et anpartsselskab. SKAT finder på baggrund heraf, at spørger ved udøvelsen af indkøbsfunktionen driver selvstændig økonomisk virksomhed og dermed er en afgiftspligtig person, jf. momslovens § 3, stk. 1. I det omfang spørger leverer varer og ydelser mod vederlag til driftsselskabet, vil der således være tale om afgiftspligtige leverancer, jf. momslovens § 4, stk. 1. Spørger kan dermed fratrække afgiften for sine indkøb mv. af varer og ydelser, der anvendes til brug for spørgers leverancer til driftsselskabet, jf. momslovens § 37, stk. 1. Indstilling SKAT indstiller, at spørgsmål 1 besvares med "ja". Spørgsmål 2 Det ønskes bekræftet, at spørger skal opkræve moms, når indkøbte varer/ydelser, som led i indkøbsfunktionen, viderefaktureres til den endelige køber (driftsselskabet). Begrundelse Da det som anført i svaret på spørgsmål 1 lægges til grund, at spørger er en afgiftspligtig person, og leverancer er afgiftspligtige, vil spørger skulle opkræve moms, når denne videresælger varer og ydelser mod vederlag til driftsselskabet. Indstilling SKAT indstiller, at spørgsmål 2 besvares med "ja". Spørgsmål 3 Det ønskes bekræftet, at spørgers udbud af sportsaktiviteter er fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5. Begrundelse Det fremgår af bestemmelsen, at ydelser i nær tilknytning til udøvelsen af sport eller fysisk træning, der præsteres af virksomheder, der ikke drives med gevinst for øje, til fordel for sports- og idrætsudøvere, er fritaget for afgift. Det lægges til grund, at spørger som oplyst har et bredt udvalg af sportsaktiviteter til alle aldersgrupper og alle niveauer, og at der er tale om udbud af sport i form af løb, cykling, svømning, styrketræning i forskellige variationer og undervisning i legemsøvelser i form af forskellige holdtræningsprogrammer. Der er således tale om sportsaktiviteter, som vil være omfattet af momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5. Det er en betingelse for afgiftsfritagelsen, at aktiviteterne udøves af virksomheder, der ikke drives med gevinst for øje. Det fremgår af vedtægterne, at spørger har idræt som et af sine virkeområder, men også drift af kommerciel virksomhed for at skabe økonomisk baggrund for driften og videreudvikling af fonden. EU-domstolen har i sagen C-174/00, Kennemer Golf & Country Club udtalt, at momsfritagelsen skal fortolkes således, at et organ kan antages ikke at arbejde med gevinst for øje, selvom det systematisk tilstræber at skabe overskud, som det derefter anvender til udførelse af sine tjenesteydelser. Da det fremgår af vedtægterne, at eventuelt opsparet overskud på den løbende drift skal anvendes til virkeliggørelse af spørgers virkeområder, og da det også fremgår, at opsparet formue i tilfælde af spørgers opløsning skal anvendes til idrætslige- og kulturelle formål i X Kommune, finder SKAT, at spørger ikke driver virksomheden med gevinst for øje. Spørgers udbud af sportsaktiviteter vil derfor være fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5. Indstilling SKAT indstiller, at spørgsmål 3 besvares med "ja". Spørgsmål 4 Det ønskes bekræftet, hvis der svares nej til spørgsmål 3, at spørgers udbud af sportsaktiviteter er fritaget for moms, jf. momslovens § 13, stk. 1, nr. 5, hvis spørger ikke stifter et driftsselskab. Begrundelse Da det indstilles, at spørgsmål 3 besvares med ja, bortfalder spørgsmål 4. Indstilling SKAT indstiller, at spørgsmål 4 besvares med "bortfalder". Skatterådets afgørelse og begrundelse Skatterådet tiltræder SKATs indstilling og begrundelse.
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Fanny Lundahl-Sundblad, vuoteen 1882 Lundahl (16. toukokuuta 1853 Helsinki – 1. huhtikuuta 1918 Turku) oli suomalainen taidemaalari, joka erikoistui kukka-aiheisiin ja kehitti ensimmäisten joukossa taideteollisesti posliininmaalausta Suomessa. Lundahl-Sundbladin vanhemmat olivat Julius Ferdinand Lundahl ja Constantina Oktavia Augusta Gripenberg ja puoliso vuodesta 1882 insinööri Gustav Wilhelm Sundblad (k. 1910). Lundahl-Sundbladin isä kuoli, kun tytär oli vain yksivuotias, ja 12-vuotiaana hän menetti myös äitinsä. Turussa asuvat tädit kasvattivat tytön ja siellä hän aloitti myös taideopinnot 1870, mutta muutti 1872 Helsinkiin ja jatkoi vielä taideopintojaan kaksi vuotta. Fredrik Cygnaeus oli hänen varhaisia tukijoitaan, mutta 1875 hän sai myös valtion apurahan vuoden mittaiselle opintomatkalle Kööpenhaminaan, erikoistuakseen kukkamaalaukseen. Siirryttyään Pariisiin syksyllä 1876 hän paneutui posliininmaalaukseen Sèvresissä sijainneessa kuuluisassa posliinitehtaassa, jossa oli myös oma koulu. Hänen maalaamiaan posliiniesineitä oli ensimmäisen kerran esillä Helsingissä joulukuussa 1876 ja kesäkuussa 1877 ja sittemmin muun muassa Pariisin maailmannäyttelyssä 1889 ja Moskovan taideteollisuusnäyttelyssä 1882. Lundahl-Sundblad toimi paitsi itsenäisenä taiteilijana omassa ateljeessaan, myös opetti posliininmaalausta Taideteollisuusyhdistyksen koulussa, ohjasi yksityisoppilaita ja koristeli Arabialle posliinia 1878-1881. Mentyään naimisiin Lundahl-Sundblad muutti miehensä työn takia Turkuun ja jatkoi työskentelyä, näyttelyihin osallistumista ja opettamista siellä, mukaan lukien kukkataulujen maalaaminen. Gladioluksia-maalaus oli esillä Kukkia kankaalle ja posliiniin -näyttelyssä Cygnaeuksen galleriassa 1992. Lähteet Suomalaiset taidemaalarit Vuonna 1853 syntyneet Vuonna 1918 kuolleet
es	contracts	EU	COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS COM(94) 511 final Bruselas, 18.11.1994 MEMORANDUM SOBRE LAS PREVISIONES PARA LAS CARNES CONGELADAS DESTINADAS LA INDUSTRIA DE TRANSFORMACIÓN Y LOS ANIMALES VIVOS PARA ENGORDE Propuesta de PLAN DE PREVISIONES DE ABASTECIMIENTO DEL CONSEJO obre los machos jóvenes de la especie bovina con un peso igual o inferior a 300 Kg destinados al engorde en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 Propuesta de PLAN DE PREVISIONES DE ABASTECIMIENTO DEL CONSEJO jobre la carne de vacuno destinada a la industria de transformación en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 (presentados por la Comisión) ---pagebreak--- <: MEMORANDUM SOBRE LAS PREVISIONES PARA LAS CARNES CONGELADAS DESTINADAS A LA INDUSTRIA DE TRANSFORMACIÓN Y LOS ANIMALES VIVOS PARA ENGORDE De conformidad con los compromisos contraídos por la CE en virtud de las negociaciones comerciales multilaterales, la Comisión ha celebrado consultas con Australia, Nueva Zelanda, Eslovenia, Hungría, Eslovaquia, Polonia, Rumania, Bulgaria, la República Checa, Argentina y Uruguay sobre las previsiones de capacidad de exportación de carne de vacuno congelada destinada a la industria de transformación y de animales vivos. Resumen de la intervención de los distintos países Australia El representante australiano comunica que las autoridades de su pals están a favor de una conversión total de la carne de vacuno de transformación en carne de alta calidad. Reitera la petición de que la conversión en carne de vacuno de alta calidad sea permanente, ya que lo contrario podría ser considerado una reducción del acceso al mercado, y expresa su preocupación por la amplitud de la cuota total de mercado comunitario que ocupan las exportaciones de carne para transformación procedentes del este de Europa. Nueva Zelanda El representante neozelandés subraya que es esencial que la decisión del Consejo se aplique en la primera mitad de 1995, ya que, a partir del mes de julio de ese año, las disposiciones actuales serán sustituidas por una cuota arancelaria del GATT. También manifiesta que su país se reserva el derecho de realizar eventualmente otras observaciones sobre la exposición realizada por los servicios de la Comisión. Rumania Las autoridades rumanas comparten el interés de las neozelandesas con respecto a la necesidad de que se aplique puntualmente la decisión del Consejo, pero no están en condiciones de confirmar si su país realizará exportaciones a la UE de carne para transformación en el primer semestre de 1995. Por otra parte, el representante rumano indica que está mejorando la situación del sector de producción animal, por lo que se espera que aumenten las exportaciones de animales vivos a la UE. República Checa Las autoridades checas señalan que la reestructuración del sector ha provocado una reducción considerable del censo, que continuará probablemente hasta 1996. Las previsiones de exportación a la UE ascienden a 500 toneladas de carne congelada para transformación y de 8.000 a 10.000 terneros (peso máximo, 80 kg). ---pagebreak--- 3 Hungría Este país solicita la creación de un subcuota dentro del plan de previsiones (primer semestre de 1995) de 25.000 cabezas de novillos. Eslovenia Las autoridades de este país, manifiestan que, como consecuencia de las nuevas prioridades económicas que se han establecido y de los cambios estructurales a que estas dan lugar, Eslovenia no podrá exportar a la UE carne destinada a la transformación; en cambio, podrá realizar algunas exportaciones de animales vivos. Polonia Este país estaría sumamente interesado en exportar un mayor número de animales jóvenes vivos y lamenta que la UE tenga previsto mantener un límite máximo de exportaciones (medidas de salvaguardia) a pesar de la mejora que ha experimentado el mercado de la carne de vacuno y de la estabilización del censo de la UE. Polonia explica las dificultades que le plantea el sistema trimestral (ya que la mayor parte de los bovinos jóvenes ya reúnen las condiciones necesarias para ser exportados a principios de cada año). Eslovaquia Las autoridades eslovacas señalan que el consumo interno de carne es mayor que la producción, de manera que su país probablemente importará carne en lugar de exportarla. Argentina Los representantes de Argentina, tras subrayar que el sector de la carne de vacuno en su país no atraviesa un buen momento, manifiestan que el hecho de fijar el plan de previsiones completo para la carne destinada a la industria de transformación sin realizar ninguna conversión en carne de alta calidad agravará la situación del sector. Además, subrayan que las exportaciones de carne para transformación son más vulnerables a la competencia de los países del este de Europa. Uruguay El representante uruguayo señala que su país podrá exportar a la UE de 2.000 a 4.000 toneladas de carne para transformación. Se suma a la preocupación manifestada por Argentina en relación con las exportaciones procedentes del este de Europa. Bulgaria Este país ha facilitado algunas estadísticas sobre el número de animales para 1994; no existe ningún tipo de previsión con respecto a las importaciones o exportaciones de carne o animales vivos para 1995. ---pagebreak--- V EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS Con motivo de la Ronda Uruguay, está previsto que los dos planes de previsiones de abastecimiento contemplados en los artículos 13 y 14 del Reglamento (CEE) nfi 805/68 se sustituyan por contigentes arancelarios con efecto a partir del 1 de julio de 1995. Por consiguiente, conviene que estos dos planes se fijen únicamente para el primer semestre de 1995. Con arreglo a los acuerdos bilaterales celebrados entre la Comunidad y determinados países proveedores, por los que se establece una cooperación para la elaboración de dichos planes de previsiones de abastecimiento, se han celebrado consultas con esos terceros países. El primer proyecto de plan propone fijar en 99.000 cabezas el número de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina que pueden importarse para el engorde, teniendo en cuenta el déficit previsible de este tipo de animales y el interés de la Comunidad por mantener relaciones armoniosas con los terceros países proveedores. En el mismo proyecto se propone fijar en 25.000 toneladas la cantidad de importación de carne congelada destinada a la transformación, basándose en un cálculo de las cantidades disponibles y de las necesidades de carne de vacuno de transformación. ---pagebreak--- Propuesta de PLAN DE PREVISIONES DE ABASTECIMIENTO DEL CONSEJO sobre los machos jóvenes de la especie bovina con un peso igual o inferior a 300 Kg destinados al engorde en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 EL CONSEJO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CEE) nQ 805/68 del Consejo, de 27 de junio de 1968, por el que se establece la organización común de mercados en el sector de la carne de bovino (•-), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CEE) nfi 1884/94(2), y e n particular el apartado 2 de su artículo 13, Vista la propuesta de la Comisión, HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE PLAN DE PREVISIONES DE ABASTECIMIENTO: Introducción El apartado 2 del4 artículo 13 del Reglamento (CEE) nfi 805/68 dispone que, antes del 1 de diciembre de cada año, el Consejo establezca un plan de previsiones de abastecimiento de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina que puedan ser importados al amparo del régimen establecido en dicho artículo. Este balance debe tener en cuenta, por una parte, el número previsto de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina destinados al engorde disponsibles en la Comunidad y, por otra, las necesidades de los ganaderos comunitarios. Para fijar el volumen de las importaciones que van a realizarse dentro de ese plan de previsiones de abastecimiento, en virtud de los compromisos contraídos por la Comunidad al amparo del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT), la presentación anual del proyecto de plan debe ir precedida de consultas entre la Comisión y representantes de determinados terceros países. La Comisión propuso la celebración de consultas con los representantes de los terceros países siguientes: Hungría, Polonia, la República Checa, la República Eslovaca, Rumania, Bulgaria y la República de Eslovenia. En estas consultas se intercambiaron puntos de vista sobre el conjunto del mercado de la carne de vacuno, las perspectivas de producción y consumo en la Comunidad y las posibilidades de que disponen esos terceros países para pypnri-ar mar-hns jjdvenes de la especie bovina. (1) DO nfi L 148 de 28.6.1968, p. 24. (2) DO nfi L 197 de 30.7.1994, p. 27. ---pagebreak--- r El presente plan corresponde únicamente al periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995, habida cuenta de que, a partir del 1 de julio de ese año, este tipo de planes se va a sustituir por un contingente arancelario previsto con motivo de la Ronda Uruguay. Para establecerlo se han tenido en cuenta la información en poder de la Comisión y la evolución previsible en 1995 de los niveles de disponibilidad y necesidad en la Comunidad de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina destinados al engorde. La Comisión seguirá aplicando medidas de gestión apropiadas en caso de que las previsiones indiquen que las importaciones en la Comunidad de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina pudiesen superar el nivel tradicional, es decir, 425.000 cabezas anuales y que, con motivo de dichas importaciones, existirera el peligro de que el mercado comunitario de carne de vacuno experimentara graves perturbaciones. Debe observarse que el presente plan puede completarse con un plan suplementario en caso dé que la Unión Europea se amplíe el 1 de enero de 1995. I. Disponibilidades comunitarias en 1995 Dado el número de hembras reproductoras (vacas y novillas) previsto para 1995 (aproximadamente 36.000.000 de cabezas), se espera que en ese año nazcan aproximadamente 28.300.000 terneros, lo que representaría una producción de unos 14.150.000 terneros machos en 1995. II. Necesidades comunitarias en 1995 1. A partir de los datos recogidos en los Estados miembros, se calcula que en 1995 el número de sacrificios de terneros machos se situará en torno a 4.000.000 de cabezas. 2. El número de animales machos destinados al sacrificio (bueyes, novillos cebados o toros de reproducción) ascenderá aproximadamente a 10.250.000 cabezas. 3. Habida cuenta de las indicaciones proporcionadas por los Estados miembros y de las previsiones antedichas, cabe prever que en 1995 los ganaderos comunitarios necesiten 10.250.000 cabezas de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina destinados al engorde. 4. De lo enunciado en los puntos 1 y 3 se desprende que en 1995 las necesidades globales de terneros machos en la Comunidad serán de 14.250.000 cabezas. ---pagebreak--- CONCLUSION =>- Teniendo en cuenta, por una parte, las previsiones expuestas y, por otra, el contingente arancelario en la materia cuya aplicación está prevista para el 1 de julio de 1995, es posible que en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 el número de animales disponible en la Comunidad sea ligeramente insuficiente (en torno a las 50.000 cabezas). No obstante, para mantener unas relaciones comerciales armoniosas con los terceros países en cuestión, es conveniente fijar, como en años anteriores, el número de machos jóvenes que pueden importarse dentro del plan de previsiones de abastecimiento en el periodo antes mencionado basándose en un nivel de referencia anual de 198.000 cabezas, teniendo en cuenta al mismo tiempo el nivel tradicional de las importaciones de machos jóvenes previstos por la Comisión para 1995. Por consiguiente, el plan del primer semestre de 1995 se fijará en 99.000 cabezas. ---pagebreak--- B. ? Propuesta de PLAN DE PREVISIONES DE ABASTECIMIENTO DEL CONSEJO sobre la carne de vacuno destinada a la industria de transformación en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 EL CONSEJO DE LA UNION EUROPEA, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CEE) nfi 805/68 del Consejo, de 27 de junio de 1968, por el que se establece la organización común de mercados en el sector de la carne de bovino(^), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) nfi 1884/94(4), y e n particular el apartado 2 de su artículo 14, vista la propuesta de la Comisión, HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE PLAN DE PREVISIONES DE ABASTECIMIENTO: INTRODUCCIÓN El apartado 2 del artículo 14 del Reglamento (CEE) nfi 805/68 dispone que, antes del 1 de diciembre de cada año, el Consejo establezca un plan de previsiones de abastecimiento de la carne que puede ser importada al amparo del régimen establecido en dicho artículo. Este plan debe tener en cuenta, por un lado, la previsión de carne de calidad apta para su utilización industrial disponible en la Comunidad y, por otro, las necesidades de las industrias, y debe mencionar por separado las cantidades de: a) carne destinada a la fabricación de conservas cuyos únicos componentes característicos sean la carne de vacuno y la gelatina; b) carne destinada a la industria de transformación para la fabricación de productos que no sean las conservas indicadas en la letra a) . (3) DO nfi L 148 de 28.6.1968, p. 24. (4) DO nfi L 197 de 30.7.1994, p. 27. ---pagebreak--- 9 La presentación anual del proyecto de plan de previsiones debe ir precedida de consultas entre la Comisión y determinados terceros países. El objetivo de estas reuniones es intercambiar puntos de vista tanto sobre la situación global del mercado de la carne de vacuno en la Comunidad Europea y en los terceros países como sobre las previsiones en materia de producción y consumo, con el fin de llevar a cabo un análisis bilateral de los elementos que puedan contribuir a elaborar los planes de previsiones de las necesidades comunitarias de carne de vacuno congelada destinada a la transformación, así como intercambiar información sobre las posibilidades de exportación. La Comisión consultó a los representantes de Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, Nueva Zelanda, Hungría, Polonia y Rumania. El presente plan abarca únicamente el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995, habida cuenta de que, a partir del 1 de julio de 1995, este tipo de planes se va a sustituir por un contingente arancelario previsto en virtud de la Ronda Uruguay. Debe observarse que el presente plan puede completarse mediante un plan suplementario, en el caso de que la Unión Europea se amplíe el 1 de enero de 1995. I. Carne disponible destinada a las industrias de transformación Según los datos suministrados por los Estados miembros a la Comisión, la cantidad de carne fresca autóctona destinada a la transformación disponible en la Comunidad en 1995 puede calcularse en 1.230.000 toneladas, expresadas en carne sin deshuesar. A finales de 1994 habrá en la Comunidad existencias públicas de carne procedentes de la compra de intervención. Se calcula que la cantidad de dichas existencias aptas para la transformación será de 100.000 toneladas expresadas en carne sin deshuesar. ---pagebreak--- - / con efectos a partir del 1 de enero de 1995, la Comunidad tiene previsto abrir un contingente arancelario de 53.000 toneladas de carne congelada deshuesada, equivalentes a 68.900 toneladas de carne sin deshuesar. La experiencia permite prever que en 1995 se importarán al amparo de este contigente 13.000 toneladas de carne congelada sin deshuesar para transformación. Se calcula en 7.000 toneladas la cantidad de carne sin deshuesar originaria de los países ACP que en 1995 cumplirá las exigencias de la industria de transformación. Por lo tanto, en 1995 las industrias de transformación dispondrán en total de las cantidades siguientes: (en toneladas) carne fresca 1.230.000 carne congelada procedente de las compras de intervención 100.000 carne congelada en virtud del contingente del GATT 13.000 carne congelada importada al amparo del régimen del convenio de los Estados de África, Caribe y Pacífico (ACP) 7.000 TOTAL 1.350.000 II. Necesidades industriales de carne destinada a la transformación Según los datos suministrados por los Estados miembros a la Comisión, las necesidades comunitarias de carne destinada a la transformación pueden calcularse para 1995 en 1.400.000 toneladas de carne, expresadas en carne sin deshuesar. Esta cifra incluye las necesidades para la fabricación de las conservas contempladas en la letra a) del apartado 1 del artículo 14 del Reglamento (CEE) nfi 805/68, necesidades que se calculan en 210.000 toneladas. ---pagebreak--- ^ CONCLUSIONES De lo enunciado anteriormente se desprende que las cantidades comunitarias disponibles sólo podrán satisfacer una parte de las necesidades de carne. El déficit comunitario previsible de carne de vacuno destinada a la industria de transformación ascenderá, pues, a unas 50.000 toneladas en 1995, siendo el déficit en el primer semestre de ese año de 25.000 toneladas. En virtud del apartado 1 del artículo 14 del Reglamento (CEE) nfi 805/68, se decide dividir esta cantidad de modo que: 12.500 toneladas de carne destinada a la fabricación de conservas cuyos únicos componentes sean la carne de vacuno y la gelatina puedan acogerse a una suspensión total de la exacción reguladora, 12.500 toneladas de carne destinada a la industria de transformación para la fabricación de productos que no sean las conservas mencionadas en el primer guión puedan acogerse a una suspensión parcial de la exacción reguladora. Hecho en Bruselas, el Por el Consejo ---pagebreak--- m FICHA DE FIHANCIACION FECHA: 1. LÍNEA PRESUPUESTARIA: Articulo 120 (derechos de aduana) CRÉDITOS! 13.712 millones de ecus Partida 1000 (exacciones reguladoras 861 millones de ecus agrarias) Artículo 210 (restituciones) 1.452 millones de ecus 2. DENOMINACIÓN: Propuesta de plan de previsiones de abastecimiento de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina con un peso igual o inferior a 300 kg destinados al engorde en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 3. FUNDAMENTO JURÍDICO: Artículo 13 del Reglamento (CEE) n& 805/68 4. OBJETIVOS: Fijar en 99.000 cabezas para el primer semestre de 1995 las necesidades de importación de la Comunidad de machos jóvenes de la especie bovina destinados al engorde. 5. REPERCUSIÓN FINANCIERA: PERIODO DE 6 MESES EJERCICIO EN CURSO(95) EJERCICIO SIGUIENTE (96) (mili, de ecus) (mili, de ecus) (mili, de ecus) 5.0 Gastos a cargo: - del presupuesto de las CE + 52 millones de + 52 millones de ecus . (restituciones/intervenciones) ecus - de los presupuestos nacionales - de otros sectores nacionales 5.1 Ingresos: - recursos propios de las C C E E . + 15,6 millones de + 15,6 millones de (exacciones reguladoras/dere- ecus ecus chos de aduanas) - en el ámbito nacional 1997 1998 1999 2000 5.0.1 PREVISIONES DE GASTOS Medida limitada al año 1995 5.1.1 PREVISIONES DE INGRESOS 5.2 MÉTODO DE CÁLCULO: Debido a la situación excedentaria del sector, estas importaciones no se realizarían si no existiera esta concesión. Exacción reguladora: 85.000 cabezas x 230 kg x 1.450 ecus/t x 25% x 1,207 (TD) = +8,6 mili, de ecus (P) 14.000 cabezas x 230 kg x 1.450 ecus/t x 35% x 1,207 (TD) = + 2 mili, de ecus (P) +10,6 mili, de ecus (P) Derechos de aduana: 22.700 t (vivo) x 0,55 x 2.500 ecus/t (muerto) x 16% = + 5,0 mili, de ecu» (P) Restitución: se debería exportar una cantidad correspondiente: 99.000 cabezas x 300 kg (peso neto de sacrificio) x 1.450 ecus/t x 1,207(TD) = +52 mili, de ecus (P) 6.0 SE FINANCIA CON CRÉDITOS CONSIGNADOS EN EL CAPITULO CORRESPONDIENTE DEL PRESUPUESTO EN CURSO DE EJECUCIÓN SÍ/JN( 6.1 SE FINANCIA MEDIANTE TRANSFERENCIA ENTRE CAPÍTULOS DEL PRESUPUESTO EN CURSO DE EJECUCIÓN > ^ 6.2 SE PRECISA UN PRESUPUESTO SUPLEMENTARIO 6.3 SE CONSIGNARAN CRÉDITOS EN LOS PRÓXIMOS PRESUPUESTOS >& OBSERVACIONES: Esta medida se tiene en cuenta en el AP de 1995. ---pagebreak--- ^3 FICHA DE FINANCIACIÓN FECHA: 1. LÍNEA PRESUPUESTARIA: Artículo 120 (derechos de aduana) CRÉDITOS: 13.712 millones de ecus Partida 1000 (exacciones reguladoras 861 millones de ecus agrarias) Artículo 210 (restituciones) 1.452 millones de ecus 2. DENOMINACIÓN: Propuesta de plan de previsiones del Consejo sobre la carne de vacuno destinada a la industria de trans- formación en el periodo comprendido entre el 1 de enero y el 30 de junio de 1995 3. FUNDAMENTO JURÍDICO: Artículo 14 del Reglamento (CEE) na 805/68 4. OBJETIVOS: Fijar en 25.000 toneladas para el primer semestre de 1995 las necesidades de importación de la Comunidad de carne de vacuno congelada destinada a la transformación 5. REPERCUSIÓN FINANCIERA: PERIODO DE 6 MESES EJERCICIO EN CURSO(95) EJERCICIO SIGUIENTE (96) (mili, de ecus) (mili, de ecus) (mili, de ecus) 5.0 Gastos a cargo: - del presupuesto de las CE + 43,8 millones de + 43,8 millones de (restituciones/intervenciones) ecus ecus - de los presupuestos nacionales - de otros sectores nacionales 5.1 Ingresos: - recursos propios de las CC.EE. + 19,3 millones de + 19,3 millones de (exacciones reguladoras/dere- ecus ecus chos de aduanas) - en el ámbito nacional 1997 1998 1999 2000 5.0.1 PREVISIONES DE GASTOS Medida limitada al año 1995 5.1.1 PREVISIONES DE INGRESOS 5.2 MÉTODO DE CALCULO: Exacción reguladora: - Suspensión de la exacción reguladora (régimen a) : 12.500 t - Disminución de la exacción reguladora un 55% (régimen b) : 12.500 t x 2.100 ecus/t x 45% x 1,207 (TD) = + 14,3 millones de ecus (P) Derechos de aduana: 25.000 t x 200 ecus/t = + 5 millones de ecus (P) Restitución: se debería exportar una cantidad correspondiente: 25.000 t x 1.450 ecus/t x 1,207 (TD) > + 43,8 millones de ecu» (P) 6.0 SE FINANCIA CON CRÉDITOS CONSIGNADOS EN EL CAPITULO CORRESPONDIENTE DEL PRESUPUESTO EN CURSO DE EJECUCIÓN SI/ 6.1 SE FINANCIA MEDIANTE TRANSFERENCIA ENTRE CAPÍTULOS DEL PRESUPUESTO EN CURSO DE EJECUCIÓN >(M 6.2 SE PRECISA UN PRESUPUESTO SUPLEMENTARIO 6.3 SE CONSIGNARAN CRÉDITOS EN LOS PRÓXIMOS PRESUPUESTOS X& OBSERVACIONES: Esta medida se tiene en cuenta en el AP de 1995. ---pagebreak--- / KSN 0257-9545 COM(94) 511 final DOCUMENTOS E S 03 N° de catálogo : CB-CO-94-538-ES-C ISBN 92-77-82361-5 Oficina, de Publicaciones Oficíales de las Comunidades Europeas 1^2985 Luxemburgo
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Jacques av Monaco, Jacques Honoré Rainier Grimaldi, född 10 december 2014 i Monacos huvudstad Monaco, är en monegaskisk prins och son till fursteparet Albert och Charlene. Han är tronarvinge i den monegaskiska tronföljden. Han är född två minuter efter sin tvillingsyster Gabriella. Han är även halvbror till Jazmin Grace Grimaldi och Alexandre Coste som fötts i furst Alberts tidigare förhållanden. Källor Huset Grimaldi Födda 2014 Levande personer Män Nuvarande tronarvingar
lt	caselaw	EU	11.5.2015 LT Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys C 155/14 2015 m. vasario 18 d.Curtea de Apel Oradea (Rumunija) pateiktas prašymas priimti prejudicinį sprendimą byloje SC Vicdantrans SRL/Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Cluj Napoca prin Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Bihor, Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu (Byla C-73/15) (2015/C 155/14) Proceso kalba: rumunų Prašymą priimti prejudicinį sprendimą pateikęs teismas Curtea de Apel Oradea Šalys pagrindinėje byloje Apeliantė: SC Vicdantrans SRL Atsakovai: Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Cluj Napoca prin Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Bihor, Administrația Fondului pentru Mediu Prejudicinis klausimas Ar Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 110 straipsnis turi būti aiškinamas kaip draudžiantis valstybei narei nustatyti mokestį, vadinamą „aplinkos mokesčiu“, kaip antai reglamentuojamas Nepaprastuoju vyriausybės potvarkiu Nr. 9/2013, taikomą įregistruojant iš kitos valstybės narės importuotas naudotas motorines transporto priemones arba perleidžiant nuosavybės teises į nacionalinėje rinkoje pirktas naudotas transporto priemones, vis dėlto išskyrus nacionalinėje rinkoje pirktas naudotas transporto priemones, už kurias jau buvo sumokėtas panašus mokestis, kuris neatitinka Sąjungos teisės ir nebuvo grąžintas?
en	caselaw	US	Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 45504 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE BIO-RAD LABORATORIES, INC. and THE UNIVERSITY OF CHCAGO, Plaintiffs, C.A. No. 15-152-RGA v. 10X GENOMICS, INC., Defendant. DEFENDANT’S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STAY Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 45505 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 4 III. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 7 A. Execution Of Judgment Should Be Stayed Pending Resolution Of 10X’s Forthcoming Motion For Relief From Judgment................................................... 7 1. Discovery In Massachusetts Contradicts Key Positions Bio-Rad Took In The Present Case, And That Discovery Was Not Available In This Case For 10X To Use In Rebuttal At Trial ......................................................... 7 2. A Stay Is Appropriate .............................................................................. 11 B. Briefing On Ongoing Royalties Should Be Stayed Pending Further Discovery . 13 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 15 ii Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 3 of 19 PageID #: 45506 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., No. 15-1031, 2020 WL 5095442 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2020) ...................................................... 13 Husqvarna AB v. Toro Co., No. 15-856-SLR, 2016 WL 5213904 (D. Del. Sep. 20, 2016) ............................................... 12 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) ........................................................................................................... 11, 13 Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 04-00876-GMS (D. Del. Apr. 14, 2014) ........................................................................... 14 Vectura Limited v. Glaxosmithkline LLC, No. 16-00638-RGA (D. Del. Sep. 12, 2019) (J. Andrews) ..................................................... 14 Rules Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1) ............................................................................................................ 13 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 62(b) ............................................................................................................... 11 iii Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 4 of 19 PageID #: 45507 I. INTRODUCTION Principles of equity and efficiency warrant a modest stay of this matter. Since the completion of trial in the present case in November 2018, 10X has obtained discovery in another case showing that the judgment in the present case was based on fraud and misrepresentation. 10X requests a modest stay of execution of the judgment in this case to gain access to the existing discovery showing fraud and to permit the resolution of proceedings under Rule 60 seeking relief from aspects of the judgment—and particularly the damages award—that were procured by systematic false and misleading statements at trial. 10X also respectfully requests a stay of briefing on ongoing royalties during the pendency of its motions to gain access to the same existing discovery that is highly relevant to the Court’s determination of such royalties. This case involves patents that were first asserted by RainDance against 10X. Then Bio- Rad acquired RainDance and replaced RainDance as Plaintiff in the present case. Discovery from Bio-Rad was extremely limited. At trial, Bio-Rad sought a 15% royalty based on, in part, the value of the RainDance portfolio. The jury found for Bio-Rad, and the Court entered an injunction. 10X appealed from this Court’s judgment to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. D.I. 613-1. 10X petitioned for rehearing en banc, but the Federal Circuit denied its petition. D.I. 612. The mandate then issued on November 12, 2020. D.I. 613. The damages award was left undisturbed based on the finding of infringement of a single patent with a worldwide damages award, even though the infringement finding was reversed as to two of the three asserted patents. By Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a) and this Court’s order, execution on judgment proceeds has been stayed for 30 days after entry of judgment. See D.I. 608 at 1. Per Bio-Rad’s demand, 10X has agreed that absent action by this Court it will pay the judgment on December 15. Post-remand proceedings are likely to begin soon. After trial in this case, Bio-Rad first filed another case against 10X in this Court (C.A. No. 1 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 5 of 19 PageID #: 45508 19-1699-RGA), voluntarily dismissed it, and then refiled it in the District of Massachusetts (C.A. No. 1:19-cv-12533-WGY) (“Massachusetts Case”). The Massachusetts Case presented some of the same issues as the present case because the rights to the asserted patents were obtained through the same acquisition of RainDance and Bio-Rad’s damages contentions rely on the 15% royalty rate from the present case. 10X thus sought discovery in the Massachusetts Case into Bio-Rad and its views of the RainDance portfolio and acquisition. While 10X is not yet permitted to provide the confidential details of the discovery, it has revealed the following:  Bio-Rad knew and had specific and conclusive evidence that the 15% royalty rate it argued for at trial was not the reasonable rate even for the entire RainDance patent portfolio let alone the handful of patents from that portfolio that Bio-Rad asserted, including because it told the jury the opposite of its outside-of-litigation beliefs about comparable and non-comparable licenses;  The Grant Thornton fair value analysis of certain assets acquired by Bio-Rad from RainDance was not, as Bio-Rad said at trial, merely a conservative accounting exercise and in fact reflected Bio-Rad’s specific analysis and beliefs regarding the appropriate royalty for a license to the entire RainDance portfolio;  Bio-Rad’s assertions when attempting to bolster the value of the patents acquired from RainDance at trial in this case are the opposite of statements it made in the Massachusetts Case when attempting to defend against 10X’s antitrust claims in that case;  Bio-Rad’s allegations that RainDance would be a perceived competitor based on RainDance’s alleged plans to enter the market, despite having no competing product in the market with 10X, were inconsistent with RainDance’s actual position and beliefs; and  Contrary to Bio-Rad’s allegations in support of its injunction demand that 10X irreparably harmed Bio-Rad, discovery in the Massachusetts Case showed that Bio-Rad failed because of its own shortcomings, lack of investment in its products, and the inferiority of its product, not because of 10X. Before 10X will otherwise be forced to pay on the judgment in this case that was obtained through key testimony inconsistent with discovery that 10X did not have at trial, 10X asks merely for the opportunity to present the full set of facts to this Court under Rule 60. While some of the facts relevant to the Rule 60 proceedings are now public, Bio-Rad has not agreed that all such relevant 2 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 6 of 19 PageID #: 45509 facts are not confidential and it has refused to allow 10X to use such discovery confidentially in the present case. Bio-Rad has been unwilling to agree to a cross-use provision, even one that would maintain the confidentiality protections of the information and would merely permit the use of confidential discovery in the present case. 10X’s cross-use proposal did not require that Bio-Rad waive any other objection to the use of the discovery from the Massachusetts Case that could be raised in the District of Delaware, nor would its implementation cause any burden or prejudice to Bio-Rad. Bio-Rad nevertheless refused to agree to any cross-use. 10X remains willing to agree to a bilateral cross-use, as the parties have agreed to in multiple prior cases, including before this Court. Because Bio-Rad has not been willing to reach an agreement on any use of documents from the Massachusetts Case in the present case, 10X is seeking the Court’s assistance. Because, absent action by this Court, 10X will need to pay the judgment by December 15, 2020, 10X respectfully requests a stay of execution of the judgment to gain access to the relevant discovery in this case, to allow briefing under Rule 60, and to permit this Court to decide whether to grant 10X relief from the judgment. 10X is working expeditiously to obtain permission to use the relevant discovery in the present case. 10X has already moved in the District of Massachusetts to modify the protective order in that case to permit the use of the confidential materials from the Massachusetts Case in this Court. 10X also plans to move in this Court to compel production of the relevant information upon receiving guidance from the Court on the preferred procedures. See Ex. 1, Massachusetts Case, D.I. 197 (Dec 8, 2020, Motion to Modify Protective Order) (“Massachusetts Motion”); Ex. 2, Massachusetts Case, D.I. 198 (Dec. 9, 2020, Memorandum in Support) (“Massachusetts Memo.”). If 10X obtains permission to use the relevant documents in this case, 10X will promptly file a Rule 3 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 7 of 19 PageID #: 45510 60 motion. The stay 10X seeks simply preserves the status quo while the discovery dispute and the Rule 60 dispute are resolved. The discovery that 10X seeks to use from the Massachusetts court or this Court is also relevant to the question of ongoing royalties that Bio-Rad has informed 10X it will be pursuing. Bio-Rad’s beliefs regarding the appropriate royalty rate for the entire RainDance portfolio, Bio- Rad’s beliefs about the comparability of other licenses, Bio-Rad’s post-verdict licenses, and the absence of competition between Bio-Rad and 10X due to Bio-Rad’s failings are all relevant to the post-verdict hypothetical negotiation between Bio-Rad and 10X that will be at issue. Bio-Rad has not agreed to the use of the relevant Massachusetts Case discovery in this case. Thus, 10X is seeking a stay to obtain permission to use the information that pertains directly to the upcoming briefing in this case. A stay pending resolution of these motions will avoid payment of the fraudulently obtained judgment and will streamline outstanding briefing. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs asserted six microfluidics patents against 10X, three of which were ultimately presented to a jury. D.I. 559 at 2. As damages for the alleged infringement, Plaintiffs proposed a high 15% royalty rate allegedly for competitors based on allegedly comparable licenses. Ignoring over a dozen relevant licenses—including a license for the patents-in-suit with rates ranging from .25% to 3%—Plaintiffs’ damages expert relied on three cherry-picked licenses: a license from Applera to Bio-Rad with a 15% rate on sales of PCR instruments; a license from Caliper to RainDance with a 2% rate for non-competitive uses like RainDance’s and a hypothetical 15% competitive rate that RainDance never paid; and a license from AppliedBio to QuantaLife with a 10-15% rate for reagents for PCR technology. D.I. 559 at 28-33. Two of the three licenses were Bio-Rad licenses produced in litigation late, when Bio-Rad took over the case. Relevant to this 4 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 8 of 19 PageID #: 45511 motion, at trial, Bio-Rad adduced a battery of testimony meant to validate its reliance on the high 15% rate for the handful of RainDance patents it asserted rather than the lower rates that the preponderance of licenses taught would have been correct. Of central importance to this theme, Bio-Rad told a story about how it bought RainDance knowing that it would terminate all of that company’s products because all it wanted—and all it paid for—was RainDance’s patent portfolio. Further, Bio-Rad put forward testimony that within the patent portfolio the most valuable patents, the ones it primarily paid for, were the asserted ones. Despite the extremely limited discovery that was allowed into Bio-Rad’s actual information about the RainDance patents, Bio-Rad was confronted at trial with a key piece of evidence that the 15% rate was simply not correct—a fair value analysis performed by Grant Thornton that appeared to place the value of the entire RainDance portfolio much lower than the value Bio-Rad asked the jury to assign to just the handful of RainDance patents asserted in this case. Bio-Rad responded by dismissing that analysis as somehow inconsistent with the reasonable royalty both because it was a mere accounting exercise and because the actual royalty rate it supposedly implied was much higher than the rate it expressly stated. Without meaningful discovery into the licenses and the valuation process and with discovery from Bio-Rad severely curtailed following its acquisition of RainDance, 10X was unable to effectively impeach Bio-Rad’s naked assertions and the jury was left free to accept them. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and post-trial motions were resolved, the Court entered final judgment in the amount of $34,475,069 on August 15, 2019. D.I. 582. That judgment included the jury verdict award of $23,930,718 based on a 15% rate; $8,341,368 in supplemental damages through the date of the verdict; and $2,202,983 in interest. Id. The Court also issued an injunction. D.I. 578. But it severed and stayed the issue of what rate, if any, applies to ongoing royalties and whether it applies to consumables for instruments already sold; the Court 5 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 9 of 19 PageID #: 45512 reserved resolution of ongoing royalties issues pending appeal. D.I. 506 at 2; D.I. 578 at 5. 10X filed a supersedeas bond, which “remain[s] in full force and effect.” D.I. 605-1 at 1. In parallel to the appeal proceedings, 10X and Bio-Rad have been litigating a related patent infringement and antitrust action in the District of Massachusetts. In the Massachusetts Case, Bio- Rad has accused 10X of infringing certain patents to which—like the patents asserted in this case— Bio-Rad obtained exclusive rights when it bought RainDance. In the same case, 10X asserts patent infringement claims against Bio-Rad and also asserts that Bio-Rad has violated antitrust law including by buying RainDance, and aggregating the RainDance patent portfolio with the patents Bio-Rad already owned or controlled in order to anticompetitively raise the price of both of the combined portfolios. Discovery in that case has progressed while this case was on appeal before the Federal Circuit and it is continuing today. In connection with Bio-Rad’s claims for damages in that case, and in connection with 10X’s antitrust claims, 10X took discovery from Bio-Rad, key Bio-Rad personnel, numerous former Bio-Rad or former RainDance personnel, and from Grant Thornton and the former Grant Thornton principal who was responsible for the Grant Thornton analysis that Bio-Rad had dismissed during trial of this case. The discovery 10X has taken in Massachusetts—discovery that was not available to 10X in this case—contradicts the core assertions Bio-Rad made at trial in this case to support its 15% royalty rate. Discovery in the Massachusetts Case has revealed that Bio-Rad’s damages demand at trial in this case was a studied edifice of false and misleading claims that Bio-Rad’s concealment of myriad essential facts deprived 10X of important defenses for itself. Based on these discoveries, 10X intends to file a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(d) for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party. Because the evidence supporting the Rule 60 motion is presently subject to 6 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 10 of 19 PageID #: 45513 a protective order in the District of Massachusetts, and because Bio-Rad has refused to agree that the information can be used in the present case, 10X has moved to modify the protective order in Massachusetts for permission to use the information in the present case. Exs. 1-2, Massachusetts Case, D.I. 197-98. 10X will also file a motion to compel production of the relevant information pending instructions from the Court about the Court’s preferred form and schedule of briefing. Gaining access to the documents 10X seeks is not burdensome. 10X already has the discovery. 10X merely needs permission to use it. Bio-Rad could at any time agree to the use of the discovery with a letter at zero cost to Bio-Rad. There is also no risk to Bio-Rad because 10X has proposed not that the discovery should be made public, but that it can be maintained under continuing confidentiality protections subject to further orders of the Court while being used in this proceeding. Bio-Rad’s refusal to agree to the use of existing discovery in the present case is contrary to Bio-Rad’s own insistence on cross-use over multiple cases. Bio-Rad even raised the issue of cross-use with this Court in another proceeding Bio-Rad filed against 10X, and this Court asked “wouldn’t that be a pretty easy thing to agree to.” Ex. 3, Case No. 18-01679-RGA, June 7, 2019, Scheduling Conference Tr. at 10. But it is Bio-Rad that now refuses to permit 10X to present the relevant evidence to this Court by attempting to cloak it in confidentiality protections of another case to avoid its pervasive false statements in this case from coming to light. That is not proper. III. ARGUMENT A. Execution Of Judgment Should Be Stayed Pending Resolution Of 10X’s Forthcoming Motion For Relief From Judgment 1. Discovery In Massachusetts Contradicts Key Positions Bio-Rad Took In The Present Case, And That Discovery Was Not Available In This Case For 10X To Use In Rebuttal At Trial Discovery in the Massachusetts Case revealed multiple examples of false and misleading 7 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 11 of 19 PageID #: 45514 statements on key issues going to Bio-Rad’s damages claims in this case. For example, at trial in this case, Ms. Tumolo, Bio-Rad’s Executive Vice President, testified that “you can’t practically do single cell without using droplets.” Trial Tr. at 133:25-134:17. This was an attempted to bolster the value of the asserted patents, which Bio-Rad alleged covered droplets. It is now public that three Bio-Rad witnesses have testified to the opposite in Massachusetts. 1 Ex. 4, Lebofsky Dep., 9:19-21, 54:10-19 (“there are practical ways to do single-cell WTA 3' analysis without droplets”); see also Ex. 5, Trauzzi Dep., 99:8-100:6, 101:9-15 (“there have been practical ways to do single- cell without droplets”); Ex. 6, Chia Dep., 95:19-24 (“[T]here are practical ways that don’t use droplets to do library prep for single-cells.”). Ms. Tumolo also testified at trial in this case that the “whole [RainDance] acquisition we viewed as an intellectual property acquisition” and “the value of the IP was $87 million.” Trial Tr. 138:3-12, 165:19-166:3, 179:17-180:17. This testimony was contradicted in the Massachusetts case. Bio-Rad’s counsel also represented to this Court that when Ms. Tumolo was “looking at the company [RainDance],” she expected “we’re going to disable the products or whatever you do, you know, to stop selling them” and told the CEO and likely the Board “the products aren’t very good.” Trial Tr. 49:4-25. But Ms. Tumolo also contradicted this claim in Massachusetts. In particular, her testimony in the Massachusetts Case was that Bio-Rad had not decided to “phase out” the RainDance products “prior to acquisition,” contradicting the argument that she had decided to stop selling the RainDance products before the acquisition. Ex. 7, Tumolo Dep., 83:1-84:23. Ms. Tumolo also submitted a declaration in this case to support Bio-Rad’s injunction that 1 While Bio-Rad permitted certain Massachusetts discovery to be filed publicly with 10X’s Massachusetts Motion, including that cited in this motion, Bio-Rad continued to shield and withhold other relevant discovery as confidential. 10X is not seeking to have the confidential information made public. 10X seeks only the permission to use the information in this Court under continued confidentiality protections. 8 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 12 of 19 PageID #: 45515 was fraught with inaccuracies. For example, Ms. Tumolo’s declaration stated that “Bio-Rad has placed many single cell systems with hundreds of ‘single cell’ customers.” ECF No. 516, ¶¶ 3-7. But Bio-Rad admitted in Massachusetts that “fewer than 100 distinct entities have purchased ddSEQ instruments,” which are Bio-Rad’s single cell instruments. Ex. 8 (Response to Request for Admission No. 2). Ms. Tumolo’s declaration also asserted that 10X harmed Bio-Rad, such as through its early market entry. ECF No. 516, ¶¶ 3-7. But Bio-Rad’s corporate witness in Massachusetts on lost sales was “not aware of lost sales” and testified that Bio-Rad did not “need 10X to stop selling its WTA 3’ product in order to compete in the market.” Ex. 4, Lebofsky Dep., 91:17-23, 93:4-7; Ex. 9 (Ex. 1 Lebofsky Dep.); Ex. 10 (Sep. 14, 2020, email). Multiple witnesses also testified in Massachusetts to Bio-Rad’s failures to invest in research and development that would have been necessary to make competitive products. Mr. Lebofsky, Bio-Rad’s Associate Director of Advanced Research, testified in Massachusetts that he “did not feel that [Bio-Rad was] staffing for success” when ten people were on projects requiring thirty in November 2017. Ex. 4, Lebofsky Dep., 105:24-108:1, 140:12-141:18, 145:3-147:24, 151:17-24. The former Bio-Rad vice president in charge of ddSEQ, Dr. Agresti, was frustrated about “not setting the ddSEQ project up to succeed” and that Ms. Tumolo “wasn’t allocating enough resources.” Ex. 11, Agresti Dep., 7:13-18, 8:24-9:6, 80:13-81:5, 87:6-88:4, 90:11-21, 94:7-23, 99:1-25. Another Bio-Rad witness testified in Massachusetts that Bio-Rad did not make “a massive investment into the roadmap for ddSEQ,” but that 10X is “continually announcing and investing in new products[;] they are putting a massive amount of money into -- into R&D.” Ex. 5, Trauzzi Dep., 18:24-19:4, 20:21-21:20. Bio- Rad’s product has been unable to compete generally, not just against 10X’s product: the “best guess” of Bio-Rad’s Director of Marketing Strategy, Ms. Trauzzi, was that a third party’s product, Becton Dickinson’s Rhapsody, “has been more widely adopted than the [Bio-Rad] ddSEQ 9 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 13 of 19 PageID #: 45516 platform.” Id., 59:2-5. As another example, Ms. Tumolo offered testimony in this case to minimize the Grant Thornton analysis as taking “a conservative point of view because this is an accounting exercise.” Trial Tr. 180:2-3. That is directly contrary to multiple sources in the Massachusetts Case confirming that the rates in the Grant Thornton analysis were accurate and conveyed Bio-Rad’s views. See, e.g., Ex. 12, DiPanfilo Dep., 9:6-11:23, 13:4-8, 18:12-19:11, 38:9-39:11 (Grant Thornton analysis “is part of our financials that are reported to the SEC” and IRS and that Bio- Rad would have attempted to provide complete, accurate, and truthful information); Ex. 13, Tr. of GT004182, 49:3-5 (“[W]e prefer the number to accurately reflect our thinking. And we’re trying to explain that to you.”). The foregoing are only examples about which Bio-Rad has permitted certain limited evidence to become public. Bio-Rad cherry-picked the evidence it provided to 10X before trial in this case, and it continues to try to prevent 10X from using the information 10X has now obtained in other cases that shows the extent of Bio-Rad’s false and misleading statements at trial in this Court. Thus, there are additional confidential facts that 10X seeks access to so that it can present the full scope of the misrepresentations to this Court. For example, an important dispute at trial in the present case was the reasonable royalty, and Bio-Rad offered argument and testimony that 15% was the reasonable royalty for a handful of RainDance-licensed patents. E.g., Trial Tr., 611:18- 612:14 (expert: “the right royalty rates [sic] is 15% for competitors”), 1499:17-21 (closing: arguing there was a 15% rate for competitors). Discovery in the Massachusetts Case showed that Bio-Rad had actually concluded that the royalty rate for the entire RainDance patent portfolio was less than the rate Bio-Rad claimed for just a handful of those same patents in this case. Ex. 2, Massachusetts Memo. at 11-15. Discovery in Massachusetts has also revealed Bio-Rad’s outside-of-litigation 10 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 14 of 19 PageID #: 45517 belief that the license it has argued to the jury is comparable, the Applera license, is not comparable, and that at least one license that Bio-Rad argued to the jury is not comparable, the Life Technologies license, is the real comparator. Id., at 7. But Bio-Rad continues to assert information about its previous views on the rate is confidential and that 10X cannot use those facts even confidentially in this case. Bio-Rad adduced testimony at trial in this case that even though RainDance had no single cell or linked read products like 10X’s, it was going to “bring[] them and showed they planned on doing it in competition.” Trial Tr., 651:14-652:19. The evidence in the Massachusetts Case is again to the contrary, but the evidence itself is again subject to Bio-Rad’s confidentiality claim and Bio-Rad will not permit its use in this case. 2. A Stay Is Appropriate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) authorizes the Court to stay execution of judgment where, as here, a bond is in effect. Rule 62(b) broadly states that “[a]t any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security.” The Comments to the 2018 Amendment reinforce that “[a] stay may be obtained under subdivision (b) at any time after judgment is entered.” The comments go on to explain that the language of the rule was changed to permit “a party” to obtain a stay instead of “an appellant,” and specifically that “a party may wish to secure a stay pending disposition of post-judgment proceedings after expiration of the automatic stay, not yet knowing whether it will want to appeal.” 10X wishes to secure a stay pending the disposition of the post-judgment proceedings that will commence shortly before this Court. This Court also has “the power to stay proceedings,” which “is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “[T]he decision of whether to grant a stay rests within the sound discretion of the court through the exercise of judgment, ‘weigh[ing] competing interests and maintain[ing] an even balance.”’ 11 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 15 of 19 PageID #: 45518 Husqvarna AB v. Toro Co., No. 15-856-SLR, 2016 WL 5213904, at 1 (D. Del. Sep. 20, 2016). In determining whether to grant a stay, courts in this district typically consider (1) “whether a stay will unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party, i.e., the balance of harms,” (2) “whether a stay will simplify the issues in question,” and (3) “whether a stay will promote judicial economy.” Id. First, the balance of harms favors a stay. Requiring 10X to satisfy a judgment procured by fraud and misrepresentation would cause gross inequity. Similarly, requiring 10X to pay on a judgment with no opportunity to be heard as to whether it was obtained by fraud based on the presently available evidence is also a significant harm. The stay is particularly warranted in this case because otherwise 10X is presently subject to a judgment based on these false statements with no access in the present case to much of the discovery that would permit 10X to show that falsity. By contrast, Bio-Rad suffers no undue prejudice or tactical disadvantage. Bio-Rad’s interest in collecting any proper award is fully protected by the bond 10X posted, which “remain[s] in full force and effect.” D.I. 605-1 at 1. The judgment provides for daily interest in the amount of $1,681 per day, which more than compensates Bio-Rad for any delay. D.I. 582. The injunction also remains in place as further protection of Bio-Rad against any alleged non-monetary harm. As 10X’s forthcoming Rule 60 motion will show,2 and as described briefly in the preceding section, relief from judgment is warranted, and there is no clear tactical disadvantage in permitting 10X to be heard before it pays on the judgment at issue. If a stay on execution remains in effect, Bio-Rad 2 10X has proceeded with diligence in filing for relief from judgment. 10X did not discover the underlying fraud, nor could it have, until well into discovery (which is still ongoing) in the District of Massachusetts Case. 10X then began the process of meeting and conferring with Bio-Rad, and after determining Bio-Rad would not agree to permit the evidence to be used in this case, moved in the District of Massachusetts and this Court to present the information here. 12 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 16 of 19 PageID #: 45519 would be in no worse position than it is in now—and “a district court does not abuse its discretion by extending a stay to maintain the status quo.” Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., No. 15- 1031, 2020 WL 5095442, at 1 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2020). Additionally, a stay would simplify the issues and promote judicial economy. If judgment is executed and the Court determines relief from judgment is warranted, it would then have to direct the parties through the process of clawing back and redistributing the judgment. There will be additional efficiencies to staying judgment pending resolution of the Rule 60 proceedings because such proceedings can occur around the same time as the ongoing royalty briefing, which will likely involve some of the same discovery 10X seeks and some of the same issues. While there is no cost to staying execution, doing so offers the efficiency gain of streamlining the post- appeal proceedings. The Court should thus grant a stay of execution of judgment pending resolution of 10X’s forthcoming Rule 60 motion. B. Briefing On Ongoing Royalties Should Be Stayed Pending Further Discovery The Court should stay briefing on ongoing royalties pending resolution of either 10X’s forthcoming Motion to Compel or 10X’s Massachusetts Motion to modify the protective order. For similar reasons to those described above, this Court has the power to manage its docket in the interest of efficiency and equity. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254 (describing such inherent authority); see also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1) (empowering court to extend time for good cause). Both those goals counsel in favor of a stay on briefing pending the resolution of either the motion to compel that is forthcoming in this case pending guidance from the Court on the preferred form and schedule of briefing, or proceedings to modify the protective order in the District of Massachusetts. As this Court has recognized, post-remand damages determination involves a post-verdict hypothetical negotiation analysis. Vectura Limited v. Glaxosmithkline LLC, No. 16-00638-RGA, 13 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 17 of 19 PageID #: 45520 D.I. 362 at 13 (D. Del. Sep. 12, 2019) (J. Andrews). This analysis includes assessment of changed economic circumstances and any ‘“other post-verdict’ factor that would impact ‘what a hypothetical negotiation would look like after the prior infringement verdict.”’ Id. As described in the preceding section , discovery from Massachusetts related to the royalty rate, significance of the Grant Thornton analysis, and the value of the RainDance patents—whether it shows fraud or not—is relevant to the hypothetical negotiation that would occur between 10X and Bio-Rad. Bio-Rad has entered into a license with 1CellBio, a company making droplet products, after the verdict. Ex. 14 Massachusetts Case, D.I. 74-7. Such post-verdict licenses are relevant to determining ongoing royalties, and 10X should be permitted to rely on the non-public information about the 1CellBio license and its terms. Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 04-00876-GMS, D.I. 439 at 6- 9 (D. Del. Apr. 14, 2014). The requested stay would permit the merits of the motion to compel or the Massachusetts Motion to be resolved before 10X needs to brief an issue to which the discovery is relevant. Information about Bio-Rad’s failed market position is also relevant to the hypothetical negotiation. While the hypothetical negotiation at trial was between RainDance and 10X, the post- verdict hypothetical negotiation would be between Bio-Rad and 10X. This is particularly relevant because at trial in the present case Bio-Rad’s expert witnesses and counsel relied upon a license with a “15 percent” rate “when there’s competition,” and “when there was non-competition was 2 percent.” Trial Tr. 625:5-20, 1168:18-1169:24, 1499:17-21, 1501:7-21. If 10X and Bio-Rad are not competitors in the post-verdict hypothetical negotiation, Bio-Rad should no longer obtain the supposed competitor licensing rate. Thus, the evidence from Massachusetts is even more relevant now, is available at no additional cost, and should be allowed. In addition to the reasons in Section 14 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 18 of 19 PageID #: 45521 III(A)(I) for why 10X and Bio-Rad do not compete, other evidence from the Massachusetts case confirmed the same, and only some of it is public. For example, Bio-Rad’s Director of Marketing Strategy, Ms. Trauzzi, testified in Massachusetts that “Bio-Rad to my knowledge has never had a significant presence in the single-cell NGS market” and has a market share “around 1 percent.” Ex. 5, Trauzzi Dep., 84:8-15. Ms. Tumolo testified at trial in this case that Bio-Rad would “leapfrog” 10X’s technology in 2019. D.I. 516, ¶¶ 3-7; Trial Tr., 134:18-135:15. But discovery in Massachusetts showed that no such new product was released; only a single new assay was released; and Bio-Rad was “falling short of what [they] were trying to achieve” with the project. Ex. 4, Lebofsky Dep., 147:10-13, 149:4-7; 149:15-150:15. 10X needs access to the full set of evidence from Massachusetts related to the market and competition to fairly defend against claims for an ongoing royalty, which have yet to be briefed. Not only would it be more efficient to stay briefing until the relevant facts have been introduced into this record, but it would also permit an equitable result. Proceeding before a full airing of the facts risks forcing 10X to pay royalties based on inaccurate and fraudulent representations. This Court should therefore grant 10X’s motion to stay briefing of ongoing royalties. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, 10X respectfully requests that the Court stay execution of judgment pending resolution of motions for relief from judgment and that the Court stay briefing on ongoing royalties pending the resolution of the motion to compel or motion to modify the protective order. 15 Case 1:15-cv-00152-RGA Document 619 Filed 12/10/20 Page 19 of 19 PageID #: 45522 Of Counsel: RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A. ORRICK HERRINGTON & /s/ Frederick L. Cottrell, III SUTCLIFFE LLP Frederick L. Cottrell, III (#2555) Jason J. Rawnsley (#5379) E. Joshua Rosenkranz Alexandra M. Ewing (#6407) (jrosenkranz@orrick.com) 920 North King Street Melanie L. Bostwick Wilmington, DE 19801 (mbostwick@orrick.com) (302) 651-7550 Elizabeth R. Moulton (emoulton@orrick.com) cottrell@rlf.com 51 West 52nd Street rawnsley@rlf.com New York, NY 10019-6142 ewing@rlf.com (212) 506-5380 TENSEGRITY LAW GROUP LLP Attorneys for 10X Genomics, Inc. Matthew Powers (matthew.powers@tensegritylawgroup.com) Azra Hadzimehmedovic (azra@tensegritylawgroup.com) Robert Gerrity (robert.gerrity@tensegritylawgroup.com) 555 Twin Dolphin Drive Suite 650 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 (650) 802-6000 DATED: December 10, 2020 16
en	caselaw	US	205 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2000) ALLEN BREAUX AND JOE AMBROGIO, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Appellants,v.CITY OF GARLAND, ET AL, Defendants,CITY OF GARLAND, Defendant-Appellee,TERRY HENSLEY AND RON HOLIFIELD Defendants-Appellants.UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 98-10638 February 23, 2000 [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas Before JONES and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, District Judge. EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge: 1 This case involves the First Amendment retaliation claims of two police officers against the City of Garland ("City"), its former Police Chief, and its former City Manager. Officers Allen Breaux and Joe Ambrogio (the "Plaintiffs") argue that Terry Hensley and Ron Holifield (the "individual Defendants"), and later the City, violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 by retaliating against the Plaintiffs for making public allegations of corruption in the Garland Police Department. 2 The jury found the individual Defendants liable, and even after a large remittitur was accepted by the Plaintiffs, the district court entered judgment exceeding $8 million, plus attorneys' fees, for the Plaintiffs. Both sides have appealed. We conclude that the judgment is fatally flawed because the Plaintiffs failed to prove that official retaliation against them was sufficiently serious to constitute a constitutional injury. No other reversible error has been raised. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3 This case is factually complex, as evidenced by the parties' continuing disagreement about what happened in the City of Garland and the Garland Police Department between 1992 and 1994. The following review of the facts is guided by the jury verdict favoring Breaux and Ambrogio. In the beginning of 1992, the City hired Holifield as its City Manager. The Garland City Council instructed Holifield to hire a new police chief from outside the department. Holifield ultimately hired Hensley, who started working for the City in April 1992. During the summer of 1992, Hensley contacted the FBI's Dallas office to discuss possible land acquisitions and flips made by members of the City administration. 4 In October 1992, Hensley met FBI Agent Largent, the supervisor of the white collar crime squad for public corruption, to discuss the land deals over lunch. Two other Garland police officers, Jody Lay ("Lay") and Larry Wilson ("Wilson"), were present at this meeting. During the conversation, it became clear that the FBI was beginning to investigate the possible involvement of some current and former council members in two City of Garland real estate transactions. According to Wilson, Hensley conducted the meeting and told the FBI agent who and what Hensley wanted investigated. The subjects included former Garland mayor Billy Earl Tomlinson ("Tomlinson"); former City Councilman James Ratliff ("Ratliff"); and Garland Councilman Vernon Gaston ("Gaston").1 Lay continued to assist the FBI until late 1992 when Officer Joe Harn("Harn") took over for Lay. The FBI initiated a second investigation concerning possible Garland public corruption in relation to a landfill deal between the City and Waste Management, Inc., which was allegedly brokered by Ratliff and Gaston. 5 During the summer of 1992, Hensley put Lay in charge of the Intelligence Unit of the Department. Hensley told Lay that he was concerned about the current direction of the Unit as well as the performance of the two officers in the Unit. Hensley was particularly concerned with Breaux, who Hensley thought devoted too much of his time to Asian gangs. Lay apparently shared these concerns; in a September 11, 1992, memo to Hensley, Lay requested that Breaux be transferred out of the Intelligence Unit. 6 Breaux was then a 20-year veteran officer. Officer Breaux testified that he asked to be transferred back to patrol duty after Lay informed him, during a truck ride in the country, that Hensley and Lay "were redirectionalizing the Intelligence Unit to start doing political investigations for Charlie Hinton, the city attorney, and members of the city council."2 Breaux was unwilling to engage in "political investigations" instituted by the new police chief. Although Breaux contemporaneously reported his conversation with Lay to Lieutenant David Swavey, he did not otherwise pursue the matter. 7 After being transferred out of the Intelligence Unit, Breaux remained on patrol duty until late 1993. In November 1993, Breaux received a poor performance review from his supervisor and was assigned to front desk duty at the Department.3 8 In the Spring of 1994, Officer Breaux, newly-elected vice-president of the Garland Police Officers Association ("GPOA"), told Detective Ambrogio, the GPOA president, about the previous attempt to recruit him for political investigations. Shortly thereafter, the GPOA conducted a survey of all Department employees to identify morale problems and to determine how to overcome any such problems. Upon learning of the survey, Chief Hensley became very upset and upbraided Ambrogio about it. 9 In March 1994, Holifield met with the GPOA Board to discuss the survey. During this meeting, Breaux first revealed to the City Manager the alleged illegal political investigations being run by Chief Hensley. Breaux also told Holifield that the station was wired so that a former police chief could monitor any telephone conversation in the building. The GPOA Board members were concerned that someone might try to monitor their calls after the results of the survey were published. After Breaux mentioned the alleged investigations, Holifield immediately ordered that any ongoing investigations were to remain confidential. Holifield also expressed his concern with GPOA tactics and allegedly threatened to "destroy" the GPOA if it acted "politically" with respect to these allegations or the survey results. But Holifield offered to work with the GPOA if the GPOA would keep politics out of the Department. With the apparent approval of Breaux and Ambrogio, Holifield agreed to investigate the GPOA allegations. Toward this end, Holifield reported the allegations to Hensley. 10 At this point, the retaliation began. Hensley informed Lay of the allegations of politically motivated investigations, and Hensley brought an Internal Affairs charge, investigation I/A 94-12, against Breaux for making false statements -- about the investigations. 11 Soon thereafter, Holifield discovered that film was missing from a secret camera, which had been installed in his office to catch suspected intruders. Realizing that police officers would recognize the hidden camera and knowing that the GPOA Board had been in his office for the March 1994 meeting, Holifield told Hensley about the missing film. Hensley initiated Internal Affairs investigation I/A 94-13 against all the GPOA Board members to determine if they had stolen the film.4 12 Detective Ambrogio, on the advice of a lawyer from the Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas ("CLEAT"), then held a press conference, where he, the lawyer, and a City Councilman who was one of the targets of the alleged investigations, made expansive allegations about illegal political investigations being conducted by Hensley and Holifield.5 Relying on statements made by Breaux during the meeting in Holifield's office, Ambrogio and the others also alleged that the Department was conducting electronic surveillance of its employees since the phones in the Department were bugged. The CLEAT attorney, Bob Hasty, went so far as to inquire whether there is "in fact, a Gestapo type of ... secret intelligence organization that is doing political investigations of police officers."6 Hasty further propagated Breaux's allegations in letters to law enforcement authorities in the state. These public statements led to another Internal Affairs investigation, I/A 94-14, which focusedon Ambrogio's possible violation of several General Orders of the police department. Investigators recommended that the charges in 94-14 be sustained and the Chain of Command Board agreed. 13 As part of the investigations, Breaux and Ambrogio were both questioned on several occasions, and Breaux was required to take a polygraph administered by the Department. The Internal Affairs investigations concluded that Breaux and Ambrogio had lied in making their allegations of corruption. Hensley publicly posted the results of the investigations in the Department and made the results available to several local media outlets, leading everyone in the department to know the Plaintiffs were "in trouble." Breaux was also required to undergo a psychiatric exam following comments he made to another officer while en route to the Department polygraph test.7 14 Following the various interviews, Internal Affairs investigations, and polygraphs, Breaux was placed on paid administrative leave. In May 1994, Hensley called each Plaintiff into his office separately, telling each that he could keep his job if he accepted a short suspension and signed a letter, the terms of which were to be mutually agreed to, retracting all of his allegations. Both men refused the agreement offered by Hensley. Hensley took no further action with respect to Breaux and Ambrogio. 15 Later in May, Ratliff was elected mayor of Garland. An ally of those whom Hensley had been investigating, Ratliff caused both Chief Hensley and City Manager Holifield to resign. In the few months following Hensley's resignation, the new Acting Police Chief Barnett "non-sustained" the Internal Affairs charges against Breaux and Ambrogio. Nevertheless, after returning from his paid administrative leave in July 1994, Breaux was assigned to the Telephone Response Unit ("TRU"). Breaux contends that Lay was a friend of Barnett's and that Barnett thought Breaux should be punished with this assignment. (According to the City, Breaux was assigned to the TRU, a position similar to the one he had at the front desk, in order to accommodate his shift preferences.) Breaux subsequently wrote to Barnett complaining about his assignment to the TRU and requesting a transfer back to patrol duty. Chief Barnett granted Breaux's request, and Breaux returned to patrol duty in November 1994. 16 Neither Breaux nor Ambrogio suffered a reduction in pay. Both remain employed by the City of Garland. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 17 In October 1994, Breaux and Ambrogio filed suit against the City, Holifield, and Hensley alleging that the defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to free speech and free association. Breaux also alleged that the City violated the Texas Whistleblower Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 544.001, et seq., by retaliating against him for reporting wrongdoing involving Holifield and Hensley. The case was removed from state to federal court. 18 Responding to serial motions for summary judgment by the City, the district court first held that the statute of limitations barred all of the Whistleblower Act claims except for Breaux's claim that his assignment to the TRU in July 1994 was in retaliation for reporting possible political investigations. Later, the district court granted summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' 1983 claim against the City on the ground that Hensley and Holifield did not have "final policy-making authority" for the City with respect to "police officer employment decisions." 19 After a seven-day trial, the jury found Hensley and Holifield individually liable under 1983, ordering actual damages against each defendant for each Plaintiff in amounts exceeding a half million dollars. Each individual Defendant was also ordered to pay $5,000,000 in punitive damages to each Plaintiff. The City was found liable to Breaux under the Whistleblower Act for $527,500 in actual damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. The total award to both Plaintiffs amounted to $27,707,012. 20 The court entered judgment on the verdict but then responded to various post-judgment motions. The district court granted the City's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on the Whistleblower Act claim, holding that Breaux had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court also found that the jury's findings of lost earning capacity and part of the award to Breaux for lost past income were not supported by the evidence. The court accordingly reduced the actual damages, proportionally reduced the punitive damages, and required a remittitur from the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs accepted the remittitur. As a result, Breaux and Ambrogio were awarded, jointly and severally from the Defendants, $6,258.75 and $2,256 respectively for past lost income, and severally from each defendant $150,000 for lost reputation, $50,000 for mental anguish, and $2,000,000 as punitive damages. The Amended Judgment dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against the City with prejudice and awarded total damagesin the amount of $4,406,258.75 to Breaux and $4,402,256 to Ambrogio, plus post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees, and expenses and costs. 21 Hensley and Holifield contend on appeal that (1) the Plaintiffs' speech is false or reckless as to its truth or falsity and therefore not constitutionally protected (or at least they reasonably could have believed it was unprotected), (2) neither Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the damages are excessive. Breaux contends on cross-appeal that he did properly exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Whistleblower Act.8 III. ANALYSIS A. Chief Hensley 22 The jury was persuaded that Breaux and Ambrogio became the objects of a vendetta by Chief Hensley and City Manager Holifield, once they blew the whistle on politically-motivated investigations of Garland City Council members by the City's top employees. No doubt the jury was powerfully influenced by the corroborating testimony of Wilson and Ratliff, who (in the wake of the officers' allegations) had become Chief of Police and Mayor, respectively. 23 This finding is, however, not the end of the matter. In order to establish a constitutional claim for retaliation against the exercise of one's First Amendment rights, four elements must be shown: 24 First, the Plaintiffs must suffer an adverse employment decision. Second, the Plaintiffs' speech must involve a matter of public concern. Third, the Plaintiffs' interest in commenting on matters of public concern must outweigh the Defendants' interest in promoting efficiency. Fourth, the Plaintiffs' speech must have motivated the Defendants' action. 25 Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 26 A major dispute between the parties throughout this litigation has persisted over whether Plaintiffs' allegations of corrupt political investigations by Hensley and Holifield were false, and if so, whether false or reckless allegations merit First Amendment protection. This complaint is answered on one level by the precise wording of the jury charge. In arriving at a verdict for the Plaintiffs, the jury was required by the court's charge to find the Plaintiffs' allegations true.9 27 Hensley and Holifield nevertheless continue to label the allegations bogus and to assert that false allegations of corruption are constitutionally unprotected, but neither they nor their opponents address what standard of review we must employ concerning the jury verdict. In this circuit, several opinions refused to determine the standard of review because of uncertainty as to whether First Amendment rights raise a legal question or a mixed question of law and fact. See Brady, 145 F.3d at 708 n.7 (citing cases). In one recent case, however, this court cited a de novo standard for First Amendment claims and then reversed a jury verdict favoring retaliation plaintiffs. Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365. As Harrington assumed arguendo that plaintiffs' speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, the offhand invocationof a de novo standard of review made no difference on that issue. 28 Like its predecessors, this opinion will not have to resolve the uncertainty over the standard of review, and the issue may be deferred again for a future panel. As in Harrington, we assume arguendo that the evidence supports the jury's finding that the Plaintiffs reported truthful allegations of public corruption in the police department. Truthful allegations of such a nature implicate matters of public concern.10 The only question then remaining is whether Officers Breaux and Ambrogio suffered adverse employment actions after the March 1994 meeting with Holifield and the subsequent press conference when they spoke out.11 Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365.12 29 Fifth Circuit caselaw, some of which post-dates the trial in this case, is inconsistent with Breaux's and Ambrogio's contention that they suffered actionable adverse employment actions. "Adverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands." Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994). Transfers can constitute adverse employment actions if they are sufficiently punitive, see id. at 1150, or if the new job is markedly less prestigious and less interesting than the old one, see Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992). This court has "declined to expand the list of actionable actions, noting that some things are not actionable even though they have the effect of chilling the exercise of free speech." Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376 (5th Cir. 1998)(citing Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1150). The reason for not expanding the list of adverse employment actions is to ensure that 1983 does not enmesh federal courts in "relatively trivial matters." Dorsett v. Board of Trustees, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991). For example, in the education context, this court has held that "'decisions concerning teaching assignments, pay increases, administrative matters, and departmental procedures,' while extremely important to the person who dedicated his or her life to teaching, do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation." Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365 (quoting Dorsett, 940 F.2d at 123). 30 Given the narrow view of what constitutes an adverse employment action, this court has held that the following are not adverse employment actions: (1) mere accusations or criticism, see Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366; (2) investigations, see Pierce,37 F.3d at 1150; (3) psychological testing, see Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 376; (4) false accusations, see Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 511 (5th Cir. 1999); and (5) polygraph examinations that do not have adverse results for the plaintiff, see Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1150. 31 The foregoing legal framework makes clear why Breaux and Ambrogio have not suffered any adverse employment actions. Hensley ordered Internal Affairs investigations of Breaux and Ambrogio after they made allegations of illegal political investigations, but, as Pierce and Colson hold, investigating alleged violations of departmental policies and making purportedly false accusations are not adverse employment actions. See Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1150; Colson, 174 F.3d at 511; see also Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 376. Hensley's requiring Breaux to undergo a psychological exam after Breaux's intemperate remark to a fellow employee also is not an adverse employment action. See Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 376. Although Breaux was placed on administrative leave from late April to July 1994, Breaux was paid while on leave and returned to his pre-leave position.13 Thus, Breaux suffered no adverse action with respect to the leave. See Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 378 (plaintiff did not suffer adverse employment action when promotion was delayed two years in response to her exercising her free speech rights because she eventually received the promotion with retroactive pay and seniority). Similarly, any criticism, such as Hensley's oral threats or abusive remarks, does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. See Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366. 32 More troubling are Chief Hensley's public posting of the findings of the Internal Affairs investigation and his attempt to get Breaux and Ambrogio to sign resignation letters. Although posting the results of the Internal Affairs investigation in the station may have comported with Departmental regulations, Hensley's disseminating that information to the media went "several steps beyond a criticism or accusation and even beyond a mere investigation" and was "punitive in a way that mere criticisms, accusations, and investigations are not." Colson, 174 F.3d at 512 n.7. The reprimands went, at least temporarily, on Breaux's and Ambrogio's permanent records. 33 However, this court recognizes that a rescinded reprimand does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action: "[if] the reprimand was rescinded through internal [Houston Police Department] procedures ... [it] does not constitute an adverse employment action." Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 377. After becoming Chief of Police, Barnett "non-sustained" the charges against Breaux and Ambrogio. The Plaintiffs contend that "an after-the-fact, unpublicized correction could not and did not undo the injury that Hensley's earlier reprimand caused." But the record does not indicate what employment injury the Plaintiffs have suffered. Breaux and Ambrogio are in a position similar to that of the law professors in Harrington. See Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366. Neither Plaintiff has been discharged from the Garland Police Department. Neither Plaintiff has been demoted, denied a promotion, suffered a reduction in pay, or lost seniority as a result of his speech. In fact, the only parties to the present suit who have lost their jobs are Hensley and Holifield. Thus, Chief Barnett's non-sustaining the charges through internal procedures precluded an adverse employment result.14 34 The Plaintiffs also contend that Hensley's attempts to get them to recant their allegations constitute threats of discharge which, under Harrington and Click, are adverse employment actions.15 However, Harrington and Click do not establish that a threat of discharge is itself sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. In summarizing the evidence, the Harrington court said only that "the evidence is clear that no Plaintiff has been discharged or threatened with discharge...." 118 F.3d at 366. Not only was the court not defining the requirements for making out a successful retaliation claim under 1983, but the court was explaining that the plaintiffs' retaliation claims must fail because the plaintiffs suffered no adverse consequences for exercising their speech rights. 35 In Click, the court principally discussed whether transfers that were effectively demotions, as opposed to threats of discharge, were actionable. As the Click court stated, the government "'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests -- especially, his interest in freedom of speech.'" 970 F.2d at 109 (quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2697 (1972)) (emphasis added). Some benefit must be denied or some negative consequence must impinge on the Plaintiff's employment before a threat of discharge is actionable.16 36 Click also stated that "even the threat of discharge can be a potent means of chilling the exercise of constitutional rights." Click, 970 F.2d at 109. For this purpose, Click referred to the Supreme Court's analysis in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (1968). Pickering does not, however, state that a threat of discharge alone will suffice for a First Amendment retaliation claim. The facts before the Court involved not a threat, but the actual dismissal of a teacher for writing a letter to a newspaper critical of the local school board. In the statement quoted above by Click, the Supreme Court was comparing dismissals of public employees with criminal sanctions and damage awards for defamation, two other devices that had been used to penalize the exercise of free speech rights -- before the Supreme Court outlawed them.17 Had the Court not spokenin Pickering, and prevented retaliatory dismissals for exercise of First Amendment rights, threats of dismissals could chill constitutional rights because they could be backed up. As the law stands now, retaliatory threats are just hot air unless the public employer is willing to endure a lawsuit over a termination. Pickering's (and by extension, Click's) reference to threats of termination illustrated the problem if threats could be realized; the Court did not hold or imply that threats of termination alone, in a post-Pickering world in which retaliatory discharge is outlawed, would generate liability. 37 Breaux contends that his transfer to the Telephone Response Unit ("TRU") was similar to the transfer that was found in Click to be an adverse employment action. Although initially compelling, this argument is without merit on a closer look at the record. First, Breaux was assigned to the TRU by Barnett only after Hensley had been fired. The record does not show that Hensley caused Breaux to be transferred. Second, since Breaux was already on front desk duty, the transfer did not constitute a punitive action by the department. Although Breaux felt that the TRU was a step down, "'a plaintiff's subjective perception that a demotion has occurred is not enough' to constitute an adverse employment decision." Harris, 168 F.3d at 221 (quoting Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1996)). At trial, Chief Wilson, the Plaintiffs' first witness, testified that the TRU assignment is not viewed as punishment in the Garland Police Department and that the TRU carries out an important function within the Department. Thus, since the transfer is not traceable to Hensley and is a position similar to front desk duty, the transfer does not constitute an adverse employment action. 38 Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that, even if the individual actions taken by Hensley do not constitute an adverse employment action, the aggregate of these actions constitutes a "vengeful vendetta" actionable under 1983. For this idea, the Plaintiffs cite only Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1990), which observed: "Although it may be difficult to delimit exactly what conduct, in the abstract, violates a public employee's first amendment rights, a vengeful vendetta seeking an employee's job because of his speech on a matter of public concern surely falls within the ambit." Id. at 470. But Thompson is not as broad as the Plaintiffs suggest. The constituent acts and the final result of the vendetta were worse than most of the alleged retaliatory actions by Hensley: The defendants accused the plaintiff police officer of committing a burglary, alleged that he threatened another officer, caused the plaintiff to be disciplined more severely than other officers for the same offense, and ultimately were instrumental in having him fired. See id. at 469. 39 Thompson is thus consistent with this court's holding in Colson. In Colson, this court evaluated when a campaign of retaliatory harassment amounted to an adverse employment action. To be actionable, "the campaign of retaliatory harassment [must] rise to such a level as to constitute a constructive adverse employment action." Id. at 514. The court explained "constructive adverse employment action" by reference to two cases. The court held that in Sharp the plaintiff was "constructively demoted ... because the defendants created an 'intolerable situation' causing her to transfer to a less desirable position." Id. (quoting Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1999)). The Colson Court also relied upon Benningfield. 174 F.3d at 513. Although one plaintiff in Benningfield resigned as a result of a campaign of harassment, the court held that a reasonable person in her position would not have felt compelled to resign.Since Breaux and Ambrogio still have their jobs with the Department and have neither been demoted nor transferred to less desirable positions, they have failed to show that the Defendants' actions amounted to a constructive or actual adverse employment action. B. City Manager Holifield 40 Despite Holifield's limited interaction with the Plaintiffs, the jury found Holifield liable under 1983 for over $4 million in damages. On appeal, Holifield argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that, as required by the language of 1983, he "cause[d]" the Plaintiffs to be subjected to First Amendment violations. As noted, whether the Plaintiffs alleged any adverse employment actions by Holifield is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365. 41 In "assessing an individual supervisor's liability under 1983," this circuit applies the City of Canton standard of municipal liability. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc). Under this standard, a supervisor is liable under 1983 only if (1) his conduct directly causes a constitutional violation or (2) the plaintiffs can show that the supervisor was "deliberately indifferent" to a violation of a constitutional right. Id. at 454 n.8. (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 388 n.8, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 n.8 (1989)). 42 Holifield did not cause the Plaintiffs to suffer a violation of their First Amendment rights. His direct contact with the Plaintiffs was limited. During the March 1994 meeting with the GPOA Board members, Holifield threatened to "destroy" the GPOA if the group acted politically within the department. With the assent of Breaux and Ambrogio, Holifield referred Breaux's allegations of politically-inspired investigations to Hensley. Holifield also notified Hensley that film was missing from the hidden camera in his office and suggested that one of the GPOA Board members, who had recently met with him there and could recognize the camera, might have stolen the film. 43 Internal Affairs investigations were commenced with respect to Breaux's allegations of corruption and the missing film. But, since neither of these investigations constitutes an adverse employment action, see Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 376, Holifield's role in initiating the investigations is not a sufficient "cause" to establish liability under 1983. See Heil v. Santoro, 147 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) ("There being no First Amendment violation in investigating, the reason for the investigation created no material issue to be tried."). Similarly, Holifield's criticism of and threat to destroy the GPOA are not adverse employment actions. See Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366. 44 The result is the same if Holifield's conduct is viewed from the perspective of his supervisory role. Liability is imposed only if he was deliberately indifferent to subordinates' violations of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Laying aside the question whether the city manager was a supervisor of anyone in the Police Department, the fact that Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were not actually infringed exonerates Hensley from supervisory liability. C. The City of Garland 1. Breaux's appeal 45 Breaux appeals the district court's summary judgment on his 1983 claim against the City and post-verdict judgment as a matter of law on his Whistleblower Act claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on all 1983 claims, holding that no injury was caused by a municipal policymaker. 46 Because of a short limitation period under the Whistleblower Act, Breaux's state law claim against the City is based solely upon his transfer to the TRU for several months in 1994. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law on the Whistleblower Act claim because Breauxfailed to exhaust his administrative remedies.18 Breaux contends that exhaustion was not required because the police department's Internal Affairs process did not allow for complaints against the Chief of Police, but, in the alternative, he did file such a complaint. This court reviews the district court's judgment as a matter of law de novo. Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1149. 47 The exhaustion requirement of the Texas Whistleblower Act is jurisdictional and, therefore, mandatory and exclusive. See Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998) ("It is true that a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction in the dispute ... [since] the exhaustion requirement seeks to assure that the appropriate body adjudicates the dispute -- the hallmark of a jurisdictional dispute."). Moreover, the Whistleblower Act requires "the employee to utilize all procedures in place for resolving disputes at the governmental entity." Gregg County v. Farrar, 933 S.W.2d 769, 775 (Tex. App. -- Austin 1996, writ denied). Contrary to Breaux's claim on appeal, the Internal Affairs process of the Garland Police Department is broad enough to encompass claims against the Chief of Police. Under General Order 76-29, the policy of Internal Affairs is to investigate "all complaints ... of misconduct of employees who are sworn police officers." General Order 76-29. Misconduct is defined to include a violation of the general orders of the Department. In response to the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law, Breaux characterized his complaint as being "that Chief Barnett and his subordinates were retaliating against him by transferring him to the TRU for 'blowing the whistle' on Barnett's allies, Hensley and Jody Lay."19 By alleging that the Chief of Police violated the Whistleblower Act, Breaux invoked both General Order 76-5, which subjects an officer to disciplinary action for violating state law, and General Order 76-29, which proscribes misconduct. The administrative remedy was available to Breaux. 48 Breaux argues, however, that the Internal Affairs process could not resolve complaints against the Chief of Police; filing a complaint with Internal Affairs would be futile since the Chief of Police determines whether an investigation should be initiated and ultimately reviews the results. In support of Breaux's claim, Chief Wilson testified that, "I would think if an officer had an accusation to make against the chief of police, it might be appropriate to go outside the Internal Affairs unit to do that ... [T]here's no guide book that says if you're going to accuse the chief of police of something follow steps one, two and three." 49 The district court rejected Breaux's argument. Texas courts have recognized a futility exception to exhaustion requirements in only a limited number of circumstances. See, e.g., Town of Sunnyvale v. Mayhew, 905 S.W.2d 234, 246 (Tex. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998); Methodist Hosps. of Dallas v. Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 874 S.W.2d 144, 149-50 (Tex. App. 1994, no writ). Since no Texas court has applied a futility exception to statutory, jurisdictional exhaustion requirements, the district court refused to "enlarge existing state law by adopting a futility exception to the Whistleblower Act's exhaustionrequirement." This court also refuses to create a futility exception under such circumstances. 50 The purposes of the exhaustion requirement are to give the employer notice of a grievance and a chance to resolve it. As the Texas Supreme Court recently noted, the exhaustion requirement demonstrates the legislature's "will to have the agency resolve disputed issues of fact and policy." Essenburg, 988 S.W.2d at 189. The fact that the Act allows an employee to file a civil suit if the employer has not resolved his complaint in 30 days shows that "the legislature intended that the governmental entity should be afforded the opportunity to correct its own errors by resolving disputes before being subjected to the expense and effort of litigation." Farrar, 933 S.W.2d at 775. 51 Even if the Department's procedures for filing a grievance against the Chief of Police were unclear, the exhaustion requirement still serves a notice-giving function. Texas courts have recognized a futility exception only in cases where it was impossible for the governmental agency to address an issue, e.g., the constitutionality of a statute.20 But here, requiring notice even if the available grievance procedures are not clearly delineated would have enabled the City either to develop a record for judicial review on fact questions (if not to resolve the dispute about the transfer) or possibly to mitigate Breaux's damages by transferring him out of the TRU sooner. To repeal exhaustion when grievance procedures are ambiguous would eliminate the notice-giving effect of the Act's exhaustion requirement, which has been held to supersede general presentment requirements.21 Id. at 773. Furthermore, requiring an employee to exhaust his remedies, which could delay a civil suit by only30 days, is hardly onerous or unfair. 52 In any event, the premise of Breaux's argument for the futility of exhaustion appears incorrect. General Order 76-29 permits Internal Affairs to investigate all complaints against any sworn police officer, thus including the Chief of Police. Under General Order 76-29, an officer can complain of misconduct to any supervisor, and "the complainant should be referred to Internal Affairs directly if possible." General Order 78-61 provides for a line of succession in command if the Chief of Police is determined to be incapacitated because, e.g., the Chief is recused from a matter due to a conflict of interest. As a result, the Internal Affairs process is equipped to handle a complaint against the Chief of Police or, at least, to provide the Department and the City with notice of an employee's potential claim. Because the Internal Affairs regulations do not preclude a complaint against the Chief andindeed contemplate the necessity of circumventing the Chief, and because the exhaustion requirement advances Texas' concern with giving employers notice, a futility exception to the Whistleblower Act exhaustion requirement is inappropriate. 53 Finally, Breaux contends that his letter to Chief Barnett, entitled "Request Consideration for Transfer," effectively initiated the Internal Affairs process for exhaustion purposes. General Order 76-29 provides that an officer's complaint may be "initiated by submitting a written memorandum to the Director of Police Services requesting an investigation and detailing the conduct being complained about." Breaux's letter stated that (1) he "was ordered into the TRU, against [his] will," (2) he "did not request assignment to this position," and (3) "the transfer was directly related to dictates of a previous police administrator." Breaux neither provided any details about retaliatory conduct nor requested an investigation into the transfer. At most, he requested that a written explanation be given if his request for a transfer were denied: "I am not aware of any reasons that would prohibit me from this requested transfer to an enforcement position in patrol; but if any exist, I would appreciate being advised in writing so that the issue could be confronted and resolved."22 His letter was insufficient to state a complaint under General Order 76-29 or to exhaust under the Whistleblower Act.23 2. Ambrogio's appeal 54 Ambrogio appeals only the taxing of some of the City's costs against him. In its May 8, 1998, Amended Judgment, the district court dismissed all claims against the City and taxed 40% of the City's costs of court against Ambrogio. This court reviews a district court's award of costs for an abuse of discretion. Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1991). 55 The taxation of costs is allowed "as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). In this case, the City clearly prevailed against Ambrogio. None of Ambrogio's claims against the City went to the jury, and he does not appeal the district court's pretrial dismissal of those claims. On appeal, Ambrogio does not explain how the district court abused its discretion in apportioning costs against him. IV. CONCLUSION 56 The police officers failed to make out a First Amendment retaliation claim. Even though they persuaded the jury, and we have assumed, that they truthfully spoke out to reveal political investigations of public officials, the exercise of First Amendment rights is not enough. The retaliation they complained of -- investigations, criticisms, public (but withdrawn) reprimands, psychological and polygraph testing, suspension with pay, transfer to the TRU -- do not, either individually or collectively, constitute adverse employment actions. The actions taken by Hensley and Holifield did not give rise to 1983 liability. For reasons previously explained, we have rejected the other issues raised on appeal. 57 This court reverses the judgment for the Plaintiffs on their 1983 claims against the individual Defendants and renders a take-nothing judgment against the Plaintiffs on these claims. We affirm the districtcourt's dismissal of the City as a Defendant and the taxing of costs against Ambrogio. 58 AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART. Notes: District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. 1 According to the Plaintiffs, Ratliff, Gaston, and Tomlinson were all close friends and political allies. Wilson was also a good friend of Tomlinson. The Plaintiffs contend that Hensley instructed the FBI to investigate these individuals because they were "political enemies" of Hensley. The Plaintiffs also assert that Holifield played a significant role in the FBI investigation by acting as a "confidential informant" for the FBI. Holifield participated in the investigation at the request of the FBI, before he made the statements that serve as the basis for the Plaintiffs' 1983 claim. 2 Lay contends that he went with Breaux to discuss Lay's recommendation in the memo. Lay maintains that during the ride he said only that the Unit would handle "high level 'public corruption' cases;" Lay denies any discussion of political investigations. 3 Breaux's supervisor reported that Breaux would not adequately enforce traffic laws because Breaux questioned the legality of (1) requiring people to have driver's licenses and (2) confiscating weapons. 4 After the March 1994 meeting in Holifield's office, Gaston admitted that someone had told him about the hidden camera, but Gaston refused to identify who it was. The investigation of all the officers present was narrowed to an investigation of Ambrogio for interfering with an investigation and revealing confidential information. Although the ensuing investigation failed to determine who stole the film, Ambrogio later admitted that he had made the unauthorized disclosure to Gaston. 5 Ambrogio first received notice that he would be questioned in I/A 94-13 on April 18, 1994. After consulting with the CLEAT attorney, Ambrogio called the GPOA press conference on April 20, 1994. 6 During the press conference, CLEAT and the GPOA requested an external investigation into the Department's activities. The Texas Rangers investigated Hensley's conduct in May 1994 and reported "a complete lack of evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Chief Hensley or his staff." At the request of Ratliff, the FBI also investigated Hensley's conduct. The FBI reached the same conclusion as the Texas Rangers. 7 Breaux told the officer that Breaux was surprised that someone had not already shot an Internal Affairs investigator between the eyes. 8 Other issues have been raised by the parties. We have considered them and conclude they are either meritless or subsumed by the dispositive issues. 9 More problematic is that the court also submitted to the jury the critical second and third elements of the retaliation claim. The second and third elements of the test outlined above examine whether a public employee's speech deserves First Amendment protection by balancing the nature of the speech, i.e. its relation to matters of public rather than purely personal concern, against the need of government entities as employers to maintain a harmonious, efficient workplace. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). District courts in this circuit have been predisposed to submit claims in this fashion, but, insofar as the second and third elements are questions of law, this court has expressed its concern about the practice. See Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 708 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998). 10 If the allegations of corruption are true, such allegations are matters of public concern and outweigh the government's interest in efficiency. See Teague v. City of Flower Mound, 179 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1999); Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The disclosure of misbehavior by public officials is a matter of public interest and therefore deserves constitutional protection, especially when it concerns the operation of a police department." (footnotes omitted)). 11 Defendants do not contest the fourth element of the retaliation claim identified in Harris. They acknowledge that Breaux and Ambrogio were subjected to various disciplinary actions because of their explosive allegations. 12 The jury found that Plaintiffs were retaliated against for exercising their First Amendment rights of free speech and association. This court's analysis focuses on the Plaintiffs' freedom of speech claims but applies equally to the freedom of association claims: "When a plaintiff's claims arise under both freedom of speech and freedom of association, as in the case at bar, the freedom of association claims are analyzed under the same Pickering balance test used to determine the success of the freedom of speech claims." Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1999). In this circuit, Harris sets out the requirements for First Amendment retaliation claims generally. The only difference between the requirements for a retaliation claim predicated on free speech and one predicated on free association is that the latter "is not subject to the threshold public concern requirement." Boddie v. City of Columbus, Mississippi, 989 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1993). As a result, the Plaintiffs' freedom of association claims fail for the same reason as their freedom of speech claims, namely the absence of an adverse employment action. 13 Breaux did not allege that his initial transfer out of the Intelligence Unit, made at his request, or his assignment to desk duty in November 1993 were retaliatory. It was not until March, 1994 that he first exercised his free speech rights by publicly alleging corruption. 14 The Plaintiffs' concern with the publication of the Internal Affairs investigations to the media suggests that they want to import defamation into the adverse employment prong of their retaliation claim. But the Plaintiffs have not made a defamation claim, nor is defamation part of the present 1983 action. Furthermore, this court has recognized that "[w]hen an employee retains his position even after being defamed by a public official, the only claim of stigma he has derives from the injury to his reputation, an interest that [Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976),] reveals does not rise to the level of" a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1977). Stigma by itself, without an impact on one's employment, does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1995) ("We have applied the holding of Paul by requiring a section 1983 plaintiff to show stigma plus an infringement of some other interest." (citation omitted)). 15 The other verbal criticisms that the Plaintiffs allege took place at the chain of command board hearings are not adverse employment actions. See Harrington, 118 F.3d at 366 ("mere criticisms do not give rise to a constitutional deprivation for purposes of the First Amendment."). 16 See also Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1255 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) ("impermissible retaliation [need] not result in the termination of his employment" in order to be actionable under 1983, but the employer's actions must alter "important conditions of employment") (emphasis added). The record does not demonstrate that the alleged threat of discharge altered any important conditions of the Plaintiffs' employment. Hensley took no further action with respect to either Plaintiff after the Plaintiffs refused to sign the letters of retraction. Breaux was already suspended with pay, and the Internal Affairs investigations had already been completed. Compare Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 404-05 (5th Cir.) (transfer without loss in pay to menial, undemanding job is actionable under 1983), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 346 (1990). 17 The Court ultimately declined fully to equate employee dismissals with constitutional rights in defamation cases, precisely because in the former, a balance must be maintained between the public interest in an orderly workplace and the discussion of issues of public concern. 18 See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 554.006(a) (West 1994) ("An employee of a local government must exhaust that government's grievance or appeal procedures relating to suspension or termination of employment or unlawful discrimination before suing under this chapter.") (amended 1995). 19 In order to show that his complaint falls outside the scope of the Internal Affairs process, Breaux also characterizes his complaint as an "employment-related dispute." But if his complaint involved only an employment dispute, Breaux's complaint would not fall within the Whistleblower Act. Thus, in order to maintain an action under the Act, Breaux must allege a violation of state law by Chief Barnett -- a claim that does fall within the purview of Internal Affairs. 20 The cases Breaux cites as examples of exceptions to the exhaustion requirement involved situations where there clearly was no way for the agency involved to provide relief. See Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Texas Co., 520 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1975) (agency powerless to determine constitutionality of statutes); City of Austin v. Phipps, 344 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1961) (Civil Service Commission given no jurisdiction over denial of injury leave of absence); Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. First Baptist Church, 788 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (agency powerless to decide constitutionality of statute). As discussed above, this is not the case in the present action. 21 Even if the grievance procedure is ambiguous with respect to filing complaints against the Chief of Police, Texas case law suggests that an employee is not exempt from the need to notify his employer that the employee is about to file a Whistleblower claim in court. Under the Act, when "it is unclear whether the employer has a post-termination grievance procedure, or it is unclear what the procedure is and when ... the terminated employee [timely] notifies the employer that he is invoking that employee's grievance procedure, informing the employer that it has 30 days in which to conclude the grievance procedure," the employee would meet the statute of limitations provision in the Act. Beiser v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 902 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. App. -- Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Since the limitations period is tolled by a proper invocation of grievance procedures, this holding speaks directly to exhaustion. 22 In his letter to Chief Barnett, Breaux asked permission "to transfer back to the uniform patrol division during the next seniority selection process" in the fall of 1994. Barnett granted Breaux's request, and Breaux returned to patrol duty in November 1994. 23 The case Breaux cites for broadly construing his alleged complaint is distinguishable. In Farrar, the court found that a letter complaining of a demotion "without just cause" was sufficient to provide notice that the complaint was about "retaliatory employment practices." Farrar, 933 S.W.2d at 774. But Farrar, unlike Breaux, had written a letter specifically to a grievance committee, initiating a committee hearing about Farrar's demotion.
cs	other	N/A	TOS Energy Service a.s. IČO: 28640462, Ostrava, výpis z rejstříku (18.06.2019) \| Euro.cz Firma TOS Energy Service a.s. IČO 28640462 TOS Energy Service a.s. má aktuální nebo historický záznam v těchto rejstřících: obchodní rejstřík, živnostenský rejstřík. TOS Energy Service a.s. (28640462) je Akciová společnost. Sídlí na adrese Stodolní 794/21, Ostrava 702 00. Do obchodního rejtříku byla zapsána dne 9. 11. 2010 a je stále aktivní. TOS Energy Service a.s. má celkem dvě provozovny a čtyři živnosti. Jako zdroj dat o TOS Energy Service a.s. nám sloužily tyto stránky: Detailní informace o TOS Energy Service a.s. na Justice.cz Detailní informace o TOS Energy Service a.s. na rzp.cz Výpis dat pro TOS Energy Service a.s. na portále firmy.euro.cz obsahuje pouze takové informace, které lze dle zákona č. 101/2000 Sb., o ochraně osobních údajů, zveřejňovat i bez souhlasu subjektu těchto údajů. Základní údaje TOS Energy Service a.s. B 4368 Počet členů statutárního orgánu: 1 21.8.2014 - 29.1.2016 Počet členů dozorčí rady: 1 21.8.2014 - 29.1.2016 Aktuální kontaktní údaje TOS Energy Service a.s. Kapitál TOS Energy Service a.s. 9.11.2010 - 23.11.2010 Akcie TOS Energy Service a.s. Akcie na jméno 20 000 Kč 100 13.3.2018 Kmenové akcie na jméno 200 000 Kč 9 21.8.2014 - 13.3.2018 Kmenové akcie na jméno 100 000 Kč 2 21.8.2014 - 13.3.2018 Kmenové akcie na majitele 200 000 Kč 9 9.9.2013 - 21.8.2014 Kmenové akcie na majitele 100 000 Kč 2 9.9.2013 - 21.8.2014 Akcie na majitele 200 000 Kč 10 9.11.2010 - 9.9.2013 Sídlo TOS Energy Service a.s. Stodolní 794/21 , Ostrava 702 00 4.1.2016 Dělnická 323/33 , Ostrava 708 00 9.9.2013 - 4.1.2016 Krnovská 398 , Horní Benešov 793 12 4.4.2012 - 9.9.2013 Sokolská třída 1615/50 , Ostrava 702 00 9.11.2010 - 4.4.2012 Předmět podnikání TOS Energy Service a.s. vedení firmy TOS Energy Service a.s. Statutární orgán TOS Energy Service a.s. Za společnost jedná navenek samostatně jediný člen představenstva. 25.5.2018 Za společnost jedná místopředseda představenstva a člen představenstva samostatně do hodnoty přijímaného závazku 1.000.000,- Kč (slovy: jeden milion korun českých). Předseda představenstva je oprávněn jednat za společnost samostatně do hodnoty přijímaného závazku 3.000.000,- Kč (slovy: tři miliony korun českých). Přesahuje-li hodnota přijímaného závazku 3.000.000,- Kč (slovy: tři miliony korun českých), jednají za společnost vždy předseda představenstva společně s dalším členem představenstva. Přesahuje- li hodnota přijímaného závazku 10.000.000,- Kč (slovy: deset milionů korun českých), jednají za společnost společně všichni tři členové představenstva. 13.3.2018 - 25.5.2018 Společnost zastupují vždy společně dva členové představenstva, z nichž alespoň jeden musí být předsedou představenstva nebo místopředsedou představenstva. Při převodu a zatěžování nemovitostí, při uzavírání smluv převyšující částku 5.000.000,-Kč, zastupuj í společnost všichni členové představenstva společně. 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 Představenstvo je statutárním orgánem společnosti. Předseda představenstva a místopředseda představenstva zastupují společnost samostatně. Při převodu a zatěžování nemovitostí, při uzavírání smluv převyšující částku 20.000.000,- Kč, zastupují společnost p ředseda představenstva a místopředseda představenstva společně. 29.1.2016 - 15.5.2017 Představenstvo je statutárním orgánem společnosti. Společnost zastupuje předseda představenstva samostatně. 21.8.2014 - 29.1.2016 Způsob jednání: Za společnost jedná předseda představenstva v plném rozsahu samostatně. 1.3.2011 - 21.8.2014 Jednání: Za společnost jedná každý člen představenstva samostatně. 9.11.2010 - 1.3.2011 Ing. Jiří Zapletal 25.5.2018 Monika Agler 9.11.2010 - 1.3.2011 Gabriela Bordovská 9.11.2010 - 1.3.2011 Radim Tvrdoň 1.3.2011 - 4.4.2012 Marie Majerové 1647/29 , Ostrava 708 00 Jindřich Vavrla 1.3.2011 - 9.9.2013 Schovaná 2237/2 , Ostrava 708 00 Kateřina Janštová 4.4.2012 - 9.9.2013 Okružní 1733/34 , Bruntál 792 01 Luboš Bittman 1.3.2011 - 21.8.2014 tř. Obránců míru 1269 2, 792 01 Bruntál Česká republika Tibor Priesol 9.9.2013 - 21.8.2014 Boloňská 306/14 , Praha 109 00 Jiří Březina 9.9.2013 - 21.8.2014 Milčická 136 , Pečky 289 11 Jiří Březina 21.8.2014 - 15.5.2017 Mgr. Petra Gálová 29.1.2016 - 15.5.2017 1050 , Horní Lhota 747 64 Michael Kincl 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 A. Skotáka 1254/10 , Blansko 678 01 Pavel Filipčík 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 Josef Trchalík 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 Karel Tomášek 13.3.2018 - 25.5.2018 Ing. Otakar Vodička 13.3.2018 - 25.5.2018 Ing. Filip Vágner 13.3.2018 - 25.5.2018 Pod Vodárnou 2975/3 , Šumperk 787 01 Dozorčí rada TOS Energy Service a.s. Ing. Josef Trchalík 13.3.2018 Martin Bordovský 9.11.2010 - 1.3.2011 Jiří Satinský 9.11.2010 - 1.3.2011 Lucie Satinská 9.11.2010 - 1.3.2011 Jana Bittmanová 1.3.2011 - 21.8.2014 Šmilovského 663/1 , Bruntál 792 01 Petr Šima 1.3.2011 - 21.8.2014 Třešňová 496 , Vřesina 742 85 Ludmila Kubešová 1.3.2011 - 21.8.2014 Květná 1721/38 , Bruntál 792 01 Ing. Petra Svobodová 21.8.2014 - 4.2.2015 Krnovská 398 , Horní Benešov 793 12 Mgr. Petra Gálová 4.2.2015 - 29.1.2016 Karel Tomášek 29.1.2016 - 15.5.2017 Karel Tomášek 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 Petra Gálová 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 Jiří Březina 15.5.2017 - 13.3.2018 Sbírka Listin TOS Energy Service a.s. B 4368/SL 11 rozhod. o statut. orgánu Zápis z jednání předst. akc. společnosti Krajský soud v Ostravě 15.1.2016 28.1.2016 5.2.2016 1 B 4368/SL 10 notářský zápis [NZ 13/2016, N 14/2016] Krajský soud v Ostravě 15.1.2016 28.1.2016 5.2.2016 6 B 4368/SL 9 účetní závěrka [2014] vč. přílohy Krajský soud v Ostravě 10.12.2015 14.12.2015 13 B 4368/SL 7 rozhod. o statut. orgánu Zápis z jednání jed.akc. Krajský soud v Ostravě 19.12.2014 6.1.2015 9.2.2015 2 B 4368/SL 6 notářský zápis, stanovy společnosti Nz 479/2014, N 517/2014 Krajský soud v Ostravě 10.7.2014 10.9.2014 29.9.2014 10 B 4368/SL 5 účetní závěrka [2012], výroční zpráva [2012] s příl. Krajský soud v Ostravě 2.12.2013 5.12.2013 12 B 4368/SL 4 účetní závěrka [2011], výroční zpráva [2011] s příl. Krajský soud v Ostravě 2.12.2013 5.12.2013 11 B 4368/SL 3 notářský zápis NZ 680/2010 Krajský soud v Ostravě 26.10.2010 20.12.2011 5.1.2012 8 B 4368/SL 2 notářský zápis NZ 98/2011 Krajský soud v Ostravě 25.1.2011 2.3.2011 3.3.2011 3 B 4368/SL 1 podpisové vzory - 6x Krajský soud v Ostravě 2.3.2011 3.3.2011 6 Živnosti a provozovny TOS Energy Service a.s. 1010317865
fi	other	N/A	Kaukolämmön ja sähkön siirron asiakkaat tyytyväisiä toimintaan \| Helen Helsingin Energian kaukolämmön ja Helen Sähköverkko Oy:n sähkönsiirrosta saamat yleisarvosanat nousivat. Tutkimustoimisto IROResearch Oy:n toteuttamassa energiayhtiöiden asiakastyytyväisyyskyselyssä Helsingin Energian kaukolämmön kokonaisarvosana oli 3,87 asteikolla 1-5 (toimialan keskiarvo 3,69) ja Helen Sähköverkko Oy:n kokonaisarvosana 3,82 (toimialan keskiarvo 3,55) Kaukolämmön asiakkaat arvostavat hyvää hinta-laatu-suhdetta Helsingin Energian kaukolämmön saamat arviot lämmönjakelun häiriöttömyydestä ja lämmönjakelun tasaisuudesta säilyivät edelleen erittäin korkealla tasolla (asteikolla 1-5 lämmönjakelun häiriöttömyys 4,31, lämmönjakelun tasaisuus 4,24). Toimialaan keskiarvoon verrattuna Helsingin Energian kaukolämpöasiakkaat antavat kaukolämmön hinta-laatu-suhteelle huomattavasti paremman arvion: 3,5 asteikolla 1-5 toimialan keskiarvon ollessa 3,24. Tulokset nousivat lähes kaikilla osa-alueilla. Erityisen korkeat arviot Helsingin Energian kaukolämpö sai laskutuksen luotettavuudesta (4,15) ja joustavuudesta (3,97) sekä tiedottamisen luotettavuudesta (3,97) sekä asiantuntevasta neuvontapalvelusta (3,89). Tutkimuksessa kysytyistä yleisistä ja imagoväittämistä Helsingin Energian kaukolämpöön liitettiin toimialan keskiarvoa enemmän erityisesti väittämät kilpailukykyinen (ero alan keskiarvoon +0,22), luotettava (+0,19) energiatehokas (+0,18) ja tulevaisuuden lämmitysmuoto (+0,14). Sähkönsiirron asiakkaat erittäin tyytyväisiä sähkönjakelun häiriöttömyyteen Sähkönjakelusta Helsingin alueella vastaavan Helen Sähköverkko Oy:n asiakkaiden tyytyväisyys sähkönjakelun häiriöttömyyteen oli noussut entisestään ja oli erittäin korkea: 4,54 asteikolla 1-5, kun toimialan keskiarvo oli 3,94. Myös vikojen korjaamisnopeutta arvioitiin huomattavasti alan keskiarvoa paremmin (Helen Sähköverkko Oy 3,83, toimialan keskiarvo 3,47). Helen Sähköverkko Oy:n asiakkaat antoivat hyviä arvioita sähkönsiirtolaskutuksen luotettavuudesta (3,98) sekä tiedotuksen luotettavuudesta (3,86). Tutkituista imagotekijöistä Helen Sähköverkko Oy sai hyvät, toimialan keskiarvon selkeästi ylittävät arviot mm. luotettavuudesta (4,01 vrt. 3,75) ja nykyaikaisuudesta (3,64 vrt. 3,58). Julkaistu: 03.02.2014 15.21
de	other	N/A	BGH, 24.03.2016 - 2 StR 36/15 - dejure.org § 263 Abs. 1, Abs. 3 StGB; § 399 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 AktG; § 73 Abs. 1 Satz 2 StGB Betrug (Vermögenschaden; Schädigungsvorsatz: Gefährdungsschaden; Vorliegen eines besonders schweren Falls); Gründungsschwindel (Vollendungszeitpunkt); Anordnung des Verfalls (entgegenstehende Ansprüche Dritter) § 111i Abs. 2 StPO, § ... 36 Abs. 2, § 37 Abs. 1 AktG, § 399 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 AktG, § 32 AktG, § 399 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 AktG, § 267 Abs. 1 Var. 3 StGB, § 399 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 AktG, § 27 StGB, § 399 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 AktG, § 267 Abs. 1 Var. 1 StGB, § 263 StGB, § 263 Abs. 3 Satz 2 Nr. 2 Alt. 2 StGB, § 111i Abs. 2 Satz 4 Nr. 2 StPO, § 73 Abs. 1 Satz 1 StGB, § 73 Abs. 1, § 73a Satz 1 StGB, § 73c StGB, § 823 Abs. 2 BGB, § 73, 73a StGB, § 73 Abs. 1 Satz 2 StGB, § 830 Abs. 1, § 840 Abs. 1 BGB, § 73c Abs. 1 Satz 2 StGB, § 73c Abs. 1 Satz 1 StGB, § 156 StGB, § 802c ZPO, § 263 Abs. 3 Nr. 2 Alt. 2 StGB, § 73a StGB, § 34 Abs. 2 AktG, § 188 Abs. 1 AktG, § 188 Abs. 2 Satz 1 AktG, § 37 AktG, § 263 Abs. 3 StGB, § 263 Abs. 3 Satz 2 Nr. 2 Alt. 1 StGB, § 263 Abs. 3 Satz 2 Nr. 1 StGB, § 49 Abs. 1 StGB, § 27 Abs. 2 StGB, § 263 Abs. 1 StGB, § 357 StPO, § 431 StPO § 399 Abs 1 Nr 4 AktG, § 27 StGB, § 262 StGB, § 263 Abs 3 S 2 Nr 2 Alt 2 StGB Strafverfahren wegen Betrugs: Kapitalerhöhungsschwindel als abstraktes Gefährdungsdelikt; Vermögensschaden beim Eingehungsbetrug; Zurechnung eines besonders schweren Falls für den Gehilfen Nachweis der Beihilfe zur Urkundenfälschung in Tateinheit mit Beihilfe zum Gründungsschwindel; Voraussetzungen für eine Beihilfe zur Urkundenfälschung in Tateinheit mit Beihilfe zum Kapitalerhöhungsschwindel Durch einen Tatbeteiligten erlangt... LG Frankfurt/Main, 22.07.2014 - 29 KLs 23/13 NStZ-RR 2016, 205 BeckRS 2016, 9445 Dies ergibt sich bereits aus der Feststellung des Berufungsgerichts, wonach V. P. ein einem "Schneeballsystem" entsprechendes Geschäftsmodell betrieb (siehe weiter zu Schaden und Schädigungsvorsatz bei sog. Schneeballsystemen BGH..., Beschluss vom 18. Februar 2009 - 1 StR 731/08, BGHSt 53, 199 Rn. 17 f.; Urteil vom 24. März 2016 - 2 StR 36/15, wistra 2016, 404 Rn. 23, 25 mwN). Das Landgericht hat zunächst geprüft, ob sich die Tat des Gehilfen als ein besonders schwerer Fall des Betrugs darstellt (vgl. dazu Senat, Urteil vom 24. März 2016 - 2 StR 36/15; NStZ-RR 2016, 205; BGH, Beschluss vom 31. Juli 2012 - 5 StR 188/12, NStZ-RR 2012, 342, 343). Eine nachvollziehbare Entscheidung, ob wegen einer unbilligen Härte im Sinne des § 73c Abs. 1 Satz 1 StGB aF oder - bei Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen des § 73c Abs. 1 Satz 2 StGB aF - aufgrund tatrichterlichen Ermessens von einer Maßnahme der Vermögensabschöpfung auf der Grundlage individueller Erwägungen zu den wirtschaftlichen und persönlichen Verhältnissen der einzelnen Angeklagten abzusehen ist (vgl. BGH, Beschluss vom 6. November 2014 - 4 StR 290/14, NStZ 14 - RR 2015, 44; Senat, Urteil vom 24. März 2016 - 2 StR 36/15, BeckRS 2016, 09445), hat es nicht vorgenommen.
fr	caselaw	EU	10.7.2017 FR Journal officiel de l'Union européenne C 221/20 Arrêt du Tribunal du 16 mai 2017 — Airhole Facemasks/EUIPO — sindustrysurf (AIR HOLE FACE MASKS YOU IDIOT) (Affaire T-107/16) (1) ([«Marque de l’Union européenne - Procédure de nullité - Marque de l’Union européenne figurative AIR HOLE FACE MASKS YOU IDIOT - Mauvaise foi - Article 52, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (CE) no 207/2009 - Pouvoir de réformation»]) (2017/C 221/25) Langue de procédure: l’anglais Parties Partie requérante: Airhole Facemasks, Inc. (Vancouver, Canada) (représentants: S. Barker, solicitor, et A. Michaels, barrister) Partie défenderesse: Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle (représentant: D. Hanf, agent) Autre partie à la procédure devant la chambre de recours de l’EUIPO: sindustrysurf, SL (Trapagaran, Espagne) Objet Recours formé contre la décision de la quatrième chambre de recours de l’EUIPO du 18 janvier 2016 (affaire R 2547/2014-4), relative à une procédure de nullité entre Airhole Facemasks et sindustrysurf. Dispositif 1) La décision de la quatrième chambre de recours de l’Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle (EUIPO) du 18 janvier 2016 (affaire R 2547/2014-4), relative à une procédure de nullité entre Airhole Facemasks, Inc. et sindustrysurf, SL, est annulée et réformée dans le sens que le recours formé auprès de l’EUIPO par sindustrysurf contre la décision de la division d’annulation du 30 juillet 2014 est rejeté. 2) Airhole Facemasks et l’EUIPO supporteront chacun leurs propres dépens exposés devant le Tribunal. 3) Sindustrysurf est condamnée aux dépens exposés par Airhole Facemasks devant la chambre de recours de l’EUIPO. 4) Le recours est rejeté pour le surplus. (1) JO C 175 du 17.5.2016.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	Le ( ; ) est un district de la municipalité spéciale de Tainan. Histoire L'ancien district de Beimen était auparavant une île barrière, située dans le lagon de Daofeng et à l'embouchure de la rivière Jishui ; ainsi, il est aussi désigné en tant qu'île de Beimen jusqu'en 1920. Si les archives relatent l'existence de cette île en tant que telle au entre les règnes des empereurs Kangxi et Qianlong, elles mentionnent également qu'elle est ensuite connectée au littoral de l'île de Taïwan à l'époque de l'empereur Daoguang. Selon les estimations, cette modification géologique a eu lieu vers la fin du règne de Qianlong et le début de celui de son successeur, Jiaqing, soit autour de 1796. L'origine du nom Beimen () n'est pas clairement définie, deux théories existant. Selon la première, l'île porte ce nom car elle se situait au nord de la grande ville environnante. Selon la seconde, elle était le point d'accès le plus au Nord de Qinfeng. Elle était en effet au carrefour de voies maritimes entre les ports du lagon de Taijiang et ceux du littoral taïwanais. Ultérieurement au rattachement naturel des îles de Beimen et de Taïwan, la saliculture se développe sur le territoire. Pendant la période de domination japonaise, l'île est désignée en tant que sous-préfecture de l'île de Beimen. Alors que le port local subit un ensablement progressif, elle est ensuite consacrée uniquement à la production de sel, son statut passant alors à celui de village. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le village de Beimen est renommé canton de Beimen. Le , alors que le comté de Tainan fusionne avec la ville de Tainan, le canton de Beimen est restructuré en tant que district de Beimen. Géographie Le district couvre une superficie de . Il compte d'après le recensement de . Notes et références Liens externes Beimen
en	wikipedia	N/A	Ben Stillman is an American film producer. Stillman assisted in the development of the Oscar-winning film The Imitation Game in 2014. He has produced four films including Broken City, which premiered at Sundance Film Festival, and Gold (2016) starring Matthew McConaughey in 2016. Stillman is vice president of Black Bear Pictures. Career In 2011, Black Bear Pictures was established and Stillman joined the company as creative executive after leaving Cinetic International. Stillman was associate producer of At Any Price in 2012. He was named vice president of Black Bear Pictures in 2013. He co-produced A.C.O.D. starring Adam Scott, as well as Broken City, starring Mark Wahlberg and Russell Crowe, in 2013. He was executive producer of Gold, a drama-thriller film about the search for gold in the jungles of Indonesia that was scheduled to be released in 2016. Filmography He was producer for all films unless otherwise noted. Film Miscellaneous crew References External links American film producers Living people Year of birth missing (living people)
en	caselaw	US	Case 2:17-cr-00169-JAM Document 207 Filed 01/12/21 Page 1 of 1 1 HEATHER E. WILLIAMS, #122664 Federal Defender 2 DOUGLAS BEEVERS, #288639 Assistant Federal Defender 3 801 I Street, 3rd Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 4 Tel: (916) 498-5700 Fax: (916) 498-5710 5 Douglas_Beevers@fd.org 6 Attorney for Defendant CHI MENG YANG 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Case No. 2:17-CR-169-JAM 11 ) Plaintiff, ) ORDER TO ALLOW DEFENSE A COPY OF 12 ) SEALED TRANSCRIPTS OF IN CAMERA vs. ) STATUS OF COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS 13 ) CHI MENG YANG ) 14 ) ) 15 Defendant. ) ) 16 17 The Matter coming before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for a Copy of the Transcripts 18 of the Sealed In Camera Status of Counsel, and it appearing that the Defendant is entitled to the 19 relief sought. It is ORDERED that the court reporter shall provide Defendant with copies of the 20 sealed transcripts of the following in camera hearings: 21 February 22, 2019, June 14, 2019, and June 16, 2020. 22 23 The Defendant shall bear the cost of the generating the transcript at the standard rate. 24 25 Dated: January 11, 2021 /s/ John A. Mendez 26 THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 27 28 -1-
en	caselaw	US	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) VINCENT MICHAEL MARINO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 11-813 (RMC) ) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ) et al, ) ) Defendants. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Vincent M. Marino, proceeding pro se, sues a host of Defendant Agencies 1 under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a, for documents related to an alleged 1996 operation during which physicians “intentionally surgically implant[ed] . . . electronic tracking & listening devices in Marino’s brain & or body.” Pl.’s Opp’n [Dkt. 28] at 1 (unchanged original). The Complaint will be dismissed. Mr. Marino’s Complaint is very simple: 1 Defendants are Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), National Security Agency (“NSA”), Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”), National Aeronautics Space Administration (“NASA”), Defense Advance Research Project Agency (“DARPA”), National Reconnaissance Office (“NRO”), Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (“GIA”), National Security Counsel (“NSC”), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (“DTRA”), Office of Science and Technology (“OSTP”), National Science Foundation (“NSF”), National Security Director (“NSD”), Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), Department of Defense (“DOD”), United States Department of State (“DOS”), Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Department of Energy (“DOE”), United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”), Commander U.S. Army Intelligence & Security Command (“AISC”), Department of the Army (“Army”), the Office of the Judge Advocate General (“JAG”), Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. (“USMC”), Department of the Air Force (“USAF”), and Department of the Navy Headquarters (“Navy”). Hand over records concerning Plaintiff Vincent Michael Marino . . ., consisting of all records generated by [the Defendant Agencies] concerning the November 24, 1996 surgical implantation of numerous devices in Plaintiff Marino’s brain & body by the . . . defendants . . . while Marino was under general anesthesia at Massachusetts General Hospital “MGH” owned by Partner Health Care Systems Inc Boston Massachusetts for a “RUSE” Laparocsopic exploratory surgery & bullet removal . . . . Compl. ¶ 1 (errors in original). Mr. Marino elaborates in his Complaint that “MGH’s staff surgically placed numerous electronic satellite tracking, listening microchips in Marino’s body & brain.” Id. ¶ 38. He alleges that the Defendants used super advanced, sophisticated billion dollar intelligence communications satellites, echelon intelligence, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology intelligence, Quantum Computer Intelligence surveillance technologies connected to super advanced computers transmitting to & from Marino’s implanted devices in Marino’s brain & body . . . being used in research & development & surveillance study, project at Marino’s physical & mental health expense. Id. ¶ 39. As a result of this surgery, Mr. Marino contends that he “was filmed conducting paranormal, esoteric, phenomena events” from February 7, 2004 after 10 p.m. through February 28, 2004. Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 6. The Complaint will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “[F]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’ Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904); ‘wholly insubstantial,’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1910); ‘plainly unsubstantial,’ Levering & Garriques Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933); or ‘no longer open to discussion,’ McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80 (1909).” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974). “A dismissal on this ground is warranted only ‘where [] a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Fiorani v. United 2 States, No 06-739, 2006 WL 3791384 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (alterations in original)). Claims involving “bizarre conspiracy theories” or “fantastic government manipulation of [one’s] will or mind” are “essentially fictitious’” and “devoid of merit.” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Mr. Marino seeks documentation to support a fantastic scenario of government manipulation of his mind through the insertion of electronic devices in his brain and body. His scenario is “clearly fanciful.” Id. at 331. Complaints seeking access to information from the federal government are subject to dismissal where the plaintiff’s stated belief that the relevant agency maintains the information sought is factually frivolous. See Burr v. Huff, 112 Fed. Appx. 537 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2004) (affirming dismissal of a FOIA complaint where facts alleged were too “insubstantial” to establish federal jurisdiction). Because Mr. Marino’s imaginary account of electronic devices is the sole basis for his requests to the Defendant Agencies, the Court will dismiss his Complaint. Mr. Marino further filed a motion to compel the NSA, CIA, NGA, NASA, BOP, DOJ, USAF, DOJ, and National Intelligence Director’s Office to “publicly inform Marino . . . [of] the specific location of the defendant’s installed GPS tracking & listening devices in Marino’s brain & body.” That motion will be denied as moot. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. Date: September 28, 2012 /s/ _ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Judge 3
fi	wikipedia	N/A	Päivän päästö on joissain karjalaisissa kansanrunoissa esiintyvä kertomusmuotoinen runoteema, joka on tunnettu parhaiten Keski-Inkerissä. Kertomuksen alussa tehdään havainto, että Aurinko ja Kuu eivät ole niiden omilla paikoillaan ja ihmisillä on siksi paha olla pimeässä ja kylmässä. Kiesus, Jumalaisen ainoa poika, tai joku muu, kuten Kave, Päivätär, Päivän poika tai Sepon piika, lähtee etsimään puuttuvia valoja Pohjolasta tai Hiitolasta. Selvittyään matkan esteistä ja takaa-ajajista kuulee etsijä Väinämöisen tai vanhan akan opastamana että valot on piilotettuna ison kalan vatsaan, kivimäkeen tai pajukkoon. Löydetyt taivaan valot nostetaan etsijän selkään, minkä jälkeen tämä ripustaa puun oksille paistamaan valoa ja lämpöä ihmisille. Anna-Leena Siikalan mukaan runon katsotaan sisältävän useita kerrostumia ja muutosvaiheita, jolloin sitä on vahvasti uudistettu. Kertomuksen pohjalla olisi Siikalan mukaan mahdollisia esikristillistä aineksia, joihin Pohjola ja Hiitola valojen kätköpaikkana viittaisivat. Eräässä A. J. Sjögrenin vuonna 1819 taltioimassa toisinnossa taivaan valojen katoaminen ja vapauttaminen rinnastuu Sammon ryöstöön. Lähteet Suomalainen kansanrunous Suomalainen mytologia
it	other	N/A	Sentenza Cassazione Civile n. 11802 del 12/05/2017 – Sentenze La Legge per Tutti Sentenza Sentenza Cassazione Civile n. 11802 del 12/05/2017 Cassazione civile, sez. un., 12/05/2017, (ud. 07/02/2017, dep.12/05/2017), n. 11802 Dott. BIELLI Stefano – Presidente Sezione – sul ricorso 23280/2015 proposto da: MERCURIO S.R.L., in persona del legale rappresentante pro tempore, elettivamente domiciliata in ROMA, VIA R. GRAZIOLI LANTE 9, presso lo studio dell’avvocato PIETRO CARLO PUCCI, che la rappresenta e COMUNE DI CORI, in persona del Sindaco pro tempore, elettivamente MARIA ATHENA LORIZIO, che lo rappresenta e difende; REGIONE LAZIO, COMITATO CITTADINI DI GIULIANELLO, PROCURATORE GENERALE PRESSO LA CORTE DI CASSAZIONE; avverso la sentenza del COMMISSARIATO PER LA LIQUIDAZIONE DEGLI USI CIVICI PER LAZIO, TOSCANA ED UMBRIA, depositata il 10/06/2015. 07/02/2017 dal Consigliere Dott. FELICE MANNA; IACOVIELLO Francesco Mauro, che ha concluso chiedendo La Mercurio s.r.l. domandava la liquidazione degli usi civici di pascolo, legnatico e semina gravanti sui propri terreni siti in comune di Cori, individuati in catasto dal f. (OMISSIS), particelle 8, 176 e 239 a favore della comunità frazionale di (OMISSIS). Con Det. 4 ottobre 2011, n. A4923, la Regione Lazio rendeva esecutivo il progetto di liquidazione, imponendo un canone annuo di Euro 148,88, contestualmente affrancato, a favore della soc. Mercurio, con l’avvenuta riscossione da parte del comune di Cori, per la popolazione della frazione di (OMISSIS), del capitale di affrancazione, pari a Euro 2.977,62. Con ricorso depositato 1’11.11.2011 il comune di Cori chiedeva al Commissario per la liquidazione degli usi civici per il Lazio, la Toscana e l’Umbria di determinare i criteri di stima per la liquidazione secondo la sentenza n. 13/90 della sezione speciale usi civici della Corte d’appello di Roma, confermata dalla sentenza di questa Corte Suprema n. 1559/93. Instaurato il contraddittorio fra tutte le suddette parti, la soc. Mercurio chiedeva il rigetto del ricorso del comune di Cori e la Regione Lazio eccepiva la carenza della giurisdizione commissariale. Interveniva in causa il Comitato cittadini di (OMISSIS), senza tuttavia costituirsi con la rappresentanza e l’assistenza di un avvocato. Respinta l’eccezione di carenza di giurisdizione con ordinanza n. 305 del 20.7.2012, il Commissario con sentenza n. 14 del 10.6.2015 dichiarava che il valore complessivo dell’uso civico sugli anzi detti terreni della soc. Mercurio era pari a Euro 29.713,67, di cui 2.977,62 già versati, con un residuo credito, pertanto, di Euro 26.736,05. Il Commissario perveniva a tale decisione osservando, preliminarmente, che sebbene la liquidazione degli usi civici su terreni privati rientrasse tra le competenze amministrative della Regione, in caso di contrasto l’unico organo giurisdizionale preposto a conoscere della controversia circa il valore della liquidazione era, appunto, il Commissario. Nel merito, rilevava che la liquidazione effettuata dal perito demaniale regionale era iniqua, a fronte del mutamento economico dei terreni (resi edificabili); e che neppure, però, era condivisibile il criterio suggerito dal comune di Cori, basato sul valore edificatorio dei terreni, perchè l’uso civico non può proiettarsi verso un’utilizzazione diversa da quella agraria. Pertanto, il criterio utilizzabile era quello di dividere il capitale di affranco attribuito dal Comune con criteri esclusivamente immobiliari-edificatori, pari a Euro 149.181,75, con il valore agrario dell’intero lotto di spettanza della soc. Mercurio, pari a Euro 14.888,12. Il quoziente così ottenuto, pari a Euro 9,979, utilizzato come fattore di moltiplicazione del capitale di affranco, e cioè Euro 2.977,62 così come determinato dal perito demaniale, conduceva all’importo complessivo di Euro 26.736,05. La cassazione di tale sentenza e dell’ordinanza n. 305 del 20.7.2012 affermativa della giurisdizione commissariale è chiesta dalla Mercurio s.r.l. con ricorso ex art. 111 Cost., affidato a sei motivi. Resiste con controricorso il Comune di Cori. Entrambe dette parti hanno depositato memoria. La Regione Lazio e il Comitato Cittadini di (OMISSIS) sono rimasti intimati. 1. – Preliminarmente deve essere disattesa l’istanza di rinvio della trattazione del ricorso, chiesta dal difensore del comune di Cori in considerazione della pendenza del termine d’impugnazione della sentenza della Corte d’appello di Roma, sezione speciale usi civici, n. 18/16, non essendo ancora pendente alcun giudizio d’impugnazione di detta pronuncia, che (come si ricava dalla memoria della società Mercurio) ha annullato per difetto di giurisdizione la sentenza commissariale oggetto del presente processo di cassazione. 2. – Sempre in via preliminare va rilevata l’inammissibilità della partecipazione al giudizio del Comitato Cittadini di (OMISSIS), non essendosi perfezionata nella fase di merito la relativa costituzione, che è avvenuta senza il ministero d’un difensore (v. l’epigrafe della sentenza impugnata). 3. – Il primo motivo di ricorso deduce la carenza della giurisdizione commissariale, e dunque la violazione della L. n. 1766 del 1927, art. 29, comma 2, in relazione dell’art. 360 c.p.c., n. 1. Detta norma limita la giurisdizione commissariale alle controversie concernenti l’esistenza, la natura e l’estensione dei diritti civici, situazioni, queste, non assimilabili ai casi in cui si controverte del credito monetario sorto per effetto della liquidazione degli usi civici su proprietà private (L. n. 1766 del 1927, art. 7, comma 1) o della legittimazione di occupazioni abusive di terreni soggetti ad uso civico (art. 10, comma 1, Legge cit.). Nello specifico, la stessa sentenza impugnata dà atto che l’oggetto del giudizio è costituito dal “criterio di liquidazione degli usi civici di pascolo, legnatico a secco, e semina con corrisposta di un quarto, a favore dei naturali di (OMISSIS), gravanti sul terreno di cui è proprietaria la Mercurio s.r.l.”; di talchè la controversia appartiene al giudice amministrativo. 4. – La censura è ammissibile e fondata. 4.1. – Ammissibile, perchè il ricorso ex art. 111 Cost., in materia di giurisdizionale commissariale (tuttora vigente, in attesa di un provvedimento legislativo di riordino: cfr. Corte Cost. n. 46/95) è esperibile in luogo del reclamo alla Corte d’appello allorchè la decisione abbia ad oggetto questioni non riguardanti l’esistenza, la natura e l’estensione dei diritti di godimento promiscuo, la qualità demaniale del suolo o l’appartenenza a titolo particolare dei beni e delle associazioni e la rivendicazione delle terre (giurisprudenza costante di queste S.U.: v. nn. 22056/07, 7540/86 e 1548/77; indirettamente conformi, perchè affermando la reclamabilità L. n. 1766 del 1927, ex art. 32, ammettono in via implicita il ricorso straordinario per cassazione ex art. 111 Cost., nei casi in cui non si controverta della demanialità civica, S.U. nn. 2419/02, 17668/03, 24170/04 e 15300/14). 4.2. – Fondata, in quanto, trasferite alle regioni le funzioni amministrative previste dalla L. n. 1766 del 1927, art. 29, comma 1 e liquidati i diritti di uso civico, viene automaticamente meno la giurisdizione commissariale su questi stessi diritti. Infatti, costituisce ius receptum nella giurisprudenza di queste S.U. che la giurisdizione del commissario per la liquidazione degli usi civici sussiste ogni qualvolta la soluzione delle questioni afferenti alle materie elencate nel secondo comma di predetta disposizione si pone come antecedente logico-giuridico della decisione (v., in motivazione, la n. 26816/09; conformi, nn. 7894/03, 720/99 e 6689/95). Pertanto, ogni qual volta la controversia abbia ad oggetto non la questione della qualitas soli, già altrimenti definita, bensì unicamente la misura del canone di affrancazione, si è al di fuori della giurisdizione tanto commissariale quanto di altro giudice, rientrandosi in un ambito riservato all’amministrazione regionale. Nello specifico, con la Det. 4 ottobre 2011, n. A4923, della Regione Lazio, che ha reso esecutivo il progetto di liquidazione, imponendo un canone annuo di Euro 148,88, contestualmente affrancato, a favore della soc. Mercurio, tale funzione amministrativa è stata esercitata; con la conseguenza che ogni contestazione relativa avrebbe dovuto essere sollevata attraverso una tempestiva impugnazione di tale provvedimento innanzi al giudice amministrativo. 5. – L’accoglimento del suddetto motivo, imponendo la cassazione senza rinvio delle pronunce impugnate, assorbe l’esame d’ogni altra censura. 6. – La (sia pur soltanto relativa) novità della questione, giustifica la compensazione integrale delle spese tra le parti. 7. – Rilevato che dagli atti il processo risulta esente dal pagamento del contributo unificato, non si applica il D.P.R. n. 115 del 2002, art. 13, comma 1-quater, inserito dalla L. n. 228 del 2012, art. 1, comma 17. La Corte accoglie il primo motivo, assorbiti i restanti, cassa senza rinvio l’ordinanza e la sentenza impugnate e compensa integralmente le spese. Così deciso in Roma, nella Camera di consiglio delle Sezioni Unite Civili della Corte Suprema di Cassazione, il 7 febbraio 2017.
en	caselaw	US	Case 6:19-cv-00445-PGB-LRH Document 52 Filed 04/29/20 Page 1 of 4 PageID 543 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION REVIVAL CHIROPRACTIC LLC, Plaintiff, v. Case No: 6:19-cv-445-Orl-40LRH ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. / ORDER This cause is before the Court on Defendants’ (“Allstate”) Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. 49). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 51). Upon due consideration, Allstate’s motion is denied. I. BACKGROUND On January 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a class action against Allstate in state court. (Doc. 1-1). Allstate filed a timely notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3). The case proceeded in district court, and Plaintiff and Allstate filed motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 28, 29). On March 5, 2020, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied Allstate’s motion. (Doc. 47). On April 2, 2020, Allstate filed the instant Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal. (Doc. 49). II. DISCUSSION Allstate argues that the Order granting Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion satisfies the requirements for certification under section 1292(b) so that an immediate appeal of the Order is warranted. (Doc. 49, p. 2). A district court may issue a certification Case 6:19-cv-00445-PGB-LRH Document 52 Filed 04/29/20 Page 2 of 4 PageID 544 for interlocutory appeal of an order not otherwise appealable, when the court is “of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that § 1292(b) appeals “should be reserved . . . for situations in which the court of appeals can rule on a pure, controlling question of law without having to delve beyond the surface of the record in order to determine the facts.” McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). The legal issue must be “controlling of at least a substantial part of the case.” Id. at 1264. Moreover, “[t]he legal question must be stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give it general relevance to other cases in the same area of law.” Id. at 1259. Plaintiff points out, correctly, that interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b) serve as a “rare exception” to the general rule that final judgment must precede appellate review. Id. at 1264; see also, Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Tyco Integrated Sec., LLC, No. 13-CIV-80371-BLOOM, 2015 WL 11251735, at 1 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2015); (Doc. 51, p. 2). The Court agrees with Allstate that its Order granting summary judgment on a purely legal interpretation of Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law does not present a disputed issue of fact or a mixed question of law and fact. Moreover, this Court’s interpretation of Florida’s personal injury protection (“PIP”) statute, Fla. Stat. § 627.736(1)(a), raises a legal question at a high enough level of abstraction to give it general relevance to other cases involving the interpretation of the PIP statute. The next, and more problematic, prong of the test requires a substantial ground for difference of 2 Case 6:19-cv-00445-PGB-LRH Document 52 Filed 04/29/20 Page 3 of 4 PageID 545 opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. “To demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion, the appellant must show ‘a legal issue is (1) difficult and of first impression, (2) the district courts of the controlling circuit are split as to the issue, or (3) the circuits are split on the issue.’” Smiley v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 8:18-cv-2410-T-33JSS, 2019 WL 4345783, at 2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2019) (quoting Flaum v. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., No. 12-61198-CIV, 2016 WL 86677304, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016)). Allstate argues there is “no controlling authority on this precise issue from either the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court of Florida, nor is there a consensus from the Florida District Courts of appeal.” (Doc. 49, p. 3). While this statement is correct, is does not advance Allstate’s position, leaving this Court only to consider whether the legal issue is “difficult and of first impression.” Allstate argues that “Fla. Stat. § 627.736 is equally susceptible of an interpretation contrary to that reached in the Order.” (Id. at p. 3). Allstate supports this position by offering their construction of the PIP statute. (Id. at pp. 3–4). Yet the Court’s Order neither addressed a difficult legal issue, nor an issue of first impression. The Court in granting summary judgement applied standard principles of statutory construction and concluded that “[u]pon review of PIP statute as a whole, the Court finds that these provisions are clear and unambiguous, and no statutory construction is required.” (Doc. 47, p. 9). And the Court cited a decision from Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal supporting this reading of the statute. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that “[a] mere claim that a district court’s decision was incorrect does not suffice to establish a substantial ground for a difference of opinion.” Consub Del. LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 476 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309– 3 Case 6:19-cv-00445-PGB-LRH Document 52 Filed 04/29/20 Page 4 of 4 PageID 546 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 543 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated in part on other grounds by Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff is correct that the legal issue interpreted by the Court does not meet the criteria for interlocutory appeal. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Allstate’s Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. 49) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on April 29, 2020. Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Parties 4
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Formel 1-VM 2020 var den sjuttioförsta säsongen av Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile:s världsmästerskap för formelbilar, Formel 1. Säsongen var planerad att starta i den 15 mars och att avslutas i den 29 november. På grund av den pågående coronaviruspandemin ställdes dock Australiens GP in och säsongspremiären sköts fram. Säsongen startade så småningom med Österrikes GP den 5 juli och avslutades med Abu Dhabis GP den 13 december. 2020 års tävlingskalender var tänkt att bestå av 22 lopp, vilket skulle bli den längsta säsongen i Formel 1:s historia. De stora förändringarna i den ursprungliga kalendern var att Tysklands Grand Prix lyftes ut ur kalendern efter att Mercedes valt att inte gå in som huvudsponsor detta år och att Nederländernas Grand Prix planerades komma tillbaka efter 35 års frånvaro. Vietnams Grand Prix var ett helt nytt Grand Prix som skulle körts i Vietnams huvudstad Hanoi 5 april. Mindre förändringar var att Azerbajdzjans Grand Prix flyttades fram till första veckan i juni samt att USA:s- och Mexikos Grand Prix bytte plats med varandra. Kalendern blev dock helt omgjord till följd av coronapandemin. F1 2020 skulle vara den sista säsongen med nuvarande reglemente. Inför 2021 skulle det ha kommit radikala förändringar i reglementet. Dessa ändringar kommer istället att ske 2022 på grund av coronaviruspandemin. Mercedes säkrade konstruktörsmästerskapet efter Emilia-Romagnas Grand Prix och Lewis Hamilton säkrade förarmästerskapet när han vann Turkiets Grand Prix. Formel 1 och Coronavirusutbrottet Med anledning av det pågående coronavirusutbrottet drog sig McLaren ur det som skulle ha varit öppningsloppet i Australien efter att en person i stallet testats positivt för covid-19. Senare samma dag tog den lokala tävlingsledningen, Formula 1 och Internationella bilsportsförbundet det gemensamma beslutet att ställa in Australiens Grand Prix. Bahrains Grand Prix var till en början tänkt att köras inför tomma läktare. 12 mars togs beslutet att tillsammans med Vietnams GP, och i likhet med Kinas GP att tillsvidare skjuta loppet på framtiden. Stall och förare Följande stall och förare deltog i 2020 års säsong av Formel 1-VM. Förare i träningspassen Under säsongen har tre förare kört som testförare eller tredjeförare i träningspassen. Först Jack Aitken och Roy Nissany för Williams vid en respektive två Grand Prix. Robert Kubica körde för Alfa Romeo i tre träningspass. Robert Shwartzman är planerad att köra i ett träningspass vid Abu Dhabis Grand Prix för Haas. Mick Schumacher och Callum Ilott skulle deltagit i det första träningspasset vid Eifels Grand Prix 2020 för Alfa Romeo respektive Haas, men träningspasset kunde inte genomföras på grund av dåligt väder. Teamförändringar Red Bull GmbH, moderbolaget av Red Bull Racing och Scuderia Toro Rosso, bytte namnet på Toro Rosso till "Scuderia Alpha Tauri". Teamet använder konstruktörsnamnet "Alpha Tauri". Namnet kommer från Red Bulls modemärke. Förarbyten Esteban Ocon återvände till formel 1 i Renault och ersatte därmed Nico Hülkenberg. Robert Kubica lämnar Williams och går med som reservförare åt Alfa Romeo. Nicholas Latifi ersätter Kubica vid Williams. Förändringar under säsongen En dag före Storbritanniens Grand Prix testade Racing Points förare Sergio Pérez positivt för sars-cov-2 och fick därmed inte lov att delta i loppet. Racing Point meddelade att om Pérez testade negativt innan nästa helg, skulle han köra under 70-årsjubileumets Grand Prix. Pérez testade dock positivt ännu en gång och deltog inte i loppet helgen efter. Nico Hülkenberg ersatte Sergio Pérez vid båda tillfällena. Pérez testade negativt under samma vecka som Spaniens Grand Prix och FIA bedömde att han kunde köra i loppet. Pérez lagkamrat Lance Stroll blev plötsligt sjuk under Eifels Grand Prix och Hülkenberg ersatte Stroll vid kvalet och loppet. Efter kraschen i Bahrains Grand Prix som Romain Grosjean råkade ut för bekräftades att Pietro Fittipaldi tar över platsen i Haas i det efterföljande loppet, Sakhirs Grand Prix. Lewis Hamilton testades positiv för Covid-19 efter Bahrains Grand Prix och kunde därför inte delta i Sakhirs Grand Prix. Det blev sedan klart att George Russell tar över platsen i Mercedes samtidigt som F2-föraren Jack Aitken får chansen i Williams istället för Russell. Tävlingskalender Följande 22 Grand Prix bekräftades av FIA 4 oktober 2019, och skulle ha ägt rum 2020. Följande kalender bekräftades av FIA efter coronavirusutbrottet. Resultat Grand Prix Förarmästerskapet Konstruktörsmästerskapet Anmärkningar Referenser Noter Säsonger Motorsportevenemang 2020 Formel 1-säsonger
en	other	N/A	Patent US6799684 - Multi-head portioning system - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsA counting and portioning system which counts discrete articles that conform to predetermined specifications into lots having a predetermined number of articles or a target volume. The system includes at least one portioning bin positioned to receive articles from a conveyor. The at least one bin has...http://www.google.com/patents/US6799684?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US6799684 - Multi-head portioning systemAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS6799684 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 10/270,079Publication dateOct 5, 2004Filing dateOct 15, 2002Priority dateOct 15, 2002Fee statusPaidAlso published asUS20040069692Publication number10270079, 270079, US 6799684 B2, US 6799684B2, US-B2-6799684, US6799684 B2, US6799684B2InventorsDonald R. WooldridgeOriginal AssigneeBatching Systems, Inc.Export CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (9), Referenced by (14), Classifications (7), Legal Events (6) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetMulti-head portioning system US 6799684 B2Abstract A counting and portioning system which counts discrete articles that conform to predetermined specifications into lots having a predetermined number of articles or a target volume. The system includes at least one portioning bin positioned to receive articles from a conveyor. The at least one bin has at least first and second outlet gates for emptying articles into separate respective first and second locations. A scanner detects and maintains a count of articles that are received in the at least one portioning bin and fall within the predetermined specification. The detector unit generates an out-of-specification signal when an article or group of articles received in the at least one portioning bin falls outside the predetermined specification. A control unit causes the first outlet gate to open when the count or volume of articles is equal to the predetermined number and causes the second outlet gate to open in response to receipt of an out-of-specification signal. The profile/volume signature for every part scanned and delivered from the infeed to the scanner is stored. What is claimed is: 1. A system which portions discrete articles which are within a predetermined range of a predetermined specification, said system comprising: A. a detector unit which detects and maintains a tally of articles that are received in said system and fall within said predetermined range of a predetermined specification, which detector generates an out-of-specification signal when an article received in said system falls outside said predetermined range; and B. a device which comprises: (1) a portioning bin positioned to receive articles from a flow of articles delivered to said device; (2) a diverter gate which holds and releases batches of articles for further processing, said diverter gate being disposed in said portioning bin; (3) at least first and second outlet gates for emptying articles from said device into respective first and second locations which are separated from each other; and (4) a control unit which causes said diverter gate to move between a first position where it holds a batch of said articles and a second position where it releases a batch of said articles for further processing; and which causes said first outlet gate to open when the articles fall within the predetermined range of the predetermined specification, and causes said second outlet gate to open in response to receipt of an out-of-specification signal from said detector unit. 2. A system according to claim 1, wherein: said first location comprises a package for receiving one lot of said articles; and said second location comprises a container for receiving and storing groups of articles which include articles that fall outside the predetermined range of a predetermined specification. 3. A system according to claim 2, wherein said package is situated on a conveyor which moves packages sequentially into said first location. 4. A system according to claim 1, further comprising a feed conveyor, said feed conveyor comprising: a hopper for receiving bulk quantities of articles to be counted; and at least one chute for delivering said flow of articles to said at least one device. 5. A system according to claim 4, comprising a plurality of devices disposed about a periphery of said hopper, with one chute associated with each respective device. 6. A system according to claim 1, wherein said predetermined specification specifies color. 7. A system according to claim 1, wherein said predetermined specification specifies size. 8. A system according to claim 1, wherein said predetermined specification specifies weight. 9. A system according to claim 1, wherein said predetermined specification specifies volume. 10. A system according to claim 1, wherein said control unit causes said first outlet gate to open when the count of articles is equal to a predetermined number and the articles fall within the predetermined range of the predetermined specification, and causes said second outlet gate to open in response to receipt of an out-of-specification signal from said scanner. 11. A system according to claim 10, wherein said predetermined specification specifies volume. said first location comprises a package for receiving one lot of said articles; and said second location comprises a receptacle for receiving groups of articles which include articles that fall outside the predetermined range of a predetermined specification and allowing said groups of articles to be conveyed to another location. 13. A system according to claim 1, wherein said portioning bin comprises an upper chamber and a lower chamber; said diverter gate is disposed in said upper chamber such that, in a first position said diverter gate holds articles in said upper chamber until needed, and in a second position said diverter gate releases articles to drop to said lower chamber. 14. A system according to claim 13, wherein said first and second outlet gates are disposed at said lower chamber. 15. A system according to claim 14, wherein said first and second outlet gates, when closed, together, form bottom walls of said lower chamber. 16. A system according to claim 14, wherein said first outlet gate, when closed, forms a bottom wall of said lower chamber and said second outlet gate, when closed, forms a side wall of said lower chamber. 17. A method for portioning discrete articles which are within a predetermined range of a predetermined specification, said method comprising: A. delivering a flow of articles separated by discrete intervals within said flow; B. providing at least one portioning bin positioned to receive articles from said flow; C. detecting and maintaining a record of articles that are received in said at least one portioning bin and fall within said predetermined range; D. detecting articles in said flow, which fall outside of said predetermined range, and generating an out-of-specification signal when an out-of-specification article is received in said at least one portioning bin; E. emptying a batch of articles from said at least one portioning bin into a first location when the record maintained in said detector indicates that said articles fall within said predetermined specification; and F. emptying at least a partial batch of articles from said at least one portioning bin into a second location in response to generation of an out-of-specification signal. 18. A method according to claim 17, wherein: said first location comprises a package for receiving one lot of said articles; and said second location comprises a container for receiving and storing groups of articles which include articles that fall outside the predetermined range of a predetermined specification. 19. A method according to claim 18, wherein said package is situated on a conveyor which moves packages sequentially into said first location. said first location comprises a package for receiving one lot of said articles; and said second location comprises a receptacle for receiving groups of articles which include articles that fall outside the predetermined range of a predetermined specification and allowing said groups of articles to be conveyed to another location. 21. A method according to claim 20, wherein said package is situated on a conveyor which moves packages sequentially into said first location. 22. A method according to claim 17, wherein said at least one portioning bin comprises an upper chamber and a lower chamber, said method further comprising: selectively storing a batch of said articles in said upper chamber until needed and releasing a batch of said articles from said upper chamber upon demand. 23. A method according to claim 17, further comprising: determining a separation interval between said articles in said flow; determining a time required to activate said diverter gate; and adjusting a flow rate of articles in said flow, based on said determined separation interval and said determined time. 24. A method according to claim 17, further comprising a computer programmed to: maintain a tally of articles detected by said scanner, which articles have been received in a currently selected portioning bin; store scan data on articles in said flow based on said out-of-specification signal; totalize total volume of scanned product passing the scanner; open said first outlet gate of said currently selected portioning bin when a count of articles received therein equals said predetermined number and cause said diverter gate to hold a succeeding batch of articles; and open said second outlet gate of said currently selected portioning bin in response to generation of an out-of-specification signal from said scanner. 25. A method according to claim 17, wherein said predetermined specification is selected from the group consisting of number, volume, size, color, weight, and combinations thereof. 26. A method according to claim 25, wherein said predetermined specification is total volume. 27. A method according to claim 17, wherein said predetermined specification is count and total volume. This invention relates to an apparatus and method for detecting and discriminating articles that are within a predetermined range of a specification into lots. More particularly, this invention relates to an apparatus and method for detecting and discriminating articles as aforesaid that have been separated and singulated while being conveyed to the apparatus of the present invention. The specification could be volume, individual or total, of articles; size or other physical characteristic of the articles; count of articles; or combinations of these properties. Devices for counting or aggregating articles are known. For example, U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,313,508 and 5,454,016, which are incorporated herein by reference in their entireties, disclose methods and apparatus for counting irregularly shaped articles. A pair of alternately energized light sources is provided at a sensing plane through which articles to be counted pass. Each of the light sources emits a light beam that is at an angle to the other light beam, such as an angle of about 90�. U.S. Pat. No. 5,804,772, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, discloses an apparatus and method for aggregating a desired number of articles without individually counting out each article to achieve the desired number. A stream of the articles is discharged into a weigh hopper until substantially a predetermined weight of articles is in the hopper. The number of articles in the hopper is determined from the total weight of the hopper and the weight of a single article. Because previously known devices do not detect and package a lot of articles having a predetermined count and a predetermined size and reject lots having articles falling outside the predetermined size range, in my copending application Ser. No. 09/970,658, filed Oct. 5, 2001, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, I disclose a counter unit for counting discrete articles within a predetermined size range into lots having a predetermined number of articles. The counter unit includes (1) a first conveyor that delivers a flow of articles separated at intervals, and (2) at least one bin positioned to receive articles from the conveyor. The at least one bin may have first and second outlet gates for emptying the articles into first and second separate locations. A detector unit counts the articles that are received from the conveyor into the at least one bin and which fall within the predetermined size range. A control unit causes the first outlet gate to open when the count of articles is equal to the predetermined number of articles. However, when an article falls outside the predetermined size range, the detector generates an out-of-size signal. The control unit, upon receipt of the out-of-size signal from the detector unit, causes the second outlet gate to open, thereby rejecting the articles. The counter unit may also be used to for counting articles having a predetermined color into lots having a predetermined number of articles. When an article does not have the predetermined color, the detector generates an out-of-color signal. The control unit, upon receipt of the out-of-color signal from the detector unit, causes the second outlet gate to open, thereby rejecting the articles. The counter unit of the aforementioned application Ser. No. 09/970,658 is quick and efficient. There is a need, however, for an improvement on that counter unit which is more suitable for: use with certain applications. In particular, although as non-limiting examples, in packaging of pharmaceutical dosage forms such as pills, capsules, or the like; or of foods such as soups or other mixtures of various ingredients, apportioning the articles by gross volume is more efficient. It is, therefore, an object of the present invention to overcome the deficiencies of prior art devices and methods and to provide an apparatus and method for apportioning articles that accurately counts a predetermined number of discrete articles, regardless of size and/or shape, and/or dispenses articles that are within predetermined specifications such as total size or volume. It is another object of the present invention to provide an article detecting and counting or volume totaling apparatus that is relatively simple and inexpensive to manufacture and to maintain and that is both accurate and reliable. It is still another object of the present invention to provide a method of counting and portioning articles accurately and efficiently Consistent with the foregoing objects, the present invention provides an article detecting and counting apparatus which comprises a detector unit which detects and maintains a count of articles that are received in the apparatus or which fall within a predetermined range of a predetermined specification such as volume, which detector generates an out-of-specification signal when an article or group of articles received in the apparatus falls outside the predetermined range; a chamber positioned to receive articles from a flow of articles delivered to the apparatus; a diverter gate which holds and releases batches of articles for further processing, the diverter gate being disposed in the chamber; at least first and second outlet gates for emptying articles from apparatus into respective first and second locations which are separated from each other; and a control unit which causes the first outlet gate to open when the count or volume of articles is equal to the predetermined number and/or the articles fall within the predetermined range of the predetermined volume, for example, and causes the second outlet gate to open in response to receipt of an out-of-specification signal from the scanner. FIG. 1 is a perspective view from the top and front of a bowl feeder schematically showing the placement of the counting and portioning system of the present invention; FIG. 2 is an elevational view, schematically shown for illustrative clarity, of one embodiment of the counting and portioning system of the present invention; FIG. 3 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing the diverter gate in a holding position; FIG. 4 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing the diverter gate allowing a first batch to proceed to the next position; FIG. 5 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing the first batch being held while the diverter gate is in holding position for a second batch; FIG. 6 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing the first batch being dispensed while the diverter gate is in a holding position for a second batch; FIG. 7 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing the diverter gate opening to allow a second batch to pass to the next position and showing the reject gate in an open position; FIG. 8 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing a second batch being rejected while the diverter gate is in a holding position for another batch; FIG. 9 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 1 showing all gates closed to begin a new cycle; FIG. 10 is an elevational view, schematically shown for illustrative clarity, of another embodiment of the counting and portioning system of the present invention; FIG. 11 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 10 showing the diverter gate in a holding position; FIG. 12 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 10 showing the diverter gate allowing a first batch to proceed to a dispensing position; FIG. 13 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 10 showing the first batch being held for dispensing while the diverter gate is in a holding position for a second batch which will include an out-of-specification article; FIG. 14 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 13 showing the first batch being dispensed while the diverter gate is in a holding position for a second batch; FIG. 15 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 10 showing the diverter gate opening to allow a rejected batch to pass to the next position and showing the reject gate in an open position; FIG. 16 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 10 showing a batch being rejected, while another batch is being held for dispensing and while the diverter gate is in a holding position for still another batch; FIG. 17 is an elevational view of the embodiment of FIG. 10 showing all gates closed to begin a new cycle; FIG. 18 is a flow chart diagram of a method for detecting and counting articles that are within a predetermine range of a desired property into lots according to the present invention; FIG. 19 is a flow chart diagram of a sub-routine of the diagram of FIG. 18 FIG. 20 is a flow chart diagram of another sub-routine of the diagram of FIG. 18; and FIG. 21 is a schematic diagram of a counting and portioning system according to the present invention. Referring first to FIG. 1, there is shown a bowl feeder generally designated by the numeral 10 according to the aforementioned U.S. Pat. No. 6,360,870. The bowl feeder 10 has a central receiving section 12 which receives bulk product to be distributed to the counting and portioning system. The product could be pieces of food such as carrots, potatoes, pasta, or any other type of food which can be handled in bulk and separated into discrete units to have volume determined, to be counted, measured, weighed, or subjected to measurement of any other physical characteristic such as color, shape, or the like, or combinations such as volume determinations combined with count; pharmaceutical products such as tablets, capsules, or any other dosage form which can be subjected to handling; electronic components such as chips, resistors, capacitors, transistors, or the like; or any other type of product to be separated from bulk quantities into individual or multiple package units. The bowl feeder 10 shown is a vibratory feeder. Due to the vibration, the bulk product is moved along one or more tracks 14 spiraling or radiating out from the center of the apparatus. This movement separates and singulates (causes the product to assume a single file) the product. Only one track 14 is shown in FIG. 1 but it is understood that there may be as many as 100, or more, channels, the number being dictated only by practical considerations such as the size of the installation. A device for counting, sorting, combining, weighing, separating, or the like is affixed to the end of a track as is shown schematically at 16. One embodiment of the counting and portioning system of the present invention is shown in FIG. 2, generally designated by the numeral 20. Parts 22 which have been singulated by the device 10 enter the system at the inlet end 24 to be optically scanned by scanner 26. Scanner 26 is any suitable detecting device such as that of the aforementioned U.S. Pat. No. 5,313,508. Diverter gate 28 is in a first position to accumulate a batch of a predetermined number or volume of parts 22. Accept gate 30 and reject gate 32 are both in the closed positions. In FIG. 3, the parts 22 have all passed through scanner 26, are within the predetermined specifications, and are accumulating. In FIG. 4, the batch count or volume is completed, that is, the predetermined number or volume of in-specification parts 22 has accumulated. The diverter gate 28 swings to its second position allowing the first batch to drop down into the holding area at the outlet end 34 of device 20. Accept gate 30 and reject gate 32 are still closed. As shown in FIG. 5, while the first batch is being held at 34, a new batch is entering at inlet end 24, with diverter gate 28 holding the new batch. The new batch shown will include an item 36 which is out of specification. It is to be understood that out-of-specification article 36 is shown schematically and could, in fact, be a cluster of items which, collectively, do not meet the prescribed specification such as volume. Typically, the plurality of devices 20 are disposed above a conveyor system (not shown) which moves containers into which the parts 22 will be dispensed. When a container is aligned under device 20, accept gate 30 is opened while reject gate 32 remains closed. This releases an accepted batch to drop into a container, as shown in FIG. 6. Now, as shown in FIG. 7, as the first batch is being dispensed into a container, diverter gate 28 swings between the out-of-specification part 36 and the next entering in-specification part 22, accept gate 30 closes and reject gate 32 opens only when the accept gate 30 is closed. The partial batch containing out-of-specification part 36 is rejected as shown in FIG. 8 while a new batch begins to accumulate. A container, bin, trough, or the like (not shown) is disposed beneath the reject gate to catch the rejected batch. In FIG. 9, the diverter gate 28, accept gate 30, and reject gate 32 are in the positions allowing counting and accumulation of another batch while the rejected batch drops away. A second embodiment of the instant invention, generally designated by the numeral 40, is shown in FIG. 10. Parts 22 which have been singulated by the device 10 enter the system at the inlet end 42 to be optically scanned by scanner 26. Diverter gate 28 is in a first position to accumulate a batch of a predetermined number or volume of parts 22. Accept gate 30 and reject gate 32 are both in the closed positions. In this embodiment, the reject gate 32 is at the side of device 40 rather than at the bottom as in device 20 of the first embodiment. In FIG. 11, the parts 22 have all passed through scanner 26, are within the predetermined specifications, and are accumulating. In FIG. 12, the batch count is completed, that is, the predetermined number or volume of parts 22 have accumulated. The diverter gate 28 swings to its second position allowing the first batch to drop down into the holding area at the outlet end 44 of device 40. Accept gate 30 and reject gate 32 are still closed. As shown in FIG. 13, while the first batch is being held at 44, a new batch is entering at inlet end 42, with diverter gate 28 holding the new batch. The new batch shown will include a part 36 which is out of specification. When a container is aligned under device 40, accept gate 30 is opened while reject gate 32 remains closed. This releases an accepted batch to drop into a container, as shown in FIG. 14. Now, as shown in FIG. 15, the first batch has been dispensed into a container, diverter gate 28 swings between the out-of-specification part 36 and the next entering in-specification part 22, accept gate 30 is closed and reject gate 32 opens only when the accept gate 30 is closed. The partial batch containing out-of-specification part 36 is rejected as shown in FIG. 16 while a new batch begins to accumulate. As in the first embodiment, a container, bin, trough, or the like (not shown) is disposed beneath the reject gate to catch the rejected batch. In FIG. 17, the diverter gate 28, accept gate 30, and reject gate 32 are in the positions allowing counting and accumulation of another batch while the rejected batch drops away. According to the method of the present invention, a flow of articles separated by discrete intervals is provided to at least one portioning device 20, 40 positioned to receive the articles. Using the scanner 26, a count of articles that are received in the at least one portioning device and/or fall within a predetermined range of a predetermined specification such as volume, size, color, weight, or the like is calculated. The predetermined specification could be, for example, volume of an individual article or total volume of an aggregate group of articles. The at least one device is emptied into a first location when the count maintained by the detector is equal to the predetermined number. When articles in the flow that fall outside the predetermined range of size, weight, volume, or the like, however, an out-of-specification signal is generated. The at least one device is emptied into a second location in response to the generation of an out-of-specification signal. As already discussed, the first location may be, for example, a package for receiving one lot of articles having the predetermined specifications. The package may be situated on a second conveyor that moves packages sequentially into the first location. The second location may be, for example, a container for receiving and storing groups of articles that include articles that fall outside the predetermined specifications such as total volume. FIG. 18 is a flow diagram for operating a method according to the present invention. The main loop is started at 100. Then, in step 101, it is determined whether there is a demand (i.e., whether there is a first location capable of accepting the counted articles, such as a package in which a preset number or volume of articles is to be filled). If there is a demand, the counter unit determines whether any lots are ready for packaging, that is, whether there is a stored batch, at 102. If there is a stored batch, the accept gate is opened and that stored batch is dumped at 103. Even if there is no demand at 101, or if there is no stored batch at 102, an incoming stream of product is scanned at 104. The scan part routine is shown in the flow diagram of FIG. 19. The part enters the optics at 105. Different characteristics are scanned denoted as “scan X” 106 and “scan Y” 107. The routine queries whether the part is in the optics at 108. If yes, the scan is stored. If no, the size of the part is calculated at 109. If the part size meets specifications, the batch count or volume is tallied and calculated at 110. At this point, the part scan is finished unless a part is off-size or the batch number is wrong, in which case the batch is marked as bad. After scanning, the method determines whether the product feed needs adjustment at 111 (FIG. 18). The adjust product feed routine is shown in the flow diagram of FIG. 20. If the flow of articles is too fast for the diverter or deflector gate to separate them, as determined in step 112, the product feed is decreased, thereby slowing the flow of articles to the scanner. Returning to FIG. 18, after product feed is adjusted, if necessary, part data is stored in temporary storage at 113. If the batch is finished, the batch accumulator is not full, and the batch is good, the part data is stored in permanent storage at 114 and the batch is stored in an accumulator at 115. The profile of every item passing through the system is stored for future reference. The method of the present invention includes counting and/or detecting a predetermined physical characteristic of the articles by detector 26 which sends the count and in-specification or out-of-specification signal to control unit 50. Control unit 50 sets the diverter gate 28 in the proper position and opens the appropriate accept gate 30 or reject gate 32. Responsive to the incoming feed rate, control unit 50 also re-sets feed rate. Information about the batches of articles is stored in data storage 52. Patent CitationsCited PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS3123217 Jan 19, 1961Mar 3, 1964 Capsule inspection method and sorting machineUS3394804 Feb 10, 1966Jul 30, 1968Richard A. ReichelArticle aligning and sorting apparatusUS3606011 Jun 27, 1969Sep 20, 1971Oregon Cutstock And Moulding CLumber sorting method and apparatusUS3618819 Oct 7, 1969Nov 9, 1971Sigma SystemsElectronic counting apparatusUS5454016 May 6, 1994Sep 26, 1995Batching Systems Inc.Method and apparatus for detecting and counting articlesUS5804772 Oct 4, 1996Sep 8, 1998Batching Systems, Inc.Apparatus and method for dispensing batches of articlesUS6360870 Aug 4, 2000Mar 26, 2002Batching Systems, Inc.Feeding and sorting apparatusUS6563901 Oct 5, 2001May 13, 2003Donald R. WooldridgeMulti-head counting system with size discriminationGB2277391A * Title not available* Cited by examinerReferenced byCiting PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS7174693Jul 15, 2005Feb 13, 2007Diamond Machine Works, Inc.Article portioning head systemUS7281361Jan 12, 2007Oct 16, 2007Diamond Machine Werks, Inc.Method of article portioningUS7555362 May 25, 2006Jun 30, 2009Parata Systems, LlcArticle dispensing and counting method and deviceUS8146777 Jul 1, 2010Apr 3, 2012Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd.Medicine feeding deviceUS8386073 Sep 19, 2008Feb 26, 2013Cretem Co., Ltd.Module for regulating quantity of various-shaped tablets in automatic tablet dispenser, and tablet dispensing method thereofUS8393495 Sep 19, 2008Mar 12, 2013Cretem Co., Ltd.Dispenser of automatically distributing various shaped tablets in medicine packing machine and tablet dispensing method thereofUS8812146Jan 31, 2008Aug 19, 2014Marel Food System Hf.Batch creationUS8925762 Jun 29, 2009Jan 6, 2015Monsanto Technology LlcHigh speed counterUS8985389 Apr 14, 2013Mar 24, 2015Yuyama Mfg. Co., Ltd.Medicine feeding device and a medicine counting device using the medicine feeding deviceUS20100264173 Jul 1, 2010Oct 21, 2010Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd.Medicine feeding deviceUS20110132721 Jun 29, 2009Jun 9, 2011Monsanto Technology LlcHigh speed counterUS20110313566 Sep 19, 2008Dec 22, 2011Cretem Co., Ltd.Module for regulating quantity of various-shaped tablets in automatic tablet dispenser, and tablet dispensing method thereofUS20130334245 Apr 14, 2013Dec 19, 2013Yuyama Mfg. Co., Ltd.Medicine feeding device and a medicine counting device using the medicine feeding deviceCN101820847BSep 19, 2008Mar 12, 2014克里腾株式会社Module for regulating quantity of various-shaped tablets in automatic tablet dispenser, and tablet dispensing method thereof* Cited by examinerClassifications U.S. Classification209/551, 209/908, 209/652International ClassificationB07C5/38Cooperative ClassificationY10S209/908, B07C5/38European ClassificationB07C5/38Legal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionJan 7, 2003ASAssignmentMar 28, 2005ASAssignmentOwner name: DONALD WOOLDRIDGE AND BEVERLY WOOLDRIDGE, MARYLANDFree format text: SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BATCHING SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:016987/0374Effective date: 20050316Mar 24, 2006ASAssignmentOwner name: DIAMOND MACHINE WERKS, INC., ILLINOISFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BATCHING SYSTEMS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:017696/0503Effective date: 20060308Oct 18, 2007FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 4May 2, 2012FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 8May 2, 2012SULPSurcharge for late paymentYear of fee payment: 7RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - About Google Patents - Send FeedbackData provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services
de	other	N/A	BGH, 11.08.2016 - IV ZR 491/15 - Unzulässigkeit der Bewilligung von Prozesskostenhilfe für einen Verfahrensantrag auf Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand \| anwalt24.de Beschl. v. 11.08.2016, Az.: IV ZR 491/15 Unzulässigkeit der Bewilligung von Prozesskostenhilfe für einen Verfahrensantrag auf Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand Referenz: JurionRS 2016, 23086 Aktenzeichen: IV ZR 491/15 LG Berlin - 16.10.2014 - AZ: 6 O 210/10 KG Berlin - 06.10.2015 - AZ: 7 U 181/14 § 119 S. 1 ZPO Der IV. Zivilsenat des Bundesgerichtshofs hat durch den Richter Felsch, die Richterin Harsdorf-Gebhardt, den Richter Lehmann, die Richterinnen Dr. Brockmöller und Dr. Bußmann Die Anträge der Antragstellerin, ihr Prozesskostenhilfe für einen Antrag auf Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand zu gewähren und einen Notanwalt für dieses Verfahren zu bestellen, werden abgelehnt. Die Anhörungsrüge gegen den Senatsbeschluss vom 22. Juli 2016 wird auf Kosten der Antragstellerin zurückgewiesen. Das Ablehnungsgesuch der Antragstellerin vom 14. Juli 2016 gegen die Vorsitzende Richterin am Bundesgerichtshof Mayen wird verworfen. 1. Die Bewilligung von Prozesskostenhilfe nur für einen Verfah rensantrag auf Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand ist im Gesetz nicht vorgesehen. Prozesskostenhilfe darf vielmehr nach § 114 ZPO nur für die gesamte Rechtverfolgung oder Rechtsverteidigung bewilligt werden. Darunter ist, wie sich aus § 119 Satz 1 ZPO ergibt, der "Rechtszug" zu verstehen (Zöller/Geimer, ZPO, 31. Aufl. § 114 Rn. 4; OLG Köln, MDR 1988, 588). Der Begriff Rechtszug ist kostenrechtlich gemeint, nämlich jeder Verfahrensabschnitt, der besondere Kosten verursacht und für den noch nicht geprüft werden konnte, ob die Rechtsverfolgung oder -verteidigung genügend aussichtsreich und nicht mutwillig ist (vgl. Zöller/ Geimer, ZPO 31. Aufl. § 119 Rn. 1; BGH FamRZ 2004, 1707 unter II 4). Voraussetzung ist immer, dass eine gesonderte, von der Beurteilung des Hauptverfahrens unabhängige Prüfung der hinreichenden Erfolgsaussicht möglich ist (OLG Köln aaO). Dies ist bei einem Wiedereinsetzungsantrag nicht der Fall. Die Wiedereinsetzung löst auch keine besonderen Gebühren aus (Zöller/Geimer, ZPO 31. Aufl. § 119 Rn. 30). Da der Antrag aussichtslos ist, kommt auch die Bestellung eines Notanwalts nicht in Betracht. 2. Die Anhörungsrüge der Antragstellerin nach § 321a ZPO gegen den Senatsbeschluss vom 22. Juni 2016 ist jedenfalls unbegründet. Eine Hinweispflicht betreffend die mangelnde Erfolgsaussicht für die beabsichtigte Rechtsverfolgung besteht im Falle der Ablehnung eines Prozesskostenhilfeantrags für eine beabsichtigte Nichtzulassungsbeschwerde nicht. Der Senat hat das Vorbringen der Antragstellerin in dem Prozesskostenhilfegesuch einschließlich der Rügen einer Verletzung des Anspruchs auf Gewährung rechtlichen Gehörs geprüft und für nicht durchgreifend erachtet. Von einer weiteren Begründung wird abgesehen. 3. Das Ablehnungsgesuch der Antragstellerin ist rechtsmissbräuchlich und damit unzulässig. Bei der Ablehnung eines Richters müssen ernsthafte Umstände angeführt werden, die die Befangenheit des einzelnen Richters aus Gründen rechtfertigen, die in persönlichen Beziehungen dieses Richters zu den Parteien oder zu der zur Verhandlung stehenden Streitsache stehen (BGH, Beschluss vom 5. Dezember 2012 - XII ZB 18/12 m.w.N., [...]). Solche Umstände zeigt die Antragstellerin nicht auf.
fr	other	N/A	Arrêté grand-ducal du 30 juillet 1925 approuvant le règlement sur les pensions des agents des chemins de fer Guillaume-Luxembourg non soumis à l'assurance-invalidité et vieillesse et non affiliés à une caisse d'assurance et de retraite. - Legilux Arrêté grand-ducal du 30 juillet 1925 approuvant le règlement sur les pensions des agents des chemins de fer Guillaume-Luxembourg non soumis à l'assurance-invalidité et vieillesse et non affiliés à une caisse d'assurance et de retraite. Signature : 30/07/1925 Permalink ELI : http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/agd/1925/07/30/n1/jo Arrêté grand-ducal du 30 juillet 1925, approuvant le règlement sur les pensions des agents des chemins de fer Guillaume - Luxembourg non soumis à l'assurance-invalidité et vieillesse et non affiliés à une caisse d'assurance et de retraite. TITRE I. - Pensions des agents. Section II. - De la computation du temps de service. Section III. - De la liquidation, des pensions. Section I. - Pension de la veuve. Section II. - Pension des orphelins de pire. Section III. - Pension des orphelins de père et mère. Section IV. - Dispositions transitoires. Est approuvé le règlement sur les pensions des agents des chemins de fer non soumis à l'assurance-invalidité et vieillesse et non affiliés à une caisse de retraite ou à une caisse d'assurance et de retraite, règlement dont la teneur suit: 1° mis d'office à la retraite pour cause de limite d'âge qui est fixée à 60 ans pour les agents ayant au moins quinze années de service actif comme mécanicien de locomotive ou chauffeur de locomotive. Elle est fixée à 68 ans pour tous les autres agents-fonctionnaires. Toutefois la pension n'est due qu'après dix ans de service, au moins; 2° après trente ans de service et s'il a 60 ans d'âge s'il s'agit d'un agent fonctionnaire et s'il a 55 ans d'âge, s'il s'agit d'un agent faisant partie de l'une des catégories du personnel pour lesquelles la limite d'âge obligatoire est fixée à 60 ans; 3° après dix années de service, s'il est reconnu hors d'état de continuer ses fonctions et de les reprendre par suite d'infirmités; 4° quelle que soit la durée du service, s'il est reconnu hors d'état de continuer ses fonctions et de les reprendre par suite de blessures reçues ou d'accidents survenus dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, soit par suite d'un acte de dévouement dans un intérêt publie on en exportant ses jours pour sauver une vie d'homme. Tout agent quittant le service en dehors des conditions définies à l'article 1er, soit volontairement, soit pour toute autre cause, a droit, s'il a plus de quinze années de service comptant pour la pension, à une pension de retraite dont la jouissance est différée à l'âge où seraient remplies, selon la catégorie d'emploi à laquelle il appartient, les conditions déterminées par l'alinéa 2 de l'article 1er. 1° les années passées au service du réseau; 2° les années passées au service de l'Etat ainsi que les services militaires effectifs remplis dans le Grand-Duché; 3° le temps pendant lequel l'agent était en jouissance d'un traitement d'attente. 1° les interruptions de service; 2° les aimées passées au service du réseau, de l'Etat ou au service militaire avant l'age de 18 ans accomplis; 3° les services qui n'ont été conférés qu'à titre révocable et qui n'auraient pas été convertis en nomination définitive; 4° les services qui ne sont conférés que sous la condition qu'ils ne donnent pas droit à la pension; Dans les états de service on ne compte que les années et les mois, prenant chaque mois pour un douzième de l'année. On n'a pas égard aux jours qui excèdent. La pension est fixée au tiers du traitement dont l'ayant -droit, a joui au moment de la cessation des fonctions et dans lequel sont à comprendre tous les émoluments ayant le caractère de traitement. Lorsque la computation du temps de service comprend plus de 10 années, la pension s'accroit d'un soixantième du même traitement pour chaque année de service au delà de 10 ans sa sans pouvoir dépasser les cinq sixièmes du traitement. Lorsqu'un agent a été reconnu hors d'état de continuer ses fonctions ou de les reprendre ultérieurement par suite de blessures reçues ou d'un accident résultant, de l'exercice de ses fonctions, la pension sera fixée comme suit: 1° pour le cas de cécité ou d'amputation de deux membres ou de l'existence d'un état d'impotence tel que l'agent ne peut subsister sans l'assistance et les soins d'autrui, pendant la durée de cet état au traitement entier dont l'intéressé a joui au moment de l'ouverture du droit à la pension; 2° pour le cas d'amputation d'un membre ou de la perte absolue de l'usage d'un mombre, aux deux tiers du dit traitement, pourvu que l'intéressé n'ait pas droit à une pension d'ancienneté plus élevée; 3° pour les cas d'infirmité de gravité moindre, il est accordé à l'intéressé nue bonification de 6 années de service. Toutefois dans les cas qui précèdent, la pension doit être refusée si les blessures ou l'accident ont été provoqués intentionnellement par l'agent; cette disposition est également applicable aux pensions des veuves et des orphelins. La pension peut être refusée totalement ou partiellement, si les blessures ont été reçues ou si l'accident a été subi par l'agent pendant la perpétration d'un crime ou d'un délit. Le refus de la pension n'est cependant justifié dans ce cas que si le blessé a été condamné irrévocablement, au moins à une peine d'emprisonnement de 15 jours ou à une amende de 300 francs ou à une peine d'emprisonnement de 8 jours et à une amende de 150 francs. L'indemnité de résidence comptera pour la pension au taux uniforme de 5 %. En dehors de leur pension les intéressés toucheront les allocations pour charge de famille consenties au personnel en activité pourvu que les enfants aient été conçus dans le mariage avant la mise en retraite du père. Les traitements servant de base au calcul des pensions seront soumis aux mêmes révisions périodiques que les traitements des agents en activité de service et les pensions varieront en même temps que les traitements correspondants. Lorsqu'un agent, rentré au service du réseau après avoir été pensionné, est de nouveau admis à la retraite, il rentre purement et simplement en jouissance de son ancienne pension, si le nouveau service n'excède pas un an. Si le nouveau service excède un an et que le traitement y attaché soit égal ou inférieur au traitement ayant servi de base à la. liquidation de la pension, l'ancienne pension est augmentée pour chaque année du nouveau service de un soixantième du dernier traitement. Si, dans le même cas, le dernier traitement a été supérieur au traitement sur lequel la pension avait été réglée, le fonctionnaire est en droit de réclamer une nouvelle liquidation de la pension basée sur la généralité des services. Est assimilé au pensionnaire remis en activité quant aux dispositions de l'article précédent, l'agent ayant eu droit à une pension, qui a accepté d'autres Fonctions lui confiées dans le même réseau avant que cette pension ait été liquidée. 1° la veuve de l'agent qui avait obtenu une pension de retraite pourvu que le mariage ait été contracté au moins un an avant la mise à la retraite du mari, et quelle que soit la durée du mariage avant la mise à la retraite, si un entant en est issu ou si la mise à la retraite du mari a, été amenée par un des accidents prévus à l'art. 1er du présent règlement; 2° la, veuve de l'agent décodé après cinq années de service, si le mariage a en lieu un an au moins avant le décès du mari ou si un enfant est issu du mariage; 3° la veuve de l'agent qui a perdu la vie par suite d'un accident quelle que soit la durée des fonctions du mari; toutefois, dans ce dernier cas, le mariage doit avoir été antérieur à l'accident. La pension de la veuve sans enfant ayant droit à la pension est de la moitié de celle que le mari a obtenue ou à laquelle il aurait eu droit. Ont droit à la pension, l'orphelin ou les orphelins d'un agent ou d'un pensionnaire, âgés de moins de dix-huit ans et non mariés et issus d'un mariage contracté avant la cessation des fonctions. Le droit à la pension n'existe que pour les enfants légitimes ou légitimés; il n'existe pas pour l'enfant, respectivement cesse pour l'enfant qui encourt une condamnation criminelle. Lorsqu'il existe à la fois un ou plusieurs orphelins et une veuve ayant droit à une pension, les enfants ont droit à une pension égale, s'il y en a un ou deux, à huit quarantièmes, s'il y en a trois, à neuf quarantièmes, et, s'il y en a quatre ou plus, à dix quarantièmes de la pension que le père avait obtenue ou à laquelle il aurait eu droit. Lorsqu'un agent est décédé par suite de blessures ou d'infirmités graves mentionnées à l'art. 7 et pourvu que le décès ne soit pas survenu plus d'une année après ces blessures, la pension est fixée, sans égard à la durée de service, pour la veuve avec orphelins aux quatre neuvièmes du dernier traitement, et pour la veuve seule ou pour un ou plusieurs orphelins seuls à un tiers du même traitement, pourvu, bien entendu, que les intéressés n'aient pas droit, à une pension d'ancienneté supérieure. La pension allouée globalement à plusieurs enfants leur est répartie par portions égales et par tête sans distinction de lit. Si la veuve vient à mourir ou à perdre ses droits, la pension des enfants est, réglée d'après les dispositions de la section III. Si la mère est décédée ou inhabile à recueillir une pension, ou déchue de ses droits, la pension des orphelins est fixée pour un enfant aux six vingtièmes, pour deux enfants aux huit vingtièmes, pour trois enfants aux neuf vingtièmes et pour quatre enfants et. plus aux dix vingtièmes de la pension du père. Lorsqu'il y a plusieurs orphelins, la pension est partagée entre eux par égales portions. L'extinction de la pension de la veuve et l'extinction successive des parts d' enfants pour d'effet qu'à partir du mois qui suit celui ou elles se sont produites; elles donnent lieu à règlement nouveau dans le sens des dispositions qui précèdent. Les taux prévus au présent Titre seront également appliqués pour la computation des pensions de réversibilité dues en vertu de pensions d'agents accordées avant le 1er juin 1921, niais échues postérieurement à cette date. Ces pensions seront calculées sur la base de la pension de l'agent et modifiées conformément aux dispositions du Titre II. Toute pension est accordée par décision du réseau. Le réseau détermine les pièces et documents à produire pour la justification des droits à la pension. Aucune pension pour cause de blessures, accidents ou infirmités n'est accordée, si leur réalité n'a pas été constatée par une commission spéciale, à la majorité des voix. Cette commission est composée de trois membres, dont deux à désigner par la Direction du réseau et un par la délégation centrale. Les membres ainsi que leurs suppléants sont désignés pour la durée d'une année. Le mandat peut être renouvelé. Ces fonctions sont gratuites. Il est adjoint à la commission, avec voix consultative, deux docteurs en médecine et en chirurgie, désignés par la Direction du réseau pour chaque réunion de la commission. Leurs honoraires, fixés par la Direction du réseau et avancés par elle, ne sont payés par les intéressés que lorsque leur demande de mise à la retraite pour infirmité est rejetée. Si les hommes de l'art sont divisés d'opinion ou bien si la demande en est laite par le réseau ou par le fonctionnaire à examiner, la Commission peut appeler un troisième homme de l'art, tant pour constater l'existence den infirmités que leur origine au point de vue médical. La Commission, sur cet avis, décidera, sauf recours aux tribunaux, si les infirmités ou l'accident qui entraînent cessation des fonctions, ont été occasionnés ou non par l'exercice ou à l'occasion de ce service; sa décision sera motivée. Le procès-verbal de la Commission indiquera pour chaque prétendant-droit à la pension, l'opinion individuelle des hommes de l'art; si l'intéressé ne peut pas se présenter devant la Commission, l'impossibilité sera constatée par un certificat motivé de deux médecins désignés par la Commission. La liquidation de la pension est faite d'office ou sur la demande de la partie intéressée. La partie qui se croit lésée dans ses droits par la décision intervenue sur la pension, peut se pourvoir en révision devant les tribunaux qui statueront d'urgence suivant la procédure sommaire. Les pensions sont établies en francs entiers, les centimes étant négligés. Les pensions sont payées par mois et d'avance. Les pensions sont incessibles. Les brevets ne peuvent être donnés en gage. Aucune saisie ou retenue ne peut être opérée que jusqu'à concurrence d'un cinquième pour dette envers l'Etat et le réseau ou pour les créances privilégiées aux termes de l'art. 2101 du Code civil, ou du chef de loyers, et d'un tiers dans les circonstances prévues par les art. 203, 205, 206, 207 et 214 du Code civil. Le pensionnaire chargé d'un emploi accessoire ou remis en activité peut cumuler sa pension avec les émoluments et traitements attachés aux emplois ou fonctions qui lui sont confiés, mais seulement jusqu'à concurrence du traitement, qui a servi de base à la, liquidation de la pension. Si le nouveau traitement atteint ou dépasse ce traitement, le paiement de la pension est suspendu. Si la pension et les émoluments ou traitement réunis dépassent ce traitement, l'excédent est retenu sur la pension. Le pensionnaire en jouissance d'une rente accordée en vertu de l'assurance-accidents peut cumuler sa pension avec cette rente jusqu'à concurrence des cinq sixièmes de la, rémunération annuelle, dont il avait joui au moment de sa retraite. Les pensions de réversibilité cumulées avec une rente d'accident sont réduites en tant qu'elles excèdent les taux prévus aux art. 13, 16 et 18. Dans le cas de mise à la retraite et dans le cas de décès d'un agent en activité ou pensionné une somme égale au traitement ou à la pension de trois mois sera, payée encore après la mise à la retraite ou le décès. En cas de décès, ce paiement se fera au profit de la veuve respectivement des enfants ou parents qui ont vécu en ménage commun avec le défunt et dont l'entretien était à sa, charge. A défaut d'une veuve, respectivement d'enfant ou de parents remplissant ces conditions, la Direction du réseau désignera le bénéficiaire de cette allocation. Toute pension commence à courir du mois suivant le trimestre de faveur mentionné à l'article précédent. Les pensions des agents sont fixées au minimum à 2100 fr., celles des veuves à 1500 fr. et celles d'un ou de plusieurs orphelins de père et de mère à 900 fr. Ces minima peuvent être modifiés, le cas échéant, en même temps que les traitements et pensions. Les allocations de quelque nature qu'elles soient, accordées avant, l'entrée en vigueur du statut, seront affectées poux les termes à échoir d'un coefficient égal aux deux tiers du nombre-index. Toutefois les montants ainsi obtenus ne pourront être ni inférieurs aux minima prévis à l'art. 30, ni aux pensions actuelles. En outre les intéressés jouiront des allocations pour charge de famille mentionnées à l'art. 8. Le pensionnaire admis à la retraite pour cause d'infirmité ou d'invalidité peut être obligé pendant 10 années par le réseau et sauf recours au Gouvernement qui statuera sans appel, à rentrer en activité de service si son état de santé vient à se modifier de telle façon qu'il soit reconnu apte par la Commission des pensions à reprendre ses anciennes fonctions ou des fonctions équivalentes au point de vue du rang et des émoluments et qu'en cas de refus de l'intéressé de se présenter à la Commission, la pension lui sera retirée par voie d'arrêté grand-ducal. Le mode d'application ainsi que la date de l'exécution du présent règlement sur les réseaux des chemins de fer Prince-Henri, Vicinaux, Cantonaux et Secondaires feront l'objet d'un arrêté spécial. Château de Berg, le 30 juillet 1925.
fr	wikipedia	N/A	En Côte d'Ivoire, la commune est une division administrative correspondant généralement à un territoire constitué de quartiers ou de villages. Comme les autres collectivités territoriales ivoiriennes que sont la région, le département, le district et la ville, la commune est une entité administrative dotée de la personnalité morale et de l'autonomie financière. Elle a pour missions, dans la limite des compétences qui lui sont expressément dévolues, d'organiser la vie collective et la participation des populations à la gestion des affaires locales, de promouvoir et réaliser le développement local, de moderniser le monde rural, d'améliorer le cadre de vie, de gérer les terroirs et l'environnement. Le conseil municipal, le maire et la municipalité constituent les organes de la commune. Historique La politique de communalisation, démarre en Côte d'Ivoire par la création, au terme de la loi du , des trois communes de plein exercice d'Abidjan, de Bouaké et de Grand-Bassam. Limitée au double plan spatial et fonctionnel, la capacité de telles structures et organes à imposer un rythme au développement local, s'avère très peu significative et conduit en 1978 à une réforme qui voit le jour en 1980. Celle-ci se poursuit en 1985par un accroissement considérable du nombre de communes autant que de leurs champs de compétences. En 1995, les pouvoirs publics ivoiriens prennent l'option d'élargir un peu plus l'expérience de la communalisation par l'érection de tous les chefs lieux de sous-préfectures en communes. La création de communautés rurales est même envisagée mais elle sera abandonnée avec l'adoption d'une nouvelle constitution en 2000qui préserve toutefois le principe de la libre administration des collectivités territoriales. En 2006, le territoire national est entièrement subdivisé en circonscriptions communales. Notes et références Bibliographie Articles connexes Liste des communes de Côte d'Ivoire
es	wikipedia	N/A	La provincia de Coronel Portillo es una de las cuatro que conforman el departamento de Ucayali en el Oriente del Perú. Limita por el Norte con el departamento de Loreto; por el Este, con la República Federativa de Brasil; por el Sur, con la provincia de Atalaya y al Oeste, con la provincia de Padre Abad, los departamentos de Pasco y Huánuco. Su nombre honra la memoria del coronel Pedro Portillo, prefecto de Loreto de 1901 a 1904 y funcionario del Ministerio de Fomento, cargos desde los cuales impulsó la exploración y el desarrollo de las comunicaciones. Historia La provincia fue creada en 1943 dentro de la jurisdicción del departamento de Loreto y abarcaba todo el actual territorio del departamento del Ucayali. El primer alcalde fue Arturo Bartra Flores, nombrado directamente por las autoridades nacionales por ser vecino notable y por su conducta intachable, así como por sus iniciativas para el progreso económico, cívico y social de la provincia. Su presencia directriz en la gestión edilicia se circunscribió al año de 1945. par Entonces estuvo integrada por los distritos de: Callería Masisea Iparía Tahuanía Raimondi Yurúa Purús Mediante Ley N° 23099 del 18 de junio de 1980 se crea el departamento de Ucayali que incluía entonces las provincias de Coronel Portillo y Ucayali. Está última no aceptó la anexión al nuevo departamento y fue devuelta a Loreto. En 1982 se reordena el departamento de Ucayali en cuatro provincias: Coronel Portillo, Atalaya, Padre Abad y Purús. División administrativa La provincia tiene una extensión de 36 815,86 km2 y se divide en siete distritos: Geografía Esta provincia se encuentra ubicada en la región selva, su suelo es sinuoso y ondulado en algunas zonas, con más notoriedad al Sur y al oeste, comprende parte de las cuencas del río Ucayali y del río Aguaytía, su altitud fluctúa desde los 104 a 2,072 msnm. Población Según censo 2007 la provincia tiene una población de 333 890 habitantes. Capital La capital de esta provincia es la ciudad de Pucallpa a 157 msnm con una población de 126 983 habitantes y 29 633 viviendas. Atractivos turísticos Esta provincia de Coronel Portillo cuenta con paisajes naturales y los recursos turísticos naturales más importantes son: Laguna Yarinacocha, en Puerto Callao, distrito de Yarinacocha. Laguna Cashibococha, en Cashibococha, distrito de Yarinacocha. Laguna Imiria, en Imiria, distrito de Masisea. Laguna Shauya, en Shauya, distrito de Masisea. Autoridades Regionales Consejeros regionales 2019 - 2022 Emerson Kepler Guevara Tello (Acción Popular) Jéssica Lizbeth Navas Sánchez (Alianza para el Progreso) Land Barbaran La Torre (Ucayali Región con Futuro) Raúl Edgar Soto Rivera (Alianza para el Progreso) Municipales 2019 - 2022 Alcalde: Segundo Leónidas Pérez Collazos, de Alianza para el Progreso. Regidores: Raúl Marden Contreras Ramírez (Alianza para el Progreso) Luis Alberto Vicente Yaya (Alianza para el Progreso) Nena Elisa Molnar Ríos (Alianza para el Progreso) Brenda Celica Rodríguez Acosta de Ramos (Alianza para el Progreso) Arturo Ananías Paucar Panez (Alianza para el Progreso) José Miguel Reátegui Urresti (Alianza para el Progreso) Kevinn Christian Chamorro Güere (Alianza para el Progreso) Ruth Erika Ventura Amasifuén (Alianza para el Progreso) José Alfredo Cárdenas Núñez (Acción Popular) Victor Hugo Soria Saldaña (Acción Popular) Maximiliano Supa Carhuas (Ucayali Región con Futuro) Liz Carol García Rengifo (Integrando Ucayali) Yris Elena Silva Orbegoso (Restauración Nacional) Véase también Región Ucayali Pucallpa Reincorporación de la Provincia de Ucayali a Loreto Amazonía del Perú Mitología de la Amazonía del Perú Referencias Enlaces externos Provincia de Coronel Portillo Coronel Portillo
de	legislation	EU	Nr. L 91 /8 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 13 . 4. 77 VERORDNUNG (EWG) Nr. 752/77 DER KOMMISSION vom 12 . April 1977 über eine Ausschreibung für die Lieferung von Butteroil im Rahmen der Nah rungsmittelhilfe an Honduras DIE KOMMISSION DER EUROPAISCHEN HAT FOLGENDE VERORDNUNG ERLASSEN : GEMEINSCHAFTEN — Artikel 1 gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europä ischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, ( 1 ) Gemäß den Verordnungen (EWG) Nr. 694/76 und 695/76 werden die Kosten der Herstellung und gestützt auf die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 804/68 des der Lieferung einer Partie von 500 Tonnen Butteroil Rates vom 27 . Juni 1968 über die gemeinsame Markt für Honduras ausgeschrieben . organisation für Milch und Milcherzeugnisse ('), zu letzt geändert durch die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. (2) Hinsichtlich des Ausschreibungsverfahrens so 559/76 (2 ), insbesondere auf Artikel 6 Absatz 7, wie der Bedingungen für die Herstellung und die Lie ferung des Butteroils gelten, unbeschadet der nachste in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe : hend aufgeführten Sondervorschriften , die Vorschrif ten der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2247/75. Die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 695/76 des Rates vom 25. März 1976 über die Lieferung von Milchfetten an be stimmte Entwicklungsländer und internationale Orga Artikel 2 nisationen im Rahmen des Nahrungsmittelpro gramms 1976 (3) sieht unter anderem vor, daß Hondu (1) Die zur Herstellung des Butteroils bestimmte ras 1 000 Tonnen Butteroil , das aus Butter aus den Butter wird von der niederländischen Interventions Beständen der Interventionsstellen herzustellen ist, stelle abgenommen . zur Verfügung gestellt werden . Dieses Land hat die Lieferung von 500 Tonnen Butteroil beantragt. (2) Das Butteroil entspricht hinsichtlich Qualität und Verpackung den im Anhang der Verordnung Gemäß Artikel 5 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 694/76 (EWG) Nr. 2247/75 festgelegten Anforderungen ; es des Rates vom 25. März 1976 über die Grundregeln wird ausschließlich in 5-kg-Dosen verpackt. Letztere müssen innen mit einer Schutzschicht versehen sein für die Lieferung von Milchfetten an Entwicklungslän der und internationale Organisationen im Rahmen oder eine Behandlung erfahren haben , die gleichwer des Nahrungsmittelhilfeprogramms 1976 (4) wird tige Sicherheiten bietet. grundsätzlich eine Ausschreibung für diese Lieferung durchgeführt. (3) Die Aufschrift auf der Verpackung gemäß Kapi tel II unter 2 b) des im vorigen Absatz genannten An hangs lautet wie folgt : Die Ausschreibung wird gemäß der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2247/75 der Kommission vom 29 . August „ Butteroil / Donación de la Comunidad Economica 1975 über die Ausschreibungsbedingungen für die Europea al Honduras / Destinado a la distribución gra Kosten der Herstellung und Lieferung von Butteroil tuita". im Rahmen der Nahrungsmittelhilfe an bestimmte Entwicklungsländer und an das Welternährungspro (4) Die Frist für die Einreichung der Angebote en gramm (5), geändert durch die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. det am 26. April 1977 um 12.00 Uhr. 221 2/76 (6), durchgeführt. Jedoch sind einige Präzisie rungen , insbesondere hinsichtlich der Frist für die Einreichung der Angebote und der Bedingungen für Artikel 3 die Lieferung des Butteroils, erforderlich . (1) Die Lieferung erfolgt zum Entladehafen von Die in dieser Verordnung vorgesehenen Maßnahmen Puerto Cortes . entsprechen der Stellungnahme des Verwaltungsaus schusses für Milch und Milcherzeugnisse — (2) Die Verschiffung erfolgt so bald wie möglich, spätestens jedoch am 10 . Juni 1977. (') AB1 . Nr. L 148 vom 28 . 6. 1968 , S. 13 . (2 ) AB1 . Nr. L 67 vom 15. 3 . 1976, S. 9 . (3) Die Lieferung zum Entladehafen gilt zu dem (J) AB1 . Nr. L 83 vom 30 . 3 . 1976, S. 6. Zeitpunkt als durchgeführt, zu dem die Ware tatsäch (4) AB1. Nr. L 83 vom 30. 3 . 1976, S. 4. lich im Laderaum des Schiffes im Entladehafen in Be (5) AB1 . Nr. L 229 vom 30. 8 . 1975, S. 60 . (') AB1. Nr. L 249 vom 11 . 9 . 1976, S. 5. sitz genommen worden ist. ---pagebreak--- 13 . 4 . 77 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften Nr. L 91 /9 Das Empfängerland übernimmt sämtliche Kosten, die schiffung der Ware die Bezeichnung des Schiffes und nach der Lieferung der Ware entstehen, einschließlich das Datum der Verladung, die bei der Verschiffung der Entladekosten (Losmachen, Hochziehen, Ab festgestellte Menge und Qualität der Ware mit. nahme) und der Kosten für etwaige Beförderung auf Leichtern . (2) Der Zuschlagsempfänger teilt dem Empfänger land das mutmaßliche Ankunftsdatum des Schiffes im Das Empfängerland trägt ein gegebenenfalls im Entla Bestimmungshafen mindestens 10 Tage vor diesem dehafen anfallendes Liegegeld und erhält ein etwaiges Datum mit. Der Zuschlagsempfänger läßt dem Kapi Eilgeld (dispatch money). Die Sätze und Modalitäten tän in der Charterpartie zur Auflage machen, das Emp für Liegegeld und Eilgeld müssen zwischen dem Zu fängerland mindestens 72 Stunden vorher von dem schlagsempfänger und dem Transportunternehmen voraussichtlichen Zeitpunkt der Ankunft des Schiffes festgelegt werden und zuvor zwischen dem Zuschlags in Kenntnis zu setzen . empfänger, der als Bevollmächtigter der Gemeinschaft handelt, und dem Abnehmer im Bestimmungsland Artikel 5 vereinbart worden sein . (4) Bei der Lieferung zum Entladehafen unter den Für das auf Grund dieser Verordnung gelieferte in Absatz 3 vorgesehenen Bedingungen übermittelt Butteroil wird weder eine Erstattung noch ein (Wäh das Bestimmungsland dem Bevollmächtigten der rungs- oder Beittritts-)Ausgleichsbetrag gewährt. Kommission eine Übernahmebescheinigung. Artikel 6 Artikel 4 Diese Verordnung tritt am Tag nach ihrer Veröffentli (1) Die betreffende Interventionsstelle teilt dem chung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaf Empfängerland innerhalb kürzester Frist nach Ver ten in Kraft. Diese Verordnung ist in allen ihren Teilen verbindlich und gilt unmittelbar in jedem Mitgliedstaat. Brüssel, den 12. April 1977 Für die Kommission Der Vizepräsident Finn GUNDELACH
el	wikipedia	N/A	Ο Σιγκέρ της Μπραμπάντ (Sigerius, Sighier, Sigieri ή Sygerius de Brabantia, περ. 1240 – πριν από τις 10 Νοεμβρίου 1284) ήταν φιλόσοφος του 13ου αιώνα από τις νότιες Κάτω Χώρες και υπήρξε σημαντικός υποστηρικτής του Αβερροϊσμού. Eίναι ένας από τους πλέον αμφιλεγόμενους μεσαιωνικούς συγγραφείς και η έρευνα παραδίδει αντικρουόμενες απόψεις για το πρόψωπό του. Από τη μια πλευρά, ορισμένοι τον βλέπουν ως το σύμβολο επικίνδυνης αίρεσης στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Παρισιού. Από μία διαφορετική οπτική γωνία ο Σιγκέρ της Μπραμπάντ, μαζί με τον Βοήθιο της Δακίας, θεωρούνται πρόσωπα ενός κινήματος που βλέπει τη φιλοσοφία ως αυτάρκη, αποκομμένη από τη θεολογία και ως εκ τούτου ως εκπρόσωπο της δυσπιστίας στον μεσαίωνα. Βίος Λίγα είναι γνωστά για πολλές από τις λεπτομέρειες της ζωής του. Το 1266 βρισκόταν στη Σχολή Τεχνών του Πανεπιστημίου του Παρισιού την εποχή που ξέσπασαν ταραχές μεταξύ των γαλλικών «εθνών» και των «εθνών Picard» -χαλαρά οργανωμένες αδελφότητες. Ο παπικός λεγάτος απείλησε τον Siger με εκτέλεση ως αρχηγό της επίθεσης Picard στους Γάλλους, αλλά δεν ελήφθησαν περαιτέρω μέτρα. Εργογραφία Στα δέκα χρόνια που ακολούθησαν την εξέγερση, έγραψε τα έξι έργα που τού αποδίδονται και εκδόθηκαν με το όνομά του από τον Πιέρ Μαντονέ το 1899. Οι τίτλοι των πραγματειών έχουν ως εξής: De anima intellectiva (1270) Quaestiones logicales Quaestiones naturales De aeternitate mundi Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: Homo est animal nullo homine existente Impossibilia Πρυτανεία Το 1271 συμμετείχε για άλλη μια φορά σε ανταγωνισμό ανάμεσα στα «έθνη». Η μειοψηφία τον επέλεξε ως πρύτανη σε αντίθεση με τον εκλεγμένο υποψήφιο, Aubri de Rheims. η διαμάχη συνεχίστηκε επί τρία έτη και πιθανότατα βασίστηκε στην αντίθεση μεταξύ των Αβερροϊστών, του Σιγκέρ και του Πιερ Ντυμπουά, και των πιο ορθόδοξων μαθητών. Το θέμα διευθετήθηκε από τον παπικό λεγάτο του Πάπα Μαρτίνου Δ' Σιμόν ντε Μπριόν. Στη συνέχεια ο Siger αποσύρθηκε από το Παρίσι στη Λιέγη . Το 1277, μια γενική καταδίκη του αριστοτελισμού περιελάμβανε μια ειδική ρήτρα εναντίον του Βοήθιου της Δακίας και του Σιγκέρ της Μπραμάντ. Ο Σιγκέρ και ο Μπερνιέ ντε Νιβέλ κλήθηκαν να εμφανιστούν με την κατηγορία της αίρεσης, ειδικά σε σχέση με τα Impossibilia, όπου συζητείται η ύπαρξη του Θεού . Φαίνεται, ωστόσο, ότι αμφότεροι κατέφυγαν στην Ιταλία και, σύμφωνα με τον Τζον Πέκαμ, αρχιεπίσκοπο του Canterbury, χάθηκαν άθλια. Θάνατος Ο τρόπος του θανάτου του, ο οποίος συνέβη στο Ορβιέτο, δεν είναι γνωστός. Ένα χρονικό της Μπραμάντ λέει ότι μαχαιρώθηκε από έναν τρελό γραμματέα (clerico suo quasi dementi). Ο γραμματέας λέγεται ότι χρησιμοποίησε πένα ως όπλο δολοφονίας και οι επικριτές του ισχυρίστηκαν, αφού είχε κάνει τόση ζημιά με την πένα του, πώς τού άξιζε αυτό που ερχόταν. Ο Δάντης, στον Παράδεισο (x.134–6), λέει ότι βρήκε «αργό θάνατο» και ορισμένοι έχουν συμπεράνει ότι αυτό υποδηλώνει θάνατο από αυτοκτονία. Σε σονέτο του 13ου αιώνα ενός Ντουράντ (xcii.9–14) αναφέρεται ότι εκτελέστηκε στο Ορβιέτο: "a ghiado il fe' morire a gran dolore, Nella corte di Roma ad Orbivieto" (από γκιάντο πέθανε με πολύ πόνο, στην αυλή της Ρώμης στο Ορβιέτο). Πιθανή ημερομηνία θανάτου ήταν το 1283-1284 όταν ο Πάπας Μαρτίνος Δ ' κατοικούσε στο Ορβιέτο. Με δεδομένες τις Καταδίκες του 1277 οι συνάδελφοί του ριζοσπάστες κρύβονταν και δεν υπήρξε κάποια έρευνα για τη δολοφονία του. Τον Δεκέμβριο του 1270, ο Αβερροϊσμός καταδικάστηκε από τις εκκλησιαστικές αρχές και σε όλη του τη ζωή ο Σιγκέρ ήταν εκτεθειμενος σε διώξεις τόσο από την Εκκλησία όσο και από καθαρά φιλοσοφικούς αντιπάλους. Πολιτιστικές αναφορές Στη Θεία Κωμωδία του Δάντη, ο Σιγκέρ της Μπραμπάντ βρίσκεται στην Τέταρτη Σφαίρα του Παραδείσου ως θετικό παράδειγμα Σύνεσης, Δικαιοσύνης, Εγκράτειας και Σθένους. Δείτε επίσης Αβερρόης Καταδίκες του 1277 Σημειώσεις παραπομπές Πηγές On the Eternity of the World, trans. Lottie H.Kendzierski (Marquette UP, 1964) [mainly translations from Thomas Aquinas, but the book includes selections from Siger of Brabant] Hissette, R. (1977) , Louvain: Publications Universitaires, Paris: Vander-Oyez. Mandonnet, P. (1908–11) , , 2 vols. Rubenstein, Richard E. Aristotle's Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Middle Ages. New York: Harcourt, 2003. Van Steenberghen, F. (1977) , Louvain: Publications universitaires, Paris: Vander-Oyez. Tony Dodd: The life and thought of Siger of Brabant, thirteenth-century Parisian philosopher: an examination of his views on the relationship of philosophy and theology. E. Mellen Press, Lewiston 1998, A. W. DeAnnuntis, Master Siger's Dream, What Books Press, Los Angeles 2010, De aeternitate mundi, μετάφραση στα αγγλικά από τον Peter King, Καθηγητή Φιλοσοφίας και Μεσαιωνικών Σπουδών, Πανεπιστήμιο του Τορόντο. Σχολαστικοί φιλόσοφοι Απόφοιτοι του Πανεπιστημίου του Παρισιού Φιλόσοφοι του 13ου αιώνα Ολλανδοί φιλόσοφοι
de	legislation	Germany	(1) Die Wahlausweise werden 1. vom Arbeitgeber für die am Stichtag (§ 50 Abs. 1 Satz 1 des Vierten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch) im Unternehmen beschäftigten Wahlberechtigten ausgestellt, soweit deren Wahlrecht unzweifelhaft ist, 2. vom Versicherungsträger auf Antrag ausgestellt, soweit das Wahlrecht dem Arbeitgeber zweifelhaft ist. (2) Zweifelsfälle hat der Arbeitgeber unverzüglich dem Versicherungsträger mitzuteilen; diese Mitteilung gilt als Antrag des Wahlberechtigten. Beantragt der Wahlberechtigte selbst die Ausstellung eines Wahlausweises, hat er eine Bescheinigung des Arbeitgebers, bei dem er am Stichtag beschäftigt ist, beizufügen, aus der sich ergibt, daß der Arbeitgeber weder einen Wahlausweis ausgestellt noch dem Versicherungsträger eine Mitteilung nach Satz 1 hat zugehen lassen. (3) Bei Wahlberechtigten, die am Stichtag bei Selbstzahlereinheiten der Stationierungsstreitkräfte beschäftigt sind, gilt als Arbeitgeber die zuständige deutsche Lohnstelle. (4) Der Versicherungsträger unterrichtet die Arbeitgeber unverzüglich über ihre Aufgaben nach dieser Verordnung, sobald feststeht, daß eine Wahl mit Wahlhandlung stattfindet. Er kann hierbei bestimmen, daß er die Wahlausweise für alle oder einen Teil der Beschäftigten anstelle der Arbeitgeber selbst ausstellt und übermittelt. Als Arbeitgeber gilt auch derjenige, in dessen Unternehmen ausschließlich mithelfende Familienangehörige beschäftigt sind. (5) Die Versicherungsträger haben den Arbeitgebern zusammen mit den Wahlunterlagen eine zum Aushang geeignete Mitteilung zur Unterrichtung der Beschäftigten über das Verfahren der Ausstellung von Wahlausweisen zu übersenden. Die Arbeitgeber haben diese Mitteilung, soweit zweckdienlich mit ergänzenden Hinweisen, im Unternehmen auszuhängen. (6) Die Arbeitgeber haben dem Versicherungsträger bis zum 18. Tag vor dem Wahltag die Gesamtzahl der ausgestellten und ausgehändigten oder übermittelten Wahlausweise mitzuteilen.
da	legislation	EU	22.3.2019 DA Den Europæiske Unions Tidende L 81/1 KOMMISSIONENS DELEGEREDE FORORDNING (EU) 2019/356 af 13. december 2018 om supplerende regler til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2365 for så vidt angår reguleringsmæssige tekniske standarder, der præciserer de oplysninger om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, der skal indberettes til transaktionsregistre (EØS-relevant tekst) EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR — under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde, under henvisning til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2365 af 25. november 2015 om gennemsigtighed af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner og vedrørende genanvendelse samt om ændring af forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012 (1), særlig artikel 4, stk. 9, og ud fra følgende betragtninger: (1) For at øge effektiviteten og øge lighederne mellem indberetningen af derivater og indberetningen af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner bør forpligtelsen til at indberette oplysninger om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner til transaktionsregistre i henhold til artikel 4 i forordning (EU) 2015/2365 tilpasses forpligtelsen til at indberette derivattransaktioner til transaktionsregistre i henhold til artikel 9 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012 (2). De indberetningskrav, der præciserer oplysningerne om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, bør derfor svare til de indberetningskrav, der præciserer oplysningerne om derivataftaler. (2) For at sikre, at indberettede oplysninger om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner er effektive og nyttige, bør de specifikke oplysninger om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionerne, der skal indberettes, tilpasses de forskellige typer værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, der er identificeret i forordning (EU) 2015/2365. Med hensyn til indberetning af margenudlånstransaktioner er formålet med forordning (EU) 2015/2365 at registrere transaktioner, der tjener samme formål som genkøbstransaktioner, buy/sell-back-transaktioner eller transaktioner med udlån af værdipapirer og derfor udgør lignende risici for den finansielle stabilitet ved at muliggøre opbygningen af gearing, procyklikalitet og indbyrdes forbindelser på de finansielle markeder eller ved at bidrage til likviditets- og løbetidsændring. Margenudlån omfatter derfor transaktioner, der er omfattet af margenaftaler mellem finansielle institutioner og deres kunder, hvor finansielle institutioner yder mæglertjenester til deres kunder, men de omfatter ikke andre lån, som f.eks. lån til virksomhedsomstruktureringsformål, som på trods af muligheden for at inddrage værdipapirer ikke bidrager til de systemiske risici, der er omhandlet i forordning (EU) 2015/2365. (3) Det er vigtigt, at oplysningerne om enhver værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, der cleares af en central modpart, indberettes korrekt og let kan identificeres, uanset om den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion blev clearet samme dato eller på en senere dato end den dato, hvor den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion blev indgået. (4) For at sikre fuldstændig indberetning, hvor specifikke oplysninger om sikkerhedsstillelsen ikke er kendt på handelsdagen, bør modparterne ajourføre oplysningerne om sikkerhedsstillelsen, så snart disse oplysninger foreligger for modparterne, og senest den første arbejdsdag efter værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionens valørdato. (5) For at give yderligere nyttige oplysninger til de myndigheder, der har adgang til oplysningerne om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner i transaktionsregistre, bør modparter til transaktionsregistrene indberette det internationale identifikationsnummer (»ISIN«) for enhver sikkerhedsstillelseskurv, som de anvender til at stille sikkerhed i forbindelse med en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, hvis denne kurv har en ISIN-kode. (6) Hvis modparterne stiller sikkerhed på et nettoeksponeringsgrundlag, der fremkommer ved modregning af et antal værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner mellem to modparter, er en specifik allokering af sikkerhedsstillelsen for en enkelt værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion ofte ikke mulig, og tildelingen af sikkerhedsstillelsen kendes muligvis derfor ikke. I disse tilfælde bør modparterne kunne indberette sikkerhedsstillelsen uafhængigt af det underliggende lån. (7) Denne forordning er baseret på det udkast til reguleringsmæssige tekniske standarder, som Den Europæiske Værdipapir- og Markedstilsynsmyndighed (ESMA) har forelagt Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med proceduren i artikel 10 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1095/2010 (3). (8) ESMA har afholdt åbne offentlige høringer om disse udkast til reguleringsmæssige tekniske standarder, analyseret de potentielle omkostninger og fordele og anmodet ESMA's interessentgruppe for værdipapirer og markeder, der er nedsat i henhold artikel 37 i forordning (EU) nr. 1095/2010, om en udtalelse — VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING: Artikel 1 Oplysninger om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, der skal indberettes 1. Indberetninger, der udarbejdes i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, indeholder de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger, der er fastsat i tabel 1, 2, 3 og 4 i det bilag, som vedrører den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion. 2. Ved indberetning af indgåelsen af en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion angiver en modpart i sin indberetning handlingstypen »Ny« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget til denne forordning. I eventuelle efterfølgende indberetninger af oplysninger om denne værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion angives i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget til denne forordning den relevante handlingstype, der vedrører denne værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion. Artikel 2 Værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, der cleares af centrale modparter 1. En værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, som allerede er indberettet i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, og som efterfølgende cleares af en central modpart, indberettes efter clearingen som afviklet ved i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget at angive handlingstypen »Ophævelse/Førtidig ophævelse«, og nye værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, som følger af clearingen, indberettes. 2. En værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, der indgås på en handelsplads, og som cleares af en central modpart samme dag, indberettes først, efter at den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion er clearet. 3. En modpart skal for den margen, der stilles eller modtages for en clearet værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, indberette oplysningerne i tabel 3 i bilaget til denne forordning og præcisere den relevante handlingstype, der er fastlagt i felt 20 i nævnte tabel i bilaget. Artikel 3 Indberetning af sikkerhedsstillelse 1. Modparter i en transaktion vedrørende udlån i værdipapirer eller råvarer eller en transaktion vedrørende indlån af værdipapirer eller råvarer, som accepterer, at der ikke stilles sikkerhed, angiver dette i felt 72 i tabel 2 i bilaget. 2. Hvis sikkerhedsstillelsen for en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion er knyttet til et individuelt lån, og modparten kender oplysningerne om sikkerhedsstillelsen inden indberetningsfristen, angiver modparten de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger om alle de enkelte komponenter af sikkerhedsstillelsen for den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion i felt 75-94 i tabel 2 i bilaget, når denne værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion indberettes for første gang med handlingstypen »Ny« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget. 3. Hvis sikkerhedsstillelsen for en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion er knyttet til et individuelt lån, men modparten kender ikke oplysningerne om sikkerhedsstillelsen inden indberetningsfristen, angiver modparten, med handlingstypen »ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget, de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger om alle de enkelte komponenter af sikkerhedsstillelsen for den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion i felt 75-94 i tabel 2 i bilaget, så snart disse er kendt og senest på arbejdsdagen efter den valørdato, der er fastsat i felt 13 i tabel 2 i bilaget. 4. En modpart, der stiller sikkerhed for en eller flere værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner med en sikkerhedsstillelseskurv, der er identificeret ved et internationalt identifikationsnummer for værdipapirer (»ISIN«), angiver ISIN-koden i felt 96 i tabel 2 i bilaget, når denne indberettes med handlingstypen »Ny« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget. 5. En modpart, der stiller sikkerhed for en eller flere værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner med en sikkerhedsstillelseskurv, der ikke er identificeret ved en ISIN-kode, angiver NTAV-koden i felt 96 i tabel 2 i bilaget, når værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen indberettes med handlingstypen »Ny« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget. 6. Med henblik på stk. 4 og 5 angiver modparten, med handlingstypen »ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget, de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger om alle de enkelte komponenter af sikkerhedsstillelsen for den pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion i felt 75-94 i tabel 2 i bilaget, så snart disse oplysninger er kendt og senest på arbejdsdagen efter den valørdato, der er fastsat i felt 13 i tabel 2 i bilaget. 7. En modpart, der stiller sikkerhed for flere værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner på et nettoeksponeringsgrundlag, angiver værdien »rigtigt« (true) i felt 73 i tabel 2 i bilaget. Denne modpart angiver, med handlingstypen »ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse« i felt 98 i tabel 2 i bilaget, de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger om alle de enkelte komponenter af sikkerhedsstillelsen for de pågældende værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner i felt 75-94 i tabel 2 i bilaget, så snart disse oplysninger er kendt og senest på arbejdsdagen efter den valørdato, der er fastsat i felt 13 i tabel 2 i bilaget. Artikel 4 Indberetning om genanvendelse af sikkerhedsstillelse 1. En modpart, der modtager et eller flere finansielle instrumenter som sikkerhedsstillelse i en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, angiver de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger om enhver genanvendelse af hvert enkelt af disse finansielle instrumenter i felt 7, 8 og 9 i tabel 4 i bilaget. 2. En modpart, der modtager kontanter som sikkerhedsstillelse i en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, angiver de fuldstændige og nøjagtige oplysninger om enhver geninvestering af alle kontanter i forbindelse med sikkerhedsstillelsen for hver enkelt valuta i felt 11, 12 og 13 i tabel 4 i bilaget. Artikel 5 Ikrafttræden Denne forordning træder i kraft på tyvendedagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende. Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat. Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 13. december 2018. På Kommissionens vegne Jean-Claude JUNCKER Formand (1) EUT L 337 af 23.12.2015, s. 1. (2) Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012 af 4. juli 2012 om OTC-derivater, centrale modparter og transaktionsregistre (EUT L 201 af 27.7.2012, s. 1). (3) Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1095/2010 af 24. november 2010 om oprettelse af en europæisk tilsynsmyndighed (Den Europæiske Værdipapir- og Markedstilsynsmyndighed), om ændring af afgørelse nr. 716/2009/EF og om ophævelse af Kommissionens afgørelse 2009/77/EF (EUT L 331 af 15.12.2010, s. 84). BILAG Tabel 1 Modpartsdata Nr. Felt Oplysninger, der skal indberettes Repo BSB SL ML 1 Tidsstempel for indberetningen Dato og klokkeslæt for indberetning til transaktionsregistret. Y Y Y Y 2 Indberettende enhed Entydig identifikationskode for den indberettende enhed. Hvis indgivelsen af indberetningen er delegeret til en tredjepart eller til den anden modpart, en entydig identifikationskode for denne enhed. Y Y Y Y 3 Indberettende modpart Entydig identifikationskode for den indberettende modpart. Y Y Y Y 4 Type indberettende modpart Angivelse af, om den indberettende modpart er en finansiel eller ikke-finansiel modpart. Y Y Y Y 5 Den indberettende modparts sektor En eller flere koder til klassificering af arten af den indberettende modparts forretningsaktiviteter. Hvis den indberettende modpart er en finansiel modpart, alle de relevante koder, som indgår i taksonomien for finansielle modparter, og som finder anvendelse på den pågældende modpart. Hvis den indberettende modpart er en ikke-finansiel modpart, alle de relevante koder, som indgår i taksonomien for ikke-finansielle modparter, og som finder anvendelse på den pågældende modpart. Hvis der indberettes mere end en enkelt aktivitet, angives koderne efter de tilsvarende aktiviteters relative betydning. Y Y Y Y 6 Supplerende klassificering af sektor Hvis den indberettende modpart er et institut for kollektiv investering i værdipapirer (investeringsinstitut) eller en alternativ investeringsfond (AIF) en kode, der fastlægger, om det er en ETF (exchange-traded fund) eller en pengemarkedsforening. Hvis den indberettende modpart er en alternativ investeringsfond (AIF) eller en ikke-finansiel modpart, der foretager finansielle og forsikringsmæssige aktiviteter eller aktiviteter i forbindelse med fast ejendom, en kode, der fastlægger, om det er en trust til ejendomsinvesteringer (REIT). Y Y Y Y 7 Filial af den indberettende modpart Hvis den indberettende modpart indgår en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion gennem en filial, den kode, der identificerer filialen. Y Y Y Y 8 Filial af den anden modpart Hvis den anden modpart indgår en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion gennem en filial, den kode, der identificerer filialen. Y Y Y Y 9 Modpartsside Angivelse af, om den indberettende modpart er en sikkerhedsstiller eller en sikkerhedshaver i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363 (1) Y Y Y Y 10 Enhed, der er ansvarlig for indberetningen Hvis en finansiel modpart er ansvarlig for indberetningen på den anden modparts vegne i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2365 (2), den entydige identifikationskode for den finansielle modpart. Hvis et administrationsselskab er ansvarligt for indberetningen på vegne af et institut for kollektiv investering i værdipapirer (investeringsinstitut) i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i samme forordning, angives den entydige identifikationskode for administrationsselskabet. Hvis en forvalter af alternative investeringsfonde (FAIF'er) er ansvarlig for indberetningen på vegne af en alternativ investeringsfond (AIF) i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, angives den entydige identifikationskode for denne FAIF. Y Y Y Y 11 Anden modpart Den entydige identifikationskode for den enhed, med hvilken den indberettende modpart har indgået en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion. Hvis der er tale om en privatperson, anvendes der konsekvent en kundekode. Y Y Y Y 12 Den anden modparts land Koden for det land, hvor den anden modparts vedtægtsmæssige hjemsted er beliggende, eller koden for hjemlandet, hvis den anden modpart er en fysisk person. Y Y Y Y 13 Modtager Hvis den berettigede modtager for aftalen ikke er en modpart i denne aftale, skal den indberettende modpart anføre en entydig identifikationskode for denne modtager eller, hvis der er tale om en privatperson, den kundekode, der konsekvent anvendes og er tildelt af den juridiske person, som denne privatperson anvender. Y Y Y N 14 Trepartsagent Den entydige identifikationskode for den tredje part, til hvilken den indberettende modpart eventuelt har uddelegeret behandlingen efter handelen af en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion. Y Y Y N 15 Mægler Den entydige identifikationskode for den enhed, der optræder som mellemled for den indberettende modpart uden selv at blive modpart til værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Med hensyn til transaktioner med udlån af værdipapirer omfatter en mægler ikke låneagenten. Y Y Y N 16 Clearingmedlem Hvis handelen cleares, den entydige identifikationskode for den indberettende modparts ansvarlige clearingmedlem Y Y Y N 17 Deltager eller indirekte deltager i værdipapircentraler Den entydige identifikationskode for den indberettende modparts deltager eller indirekte deltager i en værdipapircentral. Hvis både deltageren eller den indirekte deltager i en værdipapircentral er involveret i transaktionen, koden for den indirekte deltager. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. Y Y Y N 18 Låneagent Den entydige identifikationskode for låneagenten i en transaktion med udlån af værdipapirer. Y N Y N Tabel 2 Data om lån og sikkerhedsstillelse Nr. Felt Oplysninger, der skal indberettes Repo BSB SL ML 1 Entydig transaktionsidentifikator (UTI) Entydig reference tildelt værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen med henblik på at identificere handelen. Y Y Y Y 2 Indberetningens referencenummer For transaktioner, der er en følge af clearing, indberettes den første UTI, dvs. UTI'en for den oprindelige bilaterale transaktion. Den første UTI er dog ikke nødvendig ved indberetning foretaget af modparter, der er centrale modparter, som har clearet værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Når der udføres en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion på en handelsplads, og den cleares samme dag, genereres der et nummer af handelspladsen, som er entydigt for denne udførte transaktion. Y Y Y N 3 Dato for hændelsen Dato, på hvilken den indberetningspligtige hændelse, der vedrører værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen, og som fremgår af indberetningen, fandt sted. For handlingstyperne »Valuation update« (værdiajourføring), »Collateral update« (ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse), »Reuse update« (ajourføring af genanvendelse), »Margin update« (ajourføring af margen) den dato, for hvilken de indberettede oplysninger anføres. Y Y Y Y 4 Type værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion Typen af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion som defineret i artikel 3, stk. 7-10, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365. Y Y Y Y 5 Clearet Angivelse af, om der har fundet en central clearing sted. Y Y Y N 6 Tidsstempel for clearing Klokkeslæt og dato for clearingen. Y Y Y N 7 Central modpart Hvis en aftale er blevet clearet, den entydige kode for den centrale modpart, der har clearet aftalen. Y Y Y N 8 Handelsplads Entydig identifikationskode for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionens handelssted. Hvis værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen blev indgået OTC og optaget til handel, MIC-koden »XOFF«. Hvis værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen blev indgået OTC og ikke optaget til handel, MIC-koden »XXXX«. Y Y Y N 9 Type masteraftale Henvisning til type masteraftale, i henhold til hvilken modparterne indgik en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion. Y Y Y N 10 Anden type masteraftale Navnet på masteraftalen Dette felt udfyldes kun, hvis der i felt 9 står »OTHR«. Y Y Y N 11 Masteraftaleversion Angivelse af året for den masteraftale, der i givet fald er anvendt ved den indberettede transaktion. Y Y Y N 12 Tidsstempel for gennemførelse Dato og klokkeslæt for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionens gennemførelse. Y Y Y Y 13 Valørdato (Startdato) Den af modparterne kontraktligt fastsatte dato for udvekslingen af kontanter, værdipapirer eller råvarer mod sikkerhedsstillelse for den første del (spotbenet) af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Y Y Y N 14 Udløbsdato (Slutdato) Den af modparterne kontraktligt fastsatte dato for udvekslingen af kontanter, værdipapirer eller råvarer mod sikkerhedsstillelse for den sidste del (forwardbenet) af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Denne oplysning indberettes ikke for repoer uden fastsat løbetid. Y Y Y N 15 Ophævelsesdato Ophævelsesdatoen i tilfælde af tidlig fuldstændig ophævelse af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Y Y Y Y 16 Minimumsfrist for opsigelse Mindsteantal forretningsdage, som en modpart har til at underrette den anden modpart om transaktionens ophævelse. Y N N N 17 Første mulige dato for call-back Første mulige dato, på hvilken långiveren af kontanter har ret til at tilbagekalde en del af midlerne eller ophæve transaktionen. Y N N N 18 Indikator for generel sikkerhedsstillelse Angivelse af, om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen er omfattet af en generel ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse. For en transaktion med udlån af værdipapirer henviser feltet til værdipapirer, der stilles som sikkerhed, og ikke til det værdipapir, der anvendes i forbindelse med lån. Koden »GENE« skal angives for en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, der er omfattet af en generel ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse. En generel ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse er en ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse for en transaktion, i hvilken sikkerhedsstilleren kan vælge det værdipapir, der stilles som sikkerhed, blandt et relativt bredt udvalg af værdipapirer, der opfylder forudbestemte kriterier. Koden »SPEC« skal angives for en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, der er omfattet af en specifik ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse. En specifik ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse er en ordning om sikkerhedsstillelse for en transaktion, hvor sikkerhedshaver anmoder om et specifikt internationalt identifikationsnummer for værdipapirer (»ISIN«), der skal forelægges af sikkerhedsstilleren. Y Y Y N 19 DBV-indikator (DBV = Delivery By Value) Angivelse af, om transaktionen blev gennemført ved at anvende DBV-mekanismen. Y N Y N 20 Metode anvendt til sikkerhedsstillelse Angivelse af, om sikkerhedsstillelsen for en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion er underlagt en aftale om sikkerhedsstillelse i form af overdragelse af ejendomsret, en aftale om finansiel sikkerhedsstillelse i form af pantsætning eller en aftale om finansiel sikkerhedsstillelse med brugsret. Hvis der blev anvendt mere end én metode til at stille sikkerhed, angives den første ordning vedrørende sikkerhedsstillelse i dette felt. Y N Y Y 21 Uden fastsat løbetid Angivelse af, om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen er uden fastsat løbetid (dvs. uden fastsat udløbsdato) eller har en fastsat løbetid med en kontraktbestemt udløbsdato. Koden »True« (rigtigt) anvendes for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner uden fastsat løbetid, og koden »False« (forkert) anvendes for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner med fastsat løbetid. Y N Y N 22 Ophævelsesmulighed Angivelse af, om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen er ubegrænset eller kan forlænges. Y N Y N For margenudlån gentages felt 23-34 og udfyldes for hver enkelt valuta, der er anvendt i margenlånet. 23 Fast rente For repoer den årlige rentesats for genkøbstransaktionens nominelle beløb i overensstemmelse med konventionen for beregning af dage. For margenudlån den årlige rentesats for det lånebeløb, som låntager betaler långiver. Y N N Y 24 Konvention for beregning af dage Metode til beregning af den påløbne rente på det nominelle beløb til en given sats. Y N N Y 25 Variabel rente Angivelse af den referencerentesats, der anvendes, og som genfastsættes med faste mellemrum, under henvisning, i givet fald, til en markedsreferencerente. Y N N Y 26 Referenceperiode for variabel rente — tidsperiode Tidsperiode, der beskriver referenceperioden for den variable rente. Y N N Y 27 Referenceperiode for variabel rente — multiplikator Multiplikator for den tidsperiode, der beskriver referenceperioden for den variable rente angivet i felt 26. Y N N Y 28 Betalingshyppighed for variabel rente — tidsperiode Tidsperiode, der beskriver betalingshyppigheden for den variable rente. Y N N Y 29 Betalingshyppighed for variabel rente — multiplikator Multiplikator for den tidsperiode, der beskriver betalingshyppigheden for den variable rente angivet i felt 28. Y N N Y 30 Hyppighed for genfastsættelse af den variabel rente — tidsperiode Tidsperiode, der beskriver hyppigheden for genfastsættelsen af den variable rente. Y N N Y 31 Hyppighed for genfastsættelse af den variabel rente — multiplikator Multiplikator for den tidsperiode, der beskriver hyppigheden for genfastsættelsen af den variable rente angivet i felt 30. Y N N Y 32 Spænd Antal basispoint, der skal lægges til eller trækkes fra den variable rente for at kunne fastsætte renten på lånet. Y N N Y 33 Margenudlåns valutabeløb Margenudlånets beløb i en given valuta. N N N Y 34 Margenudlåns valuta Margenudlånets valuta. N N N Y Felt 35 og 36 gentages og udfyldes for hver enkelt justering af den variable rente. 35 Justeret rente Rente som fastsat i rentesatstabellen Y N N N 36 Rentedato Dato, fra hvilken renten er effektiv Y N N N 37 Nominelt beløb på valørdato Kontantværdi, der skal betales på transaktionens valørdato. Y Y N N 38 Nominelt beløb på udløbsdato Kontantværdi, der skal betales på transaktionens udløbsdato. Y Y N N 39 Nominelt beløbs valuta Valutaen for det nominelle beløb. Y Y N N 40 Aktivtype Angivelse af, hvilken aktivtype der er omfattet af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. N N Y N 41 Identifikator for værdipapir Identifikation af, hvilket værdipapir der er omfattet af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. N N Y N 42 Værdipapirsklassifikation CFI-kode (Classification of Financial Instruments) for det værdipapir, der er omfattet af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. N N Y N Hvis en råvare blev lånt (ud- eller indlån), angives klassifikationen af denne råvare i felt 43, 44 og 45. 43 Basisprodukt Basisprodukt som anført i råvareklassifikationen i tabel 5 i bilag I til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363. N N Y N 44 Underprodukt Underprodukt som anført i råvareklassifikationen i tabel 5 i bilag I til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363. Dette felt kræver et specifikt basisprodukt i felt 43. N N Y N 45 Yderligere underprodukt Yderligere underprodukt som anført i råvareklassifikationstabellen. Dette felt kræver et specifikt underprodukt i felt 44. N N Y N 46 Kvantitet eller nominelt beløb Kvantitet eller nominelt beløb for det værdipapir eller den råvare, der er omfattet af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen. For obligationer det samlede nominelle beløb, hvilket betyder antallet af obligationer ganget med deres pålydende værdi. For andre værdipapirer eller råvarer deres mængde. N N Y N 47 Måleenhed Måleenhed anvendt til at udtrykke mængden. Dette felt gælder for råvarer. N N Y N 48 Nominelt beløbs valuta Hvis det nominelle beløb indberettes det nominelle beløbs valuta N N Y N 49 Værdipapirkurs eller råvarepris For ud- og indlån i værdipapirer eller råvarer kursen på værdipapiret eller prisen på råvaren, der er anvendt til beregning af lånebeløbet. For en buy-sell back-transaktion kursen på værdipapiret eller prisen på råvaren, der er anvendt til beregning af transaktionsbeløbet for spotbenet af buy-sell back-transaktionen. N Y Y N 50 Prisvaluta Den valuta, i hvilken kursen på værdipapiret eller prisen på råvaren er angivet. N N Y N 51 Værdipapirets kvalitet Kode, som klassificerer værdipapirets kreditrisiko. N N Y N 52 Værdipapirets løbetid Værdipapirets løbetid. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. N N Y N 53 Udstederens jurisdiktion Jurisdiktionen for udstederen af værdipapiret. For værdipapirer udstedt af en udenlandsk dattervirksomhed den øverste modervirksomheds jurisdiktion eller, hvis den er ukendt, dattervirksomhedens jurisdiktion. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. N N Y N 54 Udstederens LEI-kode LEI-koden for udstederen af værdipapiret. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. N N Y N 55 Værdipapirtype Kode, som klassificerer værdipapirtypen. N N Y N 56 Lånebeløb Lånebeløb, dvs. mængden eller lånets nominelle beløb ganget med prisen i felt 49. N N Y N 57 Markedsværdi Markedsværdi for ud- og indlån i værdipapirer eller råvarer. N N Y N 58 Fast rabat Fast rentesats (aftalt sats, som långiver betaler for geninvestering af den kontante sikkerhedsstillelse minus eventuelt vederlag), der betales af långiveren af værdipapiret eller råvaren til låntager (positiv rabat), eller betales af låntageren til långiver (negativ rabat) på saldoen af den kontante sikkerhedsstillelse. N N Y N 59 Variabel rabat Angivelse af den referencerentesats, der er anvendt til beregningen af rabatten (aftalt sats, som långiver betaler for geninvestering af den kontante sikkerhedsstillelse minus eventuelt vederlag), der betales af långiveren af værdipapiret eller råvaren til låntager (positiv rabat), eller betales af låntageren til långiver (negativ rabat) på saldoen af den kontante sikkerhedsstillelse. N N Y N 60 Referenceperiode for variabel rabat — tidsperiode Tidsperiode, der beskriver referenceperioden for den variable rabat. N N Y N 61 Referenceperiode for variabel rabat — multiplikator Multiplikator for den tidsperiode, der beskriver referenceperioden for den variable rabat angivet i felt 60. N N Y N 62 Betalingshyppighed for variabelt rabatbeløb — tidsperiode Tidsperiode, der beskriver betalingshyppigheden for det variable rabatbeløb. N N Y N 63 Betalingshyppighed for variabelt rabatbeløb — multiplikator Multiplikator for den tidsperiode, der beskriver betalingshyppigheden for det variable rabatbeløb angivet i felt 62. N N Y N 64 Hyppighed for genfastsættelse af det variable rabatbeløb — tidsperiode Tidsperiode, der beskriver hyppigheden for genfastsættelse af det variable rabatbeløb. N N Y N 65 Hyppighed for genfastsættelse af det variable rabatbeløb — multiplikator Multiplikator for den tidsperiode, der beskriver hyppigheden for genfastsættelse af det variable rabatbeløb angivet i felt 64. N N Y N 66 Rabatspænd Spænd for det variable rabatbeløb udtrykt i basispoint. N N Y N 67 Vederlag Gebyr, som låntager af værdipapiret eller råvaren betaler til långiver. N N Y N 68 Eksklusivaftaler For ud- og indlån i værdipapirer en angivelse af, om låntager har eksklusiv adgang til at låne fra långivers værdipapirportefølje. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. N N Y N 69 Udestående margenlån Det samlede beløb for margenlån i basisvalutaen N N N Y 70 Udestående margenlåns basisvaluta Udestående margenlåns basisvaluta N N N Y 71 Markedsværdi på kort sigt Markedsværdi på kort sigt i basisvalutaen. N N N Y Oplysninger om sikkerhedsstillelse 72 SL-signalisering af udlån i værdipapirer uden sikkerhedsstillelse Angivelse af, om transaktionen med udlån i værdipapirer er uden sikkerhedsstillelse. Dette felt anvendes ikke, når modparterne er enige om at anvende sikkerhedsstillelse for handelen, og den specifikke allokering af sikkerhedsstillelsen endnu ikke kendes. N N Y N 73 Sikkerhedsstillelse for netteeksponering Angivelse af, om sikkerheden er stillet for en nettoeksponering snarere end for en enkelt transaktion. Y Y Y N 74 Sikkerhedsstillelsens valørdato Hvis der er stillet sikkerhed for transaktionerne på nettoeksponeringsgrundlag den seneste valørdato for modregningen af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionerne under hensyn til alle transaktioner, for hvilke der blev stillet sikkerhed. Y Y Y N Hvis der blev anvendt specifik sikkerhedsstillelse, gentages og udfyldes felterne 75-94 i givet fald for hver enkelt komponent af sikkerhedsstillelsen. 75 Type sikkerhedsstillelseskomponent Angivelse af typen af sikkerhedsstillelseskomponenter Y Y Y Y Hvis der blev anvendt kontanter til sikkerhedsstillelse, angives dette i felt 76 og 77. 76 Kontant sikkerhedsstillelsesbeløb Pengebeløb stillet som sikkerhed for indlån af værdipapirer eller råvarer. Y Y Y N 77 Kontant sikkerhedsstillelses valuta Den kontante sikkerhedsstillelses valuta. Y Y Y N 78 Identifikation af et værdipapir stillet som sikkerhed Identifikation af det værdipapir, der er stillet som sikkerhed. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. Y Y Y Y 79 Klassifikation af et værdipapir stillet som sikkerhed CFI-kode for det værdipapir, der er stillet som sikkerhed. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. Y Y Y Y Hvis en råvare blev anvendt som sikkerhedsstillelse, angives klassifikationen af denne råvare i felt 80, 81 og 82. 80 Basisprodukt Basisprodukt som anført i råvareklassifikationen i tabel 5 i bilag I til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363. Y Y Y N 81 Underprodukt Underprodukt som anført i råvareklassifikationen i tabel 5 i bilag I til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363. Dette felt kræver et specifikt basisprodukt i felt 80. Y Y Y N 82 Yderligere underprodukt Yderligere underprodukt som anført i råvareklassifikationen i tabel 5 i bilag I til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363. Dette felt kræver et specifikt underprodukt i felt 81. Y Y Y N 83 Sikkerhedsstillelsens kvantitet eller nominelle beløb Kvantitet eller nominelt beløb for det værdipapir eller den råvare, der er stillet som sikkerhed. For obligationer det samlede nominelle beløb, hvilket betyder antallet af obligationer ganget med den pålydende værdi. For andre værdipapirer eller råvarer deres mængde. Y Y Y Y 84 Måleenhed for sikkerhedsstillelse Måleenhed anvendt til at udtrykke den samlede sikkerhedsstillelse. Dette felt gælder for råvarer. Y Y Y N 85 Sikkerhedsstillelsens nominelle beløbs valuta Hvis det nominelle beløb for sikkerhedsstillelsen indberettes det nominelle beløbs valuta. Y Y Y Y 86 Prisvaluta Valuta for prisen på sikkerhedsstillelseskomponenten. Y Y Y Y 87 Pris pr. enhed Pris pr. enhed af sikkerhedsstillelseskomponenten, herunder den påløbne rente for forrentede værdipapirer, som anvendes til vurdering af sikkerheden eller råvaren. Y Y Y Y 88 Sikkerhedsstillelsens markedsværdi Markedsværdien for den enkelte sikkerhedsstillelseskomponent udtrykt i prisvaluta. Y Y Y Y 89 Haircut eller margen For transaktioner af typen repoer og buy-sell backs angives enhver »haircut« af sikkerhedsstillelsen ved henvisning til enhver risikokontrolforanstaltning, der anvendes på den underliggende sikkerhedsstillelse, på ISIN-niveau, hvorved værdien af denne underliggende sikkerhedsstillelse beregnes som markedsværdien af aktiverne reduceret med en vis procentsats. For transaktioner med udlån af værdipapirer angives procentdelen af enhver »haircut« af sikkerhedsstillelsen ved henvisning til enhver risikokontrolforanstaltning, der anvendes på den underliggende sikkerhedsstillelse, enten på ISIN-niveau eller på porteføljeniveau, hvorved værdien af denne underliggende sikkerhedsstillelse beregnes som markedsværdien af aktiverne reduceret med en vis procentsats. For margenudlån procentsatsen af det margenkrav, der anvendes på den samlede sikkerhedsstillelsesportefølje, som en kunde har på sin prime broker-konto. Faktiske værdier i modsætning til anslåede værdier eller standardværdier angives i dette felt. Y Y Y Y 90 Sikkerhedsstillelsens kvalitet Kode, som klassificerer risikoen ved det værdipapir, der stilles som sikkerhed. Y Y Y Y 91 Værdipapirets udløbsdato Udløbsdato for det værdipapir, der er stillet som sikkerhed. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. Y Y Y Y 92 Udstederens jurisdiktion Jurisdiktionen for den udsteder af det værdipapir, der stilles som sikkerhed. For værdipapirer udstedt af en udenlandsk dattervirksomhed indberettes den øverste modervirksomheds jurisdiktion eller, hvis den er ukendt, dattervirksomhedens jurisdiktion. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. Y Y Y Y 93 Udstederens LEI-kode LEI-koden for den udsteder af det værdipapir, der stilles som sikkerhed. Dette felt gælder ikke for råvarer. Y Y Y Y 94 Type sikkerhedsstillelse Kode, som klassificerer den type værdipapir, der stilles som sikkerhed. 95 Mulighed for genanvendelse af sikkerhedsstillelse Angivelse af, om sikkerhedshaveren kan genanvende de værdipapirer, der stilles som sikkerhed. Y Y Y Y Felt 96 angives, hvis der blev anvendt en sikkerhedsstillelseskurv. Den detaljerede allokering af sikkerhedsstillelse for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, der gennemføres mod en sikkerhedspulje, angives i givet fald i felt 75-94. 96 Identifikator for sikkerhedsstillelseskurv Hvis sikkerhedsstillelseskurven kan identificeres via en ISIN-kode, angives ISIN-koden for kurven. Hvis sikkerhedsstillelseskurven ikke kan identificeres via en ISIN-kode, udfyldes dette felt med »NTAV«-koden. Y Y Y N 97 Porteføljekode Hvis transaktionen cleares og medtages i en portefølje af transaktioner, for hvilke der udveksles margenbetalinger, identificeres porteføljen ved en entydig kode, som fastsættes af den indberettende modpart. Hvis porteføljen af transaktioner også indeholder derivativaftaler, der er indberettelsespligtige i henhold til forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012, skal porteføljekoden være den samme som den, der blev indberettet i henhold til forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012. Y Y Y N 98 Handlingstype Indberetningen skal indeholde én af de følgende handlingstyper: a) en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, der indberettes for første gang, betegnes som »New« (ny) b) en ændring af en tidligere indberettet værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion betegnes som »Modification« (ændring). Dette omfatter en ajourføring af en tidligere indberetning, som viser en position, med henblik på at afspejle nye transaktioner, som indgår i den pågældende position c) en værdiansættelse af værdipapiret eller råvaren, der er omfattet af en transaktion med udlån af værdipapirer eller varer, identificeres som »Collateral update« (ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse) d) en ændring af oplysningerne om data om sikkerhedsstillelse, herunder værdiansættelsen, identificeres som »Collateral update« (ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse) e) en annullering af en fejlagtigt indgivet fuldstændig indberetning, hvor værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen aldrig blev indgået eller ikke var omfattet af indberetningskravene for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner, men som blev indberettet til et transaktionsregister ved en fejl, identificeres i så fald som »Error« (fejl) f) en korrektion af datafelter, der blev indgivet forkert i en tidligere indberetning, identificeres som »Correction« (korrektion) g) en ophævelse af en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion uden fastsat løbetid eller en førtidig ophævelse af en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion med fastsat løbetid identificeres som »Termination/Early termination« (ophævelse/førtidig ophævelse) h) en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion, der skal indberettes som en ny transaktion og også indgå i en særskilt positionsindberetning den samme dag, identificeres som »Position component« (positionskomponent). Y Y Y Y 99 Niveau Angivelse af, om indberetningen sker på transaktions- eller positionsniveau. Indberetning på positionsniveau kan udelukkende anvendes som et supplement til indberetning på transaktionsniveau med henblik på at indberette efterfølgende transaktionshændelser og udelukkende, hvis de individuelle transaktioner i fungible produkter er erstattet af en position. Y Y Y N Tabel 3 Margendata Nr. Felt Oplysninger, der skal indberettes Repo BSB SL ML 1 Tidsstempel for indberetningen Dato og klokkeslæt for indberetning til transaktionsregistret. Y Y Y N 2 Dato for hændelsen Dato, på hvilken den indberetningspligtige hændelse, der vedrører værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen, og som fremgår af indberetningen, fandt sted. For handlingstyperne »Valuation update« (værdiajourføring), »Collateral update« (ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse), »Reuse update« (ajourføring af genanvendelse), »Margin update« (ajourføring af margen) den dato, for hvilken de indberettede oplysninger anføres. Y Y Y N 3 Indberettende enhed Entydig identifikationskode for den indberettende enhed. Hvis indgivelsen af indberetningen er delegeret til en tredjepart eller til den anden modpart, den entydige identifikationskode for denne enhed. Y Y Y N 4 Indberettende modpart Entydig identifikationskode for den indberettende modpart. Y Y Y N 5 Enhed, der er ansvarlig for indberetningen Hvis en finansiel modpart er ansvarlig for indberetningen på den anden modparts vegne i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, den entydige identifikationskode for denne finansielle modpart. Hvis et administrationsselskab er ansvarligt for indberetningen på vegne af et institut for kollektiv investering i værdipapirer (investeringsinstitut) i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, den entydige identifikationskode for dette administrationsselskab. Hvis en forvalter af alternative investeringsfonde (FAIF'er) er ansvarlig for indberetningen på vegne af en alternativ investeringsfond (AIF) i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, den entydige identifikationskode for denne FAIF. Y Y Y Y 6 Anden modpart Den entydige identifikationskode for den enhed, med hvilken den indberettende modpart har indgået en værdipapirfinansieringstransaktion. Y Y Y N 7 Porteføljekode Porteføljen af transaktioner, for hvilke der udveksles margener, identificeres ved en entydig kode af den indberettende modpart. Hvis porteføljen af transaktioner også indeholder derivativaftaler, der er indberettelsespligtige i henhold til forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012, skal porteføljekoden være den samme som den, der blev indberettet i henhold til forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012. Y Y Y N 8 Stillet initialmargin Værdi af den initialmargin, som den indberettende modpart har stillet over for den anden modpart. Hvis initialmarginen stilles på porteføljebasis, anføres værdien af hele den initialmargen, der stilles for porteføljen, i dette felt. Y Y Y N 9 Valuta for den stillede initialmargin Valuta for den stillede initialmargin Y Y Y N 10 Stillet variationsmargin Værdi af den variationsmargin, herunder også værdien af afviklede kontantbeløb, som den indberettende modpart har stillet over for den anden modpart. Hvis variationsmarginen stilles på porteføljebasis, anføres hele værdien af den variationsmargen, der stilles for porteføljen, i dette felt. Y Y Y N 11 Valuta for den stillede variationsmargin Valuta for den stillede variationsmargin. Y Y Y N 12 Modtaget initialmargin Værdi af den initialmargin, som den indberettende modpart har modtaget fra den anden modpart. Hvis initialmarginen modtages på porteføljebasis, anføres hele værdien af den initialmargen, der modtages for porteføljen, i dette felt. Y Y Y N 13 Valuta for den modtagne initialmargin Valuta for den modtagne initialmargin. Y Y Y N 14 Modtaget variationsmargin Værdi af den variationsmargin, herunder også værdien af afviklede kontantbeløb, som den indberettende modpart har modtaget fra den anden modpart. Hvis variationsmarginen modtages på porteføljebasis, anføres hele værdien af den variationsmargen, der modtages for porteføljen, i dette felt. Y Y Y N 15 Valuta for den modtagne variationsmargin Valuta for den modtagne variationsmargin. Y Y Y N 16 Overskydende stillet sikkerhed Værdi af sikkerhed stillet ud over den krævede sikkerhed. Y Y Y N 17 Valuta for den overskydende stillede sikkerhed Valuta for den overskydende stillede sikkerhed. Y Y Y N 18 Overskydende modtaget sikkerhedsstillelse Værdi af sikkerhed modtaget ud over den krævede sikkerhedsstillelse. Y Y Y N 19 Valuta for den overskydende modtagne sikkerhedsstillelse Valuta for den overskydende modtagne sikkerhedsstillelse Y Y Y N 20 Handlingstype Indberetningen skal indeholde én af de følgende handlingstyper: a) en ny margensaldo identificeres som »New« (ny) b) en ændring af oplysningerne om margenerne identificeres som »Margin update« (ajourføring af margen) c) en annullering af en fejlagtigt indgivet fuldstændig indberetning, identificeres som »Error« (fejl) d) en korrektion af datafelter, der blev indgivet forkert i en tidligere indberetning, identificeres som »Correction« (korrektion) Y Y Y N Tabel 4 Data om genanvendelse, geninvestering af kontantbeløb og finansieringskilder Nr. Felt Oplysninger, der skal indberettes Repo BSB SL ML 1 Tidsstempel for indberetningen Dato og klokkeslæt for indberetning til transaktionsregistret. Y Y Y Y 2 Dato for hændelsen Dato, på hvilken den indberetningspligtige hændelse, der vedrører værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen, og som fremgår af indberetningen, fandt sted. For handlingstyperne »Valuation update« (værdiajourføring), »Collateral update« (ajourføring af sikkerhedsstillelse), »Reuse update« (ajourføring af genanvendelse), »Margin update« (ajourføring af margen) den dato, for hvilken de indberettede oplysninger anføres. Y Y Y Y 3 Indberettende enhed Entydig identifikationskode for den indberettende enhed. Hvis indgivelsen af indberetningen er delegeret til en tredjepart eller til den anden modpart, den entydige identifikationskode for denne enhed. Y Y Y Y 4 Indberettende modpart Entydig identifikationskode for den indberettende modpart. Y Y Y Y 5 Enhed, der er ansvarlig for indberetningen Hvis en finansiel modpart er ansvarlig for indberetningen på den anden modparts vegne i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, den entydige identifikationskode for denne finansielle modpart. Hvis et administrationsselskab er ansvarligt for indberetningen på vegne af et institut for kollektiv investering i værdipapirer (investeringsinstitut) i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, den entydige identifikationskode for dette administrationsselskab. Hvis en forvalter af alternative investeringsfonde (FAIF'er) er ansvarlig for indberetningen på vegne af en alternativ investeringsfond (AIF) i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) 2015/2365, den entydige identifikationskode for denne FAIF. Y Y Y Y Felt 6 gentages og udfyldes for hver enkelt sikkerhedsstillelseskomponent 6 Type sikkerhedsstillelseskomponent Angivelse af typen af sikkerhedsstillelseskomponenter Y Y Y Y Felt 7, 8, 9 og 10 gentages og udfyldes for hvert enkelt værdipapir. 7 Sikkerhedsstillelseskomponent Identifikation af det værdipapir, der er stillet som sikkerhed. Y Y Y Y 8 Værdi af den genanvendte sikkerhedsstillelse Den samlede værdi af den genanvendte sikkerhedsstillelse, når den kan beregnes for værdipapirfinansieringstransaktionen på transaktionsniveau. Y Y Y Y 9 Anslået genanvendelse af sikkerhedsstillelsen Når den faktiske værdi af den genanvendte sikkerhedsstillelse er ukendt eller ikke kan beregnes, beregnes den anslåede værdi af genanvendelsen for det enkelte finansielle instruments vedkommende i henhold til FSB's rapport Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-based Finance, Non-Cash Collateral Re-Use»: Measure and Metrics« af 25. januar 2017. Y Y Y Y 10 Valuta for genanvendt sikkerhedsstillelse Valuta for den faktiske eller anslåede værdi af den genanvendte sikkerhedsstillelse. Y Y Y Y 11 Geninvesteringssats Gennemsnitlig rentesats, der modtages fra en geninvestering af kontant sikkerhedsstillelse, der er foretaget af långiveren. N N Y N Felt 12, 13 og 14 gentages og udfyldes for hver investering, hvor den kontante sikkerhedsstillelse er blevet geninvesteret, og for hver valuta 12 Type geninvesteret kontant sikkerhedsstillelse Geninvesteringstype. N N Y N 13 Geninvesteret kontantbeløb Det geninvesterede kontantbeløb i en given valuta. N N Y N 14 De geninvesterede kontanters valuta Valuta for geninvesterede kontanter. N N Y N For margenudlånstransaktioner gentager og udfylder modparten felt 15, 16 og 17 for hver finansieringskilde og giver oplysningerne i disse felter på enhedsniveau. 15 Finansieringskilder Finansieringskilder anvendt til at finansiere margenlån. N N N Y 16 Finansieringskildernes markedsværdi Finansieringskildernes markedsværdi nævnt i felt 15. N N N Y 17 Finansieringskildernes valuta Valutaen for finansieringskildernes markedsværdi. N N N Y 18 Handlingstype Indberetningen skal indeholde én af de følgende handlingstyper: a) en ny saldo for genanvendelse identificeres som »New« (ny) b) en ændring af oplysningerne om genanvendelsen identificeres som »Reuse update« (ajourføring af genanvendelse) c) en annullering af en fejlagtigt indgivet fuldstændig indberetning, identificeres som »Error« (fejl) d) en korrektion af datafelter, der blev indgivet forkert i en tidligere indberetning, identificeres som »Correction« (korrektion) Y Y Y Y (1) Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2019/363 af 13. december 2018 om gennemførelsesmæssige tekniske standarder for formatet for og hyppigheden af indberetninger til transaktionsregistre i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2365 af nærmere oplysninger om værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner og om ændring af gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1247/2012 for så vidt angår anvendelsen af indberetningskoder i forbindelse med indberetning af derivataftaler (se side 85 i denne EUT). (2) Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/2365 af 25. november 2015 om gennemsigtighed af værdipapirfinansieringstransaktioner og vedrørende genanvendelse samt om ændring af forordning (EU) nr. 648/2012 (EUT L 337 af 23.12.2015, s. 1).
en	caselaw	US	NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 8 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE LISANDRO CANEL, No. 18-72472 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-052-995 v. MEMORANDUM* ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 4, 2021 Pasadena, California Before: TALLMAN and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,* District Judge. Jose Lisandro Canel (“Canel”), a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his 2014 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). * The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition. 1. An asylum application must be filed within a year of the applicant’s arrival in the United States unless he can demonstrate changed circumstances affecting his asylum eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2). Whether an applicant’s circumstances have changed is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review for substantial evidence. See Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Canel puts forth as the changed circumstance the growth of the vigilante group that beat him for being out past a curfew. However, Canel’s only supporting evidence is a 2011 article stating that vigilante groups in Guatemala “have given rise to the commission of crimes, including the restriction of rights like freedom of movement.” Assuming arguendo that the article was evidence of a changed circumstance, Canel was nonetheless obligated to file his asylum application within a reasonable amount of time after the changed circumstance. See Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that a delay of over six months is presumptively unreasonable). Canel’s application was filed some three years after the article and he offers no explanation 1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those necessary to explain our decision. 2 for the delay. Accordingly, his filing was not timely. 2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Canel failed to establish past persecution, or the well-founded fear or clear probability of future persecution, on account of a protected ground. The BIA correctly concluded that Canel’s proposed social group of “young Guatemalan men from the city of San Juan, Guatemala who are targeted by local security committees because they are perceived as criminals” is not a cognizable social group. It is impermissibly defined by the risk of harm. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (holding that a social group could not “be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm in the past”); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007) (same). In addition, Canel has not shown that his proposed group is not amorphous or that Guatemalan society recognizes it as a cognizable group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that a social group cannot be “amorphous,” and must “generally be recognizable by other members of the community” (quoting Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc))). 3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Canel did not establish a reasonable likelihood of torture if removed to Guatemala. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Canel failed to show that the vigilante group would seek him out, identify, and torture him, almost fifteen years after he left Guatemala, and 3 Canel’s family, including his younger brother, remain in Guatemala and have not been harmed.2 PETITION DENIED. 2 Canel also argues that the IJ erred in not making a credibility determination. However, the BIA assumed his credibility. 4
it	other	N/A	Art. 295 codice penale - Attentato contro i Capi di Stati esteri - Brocardi.it Tu sei qui: Fonti > Codice penale > LIBRO SECONDO - Dei delitti in particolare > Titolo I - Dei delitti contro la personalità dello stato > Capo IV - Dei delitti contro gli stati esteri, i loro capi e i loro rappresentanti > Articolo 295 Articolo 295 Codice penale Dispositivo dell'art. 295 Codice penale Chiunque nel territorio dello Stato [4 2] attenta alla vita, alla incolumità o alla libertà personale (1) del Capo di uno Stato estero (2) è punito, nel caso di attentato alla vita, con la reclusione non inferiore a venti anni e, negli altri casi, con la reclusione non inferiore a quindici anni. Se dal fatto è derivata la morte del Capo dello Stato estero, il colpevole è punito con l'ergastolo, nel caso di attentato alla vita; negli altri casi è punito con l'ergastolo [298, 300, 301-309]. (1) La condotta punita consiste in un attentato alla vita, all'incolumità o alla libertà personale, intesa come libertà fisica o di movimento, quindi è del tutto identica a quella descritta per il Presidente della Repubblica (v. 276). Si deve però specificare che viene perseguita la sola condotta realizzatasi entro i confini del territorio italiano. (2) Il Capo di Stato estero è colui che, in base al diritto internazionale e al riconoscimento particolare dell'Italia, ha la rappresentanza di un ente territoriale sovrano e che quindi incarna simbolicamente lo Stato di appartenenza. Per quanto attiene al Pontefice, si richiama l'art. 8 del Trattato tra Santa Sede e Italia del 11 febbraio 1929 (cd. Patti Lateranensi), secondo il quale le offese e le ingiurie dirette alla persona del Pontefice dovevano essere punite alla pari di quelle dirette alla persona del re. La dottrina maggioritaria dunque ritiene che in tali casi attualmente non trovi applicazione la norma in esame, bensì l'art. 276, che tutela il Presidente della Repubblica italiana. L'interesse qui tutelato è ravvisabile nell'esigenza di non veder compromesse le relazioni internazionali, oltre all'incolumità stessa dei Capi di Stato estero. Spiegazione dell'art. 295 Codice penale La norma in oggetto è posto a presidio sia della incolumità individuale dei Capi di Stato estero, sia, in seconda battuta, delle relazioni diplomatiche tra lo Stato italiano e altri Stati, evidentemente compromesse da attentati di questo tipo commessi in territorio italiano (v. art. 4). La prima parte costituisce un'ipotesi di reato di pericolo, in cui la consumazione del delitto viene anticipata alla fase di mero attentato, non essendo dunque prevista la realizzazione di un evento lesivo naturalisticamente inteso. Pur non essendo espressamente previsto, è comunque necessario un accertamento in merito alla idoneità della condotta ad attentare alla vita, alla libertà personale ed alla incolumità del Capo di Stato estero, nonché l'univoca direzione degli atti. È quindi chiaro come la norma debba ricalcare pedissequamente la disciplina di cui all'art. 56. La seconda parte dell'articolo disciplina invece un reato di evento, qualora dalle condotte precedenti derivi la morte del Capo di Stato estero. Massime relative all'art. 295 Codice penale Cass. pen. n. 947/1979 L'art. 295 c.p. concerne la libertà personale, intesa come bene fisico, suscettibile di offesa attraverso ogni forma di intervento diretto che sia di ostacolo alla libertà di locomozione e comunque incida sulla libera disponibilità della persona, mentre l'art. 296 dello stesso codice riguarda la libertà morale, concepita come facoltà di libera determinazione e quindi come intima e normale attività dello spirito. (Cassazione penale, Sez. I, sentenza n. 947 del 27 gennaio 1979)
en	wikipedia	N/A	Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP; often referred to simply as LandBank), is a government-owned bank in the Philippines with a special focus on serving the needs of farmers and fishermen. While it provides the services of a universal bank, it is officially classified as a "specialized government bank" with a universal banking license. LandBank is the second largest bank in the Philippines in terms of assets and is the largest government-owned bank. It is also one of the biggest government-owned and controlled corporations and banking institutions in the Philippines along with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Overseas Filipino Bank (OFW Bank), and Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines. Unlike most Philippine banks, LandBank has an extensive rural branch network with 409 Branches and Extension Offices, 46 Lending Centers and 2,188 ATMs (as of February 2020). It services many rural sector clients in areas where banking is either limited to rural banks or is non-existent. History LandBank was established on August 8, 1963, as part of the Agricultural Land Reform Code as part of a program of land reform in the Philippines. It was to help with the purchase of agricultural estates for division and resale to small landholders and the purchase of land by the agricultural lessee. In 1965, LandBank's by-laws were approved and its first board of trustees was formed, with the Secretary of Finance as chairman. On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27, signed by President Ferdinand Marcos, emancipated all tenant farmers working on private agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn, whether working on a landed estate or not. The system was implemented through a system of sharecropping or lease-tenancy. LandBank was tasked to collect 15-year land amortizations from beneficiaries at the cost of the value of the land plus six percent interest per annum. By 1973, LandBank was in financial distress. It lacked the resources and the capital needed to implement the land reform programs and lacked the structure to implement the programs efficiently. On July 21, Marcos signed Presidential Decree No. 251 which revitalized the bank. The decree granted LandBank a universal banking license (the first bank in the Philippines to be issued such a license) with a social mission to spur countryside development. The decree expanded LandBank's powers to include lending for agricultural, industrial, homebuilding and home-financing projects and other productive enterprises, as well as lending to farmers' cooperatives and associations to facilitate production, marketing of crops and acquisition of essential commodities. LandBank was also required by the decree to provide timely and adequate support in all phases involved in the execution of agrarian reform and also increased its authorized capital to 3 billion pesos. It also became exempted from all national, provincial, city and municipal taxes and assessments. LandBank was reorganized in 1977 when it was divided into three sectors to better assess the needs of its customers. It was divided into Agrarian, Banking and Operations sectors to strengthen operations and ensure long-term viability. In 1982, the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), established under the same law as LandBank, was abolished and all its assets and functions transferred to LandBank. ACA's function was to extend credit to small farmers. Also in this year, Union Bank of the Philippines (UnionBank) was formed, with LandBank having a 40-percent stake in the government-owned commercial bank. LandBank became the financial intermediary for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1988. It was also in that year that UnionBank started a gradual privatization. The Aboitiz Group of Companies acquired LandBank's 40% share of UnionBank then which it continues to own. LandBank also became the third member of Expressnet, an interbank network in December 1991 but now a BancNet member. On February 23, 1995, LandBank's charter was once again amended. Its authorized capital was increased to nine billion pesos and it became an official government depository. The number of members of the board of trustees was also increased to nine. On August 25, 1998, LandBank's authorized capital was once again increased to 25 billion pesos, and it then increased to 200 billion pesos, after the planned DBP–LandBank merger in 2016. In 2014, LandBank was planned to be merged with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). President Benigno Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 198 on February 4, 2016, to give way on the merger, with the former as the surviving entity. However, the Duterte administration canceled the merger later that year. On June 25, 2021, President Rodrigo Duterte signed Executive Order No. 142 which mandates the merging of LandBank with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), with LandBank as the surviving entity. Current operations LandBank competes against the major banks such as Metrobank, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Banco de Oro and Philippine National Bank (PNB). In rural areas, it either competes against or complements rural banks. On the other end of the spectrum, LandBank takes on a dual role with the Development Bank of the Philippines, another government-owned bank. It either competes against or works with DBP, depending on the situation. Board of Directors Chairman: Finance Sec. Benjamin E. Diokno Vice Chairman: Cecilia C. Borromeo Members: President & Agriculture Sec. Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. DOLE Sec. Bienvenido E. Laguesma DAR Sec. Conrado M. Estrella III Virgilio D.V. Robes - Representative, Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Sector Jaime L. Miralles - Representative, Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Sector Nancy D. Irlanda - Representative, Private Sector Executive Management Team Cecilia C. Borromeo - President & CEO Liduvino S. Geron - Executive Vice President, National Development Lending Sector Julio D. Climaco Jr. - Executive Vice President, Branch Banking Sector Alan V. Bornas - Executive Vice President, Operations Sector Carel D. Halog - Executive Vice President, Treasury and Investment Banking Sector Alex A. Lorayes - Executive Vice President, Corporate Services Sector Subsidiaries and affiliates Land Bank has the following subsidiaries and affiliates: LBP Leasing Corporation LBP Insurance Brokerage LBP Resources and Development Corporation (former LB (Land Bank) Realty Development Corporation) Masaganang Sakahan, Inc. LBP Countryside Development Foundation, Inc. UCPB Securities, Inc. Overseas Filipino Bank See also List of banks in the Philippines Expressnet BancNet References External links Land Bank website Largest Banks in the Philippines (2009) Philippines Agriculture in the Philippines Banks of the Philippines Government-owned and controlled corporations of the Philippines Companies based in Manila Banks established in 1963
de	other	N/A	Kurze Verjährung für rechtsgrundlose Abgeltungen Verpassen Sie keine wichtigen Gerichts-entscheidungen mehr: Kurze Verjährung: Mieter können rechtsgrundlos gezahlte Abgeltungen nur binnen 6 Monaten zurückfordern BGH, Urteil vom 20. 6. 2012 - VIII ZR 12/12 Ansprüche des Vermieters gegen den Mieter wegen Verschlechterung der Mietsache, z.B. Ansprüche auf Endrenovierung nach Auszug des Mieters, verjähren gem. § 548 Abs. 1 BGB schon sechs Monate nach Rückgabe der Mietsache. Gleiches gilt für die finanzielle Abgeltung wegen unterlassener Renovierung. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die Verjährungsfrist schon oder erst bei Rückgabe der Mietsache beginnt, die ja nicht in jedem Fall genau am Ende des Mietverhältnisses statt findet. Nach Absatz 2 des § 548 BGB verjähren die Ansprüche des Mieters auf Ersatz von Aufwendungen ebenfalls schon nach sechs Monaten, hier aber genau sechs Monate nach Beendigung des Mietverhältnisses, unabhängig vom Zeitpunkt der Rückgabe der Mietsache. Ob diese kurze Verjährungsfrist auch für Abgeltungsbeträge gilt, die der Mieter aufgrund einer erst später als unwirksam erkannten Klausel für nicht durchgeführte Schönheitsreparaturen gezahlt hat, musste jetzt der BGH entscheiden. Über 7.000 € hatte ein Mieter auf Anforderung seiner Vermieterin im August 2007 als Ersatz für Renovierungskosten nach Auszug gezahlt. Weil sich später herausstellte, dass die der Zahlung zugrunde liegende Renovierungsklausel unwirksam war, forderte der Mieter den Betrag im November 2009 zurück und reichte erst im April 2010 die Klage ein, weil die Vermieterin die Rückzahlung verweigerte. Der BGH gab der Vermieterin Recht: "Es macht dabei keinen Unterschied, ob der Mieter - jeweils in Verkennung der Unwirksamkeit der Renovierungsklausel - die Schönheitsreparaturen selbst durchführt beziehungsweise durchführen lässt und vom Vermieter anschließend den hierfür aufgewendeten Betrag fordert, oder ob der Mieter an den Vermieter einen Abgeltungsbetrag für die nicht durchgeführten Schönheitsreparaturen zahlt. Sowohl die geldwerte Sachleistung als auch der Abgeltungsbetrag dienen der Verbesserung der Mietsache und sind deshalb als Aufwendungen auf die Mietsache im Sinne des § 548 Abs. 2 BGB anzusehen." Sechs Monate nach Ende des Mietverhältnisses sind also Ansprüche des Mieters auf Rückzahlung von Abgeltungsbeträgen verjährt, selbst wenn der Vermieter diese Abgeltung zu Unrecht kassiert. Urteil vom 20. Juni 2012 – VIII ZR 12/12
de	caselaw	Switzerland	Urteilskopf 140 III 481 71. Auszug aus dem Urteil der II. zivilrechtlichen Abteilung i.S. X. gegen Y. AG (Beschwerde in Zivilsachen) 5A_508/2014 vom 19. September 2014 Regeste Art. 2 ZGB ; rechtsmissbräuchliche Betreibung? Betreibungsbegehren, das der Betreibende drei Tage vor den Vergleichsverhandlungen stellt, die er selbst initiiert und für die er den Rückzug einer früheren Betreibung in Aussicht gestellt hat (E. 2). Sachverhalt ab Seite 481 BGE 140 III 481 S. 481 A. X. leitete am 7. Februar 2014 eine Betreibung gegen die Y. AG ein. Dabei machte er einen Schadenersatzanspruch in der Höhe von Fr. 1'392'000.- nebst Zins zu 3,5 % seit dem 11. Februar 2014 geltend. Am 10. Februar 2014 stellte das Betreibungsamt Bern-Mittelland den Zahlungsbefehl aus (Betreibung Nr. x). Dieser wurde der Y. AG am 13. Februar 2014 zugestellt. Am 14. Februar 2014 erhob die Y. AG Rechtsvorschlag. Am 20. Februar 2014 gelangte sie an das Obergericht des Kantons Bern als Aufsichtsbehörde in Betreibungs- und Konkurssachen und beantragte, die Verfügung des Betreibungsamts Bern-Mittelland vom 10. Februar 2014 für nichtig zu BGE 140 III 481 S. 482 erklären, eventualiter aufzuheben. Das Betreibungsamt sei anzuweisen, den Eintrag in der Betreibungssache Nr. x aus dem Betreibungsregister zu löschen. Am 10. Juli 2014 hiess das Obergericht des Kantons Bern die Beschwerde unter Hinweis auf die Rechtsmissbräuchlichkeit der erfolgten Betreibung gut. B. Mit Eingabe in italienischer Sprache vom 20. Juni 2014 wendet sich X. (Beschwerdeführer) an das Bundesgericht. Er verlangt, den Entscheid des Obergerichts aufzuheben und den Zahlungsbefehl in der Betreibung Nr. x für gültig zu erklären und im Betreibungsregister eingetragen zu lassen. Das Bundesgericht hat die vorinstanzlichen Akten, aber keine Vernehmlassungen eingeholt. Es weist die Beschwerde ab, soweit darauf einzutreten ist. Erwägungen Aus den Erwägungen: 2. 2.1 Einzig umstritten ist die Frage, ob der Beschwerdeführer die Betreibung Nr. x rechtsmissbräuchlich angestrengt hat. Die Vorinstanz ist dieser Meinung. Sie begründet ihren Standpunkt damit, dass der Beschwerdeführer am 7. Februar 2014, als er die Betreibung anhob, Vergleichsverhandlungen mit der Betriebenen geführt habe. Inhalt dieser Vergleichsverhandlungen sei der mögliche Rückzug eines früheren Betreibungsbegehrens des Beschwerdeführers in gleicher Sache (Betreibung Nr. y des Betreibungsamts Bern-Mittelland) gewesen. Dieses frühere Betreibungsbegehren sei der Grund gewesen, weshalb die Betriebene nicht nur Rechtsvorschlag erhoben, sondern gegen den Beschwerdeführer eine - soweit ersichtlich - nach wie vor hängige negative Feststellungsklage an seinem Wohnsitz im Kanton A. angestrengt habe. 2.2 Der Beschwerdeführer bestreitet, rechtsmissbräuchlich gehandelt zu haben. Er ist der Meinung, dass ihm die Betriebene den in Betreibung gesetzten Betrag schulde, weil sie ihrem Bewachungsauftrag im Zusammenhang mit dem Betrieb des Asylzentrums in B. nicht nachgekommen und er deshalb zu Schaden gekommen sei. Der Zahlungsbefehl verfolge damit keine sachfremden Zwecke. 2.3 2.3.1 Jedermann hat in der Ausübung seiner Rechte und in der Erfüllung seiner Pflichten nach Treu und Glauben zu handeln ( Art. 2 Abs. 1 ZGB ). Der offenbare Missbrauch eines Rechtes findet keinen Rechtsschutz ( Art. 2 Abs. 2 ZGB ). Nach der Rechtsprechung, die das BGE 140 III 481 S. 483 Obergericht richtig wiedergibt, ist eine Betreibung nur in Ausnahmefällen wegen Rechtsmissbrauchs nichtig. Rechtsmissbräuchlich verhält sich der Gläubiger, wenn er mit der Betreibung offensichtlich Ziele verfolgt, die nicht das Geringste mit der Zwangsvollstreckung zu tun haben. Allerdings steht es weder dem Betreibungsamt noch der Aufsichtsbehörde zu, die Begründetheit der in Betreibung gesetzten Forderung zu beurteilen. Deshalb darf sich der Vorwurf des Schuldners auch nicht darin erschöpfen, dass der umstrittene Anspruch rechtsmissbräuchlich erhoben werde (s. BGE 113 III 2 E. 2b S. 3 ff.). Rechtsmissbräuchlich und deswegen nichtig kann eine Betreibung demgegenüber dann sein, wenn der Betreibende bloss die Kreditwürdigkeit eines (angeblichen) Schuldners schädigen will, wenn er in schikanöser Weise einen völlig übersetzten Betrag in Betreibung setzt ( BGE 130 II 270 E. 3.2.2 S. 278; BGE 115 III 18 E. 3b S. 21). 2.3.2 Der Sache nach geht es dem Beschwerdeführer zumindest vordergründig darum, von der Betriebenen Schadenersatz und Genugtuung für erlittene seelische Unbill zu erhalten. Allein unter diesem Blickwinkel kann in der Tat nicht gesagt werden, seine Vorgehensweise habe mit der Zwangsvollstreckung nicht das Geringste zu tun. Insbesondere ist es ihm auch nicht verwehrt, die tatsächliche oder vermeintliche Schuldnerin ein zweites Mal zu betreiben, wenn diese gegen einen ersten Zahlungsbefehl Rechtsvorschlag erhoben hat. Trotzdem hält die Einschätzung der Vorinstanz, der Beschwerdeführer habe sich rechtsmissbräuchlich verhalten, vor Bundesrecht stand. Die Ausübung eines Rechts ist nämlich auch dann rechtsmissbräuchlich, wenn damit aufgrund früheren Verhaltens legitime Erwartungen der anderen Seite enttäuscht werden (venire contra factum proprium; BGE 133 III 61 E. 4.1 S. 76; BGE 130 III 113 E. 4.2 S. 123; BGE 129 III 493 E. 5.1 S. 497; je mit Hinweisen). Ein Verschulden jener Partei, die sich widersprüchlich verhält, ist dabei nicht erforderlich. Vielmehr genügt es, wenn aus objektiver Sicht Erwartungen zunächst geweckt und anschliessend enttäuscht werden (HAUSHEER/AEBI-MÜLLER, Berner Kommentar, 2012, N. 269 zu Art. 2 ZGB ). 2.3.3 Im konkreten Fall führte der Beschwerdeführer mit der Betriebenen Vergleichsverhandlungen, die er selbst angestrengt hatte. Im Hinblick auf den Verhandlungstermin vom 10. Februar 2014 vor dem zuständigen Gericht stellte er der Betriebenen den Rückzug seiner früheren Betreibung Nr. y in Aussicht, in der das Betreibungsamt Bern-Mittelland den Zahlungsbefehl am 10. Februar 2012 ausgestellt hatte. Es verstösst gegen Treu und Glauben und ist BGE 140 III 481 S. 484 rechtsmissbräuchlich, wenn der Beschwerdeführer am 7. Februar 2014 und damit gerade einmal drei Tage vor dem besagten Verhandlungstermin ein zweites Betreibungsbegehren stellt. Eine solche Verhaltensweise lässt die laufenden Vergleichsverhandlungen und den angestrebten Vergleich in Bezug auf den Rückzug des ersten Betreibungsbegehrens als sinnlos erscheinen. Daran ändert nichts, dass im zweiten Betreibungsbegehren ein höherer Forderungsbetrag genannt wird (Fr. 1'392'000.- gegenüber Fr. 1'000'000.-). In der Sache beruft sich der Beschwerdeführer für seine angebliche Forderung, was von keiner Seite bestritten wird, auf den gleichen Lebenssachverhalt und auf die gleiche rechtliche Grundlage. 2.4 Am rechtsmissbräuchlichen Charakter der heute zu beurteilenden zweiten Betreibung ändert auch die Tatsache nichts, dass das Betreibungsamt Bern-Mittelland den Rechtsmissbrauch nicht ohne weiteres erkennen konnte, wie es in seiner Vernehmlassung an die Vorinstanz selbst ausführte. Das Verfahren vor der Aufsichtsbehörde ist kontradiktorischer Natur und unterscheidet sich damit vom Verfahren vor dem Betreibungsamt (vgl. BGE 140 III 175 E. 4.3 S. 178 f.). Dies bringt es mit sich, dass die Rechtsmissbräuchlichkeit möglicherweise erst von der Beschwerdeinstanz erkannt wird. Allein die Tatsache, dass die Vorinstanz das Betreibungsbegehren als rechtsmissbräuchlich bezeichnet, bedeutet deshalb nicht, dass bereits das Betreibungsamt dies hätte bemerken müssen. Im Übrigen hat das Betreibungsamt die Möglichkeit, seine nichtige Verfügung durch den Erlass einer neuen Verfügung zu ersetzen, wenn es vom wahren Sachverhalt Kenntnis erhält. Ist in diesem Moment bereits ein Verfahren bei der Aufsichtsbehörde hängig, so steht dem Amt diese Befugnis immerhin bis zur Vernehmlassung zu ( Art. 22 Abs. 2 SchKG ).
en	caselaw	US	49 P.3d 135 (2002) 112 Wash.App. 291 SUPERIOR ASPHALT AND CONCRETE COMPANY, a Washington Corporation; and Western States Asphalt Company, a Washington Corporation, Appellants, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, Respondent. No. 27044-7-II. Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2. June 21, 2002. 136 Ryan Mark Edgley, Yakima, for Respondent. Amanda J. Goss, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant. HOUGHTON, J. The Department of Labor & Industries (L & I) issued five notices of violation of the Prevailing Wage Act to Superior Asphalt & Concrete Company (Superior) and Western States Asphalt Company (Western States) for failure to pay the prevailing wage to their employee truck drivers who delivered road construction materials to public works projects. 137 Superior and Western States appealed the notices of violation to the Office of Administrative Hearings, where an administrative law judge (ALJ) sustained the notices of violations. The L & I director affirmed the ALJ's decision, and the superior court also affirmed the director's decision. Superior and Western States appeal from the trial court's decision. We affirm. roadbed. FACTS[1] Superior and Western States are 2 of 13 subsidiary corporations wholly owned by Superior Asphalt & Paving Company, a holding company that contracts for highway and street construction projects (specializing in surfacing and paving) or supplying materials to such projects. Superior and Western States are established materials suppliers, producing and delivering sand, dirt, gravel, crushed rock, and asphalt for both publicly and privately funded projects. This case deals with five public works projects located throughout the state of Washington for which the two companies supplied road construction materials.[2] Superior supplied and delivered road construction materials to three public works projects: Indian Creek Bridge, Summitview Avenue, and West Valley Middle School. Western States supplied and delivered road construction materials to two public works projects: Cape Horn and Columbia Gateway. Superior and Western States delivered the materials by several methods, including tailgate, belly dump, spreader box or paving machine, and stockpile. In the tailgate method of delivery, the driver delivers the materials using a dump truck. The driver is told to dispense his load at certain locations after arriving at the jobsite. He then maneuvers his truck into position, raises the bed of his truck, and empties his load. To control the rate of the materials being dispensed, the driver hooks a chain between the truck bed and the tailgate so that when he raises the truck bed, the chain restricts the opening in the gate. With the chain in place and the truck bed raised, the driver controls the flow rate of the materials and hence the thickness of the layer of materials on the ground by moving his truck forward as his load empties. The tailgate method allows the delivery of materials directly onto the roadbed. The belly dump method involves using a truck equipped with a release gate on the bottom (or belly) of the truck bed. The belly dump method also allows the materials to be delivered directly onto the roadbed. When a truck arrives at the jobsite, the driver positions his truck over the roadway and opens the belly gate. The driver controls the rate of the materials being dispensed onto the roadbed by moving his truck forward as it empties. This results in a strip of materials commonly referred to as a "windrow." Administrative Record (AR) at 224. The spreader box or paving machine method is where the truck driver backs his dump truck against a machine, raises his truck bed, and delivers the materials directly into the machine. The machine then lays the materials onto the roadbed. The holding capacity of the spreading machine cannot accommodate a full truck load of materials. Therefore, the truck remains with the spreading machine, and the truck driver works in concert with the spreading machine operator to control the rate of the materials being emptied into it. After delivery of the materials, other workers must process it to complete the construction process. In the stockpile method, the driver uses a dump truck and empties his load on the ground in a pile for future use. To get the materials from a stockpile to the needed location, a front end bucket loader is used to scoop up the materials and place it at the needed location. 138 These public project contracts called for paying the prevailing wage to workers on the projects. The prevailing wage for the workers ranged from $17.00 to $19.50 per hour. The typical wage ranged from $10.00 to $13.00 per hour. Superior and Western States differentiate the truck drivers' times according to their activities. Time spent at the gravel pit or asphalt plant to load the materials is referred to as "loading time." AR at 223. Time spent transporting the materials to the jobsite and returning to the materials supply source to pick up the next load is called "drive time." AR at 223. Time spent waiting at the jobsite to deliver the materials is called "wait time." AR at 223. And time spent emptying the loads at the jobsites is called "delivery time." AR at 223. Superior and Western States paid the truck drivers the prevailing wage for only the wait time and delivery time. They paid the truck drivers the normal wage for loading time and drive time. On a typical day, the truck drivers made between six and eight deliveries. The bulk of the truck drivers' time is spent on the road traveling between the materials supply source and the jobsites and vice versa. The drive time ranged from 30 to 90 minutes each way, depending on the distance between the materials supply source and the jobsite. The loading time at the materials supply source averaged from 5 to 15 minutes per load. The wait time at the jobsite was between zero and 15 minutes. It took approximately 5 to 15 minutes for the truck drivers to deliver each load at the jobsite. L & I sought to recover from Superior and Western States the difference between the prevailing wage and the actual wage paid to the truck drivers for the loading time and drive time,[3] in addition to civil fines and penalties. L & I assessed Superior a total of $14,109.17 and Western States a total of $29,663.34 in wages due and civil fines and penalties. Superior and Western States do not dispute these calculations. They appeal the superior court's ruling affirming the director's decision upholding the ALJ's determination as to the drivers' types of activity and their corresponding wage rates. ANALYSIS Standard of Review An appeal from an L & I notice of violation of the Prevailing Wage Act is governed by chapter 34.05 RCW, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). RCW 39.12.065(1). In reviewing an administrative action, we sit in the same position as the trial court and apply the APA standards directly to the administrative record in front of the agency. Tapper v. State Employment Sec. Dep't, 122 Wash.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). We review questions of law de novo, but we accord substantial weight to the agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers. Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash.2d 819, 823, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988) (citing Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106, 103 S. Ct. 730, 74 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1983)). We review findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). Substantial evidence is evidence that is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the matter. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). On mixed questions of law and fact, we determine the law independently, then apply it to the facts as found by the agency. Hamel v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 93 Wash.App. 140, 145, 966 P.2d 1282 (1998), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1036, 980 P.2d 1283 (1999). Scope of the Prevailing Wage Act Superior and Western States contend that L & I and the superior court incorrectly interpreted the Prevailing Wage Act or, alternatively, misapplied it to the facts in this case. Specifically, they argue that the delivery of road construction materials by the truck drivers here does not constitute "`labor 139 upon a public work.'" Appellants' Brief at 13. The Washington Prevailing Wage Act provides in part: "The hourly wages to be paid to laborers, workers, or mechanics, upon all public works ... shall be not less than the prevailing rate of wage for an hour's work in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where such labor is performed." RCW 39.12.020. This statute is based, in part, on the federal Davis Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a, but provides broader coverage "`to protect the employees of government contractors from substandard earnings and to preserve local wage standards.'" Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 823, 748 P.2d 1112 (quoting Unity Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 756 F.2d 870, 873 (Fed.Cir. 1985)). The Prevailing Wage Act, chapter 39.12 RCW, is remedial in nature and should be construed liberally to carry into effect the purpose behind the statute. Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 823, 748 P.2d 1112. Further, the intended beneficiaries of the Prevailing Wage Act are the workers, not the government contractors or their assignees. Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 823, 748 P.2d 1112. L & I implemented the following regulation to describe the scope of the Prevailing Wage Act as it pertains to the production and delivery of gravel, concrete, asphalt, and similar materials: (2) All workers, regardless of by whom employed, are subject to the provisions of [the Prevailing Wage Act] when: (a) They deliver [sand, gravel, crushed rock, concrete mix, asphalt, or other similar] materials to a public works project site and perform any spreading, leveling, rolling, or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials into the project; or (b) They wait at or near a public works project site to participate in the incorporation of any of the above-listed materials into the project; or (c) They remove any materials from a public works construction site pursuant to contract requirements or specifications (e.g., excavated materials, materials from demolished structures, cleanup materials, etc.); or (d) They work in a materials production facility (e.g., batch plant, borrow pit, rock quarry, etc.,) which is established for a public works project for the specific, but not necessarily exclusive, purpose of supplying materials for the project. (3) Workers are not subject to the provisions of [the Prevailing Wage Act] when: (a) The employees' duties do not include spreading, leveling, rolling, or otherwise participating in the incorporation of the delivered materials into a public works project, and they are employed by an established materials supplier either in the production or delivery of sand, gravel, crushed rock, concrete mix, asphalt or other similar materials[.] WAC 296-127-018. In Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 84 Wash.App. 401, 929 P.2d 1120 (1996), review denied, 132 Wash.2d 1009, 940 P.2d 654 (1997), we upheld the validity of this regulation. We concluded that "the reference to workers `upon all public works' in RCW 39.12.020 is sufficiently broad to encompass contract workers who deliver materials to a public worksite and spread, level, roll, or otherwise incorporate those materials into the project." Superior Asphalt, 84 Wash.App. at 410, 929 P.2d 1120. We held that WAC 296-127-018 is as valid because it was consistent with the Prevailing Wage Act and its purposes. Because the only issue in that case was the validity of the regulation and not its application, we declined to address whether delivering construction materials using the tailgate method constitutes labor "upon" a public works project. Superior Asphalt, 84 Wash.App. at 410, 929 P.2d 1120. The issue is now squarely before us. Delivery Time Although Superior and Western States paid their truck driver employees the prevailing wage for the time, they physically spent at the public work sites (waiting time and delivery time), they assert that delivery of materials by any method, whether by stockpile, tailgate, belly dump, or paving machine, 140 does not constitute "`labor upon a public work.'" Appellants' Brief at 13. They argue that the truck drivers here do nothing more than make "`mere delivery' of the material" and thus do not participate in the incorporation of the material into the project to warrant compensation at the prevailing wage. Appellants' Brief at 12. We disagree. As L & I points out, the truck drivers do not simply deliver the materials, they "participat[e] in the spreading of material in a certain manner over the roadway." Respondent's Brief at 18. In the tailgate and belly dump methods of delivery, the drivers spread the materials onto the roadbed as they move their trucks forward while emptying their loads. To some extent, this achieves a certain level of spreading. In the spreader box or paving machine method of delivery, the drivers empty their loads directly into a machine that lays down a layer of the materials on the road. While the truck is emptying into the machine, the truck driver and the machine operator work in tandem to ensure that the materials flow into the machine at a certain rate. This indicates more than just "mere delivery," as Superior and Western States suggest. Superior and Western States also assert that as a general rule, "prevailing wage is not required to be paid to the employees of materialmen (suppliers of standard materials used in public works projects)." Appellants' Brief at 10. This is an inaccurate statement of the law. Material supplier employees are not entitled to the prevailing wage when their duties do not include "spreading, leveling, rolling, or otherwise participating in the incorporation of the delivered materials into a public works project." WAC 296-127-018(3)(a). If the employees' duties include delivering the materials to a public works project and any of these activities, they are entitled to the prevailing wage, regardless of who hires them, including material suppliers. WAC 296-127-018(2)(a); Superior Asphalt, 84 Wash.App. at 410, 929 P.2d 1120. As noted, the truck drivers here did more than simply deliver the materials. They either spread the material or, at the very least, participated in the incorporation of the materials into the public works projects. By delivering the materials directly onto the road bed using the tailgate and belly dump methods, they achieved a certain level of "spreading" the materials. Likewise, emptying their loads directly into the spreading machine and coordinating with the machine operator to ensure a specific rate of materials flow while the machine lays down a layer of the materials is a clear example of incorporating the materials into the construction process. Workers are entitled to the prevailing wage when they deliver materials to a public works project and "participate in any incorporation of the materials into the project[.]" WAC 296-127-018(2)(a). Since 1992, L & I has maintained that these methods of delivery constitute "incorporation of those materials into the project site."[4] AR at 338. This is logical. If the materials were simply dumped at the work site in a stockpile, the contractor would have to devote, at a minimum, a worker and piece of equipment, such as a front end bucket loader to move the materials to the location where it is needed. By delivering the materials directly onto the roadbed or into the spreading machine, the contractor achieves a higher level of efficiency. This eliminates the contractor's cost of paying the wage of the worker to move the materials from the stockpile to the location where needed, wear and tear on equipment, and the cost of fuel needed to operate the equipment. Taking into account the remedial nature of the Prevailing Wage Act, its liberal construction by our courts to protect the worker, and L & I's interpretation of the statute and its due deference, we hold that the truck drivers in this case participated in the incorporation 141 of the materials into the project sites. Therefore, the drivers are entitled to compensation at the prevailing wage when they made their deliveries. Loading Time and Drive Time Superior and Western States further contend that the truck drivers are not entitled to the prevailing wage for the loading time and drive time because these activities do not constitute "`labor upon a public work.'" Appellants' Brief at 15. Superior and Western States attempt to segregate and distinguish the times and activities of the truck drivers. They note that although they deny the legal obligation to do so, they paid the truck drivers the prevailing wage for the time they were physically at the jobsite.[5] Superior and Western States rely, at least in part, on the mistaken notion that work done on site is "upon public works" but work done off site is not. Nevertheless, the location of the work done on a public works project does not control whether the workers are entitled to the prevailing wage. See Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 831-32, 748 P.2d 1112 (employees of off site manufacturers of nonstandard concrete tunnel liners entitled to prevailing wage to avoid the use of cheap labor from distant areas and circumvent the purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act); see also WAC 296-127-018(2)(d) (employees of production facility entitled to prevailing wage if they supply materials specifically, but not necessarily exclusively, for a public works project). Superior and Western States attempt to distinguish Everett Concrete from the present case. They argue that the truck drivers here are not entitled to the prevailing wage because the gravel and asphalt that they delivered in this case were standard materials, unlike the nonstandard concrete tunnel liners in Everett Concrete. This argument is unpersuasive. Everett Concrete addressed the issue of whether employees of an off site manufacturer producing a nonstandard item specifically for a public works project were entitled to the prevailing wage. Hence, the focus there was on the product. The focus here is not on the product, but the method of delivery. From the workers' perspective, there is little difference between employees of a manufacturer producing nonstandard items specifically for a public works project and truck driver employees of materials suppliers transporting and delivering materials specifically to the public works jobsites. In both situations, the employees provide labor for the specific purpose of fulfilling a portion of the public works contract. If one group of workers is entitled to the prevailing wage, the other group should also be similarly entitled to the prevailing wage. Here, the more appropriate factor to focus on in considering whether the truck drivers are entitled to the prevailing wage for loading time and drive time is the purpose for which the materials are delivered. In Heller v. McClure & Sons, Inc., 92 Wash.App. 333, 963 P.2d 923 (1998), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1028, 980 P.2d 1280 (1999), a mechanic employee of a government contractor who performed on site maintenance on the contractor's equipment sought compensation at the prevailing wage rate.[6] Division Three of this court held that the mechanic employee was entitled to the prevailing wage because the work was "directly related to the prosecution of the [contracted] work" and *142 was "necessary for the completion of that work." Heller, 92 Wash.App. at 337, 963 P.2d 923. The truck drivers' services not only were directly related to the road construction projects, but also were critical to timely complete the projects. Without the truck drivers picking up, transporting, and delivering the materials, there would be no materials to build the roads. Applying the Heller standards to the present case, the truck drivers are entitled to the prevailing wage for the loading time and driving time. Finally, Superior and Western States argue that the truck drivers are not entitled to the prevailing wage because as employees of material suppliers, they performed work that employees of the contractors do not perform. Their argument is based on the premise that because the truck drivers do not displace some of the contractors' other employees, who would be entitled to the prevailing wage, they are not entitled to the prevailing wage. But the facts do not support Superior and Western States' argument. John Arambul, vice-president and general manager of Western States Paving Company (another subsidiary of Superior Asphalt & Paving Company), testified that as a contractor or subcontractor, he has the option of either having the materials supplier deliver the materials or picking up the materials from the supply point, transporting it to the jobsite, and delivering it himself. The determining factor is the costif he can pick up and deliver the materials for less than what the supplier charges, he will do it himself. Thus, the activities of picking up the materials and transporting them to the jobsites are not necessarily within the exclusive province of the materials supplier. If the contract calls for it, the contractor can assume these activities himself. Under WAC 296-127-018(1)(b), employees of contractors and subcontractors are entitled to the prevailing wage if "[t]hey are engaged in the transportation of [sand, gravel, crushed rock, concrete mix, asphalt, or other similar] materials for use on a public works project, whether or not they perform any work on the project site." Here, had the contractors or subcontractors chosen to pick up, transport, and deliver the materials, rather than have Superior and Western States perform these services, the contractors or subcontractors would have had to pay their employees the prevailing wage. Hence, Superior and Western States' argument fails. Accordingly, the truck driver employees of Superior and Western States are entitled to compensation at the prevailing wage for the duration of their delivery cycle, including loading time, driving time, waiting time, and delivery time. Affirmed. We concur: MORGAN, J., and HUNT, C.J. NOTES [1] Virtually all the facts are undisputed as the parties submitted a detailed and comprehensive prehearing stipulation to the ALJ. [2] Superior and Western States do not dispute that all five of these projects are "public works" projects and, therefore, the Prevailing Wage Act governs. The record does not disclose the exact locations of these construction projects, but it appears that the Cape Horn and Columbia Gateway projects are located in Skamania County and the other three projects are located in Yakima County. [3] Superior and Western States already paid the truck drivers the prevailing wage rate for the waiting time and delivery time. [4] In a memorandum directed at government contractors dated December 10, 1992, L & I specifies what methods of delivery it considers relevant for WAC 296-127-018. According to L & I, delivery of hot asphalt or wet concrete, delivery by tailgate or belly dump, and delivery of materials into a machine always constitute "incorporation of those materials into the project site." AR at 338. Delivery of materials into a "true stockpile" that is physically separated from the actual location of construction and that must be physically moved from the stockpile to be put into service does not constitute incorporation of the materials. AR at 338. [5] Superior and Western States assign much significance to the word "when" in WAC 296-127-018(2)(a) ("All workers ... are subject to ... chapter 39.12 RCW when ... [t]hey deliver....") (emphasis added). They adopt a literal and narrow reading of this regulation, interpreting it to mean the Prevailing Wage Act does not apply to the times when the truck drivers are not engaged in the act of delivering the materials. This position is contrary to the broad and liberal interpretation of the Prevailing Wage Act our courts have adopted. Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 823, 748 P.2d 1112; City of Spokane v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 100 Wash.App. 805, 811, 998 P.2d 913 (2000); Heller v. McClure & Sons, Inc., 92 Wash.App. 333, 338, 963 P.2d 923 (1998), review denied, 137 Wash.2d 1028, 980 P.2d 1280 (1999); Superior Asphalt, 84 Wash. App. at 406, 929 P.2d 1120. [6] The court declined to address whether the employee was entitled to the prevailing wage for work he did off site because he abandoned this claim and thus it was not before the court. Heller, 92 Wash.App. at 337, 963 P.2d 923.
cs	wikipedia	N/A	Souboj na talíři je kuchařská reality show kterou vysílá TV Nova od roku 2021. Popis Trojice kuchařů (Radek Kašpárek, Jan Punčochář, Přemek Forejt) vyrazila po krásných místech. Diváci se mohou těšit celkem na třináct míst, kde objevují skvělou lokální kuchyni z lokálních surovin. Průběh Na začátku každého dílu všichni tři kuchaři u vína rozebírají předchozí výlet a losují, kdo bude další zadavatel. Na místě, které zadavatel vybral, je odhaleno hlavní jídlo a zbylí dva kuchaři musí dané jídlo uvařit. Duel vyhraje ten, kdo získá na konci více hlasů od lidí, kteří jídla ochutnali. Ten, kdo prohraje, musí splnit trest. Epizody 1. řada (2021) 2. řada (2022) Odkazy Poznámky Reference České reality show Televizní pořady TV Nova Gastronomické televizní pořady Televizní pořady vysílané od roku 2021
en	contracts	US	UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM8-K CURRENT REPORT Pursuant to Section13 or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): February 8, 2012 AFFYMETRIX, INC. (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) DELAWARE 0-28218 77-0319159 (State of incorporation) (Commission File Number) (IRS Employer Identification No.) 3420 Central Expressway Santa Clara, California 95051 (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code) (408) 731-5000 Registrant’s telephone number, including area code (Former name or former address, if changed since last report.) Check the appropriate box below if the Form8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions (see General Instruction A.2. below): oWritten communications pursuant to Rule425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425) oSoliciting material pursuant to Rule14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12) oPre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule14d-2(b)under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b)) oPre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule13e-4(c)under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c)) Item 2.02Results of Operations and Financial Condition On February 8, 2012, Affymetrix, Inc. (the “Company”) issued a press release announcing the Company’s operating results for the fourth quarter and fiscal year ended December 31, 2011. A copy of the Company’s press release is attached hereto as Exhibit 99.1. The information furnished under Item 2.02 of this Current Report on Form 8-K, including the exhibit, shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), nor shall it be deemed incorporated by reference into Affymetrix’ filings with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference in such a filing. Item 9.01Financial Statements and Exhibits (d) Exhibits. Exhibit No. Description Press Release dated February 8, 2012 SIGNATURE Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized. AFFYMETRIX, INC. By: /s/ TIMOTHY C. BARABE Name: Timothy C. Barabe Title: Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Principal Financial Officer Dated: February 8, 2012 EXHIBIT INDEX ExhibitNo. Description Press Release dated February 8, 2012
it	legislation	EU	1 . 6 . 77 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee N. L 135/7 REGOLAMENTO (CEE) N. 1134/77 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 31 maggio 1977 che (issa i supplementi da aggiungere ai prelievi all'importazione per il riso e le rotture di riso LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, devono essere modificati conformemente alla tabella visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità economica allegata al presente regolamento, europea, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO : visto il regolamento (CEE) n . 1418/76 del Consiglio, del 21 giugno 1976, relativo all'organizzazione Articolo 1 comune del mercato del riso ('), in particolare l'arti colo 13, paragrafo 6, I supplementi che si aggiungono ai prelievi fissati in considerando che i supplementi da aggiungere ai anticipo per le importazioni di riso e di rotture di riso prelievi per il riso e le rotture di riso sono stati fissati sono adottati come indicato nella tabella allegata al dal regolamento (CEE) n . 2138 /76 (2), modificato da presente regolamento. ultimo dal regolamento (CEE) n . 1086/77 (3 ) ; Articolo 2 considerando che, in funzione dei prezzi cif e dei prezzi cif d'acquisto a termine di oggi, i supplementi Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 1° giugno da aggiungere ai prelievi, attualmente in vigore, 1977 . Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri . Fatto a Bruxelles, il 31 maggio 1977. Per la Commissione Il Vicepresidente Finn GUNDELACH (') GU n . L 166 del 25 . 6 . 1976, pag. 1 . (2 ) GU n . L 240 del 1 ". 9 . 1976 , pag . 8 . (3 ) GU n . L 131 del 26 . 5 . 1977 , pag . 21 ---pagebreak--- N. L 135/8 Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 1 . 6 . 77 ALLEGATO al regolamento della Commissione del 31 maggio 1977 che fissa i supplementi da aggiungere ai prelievi all'importazione per il riso e le rotture di riso (l'C / t) Numero della tariffa Corrente 1° term . 2° term . i° term . Designazione delle merci doganale comune 6 7 8 9 10.06 Riso : A. Risone o riso semigreggio : I. risone : a) a grani tondi 0 0 0 — b) a grani lunghi 0 0 0 — II . riso semigreggio : a) a grani tondi 0 0 0 — b) a grani lunghi 0 0 0 — B. Riso semilavorato o riso lavorato : I. riso semilavorato : a) a grani tondi 0 0 0 — b) a grani lunghi 0 0 0 — II . riso lavorato : a) a grani tondi 0 0 0 — b) a grani lunghi 0 0 0 — C. Rotture 0 0 0 0
it	wikipedia	N/A	Ha servito prima come corsaro al servizio del Regno di Gran Bretagna durante la guerra di successione spagnola, diventando in seguito uno degli autoproclamati capi della repubblica dei pirati a Nassau, New Providence. Poiché poco si sa della vita di Jennings, le prime informazioni su di lui riferiscono che fu un corsaro che operava dalla Giamaica, all'epoca governata da Lord Archibald Hamilton, durante la guerra di successione spagnola. Alcune prove confermano che Jennings possedesse abbastanza terra in Giamaica da poter vivere comodamente, e ciò pone degli interrogativi sui motivi che lo portarono a intraprendere la carriera piratesca. Il suo primo atto di pirateria di cui si abbia la certezza ha avuto luogo all'inizio del 1716 quando, con una flotta di tre navi e due corvette, con una ciurma di 150-300 uomini, Jennings tese un'imboscata all'accampamento dei sopravvissuti al naufragio della flotta del tesoro spagnolo del 1715, sulle coste della Florida. Dopo aver forzato la ritirata di circa 60 soldati, Jennings fece vela per la Giamaica con a bordo un carico di 350.000 pesos. Per di più riuscì a depredare altri 60.000 pesos dal carico di una nave spagnola, diretta da Porto Rico a L'Avana, che incontrò durante il viaggio di ritorno. In seguito si unì per qualche tempo al pirata Samuel Bellamy, con il quale organizzò altri atti di pirateria contro i Francesi; ma quando Bellamy lo tradì, la reazione di Jennings fu spietata: la collera lo portò a dar fuoco a un innocente sloop mercantile britannico e a sterminare più di 20 uomini tra Francesi e Inglesi. Jennings fu dichiarato pirata dal governatore che lo aveva inizialmente commissionato come corsaro; per tale motivo fu costretto ad allontanarsi dalla Giamaica per stabilire infine una nuova base per le sue operazioni a New Providence, Bahamas. Stabilitosi a Nassau per un periodo, Jennings divenne uno dei maggiori capi della crescente colonia pirata, ritirandosi dalla pirateria di mare. Nei primi mesi del 1718, come molti, Henry Jennings si arrese alle autorità britanniche accettando il perdono e seguendo l'amnistia generale proposta dal nuovo governatore delle Bahamas, Woodes Rogers, incaricato da re Giorgio I. Così Jennings si ritirò a vita privata come possessore di una piantagione nel Bermuda, dove poté ricevere il suo perdono. Henry Jennings è stato uno dei pochissimi pirati di cui si abbia notizia a essere riuscito a godersi le sue ricchezze, guadagnandosi una vita agiata dopo il periodo da fuorilegge. Non si sa come sia finita la sua storia, è certo che sia morto di vecchiaia dopo aver messo su famiglia. Secondo un fonte, Jennings morì di malattia all'età di 64 anni. Note
en	wikipedia	N/A	Kurt Kaiser (3 November 1906 – 24 May 1970), better known as Sydney John Kay, was a German-born composer, musician and theatre entrepreneur. Biography Germany Born in Leipzig, Germany of Peruvian-Jewish descent, he originally pursued an engineering career in Berlin, but in 1927 he joined the German-Jewish showband The Weintraub Syncopators as a musician. He appeared with them supporting Marlene Dietrich in The Blue Angel (1930). After the Nazi's came to power in 1933, the Syncopators went on a world tour, and were in Sydney when war was declared. Australian career Kaiser was interned during the early days of the war, but was eventually released, changing his name in honour of his new home, Sydney. He became musical director for the Colgate-Palmolive radio unit, and was involved in theatre, running Sydney's Theatre for Children (1944–45) and co-founding the Mercury Theatre with Peter Finch. He produced the famous production of Molière's The Imaginary Invalid that was seen by Laurence Olivier and Vivien Leigh which led to them inviting Peter Finch to England. Kay also composed for various Australian films, documentaries, orchestras and ballets. Move to England He then moved to England where he worked steadily in British film and television. He also composed for the stage. Selected credits The Blue Angel (1930) – musician Harvest Gold (1945) – composer A Son is Born (1946) – composer Bush Christmas (1947) – composer Captain Thunderbolt (1953) – composer The Back of Beyond (1954) – composer The Adventures of Long John Silver (1955) (TV series) – composer The Adventures of William Tell (1958) (TV series) – composer References External links Sydney John Kay Australian theatre credits at AusStage Sydney John Kay at National Film and Sound Archive Jewish emigrants from Nazi Germany to Australia Jewish composers 1906 births 1970 deaths Australian male composers Australian composers Musicians from Sydney Australian theatre managers and producers 20th-century German composers 20th-century Australian musicians 20th-century German male musicians
en	caselaw	US	TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-02-00489-CR Alfredo Hernandez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR2002-027, HONORABLE CHARLES R. RAMSEY, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Alfredo Hernandez was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 49.04, .09 (West 2003). He appeals, contending that the trial court erred (1) in refusing a requested jury instruction, (2) in sustaining one of the State’s objections and directing the jury to disregard certain testimony, and (3) in excluding certain other testimony. We will affirm. Background Seventeen-year-old Erik Johnson testified that on October 14, 2001, between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m., he was driving on Interstate Highway 35 when he observed a pickup truck weaving across the lanes, straddling the middle lane, and at times driving as slow as thirty-five miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. He called the New Braunfels Police Department on his cell phone to report the erratic driving, giving the 911 operator the truck’s license plate number and his own contact information and opining that “[t]he guy is drunk.” The truck left the highway, and Johnson followed with his hazard lights flashing, continuing to describe the truck’s path to the operator. Once Johnson saw a police car arrive, he stopped following the truck and continued on his way to a friend’s house. Santiago Castillo, who was a New Braunfels Police Officer in October 2001, testified that in the early morning of October 14, he heard the police dispatcher relay Johnson’s report to the district officer. Castillo was in the area, so he pulled into a parking lot to wait for the truck. About five minutes later, Castillo saw a vehicle with flashing lights, then saw a pickup truck with the reported license plate number driving slowly through the parking lot. After Castillo pulled over the truck, he approached and smelled alcohol on the driver, who was identified at trial as appellant, and saw an open can of beer. Castillo testified that appellant swayed and leaned on the truck, could not keep his balance, and had bloodshot and watery eyes. Castillo asked appellant in Spanish if he had been drinking, and appellant indicated that he had been. Castillo then called for a certified Intoxilyzer officer, and New Braunfels Police Officer Christopher Snyder responded to the scene. Snyder conducted field sobriety tests and concluded that appellant was intoxicated. Snyder transported appellant to the Comal County Jail, where appellant was videotaped being given more sobriety tests and being interviewed by Snyder. Discussion In his first issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court should have given the jury an instruction related to the voluntariness of the statement he gave to New Braunfels Police 2 Officer Snyder at the police station after his arrest. He contends that the evidence raised a question as to whether he fully understood his statutory warnings as administered by Officer Snyder. After appellant was brought to the police station, Snyder was unable to find a Spanish translation of the statutory rights that are read to all arrested persons, so he read an English-written form to appellant, translating it into Spanish; Snyder worked in Laredo for five years before coming to New Braunfels and considers himself to be fluent in Spanish. Snyder’s interview with appellant and appellant’s performance of field sobriety tests at the jail were videotaped and that videotape was admitted into evidence. The videotape shows appellant attempting to perform several sobriety tests, including reciting the alphabet in Spanish, walking heel to toe in a straight line, and holding up one foot for thirty seconds, all of which appellant was unable to do; it appears that appellant was able to perform the “finger-to-nose” test. The tape also shows appellant swaying slightly as he stood and shows Snyder reading appellant his rights and asking him some questions about the events leading up to his arrest. Snyder said that he spoke to appellant in “Tex-Mex,” which he learned informally; he did not ask for help from other officers who might have been more fluent in Spanish. Snyder said that although there were “one or two instances where I didn’t have an exact translation of the word and so I came across in English trying to see if we could come to a common understanding,” appellant indicated that he understood the rights as Snyder explained them. Snyder admitted that his translations may not have been “100 percent correct,” and said, “I did my best after each one to ask if he understood them.” At trial, the State in its direct examination of Snyder essentially walked Snyder through the videotape, asking him to translate his questions and appellant’s answers. Snyder asked appellant if he had been drinking, and Snyder said appellant replied he had not. Snyder then 3 asked appellant what he had been drinking and how much, and appellant said he had drunk one beer at about 6:30 p.m. Appellant also responded in the negative to Snyder’s questions about whether he was sick or had any disabilities and talked to Snyder about when he had last slept and eaten and where he was headed before his arrest. Outside the jury’s presence, three hours after the State played the videotape of appellant’s interview with Snyder and after the State rested its case, appellant’s attorney stated, “We’ve reviewed the tape. We have a little translation difficulty here and . . . it would seem that . . . right after, ‘You have the right to remain silent and not say anything,’ he then, the officer, says, ‘but you can also talk to us.’” Appellant sought to have his statements made to Snyder suppressed, and the trial court overruled appellant’s motion. At the charge conference, the trial court refused appellant’s requested jury instruction concerning whether his statutory warnings were properly administered and whether his statements made after those warnings were admissible. The code of criminal procedure provides that when the evidence raises an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement, “the trial judge shall appropriately instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such statement.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 7 (West 1979). Evidence obtained in violation of a provision of a defendant’s constitutional rights or federal or Texas law shall not be admitted in a criminal trial and, if the evidence raises such an issue, “the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained [by such violations], then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.” Id. art 38.23(a) (West Supp. 2003). 4 Appellant requested that the charge include the following instruction: Now bearing in mind these instructions, if you find from the evidence that, on occasion in question during any custodial interrogation or questioning, Jose Alfredo Hernandez was not read his [statutory warnings] properly by the police, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will disregard any and all oral statements obtained after defendant’s arrest by the arresting officer, and you will not consider such evidence for any purpose whatsoever. The trial court overruled appellant’s request. The jury charge in this case instructed the jury that “no evidence obtained or derived . . . as a result of an unlawful stop and detention shall be admissible in evidence,” and went on to explain when an officer may make a temporary investigative detention and to define reasonable suspicion. This portion of the charge concluded by instructing the jury that it was to disregard the testimony of Castillo and Snyder unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Castillo was justified in making the initial stop. The charge did not contain any instructions related to the admissibility of and the jury’s consideration of appellant’s statements made after Snyder attempted to translate appellant’s statutory rights to Spanish. If evidence from any source, even if weak, contradicted, or unbelievable, raises an issue as to the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement, and if the defendant requests a jury charge or instruction on that issue, the trial court must submit the issue to the jury. Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A defendant entitled to such an instruction is only entitled to a general instruction on voluntariness, not to an instruction that recites specific facts or calls attention to a specific piece of information. See Mendoza, 88 S.W.3d at 240. If a trial court erroneously refuses a requested defensive instruction or charge raised by the evidence, we then review the entire record to determine 5 whether the defendant suffered some actual harm; theoretical harm is not sufficient to constitute reversible error. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If the defendant has suffered any harm, regardless of degree, we will reverse the conviction and remand the cause to the trial court. Murphy v. State, 44 S.W.3d 656, 665-66 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). The record contains evidence that Snyder may have included in appellant’s statutory warnings a statement that, although appellant’s statement could be used against him, he “can also talk to us.” The record also indicates that, although Snyder did his best to accurately translate the warnings into Spanish, he was speaking “Tex-Mex,” learned informally, and was not completely accurate in his translation. Appellant testified through an interpreter and stated that he understood English but could not speak it. He also said he could read “a little bit” of English, but not “complex legal forms.” Appellant testified that he could read some but not all of the statutory warning form used by Snyder. He further testified that he “didn’t understand a lot of” Snyder’s translations. This raises the issue of whether appellant’s statement was given with full knowledge of his statutory rights. See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 348, 352-53 (warning that statement could be used “for or against” defendant is improper; testimony that officer might have so instructed defendant entitled defendant to general instruction on voluntariness of statement). We hold that, on the record before us, appellant was entitled to a jury instruction as to the voluntariness of his statement.1 Although 1 In a footnote, the State asserts that the holding in Mendoza v. State indicates that an instruction such as the one appellant requested is fact-bound and therefore not an appropriate jury instruction. 88 S.W.3d 236, 239-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Although the Mendoza court does state that an instruction similar to the one requested by appellant is overly fact-bound, the court notes that the voluntariness issue was adequately addressed by another instruction that was included in the jury charge. Id. at 240. We do not believe that Mendoza supports the conclusion that because appellant’s requested instruction was overly fact-bound he was not entitled to any instruction on voluntariness. 6 appellant’s requested instruction was arguably too fact-specific to be a proper instruction, the trial court erred in refusing to include such a general instruction on the issue. We must therefore examine the record to determine whether appellant suffered any harm as a result of the error. See Arline, 721 S.W.2d at 351-52; Murphy, 44 S.W.3d at 665-66. Appellant testified about his driving on the night in question. He denied weaving, driving in the middle of two lanes, or driving thirty-five miles per hour on the highway. Appellant admitted that when he was stopped he had an open can of beer with him and that he told the officer who stopped him that he had been drinking that night. Appellant admitted that he failed two field sobriety tests the police asked him to perform. Appellant testified that he had “[a]bout 12, 11” beers in a five-hour period on the night he was stopped, but said that was not “a lot for [him] to drink.” Appellant said on past occasions he had consumed twelve to fifteen beers, and that twenty-four beers would be “drinking a lot.” He said he becomes intoxicated when he drinks between fifteen and eighteen beers. Appellant testified, “[Castillo] asked me if I had been drinking and I told him yes. . . . He asked me if I had—if I could still drive and I told him yes, I’m drunk, but I can still drive.” The record includes appellant’s testimony that he had consumed about a dozen beers on the night in question, Snyder’s and Castillo’s testimony that he failed various sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, slurred his words, swayed and leaned when he tried to stand, and generally appeared to be intoxicated, a third officer’s testimony that appellant appeared to be intoxicated, and the videotape of appellant at the police station, in which he failed several sobriety tests.2 In light of 2 A videotape of a suspect attempting to perform field sobriety tests generally is not testimonial in nature and does not implicate the suspect’s statutory rights. See Gassaway v. State, 957 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 175-76 (Tex. Crim. 7 the entire record, we hold that the trial court’s error in refusing to include a general instruction as to the admissibility of a statement did not cause appellant any harm and therefore does not constitute reversible error. We overrule appellant’s first issue on appeal. In his second and third issues on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the veracity of Officer Castillo, the officer who stopped appellant. Outside the jury’s presence, Chief of Police Russell Johnson testified that he became Chief about a month before trial and had known Castillo for about ten days. He terminated Castillo’s employment with the police department after an investigation into Castillo’s submission of false vouchers for overtime pay. Asked about Johnson’s opinion of Castillo’s truthfulness, Johnson answered, “On this incident [the investigation into the fraud and theft allegations], he was truthful when asked about it. Anything prior to that, I couldn’t tell you if he was truthful or he wasn’t truthful.” He said, “Concerning this incident, I would consider him not being truthful”; Johnson also said that Castillo had never lied during the investigation, but had admitted to the false pay vouchers. The State objected that Johnson did not have a sufficient basis to have an opinion as to Castillo’s reputation for truthfulness, and the trial court sustained the objection. Officer Doug Dunlap, the Assistant Chief of Police in New Braunfels, testified that he had known Castillo for more than twenty years. Appellant attempted to ask Dunlap what his opinion was as to Castillo’s reputation for truthfulness as of the date of trial. The State objected, and App. 1990). Therefore, the only portion of the videotape that could potentially be excluded was the portion in which Snyder interviewed appellant after attempting to read him his rights. The only answers that might be potentially incriminating were those related to whether appellant had been drinking and in which appellant stated he had consumed one beer the night before. 8 the trial court limited appellant to inquiring as to Dunlap’s opinion as of the date of the offense. Dunlap then testified that up until October 2001, he always believed Castillo was truthful. Dunlap then testified that his opinion had changed since then “in certain regards.” The State objected, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard that answer. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in limiting Dunlap’s opinion testimony to the date of appellant’s arrest and in instructing the jury to disregard his answer that his opinion had changed “[i]n certain regards.” Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Johnson to testify as to his opinion of Castillo’s truthfulness. We review a trial court’s decision to exclude testimony for an abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Patton v. State, 25 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d). We will not reverse a trial court’s exclusion of testimony unless that decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 102; Patton, 25 S.W.3d at 394. Any party may attack a witness’s credibility. Tex. R. Evid. 607. A witness’s credibility may be attacked by way of opinion or reputation evidence, but such evidence “may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Id. R. 608(a). Unless a witness has been convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, a witness’s specific acts may not be used to attack the witness’s credibility through cross-examination or extrinsic evidence. Id. R. 608(b); 609(a); see Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d). A witness’s credibility may be attacked by testimony about a witness’s reputation for veracity or opinion testimony. Tex. R. Evid. 405(a). 9 Johnson testified that he became Chief of Police only about one month before trial. He did not testify as to any other experience he had with the New Braunfels Police Department or Castillo. He stated he had known Castillo for about ten days and had only spoken to him a few times during the investigation. We cannot hold that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Johnson’s testimony about Castillo, whom he had known for less than one month. See Garza v. State, 18 S.W.3d 813, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d). Appellant complains that the trial court wrongly limited Dunlap’s testimony to what his opinion was as to Castillo’s truthfulness as of the date Castillo stopped appellant and wrongly excluded Dunlap’s statement that his opinion of Castillo’s veracity had changed. However, appellant did not seek to have Dunlap’s testimony included in the record outside of the jury’s presence, nor does a review of the record indicate that appellant was barred from being allowed to establish Dunlap’s qualification to testify as to Castillo’s reputation. We do not believe that on this record appellant has shown that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in limiting Dunlap’s testimony as his opinion of Castillo’s truthfulness. Even if we assume the trial court erred in refusing to allow Johnson’s and in limiting Dunlap’s testimony, appellant has not shown that such errors had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant contends that if Dunlap and Johnson had been able to give their full testimony, the jury might have had doubts about Castillo’s testimony and thus might have “been compelled to disregard all evidence following the traffic stop.” However, Castillo testified that the only reason he stopped appellant was the information he received from Erik Johnson via the police 10 dispatcher. He did not testify that he stopped appellant after observing any kind of traffic violation. Appellant moved to suppress all evidence arising from the stop, arguing that the stop was illegal because it was based solely on information provided by an informant, not on Castillo’s observation of some kind of offense or suspicious behavior. The trial court overruled appellant’s motion and appellant does not complain on appeal of the trial court’s refusal to suppress the evidence arising from the traffic stop. Castillo’s testimony that appellant smelled of alcohol and behaved as if he was intoxicated was reiterated by the other officers who testified. The only testimony that was not confirmed by other evidence was Castillo’s testimony that he stopped appellant based on the police dispatcher’s information alone. We fail to see how allowing extensive attacks on the veracity of such testimony would have benefitted appellant. Had there been testimony that Castillo himself saw appellant driving erratically or breaking the traffic rules, an attack on such testimony might have benefitted appellant. However, in this case, Erik Johnson testified that he called the police to report erratic driving, providing a description of the truck and its location and the number of the license plate. An audiotape of that call was played for the jury. Appellant does not contest that the license plate number provided was his licence plate. Two other officers testified that appellant appeared to be intoxicated, and appellant himself testified that he had consumed about a dozen beers on the evening he was stopped. Allowing testimony to attack Castillo’s truthfulness related to his decision to stop appellant, which was admittedly made solely on the information provided by Erik Johnson and broadcast by the police dispatcher, would not have aided appellant. Appellant’s substantial rights were not harmed by any error that may have occurred when the trial court limited and excluded Dunlap’s and Johnson’s 11 testimony as to Castillo’s reputation for veracity. We overrule appellant’s second and third issues on appeal. Having overruled appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. ___________________________________________ Mack Kidd, Justice Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Puryear Affirmed Filed: September 25, 2003 Do Not Publish 12
sv	wikipedia	N/A	Saltå är en by belägen strax öster om Järna, söder om Södertälje i Överjärna socken i Södertälje kommun. Sedan 1964 är Saltå Kvarn en biodynamisk kvarn med bageri. Orten var till och med år 2000 klassad som en småort. 2015 avgränsade SCB här åter en småort. Bilder Referenser Externa länkar Kristofferuskyrkan Saltå kvarn Föreningen Saltå By (lokal webbplats) Orter i Södertälje kommun Järna Småorter i Sverige
pt	wikipedia	N/A	Paulo Cardoso Correia da Mota Pinto (Coimbra, 18 de Novembro de 1966) é um jurista, professor e político português e ex-Presidente do grupo parlamentar do Partido Social Democrata. Atualmente, é deputado à Assembleia da República pelo o PSD nas Eleições Legislativas de 2022, pelo círculo eleitoral do distrito do Leiria e também é Presidente da Assembleia Municipal de Pombal. Biografia Licenciado em Direito, mestre e doutor em Ciências Jurídico-Civilísticas, iniciou a sua atividade docente em 1990, sendo professor da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra. Como jurisconsulto integrou a Comissão para a Reforma do Direito do Consumo e para o Código do Consumidor, desde 1996, e do Grupo de Peritos nomeado em 2010 pela Comissão Europeia para rever o Projeto de Quadro Comum de Referência sobre Direito dos Contratos, até 2011. Publicou ampla obra jurídica, sobretudo no campo do Direito Civil e dos direitos fundamentais, e participou em anteprojetos legislativos sobre a venda de bens de consumo, a publicidade domiciliária indesejada ou os direitos da personalidade (no Código Civil de Macau). Foi ainda membro da Comissão de Auditoria da ZON e é atualmente presidente do Conselho Fiscal da NOS. Foi Juiz Conselheiro do Tribunal Constitucional, eleito pela Assembleia da República, entre 1998 e 2007. Militante do Partido Social-Democrata, destacou-se no período de liderança de Manuela Ferreira Leite, de quem foi mandatário na candidatura da antiga Ministra das Finanças à presidência do partido, em abril de 2008; assumindo em seguida uma das vice-presidências da Comissão Política Nacional, entre 2008 e 2010. Foi o redator do programa eleitoral com que o PSD se apresentou às legislativas de 2009, intitulado Compromisso de Verdade. Eleito deputado à Assembleia da República, nas legislativas de 2009, após encabeçar a candidatura do PSD no círculo eleitoral de Coimbra, exerceu até ao fim da legislatura de 2009-2011 o cargo de presidente da Comissão Parlamentar de Orçamento e Finanças. Na legislatura iniciada em 2011 seria reeleito deputado, desta vez pelo círculo eleitoral de Lisboa, exercendo a função de presidente da Comissão de Assuntos Europeus da Assembleia da República. Em 2011 integrou a Comissão Política da recandidatura de Cavaco Silva à Presidência da República. É Atualmente Presidente da Assembleia Municipal de Pombal. Paulo Mota Pinto é filho de Carlos Alberto da Mota Pinto e de sua mulher, Maria Fernanda Cardoso Correia. Resultados Eleitorais Eleições Legislativas Eleições Autárquicas Assembleia Municipal Naturais de Coimbra Juristas de Portugal Professores da Universidade de Coimbra Juízes Conselheiros do Tribunal Constitucional de Portugal Professores da Universidade Nova de Lisboa Políticos do Partido Social Democrata (Portugal) Deputados da Assembleia da República Portuguesa
de	wikipedia	N/A	Black Throat ist ein amerikanischer Pornofilm des Regisseurs Gregory Dark aus dem Jahr 1985. Der Film wurde 1986 bei den XRCO Awards als „Best Video“ ausgezeichnet. Er wird als Hardcore-Pop-Trash-Streifen aus den 1980er Jahren bezeichnet und beinhaltet Interracial- und Anal-Szenen. Handlung Der Film beginnt mit einer Szene, in der Tony Martino im Müll nach Essbarem sucht. Er spricht mit seinem Freund Mr. Bob, einer Figur, die eine Ratte darstellt. Er findet eine Karte, die Tony verwirrt, da er nicht weiß, was Fellatio ist. Die Ratte ruft nach Debbie, um es ihm zu zeigen. Dies ist die Szene, in der normalerweise Traci Lords hereinkam. Stattdessen beginnt in der Neufassung des Films die Suche nach Madame Mambo mit der Hilfe des Zuhälters Jamal, der denkt, dass diese Tony helfen kann. In der ersten Sexszene ist dann Kevin James mit den beiden Darstellerinnen Purple Passion und Lady Stephanie zu sehen. Danach folgt eine Szene mit Erica Boyer, Marc Wallice und Steve Powers gefolgt von einer Szene mit der Dominatrix (Christy Canyon) und einem Sklaven (Peter North). Im Anschluss sind drei weitere Szenen zu sehen. Auszeichnungen 1986: XRCO Award – Best Video 2005: XRCO Award Hall of Fame Wissenswertes Traci Lords hatte zwei Szenen im Film, die allerdings nachträglich entfernt wurden, als sich herausstellte, dass sie zum Zeitpunkt des Drehs erst 16 Jahre alt und damit noch minderjährig war. Obwohl ihre Szenen entfernt wurden, wurde ihr Name in der Titelmelodie zu Beginn und Ende des Films beibehalten. Weblinks Filmtitel 1985 Pornofilm US-amerikanischer Film
en	contracts	US	UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-Q [X]Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 or []Transition Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Commission File Number: 1-7784 CenturyTel, Inc. (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) Louisiana 72-0651161 (State or other jurisdiction of (I.R.S. Employer incorporation or organization) Identification No.) 100 CenturyTel Drive, Monroe, Louisiana 71203 (Address of principal executive offices)(Zip Code) Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (318) 388-9000 Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.Yes [X] No [] Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, or a non-accelerated filer.See definition of “accelerated filer and large accelerated filer” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. (Check one): Large accelerated filer [X] Accelerated filer [] Non-accelerated filer [] Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act).Yes []No [X] As of July 31, 2007, there were108,218,198 shares of common stock outstanding. CenturyTel, Inc. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Part I. Financial Information: Item 1. Financial Statements Consolidated Statements of IncomeThree Months and Six Months Ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 3 Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income Three Months and Six Months Ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 4 Consolidated Balance SheetsJune 30, 2007 and December 31, 2006 5 Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows Six Months Ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 6 Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity Six Months Ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 7 Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements* 8-15 Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 16-23 Item 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk 24 Item 4. Controls and Procedures 25 Part II. Other Information Item 1. Legal Proceedings 26 Item 2. Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds 26 Item 4. Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders 26-27 Item 6. Exhibits and Reports on Form 8-K 27-28 Signature 28 * All references to “Notes” in this quarterly report refer to these Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. PART I. FINANCIAL INFORMATION Item 1. Financial Statements CenturyTel, Inc. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME (UNAUDITED) Three months Six months ended June 30, ended June 30, 2007 2006 2007 2006 (Dollars, except per share amounts, and shares in thousands) OPERATING REVENUES $ 689,991 608,907 1,290,846 1,220,198 OPERATING EXPENSES Cost of services and products (exclusive of depreciation and amortization) 226,388 216,191 439,919 438,746 Selling, general and administrative 97,456 95,596 188,913 191,536 Depreciation and amortization 134,311 132,127 262,095 266,999 Total operating expenses 458,155 443,914 890,927 897,281 OPERATING INCOME 231,836 164,993 399,919 322,917 OTHER INCOME (EXPENSE) Interest expense (57,667 ) (50,639 ) (104,628 ) (100,725 ) Other income (expense) 8,080 123,459 13,370 128,056 Total other income (expense) (49,587 ) 72,820 (91,258 ) 27,331 INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAX EXPENSE 182,249 237,813 308,661 350,248 Income tax expense 69,984 85,603 118,526 128,778 NET INCOME $ 112,265 152,210 190,135 221,470 BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE $ 1.03 1.32 1.73 1.86 DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE $ 1.00 1.26 1.67 1.79 DIVIDENDS PER COMMON SHARE $ .065 .0625 .13 .125 AVERAGE BASIC SHARES OUTSTANDING 108,405 115,441 109,718 118,917 AVERAGE DILUTED SHARES OUTSTANDING 113,721 121,636 115,015 124,798 See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements. CenturyTel, Inc. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME (UNAUDITED) Three months ended June 30, Six months ended June 30, 2007 2006 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) NET INCOME $ 112,265 152,210 190,135 221,470 OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME, NET OF TAX: Minimum pension liability adjustment, net of$799 and ($25) tax - 1,282 - (41 ) Unrealized gain (loss) on investments, net of $355, ($133), $304 and ($92) tax 570 (213 ) 488 (148 ) Derivative instruments: Net loss on derivatives hedging the variability of cash flows, net of $294 tax - - 471 - Reclassification adjustment for losses included in net income, net of $61, $59, $120 and $117 tax 99 94 193 188 Items related to employee benefit plans: Change in net actuarial loss, net of $5,755 and $5,973 tax 9,233 - 9,582 - Amortization of net actuarial loss, net of $908 and $1,815 tax 1,456 - 2,912 - Amortization of net prior service credit, net of ($178) and ($356) tax (285 ) - (571 ) - Amortization of unrecognized transition asset, net of ($14) and ($28) tax (22 ) - (44 ) - Net change in other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax 11,051 1,163 13,031 (1 ) COMPREHENSIVE INCOME $ 123,316 153,373 203,166 221,469 Reflected in 2007 due to the December 31, 2006 adoption of SFAS 158. See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements. CenturyTel, Inc. CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (UNAUDITED) June 30, December 31, 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) ASSETS CURRENT ASSETS Cash and cash equivalents $ 43,525 25,668 Accounts receivable, less allowance of $19,773 and $20,905 214,810 227,346 Materials and supplies, at average cost 6,977 6,628 Other 29,094 30,475 Total current assets 294,406 290,117 NET PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT Property, plant and equipment 8,560,266 7,893,760 Accumulated depreciation (5,355,716 ) (4,784,483 ) Net property, plant and equipment 3,204,550 3,109,277 GOODWILL AND OTHER ASSETS Goodwill 3,999,526 3,431,136 Other 775,054 610,477 Total goodwill and other assets 4,774,580 4,041,613 TOTAL ASSETS $ 8,273,536 7,441,007 LIABILITIES AND EQUITY CURRENT LIABILITIES Current maturities of long-term debt $ 424,307 155,012 Short-term debt 87,000 23,000 Accounts payable 135,185 129,350 Accrued expenses and other liabilities Salaries and benefits 57,749 54,100 Income taxes 22,143 60,522 Other taxes 60,038 46,890 Interest 83,704 73,725 Other 32,735 23,352 Advance billings and customer deposits 57,413 51,614 Total current liabilities 960,274 617,565 LONG-TERM DEBT 2,735,073 2,412,852 DEFERRED CREDITS AND OTHER LIABILITIES 1,441,155 1,219,639 STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY Common stock, $1.00 par value, authorized 350,000,000 shares, issued and outstanding 108,201,274 and 113,253,889 shares 108,201 113,254 Paid-in capital 81,666 24,256 Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of tax (91,911 ) (104,942 ) Retained earnings 3,031,639 3,150,933 Preferred stock - non-redeemable 7,439 7,450 Total stockholders’ equity 3,137,034 3,190,951 TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY $ 8,273,536 7,441,007 See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements. CenturyTel, Inc. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS (UNAUDITED) Six months ended June 30, 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) OPERATING ACTIVITIES Net income $ 190,135 221,470 Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided by operating activities: Depreciation and amortization 262,095 266,999 Gain on asset dispositions - (118,649 ) Deferred income taxes 30,005 22,151 Changes in current assets and current liabilities: Accounts receivable 24,316 21,641 Accounts payable 1,106 (2,707 ) Accrued income and other taxes 27,071 (28,113 ) Other current assets and other current liabilities, net 18,342 8,719 Retirement benefits 14,647 14,926 Excess tax benefits from share-based compensation (6,312 ) (4,947 ) Decrease in other noncurrent assets 3,653 297 Increase (decrease) in other noncurrent liabilities (11,667 ) 2,286 Other, net 4,634 2,244 Net cash provided by operating activities 558,025 406,317 INVESTING ACTIVITIES Acquisitions, net of cash acquired (307,424 ) - Payments for property, plant and equipment (106,856 ) (130,455 ) Proceeds from redemption of Rural Telephone Bank stock - 122,819 Proceeds from sale of assets - 5,865 Investment in unconsolidated cellular entity - (5,222 ) Other, net 1,523 (1,296 ) Net cash used in investing activities (412,757 ) (8,289 ) FINANCING ACTIVITIES Payments of debt (667,132 ) (12,559 ) Net proceeds from issuance of long-term debt 741,840 - Net proceeds from the issuance of short-term debt 64,000 - Proceeds from issuance of common stock 42,292 41,206 Repurchase of common stock (302,033 ) (573,888 ) Cash dividends (14,480 ) (14,661 ) Excess tax benefits from share-based compensation 6,312 4,947 Other, net 1,790 (150 ) Net cash used in financing activities (127,411 ) (555,105 ) Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents 17,857 (157,077 ) Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period 25,668 158,846 Cash and cash equivalents at end of period $ 43,525 1,769 Supplemental cash flow information: Income taxes paid $ 72,928 132,666 Interest paid (net of capitalized interest of $522 and $1,005) $ 96,227 96,562 See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements. CenturyTel, Inc. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY (UNAUDITED) Six months ended June 30, 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) COMMON STOCK Balance at beginning of period $ 113,254 131,074 Issuance of common stock through dividend reinvestment, incentive and benefit plans and other 1,552 1,740 Repurchase of common stock (6,606 ) (16,523 ) Conversion of preferred stock into common stock 1 10 Balance at end of period 108,201 116,301 PAID-IN CAPITAL Balance at beginning of period 24,256 129,806 Issuance of common stock through dividend reinvestment, incentive and benefit plans 40,740 39,466 Repurchase of common stock - (71,362 ) Conversion of preferred stock into common stock 10 179 Excess tax benefits from share-based compensation 6,312 4,947 Share-based compensation and other 10,348 4,891 Balance at end of period 81,666 107,927 ACCUMULATED OTHER COMPREHENSIVE LOSS, NET OF TAX Balance at beginning of period (104,942 ) (9,619 ) Change in other comprehensive loss, net of tax 13,031 (1 ) Balance at end of period (91,911 ) (9,620 ) RETAINED EARNINGS Balance at beginning of period 3,150,933 3,358,162 Net income 190,135 221,793 Repurchase of common stock (295,427 ) (486,003 ) Cumulative effect of adoption of FIN 48 (see Note 7) 478 - Cash dividends declared Common stock - $.13 and $.125 per share, respectively (14,294 ) (14,467 ) Preferred stock (186 ) (194 ) Balance at end of period 3,031,639 3,079,291 PREFERRED STOCK - NON-REDEEMABLE Balance at beginning of period 7,450 7,850 Conversion of preferred stock into common stock (11 ) (189 ) Balance at end of period 7,439 7,661 TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY $ 3,137,034 3,301,560 See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements. CenturyTel, Inc. NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS JUNE 30, 2007 (UNAUDITED) (1) Basis of Financial Reporting Our consolidated financial statements include the accounts of CenturyTel, Inc. and its majority-owned subsidiaries.Certain information and footnote disclosures normally included in financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles have been condensed or omitted pursuant to rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission; however, in the opinion of management, the disclosures made are adequate to make the information presented not misleading. The consolidated financial statements and footnotes included in this Form 10-Q should be read in conjunction with the consolidated financial statements and notes thereto included in our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006. The financial information for the three months and six months ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 has not been audited by independent certified public accountants; however, in the opinion of management, all adjustments necessary to present fairly the results of operations for the three-month and six-month periods have been included therein.The results of operations for the first six months of the year are not necessarily indicative of the results of operations which might be expected for the entire year. During the fourth quarter of 2006, in accordance with Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108, “Considering the Effect of Prior Year Misstatements when Quantifying Misstatements in Current Year Financial Results” (“SAB 108”), we identified two misstatements that previously were deemed immaterial using the income statement approach that were deemed material upon application of the balance sheet approach.We recorded the cumulative effect of such adjustments as an adjustment to retained earnings (as of January 1, 2006). We have adjusted our results of operations for the first three quarters of 2006 to reflect the ongoing application of the adjustments recorded pursuant to SAB 108.Such adjustments were immaterial to each quarter.For additional information, see our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006. (2) Acquisition On April 30, 2007, we acquired all of the outstanding stock of Madison River Communications Corp. (“Madison River”) from Madison River Telephone Company, LLC for an initial aggregate purchase price of $322 million cash.In connection with the acquisition, we also paid all of Madison River’s existing indebtedness (including accrued interest), which approximated $522 million.Madison River operates approximately 164,000 predominantly rural access lines in four states with more than 30% high-speed Internet penetration and its network includes access to a 2,400 route mile fiber network. We are accounting for the acquisition of Madison River as a purchase under the guidance of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141, “Business Combinations” (“SFAS 141”) and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 71, “Accounting for the Effects of Certain Types of Regulation” (“SFAS 71”).SFAS 141 requires us to record the assets acquired and liabilities assumed at their respective fair values.In accordance with SFAS 71, we recorded the fixed assets of Madison River’s regulated telephone operations at historical book value since those values are used to develop the rates we charge to our customers (which are approved by regulatory authorities). We have reflected the results of operations of the Madison River properties in our consolidated results of operations beginning May 1, 2007. The total cost of the Madison River acquisition through June 30, 2007 is composed of the following components (amounts in thousands): Cash paid at closing (1) $ 322,187 Closing costs (2) 5,217 Total purchase price $ 327,404 (1)Excludes the cash payment of $671,000 we received in accordance with the purchase agreement subsequent to June 30, 2007 upon finalization of the working capital portion of the purchase price. (2)Closing costs primarily consist of advisory and legal fees incurred in connection with the acquisition. The values assigned to the assets acquired and liabilities assumed at acquisition are based on a preliminary purchase price allocation.The final allocation of the purchase price will be based on values as determined by an independent third-party valuation, which we expect will be completed by the end of third quarter 2007.The actual valuation may differ significantly from the preliminary allocation.The purchase price has been allocated to the assets acquired and liabilities assumed on a preliminary basis as follows (amounts in thousands): Current assets (1) $ 33,761 Net property, plant and equipment 242,822 Identifiable intangible assets Customer list 148,800 Goodwill 568,390 Other assets 9,827 Current liabilities (2) (22,200 ) Long-term debt (2) (520,000 ) Deferred income taxes (111,174 ) Other liabilities (22,822 ) Total purchase price $ 327,404 (1) Includes approximately $20.0 million of acquired cash and cash equivalents. (2) We paid all the long-term debt and $2.2 million of related accrued interest (included in “current liabilities” in the above table) immediately after closing. (3) Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets Goodwill and other intangible assets as of June 30, 2007 and December 31, 2006 were composed of the following: June 30, Dec. 31, 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) Goodwill $ 3,999,526 3,431,136 Intangible assets subject to amortization Customer base Gross carrying amount $ 173,894 25,094 Accumulated amortization (9,858 ) (7,022 ) Net carrying amount $ 164,036 18,072 Contract rights Gross carrying amount $ 4,186 4,186 Accumulated amortization (4,186 ) (3,256 ) Net carrying amount $ - 930 Intangible asset not subject to amortization $ 36,690 36,690 Goodwill and intangible assets increased in 2007 due to the Madison River acquisition. Total amortization expense related to the intangible assets subject to amortization for the first six months of 2007 was $3.8 million and is expected to be $10.6 million in 2007 and $13.7 million annually thereafter through 2011.Such amortization expense includes estimates based on a preliminary purchase price allocation for the Madison River acquisition, which may differ significantly from the final allocation. See Note 2. (4) Postretirement Benefits We sponsor health care plans that provide postretirement benefits to all qualified retired employees. Net periodic postretirement benefit cost for the three months and six months ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 included the following components: Three months Six months ended June 30, ended June 30, 2007 2006 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) Service cost $ 1,732 1,783 3,450 3,491 Interest cost 5,039 4,846 10,057 9,490 Expected return on plan assets (620 ) (623 ) (1,241 ) (1,219 ) Amortization of unrecognized actuarial loss 899 950 1,798 1,860 Amortization of unrecognized prior service cost (505 ) (221 ) (1,010 ) (433 ) Net periodic postretirement benefit cost $ 6,545 6,735 13,054 13,189 We contributed $6.4 million to our postretirement health care plan in the first six months of 2007 and expect to contribute approximately $13 million for the full year. (5) Defined Benefit Retirement Plans We sponsor defined benefit pension plans for substantially all employees.We also sponsor a Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan to provide certain officers with supplemental retirement, death and disability benefits. Net periodic pension expense for the three months and six months ended June 30, 2007 and 2006 included the following components: Three months Six months ended June 30, ended June 30, 2007 2006 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) Service cost $ 4,609 4,220 9,226 8,483 Interest cost 7,071 6,160 13,976 12,377 Expected return on plan assets (9,170 ) (8,183 ) (18,219 ) (16,367 ) Recognized net losses 291 1,962 556 3,840 Net amortization and deferral 1,301 (123 ) 3,260 6 Net periodic pension expense $ 4,102 4,036 8,799 8,339 The amount of the 2007 contribution to our pension plans will be determined based on a number of factors, including the results of the 2007 actuarial valuation.At this time, the amount of the 2007 contribution is not known. (6) Stock-based Compensation Effective January 1, 2006, we adopted the provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (Revised 2004), “Share-Based Payments” (“SFAS 123(R)”).SFAS 123(R) requires us to recognize as compensation expense our cost of awarding employees with equity instruments by allocating the fair value of the award on the grant date over the period during which the employee is required to provide service in exchange for the award. We currently maintain programs which allow the Board of Directors, through the Compensation Committee, to grant incentives to certain employees and our outside directors in any one or a combination of several forms, including incentive and non-qualified stock options; stock appreciation rights; restricted stock; and performance shares.As of June 30, 2007, we had reserved approximately 6.2 million shares of common stock which may be issued in connection with outstanding incentive awards under our current incentive programs.We also offer an Employee Stock Purchase Plan whereby employees can purchase our common stock at a 15% discount based on the lower of the beginning or ending stock price during recurring six-month periods stipulated in such program. Stock option awards are generally granted with an exercise price equal to the market price of CenturyTel’s shares at the date of grant.Our outstanding options generally have a three-year vesting period and all of them expire ten years after the date of grant.The fair value of each stock option award is estimated as of the date of grant using a Black-Scholes option pricing model.During the first six months of 2007, 948,920 options were granted with a weighted average exercise price of $48.50 per share and a weighted average grant date fair value of $14.67 per share. As of June 30, 2007, outstanding and exercisable stock options were as follows: Average remaining Aggregate Number Average contractual intrinsic of options price term (in years) value Outstanding 3,680,843 $ 36.70 7.2 $ 45,450,000 Exercisable 2,104,158 $ 32.83 5.7 $ 34,129,000 Our outstanding restricted stock awards generally vest over a five-year period (for employees) and a three-year period (for outside directors).As of June 30, 2007, there were 864,895 shares of nonvested restricted stock outstanding at an average grant date fair value of $36.91 per share. The total compensation cost for all share-based payment arrangements for the first six months of 2007 and 2006 was $10.3 million and $6.0 million, respectively.As of June 30, 2007, there was $38.8 million of total unrecognized compensation cost related to the share-based payment arrangements, which is expected to be recognized over a weighted-average period of 3.2 years. (7) Income Tax Uncertainties In June 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Interpretation No. 48, “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes” (“FIN 48”), which clarifies the accounting for uncertainty in income taxes recognized in financial statements.FIN 48 requires us, effective January 1, 2007, to recognize and measure tax benefits taken or expected to be taken in a tax return and disclose uncertainties in income tax positions. Upon the initial adoption of FIN 48, we recorded a cumulative effect adjustment to retained earnings as of January 1, 2007 (which increased retained earnings by approximately $478,000 as of such date) related to certain previously recognized liabilities that did not meet the criteria for recognition upon the adoption of FIN 48. As of January 1, 2007, we had approximately $55.9 million of unrecognized tax benefits reflected on our balance sheet, substantially all of which is included as a component of “Deferred credits and other liabilities”.Such amount was reflected in “Accrued income taxes” as of December 31, 2006.As of June 30, 2007, we had approximately $57.7 million of unrecognized tax benefits reflected on our balance sheet, which includes approximately $6.5 million allocated on a preliminary basis to unrecognized tax benefits in connection with our Madison River acquisition.If we were to prevail on all unrecognized tax benefits recorded on our balance sheet, approximately $49.0 million would benefit the effective tax rate. Our policy is to reflect interest and penalties associated with unrecognized tax benefits as income tax expense.We had accrued interest and penalties (presented before related tax benefits) of approximately $20.7 million as of January 1, 2007 and $27.8 million as of June 30, 2007. We file income tax returns, including returns for our subsidiaries, with federal, state and local jurisdictions.Our uncertain income tax positions are related to tax years that are currently under or remain subject to examination by the relevant taxing authorities.Our open income tax years by major jurisdiction are as follows. Jurisdiction Open tax years Federal 1998-current State Georgia 2002-current Louisiana 1997-current Minnesota 2001-current Montana 2000-current Oregon 2001-current Wisconsin 2001-current All other states 2002-current Additionally, it is possible that certain jurisdictions in which we do not believe we have an income tax filing responsibility, and accordingly did not file a return, may attempt to assess a liability.Since the period for assessing additional liability typically begins upon the filing of a return, it is possible that certain jurisdictions could assess tax for years prior to 2002. Based on (i) the potential outcomes of these ongoing examinations, (ii) the expiration of statute of limitations for specific jurisdictions, (iii) the negotiated settlement of certain disputed issues, or (iv) a jurisdiction’s administrative practices, it is reasonably possible that the related unrecognized tax benefits for tax positions previously taken may materially change within the next 12 months.However, based on the status of such examinations and the protocol of finalizing audits by the relevant tax authorities (which could include formal legal proceedings), we do not believe it is possible to reasonably estimate the amount or range of the impact of such changes, if any, at this time. (8) Debt Offerings On March 29, 2007, we publicly issued $500 million of 6.0% Senior Notes, Series N, due 2017 and $250 million of 5.5% Senior Notes, Series O, due 2013.Our $741.8 million of net proceeds from the sale of these Senior Notes were used to pay a substantial portion of the approximately $844 million of cash that was needed in order to (i) pay the purchase price for the acquisition of Madison River on April 30, 2007 ($322 million) and (ii) pay off Madison River’s existing indebtedness (including accrued interest) at closing ($522 million).We funded the remainder of these cash outflows from borrowings under our commercial paper program and cash on hand.See Note 2 for additional information concerning the acquisition of Madison River. In anticipation of the debt offerings mentioned above, we had previously entered into four cash flow hedges that effectively locked in the interest rate on an aggregate of $400 million of debt.We locked in the interest rate on (i) $200 million of 10-year debt at 5.0675% and (ii) $200 million of 10-year debt at 5.05%.In March 2007, upon settlement of the hedges, we received an aggregate of $765,000 (reflected in “Accumulated other comprehensive loss” on the balance sheet), which is being amortized as a reduction of interest expense over the 10-year term of the debt. (9) Business Segments We are an integrated communications company engaged primarily in providing an array of communications services to our customers, including local exchange, long distance, Internet access and broadband services.We strive to maintain our customer relationships by, among other things, bundling our service offerings to provide our customers with a complete offering of integrated communications services.Our operating revenues for our products and services include the following components: Three months ended June 30, Six months ended June 30, 2007 2006 2007 2006 (Dollars in thousands) Voice $ 219,803 216,485 428,878 433,499 Network access 266,202 221,663 477,601 446,986 Data 108,206 84,447 204,070 167,685 Fiber transport and CLEC 40,714 36,051 79,040 71,831 Other 55,066 50,261 101,257 100,197 Total operating revenues $ 689,991 608,907 1,290,846 1,220,198 We derive our voice revenues by providing local exchange telephone and retail long distance services to our customers in our local exchange service areas. We derive our network access revenues primarily from (i) providing services to various carriers and customers in connection with the use of our facilities to originate and terminate their interstate and intrastate voice and data transmissions and (ii) receiving universal support funds which allows us to recover a portion of our costs under federal and state cost recovery mechanisms.In March 2006, we filed a complaint against a carrier for recovery of unpaid and underpaid access charges for calls made using the carrier’s prepaid calling cards and calls that used Internet Protocol for a portion of their transmission.The carrier filed a counterclaim against us, asserting that we improperly billed them terminating intrastate access charges on certain wireless roaming traffic.In April 2007, we entered into a settlement agreement with the carrier and received approximately $49 million cash from them related to the issues described above.This amount is reflected in our second quarter 2007 results of operations as a component of “Network access” revenues. We derive our data revenues primarily by providing Internet access services (both high-speed (“DSL”) and dial-up services) and data transmission services over special circuits and private lines in our local exchange service areas. Our fiber transport and CLEC revenues include revenues from our fiber transport, competitive local exchange carrier and security monitoring businesses. We derive other revenues primarily by (i) leasing, selling, installing and maintaining customer premise telecommunications equipment and wiring, (ii) providing billing and collection services for third parties, (iii) participating in the publication of local directories and (iv) offering our video and wireless services, as well as other new product offerings. (10) Gain on Asset Dispositions In April 2006, upon dissolution of the Rural Telephone Bank (“RTB”), we received $122.8 million in cash for redemption of our investment in stock of the RTB and recorded a pre-tax gain of approximately $117.8 million in the second quarter of 2006 related to this transaction.We used the cash to reduce our indebtedness. In May 2006, we sold the assets of our local exchange operations in Arizona for approximately $5.9 million cash and recorded a pre-tax gain of approximately $866,000 in the second quarter of 2006. (11) Recent Accounting Pronouncement In June 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued EITF 06-3, “How Taxes Collected From Customers and Remitted to Governmental Authorities Should be Presented in the Income Statement” (“EITF 06-3”), which requires disclosure of the accounting policy for any tax assessed by a governmental authority that is directly imposed on a revenue-producing transaction.We adopted the disclosure requirements of EITF 06-3 effective January 1, 2007. We collect various taxes from our customers and subsequently remit such funds to governmental authorities.Substantially all of these taxes are recorded through the balance sheet.We are required to contribute to several universal service fund programs and generally include a surcharge amount on our customers’ bills which is designed to recover our contribution costs.Such amounts are reflected on a gross basis in our statement of income (included in both operating revenues and expenses) and aggregated approximately $20 million for both the six months ended June 30, 2007 and 2006. (12) Commitments and Contingencies In
de	wikipedia	N/A	Das Landschaftsschutzgebiet Kulturlandschaftskomplex Nordenau - Nesselbach mit 112,8 ha Größe liegt im Stadtgebiet von Schmallenberg. Das Gebiet wurde 2008 vom Kreistag des Hochsauerlandkreises mit dem Landschaftsplan Schmallenberg Nordwest als Landschaftsschutzgebiet (LSG) ausgewiesen. Das LSG ist eines von 71 Landschaftsschutzgebieten vom Typ B, Ortsrandlage, Landschaftscharakter im Stadtgebiet von Schmallenberg. Im Stadtgebiet gibt es auch zwei Landschaftsschutzgebiete vom Typ A (Allgemeiner Landschaftsschutz) und 58 Landschaftsschutzgebiete vom Typ C (Wiesentäler und bedeutsames Extensivgrünland) mit anderen Auflagen. Das LSG besteht aus zehn Teilflächen. Das LSG geht bis an den Siedlungsrand von Nordenau und Nesselbach. Es handelt sich um Offenlandbereiche mit Grünland. Schutzzweck Die Ausweisung erfolgte zur Sicherung der Vielfalt und Eigenart der Landschaft im Nahbereich der Ortslagen und der alten landwirtschaftlichen Vorranggebiete durch Offenhaltung. Rechtliche Vorschriften Wie in den anderen Landschaftsschutzgebieten vom Typ B in Schmallenberg besteht im LSG ein Verbot der Erstaufforstung und Weihnachtsbaum-, Schmuckreisig- und Baumschul-Kulturen anzulegen. Wie in allen Landschaftsplangebieten vom Typ B im Stadtgebiet von Schmallenberg besteht das Gebot, das LSG durch landwirtschaftliche Nutzung oder durch Pflegemaßnahmen von einer Bewaldung freizuhalten. Siehe auch Liste der Landschaftsschutzgebiete im Hochsauerlandkreis Literatur Hochsauerlandkreis – Untere Landschaftsbehörde: Landschaftsplan Schmallenberg Nordwest. Meschede 2008, S. 49 ff. Kulturlandschaftskomplex Nordenau - Nesselbach
es	wikipedia	N/A	«Sunday Sunday» —en español: «Domingo domingo»— es una canción de la banda británica rock alternativo Blur, incluida en su segundo álbum, Modern Life Is Rubbish. Fue lanzada el 4 de octubre de 1993 como el sencillo final de ese álbum, y se ubicó en el número 26 en la UK Singles Chart. Este es el más alto sencillo del álbum en las listas (aunque es el sencillo de menor venta del álbum); la compañía discográfica pensó que el álbum original no contenía singles, e hizo que la banda escribiera los otros dos singles específicamente para el lanzamiento de un sencillo. El nombre original de la banda, 'Seymour', se acredita como artista invitado en el CD 1, debido a que los sides B son grabaciones de esa época. La canción trata sobre las actividades tradicionales de los domingos británicos, como un asado dominical, ver a la familia y un paseo por el parque. La canción "Daisy Bell" es un side B del CD 2. El cantante Damon Albarn mencionó una vez que le gustaría hacer música que sus abuelos aprobarían. Graham Coxon ha admitido que las versiones de "Daisy Bell" y "Let's All Go Down the Strand" marcaron uno de los peores momentos en la carrera de Blur. El CD 2 está subtitulado The Sunday Sunday Popular Community Song CD, lo que lo hace más bien como una reproducción extendida. Lados B Los sides B de "Sunday Sunday" (Blur con Seymour) son pistas inéditas de Blur en sus primeros días como Seymour, grabadas en 1989. Originalmente, "Dizzy", "Fried" y "Shimmer" solo estaban disponibles en el CD, con "Tell Me, Tell Me" solo disponible en el 7" y "Long Legged" y "Mixed Up" en el 12". En 1999, todos estos se compilaron en un disco en el boxset del décimo aniversario. La única canción de Seymour lanzada que no era un Blur con el side B "Sunday Sunday" de Seymour fue "Sing (to Me)", una versión anterior de "Sing", que salió como un sencillo de un club de fans en 2000. Las canciones no se incluyeron en la caja de Blur 21 que se lanzó en 2012, sino que se incluyeron versiones de prueba de ensayo de "Dizzy" y "Mixed Up" en Rarities One, que aparece en el set. El sencillo del CD 2 está subtitulado como "The Sunday Sunday Popular Community Song CD". Las canciones del CD son canciones music hall como "Daisy Bell" y "Let's All Go Down the Strand". Se grabó una cuarta canción, "For Old Times Sake", pero no se incluyó en el EP. Se desconoce por qué, pero posiblemente se eliminó (la grabación por completo). "Daisy Bell" y "Let's All Go Down the Strand" llegaron a la caja del décimo aniversario en 1999 y a la caja Blur 21 en 2012. Lista de canciones Toda la música compuesta por Blur, excepto donde se indique. 7'' vinilo "Sunday Sunday" (Albarn, Coxon, James, Rowntree; Lyrics by Albarn) – 2:37 "Tell Me, Tell Me" (featuring Seymour) – 3:37 12'' vinilo "Sunday Sunday" (Albarn, Coxon, James, Rowntree; Lyrics by Albarn) – 2:37 "Long Legged" (featuring Seymour) – 2:23 "Mixed Up" (featuring Seymour) – 3:01 CD1 (Blur featuring Seymour) "Sunday Sunday" (Albarn, Coxon, James, Rowntree; Lyrics by Albarn) – 2:37 "Dizzy" (featuring Seymour) – 3:24 "Fried" (featuring Seymour) – 2:34 "Shimmer" (featuring Seymour) – 4:40 CD2 (The Popular Community Song CD) "Sunday Sunday" (Albarn, Coxon, James, Rowntree; Lyrics by Albarn) – 2:37 "Daisy Bell" (Harry Dacre) – 2:48 "Let's All Go Down the Strand" (Murphy, Castling) – 3:42 Personal "Sunday Sunday" producido por Steve Lovell "Daisy Bell" y "Let's All Go Down the Strand" producidos por Blur "Dizzy", "Fried", "Shimmer", "Long Legged" y "Mixed Up" producidos por Graeme Holdaway y Blur "Tell Me, Tell Me" producido por Graeme Holdaway Banda Damon Albarn (cantante, letrista, teclados, órgano) Graham Coxon (guitarra) Alex James (bajo) Dave Rowntree (batería) The Kick Horns (metales, solo "Sunday Sunday") Listas Referencias Enlaces externos Sencillos de 1993 Canciones de Blur Canciones escritas por Damon Albarn Canciones de 1993
bg	wikipedia	N/A	Зелената гълъбка (Russula virescens) е вид базидиева гъба от род Гълъбки. В България е добре разпространена и популярна, тъй като плодното тяло е голямо, лесно се разпознава от други гъби и е ядливо. Описание на вида Отначало гуглата е сплескана, с тъмно зелена кожица без пукнатини. Скоро гуглата се разтваря. Тогава кожицата се пропуква откъм ръба на гуглата и отделените зелени парцалчета сформират концентрични кръгове върху бял или бледо сив фон. Често кожицата в центъра остава невредима. Цветът на кожицата варира от бледо до тъмно зелен. Гуглата е вдлъбната в центъра. Ръбът е целокраен. Месото е твърдо и крехко, с приятен вкус и без миризма. Пластинките са бели до кремави и сгъстени. Не са сраснали с пънчето. Споровият прашец е бял, а индивидуалните спори са безцветни. Пънчето е бяло, цилиндрично, твърдо, крехко, чупливо и пълномесесто. Пръстенче и калъфче около основата липсват. Месторастене и събиране Само в широколистни гори, но се среща и в смесени, върху богата почва. Обича дъб и бук и се среща поединично или на малки групички. Не обича директната светлина. Среща се рядко въпреки широкото си разпространение, но е добре позната. От гълъбките това е може би най-лесният за разпознаване вид и заради това най-събираният в България. Расте от юли до септември. Гъбата се приготвя по същите начини като други гъби в прясно състояние. Не става за сушене. Възможни двойници са други гълъбки със зелени гугли като тревистозелената гълъбка (R. aeruginea), R. heterophylla, зелени разновидности на сивата (R. cyanoxantha) и виненочервената (R. xerampelina) и други. Кожицата на никоя от тези не се напуква като при зелената. И четирите изброени са също така ядливи. Отровната зелена мухоморка (Amanita phalloides) се различава с пръстенче и калъфче около нейното пънче. Липсват зелените късчета върху гуглата. Източници „Нашите гъби“, Цв. Хинкова, М. Друмева – Димчева, Г. Стойчев, В. Чалъков, Земиздат, 1986 Гълъбки Ядливи гъби
sl	legislation	Slovenia	Opozorilo: Neuradno prečiščeno besedilo predpisa predstavlja zgolj informativni delovni pripomoček, glede katerega organ ne jamči odškodninsko ali kako drugače. Neuradno prečiščeno besedilo Pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov obsega: - Pravilnik o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 55/94 z dne 16. 9. 1994), - Pravilnik o spremembah pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 95/04 z dne 27. 8. 2004), - Pravilnik o spremembah Pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 110/08 z dne 21. 11. 2008), - Pravilnik o spremembah in dopolnitvi Pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 83/13 z dne 11. 10. 2013). PRAVILNIK o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (neuradno prečiščeno besedilo št. 3) 1. OZNAČEVANJE DREVJA ZA MOŽNI POSEK 1. člen Zaradi zagotavljanja poseka samo tistih dreves, ki so bila izbrana, mora Zavod za gozdove Slovenije drevje za možni posek označiti. Izbrano drevo za možni posek nad 10 cm prsnega premera se vidno označi z žigom na koreninskem vratu tako, da ostane oznaka vidna na panju tudi po poseku drevesa, lahko pa tudi z barvo v prsni višini. Drevesa do 10 cm prsnega premera in drevesa, ki so bila za možni posek izbrana pri redčenjih do faze drogovnjaka, se ne glede na določbo iz prejšnjega odstavka označujejo le v prsni višini z barvo. Ne glede na drugi odstavek tega člena se na območjih, kjer je z gozdnogospodarskim načrtom gozdnogospodarske enote ali z gozdnogojitvenim načrtom določeno, da posamična izbira drevja za možni posek ni obvezna, skupina dreves, izbrana za možni posek, oziroma skupina dreves, v kateri bodo za možni posek izbrana posamična drevesa brez posamične izbire, označi z barvno črto na obrobnih drevesih. 2. člen Drevesa, izbrana za posek, je treba zaradi spremljanja razvoja gozdov evidentirati glede na vrsto sečnje, drevesno vrsto, prsni premer in število. V primeru, da posamična izbira drevja za možni posek ni obvezna in v primeru, da dreves, poškodovanih zaradi naravne ujme, ni mogoče posamično izbrati, je treba za evidenco poseka po drevesnih vrstah oceniti število in debelinsko strukturo dreves za posek. 3. člen Izbiro drevja za možni posek lahko v sodelovanju z lastniki gozdov opravljajo le pooblaščeni delavci Zavoda za gozdove Slovenije. 2. SEČNJA DREVJA, IZDELAVA IN SPRAVILO GOZDNIH LESNIH SORTIMENTOV IN UREDITEV SEČIŠČA 4. člen Čas sečnje in spravila je treba prilagoditi biološkemu utripu gozda. Če je le mogoče, se sečnja opravi zunaj vegetacijske dobe oziroma v času, ko se najmanj vznemirjajo prosto živeče živali. 5. člen Za posek izbrano drevo se mora posekati tako, da višina panja, merjena na zgornji strani pobočja, ni večja od 15 cm oziroma od tretjine njegovega premera. Na večjih strminah, na skalovitem terenu, ob vlakah, v primerih varstva zemljišča in sestoja pred plazovi, v primerih podrtih ali zlomljenih dreves ter pri panjevski sečnji je lahko višina panja tudi večja, uravnava pa se v odvisnosti od ekoloških razmer in funkcije panjev po poseku oziroma od lastnosti drevesne vrste. 6. člen Drevesa je treba podirati in iz njih izdelovati gozdne lesne sortimente tako, da se ne poškodujejo sosednja drevesa in pomladek v večji meri, kot je to neizogibno, da se ne poškodujejo gozdne prometnice, obrežja vodotokov in režim odvodnjavanja ter da posekana drevesa ali sortimenti ne ovirajo ali ogrožajo hoje po gozdnih poteh ter prometa na cestah in železnicah oziroma delovanja drugih infrastrukturnih objektov. V gozdu ni dovoljeno puščati obviselih ali na polpodrtih dreves. 7. člen Pri spravilu gozdnih lesnih sortimentov je treba uporabljati spravilna sredstva in tehnologijo, ki so prilagojena naravnim razmeram oziroma občutljivosti gozdnih sestojev in tal. Gozdni lesni sortimenti se morajo spravljati tako, da se ne poškodujejo pomladek, drevje, gozdna tla, gozdne vlake, poti in ceste ter da se ne poslabša režim odtoka voda v večji meri, kot je to neizogibno. Takoj po končanem spravilu je treba sanirati poškodbe na pomladku in drevju ter odpraviti poškodbe na gozdnih tleh ter gozdnih vlakah, poteh, stezah in cestah ter vzpostaviti čim ugodnejši režim odtoka vode. Pri spravilu s traktorji in drugimi samohodnimi stroji je dovoljeno vlačiti ali prevažati gozdne lesne sortimente le po gozdnih vlakah oziroma poteh. Po gozdnih cestah je dovoljeno vlačiti gozdne lesne sortimente samo zaradi njihovega sortiranja in zlaganja. Poškodbe na cestišču mora povzročitelj odpraviti takoj po končanem delu. Gozdnih lesnih sortimentov ni dovoljeno spravljati po tleh v hudourniških jarkih in po njihovih pobočjih, po plazovitih tleh in po strmih, erodibilnih pobočjih (npr. na dolomitnih rendzinah, koluvialnih tleh ipd.). 8. člen Gozdnih lesnih sortimentov in sečnih ostankov ni dovoljeno zlagati in puščati v strugah potokov in hudournikov, v jarkih, na pasiščih prosto živečih živali, v kalih ali kalužah, ob vodnih izvirih in na gozdnih prometnicah. Gozdne lesne sortimente je dovoljeno zlagati pod in nad cesto le tako, da ne ogrožajo prometa in da je zagotovljena varnost pred njihovim proženjem na cesto ali po pobočju in da je drevje zavarovano pred poškodbami. 9. člen V gozdu ni dovoljeno izkopavati panjev posekanih ali kako drugače podrtih dreves v strminah, v območju hudournikov in v gozdovih na sušnih oziroma drugih ranljivih rastiščih. 10. člen Sečišče se mora urediti takoj po poseku drevja in. spravilu gozdnih lesnih sortimentov, najpozneje pa v dveh mesecih po začetku sečnje, razen če z drugimi predpisi ali odločbo Zavoda za gozdove Slovenije ni določen krajši rok. Sečišče je urejeno, če so: • posekana vsa drevesa, ki so bila pri sečnji ali spravilu močneje poškodovana; • iz gozda spravljeni vsi gozdni lesni sortimenti; • veje in vrhači iglavcev razžagani in zloženi na kupe oziroma v primeru strojne sečnje založeni tudi v sečne poti ali v primeru uporabe procesorske glave na dvigalu žičnice, zloženi na kupe tudi ob kamionski cesti; - (črtana) ; - pri redčenju ali panjevski sečnji debelejše veje listavcev razžagane in razprostrte po gozdnih tleh; • pri pomladitvenih sečnjah sečni ostanki zloženi tako, da ne ovirajo razvoja mladja; • pri končnem poseku za umetno obnovo sečni ostanki primerno razžagani in zloženi v redi ali kupe tako, da je površina pripravljena za sajenje; • odpravljene poškodbe na gozdnih tleh in gozdnih vlakah, ki predstavljajo nevarnost za pričetek erozije, in če so odstranjeni vsi sečni ostanki iz strug potokov in hudournikov; • sečni ostanki odstranjeni z gozdnih poti in prometnic, z mejnikov, iz kaluž in vodnih izvirov ter s kmetijskih zemljišč in z zunanjih gozdnih robov; • odstranjeni vsi nelesni odpadki, ki so nastali pri opravljanju del. 11. člen Zavod za gozdove Slovenije mora za vsako sečišče ugotoviti, ali so izpolnjene določbe iz 10. člena tega pravilnika. * * * Pravilnik o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 55/94) vsebuje naslednji končni določbi: »3. KONČNI DOLOČBI 12. člen Z dnem uveljavitve tega pravilnika preneha veljati pravilnik o gozdnem redu (Uradni list SRS, št. 31/86). 13. člen Ta pravilnik začne veljati naslednji dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Republike Slovenije.«. * * * Pravilnik o spremembah pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 95/04) vsebuje naslednjo končno določbo: »3\. člen Ta pravilnik začne veljati naslednji dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Republike Slovenije.«. * * * Pravilnik o spremembah Pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 110/08) vsebuje naslednjo končno določbo: »3\. člen Ta pravilnik začne veljati petnajsti dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Republike Slovenije.«. * * * Pravilnik o spremembah in dopolnitvi Pravilnika o izvajanju sečnje, ravnanju s sečnimi ostanki, spravilu in zlaganju gozdnih lesnih sortimentov (Uradni list RS, št. 83/13) vsebuje naslednjo končno določbo: »3\. člen Ta pravilnik začne veljati petnajsti dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Republike Slovenije.«.
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de	wikipedia	N/A	Dies ist eine synchrone Darstellung der Regierungszeiten von frühantiken Herrschern im 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus, visualisiert in Form von gleich skalierten Zeitleisten. Mittelmeerraum Karthago Kyrene Syrakus Sparta Ägypten Persien China China Anmerkungen Die frühesten römischen Konsuln (vor 450 v. Chr.) werden eher als Stoff von Legenden angesehen. Danach finden sich in der Konsulnliste auch historische Gestalten. Erst im folgenden 4. Jahrhundert werden die Aufzeichnungen über die Besetzung des Konsulats als vertrauenswürdig erachtet. Es ist nicht genau bekannt, welche Politiker in Syrakus während der Phase der Demokratie herrschten. Von den chinesischen Staaten der Frühlings- und Herbstannalen werden nur die größeren Fürstentümer aufgeführt. Für den Zeitraum 500-400 vor Christus existieren weitere Angaben zu Herrschern, die aus verschiedenen Gründen hier nicht aufgelistet werden. Dazu zählen mythische Ahnenkönige, aber auch Herrscher, welche sich zeitlich nicht genauer fixieren lassen. Siehe hierzu beispielsweise die Listen der Könige von Irland, Nubien, Armenien, Byblos, Sparta, der Skythen, von Vietnam, Korea und Japan. Stellvertreter und Vizekönige werden hier nur aufgelistet, wenn das von ihnen verwaltete Territorium zuvor oder danach einen eigenständigen Staat bildete. Das betrifft beispielsweise Pontos. Allgemeines In der Zeitleiste symbolisiert eine Lücke von einem Jahr, dass in ungefähr dieser Zeit der Übergang zwischen zwei Herrschern angenommen wird. Ist der Übergangszeitraum genauer bestimmbar, wird dies durch einen dünneren Strich gekennzeichnet. Größere Lücken zwischen zwei Namen bedeuten nicht zwangsläufig, dass es keinen Herrscher gab; sondern kennzeichnen eine Ungewissheit. Wenn keine farbigen Balken angezeigt werden, können die entsprechenden Herrscher nach Stand der Forschung nicht genauer datiert werden. Die Darstellung erhebt keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit. Grundsätzlicher Hinweis: Die Jahresangaben dieser Liste sind zum Teil nicht genau ermittelbar. Durch neue archäologische Erkenntnisse können sich gelegentlich auch Forschungsstand und geltende Lehrmeinung zur Datierung abrupt ändern. Wenn neuere Erkenntnisse eingepflegt werden, ist die Quelle/Fundstelle anzugeben und auf Gleichzeitigkeiten von Herrschern zu prüfen (diese soll entsprechend archäologischem Befund gewährleistet bleiben). Für die Angaben zu ägyptischen Königen wird die Datierung nach Beckerath (1994) verwendet. Einzelnachweise Liste der Herrscher im 05. Jahrhundert v. Chr.
hu	wikipedia	N/A	A With a Child's Heart című dal az amerikai Michael Jackson első kimásolt kislemeze a Music & Me című stúdióalbumról. A dal az 50. helyre került a Billboard Pop Singles kislemezlistán, illetve 14. helyezést ért el a Billboard Hot R&B slágerlistán. Az Adult Cotemporary kislemezlistán a 23. volt. A dalt eredetileg Stephen Schartz írta, és 1966-ban Stevie Wonder vitte sikerre. Jackson egy Martin Bashir interjúban elismerte, hogy nem emlékszik arra, hogy felvették volna a dalt, valamint a dalszövegekre sem emlékszik pontosan. Megjelenések 7" Németország Tamla Motown – 1C 006-94444 A Morning Glow 3:33 B With A Child's Heart 3:26 Slágerlista Slágerlista Feldolgozások A dalt az amerikai Rayen-Symoné is feldolgozta, mely 2. stúdióalbumán, az Undeniable címűn található. A dal 1999-ben jelent meg. Jegyzetek 1973 kislemezei Michael Jackson-kislemezek
de	wikipedia	N/A	Redhouse Castle, ehemals auch Red Spittal, ist die Ruine eines Tower House nahe der schottischen Ortschaft Longniddry in der Council Area East Lothian. Die Anlage ist als Scheduled Monument denkmalgeschützt. Eine ehemalige Aufnahme in die schottischen Denkmallisten in der höchsten Kategorie A wurde 2015 aufgehoben. Geschichte Möglicherweise besteht, ähnlich wie bei dem Ballencrieff Granary, eine Verbindung zwischen Redhouse Castle und einem im 13. Jahrhundert gegründeten, dem heiligen Cuthbert geweihten Spital nahe Ballencrieff. Die ältesten Teile des Tower House stammen aus dem späten 16. Jahrhundert, als sich die Ländereien im Besitz des Clans Douglas befanden. Wahrscheinlich vor 1607, als die Ländereien John Laing zufielen, war die Südflanke in heutigem Ausmaße fertiggestellt. Laing fügte die komplexere Nordseite hinzu, bevor das Tower House durch Heirat an den Clan Hamilton fiel. Im Nachklang des Zweiten Jakobitenaufstands verloren die Hamiltons Teile ihrer Güter, darunter auch Redhouse Castle. Das Tower House fiel Patrick Murray, 2. Lord Elibank zu und ist seitdem ungenutzt. 1825 wurde es in die Ländereien von Gosford House integriert. In den 1990er Jahren wurde die Ruine stabilisiert. Beschreibung Die Ruine von Redhouse Castle liegt an dem Bach Redhouse Burn rund zwei Kilometer östlich von Longniddry. Das vierstöckige Tower House nimmt eine Fläche von 15 m × 10 m ein und ist teilweise bis zu einer Höhe von elf Metern erhalten. An der Südostseite vorgelagert ist ein befestigter Hof. Das Mauerwerk besteht aus Bruchstein vom roten Sandstein. Der Eingang befindet sich an der Südseite. Er ist mit Gesimse mit der Inschrift „NISI DOMINUS FRUSTRA“ sowie den Initialen „MIL“ und „RD“ gestaltet. Im Unterschied zu den ältesten Gebäudeteilen untergliedern an der Erweiterung aus dem 17. Jahrhundert an der Nord- und Westseite gekehlte Gurtgesimse die Fassaden horizontal. An der Nordostkante kragt eine Ecktourelle aus. An der Südseite ist eine Wappenplatte eingelassen. Die Giebel sind als Staffelgiebel gestaltet. Das Eingangsportal auf den Vorhof besteht aus einem profilierten Rundbogen. Taubenhaus Das Taubenhaus wurde im frühen 17. Jahrhundert hinzugefügt. Das Bauwerk aus rotem Sandstein ist in die Befestigungsmauer des Hofes integriert. Das Mauerwerk ist mit zwei Gurtgesimsen gestaltet und war einst mit Harl verputzt. Eine massive Mauer teilt das Gebäudeinnere mittig. Über zwei Türen im ersten Obergeschoss an der Südseite sind die Räume zugänglich. Sie umfassten einst jeweils 399 Nistkästen. An der Nordseite wurde später ein Anbau hinzugefügt. Einzelnachweise Weblinks Eintrag im Gazetteer for Scotland Ruine in East Lothian Scheduled Monument in East Lothian Erbaut im 16. Jahrhundert Tower House in East Lothian Turm in Europa