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911 | linux | 7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1 | Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org. | 1 | static int uio_mmap_physical(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct uio_device *idev = vma->vm_private_data;
int mi = uio_find_mem_index(vma);
if (mi < 0)
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_ops = &uio_physical_vm_ops;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
return remap_pfn_range(vma,
vma->vm_start,
idev->info->mem[mi].addr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
| 124,769,329,517,591,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | uio.c | 189,572,155,418,257,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-6763 | The uio_mmap_physical function in drivers/uio/uio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not validate the size of a memory block, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges via crafted mmap operations, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4511. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6763 |
912 | linux | 7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1 | Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org. | 1 | int au1100fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *fbi, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct au1100fb_device *fbdev;
unsigned int len;
unsigned long start=0, off;
fbdev = to_au1100fb_device(fbi);
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
start = fbdev->fb_phys & PAGE_MASK;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + fbdev->fb_len);
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= (6 << 9); //CCA=6
if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot)) {
return -EAGAIN;
}
return 0;
}
| 177,273,139,877,749,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | au1100fb.c | 171,201,343,492,238,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-6763 | The uio_mmap_physical function in drivers/uio/uio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not validate the size of a memory block, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges via crafted mmap operations, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4511. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6763 |
913 | linux | 7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1 | Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org. | 1 | static int au1200fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *info, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned long start=0, off;
struct au1200fb_device *fbdev = info->par;
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
start = fbdev->fb_phys & PAGE_MASK;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + fbdev->fb_len);
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= _CACHE_MASK; /* CCA=7 */
return io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
| 67,752,722,467,221,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | au1200fb.c | 20,588,446,351,461,834,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-6763 | The uio_mmap_physical function in drivers/uio/uio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not validate the size of a memory block, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly gain privileges via crafted mmap operations, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4511. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6763 |
914 | linux | cf970c002d270c36202bd5b9c2804d3097a52da0 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cf970c002d270c36202bd5b9c2804d3097a52da0 | ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
| 155,904,653,362,942,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ping.c | 52,362,142,179,938,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-6432 | The ping_recvmsg function in net/ipv4/ping.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 does not properly interact with read system calls on ping sockets, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by leveraging unspecified privileges to execute a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6432 |
915 | linux | f856567b930dfcdbc3323261bf77240ccdde01f5 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f856567b930dfcdbc3323261bf77240ccdde01f5 | aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int aac_compat_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
return aac_compat_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, (unsigned long)arg);
}
| 240,252,914,944,451,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | linit.c | 335,956,036,663,395,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-6383 | The aac_compat_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.8 does not require the CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6383 |
916 | linux | 6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62 | qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int qeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata)
{
struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob;
struct qeth_ipa_cmd *cmd;
struct qeth_snmp_ureq *ureq;
int req_len;
struct qeth_arp_query_info qinfo = {0, };
int rc = 0;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "snmpcmd");
if (card->info.guestlan)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((!qeth_adp_supported(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL)) &&
(!card->options.layer2)) {
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* skip 4 bytes (data_len struct member) to get req_len */
if (copy_from_user(&req_len, udata + sizeof(int), sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
ureq = memdup_user(udata, req_len + sizeof(struct qeth_snmp_ureq_hdr));
if (IS_ERR(ureq)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "snmpnome");
return PTR_ERR(ureq);
}
qinfo.udata_len = ureq->hdr.data_len;
qinfo.udata = kzalloc(qinfo.udata_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!qinfo.udata) {
kfree(ureq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
qinfo.udata_offset = sizeof(struct qeth_snmp_ureq_hdr);
iob = qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL,
QETH_SNMP_SETADP_CMDLENGTH + req_len);
cmd = (struct qeth_ipa_cmd *)(iob->data+IPA_PDU_HEADER_SIZE);
memcpy(&cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp, &ureq->cmd, req_len);
rc = qeth_send_ipa_snmp_cmd(card, iob, QETH_SETADP_BASE_LEN + req_len,
qeth_snmp_command_cb, (void *)&qinfo);
if (rc)
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "SNMP command failed on %s: (0x%x)\n",
QETH_CARD_IFNAME(card), rc);
else {
if (copy_to_user(udata, qinfo.udata, qinfo.udata_len))
rc = -EFAULT;
}
kfree(ureq);
kfree(qinfo.udata);
return rc;
}
| 104,798,081,715,700,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | qeth_core_main.c | 236,635,939,498,951,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-6381 | Buffer overflow in the qeth_snmp_command function in drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via an SNMP ioctl call with a length value that is incompatible with the command-buffer size. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6381 |
917 | linux | a497e47d4aec37aaf8f13509f3ef3d1f6a717d88 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a497e47d4aec37aaf8f13509f3ef3d1f6a717d88 | libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> | 1 | static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
int r, i;
char *pdata;
char *p;
char *p0;
char *p1;
char *p2;
struct debug_data *d = f->private_data;
pdata = kmalloc(cnt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pdata == NULL)
return 0;
if (copy_from_user(pdata, buf, cnt)) {
lbs_deb_debugfs("Copy from user failed\n");
kfree(pdata);
return 0;
}
p0 = pdata;
for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) {
do {
p = strstr(p0, d[i].name);
if (p == NULL)
break;
p1 = strchr(p, '\n');
if (p1 == NULL)
break;
p0 = p1++;
p2 = strchr(p, '=');
if (!p2)
break;
p2++;
r = simple_strtoul(p2, NULL, 0);
if (d[i].size == 1)
*((u8 *) d[i].addr) = (u8) r;
else if (d[i].size == 2)
*((u16 *) d[i].addr) = (u16) r;
else if (d[i].size == 4)
*((u32 *) d[i].addr) = (u32) r;
else if (d[i].size == 8)
*((u64 *) d[i].addr) = (u64) r;
break;
} while (1);
}
kfree(pdata);
return (ssize_t)cnt;
}
| 75,946,839,779,695,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | debugfs.c | 106,884,417,614,616,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-6378 | The lbs_debugfs_write function in drivers/net/wireless/libertas/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by leveraging root privileges for a zero-length write operation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6378 |
918 | linux | 17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/17d68b763f09a9ce824ae23eb62c9efc57b69271 | KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 1 | static void recalculate_apic_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_apic_map *new, *old = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int i;
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_apic_map), GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (!new)
goto out;
new->ldr_bits = 8;
/* flat mode is default */
new->cid_shift = 8;
new->cid_mask = 0;
new->lid_mask = 0xff;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u16 cid, lid;
u32 ldr;
if (!kvm_apic_present(vcpu))
continue;
/*
* All APICs have to be configured in the same mode by an OS.
* We take advatage of this while building logical id loockup
* table. After reset APICs are in xapic/flat mode, so if we
* find apic with different setting we assume this is the mode
* OS wants all apics to be in; build lookup table accordingly.
*/
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
new->ldr_bits = 32;
new->cid_shift = 16;
new->cid_mask = new->lid_mask = 0xffff;
} else if (kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic) &&
!new->cid_mask /* flat mode */ &&
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_DFR) == APIC_DFR_CLUSTER) {
new->cid_shift = 4;
new->cid_mask = 0xf;
new->lid_mask = 0xf;
}
new->phys_map[kvm_apic_id(apic)] = apic;
ldr = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LDR);
cid = apic_cluster_id(new, ldr);
lid = apic_logical_id(new, ldr);
if (lid)
new->logical_map[cid][ffs(lid) - 1] = apic;
}
out:
old = rcu_dereference_protected(kvm->arch.apic_map,
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->arch.apic_map, new);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.apic_map_lock);
if (old)
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(kvm);
}
| 90,650,423,270,339,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | lapic.c | 190,243,646,842,195,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-6376 | The recalculate_apic_map function in arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) via a crafted ICR write operation in x2apic mode. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6376 |
926 | linux | b963a22e6d1a266a67e9eecc88134713fd54775c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b963a22e6d1a266a67e9eecc88134713fd54775c | KVM: x86: Fix potential divide by 0 in lapic (CVE-2013-6367)
Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a
divide by zero and cause a crash. If the guest cpuid support
tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests
the host will crash.
- Set the mode to periodic
- Set the TMICT to 0
- Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline)
- Set the TMICT to non-zero.
Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be. If the
guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0.
This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division
does not occur.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 1 | static u32 apic_get_tmcct(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
ktime_t remaining;
s64 ns;
u32 tmcct;
ASSERT(apic != NULL);
/* if initial count is 0, current count should also be 0 */
if (kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT) == 0)
return 0;
remaining = hrtimer_get_remaining(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
if (ktime_to_ns(remaining) < 0)
remaining = ktime_set(0, 0);
ns = mod_64(ktime_to_ns(remaining), apic->lapic_timer.period);
tmcct = div64_u64(ns,
(APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * apic->divide_count));
return tmcct;
}
| 154,149,295,278,805,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | lapic.c | 163,667,959,038,676,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-6367 | The apic_get_tmcct function in arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and host OS crash) via crafted modifications of the TMICT value. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6367 |
929 | polarssl | 1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859 | https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl | https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl/commit/1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859 | ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly | 1 | int ssl_parse_certificate( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t i, n;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->authmode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
ssl->verify_result = BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state++;
/*
* Check if the client sent an empty certificate
*/
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen == 2 &&
ssl->in_msgtype == SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
ssl->in_msg[1] == SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "SSLv3 client has no certificate" ) );
ssl->verify_result = BADCERT_MISSING;
if( ssl->authmode == SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
return( 0 );
else
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
}
}
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->minor_ver != SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( ssl->in_hslen == 7 &&
ssl->in_msgtype == SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE &&
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 4, "\0\0\0", 3 ) == 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLSv1 client has no certificate" ) );
ssl->verify_result = BADCERT_MISSING;
if( ssl->authmode == SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
else
return( 0 );
}
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || ssl->in_hslen < 10 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
/*
* Same message structure as in ssl_write_certificate()
*/
n = ( ssl->in_msg[5] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[6];
if( ssl->in_msg[4] != 0 || ssl->in_hslen != 7 + n )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = (x509_cert *) malloc(
sizeof( x509_cert ) ) ) == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "malloc(%d bytes) failed",
sizeof( x509_cert ) ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
}
memset( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, 0, sizeof( x509_cert ) );
i = 7;
while( i < ssl->in_hslen )
{
if( ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
n = ( (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8 )
| (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2];
i += 3;
if( n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
}
ret = x509parse_crt( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, ssl->in_msg + i,
n );
if( ret != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " x509parse_crt", ret );
return( ret );
}
i += n;
}
SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
if( ssl->authmode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
if( ssl->ca_chain == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED );
}
ret = x509parse_verify( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
ssl->ca_chain, ssl->ca_crl,
ssl->peer_cn, &ssl->verify_result,
ssl->f_vrfy, ssl->p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
if( ssl->authmode != SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
ret = 0;
}
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
return( ret );
}
| 79,433,638,809,905,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ssl_tls.c | 193,081,241,478,287,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4623 | The x509parse_crt function in x509.h in PolarSSL 1.1.x before 1.1.7 and 1.2.x before 1.2.8 does not properly parse certificate messages during the SSL/TLS handshake, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and CPU consumption) via a certificate message that contains a PEM encoded certificate. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4623 |
930 | linux | 7d3e91a89b7adbc2831334def9e494dd9892f9af | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7d3e91a89b7adbc2831334def9e494dd9892f9af | NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> | 1 | static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
unsigned int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(buflen, PAGE_SIZE);
int ret = -ENOMEM, i;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages))
return -ERANGE;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
/* Handle the case where the passed-in buffer is too short */
if (res.acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_TRUNC) {
/* Did the user only issue a request for the acl length? */
if (buf == NULL)
goto out_ok;
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
if (buf)
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
out_ok:
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
| 318,227,710,018,918,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nfs4proc.c | 246,421,749,327,099,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4591 | Buffer overflow in the __nfs4_get_acl_uncached function in fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a getxattr system call for the system.nfs4_acl extended attribute of a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4591 |
931 | linux | 04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb | ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> | 1 | do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN];
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n",
len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, len) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* increase the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_inc();
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out_dec;
}
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH) {
/* Flush the virtual service */
ret = ip_vs_flush();
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT) {
/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
ret = ip_vs_set_timeout((struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = start_sync_thread(dm->state, dm->mcast_ifn, dm->syncid);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STOPDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = stop_sync_thread(dm->state);
goto out_unlock;
}
usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
udest_compat = (struct ip_vs_dest_user *)(usvc_compat + 1);
/* We only use the new structs internally, so copy userspace compat
* structs to extended internal versions */
ip_vs_copy_usvc_compat(&usvc, usvc_compat);
ip_vs_copy_udest_compat(&udest, udest_compat);
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO) {
/* if no service address is set, zero counters in all */
if (!usvc.fwmark && !usvc.addr.ip && !usvc.port) {
ret = ip_vs_zero_all();
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Check for valid protocol: TCP or UDP, even for fwmark!=0 */
if (usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) {
pr_err("set_ctl: invalid protocol: %d %pI4:%d %s\n",
usvc.protocol, &usvc.addr.ip,
ntohs(usvc.port), usvc.sched_name);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Lookup the exact service by <protocol, addr, port> or fwmark */
if (usvc.fwmark == 0)
svc = __ip_vs_service_get(usvc.af, usvc.protocol,
&usvc.addr, usvc.port);
else
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(usvc.af, usvc.fwmark);
if (cmd != IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD
&& (svc == NULL || svc->protocol != usvc.protocol)) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out_unlock;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD:
if (svc != NULL)
ret = -EEXIST;
else
ret = ip_vs_add_service(&usvc, &svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDIT:
ret = ip_vs_edit_service(svc, &usvc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DEL:
ret = ip_vs_del_service(svc);
if (!ret)
goto out_unlock;
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO:
ret = ip_vs_zero_service(svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADDDEST:
ret = ip_vs_add_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDITDEST:
ret = ip_vs_edit_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (svc)
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
out_dec:
/* decrease the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_dec();
return ret;
}
| 83,673,314,409,807,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ip_vs_ctl.c | 16,053,961,743,391,224,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4588 | Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33, when CONFIG_IP_VS is used, allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for (1) a getsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_get_ctl function, or (2) a setsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_set_ctl function. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4588 |
932 | linux | 338c7dbadd2671189cec7faf64c84d01071b3f96 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/338c7dbadd2671189cec7faf64c84d01071b3f96 | KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 1 | static int kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, u32 id)
{
int r;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, *v;
vcpu = kvm_arch_vcpu_create(kvm, id);
if (IS_ERR(vcpu))
return PTR_ERR(vcpu);
preempt_notifier_init(&vcpu->preempt_notifier, &kvm_preempt_ops);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(vcpu);
if (r)
goto vcpu_destroy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (!kvm_vcpu_compatible(vcpu)) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) == KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm_for_each_vcpu(r, v, kvm)
if (v->vcpu_id == id) {
r = -EEXIST;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
BUG_ON(kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)]);
/* Now it's all set up, let userspace reach it */
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
r = create_vcpu_fd(vcpu);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)] = vcpu;
smp_wmb();
atomic_inc(&kvm->online_vcpus);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(vcpu);
return r;
unlock_vcpu_destroy:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
vcpu_destroy:
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return r;
}
| 78,071,846,559,468,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | kvm_main.c | 162,946,847,399,016,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4587 | Array index error in the kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a large id value. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4587 |
933 | linux | 0e033e04c2678dbbe74a46b23fffb7bb918c288e | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0e033e04c2678dbbe74a46b23fffb7bb918c288e | ipv6: fix headroom calculation in udp6_ufo_fragment
Commit 1e2bd517c108816220f262d7954b697af03b5f9c ("udp6: Fix udp
fragmentation for tunnel traffic.") changed the calculation if
there is enough space to include a fragment header in the skb from a
skb->mac_header dervived one to skb_headroom. Because we already peeled
off the skb to transport_header this is wrong. Change this back to check
if we have enough room before the mac_header.
This fixes a panic Saran Neti reported. He used the tbf scheduler which
skb_gso_segments the skb. The offsets get negative and we panic in memcpy
because the skb was erroneously not expanded at the head.
Reported-by: Saran Neti <Saran.Neti@telus.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *packet_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
int tnl_hlen;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL |
SKB_GSO_GRE |
SKB_GSO_IPIP |
SKB_GSO_SIT |
SKB_GSO_MPLS) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
if (skb->encapsulation && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL)
segs = skb_udp_tunnel_segment(skb, features);
else {
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len - offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
if (skb_headroom(skb) < (tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz)) {
if (gso_pskb_expand_head(skb, tnl_hlen + frag_hdr_sz))
goto out;
}
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = (skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb)) +
unfrag_ip6hlen + tnl_hlen;
packet_start = (u8 *) skb->head + SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset;
memmove(packet_start-frag_hdr_sz, packet_start, unfrag_len);
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr, (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb));
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
}
out:
return segs;
}
| 168,959,719,558,504,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | udp_offload.c | 333,651,348,407,875,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-4563 | The udp6_ufo_fragment function in net/ipv6/udp_offload.c in the Linux kernel through 3.12, when UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) is enabled, does not properly perform a certain size comparison before inserting a fragment header, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via a large IPv6 UDP packet, as demonstrated by use of the Token Bucket Filter (TBF) queueing discipline. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4563 |
934 | linux | a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427 | Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int mp_get_count(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct serial_icounter_struct *icnt)
{
struct serial_icounter_struct icount;
struct sb_uart_icount cnow;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
memcpy(&cnow, &port->icount, sizeof(struct sb_uart_icount));
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
icount.cts = cnow.cts;
icount.dsr = cnow.dsr;
icount.rng = cnow.rng;
icount.dcd = cnow.dcd;
icount.rx = cnow.rx;
icount.tx = cnow.tx;
icount.frame = cnow.frame;
icount.overrun = cnow.overrun;
icount.parity = cnow.parity;
icount.brk = cnow.brk;
icount.buf_overrun = cnow.buf_overrun;
return copy_to_user(icnt, &icount, sizeof(icount)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
| 46,385,543,661,315,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-4516 | The mp_get_count function in drivers/staging/sb105x/sb_pci_mp.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a TIOCGICOUNT ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4516 |
935 | linux | 8d1e72250c847fa96498ec029891de4dc638a5ba | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d1e72250c847fa96498ec029891de4dc638a5ba | Staging: bcm: info leak in ioctl
The DevInfo.u32Reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks kernel
information to user space.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static long bcm_char_ioctl(struct file *filp, UINT cmd, ULONG arg)
{
struct bcm_tarang_data *pTarang = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
struct bcm_mini_adapter *Adapter = pTarang->Adapter;
INT Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
int timeout = 0;
struct bcm_ioctl_buffer IoBuffer;
int bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Parameters Passed to control IOCTL cmd=0x%X arg=0x%lX", cmd, arg);
if (_IOC_TYPE(cmd) != BCM_IOCTL)
return -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
Status = !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
else if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
Status = !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
else if (_IOC_NONE == (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_NONE))
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (Status)
return -EFAULT;
if (Adapter->device_removed)
return -EFAULT;
if (FALSE == Adapter->fw_download_done) {
switch (cmd) {
case IOCTL_MAC_ADDR_REQ:
case IOCTL_LINK_REQ:
case IOCTL_CM_REQUEST:
case IOCTL_SS_INFO_REQ:
case IOCTL_SEND_CONTROL_MESSAGE:
case IOCTL_IDLE_REQ:
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_SET_REQUEST:
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_STATUS_REQUEST:
return -EACCES;
default:
break;
}
}
Status = vendorextnIoctl(Adapter, cmd, arg);
if (Status != CONTINUE_COMMON_PATH)
return Status;
switch (cmd) {
/* Rdms for Swin Idle... */
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_READ_PRIVATE: {
struct bcm_rdm_buffer sRdmBuffer = {0};
PCHAR temp_buff;
UINT Bufflen;
u16 temp_value;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sRdmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sRdmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength > USHRT_MAX ||
IoBuffer.OutputLength == 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
Bufflen = IoBuffer.OutputLength;
temp_value = 4 - (Bufflen % 4);
Bufflen += temp_value % 4;
temp_buff = kmalloc(Bufflen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp_buff)
return -ENOMEM;
bytes = rdmalt(Adapter, (UINT)sRdmBuffer.Register,
(PUINT)temp_buff, Bufflen);
if (bytes > 0) {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, temp_buff, bytes)) {
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
Status = bytes;
}
kfree(temp_buff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE_PRIVATE: {
struct bcm_wrm_buffer sWrmBuffer = {0};
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sWrmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
/* Get WrmBuffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sWrmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
uiTempVar = sWrmBuffer.Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
if (!((Adapter->pstargetparams->m_u32Customize) & VSG_MODE) &&
((uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_1) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_2) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_3) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_4))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "EEPROM Access Denied, not in VSG Mode\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = wrmalt(Adapter, (UINT)sWrmBuffer.Register,
(PUINT)sWrmBuffer.Data, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Done\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Failed\n");
Status = -EFAULT;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_READ:
case IOCTL_BCM_EEPROM_REGISTER_READ: {
struct bcm_rdm_buffer sRdmBuffer = {0};
PCHAR temp_buff = NULL;
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device in Idle Mode, Blocking Rdms\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sRdmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sRdmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength > USHRT_MAX ||
IoBuffer.OutputLength == 0) {
return -EINVAL;
}
temp_buff = kmalloc(IoBuffer.OutputLength, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp_buff)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
if ((((ULONG)sRdmBuffer.Register & 0x0F000000) != 0x0F000000) ||
((ULONG)sRdmBuffer.Register & 0x3)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "RDM Done On invalid Address : %x Access Denied.\n",
(int)sRdmBuffer.Register);
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EINVAL;
}
uiTempVar = sRdmBuffer.Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)sRdmBuffer.Register, (PUINT)temp_buff, IoBuffer.OutputLength);
if (bytes > 0) {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, temp_buff, bytes)) {
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
Status = bytes;
}
kfree(temp_buff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE:
case IOCTL_BCM_EEPROM_REGISTER_WRITE: {
struct bcm_wrm_buffer sWrmBuffer = {0};
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device in Idle Mode, Blocking Wrms\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(sWrmBuffer))
return -EINVAL;
/* Get WrmBuffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sWrmBuffer, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if ((((ULONG)sWrmBuffer.Register & 0x0F000000) != 0x0F000000) ||
((ULONG)sWrmBuffer.Register & 0x3)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM Done On invalid Address : %x Access Denied.\n", (int)sWrmBuffer.Register);
return -EINVAL;
}
uiTempVar = sWrmBuffer.Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
if (!((Adapter->pstargetparams->m_u32Customize) & VSG_MODE) &&
((uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_1) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_2) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_3) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_4)) &&
(cmd == IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "EEPROM Access Denied, not in VSG Mode\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)sWrmBuffer.Register,
(PUINT)sWrmBuffer.Data, sWrmBuffer.Length);
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Done\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "WRM Failed\n");
Status = -EFAULT;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_SET_REQUEST: {
UCHAR ucResetValue[4];
UINT value = 0;
UINT uiBit = 0;
UINT uiOperation = 0;
struct bcm_gpio_info gpio_info = {0};
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "GPIO Can't be set/clear in Low power Mode");
return -EACCES;
}
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_info, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
uiBit = gpio_info.uiGpioNumber;
uiOperation = gpio_info.uiGpioValue;
value = (1<<uiBit);
if (IsReqGpioIsLedInNVM(Adapter, value) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Sorry, Requested GPIO<0x%X> is not correspond to LED !!!", value);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Set - setting 1 */
if (uiOperation) {
/* Set the gpio output register */
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_SET_REG, (PUINT)(&value), sizeof(UINT));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Set the GPIO bit\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Failed to set the %dth GPIO\n", uiBit);
break;
}
} else {
/* Set the gpio output register */
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_CLR_REG, (PUINT)(&value), sizeof(UINT));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Set the GPIO bit\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Failed to clear the %dth GPIO\n", uiBit);
break;
}
}
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_MODE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"GPIO_MODE_REGISTER read failed");
break;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
/* Set the gpio mode register to output */
*(UINT *)ucResetValue |= (1<<uiBit);
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, GPIO_MODE_REGISTER,
(PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Set the GPIO to output Mode\n");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Failed to put GPIO in Output Mode\n");
break;
}
}
break;
case BCM_LED_THREAD_STATE_CHANGE_REQ: {
struct bcm_user_thread_req threadReq = {0};
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "User made LED thread InActive");
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "GPIO Can't be set/clear in Low power Mode");
Status = -EACCES;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(threadReq))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&threadReq, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
/* if LED thread is running(Actively or Inactively) set it state to make inactive */
if (Adapter->LEDInfo.led_thread_running) {
if (threadReq.ThreadState == LED_THREAD_ACTIVATION_REQ) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Activating thread req");
Adapter->DriverState = LED_THREAD_ACTIVE;
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "DeActivating Thread req.....");
Adapter->DriverState = LED_THREAD_INACTIVE;
}
/* signal thread. */
wake_up(&Adapter->LEDInfo.notify_led_event);
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_STATUS_REQUEST: {
ULONG uiBit = 0;
UCHAR ucRead[4];
struct bcm_gpio_info gpio_info = {0};
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_info, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
uiBit = gpio_info.uiGpioNumber;
/* Set the gpio output register */
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_PIN_STATE_REGISTER,
(PUINT)ucRead, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "RDM Failed\n");
return Status;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_MULTI_REQUEST: {
UCHAR ucResetValue[4];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_info gpio_multi_info[MAX_IDX];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_info *pgpio_multi_info = (struct bcm_gpio_multi_info *)gpio_multi_info;
memset(pgpio_multi_info, 0, MAX_IDX * sizeof(struct bcm_gpio_multi_info));
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_multi_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_multi_info, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
if (IsReqGpioIsLedInNVM(Adapter, pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"Sorry, Requested GPIO<0x%X> is not correspond to NVM LED bit map<0x%X>!!!",
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask, Adapter->gpioBitMap);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Set the gpio output register */
if ((pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) &
(pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOCommand)) {
/* Set 1's in GPIO OUTPUT REGISTER */
*(UINT *)ucResetValue = pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOCommand &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOValue;
if (*(UINT *) ucResetValue)
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_SET_REG,
(PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM to BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_SET_REG Failed.");
return Status;
}
/* Clear to 0's in GPIO OUTPUT REGISTER */
*(UINT *)ucResetValue = (pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOCommand &
(~(pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOValue)));
if (*(UINT *) ucResetValue)
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_CLR_REG, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM to BCM_GPIO_OUTPUT_CLR_REG Failed.");
return Status;
}
}
if (pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) {
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_PIN_STATE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "RDM to GPIO_PIN_STATE_REGISTER Failed.");
return Status;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOValue = (*(UINT *)ucResetValue &
pgpio_multi_info[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask);
}
Status = copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &gpio_multi_info, IoBuffer.OutputLength);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Failed while copying Content to IOBufer for user space err:%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GPIO_MODE_REQUEST: {
UCHAR ucResetValue[4];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_mode gpio_multi_mode[MAX_IDX];
struct bcm_gpio_multi_mode *pgpio_multi_mode = (struct bcm_gpio_multi_mode *)gpio_multi_mode;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(gpio_multi_mode))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gpio_multi_mode, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength))
return -EFAULT;
bytes = rdmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)GPIO_MODE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(UINT));
if (bytes < 0) {
Status = bytes;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Read of GPIO_MODE_REGISTER failed");
return Status;
} else {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
/* Validating the request */
if (IsReqGpioIsLedInNVM(Adapter, pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"Sorry, Requested GPIO<0x%X> is not correspond to NVM LED bit map<0x%X>!!!",
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask, Adapter->gpioBitMap);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask) {
/* write all OUT's (1's) */
*(UINT *) ucResetValue |= (pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode &
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask);
/* write all IN's (0's) */
*(UINT *) ucResetValue &= ~((~pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode) &
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMask);
/* Currently implemented return the modes of all GPIO's
* else needs to bit AND with mask
*/
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode = *(UINT *)ucResetValue;
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, GPIO_MODE_REGISTER, (PUINT)ucResetValue, sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"WRM to GPIO_MODE_REGISTER Done");
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"WRM to GPIO_MODE_REGISTER Failed");
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
} else {
/* if uiGPIOMask is 0 then return mode register configuration */
pgpio_multi_mode[WIMAX_IDX].uiGPIOMode = *(UINT *)ucResetValue;
}
Status = copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &gpio_multi_mode, IoBuffer.OutputLength);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Failed while copying Content to IOBufer for user space err:%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_MAC_ADDR_REQ:
case IOCTL_LINK_REQ:
case IOCTL_CM_REQUEST:
case IOCTL_SS_INFO_REQ:
case IOCTL_SEND_CONTROL_MESSAGE:
case IOCTL_IDLE_REQ: {
PVOID pvBuffer = NULL;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_link_request))
return -EINVAL;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > MAX_CNTL_PKT_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
pvBuffer = memdup_user(IoBuffer.InputBuffer,
IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (IS_ERR(pvBuffer))
return PTR_ERR(pvBuffer);
down(&Adapter->LowPowerModeSync);
Status = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(Adapter->lowpower_mode_wait_queue,
!Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode,
(1 * HZ));
if (Status == -ERESTARTSYS)
goto cntrlEnd;
if (Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"Preparing Idle Mode is still True - Hence Rejecting control message\n");
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
goto cntrlEnd;
}
Status = CopyBufferToControlPacket(Adapter, (PVOID)pvBuffer);
cntrlEnd:
up(&Adapter->LowPowerModeSync);
kfree(pvBuffer);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_BUFFER_DOWNLOAD_START: {
if (down_trylock(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL,
"IOCTL_BCM_CHIP_RESET not allowed as EEPROM Read/Write is in progress\n");
return -EACCES;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Starting the firmware download PID =0x%x!!!!\n", current->pid);
if (down_trylock(&Adapter->fw_download_sema))
return -EBUSY;
Adapter->bBinDownloaded = FALSE;
Adapter->fw_download_process_pid = current->pid;
Adapter->bCfgDownloaded = FALSE;
Adapter->fw_download_done = FALSE;
netif_carrier_off(Adapter->dev);
netif_stop_queue(Adapter->dev);
Status = reset_card_proc(Adapter);
if (Status) {
pr_err(PFX "%s: reset_card_proc Failed!\n", Adapter->dev->name);
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
mdelay(10);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_BUFFER_DOWNLOAD: {
struct bcm_firmware_info *psFwInfo = NULL;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Starting the firmware download PID =0x%x!!!!\n", current->pid);
if (!down_trylock(&Adapter->fw_download_sema)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Invalid way to download buffer. Use Start and then call this!!!\n");
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
Status = -EINVAL;
return Status;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer))) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Length for FW DLD is : %lx\n", IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (IoBuffer.InputLength > sizeof(struct bcm_firmware_info)) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EINVAL;
}
psFwInfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*psFwInfo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!psFwInfo) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (copy_from_user(psFwInfo, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength)) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
kfree(psFwInfo);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!psFwInfo->pvMappedFirmwareAddress ||
(psFwInfo->u32FirmwareLength == 0)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Something else is wrong %lu\n",
psFwInfo->u32FirmwareLength);
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
kfree(psFwInfo);
Status = -EINVAL;
return Status;
}
Status = bcm_ioctl_fw_download(Adapter, psFwInfo);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
if (psFwInfo->u32StartingAddress == CONFIG_BEGIN_ADDR)
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "IOCTL: Configuration File Upload Failed\n");
else
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "IOCTL: Firmware File Upload Failed\n");
/* up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema); */
if (Adapter->LEDInfo.led_thread_running & BCM_LED_THREAD_RUNNING_ACTIVELY) {
Adapter->DriverState = DRIVER_INIT;
Adapter->LEDInfo.bLedInitDone = FALSE;
wake_up(&Adapter->LEDInfo.notify_led_event);
}
}
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL: Firmware File Uploaded\n");
kfree(psFwInfo);
return Status;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_BUFFER_DOWNLOAD_STOP: {
if (!down_trylock(&Adapter->fw_download_sema)) {
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (down_trylock(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"FW download blocked as EEPROM Read/Write is in progress\n");
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->bBinDownloaded = TRUE;
Adapter->bCfgDownloaded = TRUE;
atomic_set(&Adapter->CurrNumFreeTxDesc, 0);
Adapter->CurrNumRecvDescs = 0;
Adapter->downloadDDR = 0;
/* setting the Mips to Run */
Status = run_card_proc(Adapter);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Firm Download Failed\n");
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG,
DBG_LVL_ALL, "Firm Download Over...\n");
}
mdelay(10);
/* Wait for MailBox Interrupt */
if (StartInterruptUrb((struct bcm_interface_adapter *)Adapter->pvInterfaceAdapter))
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Unable to send interrupt...\n");
timeout = 5*HZ;
Adapter->waiting_to_fw_download_done = FALSE;
wait_event_timeout(Adapter->ioctl_fw_dnld_wait_queue,
Adapter->waiting_to_fw_download_done, timeout);
Adapter->fw_download_process_pid = INVALID_PID;
Adapter->fw_download_done = TRUE;
atomic_set(&Adapter->CurrNumFreeTxDesc, 0);
Adapter->CurrNumRecvDescs = 0;
Adapter->PrevNumRecvDescs = 0;
atomic_set(&Adapter->cntrlpktCnt, 0);
Adapter->LinkUpStatus = 0;
Adapter->LinkStatus = 0;
if (Adapter->LEDInfo.led_thread_running & BCM_LED_THREAD_RUNNING_ACTIVELY) {
Adapter->DriverState = FW_DOWNLOAD_DONE;
wake_up(&Adapter->LEDInfo.notify_led_event);
}
if (!timeout)
Status = -ENODEV;
up(&Adapter->fw_download_sema);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
case IOCTL_BE_BUCKET_SIZE:
Status = 0;
if (get_user(Adapter->BEBucketSize, (unsigned long __user *)arg))
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
case IOCTL_RTPS_BUCKET_SIZE:
Status = 0;
if (get_user(Adapter->rtPSBucketSize, (unsigned long __user *)arg))
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
case IOCTL_CHIP_RESET: {
INT NVMAccess = down_trylock(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (NVMAccess) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, " IOCTL_BCM_CHIP_RESET not allowed as EEPROM Read/Write is in progress\n");
return -EACCES;
}
down(&Adapter->RxAppControlQueuelock);
Status = reset_card_proc(Adapter);
flushAllAppQ();
up(&Adapter->RxAppControlQueuelock);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
ResetCounters(Adapter);
break;
}
case IOCTL_QOS_THRESHOLD: {
USHORT uiLoopIndex;
Status = 0;
for (uiLoopIndex = 0; uiLoopIndex < NO_OF_QUEUES; uiLoopIndex++) {
if (get_user(Adapter->PackInfo[uiLoopIndex].uiThreshold,
(unsigned long __user *)arg)) {
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_DUMP_PACKET_INFO:
DumpPackInfo(Adapter);
DumpPhsRules(&Adapter->stBCMPhsContext);
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_GET_PACK_INFO:
if (copy_to_user(argp, &Adapter->PackInfo, sizeof(struct bcm_packet_info)*NO_OF_QUEUES))
return -EFAULT;
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SWITCH_TRANSFER_MODE: {
UINT uiData = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&uiData, argp, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
if (uiData) {
/* Allow All Packets */
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SWITCH_TRANSFER_MODE: ETH_PACKET_TUNNELING_MODE\n");
Adapter->TransferMode = ETH_PACKET_TUNNELING_MODE;
} else {
/* Allow IP only Packets */
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SWITCH_TRANSFER_MODE: IP_PACKET_ONLY_MODE\n");
Adapter->TransferMode = IP_PACKET_ONLY_MODE;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_DRIVER_VERSION: {
ulong len;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
len = min_t(ulong, IoBuffer.OutputLength, strlen(DRV_VERSION) + 1);
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, DRV_VERSION, len))
return -EFAULT;
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_CURRENT_STATUS: {
struct bcm_link_state link_state;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "copy_from_user failed..\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength != sizeof(link_state)) {
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
memset(&link_state, 0, sizeof(link_state));
link_state.bIdleMode = Adapter->IdleMode;
link_state.bShutdownMode = Adapter->bShutStatus;
link_state.ucLinkStatus = Adapter->LinkStatus;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &link_state, min_t(size_t, sizeof(link_state), IoBuffer.OutputLength))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy_to_user Failed..\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_SET_MAC_TRACING: {
UINT tracing_flag;
/* copy ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&tracing_flag, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tracing_flag)
Adapter->pTarangs->MacTracingEnabled = TRUE;
else
Adapter->pTarangs->MacTracingEnabled = FALSE;
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_DSX_INDICATION: {
ULONG ulSFId = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_add_indication_alt)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Mismatch req: %lx needed is =0x%zx!!!",
IoBuffer.OutputLength, sizeof(struct bcm_add_indication_alt));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ulSFId, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(ulSFId)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Get DSX Data SF ID is =%lx\n", ulSFId);
get_dsx_sf_data_to_application(Adapter, ulSFId, IoBuffer.OutputBuffer);
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_HOST_MIBS: {
PVOID temp_buff;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength != sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,
"Length Check failed %lu %zd\n",
IoBuffer.OutputLength, sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs));
return -EINVAL;
}
/* FIXME: HOST_STATS are too big for kmalloc (122048)! */
temp_buff = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp_buff)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
Status = ProcessGetHostMibs(Adapter, temp_buff);
GetDroppedAppCntrlPktMibs(temp_buff, pTarang);
if (Status != STATUS_FAILURE)
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, temp_buff, sizeof(struct bcm_host_stats_mibs))) {
kfree(temp_buff);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(temp_buff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_WAKE_UP_DEVICE_FROM_IDLE:
if ((FALSE == Adapter->bTriedToWakeUpFromlowPowerMode) && (TRUE == Adapter->IdleMode)) {
Adapter->usIdleModePattern = ABORT_IDLE_MODE;
Adapter->bWakeUpDevice = TRUE;
wake_up(&Adapter->process_rx_cntrlpkt);
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_BULK_WRM: {
struct bcm_bulk_wrm_buffer *pBulkBuffer;
UINT uiTempVar = 0;
PCHAR pvBuffer = NULL;
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device in Idle/Shutdown Mode, Blocking Wrms\n");
Status = -EACCES;
break;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.InputLength < sizeof(ULONG) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
pvBuffer = memdup_user(IoBuffer.InputBuffer,
IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (IS_ERR(pvBuffer))
return PTR_ERR(pvBuffer);
pBulkBuffer = (struct bcm_bulk_wrm_buffer *)pvBuffer;
if (((ULONG)pBulkBuffer->Register & 0x0F000000) != 0x0F000000 ||
((ULONG)pBulkBuffer->Register & 0x3)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM Done On invalid Address : %x Access Denied.\n", (int)pBulkBuffer->Register);
kfree(pvBuffer);
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
uiTempVar = pBulkBuffer->Register & EEPROM_REJECT_MASK;
if (!((Adapter->pstargetparams->m_u32Customize)&VSG_MODE) &&
((uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_1) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_2) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_3) ||
(uiTempVar == EEPROM_REJECT_REG_4)) &&
(cmd == IOCTL_BCM_REGISTER_WRITE)) {
kfree(pvBuffer);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "EEPROM Access Denied, not in VSG Mode\n");
Status = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (pBulkBuffer->SwapEndian == FALSE)
Status = wrmWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)pBulkBuffer->Register, (PCHAR)pBulkBuffer->Values, IoBuffer.InputLength - 2*sizeof(ULONG));
else
Status = wrmaltWithLock(Adapter, (UINT)pBulkBuffer->Register, (PUINT)pBulkBuffer->Values, IoBuffer.InputLength - 2*sizeof(ULONG));
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "WRM Failed\n");
kfree(pvBuffer);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_NVM_SIZE:
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_EEPROM || Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_FLASH) {
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_CAL_INIT: {
UINT uiSectorSize = 0 ;
if (Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_FLASH) {
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&uiSectorSize, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((uiSectorSize < MIN_SECTOR_SIZE) || (uiSectorSize > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)) {
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &Adapter->uiSectorSize,
sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter)) {
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &Adapter->uiSectorSize, sizeof(UINT)))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if ((TRUE == Adapter->bShutStatus) || (TRUE == Adapter->IdleMode)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->uiSectorSize = uiSectorSize;
BcmUpdateSectorSize(Adapter, Adapter->uiSectorSize);
}
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
} else {
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SET_DEBUG:
#ifdef DEBUG
{
struct bcm_user_debug_state sUserDebugState;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "In SET_DEBUG ioctl\n");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&sUserDebugState, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_user_debug_state)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "IOCTL_BCM_SET_DEBUG: OnOff=%d Type = 0x%x ",
sUserDebugState.OnOff, sUserDebugState.Type);
/* sUserDebugState.Subtype <<= 1; */
sUserDebugState.Subtype = 1 << sUserDebugState.Subtype;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT (Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "actual Subtype=0x%x\n", sUserDebugState.Subtype);
/* Update new 'DebugState' in the Adapter */
Adapter->stDebugState.type |= sUserDebugState.Type;
/* Subtype: A bitmap of 32 bits for Subtype per Type.
* Valid indexes in 'subtype' array: 1,2,4,8
* corresponding to valid Type values. Hence we can use the 'Type' field
* as the index value, ignoring the array entries 0,3,5,6,7 !
*/
if (sUserDebugState.OnOff)
Adapter->stDebugState.subtype[sUserDebugState.Type] |= sUserDebugState.Subtype;
else
Adapter->stDebugState.subtype[sUserDebugState.Type] &= ~sUserDebugState.Subtype;
BCM_SHOW_DEBUG_BITMAP(Adapter);
}
#endif
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_NVM_READ:
case IOCTL_BCM_NVM_WRITE: {
struct bcm_nvm_readwrite stNVMReadWrite;
PUCHAR pReadData = NULL;
ULONG ulDSDMagicNumInUsrBuff = 0;
struct timeval tv0, tv1;
memset(&tv0, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
memset(&tv1, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
if ((Adapter->eNVMType == NVM_FLASH) && (Adapter->uiFlashLayoutMajorVersion == 0)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "The Flash Control Section is Corrupted. Hence Rejection on NVM Read/Write\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter)) {
if ((Adapter->eActiveDSD != DSD0) &&
(Adapter->eActiveDSD != DSD1) &&
(Adapter->eActiveDSD != DSD2)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "No DSD is active..hence NVM Command is blocked");
return STATUS_FAILURE;
}
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&stNVMReadWrite,
(IOCTL_BCM_NVM_READ == cmd) ? IoBuffer.OutputBuffer : IoBuffer.InputBuffer,
sizeof(struct bcm_nvm_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Deny the access if the offset crosses the cal area limit.
*/
if (stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes > Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
if (stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset > Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize - stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes) {
/* BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter,DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0,"Can't allow access beyond NVM Size: 0x%x 0x%x\n", stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes); */
return STATUS_FAILURE;
}
pReadData = memdup_user(stNVMReadWrite.pBuffer,
stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes);
if (IS_ERR(pReadData))
return PTR_ERR(pReadData);
do_gettimeofday(&tv0);
if (IOCTL_BCM_NVM_READ == cmd) {
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return -EACCES;
}
Status = BeceemNVMRead(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadData, stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
if (copy_to_user(stNVMReadWrite.pBuffer, pReadData, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes)) {
kfree(pReadData);
return -EFAULT;
}
} else {
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->bHeaderChangeAllowed = TRUE;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter)) {
/*
* New Requirement:-
* DSD section updation will be allowed in two case:-
* 1. if DSD sig is present in DSD header means dongle is ok and updation is fruitfull
* 2. if point 1 failes then user buff should have DSD sig. this point ensures that if dongle is
* corrupted then user space program first modify the DSD header with valid DSD sig so
* that this as well as further write may be worthwhile.
*
* This restriction has been put assuming that if DSD sig is corrupted, DSD
* data won't be considered valid.
*/
Status = BcmFlash2xCorruptSig(Adapter, Adapter->eActiveDSD);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
if (((stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset + stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes) != Adapter->uiNVMDSDSize) ||
(stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes < SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "DSD Sig is present neither in Flash nor User provided Input..");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
ulDSDMagicNumInUsrBuff = ntohl(*(PUINT)(pReadData + stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes - SIGNATURE_SIZE));
if (ulDSDMagicNumInUsrBuff != DSD_IMAGE_MAGIC_NUMBER) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "DSD Sig is present neither in Flash nor User provided Input..");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
}
}
Status = BeceemNVMWrite(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadData, stNVMReadWrite.uiOffset, stNVMReadWrite.uiNumBytes, stNVMReadWrite.bVerify);
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter))
BcmFlash2xWriteSig(Adapter, Adapter->eActiveDSD);
Adapter->bHeaderChangeAllowed = FALSE;
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (Status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
kfree(pReadData);
return Status;
}
}
do_gettimeofday(&tv1);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, " timetaken by Write/read :%ld msec\n", (tv1.tv_sec - tv0.tv_sec)*1000 + (tv1.tv_usec - tv0.tv_usec)/1000);
kfree(pReadData);
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_READ: {
struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite sFlash2xRead = {0};
PUCHAR pReadBuff = NULL ;
UINT NOB = 0;
UINT BuffSize = 0;
UINT ReadBytes = 0;
UINT ReadOffset = 0;
void __user *OutPutBuff;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_READ Called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Reading FLASH 2.x READ structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sFlash2xRead, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.Section :%x", sFlash2xRead.Section);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.offset :%x", sFlash2xRead.offset);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.numOfBytes :%x", sFlash2xRead.numOfBytes);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.bVerify :%x\n", sFlash2xRead.bVerify);
/* This was internal to driver for raw read. now it has ben exposed to user space app. */
if (validateFlash2xReadWrite(Adapter, &sFlash2xRead) == FALSE)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
NOB = sFlash2xRead.numOfBytes;
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
BuffSize = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
BuffSize = NOB;
ReadOffset = sFlash2xRead.offset ;
OutPutBuff = IoBuffer.OutputBuffer;
pReadBuff = (PCHAR)kzalloc(BuffSize , GFP_KERNEL);
if (pReadBuff == NULL) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Memory allocation failed for Flash 2.x Read Structure");
return -ENOMEM;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
return -EACCES;
}
while (NOB) {
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
ReadBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
ReadBytes = NOB;
/* Reading the data from Flash 2.x */
Status = BcmFlash2xBulkRead(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadBuff, sFlash2xRead.Section, ReadOffset, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Flash 2x read err with Status :%d", Status);
break;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT_BUFFER(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
Status = copy_to_user(OutPutBuff, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Copy to use failed with status :%d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
return -EFAULT;
}
NOB = NOB - ReadBytes;
if (NOB) {
ReadOffset = ReadOffset + ReadBytes;
OutPutBuff = OutPutBuff + ReadBytes ;
}
}
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_WRITE: {
struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite sFlash2xWrite = {0};
PUCHAR pWriteBuff;
void __user *InputAddr;
UINT NOB = 0;
UINT BuffSize = 0;
UINT WriteOffset = 0;
UINT WriteBytes = 0;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* First make this False so that we can enable the Sector Permission Check in BeceemFlashBulkWrite */
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = FALSE;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_FLASH2X_SECTION_WRITE Called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Reading FLASH 2.x READ structure */
if (copy_from_user(&sFlash2xWrite, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.Section :%x", sFlash2xWrite.Section);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.offset :%d", sFlash2xWrite.offset);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.numOfBytes :%x", sFlash2xWrite.numOfBytes);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\nsFlash2xRead.bVerify :%x\n", sFlash2xWrite.bVerify);
if ((sFlash2xWrite.Section != VSA0) && (sFlash2xWrite.Section != VSA1) && (sFlash2xWrite.Section != VSA2)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Only VSA write is allowed");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (validateFlash2xReadWrite(Adapter, &sFlash2xWrite) == FALSE)
return STATUS_FAILURE;
InputAddr = sFlash2xWrite.pDataBuff;
WriteOffset = sFlash2xWrite.offset;
NOB = sFlash2xWrite.numOfBytes;
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
BuffSize = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
BuffSize = NOB ;
pWriteBuff = kmalloc(BuffSize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pWriteBuff == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* extracting the remainder of the given offset. */
WriteBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
if (WriteOffset % Adapter->uiSectorSize)
WriteBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize - (WriteOffset % Adapter->uiSectorSize);
if (NOB < WriteBytes)
WriteBytes = NOB;
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pWriteBuff);
return -EACCES;
}
BcmFlash2xCorruptSig(Adapter, sFlash2xWrite.Section);
do {
Status = copy_from_user(pWriteBuff, InputAddr, WriteBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy to user failed with status :%d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pWriteBuff);
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT_BUFFER(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, pWriteBuff, WriteBytes);
/* Writing the data from Flash 2.x */
Status = BcmFlash2xBulkWrite(Adapter, (PUINT)pWriteBuff, sFlash2xWrite.Section, WriteOffset, WriteBytes, sFlash2xWrite.bVerify);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash 2x read err with Status :%d", Status);
break;
}
NOB = NOB - WriteBytes;
if (NOB) {
WriteOffset = WriteOffset + WriteBytes;
InputAddr = InputAddr + WriteBytes;
if (NOB > Adapter->uiSectorSize)
WriteBytes = Adapter->uiSectorSize;
else
WriteBytes = NOB;
}
} while (NOB > 0);
BcmFlash2xWriteSig(Adapter, sFlash2xWrite.Section);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pWriteBuff);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH2X_SECTION_BITMAP: {
struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap *psFlash2xBitMap;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH2X_SECTION_BITMAP Called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength != sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap))
return -EINVAL;
psFlash2xBitMap = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (psFlash2xBitMap == NULL) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Memory is not available");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Reading the Flash Sectio Bit map */
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(psFlash2xBitMap);
return -EACCES;
}
BcmGetFlash2xSectionalBitMap(Adapter, psFlash2xBitMap);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, psFlash2xBitMap, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_bitmap))) {
kfree(psFlash2xBitMap);
return -EFAULT;
}
kfree(psFlash2xBitMap);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SET_ACTIVE_SECTION: {
enum bcm_flash2x_section_val eFlash2xSectionVal = 0;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SET_ACTIVE_SECTION Called");
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&eFlash2xSectionVal, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(INT));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of flash section val failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return -EACCES;
}
Status = BcmSetActiveSection(Adapter, eFlash2xSectionVal);
if (Status)
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Failed to make it's priority Highest. Status %d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_IDENTIFY_ACTIVE_SECTION: {
/* Right Now we are taking care of only DSD */
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = FALSE;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_IDENTIFY_ACTIVE_SECTION called");
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_COPY_SECTION: {
struct bcm_flash2x_copy_section sCopySectStrut = {0};
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_COPY_SECTION Called");
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = FALSE;
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed Status :%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&sCopySectStrut, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_copy_section));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of Copy_Section_Struct failed with Status :%d", Status);
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Source SEction :%x", sCopySectStrut.SrcSection);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Destination SEction :%x", sCopySectStrut.DstSection);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "offset :%x", sCopySectStrut.offset);
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "NOB :%x", sCopySectStrut.numOfBytes);
if (IsSectionExistInFlash(Adapter, sCopySectStrut.SrcSection) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Source Section<%x> does not exixt in Flash ", sCopySectStrut.SrcSection);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (IsSectionExistInFlash(Adapter, sCopySectStrut.DstSection) == FALSE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Destinatio Section<%x> does not exixt in Flash ", sCopySectStrut.DstSection);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (sCopySectStrut.SrcSection == sCopySectStrut.DstSection) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Source and Destination section should be different");
return -EINVAL;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return -EACCES;
}
if (sCopySectStrut.SrcSection == ISO_IMAGE1 || sCopySectStrut.SrcSection == ISO_IMAGE2) {
if (IsNonCDLessDevice(Adapter)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Device is Non-CDLess hence won't have ISO !!");
Status = -EINVAL;
} else if (sCopySectStrut.numOfBytes == 0) {
Status = BcmCopyISO(Adapter, sCopySectStrut);
} else {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Partial Copy of ISO section is not Allowed..");
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
}
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return Status;
}
Status = BcmCopySection(Adapter, sCopySectStrut.SrcSection,
sCopySectStrut.DstSection, sCopySectStrut.offset, sCopySectStrut.numOfBytes);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH_CS_INFO: {
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, " IOCTL_BCM_GET_FLASH_CS_INFO Called");
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (Adapter->eNVMType != NVM_FLASH) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Connected device does not have flash");
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) == TRUE) {
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_cs_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, Adapter->psFlash2xCSInfo, sizeof(struct bcm_flash2x_cs_info)))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_flash_cs_info))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, Adapter->psFlashCSInfo, sizeof(struct bcm_flash_cs_info)))
return -EFAULT;
}
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_SELECT_DSD: {
UINT SectOfset = 0;
enum bcm_flash2x_section_val eFlash2xSectionVal;
eFlash2xSectionVal = NO_SECTION_VAL;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_SELECT_DSD Called");
if (IsFlash2x(Adapter) != TRUE) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash Does not have 2.x map");
return -EINVAL;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of IOCTL BUFFER failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&eFlash2xSectionVal, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, sizeof(INT));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy of flash section val failed");
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Read Section :%d", eFlash2xSectionVal);
if ((eFlash2xSectionVal != DSD0) &&
(eFlash2xSectionVal != DSD1) &&
(eFlash2xSectionVal != DSD2)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Passed section<%x> is not DSD section", eFlash2xSectionVal);
return STATUS_FAILURE;
}
SectOfset = BcmGetSectionValStartOffset(Adapter, eFlash2xSectionVal);
if (SectOfset == INVALID_OFFSET) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Provided Section val <%d> does not exixt in Flash 2.x", eFlash2xSectionVal);
return -EINVAL;
}
Adapter->bAllDSDWriteAllow = TRUE;
Adapter->ulFlashCalStart = SectOfset;
Adapter->eActiveDSD = eFlash2xSectionVal;
}
Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_NVM_RAW_READ: {
struct bcm_nvm_readwrite stNVMRead;
INT NOB ;
INT BuffSize ;
INT ReadOffset = 0;
UINT ReadBytes = 0 ;
PUCHAR pReadBuff;
void __user *OutPutBuff;
if (Adapter->eNVMType != NVM_FLASH) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "NVM TYPE is not Flash");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer))) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "copy_from_user 1 failed\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (copy_from_user(&stNVMRead, IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, sizeof(struct bcm_nvm_readwrite)))
return -EFAULT;
NOB = stNVMRead.uiNumBytes;
/* In Raw-Read max Buff size : 64MB */
if (NOB > DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE)
BuffSize = DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE;
else
BuffSize = NOB;
ReadOffset = stNVMRead.uiOffset;
OutPutBuff = stNVMRead.pBuffer;
pReadBuff = kzalloc(BuffSize , GFP_KERNEL);
if (pReadBuff == NULL) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Memory allocation failed for Flash 2.x Read Structure");
Status = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
down(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
if ((Adapter->IdleMode == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bShutStatus == TRUE) ||
(Adapter->bPreparingForLowPowerMode == TRUE)) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Device is in Idle/Shutdown Mode\n");
kfree(pReadBuff);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
return -EACCES;
}
Adapter->bFlashRawRead = TRUE;
while (NOB) {
if (NOB > DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE)
ReadBytes = DEFAULT_BUFF_SIZE;
else
ReadBytes = NOB;
/* Reading the data from Flash 2.x */
Status = BeceemNVMRead(Adapter, (PUINT)pReadBuff, ReadOffset, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Flash 2x read err with Status :%d", Status);
break;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT_BUFFER(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
Status = copy_to_user(OutPutBuff, pReadBuff, ReadBytes);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_PRINTK, 0, 0, "Copy to use failed with status :%d", Status);
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
return -EFAULT;
}
NOB = NOB - ReadBytes;
if (NOB) {
ReadOffset = ReadOffset + ReadBytes;
OutPutBuff = OutPutBuff + ReadBytes;
}
}
Adapter->bFlashRawRead = FALSE;
up(&Adapter->NVMRdmWrmLock);
kfree(pReadBuff);
break;
}
case IOCTL_BCM_CNTRLMSG_MASK: {
ULONG RxCntrlMsgBitMask = 0;
/* Copy Ioctl Buffer structure */
Status = copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer));
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "copy of Ioctl buffer is failed from user space");
return -EFAULT;
}
if (IoBuffer.InputLength != sizeof(unsigned long)) {
Status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
Status = copy_from_user(&RxCntrlMsgBitMask, IoBuffer.InputBuffer, IoBuffer.InputLength);
if (Status) {
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "copy of control bit mask failed from user space");
return -EFAULT;
}
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "\n Got user defined cntrl msg bit mask :%lx", RxCntrlMsgBitMask);
pTarang->RxCntrlMsgBitMask = RxCntrlMsgBitMask;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO: {
struct bcm_driver_info DevInfo;
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "Called IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO\n");
DevInfo.MaxRDMBufferSize = BUFFER_4K;
DevInfo.u32DSDStartOffset = EEPROM_CALPARAM_START;
DevInfo.u32RxAlignmentCorrection = 0;
DevInfo.u32NVMType = Adapter->eNVMType;
DevInfo.u32InterfaceType = BCM_USB;
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(DevInfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &DevInfo, sizeof(DevInfo)))
return -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IOCTL_BCM_TIME_SINCE_NET_ENTRY: {
struct bcm_time_elapsed stTimeElapsedSinceNetEntry = {0};
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_BCM_TIME_SINCE_NET_ENTRY called");
if (copy_from_user(&IoBuffer, argp, sizeof(struct bcm_ioctl_buffer)))
return -EFAULT;
if (IoBuffer.OutputLength < sizeof(struct bcm_time_elapsed))
return -EINVAL;
stTimeElapsedSinceNetEntry.ul64TimeElapsedSinceNetEntry = get_seconds() - Adapter->liTimeSinceLastNetEntry;
if (copy_to_user(IoBuffer.OutputBuffer, &stTimeElapsedSinceNetEntry, sizeof(struct bcm_time_elapsed)))
return -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IOCTL_CLOSE_NOTIFICATION:
BCM_DEBUG_PRINT(Adapter, DBG_TYPE_OTHERS, OSAL_DBG, DBG_LVL_ALL, "IOCTL_CLOSE_NOTIFICATION");
break;
default:
pr_info(DRV_NAME ": unknown ioctl cmd=%#x\n", cmd);
Status = STATUS_FAILURE;
break;
}
return Status;
}
| 15,758,140,552,209,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | Bcmchar.c | 297,513,847,153,823,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-4515 | The bcm_char_ioctl function in drivers/staging/bcm/Bcmchar.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via an IOCTL_BCM_GET_DEVICE_DRIVER_INFO ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4515 |
936 | linux | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_set_station_nickname");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
wl_lock(lp, &flags);
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);
/* Commit the adapter parameters */
wl_apply(lp);
wl_unlock(lp, &flags);
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ret;
} /* wvlan_set_station_nickname */
| 62,431,484,736,668,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | wl_priv.c | 140,308,459,115,906,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4514 | Multiple buffer overflows in drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allow local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a long station-name string, related to the (1) wvlan_uil_put_info and (2) wvlan_set_station_nickname functions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4514 |
937 | linux | b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5e2f339865fb443107e5b10603e53bbc92dc054 | staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
ltv_t *pLtv;
bool_t ltvAllocated = FALSE;
ENCSTRCT sEncryption;
#ifdef USE_WDS
hcf_16 hcfPort = HCF_PORT_0;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_uil_put_info");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
if (urq->hcfCtx == &(lp->hcfCtx)) {
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
if ((urq->data != NULL) && (urq->len != 0)) {
/* Make sure that we have at least a command and length to send. */
if (urq->len < (sizeof(hcf_16) * 2)) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "No Length/Type in LTV!!!\n");
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Verify the user buffer */
result = verify_area(VERIFY_READ, urq->data, urq->len);
if (result != 0) {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "verify_area(), VERIFY_READ FAILED\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Get only the command and length information. */
copy_from_user(&(lp->ltvRecord), urq->data, sizeof(hcf_16) * 2);
/* Make sure the incoming LTV record length is within the bounds of the
IOCTL length */
if (((lp->ltvRecord.len + 1) * sizeof(hcf_16)) > urq->len) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* If the requested length is greater than the size of our local
LTV record, try to allocate it from the kernel stack.
Otherwise, we just use our local LTV record. */
if (urq->len > sizeof(lp->ltvRecord)) {
pLtv = kmalloc(urq->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pLtv != NULL) {
ltvAllocated = TRUE;
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "Alloc FAILED\n");
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
result = -ENOMEM;
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
} else {
pLtv = &(lp->ltvRecord);
}
/* Copy the data from the user's buffer into the local LTV
record data area. */
copy_from_user(pLtv, urq->data, urq->len);
/* We need to snoop the commands to see if there is anything we
need to store for the purposes of a reset or start/stop
sequence. Perform endian translation as needed */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
lp->PortType = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
lp->Channel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID currently same as CNF_DESIRED_SSID. Do we
need separate storage for this? */
/* case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID: */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
lp->atimWindow = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
lp->DistanceBetweenAPs = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based
on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
lp->PMEnabled = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
lp->MulticastReceive = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
lp->MaxSleepDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
lp->holdoverDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy((void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
lp->loadBalancing = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
lp->mediumDistribution = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
lp->txPowLevel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_CNF_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT: */ /* Short Retry Limit */
/* case 0xFC33: */ /* Long Retry Limit */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Supported Rate Set Control */
lp->srsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->srsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_BASIC_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Basic Rate Set Control */
lp->brsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->brsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
lp->connectionControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
lp->DTIMPeriod = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
lp->ownBeaconInterval = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif /* WARP */
case CFG_COEXISTENSE_BEHAVIOUR: /* Coexistence behavior */
lp->coexistence = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[0].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[1].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[2].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[3].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[4].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[5].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
lp->multicastPMBuffering = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
lp->RejectAny = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
lp->EnableEncryption = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
lp->authentication = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
/* case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
lp->ExcludeUnencrypted = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break; */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
lp->intraBSSRelay = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/*case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:*/
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
/* case CNF_DESIRED_SSID: */
case CFG_DESIRED_SSID:
memset(lp->NetworkName, 0, sizeof(lp->NetworkName));
memcpy((void *)lp->NetworkName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
/* take care of the special network name "ANY" case */
if ((strlen(&pLtv->u.u8[2]) == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "ANY") == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "any") == 0)) {
/* set the SSID_STRCT llen field (u16[0]) to zero, and the
effectually null the string u8[2] */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = 0;
pLtv->u.u8[2] = 0;
}
break;
case CFG_GROUP_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CREATE_IBSS:
lp->CreateIBSS = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL:
lp->TxRateControl[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->TxRateControl[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_PROMISCUOUS_MODE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* case CFG_WAKE_ON_LAN: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
#if 1 /* ;? #if (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_RTS_THRH0:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL0:
/*;?no idea what this should be, get going so comment it out lp->TxRateControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];*/
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_RTS_THRH1:
lp->wds_port[0].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH2:
lp->wds_port[1].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH3:
lp->wds_port[2].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH4:
lp->wds_port[3].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH5:
lp->wds_port[4].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH6:
lp->wds_port[5].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL1:
lp->wds_port[0].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL2:
lp->wds_port[1].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL3:
lp->wds_port[2].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL4:
lp->wds_port[3].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL5:
lp->wds_port[4].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL6:
lp->wds_port[5].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
#endif /* (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
case CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS:
{
CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *pKeys = (CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *)pLtv;
pKeys->key[0].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[0].len);
pKeys->key[1].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[1].len);
pKeys->key[2].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[2].len);
pKeys->key[3].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[3].len);
memcpy((void *)&(lp->DefaultKeys), (void *)pKeys,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
}
break;
case CFG_TX_KEY_ID:
lp->TransmitKeyID = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SCAN_SSID:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_TICK_TIME:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* these RIDS are Info RIDs, and should they be allowed for puts??? */
case CFG_MAX_LOAD_TIME:
case CFG_DL_BUF:
/* case CFG_HSI_SUP_RANGE: */
case CFG_NIC_SERIAL_NUMBER:
case CFG_NIC_IDENTITY:
case CFG_NIC_MFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_CFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_TEMP_TYPE:
case CFG_NIC_PROFILE:
case CFG_FW_IDENTITY:
case CFG_FW_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_MFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_CFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_PORT_STAT:
case CFG_CUR_SSID:
case CFG_CUR_BSSID:
case CFG_COMMS_QUALITY:
case CFG_CUR_TX_RATE:
case CFG_CUR_BEACON_INTERVAL:
case CFG_CUR_SCALE_THRH:
case CFG_PROTOCOL_RSP_TIME:
case CFG_CUR_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_CUR_LONG_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_MAX_TX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_MAX_RX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_CF_POLLABLE:
case CFG_AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHMS:
case CFG_PRIVACY_OPT_IMPLEMENTED:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_REMOTE_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_USED_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_SYSTEM_SCALE: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE1: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE2: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE3: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE4: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE5: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE6: */
case CFG_NIC_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_PCF_INFO:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_COUNTRY_INFO: */
case CFG_PHY_TYPE:
case CFG_CUR_CHANNEL:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_POWER_STATE: */
/* case CFG_CCAMODE: */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_DATA_RATES:
break;
case CFG_AP_MODE:
/*;? lp->DownloadFirmware = (pLtv->u.u16[0]) + 1; */
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "set CFG_AP_MODE no longer supported\n");
break;
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* TODO: ENDIAN TRANSLATION HERE??? */
memset(lp->szEncryption, 0, sizeof(lp->szEncryption));
memcpy((void *)lp->szEncryption, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[0],
(pLtv->len * sizeof(hcf_16)));
wl_wep_decode(CRYPT_CODE, &sEncryption,
lp->szEncryption);
/* the Linux driver likes to use 1-4 for the key IDs, and then
convert to 0-3 when sending to the card. The Windows code
base used 0-3 in the API DLL, which was ported to Linux. For
the sake of the user experience, we decided to keep 0-3 as the
numbers used in the DLL; and will perform the +1 conversion here.
We could have converted the entire Linux driver, but this is
less obtrusive. This may be a "todo" to convert the whole driver */
lp->TransmitKeyID = sEncryption.wTxKeyID + 1;
lp->EnableEncryption = sEncryption.wEnabled;
memcpy(&lp->DefaultKeys, &sEncryption.EncStr,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
break;
/*case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING:
memset(lp->countryString, 0, sizeof(lp->countryString));
memcpy((void *)lp->countryString, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
*/
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
lp->driverEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
lp->wolasEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SET_WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SUITE:
lp->AuthKeyMgmtSuite = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_DISASSOCIATE_ADDR:
pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
/* Endian convert the Tx Key Information */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
/* some RIDs just can't be put */
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
default:
break;
}
/* This code will prevent Static Configuration Entities from
being sent to the card, as they require a call to
UIL_ACT_APPLY to take effect. Dynamic Entities will be sent
immediately */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
/*case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /*;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/*;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
#endif /* WARP */
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING: */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING: */
case CFG_AP_MODE:
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE: */
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
break;
/* Deal with this dynamic MSF RID, as it's required for WPA */
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
if (lp->driverEnable) {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_ENABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_CONNECT);
} else {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISCONNECT);
}
break;
default:
wl_act_int_off(lp);
urq->result = hcf_put_info(&(lp->hcfCtx), (LTVP) pLtv);
wl_act_int_on(lp);
break;
}
if (ltvAllocated)
kfree(pLtv);
} else {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "EPERM\n");
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
result = -EPERM;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB\n");
urq->result = UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB;
}
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
} /* wvlan_uil_put_info */
| 192,300,055,996,805,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | wl_priv.c | 140,308,459,115,906,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4514 | Multiple buffer overflows in drivers/staging/wlags49_h2/wl_priv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allow local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and providing a long station-name string, related to the (1) wvlan_uil_put_info and (2) wvlan_set_station_nickname functions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4514 |
938 | linux | c2c65cd2e14ada6de44cb527e7f1990bede24e15 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2c65cd2e14ada6de44cb527e7f1990bede24e15 | staging: ozwpan: prevent overflow in oz_cdev_write()
We need to check "count" so we don't overflow the ei->data buffer.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static ssize_t oz_cdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *fpos)
{
struct oz_pd *pd;
struct oz_elt_buf *eb;
struct oz_elt_info *ei;
struct oz_elt *elt;
struct oz_app_hdr *app_hdr;
struct oz_serial_ctx *ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
pd = g_cdev.active_pd;
if (pd)
oz_pd_get(pd);
spin_unlock_bh(&g_cdev.lock);
if (pd == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
if (!(pd->state & OZ_PD_S_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
eb = &pd->elt_buff;
ei = oz_elt_info_alloc(eb);
if (ei == NULL) {
count = 0;
goto out;
}
elt = (struct oz_elt *)ei->data;
app_hdr = (struct oz_app_hdr *)(elt+1);
elt->length = sizeof(struct oz_app_hdr) + count;
elt->type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA;
ei->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
ei->length = elt->length + sizeof(struct oz_elt);
app_hdr->app_id = OZ_APPID_SERIAL;
if (copy_from_user(app_hdr+1, buf, count))
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
ctx = (struct oz_serial_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_SERIAL-1];
if (ctx) {
app_hdr->elt_seq_num = ctx->tx_seq_num++;
if (ctx->tx_seq_num == 0)
ctx->tx_seq_num = 1;
spin_lock(&eb->lock);
if (oz_queue_elt_info(eb, 0, 0, ei) == 0)
ei = NULL;
spin_unlock(&eb->lock);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB-1]);
out:
if (ei) {
count = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&eb->lock);
oz_elt_info_free(eb, ei);
spin_unlock_bh(&eb->lock);
}
oz_pd_put(pd);
return count;
}
| 33,191,172,042,980,295,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ozcdev.c | 132,604,815,029,829,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4513 | Buffer overflow in the oz_cdev_write function in drivers/staging/ozwpan/ozcdev.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted write operation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4513 |
956 | linux | 6062a8dc0517bce23e3c2f7d2fea5e22411269a3 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6062a8dc0517bce23e3c2f7d2fea5e22411269a3 | ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | void ipc_rcu_putref(void *ptr)
{
if (--container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount > 0)
return;
if (container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc) {
call_rcu(&container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_grace, data)->rcu,
ipc_schedule_free);
} else {
kfree_rcu(container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_grace, data), rcu);
}
}
| 147,913,652,096,999,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | util.c | 17,292,951,975,649,307,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-4483 | The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4483 |
957 | linux | e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9 | ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static inline int ip_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int maxfraglen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP fragmentation offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb, fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
/* specify the length of each IP datagram fragment */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
}
return skb_append_datato_frags(sk, skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
}
| 119,382,236,388,357,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-4470 | The Linux kernel before 3.12, when UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) is enabled, does not properly initialize certain data structures, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call and sends both short and long packets, related to the ip_ufo_append_data function in net/ipv4/ip_output.c and the ip6_ufo_append_data function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4470 |
962 | linux | d661684cf6820331feae71146c35da83d794467e | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d661684cf6820331feae71146c35da83d794467e | net: Check the correct namespace when spoofing pid over SCM_RIGHTS
This is a security bug.
The follow-up will fix nsproxy to discourage this type of issue from
happening again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
| 113,094,377,788,410,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | scm.c | 87,676,516,371,579,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-4300 | The scm_check_creds function in net/core/scm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11 performs a capability check in an incorrect namespace, which allows local users to gain privileges via PID spoofing. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4300 |
964 | linux | 2433c8f094a008895e66f25bd1773cdb01c91d01 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2433c8f094a008895e66f25bd1773cdb01c91d01 | net: Update the sysctl permissions handler to test effective uid/gid
Modify the code to use current_euid(), and in_egroup_p, as in done
in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:test_perm()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
/* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) ||
uid_eq(root_uid, current_uid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
}
/* Allow netns root group to have the same access as the root group */
if (gid_eq(root_gid, current_gid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 3) & 7;
return (mode << 3) | mode;
}
return table->mode;
}
| 4,251,532,209,852,224,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sysctl_net.c | 256,848,416,992,939,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4270 | The net_ctl_permissions function in net/sysctl_net.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.5 does not properly determine uid and gid values, which allows local users to bypass intended /proc/sys/net restrictions via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4270 |
965 | FFmpeg | c94f9e854228e0ea00e1de8769d8d3f7cab84a55 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/c94f9e854228e0ea00e1de8769d8d3f7cab84a55 | avutil/mem: Fix flipped condition
Fixes return code and later null pointer dereference
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | int av_reallocp_array(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void **ptrptr = ptr;
*ptrptr = av_realloc_f(*ptrptr, nmemb, size);
if (!*ptrptr && !(nmemb && size))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
| 104,455,358,682,340,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | mem.c | 308,060,967,527,841,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2013-4265 | The av_reallocp_array function in libavutil/mem.c in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has an unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a "wrong return code" and a resultant NULL pointer dereference. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4265 |
977 | linux | c95eb3184ea1a3a2551df57190c81da695e2144b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c95eb3184ea1a3a2551df57190c81da695e2144b | ARM: 7809/1: perf: fix event validation for software group leaders
It is possible to construct an event group with a software event as a
group leader and then subsequently add a hardware event to the group.
This results in the event group being validated by adding all members
of the group to a fake PMU and attempting to allocate each event on
their respective PMU.
Unfortunately, for software events wthout a corresponding arm_pmu, this
results in a kernel crash attempting to dereference the ->get_event_idx
function pointer.
This patch fixes the problem by checking explicitly for software events
and ignoring those in event validation (since they can always be
scheduled). We will probably want to revisit this for 3.12, since the
validation checks don't appear to work correctly when dealing with
multiple hardware PMUs anyway.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | 1 | validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, event) >= 0;
}
| 214,965,441,703,397,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | perf_event.c | 244,258,602,866,703,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4254 | The validate_event function in arch/arm/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10.8 on the ARM platform allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by adding a hardware event to an event group led by a software event. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4254 |
978 | linux | 1fc29bacedeabb278080e31bb9c1ecb49f143c3b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fc29bacedeabb278080e31bb9c1ecb49f143c3b | cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> | 1 | build_unc_path_to_root(const struct smb_vol *vol,
const struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
{
char *full_path, *pos;
unsigned int pplen = vol->prepath ? strlen(vol->prepath) + 1 : 0;
unsigned int unc_len = strnlen(vol->UNC, MAX_TREE_SIZE + 1);
full_path = kmalloc(unc_len + pplen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (full_path == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
strncpy(full_path, vol->UNC, unc_len);
pos = full_path + unc_len;
if (pplen) {
*pos++ = CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb);
strncpy(pos, vol->prepath, pplen);
pos += pplen;
}
*pos = '\0'; /* add trailing null */
convert_delimiter(full_path, CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: full_path=%s\n", __func__, full_path);
return full_path;
}
| 8,340,581,254,640,439,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | connect.c | 127,914,316,993,594,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-4247 | Off-by-one error in the build_unc_path_to_root function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) via a DFS share mount operation that triggers use of an unexpected DFS referral name length. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4247 |
979 | libtiff | ce6841d9e41d621ba23cf18b190ee6a23b2cc833 | https://github.com/vadz/libtiff | https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/ce6841d9e41d621ba23cf18b190ee6a23b2cc833 | fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c | 1 | process(register int code, unsigned char** fill)
{
int incode;
static unsigned char firstchar;
if (code == clear) {
codesize = datasize + 1;
codemask = (1 << codesize) - 1;
avail = clear + 2;
oldcode = -1;
return 1;
}
if (oldcode == -1) {
*(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
firstchar = oldcode = code;
return 1;
}
if (code > avail) {
fprintf(stderr, "code %d too large for %d\n", code, avail);
return 0;
}
incode = code;
if (code == avail) { /* the first code is always < avail */
*stackp++ = firstchar;
code = oldcode;
}
while (code > clear) {
*stackp++ = suffix[code];
code = prefix[code];
}
*stackp++ = firstchar = suffix[code];
prefix[avail] = oldcode;
suffix[avail] = firstchar;
avail++;
if (((avail & codemask) == 0) && (avail < 4096)) {
codesize++;
codemask += avail;
}
oldcode = incode;
do {
*(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
} while (stackp > stack);
return 1;
}
| 49,639,759,056,433,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-4244 | The LZW decompressor in the gif2tiff tool in libtiff 4.0.3 and earlier allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write and crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted GIF image. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4244 |
980 | linux | 9955ac47f4ba1c95ecb6092aeaefb40a22e99268 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9955ac47f4ba1c95ecb6092aeaefb40a22e99268 | arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org | 1 | asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr)
{
console_verbose();
pr_crit("Bad mode in %s handler detected, code 0x%08x\n",
handler[reason], esr);
die("Oops - bad mode", regs, 0);
local_irq_disable();
panic("bad mode");
}
| 172,340,806,476,661,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | traps.c | 194,636,283,620,040,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-4220 | The bad_mode function in arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9.5 on the ARM64 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving an attempted register access that triggers an unexpected value in the Exception Syndrome Register (ESR). | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4220 |
982 | linux | 75a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/75a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be | ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static void ip6_append_data_mtu(int *mtu,
int *maxfraglen,
unsigned int fragheaderlen,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (!(rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)) {
if (skb == NULL) {
/* first fragment, reserve header_len */
*mtu = *mtu - rt->dst.header_len;
} else {
/*
* this fragment is not first, the headers
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
*mtu = dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
}
*maxfraglen = ((*mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7)
+ fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
}
}
| 249,477,262,173,279,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ip6_output.c | 32,175,030,324,283,845,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4163 | The ip6_append_data_mtu function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 does not properly maintain information about whether the IPV6_MTU setsockopt option had been specified, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4163 |
984 | linux | 8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1 | ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int udp_v6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct udphdr *uh;
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 *fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
__wsum csum = 0;
/* Grab the skbuff where UDP header space exists. */
if ((skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto out;
/*
* Create a UDP header
*/
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = fl6->fl6_sport;
uh->dest = fl6->fl6_dport;
uh->len = htons(up->len);
uh->check = 0;
if (is_udplite)
csum = udplite_csum_outgoing(sk, skb);
else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { /* UDP hardware csum */
udp6_hwcsum_outgoing(sk, skb, &fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
up->len);
goto send;
} else
csum = udp_csum_outgoing(sk, skb);
/* add protocol-dependent pseudo-header */
uh->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr,
up->len, fl6->flowi6_proto, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
send:
err = ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet6_sk(sk)->recverr) {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
err = 0;
}
} else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_OUTDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
out:
up->len = 0;
up->pending = 0;
return err;
}
| 308,814,749,542,050,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | udp.c | 46,858,807,665,352,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4162 | The udp_v6_push_pending_frames function in net/ipv6/udp.c in the IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 makes an incorrect function call for pending data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via a crafted application that uses the UDP_CORK option in a setsockopt system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4162 |
985 | linux | c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1 | bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int __br_mdb_del(struct net_bridge *br, struct br_mdb_entry *entry)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
struct br_ip ip;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || br->multicast_disabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (timer_pending(&br->multicast_querier_timer))
return -EBUSY;
ip.proto = entry->addr.proto;
if (ip.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
ip.u.ip4 = entry->addr.u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
else
ip.u.ip6 = entry->addr.u.ip6;
#endif
spin_lock_bh(&br->multicast_lock);
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
mp = br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &ip);
if (!mp)
goto unlock;
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (!p->port || p->port->dev->ifindex != entry->ifindex)
continue;
if (p->port->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED)
goto unlock;
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p->next);
hlist_del_init(&p->mglist);
del_timer(&p->timer);
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
err = 0;
if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
break;
}
unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&br->multicast_lock);
return err;
}
| 182,535,534,055,103,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | br_mdb.c | 276,386,508,481,368,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4129 | The bridge multicast implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 does not check whether a certain timer is armed before modifying the timeout value of that timer, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via vectors involving the shutdown of a KVM virtual machine, related to net/bridge/br_mdb.c and net/bridge/br_multicast.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4129 |
986 | linux | c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c7e8e8a8f7a70b343ca1e0f90a31e35ab2d16de1 | bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static void br_multicast_del_pg(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
mp = br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &pg->addr);
if (WARN_ON(!mp))
return;
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (p != pg)
continue;
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p->next);
hlist_del_init(&p->mglist);
del_timer(&p->timer);
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
return;
}
WARN_ON(1);
}
| 74,664,793,578,988,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | br_multicast.c | 3,552,800,112,656,103,400,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4129 | The bridge multicast implementation in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 does not check whether a certain timer is armed before modifying the timeout value of that timer, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) via vectors involving the shutdown of a KVM virtual machine, related to net/bridge/br_mdb.c and net/bridge/br_multicast.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4129 |
987 | linux | dd7633ecd553a5e304d349aa6f8eb8a0417098c5 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dd7633ecd553a5e304d349aa6f8eb8a0417098c5 | vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
{
struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs, *oldubufs = NULL;
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
goto err;
if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
vq = &n->vqs[index].vq;
nvq = &n->vqs[index];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(vq)) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto err_vq;
}
sock = get_socket(fd);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
r = PTR_ERR(sock);
goto err_vq;
}
/* start polling new socket */
oldsock = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->private_data,
lockdep_is_held(&vq->mutex));
if (sock != oldsock) {
ubufs = vhost_net_ubuf_alloc(vq,
sock && vhost_sock_zcopy(sock));
if (IS_ERR(ubufs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(ubufs);
goto err_ubufs;
}
vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
r = vhost_init_used(vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
oldubufs = nvq->ubufs;
nvq->ubufs = ubufs;
n->tx_packets = 0;
n->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
n->tx_flush = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (oldubufs) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(oldubufs);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(n, vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
if (oldsock) {
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
fput(oldsock->file);
}
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return 0;
err_used:
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, oldsock);
vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(ubufs);
err_ubufs:
fput(sock->file);
err_vq:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
err:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
| 241,366,389,520,784,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | net.c | 277,417,259,469,627,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4127 | Use-after-free vulnerability in the vhost_net_set_backend function in drivers/vhost/net.c in the Linux kernel through 3.10.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS and system crash) via vectors involving powering on a virtual machine. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4127 |
988 | linux | 307f2fb95e9b96b3577916e73d92e104f8f26494 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/307f2fb95e9b96b3577916e73d92e104f8f26494 | ipv6: only static routes qualify for equal cost multipathing
Static routes in this case are non-expiring routes which did not get
configured by autoconf or by icmpv6 redirects.
To make sure we actually get an ecmp route while searching for the first
one in this fib6_node's leafs, also make sure it matches the ecmp route
assumptions.
v2:
a) Removed RTF_EXPIRE check in dst.from chain. The check of RTF_ADDRCONF
already ensures that this route, even if added again without
RTF_EXPIRES (in case of a RA announcement with infinite timeout),
does not cause the rt6i_nsiblings logic to go wrong if a later RA
updates the expiration time later.
v3:
a) Allow RTF_EXPIRES routes to enter the ecmp route set. We have to do so,
because an pmtu event could update the RTF_EXPIRES flag and we would
not count this route, if another route joins this set. We now filter
only for RTF_GATEWAY|RTF_ADDRCONF|RTF_DYNAMIC, which are flags that
don't get changed after rt6_info construction.
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct rt6_info *rt,
struct nl_info *info)
{
struct rt6_info *iter = NULL;
struct rt6_info **ins;
int replace = (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE));
int add = (!info->nlh ||
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE));
int found = 0;
ins = &fn->leaf;
for (iter = fn->leaf; iter; iter = iter->dst.rt6_next) {
/*
* Search for duplicates
*/
if (iter->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
/*
* Same priority level
*/
if (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
return -EEXIST;
if (replace) {
found++;
break;
}
if (iter->dst.dev == rt->dst.dev &&
iter->rt6i_idev == rt->rt6i_idev &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&iter->rt6i_gateway,
&rt->rt6i_gateway)) {
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings)
rt->rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
if (!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
return -EEXIST;
if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt6_clean_expires(iter);
else
rt6_set_expires(iter, rt->dst.expires);
return -EEXIST;
}
/* If we have the same destination and the same metric,
* but not the same gateway, then the route we try to
* add is sibling to this route, increment our counter
* of siblings, and later we will add our route to the
* list.
* Only static routes (which don't have flag
* RTF_EXPIRES) are used for ECMPv6.
*
* To avoid long list, we only had siblings if the
* route have a gateway.
*/
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY &&
!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) &&
!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt->rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
if (iter->rt6i_metric > rt->rt6i_metric)
break;
ins = &iter->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* Reset round-robin state, if necessary */
if (ins == &fn->leaf)
fn->rr_ptr = NULL;
/* Link this route to others same route. */
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings) {
unsigned int rt6i_nsiblings;
struct rt6_info *sibling, *temp_sibling;
/* Find the first route that have the same metric */
sibling = fn->leaf;
while (sibling) {
if (sibling->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
list_add_tail(&rt->rt6i_siblings,
&sibling->rt6i_siblings);
break;
}
sibling = sibling->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* For each sibling in the list, increment the counter of
* siblings. BUG() if counters does not match, list of siblings
* is broken!
*/
rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, temp_sibling,
&rt->rt6i_siblings, rt6i_siblings) {
sibling->rt6i_nsiblings++;
BUG_ON(sibling->rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
BUG_ON(rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
}
/*
* insert node
*/
if (!replace) {
if (!add)
pr_warn("NLM_F_CREATE should be set when creating new route\n");
add:
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter;
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_entries++;
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
} else {
if (!found) {
if (add)
goto add;
pr_warn("NLM_F_REPLACE set, but no existing node found!\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter->dst.rt6_next;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
rt6_release(iter);
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 27,152,909,099,956,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ip6_fib.c | 287,079,937,670,340,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-4125 | The fib6_add_rt2node function in net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c in the IPv6 stack in the Linux kernel through 3.10.1 does not properly handle Router Advertisement (RA) messages in certain circumstances involving three routes that initially qualified for membership in an ECMP route set until a change occurred for one of the first two routes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted sequence of messages. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4125 |
992 | linux | ea702b80e0bbb2448e201472127288beb82ca2fe | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ea702b80e0bbb2448e201472127288beb82ca2fe | cifs: move check for NULL socket into smb_send_rqst
Cai reported this oops:
[90701.616664] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028
[90701.625438] IP: [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.632167] PGD fea319067 PUD 103fda4067 PMD 0
[90701.637255] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[90701.640878] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver binfmt_misc tun sg igb iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_core i7core_edac edac_core ioatdma dca mfd_core coretemp kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel microcode sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod pata_acpi crc_t10dif ata_piix libata megaraid_sas dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[90701.677655] CPU 10
[90701.679808] Pid: 9627, comm: ls Tainted: G W 3.7.1+ #10 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R
[90701.688950] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814a343e>] [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.698383] RSP: 0018:ffff88177b431bb8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[90701.704309] RAX: ffff88177b431fd8 RBX: 00007ffffffff000 RCX: ffff88177b431bec
[90701.712271] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000000
[90701.720223] RBP: ffff88177b431bc8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[90701.728185] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[90701.736147] R13: ffff88184ef92000 R14: 0000000000000023 R15: ffff88177b431c88
[90701.744109] FS: 00007fd56a1a47c0(0000) GS:ffff88105fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[90701.753137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[90701.759550] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000104f15f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
[90701.767512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[90701.775465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[90701.783428] Process ls (pid: 9627, threadinfo ffff88177b430000, task ffff88185ca4cb60)
[90701.792261] Stack:
[90701.794505] 0000000000000023 ffff88177b431c50 ffff88177b431c38 ffffffffa014fcb1
[90701.802809] ffff88184ef921bc 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff88184ef921c0
[90701.811123] ffff88177b431c08 ffffffff815ca3d9 ffff88177b431c18 ffff880857758000
[90701.819433] Call Trace:
[90701.822183] [<ffffffffa014fcb1>] smb_send_rqst+0x71/0x1f0 [cifs]
[90701.828991] [<ffffffff815ca3d9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70
[90701.834736] [<ffffffffa014fe6d>] smb_sendv+0x3d/0x40 [cifs]
[90701.841062] [<ffffffffa014fe96>] smb_send+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.847291] [<ffffffffa015801f>] send_nt_cancel+0x6f/0xd0 [cifs]
[90701.854102] [<ffffffffa015075e>] SendReceive+0x18e/0x360 [cifs]
[90701.860814] [<ffffffffa0134a78>] CIFSFindFirst+0x1a8/0x3f0 [cifs]
[90701.867724] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.875601] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.883477] [<ffffffffa01578e6>] cifs_query_dir_first+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.890869] [<ffffffffa015480d>] initiate_cifs_search+0xed/0x250 [cifs]
[90701.898354] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.904486] [<ffffffffa01554cb>] cifs_readdir+0x45b/0x8f0 [cifs]
[90701.911288] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.917410] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.923533] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.929657] [<ffffffff81195848>] vfs_readdir+0xb8/0xe0
[90701.935490] [<ffffffff81195b9f>] sys_getdents+0x8f/0x110
[90701.941521] [<ffffffff815d3b99>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[90701.948222] Code: 66 90 55 65 48 8b 04 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 83 fe 01 48 8b 98 48 e0 ff ff 48 c7 80 48 e0 ff ff ff ff ff ff 74 22 <48> 8b 47 28 ff 50 68 65 48 8b 14 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 9a 48 e0
[90701.970313] RIP [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.977125] RSP <ffff88177b431bb8>
[90701.981018] CR2: 0000000000000028
[90701.984809] ---[ end trace 24bd602971110a43 ]---
This is likely due to a race vs. a reconnection event.
The current code checks for a NULL socket in smb_send_kvec, but that's
too late. By the time that check is done, the socket will already have
been passed to kernel_setsockopt. Move the check into smb_send_rqst, so
that it's checked earlier.
In truth, this is a bit of a half-assed fix. The -ENOTSOCK error
return here looks like it could bubble back up to userspace. The locking
rules around the ssocket pointer are really unclear as well. There are
cases where the ssocket pointer is changed without holding the srv_mutex,
but I'm not clear whether there's a potential race here yet or not.
This code seems like it could benefit from some fundamental re-think of
how the socket handling should behave. Until then though, this patch
should at least fix the above oops in most cases.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7+
Reported-and-Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> | 1 | smb_send_rqst(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_rqst *rqst)
{
int rc;
struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
unsigned int smb_buf_length = get_rfc1002_length(iov[0].iov_base);
unsigned int i;
size_t total_len = 0, sent;
struct socket *ssocket = server->ssocket;
int val = 1;
cFYI(1, "Sending smb: smb_len=%u", smb_buf_length);
dump_smb(iov[0].iov_base, iov[0].iov_len);
/* cork the socket */
kernel_setsockopt(ssocket, SOL_TCP, TCP_CORK,
(char *)&val, sizeof(val));
rc = smb_send_kvec(server, iov, n_vec, &sent);
if (rc < 0)
goto uncork;
total_len += sent;
/* now walk the page array and send each page in it */
for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
struct kvec p_iov;
cifs_rqst_page_to_kvec(rqst, i, &p_iov);
rc = smb_send_kvec(server, &p_iov, 1, &sent);
kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
if (rc < 0)
break;
total_len += sent;
}
uncork:
/* uncork it */
val = 0;
kernel_setsockopt(ssocket, SOL_TCP, TCP_CORK,
(char *)&val, sizeof(val));
if ((total_len > 0) && (total_len != smb_buf_length + 4)) {
cFYI(1, "partial send (wanted=%u sent=%zu): terminating "
"session", smb_buf_length + 4, total_len);
/*
* If we have only sent part of an SMB then the next SMB could
* be taken as the remainder of this one. We need to kill the
* socket so the server throws away the partial SMB
*/
server->tcpStatus = CifsNeedReconnect;
}
if (rc < 0 && rc != -EINTR)
cERROR(1, "Error %d sending data on socket to server", rc);
else
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
| 125,179,843,386,250,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | transport.c | 274,077,842,134,574,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-362"
] | CVE-2013-3302 | Race condition in the smb_send_rqst function in fs/cifs/transport.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving a reconnection event. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3302 |
993 | linux | 6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d | tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 1 | ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
| 93,795,587,963,981,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ftrace.c | 76,813,553,117,675,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-3301 | The ftrace implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for write access to the (1) set_ftrace_pid or (2) set_graph_function file, and then making an lseek system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3301 |
994 | linux | d5e0d0f607a7a029c6563a0470d88255c89a8d11 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d5e0d0f607a7a029c6563a0470d88255c89a8d11 | VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | vsock_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb,
struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
int err;
size_t target;
ssize_t copied;
long timeout;
struct vsock_transport_recv_notify_data recv_data;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != SS_CONNECTED) {
/* Recvmsg is supposed to return 0 if a peer performs an
* orderly shutdown. Differentiate between that case and when a
* peer has not connected or a local shutdown occured with the
* SOCK_DONE flag.
*/
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
err = 0;
else
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
if (flags & MSG_OOB) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
/* We don't check peer_shutdown flag here since peer may actually shut
* down, but there can be data in the queue that a local socket can
* receive.
*/
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* It is valid on Linux to pass in a zero-length receive buffer. This
* is not an error. We may as well bail out now.
*/
if (!len) {
err = 0;
goto out;
}
/* We must not copy less than target bytes into the user's buffer
* before returning successfully, so we wait for the consume queue to
* have that much data to consume before dequeueing. Note that this
* makes it impossible to handle cases where target is greater than the
* queue size.
*/
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
if (target >= transport->stream_rcvhiwat(vsk)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
copied = 0;
err = transport->notify_recv_init(vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (1) {
s64 ready = vsock_stream_has_data(vsk);
if (ready < 0) {
/* Invalid queue pair content. XXX This should be
* changed to a connection reset in a later change.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_wait;
} else if (ready > 0) {
ssize_t read;
err = transport->notify_recv_pre_dequeue(
vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
break;
read = transport->stream_dequeue(
vsk, msg->msg_iov,
len - copied, flags);
if (read < 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
copied += read;
err = transport->notify_recv_post_dequeue(
vsk, target, read,
!(flags & MSG_PEEK), &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
goto out_wait;
if (read >= target || flags & MSG_PEEK)
break;
target -= read;
} else {
if (sk->sk_err != 0 || (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
|| (vsk->peer_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) {
break;
}
/* Don't wait for non-blocking sockets. */
if (timeout == 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
err = transport->notify_recv_pre_block(
vsk, target, &recv_data);
if (err < 0)
break;
release_sock(sk);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeout);
break;
} else if (timeout == 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
}
if (sk->sk_err)
err = -sk->sk_err;
else if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
err = 0;
if (copied > 0) {
/* We only do these additional bookkeeping/notification steps
* if we actually copied something out of the queue pair
* instead of just peeking ahead.
*/
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* If the other side has shutdown for sending and there
* is nothing more to read, then modify the socket
* state.
*/
if (vsk->peer_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0) {
sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
}
err = copied;
}
out_wait:
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 314,567,100,570,998,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_vsock.c | 195,983,561,794,879,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3237 | The vsock_stream_sendmsg function in net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3237 |
995 | linux | 680d04e0ba7e926233e3b9cee59125ce181f66ba | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/680d04e0ba7e926233e3b9cee59125ce181f66ba | VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue(struct kiocb *kiocb,
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int err;
int noblock;
struct vmci_datagram *dg;
size_t payload_len;
struct sk_buff *skb;
noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
if (flags & MSG_OOB || flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Retrieve the head sk_buff from the socket's receive queue. */
err = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(&vsk->sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (err)
return err;
if (!skb)
return -EAGAIN;
dg = (struct vmci_datagram *)skb->data;
if (!dg)
/* err is 0, meaning we read zero bytes. */
goto out;
payload_len = dg->payload_size;
/* Ensure the sk_buff matches the payload size claimed in the packet. */
if (payload_len != skb->len - sizeof(*dg)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (payload_len > len) {
payload_len = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
/* Place the datagram payload in the user's iovec. */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(*dg), msg->msg_iov,
payload_len);
if (err)
goto out;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_vm *vm_addr;
/* Provide the address of the sender. */
vm_addr = (struct sockaddr_vm *)msg->msg_name;
vsock_addr_init(vm_addr, dg->src.context, dg->src.resource);
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*vm_addr);
}
err = payload_len;
out:
skb_free_datagram(&vsk->sk, skb);
return err;
}
| 299,433,778,323,540,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | vmci_transport.c | 219,632,399,675,326,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3236 | The vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue function in net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not properly initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3236 |
999 | linux | 4a184233f21645cf0b719366210ed445d1024d72 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a184233f21645cf0b719366210ed445d1024d72 | rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rose_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *srose = (struct sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
unsigned char *asmptr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int n, er, qbit;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL)
return er;
qbit = (skb->data[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
skb_pull(skb, ROSE_MIN_LEN);
if (rose->qbitincl) {
asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1);
*asmptr = qbit;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (srose != NULL) {
srose->srose_family = AF_ROSE;
srose->srose_addr = rose->dest_addr;
srose->srose_call = rose->dest_call;
srose->srose_ndigis = rose->dest_ndigis;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_srose = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
for (n = 0 ; n < rose->dest_ndigis ; n++)
full_srose->srose_digis[n] = rose->dest_digis[n];
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose);
} else {
if (rose->dest_ndigis >= 1) {
srose->srose_ndigis = 1;
srose->srose_digi = rose->dest_digis[0];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose);
}
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
| 8,668,028,458,710,471,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3234 | The rose_recvmsg function in net/rose/af_rose.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3234 |
1,000 | linux | d26d6504f23e803824e8ebd14e52d4fc0a0b09cb | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d26d6504f23e803824e8ebd14e52d4fc0a0b09cb | NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int llcp_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int copied, rlen;
struct sk_buff *skb, *cskb;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%p %zu\n", sk, len);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CLOSED &&
skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
pr_err("Recv datagram failed state %d %d %d",
sk->sk_state, err, sock_error(sk));
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
rlen = skb->len; /* real length of skb */
copied = min_t(unsigned int, rlen, len);
cskb = skb;
if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(cskb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied)) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM && msg->msg_name) {
struct nfc_llcp_ui_cb *ui_cb = nfc_llcp_ui_skb_cb(skb);
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *sockaddr =
(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *) msg->msg_name;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp);
pr_debug("Datagram socket %d %d\n", ui_cb->dsap, ui_cb->ssap);
sockaddr->sa_family = AF_NFC;
sockaddr->nfc_protocol = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP;
sockaddr->dsap = ui_cb->dsap;
sockaddr->ssap = ui_cb->ssap;
}
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* SOCK_STREAM: re-queue skb if it contains unreceived data */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
skb_pull(skb, copied);
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
goto done;
}
}
kfree_skb(skb);
}
/* XXX Queue backlogged skbs */
done:
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: return real length if MSG_TRUNC is set */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && (flags & MSG_TRUNC))
copied = rlen;
return copied;
}
| 122,362,862,671,268,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sock.c | 231,788,118,584,435,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3233 | The llcp_sock_recvmsg function in net/nfc/llcp/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable and a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3233 |
1,001 | linux | 3ce5efad47b62c57a4f5c54248347085a750ce0e | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3ce5efad47b62c57a4f5c54248347085a750ce0e | netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int er;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL) {
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (er < 0) {
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return er;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM;
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, 7, sax->sax25_call.ax25_call,
AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sax);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
}
| 180,984,074,270,992,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_netrom.c | 82,889,468,786,918,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3232 | The nr_recvmsg function in net/netrom/af_netrom.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3232 |
1,002 | linux | c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181 | llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_llc *uaddr = (struct sockaddr_llc *)msg->msg_name;
const int nonblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
unsigned long cpu_flags;
size_t copied = 0;
u32 peek_seq = 0;
u32 *seq;
unsigned long used;
int target; /* Read at least this many bytes */
long timeo;
lock_sock(sk);
copied = -ENOTCONN;
if (unlikely(sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
goto out;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
seq = &llc->copied_seq;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
seq = &peek_seq;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
copied = 0;
do {
u32 offset;
/*
* We need to check signals first, to get correct SIGURG
* handling. FIXME: Need to check this doesn't impact 1003.1g
* and move it down to the bottom of the loop
*/
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (copied)
break;
copied = timeo ? sock_intr_errno(timeo) : -EAGAIN;
break;
}
/* Next get a buffer. */
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb) {
offset = *seq;
goto found_ok_skb;
}
/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
break;
if (copied) {
if (sk->sk_err ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
!timeo ||
(flags & MSG_PEEK))
break;
} else {
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
break;
if (sk->sk_err) {
copied = sock_error(sk);
break;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) {
/*
* This occurs when user tries to read
* from never connected socket.
*/
copied = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!timeo) {
copied = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
}
if (copied >= target) { /* Do not sleep, just process backlog. */
release_sock(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
} else
sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo);
if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) && peek_seq != llc->copied_seq) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("LLC(%s:%d): Application bug, race in MSG_PEEK\n",
current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current));
peek_seq = llc->copied_seq;
}
continue;
found_ok_skb:
/* Ok so how much can we use? */
used = skb->len - offset;
if (len < used)
used = len;
if (!(flags & MSG_TRUNC)) {
int rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, offset,
msg->msg_iov, used);
if (rc) {
/* Exception. Bailout! */
if (!copied)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
*seq += used;
copied += used;
len -= used;
/* For non stream protcols we get one packet per recvmsg call */
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
goto copy_uaddr;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
/* Partial read */
if (used + offset < skb->len)
continue;
} while (len > 0);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
copy_uaddr:
if (uaddr != NULL && skb != NULL) {
memcpy(uaddr, llc_ui_skb_cb(skb), sizeof(*uaddr));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*uaddr);
}
if (llc_sk(sk)->cmsg_flags)
llc_cmsg_rcv(msg, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags);
*seq = 0;
}
goto out;
}
| 63,715,411,456,460,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_llc.c | 114,091,511,487,822,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3231 | The llc_ui_recvmsg function in net/llc/af_llc.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3231 |
1,003 | linux | b860d3cc62877fad02863e2a08efff69a19382d2 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b860d3cc62877fad02863e2a08efff69a19382d2 | l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int l2tp_ip6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int noblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *lsa = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied = 0;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*lsa);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (lsa) {
lsa->l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
lsa->l2tp_unused = 0;
lsa->l2tp_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
lsa->l2tp_flowinfo = 0;
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = 0;
if (ipv6_addr_type(&lsa->l2tp_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
lsa->l2tp_scope_id = IP6CB(skb)->iif;
}
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = skb->len;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err ? err : copied;
}
| 153,456,865,559,495,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3230 | The l2tp_ip6_recvmsg function in net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3230 |
1,004 | linux | a5598bd9c087dc0efc250a5221e5d0e6f584ee88 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5598bd9c087dc0efc250a5221e5d0e6f584ee88 | iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int iucv_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
unsigned int copied, rlen;
struct sk_buff *skb, *rskb, *cskb;
int err = 0;
if ((sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN) &&
skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q) &&
skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) &&
list_empty(&iucv->message_q.list))
return 0;
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* receive/dequeue next skb:
* the function understands MSG_PEEK and, thus, does not dequeue skb */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
rlen = skb->len; /* real length of skb */
copied = min_t(unsigned int, rlen, len);
if (!rlen)
sk->sk_shutdown = sk->sk_shutdown | RCV_SHUTDOWN;
cskb = skb;
if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(cskb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied)) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: set MSG_TRUNC if recv buf size is too small */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
if (copied < rlen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
/* each iucv message contains a complete record */
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
}
/* create control message to store iucv msg target class:
* get the trgcls from the control buffer of the skb due to
* fragmentation of original iucv message. */
err = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IUCV, SCM_IUCV_TRGCLS,
CB_TRGCLS_LEN, CB_TRGCLS(skb));
if (err) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return err;
}
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* SOCK_STREAM: re-queue skb if it contains unreceived data */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
skb_pull(skb, copied);
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
goto done;
}
}
kfree_skb(skb);
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER) {
atomic_inc(&iucv->msg_recv);
if (atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) > iucv->msglimit) {
WARN_ON(1);
iucv_sock_close(sk);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
/* Queue backlog skbs */
spin_lock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
rskb = skb_dequeue(&iucv->backlog_skb_q);
while (rskb) {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, rskb)) {
skb_queue_head(&iucv->backlog_skb_q,
rskb);
break;
} else {
rskb = skb_dequeue(&iucv->backlog_skb_q);
}
}
if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
if (!list_empty(&iucv->message_q.list))
iucv_process_message_q(sk);
if (atomic_read(&iucv->msg_recv) >=
iucv->msglimit / 2) {
err = iucv_send_ctrl(sk, AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN);
if (err) {
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
}
done:
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: return real length if MSG_TRUNC is set */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && (flags & MSG_TRUNC))
copied = rlen;
return copied;
}
| 292,835,413,067,186,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_iucv.c | 219,701,138,014,006,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3229 | The iucv_sock_recvmsg function in net/iucv/af_iucv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3229 |
1,005 | linux | 5ae94c0d2f0bed41d6718be743985d61b7f5c47d | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5ae94c0d2f0bed41d6718be743985d61b7f5c47d | irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int irda_recvmsg_dgram(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(), Received truncated frame (%zd < %zd)!\n",
__func__, copied, size);
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
/*
* Check if we have previously stopped IrTTP and we know
* have more free space in our rx_queue. If so tell IrTTP
* to start delivering frames again before our rx_queue gets
* empty
*/
if (self->rx_flow == FLOW_STOP) {
if ((atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(), Starting IrTTP\n", __func__);
self->rx_flow = FLOW_START;
irttp_flow_request(self->tsap, FLOW_START);
}
}
return copied;
}
| 124,022,070,218,876,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_irda.c | 27,854,743,174,609,383,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3228 | The irda_recvmsg_dgram function in net/irda/af_irda.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3228 |
1,006 | linux | 2d6fbfe733f35c6b355c216644e08e149c61b271 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2d6fbfe733f35c6b355c216644e08e149c61b271 | caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
int copylen;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto read_error;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);
if (!skb)
goto read_error;
copylen = skb->len;
if (len < copylen) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copylen = len;
}
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, copylen);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
return ret;
read_error:
return ret;
}
| 338,803,166,792,488,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | caif_socket.c | 303,346,703,858,979,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3227 | The caif_seqpkt_recvmsg function in net/caif/caif_socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3227 |
1,007 | linux | e11e0455c0d7d3d62276a0c55d9dfbc16779d691 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e11e0455c0d7d3d62276a0c55d9dfbc16779d691 | Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rfcomm_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rfcomm_dlc *d = rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc;
int len;
if (test_and_clear_bit(RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP, &d->flags)) {
rfcomm_dlc_accept(d);
return 0;
}
len = bt_sock_stream_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, size, flags);
lock_sock(sk);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK) && len > 0)
atomic_sub(len, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= (sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 2))
rfcomm_dlc_unthrottle(rfcomm_pi(sk)->dlc);
release_sock(sk);
return len;
}
| 318,172,830,474,011,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sock.c | 118,776,679,674,709,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3225 | The rfcomm_sock_recvmsg function in net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3225 |
1,008 | linux | 4683f42fde3977bdb4e8a09622788cc8b5313778 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4683f42fde3977bdb4e8a09622788cc8b5313778 | Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err == 0)
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
| 4,403,052,444,065,820,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_bluetooth.c | 92,794,431,760,555,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3224 | The bt_sock_recvmsg function in net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not properly initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3224 |
1,009 | linux | ef3313e84acbf349caecae942ab3ab731471f1a1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef3313e84acbf349caecae942ab3ab731471f1a1 | ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int ax25_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the
* queue for us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (!ax25_sk(sk)->pidincl)
skb_pull(skb, 1); /* Remove PID */
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (msg->msg_namelen != 0) {
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
ax25_digi digi;
ax25_address src;
const unsigned char *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
ax25_addr_parse(mac + 1, skb->data - mac - 1, &src, NULL,
&digi, NULL, NULL);
sax->sax25_family = AF_AX25;
/* We set this correctly, even though we may not let the
application know the digi calls further down (because it
did NOT ask to know them). This could get political... **/
sax->sax25_ndigis = digi.ndigi;
sax->sax25_call = src;
if (sax->sax25_ndigis != 0) {
int ct;
struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *fsa = (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *)sax;
for (ct = 0; ct < digi.ndigi; ct++)
fsa->fsa_digipeater[ct] = digi.calls[ct];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
err = copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 198,649,123,377,212,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_ax25.c | 123,370,855,927,941,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3223 | The ax25_recvmsg function in net/ax25/af_ax25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3223 |
1,010 | linux | 9b3e617f3df53822345a8573b6d358f6b9e5ed87 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9b3e617f3df53822345a8573b6d358f6b9e5ed87 | atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int vcc_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, error = -EINVAL;
if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* only handle MSG_DONTWAIT and MSG_PEEK */
if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (test_bit(ATM_VF_RELEASED, &vcc->flags) ||
test_bit(ATM_VF_CLOSE, &vcc->flags) ||
!test_bit(ATM_VF_READY, &vcc->flags))
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &error);
if (!skb)
return error;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
error = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (error)
return error;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
pr_debug("%d -= %d\n", atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc),
skb->truesize);
atm_return(vcc, skb->truesize);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
| 84,284,193,461,125,215,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | common.c | 105,103,316,668,524,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3222 | The vcc_recvmsg function in net/atm/common.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3222 |
1,011 | linux | 72a763d805a48ac8c0bf48fdb510e84c12de51fe | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/72a763d805a48ac8c0bf48fdb510e84c12de51fe | crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 1 | static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned bs = crypto_ablkcipher_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(
&ctx->req));
struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned long iovlen;
struct iovec *iov;
int err = -EAGAIN;
int used;
long copied = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
iovlen--, iov++) {
unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
while (seglen) {
sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
sg = sgl->sg;
while (!sg->length)
sg++;
used = ctx->used;
if (!used) {
err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
used = min_t(unsigned long, used, seglen);
used = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl, from, used, 1);
err = used;
if (err < 0)
goto unlock;
if (ctx->more || used < ctx->used)
used -= used % bs;
err = -EINVAL;
if (!used)
goto free;
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, sg,
ctx->rsgl.sg, used,
ctx->iv);
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(
ctx->enc ?
crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(&ctx->req) :
crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(&ctx->req),
&ctx->completion);
free:
af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl);
if (err)
goto unlock;
copied += used;
from += used;
seglen -= used;
skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used);
}
}
err = 0;
unlock:
skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
return copied ?: err;
}
| 54,729,755,431,548,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | algif_skcipher.c | 322,536,590,163,032,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-3076 | The crypto API in the Linux kernel through 3.9-rc8 does not initialize certain length variables, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call, related to the hash_recvmsg function in crypto/algif_hash.c and the skcipher_recvmsg function in crypto/algif_skcipher.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3076 |
1,012 | linux | 12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7 | perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 1 | static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event) &&
perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */
if (!(p_event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW))
return 0;
/* Some events are ok to be traced by non-root users... */
if (p_event->attach_state == PERF_ATTACH_TASK) {
if (tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY)
return 0;
}
/*
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
* only allow root to have these.
*/
if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
| 282,170,608,950,902,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | trace_event_perf.c | 103,737,043,602,954,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-2930 | The perf_trace_event_perm function in kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.2 does not properly restrict access to the perf subsystem, which allows local users to enable function tracing via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2930 |
1,013 | linux | d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 | exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
/* May we inspect the given task?
* This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
* and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
*
* ptrace_attach denies several cases that /proc allows
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)
dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
rcu_read_lock();
if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
| 145,541,299,218,287,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ptrace.c | 292,077,372,195,169,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-2929 | The Linux kernel before 3.12.2 does not properly use the get_dumpable function, which allows local users to bypass intended ptrace restrictions or obtain sensitive information from IA64 scratch registers via a crafted application, related to kernel/ptrace.c and arch/ia64/include/asm/processor.h. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2929 |
1,014 | linux | cea4dcfdad926a27a18e188720efe0f2c9403456 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cea4dcfdad926a27a18e188720efe0f2c9403456 | iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> | 1 | static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);
strncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
strlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
}
| 100,762,060,795,839,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | iscsi_target_parameters.c | 259,649,241,332,208,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2850 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the iscsi_add_notunderstood_response function in drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c in the iSCSI target subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.9.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and OOPS) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a long key that is not properly handled during construction of an error-response packet. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2850 |
1,020 | linux | 84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372 | rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
int type, u32 pid, u32 seq, u32 change,
unsigned int flags, u32 ext_filter_mask)
{
struct ifinfomsg *ifm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct rtnl_link_stats64 temp;
const struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats;
struct nlattr *attr, *af_spec;
struct rtnl_af_ops *af_ops;
struct net_device *upper_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
ASSERT_RTNL();
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*ifm), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
ifm->ifi_family = AF_UNSPEC;
ifm->__ifi_pad = 0;
ifm->ifi_type = dev->type;
ifm->ifi_index = dev->ifindex;
ifm->ifi_flags = dev_get_flags(dev);
ifm->ifi_change = change;
if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFNAME, dev->name) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_TXQLEN, dev->tx_queue_len) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_OPERSTATE,
netif_running(dev) ? dev->operstate : IF_OPER_DOWN) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_LINKMODE, dev->link_mode) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_MTU, dev->mtu) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_GROUP, dev->group) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_PROMISCUITY, dev->promiscuity) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_NUM_TX_QUEUES, dev->num_tx_queues) ||
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_NUM_RX_QUEUES, dev->num_rx_queues) ||
#endif
(dev->ifindex != dev->iflink &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_LINK, dev->iflink)) ||
(upper_dev &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_MASTER, upper_dev->ifindex)) ||
nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_CARRIER, netif_carrier_ok(dev)) ||
(dev->qdisc &&
nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_QDISC, dev->qdisc->ops->id)) ||
(dev->ifalias &&
nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFALIAS, dev->ifalias)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (1) {
struct rtnl_link_ifmap map = {
.mem_start = dev->mem_start,
.mem_end = dev->mem_end,
.base_addr = dev->base_addr,
.irq = dev->irq,
.dma = dev->dma,
.port = dev->if_port,
};
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MAP, sizeof(map), &map))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (dev->addr_len) {
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_ADDRESS, dev->addr_len, dev->dev_addr) ||
nla_put(skb, IFLA_BROADCAST, dev->addr_len, dev->broadcast))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
attr = nla_reserve(skb, IFLA_STATS,
sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats));
if (attr == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
stats = dev_get_stats(dev, &temp);
copy_rtnl_link_stats(nla_data(attr), stats);
attr = nla_reserve(skb, IFLA_STATS64,
sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats64));
if (attr == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
copy_rtnl_link_stats64(nla_data(attr), stats);
if (dev->dev.parent && (ext_filter_mask & RTEXT_FILTER_VF) &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_NUM_VF, dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_config && dev->dev.parent
&& (ext_filter_mask & RTEXT_FILTER_VF)) {
int i;
struct nlattr *vfinfo, *vf;
int num_vfs = dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent);
vfinfo = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_VFINFO_LIST);
if (!vfinfo)
goto nla_put_failure;
for (i = 0; i < num_vfs; i++) {
struct ifla_vf_info ivi;
struct ifla_vf_mac vf_mac;
struct ifla_vf_vlan vf_vlan;
struct ifla_vf_tx_rate vf_tx_rate;
struct ifla_vf_spoofchk vf_spoofchk;
/*
* Not all SR-IOV capable drivers support the
* spoofcheck query. Preset to -1 so the user
* space tool can detect that the driver didn't
* report anything.
*/
ivi.spoofchk = -1;
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_config(dev, i, &ivi))
break;
vf_mac.vf =
vf_vlan.vf =
vf_tx_rate.vf =
vf_spoofchk.vf = ivi.vf;
memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
vf_tx_rate.rate = ivi.tx_rate;
vf_spoofchk.setting = ivi.spoofchk;
vf = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_VF_INFO);
if (!vf) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, vfinfo);
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_MAC, sizeof(vf_mac), &vf_mac) ||
nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_VLAN, sizeof(vf_vlan), &vf_vlan) ||
nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_TX_RATE, sizeof(vf_tx_rate),
&vf_tx_rate) ||
nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_SPOOFCHK, sizeof(vf_spoofchk),
&vf_spoofchk))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, vf);
}
nla_nest_end(skb, vfinfo);
}
if (rtnl_port_fill(skb, dev))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops) {
if (rtnl_link_fill(skb, dev) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
}
if (!(af_spec = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_AF_SPEC)))
goto nla_put_failure;
list_for_each_entry(af_ops, &rtnl_af_ops, list) {
if (af_ops->fill_link_af) {
struct nlattr *af;
int err;
if (!(af = nla_nest_start(skb, af_ops->family)))
goto nla_put_failure;
err = af_ops->fill_link_af(skb, dev);
/*
* Caller may return ENODATA to indicate that there
* was no data to be dumped. This is not an error, it
* means we should trim the attribute header and
* continue.
*/
if (err == -ENODATA)
nla_nest_cancel(skb, af);
else if (err < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, af);
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, af_spec);
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 305,591,951,297,307,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rtnetlink.c | 128,134,176,972,809,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-2635 | The rtnl_fill_ifinfo function in net/core/rtnetlink.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2635 |
1,022 | linux | fc9bbca8f650e5f738af8806317c0a041a48ae4a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc9bbca8f650e5f738af8806317c0a041a48ae4a | vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | fb_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
{
struct fb_info *info = file_fb_info(file);
struct fb_ops *fb;
unsigned long off;
unsigned long start;
u32 len;
if (!info)
return -ENODEV;
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -EINVAL;
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
fb = info->fbops;
if (!fb)
return -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&info->mm_lock);
if (fb->fb_mmap) {
int res;
res = fb->fb_mmap(info, vma);
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
return res;
}
/* frame buffer memory */
start = info->fix.smem_start;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + info->fix.smem_len);
if (off >= len) {
/* memory mapped io */
off -= len;
if (info->var.accel_flags) {
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
return -EINVAL;
}
start = info->fix.mmio_start;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + info->fix.mmio_len);
}
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
start &= PAGE_MASK;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len)
return -EINVAL;
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP are set by io_remap_pfn_range()*/
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
fb_pgprotect(file, vma, off);
if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start, vma->vm_page_prot))
return -EAGAIN;
return 0;
}
| 61,607,845,425,516,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | fbmem.c | 127,339,374,413,477,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-2596 | Integer overflow in the fb_mmap function in drivers/video/fbmem.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9, as used in a certain Motorola build of Android 4.1.2 and other products, allows local users to create a read-write memory mapping for the entirety of kernel memory, and consequently gain privileges, via crafted /dev/graphics/fb0 mmap2 system calls, as demonstrated by the Motochopper pwn program. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2596 |
1,030 | linux | 9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6 | crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 1 | static int crypto_report_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
memcpy(&ualg->cru_name, &alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_driver_name, &alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
memcpy(&ualg->cru_module_name, module_name(alg->cra_module),
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
ualg->cru_flags = alg->cra_flags;
ualg->cru_refcnt = atomic_read(&alg->cra_refcnt);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL, alg->cra_priority))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_report_larval rl;
snprintf(rl.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "larval");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_larval), &rl))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
if (alg->cra_type && alg->cra_type->report) {
if (alg->cra_type->report(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
switch (alg->cra_flags & (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
if (crypto_report_cipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_comp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
}
out:
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 20,209,587,001,997,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | crypto_user.c | 164,121,594,634,091,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-310"
] | CVE-2013-2546 | The report API in the crypto user configuration API in the Linux kernel through 3.8.2 uses an incorrect C library function for copying strings, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2546 |
1,034 | linux | 85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40 | af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> | 1 | static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
| 25,111,496,152,480,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_key.c | 178,017,057,552,300,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2237 | The key_notify_policy_flush function in net/key/af_key.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by reading a broadcast message from the notify_policy interface of an IPSec key_socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2237 |
1,035 | linux | a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int key_notify_policy_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_out;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb_out = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_out)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb_out, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDFLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb_out, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
| 89,775,021,181,796,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_key.c | 327,866,515,311,335,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2234 | The (1) key_notify_sa_flush and (2) key_notify_policy_flush functions in net/key/af_key.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 do not initialize certain structure members, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by reading a broadcast message from the notify interface of an IPSec key_socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2234 |
1,036 | linux | a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5cc68f3d63306d0d288f31edfc2ae6ef8ecd887 | af_key: fix info leaks in notify messages
key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int key_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = pfkey_proto2satype(c->data.proto);
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_FLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
| 39,936,032,300,218,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | af_key.c | 327,866,515,311,335,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2234 | The (1) key_notify_sa_flush and (2) key_notify_policy_flush functions in net/key/af_key.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 do not initialize certain structure members, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory by reading a broadcast message from the notify interface of an IPSec key_socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2234 |
1,037 | linux | a963a37d384d71ad43b3e9e79d68d42fbe0901f3 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a963a37d384d71ad43b3e9e79d68d42fbe0901f3 | ipv6: ip6_sk_dst_check() must not assume ipv6 dst
It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4
destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable,
not rt6_info.
ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else
various corruptions/crashes can happen.
Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with
trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect
With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static struct dst_entry *ip6_sk_dst_check(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry *dst,
const struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)dst;
if (!dst)
goto out;
/* Yes, checking route validity in not connected
* case is not very simple. Take into account,
* that we do not support routing by source, TOS,
* and MSG_DONTROUTE --ANK (980726)
*
* 1. ip6_rt_check(): If route was host route,
* check that cached destination is current.
* If it is network route, we still may
* check its validity using saved pointer
* to the last used address: daddr_cache.
* We do not want to save whole address now,
* (because main consumer of this service
* is tcp, which has not this problem),
* so that the last trick works only on connected
* sockets.
* 2. oif also should be the same.
*/
if (ip6_rt_check(&rt->rt6i_dst, &fl6->daddr, np->daddr_cache) ||
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ip6_rt_check(&rt->rt6i_src, &fl6->saddr, np->saddr_cache) ||
#endif
(fl6->flowi6_oif && fl6->flowi6_oif != dst->dev->ifindex)) {
dst_release(dst);
dst = NULL;
}
out:
return dst;
}
| 297,614,718,685,075,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ip6_output.c | 19,620,935,478,555,194,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-2232 | The ip6_sk_dst_check function in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by using an AF_INET6 socket for a connection to an IPv4 interface. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2232 |
1,039 | linux | f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea | sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
sctp_disposition_t retval;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_association *new_asoc;
int error = 0;
char action;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chk_p;
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length from the protocol
* perspective. In this case check to make sure we have at least
* enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is
* done later.
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.
*/
chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data;
if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
goto nomem;
/* In RFC 2960 5.2.4 3, if both Verification Tags in the State Cookie
* of a duplicate COOKIE ECHO match the Verification Tags of the
* current association, consider the State Cookie valid even if
* the lifespan is exceeded.
*/
new_asoc = sctp_unpack_cookie(ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, &error,
&err_chk_p);
/* FIXME:
* If the re-build failed, what is the proper error path
* from here?
*
* [We should abort the association. --piggy]
*/
if (!new_asoc) {
/* FIXME: Several errors are possible. A bad cookie should
* be silently discarded, but think about logging it too.
*/
switch (error) {
case -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
goto nomem;
case -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE:
sctp_send_stale_cookie_err(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
err_chk_p);
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
case -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG:
default:
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
}
/* Compare the tie_tag in cookie with the verification tag of
* current association.
*/
action = sctp_tietags_compare(new_asoc, asoc);
switch (action) {
case 'A': /* Association restart. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
case 'B': /* Collision case B. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
case 'C': /* Collision case C. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_c(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
case 'D': /* Collision case D. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_d(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
default: /* Discard packet for all others. */
retval = sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
break;
}
/* Delete the tempory new association. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DELETE_TCB, SCTP_NULL());
/* Restore association pointer to provide SCTP command interpeter
* with a valid context in case it needs to manipulate
* the queues */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC,
SCTP_ASOC((struct sctp_association *)asoc));
return retval;
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
| 32,908,841,536,456,587,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sm_statefuns.c | 263,504,569,047,803,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-2206 | The sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook function in net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c in the SCTP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.8.5 does not properly handle associations during the processing of a duplicate COOKIE ECHO chunk, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted SCTP traffic. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2206 |
1,040 | curl | 192c4f788d48f82c03e9cef40013f34370e90737 | https://github.com/curl/curl | https://github.com/bagder/curl/commit/192c4f788d48f82c03e9cef40013f34370e90737 | Curl_urldecode: no peeking beyond end of input buffer
Security problem: CVE-2013-2174
If a program would give a string like "%FF" to curl_easy_unescape() but
ask for it to decode only the first byte, it would still parse and
decode the full hex sequence. The function then not only read beyond the
allowed buffer but it would also deduct the *unsigned* counter variable
for how many more bytes there's left to read in the buffer by two,
making the counter wrap. Continuing this, the function would go on
reading beyond the buffer and soon writing beyond the allocated target
buffer...
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130622.html
Reported-by: Timo Sirainen | 1 | CURLcode Curl_urldecode(struct SessionHandle *data,
const char *string, size_t length,
char **ostring, size_t *olen,
bool reject_ctrl)
{
size_t alloc = (length?length:strlen(string))+1;
char *ns = malloc(alloc);
unsigned char in;
size_t strindex=0;
unsigned long hex;
CURLcode res;
if(!ns)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
while(--alloc > 0) {
in = *string;
if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
char hexstr[3];
char *ptr;
hexstr[0] = string[1];
hexstr[1] = string[2];
hexstr[2] = 0;
hex = strtoul(hexstr, &ptr, 16);
in = curlx_ultouc(hex); /* this long is never bigger than 255 anyway */
res = Curl_convert_from_network(data, &in, 1);
if(res) {
/* Curl_convert_from_network calls failf if unsuccessful */
free(ns);
return res;
}
string+=2;
alloc-=2;
}
if(reject_ctrl && (in < 0x20)) {
free(ns);
return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
}
ns[strindex++] = in;
string++;
}
ns[strindex]=0; /* terminate it */
if(olen)
/* store output size */
*olen = strindex;
if(ostring)
/* store output string */
*ostring = ns;
return CURLE_OK;
}
| 85,709,973,777,579,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | escape.c | 170,290,579,417,472,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2174 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the curl_easy_unescape function in lib/escape.c in cURL and libcurl 7.7 through 7.30.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted string ending in a "%" (percent) character. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2174 |
1,041 | linux | b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b9e146d8eb3b9ecae5086d373b50fa0c1f3e7f0f | kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int do_tkill(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SI_TKILL;
info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
| 92,468,020,625,669,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | signal.c | 50,160,511,605,867,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-2141 | The do_tkill function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.9 does not initialize a certain data structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application that makes a (1) tkill or (2) tgkill system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2141 |
1,042 | linux | 604c499cbbcc3d5fe5fb8d53306aa0fae1990109 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/604c499cbbcc3d5fe5fb8d53306aa0fae1990109 | xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> | 1 | static int dispatch_discard_io(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct blkif_request *req)
{
int err = 0;
int status = BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
struct block_device *bdev = blkif->vbd.bdev;
unsigned long secure;
blkif->st_ds_req++;
xen_blkif_get(blkif);
secure = (blkif->vbd.discard_secure &&
(req->u.discard.flag & BLKIF_DISCARD_SECURE)) ?
BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE : 0;
err = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, req->u.discard.sector_number,
req->u.discard.nr_sectors,
GFP_KERNEL, secure);
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "discard op failed, not supported\n");
status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (err)
status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
make_response(blkif, req->u.discard.id, req->operation, status);
xen_blkif_put(blkif);
return err;
}
| 326,182,960,843,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-2140 | The dispatch_discard_io function in drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c in the Xen blkback implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.10.5 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (data loss) via filesystem write operations on a read-only disk that supports the (1) BLKIF_OP_DISCARD (aka discard or TRIM) or (2) SCSI UNMAP feature. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2140 |
1,043 | linux | baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae | net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int tcp_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
sk_read_actor_t recv_actor)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u32 seq = tp->copied_seq;
u32 offset;
int copied = 0;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
return -ENOTCONN;
while ((skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq, &offset)) != NULL) {
if (offset < skb->len) {
int used;
size_t len;
len = skb->len - offset;
/* Stop reading if we hit a patch of urgent data */
if (tp->urg_data) {
u32 urg_offset = tp->urg_seq - seq;
if (urg_offset < len)
len = urg_offset;
if (!len)
break;
}
used = recv_actor(desc, skb, offset, len);
if (used < 0) {
if (!copied)
copied = used;
break;
} else if (used <= len) {
seq += used;
copied += used;
offset += used;
}
/*
* If recv_actor drops the lock (e.g. TCP splice
* receive) the skb pointer might be invalid when
* getting here: tcp_collapse might have deleted it
* while aggregating skbs from the socket queue.
*/
skb = tcp_recv_skb(sk, seq-1, &offset);
if (!skb || (offset+1 != skb->len))
break;
}
if (tcp_hdr(skb)->fin) {
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);
++seq;
break;
}
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);
if (!desc->count)
break;
}
tp->copied_seq = seq;
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
/* Clean up data we have read: This will do ACK frames. */
if (copied > 0)
tcp_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
return copied;
}
| 199,403,613,559,602,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | tcp.c | 12,402,514,951,805,328,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2128 | The tcp_read_sock function in net/ipv4/tcp.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly manage skb consumption, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted splice system call for a TCP socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2128 |
1,044 | openvpn | 11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee | https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn | https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee | Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de> | 1 | openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
const struct crypto_options *opt,
const struct frame* frame)
{
static const char error_prefix[] = "Authenticate/Decrypt packet error";
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init (&gc);
if (buf->len > 0 && opt->key_ctx_bi)
{
struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi->decrypt;
struct packet_id_net pin;
bool have_pin = false;
/* Verify the HMAC */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
int hmac_len;
uint8_t local_hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; /* HMAC of ciphertext computed locally */
hmac_ctx_reset(ctx->hmac);
/* Assume the length of the input HMAC */
hmac_len = hmac_ctx_size (ctx->hmac);
/* Authentication fails if insufficient data in packet for HMAC */
if (buf->len < hmac_len)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing authentication info");
hmac_ctx_update (ctx->hmac, BPTR (buf) + hmac_len, BLEN (buf) - hmac_len);
hmac_ctx_final (ctx->hmac, local_hmac);
/* Compare locally computed HMAC with packet HMAC */
if (memcmp (local_hmac, BPTR (buf), hmac_len))
CRYPT_ERROR ("packet HMAC authentication failed");
ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, hmac_len));
}
/* Decrypt packet ID + payload */
if (ctx->cipher)
{
const unsigned int mode = cipher_ctx_mode (ctx->cipher);
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher);
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int outlen;
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT)));
/* use IV if user requested it */
CLEAR (iv_buf);
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
if (buf->len < iv_size)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing IV info");
memcpy (iv_buf, BPTR (buf), iv_size);
ASSERT (buf_advance (buf, iv_size));
}
/* show the IV's initial state */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT IV: %s", format_hex (iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc));
if (buf->len < 1)
CRYPT_ERROR ("missing payload");
/* ctx->cipher was already initialized with key & keylen */
if (!cipher_ctx_reset (ctx->cipher, iv_buf))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher init failed");
/* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */
if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len))
CRYPT_ERROR ("buffer overflow");
/* Decrypt packet ID, payload */
if (!cipher_ctx_update (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work), &outlen, BPTR (buf), BLEN (buf)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher update failed");
work.len += outlen;
/* Flush the decryption buffer */
if (!cipher_ctx_final (ctx->cipher, BPTR (&work) + outlen, &outlen))
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher final failed");
work.len += outlen;
dmsg (D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex (BPTR (&work), BLEN (&work), 80, &gc));
/* Get packet ID from plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */
{
if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CBC)
{
if (opt->packet_id)
{
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CBC packet-id");
have_pin = true;
}
}
else if (mode == OPENVPN_MODE_CFB || mode == OPENVPN_MODE_OFB)
{
struct buffer b;
ASSERT (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV); /* IV and packet-ID required */
ASSERT (opt->packet_id); /* for this mode. */
buf_set_read (&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &b, true))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading CFB/OFB packet-id");
have_pin = true;
}
else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
{
ASSERT (0);
}
}
}
else
{
work = *buf;
if (opt->packet_id)
{
if (!packet_id_read (&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
CRYPT_ERROR ("error reading packet-id");
have_pin = !BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID);
}
}
if (have_pin)
{
packet_id_reap_test (&opt->packet_id->rec);
if (packet_id_test (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin))
{
packet_id_add (&opt->packet_id->rec, &pin);
if (opt->pid_persist && (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM))
packet_id_persist_save_obj (opt->pid_persist, opt->packet_id);
}
else
{
if (!(opt->flags & CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS))
msg (D_REPLAY_ERRORS, "%s: bad packet ID (may be a replay): %s -- see the man page entry for --no-replay and --replay-window for more info or silence this warning with --mute-replay-warnings",
error_prefix, packet_id_net_print (&pin, true, &gc));
goto error_exit;
}
}
*buf = work;
}
gc_free (&gc);
return true;
error_exit:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free (&gc);
return false;
}
| 289,938,016,318,508,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | crypto.c | 243,766,420,768,321,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-2061 | The openvpn_decrypt function in crypto.c in OpenVPN 2.3.0 and earlier, when running in UDP mode, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a timing attack involving an HMAC comparison function that does not run in constant time and a padding oracle attack on the CBC mode cipher. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2061 |
1,045 | linux | 929473ea05db455ad88cdc081f2adc556b8dc48f | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/929473ea05db455ad88cdc081f2adc556b8dc48f | usb: chipidea: Allow disabling streaming not only in udc mode
When running a scp transfer using a USB/Ethernet adapter the following crash
happens:
$ scp test.tar.gz fabio@192.168.1.100:/home/fabio
fabio@192.168.1.100's password:
test.tar.gz 0% 0 0.0KB/s --:-- ETA
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at net/sched/sch_generic.c:255 dev_watchdog+0x2cc/0x2f0()
NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth0 (asix): transmit queue 0 timed out
Modules linked in:
Backtrace:
[<80011c94>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x10c) from [<804d3a5c>] (dump_stack+0x18/0x1c)
r6:000000ff r5:80412388 r4:80685dc0 r3:80696cc0
[<804d3a44>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x1c) from [<80021868>]
(warn_slowpath_common+0x54/0x6c)
[<80021814>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x0/0x6c) from [<80021924>]
(warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x40)
...
Setting SDIS (Stream Disable Mode- bit 4 of USBMODE register) fixes the problem.
However, in current code CI13XXX_DISABLE_STREAMING flag is only set in udc mode,
so allow disabling streaming also in host mode.
Tested on a mx6qsabrelite board.
Suggested-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 | static int host_start(struct ci13xxx *ci)
{
struct usb_hcd *hcd;
struct ehci_hcd *ehci;
int ret;
if (usb_disabled())
return -ENODEV;
hcd = usb_create_hcd(&ci_ehci_hc_driver, ci->dev, dev_name(ci->dev));
if (!hcd)
return -ENOMEM;
dev_set_drvdata(ci->dev, ci);
hcd->rsrc_start = ci->hw_bank.phys;
hcd->rsrc_len = ci->hw_bank.size;
hcd->regs = ci->hw_bank.abs;
hcd->has_tt = 1;
hcd->power_budget = ci->platdata->power_budget;
hcd->phy = ci->transceiver;
ehci = hcd_to_ehci(hcd);
ehci->caps = ci->hw_bank.cap;
ehci->has_hostpc = ci->hw_bank.lpm;
ret = usb_add_hcd(hcd, 0, 0);
if (ret)
usb_put_hcd(hcd);
else
ci->hcd = hcd;
return ret;
}
| 178,357,202,326,078,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-2058 | The host_start function in drivers/usb/chipidea/host.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.4 does not properly support a certain non-streaming option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by sending a large amount of network traffic through a USB/Ethernet adapter. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2058 |
1,047 | linux | 0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0e9a9a1ad619e7e987815d20262d36a2f95717ca | ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org | 1 | int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
if (!EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (!handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
| 244,588,647,148,744,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | namei.c | 70,402,644,734,207,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-2015 | The ext4_orphan_del function in fs/ext4/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.3 does not properly handle orphan-list entries for non-journal filesystems, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted filesystem on removable media, as demonstrated by the e2fsprogs tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz test. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2015 |
1,050 | linux | 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 | scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 1 | static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
| 265,477,273,618,585,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-1958 | The scm_check_creds function in net/core/scm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not properly enforce capability requirements for controlling the PID value associated with a UNIX domain socket, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions by leveraging the time interval during which a user namespace has been created but a PID namespace has not been created. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1958 |
1,051 | linux | 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 | vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 1 | static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt.mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt;
int err;
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flag & (CL_SLAVE | CL_PRIVATE | CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE))
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0; /* not a peer of original */
else
mnt->mnt_group_id = old->mnt_group_id;
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) && !mnt->mnt_group_id) {
err = mnt_alloc_group_id(mnt);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_WRITE_HOLD;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &sb->s_mounts);
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
if ((flag & CL_SLAVE) ||
((flag & CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE) && IS_MNT_SHARED(old))) {
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
mnt->mnt_master = old;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
} else if (!(flag & CL_PRIVATE)) {
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) || IS_MNT_SHARED(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_share, &old->mnt_share);
if (IS_MNT_SLAVE(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave);
mnt->mnt_master = old->mnt_master;
}
if (flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED)
set_mnt_shared(mnt);
/* stick the duplicate mount on the same expiry list
* as the original if that was on one */
if (flag & CL_EXPIRE) {
if (!list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_expire, &old->mnt_expire);
}
return mnt;
out_free:
free_vfsmnt(mnt);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
| 333,226,396,239,700,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | namespace.c | 303,832,579,392,698,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-1957 | The clone_mnt function in fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not properly restrict changes to the MNT_READONLY flag, which allows local users to bypass an intended read-only property of a filesystem by leveraging a separate mount namespace. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1957 |
1,054 | linux | 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d | userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 1 | int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
return -EPERM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
return ret;
}
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
}
| 62,769,202,323,779,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | user_namespace.c | 60,695,328,771,795,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-1956 | The create_user_ns function in kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not check whether a chroot directory exists that differs from the namespace root directory, which allows local users to bypass intended filesystem restrictions via a crafted clone system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1956 |
1,055 | curl | 2eb8dcf26cb37f09cffe26909a646e702dbcab66 | https://github.com/curl/curl | https://github.com/bagder/curl/commit/2eb8dcf26cb37f09cffe26909a646e702dbcab66 | cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html | 1 | static bool tailmatch(const char *little, const char *bigone)
{
size_t littlelen = strlen(little);
size_t biglen = strlen(bigone);
if(littlelen > biglen)
return FALSE;
return Curl_raw_equal(little, bigone+biglen-littlelen) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
| 325,637,020,867,287,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | cookie.c | 232,761,289,799,062,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-1944 | The tailMatch function in cookie.c in cURL and libcurl before 7.30.0 does not properly match the path domain when sending cookies, which allows remote attackers to steal cookies via a matching suffix in the domain of a URL. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1944 |
1,056 | linux | 715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static void tg3_read_vpd(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u8 *vpd_data;
unsigned int block_end, rosize, len;
u32 vpdlen;
int j, i = 0;
vpd_data = (u8 *)tg3_vpd_readblock(tp, &vpdlen);
if (!vpd_data)
goto out_no_vpd;
i = pci_vpd_find_tag(vpd_data, 0, vpdlen, PCI_VPD_LRDT_RO_DATA);
if (i < 0)
goto out_not_found;
rosize = pci_vpd_lrdt_size(&vpd_data[i]);
block_end = i + PCI_VPD_LRDT_TAG_SIZE + rosize;
i += PCI_VPD_LRDT_TAG_SIZE;
if (block_end > vpdlen)
goto out_not_found;
j = pci_vpd_find_info_keyword(vpd_data, i, rosize,
PCI_VPD_RO_KEYWORD_MFR_ID);
if (j > 0) {
len = pci_vpd_info_field_size(&vpd_data[j]);
j += PCI_VPD_INFO_FLD_HDR_SIZE;
if (j + len > block_end || len != 4 ||
memcmp(&vpd_data[j], "1028", 4))
goto partno;
j = pci_vpd_find_info_keyword(vpd_data, i, rosize,
PCI_VPD_RO_KEYWORD_VENDOR0);
if (j < 0)
goto partno;
len = pci_vpd_info_field_size(&vpd_data[j]);
j += PCI_VPD_INFO_FLD_HDR_SIZE;
if (j + len > block_end)
goto partno;
memcpy(tp->fw_ver, &vpd_data[j], len);
strncat(tp->fw_ver, " bc ", vpdlen - len - 1);
}
partno:
i = pci_vpd_find_info_keyword(vpd_data, i, rosize,
PCI_VPD_RO_KEYWORD_PARTNO);
if (i < 0)
goto out_not_found;
len = pci_vpd_info_field_size(&vpd_data[i]);
i += PCI_VPD_INFO_FLD_HDR_SIZE;
if (len > TG3_BPN_SIZE ||
(len + i) > vpdlen)
goto out_not_found;
memcpy(tp->board_part_number, &vpd_data[i], len);
out_not_found:
kfree(vpd_data);
if (tp->board_part_number[0])
return;
out_no_vpd:
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717) {
if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_5717 ||
tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_5717_C)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM5717");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_5718)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM5718");
else
goto nomatch;
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57780) {
if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57780)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57780");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57760)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57760");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57790)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57790");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57788)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57788");
else
goto nomatch;
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57765) {
if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57761)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57761");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57765)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57765");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57781)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57781");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57785)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57785");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57791)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57791");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57795)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57795");
else
goto nomatch;
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57766) {
if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57762)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57762");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57766)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57766");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57782)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57782");
else if (tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_57786)
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM57786");
else
goto nomatch;
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "BCM95906");
} else {
nomatch:
strcpy(tp->board_part_number, "none");
}
}
| 112,924,613,750,397,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | tg3.c | 243,393,128,707,233,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-1929 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the tg3_read_vpd function in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted firmware that specifies a long string in the Vital Product Data (VPD) data structure. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1929 |
1,057 | linux | 12176503366885edd542389eed3aaf94be163fdb | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12176503366885edd542389eed3aaf94be163fdb | fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int do_video_set_spu_palette(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct compat_video_spu_palette __user *up)
{
struct video_spu_palette __user *up_native;
compat_uptr_t palp;
int length, err;
err = get_user(palp, &up->palette);
err |= get_user(length, &up->length);
up_native = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct video_spu_palette));
err = put_user(compat_ptr(palp), &up_native->palette);
err |= put_user(length, &up_native->length);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
err = sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) up_native);
return err;
}
| 316,505,203,133,565,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | compat_ioctl.c | 304,637,621,645,556,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-1928 | The do_video_set_spu_palette function in fs/compat_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6.5 on unspecified architectures lacks a certain error check, which might allow local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE ioctl call on a /dev/dvb device. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1928 |
1,058 | linux | c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa | USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 | static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ENOENT");
goto skip_error;
case -ECONNRESET:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ECONNRESET");
goto skip_error;
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ESHUTDOWN");
goto skip_error;
case -EPIPE:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -EPIPE\n");
break;
default:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"Unexpected error %d\n", status);
break;
}
}
desc->rerr = status;
desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;
memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);
desc->length += desc->reslength;
skip_error:
wake_up(&desc->wait);
set_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock(&desc->iuspin);
}
| 263,555,284,317,390,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | cdc-wdm.c | 233,028,530,119,557,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-1860 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1860 |
1,065 | linux | 726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1 | net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_assoc_stats sas;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
/* User must provide at least the assoc id */
if (len < sizeof(sctp_assoc_t))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sas, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, sas.sas_assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
sas.sas_rtxchunks = asoc->stats.rtxchunks;
sas.sas_gapcnt = asoc->stats.gapcnt;
sas.sas_outofseqtsns = asoc->stats.outofseqtsns;
sas.sas_osacks = asoc->stats.osacks;
sas.sas_isacks = asoc->stats.isacks;
sas.sas_octrlchunks = asoc->stats.octrlchunks;
sas.sas_ictrlchunks = asoc->stats.ictrlchunks;
sas.sas_oodchunks = asoc->stats.oodchunks;
sas.sas_iodchunks = asoc->stats.iodchunks;
sas.sas_ouodchunks = asoc->stats.ouodchunks;
sas.sas_iuodchunks = asoc->stats.iuodchunks;
sas.sas_idupchunks = asoc->stats.idupchunks;
sas.sas_opackets = asoc->stats.opackets;
sas.sas_ipackets = asoc->stats.ipackets;
/* New high max rto observed, will return 0 if not a single
* RTO update took place. obs_rto_ipaddr will be bogus
* in such a case
*/
sas.sas_maxrto = asoc->stats.max_obs_rto;
memcpy(&sas.sas_obs_rto_ipaddr, &asoc->stats.obs_rto_ipaddr,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
/* Mark beginning of a new observation period */
asoc->stats.max_obs_rto = asoc->rto_min;
/* Allow the struct to grow and fill in as much as possible */
len = min_t(size_t, len, sizeof(sas));
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stat(%d): %d\n",
len, sas.sas_assoc_id);
if (copy_to_user(optval, &sas, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 170,963,965,115,843,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-1828 | The sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats function in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 does not validate a size value before proceeding to a copy_from_user operation, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application that contains an SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS getsockopt system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1828 |
1,066 | linux | 864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 | xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static struct sk_buff *xfrm_state_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct xfrm_state *x, u32 seq)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
info.in_skb = in_skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = 0;
if (dump_one_state(x, 0, &info)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
}
return skb;
}
| 324,377,055,092,562,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xfrm_user.c | 252,384,883,337,736,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-1826 | The xfrm_state_netlink function in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.7 does not properly handle error conditions in dump_one_state function calls, which allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1826 |
1,067 | linux | eb178619f930fa2ba2348de332a1ff1c66a31424 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eb178619f930fa2ba2348de332a1ff1c66a31424 | xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> | 1 | _xfs_buf_find(
struct xfs_buftarg *btp,
struct xfs_buf_map *map,
int nmaps,
xfs_buf_flags_t flags,
xfs_buf_t *new_bp)
{
size_t numbytes;
struct xfs_perag *pag;
struct rb_node **rbp;
struct rb_node *parent;
xfs_buf_t *bp;
xfs_daddr_t blkno = map[0].bm_bn;
int numblks = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nmaps; i++)
numblks += map[i].bm_len;
numbytes = BBTOB(numblks);
/* Check for IOs smaller than the sector size / not sector aligned */
ASSERT(!(numbytes < (1 << btp->bt_sshift)));
ASSERT(!(BBTOB(blkno) & (xfs_off_t)btp->bt_smask));
/* get tree root */
pag = xfs_perag_get(btp->bt_mount,
xfs_daddr_to_agno(btp->bt_mount, blkno));
/* walk tree */
spin_lock(&pag->pag_buf_lock);
rbp = &pag->pag_buf_tree.rb_node;
parent = NULL;
bp = NULL;
while (*rbp) {
parent = *rbp;
bp = rb_entry(parent, struct xfs_buf, b_rbnode);
if (blkno < bp->b_bn)
rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_left;
else if (blkno > bp->b_bn)
rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_right;
else {
/*
* found a block number match. If the range doesn't
* match, the only way this is allowed is if the buffer
* in the cache is stale and the transaction that made
* it stale has not yet committed. i.e. we are
* reallocating a busy extent. Skip this buffer and
* continue searching to the right for an exact match.
*/
if (bp->b_length != numblks) {
ASSERT(bp->b_flags & XBF_STALE);
rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_right;
continue;
}
atomic_inc(&bp->b_hold);
goto found;
}
}
/* No match found */
if (new_bp) {
rb_link_node(&new_bp->b_rbnode, parent, rbp);
rb_insert_color(&new_bp->b_rbnode, &pag->pag_buf_tree);
/* the buffer keeps the perag reference until it is freed */
new_bp->b_pag = pag;
spin_unlock(&pag->pag_buf_lock);
} else {
XFS_STATS_INC(xb_miss_locked);
spin_unlock(&pag->pag_buf_lock);
xfs_perag_put(pag);
}
return new_bp;
found:
spin_unlock(&pag->pag_buf_lock);
xfs_perag_put(pag);
if (!xfs_buf_trylock(bp)) {
if (flags & XBF_TRYLOCK) {
xfs_buf_rele(bp);
XFS_STATS_INC(xb_busy_locked);
return NULL;
}
xfs_buf_lock(bp);
XFS_STATS_INC(xb_get_locked_waited);
}
/*
* if the buffer is stale, clear all the external state associated with
* it. We need to keep flags such as how we allocated the buffer memory
* intact here.
*/
if (bp->b_flags & XBF_STALE) {
ASSERT((bp->b_flags & _XBF_DELWRI_Q) == 0);
ASSERT(bp->b_iodone == NULL);
bp->b_flags &= _XBF_KMEM | _XBF_PAGES;
bp->b_ops = NULL;
}
trace_xfs_buf_find(bp, flags, _RET_IP_);
XFS_STATS_INC(xb_get_locked);
return bp;
}
| 91,424,937,264,814,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xfs_buf.c | 137,283,063,241,069,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-1819 | The _xfs_buf_find function in fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.6 does not validate block numbers, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the ability to mount an XFS filesystem containing a metadata inode with an invalid extent map. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1819 |
1,068 | linux | a2c118bfab8bc6b8bb213abfc35201e441693d55 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2c118bfab8bc6b8bb213abfc35201e441693d55 | KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | 1 | static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirect(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long result = 0;
switch (ioapic->ioregsel) {
case IOAPIC_REG_VERSION:
result = ((((IOAPIC_NUM_PINS - 1) & 0xff) << 16)
| (IOAPIC_VERSION_ID & 0xff));
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_APIC_ID:
case IOAPIC_REG_ARB_ID:
result = ((ioapic->id & 0xf) << 24);
break;
default:
{
u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
u64 redir_content;
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
(redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :
redir_content & 0xffffffff;
break;
}
}
return result;
}
| 68,178,098,106,123,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ioapic.c | 243,802,327,646,897,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-1798 | The ioapic_read_indirect function in virt/kvm/ioapic.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 does not properly handle a certain combination of invalid IOAPIC_REG_SELECT and IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW operations, which allows guest OS users to obtain sensitive information from host OS memory or cause a denial of service (host OS OOPS) via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1798 |
1,071 | linux | 0b79459b482e85cb7426aa7da683a9f2c97aeae1 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b79459b482e85cb7426aa7da683a9f2c97aeae1 | KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | 1 | int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
break;
case MSR_EFER:
return set_efer(vcpu, data);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
data &= ~(u64)0x8; /* ignore TLB cache disable */
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented HWCR wrmsr: 0x%llx\n",
data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented MMIO_CONF_BASE wrmsr: "
"0x%llx\n", data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
if (!data) {
/* We support the non-activated case already */
break;
} else if (data & ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF)) {
/* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific,
thus reserved and should throw a #GP */
return 1;
}
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
__func__, data);
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return set_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, data);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
if (guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(vcpu)) {
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
u64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset(vcpu, adj, true);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data);
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: {
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.time = data;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
if (!(data & 1))
break;
/* ...but clean it before doing the actual write */
vcpu->arch.time_offset = data & ~(PAGE_MASK | 1);
/* Check that the address is 32-byte aligned. */
if (vcpu->arch.time_offset &
(sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info) - 1))
break;
vcpu->arch.time_page =
gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, data >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(vcpu->arch.time_page))
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
break;
}
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
if (unlikely(!sched_info_on()))
return 1;
if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK)
return 1;
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
data & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
break;
vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
preempt_disable();
accumulate_steal_time(vcpu);
preempt_enable();
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
if (kvm_lapic_enable_pv_eoi(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, data);
/* Performance counters are not protected by a CPUID bit,
* so we should check all of them in the generic path for the sake of
* cross vendor migration.
* Writing a zero into the event select MSRs disables them,
* which we perfectly emulate ;-). Any other value should be at least
* reported, some guests depend on them.
*/
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
if (data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
/* at least RHEL 4 unconditionally writes to the perfctr registers,
* so we ignore writes to make it happy.
*/
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR2:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
pr = true;
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (pr || data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "disabled perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR.
* Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors,
* all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from
* AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the
* affected processor models on the command line, hence
* the need to ignore the workaround.
*/
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = set_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, data);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return set_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr
* counterpart for further detail.
*/
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data;
break;
default:
if (msr && (msr == vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr))
return xen_hvm_config(vcpu, data);
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 148,215,412,997,884,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | x86.c | 92,946,483,395,699,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-1797 | Use-after-free vulnerability in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that triggers use of a guest physical address (GPA) in (1) movable or (2) removable memory during an MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME kvm_set_msr_common operation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1797 |
1,073 | linux | c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9 | KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME (CVE-2013-1796)
If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the
time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page. The
write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time
structure and then performing a memcpy to that page starting at an offset
that the guest controls. Well behaved guests always provide a 32-byte aligned
address, however a malicious guest could use this to corrupt host kernel
memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | 1 | int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
bool pr = false;
u32 msr = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
break;
case MSR_EFER:
return set_efer(vcpu, data);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
data &= ~(u64)0x40; /* ignore flush filter disable */
data &= ~(u64)0x100; /* ignore ignne emulation enable */
data &= ~(u64)0x8; /* ignore TLB cache disable */
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented HWCR wrmsr: 0x%llx\n",
data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
if (data != 0) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented MMIO_CONF_BASE wrmsr: "
"0x%llx\n", data);
return 1;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
if (!data) {
/* We support the non-activated case already */
break;
} else if (data & ~(DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF)) {
/* Values other than LBR and BTF are vendor-specific,
thus reserved and should throw a #GP */
return 1;
}
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
__func__, data);
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return set_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, data);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_write(vcpu, msr, data);
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
kvm_set_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
if (guest_cpuid_has_tsc_adjust(vcpu)) {
if (!msr_info->host_initiated) {
u64 adj = data - vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset(vcpu, adj, true);
}
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = data;
}
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr = data;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock = data;
kvm_write_wall_clock(vcpu->kvm, data);
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME: {
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.time = data;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
if (!(data & 1))
break;
/* ...but clean it before doing the actual write */
vcpu->arch.time_offset = data & ~(PAGE_MASK | 1);
vcpu->arch.time_page =
gfn_to_page(vcpu->kvm, data >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_error_page(vcpu->arch.time_page))
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
break;
}
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
if (kvm_pv_enable_async_pf(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
if (unlikely(!sched_info_on()))
return 1;
if (data & KVM_STEAL_RESERVED_MASK)
return 1;
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
data & KVM_STEAL_VALID_BITS))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = data;
if (!(data & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
break;
vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
preempt_disable();
accumulate_steal_time(vcpu);
preempt_enable();
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
if (kvm_lapic_enable_pv_eoi(vcpu, data))
return 1;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return set_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, data);
/* Performance counters are not protected by a CPUID bit,
* so we should check all of them in the generic path for the sake of
* cross vendor migration.
* Writing a zero into the event select MSRs disables them,
* which we perfectly emulate ;-). Any other value should be at least
* reported, some guests depend on them.
*/
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3:
if (data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
/* at least RHEL 4 unconditionally writes to the perfctr registers,
* so we ignore writes to make it happy.
*/
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR2:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
pr = true;
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (pr || data != 0)
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "disabled perfctr wrmsr: "
"0x%x data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Ignore all writes to this no longer documented MSR.
* Writes are only relevant for old K7 processors,
* all pre-dating SVM, but a recommended workaround from
* AMD for these chips. It is possible to specify the
* affected processor models on the command line, hence
* the need to ignore the workaround.
*/
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = set_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, data);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return set_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* Drop writes to this legacy MSR -- see rdmsr
* counterpart for further detail.
*/
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n", msr, data);
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.length = data;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.osvw.status = data;
break;
default:
if (msr && (msr == vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr))
return xen_hvm_config(vcpu, data);
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr, data);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored wrmsr: 0x%x data %llx\n",
msr, data);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 283,608,099,968,125,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | x86.c | 147,713,205,250,400,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-1796 | The kvm_set_msr_common function in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c in the Linux kernel through 3.8.4 does not ensure a required time_page alignment during an MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME operation, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and host OS memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1796 |
1,074 | linux | 0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087 | keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 1 | int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
char buf[20];
int ret;
uid_t uid;
user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
cred = current_cred();
user = cred->user;
uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
if (user->uid_keyring) {
kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
return 0;
}
mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
ret = 0;
if (!user->uid_keyring) {
/* get the UID-specific keyring
* - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
* pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
* may have been destroyed by setuid */
sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
goto error;
}
}
/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
* already) */
sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
}
/* we install a link from the user session keyring to
* the user keyring */
ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_release_both;
}
/* install the keyrings */
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
}
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
error_release_both:
key_put(session_keyring);
error_release:
key_put(uid_keyring);
error:
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
| 150,644,529,088,063,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | process_keys.c | 57,230,651,678,538,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-362"
] | CVE-2013-1792 | Race condition in the install_user_keyrings function in security/keys/process_keys.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via crafted keyctl system calls that trigger keyring operations in simultaneous threads. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1792 |
1,075 | linux | 1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811 | USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 | static void chase_port(struct edgeport_port *port, unsigned long timeout,
int flush)
{
int baud_rate;
struct tty_struct *tty = tty_port_tty_get(&port->port->port);
struct usb_serial *serial = port->port->serial;
wait_queue_t wait;
unsigned long flags;
if (!timeout)
timeout = (HZ * EDGE_CLOSING_WAIT)/100;
/* wait for data to drain from the buffer */
spin_lock_irqsave(&port->ep_lock, flags);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (kfifo_len(&port->write_fifo) == 0
|| timeout == 0 || signal_pending(current)
|| serial->disconnected)
/* disconnect */
break;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->ep_lock, flags);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
spin_lock_irqsave(&port->ep_lock, flags);
}
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&tty->write_wait, &wait);
if (flush)
kfifo_reset_out(&port->write_fifo);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->ep_lock, flags);
tty_kref_put(tty);
/* wait for data to drain from the device */
timeout += jiffies;
while ((long)(jiffies - timeout) < 0 && !signal_pending(current)
&& !serial->disconnected) {
/* not disconnected */
if (!tx_active(port))
break;
msleep(10);
}
/* disconnected */
if (serial->disconnected)
return;
/* wait one more character time, based on baud rate */
/* (tx_active doesn't seem to wait for the last byte) */
baud_rate = port->baud_rate;
if (baud_rate == 0)
baud_rate = 50;
msleep(max(1, DIV_ROUND_UP(10000, baud_rate)));
}
| 45,678,875,671,616,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-1774 | The chase_port function in drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via an attempted /dev/ttyUSB read or write operation on a disconnected Edgeport USB serial converter. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1774 |
1,079 | linux | ce0030c00f95cf9110d9cdcd41e901e1fb814417 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ce0030c00f95cf9110d9cdcd41e901e1fb814417 | None | 1 | static void call_console_drivers(unsigned start, unsigned end)
{
unsigned cur_index, start_print;
static int msg_level = -1;
BUG_ON(((int)(start - end)) > 0);
cur_index = start;
start_print = start;
while (cur_index != end) {
if (msg_level < 0 && ((end - cur_index) > 2)) {
/* strip log prefix */
cur_index += log_prefix(&LOG_BUF(cur_index), &msg_level, NULL);
start_print = cur_index;
}
while (cur_index != end) {
char c = LOG_BUF(cur_index);
cur_index++;
if (c == '\n') {
if (msg_level < 0) {
/*
* printk() has already given us loglevel tags in
* the buffer. This code is here in case the
* log buffer has wrapped right round and scribbled
* on those tags
*/
msg_level = default_message_loglevel;
}
_call_console_drivers(start_print, cur_index, msg_level);
msg_level = -1;
start_print = cur_index;
break;
}
}
}
_call_console_drivers(start_print, end, msg_level);
}
| 150,497,347,424,301,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-1772 | The log_prefix function in kernel/printk.c in the Linux kernel 3.x before 3.4.33 does not properly remove a prefix string from a syslog header, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and system crash) by leveraging /dev/kmsg write access and triggering a call_console_drivers function call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1772 |
1,080 | tinc | 17a33dfd95b1a29e90db76414eb9622df9632320 | https://github.com/gsliepen/tinc | https://github.com/gsliepen/tinc/commit/17a33dfd95b1a29e90db76414eb9622df9632320 | Drop packets forwarded via TCP if they are too big (CVE-2013-1428).
Normally all requests sent via the meta connections are checked so that they
cannot be larger than the input buffer. However, when packets are forwarded via
meta connections, they are copied into a packet buffer without checking whether
it fits into it. Since the packet buffer is allocated on the stack, this in
effect allows an authenticated remote node to cause a stack overflow.
This issue was found by Martin Schobert. | 1 | void receive_tcppacket(connection_t *c, const char *buffer, int len) {
vpn_packet_t outpkt;
outpkt.len = len;
if(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
outpkt.priority = 0;
else
outpkt.priority = -1;
memcpy(outpkt.data, buffer, len);
receive_packet(c->node, &outpkt);
}
| 130,046,906,967,549,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | net_packet.c | 8,171,485,538,728,046,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-1428 | Stack-based buffer overflow in the receive_tcppacket function in net_packet.c in tinc before 1.0.21 and 1.1 before 1.1pre7 allows remote authenticated peers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a large TCP packet. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1428 |
1,083 | krb5 | 8ee70ec63931d1e38567905387ab9b1d45734d81 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/8ee70ec63931d1e38567905387ab9b1d45734d81 | KDC TGS-REQ null deref [CVE-2013-1416]
By sending an unusual but valid TGS-REQ, an authenticated remote
attacker can cause the KDC process to crash by dereferencing a null
pointer.
prep_reprocess_req() can cause a null pointer dereference when
processing a service principal name. Code in this function can
inappropriately pass a null pointer to strlcpy(). Unmodified client
software can trivially trigger this vulnerability, but the attacker
must have already authenticated and received a valid Kerberos ticket.
The vulnerable code was introduced by the implementation of new
service principal realm referral functionality in krb5-1.7, but was
corrected as a side effect of the KDC refactoring in krb5-1.11.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 7600 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.5
status: resolved | 1 | prep_reprocess_req(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_principal *krbtgt_princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
char **realms, **cpp, *temp_buf=NULL;
krb5_data *comp1 = NULL, *comp2 = NULL;
char *comp1_str = NULL;
/* By now we know that server principal name is unknown.
* If CANONICALIZE flag is set in the request
* If req is not U2U authn. req
* the requested server princ. has exactly two components
* either
* the name type is NT-SRV-HST
* or name type is NT-UNKNOWN and
* the 1st component is listed in conf file under host_based_services
* the 1st component is not in a list in conf under "no_host_referral"
* the 2d component looks like fully-qualified domain name (FQDN)
* If all of these conditions are satisfied - try mapping the FQDN and
* re-process the request as if client had asked for cross-realm TGT.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE) &&
!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) &&
krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
comp1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 0);
comp2 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
comp1_str = calloc(1,comp1->length+1);
if (!comp1_str) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
strlcpy(comp1_str,comp1->data,comp1->length+1);
if ((krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST ||
krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST ||
(krb5_princ_type(kdc_context, request->server) == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN &&
kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services != NULL &&
(krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
comp1_str) == TRUE ||
krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_host_based_services,
KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == TRUE))) &&
(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral == NULL ||
(krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == FALSE &&
krb5_match_config_pattern(kdc_active_realm->realm_no_host_referral,
comp1_str) == FALSE))) {
if (memchr(comp2->data, '.', comp2->length) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
temp_buf = calloc(1, comp2->length+1);
if (!temp_buf) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
strlcpy(temp_buf, comp2->data,comp2->length+1);
retval = krb5int_get_domain_realm_mapping(kdc_context, temp_buf, &realms);
free(temp_buf);
if (retval) {
/* no match found */
kdc_err(kdc_context, retval, "unable to find realm of host");
goto cleanup;
}
if (realms == 0) {
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Don't return a referral to the null realm or the service
* realm. */
if (realms[0] == 0 ||
data_eq_string(request->server->realm, realms[0])) {
free(realms[0]);
free(realms);
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Modify request.
* Construct cross-realm tgt : krbtgt/REMOTE_REALM@LOCAL_REALM
* and use it as a principal in this req.
*/
retval = krb5_build_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ,
(*request->server).realm.length,
(*request->server).realm.data,
"krbtgt", realms[0], (char *)0);
for (cpp = realms; *cpp; cpp++)
free(*cpp);
}
}
cleanup:
free(comp1_str);
return retval;
}
| 26,445,768,461,799,657,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | do_tgs_req.c | 132,430,812,994,884,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-1416 | The prep_reprocess_req function in do_tgs_req.c in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.10.5 does not properly perform service-principal realm referral, which allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a crafted TGS-REQ request. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1416 |
1,084 | krb5 | f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e | https://github.com/krb5/krb5 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e | PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved | 1 | pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *pdid_buf,
unsigned int pkid_len,
int *valid_kdcPkId)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *is = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = pdid_buf;
int status = 1;
X509 *kdc_cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
*valid_kdcPkId = 0;
pkiDebug("found kdcPkId in AS REQ\n");
is = d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL(NULL, &p, (int)pkid_len);
if (is == NULL)
goto cleanup;
status = X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(kdc_cert), is->issuer);
if (!status) {
status = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(kdc_cert), is->serial);
if (!status)
*valid_kdcPkId = 1;
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
X509_NAME_free(is->issuer);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(is->serial);
free(is);
return retval;
}
| 113,776,654,271,026,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2013-1415 | The pkinit_check_kdc_pkid function in plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c in the PKINIT implementation in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.10.4 and 1.11.x before 1.11.1 does not properly handle errors during extraction of fields from an X.509 certificate, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a malformed KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ AS-REQ request. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1415 |
1,085 | linux | 2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 | signal: always clear sa_restorer on execve
When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is
not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to
children. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by
examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction().
Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only
matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed
until the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer,
this is where it should be fixed.
Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written
since this would be the only use. Instead, we use
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places.
Example of the leak before applying this patch:
$ cat /proc/$$/maps
...
7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
$ ./leak
...
7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
...
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct *t, int force_default)
{
int i;
struct k_sigaction *ka = &t->sighand->action[0];
for (i = _NSIG ; i != 0 ; i--) {
if (force_default || ka->sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN)
ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
ka->sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigemptyset(&ka->sa.sa_mask);
ka++;
}
}
| 300,076,951,675,769,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-0914 | The flush_signal_handlers function in kernel/signal.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 preserves the value of the sa_restorer field across an exec operation, which makes it easier for local users to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application containing a sigaction system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0914 |
1,089 | linux | 0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b | Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> | 1 | static int hidp_setup_hid(struct hidp_session *session,
struct hidp_connadd_req *req)
{
struct hid_device *hid;
int err;
session->rd_data = kzalloc(req->rd_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!session->rd_data)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(session->rd_data, req->rd_data, req->rd_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto fault;
}
session->rd_size = req->rd_size;
hid = hid_allocate_device();
if (IS_ERR(hid)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hid);
goto fault;
}
session->hid = hid;
hid->driver_data = session;
hid->bus = BUS_BLUETOOTH;
hid->vendor = req->vendor;
hid->product = req->product;
hid->version = req->version;
hid->country = req->country;
strncpy(hid->name, req->name, 128);
snprintf(hid->phys, sizeof(hid->phys), "%pMR",
&bt_sk(session->ctrl_sock->sk)->src);
snprintf(hid->uniq, sizeof(hid->uniq), "%pMR",
&bt_sk(session->ctrl_sock->sk)->dst);
hid->dev.parent = &session->conn->dev;
hid->ll_driver = &hidp_hid_driver;
hid->hid_get_raw_report = hidp_get_raw_report;
hid->hid_output_raw_report = hidp_output_raw_report;
/* True if device is blacklisted in drivers/hid/hid-core.c */
if (hid_ignore(hid)) {
hid_destroy_device(session->hid);
session->hid = NULL;
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
fault:
kfree(session->rd_data);
session->rd_data = NULL;
return err;
}
| 293,512,902,537,004,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | core.c | 327,221,048,127,945,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2013-0349 | The hidp_setup_hid function in net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.6 does not properly copy a certain name field, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by setting a long name and making an HIDPCONNADD ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0349 |
1,090 | linux | a67adb997419fb53540d4a4f79c6471c60bc69b6 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a67adb997419fb53540d4a4f79c6471c60bc69b6 | evm: checking if removexattr is not a NULL
The following lines of code produce a kernel oops.
fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
fchmod(fd, 0666);
[ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000
[ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP
[ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button
[ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs
[ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0
[ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2
[ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4
[ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0
[ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000)
[ 139.924982] Stack:
[ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940
[ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3
[ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08
[ 139.924982] Call Trace:
[ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62
[ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26
[ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281
[ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76
[ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33
[ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c
[ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value.
This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation.
Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is
not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 1 | int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
int rc = 0;
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
if (rc == 0) {
xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
&xattr_data,
sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
}
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
return rc;
}
| 305,997,047,583,974,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | evm_crypto.c | 98,288,434,782,980,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-0313 | The evm_update_evmxattr function in security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.5, when the Extended Verification Module (EVM) is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an attempted removexattr operation on an inode of a sockfs filesystem. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0313 |
1,092 | linux | 89d7ae34cdda4195809a5a987f697a517a2a3177 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/89d7ae34cdda4195809a5a987f697a517a2a3177 | cipso: don't follow a NULL pointer when setsockopt() is called
As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user
attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL
tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL
pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via
the setsockopt() syscall).
This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is
non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface. In
the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add
a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is
not something we want to allow.
A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must
have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be
caught early in cipso_v4_validate():
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <string.h>
struct local_tag {
char type;
char length;
char info[4];
};
struct cipso {
char type;
char length;
char doi[4];
struct local_tag local;
};
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int sockfd;
struct cipso cipso = {
.type = IPOPT_CIPSO,
.length = sizeof(struct cipso),
.local = {
.type = 128,
.length = sizeof(struct local_tag),
},
};
memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4);
cipso.doi[3] = 3;
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#define SOL_IP 0
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS,
&cipso, sizeof(struct cipso));
return 0;
}
CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
{
unsigned char *opt = *option;
unsigned char *tag;
unsigned char opt_iter;
unsigned char err_offset = 0;
u8 opt_len;
u8 tag_len;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
u32 tag_iter;
/* caller already checks for length values that are too large */
opt_len = opt[1];
if (opt_len < 8) {
err_offset = 1;
goto validate_return;
}
rcu_read_lock();
doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(get_unaligned_be32(&opt[2]));
if (doi_def == NULL) {
err_offset = 2;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
opt_iter = CIPSO_V4_HDR_LEN;
tag = opt + opt_iter;
while (opt_iter < opt_len) {
for (tag_iter = 0; doi_def->tags[tag_iter] != tag[0];)
if (doi_def->tags[tag_iter] == CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID ||
++tag_iter == CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag_len = tag[1];
if (tag_len > (opt_len - opt_iter)) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
switch (tag[0]) {
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
/* We are already going to do all the verification
* necessary at the socket layer so from our point of
* view it is safe to turn these checks off (and less
* work), however, the CIPSO draft says we should do
* all the CIPSO validations here but it doesn't
* really specify _exactly_ what we need to validate
* ... so, just make it a sysctl tunable. */
if (cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid) {
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_enum_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
if (tag_len < CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(doi_def,
tag[3]) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 3;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len > CIPSO_V4_TAG_RNG_BLEN &&
cipso_v4_map_cat_rng_valid(doi_def,
&tag[4],
tag_len - 4) < 0) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 4;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
/* This is a non-standard tag that we only allow for
* local connections, so if the incoming interface is
* not the loopback device drop the packet. */
if (!(skb->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
if (tag_len != CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN) {
err_offset = opt_iter + 1;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
break;
default:
err_offset = opt_iter;
goto validate_return_locked;
}
tag += tag_len;
opt_iter += tag_len;
}
validate_return_locked:
rcu_read_unlock();
validate_return:
*option = opt + err_offset;
return err_offset;
}
| 254,520,361,513,953,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-0310 | The cipso_v4_validate function in net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an IPOPT_CIPSO IP_OPTIONS setsockopt system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0310 |
1,093 | linux | 77c1090f94d1b0b5186fb13a1b71b47b1343f87f | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77c1090f94d1b0b5186fb13a1b71b47b1343f87f | net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags,
int *peeked, int *off, int *err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
/*
* Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before skb_recv_datagram()
*/
int error = sock_error(sk);
if (error)
goto no_packet;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
do {
/* Again only user level code calls this function, so nothing
* interrupt level will suddenly eat the receive_queue.
*
* Look at current nfs client by the way...
* However, this function was correct in any case. 8)
*/
unsigned long cpu_flags;
struct sk_buff_head *queue = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
skb_queue_walk(queue, skb) {
*peeked = skb->peeked;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
if (*off >= skb->len) {
*off -= skb->len;
continue;
}
skb->peeked = 1;
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
} else
__skb_unlink(skb, queue);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
return skb;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
/* User doesn't want to wait */
error = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto no_packet;
} while (!wait_for_packet(sk, err, &timeo));
return NULL;
no_packet:
*err = error;
return NULL;
}
| 89,456,193,869,845,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-0290 | The __skb_recv_datagram function in net/core/datagram.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8 does not properly handle the MSG_PEEK flag with zero-length data, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and system hang) via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0290 |
1,115 | linux | c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 | x86/msr: Add capabilities check
At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.
In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
some capability and security model based systems down towards
that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.
Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
tighter.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Horses <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 1 | static int msr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
unsigned int cpu;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
cpu = iminor(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(cpu))
return -ENXIO; /* No such CPU */
c = &cpu_data(cpu);
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR))
return -EIO; /* MSR not supported */
return 0;
}
| 134,954,684,690,763,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | msr.c | 286,103,807,502,299,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-0268 | The msr_open function in arch/x86/kernel/msr.c in the Linux kernel before 3.7.6 allows local users to bypass intended capability restrictions by executing a crafted application as root, as demonstrated by msr32.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0268 |
1,123 | libarchive | 22531545514043e04633e1c015c7540b9de9dbe4 | https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive | https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/22531545514043e04633e1c015c7540b9de9dbe4 | Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library. | 1 | _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
| 130,653,882,621,145,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | archive_write.c | 270,035,346,370,556,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-0211 | Integer signedness error in the archive_write_zip_data function in archive_write_set_format_zip.c in libarchive 3.1.2 and earlier, when running on 64-bit machines, allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via unspecified vectors, which triggers an improper conversion between unsigned and signed types, leading to a buffer overflow. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-0211 |
1,124 | linux | fe685aabf7c8c9f138e5ea900954d295bf229175 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fe685aabf7c8c9f138e5ea900954d295bf229175 | isofs: avoid info leak on export
For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 1 | isofs_export_encode_fh(struct inode *inode,
__u32 *fh32,
int *max_len,
struct inode *parent)
{
struct iso_inode_info * ei = ISOFS_I(inode);
int len = *max_len;
int type = 1;
__u16 *fh16 = (__u16*)fh32;
/*
* WARNING: max_len is 5 for NFSv2. Because of this
* limitation, we use the lower 16 bits of fh32[1] to hold the
* offset of the inode and the upper 16 bits of fh32[1] to
* hold the offset of the parent.
*/
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*max_len = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*max_len = 3;
return 255;
}
len = 3;
fh32[0] = ei->i_iget5_block;
fh16[2] = (__u16)ei->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[2] = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
struct iso_inode_info *eparent;
eparent = ISOFS_I(parent);
fh32[3] = eparent->i_iget5_block;
fh16[3] = (__u16)eparent->i_iget5_offset; /* fh16 [sic] */
fh32[4] = parent->i_generation;
len = 5;
type = 2;
}
*max_len = len;
return type;
}
| 175,765,004,232,940,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6549 | The isofs_export_encode_fh function in fs/isofs/export.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6549 |
1,125 | linux | 0143fc5e9f6f5aad4764801015bc8d4b4a278200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0143fc5e9f6f5aad4764801015bc8d4b4a278200 | udf: avoid info leak on export
For type 0x51 the udf.parent_partref member in struct fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 1 | static int udf_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,
struct inode *parent)
{
int len = *lenp;
struct kernel_lb_addr location = UDF_I(inode)->i_location;
struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)fh;
int type = FILEID_UDF_WITHOUT_PARENT;
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*lenp = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*lenp = 3;
return 255;
}
*lenp = 3;
fid->udf.block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.generation = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
location = UDF_I(parent)->i_location;
fid->udf.parent_block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_generation = inode->i_generation;
*lenp = 5;
type = FILEID_UDF_WITH_PARENT;
}
return type;
}
| 271,056,274,363,302,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | namei.c | 30,071,079,208,846,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6548 | The udf_encode_fh function in fs/udf/namei.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel heap memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6548 |
1,126 | linux | a117dacde0288f3ec60b6e5bcedae8fa37ee0dfc | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a117dacde0288f3ec60b6e5bcedae8fa37ee0dfc | net/tun: fix ioctl() based info leaks
The tun module leaks up to 36 bytes of memory by not fully initializing
a structure located on the stack that gets copied to user memory by the
TUNGETIFF and SIOCGIFHWADDR ioctl()s.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static long __tun_chr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, int ifreq_len)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun;
void __user* argp = (void __user*)arg;
struct sock_fprog fprog;
struct ifreq ifr;
int sndbuf;
int vnet_hdr_sz;
int ret;
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF || _IOC_TYPE(cmd) == 0x89)
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, argp, ifreq_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (cmd == TUNGETFEATURES) {
/* Currently this just means: "what IFF flags are valid?".
* This is needed because we never checked for invalid flags on
* TUNSETIFF. */
return put_user(IFF_TUN | IFF_TAP | IFF_NO_PI | IFF_ONE_QUEUE |
IFF_VNET_HDR,
(unsigned int __user*)argp);
}
rtnl_lock();
tun = __tun_get(tfile);
if (cmd == TUNSETIFF && !tun) {
ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ-1] = '\0';
ret = tun_set_iff(tfile->net, file, &ifr);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
ret = -EBADFD;
if (!tun)
goto unlock;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_ioctl cmd %d\n", cmd);
ret = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case TUNGETIFF:
ret = tun_get_iff(current->nsproxy->net_ns, tun, &ifr);
if (ret)
break;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETNOCSUM:
/* Disable/Enable checksum */
/* [unimplemented] */
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "ignored: set checksum %s\n",
arg ? "disabled" : "enabled");
break;
case TUNSETPERSIST:
/* Disable/Enable persist mode */
if (arg)
tun->flags |= TUN_PERSIST;
else
tun->flags &= ~TUN_PERSIST;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "persist %s\n",
arg ? "enabled" : "disabled");
break;
case TUNSETOWNER:
/* Set owner of the device */
tun->owner = (uid_t) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "owner set to %d\n", tun->owner);
break;
case TUNSETGROUP:
/* Set group of the device */
tun->group= (gid_t) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "group set to %d\n", tun->group);
break;
case TUNSETLINK:
/* Only allow setting the type when the interface is down */
if (tun->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun,
"Linktype set failed because interface is up\n");
ret = -EBUSY;
} else {
tun->dev->type = (int) arg;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "linktype set to %d\n",
tun->dev->type);
ret = 0;
}
break;
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
case TUNSETDEBUG:
tun->debug = arg;
break;
#endif
case TUNSETOFFLOAD:
ret = set_offload(tun, arg);
break;
case TUNSETTXFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = update_filter(&tun->txflt, (void __user *)arg);
break;
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
/* Get hw address */
memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, tun->dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = tun->dev->type;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ifr, ifreq_len))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
/* Set hw address */
tun_debug(KERN_DEBUG, tun, "set hw address: %pM\n",
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data);
ret = dev_set_mac_address(tun->dev, &ifr.ifr_hwaddr);
break;
case TUNGETSNDBUF:
sndbuf = tun->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &sndbuf, sizeof(sndbuf)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETSNDBUF:
if (copy_from_user(&sndbuf, argp, sizeof(sndbuf))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
tun->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf = sndbuf;
break;
case TUNGETVNETHDRSZ:
vnet_hdr_sz = tun->vnet_hdr_sz;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &vnet_hdr_sz, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz)))
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case TUNSETVNETHDRSZ:
if (copy_from_user(&vnet_hdr_sz, argp, sizeof(vnet_hdr_sz))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (vnet_hdr_sz < (int)sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = vnet_hdr_sz;
break;
case TUNATTACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&fprog, argp, sizeof(fprog)))
break;
ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, tun->socket.sk);
break;
case TUNDETACHFILTER:
/* Can be set only for TAPs */
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((tun->flags & TUN_TYPE_MASK) != TUN_TAP_DEV)
break;
ret = sk_detach_filter(tun->socket.sk);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
if (tun)
tun_put(tun);
return ret;
}
| 35,869,627,182,032,717,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | tun.c | 266,233,870,309,545,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6547 | The __tun_chr_ioctl function in drivers/net/tun.c in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize a certain structure, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6547 |
1,127 | linux | e862f1a9b7df4e8196ebec45ac62295138aa3fc2 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e862f1a9b7df4e8196ebec45ac62295138aa3fc2 | atm: fix info leak in getsockopt(SO_ATMPVC)
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int vcc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
int len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (__SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) && len != __SO_SIZE(optname))
return -EINVAL;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
switch (optname) {
case SO_ATMQOS:
if (!test_bit(ATM_VF_HASQOS, &vcc->flags))
return -EINVAL;
return copy_to_user(optval, &vcc->qos, sizeof(vcc->qos))
? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_SETCLP:
return put_user(vcc->atm_options & ATM_ATMOPT_CLP ? 1 : 0,
(unsigned long __user *)optval) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_ATMPVC:
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc pvc;
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
pvc.sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
pvc.sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
pvc.sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
pvc.sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return copy_to_user(optval, &pvc, sizeof(pvc)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
default:
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!vcc->dev || !vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt)
return -EINVAL;
return vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt(vcc, level, optname, optval, len);
}
| 133,848,982,303,383,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | common.c | 247,639,831,891,652,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6546 | The ATM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6546 |
1,128 | linux | 9344a972961d1a6d2c04d9008b13617bcb6ec2ef | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9344a972961d1a6d2c04d9008b13617bcb6ec2ef | Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rfcomm_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int *len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
sa->rc_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
sa->rc_channel = rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel;
if (peer)
bacpy(&sa->rc_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->dst);
else
bacpy(&sa->rc_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->src);
*len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rc);
return 0;
}
| 94,097,099,797,321,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sock.c | 37,985,206,412,418,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-6545 | The Bluetooth RFCOMM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.6 does not properly initialize certain structures, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6545 |