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40
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164
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stringlengths 0
11.5k
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int64 0
1
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stringlengths 5
484k
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float64 1,559,120,642,045,605,000,000,000B
340,279,892,905,069,500,000,000,000,000B
| file_name
stringlengths 4
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float64 25,942,829,220,065,710,000,000,000B
340,272,304,251,680,200,000,000,000,000B
⌀ | cwe
sequencelengths 0
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
452 | enlightment | 39641e74a560982fbf93f29bf96b37d27803cb56 | https://git.enlightenment.org/legacy/imlib2 | https://git.enlightenment.org/legacy/imlib2.git/commit/?h=v1.4.7&id=39641e74a560982fbf93f29bf96b37d27803cb56 | None | 1 | load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress, char progress_granularity,
char immediate_load)
{
static const int intoffset[] = { 0, 4, 2, 1 };
static const int intjump[] = { 8, 8, 4, 2 };
int rc;
DATA32 *ptr;
GifFileType *gif;
GifRowType *rows;
GifRecordType rec;
ColorMapObject *cmap;
int i, j, done, bg, r, g, b, w = 0, h = 0;
float per = 0.0, per_inc;
int last_per = 0, last_y = 0;
int transp;
int fd;
done = 0;
rows = NULL;
transp = -1;
/* if immediate_load is 1, then dont delay image laoding as below, or */
/* already data in this image - dont load it again */
if (im->data)
return 0;
fd = open(im->real_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR >= 5
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd, NULL);
#else
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd);
#endif
if (!gif)
{
close(fd);
return 0;
}
rc = 0; /* Failure */
do
{
if (DGifGetRecordType(gif, &rec) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
if ((rec == IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE) && (!done))
{
if (DGifGetImageDesc(gif) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
w = gif->Image.Width;
h = gif->Image.Height;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit2;
rows = calloc(h, sizeof(GifRowType *));
if (!rows)
goto quit2;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
rows[i] = malloc(w * sizeof(GifPixelType));
if (!rows[i])
goto quit;
}
if (gif->Image.Interlace)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for (j = intoffset[i]; j < h; j += intjump[i])
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[j], w);
}
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[i], w);
}
}
done = 1;
}
else if (rec == EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE)
{
int ext_code;
GifByteType *ext;
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtension(gif, &ext_code, &ext);
while (ext)
{
if ((ext_code == 0xf9) && (ext[1] & 1) && (transp < 0))
{
transp = (int)ext[4];
}
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtensionNext(gif, &ext);
}
}
}
while (rec != TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE);
if (transp >= 0)
{
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
else
{
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
/* set the format string member to the lower-case full extension */
/* name for the format - so example names would be: */
/* "png", "jpeg", "tiff", "ppm", "pgm", "pbm", "gif", "xpm" ... */
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!im->format)
im->format = strdup("gif");
if (im->loader || immediate_load || progress)
{
bg = gif->SBackGroundColor;
cmap = (gif->Image.ColorMap ? gif->Image.ColorMap : gif->SColorMap);
im->data = (DATA32 *) malloc(sizeof(DATA32) * w * h);
if (!im->data)
goto quit;
ptr = im->data;
per_inc = 100.0 / (((float)w) * h);
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
}
per += per_inc;
if (progress && (((int)per) != last_per)
&& (((int)per) % progress_granularity == 0))
{
last_per = (int)per;
if (!(progress(im, (int)per, 0, last_y, w, i)))
{
rc = 2;
goto quit;
}
last_y = i;
}
}
| 248,094,330,483,319,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2014-9762 | imlib2 before 1.4.7 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a GIF image without a colormap. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9762 |
453 | savannah | 8b281f83e8516535756f92dbf90940ac44bd45e1 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8b281f83e8516535756f92dbf90940ac44bd45e1 | None | 1 | cid_parse_font_matrix( CID_Face face,
CID_Parser* parser )
{
CID_FaceDict dict;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
if ( parser->num_dict >= 0 && parser->num_dict < face->cid.num_dicts )
{
FT_Matrix* matrix;
FT_Vector* offset;
dict = face->cid.font_dicts + parser->num_dict;
matrix = &dict->font_matrix;
offset = &dict->font_offset;
(void)cid_parser_to_fixed_array( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
| 228,135,000,173,489,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2014-9746 | The (1) t1_parse_font_matrix function in type1/t1load.c, (2) cid_parse_font_matrix function in cid/cidload.c, (3) t42_parse_font_matrix function in type42/t42parse.c, and (4) ps_parser_load_field function in psaux/psobjs.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 do not check return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted font. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9746 |
454 | savannah | 8b281f83e8516535756f92dbf90940ac44bd45e1 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8b281f83e8516535756f92dbf90940ac44bd45e1 | None | 1 | t1_parse_font_matrix( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
FT_Int result;
result = T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 0 )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
root->units_per_EM = (FT_UShort)FT_DivFix( 1000, temp_scale );
/* we need to scale the values by 1.0/temp_scale */
if ( temp_scale != 0x10000L )
{
temp[0] = FT_DivFix( temp[0], temp_scale );
temp[1] = FT_DivFix( temp[1], temp_scale );
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
}
| 46,188,906,777,019,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2014-9746 | The (1) t1_parse_font_matrix function in type1/t1load.c, (2) cid_parse_font_matrix function in cid/cidload.c, (3) t42_parse_font_matrix function in type42/t42parse.c, and (4) ps_parser_load_field function in psaux/psobjs.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 do not check return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted font. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9746 |
455 | savannah | 8b281f83e8516535756f92dbf90940ac44bd45e1 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8b281f83e8516535756f92dbf90940ac44bd45e1 | None | 1 | t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
(void)T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
| 80,677,870,207,684,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2014-9746 | The (1) t1_parse_font_matrix function in type1/t1load.c, (2) cid_parse_font_matrix function in cid/cidload.c, (3) t42_parse_font_matrix function in type42/t42parse.c, and (4) ps_parser_load_field function in psaux/psobjs.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 do not check return values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted font. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9746 |
456 | enlightment | c94d83ccab15d5ef02f88d42dce38ed3f0892882 | https://git.enlightenment.org/legacy/imlib2 | https://git.enlightenment.org/legacy/imlib2.git/commit/?id=c94d83ccab15d5ef02f88d42dce38ed3f0892882 | None | 1 | __imlib_Ellipse_DrawToData(int xc, int yc, int a, int b, DATA32 color,
DATA32 * dst, int dstw, int clx, int cly, int clw,
int clh, ImlibOp op, char dst_alpha, char blend)
{
ImlibPointDrawFunction pfunc;
int xx, yy, x, y, prev_x, prev_y, ty, by, lx, rx;
DATA32 a2, b2, *tp, *bp;
DATA64 dx, dy;
if (A_VAL(&color) == 0xff)
blend = 0;
pfunc = __imlib_GetPointDrawFunction(op, dst_alpha, blend);
if (!pfunc)
return;
xc -= clx;
yc -= cly;
dst += (dstw * cly) + clx;
a2 = a * a;
b2 = b * b;
yy = b << 16;
prev_y = b;
dx = a2 * b;
dy = 0;
ty = yc - b - 1;
by = yc + b;
lx = xc - 1;
rx = xc;
tp = dst + (dstw * ty) + lx;
bp = dst + (dstw * by) + lx;
while (dy < dx)
{
int len;
y = yy >> 16;
y += ((yy - (y << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_y != y)
{
prev_y = y;
dx -= a2;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dy += b2;
yy -= ((dy << 16) / dx);
lx--;
if ((lx < 0) && (rx > clw))
return;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
xx = yy;
prev_x = xx >> 16;
dx = dy;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
while (ty < yc)
{
int len;
x = xx >> 16;
x += ((xx - (x << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_x != x)
{
prev_x = x;
dy += b2;
lx--;
rx++;
tp--;
bp--;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dx -= a2;
xx += ((dx << 16) / dy);
ty++;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
}
| 155,577,364,624,288,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2011-5326 | imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) by drawing a 2x1 ellipse. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-5326 |
457 | openssl | db82b8f9bd432a59aea8e1014694e15fc457c2bb | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=db82b8f9bd432a59aea8e1014694e15fc457c2bb | Bug fix for 64 bit HP-UX.
Submitted by: Karsten Spang <ks@bellesystems.com> | 1 | RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
{
RSA *rsa=NULL;
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
bitsq=bits-bitsp;
rsa=RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) goto err;
/* set e */
rsa->e=BN_new();
if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;
#if 1
/* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
* unsigned long can be larger */
for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
{
if (e_value & (1<<i))
BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i);
}
#else
if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
#endif
/* generate p and q */
for (;;)
{
rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->p);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
for (;;)
{
rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->q);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
{
tmp=rsa->p;
rsa->p=rsa->q;
rsa->q=tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
rsa->n=BN_new();
if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
/* for (;;)
{
if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;
if (1)
{
if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
continue;
}
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
goto err;
}
*/
rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */
if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
rsa->dmp1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
rsa->dmq1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2);
if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,ERR_LIB_BN);
ok=0;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
if (!ok)
{
if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa);
return(NULL);
}
else
return(rsa);
}
| 270,513,867,548,826,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | CVE-2000-1254 | crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c in OpenSSL before 0.9.6 mishandles C bitwise-shift operations that exceed the size of an expression, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging improper RSA key generation on 64-bit HP-UX platforms. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2000-1254 |
460 | gnupg | 9010d1576e278a4274ad3f4aa15776c28f6ba965 | http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg | https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=commit;h=9010d1576e278a4274ad3f4aa15776c28f6ba965 | None | 1 | _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_secret_key *skey,
gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t s,
int flags, int hashalgo)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc = 0;
int extraloops = 0;
gcry_mpi_t k, dr, sum, k_1, x;
mpi_point_struct I;
gcry_mpi_t hash;
const void *abuf;
unsigned int abits, qbits;
mpi_ec_t ctx;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_mpidump ("ecdsa sign hash ", input );
/* Convert the INPUT into an MPI if needed. */
rc = _gcry_dsa_normalize_hash (input, &hash, qbits);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (rc)
return rc;
k = NULL;
dr = mpi_alloc (0);
sum = mpi_alloc (0);
{
do
{
mpi_free (k);
k = NULL;
if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_RFC6979) && hashalgo)
{
/* Use Pornin's method for deterministic DSA. If this
flag is set, it is expected that HASH is an opaque
MPI with the to be signed hash. That hash is also
used as h1 from 3.2.a. */
if (!mpi_is_opaque (input))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_CONFLICT;
goto leave;
}
abuf = mpi_get_opaque (input, &abits);
rc = _gcry_dsa_gen_rfc6979_k (&k, skey->E.n, skey->d,
abuf, (abits+7)/8,
hashalgo, extraloops);
if (rc)
goto leave;
extraloops++;
}
else
k = _gcry_dsa_gen_k (skey->E.n, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&I, k, &skey->E.G, ctx);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, NULL, &I, ctx))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("ecc sign: Failed to get affine coordinates\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
goto leave;
}
mpi_mod (r, x, skey->E.n); /* r = x mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (r, 0));
mpi_mulm (dr, skey->d, r, skey->E.n); /* dr = d*r mod n */
mpi_addm (sum, hash, dr, skey->E.n); /* sum = hash + (d*r) mod n */
mpi_invm (k_1, k, skey->E.n); /* k_1 = k^(-1) mod n */
mpi_mulm (s, k_1, sum, skey->E.n); /* s = k^(-1)*(hash+(d*r)) mod n */
}
while (!mpi_cmp_ui (s, 0));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
}
| 208,238,798,261,774,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2018-0495 | Libgcrypt before 1.7.10 and 1.8.x before 1.8.3 allows a memory-cache side-channel attack on ECDSA signatures that can be mitigated through the use of blinding during the signing process in the _gcry_ecc_ecdsa_sign function in cipher/ecc-ecdsa.c, aka the Return Of the Hidden Number Problem or ROHNP. To discover an ECDSA key, the attacker needs access to either the local machine or a different virtual machine on the same physical host. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0495 |
461 | busybox | 352f79acbd759c14399e39baef21fc4ffe180ac2 | http://git.busybox.net/busybox | https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=352f79acbd759c14399e39baef21fc4ffe180ac2 | udhcpc: fix OPTION_6RD parsing (could overflow its malloced buffer)
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 1 | static NOINLINE char *xmalloc_optname_optval(uint8_t *option, const struct dhcp_optflag *optflag, const char *opt_name)
{
unsigned upper_length;
int len, type, optlen;
char *dest, *ret;
/* option points to OPT_DATA, need to go back to get OPT_LEN */
len = option[-OPT_DATA + OPT_LEN];
type = optflag->flags & OPTION_TYPE_MASK;
optlen = dhcp_option_lengths[type];
upper_length = len_of_option_as_string[type]
* ((unsigned)(len + optlen - 1) / (unsigned)optlen);
dest = ret = xmalloc(upper_length + strlen(opt_name) + 2);
dest += sprintf(ret, "%s=", opt_name);
while (len >= optlen) {
switch (type) {
case OPTION_IP:
case OPTION_IP_PAIR:
dest += sprint_nip(dest, "", option);
if (type == OPTION_IP)
break;
dest += sprint_nip(dest, "/", option + 4);
break;
case OPTION_U8:
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u", *option);
break;
case OPTION_U16: {
uint16_t val_u16;
move_from_unaligned16(val_u16, option);
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u", ntohs(val_u16));
break;
}
case OPTION_S32:
case OPTION_U32: {
uint32_t val_u32;
move_from_unaligned32(val_u32, option);
dest += sprintf(dest, type == OPTION_U32 ? "%lu" : "%ld", (unsigned long) ntohl(val_u32));
break;
}
/* Note: options which use 'return' instead of 'break'
* (for example, OPTION_STRING) skip the code which handles
* the case of list of options.
*/
case OPTION_STRING:
case OPTION_STRING_HOST:
memcpy(dest, option, len);
dest[len] = '\0';
if (type == OPTION_STRING_HOST && !good_hostname(dest))
safe_strncpy(dest, "bad", len);
return ret;
case OPTION_STATIC_ROUTES: {
/* Option binary format:
* mask [one byte, 0..32]
* ip [big endian, 0..4 bytes depending on mask]
* router [big endian, 4 bytes]
* may be repeated
*
* We convert it to a string "IP/MASK ROUTER IP2/MASK2 ROUTER2"
*/
const char *pfx = "";
while (len >= 1 + 4) { /* mask + 0-byte ip + router */
uint32_t nip;
uint8_t *p;
unsigned mask;
int bytes;
mask = *option++;
if (mask > 32)
break;
len--;
nip = 0;
p = (void*) &nip;
bytes = (mask + 7) / 8; /* 0 -> 0, 1..8 -> 1, 9..16 -> 2 etc */
while (--bytes >= 0) {
*p++ = *option++;
len--;
}
if (len < 4)
break;
/* print ip/mask */
dest += sprint_nip(dest, pfx, (void*) &nip);
pfx = " ";
dest += sprintf(dest, "/%u ", mask);
/* print router */
dest += sprint_nip(dest, "", option);
option += 4;
len -= 4;
}
return ret;
}
case OPTION_6RD:
/* Option binary format (see RFC 5969):
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | OPTION_6RD | option-length | IPv4MaskLen | 6rdPrefixLen |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 6rdPrefix |
* ... (16 octets) ...
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* ... 6rdBRIPv4Address(es) ...
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* We convert it to a string
* "IPv4MaskLen 6rdPrefixLen 6rdPrefix 6rdBRIPv4Address..."
*
* Sanity check: ensure that our length is at least 22 bytes, that
* IPv4MaskLen <= 32,
* 6rdPrefixLen <= 128,
* 6rdPrefixLen + (32 - IPv4MaskLen) <= 128
* (2nd condition need no check - it follows from 1st and 3rd).
* Else, return envvar with empty value ("optname=")
*/
if (len >= (1 + 1 + 16 + 4)
&& option[0] <= 32
&& (option[1] + 32 - option[0]) <= 128
) {
/* IPv4MaskLen */
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u ", *option++);
/* 6rdPrefixLen */
dest += sprintf(dest, "%u ", *option++);
/* 6rdPrefix */
dest += sprint_nip6(dest, /* "", */ option);
option += 16;
len -= 1 + 1 + 16 + 4;
/* "+ 4" above corresponds to the length of IPv4 addr
* we consume in the loop below */
while (1) {
/* 6rdBRIPv4Address(es) */
dest += sprint_nip(dest, " ", option);
option += 4;
len -= 4; /* do we have yet another 4+ bytes? */
if (len < 0)
break; /* no */
}
}
return ret;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_RFC3397
case OPTION_DNS_STRING:
/* unpack option into dest; use ret for prefix (i.e., "optname=") */
dest = dname_dec(option, len, ret);
if (dest) {
free(ret);
return dest;
}
/* error. return "optname=" string */
return ret;
case OPTION_SIP_SERVERS:
/* Option binary format:
* type: byte
* type=0: domain names, dns-compressed
* type=1: IP addrs
*/
option++;
len--;
if (option[-1] == 0) {
dest = dname_dec(option, len, ret);
if (dest) {
free(ret);
return dest;
}
} else
if (option[-1] == 1) {
const char *pfx = "";
while (1) {
len -= 4;
if (len < 0)
break;
dest += sprint_nip(dest, pfx, option);
pfx = " ";
option += 4;
}
}
return ret;
#endif
} /* switch */
/* If we are here, try to format any remaining data
* in the option as another, similarly-formatted option
*/
option += optlen;
len -= optlen;
if (len < optlen /* || !(optflag->flags & OPTION_LIST) */)
break;
*dest++ = ' ';
*dest = '\0';
} /* while */
return ret;
}
| 126,744,712,125,939,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2148 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the DHCP client (udhcpc) in BusyBox before 1.25.0 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving OPTION_6RD parsing. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2148 |
462 | libbsd | c8f0723d2b4520bdd6b9eb7c3e7976de726d7ff7 | https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libbsd/libbsd | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/libbsd/commit/?id=c8f0723d2b4520bdd6b9eb7c3e7976de726d7ff7 | Fix heap buffer overflow in fgetwln()
In the function fgetwln() there's a 4 byte heap overflow.
There is a while loop that has this check to see whether there's still
enough space in the buffer:
if (!fb->len || wused > fb->len) {
If this is true more memory gets allocated. However this test won't be
true if wused == fb->len, but at that point wused already points out
of the buffer. Some lines later there's a write to the buffer:
fb->wbuf[wused++] = wc;
This bug was found with the help of address sanitizer.
Warned-by: ASAN
Fixes: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93881
Signed-off-by: Guillem Jover <guillem@hadrons.org> | 1 | fgetwln(FILE *stream, size_t *lenp)
{
struct filewbuf *fb;
wint_t wc;
size_t wused = 0;
/* Try to diminish the possibility of several fgetwln() calls being
* used on different streams, by using a pool of buffers per file. */
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
if (fb->fp != stream && fb->fp != NULL) {
fb_pool_cur++;
fb_pool_cur %= FILEWBUF_POOL_ITEMS;
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
}
fb->fp = stream;
while ((wc = fgetwc(stream)) != WEOF) {
if (!fb->len || wused > fb->len) {
wchar_t *wp;
if (fb->len)
fb->len *= 2;
else
fb->len = FILEWBUF_INIT_LEN;
wp = reallocarray(fb->wbuf, fb->len, sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp == NULL) {
wused = 0;
break;
}
fb->wbuf = wp;
}
fb->wbuf[wused++] = wc;
if (wc == L'\n')
break;
}
*lenp = wused;
return wused ? fb->wbuf : NULL;
}
| 111,742,657,801,644,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | fgetwln.c | 917,190,743,564,002,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-2090 | Off-by-one vulnerability in the fgetwln function in libbsd before 0.8.2 allows attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors, which trigger a heap-based buffer overflow. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2090 |
466 | openssl | 197e0ea817ad64820789d86711d55ff50d71f631 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=197e0ea817ad64820789d86711d55ff50d71f631 | Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353 | 1 | static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
int slen;
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
}
| 122,161,343,720,297,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-4353 | The ssl3_take_mac function in ssl/s3_both.c in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1f allows remote TLS servers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) via a crafted Next Protocol Negotiation record in a TLS handshake. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4353 |
467 | samba | b9b9f6738fba5c32e87cb9c36b358355b444fb9b | https://github.com/samba-team/samba | https://git.samba.org/?p=ctdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=b9b9f6738fba5c32e87cb9c36b358355b444fb9b | None | 1 | static int ctdb_tcp_listen_automatic(struct ctdb_context *ctdb)
{
struct ctdb_tcp *ctcp = talloc_get_type(ctdb->private_data,
struct ctdb_tcp);
ctdb_sock_addr sock;
int lock_fd, i;
const char *lock_path = "/tmp/.ctdb_socket_lock";
struct flock lock;
int one = 1;
int sock_size;
struct tevent_fd *fde;
/* If there are no nodes, then it won't be possible to find
* the first one. Log a failure and short circuit the whole
* process.
*/
if (ctdb->num_nodes == 0) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("No nodes available to attempt bind to - is the nodes file empty?\n"));
return -1;
}
/* in order to ensure that we don't get two nodes with the
same adddress, we must make the bind() and listen() calls
atomic. The SO_REUSEADDR setsockopt only prevents double
binds if the first socket is in LISTEN state */
lock_fd = open(lock_path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666);
if (lock_fd == -1) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("Unable to open %s\n", lock_path));
return -1;
}
lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
lock.l_start = 0;
lock.l_len = 1;
lock.l_pid = 0;
if (fcntl(lock_fd, F_SETLKW, &lock) != 0) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("Unable to lock %s\n", lock_path));
close(lock_fd);
return -1;
}
for (i=0; i < ctdb->num_nodes; i++) {
if (ctdb->nodes[i]->flags & NODE_FLAGS_DELETED) {
continue;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(sock);
if (ctdb_tcp_get_address(ctdb,
ctdb->nodes[i]->address.address,
&sock) != 0) {
continue;
}
switch (sock.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sock.ip.sin_port = htons(ctdb->nodes[i]->address.port);
sock_size = sizeof(sock.ip);
break;
case AF_INET6:
sock.ip6.sin6_port = htons(ctdb->nodes[i]->address.port);
sock_size = sizeof(sock.ip6);
break;
default:
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR, (__location__ " unknown family %u\n",
sock.sa.sa_family));
continue;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SOCK_SIN_LEN
sock.ip.sin_len = sock_size;
#endif
ctcp->listen_fd = socket(sock.sa.sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (ctcp->listen_fd == -1) {
ctdb_set_error(ctdb, "socket failed\n");
continue;
}
set_close_on_exec(ctcp->listen_fd);
setsockopt(ctcp->listen_fd,SOL_SOCKET,SO_REUSEADDR,(char *)&one,sizeof(one));
if (bind(ctcp->listen_fd, (struct sockaddr * )&sock, sock_size) == 0) {
break;
}
if (errno == EADDRNOTAVAIL) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_DEBUG,(__location__ " Failed to bind() to socket. %s(%d)\n",
strerror(errno), errno));
} else {
DEBUG(DEBUG_ERR,(__location__ " Failed to bind() to socket. %s(%d)\n",
strerror(errno), errno));
}
}
if (i == ctdb->num_nodes) {
DEBUG(DEBUG_CRIT,("Unable to bind to any of the node addresses - giving up\n"));
goto failed;
}
ctdb->address.address = talloc_strdup(ctdb, ctdb->nodes[i]->address.address);
ctdb->address.port = ctdb->nodes[i]->address.port;
ctdb->name = talloc_asprintf(ctdb, "%s:%u",
ctdb->address.address,
ctdb->address.port);
ctdb->pnn = ctdb->nodes[i]->pnn;
DEBUG(DEBUG_INFO,("ctdb chose network address %s:%u pnn %u\n",
ctdb->address.address,
ctdb->address.port,
ctdb->pnn));
if (listen(ctcp->listen_fd, 10) == -1) {
goto failed;
}
fde = event_add_fd(ctdb->ev, ctcp, ctcp->listen_fd, EVENT_FD_READ,
ctdb_listen_event, ctdb);
tevent_fd_set_auto_close(fde);
close(lock_fd);
return 0;
failed:
close(lock_fd);
close(ctcp->listen_fd);
ctcp->listen_fd = -1;
return -1;
}
| 42,617,125,390,009,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2013-4159 | ctdb before 2.3 in OpenSUSE 12.3 and 13.1 does not create temporary files securely, which has unspecified impact related to "several temp file vulnerabilities" in (1) tcp/tcp_connect.c, (2) server/eventscript.c, (3) tools/ctdb_diagnostics, (4) config/gdb_backtrace, and (5) include/ctdb_private.h. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4159 |
468 | savannah | f6f9c48fb40b8a1e8218799724b0b61a7161eb1d | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/libcdio.git/commit/?id=f6f9c48fb40b8a1e8218799724b0b61a7161eb1d | None | 1 | get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
cdtext_destroy (p_env->cdtext);
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
| 291,782,179,769,331,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-415"
] | CVE-2017-18201 | An issue was discovered in GNU libcdio before 2.0.0. There is a double free in get_cdtext_generic() in lib/driver/_cdio_generic.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18201 |
484 | ghostscript | 2fc463d0efbd044a8232611f0898eeb12b72a970 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=2fc463d0e | None | 1 | file_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr pscratch = esp - 2;
file_enum *pfen = r_ptr(esp - 1, file_enum);
int devlen = esp[-3].value.intval;
gx_io_device *iodev = r_ptr(esp - 4, gx_io_device);
uint len = r_size(pscratch);
uint code;
if (len < devlen)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* not even room for device len */
do {
memcpy((char *)pscratch->value.bytes, iodev->dname, devlen);
code = iodev->procs.enumerate_next(pfen, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes + devlen,
len - devlen);
if (code == ~(uint) 0) { /* all done */
esp -= 5; /* pop proc, pfen, devlen, iodev , mark */
return o_pop_estack;
} else if (code > len) /* overran string */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)
|| (check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_p, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes, code + devlen, iodev, "PermitFileReading")) == 0) {
push(1);
ref_assign(op, pscratch);
r_set_size(op, code + devlen);
push_op_estack(file_continue); /* come again */
*++esp = pscratch[2]; /* proc */
return o_push_estack;
}
} while(1);
}
| 235,592,933,251,983,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2017-15652 | Artifex Ghostscript 9.22 is affected by: Obtain Information. The impact is: obtain sensitive information. The component is: affected source code file, affected function, affected executable, affected libga (imagemagick used that). The attack vector is: Someone must open a postscript file though ghostscript. Because of imagemagick also use libga, so it was affected as well. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15652 |
493 | busybox | 4e314faa0aecb66717418e9a47a4451aec59262b | http://git.busybox.net/busybox | https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=4e314faa0aecb66717418e9a47a4451aec59262b | modprobe,rmmod: reject module names with slashes
function old new delta
add_probe 86 113 +27
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 1 | static void add_probe(const char *name)
{
struct module_entry *m;
m = get_or_add_modentry(name);
if (!(option_mask32 & (OPT_REMOVE | OPT_SHOW_DEPS))
&& (m->flags & MODULE_FLAG_LOADED)
&& strncmp(m->modname, "symbol:", 7) == 0
) {
G.need_symbols = 1;
}
}
| 226,438,009,548,517,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2014-9645 | The add_probe function in modutils/modprobe.c in BusyBox before 1.23.0 allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on loading kernel modules via a / (slash) character in a module name, as demonstrated by an "ifconfig /usbserial up" command or a "mount -t /snd_pcm none /" command. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9645 |
511 | libxfont | 5bf703700ee4a5d6eae20da07cb7a29369667aef | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=d11ee5886e9d9ec610051a206b135a4cdc1e09a0 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXfont/commit/?id=5bf703700ee4a5d6eae20da07cb7a29369667aef | None | 1 | CatalogueRescan (FontPathElementPtr fpe)
{
CataloguePtr cat = fpe->private;
char link[MAXFONTFILENAMELEN];
char dest[MAXFONTFILENAMELEN];
char *attrib;
FontPathElementPtr subfpe;
struct stat statbuf;
const char *path;
DIR *dir;
struct dirent *entry;
int len;
int pathlen;
path = fpe->name + strlen(CataloguePrefix);
if (stat(path, &statbuf) < 0 || !S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
return BadFontPath;
if (statbuf.st_mtime <= cat->mtime)
return Successful;
dir = opendir(path);
if (dir == NULL)
{
xfree(cat);
return BadFontPath;
}
CatalogueUnrefFPEs (fpe);
while (entry = readdir(dir), entry != NULL)
{
snprintf(link, sizeof link, "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name);
len = readlink(link, dest, sizeof dest);
if (len < 0)
continue;
dest[len] = '\0';
if (dest[0] != '/')
{
pathlen = strlen(path);
memmove(dest + pathlen + 1, dest, sizeof dest - pathlen - 1);
memcpy(dest, path, pathlen);
memcpy(dest + pathlen, "/", 1);
len += pathlen + 1;
}
attrib = strchr(link, ':');
if (attrib && len + strlen(attrib) < sizeof dest)
{
memcpy(dest + len, attrib, strlen(attrib));
len += strlen(attrib);
}
subfpe = xalloc(sizeof *subfpe);
if (subfpe == NULL)
continue;
/* The fonts returned by OpenFont will point back to the
* subfpe they come from. So set the type of the subfpe to
* what the catalogue fpe was assigned, so calls to CloseFont
* (which uses font->fpe->type) goes to CatalogueCloseFont. */
subfpe->type = fpe->type;
subfpe->name_length = len;
subfpe->name = xalloc (len + 1);
if (subfpe == NULL)
{
xfree(subfpe);
continue;
}
memcpy(subfpe->name, dest, len);
subfpe->name[len] = '\0';
/* The X server will manipulate the subfpe ref counts
* associated with the font in OpenFont and CloseFont, so we
* have to make sure it's valid. */
subfpe->refcount = 1;
if (FontFileInitFPE (subfpe) != Successful)
{
xfree(subfpe->name);
xfree(subfpe);
continue;
}
if (CatalogueAddFPE(cat, subfpe) != Successful)
{
FontFileFreeFPE (subfpe);
xfree(subfpe);
continue;
}
}
closedir(dir);
qsort(cat->fpeList,
cat->fpeCount, sizeof cat->fpeList[0], ComparePriority);
cat->mtime = statbuf.st_mtime;
return Successful;
}
| 320,948,107,529,517,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2007-5199 | A single byte overflow in catalogue.c in X.Org libXfont 1.3.1 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-5199 |
512 | savannah | 57cbb8c148999ba8f14ed53435fc071ac9953afd | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=57cbb8c148999ba8f14ed53435fc071ac9953afd | None | 1 | tt_cmap14_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_selectors;
if ( table + 2 + 4 + 4 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
num_selectors = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
/* length < 10 + 11 * num_selectors ? */
length < 10 ||
( length - 10 ) / 11 < num_selectors )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check selectors, they must be in increasing order */
{
/* we start lastVarSel at 1 because a variant selector value of 0
* isn't valid.
*/
FT_ULong n, lastVarSel = 1;
for ( n = 0; n < num_selectors; n++ )
{
FT_ULong varSel = TT_NEXT_UINT24( p );
FT_ULong defOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
FT_ULong nondefOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( defOff >= length || nondefOff >= length )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( varSel < lastVarSel )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastVarSel = varSel + 1;
/* check the default table (these glyphs should be reached */
/* through the normal Unicode cmap, no GIDs, just check order) */
if ( defOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* defp = table + defOff;
FT_ULong numRanges = TT_NEXT_ULONG( defp );
FT_ULong i;
FT_ULong lastBase = 0;
/* defp + numRanges * 4 > valid->limit ? */
if ( numRanges > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - defp ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( base + cnt >= 0x110000UL ) /* end of Unicode */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( base < lastBase )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastBase = base + cnt + 1U;
}
}
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
FT_ULong i, lastUni = 0;
/* numMappings * 4 > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ? */
if ( numMappings > ( (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
for ( i = 0; i < numMappings; ++i )
lastUni = uni + 1U;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT &&
gid >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
| 150,741,055,389,882,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2015-9383 | FreeType before 2.6.2 has a heap-based buffer over-read in tt_cmap14_validate in sfnt/ttcmap.c. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9383 |
513 | savannah | db5a4a9ae7b0048f033361744421da8569642f73 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/src/psaux/psobjs.c?id=db5a4a9ae7b0048f033361744421da8569642f73 | None | 1 | ps_parser_skip_PS_token( PS_Parser parser )
{
/* Note: PostScript allows any non-delimiting, non-whitespace */
/* character in a name (PS Ref Manual, 3rd ed, p31). */
/* PostScript delimiters are (, ), <, >, [, ], {, }, /, and %. */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->limit;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); /* this also skips comments */
if ( cur >= limit )
goto Exit;
/* self-delimiting, single-character tokens */
if ( *cur == '[' || *cur == ']' )
{
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
/* skip balanced expressions (procedures and strings) */
if ( *cur == '{' ) /* {...} */
{
error = skip_procedure( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '(' ) /* (...) */
{
error = skip_literal_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '<' ) /* <...> */
{
if ( cur + 1 < limit && *(cur + 1) == '<' ) /* << */
{
cur++;
cur++;
}
else
error = skip_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '>' )
{
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit || *cur != '>' ) /* >> */
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" unexpected closing delimiter `>'\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '/' )
cur++;
/* anything else */
while ( cur < limit )
{
/* *cur might be invalid (e.g., ')' or '}'), but this */
/* is handled by the test `cur == parser->cursor' below */
if ( IS_PS_DELIM( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
Exit:
if ( cur < limit && cur == parser->cursor )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" current token is `%c' which is self-delimiting\n"
" "
" but invalid at this point\n",
*cur ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
parser->error = error;
parser->cursor = cur;
}
| 33,447,871,913,940,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2015-9382 | FreeType before 2.6.1 has a buffer over-read in skip_comment in psaux/psobjs.c because ps_parser_skip_PS_token is mishandled in an FT_New_Memory_Face operation. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9382 |
514 | savannah | e3058617f384cb6709f3878f753fa17aca9e3a30 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/src/type1/t1parse.c?id=e3058617f384cb6709f3878f753fa17aca9e3a30 | None | 1 | T1_Get_Private_Dict( T1_Parser parser,
PSAux_Service psaux )
{
FT_Stream stream = parser->stream;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong size;
if ( parser->in_pfb )
{
/* in the case of the PFB format, the private dictionary can be */
/* made of several segments. We thus first read the number of */
/* segments to compute the total size of the private dictionary */
/* then re-read them into memory. */
FT_ULong start_pos = FT_STREAM_POS();
FT_UShort tag;
parser->private_len = 0;
for (;;)
{
error = read_pfb_tag( stream, &tag, &size );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
if ( tag != 0x8002U )
break;
parser->private_len += size;
if ( FT_STREAM_SKIP( size ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* Check that we have a private dictionary there */
/* and allocate private dictionary buffer */
if ( parser->private_len == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" invalid private dictionary section\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( start_pos ) ||
FT_ALLOC( parser->private_dict, parser->private_len ) )
goto Fail;
parser->private_len = 0;
for (;;)
{
error = read_pfb_tag( stream, &tag, &size );
if ( error || tag != 0x8002U )
{
error = FT_Err_Ok;
break;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_READ( parser->private_dict + parser->private_len,
size ) )
goto Fail;
parser->private_len += size;
}
}
else
{
/* We have already `loaded' the whole PFA font file into memory; */
/* if this is a memory resource, allocate a new block to hold */
/* the private dict. Otherwise, simply overwrite into the base */
/* dictionary block in the heap. */
/* first of all, look at the `eexec' keyword */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->base_dict;
FT_Byte* limit = cur + parser->base_len;
FT_Byte c;
FT_Pointer pos_lf;
FT_Bool test_cr;
Again:
for (;;)
{
c = cur[0];
if ( c == 'e' && cur + 9 < limit ) /* 9 = 5 letters for `eexec' + */
/* whitespace + 4 chars */
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'x' &&
cur[3] == 'e' &&
cur[4] == 'c' )
break;
}
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" could not find `eexec' keyword\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
}
/* check whether `eexec' was real -- it could be in a comment */
/* or string (as e.g. in u003043t.gsf from ghostscript) */
parser->root.cursor = parser->base_dict;
/* set limit to `eexec' + whitespace + 4 characters */
parser->root.limit = cur + 10;
cur = parser->root.cursor;
limit = parser->root.limit;
while ( cur < limit )
{
if ( *cur == 'e' && ft_strncmp( (char*)cur, "eexec", 5 ) == 0 )
goto Found;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
break;
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
}
/* we haven't found the correct `eexec'; go back and continue */
/* searching */
cur = limit;
limit = parser->base_dict + parser->base_len;
goto Again;
/* now determine where to write the _encrypted_ binary private */
/* According to the Type 1 spec, the first cipher byte must not be */
/* an ASCII whitespace character code (blank, tab, carriage return */
/* or line feed). We have seen Type 1 fonts with two line feed */
/* characters... So skip now all whitespace character codes. */
/* */
/* On the other hand, Adobe's Type 1 parser handles fonts just */
/* fine that are violating this limitation, so we add a heuristic */
/* test to stop at \r only if it is not used for EOL. */
pos_lf = ft_memchr( cur, '\n', (size_t)( limit - cur ) );
test_cr = FT_BOOL( !pos_lf ||
pos_lf > ft_memchr( cur,
'\r',
(size_t)( limit - cur ) ) );
while ( cur < limit &&
( *cur == ' ' ||
*cur == '\t' ||
(test_cr && *cur == '\r' ) ||
*cur == '\n' ) )
++cur;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" `eexec' not properly terminated\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
size = parser->base_len - (FT_ULong)( cur - parser->base_dict );
if ( parser->in_memory )
{
/* note that we allocate one more byte to put a terminating `0' */
if ( FT_ALLOC( parser->private_dict, size + 1 ) )
goto Fail;
parser->private_len = size;
}
else
{
parser->single_block = 1;
parser->private_dict = parser->base_dict;
parser->private_len = size;
parser->base_dict = NULL;
parser->base_len = 0;
}
/* now determine whether the private dictionary is encoded in binary */
/* or hexadecimal ASCII format -- decode it accordingly */
/* we need to access the next 4 bytes (after the final whitespace */
/* following the `eexec' keyword); if they all are hexadecimal */
/* digits, then we have a case of ASCII storage */
if ( cur + 3 < limit &&
ft_isxdigit( cur[0] ) && ft_isxdigit( cur[1] ) &&
ft_isxdigit( cur[2] ) && ft_isxdigit( cur[3] ) )
{
/* ASCII hexadecimal encoding */
FT_ULong len;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
(void)psaux->ps_parser_funcs->to_bytes( &parser->root,
parser->private_dict,
parser->private_len,
&len,
0 );
parser->private_len = len;
/* put a safeguard */
parser->private_dict[len] = '\0';
}
else
/* binary encoding -- copy the private dict */
FT_MEM_MOVE( parser->private_dict, cur, size );
}
/* we now decrypt the encoded binary private dictionary */
psaux->t1_decrypt( parser->private_dict, parser->private_len, 55665U );
if ( parser->private_len < 4 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T1_Get_Private_Dict:"
" invalid private dictionary section\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* replace the four random bytes at the beginning with whitespace */
parser->private_dict[0] = ' ';
parser->private_dict[1] = ' ';
parser->private_dict[2] = ' ';
parser->private_dict[3] = ' ';
parser->root.base = parser->private_dict;
parser->root.cursor = parser->private_dict;
parser->root.limit = parser->root.cursor + parser->private_len;
Fail:
Exit:
return error;
}
| 338,869,587,383,884,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-125"
] | CVE-2015-9290 | In FreeType before 2.6.1, a buffer over-read occurs in type1/t1parse.c on function T1_Get_Private_Dict where there is no check that the new values of cur and limit are sensible before going to Again. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9290 |
515 | savannah | 2549e421c14aff886629b8482c14af800f411070 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | http://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/exosip.git/commit/?id=2549e421c14aff886629b8482c14af800f411070 | None | 1 | eXosip_init (struct eXosip_t *excontext)
{
osip_t *osip;
int i;
memset (excontext, 0, sizeof (eXosip_t));
excontext->dscp = 0x1A;
snprintf (excontext->ipv4_for_gateway, 256, "%s", "217.12.3.11");
snprintf (excontext->ipv6_for_gateway, 256, "%s", "2001:638:500:101:2e0:81ff:fe24:37c6");
#ifdef WIN32
/* Initializing windows socket library */
{
WORD wVersionRequested;
WSADATA wsaData;
wVersionRequested = MAKEWORD (1, 1);
i = WSAStartup (wVersionRequested, &wsaData);
if (i != 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_WARNING, NULL, "eXosip: Unable to initialize WINSOCK, reason: %d\n", i));
/* return -1; It might be already initilized?? */
}
}
#endif
excontext->user_agent = osip_strdup ("eXosip/" EXOSIP_VERSION);
if (excontext->user_agent == NULL)
return OSIP_NOMEM;
excontext->j_calls = NULL;
excontext->j_stop_ua = 0;
#ifndef OSIP_MONOTHREAD
excontext->j_thread = NULL;
#endif
i = osip_list_init (&excontext->j_transactions);
excontext->j_reg = NULL;
#ifndef OSIP_MONOTHREAD
#if !defined (_WIN32_WCE)
excontext->j_cond = (struct osip_cond *) osip_cond_init ();
if (excontext->j_cond == NULL) {
osip_free (excontext->user_agent);
excontext->user_agent = NULL;
return OSIP_NOMEM;
}
#endif
excontext->j_mutexlock = (struct osip_mutex *) osip_mutex_init ();
if (excontext->j_mutexlock == NULL) {
osip_free (excontext->user_agent);
excontext->user_agent = NULL;
#if !defined (_WIN32_WCE)
osip_cond_destroy ((struct osip_cond *) excontext->j_cond);
excontext->j_cond = NULL;
#endif
return OSIP_NOMEM;
}
#endif
i = osip_init (&osip);
if (i != 0) {
OSIP_TRACE (osip_trace (__FILE__, __LINE__, OSIP_ERROR, NULL, "eXosip: Cannot initialize osip!\n"));
return i;
}
osip_set_application_context (osip, &excontext);
_eXosip_set_callbacks (osip);
excontext->j_osip = osip;
#ifndef OSIP_MONOTHREAD
/* open a TCP socket to wake up the application when needed. */
excontext->j_socketctl = jpipe ();
if (excontext->j_socketctl == NULL)
return OSIP_UNDEFINED_ERROR;
excontext->j_socketctl_event = jpipe ();
if (excontext->j_socketctl_event == NULL)
return OSIP_UNDEFINED_ERROR;
#endif
/* To be changed in osip! */
excontext->j_events = (osip_fifo_t *) osip_malloc (sizeof (osip_fifo_t));
if (excontext->j_events == NULL)
return OSIP_NOMEM;
osip_fifo_init (excontext->j_events);
excontext->use_rport = 1;
excontext->dns_capabilities = 2;
excontext->enable_dns_cache = 1;
excontext->ka_interval = 17000;
snprintf(excontext->ka_crlf, sizeof(excontext->ka_crlf), "\r\n\r\n");
excontext->ka_options = 0;
excontext->autoanswer_bye = 1;
excontext->auto_masquerade_contact = 1;
excontext->masquerade_via=0;
return OSIP_SUCCESS;
}
| 238,204,468,281,732,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2014-10375 | handle_messages in eXtl_tls.c in eXosip before 5.0.0 mishandles a negative value in a content-length header. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-10375 |
528 | xserver | d088e3c1286b548a58e62afdc70bb40981cdb9e8 | http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=xorg/xserver | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d088e3c1286b548a58e62afdc70bb40981cdb9e8 | Xi: integer overflow and unvalidated length in (S)ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer
[jcristau: originally this patch fixed the same issue as commit
211e05ac85 "Xi: Test exact size of XIBarrierReleasePointer", with the
addition of these checks]
This addresses CVE-2017-12179
Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Kidd <nkidd@opentext.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> | 1 | SProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo *info;
REQUEST(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
int i;
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq);
swapl(&stuff->num_barriers);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIBarrierReleasePointerReq, stuff->num_barriers * sizeof(xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo));
info = (xXIBarrierReleasePointerInfo*) &stuff[1];
swapl(&info->barrier);
swapl(&info->eventid);
}
| 175,285,775,827,241,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-190"
] | CVE-2017-12179 | xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was vulnerable to integer overflow in (S)ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer functions allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12179 |
529 | xserver | 859b08d523307eebde7724fd1a0789c44813e821 | http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=xorg/xserver | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=859b08d523307eebde7724fd1a0789c44813e821 | Xi: fix wrong extra length check in ProcXIChangeHierarchy (CVE-2017-12178)
Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Kidd <nkidd@opentext.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> | 1 | ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any;
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type));
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length));
if (len < ((size_t)any->length << 2))
return BadLength;
#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \
do { \
if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \
rc = BadLength; \
goto unwind; \
} \
} while(0)
switch (any->type) {
case XIAddMaster:
{
xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any;
/* Variable length, due to appended name string */
if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len));
if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo);
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo);
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo);
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
}
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
| 273,466,064,398,137,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xichangehierarchy.c | 8,928,712,519,864,954,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2017-12178 | xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 had wrong extra length check in ProcXIChangeHierarchy function allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12178 |
530 | xserver | 4ca68b878e851e2136c234f40a25008297d8d831 | http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=xorg/xserver | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=4ca68b878e851e2136c234f40a25008297d8d831 | dbe: Unvalidated variable-length request in ProcDbeGetVisualInfo (CVE-2017-12177)
v2: Protect against integer overflow (Alan Coopersmith)
Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Huddleston Sequoia <jeremyhu@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Kidd <nkidd@opentext.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> | 1 | ProcDbeGetVisualInfo(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xDbeGetVisualInfoReq);
DbeScreenPrivPtr pDbeScreenPriv;
xDbeGetVisualInfoReply rep;
Drawable *drawables;
DrawablePtr *pDrawables = NULL;
register int i, j, rc;
register int count; /* number of visual infos in reply */
register int length; /* length of reply */
ScreenPtr pScreen;
XdbeScreenVisualInfo *pScrVisInfo;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeGetVisualInfoReq);
if (stuff->n > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DrawablePtr))
return BadAlloc;
return BadAlloc;
}
| 253,695,885,025,975,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-190"
] | CVE-2017-12177 | xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was vulnerable to integer overflow in ProcDbeGetVisualInfo function allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12177 |
531 | xserver | b747da5e25be944337a9cd1415506fc06b70aa81 | http://gitweb.freedesktop.org/?p=xorg/xserver | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=b747da5e25be944337a9cd1415506fc06b70aa81 | Unvalidated extra length in ProcEstablishConnection (CVE-2017-12176)
Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Kidd <nkidd@opentext.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org> | 1 | ProcEstablishConnection(ClientPtr client)
{
const char *reason;
char *auth_proto, *auth_string;
xConnClientPrefix *prefix;
REQUEST(xReq);
prefix = (xConnClientPrefix *) ((char *) stuff + sz_xReq);
auth_proto = (char *) prefix + sz_xConnClientPrefix;
auth_string = auth_proto + pad_to_int32(prefix->nbytesAuthProto);
if ((prefix->majorVersion != X_PROTOCOL) ||
(prefix->minorVersion != X_PROTOCOL_REVISION))
reason = "Protocol version mismatch";
else
return (SendConnSetup(client, reason));
}
| 25,271,822,103,545,985,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2017-12176 | xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing extra length validation in ProcEstablishConnection function allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12176 |
532 | gnupg | 8725c99ffa41778f382ca97233183bcd687bb0ce | http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg | https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=commit;h=8725c99ffa41778f382ca97233183bcd687bb0ce | None | 1 | secret_core_crt (gcry_mpi_t M, gcry_mpi_t C,
gcry_mpi_t D, unsigned int Nlimbs,
gcry_mpi_t P, gcry_mpi_t Q, gcry_mpi_t U)
{
gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure ( Nlimbs + 1 );
/* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
mpi_sub_ui ( h, P, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_powm ( m1, C, h, P );
/* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
mpi_sub_ui ( h, Q, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r ( h, D, h );
mpi_powm ( m2, C, h, Q );
/* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
mpi_sub ( h, m2, m1 );
/* Remove superfluous leading zeroes from INPUT. */
mpi_normalize (input);
if (!skey->p || !skey->q || !skey->u)
{
secret_core_std (output, input, skey->d, skey->n);
}
else
{
secret_core_crt (output, input, skey->d, mpi_get_nlimbs (skey->n),
skey->p, skey->q, skey->u);
}
}
| 284,361,140,638,249,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-310"
] | CVE-2017-7526 | libgcrypt before version 1.7.8 is vulnerable to a cache side-channel attack resulting into a complete break of RSA-1024 while using the left-to-right method for computing the sliding-window expansion. The same attack is believed to work on RSA-2048 with moderately more computation. This side-channel requires that attacker can run arbitrary software on the hardware where the private RSA key is used. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7526 |
533 | libICE | ff5e59f32255913bb1cdf51441b98c9107ae165b | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libICE/commit/?id=ff5e59f32255913bb1cdf51441b98c9107ae165b | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libICE/commit/?id=ff5e59f32255913bb1cdf51441b98c9107ae165b | None | 1 | IceGenerateMagicCookie (
int len
)
{
char *auth;
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
long ldata[2];
int seed;
int value;
int i;
#endif
if ((auth = malloc (len + 1)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
arc4random_buf(auth, len);
#else
#ifdef ITIMER_REAL
{
struct timeval now;
int i;
ldata[0] = now.tv_sec;
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
}
#else
{
long time ();
ldata[0] = time ((long *) 0);
ldata[1] = getpid ();
}
#endif
seed = (ldata[0]) + (ldata[1] << 16);
srand (seed);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
ldata[1] = now.tv_usec;
value = rand ();
auth[i] = value & 0xff;
}
| 20,612,687,529,230,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-331"
] | CVE-2017-2626 | It was discovered that libICE before 1.0.9-8 used a weak entropy to generate keys. A local attacker could potentially use this flaw for session hijacking using the information available from the process list. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2626 |
534 | libXdmcp | 0554324ec6bbc2071f5d1f8ad211a1643e29eb1f | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXdmcp/commit/?id=0554324ec6bbc2071f5d1f8ad211a1643e29eb1f | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXdmcp/commit/?id=0554324ec6bbc2071f5d1f8ad211a1643e29eb1f | None | 1 | XdmcpGenerateKey (XdmAuthKeyPtr key)
{
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
long lowbits, highbits;
srandom ((int)getpid() ^ time((Time_t *)0));
highbits = random ();
highbits = random ();
getbits (lowbits, key->data);
getbits (highbits, key->data + 4);
#else
arc4random_buf(key->data, 8);
#endif
}
| 156,663,800,142,374,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-320"
] | CVE-2017-2625 | It was discovered that libXdmcp before 1.1.2 including used weak entropy to generate session keys. On a multi-user system using xdmcp, a local attacker could potentially use information available from the process list to brute force the key, allowing them to hijack other users' sessions. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2625 |
535 | savannah | a0d7fe4589651c64bd16ddaaa634030bb0455866 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/src/pch.c?id=a0d7fe4589651c64bd16ddaaa634030bb0455866 | None | 1 | pch_write_line (lin line, FILE *file)
{
bool after_newline = p_line[line][p_len[line] - 1] == '\n';
if (! fwrite (p_line[line], sizeof (*p_line[line]), p_len[line], file))
write_fatal ();
return after_newline;
}
| 109,748,454,555,121,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-10713 | An issue was discovered in GNU patch before 2.7.6. Out-of-bounds access within pch_write_line() in pch.c can possibly lead to DoS via a crafted input file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10713 |
540 | ghostscript | e698d5c11d27212aa1098bc5b1673a3378563092 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=jbig2dec.git;a=commit;h=e698d5c11d27212aa1098bc5b1673a3378563092 | None | 1 | jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment,
const byte *data, const size_t size,
bool GSMMR, uint32_t GSW, uint32_t GSH,
uint32_t GSBPP, bool GSUSESKIP, Jbig2Image *GSKIP, int GSTEMPLATE, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
uint8_t **GSVALS = NULL;
size_t consumed_bytes = 0;
int i, j, code, stride;
int x, y;
Jbig2Image **GSPLANES;
Jbig2GenericRegionParams rparams;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
/* allocate GSPLANES */
GSPLANES = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, GSBPP);
if (GSPLANES == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate %d bytes for GSPLANES", GSBPP);
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < GSBPP; ++i) {
GSPLANES[i] = jbig2_image_new(ctx, GSW, GSH);
if (GSPLANES[i] == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate %dx%d image for GSPLANES", GSW, GSH);
/* free already allocated */
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; --j) {
jbig2_image_release(ctx, GSPLANES[j]);
}
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, GSPLANES);
return NULL;
}
}
}
| 304,560,407,984,195,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2016-9601 | ghostscript before version 9.21 is vulnerable to a heap based buffer overflow that was found in the ghostscript jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image function which is used to decode halftone segments in a JBIG2 image. A document (PostScript or PDF) with an embedded, specially crafted, jbig2 image could trigger a segmentation fault in ghostscript. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-9601 |
558 | openssl | 8aed2a7548362e88e84a7feb795a3a97e8395008 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl | https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=8aed2a7548362e88e84a7feb795a3a97e8395008 | Reserve option to use BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime in ECDSA.
Submitted by Shay Gueron, Intel Corp.
RT: 3149
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f54be179aa4cbbd944728771d7d59ed588158a12) | 1 | void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (!group) return;
if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
group->meth->group_finish(group);
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);
if (group->generator != NULL)
EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
BN_clear_free(&group->order);
OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof *group);
OPENSSL_free(group);
}
| 83,588,821,557,112,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-320"
] | CVE-2016-7056 | A timing attack flaw was found in OpenSSL 1.0.1u and before that could allow a malicious user with local access to recover ECDSA P-256 private keys. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7056 |
559 | busybox | 1de25a6e87e0e627aa34298105a3d17c60a1f44e | http://git.busybox.net/busybox | http://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=1de25a6e87e0e627aa34298105a3d17c60a1f44e | unzip: test for bad archive SEGVing
function old new delta
huft_build 1296 1300 +4
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> | 1 | static int huft_build(const unsigned *b, const unsigned n,
const unsigned s, const unsigned short *d,
const unsigned char *e, huft_t **t, unsigned *m)
{
unsigned a; /* counter for codes of length k */
unsigned c[BMAX + 1]; /* bit length count table */
unsigned eob_len; /* length of end-of-block code (value 256) */
unsigned f; /* i repeats in table every f entries */
int g; /* maximum code length */
int htl; /* table level */
unsigned i; /* counter, current code */
unsigned j; /* counter */
int k; /* number of bits in current code */
unsigned *p; /* pointer into c[], b[], or v[] */
huft_t *q; /* points to current table */
huft_t r; /* table entry for structure assignment */
huft_t *u[BMAX]; /* table stack */
unsigned v[N_MAX]; /* values in order of bit length */
int ws[BMAX + 1]; /* bits decoded stack */
int w; /* bits decoded */
unsigned x[BMAX + 1]; /* bit offsets, then code stack */
int y; /* number of dummy codes added */
unsigned z; /* number of entries in current table */
/* Length of EOB code, if any */
eob_len = n > 256 ? b[256] : BMAX;
*t = NULL;
/* Generate counts for each bit length */
memset(c, 0, sizeof(c));
p = (unsigned *) b; /* cast allows us to reuse p for pointing to b */
i = n;
do {
c[*p]++; /* assume all entries <= BMAX */
} while (--i);
if (c[0] == n) { /* null input - all zero length codes */
*m = 0;
return 2;
}
/* Find minimum and maximum length, bound *m by those */
for (j = 1; (j <= BMAX) && (c[j] == 0); j++)
continue;
k = j; /* minimum code length */
for (i = BMAX; (c[i] == 0) && i; i--)
continue;
g = i; /* maximum code length */
*m = (*m < j) ? j : ((*m > i) ? i : *m);
/* Adjust last length count to fill out codes, if needed */
for (y = 1 << j; j < i; j++, y <<= 1) {
y -= c[j];
if (y < 0)
return 2; /* bad input: more codes than bits */
}
y -= c[i];
if (y < 0)
return 2;
c[i] += y;
/* Generate starting offsets into the value table for each length */
x[1] = j = 0;
p = c + 1;
xp = x + 2;
while (--i) { /* note that i == g from above */
j += *p++;
*xp++ = j;
}
}
| 44,886,300,504,321,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2015-9261 | huft_build in archival/libarchive/decompress_gunzip.c in BusyBox before 1.27.2 misuses a pointer, causing segfaults and an application crash during an unzip operation on a specially crafted ZIP file. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9261 |
560 | wpitchoune | 8b10426dcc0246c1712a99460dd470dcb1cc4d9c | http://git.wpitchoune.net/gitweb/?p=psensor | http://git.wpitchoune.net/gitweb/?p=psensor.git;a=commit;h=8b10426dcc0246c1712a99460dd470dcb1cc4d9c | None | 1 | create_response(const char *nurl, const char *method, unsigned int *rp_code)
{
char *page, *fpath;
struct MHD_Response *resp = NULL;
if (!strncmp(nurl, URL_BASE_API_1_1, strlen(URL_BASE_API_1_1))) {
resp = create_response_api(nurl, method, rp_code);
} else {
fpath = get_path(nurl, server_data.www_dir);
resp = create_response_file(nurl, method, rp_code, fpath);
free(fpath);
}
}
| 1,938,873,346,208,583,300,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-22"
] | CVE-2014-10073 | The create_response function in server/server.c in Psensor before 1.1.4 allows Directory Traversal because it lacks a check for whether a file is under the webserver directory. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-10073 |
563 | enlightment | 666df815cd86a50343859bce36c5cf968c5f38b0 | https://git.enlightenment.org/legacy/imlib2 | https://git.enlightenment.org/core/enlightenment.git/commit/?id=666df815cd86a50343859bce36c5cf968c5f38b0 | None | 1 | main(int argc,
char **argv)
{
int i, gn;
int test = 0;
char *action = NULL, *cmd;
char *output = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_EEZE_MOUNT
Eina_Bool mnt = EINA_FALSE;
const char *act;
#endif
gid_t gid, gl[65536], egid;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
{
if ((!strcmp(argv[i], "-h")) ||
(!strcmp(argv[i], "-help")) ||
(!strcmp(argv[i], "--help")))
{
printf(
"This is an internal tool for Enlightenment.\n"
"do not use it.\n"
);
exit(0);
}
}
if (argc >= 3)
{
if ((argc == 3) && (!strcmp(argv[1], "-t")))
{
test = 1;
action = argv[2];
}
else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "l2ping"))
{
action = argv[1];
output = argv[2];
}
#ifdef HAVE_EEZE_MOUNT
else
{
const char *s;
s = strrchr(argv[1], '/');
if ((!s) || (!s[1])) exit(1); /* eeze always uses complete path */
s++;
if (strcmp(s, "mount") && strcmp(s, "umount") && strcmp(s, "eject")) exit(1);
mnt = EINA_TRUE;
act = s;
action = argv[1];
}
#endif
}
else if (argc == 2)
{
action = argv[1];
}
else
{
exit(1);
}
if (!action) exit(1);
fprintf(stderr, "action %s %i\n", action, argc);
uid = getuid();
gid = getgid();
egid = getegid();
gn = getgroups(65536, gl);
if (gn < 0)
{
printf("ERROR: MEMBER OF MORE THAN 65536 GROUPS\n");
exit(3);
}
if (setuid(0) != 0)
{
printf("ERROR: UNABLE TO ASSUME ROOT PRIVILEGES\n");
exit(5);
}
if (setgid(0) != 0)
{
printf("ERROR: UNABLE TO ASSUME ROOT GROUP PRIVILEGES\n");
exit(7);
}
eina_init();
if (!auth_action_ok(action, gid, gl, gn, egid))
{
printf("ERROR: ACTION NOT ALLOWED: %s\n", action);
exit(10);
}
/* we can add more levels of auth here */
/* when mounting, this will match the exact path to the exe,
* as required in sysactions.conf
* this is intentionally pedantic for security
*/
cmd = eina_hash_find(actions, action);
if (!cmd)
{
printf("ERROR: UNDEFINED ACTION: %s\n", action);
exit(20);
}
if (!test && !strcmp(action, "l2ping"))
{
char tmp[128];
double latency;
latency = e_sys_l2ping(output);
eina_convert_dtoa(latency, tmp);
fputs(tmp, stdout);
return (latency < 0) ? 1 : 0;
}
/* sanitize environment */
#ifdef HAVE_UNSETENV
# define NOENV(x) unsetenv(x)
#else
# define NOENV(x)
#endif
NOENV("IFS");
/* sanitize environment */
#ifdef HAVE_UNSETENV
# define NOENV(x) unsetenv(x)
#else
# define NOENV(x)
#endif
NOENV("IFS");
NOENV("LD_PRELOAD");
NOENV("PYTHONPATH");
NOENV("LD_LIBRARY_PATH");
#ifdef HAVE_CLEARENV
clearenv();
#endif
/* set path and ifs to minimal defaults */
putenv("PATH=/bin:/usr/bin");
putenv("IFS= \t\n");
const char *p;
char *end;
unsigned long muid;
Eina_Bool nosuid, nodev, noexec, nuid;
nosuid = nodev = noexec = nuid = EINA_FALSE;
/* these are the only possible options which can be present here; check them strictly */
if (eina_strlcpy(buf, opts, sizeof(buf)) >= sizeof(buf)) return EINA_FALSE;
for (p = buf; p && p[1]; p = strchr(p + 1, ','))
{
if (p[0] == ',') p++;
#define CMP(OPT) \
if (!strncmp(p, OPT, sizeof(OPT) - 1))
CMP("nosuid,")
{
nosuid = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
CMP("nodev,")
{
nodev = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
CMP("noexec,")
{
noexec = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
CMP("utf8,") continue;
CMP("utf8=0,") continue;
CMP("utf8=1,") continue;
CMP("iocharset=utf8,") continue;
CMP("uid=")
{
p += 4;
errno = 0;
muid = strtoul(p, &end, 10);
if (muid == ULONG_MAX) return EINA_FALSE;
if (errno) return EINA_FALSE;
if (end[0] != ',') return EINA_FALSE;
if (muid != uid) return EINA_FALSE;
nuid = EINA_TRUE;
continue;
}
return EINA_FALSE;
}
if ((!nosuid) || (!nodev) || (!noexec) || (!nuid)) return EINA_FALSE;
return EINA_TRUE;
}
| 300,699,053,216,122,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2014-1845 | An unspecified setuid root helper in Enlightenment before 0.17.6 allows local users to gain privileges by leveraging failure to properly sanitize the environment. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-1845 |
564 | pango | 4de30e5500eaeb49f4bf0b7a07f718e149a2ed5e | http://github.com/bratsche/pango | http://github.com/bratsche/pango/commit/4de30e5500eaeb49f4bf0b7a07f718e149a2ed5e | [glyphstring] Handle overflow with very long glyphstrings | 1 | pango_glyph_string_set_size (PangoGlyphString *string, gint new_len)
{
g_return_if_fail (new_len >= 0);
while (new_len > string->space)
{
if (string->space == 0)
string->space = 1;
else
string->space *= 2;
if (string->space < 0)
{
g_warning ("glyph string length overflows maximum integer size, truncated");
new_len = string->space = G_MAXINT - 8;
}
}
string->glyphs = g_realloc (string->glyphs, string->space * sizeof (PangoGlyphInfo));
string->log_clusters = g_realloc (string->log_clusters, string->space * sizeof (gint));
string->num_glyphs = new_len;
}
| 263,605,045,719,264,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | glyphstring.c | 149,047,394,354,023,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2009-1194 | Integer overflow in the pango_glyph_string_set_size function in pango/glyphstring.c in Pango before 1.24 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a long glyph string that triggers a heap-based buffer overflow, as demonstrated by a long document.location value in Firefox. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1194 |
566 | memcached | d9cd01ede97f4145af9781d448c62a3318952719 | https://github.com/memcached/memcached | http://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/d9cd01ede97f4145af9781d448c62a3318952719 | Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets. | 1 | static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el) {
if (c->rbytes > 1024) {
/*
* We didn't have a '\n' in the first k. This _has_ to be a
* large multiget, if not we should just nuke the connection.
*/
char *ptr = c->rcurr;
while (*ptr == ' ') { /* ignore leading whitespaces */
++ptr;
}
if (strcmp(ptr, "get ") && strcmp(ptr, "gets ")) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
| 41,269,603,813,800,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | memcached.c | 216,347,815,765,977,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2010-1152 | memcached.c in memcached before 1.4.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon hang or crash) via a long line that triggers excessive memory allocation. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1152 |
568 | uzbl | 1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047 | http://github.com/Dieterbe/uzbl | http://github.com/Dieterbe/uzbl/commit/1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047 | disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem. | 1 | eval_js(WebKitWebView * web_view, gchar *script, GString *result) {
WebKitWebFrame *frame;
JSGlobalContextRef context;
JSObjectRef globalobject;
JSStringRef var_name;
JSStringRef js_script;
JSValueRef js_result;
JSStringRef js_result_string;
size_t js_result_size;
js_init();
frame = webkit_web_view_get_main_frame(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(web_view));
context = webkit_web_frame_get_global_context(frame);
globalobject = JSContextGetGlobalObject(context);
/* uzbl javascript namespace */
var_name = JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString("Uzbl");
JSObjectSetProperty(context, globalobject, var_name,
JSObjectMake(context, uzbl.js.classref, NULL),
kJSClassAttributeNone, NULL);
/* evaluate the script and get return value*/
js_script = JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString(script);
js_result = JSEvaluateScript(context, js_script, globalobject, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (js_result && !JSValueIsUndefined(context, js_result)) {
js_result_string = JSValueToStringCopy(context, js_result, NULL);
js_result_size = JSStringGetMaximumUTF8CStringSize(js_result_string);
if (js_result_size) {
char js_result_utf8[js_result_size];
JSStringGetUTF8CString(js_result_string, js_result_utf8, js_result_size);
g_string_assign(result, js_result_utf8);
}
JSStringRelease(js_result_string);
}
/* cleanup */
JSObjectDeleteProperty(context, globalobject, var_name, NULL);
JSStringRelease(var_name);
JSStringRelease(js_script);
}
| 251,201,670,477,899,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2010-0011 | The eval_js function in uzbl-core.c in Uzbl before 2010.01.05 exposes the run method of the Uzbl object, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via JavaScript code. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0011 |
569 | FFmpeg | 8312e3fc9041027a33c8bc667bb99740fdf41dd5 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/8312e3fc9041027a33c8bc667bb99740fdf41dd5 | Do not attempt to decode APE file with no frames
This fixes invalid reads/writes with this sample:
http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/1103-exploits/vlc105-dos.txt | 1 | static int ape_read_header(AVFormatContext * s, AVFormatParameters * ap)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
APEContext *ape = s->priv_data;
AVStream *st;
uint32_t tag;
int i;
int total_blocks;
int64_t pts;
/* TODO: Skip any leading junk such as id3v2 tags */
ape->junklength = 0;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('M', 'A', 'C', ' '))
return -1;
ape->fileversion = avio_rl16(pb);
if (ape->fileversion < APE_MIN_VERSION || ape->fileversion > APE_MAX_VERSION) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unsupported file version - %d.%02d\n", ape->fileversion / 1000, (ape->fileversion % 1000) / 10);
return -1;
}
if (ape->fileversion >= 3980) {
ape->padding1 = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->descriptorlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->headerlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->seektablelength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavheaderlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->audiodatalength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->audiodatalength_high = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavtaillength = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_read(pb, ape->md5, 16);
/* Skip any unknown bytes at the end of the descriptor.
This is for future compatibility */
if (ape->descriptorlength > 52)
avio_seek(pb, ape->descriptorlength - 52, SEEK_CUR);
/* Read header data */
ape->compressiontype = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->formatflags = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->blocksperframe = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->finalframeblocks = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->totalframes = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->bps = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->channels = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->samplerate = avio_rl32(pb);
} else {
ape->descriptorlength = 0;
ape->headerlength = 32;
ape->compressiontype = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->formatflags = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->channels = avio_rl16(pb);
ape->samplerate = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavheaderlength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->wavtaillength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->totalframes = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->finalframeblocks = avio_rl32(pb);
if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_HAS_PEAK_LEVEL) {
avio_seek(pb, 4, SEEK_CUR); /* Skip the peak level */
ape->headerlength += 4;
}
if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_HAS_SEEK_ELEMENTS) {
ape->seektablelength = avio_rl32(pb);
ape->headerlength += 4;
ape->seektablelength *= sizeof(int32_t);
} else
ape->seektablelength = ape->totalframes * sizeof(int32_t);
if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_8_BIT)
ape->bps = 8;
else if (ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_24_BIT)
ape->bps = 24;
else
ape->bps = 16;
if (ape->fileversion >= 3950)
ape->blocksperframe = 73728 * 4;
else if (ape->fileversion >= 3900 || (ape->fileversion >= 3800 && ape->compressiontype >= 4000))
ape->blocksperframe = 73728;
else
ape->blocksperframe = 9216;
/* Skip any stored wav header */
if (!(ape->formatflags & MAC_FORMAT_FLAG_CREATE_WAV_HEADER))
avio_seek(pb, ape->wavheaderlength, SEEK_CUR);
}
if(ape->totalframes > UINT_MAX / sizeof(APEFrame)){
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many frames: %d\n", ape->totalframes);
return -1;
}
ape->frames = av_malloc(ape->totalframes * sizeof(APEFrame));
if(!ape->frames)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ape->firstframe = ape->junklength + ape->descriptorlength + ape->headerlength + ape->seektablelength + ape->wavheaderlength;
ape->currentframe = 0;
ape->totalsamples = ape->finalframeblocks;
if (ape->totalframes > 1)
ape->totalsamples += ape->blocksperframe * (ape->totalframes - 1);
if (ape->seektablelength > 0) {
ape->seektable = av_malloc(ape->seektablelength);
for (i = 0; i < ape->seektablelength / sizeof(uint32_t); i++)
ape->seektable[i] = avio_rl32(pb);
}
ape->frames[0].pos = ape->firstframe;
ape->frames[0].nblocks = ape->blocksperframe;
ape->frames[0].skip = 0;
for (i = 1; i < ape->totalframes; i++) {
ape->frames[i].pos = ape->seektable[i]; //ape->frames[i-1].pos + ape->blocksperframe;
ape->frames[i].nblocks = ape->blocksperframe;
ape->frames[i - 1].size = ape->frames[i].pos - ape->frames[i - 1].pos;
ape->frames[i].skip = (ape->frames[i].pos - ape->frames[0].pos) & 3;
}
ape->frames[ape->totalframes - 1].size = ape->finalframeblocks * 4;
ape->frames[ape->totalframes - 1].nblocks = ape->finalframeblocks;
for (i = 0; i < ape->totalframes; i++) {
if(ape->frames[i].skip){
ape->frames[i].pos -= ape->frames[i].skip;
ape->frames[i].size += ape->frames[i].skip;
}
ape->frames[i].size = (ape->frames[i].size + 3) & ~3;
}
ape_dumpinfo(s, ape);
/* try to read APE tags */
if (!url_is_streamed(pb)) {
ff_ape_parse_tag(s);
avio_seek(pb, 0, SEEK_SET);
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Decoding file - v%d.%02d, compression level %d\n", ape->fileversion / 1000, (ape->fileversion % 1000) / 10, ape->compressiontype);
/* now we are ready: build format streams */
st = av_new_stream(s, 0);
if (!st)
return -1;
total_blocks = (ape->totalframes == 0) ? 0 : ((ape->totalframes - 1) * ape->blocksperframe) + ape->finalframeblocks;
st->codec->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO;
st->codec->codec_id = CODEC_ID_APE;
st->codec->codec_tag = MKTAG('A', 'P', 'E', ' ');
st->codec->channels = ape->channels;
st->codec->sample_rate = ape->samplerate;
st->codec->bits_per_coded_sample = ape->bps;
st->codec->frame_size = MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE;
st->nb_frames = ape->totalframes;
st->start_time = 0;
st->duration = total_blocks / MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE;
av_set_pts_info(st, 64, MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE, ape->samplerate);
st->codec->extradata = av_malloc(APE_EXTRADATA_SIZE);
st->codec->extradata_size = APE_EXTRADATA_SIZE;
AV_WL16(st->codec->extradata + 0, ape->fileversion);
AV_WL16(st->codec->extradata + 2, ape->compressiontype);
AV_WL16(st->codec->extradata + 4, ape->formatflags);
pts = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ape->totalframes; i++) {
ape->frames[i].pts = pts;
av_add_index_entry(st, ape->frames[i].pos, ape->frames[i].pts, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
pts += ape->blocksperframe / MAC_SUBFRAME_SIZE;
}
return 0;
}
| 4,670,505,959,256,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ape.c | 314,360,533,481,047,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2011-2161 | The ape_read_header function in ape.c in libavformat in FFmpeg before 0.5.4, as used in MPlayer, VideoLAN VLC media player, and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via an APE (aka Monkey's Audio) file that contains a header but no frames. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2161 |
570 | nbd | 3ef52043861ab16352d49af89e048ba6339d6df8 | https://github.com/yoe/nbd | https://github.com/yoe/nbd/commit/3ef52043861ab16352d49af89e048ba6339d6df8 | Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh. | 1 | int mainloop(CLIENT *client) {
struct nbd_request request;
struct nbd_reply reply;
gboolean go_on=TRUE;
#ifdef DODBG
int i = 0;
#endif
negotiate(client->net, client, NULL);
DEBUG("Entering request loop!\n");
reply.magic = htonl(NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
reply.error = 0;
while (go_on) {
char buf[BUFSIZE];
size_t len;
#ifdef DODBG
i++;
printf("%d: ", i);
#endif
readit(client->net, &request, sizeof(request));
request.from = ntohll(request.from);
request.type = ntohl(request.type);
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_DISC) {
msg2(LOG_INFO, "Disconnect request received.");
if (client->server->flags & F_COPYONWRITE) {
if (client->difmap) g_free(client->difmap) ;
close(client->difffile);
unlink(client->difffilename);
free(client->difffilename);
}
go_on=FALSE;
continue;
}
len = ntohl(request.len);
if (request.magic != htonl(NBD_REQUEST_MAGIC))
err("Not enough magic.");
if (len > BUFSIZE + sizeof(struct nbd_reply))
err("Request too big!");
#ifdef DODBG
printf("%s from %llu (%llu) len %d, ", request.type ? "WRITE" :
"READ", (unsigned long long)request.from,
(unsigned long long)request.from / 512, len);
#endif
memcpy(reply.handle, request.handle, sizeof(reply.handle));
if ((request.from + len) > (OFFT_MAX)) {
DEBUG("[Number too large!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (((ssize_t)((off_t)request.from + len) > client->exportsize)) {
DEBUG("[RANGE!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (request.type==NBD_CMD_WRITE) {
DEBUG("wr: net->buf, ");
readit(client->net, buf, len);
DEBUG("buf->exp, ");
if ((client->server->flags & F_READONLY) ||
(client->server->flags & F_AUTOREADONLY)) {
DEBUG("[WRITE to READONLY!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EPERM);
continue;
}
if (expwrite(request.from, buf, len, client)) {
DEBUG("Write failed: %m" );
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
}
/* READ */
DEBUG("exp->buf, ");
if (expread(request.from, buf + sizeof(struct nbd_reply), len, client)) {
DEBUG("Read failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
DEBUG("buf->net, ");
memcpy(buf, &reply, sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
writeit(client->net, buf, len + sizeof(struct nbd_reply));
DEBUG("OK!\n");
}
return 0;
}
| 21,610,058,009,013,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nbd-server.c | 204,775,428,507,829,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-0530 | Buffer overflow in the mainloop function in nbd-server.c in the server in Network Block Device (nbd) before 2.9.20 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long request. NOTE: this issue exists because of a CVE-2005-3534 regression. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0530 |
573 | linux | 8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664 | net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static void tcp_illinois_info(struct sock *sk, u32 ext,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
if (ext & (1 << (INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO - 1))) {
struct tcpvegas_info info = {
.tcpv_enabled = 1,
.tcpv_rttcnt = ca->cnt_rtt,
.tcpv_minrtt = ca->base_rtt,
};
u64 t = ca->sum_rtt;
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
info.tcpv_rtt = t;
nla_put(skb, INET_DIAG_VEGASINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
| 162,920,631,819,149,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | tcp_illinois.c | 159,370,893,635,524,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-4565 | The tcp_illinois_info function in net/ipv4/tcp_illinois.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.19, when the net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control illinois setting is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and OOPS) by reading TCP stats. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-4565 |
579 | linux | ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d | Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int do_siocgstamp(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timeval ktv;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&ktv);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timeval(up, &ktv);
return err;
}
| 324,785,292,477,380,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | socket.c | 340,153,205,578,084,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2012-4467 | The (1) do_siocgstamp and (2) do_siocgstampns functions in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.4 use an incorrect argument order, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-4467 |
580 | linux | ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d | Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timespec kts;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timespec(up, &kts);
return err;
}
| 301,299,746,212,079,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | socket.c | 340,153,205,578,084,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2012-4467 | The (1) do_siocgstamp and (2) do_siocgstampns functions in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.5.4 use an incorrect argument order, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-4467 |
620 | linux | f0ec1aaf54caddd21c259aea8b2ecfbde4ee4fb9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f0ec1aaf54caddd21c259aea8b2ecfbde4ee4fb9 | [PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> | 1 | void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
if (p->mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = p->mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = p->mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
}
| 312,814,071,675,674,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | tsacct.c | 16,213,253,465,781,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2012-3510 | Use-after-free vulnerability in the xacct_add_tsk function in kernel/tsacct.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.19 allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a taskstats TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID command. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-3510 |
621 | linux | 06b6a1cf6e776426766298d055bb3991957d90a7 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/06b6a1cf6e776426766298d055bb3991957d90a7 | rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int msg_flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk);
long timeo;
int ret = 0, nonblock = msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct rds_incoming *inc = NULL;
/* udp_recvmsg()->sock_recvtimeo() gets away without locking too.. */
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
rdsdebug("size %zu flags 0x%x timeo %ld\n", size, msg_flags, timeo);
if (msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
while (1) {
/* If there are pending notifications, do those - and nothing else */
if (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue)) {
ret = rds_notify_queue_get(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (rs->rs_cong_notify) {
ret = rds_notify_cong(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)) {
if (nonblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
timeo = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
(!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) ||
rs->rs_cong_notify ||
rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)), timeo);
rdsdebug("recvmsg woke inc %p timeo %ld\n", inc,
timeo);
if (timeo > 0 || timeo == MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT)
continue;
ret = timeo;
if (ret == 0)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
rdsdebug("copying inc %p from %pI4:%u to user\n", inc,
&inc->i_conn->c_faddr,
ntohs(inc->i_hdr.h_sport));
ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, msg->msg_iov,
size);
if (ret < 0)
break;
/*
* if the message we just copied isn't at the head of the
* recv queue then someone else raced us to return it, try
* to get the next message.
*/
if (!rds_still_queued(rs, inc, !(msg_flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
rds_inc_put(inc);
inc = NULL;
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_deliver_raced);
continue;
}
if (ret < be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len)) {
if (msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)
ret = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_delivered);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = inc->i_saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
break;
}
if (inc)
rds_inc_put(inc);
out:
return ret;
}
| 145,358,621,780,894,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | recv.c | 115,527,263,712,618,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-200"
] | CVE-2012-3430 | The rds_recvmsg function in net/rds/recv.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0.44 does not initialize a certain structure member, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a (1) recvfrom or (2) recvmsg system call on an RDS socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-3430 |
625 | linux | adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256 | udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 1 | static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct logicalVolDesc *lvd;
int i, j, offset;
uint8_t type;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct genericPartitionMap *gpm;
uint16_t ident;
struct buffer_head *bh;
int ret = 0;
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh)
return 1;
BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
ret = udf_sb_alloc_partition_maps(sb, le32_to_cpu(lvd->numPartitionMaps));
if (ret)
goto out_bh;
for (i = 0, offset = 0;
i < sbi->s_partitions && offset < le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
i++, offset += gpm->partitionMapLength) {
struct udf_part_map *map = &sbi->s_partmaps[i];
gpm = (struct genericPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
type = gpm->partitionMapType;
if (type == 1) {
struct genericPartitionMap1 *gpm1 =
(struct genericPartitionMap1 *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_TYPE1_MAP15;
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(gpm1->partitionNum);
map->s_partition_func = NULL;
} else if (type == 2) {
struct udfPartitionMap2 *upm2 =
(struct udfPartitionMap2 *)gpm;
if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident, UDF_ID_VIRTUAL,
strlen(UDF_ID_VIRTUAL))) {
u16 suf =
le16_to_cpu(((__le16 *)upm2->partIdent.
identSuffix)[0]);
if (suf < 0x0200) {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP15;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt15;
} else {
map->s_partition_type =
UDF_VIRTUAL_MAP20;
map->s_partition_func =
udf_get_pblock_virt20;
}
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARABLE,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARABLE))) {
uint32_t loc;
struct sparingTable *st;
struct sparablePartitionMap *spm =
(struct sparablePartitionMap *)gpm;
map->s_partition_type = UDF_SPARABLE_MAP15;
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.s_packet_len =
le16_to_cpu(spm->packetLength);
for (j = 0; j < spm->numSparingTables; j++) {
struct buffer_head *bh2;
loc = le32_to_cpu(
spm->locSparingTable[j]);
bh2 = udf_read_tagged(sb, loc, loc,
&ident);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = bh2;
if (bh2 == NULL)
continue;
st = (struct sparingTable *)bh2->b_data;
if (ident != 0 || strncmp(
st->sparingIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_SPARING,
strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING))) {
brelse(bh2);
map->s_type_specific.s_sparing.
s_spar_map[j] = NULL;
}
}
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_spar15;
} else if (!strncmp(upm2->partIdent.ident,
UDF_ID_METADATA,
strlen(UDF_ID_METADATA))) {
struct udf_meta_data *mdata =
&map->s_type_specific.s_metadata;
struct metadataPartitionMap *mdm =
(struct metadataPartitionMap *)
&(lvd->partitionMaps[offset]);
udf_debug("Parsing Logical vol part %d type %d id=%s\n",
i, type, UDF_ID_METADATA);
map->s_partition_type = UDF_METADATA_MAP25;
map->s_partition_func = udf_get_pblock_meta25;
mdata->s_meta_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc);
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc);
mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc);
mdata->s_alloc_unit_size =
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize);
mdata->s_align_unit_size =
le16_to_cpu(mdm->alignUnitSize);
if (mdm->flags & 0x01)
mdata->s_flags |= MF_DUPLICATE_MD;
udf_debug("Metadata Ident suffix=0x%x\n",
le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)
mdm->partIdent.identSuffix));
udf_debug("Metadata part num=%d\n",
le16_to_cpu(mdm->partitionNum));
udf_debug("Metadata part alloc unit size=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->allocUnitSize));
udf_debug("Metadata file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataFileLoc));
udf_debug("Mirror file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataMirrorFileLoc));
udf_debug("Bitmap file loc=%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(mdm->metadataBitmapFileLoc));
udf_debug("Flags: %d %d\n",
mdata->s_flags, mdm->flags);
} else {
udf_debug("Unknown ident: %s\n",
upm2->partIdent.ident);
continue;
}
map->s_volumeseqnum = le16_to_cpu(upm2->volSeqNum);
map->s_partition_num = le16_to_cpu(upm2->partitionNum);
}
udf_debug("Partition (%d:%d) type %d on volume %d\n",
i, map->s_partition_num, type, map->s_volumeseqnum);
}
if (fileset) {
struct long_ad *la = (struct long_ad *)&(lvd->logicalVolContentsUse[0]);
*fileset = lelb_to_cpu(la->extLocation);
udf_debug("FileSet found in LogicalVolDesc at block=%d, partition=%d\n",
fileset->logicalBlockNum,
fileset->partitionReferenceNum);
}
if (lvd->integritySeqExt.extLength)
udf_load_logicalvolint(sb, leea_to_cpu(lvd->integritySeqExt));
out_bh:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
| 69,425,838,954,019,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | super.c | 195,692,247,566,564,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2012-3400 | Heap-based buffer overflow in the udf_load_logicalvol function in fs/udf/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted UDF filesystem. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-3400 |
627 | linux | 79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79549c6dfda0603dba9a70a53467ce62d9335c33 | cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
#endif
struct cred *new;
int ret;
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
ret = create_user_ns(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
}
/* cache user_ns in cred. Doesn't need a refcount because it will
* stay pinned by cred->user
*/
new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
* had one */
if (new->thread_keyring) {
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
/* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
* a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
* bit */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tgcred) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_put;
}
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
release_tgcred(new);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
validate_creds(new);
return 0;
error_put:
put_cred(new);
return ret;
}
| 297,010,684,195,110,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | cred.c | 39,275,897,372,619,242,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2012-2745 | The copy_creds function in kernel/cred.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.2 provides an invalid replacement session keyring to a child process, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via a crafted application that uses the fork system call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2745 |
629 | linux | bcc2c9c3fff859e0eb019fe6fec26f9b8eba795c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bcc2c9c3fff859e0eb019fe6fec26f9b8eba795c | Tools: hv: verify origin of netlink connector message
The SuSE security team suggested to use recvfrom instead of recv to be
certain that the connector message is originated from kernel.
CVE-2012-2669
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 1 | int main(void)
{
int fd, len, sock_opt;
int error;
struct cn_msg *message;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct nlmsghdr *incoming_msg;
struct cn_msg *incoming_cn_msg;
struct hv_kvp_msg *hv_msg;
char *p;
char *key_value;
char *key_name;
daemon(1, 0);
openlog("KVP", 0, LOG_USER);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP starting; pid is:%d", getpid());
/*
* Retrieve OS release information.
*/
kvp_get_os_info();
if (kvp_file_init()) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to initialize the pools");
exit(-1);
}
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_CONNECTOR);
if (fd < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink socket creation failed; error:%d", fd);
exit(-1);
}
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
addr.nl_pad = 0;
addr.nl_pid = 0;
addr.nl_groups = CN_KVP_IDX;
error = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (error < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bind failed; error:%d", error);
close(fd);
exit(-1);
}
sock_opt = addr.nl_groups;
setsockopt(fd, 270, 1, &sock_opt, sizeof(sock_opt));
/*
* Register ourselves with the kernel.
*/
message = (struct cn_msg *)kvp_send_buffer;
message->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
message->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)message->data;
hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = KVP_OP_REGISTER;
message->ack = 0;
message->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, message);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink_send failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
exit(-1);
}
pfd.fd = fd;
while (1) {
pfd.events = POLLIN;
pfd.revents = 0;
poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
len = recv(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "recv failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer;
incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg);
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
switch (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation) {
case KVP_OP_REGISTER:
/*
* Driver is registering with us; stash away the version
* information.
*/
p = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
lic_version = malloc(strlen(p) + 1);
if (lic_version) {
strcpy(lic_version, p);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP LIC Version: %s",
lic_version);
} else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc failed");
}
continue;
/*
* The current protocol with the kernel component uses a
* NULL key name to pass an error condition.
* For the SET, GET and DELETE operations,
* use the existing protocol to pass back error.
*/
case KVP_OP_SET:
if (kvp_key_add_or_modify(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key, "");
break;
case KVP_OP_GET:
if (kvp_get_value(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key, "");
break;
case KVP_OP_DELETE:
if (kvp_key_delete(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key, "");
break;
default:
break;
}
if (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation != KVP_OP_ENUMERATE)
goto kvp_done;
/*
* If the pool is KVP_POOL_AUTO, dynamically generate
* both the key and the value; if not read from the
* appropriate pool.
*/
if (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool != KVP_POOL_AUTO) {
kvp_pool_enumerate(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
goto kvp_done;
}
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
key_name = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key;
key_value = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value;
switch (hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index) {
case FullyQualifiedDomainName:
kvp_get_domain_name(key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "FullyQualifiedDomainName");
break;
case IntegrationServicesVersion:
strcpy(key_name, "IntegrationServicesVersion");
strcpy(key_value, lic_version);
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv4:
kvp_get_ip_address(AF_INET, key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv4");
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv6:
kvp_get_ip_address(AF_INET6, key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv6");
break;
case OSBuildNumber:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSBuildNumber");
break;
case OSName:
strcpy(key_value, os_name);
strcpy(key_name, "OSName");
break;
case OSMajorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_major);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMajorVersion");
break;
case OSMinorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_minor);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMinorVersion");
break;
case OSVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSVersion");
break;
case ProcessorArchitecture:
strcpy(key_value, processor_arch);
strcpy(key_name, "ProcessorArchitecture");
break;
default:
strcpy(key_value, "Unknown Key");
/*
* We use a null key name to terminate enumeration.
*/
strcpy(key_name, "");
break;
}
/*
* Send the value back to the kernel. The response is
* already in the receive buffer. Update the cn_msg header to
* reflect the key value that has been added to the message
*/
kvp_done:
incoming_cn_msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
incoming_cn_msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
incoming_cn_msg->ack = 0;
incoming_cn_msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, incoming_cn_msg);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "net_link send failed; error:%d", len);
exit(-1);
}
}
}
| 258,681,515,104,986,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | hv_kvp_daemon.c | 27,462,705,415,646,913,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2012-2669 | The main function in tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c in hypervkvpd, as distributed in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5, does not validate the origin of Netlink messages, which allows local users to spoof Netlink communication via a crafted connector message. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2669 |
632 | linux | ed8cd3b2cd61004cab85380c52b1817aca1ca49b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ed8cd3b2cd61004cab85380c52b1817aca1ca49b | drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_execbuffer2()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> | 1 | i915_gem_execbuffer2(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file)
{
struct drm_i915_gem_execbuffer2 *args = data;
struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec2_list = NULL;
int ret;
if (args->buffer_count < 1) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf2 with %d buffers\n", args->buffer_count);
return -EINVAL;
}
exec2_list = kmalloc(sizeof(*exec2_list)*args->buffer_count,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
if (exec2_list == NULL)
exec2_list = drm_malloc_ab(sizeof(*exec2_list),
args->buffer_count);
if (exec2_list == NULL) {
DRM_DEBUG("Failed to allocate exec list for %d buffers\n",
args->buffer_count);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = copy_from_user(exec2_list,
(struct drm_i915_relocation_entry __user *)
(uintptr_t) args->buffers_ptr,
sizeof(*exec2_list) * args->buffer_count);
if (ret != 0) {
DRM_DEBUG("copy %d exec entries failed %d\n",
args->buffer_count, ret);
drm_free_large(exec2_list);
return -EFAULT;
}
ret = i915_gem_do_execbuffer(dev, data, file, args, exec2_list);
if (!ret) {
/* Copy the new buffer offsets back to the user's exec list. */
ret = copy_to_user((struct drm_i915_relocation_entry __user *)
(uintptr_t) args->buffers_ptr,
exec2_list,
sizeof(*exec2_list) * args->buffer_count);
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
DRM_DEBUG("failed to copy %d exec entries "
"back to user (%d)\n",
args->buffer_count, ret);
}
}
drm_free_large(exec2_list);
return ret;
}
| 227,357,713,410,382,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 309,976,810,793,568,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2383 | Integer overflow in the i915_gem_execbuffer2 function in drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c in the Direct Rendering Manager (DRM) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.3.5 on 32-bit platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2383 |
633 | linux | 20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68 | Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> | 1 | static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
void *resp_buf;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int ret = -ENOMEM, npages, i, acl_len = 0;
npages = (buflen + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
if (npages > 1) {
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
}
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
/* Let decode_getfacl know not to fail if the ACL data is larger than
* the page we send as a guess */
if (buf == NULL)
res.acl_flags |= NFS4_ACL_LEN_REQUEST;
resp_buf = page_address(pages[0]);
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
acl_len = res.acl_len - res.acl_data_offset;
if (acl_len > args.acl_len)
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, NULL, acl_len);
else
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, resp_buf + res.acl_data_offset,
acl_len);
if (buf) {
ret = -ERANGE;
if (acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset,
res.acl_len);
}
ret = acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
| 331,883,198,314,548,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nfs4proc.c | 291,748,450,445,192,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2375 | The __nfs4_get_acl_uncached function in fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c in the NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3.2 uses an incorrect length variable during a copy operation, which allows remote NFS servers to cause a denial of service (OOPS) by sending an excessive number of bitmap words in an FATTR4_ACL reply. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2011-4131. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2375 |
636 | linux | 1bb57e940e1958e40d51f2078f50c3a96a9b2d75 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1bb57e940e1958e40d51f2078f50c3a96a9b2d75 | dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | rio_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
{
int phy_addr;
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
struct mii_data *miidata = (struct mii_data *) &rq->ifr_ifru;
struct netdev_desc *desc;
int i;
phy_addr = np->phy_addr;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 1:
miidata->out_value = mii_read (dev, phy_addr, miidata->reg_num);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 2:
mii_write (dev, phy_addr, miidata->reg_num, miidata->in_value);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 3:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 4:
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 5:
netif_stop_queue (dev);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 6:
netif_wake_queue (dev);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 7:
printk
("tx_full=%x cur_tx=%lx old_tx=%lx cur_rx=%lx old_rx=%lx\n",
netif_queue_stopped(dev), np->cur_tx, np->old_tx, np->cur_rx,
np->old_rx);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 8:
printk("TX ring:\n");
for (i = 0; i < TX_RING_SIZE; i++) {
desc = &np->tx_ring[i];
printk
("%02x:cur:%08x next:%08x status:%08x frag1:%08x frag0:%08x",
i,
(u32) (np->tx_ring_dma + i * sizeof (*desc)),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->next_desc),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->status),
(u32)(le64_to_cpu(desc->fraginfo) >> 32),
(u32)le64_to_cpu(desc->fraginfo));
printk ("\n");
}
printk ("\n");
break;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
| 221,960,374,900,390,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | dl2k.c | 98,599,421,759,380,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2012-2313 | The rio_ioctl function in drivers/net/ethernet/dlink/dl2k.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.7 does not restrict access to the SIOCSMIIREG command, which allows local users to write data to an Ethernet adapter via an ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2313 |
637 | linux | cc9b17ad29ecaa20bfe426a8d4dbfb94b13ff1cc | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cc9b17ad29ecaa20bfe426a8d4dbfb94b13ff1cc | net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | struct sk_buff *sock_alloc_send_pskb(struct sock *sk, unsigned long header_len,
unsigned long data_len, int noblock,
int *errcode)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
gfp_t gfp_mask;
long timeo;
int err;
gfp_mask = sk->sk_allocation;
if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT)
gfp_mask |= __GFP_REPEAT;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, noblock);
while (1) {
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err != 0)
goto failure;
err = -EPIPE;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)
goto failure;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) < sk->sk_sndbuf) {
skb = alloc_skb(header_len, gfp_mask);
if (skb) {
int npages;
int i;
/* No pages, we're done... */
if (!data_len)
break;
npages = (data_len + (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
skb->truesize += data_len;
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = npages;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
struct page *page;
page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
if (!page) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = i;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto failure;
}
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i,
page, 0,
(data_len >= PAGE_SIZE ?
PAGE_SIZE :
data_len));
data_len -= PAGE_SIZE;
}
/* Full success... */
break;
}
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto failure;
}
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto failure;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto interrupted;
timeo = sock_wait_for_wmem(sk, timeo);
}
skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
return skb;
interrupted:
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
failure:
*errcode = err;
return NULL;
}
| 265,176,515,415,961,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sock.c | 109,934,911,297,062,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2012-2136 | The sock_alloc_send_pskb function in net/core/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 does not properly validate a certain length value, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging access to a TUN/TAP device. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2136 |
649 | linux | d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 | fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 1 | int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/
if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
new->egid != old->gid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
return 0;
}
| 248,446,296,481,147,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | commoncap.c | 14,606,336,979,415,644,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2012-2123 | The cap_bprm_set_creds function in security/commoncap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.3 does not properly handle the use of file system capabilities (aka fcaps) for implementing a privileged executable file, which allows local users to bypass intended personality restrictions via a crafted application, as demonstrated by an attack that uses a parent process to disable ASLR. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2123 |
652 | linux | d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b | ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org | 1 | static int ext4_fill_flex_info(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
ext4_group_t flex_group_count;
ext4_group_t flex_group;
int groups_per_flex = 0;
size_t size;
int i;
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) {
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = 0;
return 1;
}
/* We allocate both existing and potentially added groups */
flex_group_count = ((sbi->s_groups_count + groups_per_flex - 1) +
((le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks) + 1) <<
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK_BITS(sb))) / groups_per_flex;
size = flex_group_count * sizeof(struct flex_groups);
sbi->s_flex_groups = ext4_kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory for %u flex groups",
flex_group_count);
goto failed;
}
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
flex_group = ext4_flex_group(sbi, i);
atomic_add(ext4_free_inodes_count(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].free_inodes);
atomic_add(ext4_free_group_clusters(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].free_clusters);
atomic_add(ext4_used_dirs_count(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].used_dirs);
}
return 1;
failed:
return 0;
}
| 274,161,292,744,789,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | super.c | 154,568,347,400,018,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-2100 | The ext4_fill_flex_info function in fs/ext4/super.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2, on the x86 platform and unspecified other platforms, allows user-assisted remote attackers to trigger inconsistent filesystem-groups data and possibly cause a denial of service via a malformed ext4 filesystem containing a super block with a large FLEX_BG group size (aka s_log_groups_per_flex value). NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2009-4307. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2100 |
655 | linux | d0772b70faaf8e9f2013b6c4273d94d5eac8047a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d0772b70faaf8e9f2013b6c4273d94d5eac8047a | [IPV6]: Fix slab corruption running ip6sic
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int xfrm6_tunnel_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
__be32 spi;
spi = xfrm6_tunnel_spi_lookup((xfrm_address_t *)&iph->saddr);
return xfrm6_rcv_spi(skb, spi);
}
| 339,521,390,955,967,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | xfrm6_tunnel.c | 173,432,014,061,318,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2012-1583 | Double free vulnerability in the xfrm6_tunnel_rcv function in net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.22, when the xfrm6_tunnel module is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (panic) via crafted IPv6 packets. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1583 |
673 | linux | 371528caec553785c37f73fa3926ea0de84f986f | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/371528caec553785c37f73fa3926ea0de84f986f | mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static void mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event(struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct cftype *cft, struct eventfd_ctx *eventfd)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = mem_cgroup_from_cont(cgrp);
struct mem_cgroup_thresholds *thresholds;
struct mem_cgroup_threshold_ary *new;
int type = MEMFILE_TYPE(cft->private);
u64 usage;
int i, j, size;
mutex_lock(&memcg->thresholds_lock);
if (type == _MEM)
thresholds = &memcg->thresholds;
else if (type == _MEMSWAP)
thresholds = &memcg->memsw_thresholds;
else
BUG();
/*
* Something went wrong if we trying to unregister a threshold
* if we don't have thresholds
*/
BUG_ON(!thresholds);
usage = mem_cgroup_usage(memcg, type == _MEMSWAP);
/* Check if a threshold crossed before removing */
__mem_cgroup_threshold(memcg, type == _MEMSWAP);
/* Calculate new number of threshold */
size = 0;
for (i = 0; i < thresholds->primary->size; i++) {
if (thresholds->primary->entries[i].eventfd != eventfd)
size++;
}
new = thresholds->spare;
/* Set thresholds array to NULL if we don't have thresholds */
if (!size) {
kfree(new);
new = NULL;
goto swap_buffers;
}
new->size = size;
/* Copy thresholds and find current threshold */
new->current_threshold = -1;
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < thresholds->primary->size; i++) {
if (thresholds->primary->entries[i].eventfd == eventfd)
continue;
new->entries[j] = thresholds->primary->entries[i];
if (new->entries[j].threshold < usage) {
/*
* new->current_threshold will not be used
* until rcu_assign_pointer(), so it's safe to increment
* it here.
*/
++new->current_threshold;
}
j++;
}
swap_buffers:
/* Swap primary and spare array */
thresholds->spare = thresholds->primary;
rcu_assign_pointer(thresholds->primary, new);
/* To be sure that nobody uses thresholds */
synchronize_rcu();
mutex_unlock(&memcg->thresholds_lock);
}
| 68,337,715,219,973,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | memcontrol.c | 220,205,693,046,075,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-415"
] | CVE-2012-1146 | The mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event function in mm/memcontrol.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.10 does not properly handle multiple events that are attached to the same eventfd, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact by registering memory threshold events. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1146 |
674 | linux | c8e252586f8d5de906385d8cf6385fee289a825e | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c8e252586f8d5de906385d8cf6385fee289a825e | regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view,
long signr, size_t *total)
{
unsigned int i;
/*
* NT_PRSTATUS is the one special case, because the regset data
* goes into the pr_reg field inside the note contents, rather
* than being the whole note contents. We fill the reset in here.
* We assume that regset 0 is NT_PRSTATUS.
*/
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, t->task, signr);
(void) view->regsets[0].get(t->task, &view->regsets[0],
0, sizeof(t->prstatus.pr_reg),
&t->prstatus.pr_reg, NULL);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(t->prstatus), &t->prstatus);
*total += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* Each other regset might generate a note too. For each regset
* that has no core_note_type or is inactive, we leave t->notes[i]
* all zero and we'll know to skip writing it later.
*/
for (i = 1; i < view->n; ++i) {
const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[i];
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, regset);
if (regset->core_note_type &&
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset))) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset->n * regset->size;
void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
0, size, data, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret))
kfree(data);
else {
if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRFPREG)
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "LINUX",
regset->core_note_type,
size, data);
else {
t->prstatus.pr_fpvalid = 1;
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "CORE",
NT_PRFPREG, size, data);
}
*total += notesize(&t->notes[i]);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 133,523,848,575,813,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | binfmt_elf.c | 160,007,124,444,830,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2012-1097 | The regset (aka register set) feature in the Linux kernel before 3.2.10 does not properly handle the absence of .get and .set methods, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a (1) PTRACE_GETREGSET or (2) PTRACE_SETREGSET ptrace call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-1097 |
675 | linux | 2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e | kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int override_release(char __user *release, int len)
{
int ret = 0;
char buf[65];
if (current->personality & UNAME26) {
char *rest = UTS_RELEASE;
int ndots = 0;
unsigned v;
while (*rest) {
if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3)
break;
if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.')
break;
rest++;
}
v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 40;
snprintf(buf, len, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest);
ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, len);
}
return ret;
}
| 194,389,486,511,445,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sys.c | 48,185,621,417,220,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-16"
] | CVE-2012-0957 | The override_release function in kernel/sys.c in the Linux kernel before 3.4.16 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a uname system call in conjunction with a UNAME26 personality. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0957 |
676 | linux | 61cc74fbb87af6aa551a06a370590c9bc07e29d9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/61cc74fbb87af6aa551a06a370590c9bc07e29d9 | block: Fix io_context leak after clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, copy_io() increments both ioc->refcount and ioc->nr_tasks.
However exit_io_context() only decrements ioc->refcount if ioc->nr_tasks
reaches 0.
Always call put_io_context() in exit_io_context().
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com> | 1 | void exit_io_context(void)
{
struct io_context *ioc;
task_lock(current);
ioc = current->io_context;
current->io_context = NULL;
task_unlock(current);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ioc->nr_tasks)) {
if (ioc->aic && ioc->aic->exit)
ioc->aic->exit(ioc->aic);
cfq_exit(ioc);
put_io_context(ioc);
}
}
| 254,860,370,760,445,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | blk-ioc.c | 39,920,103,338,260,244,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2012-0879 | The I/O implementation for block devices in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33 does not properly handle the CLONE_IO feature, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (I/O instability) by starting multiple processes that share an I/O context. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0879 |
678 | suhosin | 73b1968ee30f6d9d2dae497544b910e68e114bfa | https://github.com/stefanesser/suhosin | https://github.com/stefanesser/suhosin/commit/73b1968ee30f6d9d2dae497544b910e68e114bfa | Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory) | 1 | char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return d_url;
}
| 41,838,469,559,935,617,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | header.c | 22,878,982,287,999,906,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2012-0807 | Stack-based buffer overflow in the suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie function in the transparent cookie-encryption feature in the Suhosin extension before 0.9.33 for PHP, when suhosin.cookie.encrypt and suhosin.multiheader are enabled, might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long string that is used in a Set-Cookie HTTP header. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0807 |
679 | linux | a8c1f65c79cbbb2f7da782d4c9d15639a9b94b27 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8c1f65c79cbbb2f7da782d4c9d15639a9b94b27 | igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static void igmp_heard_query(struct in_device *in_dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
int len)
{
struct igmphdr *ih = igmp_hdr(skb);
struct igmpv3_query *ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
struct ip_mc_list *im;
__be32 group = ih->group;
int max_delay;
int mark = 0;
if (len == 8) {
if (ih->code == 0) {
/* Alas, old v1 router presents here. */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
in_dev->mr_v1_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V1_Router_Present_Timeout;
group = 0;
} else {
/* v2 router present */
max_delay = ih->code*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
in_dev->mr_v2_seen = jiffies +
IGMP_V2_Router_Present_Timeout;
}
/* cancel the interface change timer */
in_dev->mr_ifc_count = 0;
if (del_timer(&in_dev->mr_ifc_timer))
__in_dev_put(in_dev);
/* clear deleted report items */
igmpv3_clear_delrec(in_dev);
} else if (len < 12) {
return; /* ignore bogus packet; freed by caller */
} else if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* This is a v3 query with v1 queriers present */
max_delay = IGMP_Query_Response_Interval;
group = 0;
} else if (IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
/* this is a v3 query with v2 queriers present;
* Interpretation of the max_delay code is problematic here.
* A real v2 host would use ih_code directly, while v3 has a
* different encoding. We use the v3 encoding as more likely
* to be intended in a v3 query.
*/
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
} else { /* v3 */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
if (ih3->nsrcs) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct igmpv3_query)
+ ntohs(ih3->nsrcs)*sizeof(__be32)))
return;
ih3 = igmpv3_query_hdr(skb);
}
max_delay = IGMPV3_MRC(ih3->code)*(HZ/IGMP_TIMER_SCALE);
if (!max_delay)
max_delay = 1; /* can't mod w/ 0 */
in_dev->mr_maxdelay = max_delay;
if (ih3->qrv)
in_dev->mr_qrv = ih3->qrv;
if (!group) { /* general query */
if (ih3->nsrcs)
return; /* no sources allowed */
igmp_gq_start_timer(in_dev);
return;
}
/* mark sources to include, if group & source-specific */
mark = ih3->nsrcs != 0;
}
/*
* - Start the timers in all of our membership records
* that the query applies to for the interface on
* which the query arrived excl. those that belong
* to a "local" group (224.0.0.X)
* - For timers already running check if they need to
* be reset.
* - Use the igmp->igmp_code field as the maximum
* delay possible
*/
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, im) {
int changed;
if (group && group != im->multiaddr)
continue;
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
continue;
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
if (im->tm_running)
im->gsquery = im->gsquery && mark;
else
im->gsquery = mark;
changed = !im->gsquery ||
igmp_marksources(im, ntohs(ih3->nsrcs), ih3->srcs);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
if (changed)
igmp_mod_timer(im, max_delay);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
| 178,069,013,729,538,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | igmp.c | 318,760,992,718,953,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2012-0207 | The igmp_heard_query function in net/ipv4/igmp.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and panic) via IGMP packets. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0207 |
681 | linux | 802f43594d6e4d2ac61086d239153c17873a0428 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/802f43594d6e4d2ac61086d239153c17873a0428 | None | 1 | static void kiocb_batch_free(struct kiocb_batch *batch)
{
struct kiocb *req, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, n, &batch->head, ki_batch) {
list_del(&req->ki_batch);
kmem_cache_free(kiocb_cachep, req);
}
}
| 31,800,320,877,295,178,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2012-0058 | The kiocb_batch_free function in fs/aio.c in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) via vectors that trigger incorrect iocb management. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0058 |
682 | linux | a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2 | drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> | 1 | int drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_clip_rect __user *clips_ptr;
struct drm_clip_rect *clips = NULL;
struct drm_mode_fb_dirty_cmd *r = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb;
unsigned flags;
int num_clips;
int ret = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, r->fb_id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_FB);
if (!obj) {
DRM_ERROR("invalid framebuffer id\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_err1;
}
fb = obj_to_fb(obj);
num_clips = r->num_clips;
clips_ptr = (struct drm_clip_rect *)(unsigned long)r->clips_ptr;
if (!num_clips != !clips_ptr) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_err1;
}
flags = DRM_MODE_FB_DIRTY_FLAGS & r->flags;
/* If userspace annotates copy, clips must come in pairs */
if (flags & DRM_MODE_FB_DIRTY_ANNOTATE_COPY && (num_clips % 2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_err1;
}
if (num_clips && clips_ptr) {
clips = kzalloc(num_clips * sizeof(*clips), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!clips) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err1;
}
ret = copy_from_user(clips, clips_ptr,
num_clips * sizeof(*clips));
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_err2;
}
}
if (fb->funcs->dirty) {
ret = fb->funcs->dirty(fb, file_priv, flags, r->color,
clips, num_clips);
} else {
ret = -ENOSYS;
goto out_err2;
}
out_err2:
kfree(clips);
out_err1:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
| 108,013,488,907,801,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2012-0044 | Integer overflow in the drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl function in drivers/gpu/drm/drm_crtc.c in the Direct Rendering Manager (DRM) subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1.5 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted ioctl call. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0044 |
693 | linux | be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 | ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rose_parse_ccitt(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char l, n = 0;
char callsign[11];
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->source_call, callsign);
}
if (*p == FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_addr, p + 7, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(callsign, p + 12, l - 10);
callsign[l - 10] = '\0';
asc2ax(&facilities->dest_call, callsign);
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
| 116,021,283,864,279,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rose_subr.c | 141,742,477,628,029,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-4913 | The rose_parse_ccitt function in net/rose/rose_subr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not validate the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP fields, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (integer underflow, heap memory corruption, and panic) via a small length value in data sent to a ROSE socket, or (2) conduct stack-based buffer overflow attacks via a large length value in data sent to a ROSE socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4913 |
695 | linux | be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 | ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT)
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
else
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
| 145,952,537,291,143,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rose_subr.c | 141,742,477,628,029,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-4913 | The rose_parse_ccitt function in net/rose/rose_subr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not validate the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP fields, which allows remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (integer underflow, heap memory corruption, and panic) via a small length value in data sent to a ROSE socket, or (2) conduct stack-based buffer overflow attacks via a large length value in data sent to a ROSE socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4913 |
700 | linux | 0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93 | perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | 1 | static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
if (cpuhw->n_limited)
freeze_limited_counters(cpuhw, mfspr(SPRN_PMC5),
mfspr(SPRN_PMC6));
perf_read_regs(regs);
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_events; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
if (!event->hw.idx || is_limited_pmc(event->hw.idx))
continue;
val = read_pmc(event->hw.idx);
if ((int)val < 0) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
}
}
/*
* In case we didn't find and reset the event that caused
* the interrupt, scan all events and reset any that are
* negative, to avoid getting continual interrupts.
* Any that we processed in the previous loop will not be negative.
*/
if (!found) {
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
if (is_limited_pmc(i + 1))
continue;
val = read_pmc(i + 1);
if ((int)val < 0)
write_pmc(i + 1, 0);
}
}
/*
* Reset MMCR0 to its normal value. This will set PMXE and
* clear FC (freeze counters) and PMAO (perf mon alert occurred)
* and thus allow interrupts to occur again.
* XXX might want to use MSR.PM to keep the events frozen until
* we get back out of this interrupt.
*/
write_mmcr0(cpuhw, cpuhw->mmcr[0]);
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
}
| 175,304,852,490,672,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | perf_event.c | 69,545,096,076,586,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2011-4611 | Integer overflow in the perf_event_interrupt function in arch/powerpc/kernel/perf_event.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on powerpc platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (unhandled performance monitor exception) via vectors that trigger certain outcomes of performance events. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4611 |
701 | linux | bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c | sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__attribute__ ((aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t))));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int err, ctl_len, iov_size, total_len;
err = -EFAULT;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
return -EFAULT;
/* do not move before msg_sys is valid */
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
goto out;
/* Check whether to allocate the iovec area */
err = -ENOMEM;
iov_size = msg_sys->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
iov = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, iov_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
goto out;
}
/* This will also move the address data into kernel space */
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = verify_compat_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
} else
err = verify_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, iov, iov_size);
out:
return err;
}
| 202,239,731,063,059,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | socket.c | 43,740,973,298,172,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2011-4594 | The __sys_sendmsg function in net/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via crafted use of the sendmmsg system call, leading to an incorrect pointer dereference. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4594 |
702 | linux | a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a9cf73ea7ff78f52662c8658d93c226effbbedde | ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *mac_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_DODGY) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb->csum_start - skb_headroom(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len- offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
if ((skb_headroom(skb) < frag_hdr_sz) &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, frag_hdr_sz, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto out;
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb) +
unfrag_ip6hlen;
mac_start = skb_mac_header(skb);
memmove(mac_start-frag_hdr_sz, mac_start, unfrag_len);
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr);
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
}
| 94,739,129,464,540,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | udp.c | 10,877,562,915,240,044,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2011-4326 | The udp6_ufo_fragment function in net/ipv6/udp.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39, when a certain UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) configuration is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by sending fragmented IPv6 UDP packets to a bridge device. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4326 |
730 | linux | dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> | 1 | static void encode_share_access(struct xdr_stream *xdr, int open_flags)
{
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(8);
switch (open_flags & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE)) {
case FMODE_READ:
WRITE32(NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
WRITE32(NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
WRITE32(NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_BOTH);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
WRITE32(0); /* for linux, share_deny = 0 always */
}
| 128,669,092,881,783,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | nfs4xdr.c | 245,762,914,956,477,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2011-4324 | The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4324 |
753 | linux | 56c6a8a4aadca809e04276eabe5552935c51387f | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/56c6a8a4aadca809e04276eabe5552935c51387f | None | 1 | unsigned int oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *mem,
const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages)
{
int points;
if (oom_unkillable_task(p, mem, nodemask))
return 0;
p = find_lock_task_mm(p);
if (!p)
return 0;
/*
* Shortcut check for a thread sharing p->mm that is OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN
* so the entire heuristic doesn't need to be executed for something
* that cannot be killed.
*/
if (atomic_read(&p->mm->oom_disable_count)) {
task_unlock(p);
return 0;
}
/*
* The memory controller may have a limit of 0 bytes, so avoid a divide
* by zero, if necessary.
*/
if (!totalpages)
totalpages = 1;
/*
* The baseline for the badness score is the proportion of RAM that each
* task's rss, pagetable and swap space use.
*/
points = get_mm_rss(p->mm) + p->mm->nr_ptes;
points += get_mm_counter(p->mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
points *= 1000;
points /= totalpages;
task_unlock(p);
/*
* Root processes get 3% bonus, just like the __vm_enough_memory()
* implementation used by LSMs.
*/
if (has_capability_noaudit(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
points -= 30;
/*
* /proc/pid/oom_score_adj ranges from -1000 to +1000 such that it may
* either completely disable oom killing or always prefer a certain
* task.
*/
points += p->signal->oom_score_adj;
/*
* Never return 0 for an eligible task that may be killed since it's
* possible that no single user task uses more than 0.1% of memory and
* no single admin tasks uses more than 3.0%.
*/
if (points <= 0)
return 1;
return (points < 1000) ? points : 1000;
}
| 321,295,227,204,559,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2011-4097 | Integer overflow in the oom_badness function in mm/oom_kill.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1.8 on 64-bit platforms allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or process termination) by using a certain large amount of memory. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4097 |
754 | linux | 15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3 | jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org | 1 | static int journal_unmap_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
transaction_t *transaction;
struct journal_head *jh;
int may_free = 1;
int ret;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "entry");
/*
* It is safe to proceed here without the j_list_lock because the
* buffers cannot be stolen by try_to_free_buffers as long as we are
* holding the page lock. --sct
*/
if (!buffer_jbd(bh))
goto zap_buffer_unlocked;
/* OK, we have data buffer in journaled mode */
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jh = jbd2_journal_grab_journal_head(bh);
if (!jh)
goto zap_buffer_no_jh;
/*
* We cannot remove the buffer from checkpoint lists until the
* transaction adding inode to orphan list (let's call it T)
* is committed. Otherwise if the transaction changing the
* buffer would be cleaned from the journal before T is
* committed, a crash will cause that the correct contents of
* the buffer will be lost. On the other hand we have to
* clear the buffer dirty bit at latest at the moment when the
* transaction marking the buffer as freed in the filesystem
* structures is committed because from that moment on the
* buffer can be reallocated and used by a different page.
* Since the block hasn't been freed yet but the inode has
* already been added to orphan list, it is safe for us to add
* the buffer to BJ_Forget list of the newest transaction.
*/
transaction = jh->b_transaction;
if (transaction == NULL) {
/* First case: not on any transaction. If it
* has no checkpoint link, then we can zap it:
* it's a writeback-mode buffer so we don't care
* if it hits disk safely. */
if (!jh->b_cp_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "not on any transaction: zap");
goto zap_buffer;
}
if (!buffer_dirty(bh)) {
/* bdflush has written it. We can drop it now */
goto zap_buffer;
}
/* OK, it must be in the journal but still not
* written fully to disk: it's metadata or
* journaled data... */
if (journal->j_running_transaction) {
/* ... and once the current transaction has
* committed, the buffer won't be needed any
* longer. */
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "checkpointed: add to BJ_Forget");
ret = __dispose_buffer(jh,
journal->j_running_transaction);
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* There is no currently-running transaction. So the
* orphan record which we wrote for this file must have
* passed into commit. We must attach this buffer to
* the committing transaction, if it exists. */
if (journal->j_committing_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "give to committing trans");
ret = __dispose_buffer(jh,
journal->j_committing_transaction);
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return ret;
} else {
/* The orphan record's transaction has
* committed. We can cleanse this buffer */
clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh);
goto zap_buffer;
}
}
} else if (transaction == journal->j_committing_transaction) {
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "on committing transaction");
/*
* The buffer is committing, we simply cannot touch
* it. So we just set j_next_transaction to the
* running transaction (if there is one) and mark
* buffer as freed so that commit code knows it should
* clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer.
*/
set_buffer_freed(bh);
if (journal->j_running_transaction && buffer_jbddirty(bh))
jh->b_next_transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
return 0;
} else {
/* Good, the buffer belongs to the running transaction.
* We are writing our own transaction's data, not any
* previous one's, so it is safe to throw it away
* (remember that we expect the filesystem to have set
* i_size already for this truncate so recovery will not
* expose the disk blocks we are discarding here.) */
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, transaction == journal->j_running_transaction);
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "on running transaction");
may_free = __dispose_buffer(jh, transaction);
}
zap_buffer:
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
zap_buffer_no_jh:
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
zap_buffer_unlocked:
clear_buffer_dirty(bh);
J_ASSERT_BH(bh, !buffer_jbddirty(bh));
clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
clear_buffer_req(bh);
clear_buffer_new(bh);
bh->b_bdev = NULL;
return may_free;
}
| 113,708,723,622,617,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | transaction.c | 47,966,770,736,610,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-4086 | The journal_unmap_buffer function in fs/jbd2/transaction.c in the Linux kernel before 3.3.1 does not properly handle the _Delay and _Unwritten buffer head states, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging the presence of an ext4 filesystem that was mounted with a journal. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4086 |
755 | linux | 7ed47b7d142ec99ad6880bbbec51e9f12b3af74c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7ed47b7d142ec99ad6880bbbec51e9f12b3af74c | crypto: ghash - Avoid null pointer dereference if no key is set
The ghash_update function passes a pointer to gf128mul_4k_lle which will
be NULL if ghash_setkey is not called or if the most recent call to
ghash_setkey failed to allocate memory. This causes an oops. Fix this
up by returning an error code in the null case.
This is trivially triggered from unprivileged userspace through the
AF_ALG interface by simply writing to the socket without setting a key.
The ghash_final function has a similar issue, but triggering it requires
a memory allocation failure in ghash_setkey _after_ at least one
successful call to ghash_update.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000670
IP: [<d88c92d4>] gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ghash_generic gf128mul algif_hash af_alg nfs lockd nfs_acl sunrpc bridge ipv6 stp llc
Pid: 1502, comm: hashatron Tainted: G W 3.1.0-rc9-00085-ge9308cf #32 Bochs Bochs
EIP: 0060:[<d88c92d4>] EFLAGS: 00000202 CPU: 0
EIP is at gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul]
EAX: d69db1f0 EBX: d6b8ddac ECX: 00000004 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000670 EDI: d6b8ddac EBP: d6b8ddc8 ESP: d6b8dda4
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process hashatron (pid: 1502, ti=d6b8c000 task=d6810000 task.ti=d6b8c000)
Stack:
00000000 d69db1f0 00000163 00000000 d6b8ddc8 c101a520 d69db1f0 d52aa000
00000ff0 d6b8dde8 d88d310f d6b8a3f8 d52aa000 00001000 d88d502c d6b8ddfc
00001000 d6b8ddf4 c11676ed d69db1e8 d6b8de24 c11679ad d52aa000 00000000
Call Trace:
[<c101a520>] ? kmap_atomic_prot+0x37/0xa6
[<d88d310f>] ghash_update+0x85/0xbe [ghash_generic]
[<c11676ed>] crypto_shash_update+0x18/0x1b
[<c11679ad>] shash_ahash_update+0x22/0x36
[<c11679cc>] shash_async_update+0xb/0xd
[<d88ce0ba>] hash_sendpage+0xba/0xf2 [algif_hash]
[<c121b24c>] kernel_sendpage+0x39/0x4e
[<d88ce000>] ? 0xd88cdfff
[<c121b298>] sock_sendpage+0x37/0x3e
[<c121b261>] ? kernel_sendpage+0x4e/0x4e
[<c10b4dbc>] pipe_to_sendpage+0x56/0x61
[<c10b4e1f>] splice_from_pipe_feed+0x58/0xcd
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b51f5>] __splice_from_pipe+0x36/0x55
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b6383>] splice_from_pipe+0x51/0x64
[<c10b63c2>] ? default_file_splice_write+0x2c/0x2c
[<c10b63d5>] generic_splice_sendpage+0x13/0x15
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b527f>] do_splice_from+0x5d/0x67
[<c10b6865>] sys_splice+0x2bf/0x363
[<c129373b>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x16
[<c104dc1e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10e/0x13f
[<c129370c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x32
Code: 83 c4 0c 5b 5e 5f c9 c3 55 b9 04 00 00 00 89 e5 57 8d 7d e4 56 53 8d 5d e4 83 ec 18 89 45 e0 89 55 dc 0f b6 70 0f c1 e6 04 01 d6 <f3> a5 be 0f 00 00 00 4e 89 d8 e8 48 ff ff ff 8b 45 e0 89 da 0f
EIP: [<d88c92d4>] gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul] SS:ESP 0068:d6b8dda4
CR2: 0000000000000670
---[ end trace 4eaa2a86a8e2da24 ]---
note: hashatron[1502] exited with preempt_count 1
BUG: scheduling while atomic: hashatron/1502/0x10000002
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[...]
Signed-off-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.37+]
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 1 | static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
{
struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
ghash_flush(ctx, dctx);
memcpy(dst, buf, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
return 0;
}
| 152,497,505,395,738,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ghash-generic.c | 237,470,674,440,099,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2011-4081 | crypto/ghash-generic.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a failed or missing ghash_setkey function call, followed by a (1) ghash_update function call or (2) ghash_final function call, as demonstrated by a write operation on an AF_ALG socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4081 |
756 | linux | 7ed47b7d142ec99ad6880bbbec51e9f12b3af74c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7ed47b7d142ec99ad6880bbbec51e9f12b3af74c | crypto: ghash - Avoid null pointer dereference if no key is set
The ghash_update function passes a pointer to gf128mul_4k_lle which will
be NULL if ghash_setkey is not called or if the most recent call to
ghash_setkey failed to allocate memory. This causes an oops. Fix this
up by returning an error code in the null case.
This is trivially triggered from unprivileged userspace through the
AF_ALG interface by simply writing to the socket without setting a key.
The ghash_final function has a similar issue, but triggering it requires
a memory allocation failure in ghash_setkey _after_ at least one
successful call to ghash_update.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000670
IP: [<d88c92d4>] gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ghash_generic gf128mul algif_hash af_alg nfs lockd nfs_acl sunrpc bridge ipv6 stp llc
Pid: 1502, comm: hashatron Tainted: G W 3.1.0-rc9-00085-ge9308cf #32 Bochs Bochs
EIP: 0060:[<d88c92d4>] EFLAGS: 00000202 CPU: 0
EIP is at gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul]
EAX: d69db1f0 EBX: d6b8ddac ECX: 00000004 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000670 EDI: d6b8ddac EBP: d6b8ddc8 ESP: d6b8dda4
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process hashatron (pid: 1502, ti=d6b8c000 task=d6810000 task.ti=d6b8c000)
Stack:
00000000 d69db1f0 00000163 00000000 d6b8ddc8 c101a520 d69db1f0 d52aa000
00000ff0 d6b8dde8 d88d310f d6b8a3f8 d52aa000 00001000 d88d502c d6b8ddfc
00001000 d6b8ddf4 c11676ed d69db1e8 d6b8de24 c11679ad d52aa000 00000000
Call Trace:
[<c101a520>] ? kmap_atomic_prot+0x37/0xa6
[<d88d310f>] ghash_update+0x85/0xbe [ghash_generic]
[<c11676ed>] crypto_shash_update+0x18/0x1b
[<c11679ad>] shash_ahash_update+0x22/0x36
[<c11679cc>] shash_async_update+0xb/0xd
[<d88ce0ba>] hash_sendpage+0xba/0xf2 [algif_hash]
[<c121b24c>] kernel_sendpage+0x39/0x4e
[<d88ce000>] ? 0xd88cdfff
[<c121b298>] sock_sendpage+0x37/0x3e
[<c121b261>] ? kernel_sendpage+0x4e/0x4e
[<c10b4dbc>] pipe_to_sendpage+0x56/0x61
[<c10b4e1f>] splice_from_pipe_feed+0x58/0xcd
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b51f5>] __splice_from_pipe+0x36/0x55
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b6383>] splice_from_pipe+0x51/0x64
[<c10b63c2>] ? default_file_splice_write+0x2c/0x2c
[<c10b63d5>] generic_splice_sendpage+0x13/0x15
[<c10b4d66>] ? splice_from_pipe_begin+0x10/0x10
[<c10b527f>] do_splice_from+0x5d/0x67
[<c10b6865>] sys_splice+0x2bf/0x363
[<c129373b>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x16
[<c104dc1e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10e/0x13f
[<c129370c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x32
Code: 83 c4 0c 5b 5e 5f c9 c3 55 b9 04 00 00 00 89 e5 57 8d 7d e4 56 53 8d 5d e4 83 ec 18 89 45 e0 89 55 dc 0f b6 70 0f c1 e6 04 01 d6 <f3> a5 be 0f 00 00 00 4e 89 d8 e8 48 ff ff ff 8b 45 e0 89 da 0f
EIP: [<d88c92d4>] gf128mul_4k_lle+0x23/0x60 [gf128mul] SS:ESP 0068:d6b8dda4
CR2: 0000000000000670
---[ end trace 4eaa2a86a8e2da24 ]---
note: hashatron[1502] exited with preempt_count 1
BUG: scheduling while atomic: hashatron/1502/0x10000002
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[...]
Signed-off-by: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.37+]
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 1 | static int ghash_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
{
struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
u8 *dst = dctx->buffer;
if (dctx->bytes) {
int n = min(srclen, dctx->bytes);
u8 *pos = dst + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
dctx->bytes -= n;
srclen -= n;
while (n--)
*pos++ ^= *src++;
if (!dctx->bytes)
gf128mul_4k_lle((be128 *)dst, ctx->gf128);
}
while (srclen >= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) {
crypto_xor(dst, src, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
gf128mul_4k_lle((be128 *)dst, ctx->gf128);
src += GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE;
srclen -= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
if (srclen) {
dctx->bytes = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - srclen;
while (srclen--)
*dst++ ^= *src++;
}
return 0;
}
| 33,132,435,692,963,445,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ghash-generic.c | 237,470,674,440,099,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-476"
] | CVE-2011-4081 | crypto/ghash-generic.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a failed or missing ghash_setkey function call, followed by a (1) ghash_update function call or (2) ghash_final function call, as demonstrated by a write operation on an AF_ALG socket. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4081 |
757 | linux | 70945643722ffeac779d2529a348f99567fa5c33 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/70945643722ffeac779d2529a348f99567fa5c33 | cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> | 1 | cifs_mount(struct super_block *sb, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
char *mount_data_global, const char *devname)
{
int rc;
int xid;
struct smb_vol *volume_info;
struct cifsSesInfo *pSesInfo;
struct cifsTconInfo *tcon;
struct TCP_Server_Info *srvTcp;
char *full_path;
char *mount_data = mount_data_global;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL
struct dfs_info3_param *referrals = NULL;
unsigned int num_referrals = 0;
int referral_walks_count = 0;
try_mount_again:
#endif
rc = 0;
tcon = NULL;
pSesInfo = NULL;
srvTcp = NULL;
full_path = NULL;
tlink = NULL;
xid = GetXid();
volume_info = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smb_vol), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!volume_info) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (cifs_parse_mount_options(mount_data, devname, volume_info)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (volume_info->nullauth) {
cFYI(1, "null user");
volume_info->username = "";
} else if (volume_info->username) {
/* BB fixme parse for domain name here */
cFYI(1, "Username: %s", volume_info->username);
} else {
cifserror("No username specified");
/* In userspace mount helper we can get user name from alternate
locations such as env variables and files on disk */
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* this is needed for ASCII cp to Unicode converts */
if (volume_info->iocharset == NULL) {
/* load_nls_default cannot return null */
volume_info->local_nls = load_nls_default();
} else {
volume_info->local_nls = load_nls(volume_info->iocharset);
if (volume_info->local_nls == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "CIFS mount error: iocharset %s not found",
volume_info->iocharset);
rc = -ELIBACC;
goto out;
}
}
cifs_sb->local_nls = volume_info->local_nls;
/* get a reference to a tcp session */
srvTcp = cifs_get_tcp_session(volume_info);
if (IS_ERR(srvTcp)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(srvTcp);
goto out;
}
/* get a reference to a SMB session */
pSesInfo = cifs_get_smb_ses(srvTcp, volume_info);
if (IS_ERR(pSesInfo)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(pSesInfo);
pSesInfo = NULL;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
setup_cifs_sb(volume_info, cifs_sb);
if (pSesInfo->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_FILES)
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
else
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
/* BB FIXME fix time_gran to be larger for LANMAN sessions */
sb->s_time_gran = 100;
/* search for existing tcon to this server share */
tcon = cifs_get_tcon(pSesInfo, volume_info);
if (IS_ERR(tcon)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcon);
tcon = NULL;
goto remote_path_check;
}
/* do not care if following two calls succeed - informational */
if (!tcon->ipc) {
CIFSSMBQFSDeviceInfo(xid, tcon);
CIFSSMBQFSAttributeInfo(xid, tcon);
}
/* tell server which Unix caps we support */
if (tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX)
/* reset of caps checks mount to see if unix extensions
disabled for just this mount */
reset_cifs_unix_caps(xid, tcon, sb, volume_info);
else
tcon->unix_ext = 0; /* server does not support them */
/* convert forward to back slashes in prepath here if needed */
if ((cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS) == 0)
convert_delimiter(cifs_sb->prepath, CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
if ((tcon->unix_ext == 0) && (cifs_sb->rsize > (1024 * 127))) {
cifs_sb->rsize = 1024 * 127;
cFYI(DBG2, "no very large read support, rsize now 127K");
}
if (!(tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X))
cifs_sb->wsize = min(cifs_sb->wsize,
(tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE));
if (!(tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_READ_X))
cifs_sb->rsize = min(cifs_sb->rsize,
(tcon->ses->server->maxBuf - MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE));
remote_path_check:
/* check if a whole path (including prepath) is not remote */
if (!rc && cifs_sb->prepathlen && tcon) {
/* build_path_to_root works only when we have a valid tcon */
full_path = cifs_build_path_to_root(cifs_sb, tcon);
if (full_path == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
rc = is_path_accessible(xid, tcon, cifs_sb, full_path);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EREMOTE) {
kfree(full_path);
goto mount_fail_check;
}
kfree(full_path);
}
/* get referral if needed */
if (rc == -EREMOTE) {
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL
if (referral_walks_count > MAX_NESTED_LINKS) {
/*
* BB: when we implement proper loop detection,
* we will remove this check. But now we need it
* to prevent an indefinite loop if 'DFS tree' is
* misconfigured (i.e. has loops).
*/
rc = -ELOOP;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
/* convert forward to back slashes in prepath here if needed */
if ((cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS) == 0)
convert_delimiter(cifs_sb->prepath,
CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb));
full_path = build_unc_path_to_root(volume_info, cifs_sb);
if (IS_ERR(full_path)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(full_path);
goto mount_fail_check;
}
cFYI(1, "Getting referral for: %s", full_path);
rc = get_dfs_path(xid, pSesInfo , full_path + 1,
cifs_sb->local_nls, &num_referrals, &referrals,
cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_MAP_SPECIAL_CHR);
if (!rc && num_referrals > 0) {
char *fake_devname = NULL;
if (mount_data != mount_data_global)
kfree(mount_data);
mount_data = cifs_compose_mount_options(
cifs_sb->mountdata, full_path + 1,
referrals, &fake_devname);
free_dfs_info_array(referrals, num_referrals);
kfree(fake_devname);
kfree(full_path);
if (IS_ERR(mount_data)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(mount_data);
mount_data = NULL;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
if (tcon)
cifs_put_tcon(tcon);
else if (pSesInfo)
cifs_put_smb_ses(pSesInfo);
cleanup_volume_info(&volume_info);
referral_walks_count++;
FreeXid(xid);
goto try_mount_again;
}
#else /* No DFS support, return error on mount */
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
if (rc)
goto mount_fail_check;
/* now, hang the tcon off of the superblock */
tlink = kzalloc(sizeof *tlink, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tlink == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto mount_fail_check;
}
tlink->tl_uid = pSesInfo->linux_uid;
tlink->tl_tcon = tcon;
tlink->tl_time = jiffies;
set_bit(TCON_LINK_MASTER, &tlink->tl_flags);
set_bit(TCON_LINK_IN_TREE, &tlink->tl_flags);
cifs_sb->master_tlink = tlink;
spin_lock(&cifs_sb->tlink_tree_lock);
tlink_rb_insert(&cifs_sb->tlink_tree, tlink);
spin_unlock(&cifs_sb->tlink_tree_lock);
queue_delayed_work(system_nrt_wq, &cifs_sb->prune_tlinks,
TLINK_IDLE_EXPIRE);
mount_fail_check:
/* on error free sesinfo and tcon struct if needed */
if (rc) {
if (mount_data != mount_data_global)
kfree(mount_data);
/* If find_unc succeeded then rc == 0 so we can not end */
/* up accidentally freeing someone elses tcon struct */
if (tcon)
cifs_put_tcon(tcon);
else if (pSesInfo)
cifs_put_smb_ses(pSesInfo);
else
cifs_put_tcp_session(srvTcp);
goto out;
}
/* volume_info->password is freed above when existing session found
(in which case it is not needed anymore) but when new sesion is created
the password ptr is put in the new session structure (in which case the
password will be freed at unmount time) */
out:
/* zero out password before freeing */
cleanup_volume_info(&volume_info);
FreeXid(xid);
return rc;
}
| 325,540,286,319,854,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | connect.c | 61,138,473,515,121,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-3363 | The setup_cifs_sb function in fs/cifs/connect.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly handle DFS referrals, which allows remote CIFS servers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by placing a referral at the root of a share. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-3363 |
758 | linux | c85ce65ecac078ab1a1835c87c4a6319cf74660a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c85ce65ecac078ab1a1835c87c4a6319cf74660a | b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org | 1 | static void dma_rx(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int *slot)
{
const struct b43_dma_ops *ops = ring->ops;
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *rxhdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u16 len;
int err;
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
sync_descbuffer_for_cpu(ring, meta->dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
skb = meta->skb;
rxhdr = (struct b43_rxhdr_fw4 *)skb->data;
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
if (len == 0) {
int i = 0;
do {
udelay(2);
barrier();
len = le16_to_cpu(rxhdr->frame_len);
} while (len == 0 && i++ < 5);
if (unlikely(len == 0)) {
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
}
if (unlikely(b43_rx_buffer_is_poisoned(ring, skb))) {
/* Something went wrong with the DMA.
* The device did not touch the buffer and did not overwrite the poison. */
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: Dropping poisoned buffer.\n");
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
if (unlikely(len > ring->rx_buffersize)) {
/* The data did not fit into one descriptor buffer
* and is split over multiple buffers.
* This should never happen, as we try to allocate buffers
* big enough. So simply ignore this packet.
*/
int cnt = 0;
s32 tmp = len;
while (1) {
desc = ops->idx2desc(ring, *slot, &meta);
/* recycle the descriptor buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, meta->skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize);
*slot = next_slot(ring, *slot);
cnt++;
tmp -= ring->rx_buffersize;
if (tmp <= 0)
break;
}
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX buffer too small "
"(len: %u, buffer: %u, nr-dropped: %d)\n",
len, ring->rx_buffersize, cnt);
goto drop;
}
dmaaddr = meta->dmaaddr;
err = setup_rx_descbuffer(ring, desc, meta, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(err)) {
b43dbg(ring->dev->wl, "DMA RX: setup_rx_descbuffer() failed\n");
goto drop_recycle_buffer;
}
unmap_descbuffer(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
skb_put(skb, len + ring->frameoffset);
skb_pull(skb, ring->frameoffset);
b43_rx(ring->dev, skb, rxhdr);
drop:
return;
drop_recycle_buffer:
/* Poison and recycle the RX buffer. */
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
sync_descbuffer_for_device(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize);
}
| 104,346,933,262,330,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | dma.c | 2,031,226,938,724,601,400,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-3359 | The dma_rx function in drivers/net/wireless/b43/dma.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly allocate receive buffers, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted frame. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-3359 |
759 | linux | c2183d1e9b3f313dd8ba2b1b0197c8d9fb86a7ae | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2183d1e9b3f313dd8ba2b1b0197c8d9fb86a7ae | fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org | 1 | static int fuse_notify_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
struct fuse_notify_inval_entry_out outarg;
int err = -ENOMEM;
char *buf;
struct qstr name;
buf = kzalloc(FUSE_NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto err;
err = -EINVAL;
if (size < sizeof(outarg))
goto err;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg));
if (err)
goto err;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (outarg.namelen > FUSE_NAME_MAX)
goto err;
name.name = buf;
name.len = outarg.namelen;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1);
if (err)
goto err;
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
buf[outarg.namelen] = 0;
name.hash = full_name_hash(name.name, name.len);
down_read(&fc->killsb);
err = -ENOENT;
if (fc->sb)
err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc->sb, outarg.parent, &name);
up_read(&fc->killsb);
kfree(buf);
return err;
err:
kfree(buf);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
return err;
}
| 64,929,278,621,445,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | dev.c | 242,934,778,288,113,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-3353 | Buffer overflow in the fuse_notify_inval_entry function in fs/fuse/dev.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG_ON and system crash) by leveraging the ability to mount a FUSE filesystem. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-3353 |
840 | linux | 0d0138ebe24b94065580bd2601f8bb7eb6152f56 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0d0138ebe24b94065580bd2601f8bb7eb6152f56 | xtensa: prevent arbitrary read in ptrace
Prevent an arbitrary kernel read. Check the user pointer with access_ok()
before copying data in.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/EIO/EFAULT/]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Christian Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs)
{
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(child);
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs;
int ret = 0;
#if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS
/* Flush all coprocessors before we overwrite them. */
coprocessor_flush_all(ti);
coprocessor_release_all(ti);
ret |= __copy_from_user(&ti->xtregs_cp, &xtregs->cp0,
sizeof(xtregs_coprocessor_t));
#endif
ret |= __copy_from_user(®s->xtregs_opt, &xtregs->opt,
sizeof(xtregs->opt));
ret |= __copy_from_user(&ti->xtregs_user, &xtregs->user,
sizeof(xtregs->user));
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
| 313,347,442,751,777,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ptrace.c | 166,511,552,720,763,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-2707 | The ptrace_setxregs function in arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not validate user-space pointers, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory locations via a crafted PTRACE_SETXTREGS request. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2707 |
853 | linux | 2b472611a32a72f4a118c069c2d62a1a3f087afd | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2b472611a32a72f4a118c069c2d62a1a3f087afd | ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static struct rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct mm_slot *slot;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct rmap_item *rmap_item;
if (list_empty(&ksm_mm_head.mm_list))
return NULL;
slot = ksm_scan.mm_slot;
if (slot == &ksm_mm_head) {
/*
* A number of pages can hang around indefinitely on per-cpu
* pagevecs, raised page count preventing write_protect_page
* from merging them. Though it doesn't really matter much,
* it is puzzling to see some stuck in pages_volatile until
* other activity jostles them out, and they also prevented
* LTP's KSM test from succeeding deterministically; so drain
* them here (here rather than on entry to ksm_do_scan(),
* so we don't IPI too often when pages_to_scan is set low).
*/
lru_add_drain_all();
root_unstable_tree = RB_ROOT;
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next, struct mm_slot, mm_list);
ksm_scan.mm_slot = slot;
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
next_mm:
ksm_scan.address = 0;
ksm_scan.rmap_list = &slot->rmap_list;
}
mm = slot->mm;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (ksm_test_exit(mm))
vma = NULL;
else
vma = find_vma(mm, ksm_scan.address);
for (; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MERGEABLE))
continue;
if (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_start)
ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_start;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end;
while (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_end) {
if (ksm_test_exit(mm))
break;
*page = follow_page(vma, ksm_scan.address, FOLL_GET);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*page)) {
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
cond_resched();
continue;
}
if (PageAnon(*page) ||
page_trans_compound_anon(*page)) {
flush_anon_page(vma, *page, ksm_scan.address);
flush_dcache_page(*page);
rmap_item = get_next_rmap_item(slot,
ksm_scan.rmap_list, ksm_scan.address);
if (rmap_item) {
ksm_scan.rmap_list =
&rmap_item->rmap_list;
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
} else
put_page(*page);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return rmap_item;
}
put_page(*page);
ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE;
cond_resched();
}
}
if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) {
ksm_scan.address = 0;
ksm_scan.rmap_list = &slot->rmap_list;
}
/*
* Nuke all the rmap_items that are above this current rmap:
* because there were no VM_MERGEABLE vmas with such addresses.
*/
remove_trailing_rmap_items(slot, ksm_scan.rmap_list);
spin_lock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
ksm_scan.mm_slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next,
struct mm_slot, mm_list);
if (ksm_scan.address == 0) {
/*
* We've completed a full scan of all vmas, holding mmap_sem
* throughout, and found no VM_MERGEABLE: so do the same as
* __ksm_exit does to remove this mm from all our lists now.
* This applies either when cleaning up after __ksm_exit
* (but beware: we can reach here even before __ksm_exit),
* or when all VM_MERGEABLE areas have been unmapped (and
* mmap_sem then protects against race with MADV_MERGEABLE).
*/
hlist_del(&slot->link);
list_del(&slot->mm_list);
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
free_mm_slot(slot);
clear_bit(MMF_VM_MERGEABLE, &mm->flags);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmdrop(mm);
} else {
spin_unlock(&ksm_mmlist_lock);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
/* Repeat until we've completed scanning the whole list */
slot = ksm_scan.mm_slot;
if (slot != &ksm_mm_head)
goto next_mm;
ksm_scan.seqnr++;
return NULL;
}
| 257,503,113,012,619,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ksm.c | 89,371,547,132,209,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-362"
] | CVE-2011-2183 | Race condition in the scan_get_next_rmap_item function in mm/ksm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.3, when Kernel SamePage Merging (KSM) is enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2183 |
854 | linux | cae13fe4cc3f24820ffb990c09110626837e85d4 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cae13fe4cc3f24820ffb990c09110626837e85d4 | Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static bool ldm_frag_add (const u8 *data, int size, struct list_head *frags)
{
struct frag *f;
struct list_head *item;
int rec, num, group;
BUG_ON (!data || !frags);
if (size < 2 * VBLK_SIZE_HEAD) {
ldm_error("Value of size is to small.");
return false;
}
group = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
rec = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0C);
num = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0E);
if ((num < 1) || (num > 4)) {
ldm_error ("A VBLK claims to have %d parts.", num);
return false;
}
if (rec >= num) {
ldm_error("REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)", rec, num);
return false;
}
list_for_each (item, frags) {
f = list_entry (item, struct frag, list);
if (f->group == group)
goto found;
}
f = kmalloc (sizeof (*f) + size*num, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f) {
ldm_crit ("Out of memory.");
return false;
}
f->group = group;
f->num = num;
f->rec = rec;
f->map = 0xFF << num;
list_add_tail (&f->list, frags);
found:
if (f->map & (1 << rec)) {
ldm_error ("Duplicate VBLK, part %d.", rec);
f->map &= 0x7F; /* Mark the group as broken */
return false;
}
f->map |= (1 << rec);
data += VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
size -= VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
memcpy (f->data+rec*(size-VBLK_SIZE_HEAD)+VBLK_SIZE_HEAD, data, size);
return true;
}
| 164,142,535,356,774,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ldm.c | 72,782,463,213,063,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2011-2182 | The ldm_frag_add function in fs/partitions/ldm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.1 does not properly handle memory allocation for non-initial fragments, which might allow local users to conduct buffer overflow attacks, and gain privileges or obtain sensitive information, via a crafted LDM partition table. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2011-1017. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2182 |
855 | linux | 64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba | net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static void ip_expire(unsigned long arg)
{
struct ipq *qp;
struct net *net;
qp = container_of((struct inet_frag_queue *) arg, struct ipq, q);
net = container_of(qp->q.net, struct net, ipv4.frags);
spin_lock(&qp->q.lock);
if (qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto out;
ipq_kill(qp);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMTIMEOUT);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
if ((qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN) && qp->q.fragments != NULL) {
struct sk_buff *head = qp->q.fragments;
rcu_read_lock();
head->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, qp->iif);
if (!head->dev)
goto out_rcu_unlock;
/*
* Only search router table for the head fragment,
* when defraging timeout at PRE_ROUTING HOOK.
*/
if (qp->user == IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_IN && !skb_dst(head)) {
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(head);
int err = ip_route_input(head, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
iph->tos, head->dev);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
/*
* Only an end host needs to send an ICMP
* "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message, per RFC792.
*/
if (skb_rtable(head)->rt_type != RTN_LOCAL)
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
/* Send an ICMP "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message. */
icmp_send(head, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_FRAGTIME, 0);
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
out:
spin_unlock(&qp->q.lock);
ipq_put(qp);
}
| 133,776,853,164,301,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ip_fragment.c | 186,555,045,332,970,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2011-1927 | The ip_expire function in net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly construct ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED packets after a timeout, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via crafted fragmented packets. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1927 |
856 | linux | 764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97 | Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 1 | static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
struct super_block *s;
struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *root_info;
const char *err = "Getting sb failed";
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
int rc;
sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbi) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data);
if (rc) {
err = "Error parsing options";
goto out;
}
s = sget(fs_type, NULL, set_anon_super, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(s)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(s);
goto out;
}
s->s_flags = flags;
rc = bdi_setup_and_register(&sbi->bdi, "ecryptfs", BDI_CAP_MAP_COPY);
if (rc)
goto out1;
ecryptfs_set_superblock_private(s, sbi);
s->s_bdi = &sbi->bdi;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of sbi after that point */
sbi = NULL;
s->s_op = &ecryptfs_sops;
s->s_d_op = &ecryptfs_dops;
err = "Reading sb failed";
rc = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "kern_path() failed\n");
goto out1;
}
if (path.dentry->d_sb->s_type == &ecryptfs_fs_type) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_ERR "Mount on filesystem of type "
"eCryptfs explicitly disallowed due to "
"known incompatibilities\n");
goto out_free;
}
ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb);
s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes;
s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize;
s->s_magic = ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(path.dentry->d_inode, s);
rc = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_free;
s->s_root = d_alloc_root(inode);
if (!s->s_root) {
iput(inode);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
root_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!root_info)
goto out_free;
/* ->kill_sb() will take care of root_info */
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(s->s_root, root_info);
ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower(s->s_root, path.dentry);
ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower_mnt(s->s_root, path.mnt);
s->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
return dget(s->s_root);
out_free:
path_put(&path);
out1:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
out:
if (sbi) {
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat(&sbi->mount_crypt_stat);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, sbi);
}
printk(KERN_ERR "%s; rc = [%d]\n", err, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
| 178,146,217,980,549,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | main.c | 249,723,411,697,278,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2011-1833 | Race condition in the ecryptfs_mount function in fs/ecryptfs/main.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 allows local users to bypass intended file permissions via a mount.ecryptfs_private mount with a mismatched uid. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1833 |
867 | linux | 0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9 | ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | 1 | asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops,
const struct timespec __user *timeout)
{
struct sembuf *sops;
struct timespec local_timeout;
long err;
int i;
if (nsops < 1)
return -EINVAL;
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops) * nsops, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sops)
return -ENOMEM;
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op, &tsops->sem_op, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
tsops++;
}
if (timeout) {
/* copy this as well before changing domain protection */
err |= copy_from_user(&local_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout));
timeout = &local_timeout;
}
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_semtimedop(semid, sops, nsops, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
}
kfree(sops);
return err;
}
| 110,952,072,524,385,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sys_oabi-compat.c | 203,403,773,724,066,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2011-1759 | Integer overflow in the sys_oabi_semtimedop function in arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on the ARM platform, when CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is enabled, allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) by providing a crafted argument and leveraging a race condition. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1759 |
877 | linux | d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a | bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> | 1 | static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret, countersize;
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
struct ebt_replace tmp;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
if (!newinfo->entries) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_newinfo;
}
if (copy_from_user(
newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_entries;
}
ret = do_replace_finish(net, &tmp, newinfo);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
free_entries:
vfree(newinfo->entries);
free_newinfo:
vfree(newinfo);
return ret;
}
| 1,079,727,230,191,121,500,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ebtables.c | 56,335,259,935,410,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-1080 | The do_replace function in net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not ensure that a certain name field ends with a '\0' character, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability to replace a table, and then reading a modprobe command line. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1080 |
878 | linux | 43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573 | Bluetooth: bnep: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi> | 1 | static int bnep_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bnep_connlist_req cl;
struct bnep_connadd_req ca;
struct bnep_conndel_req cd;
struct bnep_conninfo ci;
struct socket *nsock;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case BNEPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
nsock = sockfd_lookup(ca.sock, &err);
if (!nsock)
return err;
if (nsock->sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
sockfd_put(nsock);
return -EBADFD;
}
err = bnep_add_connection(&ca, nsock);
if (!err) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
sockfd_put(nsock);
return err;
case BNEPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return bnep_del_connection(&cd);
case BNEPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = bnep_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case BNEPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = bnep_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 245,883,328,951,772,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | sock.c | 102,512,589,646,469,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2011-1079 | The bnep_sock_ioctl function in net/bluetooth/bnep/sock.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not ensure that a certain device field ends with a '\0' character, which allows local users to obtain potentially sensitive information from kernel stack memory, or cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash), via a BNEPCONNADD command. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1079 |
883 | linux | 6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287 | bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 1 | static int br_multicast_add_group(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
int err;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) ||
(port && port->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED))
goto out;
mp = br_multicast_new_group(br, port, group);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
if (IS_ERR(mp))
goto err;
if (!port) {
hlist_add_head(&mp->mglist, &br->mglist);
mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (p->port == port)
goto found;
if ((unsigned long)p->port < (unsigned long)port)
break;
}
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_ATOMIC);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(!p))
goto err;
p->addr = *group;
p->port = port;
p->next = *pp;
hlist_add_head(&p->mglist, &port->mglist);
setup_timer(&p->timer, br_multicast_port_group_expired,
(unsigned long)p);
setup_timer(&p->query_timer, br_multicast_port_group_query_expired,
(unsigned long)p);
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p);
found:
mod_timer(&p->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
out:
err = 0;
err:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
return err;
}
| 126,154,348,126,534,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | br_multicast.c | 322,560,698,151,282,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2011-0716 | The br_multicast_add_group function in net/bridge/br_multicast.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.38, when a certain Ethernet bridge configuration is used, allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and system crash) by sending IGMP packets to a local interface. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0716 |
884 | linux | 867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9 | ima: fix add LSM rule bug
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.
This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.
default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 1 | static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
{
int result;
if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal, args,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
return result;
}
| 289,210,770,505,321,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ima_policy.c | 269,496,230,888,596,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-264"
] | CVE-2011-0006 | The ima_lsm_rule_init function in security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37, when the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework is disabled, allows local users to bypass Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) rules in opportunistic circumstances by leveraging an administrator's addition of an IMA rule for LSM. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0006 |
885 | linux | 7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16 | fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+] | 1 | long fuse_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
struct fuse_ioctl_in inarg = {
.fh = ff->fh,
.cmd = cmd,
.arg = arg,
.flags = flags
};
struct fuse_ioctl_out outarg;
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct page **pages = NULL;
struct page *iov_page = NULL;
struct iovec *in_iov = NULL, *out_iov = NULL;
unsigned int in_iovs = 0, out_iovs = 0, num_pages = 0, max_pages;
size_t in_size, out_size, transferred;
int err;
/* assume all the iovs returned by client always fits in a page */
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct iovec) * FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV > PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
pages = kzalloc(sizeof(pages[0]) * FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ, GFP_KERNEL);
iov_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages || !iov_page)
goto out;
/*
* If restricted, initialize IO parameters as encoded in @cmd.
* RETRY from server is not allowed.
*/
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED)) {
struct iovec *iov = page_address(iov_page);
iov->iov_base = (void __user *)arg;
iov->iov_len = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
in_iov = iov;
in_iovs = 1;
}
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) {
out_iov = iov;
out_iovs = 1;
}
}
retry:
inarg.in_size = in_size = iov_length(in_iov, in_iovs);
inarg.out_size = out_size = iov_length(out_iov, out_iovs);
/*
* Out data can be used either for actual out data or iovs,
* make sure there always is at least one page.
*/
out_size = max_t(size_t, out_size, PAGE_SIZE);
max_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(max(in_size, out_size), PAGE_SIZE);
/* make sure there are enough buffer pages and init request with them */
err = -ENOMEM;
if (max_pages > FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ)
goto out;
while (num_pages < max_pages) {
pages[num_pages] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM);
if (!pages[num_pages])
goto out;
num_pages++;
}
req = fuse_get_req(fc);
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
err = PTR_ERR(req);
req = NULL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(req->pages, pages, sizeof(req->pages[0]) * num_pages);
req->num_pages = num_pages;
/* okay, let's send it to the client */
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_IOCTL;
req->in.h.nodeid = ff->nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 1;
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(inarg);
req->in.args[0].value = &inarg;
if (in_size) {
req->in.numargs++;
req->in.args[1].size = in_size;
req->in.argpages = 1;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, in_iov, in_iovs, in_size,
false);
if (err)
goto out;
}
req->out.numargs = 2;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(outarg);
req->out.args[0].value = &outarg;
req->out.args[1].size = out_size;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->out.argvar = 1;
fuse_request_send(fc, req);
err = req->out.h.error;
transferred = req->out.args[1].size;
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
req = NULL;
if (err)
goto out;
/* did it ask for retry? */
if (outarg.flags & FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY) {
char *vaddr;
/* no retry if in restricted mode */
err = -EIO;
if (!(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_UNRESTRICTED))
goto out;
in_iovs = outarg.in_iovs;
out_iovs = outarg.out_iovs;
/*
* Make sure things are in boundary, separate checks
* are to protect against overflow.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
if (in_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV ||
in_iovs + out_iovs > FUSE_IOCTL_MAX_IOV)
goto out;
vaddr = kmap_atomic(pages[0], KM_USER0);
err = fuse_copy_ioctl_iovec(page_address(iov_page), vaddr,
transferred, in_iovs + out_iovs,
(flags & FUSE_IOCTL_COMPAT) != 0);
kunmap_atomic(vaddr, KM_USER0);
if (err)
goto out;
in_iov = page_address(iov_page);
out_iov = in_iov + in_iovs;
goto retry;
}
err = -EIO;
if (transferred > inarg.out_size)
goto out;
err = fuse_ioctl_copy_user(pages, out_iov, out_iovs, transferred, true);
out:
if (req)
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
if (iov_page)
__free_page(iov_page);
while (num_pages)
__free_page(pages[--num_pages]);
kfree(pages);
return err ? err : outarg.result;
}
| 265,577,904,395,187,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | file.c | 190,320,006,487,793,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2010-4650 | Buffer overflow in the fuse_do_ioctl function in fs/fuse/file.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging the ability to operate a CUSE server. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4650 |
887 | linux | a2ae4cc9a16e211c8a128ba10d22a85431f093ab | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a2ae4cc9a16e211c8a128ba10d22a85431f093ab | inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure
If inotify_init is unable to allocate a new file for the new inotify
group we leak the new group. This patch drops the reference on the
group on file allocation failure.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 1 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(inotify_init1, int, flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct user_struct *user;
int ret;
/* Check the IN_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if (flags & ~(IN_CLOEXEC | IN_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
user = get_current_user();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&user->inotify_devs) >=
inotify_max_user_instances)) {
ret = -EMFILE;
goto out_free_uid;
}
/* fsnotify_obtain_group took a reference to group, we put this when we kill the file in the end */
group = inotify_new_group(user, inotify_max_queued_events);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(group);
goto out_free_uid;
}
atomic_inc(&user->inotify_devs);
ret = anon_inode_getfd("inotify", &inotify_fops, group,
O_RDONLY | flags);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
atomic_dec(&user->inotify_devs);
out_free_uid:
free_uid(user);
return ret;
}
| 321,635,802,954,137,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | inotify_user.c | 119,666,086,633,222,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2010-4250 | Memory leak in the inotify_init1 function in fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.37 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via vectors involving failed attempts to create files. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4250 |
888 | linux | f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a | wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun
When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
1) the minimum radiotap header size
2) the space for extended bitmaps
The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.
Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> | 1 | int ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init(
struct ieee80211_radiotap_iterator *iterator,
struct ieee80211_radiotap_header *radiotap_header,
int max_length, const struct ieee80211_radiotap_vendor_namespaces *vns)
{
/* Linux only supports version 0 radiotap format */
if (radiotap_header->it_version)
return -EINVAL;
/* sanity check for allowed length and radiotap length field */
if (max_length < get_unaligned_le16(&radiotap_header->it_len))
return -EINVAL;
iterator->_rtheader = radiotap_header;
iterator->_max_length = get_unaligned_le16(&radiotap_header->it_len);
iterator->_arg_index = 0;
iterator->_bitmap_shifter = get_unaligned_le32(&radiotap_header->it_present);
iterator->_arg = (uint8_t *)radiotap_header + sizeof(*radiotap_header);
iterator->_reset_on_ext = 0;
iterator->_next_bitmap = &radiotap_header->it_present;
iterator->_next_bitmap++;
iterator->_vns = vns;
iterator->current_namespace = &radiotap_ns;
iterator->is_radiotap_ns = 1;
/* find payload start allowing for extended bitmap(s) */
if (iterator->_bitmap_shifter & (1<<IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT)) {
while (get_unaligned_le32(iterator->_arg) &
(1 << IEEE80211_RADIOTAP_EXT)) {
iterator->_arg += sizeof(uint32_t);
/*
* check for insanity where the present bitmaps
* keep claiming to extend up to or even beyond the
* stated radiotap header length
*/
if ((unsigned long)iterator->_arg -
(unsigned long)iterator->_rtheader >
(unsigned long)iterator->_max_length)
return -EINVAL;
}
iterator->_arg += sizeof(uint32_t);
/*
* no need to check again for blowing past stated radiotap
* header length, because ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_next
* checks it before it is dereferenced
*/
}
iterator->this_arg = iterator->_arg;
/* we are all initialized happily */
return 0;
}
| 202,083,656,134,031,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | radiotap.c | 86,018,721,253,196,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7027 | The ieee80211_radiotap_iterator_init function in net/wireless/radiotap.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.7 does not check whether a frame contains any data outside of the header, which might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) via a crafted header. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7027 |
892 | FFmpeg | fe448cd28d674c3eff3072552eae366d0b659ce9 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/fe448cd28d674c3eff3072552eae366d0b659ce9 | avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int jpeg2000_decode_tile(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000Tile *tile,
AVFrame *picture)
{
int compno, reslevelno, bandno;
int x, y;
uint8_t *line;
Jpeg2000T1Context t1;
/* Loop on tile components */
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = tile->comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = tile->codsty + compno;
/* Loop on resolution levels */
for (reslevelno = 0; reslevelno < codsty->nreslevels2decode; reslevelno++) {
Jpeg2000ResLevel *rlevel = comp->reslevel + reslevelno;
/* Loop on bands */
for (bandno = 0; bandno < rlevel->nbands; bandno++) {
int nb_precincts, precno;
Jpeg2000Band *band = rlevel->band + bandno;
int cblkno = 0, bandpos;
bandpos = bandno + (reslevelno > 0);
if (band->coord[0][0] == band->coord[0][1] ||
band->coord[1][0] == band->coord[1][1])
continue;
nb_precincts = rlevel->num_precincts_x * rlevel->num_precincts_y;
/* Loop on precincts */
for (precno = 0; precno < nb_precincts; precno++) {
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
/* Loop on codeblocks */
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < prec->nb_codeblocks_width * prec->nb_codeblocks_height; cblkno++) {
int x, y;
Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk = prec->cblk + cblkno;
decode_cblk(s, codsty, &t1, cblk,
cblk->coord[0][1] - cblk->coord[0][0],
cblk->coord[1][1] - cblk->coord[1][0],
bandpos);
x = cblk->coord[0][0];
y = cblk->coord[1][0];
if (codsty->transform == FF_DWT97)
dequantization_float(x, y, cblk, comp, &t1, band);
else
dequantization_int(x, y, cblk, comp, &t1, band);
} /* end cblk */
} /*end prec */
} /* end band */
} /* end reslevel */
/* inverse DWT */
ff_dwt_decode(&comp->dwt, codsty->transform == FF_DWT97 ? (void*)comp->f_data : (void*)comp->i_data);
} /*end comp */
/* inverse MCT transformation */
if (tile->codsty[0].mct)
mct_decode(s, tile);
if (s->cdef[0] < 0) {
for (x = 0; x < s->ncomponents; x++)
s->cdef[x] = x + 1;
if ((s->ncomponents & 1) == 0)
s->cdef[s->ncomponents-1] = 0;
}
if (s->precision <= 8) {
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = tile->comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = tile->codsty + compno;
float *datap = comp->f_data;
int32_t *i_datap = comp->i_data;
int cbps = s->cbps[compno];
int w = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][1] - s->image_offset_x;
int planar = !!picture->data[2];
int pixelsize = planar ? 1 : s->ncomponents;
int plane = 0;
if (planar)
plane = s->cdef[compno] ? s->cdef[compno]-1 : (s->ncomponents-1);
y = tile->comp[compno].coord[1][0] - s->image_offset_y;
line = picture->data[plane] + y * picture->linesize[plane];
for (; y < tile->comp[compno].coord[1][1] - s->image_offset_y; y += s->cdy[compno]) {
uint8_t *dst;
x = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][0] - s->image_offset_x;
dst = line + x * pixelsize + compno*!planar;
if (codsty->transform == FF_DWT97) {
for (; x < w; x += s->cdx[compno]) {
int val = lrintf(*datap) + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
*dst = val << (8 - cbps);
datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
} else {
for (; x < w; x += s->cdx[compno]) {
int val = *i_datap + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
*dst = val << (8 - cbps);
i_datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
}
line += picture->linesize[plane];
}
}
} else {
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = tile->comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = tile->codsty + compno;
float *datap = comp->f_data;
int32_t *i_datap = comp->i_data;
uint16_t *linel;
int cbps = s->cbps[compno];
int w = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][1] - s->image_offset_x;
int planar = !!picture->data[2];
int pixelsize = planar ? 1 : s->ncomponents;
int plane = 0;
if (planar)
plane = s->cdef[compno] ? s->cdef[compno]-1 : (s->ncomponents-1);
y = tile->comp[compno].coord[1][0] - s->image_offset_y;
linel = (uint16_t *)picture->data[plane] + y * (picture->linesize[plane] >> 1);
for (; y < tile->comp[compno].coord[1][1] - s->image_offset_y; y += s->cdy[compno]) {
uint16_t *dst;
x = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][0] - s->image_offset_x;
dst = linel + (x * pixelsize + compno*!planar);
if (codsty->transform == FF_DWT97) {
for (; x < w; x += s-> cdx[compno]) {
int val = lrintf(*datap) + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
/* align 12 bit values in little-endian mode */
*dst = val << (16 - cbps);
datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
} else {
for (; x < w; x += s-> cdx[compno]) {
int val = *i_datap + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
/* align 12 bit values in little-endian mode */
*dst = val << (16 - cbps);
i_datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
}
linel += picture->linesize[plane] >> 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 128,636,664,101,031,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | jpeg2000dec.c | 193,978,670,820,427,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7024 | The jpeg2000_decode_tile function in libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not consider the component number in certain calculations, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7024 |
893 | FFmpeg | f31011e9abfb2ae75bb32bc44e2c34194c8dc40a | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/f31011e9abfb2ae75bb32bc44e2c34194c8dc40a | avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | int ff_combine_frame(ParseContext *pc, int next, const uint8_t **buf, int *buf_size)
{
if(pc->overread){
av_dlog(NULL, "overread %d, state:%X next:%d index:%d o_index:%d\n",
pc->overread, pc->state, next, pc->index, pc->overread_index);
av_dlog(NULL, "%X %X %X %X\n", (*buf)[0], (*buf)[1], (*buf)[2], (*buf)[3]);
}
/* Copy overread bytes from last frame into buffer. */
for(; pc->overread>0; pc->overread--){
pc->buffer[pc->index++]= pc->buffer[pc->overread_index++];
}
/* flush remaining if EOF */
if(!*buf_size && next == END_NOT_FOUND){
next= 0;
}
pc->last_index= pc->index;
/* copy into buffer end return */
if(next == END_NOT_FOUND){
void* new_buffer = av_fast_realloc(pc->buffer, &pc->buffer_size, (*buf_size) + pc->index + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if(!new_buffer)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
pc->buffer = new_buffer;
memcpy(&pc->buffer[pc->index], *buf, *buf_size);
pc->index += *buf_size;
return -1;
}
*buf_size=
pc->overread_index= pc->index + next;
/* append to buffer */
if(pc->index){
void* new_buffer = av_fast_realloc(pc->buffer, &pc->buffer_size, next + pc->index + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if(!new_buffer)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
pc->buffer = new_buffer;
if (next > -FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE)
memcpy(&pc->buffer[pc->index], *buf,
next + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
pc->index = 0;
*buf= pc->buffer;
}
/* store overread bytes */
for(;next < 0; next++){
pc->state = (pc->state<<8) | pc->buffer[pc->last_index + next];
pc->state64 = (pc->state64<<8) | pc->buffer[pc->last_index + next];
pc->overread++;
}
if(pc->overread){
av_dlog(NULL, "overread %d, state:%X next:%d index:%d o_index:%d\n",
pc->overread, pc->state, next, pc->index, pc->overread_index);
av_dlog(NULL, "%X %X %X %X\n", (*buf)[0], (*buf)[1],(*buf)[2],(*buf)[3]);
}
return 0;
}
| 222,309,056,610,865,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | parser.c | 161,485,228,604,924,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7023 | The ff_combine_frame function in libavcodec/parser.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly handle certain memory-allocation errors, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7023 |
894 | FFmpeg | e07ac727c1cc9eed39e7f9117c97006f719864bd | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/e07ac727c1cc9eed39e7f9117c97006f719864bd | avcodec/g2meet: Fix framebuf size
Currently the code can in some cases draw tiles that hang outside the
allocated buffer. This patch increases the buffer size to avoid out
of array accesses. An alternative would be to fail if such tiles are
encountered.
I do not know if any valid files use such hanging tiles.
Fixes Ticket2971
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int g2m_init_buffers(G2MContext *c)
{
int aligned_height;
if (!c->framebuf || c->old_width < c->width || c->old_height < c->height) {
c->framebuf_stride = FFALIGN(c->width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->height, 16);
av_free(c->framebuf);
c->framebuf = av_mallocz(c->framebuf_stride * aligned_height);
if (!c->framebuf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
c->old_tile_w < c->tile_width ||
c->old_tile_h < c->tile_height) {
c->tile_stride = FFALIGN(c->tile_width, 16) * 3;
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->tile_height, 16);
av_free(c->synth_tile);
av_free(c->jpeg_tile);
av_free(c->kempf_buf);
av_free(c->kempf_flags);
c->synth_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->jpeg_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->kempf_buf = av_mallocz((c->tile_width + 1) * aligned_height
+ FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
c->kempf_flags = av_mallocz( c->tile_width * aligned_height);
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
!c->kempf_buf || !c->kempf_flags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
return 0;
}
| 255,877,059,988,693,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | g2meet.c | 290,068,666,600,478,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7022 | The g2m_init_buffers function in libavcodec/g2meet.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly allocate memory for tiles, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Go2Webinar data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7022 |
895 | FFmpeg | cdd5df8189ff1537f7abe8defe971f80602cc2d2 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/cdd5df8189ff1537f7abe8defe971f80602cc2d2 | avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *buf)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int64_t delta;
int i, ret;
s->frames_in++;
/* discard frames until we get the first timestamp */
if (s->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (buf->pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (s->start_time != DBL_MAX && s->start_time != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
double first_pts = s->start_time * AV_TIME_BASE;
first_pts = FFMIN(FFMAX(first_pts, INT64_MIN), INT64_MAX);
s->first_pts = s->pts = av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
inlink->time_base);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Set first pts to (in:%"PRId64" out:%"PRId64")\n",
s->first_pts, av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
outlink->time_base));
} else {
s->first_pts = s->pts = buf->pts;
}
} else {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding initial frame(s) with no "
"timestamp.\n");
av_frame_free(&buf);
s->drop++;
}
return 0;
}
/* now wait for the next timestamp */
if (buf->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
return write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
}
/* number of output frames */
delta = av_rescale_q_rnd(buf->pts - s->pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base, s->rounding);
if (delta < 1) {
/* drop the frame and everything buffered except the first */
AVFrame *tmp;
int drop = av_fifo_size(s->fifo)/sizeof(AVFrame*);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Dropping %d frame(s).\n", drop);
s->drop += drop;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), NULL);
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, tmp);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
/* can output >= 1 frames */
for (i = 0; i < delta; i++) {
AVFrame *buf_out;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &buf_out, sizeof(buf_out), NULL);
/* duplicate the frame if needed */
if (!av_fifo_size(s->fifo) && i < delta - 1) {
AVFrame *dup = av_frame_clone(buf_out);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Duplicating frame.\n");
if (dup)
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, dup);
else
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf_out);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->dup++;
}
buf_out->pts = av_rescale_q(s->first_pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base) + s->frames_out;
if ((ret = ff_filter_frame(outlink, buf_out)) < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->frames_out++;
}
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
s->pts = s->first_pts + av_rescale_q(s->frames_out, outlink->time_base, inlink->time_base);
return ret;
}
| 40,209,124,885,848,567,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | vf_fps.c | 87,163,599,502,171,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-399"
] | CVE-2013-7021 | The filter_frame function in libavfilter/vf_fps.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly ensure the availability of FIFO content, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (double free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7021 |
896 | FFmpeg | b05cd1ea7e45a836f7f6071a716c38bb30326e0f | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/b05cd1ea7e45a836f7f6071a716c38bb30326e0f | ffv1dec: Check bits_per_raw_sample and colorspace for equality in ver 0/1 headers
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int read_header(FFV1Context *f)
{
uint8_t state[CONTEXT_SIZE];
int i, j, context_count = -1; //-1 to avoid warning
RangeCoder *const c = &f->slice_context[0]->c;
memset(state, 128, sizeof(state));
if (f->version < 2) {
int chroma_planes, chroma_h_shift, chroma_v_shift, transparency;
unsigned v= get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (v >= 2) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid version %d in ver01 header\n", v);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
f->version = v;
f->ac = f->avctx->coder_type = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->ac > 1) {
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
f->state_transition[i] = get_symbol(c, state, 1) + c->one_state[i];
}
f->colorspace = get_symbol(c, state, 0); //YUV cs type
if (f->version > 0)
f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
chroma_planes = get_rac(c, state);
chroma_h_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
chroma_v_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
transparency = get_rac(c, state);
if (f->plane_count) {
if ( chroma_planes != f->chroma_planes
|| chroma_h_shift!= f->chroma_h_shift
|| chroma_v_shift!= f->chroma_v_shift
|| transparency != f->transparency) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid change of global parameters\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
f->chroma_planes = chroma_planes;
f->chroma_h_shift = chroma_h_shift;
f->chroma_v_shift = chroma_v_shift;
f->transparency = transparency;
f->plane_count = 2 + f->transparency;
}
if (f->colorspace == 0) {
if (!f->transparency && !f->chroma_planes) {
if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8;
else
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16;
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample<=8 && !f->transparency) {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P; break;
case 0x01: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P; break;
case 0x20: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P; break;
case 0x22: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8 && f->transparency) {
switch(16*f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
}
} else if (f->colorspace == 1) {
if (f->chroma_h_shift || f->chroma_v_shift) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"chroma subsampling not supported in this colorspace\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
if ( f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 14)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14;
else
if (f->transparency) f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB32;
else f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_0RGB32;
} else {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "colorspace not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
av_dlog(f->avctx, "%d %d %d\n",
f->chroma_h_shift, f->chroma_v_shift, f->avctx->pix_fmt);
if (f->version < 2) {
context_count = read_quant_tables(c, f->quant_table);
if (context_count < 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "read_quant_table error\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (f->version < 3) {
f->slice_count = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
} else {
const uint8_t *p = c->bytestream_end;
for (f->slice_count = 0;
f->slice_count < MAX_SLICES && 3 < p - c->bytestream_start;
f->slice_count++) {
int trailer = 3 + 5*!!f->ec;
int size = AV_RB24(p-trailer);
if (size + trailer > p - c->bytestream_start)
break;
p -= size + trailer;
}
}
if (f->slice_count > (unsigned)MAX_SLICES || f->slice_count <= 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "slice count %d is invalid\n", f->slice_count);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (j = 0; j < f->slice_count; j++) {
FFV1Context *fs = f->slice_context[j];
fs->ac = f->ac;
fs->packed_at_lsb = f->packed_at_lsb;
fs->slice_damaged = 0;
if (f->version == 2) {
fs->slice_x = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->width ;
fs->slice_y = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->height;
fs->slice_width = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->width + fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->height + fs->slice_y;
fs->slice_x /= f->num_h_slices;
fs->slice_y /= f->num_v_slices;
fs->slice_width = fs->slice_width / f->num_h_slices - fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = fs->slice_height / f->num_v_slices - fs->slice_y;
if ((unsigned)fs->slice_width > f->width ||
(unsigned)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if ( (unsigned)fs->slice_x + (uint64_t)fs->slice_width > f->width
|| (unsigned)fs->slice_y + (uint64_t)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < f->plane_count; i++) {
PlaneContext *const p = &fs->plane[i];
if (f->version == 2) {
int idx = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (idx > (unsigned)f->quant_table_count) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"quant_table_index out of range\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
p->quant_table_index = idx;
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_tables[idx],
sizeof(p->quant_table));
context_count = f->context_count[idx];
} else {
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_table, sizeof(p->quant_table));
}
if (f->version <= 2) {
av_assert0(context_count >= 0);
if (p->context_count < context_count) {
av_freep(&p->state);
av_freep(&p->vlc_state);
}
p->context_count = context_count;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 145,906,591,874,544,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ffv1dec.c | 84,436,554,014,232,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7020 | The read_header function in libavcodec/ffv1dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly enforce certain bit-count and colorspace constraints, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted FFV1 data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7020 |
897 | FFmpeg | a1b9004b768bef606ee98d417bceb9392ceb788d | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/a1b9004b768bef606ee98d417bceb9392ceb788d | avcodec/jpeg2000dec: fix context consistency with too large lowres
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2898
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int get_cox(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *c)
{
uint8_t byte;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* nreslevels = number of resolution levels
= number of decomposition level +1 */
c->nreslevels = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) + 1;
if (c->nreslevels >= JPEG2000_MAX_RESLEVELS) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "nreslevels %d is invalid\n", c->nreslevels);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* compute number of resolution levels to decode */
if (c->nreslevels < s->reduction_factor)
c->nreslevels2decode = 1;
else
c->nreslevels2decode = c->nreslevels - s->reduction_factor;
c->log2_cblk_width = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk width
c->log2_cblk_height = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk height
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 10 || c->log2_cblk_height > 10 ||
c->log2_cblk_width + c->log2_cblk_height > 12) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cblk size invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 6 || c->log2_cblk_height > 6) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "cblk size > 64");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
c->cblk_style = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (c->cblk_style != 0) { // cblk style
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "extra cblk styles %X\n", c->cblk_style);
}
c->transform = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g); // DWT transformation type
/* set integer 9/7 DWT in case of BITEXACT flag */
if ((s->avctx->flags & CODEC_FLAG_BITEXACT) && (c->transform == FF_DWT97))
c->transform = FF_DWT97_INT;
if (c->csty & JPEG2000_CSTY_PREC) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->nreslevels; i++) {
byte = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
c->log2_prec_widths[i] = byte & 0x0F; // precinct PPx
c->log2_prec_heights[i] = (byte >> 4) & 0x0F; // precinct PPy
}
} else {
memset(c->log2_prec_widths , 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_widths ));
memset(c->log2_prec_heights, 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_heights));
}
return 0;
}
| 284,258,088,157,399,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | jpeg2000dec.c | 278,171,418,550,605,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-7019 | The get_cox function in libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly validate the reduction factor, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7019 |
901 | FFmpeg | 8bb11c3ca77b52e05a9ed1496a65f8a76e6e2d8f | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/8bb11c3ca77b52e05a9ed1496a65f8a76e6e2d8f | avcodec/jpeg2000dec: Check cdx/y values more carefully
Some invalid values where not handled correctly in the later pixel
format matching code.
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2848
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <ami_stuff@o2.pl>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int get_siz(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int i;
int ncomponents;
uint32_t log2_chroma_wh = 0;
const enum AVPixelFormat *possible_fmts = NULL;
int possible_fmts_nb = 0;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 36)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->avctx->profile = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // Rsiz
s->width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Width
s->height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Height
s->image_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // X0Siz
s->image_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Y0Siz
s->tile_width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XTSiz
s->tile_height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YTSiz
s->tile_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XT0Siz
s->tile_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YT0Siz
ncomponents = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // CSiz
if (ncomponents <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid number of components: %d\n",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (ncomponents > 4) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Support for %d components",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->ncomponents = ncomponents;
if (s->tile_width <= 0 || s->tile_height <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid tile dimension %dx%d.\n",
s->tile_width, s->tile_height);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 3 * s->ncomponents)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < s->ncomponents; i++) { // Ssiz_i XRsiz_i, YRsiz_i
uint8_t x = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cbps[i] = (x & 0x7f) + 1;
s->precision = FFMAX(s->cbps[i], s->precision);
s->sgnd[i] = !!(x & 0x80);
s->cdx[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cdy[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (!s->cdx[i] || !s->cdy[i]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample seperation\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
log2_chroma_wh |= s->cdy[i] >> 1 << i * 4 | s->cdx[i] >> 1 << i * 4 + 2;
}
s->numXtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->width - s->tile_offset_x, s->tile_width);
s->numYtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->height - s->tile_offset_y, s->tile_height);
if (s->numXtiles * (uint64_t)s->numYtiles > INT_MAX/sizeof(*s->tile)) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->tile = av_mallocz_array(s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles, sizeof(*s->tile));
if (!s->tile) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; i++) {
Jpeg2000Tile *tile = s->tile + i;
tile->comp = av_mallocz(s->ncomponents * sizeof(*tile->comp));
if (!tile->comp)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
/* compute image size with reduction factor */
s->avctx->width = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->width - s->image_offset_x,
s->reduction_factor);
s->avctx->height = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->height - s->image_offset_y,
s->reduction_factor);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_2K ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_4K) {
possible_fmts = xyz_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(xyz_pix_fmts);
} else {
switch (s->colour_space) {
case 16:
possible_fmts = rgb_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(rgb_pix_fmts);
break;
case 17:
possible_fmts = gray_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(gray_pix_fmts);
break;
case 18:
possible_fmts = yuv_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(yuv_pix_fmts);
break;
default:
possible_fmts = all_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(all_pix_fmts);
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < possible_fmts_nb; ++i) {
if (pix_fmt_match(possible_fmts[i], ncomponents, s->precision, log2_chroma_wh, s->pal8)) {
s->avctx->pix_fmt = possible_fmts[i];
break;
}
}
if (s->avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown pix_fmt, profile: %d, colour_space: %d, "
"components: %d, precision: %d, "
"cdx[1]: %d, cdy[1]: %d, cdx[2]: %d, cdy[2]: %d\n",
s->avctx->profile, s->colour_space, ncomponents, s->precision,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[2] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[2] : 0);
}
return 0;
}
| 101,435,318,398,182,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | jpeg2000dec.c | 304,981,785,298,091,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7016 | The get_siz function in libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not ensure the expected sample separation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7016 |
902 | FFmpeg | 880c73cd76109697447fbfbaa8e5ee5683309446 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/880c73cd76109697447fbfbaa8e5ee5683309446 | avcodec/flashsv: check diff_start/height
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2844
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int flashsv_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
FlashSVContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int h_blocks, v_blocks, h_part, v_part, i, j, ret;
GetBitContext gb;
int last_blockwidth = s->block_width;
int last_blockheight= s->block_height;
/* no supplementary picture */
if (buf_size == 0)
return 0;
if (buf_size < 4)
return -1;
init_get_bits(&gb, avpkt->data, buf_size * 8);
/* start to parse the bitstream */
s->block_width = 16 * (get_bits(&gb, 4) + 1);
s->image_width = get_bits(&gb, 12);
s->block_height = 16 * (get_bits(&gb, 4) + 1);
s->image_height = get_bits(&gb, 12);
if ( last_blockwidth != s->block_width
|| last_blockheight!= s->block_height)
av_freep(&s->blocks);
if (s->ver == 2) {
skip_bits(&gb, 6);
if (get_bits1(&gb)) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "iframe");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (get_bits1(&gb)) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Custom palette");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
}
/* calculate number of blocks and size of border (partial) blocks */
h_blocks = s->image_width / s->block_width;
h_part = s->image_width % s->block_width;
v_blocks = s->image_height / s->block_height;
v_part = s->image_height % s->block_height;
/* the block size could change between frames, make sure the buffer
* is large enough, if not, get a larger one */
if (s->block_size < s->block_width * s->block_height) {
int tmpblock_size = 3 * s->block_width * s->block_height;
s->tmpblock = av_realloc(s->tmpblock, tmpblock_size);
if (!s->tmpblock) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't allocate decompression buffer.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (s->ver == 2) {
s->deflate_block_size = calc_deflate_block_size(tmpblock_size);
if (s->deflate_block_size <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't determine deflate buffer size.\n");
return -1;
}
s->deflate_block = av_realloc(s->deflate_block, s->deflate_block_size);
if (!s->deflate_block) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Can't allocate deflate buffer.\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
}
s->block_size = s->block_width * s->block_height;
/* initialize the image size once */
if (avctx->width == 0 && avctx->height == 0) {
avcodec_set_dimensions(avctx, s->image_width, s->image_height);
}
/* check for changes of image width and image height */
if (avctx->width != s->image_width || avctx->height != s->image_height) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Frame width or height differs from first frame!\n");
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "fh = %d, fv %d vs ch = %d, cv = %d\n",
avctx->height, avctx->width, s->image_height, s->image_width);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* we care for keyframes only in Screen Video v2 */
s->is_keyframe = (avpkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY) && (s->ver == 2);
if (s->is_keyframe) {
s->keyframedata = av_realloc(s->keyframedata, avpkt->size);
memcpy(s->keyframedata, avpkt->data, avpkt->size);
}
if(s->ver == 2 && !s->blocks)
s->blocks = av_mallocz((v_blocks + !!v_part) * (h_blocks + !!h_part)
* sizeof(s->blocks[0]));
av_dlog(avctx, "image: %dx%d block: %dx%d num: %dx%d part: %dx%d\n",
s->image_width, s->image_height, s->block_width, s->block_height,
h_blocks, v_blocks, h_part, v_part);
if ((ret = ff_reget_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
/* loop over all block columns */
for (j = 0; j < v_blocks + (v_part ? 1 : 0); j++) {
int y_pos = j * s->block_height; // vertical position in frame
int cur_blk_height = (j < v_blocks) ? s->block_height : v_part;
/* loop over all block rows */
for (i = 0; i < h_blocks + (h_part ? 1 : 0); i++) {
int x_pos = i * s->block_width; // horizontal position in frame
int cur_blk_width = (i < h_blocks) ? s->block_width : h_part;
int has_diff = 0;
/* get the size of the compressed zlib chunk */
int size = get_bits(&gb, 16);
s->color_depth = 0;
s->zlibprime_curr = 0;
s->zlibprime_prev = 0;
s->diff_start = 0;
s->diff_height = cur_blk_height;
if (8 * size > get_bits_left(&gb)) {
av_frame_unref(&s->frame);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->ver == 2 && size) {
skip_bits(&gb, 3);
s->color_depth = get_bits(&gb, 2);
has_diff = get_bits1(&gb);
s->zlibprime_curr = get_bits1(&gb);
s->zlibprime_prev = get_bits1(&gb);
if (s->color_depth != 0 && s->color_depth != 2) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"%dx%d invalid color depth %d\n", i, j, s->color_depth);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (has_diff) {
if (!s->keyframe) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"inter frame without keyframe\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->diff_start = get_bits(&gb, 8);
s->diff_height = get_bits(&gb, 8);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"%dx%d diff start %d height %d\n",
i, j, s->diff_start, s->diff_height);
size -= 2;
}
if (s->zlibprime_prev)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%dx%d zlibprime_prev\n", i, j);
if (s->zlibprime_curr) {
int col = get_bits(&gb, 8);
int row = get_bits(&gb, 8);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%dx%d zlibprime_curr %dx%d\n", i, j, col, row);
size -= 2;
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "zlibprime_curr");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (!s->blocks && (s->zlibprime_curr || s->zlibprime_prev)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "no data available for zlib "
"priming\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size--; // account for flags byte
}
if (has_diff) {
int k;
int off = (s->image_height - y_pos - 1) * s->frame.linesize[0];
for (k = 0; k < cur_blk_height; k++)
memcpy(s->frame.data[0] + off - k*s->frame.linesize[0] + x_pos*3,
s->keyframe + off - k*s->frame.linesize[0] + x_pos*3,
cur_blk_width * 3);
}
/* skip unchanged blocks, which have size 0 */
if (size) {
if (flashsv_decode_block(avctx, avpkt, &gb, size,
cur_blk_width, cur_blk_height,
x_pos, y_pos,
i + j * (h_blocks + !!h_part)))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"error in decompression of block %dx%d\n", i, j);
}
}
}
if (s->is_keyframe && s->ver == 2) {
if (!s->keyframe) {
s->keyframe = av_malloc(s->frame.linesize[0] * avctx->height);
if (!s->keyframe) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot allocate image data\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
memcpy(s->keyframe, s->frame.data[0], s->frame.linesize[0] * avctx->height);
}
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(data, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
*got_frame = 1;
if ((get_bits_count(&gb) / 8) != buf_size)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "buffer not fully consumed (%d != %d)\n",
buf_size, (get_bits_count(&gb) / 8));
/* report that the buffer was completely consumed */
return buf_size;
}
| 269,767,046,134,726,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | flashsv.c | 325,814,377,149,258,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-20"
] | CVE-2013-7015 | The flashsv_decode_frame function in libavcodec/flashsv.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly validate a certain height value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash Screen Video data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7015 |
903 | FFmpeg | 86736f59d6a527d8bc807d09b93f971c0fe0bb07 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/86736f59d6a527d8bc807d09b93f971c0fe0bb07 | avcodec/pngdsp: fix (un)signed type in end comparission
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2919
Found_by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
| 13,327,716,502,808,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | pngdsp.c | 272,561,586,882,969,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-7014 | Integer signedness error in the add_bytes_l2_c function in libavcodec/pngdsp.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted PNG data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7014 |
904 | FFmpeg | 821a5938d100458f4d09d634041b05c860554ce0 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/821a5938d100458f4d09d634041b05c860554ce0 | avcodec/g2meet: Fix order of align and pixel size multiplication.
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2922
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int g2m_init_buffers(G2MContext *c)
{
int aligned_height;
if (!c->framebuf || c->old_width < c->width || c->old_height < c->height) {
c->framebuf_stride = FFALIGN(c->width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->height, 16);
av_free(c->framebuf);
c->framebuf = av_mallocz(c->framebuf_stride * aligned_height);
if (!c->framebuf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
c->old_tile_w < c->tile_width ||
c->old_tile_h < c->tile_height) {
c->tile_stride = FFALIGN(c->tile_width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->tile_height, 16);
av_free(c->synth_tile);
av_free(c->jpeg_tile);
av_free(c->kempf_buf);
av_free(c->kempf_flags);
c->synth_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->jpeg_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->kempf_buf = av_mallocz((c->tile_width + 1) * aligned_height
+ FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
c->kempf_flags = av_mallocz( c->tile_width * aligned_height);
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
!c->kempf_buf || !c->kempf_flags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
return 0;
}
| 230,706,319,375,448,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | g2meet.c | 321,002,839,552,375,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-189"
] | CVE-2013-7013 | The g2m_init_buffers function in libavcodec/g2meet.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 uses an incorrect ordering of arithmetic operations, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Go2Webinar data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7013 |
905 | FFmpeg | 780669ef7c23c00836a24921fcc6b03be2b8ca4a | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/780669ef7c23c00836a24921fcc6b03be2b8ca4a | avcodec/jpeg2000dec: non zero image offsets are not supported
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket3080
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int get_siz(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int i;
int ncomponents;
uint32_t log2_chroma_wh = 0;
const enum AVPixelFormat *possible_fmts = NULL;
int possible_fmts_nb = 0;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 36)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
s->avctx->profile = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // Rsiz
s->width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Width
s->height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Height
s->image_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // X0Siz
s->image_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // Y0Siz
s->tile_width = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XTSiz
s->tile_height = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YTSiz
s->tile_offset_x = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // XT0Siz
s->tile_offset_y = bytestream2_get_be32u(&s->g); // YT0Siz
ncomponents = bytestream2_get_be16u(&s->g); // CSiz
if (ncomponents <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid number of components: %d\n",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (ncomponents > 4) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Support for %d components",
s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
s->ncomponents = ncomponents;
if (s->tile_width <= 0 || s->tile_height <= 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid tile dimension %dx%d.\n",
s->tile_width, s->tile_height);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 3 * s->ncomponents)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < s->ncomponents; i++) { // Ssiz_i XRsiz_i, YRsiz_i
uint8_t x = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cbps[i] = (x & 0x7f) + 1;
s->precision = FFMAX(s->cbps[i], s->precision);
s->sgnd[i] = !!(x & 0x80);
s->cdx[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
s->cdy[i] = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if ( !s->cdx[i] || s->cdx[i] == 3 || s->cdx[i] > 4
|| !s->cdy[i] || s->cdy[i] == 3 || s->cdy[i] > 4) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid sample separation %d/%d\n", s->cdx[i], s->cdy[i]);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
log2_chroma_wh |= s->cdy[i] >> 1 << i * 4 | s->cdx[i] >> 1 << i * 4 + 2;
}
s->numXtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->width - s->tile_offset_x, s->tile_width);
s->numYtiles = ff_jpeg2000_ceildiv(s->height - s->tile_offset_y, s->tile_height);
if (s->numXtiles * (uint64_t)s->numYtiles > INT_MAX/sizeof(*s->tile)) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->tile = av_mallocz_array(s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles, sizeof(*s->tile));
if (!s->tile) {
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; i++) {
Jpeg2000Tile *tile = s->tile + i;
tile->comp = av_mallocz(s->ncomponents * sizeof(*tile->comp));
if (!tile->comp)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
/* compute image size with reduction factor */
s->avctx->width = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->width - s->image_offset_x,
s->reduction_factor);
s->avctx->height = ff_jpeg2000_ceildivpow2(s->height - s->image_offset_y,
s->reduction_factor);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_2K ||
s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_JPEG2000_DCINEMA_4K) {
possible_fmts = xyz_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(xyz_pix_fmts);
} else {
switch (s->colour_space) {
case 16:
possible_fmts = rgb_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(rgb_pix_fmts);
break;
case 17:
possible_fmts = gray_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(gray_pix_fmts);
break;
case 18:
possible_fmts = yuv_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(yuv_pix_fmts);
break;
default:
possible_fmts = all_pix_fmts;
possible_fmts_nb = FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(all_pix_fmts);
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < possible_fmts_nb; ++i) {
if (pix_fmt_match(possible_fmts[i], ncomponents, s->precision, log2_chroma_wh, s->pal8)) {
s->avctx->pix_fmt = possible_fmts[i];
break;
}
}
if (s->avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown pix_fmt, profile: %d, colour_space: %d, "
"components: %d, precision: %d, "
"cdx[1]: %d, cdy[1]: %d, cdx[2]: %d, cdy[2]: %d\n",
s->avctx->profile, s->colour_space, ncomponents, s->precision,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[1] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdx[2] : 0,
ncomponents > 2 ? s->cdy[2] : 0);
}
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = s->precision;
return 0;
}
| 85,678,138,236,663,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | jpeg2000dec.c | 302,431,616,552,773,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7012 | The get_siz function in libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not prevent attempts to use non-zero image offsets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted JPEG2000 data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7012 |
906 | FFmpeg | 547d690d676064069d44703a1917e0dab7e33445 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/547d690d676064069d44703a1917e0dab7e33445 | ffv1dec: check that global parameters dont change in version 0/1
Such changes are not allowed nor supported
Fixes Ticket2906
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static int read_header(FFV1Context *f)
{
uint8_t state[CONTEXT_SIZE];
int i, j, context_count = -1; //-1 to avoid warning
RangeCoder *const c = &f->slice_context[0]->c;
memset(state, 128, sizeof(state));
if (f->version < 2) {
unsigned v= get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (v >= 2) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid version %d in ver01 header\n", v);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
f->version = v;
f->ac = f->avctx->coder_type = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (f->ac > 1) {
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++)
f->state_transition[i] = get_symbol(c, state, 1) + c->one_state[i];
}
f->colorspace = get_symbol(c, state, 0); //YUV cs type
if (f->version > 0)
f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->chroma_planes = get_rac(c, state);
f->chroma_h_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->chroma_v_shift = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
f->transparency = get_rac(c, state);
f->plane_count = 2 + f->transparency;
}
if (f->colorspace == 0) {
if (!f->transparency && !f->chroma_planes) {
if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8;
else
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16;
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample<=8 && !f->transparency) {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P; break;
case 0x01: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P; break;
case 0x20: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P; break;
case 0x22: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample <= 8 && f->transparency) {
switch(16*f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
f->packed_at_lsb = 1;
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
} else {
switch(16 * f->chroma_h_shift + f->chroma_v_shift) {
case 0x00: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16; break;
case 0x10: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16; break;
case 0x11: f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16; break;
default:
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "format not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
}
} else if (f->colorspace == 1) {
if (f->chroma_h_shift || f->chroma_v_shift) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"chroma subsampling not supported in this colorspace\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
if ( f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12;
else if (f->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 14)
f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14;
else
if (f->transparency) f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB32;
else f->avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_0RGB32;
} else {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "colorspace not supported\n");
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
av_dlog(f->avctx, "%d %d %d\n",
f->chroma_h_shift, f->chroma_v_shift, f->avctx->pix_fmt);
if (f->version < 2) {
context_count = read_quant_tables(c, f->quant_table);
if (context_count < 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "read_quant_table error\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (f->version < 3) {
f->slice_count = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
} else {
const uint8_t *p = c->bytestream_end;
for (f->slice_count = 0;
f->slice_count < MAX_SLICES && 3 < p - c->bytestream_start;
f->slice_count++) {
int trailer = 3 + 5*!!f->ec;
int size = AV_RB24(p-trailer);
if (size + trailer > p - c->bytestream_start)
break;
p -= size + trailer;
}
}
if (f->slice_count > (unsigned)MAX_SLICES || f->slice_count <= 0) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "slice count %d is invalid\n", f->slice_count);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (j = 0; j < f->slice_count; j++) {
FFV1Context *fs = f->slice_context[j];
fs->ac = f->ac;
fs->packed_at_lsb = f->packed_at_lsb;
fs->slice_damaged = 0;
if (f->version == 2) {
fs->slice_x = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->width ;
fs->slice_y = get_symbol(c, state, 0) * f->height;
fs->slice_width = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->width + fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = (get_symbol(c, state, 0) + 1) * f->height + fs->slice_y;
fs->slice_x /= f->num_h_slices;
fs->slice_y /= f->num_v_slices;
fs->slice_width = fs->slice_width / f->num_h_slices - fs->slice_x;
fs->slice_height = fs->slice_height / f->num_v_slices - fs->slice_y;
if ((unsigned)fs->slice_width > f->width ||
(unsigned)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if ( (unsigned)fs->slice_x + (uint64_t)fs->slice_width > f->width
|| (unsigned)fs->slice_y + (uint64_t)fs->slice_height > f->height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < f->plane_count; i++) {
PlaneContext *const p = &fs->plane[i];
if (f->version == 2) {
int idx = get_symbol(c, state, 0);
if (idx > (unsigned)f->quant_table_count) {
av_log(f->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"quant_table_index out of range\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
p->quant_table_index = idx;
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_tables[idx],
sizeof(p->quant_table));
context_count = f->context_count[idx];
} else {
memcpy(p->quant_table, f->quant_table, sizeof(p->quant_table));
}
if (f->version <= 2) {
av_assert0(context_count >= 0);
if (p->context_count < context_count) {
av_freep(&p->state);
av_freep(&p->vlc_state);
}
p->context_count = context_count;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 255,289,524,855,579,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | ffv1dec.c | 71,974,849,264,050,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7011 | The read_header function in libavcodec/ffv1dec.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not prevent changes to global parameters, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted FFV1 data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7011 |
909 | FFmpeg | 3819db745da2ac7fb3faacb116788c32f4753f34 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/3819db745da2ac7fb3faacb116788c32f4753f34 | avcodec/rpza: Perform pointer advance and checks before using the pointers
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2850
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | 1 | static void rpza_decode_stream(RpzaContext *s)
{
int width = s->avctx->width;
int stride = s->frame.linesize[0] / 2;
int row_inc = stride - 4;
int stream_ptr = 0;
int chunk_size;
unsigned char opcode;
int n_blocks;
unsigned short colorA = 0, colorB;
unsigned short color4[4];
unsigned char index, idx;
unsigned short ta, tb;
unsigned short *pixels = (unsigned short *)s->frame.data[0];
int row_ptr = 0;
int pixel_ptr = 0;
int block_ptr;
int pixel_x, pixel_y;
int total_blocks;
/* First byte is always 0xe1. Warn if it's different */
if (s->buf[stream_ptr] != 0xe1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "First chunk byte is 0x%02x instead of 0xe1\n",
s->buf[stream_ptr]);
/* Get chunk size, ingnoring first byte */
chunk_size = AV_RB32(&s->buf[stream_ptr]) & 0x00FFFFFF;
stream_ptr += 4;
/* If length mismatch use size from MOV file and try to decode anyway */
if (chunk_size != s->size)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "MOV chunk size != encoded chunk size; using MOV chunk size\n");
chunk_size = s->size;
/* Number of 4x4 blocks in frame. */
total_blocks = ((s->avctx->width + 3) / 4) * ((s->avctx->height + 3) / 4);
/* Process chunk data */
while (stream_ptr < chunk_size) {
opcode = s->buf[stream_ptr++]; /* Get opcode */
n_blocks = (opcode & 0x1f) + 1; /* Extract block counter from opcode */
/* If opcode MSbit is 0, we need more data to decide what to do */
if ((opcode & 0x80) == 0) {
colorA = (opcode << 8) | (s->buf[stream_ptr++]);
opcode = 0;
if ((s->buf[stream_ptr] & 0x80) != 0) {
/* Must behave as opcode 110xxxxx, using colorA computed
* above. Use fake opcode 0x20 to enter switch block at
* the right place */
opcode = 0x20;
n_blocks = 1;
}
}
switch (opcode & 0xe0) {
/* Skip blocks */
case 0x80:
while (n_blocks--) {
ADVANCE_BLOCK();
}
break;
/* Fill blocks with one color */
case 0xa0:
colorA = AV_RB16 (&s->buf[stream_ptr]);
stream_ptr += 2;
while (n_blocks--) {
block_ptr = row_ptr + pixel_ptr;
for (pixel_y = 0; pixel_y < 4; pixel_y++) {
for (pixel_x = 0; pixel_x < 4; pixel_x++){
pixels[block_ptr] = colorA;
block_ptr++;
}
block_ptr += row_inc;
}
ADVANCE_BLOCK();
}
break;
/* Fill blocks with 4 colors */
case 0xc0:
colorA = AV_RB16 (&s->buf[stream_ptr]);
stream_ptr += 2;
case 0x20:
colorB = AV_RB16 (&s->buf[stream_ptr]);
stream_ptr += 2;
/* sort out the colors */
color4[0] = colorB;
color4[1] = 0;
color4[2] = 0;
color4[3] = colorA;
/* red components */
ta = (colorA >> 10) & 0x1F;
tb = (colorB >> 10) & 0x1F;
color4[1] |= ((11 * ta + 21 * tb) >> 5) << 10;
color4[2] |= ((21 * ta + 11 * tb) >> 5) << 10;
/* green components */
ta = (colorA >> 5) & 0x1F;
tb = (colorB >> 5) & 0x1F;
color4[1] |= ((11 * ta + 21 * tb) >> 5) << 5;
color4[2] |= ((21 * ta + 11 * tb) >> 5) << 5;
/* blue components */
ta = colorA & 0x1F;
tb = colorB & 0x1F;
color4[1] |= ((11 * ta + 21 * tb) >> 5);
color4[2] |= ((21 * ta + 11 * tb) >> 5);
if (s->size - stream_ptr < n_blocks * 4)
return;
while (n_blocks--) {
block_ptr = row_ptr + pixel_ptr;
for (pixel_y = 0; pixel_y < 4; pixel_y++) {
index = s->buf[stream_ptr++];
for (pixel_x = 0; pixel_x < 4; pixel_x++){
idx = (index >> (2 * (3 - pixel_x))) & 0x03;
pixels[block_ptr] = color4[idx];
block_ptr++;
}
block_ptr += row_inc;
}
ADVANCE_BLOCK();
}
break;
/* Fill block with 16 colors */
case 0x00:
if (s->size - stream_ptr < 16)
return;
block_ptr = row_ptr + pixel_ptr;
for (pixel_y = 0; pixel_y < 4; pixel_y++) {
for (pixel_x = 0; pixel_x < 4; pixel_x++){
/* We already have color of upper left pixel */
if ((pixel_y != 0) || (pixel_x !=0)) {
colorA = AV_RB16 (&s->buf[stream_ptr]);
stream_ptr += 2;
}
pixels[block_ptr] = colorA;
block_ptr++;
}
block_ptr += row_inc;
}
ADVANCE_BLOCK();
break;
/* Unknown opcode */
default:
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown opcode %d in rpza chunk."
" Skip remaining %d bytes of chunk data.\n", opcode,
chunk_size - stream_ptr);
return;
} /* Opcode switch */
}
}
| 269,902,084,834,802,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | rpza.c | 178,523,187,513,410,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | [
"CWE-119"
] | CVE-2013-7009 | The rpza_decode_stream function in libavcodec/rpza.c in FFmpeg before 2.1 does not properly maintain a pointer to pixel data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Apple RPZA data. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7009 |
910 | krb5 | c2ccf4197f697c4ff143b8a786acdd875e70a89d | https://github.com/krb5/krb5 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/c2ccf4197f697c4ff143b8a786acdd875e70a89d | Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved | 1 | setup_server_realm(krb5_principal sprinc)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
kdc_realm_t *newrealm;
kret = 0;
if (kdc_numrealms > 1) {
if (!(newrealm = find_realm_data(sprinc->realm.data,
(krb5_ui_4) sprinc->realm.length)))
kret = ENOENT;
else
kdc_active_realm = newrealm;
}
else
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
return(kret);
}
| 321,135,329,376,345,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | None | null | [
"CWE-703"
] | CVE-2013-1418 | The setup_server_realm function in main.c in the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.10.7, when multiple realms are configured, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via a crafted request. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1418 |