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RS21511 -- Campaign Finance: Brief Overview of District Court Opinion in McConnell v.FEC Updated May 19, 2003 On March 27, 2002, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155 ( H.R. 2356 , 107th Cong.), and most provisions of thenew law became effective on November 6, 2002. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA into law, SenatorMitch McConnell filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District ofColumbia against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In summary, the McConnell complaint for declaratory and injunctiverelief argued that portions of BCRA violate the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. (2) Likewise, shortly after enactment, the National Rifle Association (NRA) filed suit in U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia against the FEC and the Attorney General seekingdeclaratory and injunctive relief against certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), asamended by BCRA. In summary, the NRA argued that the new lawdeprives it of freedom of speech and association, of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances,and of the rights to equal protection and due process, in violation of theFirst and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Ultimately, eleven suits challenging BCRA were brought by more than 80 plaintiffs and were consolidated into one lead case, McConnell v. FEC , (3) bythe U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia. Section 403(a) of BCRA provides that if an action is brought for declaratory or injunctiverelief challenging the constitutionality of any provision of the Act, itshall be brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and shall be heard by a 3-judge court. Itfurther provides that a final decision in such an action shall be reviewableonly by appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court by the filing of a notice of appeal within 10 days and the filingof a jurisdictional statement within 30 days after a final decision isrendered. Section 403(a)(4) charges the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court toadvance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extentthe disposition of the action and appeal. On December 4 and 5, 2002 oral argument was heard in McConnell v. FEC before the three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Under the BCRAexpedited review provision, (4) the court's decision,which was issued on May 2, 2003, will be reviewed directly by the U.S. Supreme Court. Issue Advocacy/Political Advertising by Corporations and Labor Unions (Soft Money). Generally, sections 203 and 201 of BCRA,respectively, prohibit labor unions and corporations (and any persons using funds donated by a corporation or laborunion) from using treasury funds for "electioneeringcommunications" -- they must use a separate segregated fund (also known as a PAC) in order to fund such ads --and require disclosure to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) ofdisbursements for the costs of producing and broadcasting "electioneering communications" by any spender exceeding $10,000 per year. BCRA generally defines an "electioneeringcommunication" as a broadcast, cable, or satellite advertisement that "refers" to a clearly identified federal candidate,is made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primaryand if for House or Senate elections, is targeted to the relevant electorate. (5) In the event that the primary definition of "electioneering communication" isheld to be unconstitutional,Section 201 of BCRA provides a backup definition: any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate forthat office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) andwhich also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than anexhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. In McConnell v. FEC, the three-judge district court ruled 2 to 1 that the primary definition of "electioneering communication" is unconstitutional and accordingly, ruled that theprohibition on labor unions and corporations (and any persons using funds donated by a corporation or labor union)using treasury funds for "electioneering communications" and therequirement for disclosure to the FEC of spending for all "electioneering communications" is unconstitutional underthe primary definition. The court upheld, however, the backupdefinition of "electioneering communication," deleting the last clause, "and which also is suggestive of no plausiblemeaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specificcandidate," and hence, generally upheld the disclosure requirements and the prohibition on labor unions andcorporations funding "electioneering communications" as defined by aportion of the backup definition. (6) As a result of thisruling, corporations and labor unions are generally prohibited from using treasury funds to pay for any broadcast,cable, or satellitecommunication -- at any time in the election cycle -- which "promotes or supports" or "attacks oropposes" a candidate for that office, "regardless of whether the communicationexpressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate." Section 203 of BCRA also contains an exemption to the prohibition on corporations directly funding "electioneering communications," ( i.e. using treasury funds instead of funding suchadvertisements through a PAC) for certain non-profit organizations. Under a portion of Section 203 known asSnowe-Jeffords, (7) Internal Revenue Code Section501(c)(4) and 527(e)(1)organizations are permitted to use their general treasury funds for "electioneering communications" so long as thecommunication is paid for exclusively with funds from individualswho are U.S. citizens, nationals, or lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (8) The Snowe-Jeffords provision is an expansion of the law as it existed priorto BCRA. Prior to BCRA,the 1986 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), (9) had provided an as-applied exception for non-profitcorporations that satisfied certain criteria. (10) Section 204 of BCRA, however, (known as the Wellstone Amendment) (11) effectively withdraws the Snowe-Jeffords exception in Section 203,according to the court in McConnell v.FEC . (12) As a result of the WellstoneAmendment in Section 204, entities that are organized under Internal Revenue Code Sections 501(c)(4) and527(e)(1) are not permitted to use theirgeneral treasury funds for "electioneering communications." (13) As the McConnell court noted, the Wellstone Amendment was codified in a separate portion ofBCRA in order topreserve severability. (14) Indeed, the McConnell three-judge panel struck down the Wellstone Amendment in Section 204 as it applies tocorporations that meet the criteria set forth bythe Supreme Court in MCFL, also known as " MCFL corporations." Hence, according thecourt, the prohibition against corporations using treasury funds to pay for "electioneeringcommunications" applies only to non- MCFL corporations. Raising and Spending of Soft Money by Political Parties. Section 101 of BCRA, which creates a new section in the Federal ElectionCampaign Act (FECA), Section 323(a), (15) prohibitsnational parties from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, and spending nonfederal funds, i.e., soft money. In a 2 to 1 split,the McConnell v. FEC court ruled that Section 323(a) is constitutional only to the extent that it bansnational party committees from using nonfederal funds for public communicationsthat "refer" to a clearly identified federal candidate -- "regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office isalso mentioned or identified" -- and that "promotes or supports" or"attacks or opposes" a candidate for that office, "regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates avote for or against a candidate." (16) Section 101 of BCRA creates another new FECA provision, Section 323(b), which prohibits state and local parties from using nonfederal funds (or soft money) for "federal electionactivities." Section 301(20)(A) of FECA, as amended by BCRA, defines "federal election activities" to include:(i) voter registration drives in the last 120 days of a federal election; (ii)voter identification, Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) drives, and generic activity in connection with an election in whicha federal candidate is on the ballot; (iii) public communications that"refer" to a clearly identified federal candidate -- "regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is alsomentioned or identified" -- and that "promotes or supports" or"attacks or opposes" a candidate for that office, "regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates avote for or against a candidate"; or (iv) services by a state or local partyemployee who spends at least 25% of paid time in a month on activities in connection with a federal election. (17) The McConnell v. FEC three-judgecourt ruled that Section 323(b) ofFECA, as amended by BCRA, is constitutional only as applied to Section 301(20)(A)(iii) activities. That is,according to the court, state and local parties are prohibited from spendingnonfederal or soft money on public communications that "refer" to a clearly identified federal candidate --"regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentionedor identified" -- and that "promotes or supports" or "attacks or opposes" a candidate for that office, "regardless ofwhether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against acandidate." (18) Raising and Spending of Soft Money by Federal Officeholders and Candidates. Section 101 of BCRA prohibits, with few exceptions,federal officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending nonfederal or softmoney for any local, state, or federal election. (19) The McConnell v.FEC court upheld the constitutionality of this section of the statute in its entirety. (20) Hard Money Sources for Candidates. Sections 304, 316 and 319 of BCRA, (21) sometimes referred to as the "millionaireprovisions,"were held to be non-justiciable by the McConnell v. FEC district court. (22) In brief summary, Section 304 limits repayment of candidate loans to hisor her own campaign to $250,000,from amounts contributed after the election occurs. Section 304 also raises the limit on individual and party supportfor a Senate candidate whose opponent exceeds the designatedthreshold level of personal campaign funding. Section 319 raises the limits on individual and party support for aHouse candidate whose opponent exceeds the threshold of $350,000 inpersonal campaign funding. Hard Money Contribution Limits. Section 307 of BCRA, (23) increases the limits on the amount that individualscan contribute tofederal office candidates and to political parties. Under Section 307, individuals may contribute no more than$2,000 per candidate, per election, and no more than $25,000 per year tonational party committees. The McConnell v. FEC district court panel held non-justiciable the issuespresented by plaintiffs in regard to Section 307. (24) Limitation on Lowest Unit Charge for Candidates. If a candidate makes any direct reference to another candidate for the same officein a broadcast advertisement, section 305 of BCRA denies a federal candidate the "lowest unit charge" for radio andtelevision broadcast advertisements unless certain attributionrequirements are met. (25) The McConnellv. FEC district court held that no plaintiff had standing at this time to challenge Section 305. (26) Prohibition on Contributions by Minors. Section 318 of BCRA prohibits minors (defined as persons 17 and younger) from makingcontributions or donations to candidates or to a political party. (27) In McConnell v. FEC, the three-judge court unanimously held the prohibition to beunconstitutional. (28)

On March 27, 2002, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign ReformAct of 2002 (BCRA), P.L. 107-155 (H.R. 2356, 107th Cong.), which was also known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reformlegislation prior to enactment. Most provisions of the new law became effective onNovember 6, 2002. Shortly after President Bush signed BCRA into law, Senator Mitch McConnell filed suit in U.S.District Court for the District of Columbia against the FederalElection Commission (FEC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Ultimately, eleven suitschallenging the campaign finance reform law were brought by more than 80plaintiffs and were consolidated into one lead case, McConnell v. FEC. In summary, the McConnellcomplaint for declaratory and injunctive relief argued that portions of BCRA violatethe First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to theConstitution. On May 2, 2003, the U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia issued its decision in McConnell v. FEC, striking down many key provisions ofthe law. (See the text of the per curiam opinion athttp://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/02cv582a.pdf.) This report provides a brief overview of the court's decision and willbe updated. The three-judge panel, which was split 2 to 1 on manyissues, ordered that its ruling take effect immediately. Since the court has issued its opinion, several appeals havebeen filed. Under the BCRA expedited review provision, the court'sdecision will be reviewed directly by the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 19 the U.S. district court issued a stay toits ruling, which leaves BCRA, as enacted, in effect until the SupremeCourt issues a decision. For more information see, Campaign Finance Reform Oversight http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isele2.html, and CRS Report RL30669,Campaign Finance Regulation Under the First Amendment.

The traditional practice of the House is to elect a Speaker by roll call vote upon first convening after a general election of Representatives. Customarily, the conference of each major party in the House selects a candidate whose name is formally placed in nomination before the roll call. A Member may vote for one of these nominated candidates or for another individual. In the great majority of cases, Members vote for the candidate nominated by their own party conferences, since the outcome of this vote in effect establishes which party has the majority and therefore will organize the House. Table 1 presents data on the votes cast for candidates for Speaker of the House of Representatives in each Congress from 1913 (63 rd Congress) through 2019 (116 th Congress). It shows the votes cast for the nominees of the two major parties, other candidates nominated from the floor, and individuals not formally nominated. Included in the table are not only the elections held regularly at the outset of each Congress but also those held during the course of a Congress as a result of the death or resignation of a sitting Speaker. Such elections have occurred five times during the period examined: in 1936 (74 th Congress) upon the death of Speaker Joseph Byrns; in 1940 (76 th Congress) upon the death of Speaker William Bankhead; in 1962 (87 th Congress) upon the death of Speaker Sam Rayburn; in 1989 (101 st Congress) upon the resignation of Speaker Jim Wright; and in 2015 (114 th Congress) upon the resignation of Speaker John Boehner. On the two earlier occasions among these five, the election was by resolution rather than by roll call vote. On the more recent three, the same procedure was followed as at the start of a Congress. The data presented here cover the period during which the permanent size of the House has been set at 435 Members. This period corresponds to that since the admission of Arizona and New Mexico as the 47 th and 48 th states in 1912. The actual size of the House was 436, and then 437, for a brief period between the admission of Alaska and Hawaii (in 1958 and 1959) and the reapportionment of Representatives following the 1960 census. By practice of the House going back to its earliest days, an absolute majority of the Members present and voting is required in order to elect a Speaker. A majority of the full membership of the House (218, in a House of 435) is not required. Precedents emphasize that the requirement is for a majority of "the total number of votes cast for a person by name." A candidate for Speaker may receive a majority of the votes cast, and be elected, while failing to obtain a majority of the full membership because some Members either are not present to vote or instead answer "present" rather than voting for a candidate. During the period examined, this kind of result has occurred five times: in 1917 (65 th Congress), "Champ" Clark was elected with 217 votes; in 1923 (68 th Congress), Frederick Gillett was elected with 215 votes; in 1943 (78 th Congress), Sam Rayburn was elected with 217 votes; in 1997 (105 th Congress), Newt Gingrich was elected with 216 votes; and in 2015 (114 th Congress), John Boehner was elected with 216 votes. In addition, in 1931 (72 nd Congress), the candidate of the new Democratic majority, John Nance Garner (later Vice President), received 218 votes, a bare majority of the membership. The table does not take into account the number of vacancies existing in the House at the time of the election; it therefore cannot show whether any Speaker may have been elected lacking a majority of the then qualified membership of the House. If no candidate obtains the requisite majority, the roll call is repeated. On these subsequent ballots, Members may still vote for any individual; no restrictions have ever been imposed, such as that the lowest candidate on each ballot must drop out, or that no new candidate may enter. Because of the predominance of the two established national parties during the period examined, only once in the period did the House fail to elect on the first roll call. In 1923 (68 th Congress), in a closely divided House, both major party nominees initially failed to gain a majority because of votes cast for other candidates by Members from the Progressive Party or from the "progressive" wing of the Republican Party. Many of these Members agreed to vote for the Republican candidate only on the ninth ballot, after the Republican leadership had agreed to accept a number of procedural reforms these Members favored. Thus the Republican was ultimately elected, although (as noted earlier) still with less than a majority of the full membership. In the first portion of the period covered by Table 1 , it was common for candidates other than those of the two major parties to receive votes. Such action occurred in 11 of the 16 Congresses (63 rd -78 th ) that convened from 1913 through 1943. On 7 of those 11 occasions, candidates other than those of the two major parties were formally nominated. These events reflect chiefly the influence in Congress, during those three decades, of the progressive movement. The additional nominations were offered in the name of that movement, and the votes cast for Members other than the major party nominees also generally represent an expression of progressive sentiments. During this period, the occurrence of additional nominations (displayed in the table) reflects changing views of Members identifying themselves as "progressives" about whether to constitute themselves in the House as a separate Progressive Party caucus or as a wing of the Republican Party. So does the pattern of shifts in the party labels by which these nominees and others receiving votes chose to designate themselves. The last formal Progressive Party nominee appeared in 1937 (75 th Congress). After defeats in the following election, the only two remaining Members representing the Progressive Party were reduced to voting for each other for Speaker, and beginning in 1947 (80 th Congress), the last standard-bearer of the tendency accepted the Republican label. The demise of this movement in the House represented the final stage in the establishment of a two-party system at the national level. From 1945 through 1995 (79 th -104 th Congresses), only the official nominees of the two major parties received votes for Speaker. This pattern, in other words, persisted from the end of World War II and the advent of the "modern Congress" until after the Republicans had regained the majority in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) after four decades as the minority party. During this period, the presumption became firmly established that a Member's vote for Speaker will reliably reflect his or her party membership. The opening of the 105 th Congress in 1997, accordingly, marked the first time since 1943 that anyone other than the two major party candidates received votes for Speaker. In 10 of the 13 speakership elections since then (1997-2019), at least one Member has voted for a candidate other than ones formally nominated by the major party conferences. Early in this period, votes cast for other candidates seem to have usually reflected specific circumstances and events, but in the most recent instances, some of them may be regarded as reflecting action by identifiable political factions or groupings. During this period, only in the initial election of 2015 have the names of any candidates other than those of the party conferences been formally placed in nomination. The ballots in 1997, 2013, 2015 (both instances), and 2019 were also notable because votes were cast for candidates who were not Members of the House at the time. In the initial election in 2015, two of the votes cast were for sitting Members of the Senate; in 2019, one such ballot was cast. Although the Constitution does not require the Speaker (or any other officer of either chamber) to be a Member, the Speaker has always been so; it is not known that any votes for individuals other than Members to be Speaker had ever previously been cast in the history of the House. Notably, in 2001, a Member who bore the designation of one major party voted for the nominee of the other. Although the table below does not indicate the party affiliation of the Members voting for each candidate, examination of other available records confirms that no such action had occurred at least for the previous half century.

Each new House elects a Speaker by roll call vote when it first convenes. Customarily, the conference of each major party nominates a candidate whose name is placed in nomination. A Member normally votes for the candidate of his or her own party conference but may vote for any individual, whether nominated or not. To be elected, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of all the votes cast for individuals. This number may be less than a majority (now 218) of the full membership of the House because of vacancies, absentees, or Members answering "present." This report provides data on elections of the Speaker in each Congress since 1913, when the House first reached its present size of 435 Members. During that period (63rd through 116th Congresses), a Speaker was elected five times with the votes of less than a majority of the full membership. If a Speaker dies or resigns during a Congress, the House immediately elects a new one. Five such elections occurred since 1913. In the earlier two cases, the House elected the new Speaker by resolution; in the more recent three, the body used the same procedure as at the outset of a Congress. If no candidate receives the requisite majority, the roll call is repeated until a Speaker is elected. Since 1913, this procedure has been necessary only in 1923, when nine ballots were required before a Speaker was elected. From 1913 through 1943, more often than not, some Members voted for candidates other than those of the two major parties. The candidates in question were usually those representing the "progressive" group (reformers originally associated with the Republican Party), and in some Congresses, their names were formally placed in nomination on behalf of that group. From 1945 through 1995, only the nominated Republican and Democratic candidates received votes, reflecting the establishment of an exclusively two-party system at the national level. In 10 of the 13 elections since 1997, however, some Members have voted for candidates other than the official nominees of their parties. Only in the initial election in 2015, however, were any such candidates formally placed in nomination. Usually, the additional candidates receiving votes have been other Members of the voter's own party, but in one instance, in 2001, a Member voted for the official nominee of the other party. In the 1997, 2013, 2015 (both instances), and 2019 elections, votes were cast for candidates who were not then Members of the House, including, in the initial 2015 election and the 2019 election, sitting Senators. Although the Constitution does not so require, the Speaker has always been a Member of the House. The report will be updated as additional elections for Speaker occur.

The Export Clause states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The clause is perhaps among the lesser-known provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Nonetheless, it is an important one for Congress because it is one of the few limitations on Congress's taxing power. The Clause's prohibition typically becomes relevant in discussions about certain energy and transportation-related taxes (such as the coal excise tax and harbor maintenance tax). The Export Clause is an absolute prohibition on taxing exports by the federal government. Whether a tax discriminates against exports is irrelevant—even a generally applicable tax that applies to all goods equally is unconstitutional as applied to exports. The Clause prohibits any federal tax or duty that is imposed on goods during "the course of exportation" or targeted at exports, as well as those imposed on services and activities "closely related" to the export process. A situation where a good may be found to be in the course of exportation is when it is loaded onto an export vessel and title is transferred from the producer to a foreign purchaser. Once a good is in the course of exportation, it does not matter that there may be some theoretical possibility it might not actually be exported—the good cannot be taxed. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has found a tax to be impermissible when it was essentially imposed on an export good even though it was not directly imposed on it. For example, in a 1915 case, Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States , the Court held that a federal stamp tax on insurance policies against marine risks could not be applied to policies covering exports. The Court explained that "proper insurance during the voyage is one of the necessities of exportation" and "taxation of policies insuring cargoes during their transit to foreign ports is as much a burden on exporting as if it were laid on ... the goods themselves." In a more recent case, United States v. IBM Corp., the Court recognized Thames & Mercy as still good law, which led it to conclude that a tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers not subject to the federal income tax could not be applied to insurance for exports. Additional taxes that have been found to be essentially imposed on the good itself are those imposed on charter contracts and a federal stamp tax on bills of lading for export shipments. Other than these examples, there is not much guidance on when an activity or service is protected from tax because it is "closely related" to the export process. Importantly, the Clause does not prohibit a generally applicable tax from being imposed on goods prior to export. In other words, goods that are exported are not exempted "from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situated." Thus, for example, a manufacturing tax on filled cheese was permissible even though the specific cheese at issue was manufactured under contract for exportation and was in fact exported. Similarly, a stamp charge of 25 cents per package of tobacco intended for export was upheld when the stamp charge, which indicated the tobacco was otherwise exempt from tobacco excise taxes, was designed to prevent fraud with respect to the excise tax exemption. This purpose led the Court to conclude the stamp charge was not a tax on exports. The Export Clause only prohibits the imposition of "taxes" and "duties." It does not prohibit user fees. Thus, the distinction between a tax and user fee is important. Congress's choice to call something a tax or a fee will not be determinative in assessing the provision's constitutionality. Rather, a court will likely examine the provision's substantive characteristics to determine if it is a fee or tax. Thus, it is possible that a charge referred to in statute as a "fee" could be recharacterized by a court to be a "tax" if it failed to meet the characteristics of a user fee (described below), and vice versa. A case that illustrates this distinction is United States v. U.S. Shoe Corporation . At issue in that case was the harbor maintenance tax (HMT), which imposes a charge on cargo passing through U.S. ports in order to fund harbor maintenance projects. The question was whether the HMT was a tax, in which case it could not be imposed on exports, or a user fee that would fall outside the Export Clause's scope. The Supreme Court held that the HMT was a tax and therefore could not be imposed on goods in the process of exportation. In so doing, it exhibited a willingness to engage in substantive analysis to determine whether a government charge was a user fee or a tax. To make the determination, the Court relied on a prior case, Pace v. Burgess . According to that case, the primary characteristics of a user fee for purposes of the Export Clause are that it, unlike a tax, is (1) proportional to the government services or benefits received by the payor and (2) not determined solely on an ad valorem basis (i.e., not solely based on the quantity or value of the goods or services on which it is placed). Applying that analysis here, the Court determined there was not a close enough relationship between the services rendered by the U.S. ports and the charges levied under the HMT since the HMT was solely determined on an ad valorem basis. Even though the HMT was considered a tax in this context, the Court made clear this should not be interpreted to mean that exporters are exempt from user fees intended to defray costs associated with harbor maintenance. Rather, it meant that any such fee "must fairly match" their use of port services and facilities. After decades of no serious Export Clause challenges, several taxes were found in the late 1990s to be unconstitutional as applied to exports. In the 1996 IBM case, the Supreme Court struck down the tax on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers that are not subject to federal income tax as applied to insurance for exports. In 1998, the Court in U.S. Shoe struck down the imposition of the HMT as applied to exports. Later that same year, a federal district court ruled that imposing the excise tax on domestically mined coal in the stream of exportation clearly violated the Export Clause. After that streak of taxes being struck, a different result was reached in several recent cases brought by coal producers and exporters alleging that a reclamation fee imposed by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 on exported coal violates the Export Clause. The reclamation fee is based on each ton of "coal produced" by surface and underground mining. Neither the statute nor the agency regulations define the term "coal produced." The coal producers and exporters argued that the term refers to the process of extracting and selling coal, and therefore the imposition of the fee on coal sold to foreign purchasers violates the Export Clause. The government argued the term only refers to the extraction, and not the sale, of coal. In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the government and upheld the reclamation fee statute as constitutional. The court, using the principle of statutory construction that "every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save the [challenged] statute from unconstitutionality," found that interpreting the term "coal produced" to refer to "coal extracted" is reasonable. Courts have found several taxes to be unconstitutional as applied to exports, including the coal excise tax and the harbor maintenance tax (see the text box above). One question that arises in these situations is what remedy exists for taxpayers who paid an unconstitutional charge imposed by the government. Taxpayers who overpay a federal tax are typically required to seek a refund from the IRS using the refund process found in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The question here is whether there is another option: can taxpayers bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act seeking damages from the government in the amount of unconstitutional taxes paid? The Tucker Act grants the court jurisdiction over claims against the United States, including those founded in the Constitution. This same question may arise in the event that a government charge outside the IRC refund procedure was invalidated (e.g., if a non-IRC "fee" was recharacterized by a court to be a "tax"): could a person who paid the unconstitutional charge bring suit under the Tucker Act outside of any applicable administrative refund procedure? Taxpayers may prefer the Tucker Act because it bypasses two limitations in the IRC refund process. First, the Tucker Act has a longer statute of limitations than the IRC—six years from the time the tax is paid, compared to three years from such time. Thus, taxpayers could seek damages for taxes paid in the several years preceding those for which they could receive IRC refunds. Second, the IRC sometimes gives priority to producers' refund claims, while the Tucker Act does not. As a result, the Tucker Act could allow parties farther down the supply chain (e.g., exporters) to bring claims alleging they deserved damages because they bore the economic burden of the tax through higher prices. A threshold issue is whether the Court of Federal Claims can hear these suits. The Tucker Act only confers jurisdiction—it does not create an enforceable right against the United States for monetary damages. Rather, the right must be found in another source of law, which here would be the Export Clause. Thus, a key question is whether the Export Clause provides a right to monetary damages when the government violates it. If the answer is yes, the next question is whether such a claim can be made independent of an IRC (or other administrative ) refund claim. In 2000, the Court of Federal Claims held that the Export Clause provided a separate cause of action so that taxpayers could bring a suit for damages independent of an IRC refund claim. The court based this conclusion on its findings that the Export Clause was a money-mandating provision, as required for Tucker Act jurisdiction, and that the cause of action founded in a violation of the Export Clause was self-executing. However, in a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co. , the Supreme Court held that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally imposed coal excise tax must comply with the IRC refund process. Notably, the Court did not address whether the Export Clause provides a cause of action that could be brought under the Tucker Act, finding that the IRC refund provisions would apply regardless. Thus, that question remains unanswered. The taxpayers in Clintwood Elkhorn had filed administrative refund claims for the three tax years open under the IRC's statute of limitations and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking the amount of taxes paid for the three previous years that were open only under the Tucker Act's longer limitations period. The Supreme Court held that the plain language of the relevant IRC provisions, Sections 7422 and 6511, clearly required taxpayers to file a timely refund claim with the IRS before bringing suit. The Court stated that it had basically decided the issue in a 1941 case where it had reasoned that the Tucker Act's statute of limitations was simply "an outside limit" which Congress could shorten in situations requiring "special considerations," such as tax refunds since suits against the government to recover taxes would hinder administration of the tax laws. As the Court had explained in that case, the IRC's refund provisions would have "'no meaning whatever'" if taxpayers who did not comply with those provisions could still bring refund suits under the Tucker Act. Further, noting that it was clear from its past cases that unconstitutionally collected taxes could be subject to the same administrative requirements as other taxes, the Court rejected the taxpayers' argument that something unique about the Export Clause required different treatment. The Court explained that while the government may not impose unconstitutional taxes, it may create an administrative process to refund them because of its "exceedingly strong interest in financial stability," regardless of whether the tax violated the Export Clause or some other provision of the Constitution. The Court also rejected the taxpayers' claim that the IRC refund scheme could not apply to facially unconstitutional taxes, finding the plain language of Section 7422 clearly included them. Looking to the implications of Clintwood Elkhorn , it seems clear that any tax collected in violation of the Export Clause that is subject to the IRC refund process may only be refunded through that process. Because these issues are matters of statutory construction, Congress has the option to modify the refund procedures for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause, if it so chooses (e.g., as it did by providing an alternative refund process for the coal excise tax post- Clintwood Elkhorn ). With respect to whether the Export Clause provides it own cause of action for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction, the Court in Clintwood Elkhorn did not address this issue. The Court of Federal Claims has previously answered the question affirmatively, thus indicating that claims for taxes or any fees recharacterized as taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause that fall outside the IRC (or another administratively mandated) refund process may be brought in that court, unless another provision of law removes jurisdiction.

The Export Clause, found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, directly states "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Clause represents one of the few restrictions on Congress's otherwise broad taxing power. Examples of taxes that have been found unconstitutional as applied to exports include the harbor maintenance tax and the excise tax on domestically mined coal. The Clause prohibits taxes and duties that are targeted at exports or imposed on goods during "the course of exportation." It also protects those services and activities that are "closely related" to the export process. Importantly, pre-export goods and services are not exempt from otherwise generally applicable taxes. The Export Clause only prohibits the imposition of taxes and duties. It does not prohibit user fees. Congress's choice to call something a tax or a fee will not be determinative in assessing the provision's constitutionality; rather, a court will likely examine the provision's substantive characteristics to determine if it is a fee or tax. According to the Supreme Court, the primary characteristics of a user fee are that it, unlike a tax, is (1) proportional to the government services or benefits received by the payor and (2) not determined solely on an ad valorem basis (i.e., not based solely on the quantity or value of the goods or services on which it is placed). Thus, it is possible that a charge referred to in statute as a "fee" could be recharacterized by a court to be a "tax" if it failed to meet these criteria, and vice versa. When a government charge has been imposed in violation of the Export Clause, one issue that arises is the remedy for persons who paid the unconstitutional amount. Typically, taxpayers who overpay a tax are required to seek a refund using the process found in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). In the event that a "fee" was recharacterized as an impermissible tax, there might be a similar administrative refund procedure. The question here is whether it is possible to bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act seeking damages from the government in the amount of unconstitutional amounts paid. Taxpayers may prefer the Tucker Act because it has a longer statute of limitations than the IRC—six years from the time the tax is paid versus three years—and, in some situations, might allow parties farther down the supply chain (e.g., exporters) to bring claims alleging they deserve damages because they bore the economic burden of the tax through higher prices. A threshold issue has been whether the Court of Federal Claims can hear these suits. In order for a claim to be permissible under the Tucker Act, two things must be true: (1) the Export Clause must provide a right to monetary damages when the government violates it, and (2) it must be permissible to make such a claim independent of an IRC (or other administrative) refund claim. In 2008, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers must comply with the IRC procedures when seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally imposed coal excise tax. It appears the Court's holding would apply to any tax covered by the IRC refund process. The Court did not address whether the Export Clause provides a right to monetary damages, finding that the IRC refund process applies regardless. Because these issues are matters of statutory construction, Congress has the option to modify the refund procedures for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause, if it so chooses. For example, after the 2008 Supreme Court case, Congress provided an alternative refund process for the coal excise tax that extended the statute of limitations and expanded the opportunity for exporters to seek refunds.

Federal agency funding for homeland security R&D was requested at about $5.1 billion for FY2007, about the same amount as in FY2005 and FY2006. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) reports that the top three agency supporters are the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), specifically the National Institutes of Health (NIH) at 40% of the total, DHS with about 23%, and the Department of Defense (DOD), with 21%. See Table 1 . Other funding agencies in descending order are the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Aeronautics, and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Commerce (DOC). DHHS (NIH) manages most of the federal civilian effort against bioterrorism. DHS R&D focuses largely on technology-oriented projects, which for FY2007, emphasize countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). DOD's homeland security R&D portfolio includes work on countering chemical and biological threats, emergency preparedness, and R&D supported by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), a State Department/DOD group that coordinates interagency R&D on new technologies to combat terrorism. USDA's work includes physical protection for agricultural resources and maintaining security of the food supply. NSF's homeland security R&D focuses on protection of critical infrastructures and key assets and includes cybersecurity R&D. EPA has focused on toxic materials research. In the DOC, R&D at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) deals with protecting information systems. In the past, DOE's counterterrorism R&D included work on materials, detection of toxic agents, genomic sequencing, DNA-based diagnostics, and microfabrication technologies. NASA's homeland security R&D deals with aviation safety and remote sensing. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 , created DHS and, as one of its four directorates, a Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T). The Under Secretary for S&T, created by Title III, has responsibility for most of DHS's research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). The Under Secretary's responsibilities are to: coordinate DHS's S&T missions; in consultation with other agencies, develop a strategic plan for federal civilian countermeasures to threats, including research; except for human health-related R&D, conduct and/or coordinate DHS's intramural and extramural R&D; set national R&D priorities to prevent importation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and related (CBRN) weapons and terrorist attacks; collaborate with DOE regarding using national laboratories; collaborate with the Secretaries of USDA and DHHS to identify biological "select agents;" develop guidelines for technology transfer; and support U.S. S&T leadership. If possible, DHS's research is to be unclassified. Title III transferred to DHS DOE programs in chemical and biological security R&D; nuclear smuggling and proliferation detection; nuclear assessment and materials protection; biological and environmental research related to microbial pathogens; the Environmental Measurements Laboratory; and the advanced scientific computing research program from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. DHS was mandated to incorporate a newly created National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center and USDA's Plum Island Animal Disease Center, but USDA is permitted to continue to conduct R&D at Plum Island. Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) R&D are now located within DHS. DHS's Secretary is to collaborate with the DHHS Secretary to set priorities for DHHS's human health-related CBRN R&D. Title III authorized establishment of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) to support applications-oriented, innovative RDT&E in industry, FFRDCs, and universities. Extramural funding is to be competitive and merit-reviewed, but distributed to as many U.S. areas as practicable. The law mandated creation of university-based centers of excellence for homeland security; five multi-year awards ranging between $10 million to $18 million have been made for centers on: risk and economic analysis of terrorism at the University of Southern California; agro-security at the University of Minnesota and at Texas A&M; on behavioral and sociological aspects of terrorism at the University of Maryland; and on high consequence event preparedness and response at Johns Hopkins. DHS and EPA jointly fund a cooperative center on advancing microbial risk assessment at Michigan State; there are plans for a DHS-Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory cooperative center on computational challenges for homeland security. DHS also supports a university fellowship/training program, which plans to train 200 students in 2007, down from 300 in 2006, and up to 15 postdoctoral fellows. Regarding intramural R&D, DHS may use any federal laboratory and may establish a headquarters laboratory to "network" federal laboratories. DHS relies mostly on the following DOE laboratories: Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, Pacific Northwest and Oak Ridge. A Homeland Security Institute (HSI), an FFRDC operated by Analytic Services Inc., funded in May 2004, is authorized to conduct risk analysis and policy research on vulnerabilities of, and security for, critical infrastructures; improve interoperability of tools for field operators and first responders; and test prototype technologies. A clearinghouse was authorized to transfer information about innovations. In addition, DHS created the Interagency Center for Applied Homeland Security Technology (ICAHST), which validates technical requirements and conducts evaluations for threat and vulnerability testing and assessments. P.L. 107-296 gave the DHS Secretary special acquisitions authority for basic, applied, and advanced R&D (Sec. 833). The Special Assistant to the Secretary, created by Sec. 102 of the law, is to work with the private sector to develop innovative homeland terrorism technologies. DHS issued rules for liability protection for manufacturers of anti-terrorism technologies pursuant to the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 2002, part of P.L. 107-296 . DHS also issued a rule to handle critical infrastructure information that is voluntarily submitted to the government in good faith that will not be subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act ( Federal Register , Feb. 20, 2004, pp. 8073-8089). Sec. 1003 of P.L. 107-296 authorized NIST to conduct R&D to improve information security. P.L. 107-305 , the Cyber Security Research and Development Act, authorized $903 million over five years for NSF and NIST R&D and training programs to combat terrorist attacks on computers. For FY2007, DHS requested funding for R&D per se of $1.1 billion, and Congress, in P.L. 109-295 , appropriated $1.0 billion, about 22% less than the estimated FY2006 level. This is the first reduction in the agency's R&D budget since DHS was created in 2002. The FY2007 budget increased R&D support for explosives countermeasures, interoperable communications, and cybersecurity. Other areas of R&D, including university centers, received decreased funding. See Table 2 . The FY2006 appropriations law had increased R&D funding above the President's requested levels for biological countermeasures, explosives countermeasures, DNDO, rapid prototyping, SAFETY Act, interoperable communications, and critical infrastructure. See CRS Report RL33428, Homeland Security Department: FY2007 Appropriations and CRS Report RL33345, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2007 , (section on DHS). The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is a statutory office in the Executive Office of the President; its director advises the President and recommends federal R&D budgets. The OSTP Director is responsible for advising the President on homeland security (Sec. 1712 of P.L. 107-296 ). The Director has chaired the National Security Council's Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction R&D Subgroup, comprised of 16 agencies. OSTP also manages the interagency National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)'s Committee on Homeland and National Security to help set R&D priorities in eight functional areas. OSTP's interagency work has focused on such topics as anthrax, regulations to restrict access to research using biological "select agents," access to "sensitive but unclassified" scientific information, policy for foreign student visas, access to "sensitive" courses, and advanced technology for border control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13231, OSTP worked with the interagency President's Critical Infrastructure Board to recommend priorities and budgets for information security R&D. The working group on bioterrorism prevention, preparedness, and response, established by Sec. 108 of P.L. 107-188 , the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, consists of the DHHS and DOD Secretaries and other agency heads. The Homeland Security Council (HSC), created by P.L. 107-296 , provides policy and interagency guidance. An HSC Policy Coordination Committee on R&D was created pursuant to Executive Order 13228. Former DHS Under Secretary McQueary testified that, by the fall of 2004, all U.S. government R&D "relevant to fulfilling the Department's mission will have been identified and co-ordinated as appropriate." He inventoried DHS's many R&D-related interagency activities in testimony before the House Committee on Science on February 16, 2005. In 2006, GAO issued a report dealing with Plum Island, DHS and USDA Are Successfully Coordinating Current Work, But Long-Term Plans Are Being Assessed (GAO-06-132). Controversial issues about DHS's R&D include preventing conflicts of interest in awarding R&D funds since many DHS S&T portfolio managers are hired from, and will return to, national laboratories which are among the contenders for DHS R&D contracts and awards' decisions, which according to GAO, are often undocumented (based on DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, December 2005, GAO-06-206); providing Congress with more detailed information regarding priority setting and R&D budgeting and spending (see H.Rept. 109-476 and S.Rept. 109-273 on DHS's FY2007 appropriations request); monitoring HSARPA's mission and performance in transitioning homeland security technology to the field; assessing possible waste in technology procurement; improving the effectiveness of DHS's S&T (only one program of six that were evaluated using OMB's Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) received a score of "highly effective"); developing S&T priorities that meet responder needs and benefit from external experts' advice; monitoring the adequacy of cybersecurity R&D; and improving linkages between providing rapid scientific and technical expertise and decisionmaking and responding to weapons of mass destruction attacks and incidents. DHS's Acting Inspector General testified on January 26, 2005 before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the S&T Directorate needs to better integrate threat assessment information into its priority-setting and to improve inter- and intra-agency coordination. Executive Order 13311 transferred to DHS the President's responsibilities to design procedures to protect sensitive unclassified homeland security information that were mandated by Sec. 892 of P.L. 107-296 . DHS issued guidance for its own information control procedures in Management Directive System MD Number: 11042.1 , 01/05/05 , but has not yet released government-wide guidance on this controversial topic. For additional information, see CRS Report RL33303, "Sensitive But Unclassified" Information and Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information . During the 109 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1817 , a DHS authorization bill, on May 18, 2005; it was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. It would have required creation of the Technology Clearinghouse mandated in P.L. 107-296 , a homeland security technology transfer program, and a working group, including the DOD Secretary, to advise the clearinghouse to identify relevant military technologies. It would also have required assessment of whether DHS procurements are candidates for the litigation and risk management protections of P.L. 107-296 , established a university center of excellence for border security, authorized academic and other types of cybersecurity R&D, and allowed DOE laboratories to participate in proposal writing and other activities of the university centers of excellence. On June 14, 2006, the Homeland Security Committee reported two bills. An amended H.R. 4941 , the Homeland Security S&T Enhancement Act, would have required DHS to transfer anti-terrorism technology developed by federal agencies or the private sector, to develop standards for first-responder communications equipment, require the government to share results of tests of equipment with first responders, to develop a strategic plan for S&T activities, and to work to develop guidelines for researchers about the potential homeland security implications of their work. H.R. 4942 , the Promoting Anti-Terrorism Capabilities Through International Cooperation Act, would have required DHS's S&T Directorate to support homeland security R&D with U.S. allies. It was reported ( H.Rept. 109-674 ), amended, and approved on September 26, 2006. H.R. 5814 , an authorization bill, reported by the Homeland Security Committee on July 19, 2006, would have streamlined SAFETY Act procedures to develop anti-terrorism technology, enhanced biosurveillance systems, and created an assistant secretary for cybersecurity.

P.L. 107-296, the Homeland Security Act, consolidated some research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For FY2007, Congress appropriated an R&D budget (excluding management/procurement) totaling about $1.0 billion, about 22% less than FY2006, and representing the first decline in DHS's R&D funding since the inception of DHS in 2002. DHS is mandated to coordinate all federal agency homeland security R&D, which was requested at about $5.1 billion. During the 110th Congress, contentious policy issues relating to DHS's R&D are likely to include priority-setting, management, possible waste in research and technology programs, and improving program performance results. This report will be updated.

RS21569 -- Geographical Indications and WTO Negotiations July 14, 2003 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) defines geographical indications as"indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory,where a givenquality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin." (1) The term is most often,although not exclusively, applied to wines, spirits, and agricultural products. Examples of geographical indicationsare Roquefortcheese, Idaho potatoes, Champagne, or Tuscan olive oil. Geographical indications protect consumers from the use of deceptive or misleading labels. They also provide consumers withchoices among products and with information on which to base their choices. Producers benefit becausegeographical indicationsgive them recognition for the distinctiveness of their products in the market. They are thus commercially valuable.As intellectualproperty, geographical indications are eligible for relief from acts of infringement and/or unfair competition. (2) The use of geographical indications for wines and dairy products particularly, which some countries consider to be protectedintellectualproperty, and others consider to be generic or semi-generic terms, has become a contentious international trade issue. The TRIPS Agreement provides two levels of protection for geographical indications and lists exceptions to TRIPS rules for theirprotection. TRIPS provides general standards of protection for all geographical indications . WTO members must provide the legal means forinterested parties to prevent the misleading or deceptive use of these terms and other forms of unfair competition. WTO membersmust refuse or invalidate the registration of a misleading trademark which contains or consists of a geographicalindication, if amember's legislation so permits or at the request of an interested party. TRIPS provides additional protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits . WTOmember countries must provide thelegal means for interested parties to prevent misuse of a geographical indication of wines and spirits even wheresuch use does notmislead the public. No exception is granted even if the true origin of the goods is indicated, the geographicalindication is used intranslation, or is accompanied by expressions such as "kind," "type," "style," "imitation," or the like. Theregistration of a misleadingtrademark for wines or spirits must be refused or invalidated. To facilitate the protection of geographical indicationsfor wines, WTOmembers agreed to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration ofgeographical indications forwines eligible for protection in those members participating in the system. Exceptions to the protection of geographical indications include: where a term has been used for at least 10 years prior to April 15,1994, or in good faith if prior to that date; where a term is also subject to good faith trademark rights; where a termhas significance asa personal name; and where a term has become identified with the common name for a good or service. During the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), the European Union (EU) and Switzerland made proposals for ahigher level of protection for geographical indications than provided in existing international agreements. They alsoproposed amultilateral registry for geographical indications. (3) The EU/Swiss proposal would have eliminated most of the exceptions in Article24 which permit the use, for example, of such names as Chablis, Burgundy, or Champagne based on prior or goodfaith use. TheUnited States, on the other hand, while pressing for strong intellectual property protections in general, proposedmore limitedprotections for geographical indications. (4) The UnitedStates proposed simply (1) that member countries would protect geographicalindications of any products through registration of certification or collective marks (see below), and (2) thatappellations of origin ofwines that had not become generic names would be guaranteed protection against misleading use. The resulting TRIPS provisions for geographical indications represented a compromise between these two positions and postponeddebate over a multilateral registry for wines and spirits and over extending higher protections to agriculturalgeographical indications. The TRIPS compromise on protection of geographical indications reflects more the EU's expansive proposals thanthe United States'more modest ones. In the United States, geographical indications are protected under the U.S. Trademark Act (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.). Section 4 of theTrademark Act (15 U.S.C. 1054) provides for the registration of "certification marks including indications ofregional origin." Thekinds of certification marks recognized in the Trademark Act include marks that certify that goods or servicesoriginate in a specificgeographic region. These would be the kinds of marks most likely viewed as geographical indications underTRIPS. (6) Partiesasserting rights to use a geographical indication can obtain formal protection via use of the trademark systemthrough registration as acertification mark. (7) The U.S. system for recognitionfor geographic indications applies equally to foreign geographic indications. Anexample is U.S. Registration No. 571,798 ("ROQUEFORT") for that French cheese. Other means also would beavailable to protectgeographical indications (see footnote 5 for details). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides protection for some specific geographical indications by recognizingthat Bourbon Whiskey, Tennessee Whiskey, Canadian Whiskey, Tequila, and Mezcal are "distinctive products" inthe NAFTA countries where they are produced (NAFTA, Chapter 3, Annex 313). The so-called D'Amato amendment (Section910 of P.L.105-32 ) provides authority for the use of "semi-generic" names of wines if the true place of origin also isindicated. (8) (This use is amain point of contention in both multilateral and bilateral negotiations with the EU.) Two issues concerning geographical indications are under consideration in the Doha Development Agenda: negotiations concerning amultilateral registry for wine and spirits; and debate over extending additional protections for agriculturalgeographical indications. (1) Negotiating a Multilateral Registry for Wine and Spirits The Ministerial declaration launching the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations established the fifth WTO MinisterialConference (September 10-14, 2003 in Cancun, Mexico) as the deadline for completing negotiations for amultilateral system ofnotification and registration. (9) In the negotiations, the EU has proposed a multilateral system of notification and registration that would create obligations for WTOmember countries to grant exclusive rights for individual geographic indications, rather than allow interested partiesto apply forprotection according to a country's national legal procedures. (10) Participation would be voluntary, but the multilateral registry wouldhave mandatory effect, so that notification of a geographical indication by one country creates a presumption thatit must be protectedeverywhere. Under the EU proposal, a country would be required to grant exclusive rights to producers in thenotifying country,unless it successfully challenged the notification in WTO dispute settlement. The EU lists among the advantages of a registry with mandatory effect the following. It would provide information to members aboutwhich geographical indications are protected in each member's territory. It would make operational the protectionsextended togeographical indications for wines and spirits provided in TRIPS Article 23, without requiring members to enactnew legislation oradministrative procedures. It would provide transparency and legal certainty to international trade in wine andspirits. The United States, Japan, Chile, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and others have all expressed concern about a registry withmandatory effect on grounds that it would lead to new and costly administrative burdens and legal obligations. Theysee the proposedmultilateral registry as a clearing house for information about the protection of specific geographical indications ineach country. Applications for protection of geographical indications would be made through existing legal procedures in a WTOmember country. While multilateral negotiations have been underway, the United States and the EU have been negotiating a bilateral wine agreement. A principal EU objective is to secure an end to U.S. use of "semi-generic" names for wines (see footnote 5). TheEU is also seekingprotection for what it calls traditional terms applied to wines such as "tawny" or "ruby red", among others. Aprincipal U.S. objectiveis to gain acceptance by the EU of U.S. wine-making practices. Because the EU only permits wine made inaccordance with itsregulations to be sold in the EU, a substantial amount of U.S. wine is blocked from that market. Australia and, morerecently, Canadahave concluded bilateral wine agreements with the EU which contain mutual recognition of wine making practicesand agreement byAustralia and Canada to phase out the use of the generic names still permitted under U.S. law. (2) Extending Additional Protection to Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products The second issue under debate in the TRIPS Council is that of extending the protection of geographical indications provided for inArticle 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to products other than wines and spirits. This and other so-calledimplementation issues ofimportance to developing countries were to have been addressed by the end of 2002, but were not. Proposals to extend protection accorded wines and spirits to other agricultural products have been made by the EU (11) and by a groupof European and developing countries. (12) Additional protection for geographical indications of agricultural products is viewed as acorollary of efforts to liberalize agricultural trade and to promote trade of goods with higher added value. Forexample, the EUexplicitly links extending protection for geographical indications to its strategy to promote the development ofquality agriculturalproducts. (13) Proponents also argue that increasedprotection would bring more effective protection of consumers. Negotiations onthis issue are taking place in the TRIPS Council, but the EU has linked reaching agreement on geographicalindications to itswillingness to deal with the agricultural negotiating issues of market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. Conversely, the United States and a number of other countries argue that the existing level of protection provided by TRIPS enablescountries to maintain access to existing markets; maintains ongoing access to trade opportunities in new andemerging markets;provides adequate protection to producers and consumers; and does not impose new administrative costs and legalobligations onmembers. (14) Additional costs cited by the UnitedStates include potential for consumer confusion (from re-naming and re-labelingproducts), potential producer conflicts within the WTO, and a heightened risk of WTO disputes. The debate over extending protection for geographical indications of agricultural products is reflected in the U.S. request forconsultations (the first step in WTO dispute settlement) with the EU on EU regulations for the protection ofgeographical indicationsfor wines and spirits (Community Regulation 1493/99) and for other agricultural products (Community Regulation2081/92). TheU.S. request, which has been joined by Australia, argues that the EU regulations violate the TRIPS Agreement(Article 22) byrequiring specific bilateral agreements, rather than recourse to national legal systems, before according recognitionto other countries'registered geographical indications. Commentators have suggested that this possible challenge to EU regulationsanticipates that EUenlargement to include 10 central and eastern European countries could create additional problems for U.S.registered trademarkowners vis-a-vis EU protected geographical names. (15) A case in point is the U.S.-owned Budweiser beer trademark which, althoughregistered in a number of EU countries, could come into question if the Czech Republic registers and claims thename Budweiser,even in translation, as a protected geographical indication in the EU. Decisions about geographical indications will be on the agenda of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun. The Chairman of theAgriculture negotiating group has identified geographical indications for agricultural products as an unresolvedissue. (16) Congress isclosely monitoring the Doha negotiations; the House Agriculture Committee has scheduled oversight hearings onthe protection ofgeographical indications for agricultural products. Should negotiations result in agreements that require changesin U.S. law coveringgeographical indications, Congress would take up legislation to implement such an agreement under expedited (fasttrack) proceduresestablished in the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ).

The issue of expanding intellectual property protections for geographical indicationsforwines, spirits, and agricultural products is being debated in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Geographicalindications areimportant in international trade because they are commercially valuable. Some European and developing countrieswant to establish tougher restrictions and limits on the use of geographical names for products, while the United States and associatedcountries arguethat the existing level of protection of such terms is adequate. Decisions about the future scope of protection ofgeographicalindications will be made as the current (Doha) round of multilateral trade negotiations continues. Congress ismonitoring thenegotiations and their potential impacts on U.S. producers. This report will be updated as events warrant.

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. For each title of the regular FSGG appropriations bill, Table 1 lists the enacted amounts for FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012, as well as amounts requested by the President for FY2013. Title I of the FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for the Department of the Treasury and its bureaus, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The President requested $13.24 billion for the Treasury Department for FY2013, an increase of $1.03 billion above FY2012 enacted amounts. The President's request includes a proposal to create a new bureau, the Fiscal Service, which would result from the merger of the Financial Management Service and the Bureau of the Public Debt. According to the budget request, the new bureau would reduce duplicative functions. Table 2 lists the enacted amounts for FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012, as well as amounts requested by the President for FY2013. Title II of the FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for all but three offices under the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The President requested $649 million for the EOP for FY2013, a decrease of $10 million below FY2012 enacted amounts. Table 3 lists the enacted amounts or FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012, as well as amounts requested by the President for FY2013. Title III of the FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for the judicial branch of the federal government, including the Supreme Court. As a co-equal branch of government, the judiciary presents its budget to the President, who transmits it to Congress unaltered. The President's FY2013 budget request for the judiciary is $7.19 billion, which is $219 million more than appropriated for FY2012. Table 4 lists the enacted amounts for FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012, as well as amounts requested by the President for FY2013. Title IV of the FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for the District of Columbia. The President's FY2013 budget request includes $680 million for special federal payments to the District, an increase of $15 million above FY2012 enacted amounts. Table 5 lists the enacted amounts for FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012, as well as amounts requested by the President for FY2013. Title V provides funding for more than two dozen independent agencies which perform a wide range of functions, including the management of federal real property (GSA), the regulation of financial institutions (SEC), and mail delivery (USPS). The President's FY2013 budget request includes $24.05 billion for independent agencies that receive their funding through the FSGG appropriations bill, an increase of $159 million over FY2012 funding levels. Table 6 lists the enacted amounts for FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012, as well as amounts requested by the President for FY2013.

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. Among those independent agencies are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded in the House through the Agriculture appropriations bill and in the Senate through the Financial Services and General Government bill. CFTC funding is included in all FSGG funding tables in this report. For FY2013, the President has requested $45.83 billion for agencies funded through FSGG appropriations, an increase of $1.41 billion above amounts enacted for FY2012.

During the 112 th Congress, Members faced the issue of whether to extend permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Russia and Moldova. On November 16, 2012, the House passed (365-43), and on December 6, 2012, the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. 6156 , which did just that, among other things. President Obama signed the legislation into law ( P.L. 112-208 ) on December 14, 2012. The 113 th Congress may face the issue of authorizing PNTR for at least two other countries—Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment is a fundamental principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), which governs trade in goods; of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). In essence, the principle requires that each WTO member treat the product of another member no less favorably than it treats a like product from any other member. If a member country lowers a tariff or nontariff barrier in its trade with another member that "concession" must apply to its trade with all other member countries. The United States grants all but a few countries, namely Cuba and North Korea, normal trade relations (NTR), or MFN, status. In practice, duties on the imports from a country that has not been granted NTR status are set at much higher levels—rates that are several times higher than those from countries that receive such treatment. Thus, imports from a non-NTR country can be at a significant price disadvantage compared with imports from NTR-status countries. The WTO agreements also require that MFN treatment be applied "unconditionally." However, when a WTO member determines that it cannot, for political or other reasons, accede to this or any other GATT/WTO principle toward a newly acceding member, it can "opt-out" of its obligations toward that member by invoking the non-application provision (Article XIII of the WTO or Article XXXV of the GATT). In so doing, the WTO member is declaring that the WTO obligations and mechanisms (e.g., the dispute settlement mechanism) are not applicable in its trade with the new member in question. Invoking the non-application clause is a double-edged sword. Although it relieves the member invoking the provision of applying MFN or any other obligations toward the new member, it also denies the benefits and protections that the WTO would provide to the former in its trade with the latter. In 1951, the United States suspended MFN status to all communist countries (except Yugoslavia) under Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. That provision was superseded by Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 401 of Title IV requires the President to continue to deny nondiscriminatory status to any country that was not receiving such treatment at the time of the law's enactment on January 3, 1975. In effect, this meant all communist countries, except Poland and Yugoslavia. Section 402 of Title IV, the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, denies the countries eligibility for NTR status as long as the country denies its citizens the right of freedom of emigration. These restrictions can be removed if the President determines that the country is in full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration conditions set out under the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Jackson-Vanik amendment also permits the President to waive full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration requirements if he determines that such a waiver would promote the objectives of the amendment, that is, encourage freedom of emigration. While Title IV addresses only freedom of emigration, Congress has used the law to press the subject countries on a number of economic and political issues. Removal of a country from Jackson-Vanik restrictions requires Congress to pass legislation. Czechoslovakia was an original signatory to the GATT in 1947. In 1951, the United States suspended MFN treatment because it had become communist. Because Czechoslovakia was an original signatory to the GATT and not a newly acceding member, the non-application provision did not apply. Instead, the United States sought and obtained from the other GATT signatories approval for the suspension of MFN treatment. The United States invoked the non-application provision when Romania and Hungary became GATT signatories in 1971 and 1973, respectively. These restrictions no longer applied after the United States, through legislation, extended unconditional MFN, or permanent normal trade relations (PNTR), status to Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, and Romania after the fall of the communist governments in those countries. The United States granted PNTR to Albania, Bulgaria, and Cambodia before these countries acceded to the WTO, making it unnecessary to invoke the non-application provision. This was also the case for the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Mongolia joined the WTO on January 29, 1997, more than two years before the United States granted it PNTR. During that time, the United States invoked the non-application provision. It also invoked the provision with Armenia when it joined the WTO on February 5, 2003, and received PNTR on January 7, 2005, and with Kyrgyzstan when it joined the WTO on December 20, 1998, before receiving PNTR on June 29, 2000. Each bill authorizing PNTR for Mongolia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia contained a "finding" that extending PNTR would enable the United States to avail itself of all rights within the WTO regarding that country. The United States invoked Article XIII also in its trade relations with Vietnam on November 7, 2006, before PNTR for Vietnam went into effect, but had granted Ukraine PNTR status in 2006 prior to that country's accession to the WTO. It invoked non-application regarding Moldova and Russia prior to thsoe countries receiving PNTR status. As with the other communist countries, China was subject to the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The United States denied China MFN status until October 1979, when it was granted conditional MFN under the statute's presidential waiver authority. China acceded to the WTO on December 11, 2001. Congress passed legislation ( P.L. 106-286 ) removing the Jackson-Vanik requirement from U.S. trade with China and authorizing the President to grant PNTR to China, which he did on January 1, 2002. However, in the legislation, Congress linked the granting of PNTR to U.S. acceptance of conditions for accession to the WTO. It states that prior to making a determination on granting PNTR, "the President shall transmit to Congress a report certifying that the terms and conditions for the accession" of China to the WTO "are at least equivalent to those agreed to" in the bilateral agreement the United States and China reached as part of the accession process. China's bilateral agreement with the United States, which is contained in the final accession agreement, contains provisions for special safeguard procedures (codified in U.S. law as Sections 421-423 of the Trade Act of 1974) to be used when imports cause or threaten to cause market disruption in the United States. It also provides for a separate safeguard procedure in the case of surges in imports of textiles and wearing apparel from China, as well as special antidumping and countervailing duty procedures. All of these provisions have time limits. The legislation authorizing PNTR for China also provided for the establishment of a congressional-executive commission to monitor human rights protection in China to replace Congress's focus on this issue that occurred during the annual NTR renewal debate. Countries that are still subject to the restrictions have also applied for membership to the WTO and are at various stages of the accession process: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Congress usually has no legislative role in the accession of countries to the WTO. However, the legislative requirement for repeal of Title IV provides a role, albeit indirectly, in the cases of the above-mentioned affected countries by giving Congress leverage on the negotiation of conditions for WTO accession. Congress has several options. It could repeal the restrictions before the country(ies) actually enter(s) the WTO, completely separating the issues of Title IV repeal and WTO accession. This is the course that Congress has followed in most cases to date and would allow the United States to fulfill the unconditional MFN requirement prior to the country acceding to the WTO. Many of the countries in question, view the Jackson-Vanik requirements and the rest of the Title IV restrictions as Cold War relics that have no applicability to their current emigration policies and, more generally, to the types of governments they now have. They assert that their countries should be treated as normal trade partners and, therefore, that the restrictions should be removed unconditionally. A second option would be for Congress to link the granting of PNTR with the country's accession to the WTO. For example, Congress could follow the model established with PNTR for China by requiring the President to certify that the conditions under which the country is entering the WTO are at least equivalent to the conditions that the United States agreed to under its bilateral accession agreement with the country. It can be argued that in this way, Congress helped define, at least indirectly, the conditions under which China entered the WTO. However, the candidate countries would probably bridle at such treatment, asserting that they would be asked to overcome hurdles that are not applied to most of the other acceding countries, especially countries not subject to Jackson-Vanik. During the debate on PNTR for Russia, some Members of Congress raised concerns about Russia's fulfillment of commitments in certain areas and wanted some assurances. H.R. 6156 , which authorized PNTR for Russia, contained provisions that required the USTR report annually to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee on Russia's implementation of its WTO commitments, including sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards and IPR protection and on acceding to the WTO plurilateral agreements on government procurement and information technology; the USTR report to the two committees within 180 days and annually thereafter on USTR actions to enforce Russia's compliance with its WTO commitments; the USTR and the Secretary of State report annually on measures that they have taken and results they have achieved to promote the rule of law in Russia and to support U.S. trade and investment by strengthening investor protections in Russia; the Secretary of Commerce to take specific measures against bribery and corruption in Russia, including establishing a hotline and website for U.S. investors to report instances of bribery and corruption; a description of Russian government policies, practices, and laws that adversely affect U.S. digital trade be included in the USTR's annual trade barriers report (required under section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974); and the negotiation of a bilateral agreement with Russia on equivalency of SPS measures. A third option would be for Congress to not repeal Title IV at all. This option would send a strong message to the partner country of congressional concerns or discontent with its policies or practices without preventing the country's entrance into the WTO. At the same time, the United States would have to invoke the non-applicability provision (Article XIII) in its trade relations with that country. The United States would not benefit from the concessions that the partner country made in order to accede to the WTO. The United States would not be bound by WTO rules in its trade relations with the country, nor would that country be so bound in its trade with the United States. For example, the WTO dispute settlement body mechanism would not be available to the two countries in their bilateral trade relationship. In determining which option to exercise, Congress faces the balance of costs and benefits of each. In addition, how Congress treats each of the countries relative to the others could have implications for U.S. relations with them. The 113 th Congress may face the issue of extending PNTR to at least two r countries. On December 10, 2012, WTO members invited Tajikistan to join, subject to that country's ratification of its accession package. In addition, Kazakhstan may accede to the WTO in 2013. Both countries are currently subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.

Unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) status, or in U.S. statutory parlance, normal trade relations (NTR) status, is a fundamental principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under this principle, WTO members are required unconditionally to treat imports of goods and services from any WTO member no less favorably than they treat the imports of like goods and services from any other WTO member country. Under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, most communist or nonmarket-economy countries were denied MFN status unless they fulfilled freedom-of-emigration conditions as contained in Section 402, the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, or were granted a presidential waiver of the conditions, subject to congressional disapproval. The statute still applies to some of these countries, even though most have replaced their communist governments. The majority of these countries have joined the WTO or are candidates for accession. Several countries are close to completing the accession process, and Congress could soon face the issue of what to do about their NTR status to ensure that the United States benefits from those accession agreements. During the 112th Congress, Members faced the issue of whether to extend permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Russia and Moldova. On November 16, 2012, the House passed (365-43), and on December 6, 2012, the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. 6156, which did just that, among other things. The legislation also included provisions—the Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012—that impose sanctions on individuals linked to the incarceration and death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. President Obama signed the legislation into law (P.L. 112-208) on December 14, 2012. The 113th Congress may face the issue of extending PNTR to at least two other countries. On December 10, 2012, WTO members invited Tajikistan to join, subject to that country's ratification of its accession package. In addition, Kazakhstan may accede to the WTO in 2013. Both countries are currently subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.

The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established by the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461, et seq.) and now provides preferential duty-free entry of up to 5,000 agricultural and non-agricultural products for 120 designated beneficiary countries and territories. Agricultural products under the program totaled $2.6 billion in 2015, accounting for 15% of the total value of annual GSP imports. Some in Congress have called for changes to the program that could limit or curtail benefits to certain countries. The program was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27 ). Expiration of the program in 2017 means that GSP renewal could be a legislative issue in the 115 th Congress. In recent years, GSP has been reauthorized through a series of short-term extensions. In 2015, U.S. imports under GSP totaled $17.7 billion, accounting for roughly 1% of all commodity imports. Leading U.S. imports under the program are manufactured products and parts, chemicals, plastics, minerals, and forestry products. Agricultural products accounted for 15% of all imports under GSP, totaling $2.6 billion in 2015. Compared to 2010, the value of agricultural imports under the program has nearly doubled. Imports under the program account for about 2% of total U.S. agricultural imports. Table 1 shows the leading agricultural products (ranked by value) imported into the United States under the program. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs; beverages and drinking waters; processed and fresh fruits and vegetables; sugar and sugar confectionery; olive oil; and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. More than one-third of agricultural imports under GSP (based on value) include food processing inputs, such as miscellaneous processed foods, processed oils and fats, fruit and vegetable preparations, and ag-based chemicals and byproducts ( Table 1 ). About 15% of GSP agricultural imports consist of sugar and sugar-based products, and cocoa and cocoa-containing products. Mineral waters and other types of beverages account for about 12%, while olive oil accounts for about 8% of the value of GSP agricultural imports. Fresh fruits and vegetables account for another 11%, with roughly half of that consisting of bananas and other tropical produce imports. Most GSP agricultural imports are supplied by beneficiary countries that have been identified for possible graduation from the program. In 2015, five beneficiary countries ranked by import value—Thailand, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey—accounted for roughly two-thirds of the value of agricultural imports under the GSP program (see Table 2 ). Thailand and Brazil alone accounted for 40% of agricultural imports under the program. GSP was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27 ). Over the past decade, GSP renewal has been somewhat controversial. Some in Congress have continued to call for changes to the program, including tightening the program's requirements on products that can be imported under the program and limiting GSP benefits for certain eligible countries. Leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have continued to express an interest in evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs, including GSP, and broader reform of these programs might be possible. Both committees have conducted a series of oversight hearings in recent years, focused on determining the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs and discussing ways to reform them. Others have continued to call for meaningful reforms to GSP. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has published a series of reports highlighting the perceived benefits and shortcomings of U.S. preference programs, including GSP. Amendments to GSP followed extensive debate about the program during the 109 th Congress. Specifically, some in Congress questioned the inclusion of certain more advanced "beneficiary developing countries" (BDCs) under GSP and also commented that certain countries had contributed to the ongoing impasse in multilateral trade talks in the WTO Doha Development Agenda. In response to these concerns, both Congress and the previous Administrations have made changes to the program regarding product coverage (e.g., the type of products that can be imported under the program) and country eligibility (e.g., limiting GSP benefits to certain countries). Congress enacted a number of amendments to GSP as part of its annual review in 2006 by tightening the program's rules on "competitive need limits" (CNL) waivers that allow imports from beneficiary countries in excess of GSP statutory thresholds for some products ( P.L. 109-432 ). CNLs are quantitative ceilings on GSP benefits for a particular product from a particular BDC. CNL waivers allow for certain products to be imported from a country duty-free under GSP despite the statutory import thresholds. Periodically USTR has revoked a country's CNL waiver, as part of the agency's program review. For example, as part of USTR's 2006 review, Côte d'Ivoire lost its CNL waivers for fresh or dried shelled kola nuts (HTS 0802.90.94). In 2006, the statute was amended to allow for the revocation of any waiver that has been in effect for at least five years, if a GSP eligible product from a specific country has an annual trade level in the previous calendar year that exceeds 150% of the annual dollar value limit or exceeds 75% of all U.S. imports. In July 2015, USTR granted a CNL waiver for coconut products (HTS 2008.19.15) from Thailand. USTR further granted CNL waivers, in July 2016, for the following products: (1) certain pitted dates (HTS 0804.10.60) from Tunisia; (2) certain inactive yeasts (HTS 2102.20.60) from Brazil; and (3) certain nonalcoholic beverages (HTS 2202.90.90) from Thailand. Other existing waivers include sugar and preserved bananas (Philippines); sugar, carnations, figs, yams, and gelatin derivatives (Colombia); and animal hides (South Africa and Thailand). A listing of all current CNL waivers, including for agricultural products under GSP, is available in USTR's GSP Guidebook . In addition, the most recent GSP extension in 2015 broadly designated five new cotton products as eligible for GSP status (for least-developed beneficiary developing countries only), along with some other non-agricultural products ( Table 3 ). Some African cotton-producing nations, such as Benin, Burkino Faso, Chad, and Mali, are among the current list of eligible countries. To date, no cotton imports have been reported under these new import categories. In early 2012, the Obama Administration implemented a number of actions affecting certain countries' eligibility under the GSP program. Included was the suspension of GSP eligibility of Argentina. Argentina was among the program's top beneficiary countries, accounting for more than 10% of all agricultural imports under the GSP (ranked by import value). The President suspended GSP benefits for Argentina because "it has not acted in good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partnership, or association that is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens." (In October 2016, the Government of Argentina requested designation as a beneficiary of the GSP, which is under review by USTR.) In 2012, Gibraltar and the Turks and Caicos were graduated from the program after they were determined to have become "high income" countries, while the Republic of South Sudan and Senegal were designated as "least-developed beneficiary developing countries" (LDBDCs), becoming eligible under GSP. Other countries have since been suspended from GSP. The Administration announced the suspension of GSP benefits for Bangladesh in June 2013. To date, USTR has not reinstated Bangladesh's GSP status. In 2014, following Russia's invasion of Crimea, many in Congress became critical of Russia's status as a GSP beneficiary. Russia's GSP status was officially terminated in October 2014. Under GSP, Russia had exported nearly $20 million of agricultural products in 2012, duty-free, including grain-based products, cocoa preparations, sugar and molasses-based confectionary, tree nuts, and other products. In September 2015, President Obama announced, among other things, that Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela had become "high income" countries and were no longer eligible to receive GSP benefits, effective January 1, 2017. In September 2016, USTR reinstated Burma's (Myanmar's) eligibility for GSP benefits as an LDBDC, effective November 13, 2016. For more information and for a discussion of possible legislative options, see CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress . Changes made to GSP in the past decade have affected the overall distribution and volume of both agricultural and non-agricultural product imports under the program. The suspension from GSP of some countries, such as Argentina, likely has had an impact on agricultural trade under the program. Argentina had been among the main beneficiary countries under GSP and in earlier years accounted for more than one-tenth of all agricultural imports under GSP (ranked by import value). In 2012, Argentina had exported $116 million of agricultural products under the program, accounting for nearly 5% of the total value of GSP agricultural imports. Products imported from Argentina under GSP included casein, olive oil, prepared meats, gelatin derivatives, cheese and curd, sugar confectionery, wine, and other food products. Other countries whose GSP beneficiary status has been suspended or who have graduated out of the program had not been major suppliers of U.S. agricultural imports under the program. Aside from changes made to the list of eligible GSP countries, other statutory changes to GSP tightening rules for CNL waivers may not have greatly affected U.S. agricultural imports under the program. Historically, there have been few CNL waivers for agricultural products imported duty-free under GSP. Other types of program changes, however, could affect U.S. agricultural imports under the program, including additional limits on CNL waivers from certain countries or graduation of some beneficiary countries. Some African cotton-producing nations are now eligible to supply certain cotton products to the United States, but data are not yet available to determine whether imports will consequently increase under these new categories. Although USTR has continued to conduct annual reviews of the program, it has not conducted a broad review that has solicited extensive stakeholder comment. However, previous comments submitted to USTR as part of its 2006 review from U.S. agricultural industry groups indicate that opinions vary among U.S. agricultural groups regarding the program. For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) expressed its general opposition to the GSP program, stating that products imported duty-free under the program compete with U.S.-produced goods without granting a commensurate level of opportunity for U.S. producers in foreign markets. AFBF further supported withdrawal of CNL waivers for the Philippines, Argentina, and Colombia. The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) expressed support for the current GSP program and identified certain agricultural products of importance to GMA under the program, including sugar confections, spices, and certain processed foods and inputs from Brazil, India, and Argentina. GMA's position was generally supported by comments from the American Spice Trade Association, the National Confectioners Association, and the Chocolate Manufacturers Association. GMA has previously supported congressional efforts to extend GSP. What remains unclear is whether duty-free access for most agricultural imports under the GSP greatly influences a country's willingness to export these products to the United States. In most cases, costs associated with import tariffs are borne by the importer. These costs may be passed on to the BDCs in terms of lower import prices. However, import tariffs to the United States for most of these products tend to be low. As calculated by CRS, ad valorem equivalent tariffs range from 3% to 4% for sugar, 2% to 10% for cocoa-containing products, 5% to 12% for confectionery, 1% to 2% for most processed meats, about 2% for olive oil, less than 1% for mineral water, and about 5% for agriculture-based organic chemicals. In general, any additional costs that might be incurred by the BDCs as a result of the proposed changes could be more than offset by the generally higher U.S. prices for most products compared to prices in other world markets. Nevertheless, the imposition of even relatively low import tariffs could represent an increase in input costs to some U.S. food processors and industrial users. These costs could be passed on to consumers through higher prices for these and other finished agricultural or manufactured products. As shown in Table 1 , most GSP agricultural imports are intermediate goods and inputs, such as raw sugar, miscellaneous processed foods, preparations, and byproducts, and agriculture-based organic chemicals.

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from designated developing countries. Agricultural imports under GSP totaled $2.6 billion in 2015, nearly 15% of the value of all U.S. GSP imports. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs; beverages and drinking waters; processed and fresh fruits and vegetables; sugar and sugar confectionery; olive oil; and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. The majority of these imports are from Thailand, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey, which combined account for roughly two-thirds of total agricultural GSP imports. GSP was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27). Expiration of the program in 2017 means that GSP renewal could be a legislative issue in the 115th Congress. Additional background information on such legislation is available in CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress. Over the past decade, GSP renewal has been somewhat controversial. Some in Congress have continued to call for changes to the program. Both Congress and the previous Administrations have made changes to the program regarding product coverage (e.g., the type of products that can be imported under the program) and country eligibility (e.g., limiting GSP benefits to certain countries). Both Congress and the previous Administrations have tightened and/or expanded the program's requirements on imports under certain circumstances. In recent years, a number of countries have had their GSP status revoked, including Argentina and Russia, among others. In September 2015, President Obama announced, among other things, that Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela had become "high income" countries and were no longer eligible to receive GSP benefits, effective January 1, 2017. Also, as part of the most recent GSP extension, Congress designated a few new product categories as eligible for GSP status, including some cotton products (for least-developed beneficiaries only) and other non-agricultural products. Congressional leaders have continued to express an interest in evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs, including GSP, and broader reform of these programs might be possible. Opinion within the U.S. agriculture industry is mixed, reflecting both support for and opposition to the current program.

RS21516 -- Iraq's Agriculture: Background and Status May 13, 2003 1. (back) Ahmad, Mahmood. "Agricultural PolicyIssues and Challenges in Iraq" Short- and Medium-term Options," from Iraq's Economic Predicament ,Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press,copyright©Kamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 179-180. 2. (back) FAOSTAT, Food and AgriculturalOrganization, United Nations, http://apps.fao.org/ Note: A hectare equals about 2.47 acres. 3. (back) PECAD, FAS, USDA. "Iraq CropProduction." January 16, 2003. http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad/highlights/2003/01/iraq_update/index.htm 4. (back) FAOSTAT, FAO, U.N. 5. (back) In the early 1990s, cultivated areatemporarily expanded to nearly 5.5 million hectares before returning to under 4 million. 6. (back) The Iraq government reported an expansionof irrigated area to 3.525 million hectares in 1990, but this appears unlikely and is inconsistent with anecdotalreports. This reported new irrigated area could be a "euphemistic"reclassification of the government program of draining the southeast marshlands. 7. (back) Springborg, Robert. "Infitah, AgrarianTransformation, and Elite Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq," The Middle East Journal , Vol. 40, No.1, Winter 1986, pp. 33-52. 8. (back) Ibid., p. 37. 9. (back) Springborg (1986), p. 40-41. 10. (back) FAOSTAT, FAO, U.N. 11. (back) Ibid. 12. (back) U.S. General Accounting Office. Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export Programs , NSIAD-91-76, November 1990, http://161.203.16.4/d22t8/142766.pdf Note: under GSM-102 USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantees repayment for credit salesof 3 years or less; under GSM-103, CCC guarantees repayment for credit sales of more than 3 years but less than10 years. 13. (back) Ibid, p. 22-23. 14. (back) United Nations, Office of the IraqProgram -- Oil for Food; "About the Program: In Brief." http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/inbrief.html 15. (back) Country Factsheet, The EconomistIntelligence Unit, http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq . 16. (back) The Economist , "Diggingfor defeat: Iraq," May 2, 1998, Vol. 348, No. 8066, p.44. 17. (back) U.S. Bureau of the Census,International Data Base (IDB), Iraq, Oct. 10, 2002; http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbacc.html 18. (back) FAOSTAT, FAO, U.N. 19. (back) UNDP, Iraq Country Office,1999-2000 Report, June 2000. 20. (back) USDA, PSD database, April 2003. Note: during 1960-69 annual cereal production per capita averaged 249 kilograms, this fell to 177 in the 1970s, and130 in the 1980s, but had regained ground to 155 kilograms during the1990-94 period.

Iraq's agricultural sector represents a small, but vital component of Iraq's economy.Over the past several decades agriculture's role in the economy has been heavily influenced by Iraq'sinvolvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, and by varyingdegrees of government efforts to promote and/or control agricultural production. In the mid-1980s, agricultureaccounted for only about 14% of the national GDP. After the imposition of U.N. sanctions and the Iraqigovernment's non-compliance with a proposed U.N. Oil-for-Food program in 1991, agriculture's share of GDP isestimatedto have risen to 35% by 1992. (1) Rapid population growth during the past three decades, coupled with limited arable land and a generalstagnation in agricultural productivity, has steadily increased dependence on imports to meet domestic food needssince themid-1960s. By 1980 Iraq was importing about half of its food supply. By 2002, between 80% and 100% of manybasic staples -- wheat, rice, sugar, vegetable oil, and protein meals -- were imported. This report will be updated if events warrant.

The International Military Education and Training program (IMET) was formally established in 1976 as part of a restructuring of the United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. It had its antecedents in legislation passed in 1949 that created the grant Military Assistance Program (MAP). IMET, as currently constituted, is intended to be a low-cost policy program to provide training in U.S. Defense Department schools to predominantly military students from allied and friendly nations on a grant basis. The foreign students must speak English and train to U.S. standards, alongside American military personnel and other foreign students. They are offered courses in military skills and doctrine, exposed to the U.S. professional military establishment and the American way of life, including democratic values, respect for internationally recognized human rights, and the belief in the rule of law. Students are also exposed to U.S. military procedures and the manner in which the military functions under civilian control. Through the IMET program, the United States seeks to influence students who may rise to positions of prominence in foreign governments, expose foreign students to a professional military in a democratic society, and professionalize foreign armed forces. It also seeks to strengthen regional relationships while enhancing the self-defense capabilities of U.S. friends and allies, as well as enhancing the ability of the U.S. and participant nations to conduct military operations and peacekeeping activities together. Many nations come to participate in IMET, in part, to enhance their capabilities to utilize effectively the defense articles and services they obtain from the United States. The United States in recent years has annually trained, on average, over 10,000 students from approximately 130 countries through IMET. Formal instruction involves over 2,000 courses, nearly all of which are taught in the United States at approximately 150 military schools and installations. Other activities utilized to achieve IMET goals include orientation tours for key senior military and civilian officials, observer training, and on-the-job training. The United States Coast Guard also provides education and training in maritime search and rescue, operation and maintenance of aids to navigation, port security, at-sea law enforcement, international maritime law, and general maritime skills. Senior Service Schools . The Service War Colleges and the National Defense University's (NDU) National War College programs are attended by U.S. and foreign senior military and civilian equivalents. These programs focus on service/national security policy and the politico-military aspects of Service/Defense policies and programs. The Services and the Joint Staff (for the NDU) annually provide invitations to the governments of foreign friends and allies, for foreign student participation. The senior service schools remain a significant element of IMET sponsored training. The specific schools and their locations are as follows: NDU, Fort McNair, Washington DC; Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Navy War College, Newport, RI; Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. Professional Military Education (PME) Program s. The United States military services offer numerous programs and courses categorized as professional training. These include Service Command and Staff College programs, basic and advanced officer training in specialized areas such as finance, ordnance, artillery and medicine. PME programs and the senior service school programs combined account for approximately 50% of the annual IMET appropriation. A representative listing of the schools involved include Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KA; Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, VA; U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA; Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. English Language Training. The majority of IMET sponsored training is conducted in the United States at Defense Department and U.S. military Service schools, with U.S. military personnel. Therefore, English language proficiency is required. The U.S. Defense Department has assigned the English language training mission to the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC), located at Lackland Air Force Base, TX. DLIELC provides resident English language training in state-of-the art facilities. Additionally, DLIELC conducts English language training surveys to evaluate foreign government programs and will assign instructors as a "detachment" to the host country to personally assist in the establishment and maintenance of their English language training program. In 1990, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees initiated a statutory change based on their view that changing world political-military circumstances warranted a new direction for the traditional IMET program, one that would bring an increased emphasis on enhancing the skills and professionalism of both civilian and military leaders and managers of foreign military establishments. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1991 ( H.R. 5114 , P.L. 101-513 , signed November 5, 1990) directed the Defense Department to establish a program within IMET focused, in particular, on training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering military establishments and budgets; creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights; and fostering greater respect for the principle of civilian control of the military. Congress earmarked $1 million of the FY1991 IMET Appropriation to be used to establish this program. This initiative is called Expanded IMET, or E-IMET, and each year the Defense Department has broadened the program. Although Congress did not earmark IMET funds to support this program after FY1991, it has in report language noted an expectation that the financial investment in E-IMET be increased. Congress further broadened the program to include participation by members of national legislatures who are responsible for oversight and management of the military, and "individuals who are not members of a government." Because E-IMET is a sub-element of the overall IMET program, it is funded as part of the annual IMET appropriation. The E-IMET initiative is accomplished through educational programs in the United States offered by U.S Defense Department and U.S. military Service schools, by Mobile Education Teams visiting host countries, and by funding military participation in overseas conferences, such as the African American Institutes' seminar on "The Role of the Military in a Democracy" (a joint USAID, World Bank and IMET funded initiative). Although IMET funding can be used for such an initiative (overseas seminars) under the auspices of the E-IMET program when such activities are deemed appropriate, the emphasis and preference is for a longer training experience in the United States that maximizes the students' exposure to the American way of life. Beginning in FY1991, the Defense Department launched E-IMET by refining some existing programs and initiating new courses through the military departments. Further, new educational programs were established to address the topics of military justice, human rights and civil-military relations. The bulk of this effort is accomplished through three schools: Defense Resource Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA; Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; and the Naval Justice School, Newport, RI. Defense Reso urce Management Institute (DRMI). The Defense Resource Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, CA, was tasked with meeting the E-IMET criteria to assist recipients establish processes for more effective defense resources management. DRMI reactivated a two week Mobile Education Team, which takes the curriculum to the host country, and developed two resident programs within the U.S.—the 11-week, mid-level International Defense Management Course, and the four-week Senior International Defense Management Course established for flag-rank military and civilian equivalents. The Naval Justice School . Under Defense Department assistance and guidance, the Naval Justice School established a program to address the topics of military justice and human rights. They developed a multi-phased program, comprised of seminars and resident programs, designed to culminate in the passage of a rewritten military code by their national legislature. Albania was the first nation to legislate into effect its rewritten military code in October 1995. The Center for Civil-Military Re lations (CCMR) . The Center for Civil-Military Relations, located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA, was established by DOD's Defense Security Assistance Agency to provide a broad range of innovative graduate level educational programs and research to address the issue of civil-military relations in a democratic society. This program is first conducted as a one week seminar, held in the host country, which is attended by ministers, key parliamentarians, ranking military representatives, and the U.S. Ambassador. It is followed with resident programs within the United States, to include a one year accelerated graduate degree program—the first class of which began in January 1996. Other E-IMET Programs . All E-IMET approved programs are published in an annual E-IMET Handbook. The handbook reflects the various programs described above and others covering such topics as equal opportunity, financial management, and maritime law. In addition, the E-IMET effort was recently broadened to include environmental military law and resource management issues. As worldwide U.S. military assistance funding levels have declined in the post-Cold War era, the IMET program is viewed by its supporters as a valuable tool in support of American foreign policy. IMET, and within it, E-IMET, are seen as a low-cost means of maintaining access to and influencing the military and civilian leaderships of nations with political traditions less democratic in nature than most Western democracies. By making professional military training available to U.S. friends and allies, IMET also enhances the ability of participating countries to make the most of U.S. weaponry they have obtained from the United States, thereby increasing the self-defense capabilities of these nations—and lessening the need for U.S. military forces to be utilized to protect such nations. Advocates of a strong IMET program believe it should be afforded increased funding to build on the programs' successes in the past, and to enable IMET to be extended to more of the emerging nations of the former Soviet Union, while continuing to provide assistance to traditional clients. Critics of IMET argue that it is a relic of the high Cold War era and has been, at best, only marginally successful in advancing United States foreign policy interests. Indeed, IMET opponents believe that much of the training related to human rights issues and exposure to American democratic institutions is conducted in a pro forma fashion, and is, in any event, not taken seriously by many foreign participants. IMET critics argue that a number of the program's notably effective military elements should be drastically curtailed, if not totally eliminated, because they enhance the capabilities of anti-democratic military establishments and associate the United States with their practices. Should IMET focus almost exclusively on training foreign military and civilian participants in U.S. democratic values, institutions, and principles of human rights, they might be prepared to support carefully targeted funding of the program. But in the absence of a substantial re-direction of the program toward these ends, these opponents would support a termination of the program. The level of funding for IMET has increased significantly since FY1995 from $26.35 million to an estimated $91.7 million for FY2004, while overall foreign assistance program funding has continued to decline. The recent funding levels represent a restoration of IMET funding to levels more consistent with those that existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It also reflects support for efforts to meet training requirements generated by 29 newly emerging democracies globally. The Defense Department expects the costs associated with the IMET program to increase due to inflation, to growing requirements of Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (NIS), to the increasing popularity of Expanded IMET, and efforts to maintain existing programs in Africa and Latin America. In addition, since FY1994, the United States has placed a strict limitation on the amount of technical and high-cost training in response to an earlier large reduction in IMET funding. Instead emphasis has been placed on the U.S. military services' senior service school programs, professional military educational efforts, Expanded IMET and English language training. As a result, there has been a notable reduction in the proportion of technical training. In FY1995, for example, technical training represented about 17% of the overall IMET appropriation, while professional military education programs constituted over 50% of the appropriation. These facts raise the current issue of whether or not more resources, and possibly more funds, should be made available for technical training. This issue may become more acute as the United States attempts to advance its policy goals in NATO enlargement (which might well require training on NATO interoperable systems), and in seeking to help IMET participants enhance their ability to assume greater roles in international peacekeeping operations. However, any decision to provide additional funding for IMET would mean that those funds could come at the expense of other programs, given current budgetary constraints. In recent years, American concerns with human rights practices of certain nations that were recipients of United States foreign aid has led to restrictions or conditions being placed on their participation in the IMET program. In the case of Indonesia, for example, Congress has required that the President make a number of certifications about the actions of the Indonesian government before funds can be provided under the Expanded IMET program. In some cases, the IMET program represents the major current vehicle for contact between the United States military and its counterparts in countries with a record of human rights violations or a tradition of authoritarian or undemocratic governments. As reductions in the United States Foreign Military Financing program (FMF) continue, IMET is increasingly the remaining military assistance program that Congress can use to sanction nations it finds to be abusing the human rights of its people. At the same time, IMET may also be the only instrument available that might assist in changing the attitudes of military-dominated governments and lead to a reduction in human rights abuses and greater levels of democratic government. A current issue, then, is whether using IMET restrictions to sanction nations with poor human rights records can be an effective means for modifying the behavior of their governments.

This report provides background on the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). It discusses the program's main features and purposes, perspectives of the IMET's supporters and critics, and recent issues surrounding the program and its implementation. The United States in recent years has trained annually, on average, over 10,000 students from approximately 130 countries. Formal instruction under IMET involves over 2,000 courses, nearly all of which are taught in the United States at approximately 150 military schools and installations. As the size of the United States foreign assistance program has declined, the IMET program has attracted greater attention as an instrument for serving broad U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. At the same time the program, and placement of restrictions on its participants, has also been an instrument for expressing concerns about the human rights practices of certain nations that have been IMET program participants. This report will be revised should major changes occur in the IMET program.

The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) was enacted on December 19, 2014. The law outlines seven areas of reform that affect how federal agencies purchase and manage their information technology (IT) assets, including— enhancing the authority of agency chief information officers (CIOs); improving transparency and risk management of IT investments; setting forth a process for agency IT portfolio review; refocusing the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) from only consolidation to optimization; expanding the training and use of "IT Cadres," as initially outlined in the "25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Management Technology"; maximizing the benefits of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI); and creating a govemment-wide software purchasing program, in conjunction with the General Services Administration. On June 10, 2015, OMB published guidance to implement the requirements of FITARA and harmonize existing policy and guidance with the new law. Among other goals, the requirements are intended to— assist agencies in establishing management practices that align IT resources with agency missions, goals, programmatic priorities, and statutory requirements; establish government-wide IT management controls that will meet FITARA requirements while providing agencies with the flexibility to adapt to agency processes and unique mission requirements; establish universal roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the agency CIO and other senior agency officials; strengthen the agency CIO's accountability for the agency's IT costs, schedules, performance, and security; strengthen the relationship between agency and bureau CIOs; establish consistent government-wide interpretation of FITARA terms and requirements; and provide appropriate visibility and involvement of the agency CIO in the management and oversight of IT resources to support the implementation of effective cybersecurity policies. In addition to implementing FITARA, OMB Memorandum M-15-14, "Management and Oversight of Federal Information Technology," also harmonizes the requirements of FITARA with existing law, primarily the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the E-Government Act of 2002. Those laws require OMB to issue management guidance for information technology and electronic government activities across the government, respectively. FITARA also contains provisions that required OMB interpretation before implementation. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the federal government budgets more than $80 billion each year for IT investment. In FY2017, that investment will be more than $89 billion. Unfortunately, these investments often incur "multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays," may contribute little to mission-related outcomes, and in some cases fail altogether. For example— the Department of Defense (DOD) canceled its Expeditionary Combat Support System in December 2012 after it had spent more than a billion dollars, but had not deployed the system within five years of initially obligating funds; the Department of Homeland Security's Secure Border Initiative Network program was canceled in January 2011 after it had spent more than $1 billion because the program did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards; the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA's) Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise program, which was intended to be delivered by 2014 at a total estimated cost of $609 million, was terminated in October 2011 due to challenges in managing the program; the Farm Service Agency's Modernize and Innovate the Delivery of Agricultural Systems program, which was to replace aging hardware and software applications that process benefits to farmers, was canceled after 10 years at a cost of at least $423 million, while delivering only about 20% of the functionality that was originally planned; and the Office of Personnel Management's Retirement System Modernization program was canceled in February 2011 after the agency had spent approximately $231 million on its third attempt to automate the processing of federal employee retirement claims. These undesirable results, according to GAO, "can be traced to a lack of disciplined and effective management and inadequate executive-level oversight." FITARA was enacted to reduce the likelihood of such results . Generally, agencies identified in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as well as their subordinate divisions and offices, are subject to the requirements of FITARA ( Table 1 ). The DOD, the Intelligence Community, and portions of other agencies that operate systems related to national security are subject to only certain portions of FITARA. Additionally, executive branch agencies not named in the CFO Act are encouraged, but not required, to follow FITARA guidelines. The OMB develops and promulgates guidance based on the codified requirements of FITARA and monitors agency implementation of that guidance. Additionally, Congress monitors the progress of FITARA implementation through audits conducted by GAO and hearings by relevant House and Senate committees. Between FY2010 and FY2015, GAO has made approximately 800 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve acquisition and operations of IT. As of October 2015, GAO reported that about a third of its recommendations had been implemented. That percentage remained the same in May 2016. Since FITARA was signed into law in December 2014, the Senate has held two hearings and the House has held four hearings on FITARA implementation: Risky Business: Examining GAO 's 2015 List of High Risk Government Programs Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Full Committee) February 11, 2015 Reducing Unnecessary Duplication in Federal Programs: Billions More Could Be Saved Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Full Committee) April 14, 2015 The Role of FITARA in Reducing IT Acquisition Risk Joint Hearing: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Subcommittees on Information Technology and Government Operations) June 10, 2015 The Role of FITARA in Reducing IT Acquisition Risk, Part II — Measuring Agencies' FITARA Implementation Joint Hearing: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Subcommittees on Information Technology and Government Operations) November 4, 2015 The Federal Information Technology Reform Act Scorecard 2.0 Joint Hearing: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Subcommittees on Information Technology and Government Operations) May 18, 2016 Federal Agencies' Reliance on Outdated and Unsupported Information Technology House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform May 25, 2016 The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform released a "FITARA scorecard" in conjunction with its November 4, 2015, hearing on the status of FITARA implementation (see Table 1 ). In explaining the scorecard, Representative Gerry Connolly, ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government Operations and co-author of FITARA, stated: This scorecard is not intended to be a juridical, prescriptive exercise. It is an initial assessment, a point in time snapshot, much like a quarterly report card one might get in a university or school. The intent isn't to punish or stigmatize. It is, in fact, to exhort and urge agencies to seize this opportunity, and use the scorecard as a management tool to better guide decision making and investments within the agency. While the grades themselves are illustrative of overall performance, it is the multiple elements that make up the grades on which agencies and our committee will focus to ensure we deliver on the transformative promise of FITARA. The committee scored agencies across four of the seven requirement areas of FITARA to develop a final score: data center consolidation plans, planned IT portfolio review savings, transparency of IT project risk assessment, and incremental development for IT projects. Across the four metrics and the final score, agencies earned a total of 14 "A" ratings out of 120 total grades. The only agencies to get a passing grade in each of the four categories were the Department of Commerce and the General Services Administration, which both received overall B ratings. GAO has stated that legislative oversight of agencies and their progress in implementing FITARA will continue and perhaps increase during 2016, as plans and expectations become more concrete. Another issue to be resolved is that OMB approved 22 out of 24 agencies' original self-assessments and FITARA implementation plans, but GAO found that not all of the self-assessments were accurate. OMB imposed an April 30, 2016, deadline for agencies to submit updated FITARA common baseline self-assessments and GAO has reported that as of May 2016, 22 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had made their plans publicly available.

Federal agencies rely on information technology (IT) to conduct their work, requiring extensive investments in both updating existing IT and developing new IT. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the federal government budgets more than $80 billion each year for IT investment. In FY2017, that investment will be more than $89 billion. Unfortunately, these investments often incur "multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays," may contribute little to mission-related outcomes, and in some cases fail altogether. The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) (P.L. 113-291) was enacted on December 19, 2014, to address this problem. FITARA outlines seven areas of reform to how federal agencies purchase and manage their information technology (IT) assets, including— enhancing the authority of agency chief information officers (CIOs); improving transparency and risk management of IT investments; setting forth a process for agency IT portfolio review; refocusing the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) from only consolidation to optimization; expanding the training and use of "IT Cadres," as initially outlined in the "25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Management Technology" issued by the CIO of the United States; maximizing the benefits of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI); and creating a govemment-wide software purchasing program, in conjunction with the General Services Administration. Not all federal agencies are covered by FITARA. Generally, agencies identified in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as well as their subordinate divisions and offices, are subject to the requirements of FITARA. The Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and portions of other agencies that operate systems related to national security are subject to only certain portions of FITARA. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published guidance to implement the requirements of FITARA in June 2015 (OMB Memorandum M-15-14). In addition to implementing FITARA, this guidance also harmonizes the requirements of FITARA with existing laws, primarily the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106) and the E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). The OMB also monitors agency implementation of FITARA. Congress also monitors the progress of FITARA implementation through audits conducted by GAO and hearings by relevant House and Senate committees. Since FITARA was signed into law, the Senate and House have each held two hearings on overall agency FITARA implementation. OMB imposed an April 30, 2016, deadline for agencies to submit updated FITARA common baseline self-assessments and GAO has reported that as of May 2016, 22 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had made their plans publicly available.

The FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5408 ) enacted into law by P.L. 106-398 , established authority for the Secretary of Defense to operate a facility for the purpose of providing "professional education and training to eligible nations of the Western Hemisphere within the democratic principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States...while fostering mutual knowledge, transparency, confidence, and cooperation among the participating nations and promoting democratic values, respect for human rights, and knowledge of United States customs and traditions." The name of the new facility is The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). This Institute is the successor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas, whose authorities were repealed in the legislation establishing the Institute. The purpose of the new Institute is to help prepare mid-level civilian and military personnel of eligible countries for various challenges involved in dealing with new transnational threats to the region. The Secretary of Defense is authorized by law to designate the Secretary of a military department as the Defense Department's executive agent for carrying out the responsibilities of the Defense Secretary in administering the Institute. The person designated for this task is the Secretary of the Army. The Institute is located on the grounds of the U.S. Army base at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Institute was formally opened on January 17, 2001, and has begun to conduct training at this location since that date. Individuals who are military, civilian, and law enforcement personnel from nations of the Western Hemisphere are eligible to participate in the Institute's education and training activities. By law, the Secretary of State is to be consulted in the selection of foreign personnel for education and training at the Institute. The Institute's faculty and staff consists of United States military officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel, in addition to guest foreign instructors. The State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross provide full-time and adjunct professors. The Institute also hosts up to three visiting Fellows annually. By law, the curriculum of the Institute must include "mandatory instruction for each student, for at least 8 hours, on human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a democratic society." The Institute is authorized to provide instruction and other training activities in the following areas: leadership development, counterdrug operations, peace support operations, disaster relief, and "any other matter that the Secretary determines appropriate." The Institute consists of three departments: Professional Military Education (PME), Civil-Military Studies, and the Training Battalion. The Professional Military Education Department provides five professional development courses to senior military commanders, staff officers, and junior officers dealing with topics such as joint military operations, course of action analysis, and decision making. These multinational courses are taught by both U.S. and foreign guest instructors, and range from five to 49 weeks in length. The Civil-Military Studies Department provides courses for both military and civilian students, focusing on skills and knowledge that can improve civil-military cooperation. The Institute's Human Rights/International Law Division is located in this Department. This Department is under the supervision and guidance of a State Department Foreign Service Officer who is an expert in Latin American and Caribbean affairs. Army lawyers, chaplains, and Latin American guest instructors conduct the eight functionally structured civil-military courses. These courses cover a broad spectrum of areas including: operational planning for peace operations; disaster relief, tactical planning and execution of counter drug operations, and civil-military operations. These courses include large numbers of civilian students representing both governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Training Battalion at the Institute provides the organization and cadre to teach and train military leadership and tactics to junior officers and non-commissioned officers. It also provides interagency instruction in counterdrug operations and in disaster relief. The Battalion provides 16 resident courses, consisting of tactical and leadership courses for both military officers and noncommissioned officers, as well as law enforcement officers. The goals of these courses are to enhance the professionalism of Latin American and Caribbean military field units and their conduct of military and interagency operations, while developing their skills in effectively interacting with civilians and neighboring military forces during the conduct of multilateral operations. Congress has demonstrated a long-standing interest in military instruction and training of foreign students at U.S. military installations. Controversies related to activities at the former U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, led to attempts from 1993 through 2000 to effect changes in the nature and focus of the training at that School, and in some instances to abolish it and its functions entirely. The strongest critics of this School, inside and outside the Congress, argued that in the post-Cold War circumstances, there was no compelling reason to continue its operations. Others in Congress took a different view, arguing that a military training institution for students from nations in the Western Hemisphere had continuing utility, but that it was important to ensure that its focus and training activities were consistent with support of U.S. interests, policies and values. In this context, Congress authorized the creation of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, while at the same time disestablishing the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the FY2001 Defense Department authorization , enacted into law on October 30, 2000. Through explicit statutory guidelines for the new Institute's operations, the need for funds to be appropriated annually, and the requirement for an annual report on the Institute's activities, Congress has indicated that it will continue to monitor the Institutes's progress in fulfilling its mandate. Key elements of oversight of the new Institute are described below. The Institute receives funding from three sources: Operations and Maintenance Funds, Army (OMA); International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Funds; and International Military Education and Training (IMET) Funds. Such funds are annually provided through the Defense Department appropriations legislation, and the Foreign Operations appropriations legislation. By law, tuition fees charged for persons who attend the Institute may not include the "fixed costs of operating and maintaining the Institute." The Defense Department's preliminary estimate was that the initial costs of operating the new Institute would be comparable to those of the now disbanded U.S. Army School of the Americas. The Department of the Army has stated that the total cost of operating WHINSEC in FY2002 is $5.887 million. The largest portion ($3.419 million) of this total comes from the Army's Operation and Maintenance account. Another estimated $1.5 million comes from the IMET account. The statute creating the Institute established a Board of Visitors. This Board is composed of the chairman and ranking minority member of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees or a designee of any of these individuals; six persons designated by the Secretary of Defense, "including, to the extent practicable, persons from academia and the religious and human rights communities. The Board also includes one person designated by the Secretary of State, and additional military personnel to include the "senior military officer responsible for training and doctrine for the Army" or a "designee" of that senior military officer, as well as the "commander of the unified combatant command having geographic responsibility for Latin America," or a "designee" of that officer. The Board of Visitors is to meet at least once a year, and is charged with inquiring into the "curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, and academic methods of the Institute, other matters relating to the Institute that the Board decides to consider," and "any other matter" determined to be appropriate by the Secretary of Defense. The Board is to review the curriculum of the Institute to determine whether it: "complies with applicable United States laws and regulations," is "consistent with United States policy goals toward Latin America and the Caribbean," adheres to current United States doctrine," and that "instruction under the curriculum appropriately emphasizes" the matters mandated in law relating to instruction on human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military, and the role of the military in a democratic society. The Board is to submit to the Secretary of Defense, not later than 60 days after its annual meeting, a "written report of its activities and of its views and recommendations pertaining to the Institute." The Institute, as a Defense Department school, receives routinely scheduled visits from standard Defense Department oversight agencies. The Defense Department, the Joint Staff, and the U.S. Army will validate the education and training needs for North American nations. In the case of Latin American and Caribbean nations, the Southern Command, as the unified command responsible for that region, will conduct annual validation reviews of courses to ensure that they support one or more the SOUTHCOM Theater Engagement Plan's objectives. Each year, not later than March 15, the Secretary of Defense, by law, must submit to Congress a "detailed report on the activities of the Institute during the preceding year. This report must be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of State.

The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation was created pursuant to language contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 ( H.R. 5408 ), which was incorporated into the H.R. 4205 conference report ( H.Rept. 106-945 ), enacted into law on October 30, 2000 ( P.L. 106-398 ). The Institute was created by Congress in response to a legislative initiative sponsored by the Clinton Administration. When the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation was formally established in Section 2166 of Title 10 U.S.C., the authorities of its controversial predecessor, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, were repealed. This report provides background on the purpose, structure, and other aspects of the new Institute. It will be revised as events warrant.

Medicaid is a state-administered program that is jointly financed by states and the federal government. The federal and state shares of program costs vary for each state based on a formula that takes into consideration each state's per capita income compared with the national per capita income. The formula is designed so that states with per capita income that is relatively lower than other states will pay a lower state share of Medicaid program costs. Nonetheless, many states have found raising their state share of Medicaid program costs to be challenging, particularly during economic downturns. Intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) are one of the methods used by some states to finance the non-federal share of Medicaid costs. Certain IGTs are specifically allowed for funding the state share of program costs. For example, units of government, such as counties, are able to contribute to the state's share of Medicaid. At least three states currently require counties to fund some part of the state share. Congress specifically protects the ability of states to use funds derived from state or local taxes and transferred or certified by units of government within a state. Some states have instituted programs where all or portions of the Medicaid state share is paid by hospitals or nursing homes that are public providers, however, not units of government; or are units of government, but the state share is returned to the provider sometimes through inflated Medicaid payment rates. The purpose of such financing arrangements is generally to draw additional federal funds for which a state share may not otherwise be available. While the funds often help to pay for Medicaid or other health care services, those arrangements effectively raise the federal share of Medicaid program spending. These "intergovernmental transfers" are often repaid through Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments or through inflated Medicaid payment rates for which federal matching amounts are claimed. Alternately, states can make Medicaid payments to the providers, and the providers transfer a portion or all of those payments back to the state through what is claimed as an IGT. Either way, the net impact is to effectively raise the federal matching rate in the state to levels beyond those specified in law. In May of 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a regulation tightening the administrative procedures and clarifying the vague definitions that allow these types of financing mechanisms to operate. The regulation tightens the definitions of governmental entities and CPEs for the purpose of Medicaid financing, and establishes a ceiling on payment rates for governmental providers equal to the cost of providing Medicaid services. Existing rules that establish ceilings on Medicaid payments to privately owned and operated facilities would not be affected by this rule. Section 1903(w)(7)(G) of the Social Security Act (SSA) identifies five types of units of government that may participate in the non-federal share of Medicaid payments: a state, a city, a county, a special purpose district, or other governmental units within the state. The rule would elaborate on those units of government in the following ways. It would include as a state or local governmental entity (including Indian tribes), a unit of government that can demonstrate having generally applicable taxing authority or is a state-operated, city-operated, county-operated, or tribally operated health care provider. Health care providers that assert to be a "special purpose district" or "other" local governmental entity must demonstrate that they are operated by a unit of government by showing that they have generally applicable taxing authority or that the health care provider is able to access funding as a integral part of a governmental unit with taxing authority , and that a contractual relationship with the state or local government is not the primary or sole basis for the health care provider to receive tax revenues. The explanation of the regulation goes on to state, "If the unit of government merely uses its funds to reimburse the health care provider for the provision of Medicaid or other services, that alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that the entity is a unit of government." Prior regulations, in defining the types of public funds that may be available to fund the state share of Medicaid costs, establish that funds "transferred from other public agencies" to the state or local agency and under the state's administrative control can be used to fund the state share of Medicaid. The term "public agency" has been interpreted by some states to include health care providers that are not governmental in nature, but have a public-oriented mission, such as not-for-profit hospitals. The rule would remove the term "public agency" from prior regulations and replace it with the phrase "other units of government (including Indian tribes)" reflecting the statutory language of Section 1903(w)(7)(G) of the SSA. The rule also would require a governmental entity using a CPE to submit a certification statement to the state Medicaid agency and have additional documentation available. It would require that a CPE used to fund Medicaid be supported by auditable documentation in a form approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and subject to periodic state audit and review. The documentation must at least identify the category of spending under the state Medicaid plan, explain whether the contributing unit of government is exempted from the current law limits on the use of provider taxes or donations, identify actual costs incurred by the unit of government in providing Medicaid services, and demonstrate that the funds are not from federal funds nor are authorized by federal law to be used to match other federal funds. A number of reports issued by the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) have identified questionable Medicaid financing practices in states in which supplemental payments to providers in excess of Medicaid costs have been made. Prior regulations have placed limits on such practices, which are referred to as upper payment limit (UPL) financing arrangements. Under such UPL arrangements, states make Medicaid payments to public hospitals and other public long-term care institutional providers at inflated payment rates set at the statutory ceiling known as the Medicare upper payment limit. The payments generate federal matching. The hospitals or other providers return some or all of the amounts in excess of the usual Medicaid rate to the state through intergovernmental transfers. The preamble to the proposed rule explains that the excess payments violate another statutory rule requiring Medicaid payments to be consistent with economy and efficiency (42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A)). Consequently, the rule would limit reimbursements to governmentally operated providers to amounts that do not exceed cost. This limit would not apply to Indian Health Service facilities and tribal facilities, nor to disproportionate share hospital payments. The Secretary would be required to determine a reasonable method for identifying allowable Medicaid costs. It would also require that Medicaid costs be supported by auditable documentation in a form approved by the Secretary that meets the same standards as for the CPE documentation (see above). If it is found that a governmentally operated provider received an overpayment, those amounts would be credited to the federal government under normal procedures. The regulation would also require governmental providers to submit an annual cost report to the Medicaid agency that reflects their cost of services to Medicaid recipients during the year. Finally, the rule would make conforming changes, including eliminating 42 CFR 447.271(b) to conform with the limit on payments to governmental providers that do not exceed cost. A provision intended to prevent public providers from receiving Medicaid payments and then transferring, through an IGT or other mechanism, some or all of those payments back to state Medicaid agencies is included as well. The rule would require that providers receive and retain the full amount of the Medicaid payments provided to them for Medicaid services. The rule states that the Secretary will determine compliance with this provision by examining any related transactions. HHS estimated that the imposition of the rule would reduce federal Medicaid outlays by $3.87 billion over a five-year period starting in (and assuming the rule went into effect) 2007. In early 2008, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the impact to be a reduction in federal outlays of $9 billion over a five-year period starting with FY2008. States, however, in responding to a 2008 survey conducted by the staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, estimated their loss of federal Medicaid funds to be over $21 billion for same five-year period beginning in 2008, an amount that is more than five times the HHS estimates. States, public and governmental providers, and advocacy organizations have expressed opposition to the rule. All agree that the rule would significantly reduce Medicaid payments in certain states, and concerns are raised about whether those states would be able to fill the funding gap and, if not, what the implications would be for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers. Aside from the concerns about the impact of the considerable loss of federal funds on Medicaid providers and beneficiaries, the rule has been viewed by some as CMS overstepping its authority to limit intergovernmental transfers, when Congress explicitly allows such transfers. Governors' concerns were expressed in a letter from the National Governor's Association to House and Senate leadership dated February 25, 2008. The letter calls on Congress to take immediate action to delay implementation of the rules, fearing that their implementation would inappropriately shift costs to states at a time when some states are facing particularly difficult fiscal situations. The governors point out that the new rules reflect a departure from past practices and are based on new and unsupported interpretations of Medicaid law. Finally, the letter reminds members of the Congress that some of the rule changes were considered and rejected when the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) was deliberated. On March 11, 2008, a lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by a coalition of provider groups led by the National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems, the American Hospital Association, and the Association of American Medical Colleges. . The lawsuit asked the court to reject the rule on three grounds: that CMS has overstepped its authority in limiting intergovernmental transfers, that Congress has barred the agency from imposing a cost limit on Medicaid payments to governmental providers, and that CMS improperly issued the rule. From NAHP's website: The litigants make three major claims: (1) The rule defines "units of government" more narrowly than permitted under law and severely restricts options for states to finance the non-federal share of their Medicaid program expenditures. The CMS definition usurps states' ability to determine the governmental status of entities within states, severely limiting the type of governmental entities that can make intergovernmental transfers to fund the non-federal share of the program; (2) CMS does not have the authority to limit Medicaid payments to public providers to cost while continuing to allow private providers to be paid under a different methodology. Congress rejected cost-based reimbursement and payment limits in the early 1980s in favor of granting states flexibility to tailor Medicaid reimbursement to their unique needs. A cost limit imposed solely on governmental hospitals is counter to clear Congressional intent and is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. It also upends decades of Medicaid payment policies established by CMS and relied on by states. (3) The moratorium signed by the President on May 25, 2007 effectively prevented CMS from issuing a final rule the same day. Indeed, a ruling in this case, filed on May 23, 2008, found the latter claim compelling. U.S. District Court Judge James Robertson has prohibited the implementation of the final rule. The rule was vacated and the matter returned to the agency. In response to the ruling, a spokesman for CMS suggested that the judge's finding is technical in nature only and that the substance of the rule will ultimately be upheld. Congress has taken action as well. In May of 2007, Congress enacted a one-year moratorium on the implementation of the rule. That moratorium was extended until April 1, 2009, as part of H.R. 2642 , The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (the War Supplemental), signed by the President on June 30, 2008. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) includes a Sense of the Congress that the Secretary of HHS should not promulgate a final rule on cost limits on public providers (nor on two other rules regarding graduate medical education and rehabilitative services). The Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that this Sense of the Congress, in combination with new and extended moratoria on other Medicaid rules (affecting case management services, school-based services, provider taxes, and outpatient hospital services), would increase federal spending by $105 million in FY2009. Separate cost estimates for the provisions affecting each individual regulation were not provided.

On May 29, 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a rule intended to establish control over the use and misuse of intergovernmental transfers in financing the states' shares of Medicaid costs. The rule clarifies the types of intergovernmental transfers of funds allowable for financing a portion of Medicaid costs, imposes a limit on Medicaid reimbursements for government-owned hospitals and other institutional providers, and requires certain providers to retain all of their Medicaid reimbursements. In addition, the rule would establish documentation requirements to substantiate that a governmental entity is making a certified public expenditure (CPE) when contributing to the state share of Medicaid. The rule has raised considerable concern among states and health care providers that its impact on Medicaid services, providers, and beneficiaries could be severe. In response, Congress placed a moratorium on the implementation of its provisions. The moratorium was recently extended until April 1, 2009. Further, in May of 2008, a federal judge ruled, in a lawsuit brought by a coalition of provider groups, that the rule was "improperly promulgated" and vacated the rule, and remanded the matter back to the agency. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) includes a Sense of the Congress that the Secretary of Health and Human Services should not promulgate a final rule on cost limits on public providers.

The BSA is "the primary U.S. anti-money laundering (AML) law" regulating financial institutions. Among other things, the Act and related regulations impose certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements and require certain institutions to establish AML programs that meet specified minimum standards. The BSA and related regulations provide for civil and criminal penalties for violations of their provisions, as well as the forfeiture of assets involved in a violation. The level of BSA penalties varies based on the type of entity charged with a violation, the type of violation, and the defendant's level of intent. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau within the Department of the Treasury primarily charged with administering the BSA, has enforcement authority to bring administrative actions for failure to meet BSA requirements. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and the National Credit Union Administration also have authority to enforce the BSA's requirements against the institutions they regulate. Moreover, the Department of Justice (DOJ) regularly brings criminal charges for BSA violations. Commentators have noted an increase in the frequency with which BSA enforcement actions have involved an assessment by federal regulators of monetary penalties, and an increase in the size of those penalties. According to a June 2016 study conducted by National Economic Research Associates, Inc. (NERA), nearly 90% of BSA/AML enforcement actions from 2012 through 2015 involved an assessment of money penalties, compared to less than half of such enforcement actions from 2002 through 2011. NERA also observed that BSA/AML penalties "have grown substantially in both absolute terms and as a proportion of firm capital." Specifically, NERA found that more than 80% of the total money penalties imposed for BSA/AML violations since 2002 have been levied after 2012. Moreover, according to that same report, since October 2009, nearly one-third of BSA/AML penalties have exceeded 10% of a defendant institution's capital. By contrast, no penalty imposed before 2007 exceeded 9% of a defendant institution's capital. Two recent BSA/AML enforcement actions stand out for their size. In 2012, HSBC Holdings plc and HSBC Bank USA N.A. (together, HSBC) were assessed a $665 million civil money penalty, forfeited roughly $1.2 billion, and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) based on, among other things, their failure to maintain an effective AML program and conduct appropriate due diligence on foreign correspondent account holders. The HSBC enforcement action was pursued concurrently by the DOJ, the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the Department of the Treasury. Pursuant to the DPA, HSBC admitted responsibility for violating the BSA and associated regulations from 2006 to 2010. Specifically, HSBC admitted that during the relevant time period, it "ignored the money laundering risks associated with doing business with certain Mexican customers and failed to implement a BSA/AML program that was adequate to monitor suspicious transactions from Mexico." According to the DPA, as a result of HSBC's failures, at least $881 million in drug trafficking proceeds were laundered through HSBC Bank USA without being detected. In a series of other BSA enforcement actions, a number of federal regulators assessed large penalties against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan) in January 2014 for its role in the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi scheme. JPMorgan entered into a DPA with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York concerning Madoff-related BSA violations. Pursuant to the DPA, JPMorgan admitted that it violated the BSA by failing to maintain an effective AML compliance program and failing to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) concerning transactions related to the Madoff scheme. JPMorgan further agreed to forfeit $1.7 billion to compensate victims of the Madoff fraud—the largest-ever penalty for a BSA violation. Separately, the OCC and FinCEN assessed civil money penalties of $350 million and $461 million, respectively, against JPMorgan for its Madoff-related BSA violations. A second recent trend in BSA/AML enforcement is an increased emphasis by regulators on the acceptance of responsibility by institutions charged with BSA violations. In 2013, FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery indicated that FinCEN had changed its approach of generally allowing financial institutions charged with BSA violations to enter into settlements "without admitting or denying" the facts alleged in a penalty assessment. Shasky Calvery noted that in FinCEN's most recent enforcement actions, defendant institutions had been required to stipulate to a statement of facts, reflecting the agency's new position that "[a]cceptance of responsibility and acknowledgment of the facts is a critical component of corporate responsibility." Two years later, FinCEN's Director of Enforcement confirmed the agency's changed approach when she indicated that FinCEN operates under a "presumption" that "a settlement of an enforcement action will include an admission to the facts, as well as the violation of law." Along these lines, NERA's 2016 study found that four of the six largest BSA/AML violations charged between 2010 and 2015 "required the [defendant] financial institution to admit the accuracy of government claims and accept responsibility for the actions of its officers, agents, and employees who violated BSA/AML regulations." Finally, commentators have noted an increased risk of individual liability for BSA violations. In December 2014, FinCEN assessed a $1 million civil money penalty against Thomas Haider, the former Chief Compliance Officer of MoneyGram International for willful violations of the BSA's program requirements and failure to timely file SARs concerning fraudulent telemarketing operations and other schemes. FinCEN's enforcement action led to litigation over the application of the BSA to individuals. In January 2016, a federal district court held in U.S. Department of Treasury v. Haider that individuals can be liable for violations of the BSA's AML program requirements. In that case, Haider argued that individuals cannot be liable for violations of the BSA's program requirements because the relevant BSA provision provides that "financial institution[s] shall establish anti-money laundering programs," in contrast to the BSA's provision requiring the filing of SARs, which provides that "any financial institution, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution , [may be required] to report suspicious transactions relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation." The court rejected this argument, reasoning that because the BSA's general civil penalty provision authorizes the imposition of money penalties against, among other individuals, "officer[s]" of financial institutions, Haider could be held liable for violations of the BSA's AML program requirements. Regulators have recently pursued a number of other BSA enforcement actions against individual compliance officers. This increased emphasis on individual prosecutions is broadly consistent with the approach outlined by the DOJ in the September 2015 "Yates Memo," which emphasized the importance of individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing. Current Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein has indicated that while he "generally agree[s] with the critique that motivated" the Yates Memo, the memo is currently under review. Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether the DOJ under President Trump will maintain the previous Administration's emphasis on individual responsibility in white-collar enforcement actions and prosecutions.

This report provides an overview of recent trends in the enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), the principal U.S. anti-money laundering law regulating financial institutions. The report begins by providing general background information on BSA penalties and enforcement. The report concludes by discussing three recent trends that commentators have observed in BSA enforcement: (1) an increase in the frequency with which BSA enforcement actions involve an assessment of money penalties, and an increase in the size of those penalties, (2) an increased emphasis by regulators on the acceptance of responsibility by institutions entering into settlement agreements for BSA violations, and (3) an increased risk of individual liability for BSA violations.

In an effort to protect the purchasing power of Social Security recipients, Congress in the early 1970s indexed benefit increases to the only consumer price index available at the time. The index to which Social Security benefits are linked became known as the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) after the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) began publishing the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in 1978. Concern has periodically been expressed that the CPI-W may not accurately reflect the inflation experience of the elderly, who make up the majority of Social Security beneficiaries. It has been argued that because annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) in Social Security benefits have not kept pace with increases in the prices of goods and services more often purchased by the elderly (e.g., health care), some index other than the CPI-W might be more appropriate (e.g., an index for the elderly that Congress directed BLS to develop in 1987). This is not the context within which reconsidering the index upon which Social Security benefits are based has most recently been raised, however. Suggestions to change the index for inflation-adjusting Social Security among other programs and provisions in federal law most recently have arisen in connection with deficit reduction. Several plans to curb the growth in the U.S. budget deficit, which were put forth in 2010 and 2011, recommend that inflation-indexing be based on the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) rather than on the CPI-W or CPI-U. Because the C-CPI-U has typically risen more slowly than the two indexes, this proposal raised concern at that time among those Social Security recipients who believe they already are being insufficiently compensated for increases in their cost of living. A bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute to the FY2013 budget resolution in the House, which was introduced but not approved in March 2012, suggests that interest remains in slowing the growth in the deficit by changing the price index on which Social Security COLAs are based. This report opens with an explanation of whom and what the CPI-W represents before examining how the spending pattern of the average elderly household differs from that of all households. It then focuses on BLS' experimental consumer price index (CPI-E) for the elderly and analyzes rates of change over time in the CPI-E, CPI-W, and C-CPI-U. The report closes with a brief discussion of policy considerations. The CPI-W is designed to measure changes in the price of a market basket of goods and services purchased by those who earn at least half of their income by having worked in clerical, blue-collar, or service occupations for at least 37 weeks in the previous year. In other words, the CPI-W only tracks the buying habits of the employed. This particular group of employed persons has accounted for a dwindling share of the U.S. population over time. Today, it reflects changes in the cost of living of about 32% of the population. Price changes may affect the average retiree's cost of living differently from that of the average CPI-W household to the extent that their purchasing patterns differ from one another. BLS collects data through the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) on how households spend their money in order to assign weights to each of the goods and services in the market basket. The weight reflects an item's relative importance in the market basket and determines how much a change in an item's price will affect the overall CPI. As shown in Table 1 , elderly households allocate their spending differently from the rest of the population across the major categories of goods and services in the CPI. The largest difference in spending patterns between the elderly and the general population is found in the shares of expenditures accounted for by health care. In 2010, the latest year for which data are available, those aged 65 and older spent twice as large a share of their total outlays on health care compared with the overall population. With respect to the population aged 75 and older, the share of their spending devoted to health care was two-and-one-third times the share of the total population. Health care costs have consistently risen more rapidly than the average price level. Because the elderly consume a greater than average share of a good whose price has generally risen faster than overall prices, the CPI-W may understate the inflation experience of the average elderly household. As noted above, the argument is often made that the CPI does not represent the average inflation experience of the elderly population. But, just as the inflation experience of the elderly population may differ from that of the population at large, so too are there differences within the elderly population itself. No summary inflation measure for a large population group will exactly account for the experience of each member of that group. Differences in spending patterns, in combination with different rates of price change for all of the various goods and services included in the CPI, mean that individual inflation rate experiences may range considerably above or below the measured average. If there is a great deal of variation in both the general population and within subgroups such as the elderly, a small difference in average inflation rates between groups may not be significant. Suppose the average inflation rate of the elderly population is slightly higher than the rate for the overall population, but that the distribution of individual inflation rates among the elderly is widely dispersed. In this case all of the elderly would be better off if their benefits were indexed to an inflation measure based on the average elderly household. Within the elderly population, however, there would be several different consequences. First, there would be some elderly whose inflation rates would be understated by the overall rate, but exaggerated by the elderly inflation measure. Second, there would be those elderly whose inflation rates were higher than either the overall measure or one based on elderly consumption patterns. Finally, there would be a number of elderly whose actual inflation rates would be lower than either the overall measure or one based on the elderly. One study of the distribution of inflation rates across the population found that differences in inflation rates among demographic groups were small in comparison with the variation within those groups. Further, it was found that differences among groups tended not to be stable over time. This study argued that no one group suffered disproportionately from inflation. If the variation in consumption patterns is great among the elderly and if the average inflation rate of the elderly is not dramatically different from the average rate of the overall population, then arguments for a separate index for the elderly population may be less compelling. In 1987, Congress amended the Older Americans Act of 1965 to direct BLS to develop an experimental price index to track inflation in the population aged 62 and older. BLS has calculated estimates of such an index, commonly called the CPI-E, dating back to December 1982. In all but 5 of the 29 years between December 1982 and December 2011, the experimental index rose as or more rapidly than the CPI-W and CPI-U. (See Table 2 .) In only three years was the increase in the CPI-E closer to that of the CPI-W than the CPI-U. The increase in the CPI-E has usually been closer to that of the CPI-U partly because a larger weight is given to health care outlays in the market basket of the CPI-U than the CPI-W. (Recall that unlike the CPI-W, the CPI-U covers persons not in the labor force including retirees.) The difference in the annual rates of change of the CPI-E compared with both the CPI-W and CPI-U has generally decreased since 1993, largely because the gap between health care inflation and overall inflation has narrowed as has the gap between shelter inflation and overall inflation. The 0.5-0.7 percentage point gap in the annual rates of change between the CPI-E compared with the CPI-W and CPI-U that often was the case from 1982 to 1993, shrank to 0.3 percentage points or less in most years thereafter. (See Table 2 .) Although the differences in the three indexes usually have been in the expected direction, the relationships between the three might not be the same if BLS developed an official rather than experimental index for the elderly. Optimally, when constructing a CPI for older Americans, a sample of geographic areas would be drawn for that specific population. In addition, surveys would be designed to collect expenditure weights for that specific population, a point-of-purchase survey designed for that population would be used to construct the outlet frame, and the distribution of items sampled would be representative of older Americans. Such an index would be costly to construct, however, and Congress has not appropriated the necessary funds to do so. For example, the number of households in the CES on which market baskets are based is much smaller for the CPI-E than for the CPI-W and CPI-U. The CPI-E therefore is subject to greater sampling error than the official indexes because of BLS' limited resources. The CPI-E also uses the CPI-U's sample of retail outlets to gather prices, but the outlets may not accurately reflect those at which the elderly shop and the prices may not be representative of those paid by the elderly. These methodological limitations may have contributed to the differences in the experimental compared with official measures of inflation and are the reasons for it being "classified as an experimental index." If the primary purpose of developing a separate index for the elderly is to inflation-adjust Social Security benefits, it should be kept in mind that not all Social Security recipients are elderly. Some receive benefits under the program because they have disabilities; others, because they are the spouse or young child of a deceased worker covered by the program. Thus, some would argue that the market basket of the elderly population is not the most appropriate one on which to base adjustments to Social Security benefits. Having a separate price index for the elderly may introduce complications in other areas. For example, the income thresholds that define tax brackets currently are adjusted annually by the CPI-U. If it is appropriate to base Social Security benefit adjustments on a price index for the elderly, should it also be used to adjust income tax brackets of elderly taxpayers? Finally, as stated at the outset, recent interest in the indexes used to inflation-adjust federal programs and individual income tax provisions has been prompted by the desire among policymakers to curb the growth rate of the budget deficit. Switching from the CPI-W or CPI-U to the Chained CPI-U may reduce government outlays and raise revenue in future years because the Chained CPI-U has risen more slowly than the two official indexes—and therefore, more slowly than the CPI-E. Leaving aside whether the Chained CPI-U is a more accurate measure of inflation than the CPI-W and CPI-U, it would not appear to achieve the purpose of those who have proposed changing to the Chained CPI-U to instead switch to the CPI-E for calculation of Social Security benefits as some have suggested. Were BLS to replace the experimental index with a newly developed index more representative of the elderly population, there also is no guarantee it would bear the same relationship to the CPI-W and Chained CPI-U as that of the CPI-E.

The federal government, in an effort to protect the purchasing power of Social Security beneficiaries, indexes benefits to increases in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Concern has periodically been expressed that the CPI-W may understate the impact of inflation on the elderly population and that it therefore may not be the most appropriate measure of inflation's impact on the elderly. At the behest of Congress, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) developed an experimental price index to track changes in the cost of living for the population aged 62 and older. In most years since 1982, the start of the experimental consumer price index (CPI-E) for the elderly, the annual rate of change in the CPI-E has exceeded that of the CPI-W and CPI-U. But, methodological limitations in the experimental index may have contributed to this pattern. Were BLS to construct an index that is more representative of the elderly population than the CPI-E, there is no guarantee that the relationship between the new index and the CPI-W would be the same. Interest in the CPI-E most recently emerged in response to deficit-reduction plans issued in 2010 and 2011 that recommend inflation-indexed provisions in federal law be based on the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U). Because the C-CPI-U has typically risen more slowly than the CPI-W, this proposal raised concern at the time among those Social Security recipients who already believe they have not been fully compensated for increases in their cost of living. Bills were then introduced to switch for purposes of Social Security indexation from the CPI-W to a CPI for those aged 62 and older (H.R. 456, H.R. 539, H.R. 776, H.R. 798, and S. 1876). As suggested by an amendment in the nature of a substitute to the FY2013 budget resolution in the House, interest has lingered into 2012 among some Members to switch to the C-CPI-U as a means of curbing the rate of growth in the budget deficit.

In 2005, Indiana enacted a statute requiring citizens voting in person on primary or general election day, or casting a ballot in person at the office of the circuit court clerk prior to election day, to present a photo identification card issued by the government. Often referred to as the "Voter ID Law," it does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail and excepts persons who reside and vote in state-licensed facilities such as nursing homes. It further provides that a voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may cast a provisional ballot that will only be counted if the voter executes an appropriate affidavit before the circuit court clerk within 10 days after the election. Under Indiana law, photo identification is not required for registering to vote, and for qualified voters, the state offers free photo identification. Shortly after enactment of the Voter ID Law, the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee (hereafter referred to as the "Democratic Party") filed suit in federal district court against state officials responsible for enforcement of the law, seeking a judgment declaring the statute invalid on its face and enjoining its enforcement. Seeking the same relief, a second suit was filed on behalf of two elected officials and several nonprofit organizations representing groups of elderly, disabled, poor, and minority voters, and the cases were consolidated. In defense of the law, the State of Indiana intervened. In sum, the plaintiffs alleged that the Voter ID Law substantially burdens the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that it is neither a necessary nor appropriate means of avoiding election fraud; and that it will arbitrarily disenfranchise qualified voters without the requisite identification and place an unjustified burden on those who cannot obtain such identification. In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the federal district court found that the plaintiffs had "not introduced evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote as a result of [the Voter ID Law] or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its requirements." Rejecting an expert's report that up to 989,000 registered Indiana voters did not possess either a driver's license or other acceptable photo identification "as utterly incredible and unreliable," the court estimated that as of 2005 (when the statute was enacted), approximately 43,000 Indiana residents did not possess driver's licenses or state-issued identification. The Democratic Party appealed. In affirming the lower court ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7 th Circuit held that the Democratic Party had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Voter ID Law on its face. Next, pointing out that no plaintiff was claiming that the law would deter him or her from voting, the court inferred that "the motivation for the suit is simply that the law may require the Democratic Party to work harder to get every last one of their supporters to the polls." Finally, rejecting the argument that the law should be evaluated under the same strict standard applicable to a poll tax, the court held that the burden placed on voters was balanced by the benefit of reducing the risk of voter fraud. The Democratic Party appealed. Voting 6 to 3, in April 2008, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 7 th Circuit, persuaded that both lower courts had correctly determined that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a facial attack on the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID Law. Justice Stevens wrote the "lead opinion," which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy; Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito; Justice Souter filed a dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg; and Justice Breyer filed a dissent. The lead opinion in Crawford begins with an analysis of the Court's 1966 decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections , which invalidated a Virginia statute conditioning the right to vote on the payment of a $1.50 poll tax. The Harper Court concluded that whenever a state makes the affluence of a voter or the payment of a fee an electoral standard, it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion further notes that under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. Clarifying that standard, however, the lead opinion finds that in the Court's 1983 decision, Anderson v. Celebrezze , the Court confirmed the general rule that "'evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself' are not invidious" and indeed, satisfy the Harper standard. As the opinion explains, "[r]ather than applying any 'litmus test' that would neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions, we concluded that a court must identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, and then make the 'hard judgment' that our adversary system demands." Application of this balancing test, the opinion further points out, was made in subsequent election decisions by the Court. In making the judgment in Crawford as to whether the Indiana Voter ID Law is justified by a legitimate state interest, the opinion analyzes each of the three interests identified by the State of Indiana—deterring and detecting voter fraud; preventing voter fraud; and safeguarding voter confidence—and finds that they are "unquestionably relevant" to the state interest of protecting the integrity of the electoral process. Furthermore, it notes that even the petitioners in this case, while charging the statute was motivated by partisan goals, did not question the legitimacy of the interests identified by the State of Indiana. On the issue of voter fraud, it determines that the only type of voter fraud that the Voter ID Law seeks to address is in-person voter impersonation at the polls, but that the record contains no evidence of such fraud ever occurring within Indiana. On the other side of the coin, the Crawford lead opinion also discusses the burdens that the Voter ID Law imposes on voters, burdens that are not imposed by non-photo identification requirements. For example, it points out the possible inconveniences of a voter's photo identification being lost or stolen or no longer representing the likeness of a voter, thereby creating an impediment to voting. However, it concludes that "burdens of that sort arising from life's vagaries ... are neither so serious nor so frequent as to raise any question about the constitutionality of [the Voter ID Law]; the availability of the right to cast a provisional ballot provides an adequate remedy for problems of that character." The relevant burdens imposed by the law, the opinion finds, are those that are placed on people who are eligible to vote, but do not possess photo identification that complies with the Voter ID Law. If the State of Indiana required voters to pay a tax or a fee to obtain the requisite photo identification, the fact that most voters already possess a valid driver's license or other acceptable identification would not save the statute under the Court's holding in Harper , the lead opinion notes. However, in Indiana, free photo identification cards are available through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). In view of that fact, the opinion concludes that "for most voters ... the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting." For a "limited number of persons," based on evidence in the record and facts of which the Court takes judicial notice, the Voter ID Law may still impose a "somewhat heavier burden." However, the lead opinion determines that the severity of that burden is mitigated by the fact that eligible voters may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be counted. While casting a provisional ballot requires traveling to the circuit court clerk's office within 10 days to execute an affidavit, it is "unlikely" that the requirement would create a constitutional problem "unless it is wholly unjustified." Moreover, even if the burden cannot be justified to a few voters, it would be insufficient to establish the relief sought by the petitioners in this case: invalidation of the Voter ID Law in all its applications. In view of such relief sought by the petitioners, the opinion finds that they bear a "heavy burden of persuasion," asking the Court "in effect, to perform a unique balancing analysis that looks specifically at a small number of voters who may experience a special burden" and weigh that against the State of Indiana's interests in protecting election integrity. On the basis of the record before the Court, the lead opinion determines that it "cannot conclude that the Voter ID Law imposes 'excessively burdensome requirements' on any class of voters" and that it "'imposes only a limited burden on voters' rights,'" which are justified by the interests advanced by the State of Indiana. It also finds that if a "nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications," those justifications should not be ignored merely "because partisan interests may have provided one motivation" for its enactment. Finally, the opinion cautions that even if the statute constituted an unjustified burden on some voters, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the proper remedy was to invalidate the entire statute. The concurrence, written by Justice Scalia, finds that the Indiana Voter ID Law is "a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation" and disputes the notion that "individual impacts are relevant to determining the severity of the burden it imposes." Indeed, according to the concurring opinion, it is the job of state legislatures to assess the costs and benefits of election regulations and "their judgment must prevail unless it imposes a severe and unjustified overall burden upon the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a particular class." Judicial review of such election regulations must be applied in such an objective and uniform manner that legislatures know beforehand whether the resulting burden is too severe. Specifically criticizing the lead opinion, the concurrence characterizes it as a "record-based resolution" that "neither rejects nor embraces the rule of our precedents, provides no certainty, and will embolden litigants who surmise that our precedents have been abandoned." In sum, the concurrence labels it an "indulgence" that the State of Indiana accommodates certain voters by permitting the casting of provisional ballots, finding it not to be a constitutional requirement. Instead, it concludes that it is constitutionally sufficient that the Voter ID Law does not significantly increase typical burdens of voting and that the state's interests are enough to sustain that minimal burden. According to the concurrence, "[t]hat should end the matter." The Souter dissent warns that the Voter ID Law poses a threat of "nontrivial burdens" on the voting rights of tens of thousands of Indiana's citizenry and accordingly, is likely to result in a substantial percentage of those individuals being deterred from voting. It concludes that the law is unconstitutional under the standard the Court established in its 1992 decision, Burdick v. Takushi , finding that a state may not burden the right to vote "merely by invoking abstract interests" even if legitimate or compelling, but must make a "particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the particular impediments it has imposed." In view of "no evidence of in-person voter impersonation fraud in the State," the dissenting opinion determines that the State of Indiana failed to justify the practical limitations on voting rights created by the law and finds that it creates an "unreasonable and irrelevant burden on voters who are poor and old." The Breyer dissent compares the Voter ID Law with similar laws in Georgia and Florida that require photo identification for voting, but accept a broader range of identification. For example, the State of Florida accepts student ID cards, employee badges and cards from neighborhood associations, and will accept a provisional ballot on the condition that the voter's signature matches the signature on file. The State of Indiana, according to the dissent written by Justice Breyer, did not sufficiently justify the "significantly harsher, unjustified burden" created by its law. In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford , some commentators have speculated that more states are likely to enact laws requiring photo identification for voting. However, even though the Court's ruling strikes down a facial challenge to Indiana's Voter ID Law, it appears to leave open the possibility of "as applied" challenges to such laws, if greater evidence of the burdens imposed on voters' rights can be provided. Furthermore, while three members of the Court—Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—hold the position that a "record-based" evaluation of the impact of such laws on individuals is inappropriate, that view does not appear to be shared by the remainder of the Court.

In a splintered decision issued in April 2008, the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute requiring photo identification for voting, determining that lower courts had correctly decided that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a facial attack on the constitutionality of the law. Written by Justice Stevens, the lead opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board finds that the law imposes only "a limited burden on voters' rights," which is justified by state interests.

On May 29, 1993, at The Hague, 66 nations approved the final text of a multilateral Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, popularly known as the "Hague Adoption Convention" (hereinafter "Convention"). The purpose of the Convention is to establish uniform standards and procedures that will protect the rights and interests of adopted children, birth parents, and adoptive parents involved in intercountry adoptions. The Convention mandates that each signatory country establish a national Central Authority on adoptions. The Central Authority is to oversee the Convention's implementation in the signatory country and will have an ongoing role in the country's international adoption process. The Convention has three primary features. First, it reinforces the protection of children's rights concerning international adoption. Second, it establishes a mechanism for the cooperation of signatory countries in international adoption. Third, it ensures the recognition of adoptions undertaken and certified through the Convention provisions. The Convention entered into force among participating countries on May 1, 1995. At the present time, the Convention has entered into force in 75 countries. The United States completed the formal ratification procedures on December 12, 2007, and the Convention entered into force on April 1, 2008, in the United States. For the Convention to be fully operative in a participating country, there are three steps which must be fulfilled in sequential order. First, the country must sign the Convention. Second, the country must have a domestic ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession procedure. Third, a formal filing/deposit is required. The instruments of approval (the domestic form of approval) from each country are required to be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which serves as the depository of the Convention. The United States became a signatory to the Convention on March 31, 1994, which fulfilled the first step. The Convention was transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on June 11, 1998. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the United States' ratification of the Convention on September 20, 2000. The Senate provided two specific qualifications in its advice and consent to the Convention. One qualification, discussed below, concerned the approval of adoption service providers by federal and state authorities. The second qualification required that the President was not to "deposit the instrument of ratification for the Convention until such time as the federal law implementing the Convention is enacted and the United States is able to carry out all the obligations of the Convention, as required by its implementing legislation." On September 20, 2000, the Senate passed the domestic implementation legislation—the International Adoption Act of 2000 (IAA). The legislation had previously cleared the House on September 18, 2000, and was signed into law by President William J. Clinton on October 6, 2000. The legislation established the domestic administrative framework for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. Under this framework, the United States opted to permit private agencies to perform adoptive services that are given to the "Central Authorities" under the Convention. The U.S. Department of State (DOS), as the Central Authority for the United States (USCA), has many administrative, oversight, and other functions under the Convention. Various administrative actions were required by the DOS to put these functions in place before ratification could be completed. These administrative actions are summarized below. On February 15, 2006, the DOS published the final rules on the accreditation and approval of agencies and persons concerned with the international adoption process in accordance with the Convention. The first body of regulations concerns the approval and accreditation of adoption service providers who wish to provide services in adoption cases subject to the Convention (Part 96). The regulations set out the procedures and the standards that will be used in the approval and the accreditation process. The second body of regulations concerns the federal government's preservation of Convention records (Parts 97, 98). On its website, the DOS summarized the extensive preparations that were necessary to be completed prior to Convention implementation and formal ratification. These included the following: 1) establish and staff the Central Authority within the Office of Children's Issues, Bureau of Consular Affairs; 2) promulgate regulations to (a) establish requirements/procedures for the designation and monitoring of accrediting entities, (b) set the standards that must be met for non-profit adoption agencies to qualify for Convention accreditation and for other agencies and individuals to qualify for Convention approval, (c) govern the registration of smaller community-based agencies for temporary accreditation, and (d) provide the procedures and requirements for incoming and outgoing Convention adoptions involving the United States; 3) establish a case-tracking computer system for intercountry adoptions; 4) designate entities to accredit non-profit U.S. adoption agencies to provide adoption services for Convention adoptions and the related approval of adoption providers; 5) prepare designated accrediting entities to (a) process applications for Convention accreditation and approvals and registration for temporary accreditation, (b) deal with complaints, and (c) continuously monitor the compliance by accredited agencies and approved persons with the requirements of the Convention, the IAA, and the regulations; 6) oversee preparations by accrediting entities and the USCA of the first list of providers authorized under the Convention to offer and provide adoption services for Convention adoptions; 7) establish education materials and programs about Convention adoptions; and 8) deposit the U.S. instrument of ratification and entry into force of the Convention between the United States and other party countries. The DOS completed these preparations in late 2007. On December 12, 2007, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Maura Harty deposited the United States' instrument of ratification of the Convention at a ceremony in The Hague. As a result of this action, the United States is now a full member of the Hague Adoption Convention, which entered into force for the United States on April 1, 2008. The DOS has various ongoing responsibilities with respect to the Convention and intercountry adoption. Annual reports to Congress are required by the IAA concerning certain aspects of the Convention and the IAA implementation. These reports are to be available to the general public and to the Central Authorities of other countries, beginning about one year after the Convention enters into force in the United States. Prior to Convention implementation, adoptions and placements for adoption made in the United States were subject only to state law and procedures, and were not subject to any federal law. IAA and Convention compliance provide new responsibility for state authorities, and necessitate close cooperation and coordination between the DOS and state authorities in order to guarantee that the United States meets its treaty obligations with respect to intercountry adoptions. The United States became a full member of the Convention, and the Convention entered into force on April 1, 2008. The Convention now governs intercountry adoptions between the United States and other Convention member countries in accordance with the provisions of the Intercountry Adoption Act. Prior to ratification, the DOS had numerous duties and responsibilities connected with the implementation of the Convention. The DOS has a continuing role in the operation of the Convention, and has various oversight, reporting, and record-keeping requirements. The DOS maintains a comprehensive website that describes its progress with these activities.

On April 1, 2008, the United States became a full member of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (hereinafter "Convention"), and the Convention entered into force in the United States. As a result, the Convention now governs intercountry adoptions between the United States and other Convention member countries in accordance with the provisions of the Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA). In order to comply with the Convention membership requirements, the United States had signed the Convention, the Senate had given its advice and consent to the ratification of the Convention, and Congress had approved legislation (the IAA) for the implementation of the Convention. In addition, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) had a number of duties and responsibilities, summarized below, which were required to be completed prior to the formal ratification and the entry into force of the Convention.

Educational organizations qualify for tax-exempt status as entities described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Benefits that arise from 501(c)(3) status include exemption from federal income taxes and eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions. One criterion for 501(c)(3) status is that the organization's activities must be primarily for at least one tax-exempt purpose—for example, charitable, religious, or educational. When it comes to having an "educational" purpose, questions often arise about the scope of the term's definition. Can a group espousing a viewpoint be characterized as educational? If so, does it have to provide factual information to support its statements? Relatedly, is there some standard for truthfulness and accuracy? This report discusses the legal definition of the term "educational," as well as the constitutional implications of that definition. There is no statutory definition of the term "educational" in the IRC. Rather, the term is defined by a Treasury regulation. It defines "educational" to encompass both (1) individual instruction "for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities," and (2) "[t]he instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." The regulation goes on to address the heart of the matter about the term's scope: An organization may be educational even though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the other hand, an organization is not educational if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion. The regulation also provides examples of educational organizations, including schools of every educational level; groups that hold public forums and lectures; and museums and zoos. In 1986, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) developed the "methodology test" to supplement the regulation's "full and fair exposition" standard. The test assists in determining whether the method used by an organization to communicate a particular viewpoint or position is educational. Under the test, a method is not educational if it fails to provide a "factual foundation" for the position or viewpoint or "a development from the relevant facts that would materially aid a listener or reader in a learning process." The IRS has identified four factors that lead to the conclusion the method is not educational: a significant portion of the group's communications consists of the presentation of viewpoints or positions that are unsupported by facts; facts that purport to support the viewpoints or positions are distorted; the group's presentations make substantial use of inflammatory and disparaging terms and express conclusions based more on strong emotional feelings rather than objective evaluation; and the presentation's approach is not aimed at developing the audience's understanding of the subject matter because it does not consider their background or training. Absent exceptional circumstances, the presence of any one of these factors indicates the organization's method of communicating its views does not meet the criteria to be "educational." There is relatively little case law or IRS rulings on the "full and fair exposition" test. A group advocating for the use of alternative schools was found to have met the test when it (1) made publicly available copies of all the briefs, including those of the opposing parties, filed in relevant legal actions; (2) encouraged those with different viewpoints to submit articles to its newsletter; and (3) provided information on a subject that was useful and beneficial to the public. A group that advocated for the use of one method of childbirth was found to have met the standard when it carried out its purpose by (1) hosting film presentations followed by discussions with doctors and its members; (2) conducting presentations on local radio stations; (3) hosting meetings between medical professionals and expectant parents; and (4) preparing pamphlets, manuals, and books that it distributed to libraries, hospitals, and obstetricians. Similarly, a group that was formed to "educate the public about homosexuality in order to foster an understanding and tolerance of homosexuals and their problems" was found to be educational. The group hosted public seminars, forums, and discussion groups, as well as distributed materials that included copies of surveys and opinion polls; scholarly statements; government publications; and policy resolutions adopted by educational, medical, scientific, and religious organizations. The group was described as "accumulat[ing] factual information through the use of opinion polls and independently compiled statistical data from research groups and clinical organizations," and all of its materials contained "a full documentation of the facts" to support its conclusions. In ruling that the group qualified as educational, the IRS explained: The presentation of seminars, forums, and discussion groups is a recognized method of educating the public.... By disseminating information relating to the role of homosexuals in society, the organization is furthering educational purposes by instructing the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community. The method used by the organization in disseminating materials is designed to present a full and fair exposition of the facts to enable the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. The fact that the organization's materials concern possibly controversial topics relating to homosexuality does not bar exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code, so long as the organization adheres to the educational methodology guidelines of section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). It also appears that a group that presents information prepared by others may qualify to be educational if it subjects those others to the full and fair exposition test. On the other hand, in seemingly the only case applying the methodology test, the Tax Court held that a group purportedly "dedicated to advancing American freedom, American democracy and American nationalism" did not qualify as educational when its newsletters were filled with inflammatory language and unsupported conclusions. The court found the newsletters failed the first, third, and fourth factors in the methodology test. They failed the first factor because a significant portion presented viewpoints that were clearly not supported by facts. These included the "common sense" standards for Supreme Court Justices of "No odd or foreign name" and "No beard"; listing of "Boat people, wetbacks and aliens who are incompatible with American nationality and character, such as Nicaraguan refugees or Refusnik immigrants" as people who should be denied U.S. Citizenship; and the statement regarding Black History Month that "No such thing. Nary a wheel, building or useful tool ever emanated from non-white Africa. Africanization aims to set up a tyranny of minorities over Americans." The court had no trouble finding the third factor was met, as the newsletters were filled with inflammatory and disparaging terms for gays and African Americans, among others. Finally, the court found that the fourth factor was met because a significant portion of the newsletters' intended readership were young people who would likely have little knowledge about the historical events presented in the newsletters, and the newsletters' negative treatment of these events would not assist in the readers' understanding of them. An example of an organization that failed to meet the "full and fair exposition" standard was one formed to "promote the education of the public on patriotic, political, and civic matters, and to inform and alert the American citizenry to the dangers of an extreme political doctrine." The group distributed written materials (e.g., books, pamphlets, and newsletters) and operated a speakers' bureau. The materials included substantial data about the doctrine's activities. The problem was they also included many allegations and charges that certain individuals and institutions are of questionable national loyalty. Such charges are primarily developed by the use of disparaging terms, insinuations, and innuendoes and the suggested implications to be drawn from incomplete facts. For instance, the organization bases many of its conclusions on incomplete listings of an individual's organizational affiliations without stating the extent or the nature of the affiliations or attempting to present a full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts about those organizations. The IRS ruled that these types of activities were a substantial part of the organization's overall activities, and therefore the group failed to be classified as educational. Similarly, a white supremacist group was held not to meet the criteria to be an educational organization. The court in this case did not base its holding on the regulation, but rather found there was simply no way in which the organization's materials could fall within the term "educational" as Congress intended. Important to the court was that there was "no reasoned development" from the purported facts presented in the organization's publications (e.g., the occurrence of violent acts by African Americans or the presence of Jews in important positions) to the positions it advocated (e.g., removing these groups from society), and therefore the publications "cannot reasonably be considered intellectual exposition." There are constitutional implications as to how the term "educational" is defined. In particular, the denial of tax-exempt status to an organization on the basis of its speech could raise issues under the First Amendment. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has made clear that the government may choose to not subsidize taxpayers' speech through the provision of a tax incentive. Thus, there appears to be no constitutional requirement that the term "educational" encompass every communication protected by the First Amendment. At the same time, courts will examine the IRS's denial of a tax exemption or other benefit when it is based on the content of the taxpayer's speech in order to ensure the denial was not done for an impermissible reason. Groups that promote controversial positions may be particularly vulnerable to an interpretation of "educational" that permits a subjective determination by the IRS as to whether a group's methods of presenting its views are educational. As one court has explained in this context, "the government must shun being the arbiter of 'truth.'" The IRS recognizes the potential issues here, emphasizing that "[i]t has been, and it remains, the policy of the Service to maintain a position of disinterested neutrality with respect to the beliefs advocated by an organization." The government reportedly believes the methodology test "leads to the minimum of official inquiry into, and hence potential censorship of, the content of expression, because it focuses on the method of presentation rather than the ideas presented" and is therefore "the least intrusive standard available." On the other hand, some have questioned if the methodology test can be fairly categorized as objective or content neutral when it requires looking into such things as whether the organization uses "particularly inflammatory" language or distorts facts. Concern over these issues has led to questions about whether the "educational" standard is unconstitutionally vague. Not only does a vague law that affects First Amendment rights "inhibit the exercise of those freedoms," but vagueness may also lead to arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law in violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process protections. In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States , the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the definition of "educational" in the Treasury regulation was unconstitutionally vague. Note that this case predates the methodology test. The court found that it was not clear which organizations were subject to the "full and fair exposition" test and what the standard required. For example, the court found the distinction between facts and opinions to be "not so clear-cut" that the organization or the IRS "will be able to judge when any given statement must be bolstered by another supporting statement." The same court had the opportunity to look at the regulation several years later in National Alliance v. United States , where it held that a white supremacist group did not meet the criteria to be an educational organization. Notably, the court did not decide the case based on the regulation or methodology test. Rather, as discussed above, the court's holding was based on its determination that there was simply no way in which the organization's materials could fall within the term "educational" as Congress intended. The court did state in dicta that the IRS's methodology test reduced the vagueness concerns by tending to limit the meaning of "educational" to "material which substantially helps a reader or listener in a learning process." The court noted with approval that the "IRS has attempted to test the method by which the advocate proceeds from the premises he furnishes to the conclusion he advocates rather than the truth or accuracy or general acceptance of the conclusion." While the court did not overrule Big Mama Rag , its decision in National Alliance is commonly understood to represent the court moving away from its reasoning in that case. As a result, the court's approval of the methodology test, while in dicta, is often seen as reducing any precedential value of Big Mama Rag . It appears the only court to address the vagueness issue since National Alliance is the Tax Court. In Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner , the court rejected the argument that the methodology test was overly vague. The court found the test was "sufficiently understandable, specific, and objective both to preclude chilling of expression protected under the First Amendment and to minimize arbitrary or discriminatory application by the IRS." Further, the court did not find the test's purpose or effect to be the suppression of "disfavored ideas." Other cases, both prior to and after Big Mama Rag/National Alliance , have involved application of the regulation, without addressing the issue of its constitutionality.

Concern is sometimes expressed that certain entities which qualify for tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status as "educational" organizations have abused their exemption by advocating a policy viewpoint. The argument is that these entities should have to present information on both sides of an issue equally and neutrally, without opinion. The term "educational" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). It is defined by regulation to encompass individual instruction, as well as public instruction "on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." The question here is how far can the term "educational" be extended? Can a group espousing a viewpoint (i.e., only one side of an issue) be characterized as educational? If so, does the group have to provide factual information to support its statements? Is there some standard for truthfulness and accuracy? The answers are rooted in a Treasury regulation, which provides that an organization that advocates a position or viewpoint can qualify as educational if it presents "a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts" so that people can form their own opinions or conclusions. To supplement the regulation's "full and fair exposition" standard, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has developed the "methodology test." Under it, a method is not "educational" if it fails to provide a "factual foundation" for the position or viewpoint or "a development from the relevant facts that would materially aid a listener or reader in a learning process." There are constitutional implications in how the term "educational" is defined. In particular, the denial of tax-exempt status on the basis of an organization's speech could raise issues under the First Amendment. While there is no constitutional requirement that the term "educational" encompass every communication protected by the First Amendment, courts will examine the IRS's denial of a tax exemption or other benefit when it is based on the content of the taxpayer's speech in order to ensure the denial was not done for an impermissible reason. Groups that promote controversial positions may be particularly vulnerable to an interpretation of "educational" that permits a subjective determination by the IRS as to whether a group's methods of presenting its views are educational. Concern over these issues has led to questions about whether the "educational" standard is unconstitutionally vague. While the IRS's methodology test was held to be unconstitutionally vague by a federal appellate court, subsequent court decisions have suggested that the test passes constitutional muster.

Lifeline is a federal program, established in 1984, that assists eligible individuals in paying the recurring monthly service charges associated with either wireline or wireless telephone usage. The program is part of the Low Income Program supported by the Universal Service Fund. Eligible households can receive up to $9.25 per month in Lifeline discounts. Additional state support may be available. Approximately 2,000 telephone companies are eligible to provide these discounts. A household applies for the discounts through their designated telecommunications service provider. Support is not given directly to the subscriber, but to the service provider. The provider is reimbursed through the Lifeline Program and in turn passes the discount on to the subscriber. The Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), an independent not-for-profit organization, is the designated administrator of the Universal Service Fund (USF), of which the Lifeline Program is a part. USAC administers the USF programs for the Federal Communications Commission and does not set or advocate policy. The Lifeline program covers the minutes of use for the eligible subscriber. Depending on the package selected the subscriber is allocated a set number of usage minutes per month. Once the allocation is used the subscriber may choose to pay for additional minutes of use. Although not required, most providers that offer a prepaid wireless option provide a wireless phone to the subscriber for free. The cost of this phone is not covered under the Lifeline program but is borne by the designated provider. Although the prepaid wireless option is growing in popularity the Lifeline program also covers a wireline option or a postpaid wireless option. As with the case of the prepaid wireless option the program solely covers the minutes of use, not the device. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, and commonwealth, and on Tribal lands. To participate in the program, consumers must either have an income that is at or below 135% of the federal Poverty Guidelines or participate in one of the following assistance programs: Medicaid; Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (Food Stamps or SNAP); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); Federal Public Housing Assistance (Section 8); Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP); Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF); National School Lunch Program's Free Lunch Program; Bureau of Indian Affairs General Assistance; Tribally-Administered Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TTANF); Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR); Head Start (if income eligibility criteria are met); or state assistance programs (if applicable). The Lifeline Pre-Screening Tool ( http://www.lifelinesupport.org/ls/eligibility/default.aspx ) provided by USAC can help determine whether a household is eligible for Lifeline assistance. At least once each year, beginning in 2012, consumers who are receiving lifeline service must recertify their eligibility and that no one else in their household has a lifeline discounted service. A failure to recertify eligibility will result in removal from the program. Consumers apply for Lifeline through their local telephone company or designated state agency. The Companies in My State ( http://www.lifelinesupport.org/ls/companies.aspx ) provided by USAC can help locate a Lifeline provider in your state. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) provides a listing and links to state utility commissions ( http://www.naruc.org/Commissions/CommissionsList.cfm ). Telecommunications carriers that provide interstate service and certain other providers of telecommunications services are required to contribute to the federal USF based on a percentage of their end-user interstate and international telecommunications revenues. These companies include wireline telephone companies, wireless telephone companies, paging service providers, and certain Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers. The USF receives no federal monies. Some consumers may notice a "Universal Service" line item on their telephone bills. This line item appears when a company chooses to recover its USF contributions directly from its customers by billing them this charge. The FCC permits, but does not require, this charge to be passed on directly to customers. Each company makes a business decision about whether and how to assess charges to recover its Universal Service obligations. The charge, however, cannot exceed the amount owed to the USF by the company. No. Federal rules prohibit eligible low-income consumers from receiving more than one Lifeline discount per household. An eligible consumer may receive a discount on either a wireline or wireless service, but not both. If a household is currently receiving more than one monthly Lifeline service, it must select one provider to provide Lifeline service and it must contact the other provider to de-enroll from their program. Subscribers found to be violating this rule will be de-enrolled and may also be subject to criminal and/or civil penalties.

The concept that all Americans should have affordable access to the telecommunications network, commonly called the "universal service concept," can trace its origins back to the 1934 Communications Act. The preservation and advancement of universal service has remained a basic tenet of federal communications policy, and in the mid-1980s the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established the Lifeline program to provide support for low-income subscribers. The Lifeline program, which is administered under the Universal Service Fund (USF) Low Income Program, was established by the FCC in 1984 to assist eligible low-income subscribers to cover the recurring monthly service charges incurred for telephone usage. Although the program solely covers costs associated with the minutes of use, not the telephone, misinformation connecting the program to payment for a "free phone" has resulted in a significant number of constituent inquiries.

The Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) is authorized by Part B of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA, P.L. 114-95 ) in 2015. Congress created this program to address the unique needs of rural schools that disadvantage them relative to non-rural schools. To compensate for the challenges facing rural schools, REAP awards two types of formula grants. The Small, Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program provides funds to rural local educational agencies (LEAs) that serve small numbers of students. The Rural and Low-Income School (RLIS) program provides funds to rural LEAs that serve high concentrations of low-income students, regardless of the LEA's size. Funds appropriated for REAP are divided equally between the SRSA and RLIS programs. The ESSA reauthorization of the REAP statute made major changes to the program by 1. updating the locale codes used for determining the eligibility of LEAs, 2. clarifying that LEAs within educational service agencies are to be considered for SRSA eligibility, 3. extending to RLIS the alternative state certification option for meeting the rural criterion that already existed for SRSA, and 4. giving LEAs the option to choose which program to receive funds under if eligible for both SRSA and RLIS. This report discusses the challenges facing rural schools and the manner in which REAP attempts to address these challenges. According to their proponents, rural schools have some advantages over their urban and suburban counterparts. Rural teachers are key members of the community and tend to know students and their families well. Rural schools often have less complex organizational structures with fewer layers than non-rural school systems, and they may be able to adjust or adapt relatively quickly to change. Additionally, the schools within rural communities are very visible and strongly connected with the community. However, rural schools also confront significant challenges. Many face fiscal limitations due to tax base constraints. Resource shortages contribute to various perceived problems, including a limited range of curricular options (such as a lack of advanced placement course offerings) and difficulties providing competitive salaries to attract and retain highly qualified teachers. Rural schools tend to have declining enrollment due to net out-migration and aging of the population. Rural schools' low population density can result in other problems, such as high transportation costs and limited access to cultural and educational resources. In addition to these general challenges, rural school districts may face particular problems meeting ESEA requirements related to academic accountability and teacher quality. While ESSA provided greater funding use flexibility, rural districts may find it difficult to implement ESEA's requirements for schools identified as in need of improvement (such as providing public school choice). Rural districts may also face difficulty in meeting the ESEA requirement that students receive instruction in the core academic subjects from teachers who are fully certified by the state and have demonstrated competency in the subjects they teach. Additionally, where ESEA funds are concerned, rural LEAs may be at a relative disadvantage compared to non-rural LEAs in both seeking competitive awards and utilizing small formula grant amounts from varied programs. Congress created REAP to meet many of the challenges facing rural schools. According to the statute, the purpose of REAP is to address "the unique needs of rural school districts that frequently (1) lack the personnel and resources needed to compete effectively for Federal competitive grants; and (2) receive formula grant allocations in amounts too small to be effective in meeting their intended purposes." REAP authorizes two rural education programs under ESEA Title V-B. Subpart 1 authorizes the SRSA program, which focuses on LEAs with less than 600 students. Subpart 2 authorizes the RLIS program, which focuses on larger rural LEAs with relatively high poverty rates (at least 20% of children from families below the poverty line). Recipients of grants from these programs may use their funds to support a fairly broad set of educational programs and activities authorized by several ESEA programs. ESSA authorized REAP at $169,840,000 for the fiscal years 2017 through 2020, to be distributed equally between subparts 1 and 2. However, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ) Congress appropriated $175,840,000 for REAP. Table 1 shows the history of appropriations for the program. To be eligible for REAP funds, LEAs must be designated rural by the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has devised a typology to classify schools based on their geographic locations. Using Census Bureau geographic data, NCES assigns "locale codes" to each school. Based on their proximity to urbanized areas and urban clusters, schools are classified along a 12-point urban-to-rural scale as follows (locale codes in parentheses): Large City (11) : Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with population of 250,000 or more. Midsize City (12) : Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with population of less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000. Small City (13) : Territory inside an urbanized area and inside a principal city with population of less than 100,000. Large Suburb (21) : Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with population of 250,000 or more. Midsize Suburb (22) : Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with population of less than 250,000 and greater than or equal to 100,000. Small Suburb (23) : Territory outside a principal city and inside an urbanized area with population of less than 100,000. Fringe Town (31) : Territory inside an urban cluster that is less than or equal to 10 miles from an urbanized area. Distant Town (32) : Territory inside an urban cluster that is more than 10 miles and less than or equal to 35 miles from an urbanized area. Remote Town (33) : Territory inside an urban cluster that is more than 35 miles from an urbanized area. Fringe Rural (41) : Census-defined rural territory that is less than or equal to 5 miles from an urbanized area, as well as rural territory that is less than or equal to 2.5 miles from an urban cluster. Distant Rural (42) : Census-defined rural territory that is more than 5 miles but less than or equal to 25 miles from an urbanized area, as well as rural territory that is more than 2.5 miles but less than or equal to 10 miles from an urban cluster. Remote Rural (43) : Census-defined rural territory that is more than 25 miles from an urbanized area and is also more than 10 miles from an urban cluster. An LEA is eligible for the SRSA program if all schools served by the LEA have a locale code of 41, 42, or 43 and either its average daily attendance (ADA) is less than 600 or the county or counties in which the LEA is located has a population density of fewer than 10 people per square mile. The SRSA statute allows the Secretary of Education to waive the locale code requirement (but not the ADA or population density requirements) based on a state government agency's determination that the LEA is located in a rural area. The ESSA amendments made otherwise eligible LEAs within educational service agencies eligible for SRSA funds. LEAs that lost SRSA eligibility due to the ESSA amendments are provided a declining share of prior grant amounts through FY2019 under a hold harmless provision. An LEA is eligible for the RLIS program if all its schools have locale codes of 32, 33, 41, 42, or 43 and at least 20% of the children the LEA serves are from families below the poverty line. The ESSA amendments provided the Secretary with waiver authority for the locale code requirement based on state determination that the LEA is located in a rural area, which previously only existed for the SRSA program. Amounts that LEAs receive and aggregate state amounts are determined differently under the SRSA and RLIS programs. Under the SRSA program, an initial amount is calculated for each eligible LEA and then funds are added based on enrollment and subtracted based on "offsetting" amounts received from other ESEA programs. Under RLIS, grants are first made to states based on a formula and then subgranted to LEAs on either a formula or competitive basis. Congress intended the SRSA program to be a supplement to certain other ESEA grant funds. Thus, an LEA's final SRSA grant amount is based on adjusting its initial amount by the total amount it received from other ESEA programs. The initial SRSA amount is equal to a base grant of $20,000 plus an additional amount for LEAs with enrollments of more than 50 students. The additional amount is equal to $100 for each student in excess of 50 students; however, generally, no grant amount may exceed $60,000. The following are some examples of initial amount calculations: LEAs with 50 students or fewer have initial grant amounts equal to the base amount of $20,000. An LEA with 55 students has an initial amount of $20,500 (i.e., the base amount of $20,000 plus $500, which is $100 times the five students in excess of 50 students). An LEA with 449 students has an initial amount of $59,900 (i.e., the base amount of $20,000 plus $39,900, which is $100 times the 399 students in excess of 50 students). LEAs with between 450 and 599 students have initial amounts of $60,000 (e.g., the calculation for an LEA with 451 students would be the base amount of $20,000 plus $40,100, which is $100 times the 401 students in excess of 50 students; since this exceeds the maximum amount of $60,000, the amount of the initial award would be $60,000). The final SRSA grant amount is equal to the initial award minus the amount an LEA received from two ESEA grant programs in the prior fiscal year: (1) the Supporting Effective Instruction program, Title II, Part A, and (2) the Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants, Title IV, Part A. As a result of this offset provision, an LEA whose initial SRSA grant amount is less than what it received from these two ESEA programs in the prior fiscal year would not receive funds under the SRSA program. Unlike under the SRSA program, the Secretary must reserve funds from the total RLIS appropriation for Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools (0.5%) and for outlying areas (0.5%). The remainder is allotted to states based on each state's share of students attending schools in eligible LEAs nationwide. For example, a state with 2% of the national enrollment in RLIS-eligible LEAs would receive 2% of funds remaining after reserving BIE and outlying area funds. States award subgrants to eligible LEAs either competitively or based on a formula selected by the state, and approved by the Secretary. The ESSA amendments provide that LEAs in a state that does not participate in the RLIS program may submit an application directly to the Secretary as a "specially qualified agency." ESSA provided new authority allowing an LEA eligible under both the SRSA and RLIS programs to choose the program from which to receive funds; the Secretary is to determine the date by which notification must be given to ED. Table 2 shows the number of LEAs in each state that are eligible for REAP funds for FY2017, and a map of these LEAs is displayed in the Appendix . Recipients of REAP grants may use funds for activities authorized by several ESEA programs: Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies (Title I, Part A); Supporting Effective Instruction (Title II, Part A); Language Instruction for English Learners and Immigrant Students (Title III); and Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants (Title IV, Part A). Under the "alternative use of funds authority" (commonly known as REAP-Flex), LEAs that are eligible for SRSA grants (whether or not they receive any SRSA funds) have the flexibility to use offsetting funds from ESEA Title II-A and Title IV-A programs for any activities authorized by the SRSA program. For example, under REAP-Flex an LEA may use funds received under the Supporting Effective Instruction program (Title II-A) to provide language acquisition and services to immigrant students authorized under the Language Instruction for English Learners and Immigrant Students Program (Title III). Changes made by the ESSA amendments may present implementation issues. One possible area concerns the impact of dual eligibility on the awarding of grants. ESSA provided new authority allowing an LEA eligible under both the SRSA and RLIS programs to choose the program from which they prefer to receive funds. This could greatly complicate grant administration at both the federal and state levels. The new law requires the Secretary to establish a date by which LEAs must declare their choice; however, this may be a difficult decision to make by a certain date because estimated grant amounts will change due to the number and characteristics of other participating LEAs. Specifically, the ratable reduction and hold harmless provisions in SRSA will be greatly impacted by the number of LEAs that choose this program. Similarly, RLIS amounts will depend largely on the popularity of this choice. Currently, SRSA awards are much larger than RLIS awards. In FY2016, the average per pupil grant amount was $78 for SRSA, compared to $23 for RLIS. However, that could change substantially if a large number of former RLIS recipients decided to take SRSA funds. Even though it appears that most dual-eligible LEAs were formerly not in the RLIS program, there still may be a significant impact due to the ESSA changes. Perhaps most importantly, the changes appear to force a choice based upon limited information. This is likely to create some uncertainty for LEAs and administrative complications for ED and state officials.

The Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) is authorized by Part B of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA, P.L. 114-95) in 2015. To compensate for the challenges facing rural schools, REAP awards two types of formula grants. The Small, Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program provides funds to rural local educational agencies (LEAs) that serve small numbers of students. The Rural and Low-Income School (RLIS) program provides funds to rural LEAs that serve high concentrations of low-income students, regardless of the LEA's size. The ESSA reauthorization of the REAP statute made several major changes to the way funds are allocated to rural LEAs. Most notably, ESSA amended the scheme used to identify rural LEAs that may be eligible for REAP funds and gave LEAs the option to choose which program to receive funds under if eligible for both SRSA and RLIS. REAP funds are divided equally between the SRSA and RLIS programs at the national level, but at the local level, award amounts to LEAs under each program vary widely. In FY2016, the average per pupil grant amount was $77 for SRSA awards, compared to $22 for RLIS awards. Given that final award amounts under each program depend greatly on the number of LEAs eligible for funds, the new option to choose the program from which to receive funds may raise important implementation issues. This report provides a detailed description of eligibility rules and formula allocation procedures for SRSA and RLIS and discusses issues that may arise as ESSA amendments are implemented.

This report briefly poses and answers several frequently asked questions in relation to the floor proceedings used to elect a Speaker of the House. For a more detailed treatment of these election procedures, as well as data on elections of the Speaker in each Congress since 1913, see CRS Report RL30857, Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2017 . For a list of all Speakers of the House and their periods of service, as well as additional discussion of selection procedures, see CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative . Upon convening at the start of a new Congress, the House elects a Speaker by roll call vote. If a Speaker dies, resigns, or is removed during a Congress, the House elects a new Speaker at that time. In the most recent cases of an election held during the middle of a Congress, the practice has been to elect a new Speaker using the same process as at the start of a Congress. When a Speaker is selected at the start of a new Congress, the Clerk of the House presides; the Clerk may also preside over an election to replace a Speaker who had died during a Congress. A sitting Speaker could preside over the election of his or her successor. However, under clause 8(b)(3) of House Rule I (adopted in the 108 th Congress), the Speaker must provide the Clerk a list of Members designated to act as Speaker pro tempore in the case of a vacancy in the office. It is possible that a Member on this list could preside over an election in the case of a vacancy during a Congress. In current practice, each House party caucus selects, prior to the floor vote, a candidate whose name is placed in nomination immediately before the vote. Typically, the election commences with a Member from each party caucus placing in nomination the party's candidate for Speaker. Other names may also be placed in nomination on the floor. Since 1839, the election has been by roll-call vote, a quorum being present. Votes are cast v iva voce , meaning that each voting Member states aloud the surname of the candidate whom he or she favors for Speaker. The presiding officer appoints several Members as tellers, who tally the votes. Members are not required to vote for one of the candidates nominated by each major party (or even for some other candidate formally nominated on the floor); they may vote for any individual. Although the U.S. Constitution does not require the Speaker to be a Member of the House, all Speakers have been Members. However, some individuals not serving in the House have received votes. The long-standing practice of the House is that electing a Speaker requires a numerical majority of the votes cast by Members "for a person by name." This does not mean that an individual must necessarily receive a majority (currently 218) of the full membership of the House, because some Members may not be present to vote (or may instead answer "present"). If no candidate receives the requisite majority of votes cast, the roll call is repeated. No restrictions are imposed on who may receive votes in the subsequent ballots. (For instance, no candidate is eliminated based on receiving the fewest votes in the floor election, and a Member's vote is not limited to individuals who received votes in previous ballots. )

This report briefly poses and answers several "frequently asked questions" in relation to the floor proceedings used to elect a Speaker of the House. Current practice for electing a Speaker, either at the start of a Congress or in the event of a vacancy (e.g., death or resignation), is by roll-call vote, during which Members state aloud the name of their preferred candidate. Members may vote for any individual. If no candidate receives a majority of votes cast, balloting continues; in subsequent ballots, Members may still vote for any individual. For a more detailed treatment of these election procedures, as well as data on elections of the Speaker in each Congress since 1913, see CRS Report RL30857, Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2017. For a list of all Speakers of the House and their periods of service, as well as additional discussion of selection procedures, see CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative.

On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in April 1997, and since February 2013 has served as the circuit court's Chief Judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. During his nearly two decades on the bench, Judge Garland has served on three-judge or en banc D.C. Circuit panels that have made rulings in well over 1,000 cases. He has also served on a few panel decisions at the district court level. Cases considered by Judge Garland have concerned a wide range of legal topics ranging from rulemaking by federal administrative agencies, to criminal law and procedure, to the review of legal challenges arising under the local laws of the District of Columbia. To assist Members and committees of Congress and their staff in their ongoing research into Judge Garland's approach to the law, this report identifies and briefly summarizes each of the more than 350 cases in which Judge Garland has authored a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. Arguably, these written opinions provide the greatest insight into Judge Garland's judicial approach, as a judge's vote in a case or decision to join an opinion authored by a colleague may be based upon a number of considerations and may not necessarily represent full agreement with a joined opinion. This report does not address instances when Judge Garland sat on a reviewing judicial panel but did not author an opinion. Accordingly, instances where Judge Garland was part of a panel that issued a per curiam opinion, which did not credit a particular judge as the author, are omitted from this report. The report also does not address subsequent legal proceedings that may have occurred after a cited decision was issued. The opinions listed in this report are categorized into two tables: one table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland on behalf of the reviewing court, and the other table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland separate from the majority opinion. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order by date of decision. In each case, the key ruling or rulings of the case are succinctly described. Judicial opinions discussed in this report are categorized using the following 19 legal subject areas: Administrative law Civil liability (e.g., tort preemption, arbitration, class actions, statutory right to sue) Civil rights Criminal law/procedure D.C. local government Election law Environmental law Energy Federalism Federal courts (e.g., standing to sue, civil procedure) First Amendment (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of the press) Government information (e.g., claims concerning the Freedom of Information Act) Health care (e.g., Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement) International law Labor law National security Separation of powers Tax law Transportation Where appropriate, multiple subject areas are identified as relevant to a particular case. The list above is not an exhaustive accounting of all possible subject areas addressed by the cases below, but focuses on those legal topics that have most frequently arisen in cases adjudicated by Judge Garland. Moreover, the fact that a case is categorized under a particular legal subject area does not necessarily mean that some observers might not deem other categories to be pertinent. For example, several cases concerning the disposition of challenges brought by wartime detainees held at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are categorized solely under the legal subject area of "National security," though some observers may believe that such cases also could be deemed to fall under the "Separation of powers" category (because they arguably concern judicial review of executive discretion in wartime matters) or the "Administrative law" category (because such cases often involve review of determinations made through an administrative process employed by the U.S. military to assess whether a person is properly detained as an enemy belligerent). Accordingly, while the categorizations employed by this report may provide a helpful guide to readers in locating decisions dealing with particular topics, they do not necessarily reflect the full range of legal issues raised by a judicial opinion. While this report identifies and briefly describes those opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the federal court, it does not analyze the implications of his judicial opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters are discussed in CRS Report R44479, Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The cases included in this report were compiled utilizing the following methodology: The majority opinions were found by searching the District of Columbia Circuit—U.S. Court of Appeals database on Lexis for OpinionBy(Garland). The concurring opinions were found by searching the District of Columbia Circuit—U.S. Court of Appeals database on Lexis for ConcurBy(Garland) . The dissenting opinions were found by searching the District of Columbia Circuit—U.S. Court of Appeals database on Lexis for DissentBy(Garland) . Concurring or dissenting opinions issued in cases where Judge Garland wrote the majority opinion were found by searching the District of Columbia Circuit—U.S. Court of Appeals database on Lexis for OpinionBy(Garland ) , and limiting those results by searching for Judges(concur! or dissent!) . District court opinions in which Judge Garland is credited as an author were found by searching the District of Columbia Circuit—U.S. District Court Cases database on Lexis for Judges(Garland) . Not all results from these searches ultimately proved to be relevant, such as when the D.C. Circuit declined a petition for en banc rehearing in a one-sentence decision joined by all of the reviewing judges. That decision and similar rulings are not discussed in this report. Ultimately, this methodology resulted in the identification of 355 instances in which Judge Garland is credited as an author of a judicial opinion in cases either before the D.C. Circuit (354 cases) or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (a single case).

On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit in April 1997, and since February 2013 has served as the circuit court's Chief Judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. To assist Members and committees of Congress and their staff in their ongoing research into Judge Garland's approach to the law, CRS attorneys have prepared tabular listings of cases in which Judge Garland authored an opinion. These opinions are categorized into two tables: one table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland on behalf of the reviewing court, and the other table identifying opinions authored by Judge Garland that concur with or dissent from the majority opinion. While this report identifies and briefly describes judicial opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the federal court, it does not analyze the implications of his judicial opinions or suggest how he might approach legal issues if appointed to the Supreme Court. Those matters are discussed in CRS Report R44479, Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), enacted at the behest of President Kennedy, sought to organize and implement U.S. foreign assistance programs with a commitment to long-range economic assistance to the developing world. The President, in a "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid," delivered March 22, 1961, described the U.S. foreign aid programs emerging from World War II as [b]ureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes. Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad. President Kennedy went on to note the declining prestige of the United States' foreign aid apparatus and the negative impact of that decline on administering and staffing programs abroad. The President also cited the uneven and undependable short-term financing of programs and the resulting disincentive for long-term efficient planning. Congress and the executive branch worked together to enact the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to address these shortcomings at a time when much of the developing world was emerging as newly independent states, when those new nations were, "without exception ... under Communist pressure," and when "the free industrialized nations" found themselves in a position "to assist the less-developed nations on a long-term basis ... [as they find themselves] on the threshold of achieving sufficient economic, social and political strength and self-sustained growth to stand permanently on their own feet." Though the original Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 lengthened the authorization time frame for funding development assistance to five years, other programs were authorized for shorter periods. The act still required occasional reauthorization legislation to renew programs beyond that original time frame, and Congress retained its role of appropriating funds. The original act authorized the funding levels shown in Table 1 . Through 1985, Congress regularly enacted new authorization legislation or amended the original act to update authorization time frames, and to incorporate newer programs and authorities. From 1986 on, however, Congress turned more frequently to enacting freestanding authorities that did not amend the 1961 act, and included language in annual appropriations measures to waive the requirement to keep authorizations current. Thus, sections in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, in many instances, do not refer to authorization beyond fiscal years 1986 and 1987 (unless the program was added to the act by an amendment enacted after that period), but programs are continued through appropriations. A few programs are established outside the statutory framework of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and thus are not included in detail in this report. Reimbursable military exports, for example, are addressed in the Arms Export Control Act and subsequent Security Assistance Acts. Since 1985, the last year Congress passed a comprehensive reauthorization of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, both Congress and the President have promoted a variety of specialized authorities in freestanding legislation. And, on rare occasion, Congress has established new authorities or programs in annual appropriations acts. Some freestanding laws that authorize foreign aid or apply new conditions to aid authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 are shown in Table 2 . Table 3 presents the authorities enacted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the corresponding appropriations that fund those authorities in the current foreign assistance appropriations act. The left-side column of Table 3 cites sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that authorize programs, and provides the latest year for which authorization is enacted. Sections that establish a need for such a program—in the form of policy or finding statements, for example—are not cited. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is organized in a conventional manner, however, so those sections that state policy, findings, program requirements, or implementing structure can be found in the text of the law in sections proximate to the authorizing section. All of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is stated in the United States Code, beginning at 22 U.S.C. 2151. For each section that states the President's power to authorize funds, the relevant U.S. Code citation and year of enactment is included here. In nearly all cases, these sections have been substantially amended, or rewritten altogether, subsequent to enactment. This table reflects the language as amended. Though the sections generally afford the President the authority to furnish whatever assistance the section establishes, Section 622(a) and (c) (22 U.S.C. 2382(a), (c)) of the act states that Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.... Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining where there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby. In many instances, the President has delegated his authority to the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, or some other appropriate office holder. Delegations of authority are to be found, either in whole text or as a reference, in the U.S. Code, at sections corresponding to the section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that states the relevant authority. The right-side column of Table 3 states appropriations levels that correspond to the authorized program, as enacted in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (division I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012; P.L. 112-74 ; 125 Stat. 786 at 1164). The General Provisions title in an appropriations act usually states conditions for administering the appropriations. In Table 3 , General Provisions sections that state conditionality and terms that might be applicable to the aid being provided are also listed, and a statute citation is provided to assist the reader who might wish to read in further detail. General Provisions measures that apply to the entire appropriations act are cited only at Chapter 1—Policy, Development Assistance Authorizations; they are numerous and apply to most authorities. Such General Provisions sections prohibit assistance for reasons relating to terrorism, military overthrows, and debt arrearages, to name a few.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) serves as the cornerstone for the United States' foreign assistance policies and programs. Written, passed, and signed into law at what some consider the height of the Cold War, the act is seen by some today as anachronistic. Ironically, when President Kennedy urged the 87th Congress to enact foreign aid legislation that would exemplify and advance the national interests and security strategies of the United States post-World War II, he described the existing foreign aid mechanisms as bureaucratic, fragmented, awkward, and slow. Some have used the same language today, more than 50 years later, to characterize the legislation he promoted. On several occasions over the past 20 years, Congress has set out to assess the current body of law that comprises foreign aid policy, starting with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, in recent past Congresses, have considered legislation to rebuild the United States' capacity to deliver effective foreign aid, and make aid more transparent and responsive to today's quick-changing international challenges. Proposals have ranged from setting up advisory committees to a complete overhaul of foreign aid objectives and programs. This report presents the authorities of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and correlates those authorities with the operative appropriations measure (division I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012; P.L. 112-74; 124 Stat. 786 at 1164) that funds those authorities. It replaces an earlier issue of the same report, dated July 29, 2011, to incorporate the current appropriations act. For many years, foreign aid appropriations measures have waived the requirement that funds must be authorized before they are appropriated and expended. Understanding the relation between the authorities in the cornerstone act and appropriations is key to foreign aid reform.

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2779, P.L. 98-549 , established for the first time a national regulatory policy concerning cable television communications. The act established a comprehensive cable regulatory scheme, delineating regulatory authority among the federal, state, and local levels. Increasing cable service rates and customer service complaints, however, prompted Congress to revisit the law as local authorities and consumer groups lobbied for new legislation. On October 5, 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 1460, P.L. 102-385 . This law addressed such issues as cable rates, must-carry rules, retransmission consent, program access, franchising authority, service standards, and more. Promulgation of regulations required by the 1992 act was done by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The regulations were completed in stages, according to dates set by the act. The FCC's first set of cable rate rules implementing this act went into effect September 1, 1993. The FCC expected, on average, a 10% reduction in overall cable bills. However, "on average" did not mean that all rates decreased 10%, or even that all rates decreased. One reason was that all cable systems did not charge rates that the FCC determined to be "unreasonable." Some rates increased, and Congress and the FCC decided to address the issue of rate hikes. After conducting a review of cable rates following issuance of its 1993 rate regulations, the FCC decided to revisit this issue. On March 30, 1994, the FCC issued rules for a second round of cable rate regulations. These new rules were intended to cut cable rates, on average, an additional 7%. No predictions were made estimating the number of cable subscribers who would see further reductions in their cable bills. The new rules took effect on May 15, 1994. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 115, P.L. 104-104 , was passed by the 104 th Congress in February 1996. This act eliminated most cable television rate regulations beyond the basic tier as of March 31, 1999 . In most cases, rates for a basic tier of services (defined as the tier that includes "over the air" broadcast stations) continues to be regulated either by local franchising authorities (LFAs) or state authorities. Most small cable operators (those serving less than 1% of all cable subscribers and having no affiliation with any company whose gross annual revenues exceed $250 million) were freed from rate regulation immediately. The FCC continues to monitor cable rate activity and issues an annual report on cable industry prices and one on competition in video markets. According to the 2005 FCC Annual Report on Cable Industry Prices , released in December 2006, the overall average monthly price for basic-plus-expanded basic cable service increased by 5.2% from $40.91 to $43.04 over the 12-month period ending January 1, 2005. Industry statistics on cable rates vary slightly from FCC statistics (see below), but cable companies in recent years have stated that sharply rising costs of obtaining sports and entertainment programming coupled with system upgrades caused them to increase rates for subscribers. Ongoing consumer concerns about rate increases for subscription television prompted Congress to mandate a General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) study of cable rates released in October 2003. In its report, Telecommunications: Issues Related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry , GAO sought to examine the impact of competition on cable rates, assess the reliability of information contained in the annual FCC report on cable industry prices, and examine the causes of recent cable rate increases. In surveys of the industry conducted by GAO for its report, GAO concluded that the annual FCC report did not appear to provide a reliable source of information on the cost factors underlying rate increases or on the effects of competition, most notably costs associated with upgrading equipment and services. GAO recommended that FCC take steps to improve the reliability of data in its report. GAO also found that several key factors, including a 34% average increase in programming costs incurred by cable operators during the past three years—specifically a 59% average increase in sports programming costs—and cost increases from system upgrades have put upward pressure on operators to raise rates to their customers. The GAO report also discussed the option of converting cable system pricing to à la carte (per channel) pricing instead of the current tiered system. It noted that despite the customer benefit of greater choice, à la carte pricing could impose additional equipment costs on the customer and alter the current economics of the industry, especially how cable providers generate advertising revenues. According to the FCC's Twelfth Annual Report on Competition in Video Markets , released in March 2006, approximately 65.4 million homes in the United States, or 69.4% of all Multichannel Video Program Distributor (MVPD) television homes, subscribed to cable television as of June 2004. As defined by the FCC, an MVPD distributor is "an entity engaged in the business of making available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming." Such entities include cable operators, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services, and—in much smaller numbers—subscribers to five other technologies that deliver programming. Subscriptions to DBS in recent years have increased rapidly. As of June 2005, DBS subscribers numbered more than 26.1 million, or 27.7% of all MVPD subscribers. MVPD (cable and noncable) subscribers total approximately 94 million homes. The other five technologies (MMDS, HSD, PCO, BSP, and OVS) represent the approximately 2.9% of remaining MVPD subscribers. As a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, telephone companies can provide video services in direct competition with the local cable television company and in certain cases may merge with the local cable company. Cable television companies are also able to offer local phone service and broadband Internet services (including such services as "Voice Over Internet protocol" [VoIP]). Although individual consumers will presumably have more choices as a result of competition in the developing communications market, particularly from satellite services such as DBS, forecasts of what will happen in this new and complex environment are conflicting and uncertain. Many providers of cable television programming are owned by or affiliated with cable television operators. Concerns that such programmers may only provide their programming to their corporate affiliates prompted Congress to approve a provision in the Cable Act of 1992 addressing "program access" concerns. Program access provisions prevent the use of exclusive contracts between cable operators and their affiliated programmers for satellite delivered programming. The FCC was instructed in the statute to reexamine the continuing need for the prohibition after it had been in effect for 10 years. The prohibition was set to expire on October 5, 2002, but the FCC issued a Report and Order on June 13, 2002, extending for five years (until 2007) the statutory prohibition. The FCC found that the prohibition continues to be necessary to preserve and protect competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming. Broadband or high-speed Internet services can be offered through a series of technologies including cable, digital subscriber lines (DSL) provided by telephone carriers, satellite television, fixed wireless, and others. Cable television companies offer broadband services via a cable modem. Classifying broadband cable service as an "information service," a "telecommunications service," or as a combination of the two has important regulatory implications. Generally, classification as an information service would subject cable broadband services to minimal federal regulation and no requirement that they provide open access to their systems to competing Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Classification as a telecommunications service could subject cable broadband services to common carrier regulation and could require provision of open access to competing ISPs. Recently, the courts and the FCC have come to different conclusions regarding classification of these services. In a ruling on March 14, 2002, the FCC ruled that cable modem service is properly classified as an interstate information service. The ruling further determined that cable modem service is not a "cable service" and that cable modem service does not contain a separate "telecommunications service" and is not subject to common carrier regulation (the rules that govern telephone providers). However, in an opinion filed on October 6, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion regarding the classification of cable modem services. The court ruled in Brand X Internet Service v. FCC that cable modem services are legally in part a telecommunications service, which could lead to the requirement that cable operators open their lines to competing Internet service providers. This decision vacated in part the FCC March 2002 declaratory order , which classified cable modem service as exclusively an information service free from the rules of access governing telecommunications services. The FCC appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision, but the appeals court denied the FCC's petition for a full court review on March 31, 2004. The FCC and the Solicitor General of the United States then filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 27, 2005, the high court overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision, ruling that cable companies do not have to open their lines to ISPs. In the 6-3 decision, the court basically supported the FCC's decision to classify cable modem service as an information service. U.S. Federal Communications Commission. "Regulation of Cable TV Rates." FCC Consumer Facts. September 2006. http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cablerates.html . This two-page fact sheet provides brief information on state and local franchising authorities' cable television responsibilities, including the regulation of rates for basic service tiers. ——. "Choosing Cable Channels." FCC Consumer Facts. December 2006. http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cablechannels.html . This two-page fact sheet explains how cable channels are packaged and distributed to consumers. It includes a brief description of tiers, "a la carte," and pay-per-view programming. ——. "General Information on Cable TV and Its Regulation." Fact Sheet. June 2000. http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html . This extensive fact sheet presents background information on the history and evolution of the cable industry in the United States, including the evolution of parts of the Communications Act of 1934 that affect cable television, discussion of issues such as must-carry regulations, and information on the regulation of cable television by state and local authorities, including local franchising authority agreements and customer service guidelines. Additional fact sheets on specific cable TV topics are available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/#cable . ——. "FCC Role in Cable Rate Regulation Ends." Consumer Alert. March 1999. http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/Factsheets/cblrate.html . This two-page notice details the end of federal regulation of expanded basic cable rates as of March 31, 1999, which was mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. 104-104 . CRS Report RL33542, Broadband Internet Regulation and Access: Background and Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32398, Cable and Satellite Television Network Tiering and " a la Carte " Options for Consumers: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31260, Digital Television: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS22217, The Digital TV Transition: A Brief Overview , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21768, Satellite Television: Reauthorization of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA) — Background and Key Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33338, The FCC ' s " a la Carte " Reports , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32589, The Federal Communications Commission: Current Structure and Its Role in the Changing Telecommunications Landscape , by [author name scrubbed].

Cable television is one of the oldest and most popular distribution technologies used to deliver video programming to consumers. It uses fixed coaxial or fiber-optic cables to accomplish delivery. Of the various other methods used to deliver video, only direct broadcast satellite (DBS) successfully competes with cable. It uses communications satellites to deliver signals to individual consumers. In 2005, cable television was received by 65.4 million homes, or approximately 69% of all pay television subscribers. In comparison, DBS was received by 26.1 million homes, or approximately 27.7% of all television subscribers. This report presents information on the history of federal regulation of the cable television industry and background information on cable rates and other cable industry issues. The DBS industry, cable's main competitor, is not addressed extensively in this report. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, P.L. 104-104, eliminated most cable rate regulation beyond the basic tier of services as of March 31, 1999. Some small cable operators were freed from regulation upon the enactment of the law, but in most cases, rates for a basic tier of services continue to be regulated. The Telecommunications Act also opened up new areas of competition between telephone companies and cable companies. This report will be updated as legislation or news events warrant.

The Fed directly changes two interest rates. The first, called the discount rate , is an administered rate explicitly set by the Fed. It is the rate at which the Fed lends short-term funds to banks, pursuant to P.L. 96-221 , the Monetary Control Act of 1980. It is determined by the seven-person Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second, known as the federal funds rate , is a market rate at which banks lend to each other overnight to meet their "reserve requirements " and other liquidity needs. The Fed sets a target for this rate and historically has bought and sold primarily U.S. Treasury securities with an aim to achieving the target, which speedily becomes known to market participants. It is decided by a 12-person Federal Open Market Committee, which includes each member of the board plus a varying five-person roster selected from among the 12 regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents (among the 12, the New York bank is always represented on the FOMC). On January 6, 2003, the Board of Governors announced a fundamental change to the setting of the discount rate. Henceforth, it was to be made a "penalty" rate for those banks who chose to borrow from the Federal Reserve to meet temporary reserve deficiencies as opposed to borrowing in the federal funds market (the "penalty" aspect of the discount rate comes from the fact that it is set above the target for federal funds). A primary discount rate of 2¼% was initially set for banks judged to be in a sound financial condition, whereas banks whose financial condition was judged to be riskier would be required to pay a higher secondary rate of 2¾%. This change in operating procedure is shown in Table 1 . Since the onset of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007, the Fed has not made an issue of whether banks borrow at the discount window or in the federal funds market even though the discount rate remains slightly higher than the target rate for federal funds. Because the discount rate is administered, changes in it are stated explicitly and all transactions with the Federal Reserve are at that rate. Hence, the changes shown in Table 1 are the relevant transactions rate. However, because the federal funds rate is market determined, it may vary from day to day or within a day from the announced target set by the FOMC. Thus, the federal funds rates shown in Table 1 are the target rates. Reference to the available financial data may show rates in the federal funds market that vary somewhat from the target in response to shifts in market conditions. At its December 16, 2008 meeting, the FOMC, for the first time, set a range for the federal funds target. This is because it was having difficulty holding the actual federal funds rate at the 1% target rate set on October 29, 2008. For much of the period between that date and December 16, the actual federal funds rate was substantially below the 1% target. The Fed tries to keep the economy operating at an output level consistent with a low rate of inflation and low unemployment. It therefore seeks a level of interest rates at which the economy will grow at its potential to produce. The interest rate levels consistent with this growth rate vary with the course of the business cycle. Different rates are judged appropriate at different times. Changes in the federal funds target are the most visible signs of shifts in Fed monetary policy stance and they immediately affect financial institutions and markets of all kinds here and abroad. Unusual financial market conditions such as those related to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the Russian debt crisis of 1998, the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and the financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 also influence Fed decisions on rate changes. The Fed reports to Congress twice yearly on its monetary policy including rate changes, in oversight hearings in February and July as originally required by P.L. 95-188 , the Federal Reserve Reform Act. Since 2001, the stance of monetary policy has varied considerably. Initially, it was aimed at setting an expansion in motion. To do this, the federal funds target was reduced from 5½% in March 2001 to 1% in June 2003. It remained at 1% for a year. As the expansion gathered momentum, the target was raised gradually to 5¼%, in 17 equal increments spread over two years. Even as the FOMC drew attention to upward movements in the core rate of inflation at various meetings during 2006 and 2007, it continued to express the view that inflation would moderate over time, as would the rate of growth of GDP. These reasons appear to be important for leaving the rate unchanged at 5¼% for more than a year. However, during the late summer of 2007, the fall in housing prices and conditions in financial markets related to the difficulty in refinancing subprime mortgages and extending credit in general became a matter of great concern. To ease these conditions, the Board of Governors on August 17, 2007, reduced the discount rate for primary credit to 5¾%. This was followed on September 18 with another reduction of ½% and a reduction in the federal funds target to 4¾%. Additional cuts of ¼% in both rates were approved on October 31 and December 11, 2007. On January 22, 2008, the target was reduced by ¾% and on January 30 by a further ½%. The economy began to soften in the third quarter of 2007 (GDP growth was negative, falling at an annual rate of -0.2%). In the first quarter of 2008 it was positive again, and rose at an annual rate of 0.9%. During the second quarter, growth was also positive and at an annualized rate of 2.8%. Unhappily, GDP contracted again in both the third and fourth quarters and, again, during the first quarter of 2009 (it contracted at a 6.3% annual rate during 2008:4 and 6.1% during 2009:1) . The unemployment rate began to rise on a sustained basis beginning in February 2008 and, 13 months later, in March, 2009, it had risen to 8.5% from 4.8%. Job losses since the employment peak in December 2007 are some 5.1 million. As conditions in financial markets worsened and the economy softened, the FOMC and the Board approved further reductions in the federal funds target and discount rate during 2008. Both rates were lowered on March 18, April 30, October 8, October 29, and December 16, and the discount rate was reduced itself on March 16. They now stand at a range of 0% to ¼% and ½%, respectively. As these developments were taking place, the world price of energy began to rise at a brisk rate. Rising energy prices threatened to boost the overall rate of inflation, posing a challenge to the Fed's mandated commitment to stable prices. Initially, the Fed reacted by holding the federal funds target steady. However, as the magnitude and international scope of the credit crisis became apparent and energy and other commodity prices began to fall, the target was lowered and the Fed undertook a number of new and innovative measures to shore up the financial system and contain the economic contraction. These measures, as well as traditional monetary policy measures, have been unprecedented in their magnitude. During March 2008, the total reserves of depository institutions were $44.3 billion, of which $41.3 billion were required. One year later, total reserves were $780 billion, of which only $55.3 billion were required. Initiatives announced on March 17, 2009, should add nearly $2 trillion to total reserves over the remainder of 2009. The next scheduled meeting of the FOMC is June 23-24, 2009. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL30354, Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Conditions , by [author name scrubbed].

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its scheduled meeting, held on April 29, 2009, to leave unchanged the target rate for federal funds, which is now at a range from 0% to ¼%. In doing so, it took notice of its previous decision to add up to $1.75 trillion to the reserves of depository institutions by purchasing agency mortgage-backed securities ($1.25 trillion), agency debt ($200 billion), and Treasury securities ($300 billion). It also repeated that other measures had been adopted to facilitate the flow of credit to households and small businesses. In making its decision, the FOMC stressed that while the pace of the economic contraction appears to have slowed somewhat, the following factors remain: (1) a continuing pattern of job losses, lower household wealth, and tight credit; (2) the decline in global demand is increasing; and (3) while inflationary pressures remain subdued, they may be inconsistent with longer term growth and price stability (meaning that the United States may be facing deflation in the future). Nevertheless, a gradual recovery of sustainable economic growth in the context of price stability is expected to begin, given Fed action to stabilize financial markets and institutions and the monetary and fiscal stimulus now in place. The FOMC pledged to employ all available tools to promote the resumption of sustainable economic growth in a stable price environment. It expects that this will require an exceptionally low federal funds target for some time. The Board of Governors also decided to keep unchanged the discount rate for primary credit at ½%. The next scheduled meeting of the FOMC is set for June 23-24, 2009. This report will be updated as events warrant.

It takes an average of 15 years from the moment a manufacturer first approaches the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with an idea for a new drug to its final approval for marketing. Steps in the development and approval of a drug or biologic (e.g., a vaccine) involve actions by both the manufacturer and FDA. First, a manufacturer (sometimes referred to as the sponsor) submits to FDA an Investigational New Drug (IND) application for permission to conduct clinical studies in humans. Second, the manufacturer completes Phase I, II, and III clinical trials to establish that a product is safe and effective for a specific purpose and population. Third, the manufacturer submits to FDA a New Drug Application or a Biologics Licensing Application (noted as NDA/BLA throughout this report) for permission to market the product. Fourth, FDA reviews the NDA/BLA for evidence of safety and effectiveness, a process that sometimes includes requests to the sponsor for additional information, the sponsor's response, and further FDA review. Finally, FDA decides whether to approve the application. For drugs and biologics that address unmet needs or serious diseases or conditions, FDA regularly uses three formal mechanisms to expedite the development and review process: Fast Track product development, Priority Review, and Accelerated Approval. This report briefly describes (in text and in Table 1 ) those mechanisms, including their intended effects and statutory and regulatory bases, and examines whether Fast Track accomplishes two goals: making approval more likely and shortening approval time. For the treatment of a serious or life-threatening illness, FDA regulations, promulgated in 1992, allow "accelerated approval" of a drug or biologic product that provides a "meaningful therapeutic benefit ... over existing treatments." The rule covers two situations. The first allows approval to be based on clinical trials that, rather than using standard outcome measures such as survival or disease progression, use "a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely ... to predict clinical benefit." The second situation addresses drugs whose use could be deemed safe and effective only under set restrictions that could include limited prescribing or dispensing. FDA usually requires postmarketing studies of products approved this way. Accelerated Approval involves different concerns than do the other programs designed to speed the normal process for important new products, and therefore this paper will not discuss it further. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA, P.L. 105-115 ) directed the Secretary to create a mechanism whereby FDA could designate as "Fast Track" certain products that met two criteria. First, the product must concern a serious or life-threatening condition; second, it has to have the potential to address an unmet medical need. Once FDA grants a Fast Track designation, it encourages the manufacturer to meet with the agency to discuss development plans and strategies before the formal submission of an NDA/BLA. The early interaction can help clarify elements of clinical study design and presentation whose absence at NDA/BLA submission could delay approval decisions. However, FDA makes similar interactions available to any sponsor who seeks FDA consultation throughout the stages of drug development. A unique option within Fast Track is the opportunity to submit sections of an NDA/BLA to FDA as they are ready, rather than the standard requirement to submit a complete application at one time. Unlike Fast Track or Accelerated Approval, the Priority Review process begins only when a manufacturer officially submits an NDA/BLA. Priority Review, therefore, does not alter the timing or content of steps taken in a drug's development or testing for safety and effectiveness. For products believed to address unmet needs, however, it shortens the average amount of time from completed application until approval decision from 10 months to 6 months. Although Priority Review is not explicitly required by law, FDA has established it in practice, and various statutes, such as the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), refer to and sometimes require it. Are products that receive Fast Track designation more likely to have their NDA/BLA approved by FDA than products that receive no such designation? The answer is we don't know, because, while FDA provides statistics on the products it designates as Fast Track, it does not make public information on the NDA/BLAs it receives unless and until the product is approved/licensed. What we do know from material on the FDA website: Manufacturers have requested Fast Track designation for 569 drugs and 195 biological products since the Fast Track program was set into law. FDA granted the designation to 74.5% of those drug requests and 63.6% of those biologics requests. Of products with Fast Track designation, FDA eventually approved 10.6% of the drugs and licensed 17.7% of the biologics. What that means is obscured by what we do not know: For what percentage of products with Fast Track designation do sponsors submit NDA/BLAs? How many NDA/BLAs submitted each year are for Fast Track products? With only the numerator (approved products), one cannot calculate the percentage of NDA/BLA submissions that are approved among Fast Track products. FDA receives approximately 100-130 applications a year, and has stated that "close to 80 percent of all filed applications will eventually be approved." The 10.6 and 17.7% figures for Fast Track are not a comparable statistic because they include the apparently large, but unquantified, number of product development attempts that manufacturers discontinue (for safety problems, lack of effectiveness, business decisions, competing projects). A useful analysis would account for the percentage of Fast Track and non-Fast Track products of which FDA is aware (e.g., that have INDs) that result in submitted NDA/BLAs. How long it takes from the time a sponsor applies for marketing permission to the moment FDA makes its decision varies greatly. The length matters to the sponsor and its stockholders, to potential consumers and healthcare providers, and to FDA. Two factors contribute to longer review times: review staff constraints at FDA, and the quality and completeness of applications when they are first submitted. PDUFA and its three reauthorizations have addressed the staffing issue by authorizing industry user fees to support FDA reviewers. FDA's Web pages on the use of its Fast Track and Priority Review programs provide the review times for successful applications. Table 2 compares the review times, by year and type of review procedure, for all 787 approved NDA/BLAs applications that were submitted from FY1998 through FY2006. These applications received either a Standard Review or a Priority Review , and the review times for these two procedures are summarized in the first two pairs of data columns in the table. The third pair of columns summarizes review times for approved NDA/BLA applications for products that received a Fast Track designation. As discussed below, most, though not all, of these 55 applications received a Priority Review and thus are counted in the Priority Review columns; the remainder are captured in the Standard Review data. The final pair of columns provide data on Priority Review times for NDAs of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) and New BLAs . These applications represent a subset of all those subject to Priority Review, and are the group of products most similar to Fast Track products. Each row of Table 2 corresponds to approved applications submitted during a specific year. The total approval time includes the time FDA spends to review an application, plus the time the sponsor takes to respond to questions, if necessary, plus the time FDA spends on any additional review. The table provides the median approval time for each submission year group, which is the value at the mid-point of times in a group. FDA uses the median in its reports, stating, "It provides a truer picture of our performance than average time, which can be unduly influenced by a few very long or short times." Fast Track submissions in theory differ from routine NDA/BLA submissions because they address unmet needs in the treatment of life-threatening or serious conditions. Similar criteria apply to drugs that FDA gives Priority Review status. In fact, 80% of Fast Track NDA approvals were also given Priority Review, as were all of the approved Fast Track BLAs. Again, FDA makes public detailed data only regarding the products that it approves/licenses. Using the data in Table 2 to determine the impact Fast Track designation has on approval time is complicated by limitations in the data available. These include the following: Inadequate data: Available FDA tables aggregate applications by year and present only the median approval time value for each year. This precludes using the individual application times in subsequent calculations. Missing data: Data available for analysis come from approved applications. Inclusion of numbers of applications and total time to review decision (approval or not) would allow examination of additional aspects of the Fast Track program that may provide advantages that do not affect total approval time. Unavailable documentation of decisions: Without detailed documentation of the many decisions embedded in the FDA summary tables, accuracy or consistency in assignment to year of submission rather than year of approval cannot be assessed. If an application is assigned to one year in the Fast Track column and to another in the All Priority column, for example, relying on the annual median approval times could distort the comparisons. Overlapping categories: The All Priority and All Standard groups sum to the total number of approved applications in each submission year. The other categories, however, overlap. By definition, the Priority NMEs and New BLAs category is a subset of the All Priority NDAs and BLAs. For the Fast Track NDAs, at least 87% are counted in the Priority NDA group and at least 68% are also counted in the Priority NME group. (FDA lists some Fast Track NME applications as assigned to Standard Review.) As expected, based on program goals, times are shorter for Priority Review than for Standard Review. For seven of the nine years, median Fast Track times were shorter than Priority Reviews, suggesting that Fast Track may have reduced time-to-market beyond the shortening of review time afforded by Priority Review. A more detailed analysis of individual application data might indicate how group differences may be due to obvious exceptions, different procedures or application completeness or quality, or unknown factors or chance. For example, how does the wide range of approval times—from 2.4 to 34.1 months—for the eight Fast Track product NDA/BLAs submitted in 2001 affect group averages? Finally, review time from submission to approval is only one measure of Fast Track effect. If a Fast Track designation enables a sponsor to submit a completed NDA/BLA sooner than it would otherwise, that advantage would not be evident in this comparison of review times that begins with submission.

By statutory requirements and by regulation, guidance, and practice, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) works with several overlapping yet distinct programs to get to market quickly new drug and biological products that address unmet needs. FDA most frequently uses three mechanisms for that purpose: Accelerated Approval, Fast Track, and Priority Review. The first two affect the development process before a sponsor submits a marketing application. Accelerated Approval allows surrogate endpoints in trials to demonstrate effectiveness and is relevant in fewer situations than the others. The Fast Track program encourages a sponsor to consult with FDA while developing a product. Unlike the others, Priority Review involves no discussions of study design or procedure; it relates only to an application's place in the review queue. Analysis of total approval time for approved applications under the Fast Track and Priority Review programs shows that for seven of the past nine years, Fast Track products have shorter median approval times than do all those applications assigned to Priority Review.

M ore than half of business income is generated by sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations. Businesses that choose one of these organizational forms are often referred to as "pass-throughs" because the income they earn passes through the company to its owners without triggering a business-level tax. Pass-through owners then pay taxes on their share of the business's income according to the individual income tax rates. In contrast, the income of C corporations is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level. The fact that pass-throughs are responsible for more than half of business income is important because recent tax reform discussions have included the possibility of lowering the tax burden on these businesses. Proponents suggest that lowering taxes on pass-throughs may increase investment, output, and employment. On the other hand, lower taxes on pass-throughs could have important consequences on the income distribution and progressivity of the tax system, incentives to characterize labor income as business income, and federal tax revenues. This report uses a nationally representative sample of individual tax returns to analyze who earns pass-through income. The report begins with examining who earns pass-through income generally. The analysis then summarizes the distribution of pass-through income for each type of organization. Recent tax reform proposals are then presented, followed by a review of several considerations that Congress may find useful as it continues to debate tax reform. Approximately 28.7 million (or one in five) taxpayers reported pass-through business income (or loss) totaling more than $687 billion in 2011. Among those earning pass-through income, the average amount reported was $26,011. These figures exclude capital gains income from pass-throughs and farming income. This section analyzes the distribution of pass-through income by adjusted gross income (AGI). When useful and possible, the analysis also distinguishes between sole proprietorship, partnership, and S corporation income, as well as active and passive income. Figure 1 shows the distribution of pass-through income by several AGI groups. A more detailed distribution, along with the distribution of tax returns reporting pass-through income, may be found in Table A-1 of the Appendix . Taxpayers with an AGI of $100,000 or greater earned 84% of pass-through income, while accounting for roughly 23% of returns reporting pass-through income. Conversely, taxpayers with AGI less than $100,000 earned about 16% of pass-through income, but accounted for 77% of returns with pass-through income. A significant proportion of pass-through income was concentrated among upper-income earners. Taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, for example, received 63% of pass-through income, but accounted for just over 6% of returns reporting such income. Those with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned about 32% of pass-through income, while filing roughly 1% of all returns reporting pass-through income. Table 1 displays the distribution of pass-through income by business type. The distribution shows that sole proprietorship income was more evenly distributed across income groups than partnership and S corporation income. Partnership net income was more concentrated among upper income individuals with nearly all of it accruing to taxpayers with AGI in excess of $100,000, including nearly 48% accruing to those with AGI over $1 million. Nearly all of S corporation income was also earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $100,000, but a greater share of S corporation income than partnership income was earned by those with an AGI over $1 million—about 52%. Table 1 also shows a concentration of net losses for partnerships and S corporations at the lower end of the income distribution. Pass-through income and losses are one component of AGI. Thus, if a taxpayer relies primarily on a partnership or S corporation for income, and the business realizes losses, the taxpayer's AGI will likely be negative. There are several scenarios which could explain the losses. A portion of these losses may be due to start-up businesses that are experiencing losses. It is also possible that a portion of these losses are due to failing businesses, both new and old. Lastly, some of the losses may be attributable to temporary business disruptions experienced at particular firms. Without more detailed data on the businesses associated with these losses, however, it is difficult to know for certain. Partnership and S corporation income can be separated into active and passive income. The distinction between the two can be important because passive activity loss rules generally prevent passive losses from offsetting active income. Additionally, active income is exempt from the 3.8% net investment tax that was enacted as part of health care reform, but not imposed until the 2013 tax year. Active income is income resulting from active participation in a business, whereas passive income is income from a business in which the taxpayer did not materially participate. A business partner involved in the day to day management and operations of the business, for example, would earn active income, while a silent partner who has no involvement in the business outside of possibly financial commitments would earn passive income. Sole proprietorship income is not distinguished in the data used in this analysis. Most sole proprietors, however, will be actively involved in their business (since they are sole owner) suggesting that the overwhelming majority of sole proprietor income is active. Figure 2 displays the distribution of active and passive income for partnerships and S corporations. Active income accounts for 76% of partnership income and 90% of S corporation income. Conversely, 24% of partnership income and 10% of S corporation income is passive. A significant share of passive income from either business type is concentrated among higher income individuals (see Table A-2 in the Appendix ). Recent tax reform discussions have included lowering the tax rates and tax burden on pass-through income. Most recently, the majority party leaders of the House and Senate, along with the Trump Administration, issued the "Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code" on September 27, 2017, which proposes limiting the maximum tax rate on pass-through income to 25%. The House Republican Conference's "Better Way" tax reform blueprint, released on June 24, 2016, also proposes limiting the tax rate to 25%, but indicates that the lower rate will only apply to active pass-through income. Both proposals also include other changes that could potentially affect pass-throughs, such as the tax treatment of depreciable assets and business interest, as well as the restriction or repeal of other business deductions and credits. Because there is a great deal of uncertainty over exactly how these other changes may be implemented, the considerations presented below are reviewed within the context of reducing the tax rates and the general tax burden on pass-through income. Attention thus far appears to be primarily focused on the effect reducing taxes on pass-through income could have on the economy's performance, both in the short-run and long-run, the progressivity of the tax system, and small businesses. However, tax experts have also pointed out that the rate reduction could change the incentive for individuals to characterize labor income as business income. Additionally, there is the longer standing question of why the tax code treats businesses differently based on whether they are organized as a pass-through or C corporation, and what effect that has on the complexity of the tax system. This section discusses each of these issues in turn. Lowering the maximum statutory tax rate on pass-through income would likely stimulate investment in the short-run. The rate reduction, however, may not stimulate as much new investment as other changes that have been discussed as part of tax reform. For example, both the Unified Framework and the Better Way propose allowing businesses to expense new investments. Expensing may be more stimulative, or at least better targeted, than a rate reduction since expensing would benefit new investments relatively more than rate reductions. A rate reduction would benefit all pass-through income and thus provide a windfall gain for old investments. The longer-run effect on the economy from a rate reduction is less clear. This is particularly true if deficits are predicted to increase. Increased deficits may lead to higher future interest rates as the government competes with the private sector for financing. Additionally, policymakers in the future may grow concerned over the sustainability of deficits and raise taxes in response. A rise in interest rates or taxes could curtail or offset any positive effect from a tax rate reduction for pass-throughs or tax reform more generally. Still, without more details about the overall reform, it is difficult to determine more precisely what the impact would be in the short-run or the long-run from any changes. While lowering the tax burden on pass-through income could potentially stimulate the economy, particularly in the short-run, it may also reduce the progressivity of the tax code. As previously stated, 62% of pass-through income was earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, and 32% was earned by individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million. The distributions of partnership and S corporation income were more heavily skewed to the upper end of the income distribution. As a result, the benefit from lowering taxes on pass-through income is likely to accrue predominately to upper-income individuals. This would cause the tax system to become less progressive, all else equal. Reducing the tax burden on pass-throughs seems to be partly driven by the assumption that pass-throughs and small business are synonymous. The data show that this is not the case; the majority of all businesses are small. For example, in 2011, more than 99% of both pass-throughs and C corporations had less than 500 employees, which is the most common employment-based threshold used by the Small Business Administration. Additionally, large firms are responsible for a non-trivial share of pass-through employment. About 24% of employees at pass-throughs worked at firms with more than 500 employees in 2011, which is more than the share who were employed at firms with 10 or fewer employees. If the goal of a particular tax policy is to assist small businesses, then basing the policy on a measure of firm size rather than legal form of organization may enhance its effectiveness. Tax professionals have expressed concern that lowering the tax rate on pass-through business income may encourage some individuals to recharacterize the nature of their income to reduce their taxes. The Unified Framework and the Better Way both propose a maximum tax rate of 25% on pass-through business income. However, the Unified Framework would tax labor income at a maximum rate of at least 35%, and the Better Way would tax labor income at rate up to 33%. By taxing business income at a lower rate than labor income, employee-owners of pass-throughs may characterize labor income as business income to take advantage of the lower tax rate. Additionally, some individuals may create pass-through businesses through which to direct their compensation so as to benefit from the lower tax rate. The Unified Framework and Better Way plan recognize this potential challenge but do not lay out detailed steps that would be taken to prevent the recharacterization of income. Arguably, a comprehensive tax reform would address the discrepancy that exists in the taxation of corporate and non-corporate businesses. It is well known that this is not an easy task, but reducing the tax burden on pass-through income alone would not address this discrepancy or the inequity and inefficiencies that exist because two otherwise identical businesses are taxed differently because of their legal structure. Additionally, a rate reduction on pass-through (or corporate) income by itself does little to simplify the tax treatment of businesses. The majority of the complexity in the tax system is the result of special tax incentives such as exclusions, credits, and deductions. While policymakers have expressed a desire to pare back business tax incentives in exchange for a rate reduction there have not been any detailed proposals to do so during the most recent round of tax reform debates. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has not provided official revenue estimates for the Unified Framework or Better Way proposals as of the date of this writing. The Tax Policy Center (TPC), however, has conducted a preliminary analysis of the Unified Framework. The TPC has estimated that the proposal to limit the tax rate on pass-through income to 25% would generate a revenue loss of $769.6 billion over ten years. The TPC has also estimated that the rate reduction contained in the Better Way proposal would lose $412.8 billion over ten years. The difference in estimates is explained in part by the fact that the TPC assumed that under the Better Way proposal, characterization of labor income as pass-through income would not occur, whereas it did not make such an assumption for their analysis of the Unified Framework. The Tax Foundation also analyzed the Better Way plan and found that the rate reduction on pass-through income would cost $515 billion over ten years using a "static" modeling approach, and $388 billion over ten years using a "dynamic" modeling approach. Dynamic revenue estimates incorporate economic feedback effects that can result in a portion of a tax rate reduction's static cost being offset by greater economic activity and thus greater tax revenues. The TPC also constructed a dynamic estimate for the Better Way plan, but not for individual provisions. As the date of this writing the Tax Foundation had not estimated the cost of the Unified Framework nor has the TPC conducted a dynamic analysis. It is important to emphasize that with any estimates made thus far by outside groups they must be interpreted with caution. Because detailed legislative language has not been released, estimators made assumptions about missing details needed to estimate the draft proposals. Changing these assumptions to reflect currently unavailable plan details would likely change revenue estimates, perhaps significantly.

Pass-through businesses—sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations—generate more than half of all business income in the United States. Pass-through income is, in general, taxed only once at the individual income tax rates when it is distributed to its owners. In contrast, the income of C corporations is taxed twice; once at the corporate level according to corporate tax rates, and then a second time at the individual tax rates when shareholders receive dividend payments or realize capital gains. This leads to the so-called "double taxation" of corporate profits. This report analyzes individual tax return data to determine who earns pass-through business income. The analysis finds that in 2011 over 82% of net pass-through income was earned by individuals with an adjusted gross income (AGI) over $100,000, although these taxpayers accounted for just 23% of individual returns with pass-through income. A significant fraction of pass-through income is concentrated among upper-income earners. Taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, for example, received 62% of pass-through income, but accounted for just over 6% of returns with pass-through income. Individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned about 32% of pass-through income, while filing roughly 1% of all returns with pass-through income The findings change slightly when the data for each organizational type are analyzed separately. Nearly half of sole proprietorship income was earned by individuals with an AGI of $100,000 or less. Taxpayers with an AGI between $100,000 and $500,000 earned 39% of sole proprietor income. Individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned 6% of sole proprietor income. Partnership net income was more concentrated among upper-income individuals with nearly all of it accruing to taxpayers with AGI in excess of $100,000, including nearly 48% accruing to those with an AGI over $1 million. Nearly all of S corporation income was also earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $100,000, but a greater share of S corporation income than partnership income was earned by those with an AGI over $1 million—about 52%. Who earns pass-through income may have important implications for tax reform. Recent tax reform discussions have included taxing pass-through income at a lower rate than the current rate. While lowering the tax burden on pass-through income could potentially stimulate the economy, particularly in the short-run, it could also reduce the progressivity of the tax code given the share of pass-through income that is attributable to the upper end of the income distribution. Tax reform could also result in pass-through income being taxed at lower rates than labor income. This could lead some taxpayers to characterize labor income as business income to minimize taxes. Additionally, a tax rate reduction on pass-through (or corporate) income does little to simplify the tax treatment of businesses. The majority of the complexity in the tax system is the result of special tax incentives such as exclusions, credits, and deductions, formally known as "tax expenditures." Finally, reducing taxes on pass-through businesses could have important budgetary and revenue impacts.

On May 23, 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the District Court for the Southern District of Florida to impose an injunction on EchoStar Communications Corporation to cease retransmitting all programming originating on stations affiliated with ABC, Inc.; CBS Broadcasting, Inc.; Fox Broadcasting Co.; or National Broadcasting Co. The district court complied in two orders, one granting a motion for entry of a permanent injunction and denying a settlement agreement, the other ordering the implementation of the injunction effective December 1, 2006. At issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether EchoStar had violated the Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), as amended, which grants a limited statutory license to satellite carriers transmitting distant network signals to private homes if the subscribers reside in unserved households, and the scope and consequences of that violation. The court of appeals held that because EchoStar was unable to disprove it had engaged in a "pattern or practice" of SHVA violations on a nationwide scale, the terms of the Satellite Home Viewer Act required that the court impose a nationwide injunction against EchoStar's improper retransmission of distant network programming. This differs from the decision of the district court, which had concluded that so long as EchoStar was currently complying with SHVA, the court had discretion to order EchoStar to re-analyze its subscriber base, supervised by the court to ensure compliance with SHVA, and terminate all subscribers who were ineligible to receive the signals. This report briefly describes the Satellite Home Viewer Act, as amended, through the lens of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling regarding a satellite provider's retransmission of programming originating on distant network affiliate stations to persons who live in "unserved" households. It then describes the facts underpinning the court's decision, followed by the main legal issues the court addressed and a discussion of the district court's implementation of the court of appeals' decision. The report concludes with possible legislative action. The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA), as amended, grants satellite carriers like EchoStar a compulsory license to retransmit copyrighted "distant network programming" to "unserved households." The purpose behind granting the compulsory license is to "satisfy the public interest in making available network programming in these (typically rural) areas, while also respecting the public interest in protecting the network-affiliate distribution system." Distant network programming is programming that a satellite television subscriber receives from a network-affiliated broadcast station located outside his or her market area. An example is a person who lives in Fort Lauderdale but receives an ABC, CBS, Fox, or NBC network station from New York City. An unserved household , for the purposes of this discussion, is one in which a subscriber (1) cannot receive an over-the-air television signal at a certain level of signal intensity, (2) has received a waiver from the local affiliated network station, or (3) is grandfathered in. Under SHVA, the satellite carrier bears the burden of proving its subscribers reside in unserved households. If it fails to provide sufficient evidence that a household is unserved, the satellite carrier may be held liable for damages and injunctive relief. For households receiving an over-the-air television signal, SHVA permits two methods of determining whether a household is unable to receive a signal of requisite strength: the use of the "accurate measurements method" and the "accurate predictive model." The accurate measurements method requires actual physical measurements to determine the strength of the television signal at the subscriber's residence, performed in accordance with statutory and regulatory requirements. By contrast, the accurate predictive model, or ILLR, does not require home visits, yet allows the satellite carrier, through a computer model, to presumptively establish that a household cannot receive a sufficient signal and is therefore unserved. Penalties for violating SHVA vary, depending on whether they are classified as "individual violations" or "patterns of violations." An individual violation occurs where there is a willful or repeated retransmission to a subscriber who is not eligible to receive the transmission. By contrast, a pattern of violations occurs when a satellite carrier engages in a willful or repeated pattern or practice of delivering distant network service to subscribers who are not eligible to receive the transmission. A district court has broad discretion to remedy individual violations but has less discretion in its choice of remedy for a pattern or practice of violations. Assuming a court finds a willful or repeated pattern or practice of violations, it must order a permanent injunction barring retransmission by the satellite carrier of any primary transmissions from any network station affiliated with the same network, and may order damages not to exceed $250,000 for each six-month period during which the pattern or practice of violations occurred. If the violations occurred on a "substantially nationwide basis," the court must order a permanent injunction against the satellite carrier encompassing "the primary transmissions of any primary network station affiliated with the same network" —a nationwide ban. If the violations occurred on a "local or regional basis," the court must order a permanent injunction against the satellite carrier that bars the retransmission "in that locality or region." At issue was whether EchoStar willfully or repeatedly violated SHVA by retransmitting distant network signals to ineligible satellite television subscribers from 1996 to 2003, and if so, whether the nature of the violations was best classified as "individual" or "pattern or practice" violations, thereby triggering different penalties. The district court examined the methodology by which EchoStar classified a household as unserved and the percentage of the carrier's subscriber base inappropriately classified as eligible for service. The court concluded that from 1996 to 2002, EchoStar used improper methodology to assess whether a person resided in an unserved household, with the result that 60% or more of subscribers were ineligible for service. Because EchoStar did not satisfy its statutory burden of proving it only retransmitted distant network signals to unserved households, the district court held that EchoStar's conduct constituted willful or repeated copyright infringement, actionable under the part of SHVA that governs "individual violations." The district court did not reach a conclusion as to whether EchoStar engaged in a pattern or practice of violations, which would trigger a permanent injunction, because "no pattern or practice currently exists that would warrant such an extreme sanction." The court of appeals overturned the district court's legal conclusion regarding EchoStar's punishment, holding that the district court was indeed obligated to issue a nationwide permanent injunction against EchoStar's retransmission of network programming as a consequence of "the inescapable conclusion, based on the district court's findings, that EchoStar did engage in a 'pattern or practice' of violations." The district court erroneously concluded that the legal standard for "pattern or practice" liability required EchoStar to be currently engaged in violating SHVA. The court of appeals held that the permanent injunction required under "pattern or practice" must be imposed, so long as a pattern or practice of statutory violations occurred at some point in time. The court then proceeded to evaluate whether EchoStar had engaged at any time in a pattern or practice of violating SHVA. According to the court, the standard for concluding "pattern or practice" liability under SHVA is "whenever a satellite carrier fails to carry its burden of proving eligibility [for distant network service] on a sufficient scale, and to a sufficient degree, that [a court] can presume that the satellite carrier is engaging in 'pattern or practice' of serving ineligible subscribers." Looking at the legislative history of SHVA, the court determined that a threshold of 20% of subscribers being ineligible for service is a relevant marker for pattern or practice analysis. The court of appeals, believing "that there is no other possible conclusion that can be drawn from the district court's findings of fact," determined that EchoStar's prior conduct did constitute a pattern or practice of violations. The court based this conclusion on a three main factors. First, EchoStar's three-and-a-half year history of using inadequate procedures for assessing subscriber eligibility. Second, EchoStar's exceeding the 20% threshold of unlawful subscribers nationwide. Third, EchoStar's pattern of behavior, about which the court stated, "we have found no indication EchoStar was ever interested in complying with the Act." The court also denied all but one of EchoStar's 17 claims of error. In addressing EchoStar's assertions that the court had discretion to determine a remedy for the violations, the court found that "Congress unequivocally stated a purpose to restrict the courts' traditional equitable authority upon a finding of a 'pattern or practice.'" Because the act instructs that a court shall order a permanent injunction and may order statutory damages, the court found there to be "no ambiguous statutory language in the SHVA ... [or] any legislative history that would indicate that the remedial measure chosen by Congress is anything but mandatory." As a result, on August 15, 2006, the court of appeals ordered the district court to issue a nationwide permanent injunction barring the retransmission of distant network programming pursuant to the act's statutory license. Ten days after the court of appeals decision, EchoStar and the Affiliate Associations filed a Notice of Settlement between those parties in the district court. On August 31, Fox Broadcasting Company (Fox) filed a motion for entry of a nationwide permanent injunction in accordance with the court of appeals' decision. The district court issued two orders in response to Fox's motion on October 20, 2006. EchoStar and the Affiliate Associations (the Settling Parties) made three arguments against the court's imposition of the injunction and in favor of granting the proposed consent agreement. First, the Settling Parties argued that Fox lacked standing to obtain relief because the act only applies to networks, not network stations, and Fox abandoned its cross-appeal to the court of appeals, thereby waiving its right to seek an injunction. Second, they argued that the nationwide permanent injunction Fox sought was overly broad, and considering the agreement between the Settling Parties, the court had discretion to enter more narrow relief. Finally, Echostar argued that the entry of a nationwide permanent injunction would cause manifest injustice to the parties and EchoStar's customers. The district court rejected all three arguments. The district court concluded that the question of Fox's standing was irrelevant because the court had "an obligation to implement the mandate issued by the Eleventh Circuit even without the request of any party." The district court also found that, according to controlling case law, it was unable to review or alter the mandate from the court of appeals, as the parties' settlement agreement did not present new evidence or an intervening change in controlling law , the only circumstances under which the district court held it would have discretion to review the court of appeals' mandate. The district court also concluded that implementing the law would not constitute "manifest injustice," as it would be "neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law," the standard for a court making that finding. As a result, the district court granted an Order of Permanent Injunction, effective December 1, 2006, that permanently enjoined and restrained EchoStar from retransmitting "a performance or display of a work embodied in the primary transmission of any network station affiliated with ABC, Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., Fox Broadcasting Company, or National Broadcasting Co." Introduced by Senator Allard and substantively identical to S. 4074 introduced in the 109 th Congress, section 2 would allow satellite broadcasters to retransmit signals originating in Denver to subscribers in two counties in Colorado that are in a local market comprised principally of counties located in another state. Introduced by Senator Sununu, co-sponsored by Senator Gregg, and identical to S. 4068 introduced in the 109 th Congress, it generally would allow a satellite broadcaster to continue retransmitting, despite the injunction, in states with a single full-power network station. Introduced by Representative Boren, it allows subscribers to receive the secondary transmissions of network stations located in Oklahoma so long as they either reside in Oklahoma but do not receive the secondary transmission of any network station located in Oklahoma or live in another state that contains a local market that includes some Oklahoma residents and the subscriber elects to receive the secondary transmission originating in Oklahoma. Introduced by Senator Salazar, it allows subscribers in certain counties in Colorado to receive secondary transmissions of network stations located in the state capital. It also permits subscribers who are located in a designated market area comprised primarily of counties outside of Colorado to receive retransmission of broadcast signals upon FCC approval and broadcaster agreement. Multiple pieces of legislation were introduced in the second session of the 109 th Congress, subsequent to the district court's order implementing the permanent injunction. Introduced by Senator Leahy and joined by 15 co-sponsors in the Senate and introduced by Representative Mollohan and co-sponsored by Representative Rahall in the House, it would have allowed in several limited circumstances, subject to additional conditions, a satellite provider to continue providing distant network service despite a court's permanent injunction. Introduced by Senator Sununu and cosponsored by Senator Gregg in the Senate and introduced by Representative Bass and cosponsored by Representative Bradley in the House, it generally would have allowed a satellite broadcaster to continue retransmitting, despite the injunction, in states with a single full-power network station. Introduced by Senator Allard, the relevant portion, section 2, with some caveats, would have allowed subscribers in two counties in Colorado to choose to receive transmissions of any network station located in Denver, regardless of whether they would otherwise qualify as an unserved household. Introduced by Senators Stevens and cosponsored by Senators Allard, Ensign, and Murkowski, in the Senate and introduced by Representative Boucher and joined by 18 co-sponsors in the House, it would have permitted a court to approve a settlement agreement reached by at least one plaintiff and one defendant in litigation that resulted in the issuance of a permanent injunction.

On May 23, 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the District Court for the Southern District of Florida to enjoin EchoStar Communications Corporation from retransmitting all programming originating on any station affiliated with ABC, Inc.; CBS Broadcasting, Inc.; Fox Broadcasting Co.; or National Broadcasting Co. The district court complied, rejecting EchoStar's last-minute arguments and partial settlement agreement and ordering the injunction imposed effective December 1, 2006. At issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether EchoStar had violated the Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), as amended, which grants a limited statutory license to satellite carriers transmitting distant network signals to private homes if the subscribers cannot receive local signals, and the scope and consequences of violating SHVA. The court of appeals determined that EchoStar engaged in a pattern or practice of violating SHVA on a nationwide scale and, consequently, that SHVA required the court to impose a nationwide injunction against EchoStar for its improper retransmission of programming. This was a different legal conclusion than that reached by the district court, which had concluded that because of EchoStar's cessation of the violation, SHVA did not require "pattern or practice" liability, and the court consequently had discretion to order EchoStar to re-analyze its subscriber base, in compliance with SHVA, and to limit termination to subscribers found ineligible under the court-supervised analysis. Subsequent to the district court's orders implementing the court of appeals' decision, multiple bills were introduced in the 109th Congress—S. 4067, S. 4068, S. 4074, S. 4080, H.R. 6402, H.R. 6340, and H.R. 6384—that would have allowed EchoStar to recommence retransmission of distant network programming under varying circumstances. Several bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 602, S. 124, S. 258, and S. 760.

Wireless signals are subject to various types of interference, even when operating within assigned frequencies. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates commercial radio, television, commercial wireless services, and state and local public safety and other non-federal uses of radio frequency spectrum. Its primary tool in dealing with interference to wireless transmissions is to prevent it by the judicious allocation of radio frequencies, following band plans designed to preclude or minimize most types of interference. In the case of frequencies at 800 MHz, interference had been caused primarily by transmissions from commercial cell phone towers, many of which were part of Sprint Nextel's "push to talk" network. When the frequencies in the 800 MHz band were first assigned, the FCC did not anticipate that channels in that band intended for short messages over commercial mobile radio (used by taxi dispatchers, for example) would—with time, technology, and soaring consumer demand for wireless service—be converted to a heavily-trafficked national cell phone network. The commercial allocations at 800 MHz were closely interleaved with public safety allocations, with the expectation that the (presumably) low-usage commercial assignments would act as buffers to prevent interference with public safety channels. The FCC announced in 2004 that it had agreed upon a rebanding plan to consolidate public safety frequencies and those used by some other operators, such as utilities, in the lower part of the 800 MHz band, while moving some of the 800 MHz channels acquired by Nextel, and some other commercial users, to the higher end of the band. The band reconfiguration is expected to eliminate interference caused by the close proximity and interleaving of commercial and public safety channels. The decision reached by the FCC in general supported a rebanding plan first proposed by Nextel. After months of negotiations, clarifications and technical corrections, a modified plan was accepted in February 2005. The conversion process was scheduled to be completed by June 26, 2008. Disputes related to cost reimbursement have delayed the transition, however. Because waivers extending deadlines are granted on a case-by-case basis, the final completion date for the transition has remained uncertain. The FCC has ruled to establish December 9, 2013, as the final date for resolving all cost-sharing obligations. The news release announcing the FCC decision regarding the decision for rebanding provided a summary of key points, some of which are highlighted below. These provisions, negotiated with Nextel, apply to Sprint Nextel effective as of the date of the merger. Separate "generally incompatible technologies" by eliminating interleaving. Move channels designated for interoperability to the lower end of the band, close to the planned public safety band at 700 MHz. Require public safety systems to relocate to channels at 809-815 MHz and 854-860 MHz. Require certain business and industrial users to relocate to channels at 809-815 MHz and 854-860 MHz. Require Enhanced Specialized Mobile Radio users, "ESMR," to relocate to 817-824 MHz and 862-869 MHz. Until the band relocation plan is complete, apply "Enhanced Best Practices" to define and correct interference that will place "strict responsibility on carriers to fix such interference." Require Nextel to give up some of its licenses at 800 MHz and all of its licenses at 700 MHz. Modify Nextel's licenses to provide the right to operate at 1910-1915 MHz and 1990-1995 MHz, "conditioned on Nextel fulfilling certain obligations specified in the Commission's decision." Value the 1.9 GHz spectrum rights to be assigned to Nextel at almost $4.9 billion, less the cost of relocating incumbent users in those channels. Credit Nextel the value of the spectrum rights it is relinquishing at 700 MHz and 800 MHz plus the "actual costs" to Nextel in relocating "all incumbents in the 800 MHz band." Require Nextel to make an "anti-windfall payment" to the Treasury at the conclusion of the relocation process that will equal the difference between the $4.9 billion valuation and the cumulative credits. Require Nextel to provide public safety users at 800 MHz and incumbent users at 1.9 GHz with "comparable facilities." Require Nextel to establish escrow accounts and a letter of credit in the amount of $2.5 billion, to "ensure that the band reconfiguration process will be completed." Provide an independent "Transition Administrator" to authorize disbursements, "subject to de novo Commission review." The FCC rebanding plan required that Sprint Nextel pledge $2.5 billion in cash and letters of credit to cover relocation costs for public safety. Sprint Nextel's obligation to cover the costs of rebanding is not limited to $2.5 billion, however. Sprint Nextel is expected to pay all the agreed upon costs, even if this total exceeds $2.5 billion. The difference between the values of the spectrum Sprint Nextel is relinquishing and of the new spectrum it is receiving is an increase—a potential windfall—of approximately $2.8 billion. This is the value, before specified relocation costs, that Sprint Nextel might be obligated to pay the U.S. Treasury. If the rebanding plan costs reach $2.5 billion, the "anti-windfall payment" due the U.S. Treasury would be $300 million. If the costs exceed $2.8 billion, the Treasury receives nothing. If the costs are no more than $850 million (a preliminary estimate provided by Nextel), the payment to the Treasury could approach $2 billion. Therefore, all the relocation costs reimbursed by Sprint Nextel must be tallied and documented to be applied toward the potential anti-windfall payment. The final determination of the payment, if any, from Sprint Nextel is referred to as a true-up. Because the deadline for the completion of the rebanding has been extended several times, the deadline for the true-up has also been extended. The TA must file regular reports with the FCC with its recommendations as to whether it has sufficient information on the costs of rebanding to calculate the anti-windfall payment—if any—that Sprint Nextel will be obligated to pay, or whether the deadline must be postponed again. The Transition Administrator (TA) is an independent organization set up in accordance with FCC rules. The responsibilities of the TA are to facilitate a smooth transition and to oversee the administration and financial management of the plan. The TA is also to monitor progress in the rebanding plans and to enforce the deadlines set by the FCC. It also files quarterly reports on Frequency Realignment Agreements (FRAs) plans filed with the TA. It is the TA that requests estimates of rebanding costs from public safety and private wireless networks covered by the plan, and decides whether or not to provide funds in advance. Disagreements about the implementation of the plan that the TA cannot resolve on its own or through mediation will in most cases be referred to the FCC. The TA consists of a team provided by Deloitte Consulting LLP, Squire, Sanders, & Dempsey LLP, and Baseline Wireless Services, LLC.

In mid-2005, wireless communications managers commenced the process of moving selected public safety radio channels to new frequencies. This step was part of a rebanding plan to mitigate persistent problems with interference to public safety radio communications. The majority of documented incidents of interference was attributed to the network built by Nextel Communications, Inc (now Sprint Nextel). As part of an agreement originally made between Nextel and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), some public safety wireless users have moved or will move to new frequencies, with the wireless company paying all or part of the cost. The rebanding agreement was not affected by the merger between Nextel and Sprint Corporation. In return for the expenditures, and reflecting the value of spectrum that Sprint Nextel relinquished as part of the band reconfiguration, the FCC assigned new spectrum licenses to the wireless company. The FCC set the "windfall" value of the new licenses, after allowing for the value of the licenses being relinquished, at $2.8 billion. The costs that Sprint Nextel incurs in the rebanding process are being applied to the $2.8 billion windfall. If the total is less than $2.8 billion, Sprint Nextel will be required to make an "anti-windfall" payment to the U.S. Treasury for the difference. If the costs exceed $2.8 billion, Sprint Nextel is obligated to pay them without any new concessions from the FCC. The rebanding plan is being implemented by the 800 MHz Transition Administrator (TA), created by the FCC for this purpose. The TA's ongoing responsibilities are to set priorities, establish schedules, and oversee reimbursement to parties for eligible expenses associated with relocation. Disagreements about the implementation of the plan that the TA cannot resolve on its own or through mediation are in most cases referred to the FCC. From the outset, there have been debates about the transition plan, such as maintaining interoperability, scheduling, and reimbursement for costs incurred. As the band reconfiguration proceeds, debates have often become protracted negotiations—and even litigatious disputes—slowing the transition process. The original plan set a deadline of June 2008 to complete the transition, with the calculation—or true-up—of the anti-windfall payment to occur six months later. The deadline has been extended several times while issues regarding the transition process were resolved. Consequently, the deadline for the true-up has also been extended, most recently until December 9, 2013.

Center-left presidential candidate Alvaro Colom of the National Union for Hope (UNE) defeated General Otto Pérez Molina of the right-wing Patriot Party (PP) in the November 4, 2007 run-off elections, which were considered free and fair. Voter turnout fell to under 50%, down from nearly 60% in the September 9 first round of voting, as anticipated by many observers who note that Guatemalan voters are often more interested in local races. Colom received 52.8% of the run-off vote to Pérez Molina's 47.2%. President-elect Colom will take office on January 14, 2008. After his victory, President-elect Colom told a local radio station that he plans "to convert Guatemala into a social democratic country with a Mayan face." Voting patterns reflected the country's urban-rural divide. Pérez Molina defeated Colom in Guatemala City and its surrounding areas, where 25% of Guatemalan voters reside. Colom dominated the countryside and won in 20 of the nation's 21 departments. Colom's party, UNE, gained seats in the country's National Assembly, winning 48 of the legislative body's 158 seats. Since his party does not have a majority in the legislature, Colom's success will likely depend on his ability to forge alliance with other parties. Guatemala held general elections on September 9, 2007, the third wave of democratic elections since the end of its 36-year civil conflict in which an estimated 200,000 people were killed. The current President, Óscar Berger, of the Grand National Alliance (GANA), was barred from seeking reelection by a constitutional prohibition. Both the European Union and the Organization of American States sent electoral observers to monitor the elections. Although the electoral campaigns were marred by violence, both missions expressed satisfaction that the elections were relatively free and fair and that voter turnout was largely unimpeded. Rural voting increased due to an increased number of polling stations. However, there were irregularities such as the burning of one polling station in El Cerinal, southeast of Guatemala City. The missions also expressed concern about the lack of information available in Mayan languages as well as the low number of women elected to Congress. The UNE won 48 seats, increasing its representation by one third. GANA came in second with 37 seats, followed by PP with 30 seats. The FRG's position in congress was decreased from 29 to 15 seats. Former President Efraín Ríos Montt was elected to a four-year term in congress, granting him immunity from prosecution on genocide charges he faces in Spain until the end of his term. While the UNE gained a significant increase in its representation in the National Assembly, it controls less than one-third of seats, meaning that President-elect Colom will have to negotiate with other parties in the 158-seat legislature to pass his agenda. President Óscar Berger won the November 2003 elections and took office on January 14, 2004. During Berger's presidency, the Guatemalan economy has expanded, but drug trafficking and organized crime have overwhelmed the country's weak institutions. Guatemala's GDP grew by 4.6% in 2006, the highest rate since 1998, helped by increased remittances; high prices for primary exports, such as sugar and cardamom; and increased investor confidence due in part to implementation of the U.S. Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Under Berger's leadership, the legislature passed a law against organized crime and secured legislative approval of the creation of an International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Because of GANA's minority presence in Congress, however, Berger has struggled to secure timely passage of needed tax reforms, and the 2007 budget. Some assert that his government has not made significant progress on implementation of reforms agreed upon in the 1996 peace accords. The Guatemalan peace accords were signed in 1996, but required reforms were not fully implemented and security forces were not purged, leaving intact the institutional framework through which organized crime has infiltrated the political process. Murders have increased, reaching 6,033 in 2006, higher than any single year during the civil conflict. The murder rate is disproportionately high in Guatemala City, eastern departments, and along the Mexican border. The root problem lies in the lack of employment and educational opportunities; many youth search for other means of living, including gangs and organized crime. The majority of violence is attributed to drug trafficking and organized crime, with nearly 90% of cocaine heading for the United States passing through Central America. The infiltration of security forces by organized crime was highlighted earlier this year after the murder of three Salvadoran deputies and their driver. The four police officers accused of the crime were assassinated while in prison. This situation led to the resignation of several high-ranking security officials. All levels of the 2007 electoral campaigns were affected by political violence, making this election the bloodiest in Guatemala's history since 1985. In the period leading up to the September 9 general election there were 119 violent acts resulting in 51 deaths, including the murders of candidate's relatives and party activists. The torture and killing of one candidate's 14-year-old daughter highlighted the brutality of the campaigns. This was not an isolated incident with two other candidates' sons killed, bringing the number of relatives killed to six. The UNE party, of front runner 'lvaro Colom, suffered the most losses with 18 murders, followed by the ruling party GANA with 7 murders. Violence appeared to lessen in the period between the first and second round of voting. During that time five political candidates and supporters were killed. Among those killed was Aura Salazar, a close advisor of Pérez Molina. Colom's campaign strategist, José Carlos Marroquín, resigned in October reportedly due to threats from organized crime groups. Prosecuting murders is rare in Guatemala, and to date it is not clear who is responsible for many of them or what role, if any, organized crime and drug traffickers played in the campaign violence. Three-time presidential candidate 'lvaro Colom moderated his leftist platform over the last two elections and ran as a center-left candidate for the UNE. Colom studied industrial engineering at the University of San Carlos before becoming a businessman and eventually a politician. He has held an array of positions, including Vice Minister of Economy in 1991, director of the National Foundation for Peace, from 1991 to 1997, and executive director of the Presidential Office of Legal Assistance and Land Conflict Resolution in 1997. In 1999, he ran for president under the New National Alliance (ANN), a faction of the leftist Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG), a former guerrilla group that was assimilated into the political process by the 1996 Peace Accords. In 2003, Colom ran on the ticket of UNE, softening his leftist rhetoric, and contested Óscar Berger in a second round of voting. Colom now identifies himself as a moderate social democrat like President Lula da Silva of Brazil. He also supports the more radical policies of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia, but states that he does not see their reforms as the route for Guatemala. During the campaign, President-elect Colom stated that he would focus his policies on social development and expanding education. Colom indicated he would create a social dialogue, cooperating with other parties in the Guatemalan Congress to tackle the pressing issues that Guatemala is currently facing. 'lvaro Colom called for a holistic approach to curb the country's rampant violence, crime, delinquent youth, and impunity. He promised to prioritize security within 100 days of taking office, along with strengthening the supreme court in order to put an end to impunity. Colom took a "zero tolerance" stance on corruption and organized crime, which previously led to the dismissal of one UNE congressman, Manuel Castillo, due to alleged drug trafficking links. Castillo was also recently linked to the murders of three Salvadoran deputies and their drivers and the subsequent murders of four accused police officers. The Castillo case and an allegation made by Rolando Morales, a member of UNE and president of the congress in 2004, that Colom's wife took US$1.5 million from the congressional budget to fund a company controlled by her sister, has raised suspicion among his critics about Colom's integrity and possible connections to organized crime. Otto Pérez Molina, a retired general and former head of military intelligence, campaigned as the "General of Peace," emphasizing his role as a military representative during peace negotiations in the 1990s. Pérez Molina founded the Patriot Party in 2001, which, in 2003, joined together with the National Solidarity Party and Reformer Movement to form the Grand National Alliance (GANA), currently the ruling party. Pérez Molina was originally selected for GANA's ticket, but he and the PP subsequently left the alliance. PP backed Pérez Molina in the 2007 presidential race. The focus of Pérez Molina's campaign was his hardline or "iron fist" security policy. He wanted to put more soldiers on the streets in the capital city in order to quell the violence. He also advocated the professionalization of the army and national police with the hopes of weeding out corruption. Pérez Molina's hardline rhetoric appealed to many because of the continued increase in violence across the country. Human rights groups, however, were concerned that Pérez Molina's policies and his alleged involvement in human rights violations would impede the country's reconciliation with its violent history. Pérez Molina has been implicated in a number of human rights abuses taking place during his time in the military, including being linked to the 1994 murder of a judge and the 1996 murder of a guerrilla leader. Pérez Molina viewed security as a necessity for the rest of his platform which included education, health, and economic and rural development. He planned to decentralize education to allow for local governments to have more control, increase the coverage of the health system and industrialize agriculture to help fight rural poverty. Pérez Molina supported extensive legal and constitutional reforms but through a national constituent assembly rather than through the Guatemalan legislature. Impunity and violence are two of the biggest issues facing the new president. Guatemala has one of the highest murder rates in Latin America due to institutional weaknesses and infiltration of security forces by organized crime. Very few murders are investigated and even fewer are prosecuted. The past two administrations have struggled to get approval of a joint commission, with the United Nations, that would investigate clandestine groups working within the government and security forces. The establishment of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, known by its Spanish acronym CICIG, has been one of President Berger's successes. The opposition to CICIG came mainly from the Guatemalan Revolutionary Front (FRG) citing that CICIG was a violation of Guatemala's sovereignty. Both Colom and Pérez Molina, as well as their parties, were vocal supporters of the international commission. However, two members of the UNE, 'lvaro Colom's party, voted against CICIG in the Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations. This was an embarrassment for Colom and his party and resulted in the suspension of one of the deputies. On August 16, a law was passed that formally established CICIG for the next two years. CICIG has been praised by human rights groups and the international community. Concerns persist, however, the Guatemalan executive branch will decide which cases will be investigated and the commission will not be able to investigate crimes retroactively, such as war crimes committed during the civil war. The approval of CICIG prompted the U.S. House and Senate to approve Foreign Military Financing for Guatemala in FY2008, pending Department of State certification that certain human rights conditions have been met. Both presidential candidates are likely to support continued cooperation with the international community to fight impunity and violence in Guatemala. The United States and Guatemala have traditionally had close relations. U.S. interest in Guatemala lies in consolidating democracy, securing human rights, establishing security, and promoting trade. U.S. immigration policy has been a point of tension. President Bush visited Guatemala in March 2007 to express support for greater cooperation on counternarcotics and youth gangs. The United States' immigration policy has been a growing source of tension since tighter U.S. border security has led to increased deportation of Guatemalan nationals. As of July 24, 2007, 12,445 Guatemalans had been deported from the United States with the total for 2007 expected to reach 24,000. This number grew from 11,000 in 2005 and 18,306 in 2006. The surge in deportations has strained reintegration programs. Guatemala maintains that deportations have added to gang related problems. Guatemala has an estimated 1.2 million nationals living in the United States, nearly 60% illegally. They sent back $3.61 billion in remittances in 2006, equal to 10% of the country's GDP. Since immigration is a bipartisan issue in Guatemala, both Colom and Pérez Molina are expected to continue to appeal to the U.S. Government to revise its immigration policies.

Alvaro Colom, of the center-left Nation Union of Hope (UNE) party, defeated right-wing candidate Otto Pérez Molina of the Patriot Party, in November 4, 2007 run-off elections. President-elect Colom will take office on January 14, 2008. No single presidential candidate won a majority of votes in the first round held on September 9, 2007, in which congressional and mayoral races were also held. The dominant issue in the campaign was security, and the 2007 election campaigns were the most violent since the return to democracy in 1985, with 56 candidates, activists, and family members killed. Since no party won a majority in Congress, the next president will have to build coalitions to achieve his legislative agenda. U.S. interests in Guatemala include consolidating democracy, securing human rights, establishing security and promoting trade, though U.S. immigration policy has been a point of tension in bilateral relations.

Amber Alerts (also referred to as AMBER ) use technology to disseminate information about child abductions in a timely manner. Typically an Amber Alert is triggered for children under 18 who are believed by law enforcement officers to have been abducted (except in cases of parental abduction). Research has found that most abducted children murdered by their kidnappers are killed within three hours of the abduction. Prompt response to child abductions is therefore deemed critical by many. Law enforcement officers are encouraged to send out an alert if circumstances indicate that the child is in harm's way, if they have sufficient descriptive information about the child and/or the abductor for an alert, and if they believe that the immediate broadcast of an alert will help. When there is information about a vehicle used in an abduction, this information will usually be transmitted to highway message boards, if that technology is in place. While each plan sets its own parameters, most follow guidelines set by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). A typical Amber Alert would include an Emergency Alert System (EAS) broadcast, alerts on highway message boards, and notifications to public service partners such as police, highway patrols and the field crews of public utilities. A number of counties and cities have Amber Alert programs that notify local residents using e-mail or telephone alert systems to aid in the recovery of abducted children. Alerts can also be sent by text messages to cell phones and other wireless devices. AT&T Mobility, Sprint Nextel, Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile are among the wireless service providers that participate in the Amber Alert network; subscribers can sign up for free text messages. These systems have the advantage of targeting selected audiences by function or geographical location but may not be received in a timely manner; telephone alert systems, for example, can be blocked by call-screening technologies. Amber Alert technology and alerting techniques are also used for other missing person notifications. A number of local or faith-based organizations maintain services to assist in locating missing adults. Some states participate in a consortium that operates an Amber Alert Web Portal using Internet technology. Information about an Amber Alert is sent to a web portal and reconfigured for different types of broadcasting, including cell phones, pagers, e-mail, highway signs, TV news websites, and emergency communications centers. The technology allows police officers to transmit details and photos through encrypted computer systems in patrol cars. Information, therefore, is disseminated both more quickly and more widely, maximizing the opportunity to find a missing child in the critical first three hours. The alert system is managed from a dedicated web portal that can be accessed by statewide or local systems. The software recognizes the reported locations of abductions and sends emergency messages to targeted areas. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is jointly administered by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), an organization within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).The EAS sends emergency messages with the cooperation of broadcast radio and television and most cable television stations. Its most common use is for weather alerts. EAS technology is also used in the Amber Alert programs administered in some states and communities. To facilitate transmittal, EAS messages are classified by types of events, which are coded. These event codes speed the recognition and retransmittal process at broadcast stations. For example, a tornado warning is TOR, evacuation immediate is EVI, a civil emergency message is CEM. When a message is received at the broadcast station, it can be relayed to the public either as a program interruption or, for television, a "crawl" at the bottom of the TV screen. In the early stages of Amber Alert program development the CEM (civil emergency) event code was used for EAS messages. In February 2002, the FCC added several new event and location codes for broadcast and cable stations to use; included was a Child Abduction Emergency (CAE) event code. Although broadcaster participation is mandatory for national alerts, the participation of broadcast and cable stations in state and local emergency announcements is voluntary. The PROTECT Act ( P.L. 108-21 ) formally established the federal government's role in the Amber Alert system in 2003. Congress has encouraged federal support for other alert programs as well. The Office of Justice Programs, at the Department of Justice, includes an Amber Alert division, the National AMBER Alert Initiative. The Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, NCMEC, broadcasters, and law enforcement officers collaborate on national strategies for the Amber Alert program. One collaborative initiative was to develop standard procedures for emergency call takers responding to a report of a missing or abused child. Members of the joint committee that developed the standard included the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO), the National Academies of Emergency Dispatch (NAED), the National Emergency Number Association (NENA), NCMEC, and the Department of Justice. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Board of Standards Review approved the standard in December 2007 [APCO American National Standard (ANS)1.101.1-2007]. The National Emergency Child Locator Center has been established within NCMEC, as required by the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 ( P.L. 109-295 , Title VI, Subtitle E). The purpose of the center is to identify children separated from their families as the consequence of a disaster and reunite them expeditiously. NCMEC is to operate a toll-free call center, set up a website with information about displaced children, and take other steps to collect and disseminate information about the children and their families. NCMEC established a website with links to reports of missing children and missing adults in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The National Center for Missing Adults (NCMA) operates as the national clearinghouse for missing adults. NCMA also maintains a national database of missing adults determined to be "endangered" or otherwise at-risk. NCMA was formally established after the passage of Kristen's Act ( P.L. 106-468 ), in 2002. NCMA is a division of the Nation's Missing Children Organization, Inc. (NMCO)—a 501c (3) non-profit organization working in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs. Kristen's Act authorized the Attorney General to make grants to public agencies or not-for-profit organizations to perform these functions: to assist law enforcement and families in locating missing adults; to maintain a national, interconnected database for the purpose of tracking missing adults who are determined by law enforcement to be endangered due to age, diminished mental capacity, or the circumstances of disappearance, when foul play is suspected or circumstances are unknown; to maintain statistical information of adults reported as missing; to provide informational resources and referrals to families of missing adults; to assist in public notification and victim advocacy related to missing adults; and to establish and maintain a national clearinghouse for missing adults. All 50 states operate Amber Alert programs for missing children. Many states have extended their Amber Alert programs to include missing adults or participate in other alert programs. Silver Alert programs, for example, are operated for the benefit of those with Alzheimer's Disease and other cognitive impairments. Silver Alerts are modeled on Amber Alerts and use many of the same technologies and information channels for disseminating information. CRS has prepared an analysis of 11 states with active alert programs, evaluating program features such as legal authority, administrative responsibility, training, and interstate coordination. The states are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia. The Emergency Alert System is being upgraded to digital technology and in time will be connected to a gateway that will be able to receive and direct alerts of all types, to any designated location, using any digital media. The gateway, the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), is being developed through FEMA's National Continuity Program Directorate. One of the new alert technologies that will use the gateway is the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS). The regulations for CMAS were established by the FCC through its rule-making process. In addition to message formats and other standards, regulations require three alert categories that must be carried by participating carriers: presidential, imminent threat, and Amber Alerts. Another investment in emergency communications infrastructure that will likely benefit Amber Alerts and similar programs is for the transition to Internet protocols in 911 call centers and networks. Unlike most existing 911 systems, which use analog technology, IP-enabled networks can transmit information digitally. The networks, which operate like the Internet but do not necessarily connect to the Internet, can support any type of broadband communication and therefore can be used for a variety of communications purposes. In compliance with requirements of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security issued the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) in July 2008. The plan focused on the communications needs of first responders at the site of disasters. The next version of the plan, due in 2010, is expected to expand the planning process to include 911 systems, alert programs, and other communications tools that are needed in responding to large-scale emergencies. The NECP is widely viewed as the capstone of coordinated planning for emergency communications between and among agencies at all levels of government. The scope of the plan, however, may not be wide enough to include the type of technology-policy decisions that would ensure that all facets of emergency communications are developed in concert. Such a step is widely considered to be essential to an effective response capacity for crises big or small, personal or global, that would endeavor to protect everyone with equal zeal and efficiency.

Amber Alerts (also referred to as AMBER plans) were created to disseminate information about child abductions in a timely manner. Research has found that most abducted children murdered by their kidnappers are killed within three hours of the abduction. Prompt response to child abductions is therefore deemed critical by many. Amber Alert plans are voluntary partnerships including law enforcement agencies, highway departments, and companies that support emergency alerts. Technologies used for alerts include the Emergency Alert System (EAS), highway message boards, telephone alert systems, the Internet, text messaging, and e-mail. All 50 states have statewide Amber Alert programs. Because kidnappers can cross state lines with their victims, the Department of Justice will often be involved in responding to an abduction. For this and other reasons, there is increased federal involvement in and support of Amber Alert plans. The National Center for Missing Adults is another example of an alert program that receives support from the U.S. Department of Justice. Amber Alert and related technologies are in place for other at-risk programs as well. For example, a number of states have created Silver Alert programs to assist in locating missing adults with cognitive impairments. Government, non-profit, and volunteer programs use alert technologies as tools to meet their larger goals. Participants choose among the tools available to them. From the perspective of technology policy, more thought might be given by the various program managers, and policy-makers in general, as to how to ensure that the development paths of these technologies mesh. Ideally program alerts should be interoperable – able to exchange information seamlessly across different systems. Planning for state and national emergency alert systems might provide gateways that would ensure access for alerts from all certified programs. Among the new systems being developed, with federal support, that could provide such gateways are the Commercial Mobile Alert System, for cell phone alerts, and new networks using Internet protocols to support 911 call center and other non-commercial communications needs.

The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, P.L. 109-73 , provides tax relief that is intended to assist the victims of Hurricane Katrina. Some of its provisions distinguish between the "Hurricane Katrina disaster area," which is the presidentially declared disaster area, and the "core disaster area," which is the portion of the disaster area determined by President Bush to warrant individual or individual and public assistance under the Stafford Act. Section 101 waives the 10% penalty tax that would otherwise apply on an early withdrawal from a retirement plan if the individual's principal place of abode on August 28, 2005, was in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area and the individual sustained an economic loss due to the Hurricane. The section applies to distributions made between August 24, 2005, and January 1, 2007, and the maximum amount that be withdrawn without penalty is $100,000. The funds may be re-contributed to a qualified plan over a three-year period and receive tax-free rollover treatment. Additionally, with respect to the taxable portion of the distribution, the individual may include one third of such amount in his or her income for three years rather than the entire amount in the year of distribution. Section 102 allows individuals to re-contribute, without tax consequences, distributions that were made between February 28, 2005, and August 29, 2005, to purchase or construct a principal residence in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area and were not used because of the Hurricane. The contributions must be made between August 24, 2005, and March 1, 2006. Section 103 increases the amount that Hurricane Katrina victims may borrow from their retirement plans without immediate tax consequences. The provision applies to individuals whose principal place of abode on August 28, 2005, was in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area and who sustained an economic loss due to the Hurricane. Under current law, the maximum amount that may be borrowed without being treated as a taxable distribution is the lesser of (a) $50,000, reduced by certain outstanding loans or (b) the greater of $10,000 or 50% of the present value of the employee's nonforfeitable accrued benefits. For loans made between September 23, 2005, and January 1, 2007, the act increases this to the lesser of (1) $100,000, reduced by certain outstanding loans, or (2) the greater of $10,000 or 100% of the present value of the employee's nonforfeitable accrued benefits. The section also extends repayment due dates by one year if the original date fell between August 24, 2005, and January 1, 2007. Section 104 contains transition rules for plans adopting these new provisions. Under IRC § 51, businesses that hire individuals from groups with high unemployment rates or special employment needs, such as high-risk youths and veterans, may claim the work opportunity tax credit. The credit may be claimed for the wages of up to $6,000 that were paid during the employee's first year. For an employee who worked at least 400 hours, the credit equals 40% of his or her wages—thus, the maximum credit is $2400. For an employee who worked between 120 and 400 hours, the credit equals 25% of his or her wages. The credit does not apply to wages paid after December 31, 2005. Section 201 allows the work opportunity credit to be claimed for wages of Hurricane Katrina employees. Eligible employees are individuals who had a principal place of abode in the core disaster area on August 28, 2005, and either (1) are hired during the 2-year period beginning on that date for a position in the area or (2) were displaced by the Hurricane and are hired between August 27, 2005, and January 1, 2006. For employers with an active business that was rendered inoperable due to damage from Hurricane Katrina for any day between August 28, 2005, and January 1, 2006, section 202 provides a new credit for continuing to pay their employees' wages. The credit is equal to 40% of the wages, limited to $6,000, of each employee whose principal place of employment with the employer on August 28, 2005, was in the core disaster area. It applies to wages paid between the date the business became inoperable at the employee's principal place of employment and the date it resumed significant operations there, but no later than December 31, 2005. It may not be claimed by an employer with more than 200 employees or one who claims a work opportunity credit for the wages. Under IRC § 170, individuals may not claim a charitable deduction that exceeds 50% of their "contribution base" (adjusted gross income with certain adjustments) and corporations may not claim a deduction that exceeds 10% of their taxable income with certain adjustments. Any excess contributions may be carried forward for five years. Section 301 suspends the 50% and 10% limitations for cash contributions made between August 27, 2005, and January 1, 2006. For individuals, the deduction may not exceed the amount that the taxpayer's contribution base exceeds his or her other charitable contributions. For corporations, the deduction is allowed only for contributions used for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts and may not exceed the amount that the corporation's taxable income exceeds its other contributions. The act also suspends the overall limitation on itemized deductions for individuals. Section 302 of the bill allows individuals who provide free housing for at least 60 consecutive days to persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina to claim personal exemptions for those persons. The exemption is $500 per person, with a maximum of four exemptions per year. They are available in 2005 and 2006, although a taxpayer may claim a person only once. The taxpayer must include on his or her return the displaced person's taxpayer identification number. In order to qualify, the displaced person must have had a principal place of abode on August 28, 2005, in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area. If the home was not in the core disaster area, then either the home had to have been damaged by the Hurricane or the person was evacuated due to it. Individuals who use their personal vehicles for charitable purposes may claim a deduction based on the number of miles driven. The statutory amount is 14 cents per mile. Section 303 sets the rate at 70% of the standard business mileage rate (rounded to the next highest cent) if the vehicle is used for Hurricane Katrina relief between August 24, 2005, and January 1, 2007. The standard business mileage rate is periodically set by the IRS and is currently 48.5 cents per mile. Section 304 excludes from a charitable volunteer's gross income any qualifying mileage reimbursements received from the charitable organization for the operating expenses of the volunteer's passenger automobile. The expenses must arise from using the vehicle for Hurricane Katrina relief between August 24, 2005, and January 1, 2007. In general, donors of food inventory who are not C corporations may only claim a charitable deduction that equals their basis in the inventory (typically, its cost). C corporations may deduct the lesser of (1) the basis plus 50% of the property's appreciated value or (2) two times basis. Section 305 allows all donors of wholesome food inventory to benefit from this enhanced deduction if the donation is made between August 28, 2005, and January 1, 2006. Donors who are not C corporations may not compute the deduction using contributions in excess of 10% of their net business income. Section 306 allows C corporations to claim an enhanced deduction for donations of book inventory to public schools if made between August 27, 2005, and January 1, 2006. The corporation may deduct the lesser of (1) the basis plus 50% of the property's appreciated value or (2) two times basis. The school must certify that the books are suitable and will be used in its educational program. When all or part of a debt is forgiven, the amount of the cancellation is ordinarily included in the income of the taxpayer receiving the benefit of the discharge. There are currently several exceptions to the general rule that a cancelled debt is included in taxable income in the year of discharge. For example, no amount of the discharge is included in income if the cancellation is intended to be a gift or is from the discharge of student loans for the performance of qualifying services. There are also certain situations in which the taxpayer may defer taxation, with the possibility of permanent exclusion, on income from the discharge of indebtedness, such as if discharge occurs when the debtor is in title 11 bankruptcy proceedings or insolvent. Section 401 allows victims of Hurricane Katrina to exclude non-business debt that was forgiven by a governmental agency or certain financial institutions if the discharge occurred between August 24, 2005, and January 1, 2007. Individuals are eligible for this benefit if their principal place of abode on August 25, 2005, was in the core disaster area or if it was in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area and they suffered an economic loss due to the Hurricane. The exclusion does not apply if the real property that secured the debt was located outside of the Hurricane Katrina disaster area. Individuals with certain tax attributes (such as basis) would be required to reduce them by the amount excluded from income, which has the effect of deferring the tax on the cancelled debt. There are several circumstances under which taxpayers may deduct losses of property not connected to a trade or business, including when the losses are from a casualty, such as a hurricane. In addition to losses from the actual damage caused by the casualty, a taxpayer in a presidentially declared disaster area has a casualty loss if ordered, within 120 days of the area's designation, by the state to demolish or relocate his or her home because it is unsafe due to the disaster. The amount of the loss is the lesser of (1) the decrease in the property's fair market value due to the casualty or (2) the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property (i.e., the cost of the property with certain adjustments). The cost of repairing the property may be used as evidence of the amount of loss. There is no loss if the taxpayer is reimbursed by insurance or other means. The taxpayer may only claim a deduction to the extent that the loss from the casualty exceeds (1) $100 plus (2) the sum of 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income and any taxable gains from property that was involuntarily converted due to a casualty (discussed above). In general, the deduction may only be claimed in the year of the loss, although a loss in a presidentially declared disaster zone may be deducted in the year prior to the loss. Section 402 waives the $100 and 10% floors for casualty losses from Hurricane Katrina. Under IRC §§ 7508 and 7508A, the IRS has the authority to postpone tax-related deadlines for certain taxpayers, including those affected by a presidentially declared disaster. These deadlines include those for filing returns and making payments for income, gift, and estate taxes. Income taxes withheld at source and employment taxes are explicitly excluded, and excise taxes are not mentioned. Section 403 gives the IRS the authority to postpone deadlines related to employment and excise taxes. Additionally, while the IRS announced in News Release IR-2005-96 that it would extend deadlines for Hurricane Katrina victims until January 3, 2006, section 403 further extends the deadlines to February 28, 2006. Mortgage revenue bonds are tax-exempt bonds used to finance below-market rate mortgages for low and moderate-income homebuyers who have not owned a home for the past three years. Homes in targeted areas, which are areas that are low-income or of chronic economic distress, are subject to special rules that, among other things, remove the requirement that the homebuyer not have owned a home for the past three years. Section 404 similarly removes the three-year requirement if the home is in the core disaster area or if it is a replacement residence for an individual whose original residence in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area was made uninhabitable by the Hurricane. The provision applies to financing provided before January 1, 2007. The section also increases the limitation on qualified home improvement loans from $15,000 to $150,000 for loans used to repair damage from the Hurricane. An involuntary conversion occurs when property is converted to money or other property because of its complete or partial destruction, theft, seizure or condemnation, or if it is disposed of under threat of condemnation. An example of an involuntary conversion is when an individual receives an insurance payment for damaged property. If the cash or property that was received is worth less than the basis of the property that was converted, the taxpayer has a loss, which may qualify for deduction under the casualty loss rules discussed below. If the cash or property received is worth more than the basis of the property that was converted, then the taxpayer has a gain, which may or may not be immediately taxable. There are no immediate tax consequences if the property is converted to property that is similar or related in service or use ("similar property"). If, on the other hand, the property is involuntarily converted to cash or dissimilar property, the taxpayer must recognize any gain unless he or she purchases similar property within a certain time period. If the taxpayer purchases the replacement property in a timely manner, then he or she may elect to only recognize gain to the extent that the amount realized from the involuntary conversion exceeds the cost of the new property. The time period is generally two years. It is increased to three years if the converted property is business real property and to four years if the property is the taxpayer's principal residence or its contents which were involuntarily converted due to a presidentially-declared disaster. Additionally, the IRS has the discretion to extend the time period on a case-by-case basis. Section 405 increases the time period to purchase the replacement property to five years. The extended period applies for property in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area that was converted due to the Hurricane so long as substantially all of the use of the replacement property occurs in the disaster area. Section 406 allows Hurricane Katrina victims to elect to use last year's earned income for computing the child tax credit [IRC § 24] and the earned income tax credit [IRC § 32] instead of this year's income. It applies to individuals whose principal place of abode on August 25, 2005, was in the core disaster area or was in the Hurricane Katrina disaster area and who were displaced by the Hurricane. Section 407 allows the Treasury Secretary to make adjustments in the application of the tax laws for tax years 2005 and 2006 so that temporary relocations due to Hurricane Katrina or the receipt of relief does not cause taxpayers to lose dependency exemptions or child credits or to have a change of filing status.

On September 23, 2005, President Bush signed the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA; H.R. 3768 ) into law, P.L. 109-73 . It primarily contains temporary tax relief intended to directly and indirectly assist individuals in recovering from Hurricane Katrina. The provisions cover a variety of areas, including work credits, charitable giving, and casualty losses. This report summarizes the act.

T he Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP; Title II), the judiciary (Title III), the District of Columbia (Title IV), and more than two dozen independent agencies (Title V). The bill typically funds mandatory retirement accounts in Title VI, which also contains additional general provisions applying to the funding provided to agencies through the FSGG bill. Title VII typically contains general provisions applying government-wide. FSGG bills have often also contained provisions relating to U.S. policy toward Cuba. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed in its current form since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC. On July 17, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3280 , H.Rept. 115-234 ). Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would have been $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3268 , H.Rept. 115-232 ). The combined total of $42.7 billion would have been about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). Nearly all of H.R. 3280 's text was included as Division D of H.R. 3354 when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on September 6, 2017. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. H.R. 3354 passed on September 14, 2017. The Senate Committee on Appropriations released an FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG draft bill along with an explanatory statement on November 20, 2017. Funding in the recommended bill totaled $43.3 billion, about $1.9 billion below the President's FY2018 request with most of this difference in funding for the GSA. With the end of FY2017 approaching and no permanent FY2018 appropriations bills enacted, Congress passed, and the President signed, H.R. 601 / P.L. 115-56 . Division D of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 8, 2017, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). P.L. 115-556 provided funding for most FSGG agencies based on the FY2017 funding rate. In addition, the CR contained a number of deviations or "anomalies" from the general formula. The FSGG anomalies focused on decreasing funding related to the presidential transition, which had been increased in FY2017. Four additional CRs were enacted—on December 8, 2017 ( P.L. 115-90 ), December 22, 2017 ( P.L. 115-96 ), January 22, 2018 ( P.L. 115-120 ), and February 8, 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). P.L. 115-123 also included an additional $127 million for the GSA and $1.66 billion for the Small Business Administration (SBA), largely to address disaster costs from hurricanes in 2017. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 1625 , P.L. 115-141 ) was enacted on March 23, 2018. The bill, originally focused on eradication of human trafficking, was amended with the appropriations measure, passed in the House on March 22, 2018, and passed in the Senate on March 23, 2018. The C ongressional Record for March 22, 2018, includes an Explanatory Statement which is to have the same effect as a joint explanatory statement of a conference committee. FSGG appropriations are included in Division E, with the CFTC funded in the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. Additional legislative language affecting financial regulation is in Division S, Titles VIII and IX. FY2018 enacted appropriations in both P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 totaled $47.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $2.5 billion above the original request with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. The GSA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) also had substantial funding differences between requested and enacted amounts. Most of the EAC funding was for grants to states for the election reform program. Table 1 reflects the status of FSGG appropriations measures at key points in the appropriations process. Table 2 lists the broad amounts requested by the President and included in the various FSGG bills, largely by title, and Table 3 details the amounts for the independent agencies. Specific columns in Table 2 and Table 3 are FSGG agencies' enacted amounts for FY2017, the President's FY2018 request, the FY2018 amounts from H.R. 3554 as passed by the House, from the Senate Appropriations chairmen's draft bill, and the enacted amounts combined from P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 . Although financial services are a focus of the FSGG bill, the bill does not actually include funding for the regulation of much of the financial services industry. Financial services as an industry is often subdivided into banking, insurance, and securities. Federal regulation of the banking industry is divided among the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (generally known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or CFPB). In addition, credit unions, which operate similarly to many banks, are regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). None of these agencies receives its primary funding through the appropriations process, with only the FDIC inspector general and a small program operated by the NCUA currently funded in the FSGG bill. Insurance generally is regulated at the state level, with some oversight at the holding company level by the Federal Reserve. There is a relatively small Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside the Treasury, which is funded through the Departmental Offices account, but FIO has no regulatory authority. Federal securities regulation is divided between the SEC and the CFTC, both of which are funded through appropriations. The CFTC funding is a relatively straightforward appropriation from the general fund, whereas the SEC funding is provided by the FSGG bill, but then offset through fees collected by the SEC. Although funding for many financial regulatory agencies may not be provided by the FSGG bill, legislative provisions affecting financial regulation in general and some of these agencies specifically have often been included in FSGG bills. H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354 as passed by the House include many provisions, particularly in Title IX and Title X, that would amend the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and other statutes relating to the regulation of financial institutions and the authority and funding of financial regulators. Many of these provisions were included in other legislation, notably H.R. 10 , which passed the House on June 8, 2017. Of particular interest from the appropriations perspective, H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354 as passed by the House would bring several financial regulators under the FSGG bill instead of receiving funding from outside of the appropriations process, as is currently the case. P.L. 115-141 included the texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792 , both of which address small business access to capital. H.R. 4267 was also included in H.R. 10 , but had not been originally included in H.R. 3280 or H.R. 3354 . The texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792 , however, were not included in the FSGG portion of the bill. Instead they were in Titles VIII and IX in a separate Division S. None of the language bringing financial regulators under the appropriations process was included in the law as enacted. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reorganized their subcommittee structures in early 2007. Each chamber created a new Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee. In the House, the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee is composed primarily of agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies, commonly referred to as TTHUD. In addition, the House FSGG Subcommittee was assigned four independent agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Subcommittee: the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). In the Senate, the jurisdiction of the new FSGG Subcommittee is a combination of agencies from the jurisdiction of three previously existing subcommittees. Most of the agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Subcommittee were assigned to the FSGG subcommittee. In addition, the District of Columbia, which had its own subcommittee in the 109 th Congress, was placed under the purview of the FSGG Subcommittee, as were four independent agencies that had been under the jurisdiction of the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee: the FCC, FTC, SEC, and SBA. As a result of this reorganization, the House and Senate FSGG Subcommittees have nearly identical jurisdictions, except that the CFTC is under the jurisdiction of the FSGG Subcommittee in the Senate and the Agriculture Subcommittee in the House. Table 4 below lists various departments and agencies funded through FSGG appropriations and the names and contact information of the CRS expert(s) on these departments and agencies.

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC. The House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3280, H.Rept. 115-234) on July 17, 2017. Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would have been $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3268, H.Rept. 115-232). The combined total of $42.7 billion would have been about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with the largest difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). Nearly all of H.R. 3280's text was included as Division D of H.R. 3354, an omnibus appropriations bill, when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on September 6, 2017. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. H.R. 3354 passed on September 14, 2017. The full Senate Committee on Appropriations did not act on an FY2018 FSGG appropriations bill. A draft FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG bill along with an explanatory statement was released on November 20, 2017. Funding in the draft bill would have totaled $43.3 billion, about $1.9 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in funding for the GSA. No appropriations bills were passed prior to the start of FY2018. Five separate continuing resolutions (CR) were enacted—on September 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-56), December 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-90), December 22, 2017 (P.L. 115-96), January 22, 2018 (P.L. 115-120), and February 8, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The CRs generally maintained FSGG funding based on FY2017 levels, with P.L. 115-123 also adding supplemental emergency funding for the GSA ($127 million) and the Small Business Administration (SBA; $1.66 billion) largely to address natural disasters. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) was enacted on March 23, 2018. FSGG appropriations were included as Division E, with the CFTC funded in the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. FY2018 enacted appropriations in P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 combined totaled $47.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $2.5 billion above the original request with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies, as was the case with H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354, which contained several provisions in Title IX and Title X that also appear in H.R. 10, a broad financial regulatory bill passed by the House on June 8, 2017. Although most of these provisions were not ultimately attached, P.L. 115-141 included the texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792, both of which addressed small business access to capital.

In the 2005 BRAC round, the Department of Defense (DOD) recommended 190 closures and realignments. Of this number, the BRAC Commission approved 119 with no changes and accepted 45 with amendments. These figures represented 86% of the Department of Defense's overall proposed recommendations. In other words, only 14% of DOD's list was significantly altered by the Commission. Of the rest, the Commission rejected 13 DOD recommendations in their entirety and significantly modified another 13. It should be pointed out that the BRAC Commission approved 21 of DOD's 33 major closures, recommended realignment of 7 major closures, and rejected another 5. Over the next 20 years, the total savings of the Commission's recommendations are estimated at $35.6 billion – significantly smaller than DOD's earlier estimate of $47.8 billion. The difference between Commission and DOD estimates has proved controversial. According to the Commission, DOD achieved only minor success in promoting increased jointness with its recommendations. Most of the proposed consolidations and reorganizations were within, not across, the military departments. Among the most difficult issues faced by the 2005 BRAC Commission were DOD's proposals to close or realign Air National Guard bases. Thirty seven of 42 DOD Air Force proposals involved Air National Guard units. According to the Commission, its process was open, transparent, apolitical, and fair. Commissioners or staff members made 182 site visits to 173 separate installations. It conducted 20 regional hearings to obtain public input and 20 deliberative hearings for input on, or discussion of, policy issues. In 2005, DOD adopted an approach supporting an emphasis on joint operations. The 1988, 1991, and 1993 rounds did not include a Joint Cross-Service element. The 1995 round did utilize Joint Cross-Service Groups in its analytical process, but the three military departments were permitted to reject their recommendations. In 2005, the Joint Cross-Service Groups were elevated to become peers of the military departments. The 2005 Commission consisted of nine members rather than eight, thereby minimizing the possibility of tie votes. For the 2005 round, the time horizon for assessing future threats in preparing DOD's Force Structure Plan was 20 years rather than six. The 1995 selection criteria stated that the "environmental impact" was to be considered in any base closure or realignment. The 2005 criteria required the Department of Defense (and ultimately the Commission) to consider "the impact of costs related to potential environmental restorations, waste management and environmental compliance activities." Existing BRAC law specifies eight installation selection criteria. The 2005 Commission emphasized the sixth, which directed consideration of economic impact on local communities. In prior rounds, homeland defense was not considered a selection criterion. It is now a significant element among the military value selection criteria. The 1991 Commission added 35 bases to the DOD list of recommendations, the 1993 Commission added 72, and the 1995 Commission added 36 – where as the 2005 Commission added only 8. Finally, prior BRAC rounds did not take place in the face of the planned movement of tens of thousands of troops from abroad back to the United States. The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended various changes to the existing statute governing its creation, organization, process, and outcome. The proposed revision of the governing Act, if enacted, would arguably represent a significant change in scope of the BRAC law. It would expand the Commission's lifespan and mission. It would explicitly link reconsideration of the defense infrastructure "footprint" to security threat analysis by the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the periodic study of the nation's defense strategy known as the Quadrennial Defense Review. It would also formalize BRAC consideration of international treaty obligations undertaken by the United States, such as the scheduled demilitarization of chemical munitions. By passing legislation containing the Commission's recommended language, Congress would authorize the Secretary of Defense to conduct a 2014-2015 BRAC round, should he or she deem it necessary. Other recommended provisions would enable the Commission to suggest new vehicles for the expeditious transfer of title of real property designated for disposal through the BRAC process. In addition, recommended legislative language suggests expanding the requirement for Department of Defense release of analytical data and strengthens the penalty for failure to do so. It would increase the responsibilities of the Commission's General Counsel and would exempt the Commission from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) while retaining conformity with the Freedom of Information (FOIA) and Government in the Sunshine Acts. The recommended legislation would also make permanent the existing temporary authority granted to the Department of Defense to enter into environmental cooperative agreements with federal, state, and local entities (including Indian tribes). Finally, the recommended legislation, while it retains many of the features new to the 2005 round (such as the super majority requirement), it repeals others, such as statutory selection criteria. The 2005 BRAC round was the fourth in which an independent commission reviewed recommendations drawn up by the Department of Defense, amended them, and submitted the revised list to the President for approval. While the 2005 process resembled the previous three rounds, it was profoundly different in many respects. For example, the DOD's analytical process attempted to reduce former rounds' emphasis on individual military departments by enhancing the joint and cross-service evaluation of installations. BRAC analysis in 2005 also attempted to project defense needs out to 20 years, whereas previous rounds used a much shorter six-year analytical horizon. This encouraged DOD analytical teams to base their assessments on assumptions of the needs of transformed military services, not formations created for the Cold War. These assumptions were embodied in the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory submitted by the Secretary of Defense. In its legislative recommendation, the Commission suggested that a potential 2014-2015 BRAC round be placed in a strategic sequence of defense review, independent threat analysis, and base realignment. The new statute would couple the existing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), currently required every four years, with consideration of a new BRAC round. If the QDR leads the Secretary of Defense to initiate a new BRAC round, the DNI would produce and forward to Congress an independent threat assessment. Under the 2005 statute, the BRAC Commission was terminated on April 16, 2006. The proposed legislation would have extended the life of a subset of the Commission (Chairman, Executive Director, and staff of not more than 50), which would have maintained the Commission's documentation and formed the core of an expanded staff for a possible 2014-2015 Commission. In addition, the continued Commission would have been tasked to monitor and report on: (1) the use of BRAC appropriations; (2) the implementation and savings of 2005 BRAC recommendations; (3) the execution of privatizations-in-place at BRAC sites; (4) the remediation of environmental degradation and its associated cost at BRAC sites; and (5) the impact of BRAC actions on international treaty obligations of the United States. The proposed law would have required the prolonged Commission to prepare and submit three reports to Congress and the President: an Annual Report, a Special Report (due on June 30, 2007), and a Final Report (due on October 31, 2011). The Commission would have reported not later than October 31 of each year on Department of Defense utilization of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Account 2005, implementation of BRAC recommendations, the carrying out of privatization-in-place by local redevelopment authorities, environmental remediation undertaken by the Department (including its cost), and the impact of BRAC actions on international treaty obligations of the United States. The legislation would have authorized the Commission to study and analyze the execution of BRAC 2005 recommendations. This report, undertaken if the Commission considered it beneficial, would have been completed not later than June 30, 2007. It would have focused on actions taken and planned for those properties whose disposal proves to be problematic, including: Properties Requiring Special Financing . Some properties planned for transfer to local redevelopment authorities or others may require special financial arrangements in the form of loans, loan guarantees, investments, environmental bonds and insurance, or other options. National Priorities List (NPL) Sites . NPL sites and other installations present particularly difficult environmental remediation challenges necessitating long-term management and oversight. The 2005 Commission report proposed that this study examine freeing the Department, after a set period, to withdraw from unsuccessful title transfer negotiations with local redevelopment authorities in order to seek other partners. It also envisioned potential Department contracts with private environmental insurance carriers after the completion of remediation in order to mitigate risk of future liability. The study could have considered the advisability of crafting a financial "toolbox," similar in concept to the special authorizations granted to the Department of Defense in the creation of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, in order to expedite the disposal of challenging properties. Other alternatives studied were the creation of public-private partnerships, limited-liability corporations, or independent trusteeships to take title to and responsibility for properties. The Commission would have consulted closely with the Department of Defense, the military departments, the Comptroller General of the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior, in preparing its study and report. Existing law requires all BRAC implementation actions to be completed not later than six years after the date that the President transmitted the current Commission's report, or September 15, 2011. The recommended legislation would have required the Commission to submit a final report on the execution of these actions not later than October 31, 2011. The recommended legislation included other provisions suggested by the experience of the 2005 round. The proposed legislation would require the Secretary of Defense to release the supporting certified data not later than seven (7) days after forwarding his or her base closure and realignment recommendations to the congressional defense committees and the Commission. Failure to do so would terminate the BRAC round. The 2005 Commission report notes that the four months allotted by statute for the Commission to complete its work was shortened considerably by delays in staffing the Commission, the appointment of Commissioners, and the release of Defense Department certified data, among other considerations. The Commission proposed legislation to extend the period to seven (7) months. The 2005 Commission suggested that a future body be granted the Commission the power to subpoena witness for its hearings. The Commission recommended a statutory designation of the Commission's General Counsel as its sole ethics counselor. The 2005 Commission found that questions concerning recusal from consideration, potential conflicts of interest, etc., were not materially assisted by consultation with other agency counsel. Legislation recommended by the Commission stated that the "records, reports, transcripts, minutes, correspondence, working papers, drafts, studies or other documents that were furnished to or made available to the Commission shall be available for public inspection and copying at one or more locations to be designated by the Commission. Copies may be furnished to members of the public at cost upon request and may also be provided via electronic media in a form that may be designated by the Commission." It would continue the traditional practice of opening all unclassified hearings and meetings of the Commission to the public and provides for official transcripts, certified by the Chairman, to be made available to the public. The recommended legislation would have repealed Sec. 2912-2914 of the existing law. These sections authorized the 2005 round and include, among other provisions, the statutory installation selection criteria.

The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (commonly referred to as the BRAC Commission) submitted to the President its report on domestic military base closures and realignments on September 8, 2005. The President approved the list and forwarded it to Congress on September 15. This report summarizes some of the report's highlights and examines in detail the Commission's proposed legislation for the conduct of a potential future BRAC round. It will not be updated.

Corporate tax revenues have been declining for the last six decades. This report discusses the three main factors for the decline. First, the average effective corporate tax rate has decreased over time, mostly due to reductions in the statutory rate and changes affecting the tax treatment of investment and capital recovery (depreciation). Second, an increasing fraction of business activity is being carried out by partnerships and S corporations, which are not subject to the corporate income tax. This has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. And third, corporate sector profitability has fallen over time, leading to a further erosion of the corporate tax base. As Congress considers options for tax reform, background on the decline in corporate tax revenue could prove useful in preserving any tax reforms enacted, or structuring a reform to obtain a desired revenue effect, such as revenue neutrality or enhancement. The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance have held hearings on tax reform throughout the first session of the 112 th Congress. In his 2011 State of the Union address the President called for corporate tax reform that did not add to the deficit. Generally, the corporate tax reform discussion has focused on reducing statutory rates and achieving revenue neutrality through broadening the tax base by eliminating various deductions, exemptions, and credits, among other things, such as shifting to a territorial tax system. This report begins by documenting the decline in corporate tax revenue. An analysis of the three main factors explaining this decline is then presented. The data and calculations used in this report may be found in the Appendix . The analysis in this report focuses only on nonfinancial corporations for two reasons. First, nonfinancial corporations are the firms primarily affected by investment- and depreciation-related tax changes since they account for the majority of physical capital investment. Second, the bulk of revenue that is generated from the corporate tax comes from taxing nonfinancial companies. Corporate tax revenues are low by historical standards. In the post-World War II era, corporate tax revenue as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) peaked in 1952 at 6.1% and generally declined since (see Figure 1 ). Today, the corporate tax generates revenue equal to approximately 1.3% of GDP, although projections (not shown here) have the corporate tax raising revenue over 2.4% of GDP in several years as the economy recovers and temporary bonus depreciation provisions expire. While corporate tax revenues have fallen, overall federal tax revenues have remained relatively stable, averaging around 17.7% of GDP since 1946 (aside from business cycle fluctuations). Revenues generated from the individual tax have exhibited similar relative stability, averaging around 8.1% of economic output. Two other tax revenue sources, however, have not remained stable. Payroll tax revenue has increased from 1.4% of GDP in 1946 to 6.0% in 2010, while at the same time excise tax revenue has decreased from 3.1% to 0.5% of GDP. Taken together, the corporate tax has also decreased in importance relative to other revenue sources. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In that same year the individual tax accounted for 42.2% of federal revenue, and the payroll tax accounted for 9.7% of revenue. Today, the corporate tax accounts for 8.9% of federal tax revenue, whereas the individual and payroll taxes generate 41.5% and 40.0%, respectively, of federal revenue. There are a number of possible explanations for the decline in corporate tax revenues. The amount of revenue collected from any tax depends on the tax rate and the dollar size of what is being taxed, also known as the "tax base." If the corporate tax rate falls, all else equal, so too will revenue. The same relationship holds between revenue and the corporate tax base. A number of factors can impact the tax base, including the number of firms operating in the corporate form and corporate profitability. So the decline in corporate tax revenues may be due to either a reduction in corporate tax rates, a reduction in the corporate tax base, or both. The analysis presented below suggests that both factors have played a role in the decline in revenues generated by the corporate tax. A lower average effective corporate tax rate explains a portion of the decline in corporate tax revenue. The effective tax rate is the rate at which income is actually (or effectively) taxed. As Figure 2 shows, this rate has decreased from a post-WWII high of 55.8% in 1951 to 28.4% in 2010. The decrease in the effective rate would have resulted in lower corporate tax revenue if the corporate tax base remained constant. The subsequent sections provide evidence that the tax base has decreased as well. The fall in the average effective tax rate appears to be driven by three primary factors. First, there has been a reduction in the top statutory rate over this time (see Figure 2 ), from a high of around 50% in the 1950s and 1960s to its current rate of 35%. The statutory tax rate is the rate specified in the Internal Revenue Code, and along with special tax credits, deductions, and other tax benefits, determines the effective rate corporations face. As a result, a reduction in the statutory rate naturally reduces the effective rate. Second, aside from two very brief periods, corporations were allowed to claim an investment tax credit equal to a fraction of certain new investments made between 1962 and 1986. The credit rate, particular rules, and eligible investments varied over time, but overall the credit had the effect of reducing the effective corporate tax rate below the statutory rate. Since 2004, corporations (and non-corporate businesses) have been able to claim the Section 199 deductions for certain activities, primarily concentrated in the domestic manufacturing industry. Like the investment tax credit, the Section 199 deduction has the effect of reducing the effective tax rate on corporate income. Third, changes to the rules governing depreciation contributed to the reduced effective tax rates. Depreciation deductions became more valuable following significant changes in 1954, 1962, 1971, and 1981, which allowed for more rapid capital recovery. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-514 ) reversed this trend by bringing tax depreciation closer in line with physical depreciation. Depreciation was once again enhanced temporarily via "bonus depreciation" in 2002 and 2009 in attempts to stimulate the economy. According to research by economists Alan Auerbach and James Poterba, other factors that could explain falling effective corporate tax rates have had relative small effects. Inflation, the foreign tax credit, and other corporate tax credits have at times reduced the effective tax rate, and at other times increased the effective corporate tax rate. The net effect of these other factors has been small relative to effects of accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit. Although effective rates have generally fallen over time, Figure 2 shows two recent effective tax rate spikes. The average effective corporate tax rate rose above the 35% top statutory rate around 2000, and then again around 2007. In both instances, the economy was in a recession and some businesses were experiencing losses. Businesses are typically allowed to use current losses to reduce, or offset, income paid in the previous two years. This "carrying back" of losses allows businesses to receive a tax refund equal to the reduction in taxes paid in prior years, thus reducing the average effective rate for these firms. When losses are large, such as in a recession, two years may not be long enough to allow firms to fully utilize current losses via carrybacks. As a result, the taxes of struggling corporations are higher than they would be with a longer carryback period (i.e., their tax refunds are smaller). This leads overall average tax rates to rise above the statutory rate. In response, Congress temporarily extended the carryback period from two years to five years in 2002 and 2008 in attempt to stimulate the economy. Lower effective tax rates do not appear to be the only cause of decline in corporate tax revenue. There is evidence that the nonfinancial corporate tax base has shrunk as an increasing share of business income has been generated by partnerships and S corporations. Businesses that choose either one of these forms are, in general, not subject to the corporate income tax system. Rather, the income they earn is distributed directly to the individual business owners, and taxed according to the individual income tax system. Partnerships and S corporations are commonly referred to as "pass-throughs" because of this feature. Figure 3 shows that in 1980, C corporations generated 78% of all business income in the United States. By 2007, however, they were responsible for only 44% of all business income. Over the same time period, partnerships' share of income rose from 3% to 28%, and S corporations' share rose from 1% to nearly 17%. The shift in the distribution of business income from the corporate sector to the noncorporate sector has resulted in a smaller corporate tax base, and explains a portion of the drop in corporate tax revenues. At the same time that there was a change in the distribution of business income, there was also a change in the distribution of businesses themselves. C corporations accounted for 17% of all businesses in 1980, but only 6% of all businesses by 2007 (see Figure 4 ). S corporations, however, increased in popularity, especially after 1986, when the Tax Reform Act of 1986 set the highest individual tax rate at 28% and the highest corporate tax rate at 34%. This gave businesses an incentive to organize as S corporations. Legislation eventually increased the S corporation shareholder limit from 35 to 100, which made the S corporation form more attractive and practical. By 2007, S corporations represented 12% of businesses, up from 4% in 1980. A reduction in the profitability of those firms comprising the corporate sector has compounded the effect on the tax base from a shrinking corporate sector. Although profitability can be summarized a number of different ways, a popular measure used by economists is the ratio of profit to net assets (also known as net worth). The net asset component accounts for the size and amount of productive resources in the corporate sector. The profit component measures the aggregate return to those resources. When combined, the profit to asset ratio summarizes how well the corporate sector is using its available resources to generate profits, adjusting for the amount of resources available. Since peaking in 1966, corporate profitability has fallen over two and a half times as shown in Figure 5 . Economists Alan Auerbach and James Poterba, using the same general measure of profitability used here, determined that falling profitability has been "substantially more important than changes in the average tax rate in accounting for the reduction in corporate taxes." This naturally leads to the question: Why has nonfinancial corporate profitability fallen over time? There are several potential explanations for the decline in profits. First, it is possible that there has been a shift within the corporate sector from less volatile industries to more volatile industries. This could increase the fraction of corporations experiencing losses, which would lower overall profits. Second, there may have been a shift in the age of corporations from older to younger. Younger firms are generally less profitable than older firms in the initial years, which would drive down overall profits relative to assets. Third, American corporations could be shifting profits out of the United States and into lower-tax countries, which would lower profits reported domestically. An increasing collection of research has documented evidence of profit-shifting among multinational corporations, and that such behavior is significant. And fourth, the profit measure used here is based on income reported for tax purposes (as opposed to for financial accounting purposes). Firms have an incentive to reduce their income for tax purposes, so as to lower their tax liability. Economists have, in fact, documented growing differences in what corporations report to the IRS as income, and what they report to shareholders. Corporate tax revenues have been declining for the last six decades. The analysis in this report points to three primary factors responsible for the decline. First, the average effective corporate tax rate has decreased over time, mostly due to reductions in the statutory rate and changes affecting the tax treatment of investment and capital recovery (depreciation). Second, an increasing fraction of business activity is being carried out by partnerships and S corporations rather than C corporations. These pass-though business structures are not subject to the corporate income tax. This has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. And third, corporate sector profitability has fallen over time, leading to a further erosion of the corporate tax base. Understanding why corporate tax revenues have fallen could be relevant as the tax reform debate continues. Generally, the corporate reform discussion has focused on reducing statutory rates and achieving revenue neutrality through broadening the tax base by eliminating various deductions, exemptions, and credits, among other things, such as shifting to a territorial tax system. The fact that the effective tax rate is usually below the statutory tax rate (see Figure 2 ) suggests that a revenue-neutral reduction of the top statutory corporate tax rate may be possible. How much rates could be reduced in a revenue-neutral manner, however, depends on how much room there is to broaden the base. Existing research indicates reducing the top corporate rate from 35% to 25% would require repeal of all corporate tax expenditures, changes to tax preferences available to noncorporate businesses, and other reforms to business taxation. As the corporate rate is reduced, and tax reforms to the noncorporate sector are enacted, some business activity may return to the corporate sector, naturally broadening the base. Other business tax reforms may include changes to the taxation of American multinationals operating overseas. To the degree that these reforms reduced profit shifting to low-tax countries, the domestic corporate tax base may expand. This section provides a brief overview of the mathematics behind the calculation of the average effective tax rates. Table A-1 presents the source of the data for each variable used in the calculation as well as a brief description. Superscripts used in the equation identify the level of government, F for federal and SL for state and local, and the subscript t is an index for the year. The equation for the average effective tax corporate tax rate calculation (AECTR) may be written as follows: where,

Corporate tax revenues have declined over the last six decades. In the post-World War II era, corporate tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) peaked in 1952 at 6.1%. Today, the corporate tax generates revenue equal to approximately 1.3% of GDP. The corporate tax has also decreased in importance relative to other revenue sources. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In that same year the individual tax accounted for 42.2% of federal revenue, and the payroll tax accounted for 9.7% of revenue. Today, the corporate tax accounts for 8.9% of federal tax revenue, whereas the individual and payroll taxes generate 41.5% and 40.0%, respectively, of federal revenue. This report discusses the three main factors for the decline in corporate tax revenue. First, the average effective corporate tax rate has decreased over time, mostly as a result of reductions in the statutory rate and changes affecting the tax treatment of investment and capital recovery (depreciation). Second, an increasing fraction of business activity is being carried out by partnerships and S corporations, which are not subject to the corporate income tax. This has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. And third, corporate sector profitability has fallen over time, leading to a further erosion of the corporate tax base. Understanding the decline in corporate tax revenue could be helpful in preserving any tax reforms enacted, or structuring a reform to obtain a desired revenue effect, such as revenue neutrality or enhancement. The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance have held hearings on tax reform throughout the first session of the 112th Congress. The President, in his 2011 State of the Union address, called for corporate tax reform that did not add to the deficit. Generally, the corporate tax reform discussion has focused on reducing statutory rates and achieving revenue neutrality through broadening the tax base by eliminating various deductions, exemptions, and credits, among other things.

Resale price maintenance has been called "vertical price fixing" because it involves entities at different levels of the supply/marketing chain. It generally entails an agreement (via formal contract or otherwise) between a manufacturer and a retailer that the dealer will charge some specific price for the manufacturer's products. As such, the agreement is considered a "conspiracy in restraint of trade" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The practice, particularly when a floor has been set under permissible resale prices ( minimum RPM), has been considered a per se violation of the antitrust laws since 1911, when the Court decided in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company that such imposition and agreement was not analytically different from an agreement among the dealers themselves to fix their prices, thus depriving consumers of the advantages of competition. Imposition of maximum resale prices (a "ceiling" on permissible resale prices, as opposed to a "floor" below which a price is not permissible) or some other agreement which may affect price but does not require any specific level or term, on the other hand, has more recently been analyzed under the more lenient Rule of Reason standard. Significant inroads in the law of vertical restraints generally were made by three cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s. First, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. , the Court distinguished between vertically imposed price and non-price restraints, specifically overruling a barely 10-year-old, and very contentious case. The Sylvania Court concluded that it was "appropriate," given the "complex" market impact of non-price vertical restraints, to return to the Rule of Reason analysis for evaluating them (433 U.S. at 51, 52, 59). Then, in two dealer-termination cases, the Court further clarified its thinking on the "proper dividing line between" per se vertical price restraints and Rule of Reason non-price restraints. It required the plaintiff in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. to provide evidence of activity on the part of the manufacturer and the non-terminated dealer that "tends to exclude the possibility that [they] were acting independently" (465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). Finally, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. the Court determined that neither (1) all of those agreements which affect price (because nearly all vertical agreements do), nor (2) all of those which contain the word "price" should be treated as per se violations. Per se illegality should be reserved for only those restraints that include "some [express or implied] agreement on price or price levels" (485 U.S. 717, 719, 728 (1988)). Having distinguished between the proper analysis of vertically imposed price and non-price restraints, the Court, in 1997, imposed further, and more direct, delineations in the law of vertical restraints; in State Oil Co. v. Khan , a unanimous Court acknowledged that although maximum RPM might be used "to disguise arrangements to fix minimum prices, ... we believe such conduct ... can be appropriately recognized and punished under the rule of reason." Notwithstanding that the per se treatment of maximum RPM had been in effect for approximately 30 years, Justice O'Connor noted, the Court had never been confronted with an "unadulterated" maximum RPM arrangement, and so found the "conceptual foundations [of that rule to be] gravely weakened." Continuing the erosion of its precedents in the law of vertical restraints/RPM, a divided (5-4) Court overruled Dr. Miles , the final barrier to the Rule of Reason treatment of minimum RPM. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia (who had authored the Business Electronics opinion, supra , note 1), Thomas and Alito, stated that [v]ertical retail-price agreements have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending on the circumstances in which they were formed; and the limited empirical evidence available does not suggest [that] efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical. 127 S.Ct. at 2709. Therefore, the opinion continued, [a] per se rule should not be adopted for administrative convenience alone. Such rules can be counterproductive, increasing the antitrust system's total cost by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage. And a per se rule cannot be justified by the possibility of higher prices absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct. The antitrust laws primarily are designed to protect interbrand competition from which lower prices can later result. Ibid . In apparent anticipation of its decision to overrule Dr. Miles (notwithstanding the doctrine of precedent known as stare decisis , which counsels that prior judicial precedents generally should not be upset), the opinion devoted a number of pages to presentation of its justifications. After acknowledging that "we do not write on a clean slate, for the decision in Dr. Miles is almost a century old," Justice Kennedy set out the reasons the majority felt it appropriate to abandon stare decisis in this case (127 S.Ct. at 2720). His justifications included first, the fact that even though "concerns about maintaining settled law are strong when the question is one of statutory interpretation," precedents involving the Sherman Act present a lesser compulsion: "The general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act." Second, the Sherman Act has been considered and approached as a common-law statute, and, Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibition on 'restraint(s) of trade' evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions. 127 S.Ct. at 2720. Third, it would create a "chronically schizoid statute" to have an evolving rule of reason that takes into account "new circumstances and new wisdom," but leaves an "immovable" per se line that "remains forever fixed where it was." Fourth, there is ample evidence in economic literature that the per se rule is not appropriate for use in any RPM context. Fifth, both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—"the antitrust enforcement agencies with the ability to assess the long-term impacts of resale price maintenance"—have urged that the distinctions between classes of RPM be abandoned. Finally, prior to reviewing its decisions in the cases described in the "Background" portion of this report, as well as others it considered relevant, the Court quoted from a 2000 opinion to note that "we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings." Addressing PSKS's argument that when Congress repealed the authorization for state Fair Trade Laws it was, essentially, ratifying the per se rule, the Court replied, This is not so. The text of the Consumer Goods Pricing Act [ P.L. 94-145 ] did not codify the rule of per se illegality for vertical price restraints. It rescinded statutory provisions that made them per se legal. Congress once again placed these restraints within the ambit of § 1 of the Sherman Act.... Congress intended § 1 to give courts the ability 'to develop governing principles of law' in the common-law tradition. The Leegin case, therefore, was remanded to the 5 th Circuit, which. in turn, remanded to the district court "for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion" (498 F.3d 486 (5 th Cir. 2007)). The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, took issue with the majority's justification for "its departure from ordinary considerations of stare decisis ...." (127 S.Ct. at 2725). Although the lawfulness of particular practices is often determined pursuant to the Rule of Reason, they acknowledged, there are some practices whose "likely anticompetitive consequences" are either so serious, with so few possible justifications, or whose justifications are "so difficult to prove [that] this Court has imposed a rule of per se unlawfulness—a rule that instructs courts to find the practice unlawful all (or nearly all) of the time" (127 S.Ct. at 2726). The "upshot" of ample economic evidence that RPM can result and has resulted in increased consumer prices, as well as the other side of the argument—that RPM can be beneficial to consumers —leads Justice Breyer to "ask such questions as, how often are harms or benefits likely to occur? How easy is it to separate the beneficial sheep from the antitrust goats?" (127 S.Ct. at 2729). Moreover, the dissent continued, while it is rational to allow economic discussions to inform antitrust analysis, there is a significant difference between recognizing that economics is a discipline which necessarily contains conflicting views and abandoning the necessity for antitrust law to be administered in such a way as to provide adequate certainty in the "content of rules and precedents" to be applied by the courts and used by "lawyers advising their clients" (127 S.Ct. at 2729). The "special advantages" of a "bright-line rule" they suggested, also might include the potential unfairness and impracticality of pursuing certain potentially criminal offenses (127 S.Ct. at 2731). In its reply to the majority's assertion that the Consumer Goods Pricing Act had not "codified" the per se rule of RPM, but rather, had merely "intended § 1 to give courts the ability 'to develop governing principles of law' in the common-law tradition," the dissent emphasized that Congress did not prohibit this Court from reconsidering the per se rule. But enacting major legislation premised upon the existence of that rule constitutes important public reliance upon that rule. And doing so aware of the relevant arguments constitutes even stronger reliance upon the Court's keeping the rule, at least in the absence of some significant change in respect to those arguments. Finally, the dissent argued, "every relevant factor ... mention[ed]" by Justice Scalia (a member of the Court's majority here), concurring in the judgment of an earlier case decided this Term, Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (127 S.Ct. 2652, 2007 WL 1804336), "argues [here] against overturning Dr. Miles " (127 S.Ct. at 2734). Those reasons are listed and discussed by Justice Breyer at 127 S.Ct. at 2734-2737: First, this case ( Leegin) is statutory, despite the Court's assertion that it is more properly to be considered in the realm of common-law adjudication; therefore, the Court should accord the deference due stare decisis concerning cases involving statutory interpretation. Second, although "the Court does sometimes overrule cases that it decided wrongly only a reasonably short time ago," Dr. Miles is nearly a century old (not to mention that in overruling Dr. Miles this decision also serves to overrule every case that has followed or applied it). Third, there is no credible argument that keeping the per se rule associated with Dr. Miles creates or maintains an "'unworkable' legal regime." Fourth, overruling Dr. Miles "unsettles" the law to a far greater degree than keeping it would. Fifth, the "considerable reliance upon the per se rule" of Dr. Miles that has led to the involvement of property or contract rights in RPM cases "argues against overruling [that case]." Sixth, overruling a "rule of law [that] has become 'embedded' in our 'national culture,'" as has the per se rule for RPM, is both improper and unwise. Accordingly, Justice Breyer concluded: The only safe predicitions to make about today's decision are that it will likely raise the prices of goods at retail and that it will create considerable legal turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles. I do not believe that the majority has shown new or changed conditions sufficient to warrant overruling a decision of such long standing. All ordinary stare decisis considerations indicate the contrary. 127 S.Ct. at 2737.

The plaintiff in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. successfully asked the Supreme Court to soften the longstanding treatment of resale price maintenance (RPM, vertical imposition of direct, minimum price restraints) as a per se (automatic, and not capable of being justified) antitrust offense. RPM had been so analyzed since the Court decided in 1911 that a manufacturer of patent medicines could not lawfully agree with retailers of its products on the prices at which those products would be sold (Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373). Such agreements, the Court had said in Dr. Miles, constituted both unlawful restraints of trade under the common law, and violations of the Sherman Act's prohibition against "contract[s] or combination[s] ... in restraint of trade" (15 U.S.C. § 1). Leegin's practice of entering into contracts with its retailers of the Brighton line of leather products to set the prices at which the dealers would resell those products was challenged by a discounting retailer whose replacement shipments were terminated; the trial court found a per se violation of section 1 (2004 WL 5254322), and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision (171 Fed.Appx. 464 (2006)). Leegin argued in the Supreme Court that because RPM may sometimes be pro-consumer (might, for example, allow the retailers to profitably provide extra services desired by some consumers), the practice should not be conclusively presumed unreasonable "without elaborate inquiry as to 'its precise harm or business justification for its use.'" Agreeing with Leegin, the Court overruled Dr. Miles, stating that allowing RPM to be analyzed as a Rule of Reason violation (pursuant to which the procompetitive effects of a judicially determined antitrust violation are weighed against the anticompetitive results of the challenged activity) should be allowed: "Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that [RPM] always tend[s] to restrict competition ...." 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2709 (2007), quoting, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). This report will not be updated.

Historically, crime control has been the responsibility of local and state governments, with little involvement from the federal government. However, as crime became more rampant in the United States, the federal government increased its support for domestic crime control by creating a series of grant programs designed to assist state and local law enforcement. In the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, Congress created the Edward Byrne Memorial Formula Grant (Byrne Formula Grant) program and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) program, along with other grant programs, to assist state and local law enforcement in their efforts to control domestic crime. In 2005, however, legislation was enacted that combined the Byrne Formula Grant and LLEBG programs into the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. This report provides background information on the JAG program. It begins with a discussion of the programs that were combined to form the JAG program: the Byrne Formula Grant and LLEBG programs. The report then provides an overview of the JAG program. This is followed by a review of appropriations for JAG and its predecessor programs going back to FY1998. As mentioned, prior to creating the JAG program in the middle part of the past decade, Congress provided federal assistance to state and local governments for a variety of criminal justice programs through the Byrne Formula Grant and LLEBG programs. Each program is briefly described below. The Byrne Formula Grant program was authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-690 ). Funds awarded to states under the Byrne Formula Grant program were to be used to provide personnel, equipment, training, technical assistance, and information systems for more widespread apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, detention, and rehabilitation of offenders who violate state and local laws. Grant funds could also be used to provide assistance (other than compensation) to victims of crime. Twenty-nine "purposes areas" were established by Congress to define the nature and scope of the programs and projects that could be funded with the formula grant funds. The purpose of the LLEBG program, which was also a formula grant program, was to provide units of local government with federal grant funds so they could either hire police officers or create programs that would combat crime and increase public safety. Like the Byrne Formula Grant program, LLEBG had program purpose areas outlining what types of programs LLEBG funds could support. There were six program purpose areas that governed how state and local governments could use their funding under the LLEBG program. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) combined the Byrne Grant programs and LLEBG into the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program (JAG). Congress consolidated the programs to streamline the process for states applying for funding under the programs. JAG funds are allocated to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, America Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The formula used by the JAG program to allocate funds combines elements of the formulas used in the Byrne Formula Grant program and LLEBG. Under the current JAG formula, the total funding allocated to a state is based on the state's population and reported violent crimes. Specifically, half of a state's allocation is based on a state's respective share of the United States' population. The other half is based on the state's respective share of the average number of reported violent crimes in the United States for the three most recent years for which data are available. Under current law, each state and territory is guaranteed to receive no less than 0.25% of the amount appropriated for the JAG program in a given fiscal year (i.e., the minimum allocation). Therefore, after each state's allocation is calculated using the JAG formula, if a state's allocation is less than the minimum allocation, the state receives the minimum allocation as its award. If a state's initial allocation was greater than the minimum amount, then the state receives the minimum allocation plus a share of the remaining funds based on the state's proportion of the country's population and the reported number of violent crimes (population and violent crime data for the states that received the minimum allocation as their award are excluded when allocating the remaining funds for the states that receive more than the minimum allocation). After each state's allocation is calculated, 40% of the state's allocation is directly awarded to units of local government. Awards to units of local government under JAG are made the same way they were under LLEBG; namely, each unit of local government's award is based on the jurisdiction's proportion of the average number of violent crimes committed in its respective state. Only units of local government that would receive $10,000 or more are eligible for a direct allocation. The balance of funds not awarded directly to units of local government is administered by the state, which must be distributed to state police departments that provide criminal justice services to units of local government and to units of local government who were not eligible to receive a direct award from Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Also, like the Byrne Formula Grant program, each state is required to "pass through" a certain percentage of the funds directly awarded to the state. For JAG, the pass-through percentage is calculated as the ratio of the total amount of expenditures on criminal justice by the state for the most recent fiscal year to the total amount of expenditures on criminal justice by both the state and all units of local government in the past fiscal year. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 consolidated the program purpose areas under the Byrne Formula Grant and LLEBG programs into a total of seven program purpose areas under the JAG program. The seven broad program purpose areas are intended to give states and local units of government flexibility in creating programs to address local needs. JAG funds can be used for state and local initiatives, technical assistance, training, personnel, equipment, supplies, contractual support, and criminal justice information systems to improve or enhance such areas as law enforcement programs; prosecution and court programs; prevention and education programs; corrections and community corrections programs; drug treatment programs; planning, evaluation, and technology improvement programs; and crime victim and witness programs (other than compensation). The program purposes areas are broad enough to allow programs funded under the Byrne Grant program and LLEBG to continue to be funded under JAG. Funding for JAG has averaged $440 million per fiscal year since Congress started appropriating funding for the program in FY2005. However, as shown in Table 1 , funding for the program fluctuated over that time period. The appropriations data also show that there has been a general downward trend in providing assistance to state and local law enforcement through these formula grant programs. Trends in funding for the Byrne Formula Grant, LLEBG, and JAG programs roughly mirror those of other Department of Justice (DOJ) grant accounts. The amounts appropriated for JAG over the fiscal years have been below the amount authorized for the program, which was $1.095 billion per fiscal year for FY2006-FY2012. Since funding was authorized for the program in FY2006, the most Congress appropriated for JAG—$546 million for FY2009—represented 50% of the amount authorized per fiscal year.

The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program was created by the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162), which collapsed both the Edward Byrne Memorial Formula (Byrne Formula) Grant and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) into a single program. This report provides a brief overview of JAG and its funding. JAG funds are awarded to state and local governments based on a statutorily defined formula. Each state's allocation is based on its proportion of the country's population and the state's proportion of the average total number of reported violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) for the last three years. After a state's allocation is calculated, 60% goes directly to the state government and the remaining 40% is awarded directly to units of local government in the state. State and local governments can use their JAG funding for programs or projects in one of seven purpose areas: (1) law enforcement programs; (2) prosecution and court programs; (3) prevention and education programs; (4) corrections and community corrections programs; (5) drug treatment programs; (6) planning, evaluation, and technology improvement programs; and (7) crime victim and witness programs (other than compensation). Funding for JAG has averaged $440 million per fiscal year since Congress started appropriating funding for the program in FY2005. However, funding for the program fluctuated over that time period. The appropriations data also show that since FY1998 there has been a general downward trend in providing assistance to state and local law enforcement through the LLEBG, Byrne Formula, and JAG grant programs.

Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules, which may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules. The requirement that each committee must adopt its own set of rules dates to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 91-510). That law built on the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act (P.L. 79-601), which set out some requirements to which most Senate committees must adhere. Under the provisions of the 1970 law (now incorporated into Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 2), Senate committees must adopt their rules and generally have them printed in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of a Congress. Typically, the Senate also publishes a compilation of the rules of all the committees each Congress, and some individual committees also publish their rules as committee prints. Committee rules govern actions taken in committee proceedings only, and they are enforced in relation thereto by the committee's members in a similar way that rules enforcement occurs on the Senate floor. There is generally no means by which the Senate can enforce committee rules at a later point on the floor. So long as the committee met the requirement of Senate Rule XXVI that a physical majority be present for reporting a measure or matter, no point of order lies against the measure or matter on the floor on the grounds that the committee earlier acted in violation of other procedural requirements. Beyond the requirements of Senate rules and a committee's own formal rules, many committees have traditions or practices they follow that can affect their procedures. (One committee, for example, does not allow Senators to offer second-degree amendments during committee markups, though this restriction is not contained in either the Senate or the committee's rules.) An accounting of any such informal practices that committees might observe is not provided below. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then provides four tables that summarize each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, and scheduling of witnesses ( Table 1 ); hearing quorum, business quorum, and amendment filing requirements ( Table 2 ); proxy voting, polling, and nominations ( Table 3 ); and investigations and subpoenas ( Table 4 ). Table 4 also identifies selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. Although there is some latitude for committees to set their own rules, the standing rules of the Senate set out specific requirements that each committee must follow. The provisions listed below are taken from Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate. (Some committees reiterate these rules in their own rules, but even for those committees that do not, these restrictions apply.) This is not an exhaustive explanation of Senate rules and their impact on committees. Rather, this summary is intended to provide a background against which to understand each committee's individual rules that govern key committee activities. Rules. Each committee must adopt rules; those rules must generally be published in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of each Congress. If a committee adopts an amendment to its rules later in the Congress, that change becomes effective only when it is published in the Record (Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Meetings. Committees and subcommittees are authorized to meet and hold hearings when the Senate is in session and when it has recessed or adjourned. A committee may not meet on any day (1) after the Senate has been in session for two hours, or (2) after 2 p.m. when the Senate is in session. Each committee must designate a regular day on which to meet weekly, biweekly, or monthly. (This requirement does not apply to the Appropriations Committee.) A committee is to announce the date, place, and subject of each hearing at least one week in advance, though any committee may waive this requirement for "good cause" (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(a); Rule XXVI, paragraph 3). Special meeting. Three members of a committee may make a written request to the chair to call a special meeting. The chair then has three calendar days in which to schedule the meeting, which is to take place within the next seven calendar days. If the chair fails to do so, a majority of the committee members can file a written motion to hold the meeting at a certain date and hour (Rule XXVI, paragraph 3). Open meetings. Unless closed for reasons specified in Senate rules (such as a need to protect national security information), committee and subcommittee meetings, including hearings, are open to the public. When a committee or subcommittee schedules or cancels a meeting, it is required to provide that information—including the time, place, and purpose of the meeting—for inclusion in the Senate's computerized schedule information system. Any hearing that is open to the public may also be open to radio and television broadcasting at the committee's discretion. Committees and subcommittees may adopt rules to govern how the media may broadcast the event. A vote by the committee in open session is required to close a meeting (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(b)). Quorums. Committees may set a quorum for doing business so long as it is not less than one-third of the membership. A majority of a committee must be physically present when the committee votes to order the reporting of any measure, matter, or recommendation. Agreeing to a motion to order a measure or matter reported requires the support of a majority of the members who are present. Proxies cannot be used to constitute a quorum (Rule XXVI paragraph 7(a)(1)). Meeting r ecord . All committees must make public a video, transcript, or audio recording of each open hearing of the committee within 21 days of the hearing. These shall be made available to the public "through the Internet" (Rule XXVI, paragraph 5(2)(A)). Proxy voting. A committee may adopt rules permitting proxy voting. A committee may not permit a proxy vote to be cast unless the absent Senator has been notified about the question to be decided and has requested that his or her vote be cast by proxy. A committee may prohibit the use of proxy votes on votes to report. However, even if a committee allows proxies to be cast on a motion to report, proxies cannot make the difference in ordering a measure reported, though they can prevent it (Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(3)). Investigations and subpoenas. Each standing committee (and its subcommittees) is empowered to investigate matters within its jurisdiction and issue subpoenas for persons and papers (Rule XXVI, paragraph 1). Witnesses selected by the minority. During hearings on any measure or matter, the minority shall be allowed to select witnesses to testify on at least one day when the chair receives such a request from a majority of the minority party members. This provision does not apply to the Appropriations Committee (Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d)). Reporting. A Senate committee may report original bills and resolutions in addition to those that have been referred to it. As stated above in the quorum requirement, a majority of the committee must be physically present for a measure or matter to be reported, and a majority of those present is required to order a measure or matter favorably reported. A Senate committee is not required to issue a written report to accompany a measure or matter it reports. If the committee does write such a report, Senate rules specify a series of required elements that must be included in the report (Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a)(3); Rule XXVI, paragraph 10(c)). Table 1 summarizes each's committee's rules in three areas: meeting day(s), notice requirements for meetings and hearings, and witness selection provisions. Many committees repeat or otherwise incorporate the provisions of Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(a), which, as noted above, requires a week's notice of any hearing (except for the Appropriations and Budget committees) "unless the committee determines that there is good cause to begin such hearing at an earlier date." Provisions in committee rules are identified and explained in this column only to the extent that they provide additional hearing notice requirements, specifically provide the "good cause" authority to certain members (e.g., chair or ranking minority member), or apply the one week notice to meetings other than hearings (such as markups). Similarly, as noted in the report, Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 4(d) (sometimes referred to as the "minority witness rule"), provides for the calling of additional witnesses in some circumstances (except for the Appropriations Committee). Some committees restate this rule in their own rules. Only committee rule provisions that go further in specifically addressing the selection of witnesses or a right to testify are identified in this column. Table 2 focuses on each's committee's rules on hearing quorums, business quorums, and requirements to file amendments prior to a committee markup. In regard to a business quorum, committees generally consider "conduct of business" to include actions (such as debating and voting on amendments) that allow the committee to proceed on measures up to the point of reporting. Some committees require that a member of the minority party be present for the conduct of business; such provisions are noted below. As noted earlier, Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 7(a), requires a majority of the committee to be physically present (and a majority of those present to agree) to report out a measure or matter; this is often referred to as a "reporting quorum." The rule allows Senate committees to set lower quorum requirements, though not less than a third of membership for other business besides hearings. Some committees restate the Senate requirement in their own committee rules, but even those committees that do not are bound by the reporting quorum requirement. Table 2 does not identify committee rules that simply restate the reporting quorum requirement unless the committee has added additional requirements to its provisions (e.g., that a reporting quorum must include a member of each party). Though no Senate rules govern the practice, several committees require, in their committee rules, that Senators file with the committee any first-degree amendments they may offer during a committee markup before the committee meets. Such a provision allows the chair and ranking member of the committee to see what kinds of issues may come up at the markup and may also allow them to negotiate agreements with amendment sponsors before the formal markup session begins. Some committees distribute such filed amendments in advance of the markup to allow committee members a chance to examine them. It also provides an opportunity to Senators to draft second-degree amendments to possible first-degree amendments before the markup begins. Table 3 summarizes each's committee's rules on proxy voting, committee polling, and nominations. Since Senate rules require a majority of a committee to be physically present for a vote to report a measure or matter, a committee vote to report an item of business may not rely on the votes cast on behalf of absent Senators (that is, votes by proxy). Some committees effectively restate this requirement in their committee rules by either stating that proxies do not count toward reporting or referencing the proxy provisions of Senate Rule XXVI. However, committees may still allow (or preclude) proxy votes on a motion to report (as well as on other questions so long as members are informed of the issue and request a proxy vote). Table 3 identifies committees that explicitly allow or disallow proxy votes on a motion to report (even though such votes cannot, under Senate rules, count toward the presence of a "reporting quorum" or make the difference in successfully reporting a measure or matter). "Polling" is a method of assessing the position of the committee on a matter without the committee physically coming together. As such, it cannot be used to report out measures or matters, because Senate rules require a physical majority to be present to report a measure or matter. Polling may be used, however, by committees that allow it for internal housekeeping matters before the committee, such as questions concerning staffing or how the committee ought to proceed on a measure or matter. Senate Rule XXVI does not contain provisions specific to committee consideration of presidential nominations. Some committees, however, set out timetables in their rules for action or have other provisions specific to action on nominations. Some committees also provide in their rules that nominees must provide certain information to the committee. Such provisions are not detailed in this table except to the extent that the committee establishes a timetable for action that is connected to such submissions. This column of the table also identifies any committee provisions on whether nominees testify under oath. Table 4 describes selected key committee rules in relation to investigations and subpoenas. Note that some Senate committees do not have specific rules providing processes for committee investigations, and many also do not set out procedures for issuing subpoenas. The lack of any investigation or subpoena provisions does not mean the committees cannot conduct investigations or issue subpoenas; rather, the process for doing so is not specified in the committee's written rules. Some committees have provisions that are generally not included in other committee rules. Selected notable examples (that do not fit into other categories in other tables) are summarized in the last column of Table 4 .

Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for certain Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules to govern its own proceedings. These rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees may also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules but are not specifically addressed by Senate rules. In sum, Senate committees are allowed some latitude to establish tailored procedures to govern certain activities, which can result in significant variation in the way different committees operate. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committee actions. The report then provides tables that summarize selected, key features of each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category. The tables represent only a portion of each committee's rules, and provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's Standing Rules are not included. This report will be not be updated further during the 115th Congress.

Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Congress authorized the closure of certain military installations under four BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. These installations have been closed for many years, and the majority of the properties have been made available for civilian purposes. However, cleanup efforts continue at some of the most contaminated properties, delaying their reuse. Public desire for their redevelopment has motivated ongoing concern about the pace and costs of cleaning up these remaining properties. The completion of cleanup is often a key factor in economic redevelopment, because a property cannot be used for its intended purpose until it is cleaned up to a degree that would be suitable for that use. In 2005, the 109 th Congress approved a new BRAC round. Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is required to close and realign selected installations by 2011, there is no statutory deadline for the cleanup of contaminated property. The timing of cleanup will depend on response actions negotiated with federal and state regulators, capabilities of cleanup technologies, and the amount of funding appropriated by Congress to support cleanup efforts. This report explains the federal statutory requirements that govern the transfer and reuse of contaminated properties on closed military installations, discusses the status of cleanup to prepare these properties for reuse, examines estimates of costs to address remaining cleanup challenges, and identifies issues for Congress. As amended in 1986, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly referred to as Superfund) generally requires the United States to clean up contaminated federal property prior to transfer out of federal ownership. This requirement applies to all contaminated property declared surplus to the needs of the federal government, including property on closed military installations. The agency with administrative jurisdiction over a property usually administers and pays for the cleanup to satisfy the responsibility of the United States. DOD typically assumes this responsibility for closed military installations. After a property is transferred out of federal ownership, the United States remains liable for any original contamination found not to have been sufficiently remediated. However, the document transferring ownership typically guarantees cleanup only to a level suitable for a specific use, and in some cases may include a deed restriction prohibiting certain uses that would be considered unsafe relative to the level of cleanup performed. Considering this condition, the United States is usually held responsible for further cleanup to the extent that more work is found to be needed to make the originally agreed-upon use safe. If a new owner later decides to use the property for another purpose that would require further cleanup, the new owner ordinarily is held responsible for additional cleanup costs to make the property suitable for that purpose. Property declared surplus to the needs of the federal government is typically transferred to a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) responsible for implementing a plan for civilian reuse. While the administering agency generally must complete the cleanup prior to transfer out of federal ownership, CERCLA authorizes early transfer under certain conditions, including assurances that the cleanup will be carried out. Early transfer can speed the redevelopment process, if it may be feasible for cleanup to occur in conjunction with redevelopment planning and construction, or if a short-term use would be suitable for the existing level of contamination while cleanup proceeds to prepare the property for its eventual use. Early transfer also may offer the potential to speed the redevelopment process in situations in which the recipient voluntarily agrees to administer and pay for the cleanup. In such cases, the property is usually sold at a discounted price to offset the cleanup costs borne by the purchaser. A discounted price may lower a purchaser's initial costs to buy the property, but the purchaser does assume some financial risk if the cleanup costs are greater than expected. The cost of environmental insurance to limit this financial risk may offset some of the initial savings gained from a discounted price. If a property on a closed installation still could be of use to the federal government, DOD may transfer it to another federal agency rather than make it available to non-federal entities. If a contaminated property remains in federal ownership, CERCLA does not specify which agency has responsibility for the cleanup. The determination of which agency performs the cleanup is subject to negotiation among the agencies involved, and as such is an Executive Branch decision. Although the agency that caused the contamination most often administers and pays for the cleanup, disagreements over this responsibility sometimes arise in negotiating the transfer of jurisdiction. Congress has sometimes addressed such disagreements in legislation, specifying agency responsibilities. Regardless of who administers the cleanup of a closed military installation, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state regulatory agencies oversee cleanup decisions to ensure that applicable requirements are met. CERCLA specifically requires EPA to take the lead in overseeing cleanup of federal facilities on the National Priorities List (NPL). States usually oversee cleanup of federal facilities not on the NPL. CERCLA generally requires cleanup actions to achieve levels of exposure to contamination that would be protective of human health and the environment. Land use is critical in determining the potential exposure risks and the cleanup actions needed to address those risks. Cleanup generally is more extensive and more costly for land uses that would result in greater exposure risks. Cleanup typically is the most stringent and the most costly for residential use because of the greater likelihood of exposure among sensitive populations, including children and the elderly. Cleanup is usually the least costly and the least stringent for industrial use, as the exposure risks are not as great. As amended, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act requires DOD to give "substantial deference" to an LRA's redevelopment plan in determining the use of surplus property on closed military installations. Still, the locally preferred use can be constrained, if costs or technical challenges would make it infeasible to clean up a property to a certain degree. EPA guidance acknowledges that some uses may not be practical because of such challenges, and indicates that cleanup goals may need to be revised, which could result in "different, more reasonable land use(s)." DOD administers a Defense Environmental Restoration Program to carry out cleanup actions under CERCLA on military installations in the United States. Multiple defense appropriations accounts fund this program. Two Defense Base Closure accounts fund the cleanup of installations closed under the BRAC rounds. The "1990" account consolidates funding for the cleanup of installations closed prior to the 2005 round. This account is now entirely devoted to cleanup, as these installations were closed many years ago. The "2005" account funds the cleanup of installations being closed under the 2005 round. Most of this account currently funds the actions necessary to close and realign the missions of the installations. As these actions are completed, a greater portion of the 2005 account will be devoted to cleanup to prepare surplus properties for reuse. The cleanup of realigned installations that remain in active use will be funded out of the Defense Environmental Restoration Accounts that support cleanup of active installations. See the " Estimated Costs " section of this report for the amount of funding spent on the cleanup of closed installations over time out of the Base Closure accounts. To manage cleanup efforts, DOD divides each installation into discrete sites (i.e., parcels of land), based on the nature and boundary of contamination. One installation may contain numerous sites with differing types of contamination. As of the end of FY2007, DOD had identified a total of 5,356 sites on hundreds of installations closed under all five BRAC rounds where contamination was known or suspected to be present. These sites include those on installations that are in the process of closing under the 2005 round. The vast majority of sites on BRAC installations were contaminated with hazardous substances (i.e., chemical contaminants), but some sites contained abandoned or discarded munitions on former training ranges and munitions disposal facilities. Congress enacted specific authorities for the cleanup of munitions sites in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 ( P.L. 107-107 ). See CRS Report RS22862, Cleanup of U.S. Military Munitions: Authorities, Status, and Costs , by [author name scrubbed]. DOD reported that planned response actions were complete at 70% of the 5,356 sites it had identified through FY2007. No response was required or expected at 14% of the sites because investigations revealed that the potential for exposure to contamination was within an acceptable range, based on applicable standards. Response actions were pending at 10% of the site inventory, with varying stages of progress among individual sites ranging from the assessment phase to the construction of cleanup remedies. Evaluations were pending at 6% of the sites, leaving much uncertainty as to the extent of contamination at those locations and the cleanup actions that will be required. Sites requiring no further response actions generally have been made available for their intended use. Some sites where response actions were not complete also have been made available using early transfer authority, or by leasing the property with ownership retained by the federal government. However, remaining contamination and ongoing cleanup could limit the use of these properties. Table 1 presents the status of cleanup through FY2007 at sites on closed military installations by individual BRAC round. Considering that the cleanup of 2005 round installations began many years ago when these installations were still operational, cleanup generally should be at a more advanced stage upon closure than experienced under earlier rounds when cleanup efforts were less mature. As of the end of FY2007, planned response actions were complete, or not required, at half of the sites on 2005 round installations, leaving much of the property inventory suitable for reuse. However, sites where response actions were complete would have been cleaned up to a level compatible with military use at that time. If other uses are desired after closure, additional cleanup may be needed. Through FY2007, DOD had spent nearly $7.3 billion out of the Base Closure accounts over time to clean up contaminated sites on installations closed under all five BRAC rounds to prepare these properties for reuse. In March 2007, DOD estimated that another $3.9 billion would be needed to complete all planned cleanup actions. DOD estimated the future cleanup costs based on its most recent knowledge of conditions at the sites presented in Table 1 . DOD periodically revises its estimates as more is learned about the type and level of contamination at each site, and the actions that federal and state regulators will seek to address potential risks. In effect, these estimates are "moving targets" that change as more information becomes available to project the costs of future actions. Uncertainties about the degree of cleanup that ultimately will be required at some sites make it challenging to accurately estimate the total costs to complete cleanup. Table 2 presents the past and estimated future costs to clean up contaminated sites at closed military installations by individual BRAC round. Some attention has been drawn to the impact that potentially higher cleanup costs could have on the savings expected from a BRAC round. The closure of a military installation results in annual "savings" in operational expenses, but cleanup costs to prepare decommissioned properties for reuse can reduce these savings. However, some of the cleanup costs would have been incurred regardless, as DOD still is required to clean up its active installations to a degree that would be suitable for military purposes. The amount of time and resources needed to complete the cleanup of closed military installations generally depends on the level of contamination on those properties, and the actions selected to make them suitable for civilian reuse. Cleanup can take many years in some instances, as the continuing cleanup of certain installations closed between 1988 and 1995 demonstrates. However, the generally more advanced stage of cleanup at 2005 round installations anticipated upon closure may allow contaminated properties to become available for reuse more quickly. Still, the availability of funding and capabilities of cleanup technologies could limit the feasibility of cleanup at some installations, making certain land uses impractical and posing challenges to economic redevelopment. It is difficult to ascertain whether DOD's cleanup cost estimates are a reasonable approximation of the funding that will be needed to prepare closed installations for reuse. Because the civilian uses of installations to be closed in the 2005 round have yet to be decided, DOD's cost estimates are based on a degree of cleanup that would be compatible with recent military use. If a property were to be used for other purposes that would result in a higher risk of exposure to contamination, more stringent cleanup likely would be required to make the property suitable for that use. In these circumstances, more time and resources could be needed to complete cleanup than DOD has estimated.

In 2005, the 109th Congress approved a new Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. As the Department of Defense (DOD) implements the new round, issues for Congress include the pace and costs of closing and realigning the selected installations and the impacts on surrounding communities. The disposal of surplus property has stimulated interest among affected communities in how the land can be redeveloped to replace jobs lost as a result of the planned closures. Environmental contamination can limit the potential for economic redevelopment if the availability of funding or technological capabilities constrains the degree of cleanup needed to make the land suitable for its intended use. Although most of the properties on installations closed under the four earlier rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 have been cleaned up and made available for redevelopment, the most extensively contaminated properties remain in various stages of cleanup to make them suitable for their desired use. Cleanup began many years ago at 2005 round installations when they were still operational. As a result, cleanup generally should be at a more advanced stage upon closure, compared to installations closed under earlier rounds when cleanup efforts were less mature. Still, installations closed under the 2005 round could face delays in redevelopment if a community's desired land use would require a lengthy and costly cleanup.

The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in Congress, or job tenure, is a source of recurring interest among Members of Congress, congressional staff, those who study staffing in the House and Senate, and the public. There may be interest in congressional tenure information from multiple perspectives, including assessment of how a congressional office might oversee human resources issues, how staff might approach a congressional career, and guidance for how frequently staffing changes may occur in various positions. Others might be interested in how staff are deployed, and could see staff tenure as an indication of the effectiveness or well-being of Congress as an institution. This report provides tenure data for 18 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices, and information for using those data for different purposes. The positions include the following: Administrative Director Casework Supervisor Caseworker Chief Counsel Chief of Staff Communications Director Counsel Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Office Manager Press Secretary Regional Representative Scheduler Staff Assistant State Director Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff tenure data in a readily retrievable or analyzable form. The most recent publicly available Senate staff compensation report, which provided some insight into the duration which congressional staff worked in a number of positions, was issued in 2006, and relied on anonymous, self-reported survey data. Data in this report are instead based on official Senate pay reports, from which tenure information arguably may be most reliably derived, and which afford the opportunity to use complete, consistently collected data. Tenure information provided in this report is based on the Senate's Report of the Secretary of the Senate , published semiannually, as collated by LegiStorm, a private entity that provides some congressional data by subscription. Senators' staff tenure data were calculated for each year between 2006 and 2016. Annual data allow for observations about the nature of staff tenure in Senators' offices over time. For each year, all staff with at least one week's service on March 31 were included. All employment pay dates from October 2, 2000, to March 24 of each reported year are included in the data. Utilizing official salary expenditure data from the Senate may provide more complete, robust findings than other methods of determining staff tenure, such as surveys; the data presented here, however, are subject to some challenges that could affect the interpretation of the information presented. Tenure information provided in this report may understate the actual time staff spend in particular positons, due in part to several features of the data. Overall, the time frame studied may lead to some underrepresentation in tenure duration. Figure 1 provides potential examples of congressional staff, identified as Jobholders A-D, in a given position. Since tenure data are not captured before October 2, 2000, some individuals, represented as Jobholder A, may have an unknown length of service prior to that date that is not captured. This feature of the data only affects a small number of employees within this dataset, since many tenure periods completely begin and end within the observed period of time, as represented by Jobholders B and C. The data last capture those who were employed in Senators' personal offices as of March 31, 2016, represented as Jobholder D, and some of those individuals likely continued to work in the same roles after that date. Data provided in this report represent an individual's consecutive time spent working in a particular position in a Senator's personal office. They do not necessarily capture the overall time worked in a Senate office or across a congressional career. If a person's job title changes, for example, from staff assistant to caseworker, the time that individual spent as a staff assistant is recorded separately from the time that individual spent as a caseworker. If a person stops working for the Senate for some time, that individual's tenure in his or her preceding position ends, although he or she may return to work in Congress at some point. No aggregate measure of individual congressional career length is provided in this report. Other data concerns arise from the variation across offices, lack of other demographic information about staff, and lack of information about where congressional staff work. Potential differences might exist in the job duties of positions with the same or similar title, and there is wide variation among the job titles used for various positions in congressional offices. The Appendix provides the number of related titles included for each job title for which tenure data are provided. Aggregation of tenure by job title rests on the assumption that staff with the same or similar title carry out the same or similar tasks. Given the wide discretion congressional employing authorities have in setting the terms and conditions of employment, there may be differences in the duties of similarly titled staff that could have effects on the interpretation of their time in a particular position. Acknowledging the imprecision inherent in congressional job titles, an older edition of the Senate Handbook states, "Throughout the Senate, individuals with the same job title perform vastly different duties." As presented here, tenure data provide no insight into the education, age, work experience, pay, full- or part-time status of staff, or other potential data that might inform explanations of why a congressional staff member might stay in a particular position. Staff could be based in Washington, DC, state offices, or both. It is unknown whether, or to what extent, the location of congressional employment might affect the duration of that employment. Tables in this section provide tenure data for selected positions in Senators' personal offices and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides a summary of staff tenure for selected positions since 2006. The data include job titles, average and median years of service, and grouped years of service for each positon. The "Trend" column provides information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Table 2 - Table 19 provide information on individual job titles over the same period. In all of the data tables, the average and the median length of tenure columns provide two different measures of central tendency, and each may be useful for some purposes and less suitable for others. The average represents the sum of the observed years of tenure, divided by the number of staff in that position. It is a common measure that can be understood as a representation of how long an individual remains, on average, in a job position. The average can be affected disproportionately by unusually low or high observations. A few individuals who remain for many years in a position, for example, may draw the average tenure length up for that position. A number of staff who stay in a position for only a brief period may depress the average length of tenure. Another common measure of central tendency, the median, represents the middle value when all the observations are arranged by order of magnitude. The median can be understood as a representation of a center point at which half of the observations fall below, and half above. Extremely high or low observations may have less of an impact on the median. Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in at least three potentially significant ways, including: the relatively brief period of time for which reliable, largely inclusive data are available in a readily analyzable form; how the unique nature of congressional work settings might affect staff tenure; and the lack of demographic information about staff for which tenure data are available. Considering tenure in isolation from demographic characteristics of the congressional workforce might limit the extent to which tenure information can be assessed. Additional data on congressional staff regarding age, education, and other elements would be needed for this type of analysis, and are not readily available at the position level. Finally, since each Senator's office serves as its own hiring authority, variations from office to office, which for each position may include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which aggregated data provided here might match tenure in a particular office. Despite these caveats, a few broad observations can be made about staff in Senators' offices. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in 10 position titles in Senate offices. The median tenure was unchanged for eight positions. This may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Although pay is not the only factor that might affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job, staff in positions that generally pay less typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in higher-paying positions. Some of these lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level positions in some Senators' offices; if so, Senate office employees in those roles appear to follow national trends for others in entry-level types of jobs, remaining in the role for a relatively short period of time. Similarly, those in more senior positions, which often require a particular level of congressional or other professional experience, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. There is wide variation among the job titles used for various positions in congressional offices. Between October 2000 and March 2016, House and Senate pay data provided 13,271 unique titles under which staff received pay. Of those, 1,884 were extracted and categorized into one of 33 job titles used in CRS Reports about Member or committee offices. Office type was sometimes related to the job titles used. Some titles were specific to Member (e.g., District Director, State Director, and Field Representative) or committee (positions that are identified by majority, minority, or party standing, and Chief Clerk) offices, while others were identified in each setting (Counsel, Scheduler, Staff Assistant, and Legislative Assistant). Other job titles variations reflect factors specific to particular offices, since each office functions as its own hiring authority. Some of the titles may distinguish between roles and duties carried out in the office (e.g., chief of staff, legislative assistant, etc.). Some offices may use job titles to indicate degrees of seniority. Others might represent arguably inconsequential variations in title between two staff members who might be carrying out essentially similar activities. Examples include: Seemingly related job titles, such as Administrative Director and Administrative Manager, or Caseworker and Constituent Advocate Job titles modified by location, such as Washington, DC, State, or District Chief of Staff Job titles modified by policy or subject area, such as Domestic Policy Counsel, Energy Counsel, or Counsel for Constituent Services Committee job titles modified by party or committee subdivision. This could include a party-related distinction, such as a Majority, Minority, Democratic, or Republican Professional Staff Member. It could also denote Full Committee Staff Member, Subcommittee Staff Member, or work on behalf of an individual committee leader, like the chair or ranking member. The titles used in this report were used by most Senators' offices, but a number of apparently related variations are included to ensure inclusion of additional offices and staff. Table A-1 provides the number of related titles included for each position used in this report or related CRS Reports on staff tenure. A list of all titles included by category is available to congressional offices upon request.

The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress—or congressional staff tenure—is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time Senate office staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives. This report provides tenure data for a selection of 18 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief Counsel, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Regional Representative, Scheduler, Staff Assistant, and State Director. Senators' staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in 10 position titles in Senators' offices, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position. For eight positions, the median tenure trend was unchanged. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. Senate office staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for Senators' office employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entry-level jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each Senator's office serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. An employing Senator's retirement or electoral loss, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly. This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43946, Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, and CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014.

The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appoin tees. Presidential appointments with Senate confirmation are often referred to with the abbreviation PAS. This report identifies, for the 114 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for executive-level full-time positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. It excludes appointments to regulatory boards and commissions as well as to independent and other agencies, which are covered in other Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2016 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Related CRS reports regarding the presidential appointments process, nomination activity for other executive branch positions, recess appointments, and other appointment-related matters may be found at http://www.crs.gov . Table 1 summarizes appointment activity, during the 114 th Congress, related to full-time PAS positions in the 15 executive departments. President Barack H. Obama submitted 102 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 102 nominations, 64 were confirmed; 8 were withdrawn; and 30 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. The length of time a given nomination may be pending in the Senate has varied widely. Some nominations were confirmed within a few days, others were confirmed within several months, and some were never confirmed. This report provides, for each executive department nomination confirmed in the 114 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). Under Senate Rules, nominations not acted on by the Senate at the end of a session of Congress (or before a recess of 30 days) are returned to the President. The Senate, by unanimous consent, often waives this rule—although not always. In cases where the President resubmits a returned nomination, this report measures the days to confirm from the date of receipt of the resubmitted nomination, not the original. For executive department nominations confirmed in the 114 th Congress, a mean of 156.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 125.5. Each of the 15 executive department profiles provided in this report is divided into two parts. The first table lists the titles and pay levels of all the department's full-time PAS positions as of the end of the 114 th Congress. For most presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation, pay levels fall under the Executive Schedule. As of the end of the 114 th Congress, these pay levels range from level I ($205,700) for Cabinet-level offices to level V ($150,200) for lower-ranked positions. The second table lists appointment action for vacant positions during the 114 th Congress in chronological order. This table provides the name of the nominee, position title, date of nomination or appointment, date of confirmation, and number of days between receipt of a nomination and confirmation, and notes relevant actions other than confirmation (e.g., nominations returned to or withdrawn by the President). When more than one nominee has had appointment action, the second table also provides statistics on the length of time between nomination and confirmation. The average days to confirm are provided in two ways: mean and median. The mean is a more familiar measure, though it may be influenced by outliers in the data. The median, by contrast, does not tend to be influenced by outliers. In other words, a nomination that took an extraordinarily long time to be confirmed might cause a significant change in the mean, but the median would be unaffected. Examining both numbers offers more information with which to assess the central tendency of the data. For a small number of positions within a department, the two tables may contain slightly different titles for the same position. This is because the title used in the nomination the White House submits to the Senate, the title of the position as established by statute, and the title of the position used by the department itself are not always identical. The first table listing incumbents at the end of the 114 th Congress uses data provided by the department itself. The second table listing nomination action within each department relies primarily upon the LIS database of Senate nominations. This information is based upon nominations sent to the Senate by the White House. Any inconsistency in position titles between the two tables is noted following each appointment table. Appendix A provides two tables. Table A-1 relists all appointment action identified in this report and is organized alphabetically by the appointee's last name. Table entries identify the agency to which each individual was appointed, position title, nomination date, date confirmed or other final action, and duration count for confirmed nominations. The table also includes the mean and median values for the "days to confirm" column. Table A-2 provides summary data for each of the 15 executive departments identified in this report. The table summarizes the number of positions, nominations submitted, individual nominees, confirmations, nominations returned, and nominations withdrawn for each department. It also provides the mean and median values for the numbers of days taken to confirm nominations within each department. A list of department abbreviations can be found in Appendix B . Appendix A. Presidential Nominations, 114 th Congress Appendix B. Abbreviations of Departments

The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone, or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 350 full-time leadership positions in the 15 executive departments for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate during the 114th Congress for full-time positions in these 15 executive departments. Information for each department is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 15 executive departments appears in the Appendix. During the 114th Congress, the President submitted 102 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in executive departments. Of these 102 nominations, 64 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 30 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 156.1 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 125.5. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2016 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions). This report will not be updated.

RS21539 -- Vacancies and Special Elections: 108th Congress Updated January 12, 2005 Vacancies in Congress occur when a Senator or Representative dies, resigns, declines to serve, or is expelled orexcluded by either house. The Constitution requires that vacancies in both houses be filled by special election; butinthe case of the Senate, it empowers the state legislatures to provide for temporary appointments to the Senate by thegovernor until special elections can be scheduled. (1) Senate. Prevailing practice for Senate vacancies is for state governors to fill them by appointment, with the appointee serving until a special election can be held. The winnerofthe special election then serves for the balance of the term. In the event that the seat becomes vacant between thetimeof a statewide election and the expiration of the term, the appointee usually serves the remainder of the term. Oregonand Wisconsin are the only states that do not provide for gubernatorial appointments; their Senate vacancies canonlybe filled by election. House of Representatives. All House vacancies are filled by special election. Scheduling for special elections is largely dependent upon the amount of time remaining beforethenext regular elections for the House. When a vacancy occurs during the first session of Congress, a special electionisalways scheduled for the earliest possible time, preferably to coincide with elections regularly scheduled for otherpurposes in the district. If, however, a seat becomes vacant within six months of the end of a Congress, some states hold a special election forthe balance of the congressional term on the same day as the regular election. Winners of special elections in thesecases are sometimes not sworn in immediately as Members of the House, Congress having often adjourned sine die before election day. They are, however, accorded the status of incumbent Representatives for the purposes ofseniority, office selection, and staffing. Other states do not provide for a special election in these circumstances,andthe seat remains vacant for the balance of that particular Congress. For additional information, see CRS Report 97-1009(pdf) , House and Senate Vacancies: How Are They Filled? by Sula P.Richardson and [author name scrubbed]. Table 1. Special Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives: 108th Congress(2003-2004) a In California, Rep. Robert T. Matsui died on Jan. 1, 2005, three days before the convening of the 109th Congress, towhich he had been reelected. A special primary election to fill the vacancy will be held on Mar. 8, 2005. The namesof all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, will appear on the March ballot. If no candidate receives a majorityofvotes, the top vote-getters from each party will advance to a special runoff election on May 3, 2005. b Three days before the 108th Congress convened on January 7, 2003, a special election was held to fill the vacancycaused during the 107th Congress by the death of Rep. Patsy Mink, who had been re-elected posthumously to the 108thCongress. (Rep. Patsy Mink died two days after the deadline for replacing her name on the ballot for re-electionto the108th Congress.) On January 4, 2003, Ed Case defeated 43 other candidates in a special election tofill that vacancy. The other candidates in the open special election were: Kabba Anand (N), Whitney T. Anderson, Paul Britos (D),John S. (Mahina) Carroll (R), Brian G. Cole (D), Charles (Lucky) Collins (D), Doug Fairhurst (R), Frank F. Fasi(R),Michael Gagne (D), Alan Gano (N), Carolyn Martinez Golojuch (R), G. Goodwin (G), Richard H. Haake (R), ChrisHalford (R), Colleen Hanabusa (D), S. J. Harlan (N), Herbert Jensen (D), Kekoa D. Kaapu (D), MoanaKeaulana-Dyball (N), Kimo Kaloi (R), Jeff Mallan (L), Barbara C. Marumoto (R), Sophie Mataafa (N), MattMatsunaga (D), Bob McDermott (R), Mark McNett (N), Nick Nikhilananda (G), Richard (Rich)Payne (R), John(Jack) Randall (N), Jim Rath (R), Mike Rethman (N), Art P. Reyes (D), Pat Rocco (D), Bartle Lee Rowland (N),BillRussell (N), John L. Sabey (R), Nelson J. Secretario (R), Steve Sparks (N), Steve Tataii (D), Marshall (Koo Koo)Turner (N), Dan Vierra (N), Clarence H. Weatherwax (R), and Solomon (Kolomona) Wong (N). Prior to winningtheJanuary 4, 2003 special election, Mr. Case had also won the special election that had been held on November 30,2002, to fill the remainder of Rep. Mink's term for the 107th Congress. He was not sworn in,however, as the 107thCongress was not in session. (For further information on the 107th Congress vacancy and specialelection see CRS Report RS20814(pdf) , Vacancies and Special Elections: 107th Congress .) c In Kentucky, Rep. Ernie Fletcher resigned from the House on December 9, 2003, and was sworn in as Governor ofKentucky. A special election to fill the vacancy caused by Rep. Fletcher's resignation was held on February 17,2004,at which time the House was in recess until Feb. 24, 2004. Representative Albert Benjamin "Ben" Chandler wassworn in on Feb. 24, 2004. d In Nebraska, no special election was held to fill the seat vacated by Rep. Doug Bereuter, who resigned from theHouse on Aug. 31, 2004. The vacancy continued throughout the remainder of the 108th Congress. e In North Carolina, a special election to fill the vacancy in the 1st congressional district was held on July 20, 2004, tocoincide with the state's primary elections. f In South Dakota, a special election to fill the vacancy in the at-large district was held on June 1, 2004, to coincidewith the state's primary elections. g In Texas for the special election, which was held on May 3, 2003, the names of 17 candidates (regardless of party)appeared on a single ballot and the voters could choose any of these candidates: Richard Bartlett (R), John D. Bell(R), Jamie Berryhill (R) William M. (Bill) Christian (R), Mike Conaway (R), Thomas Flournoy (C), Kaye Gaddy(D),E.L. "Ed" Hicks (I), Carl H. Isett (R), David R. Langston (D), Donald May (R), Randy Neugebauer (R), JuliaPenelope (G), Richard (Chip) Peterson (L), Jerri Simmons-Asmussen (D), Vickie Sutton (R), and Stace Williams(R). A candidate who received a majority of the votes would have been elected to the office. Because no candidatereceived a majority of the votes, a special runoff election was held on June 3, 2003, and the names of the two topvotegetters were on that ballot. Key to Abbreviations for Party Affiliation C Constitution D Democratic G Green I Independent L Libertarian N Nonpartisan R Republican

There were seven vacancies in the 108th Congress, all in the House. One,in the 2nd District of Hawaii, was caused by the death of the incumbent, who had been re-electedposthumously to the108th Congress. Five other vacancies were caused by the resignation of the incumbent in the19th District of Texas, the6th District of Kentucky, the at-large district of South Dakota, the 1st District of NorthCarolina, and the 1st District ofNebraska. The seventh vacancy, in the 5th District of California, was caused by the death of theincumbent three daysbefore the 109th Congress, to which he had been reelected, convened. The first vacancy was filled byspecial electionon January 4, 2003, three days before the 108th Congress convened. For further information, see CRS Report RS20814(pdf), Vacancies and Special Elections: 107th Congress. The second vacancy wasfilled by special election onJune 3, 2003. The third vacancy was filled by special election on February 17, 2004. The fourth vacancy was filledby special election on June 1, 2004. The fifth vacancy was filled by special election on July 20, 2004. The vacancyin the 1st District of Nebraska continued throughout the remainder of the 108th Congress. A special primary election tofill the vacancy in the 5th District of California for the 109th Congress will be held onMarch 8, 2005. If no candidatereceives a majority of votes, a special runoff election will be held on May 3, 2005. This report records vacanciesinthe offices of U.S. Representative and Senator that occurred during the 108th Congress. It providesinformation on theformer incumbents, the process by which these vacancies are filled, and the names of Members who filled the vacantseats. This report will not be updated. For additional information, see CRS Report 97-1009(pdf), House andSenateVacancies: How Are They Filled?

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. Under current law there are two categories of EITC recipients: childless adults and families with children. Because the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefits. However, a low-income individual or family must file a tax return to receive the EITC. An EITC-eligible family may also receive a portion of the credit in the form of advanced payments. Eligibility for, and the size of, the EITC is based on income, age, and the presence of qualifying children. Several policy and legislative issues are associated with the EITC: compliance, the use of refund anticipation loans, marriage penalty, and poverty relief (family size). Compliance with the EITC provisions has been an issue for the program since 1990, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), as part of the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), released a study on 1985 tax year returns with the EITC. The study concluded that there was an over-claim rate of 39.1%. The over-claim rate represents the percentage of claimed EITC that was invalid. Some of these over-claims were recovered after the study by IRS collection efforts. Later studies by the IRS have resulted in lower over-claim rates. The 1997 and 1999 tax return studies estimated that the unrecovered over-claim rates were 23.8% to 25.6%, and 27.0% to 31.7%, respectively. These studies presented the rates as upper- and lower-bound estimates because a number of individuals contacted as part of the studies did not respond. In the 1999 study, 24.9% of over-claims (with the errors known) were due to the child claimed not meeting the EITC requirements for a qualified child. The most common qualifying child error was that the child did not meet the residency test (living with the tax filer for at least six months in the case of certain blood relatives, or one year for other individuals). The second most common error was the child not meeting the relationship (to the tax filer) test, particularly in the case of foster children where the child did not live with the tax filers for the full year or was not cared for as the tax filer's own child. The definition of a child prior to tax year 2005 for the EITC was different from the definition of (or requirements to claim) a child as a dependent for the personal exemption. As a result, a single parent living in a multi-generational household may have been able to claim the child for the EITC, while the grandparent or the child's nonresident parent may have been able to claim the child for the personal exemption and child credit and not the EITC. To reduce the complexity created by the different definitions of a child, proposals were made by both the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation to conform the definition of a child for purposes of the personal exemption, child credit, EITC, dependent care, and head of household filing status. The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-311 ) created a more uniform definition of a child for tax purposes, including the EITC. This new definition became effective with tax year 2005. In 2003, the IRS announced plans to conduct a pre-certification effort for the tax year 2003 returns, in which tax filers expecting to claim the EITC would need to pre-certify that any child claimed for the EITC met the residency requirement (had resided with the tax filer for at least half of the tax year). The pre-certification effort was converted to a study of approximately 25,000 returns expected to claim the EITC, and combined with two other compliance studies related to the EITC: (1) a study of filing status and (2) an automated underreporter (income) study. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ) required a report to Congress on the qualified child study (the pre-certification of a child for the EITC residency requirement). According to the IRS, the three studies uncovered and prevented payment of more than $275 million in erroneous claims for the EITC, with approximately $250 million of the $275 million from the automated underreporter study. In the automated underreporter study, the IRS manually reviewed 300,000 tax returns that claimed the EITC in tax year 2003, which also had indications of income misreporting for tax year 2002. Approximately 83% of the tax returns had a reduction or disallowance of the EITC as a result of the manual review. A large number of tax returns are completed by paid tax preparers (51.8% of individual tax returns received in the most recent (tax year 2011) current filing season, through June 8, 2012, were electronic returns prepared by tax practitioners). However, use of a paid tax preparer does not guarantee an accurate tax return as tax preparers vary in terms of training and experience. In an effort to improve the quality of services provided to taxpayers by paid tax preparers and to assist in compliance efforts, IRS began (on January 1, 2011) to require paid tax preparers to register and receive a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN). Paid tax preparers must renew their registration each year. Beginning in 2012, certain paid tax preparers will have to pass a competency test and meet continuing education requirements. EITC recipients may use paid preparers for a number of reasons, including language differences, literacy problems, IRS's close review of EITC returns, less effort (work) by the tax filer, the belief that use of a paid preparer prevents errors, and the belief that refunds are received faster. The structure of the EITC may, depending on the relative income levels of both parties, impose a "marriage penalty" on single low-income parents if they choose to marry. For example, in tax year 2012, two single parents, each with one child and earned income of $15,000 would each receive an EITC of $3,169 for a total of $6,338. If they marry, their combined income is $30,000, and with two children, the EITC is $3,614. The EITC marriage penalty for the couple is $2,724 (the difference between $6,388 and $3,614). The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ) provided marriage penalty relief for the EITC by raising the phase out income level of the EITC for married couples. The American Recovery and Relief Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) temporarily increased the marriage penalty relief for the EITC by raising the phase out income level by $5,000 for married couples in 2009 and indexing the $5,000 for tax year 2010. While the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ) made the EGTRRA provisions for marriage penalty relief permanent, the increase in marriage penalty relief to $5,000 (indexed for inflation) made by ARRA was extended for only five years (the expansion will sunset on December 31, 2017). The differential in the EITC based on the number of children, combined with the annual inflation adjustment, is designed to help families stay above the poverty threshold over time. However, because the EITC adjustment for family size is limited to two children, over time larger families may not be kept above the poverty threshold. As shown in Table 1 , for tax year 2011, married couples with children earning $25,000 a year have net income after taxes that is above the poverty threshold. However, the extent to which income exceeds the poverty threshold declines as the number of children increases. Certain low-income childless adults may not receive the EITC, even if working full time at the minimum wage. In tax year 2011, a childless adult working full-time (40 hours a week for 50 weeks) at the current minimum wage of $7.25 would earn $14,500. That adult would receive an EITC of $0. However, when combined with a tax liability before credits of $510, and payroll taxes of $819 (reflecting the temporary payroll tax holiday), the adult has an after tax income of $13,171. However, this is 114.7% of the 2011 poverty threshold for one person ($11,484). The ARRA ( P.L. 111-5 ) created a new credit rate for taxpayers with three or more eligible children, and this new credit rate was extended through tax year 2017 by ATRA ( P.L. 112-240 ). For tax years 2009 through 2017 only, taxpayers with three or more eligible children will use a credit rate of 45% to calculate their EITC. The EGTRRA ( P.L. 107-16 ) made several changes to the EITC that were scheduled to expire on December 31,2010. Changes to the EITC that were scheduled to expire include changing the definition of earned income for the EITC so that it does not include nontaxable employee compensation; eliminating the reduction in the EITC for the alternative minimum tax (AMT); and simplifying the calculation of the credit through use of AGI rather than modified AGI. ATRA ( P.L. 112-240 ) made these EGTRRA changes permanent. The ARRA created the category for families with three or more children, with a credit rate of 45%, for tax years 2009 and 2010 only. The ARRA also increased the phase-in amount for married couples filing joint tax returns so that it is $5,000 higher than for unmarried taxpayers in tax year 2009, and indexed for inflation beginning in tax year 2010. The ARRA changes were also scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ) extended the ARRA provisions for two years (through 2012). ATRA ( P.L. 112-240 ) extended the ARRA provisions for five years (through tax year 2017).

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC or EIC) began in 1975 as a temporary program to return a portion of the Social Security taxes paid by lower-income taxpayers, and was made permanent in 1978. In the 1990s, the program was transformed into a major component of federal efforts to reduce poverty, and is now the largest anti-poverty entitlement program. Tax year 2009 data show a total EITC amount of $59.7 billion for 27.2 million tax returns, yielding an average tax credit of $2,195. Most of the EITC (87.1%) was received as a refund (EITC exceeded tax liability) by low-income workers. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-116) made several changes to the credit, including simplifying the definition of earned income to reflect only compensation included in gross income; basing the phase-out of the credit on adjusted gross income (AGI) instead of expanded (or modified) gross income; and eliminating the reduction in the EITC for the alternative minimum tax (AMT). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) created the category for families with three or more children, with a credit rate of 45%, for tax years 2009 and 2010 only. The ARRA also increased the phase-in amount for married couples filing joint tax returns so that it is $5,000 higher than for unmarried taxpayers in tax year 2009, and $5,010 in tax year 2010. The changes to the credit made by EGTRRA and ARRA were set to expire on December 31, 2010. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the EGTRRA and ARRA provisions for two years (through 2012). The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) permanently extended the EGTRAA provisions, but extended the ARRA provisions for only five years. The expiration of the ARRA provisions for the EITC is one of the legislative issues for Congress. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants.

During its development, the U.S. Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and its predecessors have been proposed to fill a number of roles and operate in a variety of air defense environments. The effort to choose among those roles and determine final requirements for the system has led to controversy and delay in executing the program. Members of Congress have proposed actions to resolve the requirements issue and allow the program to move ahead. Prepared in response to a specific Congressional request, this report details the history of UCLASS requirements development through the program's evolution to its current stage. It is based on available open-domain information, which may not agree in all particulars with Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition documents not available in the public domain. Table 1 summarizes changes in UCLASS and predecessor program requirements over time. In 1999, the Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began research into an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV). At the same time, the Air Force and DARPA jointly undertook a separate UCAV project. The Navy's UCAV (referred to variously as N-UCAV and UCAV-N) was designed to fit a relatively small niche. The Navy planned to continue using manned aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) and perform electronic attack. N-UCAV was thus intended "for reconnaissance missions, penetrating protected airspace to identify targets for the attack waves" consisting of manned aircraft. Although the program focused mostly on system studies, Northrop Grumman independently built a single X-47A air vehicle, which was tested under the N-UCAV program. First flight took place in February 2003. On December 31, 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued a program decision memorandum adjusting future funding for both Navy and Air Force UCAV development and mandating the services merge their efforts into a joint program. The Defense Department recognized the potential for significant synergy by combining the programs, and in 2003 "directed that the programs be consolidated into a joint demonstration program supporting both Navy and Air Force needs." The resulting Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program was a DARPA-Air Force-Navy effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility, military utility, and operational value of a networked system of high-performance, weaponized unmanned air vehicles. Missions included SEAD, electronic attack, precision strike, penetrating surveillance/reconnaissance, and persistent global attack. "The operational focus of this system is on those combat situations and environments that involve deep, denied enemy territory and the requirement for a survivable, persisting combat presence ... operating and surviving in denied airspace." Three years later, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the J-UCAS to be terminated. Instead, the Air Force was to begin developing a new bomber, while the Navy was mandated to develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence. That follow-on effort became the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS). Given the baseline of being able to operate from aircraft carriers, N-UCAS's other requirements looked much like J-UCAS, with the desired ability to provide "persistent, penetrating surveillance, and penetrating strike capability in high threat areas" "or suppress enemy air defenses." In 2006, as part of the N-UCAS program, the Navy initiated the Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program, intended to demonstrate the technical feasibility of operating unmanned air combat systems from an aircraft carrier. In 2013, the Navy successfully launched and landed a UCAS-D on an aircraft carrier. However, as UCAS-D was a subset of N-UCAS, it did not have a separate set of requirements. In total, the Navy invested more than $1.4 billion in UCAS-D. In 2011, as UCAS-D efforts were ongoing, the Navy received approval from DOD to begin planning for the UCLASS acquisition program. N-UCAS had been a development program to determine how to make an unmanned vehicle take on many of the aspects of a manned fighter. UCLASS, the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program, was the Navy's way of turning what it had learned from N-UCAS into an operational platform "to address a capability gap in sea - based surveillance and to enhance the Navy's ability to operate in highly contested environments defended by measures such as integrated air defenses or anti - ship missiles." On June 9, 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) issued JROCM 087-11, a memorandum approving the UCLASS Initial Capabilities Document. That document stated UCLASS was to be "a persistent, survivable carrier-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and precision strike asset." In preparing for the FY2014 budget submission, the JROC revisited the UCLASS requirement. On December 19, 2012, the JROC published memoranda 086-12 and 196-12, which significantly altered "the requirements for UCLASS, heavily favoring permissive airspace intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities." The change in requirements appeared to be budget-driven. "The reduction in strike capability of the Navy's next generation carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle was born of fiscal realities, said Dyke Weatherington, the Pentagon's director of unmanned warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)." The Navy stated: In support of affordability and adaptability directives, JROCMs 086-12 and 196-12 redefined the scope of JROCM 087-11 and affirmed the urgency for a platform that supports missions ranging from permissive counter-terrorism operations, to missions in low-end contested environments, to providing enabling capabilities for high-end denied operations, as well as supporting organic Naval missions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense stated: In a December 2012 memorandum, the JROC emphasized affordability as the number one priority for the program. The CDD (Capability Development Document) established an affordability KPP (Key Performance Parameter) in which the recurring fly-away cost of the air vehicles to conduct one 600 nautical mile orbit shall not exceed $150 million. Available funding to complete system development is also limited, pressuring industry to provide mature systems and emphasize cost during development. On April 17, 2014, the Navy issued a draft request for proposals (RFP) for the UCLASS system. The RFP reportedly held to the requirements that, in the Government Accountability Office (GAO)'s words, "emphasized affordability, timely fielding, and endurance, while deemphasizing the need to operate in highly contested environments." The UCLASS draft RFP is classified. However, "according to (Chief of Naval Research RADM Mathias) Winter, the broad overarching goals of the UCLASS program are to provide two intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance orbits at 'tactically significant ranges' 24 hours a day, seven days a week over uncontested airspace." The UCLASS would also have a light strike capability to eliminate targets of opportunity. A press report stated: "The plan here is to provide an early operational capability that will be verified and validated for a light strike permissive environment," (RADM Mathias) Winter said. "What we will ensure is that the design of the system does not preclude what we call capability growth to be able to operate in contested environments." UCLASS is still expected to grow into the missions required before the 2012 JROC memo. According to the Secretary of the Navy, "(t)he end state is an autonomous aircraft capable of precision strike in a contested environment, and it is expected to grow and expand its missions so that it is capable of extended range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, tanking, and maritime domain awareness." The timeline for procurement of UCLASS is unclear, and the GAO has noted that in part due to changes in requirements, UCLASS has experienced ongoing delays: Since our last review in September 2013, the system's intended mission and required capabilities have come into question, delaying the Navy's UCLASS schedule. DOD has decided to conduct a review of its airborne surveillance systems and the future of the carrier air wing, and has as a result adjusted the program's schedule. The Navy's fiscal year 2016 budget documents reflect these changes, with award of the air system contract now expected to occur in fiscal year 2017, a delay of around 3 years. In addition the Navy now expects to achieve early operational capability—a UCLASS system on at least one aircraft carrier—no earlier than fiscal year 2022, a delay of around 2 years... The schedule in the Navy's budget documents show that a Milestone A review—the decision to begin technology maturation and risk reduction efforts—is expected to occur in fiscal year 2017, a delay of around 3 years since our last review. As the UCLASS program continues to stretch out across multiple budget years, possibly including further JROC reviews, Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and other changes in DOD priorities, it is possible that requirements will evolve further.

During its development, the U.S. Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and its predecessors have been proposed to fill a number of roles and operate in a variety of air defense environments. Over time, those requirements have evolved to encompass a less demanding set of capabilities than first envisioned. This report details the history of UCLASS requirements development through the program's evolution to its current stage.

This report provides a brief overview of federal statutes and where to find them, in print format and on the Internet. When Congress passes a law, it may amend or repeal earlier enactments or it may create new law. Newly enacted laws are published chronologically, first as separate statutes in "slip law" form and later cumulatively in the bound volumes of the Statutes at Large . Additionally, most statutes are also incorporated into the United States Code ( U.S.C. ). The U.S.C. and its commercial counterparts, United States Code Service ( U.S.C.S.) and United States Code Annotated ( U.S.C.A.) , take the federal statutes that are of a general and permanent nature and arrange them by subject into 51 separate titles. As the statutes that underlie the Code are revised, superseded, or repealed, the provisions of the Code are updated to reflect these changes. When a piece of legislation is enacted under the procedures set forth in Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution, it is characterized as a "public law" or a "private law." Each new statute is assigned a number according to its order of enactment within a particular Congress (e.g., the 10 th public law enacted in the 112 th Congress was numbered as P.L. 112-10; the 10 th private law was numbered Priv. L. 112-10). Private laws are enacted for the benefit of a named individual or entity (e.g., due to exceptional individual circumstances, Congress enacts a law providing a government reimbursement to a named person who would not otherwise be eligible under general law). In contrast, public laws are of general applicability and permanent and continuing in nature. Public laws form the basis of the Code . The first official publication of the law is called the slip law. The Government Printing Office's (GPO's) Federal Digital System (FDsys) provides free online access to official federal government publications. Individual slip laws in printed pamphlet form can be obtained from the GPO. Federal Depository Libraries, located throughout the United States, also provide free public access to federal publications and other information. A list of Federal Depository Libraries and their locations is accessible on the Internet at http://catalog.gpo.gov/fdlpdir/FDLPdir.jsp . Some private and public libraries compile the laws in looseleaf binders or in microfiche collections. The United States Code Congressional and Administrative News ( U.S.C.C.A.N. ) compiles and publishes public laws chronologically in their slip law version. U.S.C.C.A.N. 's annual bound volumes and monthly print supplements include the texts of new enactments and selected Senate, House, and/or conference reports. The U.S.C.S. and the U.S.C.A. publish new public laws chronologically as supplements. Slip laws (both public laws and private laws) are accumulated, corrected, and published at the end of each session of Congress in a series of bound volumes entitled Statutes at Large . The laws are cited by volume and page number (e.g., 96 Stat. 1259 refers to page 1259 of volume 96 of the Statutes at Large ). Researchers are most likely to resort to this publication when they are interested in the original language of a statute or in statutes that are not codified in the Code , such as appropriations or private laws. Most statutes do not initiate new programs. Rather, most statutes revise, repeal, or add to existing statutes. Consider the following sequence of enactments. In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (P.L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163). This law generally consolidated and amended federal statutory law on the admission and stay of aliens in the United States and how they may become citizens. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was codified at Title 8 of the U.S.C. §§1 et seq. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-603 , 100 Stat. 3359). Section 101 of this act amended Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (codified at 8 U.S.C §1324) by adding Section 274a (codified at 8 USC §1324a). This new section (Section 274a) made it unlawful for a person to hire for employment in the United States an illegal alien. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-208 , Division C, 110 Stat. 3009). Section 412 of the 1996 act amended the employer sanctions process by requiring an employer to verify that a new employee is not an illegal alien. As with the 1986 act, the 1996 act expressly amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Section 274A in this case) and Section 1324a in Title 8 of the U.S.C. (8 U.S.C. §1324a). As the above sequence illustrates, the canvas upon which Congress works is often an updated, stand-alone version of an earlier public law (e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended), and not the U.S. Code . On the "Titles of United States Code " page of the Code an asterisk appears next to some of the titles. The asterisks refer to a note that states: "This title has been enacted as positive law." If the title is asterisked, the Code provides the authoritative version of the public law, as amended. For example, there is no asterisk beside Title 42 of the U.S.C . Thus, the provisions codified in Title 42 are not authoritative. Should there be a discrepancy, a court will accept the language in the Statutes at Large as the authoritative source and not the Code . It should be noted that there is no substantive difference between the language of the public law as published in the Statutes at Large and that of the Code . It is often difficult to find current, updated versions of frequently amended public laws. Many congressional committees periodically issue committee prints containing the major public laws within their respective jurisdictions. Alternatively, the various commercial publishers, discussed herein, print updated versions of major public laws. In addition, the amended versions of some major public laws can be found on the Internet. The United States Code (U.S.C.) is the official government codification of federal legislation. This resource has been printed by the GPO every six years since 1926 and supplemented by annual cumulative bound volumes. The latest edition is dated 2006. The Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives and FDsys provide authoritative and current online access to the U.S.C . In the U.S.C . , statutes are grouped by subject into 51 titles. Each title is further organized into chapters and sections. A listing of the titles is provided in each volume. Unlike the statutes, the Code is cited by title and section number (e.g., 28 U.S.C. §534 refers to Section 534 of Title 28). Notes at the end of each section provide additional information, including statutory origin of the Code provision (both by public law number and Statutes at Large citation), the effective date(s), a brief citation and discussion of any amendments, and cross references to related provisions. The United States Code Annotated ( U.S.C.A .) published by Thomson/West and the United States Code Service ( U.S.C.S. ) published by LexisNexis are unofficial, privately published editions of the Code . These publications often include the text of the Code , annotations to judicial decisions interpreting the sections, cross references to the Code of Federal Regulations ( C.F.R. ) provisions, and historical notes. Both also provide references to selected secondary sources. For example, the U.S.C.S . includes selected law review articles. Bound volumes of the U.S.C.A. and the U.S.C.S. are updated by annual inserts ("pocket parts") or supplements. These updates include newly codified laws and annotations. Both U.S.C.A. and U.S.C.S. issue pamphlets containing copies of recently enacted public laws arranged in chronological order. Since there is a time lag in publishing the official U.S.C. , codified versions of new enactments usually appear first in the U.S.C.A. and U.S.C.S. supplements. Each edition of the Code has a comprehensive index that is organized by subject. The index is updated in each annual supplement to the Code . Each edition of the Code also has a table that can be used to find an act and where it was codified in the Code . The public laws are arranged alphabetically and can be searched under their commonly known names. This reference also provides the public law number and the citations to the Statutes at Large , U.S.C ., and their amendments. For example, searching for the "Stone Act" in the table shows that it has been codified at 30 U.S.C. §161. The Statutes at Large table is one of the most useful research tools because it shows the relationship between public laws, the Statutes at Large , and the U.S.C . A researcher who has either a public law number or a Statutes at Large citation can use this table to ascertain where that law is codified and its present status. The table is particularly useful when searching in one section of a law that contains many subsections because it can be used to find where individual sections and subsections of a public law have been codified. For example, the table indicates that P.L. 99-661 , Section 1403 is codified in the U.S.C. at 20 U.S.C. §4702. U.S.C.A. and the U.S.C.S. also have their own versions of the research tools discussed above. Legal resources, including federal statutes, are widely available to both scholars and the general public through the Internet. Several considerations should be taken into account when using Internet materials. Materials on Internet sites may not be up-to-date, and it may be difficult to discern how current the material is or whether it has been revised. It may be difficult to find current federal statutes, especially in the case of "popular name" statutes that are amended frequently. On their websites, federal agencies do not always include the current versions of the statutes they administer, however, they may provide useful summaries and discussions of the statutes. Websites are constantly changing. The inclusion and location of information may differ from time to time. The address or URL of a website may also change. In addition, each website has its own search capabilities and format. With the foregoing caveats in mind, the following are public resources for the selected statutory materials described in this report. Public Laws Library of Congress - American Memory http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsllink.html This page provides access to the Statutes a t Large from the 1 st Congress (1789 - 1790) to the 43 rd Congress (1873 - 1874). An index is also available for the first eight volumes of the Statutes a t Large . Library of Congress: THOMAS http://thomas.loc.gov/ This page provides access to the full-text of public laws from the 101 st Congress (1989 – 1990) to present. GPO's Federal Digital System http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/advanced/advsearchpage.action This page provides access to the Statutes at Large and public and private laws from the 104 th Congress (1995 - 1996) to the present. The "Advanced Search" capability enables more than one collection to be searched at a time by adding "more search criteria." United States Code Office of the Law Revision Counsel U.S.C. http://uscode.house.gov/search/criteria.shtml This page provides access to the 2006 edition and its supplements. The page also links to the previous editions and supplements. GPO's Federal Digital System http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/advanced/advsearchpage.action This page provides access to the 1994 through 2006 editions and their supplements. The "Advanced Search" capability enables more than one collection to be searched at a time by adding "more search criteria." Popular Name Index Office of the Law Revision Counsel http://uscode.house.gov/popularnames/popularnames.htm#letterE This page provides a list of the popular and statutory names of Acts in alphabetical order. Other Resources U.S. Code Classification Tables http://uscode.house.gov/classification/tables.shtml This page shows where recently enacted laws will appear in the United States Code and which sections of the Code have been amended by those laws. The tables only include those provisions of law that have been classified to the Code .

This report provides a brief overview of federal statutes and where to find them, both in print and on the Internet. When Congress passes a law, it may amend or repeal earlier enactments or it may create new law. Newly enacted laws are published chronologically, first as separate statutes in "slip law" form and later cumulatively in a series of volumes known as the Statutes at Large. Statutes are numbered by order of enactment either as public laws or, far less frequently, private laws, depending on their scope. Most statutes are incorporated into the United States Code. The United States Code and its commercial counterparts arrange federal statutes, that are of a general and permanent nature, by subject into titles. As the statutes that underlie the Code are revised, superseded, or repealed, the provisions of the Code are updated to reflect these changes. Statutes and the United States Code can be found on the Internet. In addition, the slip law versions of public laws are available in official print form from the Government Printing Office. Federal Depository Libraries (e.g., university and state libraries) provide slip laws in print and/or microfiche format. The Statutes at Large series often is available at large libraries. The United States Code and its commercial counterparts are usually available at local libraries. Many statutes (for example, the Social Security Act and the Clean Air Act) are published and updated both in the public law, as amended, version and in the United States Code. For some titles the public law, as amended, is the authoritative version of the statute and not the Code. If the title is asterisked, the Code provides the authoritative version of the public law, as amended. After providing an overview on the basics of federal statutes, this report gives guidance on where federal statutes, in their various forms, may be located on the Internet. This report will be updated periodically.

On July 8, 2014, the Administration requested $4,346 million in FY2014 supplemental appropriations to address two issues: the federal costs of managing the surge of both unaccompanied alien children (UAC) and escorted alien children illegally crossing the southwest border, and a projected shortfall in federal funding to pay the costs of wildfires. The Senate Appropriations Committee conducted a hearing July 10, 2014, focusing on the border security and immigration aspects of the Administration's request. In addition, the following hearings on the issues involved in the supplemental request were held between the submission of the request and the introduction of the respective bills: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, July 9 and 16, 2014, "Challenges at the Border: Examining the Causes, Consequences, and Responses to the Rise in Apprehensions at the Southern Border," and "Challenges at the Border: Examining and Addressing the Root Causes Behind the Rise in Apprehensions at the Southern Border"; Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July 15, 2014, "Wildfire Preparedness and Forest Service 2015 Fiscal Year Budget"; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 17, 2014, "Dangerous Passage: Central America in Crisis And the Exodus of Unaccompanied Minors." On July 23, 2014, the Senate introduced S. 2648 , which included $3,571 million in supplemental appropriations for those purposes as well as providing funding for defense assistance to Israel. The legislation would designate the appropriations as an emergency requirement, meaning the funding would not count against the discretionary budget caps for FY2014. On July 29, 2014, the House introduced H.R. 5230 , which included $659 million in supplemental appropriations to address the situation at the southwest border. The original legislation included $659 million in offsets. After consideration under the initial rule was postponed, a second rule was passed that increased the amount appropriated by $35 million, the offsets by $35 million, and altered the policy provisions included in the bill. This amended bill passed the House by a vote of 223-189 on August 1, 2014. Table 1 below outlines the Administration's request for supplemental funding for FY2014, and the proposed new budget authority provided in response to those requests. All figures are in millions of dollars of budget authority, and like all numbers in this report, are rounded to the nearest million. The figures in the table below are presented thematically between the issue areas: (1) the southwest border crisis, (2) wildfires, and (3) aid to Israel. Headers in bold italics note the theme. Under each theme, appropriations are listed by department and subtotaled. The left column notes the department or agency and the funded activity by appropriation. The Administration's request is in the next column, in millions of dollars of budget authority, followed by the appropriations that would be provided under the Senate bill and the House bill. The table only reflects new budget authority that would be provided in the legislation: transfers, rescissions, and redirection of appropriated funds are not included in the table. A brief narrative description of the request and each bill follows, which explores those issues, as well as the potential budgetary impact of each proposal. The Administration requested $4,346 million in supplemental appropriations to address two issues: the surge in unaccompanied and escorted children illegally crossing the southwest border, and a shortfall in federal funding to pay the costs of wildland fires. Of the request, $3,731 million was for the southwest border crisis to be distributed through appropriations that would fall under four appropriations subcommittees: Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (2% of the border funding); Homeland Security (42%); Labor, Health, and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (49%); and State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (8%). The request included a general provision allowing up to $250 million of this amount to be transferred among applicable appropriations, which would give the Administration additional flexibility in how these funds may be used. The Administration also requested expanded transfer authority specifically for supplemental funds appropriated to DHS. The request included $615 million to cover wildland fire suppression and emergency rehabilitation activities. Similar to the Administration's request, the bill would also create a new adjustment to statutory spending limits to accommodate a portion of spending subsequently provided for "wildfire suppression operations," formulated with the intent of minimizing any additional spending beyond what is allowed under current law by tying it to the existing disaster relief cap adjustment. The Administration requested the supplemental funding be designated as an emergency under the budget laws. Funding with the designation would not count against the discretionary spending caps for FY2014, and an offset would not be needed to avoid violating those caps. S. 2648 has four titles, one each for border issues, wildfire, and aid to Israel, as well as a title of general provisions that apply broadly across the bill. It would provide $1 billion less than the Administration requested for managing the situation on the southwest border, and $225 million in funding for military assistance to Israel that the Administration had not formally requested. The bill would provide the requested wildfire funding, and includes an amendment sought by the Administration to make it easier to fund federal costs for fighting wildland fires. The Senate bill would provide almost double the supplemental funding requested for DOJ to speed the adjudications of those taken into custody along the border, appropriating $125 million. It would provide 28% less than requested for DHS—just over $1.1 billion—and would provide roughly two-thirds of the requested level of funding for HHS—$1.2 billion. The Senate bill would appropriate $300 million for the State Department and foreign operations work to address the flow of migrants, the same overall amount as requested by the Administration, but would reprioritize some of the funding. Title II of the bill would provide the requested $615 million for wildland fire costs, and the amendment sought by the Administration to create a new adjustment to discretionary spending limits for wildfire suppression operations and emergency restoration. Title III of S. 2648 would provide $225 million, through the Department of Defense, to the Government of Israel for the procurement of the Iron Dome defense system to counter short-range rocket threats. All funding in the bill would be designated as emergency funding, as the Administration requested. The Senate bill's southwest border title includes a number of provisions that would require a total of $3 million of the funding be transferred to various inspectors general to oversee the use of funds that would be provided in the bill. Under the appropriation for the Economic Support Fund, funds are also designated to be transferred to the Inter-American Foundation for youth training programs ($5 million) and DOJ efforts "to build investigative and prosecutorial capacity" in source countries ($10 million).   There are three provisions in the same title that would allow for transfer and reprogramming of funds. Funding for DHS in S. 2648 could be transferred between appropriations accounts or reprogrammed within them without limitation, and up to $250 million could be transferred between appropriations in other parts of the southwest border title with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Use of either authority would require advance notification to the appropriations committees—a common practice. The bill would also allow HHS to transfer funds for medical response expenses to the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund. The House bill has two divisions: the first is a five-title appropriations act; the second has three titles that would modify immigration laws, provide a framework for National Guard deployment to the southwest border, and provide exemptions from certain environmental laws for border security activities. The third title of the second division also includes a sense of Congress statement regarding the housing of undocumented minors on military installations. The analysis of this report only focuses on the first division of the House bill. Unlike the Senate bill, House-passed H.R. 5230 would provide funding only for the southwest border crisis—no supplemental funding is included for wildland fire management or aid to Israel. Its $694 million in new budget authority is $3.1 billion less than the request for the southwest border crisis, and over $2 billion less than the amount the Senate bill would provide for those activities. House-passed H.R. 5230 would provide $22 million for DOJ to speed the adjudications of those taken into custody along the border—$41 million less than the request. The House bill would provide $405 million (74% less than requested) for DHS, and $197 million (89% less) for HHS. The House bill would not provide any new budget authority for the State Department and foreign operations work to address the flow of migrants, but would allow $40 million of previously appropriated aid for Central America to be made available for "repatriation and reintegration activities." No transfers or additional transfer or reprogramming authority would be provided in the House bill. Unlike the Senate bill, which includes an emergency designation for the funding it would provide, the House bill is fully offset. H.R. 5230 as passed by the House would provide $694 million in new budget authority, which would be offset by the following permanent rescissions of $694 million: $405 million from the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Disaster Relief Fund; $70 million from Department of Defense-wide operations and maintenance; $22 million from the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund; and $197 million from international bilateral economic assistance through the Economic Support Fund.

On July 8, 2014, the Administration requested $4,346 million in FY2014 supplemental appropriations to address two issues: the surge in both unaccompanied and escorted children illegally crossing the southwest border, and a shortfall in federal funding to pay the costs of wildfires. The appropriations were requested to be designated as emergency funding, meaning the requested funds would not count against the discretionary budget caps for FY2014. On July 23, 2014, the Senate introduced S. 2648, which includes $3,571 million in supplemental appropriations for the Administration's requested purposes as well as for defense assistance to Israel. S. 2648 would designate the appropriations as an emergency, meaning they would not count against the discretionary budget caps for FY2014. On July 29, 2014, the House introduced H.R. 5230, which included $659 million in supplemental appropriations to address the situation at the southwest border. The legislation also included $659 million in rescissions that would offset the budgetary impact of the bill. An amended version of H.R. 5230, which includes an additional $35 million to defray the cost to states of National Guard deployments to the southern border, $35 million more in offsets, and a different set of policy provisions, passed the House 223-189 on August 1, 2014. The primary focus of this report is the Administration's request for supplemental appropriations, and the appropriations legislation considered in response to that request. Other policy-related provisions of the legislation will be analyzed in other CRS materials. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Following the 2000 census, Texas was apportioned two additional congressional seats. Subsequently, the state legislature was unable to enact a redistricting map, resulting in litigation and, ultimately, imposition of a court-ordered congressional redistricting plan. The 2002 election was held under the court-ordered plan, resulting in a Democratic majority in the Texas congressional delegation. In October 2003, after the Republican party gained control of the Texas State House of Representatives, and thus, both houses of the legislature, it enacted a new congressional redistricting map with the goal "to increase [Republican] representation in the congressional delegation." The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and others challenged the new plan in court, alleging various statutory and constitutional violations. The district court entered judgment against LULAC on all claims, and they appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the Court had just issued its decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer , it vacated the district court decision and remanded in light of its holding in Vieth. On remand, the district court again ruled against LULAC, finding that the scope of its consideration was limited to questions of political gerrymandering. In their appeal to the Supreme Court, appellants argued that the new redistricting plan should be invalidated as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry was a consolidation of four appeals before the U.S. Supreme Court. In this ruling, the Supreme Court's nine Justices filed six different opinions, each with subparts. Many issues were raised by the appellants in this case, but the decision primarily addressed two topics: (1) the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering and (2) whether the Texas redistricting plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. While not ruling out the possibility of a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering being within the scope of judicial review, the Court in LULAC v. Perry was unable to find a sufficient standard for making such a determination. Appellants in LULAC challenged the 2003 mid-decennial Texas redistricting plan on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional political gerrymander motivated by partisan objectives, in violation of equal protection and First Amendment guarantees under the Constitution. They maintained that the plan served no legitimate public purpose and burdened one group because of its political opinions and affiliation. Appellants urged the Court to adopt a rule or presumption of invalidity when a mid-decade redistricting plan is enacted solely for partisan purposes, thereby alleviating the need for courts to inquire about (or for parties to prove) the discriminatory effects of partisan gerrymandering. In evaluating appellants' arguments, the Court first noted that there were indications that "partisan motives did not dictate the plan in its entirety." The Court further determined that ascertaining the legality of an act arising from "mixed motives" can be complicated, and indeed, "hazardous," particularly when the actor is a legislature and the act is a series of choices. Hence, the Court expressed skepticism of a claim seeking to invalidate a statute based on a legislature's unlawful motive without reference to its content. Notwithstanding its skepticism, the Court also found that in order for a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering to prevail, it must show a burden on complainants' representational rights, "as measured by a reliable standard." Indeed, the Court noted, for this exact reason, a majority of the Vieth Court had rejected a test "markedly similar" to the one proposed by the appellants. In regard to appellants' reliance on the fact that the redistricting plan was enacted mid-decade, the Court announced that the Constitution and the Court's case law "indicate that there is nothing inherently suspect about a legislature's decision to replace, mid-decade, a court-ordered plan with one of its own." Even if there were, the Court commented, "the fact of mid-decade redistricting alone is no sure indication of unlawful political gerrymanders." The Court also observed that the "sole-intent standard" is no more compelling when bolstered by the fact that the redistricting was enacted mid-decade. Appellants proffered a second political gerrymandering theory: that mid-decade redistricting for exclusively partisan purposes violates the Constitution's one-person, one-vote requirement. Citing landmark Supreme Court holdings in Karcher v. Daggett and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler , they observed that population variances among congressional districts are acceptable only if they are "unavoidable," despite good faith efforts to attain complete equality "or for which justification is shown." From that premise, appellants maintained that due to population shifts in Texas since the 2000 census, the 2003 redistricting, which still relied on the 2000 census numbers, created unlawful population variances among the districts. To distinguish the Texas 2003 redistricting plan's reliance on three-year-old census numbers from other, more typical redistricting plans' reliance on three-year-old (or older) census numbers, appellants again highlighted the "voluntary, mid-decade" nature of the redistricting and its "partisan motivation." The Court found that the appellants' theory merely restated their primary argument that it was impermissible for the Texas legislature to redraw the districting map, mid-decade, for solely partisan purposes. Hence, for the same reasons it had originally rejected this argument, the Court once again found it unpersuasive. In its concluding statement, the Court announced: In sum, we disagree with appellants' view that a legislature's decision to override a valid, court-drawn plan mid-decade is sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders. We conclude that appellants have established no legally impermissible use of political classifications. For this reason, they state no claim on which relief may be granted for their statewide challenge. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy announced that a majority of the Justices were unable to find a "reliable measure" of what constitutes unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering and therefore determined that the claims presented were not justiciable. Notably, however, a majority of the Court stopped short of concluding that standards a court could use to evaluate such claims do not exist, which left existing Court precedent basically unchanged. In the 2004 Supreme Court case of V ieth v. Jubelirer, a plurality of four justices argued that claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering are not justiciable while another plurality of four justices maintained that such claims are justiciable, but were unable to agree upon a standard that courts could use in order to make such determinations. The deciding vote in Vieth , Justice Kennedy, determined that the claims presented were not justiciable, but left open the possibility that such standards might exist. Similar to its decision in Vieth , the Court in LULAC was also divided into three camps on the issue of whether partisan gerrymandering claims are beyond the scope of judicial review. In LULAC , the same four justices from Vieth argued that claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering are justiciable, while not agreeing upon a standard for adjudicating such claims. Of the four justices in Vieth who believed that such claims are not justiciable, the two who remain on the Court maintained that same position in LULAC . Two justices who joined the Court since its ruling in Vieth , Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, generally agreed with Justice Kennedy's position, leaving open the possibility that the Court might discern a standard for adjudicating unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering claims in a future case. As a result, a majority of the Court in LULAC was unable to find a "reliable measure" of what constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. Therefore, the Court determined that the claims presented in this case were not justiciable, but declined to conclude that standards a court could use to evaluate such claims do not exist. In the aftermath of LULAC , it appears theoretically possible for a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering to prevail. However, the critical standard that a court could use to ascertain such a determination and grant relief remains unresolved. Appellants in LULAC argued that changes to Texas's congressional District 23 diluted the voting rights of Latinos who remained in the district after the 2003 redistricting, causing the Latino share of the citizen voting-age population to drop from 57.5% to 46%, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the district court's finding that Latino voting strength was unquestionably weakened, the question for the Court was whether it constituted vote dilution. Engaging in a threshold analysis for establishing a Section 2 violation in accordance with its landmark decision, Thornburg v. Gingle s, the Court determined that appellants satisfied all three Gingles requirements; that is, District 23 possessed the requisite cohesion among the Latino minority group, bloc voting among the majority population, and a Latino citizenry that was "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Nevertheless, the appellee argued that it met its Section 2 obligations by creating a new District 25 as an "offsetting opportunity" district. Noting that it has rejected the premise that a state can compensate for the "less-than-equal" opportunity of some individuals by providing greater opportunity to others, the Court rejected the appellee's argument. Next, as directed by the text of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court turned to consider the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether members of the Latino population have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. The Court determined that changes to District 23 stymied the progress of a racial group that had historically been subject to substantial voting-related discrimination and was increasingly politically active and cohesive. In effect, the Court noted, "the State took away the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it." The Court further announced that the state "chose to break apart a Latino opportunity district to protect the incumbent congressman from the growing dissatisfaction of the cohesive and politically active Latino community in the district." Then, purporting to compensate for the injury, the state created an entirely new district, combining two groups of Latinos, geographically far apart and representing differing communities of interest. Even assuming that the redrawing of District 23 was close to proportional representation, the Court held that "its troubling blend of politics and race—and the resulting vote dilution of a group that was beginning to achieve §2's goal of overcoming prior electoral discrimination—cannot be sustained." Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it diluted the voting power of Latinos. This portion of the opinion was written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer. After rejecting the statewide challenge to Texas's redistricting as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, and holding that congressional District 23 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court in LULAC remanded the case for further proceedings. In accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling, on June 29, 2006, a federal district court in Texas ordered parties in the case to submit remedial proposals, including supporting maps and briefs. The court heard oral argument on August 3 and adopted a new plan on August 4 redrawing Texas congressional districts 15, 21, 23, 25, and 28. The court ordered that special elections in the redrawn districts for the 110 th Congress be held in conjunction with the November 7, 2006, general election. As a result of the Court's ruling, commentators have observed other states may dispense with the tradition of redrawing congressional districts only once per decade following the decennial census, and instead, redistrict following a change in political control of the state government. It has also been noted, however, that there does not appear to be any urgency on the part of state legislatures to do so. In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 3025 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Representative Tanner) and S. 1332 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Senator Johnson) are pending. These bills would, among other things, prohibit states from carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after a decennial census and apportionment, unless a court required the state to conduct subsequent redistricting to comply with the Constitution or to enforce the Voting Rights Act; require states to conduct redistricting through the use of independent commissions; and impose standards of compactness, contiguity, and geographical continuity.

In a splintered, complex decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry largely upheld a Texas congressional redistricting plan that was drawn mid-decade against claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The Court invalidated one Texas congressional district, District 23, finding that it diluted the voting power of Latinos in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. While not ruling out the possibility of a claim of partisan gerrymandering being within the scope of judicial review, a majority of the Court in this case was unable to find a "reliable" standard for making such a determination. In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 3025 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Representative Tanner) and S. 1332 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Senator Johnson) are pending. These bills would, among other things, prohibit states from carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after a decennial census and apportionment, unless a court required the state to conduct subsequent redistricting to comply with the Constitution or to enforce the Voting Rights Act; require states to conduct redistricting through the use of independent commissions; and impose standards of compactness, contiguity, and geographical continuity.

T he partnership parks of the National Park System are those units that the National Park Service (NPS) owns and/or manages along with one or more partners in the federal, tribal, state, local, or private sectors. The partnership parks differ from traditional units of the National Park System, in which NPS is the sole land manager. Historically, partnership parks constituted a relatively small part of the National Park System. In the past several decades, however, Congress has created a growing number of partnership parks among the system's 410 units. Of the units added to the National Park System in the Administrations of Presidents William Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, nearly half might be considered partnership parks. This report responds to ongoing congressional interest in partnership parks, as Congress seeks to leverage limited financial resources for park management, to respond to concerns about federal land acquisition, and to create park units in "lived-in" landscapes, where natural and historical attractions are mixed with homes and businesses. It discusses several types of partnership parks: parks with a federal partner; parks with a tribal partner; parks with a state or local government partner; parks with a private partner; and parks with a mix of landowners and management partners. The partnership parks vary in their physical characteristics and legislative histories, but in each, NPS collaborates with outside entities to manage the land, significant portions of which may be owned by the partnering entity. Congress typically establishes the broad terms of partnerships in the enabling legislation for the unit. Details of the partnership arrangement may be worked out in cooperative agreements, memoranda of understanding, the park's general management plan, or combinations of these and other tools. Partnership arrangements are specific to each unit and vary widely; there is no overall model that partnership parks must follow. For example, NPS may be the sole or primary manager of land that is owned by another party, such as a conservancy or land trust (as in Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve in Kansas). NPS and a state or local government partner may manage side by side, with each unit of government administering land it owns within the park (as in Redwood National Park in California). In a park unit spread out over an urban or suburban area, NPS may manage visitor centers and provide overall supervision, while a variety of partners own and manage specific sites in the park (as in New Bedford Whaling National Park in Massachusetts). At other units, NPS may serve in a supervisory role only, with partners providing all of the day-to-day management, even on federally owned land (as in First Ladies National Historic Site in Ohio). Partnership parks may be loosely grouped by the type of management partner, whether federal, tribal, state or local, private, or a mix of several types. Table 1 gives examples of partnership parks of each type across the National Park System. Parks with Federal Partners. Federal park partnerships occur when a park unit contains resources managed by a federal agency other than NPS. For example, NPS co-manages some national recreation areas built around reservoirs with the Bureau of Reclamation, which administers the reservoirs' water resources. Similarly, NPS works with the Fish and Wildlife Service to manage several national seashores containing wildlife refuges. Other federal park partners include the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, the Navy, and the Coast Guard, among others. Many of the Park Service's federal management partnerships are of long standing, dating back 40 years or more. Parks with Tribal Partners. Many national park units have a connection to Native American history and culture. In some of them, Indian tribes play a major role in ownership and/or management of the park. Along with federal partnerships, tribal partnerships are among the longest-standing types of shared land stewardship in the National Park System. Parks with State and Local Government Partners. When NPS manages a national park unit in cooperation with state or local government, some significant portion of the land is generally still owned by the state or locality. In establishing such management partnerships, Congress may aim to leverage both federal and state/local financial resources. For example, cost savings could be realized through smaller outlays for land acquisition (as each level of government owns only a portion of the unit) or through management efficiencies. By ensuring that some park land remains under state or local control, Congress may also address concerns about extending the federal estate. Parks with Private Partners. The number of parks with private ownership and/or management partners has grown in recent decades. Congress may achieve cost savings through these public-private partnerships—as, for example, when historic preservation groups provide the primary on-site staff at a historic site, allowing the Park Service to save on personnel costs. Congress may also establish private partnerships where there is controversy over federal land control. Parks with a Mix of Partners. These parks are often in urban or suburban population centers, where the park coexists with many other public and private land uses. In such areas, the Park Service has stated, "managing through agreements and partnerships is a matter of both practical necessity and philosophy." Congress may specify in these parks' establishing legislation that much of the land is to remain in nonfederal ownership. The legislation may establish a cooperative management body made up of many types of landowners and administrators. With their diverse ownership and management arrangements, some of these park s have served as sites for innovative management techniques within the Park Service. When considering NPS management partnerships, Congress faces a number of issues. Some relate to the treatment of individual partnership sites: Is administration within or outside the National Park System most appropriate? How should financial responsibilities be shared between NPS and its partners? What issues must be resolved with respect to federal versus nonfederal land ownership? What administrative benefits and challenges might the partnership bring? More broadly, do partnership parks further the mission of the National Park Service, or does extending the agency's reach through partnerships weaken its focus on its core priorities? In considering proposals to establish partnership areas, a basic question for Congress is whether the area should become a unit of the National Park System or whether some other arrangement (perhaps with less federal involvement) is more appropriate. On the one hand, inclusion in the park system might better ensure ongoing conservation and stewardship of the land. NPS assumes a basic financial responsibility for park system units, which may be desirable to previous land managers (although in some cases partnership terms may dictate ongoing financial participation by existing land managers). Furthermore, there is evidence that park system units benefit surrounding communities by drawing tourism to the area. On the other hand, some in Congress are reluctant to add new units to the system, contending that the federal government's land holdings are already too large and that budgetary resources would be better used to address problems in existing parks. Existing landholders, too, may have concerns about joining the park system, fearing a loss of control over their lands. In addition, there are procedural hurdles to establishing a new unit of the National Park System. Potential units typically undergo study to determine whether they meet explicit criteria for establishment and then must win congressional approval and funding. Even if successful, this process may take many years. For such reasons, it may be more attractive to legislators to enable the Park Service to assist in other ways—for instance, through the model of a national heritage area (a type of area established by Congress that is not under federal control but receives technical and financial assistance from NPS) or through grant programs such as the Historic Preservation Fund. NPS studies of sites for potential addition to the National Park System are required to consider "whether direct NPS management or alternative protection by other public agencies or the private sector is appropriate for the area." Beyond this broad requirement, individual legislation to authorize studies of potential park units may also contain specific directions for NPS to consider a range of protection options in addition to traditional park unit status. Both NPS and its partners may face constrained financial resources for management of a partnership park. Nonfederal partners may seek national park status with the idea of receiving an infusion of federal funds for a struggling area, while federal legislators may specify partnership arrangements in order to limit the government's financial obligations for a new unit. In some cases, the establishing legislation for partnership units does not specify the exact breakdown of financial responsibilities between the Park Service and partnering managers. Instead, it delineates the broad functional responsibilities of each entity, and the Park Service subsequently works with partners to develop the financial details of these arrangements—for example, through cooperative agreements or memoranda of understanding. In other cases, the establishing legislation does include specific funding directions, such as requiring a 50/50 cost share between the federal government and nonfederal partners. Reflecting current federal economic constraints, some proposals have been made to create National Park System units with no federal funding. Many units of the National Park System—not just the partnership units—contain parcels of land not owned by the federal government. However, Congress typically gives the Park Service authority to acquire these "inholdings" over time, with the goal that the entire unit will eventually come under Park Service management. In many partnership parks, this is not the case; instead, when establishing these parks, Congress has taken into account that land ownership by the federal government may not be feasible or desirable. In heavily populated areas, for example, lands might be prohibitively expensive to acquire, owners might not be willing to sell, and some land might be inappropriate for Park Service management because of existing natural resource degradation or uses that are not part of the NPS mission. Federal land ownership also may be opposed for economic, philosophical, or other reasons. No statute specifies the amount of park land that must be owned by the federal government to justify creation of a national park unit. In a few cases, Congress has created a partnership park with the explicit provision that the federal government will acquire no land in the unit, or will acquire only a very small amount. More commonly, provisions for partnership units (as well as traditionally managed units) state that the federal government may acquire land, but only from willing sellers or donors. In partnership parks with little federally owned land, management plans, cooperative agreements, and/or memoranda of understanding are used to clarify partners' responsibilities and create a joint management framework in accordance with the laws governing the National Park System and the purposes for which the park was created. Still, questions may arise about whether the Park Service has adequate—or excessive—jurisdiction over these nonfederally owned or managed areas within park units. Beyond funding issues and land ownership questions, partnership parks face a variety of administrative issues. Different organizational mandates may lead to conflicts or differences in focus between the Park Service and its partners. From the visitor's standpoint, partnership management may result in confusion about what is and is not a national park—for example, when both NPS and nonfederal partners contribute branding and signs to a unit. From a managerial standpoint, challenges arise as partner organizations confront the institutional culture of the Park Service, and vice versa. Several studies of park partnerships have identified partners' failure to understand each other's procedural requirements, timetables, reporting needs, and similar matters as sources of delays and frustration. Despite administrative challenges, both the Park Service and its partners have reported successes in managing partnerships. NPS case studies have pointed to administrative benefits including cost savings, shared expertise, and innovative management ideas from private-sector partners. The Park Service has reported a growing acceptance of partnerships within the agency and in the general public. Congress may consider both administrative challenges and successes when determining whether to create new partnership parks, or in providing oversight for existing parks. The Park Service has attempted to address administrative issues through active efforts to improve partnering skills among agency staff. The agency established a national partnership office in Washington and regional partnership coordinators around the country. A website contains partnership resources and case studies for agency staff, and the agency encourages training in partnering skills. NPS Director Jonathan Jarvis has stated that when selecting park superintendents, he ranks partnership skills "at the top of my list." Do partnership parks extend the Park Service's capacity to accomplish its central missions of preservation and public enjoyment of resources, or do they draw funds and staff away from the Park Service's core needs and priorities? Members of Congress and other observers have expressed both views. On the one hand, partnerships can enable the preservation of valuable natural, historical, and recreational resources in cases where a traditional national park is not feasible for financial or other reasons. Partnerships also may encourage a paradigm of joint citizen responsibility for the system, rather than agency control. They may bring innovative approaches needed to manage new types of parks in "living landscapes." The National Park Service Advisory Board has recommended partnership management as a way to address large-scale landscape challenges, tackle problems of invasive species control and air and water quality, and better ensure the economic viability of neighboring communities. The board stated: The future should not be about doubling the amount of land owned by NPS; instead it should look to increasing the impact of NPS by enabling the service to do much more through affiliations and partnerships. The "old think" is park units with strict boundaries within which NPS must own, manage, maintain and operate everything. New think is "park areas" in which NPS works collaboratively with other public, private and non-profit organizations—each with a distinct role and complementary function. On the other hand, some Members of Congress and other observers have raised the concern that partnership efforts may divert resources from the Park Service's central needs and priorities. Some in Congress contend that partnership management has served as an incentive to add new units to the National Park System that do not necessarily warrant federal protection or investment. They claim that some of these units lack the national significance of earlier national parks. Rather than seeking to create more parks that might be better managed by nonfederal interests, these observers suggest, Congress should focus NPS funding on the agency's growing maintenance backlog for its existing units, estimated at $11.93 billion for FY2015. Despite these concerns, numerous parks with partnership management provisions have been established or proposed in recent years. Many of the proposals have included cost-sharing requirements for joint activities. Given current economic constraints, ongoing questions about federal land acquisition, and the desire to preserve resources in areas with many different existing uses, interest in partnership parks can be expected to continue.

In recent decades, it has become more common for the National Park Service (NPS) to own and manage units of the National Park System in partnership with others in the federal, tribal, state, local, or private sectors. Such units of the park system are often called partnership parks. Congressional interest in partnership parks has grown, especially as Congress seeks ways to leverage limited financial resources for park management. Congress generally specifies the shared management arrangements for partnership parks in the establishing legislation for each park. The arrangements may aim to save costs for both NPS and nonfederal stakeholders, combining investments so that neither partner carries the entire burden for park administration. Partnerships may also address concerns of Members of Congress and others about federal land acquisition by allowing nonfederal partners to own significant portions of a park unit, and they may address concerns about local input into decisionmaking. Partnership parks span a range of physical settings, including "lived-in" landscapes, where natural and historical attractions are mixed with homes and businesses. When considering NPS management partnerships, Congress faces both specific questions about the suitability and effectiveness of partnerships in particular units and larger questions about the role of these parks in the system as a whole. For specific areas, how much federal involvement is warranted, and how should financial responsibilities be shared between NPS and its partners? What concerns might arise around federal land ownership? What administrative benefits and challenges would NPS and its partners face in a given unit? More broadly, does partnership management help NPS fulfill its statutory mission to preserve valued natural and historic resources and provide for their enjoyment by the public, or does it too broadly diversify the agency's portfolio, compromising its ability to focus on core priorities? To the extent that partnerships enable or require new units to be protected as part of the National Park System, is this desirable? Some in Congress are reluctant to add units to the system, contending that the system is already too large and that NPS's budgetary resources would be better used to address concerns in existing parks, including a substantial maintenance backlog. Others see partnership parks as an opportunity to protect valuable resources that would not be feasible for NPS or its outside partners to administer alone.

The Emergency Food and Shelter (EFS) program, the oldest federal program serving the homeless, was established in March 1983. The program was first funded through an emergency jobs appropriation bill ( P.L. 98-8 ) in which Congress allocated $50 million to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide emergency food and shelter to needy individuals. The program funds soup kitchens, food banks, and shelters, and also provides homeless prevention services. Local communities largely determine how funds will be used. The EFS program was not initially authorized, but continued to exist due to annual appropriations until 1987, when the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act ( P.L. 100-77 ) authorized it through FY1988. Congress has since reauthorized the program three times, first in 1988 for FY1989-FY1990 ( P.L. 100-628 ), again in 1990, for FY1991-FY1992 ( P.L. 101-645 ), and then in 1992 for FY1993-FY1994 ( P.L. 102-550 ). The program has not been reauthorized since 1994, but Congress has continued to fund it each year in annual appropriations bills. In FY2006, Congress funded the EFS program at $151.5 million ( P.L. 109-90 ). Although funds for the EFS program are appropriated to FEMA, a National Board was established to carry out the program, including the distribution of funds to local jurisdictions. The Board consists of designees from six charitable organizations—United Way of America, Salvation Army, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Catholic Charities USA, United Jewish Communities, and the American Red Cross—and is chaired by a representative from FEMA. The EFS program's authorizing statute gives the National Board a great deal of discretion, and itself contains only minimal requirements. In addition to establishing the National Board, the statute requires the Board to be audited annually, release an annual report to Congress, disburse funds within three months of receipt, and establish its own written guidelines. The statute states that the written guidelines must include methods to identify local jurisdictions with the highest need, methods to determine the amount of funding to give to each local jurisdiction, and eligible program costs, reporting requirements, and a requirement that homeless individuals be members of local boards. These guidelines are published in the Federal Register. The National Board distributes funds directly to eligible local jurisdictions, which then determine how to allocate the funds among local service providers. Local jurisdictions must fulfill two requirements to be considered eligible. First, they must either be cities of 50,000 or more or counties (typically local jurisdictions are counties). Second, they must have the highest need for emergency food and shelter as determined by unemployment and poverty rates. Specifically, the National Board uses three measures to determine which local jurisdictions have the highest need: those with 13,000 or more residents unemployed and an unemployment rate of at least 4.7%; those with between 300 and 12,999 residents unemployed and an unemployment rate of at least 6.7%; or those with 300 or more unemployed and a poverty rate of at least 11%. Once the National Board determines which local jurisdictions are eligible to receive funds, it calculates the amount of funds each will receive by dividing the amount of available funds by the number of unemployed within all eligible local jurisdictions combined to arrive at a per capita rate of funding per unemployed person. It then distributes the funds by multiplying the per capita rate by the number of unemployed persons in each eligible local jurisdiction. Local jurisdictions that do not qualify for funding under one of the three measures of unemployment and poverty (sometimes referred to as direct funding) may still receive funds through a state set-aside process. The National Board reserves a portion of appropriated funds so that states may either fund local jurisdictions that otherwise do not qualify for funds, or provide additional funds to jurisdictions that have already qualified. In determining the portion of state set-aside funds to allocate from the total, the National Board uses its discretion, although it attempts to minimize fluctuations in funding from year to year and maintain a constant ratio of per capita state set-aside funding to per capita direct funding. The state set-aside allows states to address pockets of homelessness or poverty, help areas that undergo economic changes like plant closings, or assist communities where levels of unemployment or poverty do not quite rise to the required threshold. Each state has a set-aside committee that develops its own criteria to determine which local jurisdictions will receive set-aside funds, however the committees must give priority to those jurisdictions that did not receive funding based on unemployment and poverty measures. The National Board allocates the state set-aside funds based on a ratio of each state's average number of unemployed individuals in unfunded jurisdictions to the average number of unemployed in unfunded jurisdictions nationwide. In FY2006, Congress appropriated $151.5 million to the EFS program. Of this, just over $138 million was distributed to eligible local jurisdictions according to measures of unemployment and poverty, and approximately $11.8 million was distributed as state set-aside funding. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and four territories received funds totaling $150,040,072. (See Table 1 .) Very little EFS program funding is used for administrative expenses. By statute, no more than 5% of the total appropriation may be used for administrative purposes. Local jurisdictions may use up to 2% of their funds, and state set-aside committees 0.5% of state set-aside funds toward the 5% total. The National Board uses no more than 1% of funds for administrative expenses. In the FY2006 appropriation for the program ( P.L. 109-90 ), Congress directed that no more than 3.5% of the total award go to pay administrative expenses. On average, no more than 2.5% of the total award is used for these expenses. Local boards determine which organizations within each jurisdiction will receive funds. Once the National Board identifies local jurisdictions that qualify for funds, it directs the United Way in each jurisdiction to convene a local board if one does not already exist. Local boards are comprised of representatives from the same six charitable organizations that make up the National Board. Instead of a FEMA representative, however, the head of the local government entity, or a designee, serves at the local level, and the chairperson of the board is elected. In addition, each local board must include a member who is homeless or formerly homeless, and if the jurisdiction is located within an Indian reservation, the board must invite a Native American to serve. Boards are encouraged to expand membership with representatives from minority populations, private non-profits, or government organizations. When local boards receive their share of funds from the National Board, they invite local service providers—nonprofits and government agencies—to apply for funds. The local boards select grantees, called local recipient organizations (LROs), based on the "demonstrated ability of an organization to provide food, shelter assistance or both." Funds are distributed twice per year, the first payment is automatic, and the second occurs after LROs clear an audit procedure. The local boards are responsible for monitoring LROs, establishing an appeals process for applicants denied funding, and reporting to the National Board on allocations and expenditures. Eligible expenses for which LROs may use funds include items for food pantries like groceries, food vouchers, and transportation expenses related to the delivery of food; items for mass shelters like hot meals, transportation of clients to shelters or food service providers, and toiletries; payments to prevent homelessness like utility assistance, hotel or motel lodging, rental or mortgage assistance and first month's rent; and LRO program expenses like building maintenance or repair, and equipment purchases up to $300. LROs may apply to local boards for variances in their budgets or waivers to use funds in a way not addressed in the guidelines, but which is in line with the program's intent. If a local board determines that the way it has allocated funds in its local jurisdiction is not meeting the actual need for services, or if any LRO is not using its grant effectively, the local board may reprocess and reallocate funds among other LROs. According to the National Board's guidelines, although EFS program funds are targeted to special emergency needs, the term applies to "economic, not disaster related, emergencies." When Congress created the program in 1983, the country was in the midst of a recession and high unemployment, so it gave jurisdiction to FEMA, the nation's emergency response agency, so that funds would be delivered quickly and efficiently. EFS funds are not distributed in a manner that is responsive to Presidentially-declared disasters, and LROs may not use funds to purchase supplies in anticipation of a natural disaster. However, there is no prohibition on using funds to provide services to those displaced by disaster as long as the services fall within the parameters of the program. In fact, there is past precedent for focusing EFS program funds on those individuals affected by disaster. After the Los Angeles riots in 1992, the Los Angeles area's local board issued special instructions to its LROs to provide help to those who needed it as a result of the riots. The National Board also fast tracked the Los Angeles board's second annual payment. Finally, local boards, supported by the National Board, issued to Congress and the White House "an urgent appeal to supplement this current year's allocation of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program in light of the increasing need both before and following the riots." Congress did not supplement the EFS Program funds, however. Beginning in FY2003 and continuing through FY2005, the President's budget request proposed moving the EFS program from FEMA to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in order to consolidate homeless programs. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees specifically chose to keep the program within FEMA. In its FY2004 report for the Veterans Affairs, HUD and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill ( S.Rept. 108-143 ), the Senate Appropriations Committee explicitly stated that it was not including the President's proposal to transfer the program to HUD in its bill. And Senator Robert Byrd, in a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Homeland Security appropriations for FY2004, noted that the EFS program had been "well run" and "well managed by FEMA." In its report for FY2005 ( S.Rept. 108-280 ), the Senate Appropriations Committee stated that the program is appropriately run within FEMA, and that it would not move it to HUD as the President requested. The President's FY2006 budget request left the EFS program within the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response, also known as FEMA.

The Emergency Food and Shelter (EFS) Program allocates funds to local communities to fund homeless programs including soup kitchens, food banks, shelters, and homeless prevention services. The EFS program is part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and after Hurricane Katrina struck, some questions arose about the use of EFS program funds for Presidentially-declared disasters. This report describes how the EFS program operates through its National Board, local boards, and local recipient organizations. It further discusses the use of EFS program funds during disasters, and recent attempts to move the program from FEMA to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

RS21311 -- U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force Updated April 11, 2003 During the summer and fall of 2002, the question of the possible use of "preemptive" military force by the United States to defend its security was raised byPresident Bush and members of his Administration, including possible use of such force against Iraq. Inmid-September 2002, the Bush Administrationpublished The National Security Strategy of the United States which explicitly states that the UnitedStates is prepared to use preemptive military force toprevent U.S. enemies from using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against it or its friends or allies (1) The following analysis reviews the historical recordregarding the uses of U.S. military force in a preemptive manner. It examines and comments on military actionstaken by the United States that could bereasonably interpreted as preemptive in nature. For purposes of this analysis a preemptive use of military force isconsidered to be the taking of military actionby the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack oruse of force by that nation against the United States. Thedeployment of U.S. military forces in support of U.S. foreign policy, without their engaging in combat, is not deemed to be a preemptive use of military force. Preemptive use of military force is also deemed to be an action addressed at a specific and imminentmilitary threat, requiring timely action (2) By contrast, a "preventive war" would be a significant use of military force against a nation as a "preventive"action, to forestall a presumed military threat fromthat nation at some point in the future, whether months or years. Such an action would be outside the traditionalparameters of the concept of preemptive use ofmilitary force. It would be a significant expansion of the customary understanding of the elements that define suchan action. However, such an expansiveview of military preemption is contained in the Bush Administration's September 2002 U.S. National Strategydocument, and in related public policystatements by senior Bush Administration officials. Thus, various instances of the use of force that are examinedherein could, using a less stringent definition,be argued by some as examples of preemption by the United States.CRS:Logo: The discussion below is based uponour review of all noteworthy uses ofmilitary force by the United States since establishment of the Republic. Historical overview. The historical record indicates that the United States has never, to date, engaged in apreemptive military attack, as traditionally defined, against another nation. And only once has the United Statesever unilaterally attacked another nationmilitarily prior to its first having been attacked or prior to U.S. citizens or interests firsthaving been attacked. That instance was the Spanish-American War of1898. In that military conflict, the principal goal of United States military action was to compel Spain to grant Cubaits political independence. An act ofCongress, passed in April 1898, just prior to the U.S. declaration of war against Spain, explicitly declared Cuba tobe independent of Spain, demanded thatSpain withdraw its military forces from the island, and authorized the President to use U.S. military force to achievethese ends, if necessary. (3) Spain rejectedthese demands, and an exchange of declarations of war by both countries soon followed thereafter. (4) Although U.S. military actions against Spain werebasedon special U.S. foreign policy considerations, they occurred after war was formally declared, and cannot be fairlycharacterized as preemptive in nature. During the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, preemptive use of military force to destroy Soviet missiles that had beenintroduced into Cuba was very seriously consideredin the early days of the crisis, but the matter was ultimately resolved diplomatically. Although the United Statesdid not use military force "preemptively," it diddeploy military forces as an adjunct to its diplomacy, while reserving its right to take additional military actions asit deemed appropriate. The circumstances surrounding the origins of the Mexican War are somewhat controversial in nature-but the term preemptive attack by the United States doesnot apply to this conflict. During, and immediately following the First World War, the United States, as part ofallied military operations, sent military forcesinto parts of Russia to protect its interests, and to render limited aid to anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian civilwar. In major military actions since theSecond World War, the President has either obtained congressional authorization for use of military force againstother nations, in advance of using it, or hasdirected military actions abroad on his own initiative in support of multinational operations such as those of theUnited Nations or of mutual securityarrangements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Examples of these actions include participationin the Korean War, the 1990-1991 PersianGulf War, and the Bosnian and Kosovo operations in the 1990s. The use of military force against Iraq in 2003,while controversial within the internationalcommunity, was justified by the United States, the United Kingdom and others, as an action necessary to enforceexisting U.N. Security Council resolutions thatmandated Iraqi disarmament. Yet in all of these varied instances of the use of military force by the United States,such military action was a "response," afterthe fact , and was not preemptive in nature, as traditionally defined. Central American and Caribbean interventions. This is not to say that the United States has not used its militaryto intervene in other nations in support of its foreign policy interests. However, U.S. military interventions,particularly a number of unilateral uses of force inthe Central America and Caribbean areas throughout the 20th century were not preemptive in nature. What led the United States to intervene militarily innations in these areas was not the view that the individual nations were likely to attack the United Statesmilitarily . Rather, these U.S. military interventionswere grounded in the view that they would support the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed interference in the Westernhemisphere by outside nations. U.S.policy was driven by the belief that if stable governments existed in Caribbean states and Central America, then itwas less likely that foreign countries wouldattempt to protect their nationals or their economic interests through their use of military force against one or moreof these nations. Consequently, the United States, in the early part of the 20th century, established through treaties with the Dominican Republic (in 1907) (5) and withHaiti (in1915) (6) , the right for the United States to collect anddisperse customs income received by these nations, as well as the right to protect the Receiver General ofcustoms and his assistants in the performance of his duties. This effectively created U.S. protectorates for thesecountries until these arrangements wereterminated during the Administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Intermittent domestic insurrectionsagainst the national governments in bothcountries led the U.S. to utilize American military forces to restore order in Haiti from 1915-1934 and in theDominican Republic from 1916-1924. But thepurpose of these interventions, buttressed by the treaties with the United States, was to help maintain or restorepolitical stability, and thus eliminate thepotential for foreign military intervention in contravention of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Similar concerns about foreign intervention in a politically unstable Nicaragua led the United States in 1912 to accept the request of its then President AdolfoDiaz to intervene militarily to restore political order there. Through the Bryan-Chamorro treaty with Nicaragua in1914, the United States obtained the right toprotect the Panama Canal, and its proprietary rights to any future canal through Nicaragua as well as islands leasedfrom Nicaragua for use as militaryinstallations. This treaty also granted to the United States the right to take any measure needed to carry out thetreaty's purposes. (7) This treaty had the effect ofmaking Nicaragua a quasi-protectorate of the United States. Since political turmoil in the country might threatenthe Panama Canal or U.S. proprietary rights tobuild another canal, the U.S. employed that rationale to justify the intervention and long-term presence of Americanmilitary forces in Nicaragua to maintainpolitical stability in the country. U.S. military forces were permanently withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933. Apartfrom the above cases, U.S. militaryinterventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and in Panama in 1989 were based uponconcerns that U.S. citizens or other U.S. interestswere being harmed by the political instability in these countries at the time U.S. intervention occurred. While U.S.military interventions in Central Americaand Caribbean nations were controversial, after reviewing the context in which they occurred, it is fair to say thatnone of them involved the use of "preemptive" military force by the United States. (8) Covert action. Although the use of preemptive force by the United States is generally associated with the overt use of U.S. military forces, it is important to note that the United States has also utilized "covert action" by U.S.government personnel in efforts to influencepolitical and military outcomes in other nations. The public record indicates that the United States has used this formof intervention to prevent some groups orpolitical figures from gaining or maintaining political power to the detriment of U.S. interests and those of friendlynations. For example, the use of "covertaction" was widely reported to have been successfully employed to effect changes in the governments of Iran in1953, and in Guatemala in 1954. Its use failedin the case of Cuba in 1961. The general approach in the use of a "covert action" is reportedly to support localpolitical and military/paramilitary forces ingaining or maintaining political control in a nation, so that U.S. or its allies interests will not be threatened. Noneof these activities has reportedly involvedsignificant numbers of U.S. military forces because by their very nature "covert actions" are efforts to advance anoutcome without drawing direct attention tothe United States in the process of doing so. (9) Suchprevious clandestine operations by U.S. personnel could arguably have constituted efforts at preemptiveaction to forestall unwanted political or military developments in other nations. But given their presumptive limitedscale compared to those of majorconventional military operations, and also that they were not used to preempt an imminent military attack on theUnited States, it seems more appropriate toview U.S."covert actions" as adjuncts to more extensive U.S. military actions in support of U.S. foreign policy. Assuch, these U.S. "covert actions" do notappear to be true case examples of the use of preemptive military force by the United States. Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The one significant, well documented, case of note, where preemptive militaryaction was seriously contemplated by the United States, but ultimately not used, was the Cuban missile crisis ofOctober 1962. When the United States learnedfrom spy-plane photographs that the Soviet Union was secretly introducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-rangeballistic missiles into Cuba, missiles that couldthreaten a large portion of the eastern United States, President John F. Kennedy had to determine if the prudentcourse of action was to use U.S. military airstrikes in an effort to destroy the missile sites before they became operational, and before the Soviets or the Cubansbecame aware that the U.S. knew they werebeing installed. While the military preemption option was seriously considered, after extensive debate among hisadvisors on the implications of such anaction, President Kennedy undertook a measured but firm approach to the crisis that utilized a U.S. naval"quarantine" of the island of Cuba to prevent receiptof additional missile shipments from the Soviet Union as well as military supplies and material for the existingmissile sites, while a diplomatic solution wasaggressively pursued. At the same time, the U.S. reserved the right to employ the full range of military actionsshould diplomacy fail. This approach wassuccessful, and the crisis was peacefully resolved. (10) Iraq War of 2003. In the case of the Iraq War of 2003, the United States has used significant military forceagainst that nation even though the U.S. was not attacked first by Iraq. Various public speeches made by the BushAdministration during the summer and fallof 2003 noted that the United States was prepared to engage in "preemptive" military action against unfriendlynations in advance of their becoming an"imminent" military threat to the U.S. In September 2002, the Bush Administration published The NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States of America which explicitly states that the United States is prepared to use preemptive military force to prevent enemies of theUnited States from using weapons of massdestruction (WMD) against it or its allies and friends. The timing of the release of this strategy document, togetherwith statements of senior BushAdministration officials regarding the potential threat to the U.S. that Iraq's WMD program posed, led to speculationthat Iraq could be the first case where theexpansive approach to use of preemptive military force would be applied. Subsequently, the Bush Administrationsought and obtained passage of U.N. SecurityCouncil Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, which, among other things, noted that Iraq was still in materialbreach of its obligations under prior U.N.Security Council resolutions to destroy and not to seek to obtain various proscribed weapons and capabilities. UNSCR 1441 further noted that "seriousconsequences" would result from failure of Iraq to comply unconditionally with its obligations contained in the U.N.Resolutions. (11) When President Bush launched U.S. military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003, he stated he was doing so, with coalition forces, to enforce existing UNSecurity Council Resolutions that had been violated by Iraq since the Gulf War of 1990-1991--Security CouncilResolutions that expressly contemplated theuse of force should Iraq not comply with them--and also to protect the security of the U.S. In a March 19, 2003report to Congress on the issue, President Bush noted his conclusion and determination that further diplomatic efforts to enforce the U.N. imposed obligation thatIraq destroy its WMD would not succeed,thus requiring the use of military force to achieve Iraqi disarmament. The President did not explicitly characterizehis military action as an implementation ofthe expansive concept of preemptive use of military force against rogue states with WMD contained in his NationalSecurity Strategy document of September2002. (12) However, as U.S. military action wasjustified to protect the security of the United States from a prospective , but not imminent threat of military actionby Iraq, it could be argued that, measured against the traditional concept of preemptive use of military force, thiswas an act of "preventive war"by the UnitedStates.

This report reviews the historical record regarding the uses of U.S. military force ina "preemptive" manner, anissue that emerged during public debates prior to the use of U.S. military force against Iraq in 2003. It examinesand comments on military actions taken by theUnited States that could be reasonably interpreted as preemptive in nature. For purposes of this analysis apreemptive use of military force is considered to bethe taking of military action by the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumedimminent military attack or use of force by thatnation against the United States. The deployment of U.S. military forces in support of U.S. foreign policy, withouttheir engaging in combat, is not deemed tobe a preemptive use of military force. This review includes all noteworthy uses of military force by the UnitedStates since the establishment of the Republic. A listing of such instances can be found in CRS Report RL32170, Instances of Use of United States ArmedForces Abroad, 1798-2003. For an analysis ofinternational law and preemptive force see CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Useof Force Against Iraq. This report will be updatedif significant events warrant.

T his report summarizes the federal civil remedies and criminal penalties that may be available for violations of the rights granted by the federal intellectual property laws: the Copyright Act of 1976, the Patent Act of 1952, the Trademark Act of 1946 (conventionally known as the Lanham Act), and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Intellectual property (IP) law has four major branches, applicable to different types of subject matter: copyright (original artistic and literary works of authorship), patent (inventions of processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter that are useful, new, and nonobvious), trademark (commercial symbols), and trade secret (confidential, commercially valuable business information). The source of federal copyright and patent law originates with the Copyright and Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." By contrast, the Commerce Clause provides the constitutional basis for federal trademark law and trade secret law. The Copyright Act, Patent Act, and Lanham Act provide legal protection for intellectual property against unauthorized use, theft, and other violations of the rights granted by those statutes to the IP owner. The Copyright Act provides copyright owners with the exclusive right to control reproduction, distribution, public performance, and display of their copyrighted works. The Patent Act grants patent holders the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling their patented invention throughout the United States, or importing the invention into the United States. The Lanham Act allows sellers and producers of goods and services to prevent a competitor from (1) using any counterfeit, copy, or imitation of their trademarks (that have been registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), in connection with the sale of any goods or services in a way that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception, or (2) using in commercial advertising any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any false or misleading designation of origin or false or misleading description or representation of fact, which: (a) is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to affiliation, connection, or association, or as to origin, sponsorship, or approval, of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (b) misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities. In addition, the Lanham Act grants to owners of "famous" trademarks the right to seek injunctive relief against another person's use in commerce of a mark or trade name if such use causes dilution by blurring or tarnishment of the distinctive quality of the famous trademark. An alternative to patent law protection may be found in trade secret law, which grants inventors proprietary rights to particular technologies, processes, designs, or formula that may not be able to satisfy the rigorous statutory standards for patentability. Until 1996, trade secret protection was primarily governed by state law. Congress enacted the federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to provide criminal penalties (and authorize the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief) for the theft of trade secrets by domestic and foreign entities, in certain circumstances. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 amended the Economic Espionage Act to provide private parties with a federal civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation. Enforcement of IP rights may be accomplished by the IP owner bringing a lawsuit against an alleged infringer. The U.S. Department of Justice may also criminally prosecute particularly egregious violators of the IP laws in order to impose greater punishment and possibly deter other would-be violators. In certain circumstances, a variety of federal agencies may become involved in IP rights enforcement: for example, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency has the power to seize counterfeit goods upon their attempted importation in the United States; the International Trade Commission may investigate and adjudicate allegations of unfair trade practices due to the importing of goods that were produced as a result of trade secret theft or that infringe U.S. patents, trademarks, or copyrights; and the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration, and the U.S. State Department are all involved in promoting and seeking IP rights enforcement by trading partners and other foreign countries. In copyright cases, the statute of limitations for initiating a civil action is within three years after the claim accrued, while a criminal proceeding must be commenced within five years after the cause of action arose. Although there is no express federal statute of limitations for civil trademark infringement claims, federal courts generally follow the limitations period for the most analogous state-law cause of action from the state in which the claim is heard; courts have also applied the equitable doctrine of laches (unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing a lawsuit) to determine whether a trademark infringement claim is untimely. One federal appellate court has determined that criminal trademark infringement prosecutions are governed by the general five-year statute of limitations for non-capital offenses under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Although there is no statute of limitations in patent infringement actions, the Patent Act specifies a time limit on monetary relief for patent infringement claims: damages are available only for infringement that occurs within the six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for patent infringement. Finally, federal law provides a three-year statute of limitations period for a civil action involving the misappropriation of a trade secret. The Lanham Act, Copyright Act, and Economic Espionage Act have criminal and civil provisions for violations of their respective provisions, while the Patent Act only provides civil remedies in the event of patent infringement. Federal courts determine the civil remedies in an action for infringement brought by the IP owner. If the federal government chooses to prosecute individuals or organizations for IP violations, the imprisonment terms are set forth in the substantive statutes describing the particular IP crime, while the criminal fine amount for violations of the trademark and copyright laws is determined in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. Section 3571 (which specifies the amount of the fine under Title 18 of the U.S. Code). In comparison, the criminal fine amount for economic espionage or trade secret theft is specified in the Economic Espionage Act itself. Information regarding the civil remedies and criminal penalties for violations of the copyright, trademark, patent, and trade secret laws is presented on the following pages in table-format. These penalties may be imposed upon conviction of the defendant in the case of a criminal prosecution, and the civil remedies follow a judgment of infringement reached by a federal judge or jury in a civil action. (Certain injunctive relief may be available prior to final judgment, such as temporary injunctions or impounding of infringing articles.) For any offense that provides forfeiture penalties, criminal forfeiture is available upon the conviction of the owner of the offending property; civil forfeiture is available if the government establishes that the infringing goods are subject to confiscation by a preponderance of the evidence. Restitution is available when the defendant is convicted of a criminal property offense. .

This report provides information describing the federal civil remedies and criminal penalties that may be available as a consequence of violations of the federal intellectual property laws: the Copyright Act of 1976, the Patent Act of 1952, the Trademark Act of 1946 (conventionally known as the Lanham Act), and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. The report explains the remedies and penalties for the following intellectual property offenses: 17 U.S.C. §501 (copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. §2319(b) (criminal copyright infringement for profit); 17 U.S.C. §506(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. §2319(c) (criminal copyright infringement without a profit motive); 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C. §2319(d) (pre-release distribution of a copyrighted work over a computer network); 17 U.S.C. §1309 (infringement of a vessel hull or deck design); 17 U.S.C. §1326 (falsely marking an unprotected vessel hull or deck design with a protected design notice); 17 U.S.C. §§1203, 1204 (circumvention of copyright protection systems); 18 U.S.C. §2319A (bootleg recordings of live musical performances); 18 U.S.C. §2319B (unauthorized recording of films in movie theaters); 15 U.S.C. §1114(1) (unauthorized use in commerce of a reproduction, counterfeit, or colorable imitation of a federally registered trademark); 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (trademark infringement due to false designation, origin, or sponsorship); 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) (dilution of famous trademarks); 15 U.S.C. §§1125(d) and 1129 (cybersquatting and cyberpiracy in connection with Internet domain names); 18 U.S.C. §2318 (counterfeit/illicit labels and counterfeit documentation and packaging for copyrighted works); 35 U.S.C. §271 (patent infringement); 35 U.S.C. §289 (infringement of a design patent); 35 U.S.C. §292 (false marking of patent-related information in connection with articles sold to the public); 28 U.S.C. §1498 (unauthorized use of a patented invention by or for the United States, or copyright infringement by the United States); 19 U.S.C. §1337 (unfair practices in import trade); 18 U.S.C. §2320 (trafficking in counterfeit trademarks); 19 U.S.C. §1526(e), 15 U.S.C. §1124 (importing merchandise bearing counterfeit marks),18 U.S.C. §2320(h) (transshipment and exportation of counterfeit goods); 18 U.S.C. §1831 (trade secret theft to benefit a foreign entity); and 18 U.S.C. §1832 (theft of trade secrets for commercial advantage).

Pharmacy Co-payments (formerly collected in theHealth Services Improvement Fund -- HSIF). In FY2002, Congresscreated a new fund (Health Services Improvement Fund) to collect increases inpharmacy copayments (from $2 to $7 for a 30-day supply of outpatient medication)that went into effect on February 4, 2002. The Consolidated AppropriationsResolution, 2003 ( P.L.108-7 ) granted VA the authority to consolidate the HSIF withMCCF and granted permanent authority to recover copayments for outpatientmedications. Long-Term Care Co-payment Account (formerlythe Veterans' Extended Care Revolving Fund). The MillenniumHealth Care and Benefits Act ( P.L.106-117 ) provided VA authority to collectlong-term care copayments. These out-of- pocket payments include per diemamounts and copayments from certain veteran patients receiving extended careservices. These funds are used to provide extended care services, which accordingto the Administration's budget documents, are defined as geriatric evaluation, nursinghome care, domiciliary services, respite care, adult day health care, and othernoninstitutional alternatives to nursing home care. (29) Compensated Work Therapy Program (formerlythe Special Therapeutic and Rehabilitation Activities Fund). Theprogram was created by the Veterans' Omnibus Health Care Act of 1976 ( P.L.94-581 ) to provide rehabilitative services to certain veteran beneficiaries receivingmedical care and treatment from VA. Funds collected in this program are derivedfrom goods and services produced and sold by patients and members in VA healthcare facilities. Compensation and Pension Living ExpensesProgram (formerly the Medical Facilities Revolving Fund). Theprogram was established by the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1992 ( P.L.102-568 ). Underthis program, veterans who do not have either a spouse or child may have theirmonthly pension reduced to $90 after the third month a veteran is admitted for nursing home care. The difference between the veteran's pension and the $90 is usedfor the operation of the VA medical facility. Parking Program (formerly the Parking RevolvingFund). The program provides funds for construction and acquisitionof parking garages at VA medical facilities. VA collects fees for use of these parkingfacilities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 authorized collections fromthe Parking Program to be deposited in MCCF and be used for medical services. Funds for construction or alterations of parking facilities will now be included underthe construction major projects and construction minor projects accounts. (30) Sale of Assets (formerly the Nursing HomeRevolving Fund). This fund provides for construction, alteration,and acquisition (including site acquisition) of nursing home facilities as provided forin appropriation acts. Collections to this revolving fund are realized from the transferon any interest in real property that is owned by VA and has an estimated value inexcess of $50,000. No budget authority is required for this revolving fund, and fundsare available without fiscal year limitation. Medical Services. Provides fundsfor treatment of veterans and eligible beneficiaries in VA medical centers, nursinghomes, outpatient clinic facilities, and contract hospitals. Hospital and outpatientcare is also provided by the private sector for certain dependents and survivors ofveterans under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of VA (CHAMPVA). Funds are also used to train medical residents, interns, and other professional,paramedical and administrative personnel in health science fields to support VA'smedical programs. Overhead costs associated with medical and prosthetic researchis also funded by this account. Medical Administration. Providesfunds for the management and administration of VA's health care system. Funds areused for the costs associated with the operation of VA medical centers, otherfacilities, VHA headquarters, costs of Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN)offices, billing and coding activities, and procurement. (31) Medical Facilities. Provides fundsfor the operation and maintenance of VHA's infrastructure. Funds are used for costsassociated with utilities, engineering, capital planning, leases, laundry, food services,groundskeeping, garbage disposal, facility repair, and selling and buying of property. Medical and Prosthetic Research. Provides funds for medical, rehabilitative, and health services research. The medicaland prosthetic research program is an intermural program. In addition to funds fromthis appropriation, reimbursements from the Department of Defense (DOD), grantsfrom the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and private sources supports VAresearches. Medical research supports basic and clinical studies that advancesknowledge so that efficient, and rational interventions can be made to prevent, carefor, or alleviate disease. The prosthetic research program is involved in thedevelopment of prosthetic, orthopedic and sensory aids to improve the lives ofdisabled veterans. The health services research program focuses on improving theoutcome effectiveness and cost-efficiency of health care delivery for the populationof veterans. Overhead costs associated with medical and prosthetic research are alsofunded by the medical services account. Medical Administration. Providesfunds for costs associated with operation of medical centers, other facilities and VHAheadquarters as well as VISN offices. It also funds all the medical informationtechnology, including patient records, computer equipment and softwaredevelopment, which are considered capital assets by VA. Medical Facilities. Provides fundsfor the operation and maintenance of VHA's infrastructure. Funds are used for costsassociated with utilities, engineering, capital planning, leases, laundry, food services,groundskeeping, garbage disposal, facility repair, and selling and buying of property. Construction Major. Providesfunds for capital projects costing $7 million or more that are intended to design,build, alter, extend or improve a VHA facility. As part of VA's budget process,Congress reviews, approves, and funds major construction on a project by projectbasis. Typical major construction projects are replacements of hospital buildings,addition of large ambulatory care centers, and new hospitals or nursing homes. Construction Minor Projects. Provides funds for capital projects costing $500,000 or more and less than $7 millionthat are intended to design, build, alter, extend or improve a VHA facility. Minorconstruction projects are approved at the Veterans Integrated Service Network(VISN) level. Grants for Construction of State Extended CareFacilities. Provides grants to states for construction or acquisitionof state home facilities, including funds to remodel, modify or alter existing buildingsused for furnishing domiciliary, nursing home or hospital care to veterans. A grantmay not exceed 65% of the total cost of the project.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides services and benefits such as hospital andmedical care, rehabilitation services, and pensions, among other things, to veterans who meet certaineligibility criteria. VA provides these benefits and services through four administrative units: theVeterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the NationalCemetery Administration (NCA), and the Board of Veterans' Appeals. VHA is primarily a directservice provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support servicesto veterans through an integrated health care system. Funding for VHA is an issue of perennial interest to Congress, especially with the increasingdemand for VA medical services and with some veterans increasingly having to wait more than sixmonths for a primary care or speciality care appointment. VHA is funded through multipleappropriation accounts, which are supplemented by other sources of revenue. Over the past decade,the composition of VHA's funding has changed. Not only has VA's appropriation account structurebeen modified, but also VA's ability to retain nonappropriated funds has increased. These changespresent challenges in comparing VHA funding over a period of time. Between FY1995 and FY2004, appropriations for VA medical care grew by 63%. For thefirst four years of this time period, from FY1995 through FY1999, appropriations for VA medicalcare grew by 6.7%, from $16.2 billion in FY1995 to $17.3 billion in FY1999. In comparison, duringthe last five years of this time period, from FY1999 through FY2004, VA medical careappropriations grew by 52.7%, from $17.3 billion in FY1999 to $26.4 billion in FY2004. Theseamounts do not include appropriations for medical research, medical administration andmiscellaneous operating expenses (MAMOE), and funds from nonappropriated funding sources. The total number of veteran enrollees has grown by 76.9% from FY1999, the first year VHAinstituted an enrollment system, to FY2004. During this same period the number of veteransreceiving medical care has grown by almost 50%, from 3.2 million veterans in FY1999 to anestimated 4.7 million veterans in FY2004. This report will not be updated.

Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy that has held generally free and fair elections since the overthrow of the Communist regime in 1989. Bulgaria held its most recent parliamentary elections on June 25, 2005. The winner of the vote was a coalition led by the left-of-center Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which received 82 seats in the 240-seat National Assembly, Bulgaria's unicameral parliament. The National Movement for Stability and Progress (NMSP), a centrist group, finished second with 63 seats. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), representing the country's ethnic Turkish minority, won 34 seats. Ataka (Attack!), a group that mixes far-right xenophobia with leftist economic populism, won a surprising 21 seats. Three center-right groups won the remaining seats: the Union of Democratic Forces (20); Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (17); and the Bulgarian National Union Coalition (13). In an effort to boost turnout, the government introduced a lottery in which voters could win televisions, cars, and other prizes. Nevertheless, turnout was only 55%, the lowest since the end of communism. All parties pledged to exclude Ataka from the government. Nevertheless, analysts were concerned about the group's electoral success, which shows significant public dissatisfaction with Bulgaria's political class. Experts note that it has been a common phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe that when a former Communist Party (such as the BSP) moves to the center, often as part of European integration efforts, its place in the political spectrum is often taken over by populist and nationalist groups. The process of forming a new government proved difficult, in part because of the scattered distribution of the vote and personal animosity among party leaders, including within the center-right portion of the political spectrum. The stalemate was finally resolved on August 15, when the parliament approved a new coalition government. It is composed of the BSP, MRF, and NMSP, with BSP leader Sergei Stanishev as Prime Minister. Critics claim that Stanishev is a relatively weak leader and that real power rests in the hands of party barons, particularly in the BSP and MRF. This situation, they say, has hindered reform implementation and the fight against corruption. Despite the defection of some NMSP deputies to the opposition in 2007, the government retains a majority and appears determined to stay in power until 2009, when new elections must be held. A new party, Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (CEDB), is not currently represented in parliament, but could win a large number of seats in new elections. The CEDB, led by Sofia mayor Boiko Borisov, espouses pro-EU and pro-law-and-order policies. The current coalition could face a serious challenge if a number of small center-right parties in the current parliament can form an alliance with the CEDB. President Georgi Purvanov, backed by the BSP, won re-election in 2006. Although Purvanov is one of Bulgaria's most popular political figures, most political power is held by the Prime Minister and government; the Bulgarian presidency is relatively weak. Bulgaria is one of the poorest countries in Europe. According to the World Bank, its per capita income is only 56% of that of the eight central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. As in many other transition countries, Sofia and other urban areas are more prosperous than rural ones, which have suffered an exodus of young people. Bulgaria is also battling a rapidly shrinking and aging population, due partly to a low birth rate and partly to the emigration of large numbers of young Bulgarians to better-paying jobs in Western Europe. Mistakes and fitful reforms made by previous governments, culminating in disastrous policies pursued by a previous BSP government in 1995-1996, were serious setbacks. However, Bulgaria's economic situation has improved substantially since 1997, when the country's currency was pegged to the euro under a currency board arrangement, which gives the Bulgarian central bank little discretion in setting monetary policy. From 1998 through 2005, Bulgaria has had an average economic growth rate of more than 5% per year. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by just under 6% in the first three-quarters of 2007. Unemployment has fallen from 18.1% in 2000 to 7.8% in 2007. Bulgaria ran a government budget surplus of 3.5% of GDP in 2007. The central bank is working to restrain rapidly expanding commercial bank lending in order to maintain stable growth. However, inflation remains high; average consumer price inflation was 8.4% in 2007. Persistent inflation is likely to delay Bulgaria's efforts to adopt the euro as its currency for a few years, at least. Due to strong import demand, Bulgaria had a large current account deficit of 20% of GDP in 2007. On the other hand, Bulgaria has seen a surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years. FDI amounted to $8.4 billion in 2007, or nearly 20% of GDP. Bulgaria is attractive to investors because it can supply not only cheap labor, but qualified experts in such fields as computer science. Organized crime and corruption are very serious problems in Bulgaria. Powerful organized crime kingpins continue to operate in Bulgaria with relative impunity, and dozens have died in contract killings and gang shootouts in the past few years. Organized crime groups are involved in such activities as trafficking in persons, drugs and weapons, money laundering, counterfeiting, optical disc piracy, and credit card fraud. High-level corruption is also a critical issue. Powerful politicians are perceived as operating their ministries as corrupt fiefdoms with relative impunity. One of Bulgaria's biggest challenges is long-delayed judicial reform. The Bulgarian system remains weak, corrupt, and sometimes politicized. Experts believe that Bulgaria must also overhaul its education and health care systems. Bulgaria's foreign policy in recent years has focused on joining NATO and the European Union. Bulgaria joined NATO in April 2004, in part due to strong U.S. support. Bulgaria has deployed over 400 troops to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They are stationed in Kabul and in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar. Bulgaria is considering providing training to Afghan security forces. Bulgaria has deployed 42 soldiers to KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, as well as to SFOR, the former NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia. SFOR has been replaced by an EU-led force, in which Bulgaria is also participating, with 152 soldiers. Bulgaria has supported extending membership invitations to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia at the NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, 2008. Bulgarian officials say the move would strengthen peace and stability in the region. Bulgarian officials say that military modernization has proceeded slowly in part because of the costs of participating in overseas deployments. In April 2005, Gen. Nikola Kolev, Chief of General Staff of the Bulgarian army, said that it will take at least 10 years for Bulgaria to achieve full integration in the Alliance, citing in particular the need for new equipment. He said that Bulgaria was focusing on preparing at least one mechanized brigade for use in the full range of NATO's missions, as well as several smaller, specialized units, totaling over 5,000 men in all. Some observers have expressed concern that some of the Soviet-trained officers holding senior positions in the Bulgarian military and intelligence services may continue to have links with Russian intelligence agencies. In 2004, several senior Bulgarian nominees to NATO posts were denied NATO security clearances. Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007, but under stringent conditions. It must provide regular reports to the EU Commission on its progress toward specific benchmarks in several areas, including the fight against organized crime and corruption, and judiciary reform. The EU may apply sanctions (suspending judicial cooperation, for example) against Bulgaria if the benchmarks are not met. In February 2008, the European Commission released a report on Bulgaria's progress. It recognized progress in judicial reform and fighting corruption on Bulgaria's borders, but noted shortcomings in such areas as corruption in local government, healthcare, and education. The report particularly stressed the need to make stronger efforts in fighting high-level corruption and organized crime. No sanctions have been taken against Bulgaria yet, but the EU has suspended funding for some projects in Bulgaria, due to irregularities in how the money has been spent, including corruption concerns. Russia and Bulgaria have traditionally had good relations, due to longstanding historical and personal ties. However, some analysts have expressed concern about Russia's dominance in Bulgaria's energy sector. Bulgaria is almost entirely dependent on Russia for its oil and natural gas needs. Russian firms own major oil refineries, a key commercial natural gas distribution company, and many retail gasoline stations in Bulgaria. As in other countries in Central Europe, some analysts are concerned that Russia could use this control and its links with some politicians (particularly in the BSP) and business leaders to manipulate the country. Bulgarian-Russian energy relations became closer in January 2008, when President Putin won Bulgaria's support for Russia's South Stream natural gas pipeline. Bulgaria's position on the Black Sea may make it an important transit point for oil and natural gas supplies from Russia and the Caspian Sea region to Western Europe. Routes through Bulgaria would avoid Turkey's crowded Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. South Stream, which would run though Bulgaria and the Balkans to western Europe, may increase Europe's dependence on Russian energy by reducing the prospects for the U.S.- and EU-sponsored Nabucco project. Nabucco is intended to supply Central Asian gas to Europe without transiting Russia. Russian and Bulgarian leaders also signed agreements on a proposed oil pipeline from the Bulgarian city of Burgas to the Greek port at Alexandropoulos on the Aegean Sea and on building two Russian nuclear reactors in Bulgaria. The United States and Bulgaria have excellent bilateral relations. In April 2006, the United States signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Sofia on use of military bases in Bulgaria. (Even before the agreement, the United States was already using Bulgarian bases for joint exercises with Bulgarian and other troops, as well as for U.S. forces in transit to Iraq and Afghanistan.) The Bulgarian government eagerly sought such bases, viewing them as an economic stimulus and as useful in cementing strategic bonds with the United States. The bases involved include the Bezmer and Graf Ignatievo air bases and the Novo Selo training range. About 2,500 U.S. troops are expected to be deployed to the relatively spartan facilities at the bases at any one time, each group staying for only a few months. In February 2008, the United States signed additional agreements needed to implement the 2006 accord, including on customs procedures, taxes, and other issues. Bases in Bulgaria are likely to be less expensive than bases in Western Europe and subject to fewer constraints on training and exercises. Bulgaria is also closer geographically to the Middle East than Western Europe. At the same time, Bulgaria's infrastructure is inferior to that of countries such as Germany. Bulgaria contributed 450 troops to U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, despite the deployment's unpopularity among Bulgarians, according to opinion polls. Bulgaria suffered casualties in Iraq: 13 soldiers have died. In March 2005, a Bulgarian soldier was killed in a friendly-fire incident involving U.S. troops. In May 2005, with the parliamentary elections looming, the Bulgarian parliament voted to withdraw the Bulgarian contingent by the end of the year. Although the 450-man infantry battalion was indeed withdrawn at the end of 2005, Bulgaria sent a 150-man unit to guard a refugee camp north of Baghdad in March 2006. Bulgaria is also helping to train Iraqi security force members in Bulgaria. The State Department's 2007 Trafficking in Persons report said that Bulgaria is a "transit country and to a lesser extent, a source country" for human trafficking. It is a "Tier 2" country, meaning that it does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. The report said that Bulgaria improved its victim assistance infrastructure and continued to demonstrate increased law enforcement efforts. However, Bulgaria's National Anti-Trafficking Commission could not effectively monitor and improve national and local efforts due to inadequate staffing, according to the report. In FY2006, Bulgaria received $35 million in U.S. total aid. FY2006 was the last year that Bulgaria received assistance under the SEED program to promote political and economic reform, because of Bulgaria's pending admission to the EU. In FY2007, Bulgaria received $11 million in U.S. aid, including $9.6 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $1.4 million in IMET military training funding to bring Bulgaria's military closer to NATO standards. Bulgaria will receive an estimated $8.5 million in U.S. aid in FY2008. Of the amount, $6.6 million is in FMF, $1.6 million is in IMET, and $0.3 million in funding to destroy excess small arms and ammunition stocks. For FY2009, the Administration requested $11 million in aid for Bulgaria. This total includes $9 million in FMF and $1.6 million in IMET. Another $0.4 million is aimed at helping Bulgaria destroy small arms and ammunition stocks.

This short report provides information on Bulgaria's current political and economic situation, and foreign policy. It also discusses U.S. policy toward Bulgaria. This report will be updated as warranted.

All unemployment benefits including regular state Unemployment Compensation (UC), extended benefits (EB), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), and railroad unemployment benefits are potentially subject to the federal income tax. For income tax purposes, all temporary benefits, such as the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) benefits, are also included within this category. This tax treatment, which has been in place since 1987, puts all unemployment benefits on an equal basis with wages and other ordinary income with regard to income taxation. Unemployment benefits are not subject to employment taxes, including Social Security and Medicare taxes, because the benefits are not considered to be wages. In addition to being subject to federal income taxes, in most states that have an income tax, unemployment benefits are taxed. Most other industrial nations also tax unemployment benefits. State UC agencies must give UC beneficiaries the opportunity to elect federal income tax withholding at the time the claimant first files for UC benefits. Benefit claimants wishing to have federal income tax withheld from their UC benefits must file form W-4V, Voluntary Withholding Request . The current withholding rate for federal income tax is 10% of the gross UC benefits payment. Federal law does not require that states offer state income tax withholding to UC beneficiaries, although many do offer such services. Beneficiaries may opt to pay quarterly estimated taxes if a state does not offer state income tax withholding. Table 1 shows the number of federal income tax returns that reported unemployment benefits and the amount of unemployment benefits for tax years 1998 through 2013. The increases in the number of tax returns claiming unemployment benefits as income filed in 2001 through 2003 are attributable to the 2001 economic recession and the policy responses, including the temporary extension of unemployment benefits (the Temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, TEUC) and providing additional benefits for individuals affected by the 2001 terrorist attack. The most recent recession that began in December 2007 is reflected in the sharp increases in 2008 and 2009 tax returns with an estimated additional 3.7 million tax returns claiming unemployment benefits as income in 2009 as compared with tax filings for 2007. This increase was attributable to higher levels of unemployment as well as the availability of additional weeks of unemployment benefits via the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program (EUC08, P.L. 110-252 , as amended). For tax year 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 §1007) excluded the first $2,400 from income taxes. Thus, the number of persons who had reportable unemployment insurance income was less than it would have otherwise been. This meant that the amount of unemployment benefits reported as income for tax purposes in 2009 was less than it would have otherwise been under the permanent law income tax treatment of unemployment compensation. The difference in the number of taxpayers reporting UC income in tax year 2010 as compared with 2009 was large, with an additional 3.6 million returns in 2010. The difference in returns was attributable to both the increase of potential weeks of EUC08 benefits available in 2010 ( P.L. 111-92 , enacted in November 2009) and the termination of the exclusion of the first $2,400 of UC income from income tax calculations. Nationally, the number of unemployed persons began to decrease in 2011 and as a result this triggered a decrease in the number of weeks available for some extended unemployment benefits (EB and EUC08) as both programs incorporated automatic reduction mechanisms based upon unemployment rates. These reductions in the number of persons receiving benefits and the potential number of weeks of unemployment benefits were reflected in the decreased number of returns reporting unemployment benefits as well as reported amount. By 2013, the number of returns containing UC income had decreased to 9.3 million, the lowest level since 2007. Typically, the loss of a job, even with unemployment benefits, results in a decline in earned income and often in total income. Unemployment benefits are not considered earned income for purposes of computing the earned income tax credit, and the earned income tax credit is not available if adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeds a certain level or if investment income (interest, dividends, and capital gains distributions) exceeds a certain level. Table 2 shows the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of the effect of taxing unemployment compensation at various income levels. Families that reported an income of less than $10,000 in 2005 received an estimated $1.8 billion in UC benefits but only paid $6 million in taxes on those benefits. In comparison, families reporting an income between $50,000 and $100,000 received an estimated $7.3 billion in unemployment benefits and paid $1.2 billion in taxes on those benefits. Before 1979, UC benefits were not subject to the federal income tax. In the Revenue Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-600 ), UC benefits were made partially taxable for benefits received after December 31, 1978. Benefits were taxable only for tax filers whose AGI exceeded $20,000 (single filers) or $25,000 (joint filers). Taxation was applied to the lesser of (1) UC benefits or (2) one-half of AGI (with UC benefits included) in excess of the above-mentioned AGI thresholds. During the 1970s, some policy studies had shown that the proportion of wages replaced by UC benefits on an after-tax basis was large enough to erode a claimant's work incentive. Taxation of UC benefits served to reduce the degree of after-tax wage replacement and reduce the work disincentive effect. However, UC benefits of lower-income claimants remained untaxed because their total income was under the tax threshold (i.e., their standard deduction and personal exemptions offset their income). In 1982, Congress lowered the AGI thresholds for taxation of UC benefits. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ( P.L. 97-248 ) reduced those thresholds to $12,000 for single filers and $18,000 for joint filers. A primary motivation of this legislation was to raise revenue, but it left in place a policy of protecting lower-income claimants from taxation of UC benefits. Congress made UC benefits fully taxable in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-514 ), effective for benefits received after December 31, 1986. Although this action reversed the original policy of taxing UC benefits only above an AGI threshold, it occurred in the context of a law that removed many low-income filers from the tax rolls, lowered the marginal tax rates for the majority of taxpayers, and expanded eligibility for the earned income credit. The rationale for full taxation of UC benefits was to treat UC benefits the same as wages and to eliminate the work disincentive caused by favorable tax treatment for UC benefits relative to wages. Concern about claimants' cash flow problems caused by the lack of tax withholding from UC benefits arose during the 1990-1991 recession. P.L. 102-318 required states to inform all new claimants of their responsibility to pay income tax on UC benefits and to provide them with information on how to file estimated quarterly tax payments. In 1994, P.L. 103-465 required states to withhold federal income tax from UC benefits if a claimant requested withholding, and permitted states to withhold state and local income taxes. P.L. 103-465 set the federal withholding rate at 15% of the gross benefit payment amount. The federal withholding rate was changed to 10% by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ) effective August 7, 2001. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 §1007) included a temporary exclusion on the first $2,400 of UC benefits for the purposes of the federal income tax. This exclusion applied only for the 2009 tax year. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that this exclusion would reduce federal receipts by approximately $4.7 billion. As of the date of this report, no relevant legislation in the current Congress has been introduced.

Unemployment compensation (UC) benefits have been fully subject to the federal income tax since the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). Under tax law, unemployment compensation is a broad category that includes regular state UC benefits, Extended Benefits (EB), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), and railroad unemployment benefits, as well as the now expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) benefits. Individuals who receive UC benefits during a year may elect to have the federal (and in some cases state) income tax withheld from their benefits. UC benefits are considered income and may be subject to federal income tax. This report provides an overview of the taxation of UC benefits and legislation related to taxing UC benefits.

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a broad range of benefits and services to American veterans and to certain members of their families. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) offers a variety of benefits to veterans who are also military retirees. Retired members of the National Guard or the reserve components who have not yet reached the age of 60 and who have not been recently deployed to a combat theater, however, are not entitled to the same federal benefits, such as health care, that other veterans and military retirees receive. National Guard and reserve members may not necessarily meet the relevant statutory definition of "veterans" for VA benefit purposes, and retired members of the National Guard or reserve are not eligible for DOD benefits until they reach the age of 60. These National Guard and reserve retirees are commonly known as Gray Area Retirees (GARs). The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 ) provided TRICARE Standard (TS) coverage for certain members of the retired reserve who are qualified for a non-regular retirement, but are not yet 60 years old. This report examines the current VA and DOD benefit eligibility for members of the National Guard and the reserves; the benefit status and situation of GARS; and legislation related to GARS. Eligibility for VA benefits may vary significantly for certain members of the Guard and the reserves, as compared with members of the regular military, particularly at the time that a member of the Guard or reserves retires. The Guard had its predecessors in the colonial militias with the concept of the "citizen-soldier," who was called to service during times of need. Today, the Guard serves a two-fold function—it provides security and assistance on the home front and is available for military missions abroad. For example, the Guard was deployed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and many members of the Guard have served or are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reserves of the U.S. Armed Forces are military organizations—such as the Army Reserve or the Navy Reserve—whose members usually perform a minimum number of military duty days per year and whose members may be "called up" for duty as required. The reserves enlarge the active-duty (full-time) military when their services are needed. These entities are known collectively as "the reserves," the "reserve units," or the "reserve components." Ordinarily, a member of the Guard or the reserves may retire after 20 years of service with his or her unit. Certain federal benefits for the retired member (which include health care and retirement pay) currently do not commence until the retiree reaches the age of 60. Depending upon the retiree's age and length of service, the retiree could be as young as 37 years old, but he or she will not receive the federal retirement benefits until reaching the age of 60. This time period from retirement to the age of 60 is generally referred to as the "Gray Area," and this category of retirees is generally referred to as "Gray Area Retirees." This term is not defined by statute or regulations, but it generally refers to members of the Guard or reserves who have transferred to the retired reserve after 20 years (or more) of service with their unit and who have not reached the age of 60. Most members of the Guard or the reserves who elect to remain in service will have served between 20 and 30 years. Upon retirement, the servicemember will transfer from the active reserve service to the retired reserve. The servicemember is still subject to "call up" to active duty. At the age of 60, the GAR is then usually entitled to DOD benefits similar to those of servicemembers who retire from active military service after at least 20 years. However, in many cases, GARs are not considered to be veterans under Title 38 for VA benefit purposes. A GAR carries a Military ID card marked "Ret," maintains military base privileges, and usually keeps the commissary privileges that he or she had while on active reserve status. GARs are eligible for (1) VA disability compensation and VA health care for disabilities or injuries incurred while performing inactive duty for training, regardless of length of service; (2) VA home loan eligibility, as long as the retiree had six or more years of honorable service in the selected reserve; (3) VA burial and memorial benefits if the retiree is entitled to reserve retired pay at the time of his or her death; and (4) conversion of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) to Veterans Group Life Insurance (VGLI). Basically, before the age of 60, the GAR has the same benefits that he or she had before retirement, but without receiving pay. When the GAR reaches the age of 60, retirement pay and medical benefits begin. But, if the GAR is called back to active service, the GAR will regain eligibility for pay, medical benefits, and other service benefits during this period of active service. Generally, once a GAR reaches the age of 60, he or she will receive DOD benefits and privileges comparable to those of a "regular" military retiree, including retirement pay and medical benefits. GARs' surviving spouses are eligible for annuities. Section 656 of the National Defense authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 ( P.L. 106-65 ) provides authority for granting an annuity to certain surviving spouses of servicemembers who did not decline participation in the military Survivor Benefit Plan. This legislation provides coverage to surviving spouses of all GARs. Various benefits are provided by the VA to "veterans," and other benefits are provided by the DOD to certain military retirees. These two benefit systems are examined below. Among the benefits extended to veterans through the VA are health care and related services, such as nursing homes, clinics, and medical centers; education, vocational training, and related career assistance; home financing; life insurance; burial benefits; benefits for certain family survivors; and financial benefits, including disability compensation and pensions. To be eligible for most VA benefits, the claimant must be a veteran, or, in some cases, the survivor or the dependent of a veteran. Significantly, however, not every person who has served in the military is considered to be a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits. By federal statute, for VA benefit purposes, a "veteran" is defined as a "person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable." Various criteria, however, including discharge status, "active" service, time of service (whether during a "time of war"), and length of duty are all factors considered in determining whether a former servicemember is a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits. Two particular elements of these criteria—"active duty" and "length of service"—are often difficult for members of the Guard and the reserves to meet. As a result, these servicemembers, having not met the statutory threshold criteria for "veteran," are often not eligible for VA benefits. In many cases, members of the Guard and the reserves may not have fulfilled the "active duty" requirement. Members of the Guard and reserves who served on regular active duty are eligible for the same VA benefits as other veterans. An example of this situation would be a Guard member who was called up to serve in the Persian Gulf for 12 months, and at the end of that period would thus be considered to have served on active duty for that period of time. Otherwise, Guard and reserve duty is not considered "active duty" for benefits unless the servicemember performing this duty was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty. Guard and reserve members must ordinarily serve a minimum of 24 continuous months on active duty to meet the "length of service" requirement to qualify for VA benefits. A former Guard or reserve member who has served for less than 24 months of continuous active duty may still qualify so long as the servicemember has served the "full period" for which he or she was "called to duty." This requirement was fulfilled, for example, by Guard and reserve members who were called to active duty during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. These servicemembers satisfied the minimum length of service requirement, even though most did not serve for a full 24 months. But their orders reflected that they served the full period for which they were called to active duty. Although many Guard and reserve members may not appear to be eligible "veterans" for the purposes of VA benefits, certain exceptions and special circumstances may exist, which add to the complexity of the eligibility determination. As each servicemember's military service may be different, and therefore may fit within certain case categories or exceptions, eligibility is usually determined by the VA on a case-by-case basis after reviewing the individual servicemember's military service records. As the statutory definition of "veteran" is not precise or absolute, it provides the VA with some discretion in determining who may be considered a "veteran" for purposes of VA benefits. As with the VA's system, the DOD's military health system includes a health benefits program, generally referred to as "TRICARE." TRICARE serves active duty servicemembers; National Guard and reserve members; retirees; and their families, survivors, and certain former spouses, worldwide. As a major component of the Military Health System, TRICARE brings together the health care resources of the uniformed services and supplements them with networks of civilian health care professionals, institutions, pharmacies, and suppliers to provide access to health care services while maintaining the capacity to support military operations. Prior to the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 ), GARs were usually not eligible for TRICARE health benefits until they became eligible for retirement pay at the age of 60 (at which time, they are no longer considered GARs). However, these individuals and eligible family members may purchase the TRICARE Retiree Dental Program (TRDP) before drawing retirement pay. Individuals who enroll in TRDP within 120 days of their official retirement date are not subject to a 12-month waiting period, which is otherwise required for certain TRDP benefits. Members of the retired reserve who are receiving retirement pay but are not yet eligible for Medicare (generally those retirees between the ages of 60 and 64) are automatically eligible for TRICARE Standard or TRICARE Extra. They may also enroll in TRICARE Prime if they live in an area where it is offered. Upon reaching the age of 65, reservists receiving retirement pay must enroll in Medicare Part B to retain TRICARE coverage, which converts to TRICARE for Life (TFL). TFL covers all TRICARE beneficiaries who are entitled to Medicare Part A and have Medicare Part B coverage based on age. There are no enrollment fees for TFL, and the catastrophic cap is $3,000 per fiscal year per family. TRDP also remains available. Section 705 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 ) (October 28, 2009) provided TRICARE Standard (TS) coverage for certain members of the retired reserve who are qualified for a non-regular retirement but are not yet 60 years old. The TRICARE program allows retired reservists to purchase TRICARE coverage if "they are under the age of 60 and are not eligible for, or enrolled in, the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program." They are also required to be members of the retired reserve of a reserve component and qualified for non-regular retirement. Detailed eligibility criteria are available on the TRICARE website. In the 112 th Congress, S. 542 , S. 1768 , and H.R. 1003 would authorize space-available travel on military aircraft for GARs on the same basis as active-duty military personnel. S. 491 and H.R. 1025 would recognize service by certain persons in the reserves by honoring them with the status as veterans under law. However, such persons would not be entitled to any benefit by reason of such recognition.

The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a broad range of benefits and services to American veterans and to certain members of their families. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) offers a variety of benefits to veterans who are also military retirees. When members of the National Guard or the reserves who have not yet reached the age of 60 retire (usually after at least 20 years of service), they may not necessarily meet the statutory definition of "veterans" for VA purposes or be eligible for DOD health benefits. These military retirees are commonly known as Gray Area Retirees (GARs). To be eligible for most VA benefits, the claimant must be a veteran, or in some cases, the survivor or dependent of a veteran. However, not every person who has served in the military is considered to be a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits. The concept of "veteran" is defined by federal statute and includes various criteria, such as discharge status, "active" service, time of service, and length of duty. Section 705 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84) made TRICARE Standard (TS) coverage available for purchase by certain members of the retired reserve who are qualified for a non-regular retirement, but are not yet 60 years old (GARs). This program, known as TRICARE Retired Reserve (TRR), was launched on September 1, 2010, and is now fully operational. In 2011, a program was implemented that permits GARs to enroll in the TRR online, through a DOD website. In the 112th Congress, S. 542, S. 1768, and H.R. 1003 would authorize space-available travel on military aircraft for GARs on the same basis as active-duty military personnel. S. 491 and H.R. 1025 would recognize service by certain persons in the reserves by honoring them with the status as veterans under law. However, such persons would not be entitled to any benefit by reason of such recognition.

The mental health of veterans—and particularly veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) —has been a topic of ongoing concern to Members of Congress and their constituents, as evidenced by hearings and legislation. Knowing the number of veterans affected by various mental disorders and actions the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is taking to address mental disorders can help Congress determine where to focus attention and resources. Using data from the VA, this brief report addresses the number of veterans with (1) depression or bipolar disorder , (2) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (3) substance use disorders; Appendix A discusses important data limitations. For each topic, this report also briefly describes what the VA is doing in terms of screening and treatment; Appendix B lists reports evaluating the VA's efforts. Veterans generally must enroll in the VA health care system to receive medical care; for information about enrollment, health benefits, and cost-sharing, see CRS Report R42747, Health Care for Veterans: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. From FY2002 through FY2012, 1.6 million OEF/OIF veterans (including members of the Reserve and National Guard) left active duty and became eligible for VA health care; by the end of FY2012, 56% of them had enrolled and obtained VA health care. The VA publishes the cumulative prevalence of selected mental disorders among OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care, based on information in the VA's electronic health records. Systematic information regarding veterans who do not use VA health care is not available. Data about OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care should not be extrapolated to the rest of the OEF/OIF veteran population, or to the broader veteran population. Limitations of the VA's data are discussed in Appendix A . Depression and bipolar disorder are both mood disorders; bipolar disorder includes episodes of both depressed mood (which characterizes depression) and mania (elevated mood or irritability) or hypomania (a milder form of mania). The VA does not present separate prevalence figures for depression and bipolar disorder, nor does it provide the prevalence of depression and bipolar disorder combined; instead, the VA presents the prevalence of affective psychoses , a range of diagnoses including major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, among others (14%); and depressive disorder not elsewhere classified (NEC) , a diagnosis assigned when a patient reports depressive symptoms that do not meet criteria for other depressive disorders (e.g., major depressive disorder) (22%). The percentages are presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 .Neither of these categories includes dysthymic disorder (a form of depression), which falls in a category of neurotic disorders (a broad category that also includes panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, among others). It is possible that a patient with a diagnosis of one mood disorder reflected in the electronic health record might also have a diagnosis of another mood disorder in the electronic health record; for this reason, the prevalence of affective psychoses (14%) and the prevalence of depressive disorder NEC (22%) should not be summed. These percentages are subject to other important data limitations discussed in Appendix A . Department policy requires an annual depression screening for veterans using VA health care . Depression and bipolar disorder may be treated with medication, psychosocial interventions, or both. The VA's suicide prevention efforts, which are relevant to patients with mood disorders (as well as other veterans), are described in CRS Report R42340, Suicide Prevention Efforts of the Veterans Health Administration , by [author name scrubbed]. All veterans, regardless of enrollment, may use the department's Veterans Crisis Line (1-800-273-8255, option 1), an online chat service ( www.VeteransCrisisLine.net/chat ), and an online suicide prevention resource center ( www.suicideoutreach.org ) maintained jointly with the Department of Defense (DOD). Several reports that have evaluated the department's mental health programs (including treatment for mood disorders and suicide prevention) and offered recommendations are listed in Appendix B . Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—one of the "signature injuries" of OEF/OIF —is a psychological response to a traumatic event; however, a history of trauma is not enough to establish a diagnosis of PTSD. The diagnosis requires a minimum number of symptoms in each of three categories: reexperiencing (e.g., recurring nightmares about the traumatic event); avoidance (e.g., avoiding conversations about the traumatic event); and arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping). Symptoms must persist for at least one month and must result in clinically significant distress or impairment in functioning. As illustrated in Figure 3 , the VA reports the prevalence of PTSD among OEF/OIF veterans receiving VA health care in FY2002–FY2012 to be 29%. This percentage is subject to important data limitations discussed in Appendix A . Given the attention on PTSD, it is worth noting that prevalence estimates from other sources (generally not limited to users of VA health care) vary widely. A 2010 RAND analysis of 29 relevant studies found prevalence estimates for PTSD ranging from around 1% to 60% among OEF/OIF servicemembers; variation was attributed in part to the use of different samples and different methods of identifying PTSD. A 2012 report by the Institute of Medicine indicates that recent estimates of PTSD prevalence among OEF/OIF servicemembers and veterans range from 13% to 20%. Department policy requires that veterans new to VA health care receive a PTSD screening, which is repeated every year for the first five years and every five years thereafter, unless there is a clinical need to screen earlier. Department policy also requires that new patients requesting or referred for mental health services receive an initial assessment within 24 hours and a full evaluation within 14 days. Congressional testimony has raised questions about the extent to which these policies are implemented in practice. PTSD treatment provided by the VA includes both medication and cognitive-behavioral therapy (a category of talk therapy). Every VA Medical Center has specialists in PTSD treatment. Some facilities offer specialized PTSD treatment programs of varying intensity and duration, including (among others) PTSD day hospitals (four to eight hours per day, several days per week); evaluation and brief treatment PTSD units (14-28 days); specialized inpatient PTSD units (28-90 days); and PTSD residential rehabilitation programs (28-90 days living in a supportive environment while receiving treatment). Veterans may also receive PTSD treatment at VA community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) or at Vet Centers (which are subject to different policies than VA health care facilities). Several reports that have evaluated the VA's PTSD screening and treatment efforts and offered recommendations are listed in Appendix B . Substance use disorders include dependence on and abuse of drugs, alcohol, or other substances (e.g., nicotine). A diagnosis of dependence requires at least three symptoms (e.g., tolerance or withdrawal); substance use that does not meet criteria for dependence, but leads to clinically significant distress or impairment, is called abuse. Each diagnosis is specific to the substance, so an individual may have multiple diagnoses of abuse or dependence—one for each substance (e.g., marijuana dependence and cocaine abuse). Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the prevalence of drug dependence and abuse (respectively) among OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care during FY2002–FY2012. Alcohol dependence (6%) is more common than either drug dependence (3%) or abuse (5%); the prevalence of alcohol abuse was not provided. These percentages are subject to important data limitations discussed in Appendix A . Given the comparatively low rates of drug abuse and dependence (relative to other disorders presented in this report), VA policy does not require routine drug use screening. Department policy does require an annual alcohol screening, which is waived for veterans who drank no alcohol in the prior year. The VA offers medication and psychosocial interventions for substance use disorders, as well as acute detoxification care when necessary. Medication may be used to reduce cravings or to substitute for the drug of abuse (e.g., methadone for heroin users). Psychosocial interventions include (among others) brief counseling to enhance motivation to change; intensive outpatient treatment; residential care (i.e., living in a supportive environment while receiving treatment); long-term relapse prevention; and referral to outside programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous. Several reports that have evaluated the department's alcohol screening and substance use disorder treatment efforts and offered recommendations are listed in Appendix B . Appendix A. Data Limitations In order to understand the limitations of the data presented in this report, it is helpful to understand their sources. The VA identifies PTSD and substance use disorders by searching VA administrative data for diagnosis codes associated with specific conditions (e.g., 309.81 for PTSD). These codes are entered into veterans' electronic medical records by clinicians, in the normal course of evaluation and treatment. The data provided by the VA should be interpreted in light of at least three limitations, each of which is discussed below. First, some conditions may be overstated, because veterans with diagnosis codes for a condition might not have the condition, as a result of provisional diagnoses or noncurrent diagnoses. A provisional diagnosis code may be entered into a veteran's electronic medical record when further evaluation is required to confirm the diagnosis. A diagnosis may be noncurrent when a veteran who had a condition in the past no longer has it. In either case, the code remains in the veteran's electronic medical record. Second, some conditions may be understated, because veterans who have a condition might not be diagnosed (and therefore might not have the diagnosis code in their records), if they choose not to disclose their symptoms. Veterans might not want to disclose information that would lead to a diagnosis of mental illness. Veterans have reported not wanting to disclose trauma for fear that that they will not be believed, that others will think less of them, that they will be institutionalized or stigmatized, or that their careers will be jeopardized, among other reasons. Also, veterans using VA health care services may receive additional services outside the VA, without the knowledge of the department. Third, the numbers provided by the VA should not be extrapolated to all OEF/OIF veterans, or to the broader veteran population, because OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care are not representative of all OEF/OIF veterans or the broader veteran population. Veterans who use VA health care may differ from those who do not, in ways that are not known. Potential differences include (among other characteristics) disability status, employment status, and distance from a VA medical facility. Appendix B. Selected Evaluations of VA Services Table B-1 lists selected reports published since 2008 that evaluate the VA's efforts to address veterans' mental health:

The mental health of veterans—and particularly veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF)—has been a topic of ongoing concern to Members of Congress and their constituents, as evidenced by hearings and legislation. Knowing the number of veterans affected by various mental disorders and actions the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is taking to address mental disorders can help Congress determine where to focus attention and resources. Using data from the VA, this brief report addresses the number of veterans with (1) depression or bipolar disorder, (2) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (3) substance use disorders. For each topic, this report also briefly describes what the VA is doing in terms of screening and treatment. From FY2002 through FY2012, 1.6 million OEF/OIF veterans (including members of the Reserve and National Guard) left active duty and became eligible for VA health care; by the end of FY2012, 56% of them had enrolled and obtained VA health care. The VA publishes the cumulative prevalence of selected mental disorders among OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care, based on information in the VA's electronic health records. Systematic information regarding veterans who do not use VA health care is not available. Data about OEF/OIF veterans using VA health care should not be extrapolated to the rest of the OEF/OIF veteran population, or to the broader veteran population. Limitations of the VA's data are discussed in Appendix A. Reports that have evaluated VA's efforts and offered recommendations are listed in Appendix B.

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), regulates "federal election activity," which is defined to include (1) voter registration drives in the last 120 days of a federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the vote drives (GOTV), and generic activity in connection with an election in which a federal candidate is on the ballot; (3) "public communications" that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate and promote, support, attack, or oppose that candidate (regardless of whether the communications expressly advocate a vote for or against a candidate); and (4) services by a state or local party employee who spends at least 25% of paid time per month on activities in connection with a federal election. FECA further defines "public communications" as broadcast, cable, satellite, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank communications made to the general public, "or any other form of general public political advertising." As a result, candidate and party committees can only use regulated federal funds to pay for such "federal election activity." Regulated federal funds, also known as "hard money," are funds that are subject to FECA's contribution limitations, source restrictions, and reporting requirements. Shortly after enactment of the BCRA amendments to FECA in 2002, the FEC promulgated regulations that exempted Internet communications from federal campaign finance regulation altogether by excluding such communications from the definition of "public communication." In response, the two primary sponsors of BCRA in the House of Representatives, Representatives Shays and Meehan, filed suit in U.S. district court against the FEC. In seeking to invalidate the regulations, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that by not regulating Internet activities, the FEC was opening a new avenue for circumvention of federal campaign finance law, contrary to Congress's intent in enacting BCRA. In 2004, in Shays v. FEC, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with the BCRA sponsors and generally overturned the FEC's initial regulations governing political communications on the Internet. The Shays court held that excluding all Internet communications from the FEC rule defining "public communication," at 11 CFR § 100.26, was inconsistent with Congress's use of the phrase, "or any other form of general public political advertising," in the BCRA definition of "public communication." Further, the court found that the FEC had failed to provide legislative history that would persuade the court to ignore the plain meaning of the statute. While not all Internet communications fall within the phrase, "any other form of general public political advertising," the court observed that "some clearly do." However, the court left it to the FEC to determine precisely what constitutes "general public political advertising" in the context of the Internet. Furthermore, while the court specifically upheld the definition of "generic campaign activity" as a "public communication," it found that the FEC's 2002 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) failed to provide adequate notice to the public, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), that the FEC might establish such a definition. As the court noted, it could not "fathom how an interested party 'could have anticipated the final rulemaking from the draft rule.'" The Shays court also found that the FEC rule exempting Internet communications from the definition of "public communications" meant that no matter how closely such communications were coordinated with political parties or candidate campaigns, they could not be considered "coordinated communications" and hence, subject to FECA regulation. As the court observed, it had long been a tenet of campaign finance law that, in order to prevent circumvention of regulation, FECA treated expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with or at the suggestion of a candidate" as a contribution to such candidate. According to the court, the exclusion of Internet communications from coordinated communications contrasted with prior FEC rules and was contrary to Congress's intent in enacting the statute. The court remanded the case to the FEC for further action consistent with its decision. In response to the district court's decision in Shays v. FEC , in April 2005, the FEC published an NPRM seeking comment on its proposal to amend the definition of "public communication" to conform to the ruling. In its NPRM, the FEC requested comments on proposed rules to include paid Internet advertisements in the definition of "public communication." In addition, the FEC sought comment on the related definition of "generic campaign activity," on proposed changes to disclaimer regulations, and on proposed exceptions to the definitions of "contribution" and "expenditure" for certain Internet activities and communications that would qualify as individual volunteer activity or that would qualify for the "press exemption." According to the FEC, the proposed rules were intended to ensure that political committees properly finance and disclose their Internet communications, without impeding individual citizens from using the Internet to speak freely regarding candidates and elections (e.g., blogging). The comment period closed and a public hearing was held in June 2005, and in anticipation of congressional action, the FEC delayed consideration of the Internet regulations. However, in the absence of congressional legislation, in March 2006, the FEC voted unanimously to approve the new regulations. In so doing, the commissioners cited the 2004 Shays v. FEC federal district court decision as requiring them to take such action. Generally, the Internet regulations reflect an attempt by the FEC to leave blogs, created and wholly maintained by individuals, free of FECA regulation, so long as such services are not performed for a fee. As stated in its NPRM: While drafting a proposed rule, the Commission recognized the important purpose of BCRA in preventing actual and apparent corruption and the circumvention of the Act as well as the plain meaning of "general public political advertising," and the significant public policy considerations that encourage the promotion of the Internet as a unique forum for free or low-cost speech and open information exchange. The Commission was also mindful that there is no record that Internet activities present any significant danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption, nor has the Commission seen evidence that its 2002 definition of "public communication" has led to circumvention of the law or fostered corruption or the appearance thereof. Therefore the Commission proposed to treat paid Internet advertising on another person's website as a "public communication," but otherwise sought to exclude all Internet communications from the definition of "public communication." The regulations apply only when money is exchanged for Internet-related campaign advertisements. Accordingly, the funds expended for such advertisements are subject to the limitations, source restrictions, and reporting requirements of FECA. Key aspects of the FEC regulations include the following: Regulation of paid Internet ads as " public communications " —The definition of "public communication" includes paid Internet ads placed on another individual or entity's website as a form of "general public political advertising," with no dollar threshold required; the advertiser, not the website operator, is considered to be making the public communication. Accordingly, the fees for such ads are subject to FECA contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Disclaimer requirements —Disclaimers (statements of attribution) are required on all political committee websites available to the public. As "public communications," paid Internet ads must contain disclaimers if they expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate or solicit contributions. Disclaimers are not required on e-mails from individuals or groups unless they are political committees, in which case disclaimers are required if more than 500 substantially similar, unsolicited e-mails are sent within a 30-day period. Disclosure of fees paid by candidates to bloggers —Payments to bloggers from candidates are required to be disclosed only on candidate disclosure statements; no such disclaimers are required on blog sites. Coordinated communications —Internet advertisements made for the purpose of influencing a federal election, placed on the website of another person or entity for a fee —and coordinated with a candidate or party committee—are considered "coordinated communications" and as such, constitute in-kind contributions to the candidate or committee. Accordingly, the fees for such ads are subject to FECA contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Media exemption —Under the definition of "contribution," the general exemption from FECA coverage of news stories, commentaries, and editorials distributed through broadcasters, newspapers, and periodicals applies to such communications that are distributed over the Internet. Exceptions for individual or volunteer activity on the Internet —Under the definitions of "contribution" and "expenditure," an uncompensated individual or group of individuals using Internet equipment and services in order to influence a federal election, whether or not such services were known by or coordinated with a campaign, are excluded from FECA regulation. During Congress's consideration of BCRA in 2001 and 2002, the subject of communications over the Internet was not addressed, but it was discussed during debate on a previous version of what became BCRA during House consideration of H.R. 417 (Shays-Meehan) in the 106 th Congress. An amendment was offered to that bill by Representative DeLay to exempt communications over the Internet from regulation under FECA, but was defeated by a vote of 160-268. During the 109 th Congress, several bills were proposed to exempt all communications over the Internet from the BCRA definition of "public communication," and therefore, regulation under FECA. These proposals included H.R. 1606 (Hensarling), the Online Freedom of Speech Act, which was considered by the House under suspension of the rules but, on a 225-182 vote, failed to receive the two-thirds necessary for passage. The bill was brought up again and ordered reported favorably by the House Administration Committee on March 9, 2006, setting up consideration by the House, but the vote was postponed pending FEC regulatory action. Also during the 109 th Congress, in response to concerns that the Online Freedom of Speech Act could open the door to FECA circumvention (for example, by allowing corporations and unions to finance advertisements), two additional bills were offered: H.R. 4194 (Shays-Meehan) would have excluded Internet communications from FECA regulation, but regulated communications placed on a website for a fee and those made by most corporations and unions, by any political committee, and by state and local parties; and H.R. 4900 (Allen-Bass) would have exempted from FECA regulation most individual online communications and advertisements below a dollar threshold. In the wake of the new FEC regulations approved on March 27, 2006, however, House floor action was postponed indefinitely. During the 110 th Congress, the regulation of political communications on the Internet was not the subject of major legislative action. H.R. 894 (Price, NC) would have extended "stand by your ad" disclaimer requirements to Internet communications, among others. It was referred to the Committee on House Administration. H.R. 5699 (Hensarling) would have exempted from treatment as a contribution or expenditure any uncompensated Internet services by individuals and corporations that are wholly owned by individuals engaging primarily in Internet activities, which do not derive a substantial portion of revenue from sources other than income from Internet activities, except payment for (1) a public communication (other than a nominal fee), (2) the purchase or rental of an email address list made at the direction of a political committee, or (3) an email address list that is transferred to a political committee. H.R. 5699 also would have exempted blogs and other Internet and electronic publications from treatment as an expenditure by including such communications in the general media exemption applicable to broadcast stations and newspapers. It was referred to the Committee on House Administration. Similar legislation has not yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress.

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates "federal election activity," which is defined to include a "public communication" (i.e., a broadcast, cable, satellite, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank communication made to the general public) or "any other form of general public political advertising." In 2006, in response to a federal district court decision, the FEC promulgated regulations amending the definition of "public communication" to include paid Internet advertisements placed on another individual or entity's website. As a result, a key element of online political activity—paid political advertising—is subject to federal campaign finance law and regulations. During the 110th Congress, the regulation of political communications on the Internet was not the subject of major legislative action. H.R. 894 (Price, NC) would have extended "stand by your ad" disclaimer requirements to Internet communications, among others. H.R. 5699 (Hensarling) would have exempted from treatment as a contribution or expenditure any uncompensated Internet services by individuals and certain corporations. Similar legislation has not yet been introduced in the 111th Congress. This report will be updated in the event of major legislative, regulatory, or legal developments.

Network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-centric operations (NCO), is a key element of defense transformation. NCW focuses on using computers, high-speed data links, and networking software to link military personnel, platforms, and formations into highly integrated local and wide-area networks. Within these networks, personnel are to share large amounts of information on a rapid and continuous basis. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy view NCW as a key element of defense transformation that will dramatically improve combat capability and efficiency. The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network. Units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense picture. CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles that the ship itself cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other units in the network. It will also permit air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by other ships or aircraft. The Navy wants to install the system on aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft over the next several years. The system has potential for being extended to include Army and Air Force systems. Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e., compatibility) problems between CEC's software and the software of the air-defense systems on some ships. In response, the Navy undertook a major effort to identify, understand, and fix the problems. The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001. In 2002, the primary CEC contractor, Raytheon, faced potential competition from two firms—Lockheed and a small firm called Solipsys—for developing the next version of CEC, called CEC Block II. Solipsys had devised an alternative technical approach to CEC, called the Tactical Component Network (TCN). Solipsys entered into a teaming arrangement with Lockheed to offer TCN to the Navy as the technical approach for Block II. In late-December 2002, Raytheon announced that it had agreed to purchase Solipsys. In early-February 2003, Raytheon and Lockheed announced that they had formed a team to compete for the development of Block II. Some observers expressed concern that these developments would reduce the Navy's ability to use competition in its acquisition strategy for Block II. As an apparent means of preserving competition, the Navy in mid-2003 announced that it would incorporate open-architecture standards into Block II divide the Block II development effort into a series of smaller contracts for which various firms might be able to submit bids. In December 2003, however, the Navy canceled plans for developing Block II in favor of a new plan for developing a joint-service successor to Block I. The conference report ( H.Rept. 108-283 , page 290) on the FY2004 defense appropriations act ( H.R. 2658 / P.L. 108-87 ) directed the Navy to keep the Appropriations committees informed on potential changes to the CEC Block II acquisition strategy and stated that, if the Navy adopts a new acquisition strategy, "the additional funds provided in this act for CEC Block 2 may be merged with and be available for purposes similar to the purposes for which appropriated." The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports ( H.Rept. 109-89 , page 178, and S.Rept. 109-69 , pages 108-109, respectively) on the FY2006 defense authorization bill ( H.R. 1815 / S. 1042 ), expressed satisfaction with the Navy's efforts to improve interoperability between the CEC system and other combat direction systems and ended a requirement established in the conference report ( H.Rept. 105-736 ) on the FY1999 defense authorization act ( P.L. 105-261 ) for the Navy to report to Congress on these efforts on a quarterly basis. The Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system is to combine the CEC system with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye carrier-based airborne radar and control system (AWACS) aircraft and the SM-6 version of the ship-based Standard air defense missile (both now in development) to expand the Navy's networked air-defense capabilities out to the full range of the SM-6 missile. Among other things, NIFC-CA will enable Navy forces at sea to provide overland defense against enemy cruise missiles. Current Navy plans call for NIFC-CA to be partially deployed in FY2011 and fully deployed in 2014. IT-21, which stands for Information Technology for the 21 st Century, is the Navy's investment strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and between Navy ships. The IT-21 network uses commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop computers and networking software that provide a multimedia organizational intranet. The Navy believes IT-21 will improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost reductions by significantly reducing the time and number of people required to carry out various tactical and administrative functions. FY2008 funding requested for IT-21 "continues to provide Integrated Shipboard Network Systems (Increment 1) procurement and installation to achieve a Full Operational Capability (FOC) for all platforms by FY2011." FORCEnet is the Navy's overall approach for linking various networks that contribute to naval NCW into a single capstone information network for U.S. naval forces. The Navy has highlighted FORCEnet as being at the center of Sea Power 21, the Navy's vision statement for the future. The Navy states that "Undersea FORCEnet Satellite Communications (SATCOM) FY2008 funding provides the Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity between Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms to conduct collaborative ASW. Connecting the platforms for collaborative ASW enables sharing of time critical queuing, classification, and targeting data, provides a means for precluding blue-on-blue engagement, and ensures rapid positioning of ASW platforms into the best attack posture to prosecute the threat submarine." Some observers have criticized FORCEnet for being insufficiently defined. The Naval Network Warfare Command issued a functional concept document for FORCEnet in February 2005, but Navy officials acknowledged at the time that the concept was not yet adequately defined and stated that an improved version of the document would be published in 2006. The conference report ( H.Rept. 107-732 ) on the FY2003 defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 5010 / P.L. 107-248 ) expressed concern about "the lack of specificity and documentation on the program," and directed the Navy to submit a detailed report on it by May 1, 2003 (page 279). The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report ( S.Rept. 108-87 , page 156) on the FY2004 defense appropriations bill ( S. 1382 ), expressed support for the FORCEnet program but also said it "is concerned that no requirements have been approved or implemented and that there is duplication of effort, especially in the areas of experimentation and demonstrations. The Committee directs that the FORCEnet program establish these requirements, test them within the Navy Warfighting Experimentations and Demonstrations line (PE0603758N), and release the approved requirements changes as quickly as possible." A significant program related to NCW is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is a corporate-style intranet linking more than 300 Navy and Marine Corps shore installations. NMCI is to include a total 344,000 computer work stations, or "seats." As of January 2006, the Navy had ordered 341,000 seats and fully implemented about 264,000. The Navy planned to achieve steady-state operation of all NMCI seats during FY2007. In October 2000, the Navy awarded an industry team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation an $6.9-billion, five-year contract for installing, supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI. In October 2002, Congress, through P.L. 107-254 , authorized a two-year extension to this contract, which is now worth $8.9 billion. Congress has closely followed the program for several years. The NMCI implementation effort has experienced a number of challenges and delays. A 2005 report from DOD's weapons-testing office identified problems found with the program in 2003. On September 30, 2004, the Navy and EDS restructured the terms of the NMCI contract to consolidate the number of performance measures and focus on measuring results rather than implementation steps. User reaction to the system reportedly has been mixed. A December 2006 Government Accountability office (GAO) report on NMCI stated: NMCI has not met its two strategic goals—to provide information superiority and to foster innovation via interoperability and shared services. Navy developed a performance plan in 2000 to measure and report progress towards these goals, but did not implement it because the program was more focused on deploying seats and measuring contractor performance against contractually specified incentives than determining whether the strategic mission outcomes used to justify the program were met. GAO's analysis of available performance data, however, showed that the Navy had met only 3 of 20 performance targets (15 percent) associated with the program's goals and nine related performance categories. By not implementing its performance plan, the Navy has invested, and risks continuing to invest heavily, in a program that is not subject to effective performance management and has yet to produce expected results. GAO's analysis also showed that the contractor's satisfaction of NMCI service level agreements (contractually specified performance expectations) has been mixed. Since September 2004, while a significant percentage of agreements have been met for all types of seats, others have not consistently been met, and still others have generally not been met. Navy measurement of agreement satisfaction shows that performance needed to receive contractual incentive payments for the most recent 5-month period was attained for about 55 to 59 percent of all eligible seats, which represents a significant drop from the previous 9-month period. GAO's analysis and the Navy's measurement of agreement satisfaction illustrate the need for effective performance management, to include examining agreement satisfaction from multiple perspectives to target needed corrective actions and program changes. GAO analysis further showed that NMCI's three customer groups (end users, commanders, and network operators) vary in their satisfaction with the program. More specifically, end user satisfaction surveys indicated that the percent of end users that met the Navy's definition of a satisfied user has remained consistently below the target of 85 percent (latest survey results categorize 74 percent as satisfied). Given that the Navy's definition of the term "satisfied" includes many marginally satisfied and arguably somewhat dissatisfied users, this percentage represents the best case depiction of end user satisfaction. Survey responses from the other two customer groups show that both were not satisfied. GAO interviews with customers at shipyards and air depots also revealed dissatisfaction with NMCI. Without satisfied customers, the Navy will be challenged in meeting program goals. To improve customer satisfaction, the Navy identified various initiatives that it described as completed, under way, or planned. However, the initiatives are not being guided by a documented plan(s), thus limiting their potential effectiveness. This means that after investing about 6 years and $3.7 billion, NMCI has yet to meet expectations, and whether it will is still unclear. Department of Defense officials conceded problems with the implementation of NMCI at a March 28, 2007, hearing before the Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Potential issues for Congress include the following: Is the Navy's implementation of NMCI adequate? To what degree is the system achieving its goals? Does the Navy have a clear and adequate acquisition strategy for developing a successor to CEC Block I? Is the FORCEnet concept adequately defined? Is the Navy taking sufficient actions for preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks on NCW computer networks? Is the Navy taking sufficient steps to provide adequate satellite bandwidth capacity to support NCW? Are Navy efforts to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage of NCW sufficient? Has the Navy taken the concept of NCW adequately into account in planning its future fleet architecture? What effect will implementation of NCW in U.S. and allied navies have on U.S.-allied naval interoperability?

Programs for implementing network-centric warfare (NCW) in the Navy include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) systems, the IT-21 program, and FORCEnet. A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). Congress has expressed concern for some of these programs, particularly NMCI. This report will be updated as events warrant.

RS21787 -- Foreign Trade Effects of an Alaskan Natural Gas Pipeline March 30, 2004 This report examines the policy implications for the U.S. current account balance of the construction of natural gas pipeline from Alaska to the lower 48 states. The 108th Congress hasincluded in H.R. 6 , the omnibus energy bill, provisions which provide incentives for the construction of anAlaska natural gas pipeline. A pipeline would link currentlyunavailable Alaskan gas supplies to the consuming market. This report analyzes the possible expansion orcontraction of natural gas imports as a result of constructing, or notconstructing, an Alaskan pipeline, within the framework of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). (1) NEMS is used by the EIA as a tool to forecast futureenergy trends asincluded in the AEO. (2) Recently, the EIA haspublished analyses of a variety of restricted natural gas supply scenarios including the non-availability of an Alaskanatural gas pipeline. (3) The AEO reference case forecast is the EIA's baseline estimate of the state of energy markets in the out years to 2025. (4) The reference case forecast projects naturalgas prices to be highenough after 2009 to begin construction of an Alaska natural gas pipeline. (5) In the forecast, natural gas deliveries come on stream from a pipeline in 2018with full capacity deliveriesbecoming available near the end of the forecast period, in 2024. If policy based incentives to construct a pipelinebecome available, it is possible that a pipeline might be constructedsooner than in the AEO reference case altering the results presented in this report. As a result of the constructionand delivery time line assumed in the reference case, the forecasts withand without the construction of a pipeline are virtually identical until 2018. This report will examine differencesin the forecasts for the years 2020 and 2025. (6) To focus on the international trade effects of the pipeline, likely variations in the current account balance in 2020 and 2025 will be calculated. The current account balance is a basicmeasure of a nation's foreign trade position and is defined as the nation's exports of goods and services minus thenation's imports of goods and services. When a nation's exportsexceed its imports, the country has a current account surplus. When a nation's imports exceed its exports, the nationhas a current account deficit. The EIA forecasts do not includeestimates of the cost of constructing the pipeline, or any trade effects that might come about as a result of sourcingdecisions for the steel and other goods and services used in theconstruction process. The current account balance effects described in this report are limited to the natural gas thata pipeline would deliver to the market. In the AEO reference case, an Alaska natural gas pipeline is expected to deliver approximately 2 trillion cubic feet (tcf), about 7% of yearly consumption, of gas per year by the time itreaches full capacity operation in 2024. Although deliveries are forecast to begin in 2018, they are expected to beginat approximately 0.8 tcf per year and grow to full capacity. By 2020 the reference case forecast projects a gap between total domestic production, 23.89 tcf, and total demand, 30.36 tcf, requiring imports of 6.47 tcf. The forecast projects that by2020 pipeline natural gas imports from Canada will be in decline compared to 2003 level. The U.S. imported 3.4tcf of natural gas from Canada in 2003, about 97% of importrequirements. By 2020 Canadian imports are expected to decline to 2.5 tcf, even though total U.S. importrequirement will have nearly doubled over 2003 levels. The reference forecastprojects that essentially all of the additional U.S. import requirements will come from liquefied natural gas (LNG). The values cited in the forecast are determined in conjunction withthe forecast wellhead price of natural gas in 2020 which is expected to reach $4.28 per thousand cubic feet in realterms, which would be over $8.00 per thousand cubic feet in nominalterms. (7) By 2025, the reference case projects total domestic production to reach 24.09 tcf and total demand to reach 31.33 tcf with a gap of 7.24 tcf to be filled by imports. In 2025, Canadianpipeline imports are projected to be 2.56 tcf with LNG again filling most of the remaining import gap. The referencecase forecast projects LNG demand growing from 2.16 tcf in 2010to 4.14 tcf in 2020 and 4.8 tcf in 2025. By 2025, the reference case projects a wellhead natural gas price of $4.40per thousand cubic feet in real terms, translating to a nominal price ofabout $8.40. (8) In contrast to the reference case forecast, the no pipeline case assumes that a natural gas pipeline from Alaska is not constructed. As a result, Alaskan natural gas production, whichtotaled about 0.51 tcf in 2003, is projected to rise to 0.72 tcf in 2020 and 0.51 tcf in 2025, less than the 2.29 tcf and2.71 tcf for the same years in the reference case. (9) Since imports areexpected to fill the gap between U.S. domestic production and total demand, a simple analysis might suggest thatthe no pipeline case would show an approximate 2 tcf increase inimports to compensate for no delivery of Alaskan gas. This is not the case, however. The unavailability of Alaskannatural gas through the pipeline leads to price increases in the naturalgas market. These price increases reduce the total demand for natural gas, as well as providing an incentive forproducers both in the U.S. and Canada to increase production. As aresult of these adjustments, the gas not available because of a lack of a pipeline from Alaska is not replaced byimports on a one to one basis in the EIA analysis. The increases in imports attributable to the lack of a natural gas pipeline from Alaska are 0.72 tcf in 2020, and 0.63 tcf in 2025 as projected in the EIA no pipeline case. To determinethe effect of these projected increases in natural gas imports, these quantities must be multiplied by appropriateprices. The EIA publishes import prices as part of the AEO referencecase, but not for the no pipeline case. As an approximation of the import price in the no pipeline case, CRS hascomputed prices based on the EIA reference case prices. (10) For 2020, theestimated import price is $4.81 per thousand cubic feet, and for 2025 it is $4.90 per thousand cubic feet. Based onthese values for price and quantity of imported natural gas, estimatedincreases in the value of natural gas imports as a result of lack of construction of a pipeline would be approximately$3.46 billion in 2020 and $3.09 billion in 2025. (11) To put theseprojected increases in imports in perspective, they are less than 1% of the current account deficit in 2002, the yearto which the price of natural gas is set in the EIA forecasts. Although these values represent potential increases in the current account deficits in 2020 and 2025 (or reductions in the surpluses), they might well be either increased or decreased byother related effects in the economy that might result from higher projected natural gas prices. For example,industrial demand for natural gas is projected to decrease. This could meanthat the U.S. production of chemicals, especially those that have natural gas as a large cost component, might bereduced. This might mean greater imports of fertilizers and otherchemicals bringing additional pressure on the current account balance. On the other hand, if the higher natural gasprices resulted in general reductions in income and employment in theUnited States, that might imply lower imports of consumer goods and services, improving the current accountbalance. The EIA analysis, which focuses on energy issues, does notprovide a detailed picture of all the secondary economic effects of higher natural gas prices as they alter relationshipsin the economy as a whole. An Alaska natural gas pipeline is projected to account for about 2 tcf of delivered gas in 2025 when operating at full capacity, but imports increase by only 0.63 tcf in that year as a resultof the lack of pipeline construction. In 2020, a pipeline is projected to deliver about 1.6 tcf, reflecting the build-upof delivered gas as operation begins in 2018, but imports increase byonly 0.72 tcf in the forecasts if no pipeline is constructed. It might appear that 1.37 tcf of gas in 2025, and almost1 tcf in 2020, has disappeared. The lost volumes can be accounted forby examining the effects of the higher projected prices of natural gas in 2025 and 2020 on aggregate demand andsupply. As a likely result of higher prices, projected natural gas demand is lower in the no pipeline case, both in 2025 and in 2020. Aggregate demand is 0.71 tcf lower in 2025 and 0.62 tcflower in 2020 compared to the reference case. In a 2025 comparison of demand patterns in the reference case andthe no Alaska pipeline case, all sectors reduce their consumption, butthe largest declines are in the industrial and electric generators at 0.11 tcf (1%) and 0.31 tcf (3.7%), respectively. In comparison, the residential and commercial sectors reduced theirconsumption by only 0.06 tcf (0.5%) in total. Fuel switching and reduced demand due to curtailed production arelikely explanations for the relatively larger reductions in the industrialand electric generator sectors. The pattern of reduced consumption is similar in 2020. Residential and commercial consumption each decline about 1%, while industrial demand declines by about 2% and demandfrom electric generators falls by 2.7%. On the production side of the market, because of the incentive of higher prices, domestic onshore and offshore production of natural gas in the lower 48 states increases, by 0.23 tcf in2020 and 0.67 tcf in 2025. For 2025, if the reduced demand of 0.71 tcf is added to the increased lower 48 statesproduction of 0.67 tcf the total is 1.38 tcf. If 1.38 tcf is added to theextra imports of 0.63 tcf the total is approximately equal to the 2 tcf that is not delivered through an Alaskanpipeline. For 2020, the reduction in demand is 0.72 tcf and the addedproduction projected from onshore and offshore production in the lower 48 states is 0.28 tcf which, when added,equals 1 tcf. Imports are projected to increase by 0.72 tcf in 2020 whichwhen added to the 1 tcf demand reduction and lower 48 state increased production equals 1.72 tcf which again isapproximately equal to the amount of gas not delivered as a result of noconstruction of an Alaska pipeline. (12) In the AEO reference case, an Alaska natural gas pipeline is projected to begin deliveries in 2018 and achieve full capacity delivery of about 2 tcf of gas per year to market when itachieves full capacity operation in 2025. This quantity of natural gas, subtracted from the market in the no pipelinecase, is sufficient to alter projected market prices. In the no pipelinecase, increases in the price of natural gas cause changes in consumption and production of gas, as well as thecomposition of gas sources. These price changes and resultant changessuggest that, in the forecast, energy markets compensate for the lack of Alaskan gas supplies in a variety of ways. As a result, the forecast increase in gas imports is not as great as theloss in deliveries from the pipeline if it is not constructed.

The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in the Annual Energy Outlook 2004(AEO), projects increased demand for imported naturalgas through 2025. The AEO reference case forecast assumes a natural gas pipeline will begin delivering Alaskannatural gas to the lower 48 state consuming markets in 2018. H.R. 6, the omnibus energy bill, contains provisions to enhance the future supply of natural gas throughconstruction of a pipeline. This report examines the effects of an Alaska natural gas pipeline on the U.S. current account balance. TheEIA finds that if the pipeline is not constructed, natural gas prices willincrease, markets will adjust, and imports of natural gas will increase. However, due to price induced marketadjustments, the increase in imports is projected to be less than the gasvolume lost from the lack of pipeline construction. As a result, if no pipeline is constructed, the effect on the currentaccount balance will be less than the value of the amount of gas thatwas projected to be delivered through a pipeline. This report will not be updated.

House and Senate rules define the term ea rmark slightly differently ( Table 1 ) but generally emphasize that an y congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff benefit be considered an earmark if it would benefit a specific entity or state, locality, or congressional district other than through a statutory or administrative formula or competitive award process. For the purposes of this report, from this point forward the term ea rmark includes any congressionally directed spending, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit. In the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), the House and Senate began observing what has been referred to as an earmark moratorium or earmark ban. The moratorium does not exist in House or Senate rules, however, and therefore is not enforced by points of order. Instead, the moratorium has been established by party rules and committee protocols and is enforced by chamber and committee leadership through their agenda-setting power. For example, the Rules of the House Republican Conference for the 112 th Congress (2011-2012) included a standing order labeled Earmark Moratorium that stated, "It is the policy of the House Republican Conference that no Member shall request a congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit, as such terms have been described in the Rules of the House." This language has been included in orders adopted by the conference in the 113 th , 114 th and 115 th Congresses (2013-2018). Likewise, in early 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a press release stating that it would implement a two-year moratorium on earmarks (which was later extended). Additionally, the Senate Republican Conference adopted a resolution on November 14, 2012, that included an earmark moratorium. It stated "Resolved, that it is the policy of the [Senate] Republican Conference that no Member shall request a congressionally directed spending item, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit, as such terms are used in Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate for the 113 th Congress." This same rule has been adopted by Senate Republicans in each Congress through the 115 th Congress (2017-2018). As noted above, the earmark moratorium is not codified in House or Senate rules. Therefore, lifting the earmark moratorium would not require an amendment to either chamber's rules. Since the moratorium has been established through Republican Party rules and committee protocols and has been enforced by chamber and committee leadership through their agenda-setting power, presumably the moratorium might be "lifted" simply by either or both chambers permitting the development and consideration of legislation that includes earmarks. The House and Senate continue to have formal earmark disclosure requirements in their standing rules that were first established in the 110 th Congress (2007-2008) with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to earmarking. A summary of those requirements is presented below. For additional information, see CRS Report RS22866, Earmark Disclosure Rules in the House: Member and Committee Requirements , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22867, Earmark Disclosure Rules in the Senate: Member and Committee Requirements , by [author name scrubbed]. House Rules generally require that certain legislation be accompanied by a list of congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits that are included in the measure or its report or include a statement that the proposition contains no earmarks. Depending upon the type of measure, the list or statement is to be either included in the measure's accompanying report or printed in the Congressional Record . House earmark disclosure rules apply to any earmark included in either the text of a bill or joint resolution, or the committee report accompanying them, as well as to conference reports and their accompanying joint explanatory statements. The disclosure requirements apply to items in authorizing, appropriations, and tax legislation. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to unreported measures, "managers amendments," Senate bills and joint resolutions, and conference reports. Under the House Code of Official Conduct, a Member requesting a congressional earmark is required to provide a written statement to the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction that includes: the Member's name; the name and address of the intended earmark recipient (if there is no specific recipient, the location of the intended activity should be included); in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, identification of the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit, to the extent known to the Member; the purpose of the earmark; and a certification that the Member or Member's spouse has no financial interest in such an earmark. Under House rules, the earmark disclosure responsibilities of House committees and conference committees fall into three major categories: (1) determining if a spending provision is an earmark, (2) compiling earmark requests for presentation to the full chamber, and (3) preserving records related to the earmark requests. Individual committees may establish their own additional requirements in the committee rules they are required to adopt each Congress. Committees of jurisdiction must use their discretion to decide what constitutes an earmark. Definitions in House rules, as well as past earmark designations, may provide guidance in determining if a certain provision constitutes an earmark. House rules state that in the case of any reported bill or joint resolution or conference report, a list of included earmarks and their sponsors (or a statement declaring the absence of earmarks) must be included in the corresponding committee report or joint explanatory statement. In the case of a measure not reported by a committee or a manager's amendment, the committee of initial referral must cause a list of earmarks and their sponsors, or a letter stating the absence of earmarks, to be printed in the Congressional Record before floor consideration. A conference report accompanying a regular appropriations bill must identify congressional earmarks in the conference report or joint explanatory statement that were not specified in the legislation or report as it initially passed either chamber. Each House committee and conference committee is responsible for "maintaining" all written requests for earmarks received—even those not ultimately included in the legislation or report. Furthermore, those requests that were included in any measure reported by the committee must not only be "maintained" but also be "open for public inspection." Rule XXIII does not define these terms. Senate rules prohibit a vote on a motion to proceed to consider a measure or a vote on adoption of a conference report unless the chair of the committee or the majority leader (or designee) certifies that a complete list of earmarks and the name of each Senator requesting each earmark is available on a publicly accessible congressional website in a searchable format at least 48 hours before the vote. If a Senator proposes a floor amendment containing additional earmarks, those items must be printed in the Congressional Record as soon as "practicable. " If these earmark certification requirements have not been met, a point of order may lie against consideration of the legislation or vote on the conference report. A point of order could not be raised against a floor amendment. Senate earmark disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark included in either the text of the bill or joint resolution or the committee report accompanying the measure as well as to conference reports and their accompanying joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to items in authorizing, appropriations, and tax legislation. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to unreported measures, amendments, House bills, and conference reports. Under Senate rules, a Senator requesting that a congressional earmark be included in a measure is required to provide a written statement to the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction that includes: the Senator's name; the name and address of the intended earmark recipient (or, if there is no specific recipient, the location of the intended activity); in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, identification of the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit to the extent known to the Senator; the purpose of the earmark; and a certification that neither the Senator nor the Senator's immediate family has a financial interest in such an earmark. Under the Senate rule, the earmark disclosure responsibilities of Senate committees and conference committees fall into three major categories: (1) determining if a spending provision is an earmark, (2) compiling earmark requests for presentation, and (3) certifying that requirements under the rule have been met. Committees of jurisdiction may use their discretion to decide what constitutes an earmark. Definitions in Senate rules, as well as past earmark designations during the 110 th Congress (2007-2008), may provide guidance in determining if a certain provision constitutes an earmark. Senate Rules state that before consideration of a measure or conference report is in order, a list of included earmarks and their sponsors must be identified through lists, charts, or other means and made available on a publicly accessible congressional website for at least 48 hours. The rule states that the consideration of a measure or conference report is not in order until the applicable committee chair or the majority leader (or designee) "certifies" that the requirements stated above have been met. The 116 th Congress may examine what changes, if any, are needed in the area of earmark policy. Congress may choose to keep the earmark moratorium in place but insert it into formal chamber rules. Alternatively, Congress might choose to lift the earmark moratorium but institute any number of policies or restrictions to govern the use of congressional earmarks. Just as in the past, these policies or restrictions might be instituted through formal amendments to House and Senate standing rules or by enacting new provisions in law. Restrictions could also be instituted through party rules, leadership and committee practices and protocols, or standing order. Such policies or restrictions could seek to accomplish a number of goals. For example, some policies could seek to add additional transparency to the earmarking process. In the past the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have required Members requesting earmarks to post information regarding earmarks on their personal websites, including the purpose of the earmark and why it was a valuable use of taxpayer funds. In 2010, the House Appropriations Committee stated that it would "establish a 'one-stop' online link to all House Members' appropriations earmark requests to enable the public to easily view them." Congress could also restrict the purposes for which an earmark might be used or prohibit certain entities from receiving earmarks entirely. For example, according to press reports, the House Appropriations Committee adopted a policy prohibiting earmarks for projects named after the Member of Congress requesting the earmark. In March 2010, the House Appropriations Committee announced that it would no longer consider earmarks directed to for-profit entities. Congress could also limit the amount that might be spent on an earmark. Such a limit could apply to each specific earmark or to the total cost of all earmarks. For example, in January 2009, the House Appropriations Committee articulated a policy of limiting "total funding for non-project based earmarks" to 50% of the 2006 levels and no more than 1% of the total discretionary budget. Congress could also choose to institute new policies or restrictions that would involve the executive branch. This could allow the executive branch to affect the earmarking process by, for example, advising committees on whether a potential earmark constitutes a suitable use of funds. Congress could also involve the executive branch by requiring agency inspectors general to audit spending for earmarked projects in order to ensure that the funds are being used for their intended purpose. Congress could also choose to conduct further research into the practice of earmarking generally. This might involve asking CRS or the Government Accountability Office to perform research or creating a select committee to study earmarks and recommend new policies or restrictions.

While the term earmark has been used historically to describe various types of congressional spending actions, since the 110th Congress (2007-2008) House and Senate rules have defined an earmark as any congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff benefit that would benefit an entity or a specific state, locality, or congressional district. In the 112th Congress (2011-2012), the House and Senate began observing what has been referred to as an earmark moratorium or earmark ban. The moratorium does not exist in House or Senate chamber rules, however, and therefore is not enforced by points of order. Instead, the moratorium has been established by party rules and committee protocols and is enforced by chamber and committee leadership through their agenda-setting power. In recent years, some Members have expressed interest in lifting the earmark moratorium. Whether or not the earmark moratorium is lifted, the House and Senate continue to have formal earmark disclosure rules that were implemented in the 110th Congress with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to earmarking. These rules generally prohibit consideration of certain legislation unless information is provided about any earmarks included in the legislation. House and Senate rules require that any Member submitting an earmark request provide a written statement that includes the name of the Member, the name and address of the earmark recipient, and a certification that the Member has no financial interest in the earmark. House and Senate rules require that committees determine whether a provision constitutes an earmark, and committees must compile and make accessible certain earmark-related information. If Congress were to lift the current earmark ban, it might also choose to institute any number of policies or restrictions to govern the use of congressional earmarks. These policies or restrictions might be instituted through formal amendments to the House and Senate standing rules, by standing order, or by enacting new law. Such policies might also be instituted through party rules or leadership and committee practices and protocols. Some policies might seek to add more transparency to the earmarking process or prohibit certain types of entities from receiving earmarks. Restrictions might be implemented related to the purposes for which an earmark could be used or limiting the amount of federal dollars that might be spent on earmarks. Other policy approaches might potentially involve the executive branch or the congressional support agencies.

RS20721 -- Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress Updated January 30, 2001 On October 12, 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole (1) was attacked by a small boat laden with explosives during a brief refueling stop in the harbor ofAden,Yemen. (2) The suicide terrorist attack killed 17members of the ship's crew, wounded 39 others, and seriously damaged the ship. (3) The attack has been widelycharacterized as a "boat bomb" adaptation of the truck-bomb tactic used to attack the U.S. Marine Corps barracksin Beirut in 1983 and the Khobar Towers U.S.military residence in Saudi Arabia in 1996. The FBI, in conjunction with Yemeni law-enforcement officials, is leading an investigation to determine who is responsible for the attack. At least six suspects arein custody in Yemen. Evidence developed to date suggests that it may have been carried out by Islamic militantswith possible connections to the terrorist networkled by Usama bin Ladin. (4) In addition to the FBI-ledinvestigation, Secretary of Defense William Cohen has formed a special panel headed by retired GeneralWilliam W. Crouch, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr, formercommander-in-chief of U.S. Joint ForcesCommand. The panel, in a report released January 9, 2001, avoided assigning blame but found significantshortcomings in security throughout the region andrecommend improvements in training and intelligence designed to thwart terrorist attacks. A Navy investigation,the results of which were released by theCommander of the Atlantic Fleet on January 19, 2001, concluded that many of the procedures in the ship's securityplan had not been followed, but that even ifthey had been followed, the incident could not have been prevented. Consequently, no single individual should bedisciplined for the incident, i.e. blame must bedistributed at a number of administrative levels. Members and staff have also held classified meetings on the attackwith Administration officials. The attack on the Cole raises potential issues for Congress concerning (1) procedures used by the Cole and other U.S. forces overseas to protect against terroristattacks; (2) intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination as it relates to potential terrorist attacks; and (3) U.S.anti-terrorism policy and how the U.S. shouldrespond to this attack. These issues are discussed below. Force-protection procedures. Before it arrived at Aden for its brief refueling stop, the Cole, like all visitingU.S. ships, was required to file a force-protection plan for the visit. This plan was approved by higher U.S. militaryauthorities, and was implemented during theship's visit. In accordance with the plan, the Cole at the time of the attack was operating under threat conditionBravo, which is a heightened state of readinessagainst potential terrorist attack. (The lowest condition of heightened readiness is Alpha; Bravo is higher; Charlieis higher still, and Delta is the highest.) Thisthreat condition includes steps that are specifically intended to provide protection against attack by small boats. Members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees and other observers have raised several issues concerning the force-protection procedures beingused by the Cole and by other U.S. military forces and bases in the region, including the following: What were the elements of the Cole's force-protection plan and how were these elements determined? Did the Cole effectively implement all the elements of this plan? If not, why not? If so, does this indicate that the plan was not adequate fordefending against this type of attack? Was the force-protection plan, including the use of threat condition Bravo, appropriate in light of the terrorist threat information that wasavailable to military officials in the days leading up to the ship's visit? Was the ship's threat condition consistentwith the very high threat condition beingmaintained at that time by the U.S. embassy in Yemen? What changes, if any, should be made in force-protection policies for ships and other U.S. military forces and bases overseas, particularly inthe Middle East and Persian Gulf region? Given the need for Navy ships to periodically refuel and receive otherservices from local sources, as well as thepotential difficulty of identifying hostile craft in often-crowded harbors, how much can be done to reduce the riskof future attacks like this one? What can be doneto protect against more sophisticated terrorist tactics for attacking ships, such as using midget or personalsubmarines, scuba divers with limpet mines, orcommand-detonated harbor mines? Should the Navy reduce its use of ports for refueling stops and instead rely moreon at-sea tanker refuelings? How manyadditional tankers, at what cost, might be needed to implement such a change, and how would this affect the Navy'sability to use such stops to contribute to U.S.engagement with other countries? In addition to these issues, members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees at the hearings also raised an underlying question on whether the Cole'srefueling stop was necessary from an operational (as opposed to political/diplomatic) point of view. (5) Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. Members of the Armed Services and Intelligencecommittees as well as other observers have raised several questions relating to the role of intelligence collection,analysis and dissemination in the Cole attack andin preventing other terrorist attacks against the United States. In some cases, these questions have been spurred bypress reports about the existence of informationand analyses from the U.S. Intelligence Community that, some argue, might have helped prevent the attack had itbeen given greater consideration or beendisseminated more quickly. (6) The details of theseclaims are currently under investigation by the Executive Branch and Committees in Congress. Questionsinclude the following: Does the United States have sufficient intelligence collection capacity, particularly in the form of human intelligence (as opposed tointelligence gathering by satellites or other technical means), for learning about potential terrorist attacks,particularly in the Middle East or Persian Gulf? Doesthe attack on the Cole represent a U.S. intelligence failure, or does it instead reflect the significant challenges oflearning about all such attacks soon enough tohead them off? In the days and weeks prior to the attack on the Cole, was all the available intelligence information about potential terrorist attacks in theMiddle East and Persian Gulf given proper weight in U.S. assessments of the terrorist threat in that region? Werereports providing information and analyses ofpotential terrorist attacks in the region disseminated on a timely basis to U.S. military and civilian officials in theregion who have responsibility for providingadvice or making decisions about ship refueling stops or other military operations? Was there adequate coordination, prior to the attack on the Cole, between the Defense Department [including the National Security Agency],the State Department, and the U.S. Central Command (the regional U.S. military command for the Middle East andPersian Gulf) in sharing and using availableintelligence information and analyses on potential terrorist attacks? What actions, if any, should be taken to improve U.S. intelligence collection and analysis, particularly as it relates to potential terroristattacks on U.S. assets in the Middle East and Persian Gulf or elsewhere? U.S. anti-terrorism policy and potential response. Beyond these more specific issues, the attack on the Coleposes several additional potential issues relating to U.S. anti-terrorism policy in general. Some of these issueshighlight dilemmas and concerns inherent inpolicies designed to prevent or mitigate terrorist acts. These issues include the following: Why was Yemen chosen for refueling? U.S. Navy ships began making refueling stops in Aden in January 1999. Since then, Navy ships have stopped there 27 times to refuel, twice to make port visits, and once to take on supplies. Members of the Armed Services Committeesand other observers have asked why the U.S. Central Command decided in 1998 to begin using Yemen for refuelingstops rather than continuing to use nearbyDjibouti on the Horn of Africa (which U.S. Navy ships had used for refueling for several years) - and why CentralCommand continued to use Yemen this year forrefuelings when an April 2000 State Department report on worldwide terrorism characterized Yemen as a havenfor terrorists but did not mention Djibouti. Members and others have asked whether the risk of a terrorist attack against a U.S. ship in Yemen was properlybalanced against the political/diplomatic goals ofimproving relations with Yemen and encouraging its development toward a stable, pro-Western, democratic countrythat does not support terrorism and cooperateswith U.S. efforts to contain Iraq. In response, General Tommy R. Franks, the current Commander-in-Chief of U.S.Central Command, stated the followingregarding the process that led his predecessor, General Anthony C. Zinni, to the decision to use Yemen for refuelingstops: The decision to go into Aden for refueling was based on operational as well as geo-strategic factors and included anassessment of the terrorist and conventional threats in the region. As you know, the Horn of Africa was in greatturmoil in 1998. We had continuing instability inSomalia, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, an ongoing war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and aninternal war in Sudan....As of December 1998, 14 ofthe 20 countries in the USCENTCOM AOR [U.S. Central Command area of responsibility] were characterized as"High Threat"countries. Djibouti, which had been the Navy refueling stop in the Southern Red Sea for over a decade, began to deteriorate as auseful port because of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. This war caused increased force-protection concerns for our ships,as well as congestion in the port resulting inoperational delays. The judgment at this time was that USCENTCOM needed to look for more refueling options,and Aden, Yemen was seen as a viablealternative. At the time the refueling contract was signed, the addition brought the number of ports available in theUSCENTCOM AOR to 13. Selection of whichof these ports to use for a specific refueling operation involves careful evaluation of the threat and operationalrequirements. The terrorism threat is endemic in the AOR, and USCENTCOM takes extensive measures to protect our forces.... Thethreat situation was monitored regularly in Yemen and throughout the AOR. The intelligence community andUSCENTCOM consider this AOR a High Threatenvironment, and our assessments of the regional threat and the threat in Yemen were consistent in their evaluation.We had conducted a number of threatassessments in the port, and throughout the area. However, leading up to the attack on USS Cole on 12 October,we received no specific threat information forYemen or for the port of Aden that would cause us to change our assessment. Had such warning been received,action would have been taken by the operatingforces in response to the warning. (7) Anticipating new modes of terrorist attack. Truck bombs have been used to attack U.S. targets for at least 17 years. Did U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies anticipate or consider sufficiently plausible the possible useof the maritime equivalent of a truck bombagainst a U.S. Navy ship in a harbor? If not, what changes, if any, should be made to improve the ability of U.S.intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies toidentify and give sufficient prominence to modes of terrorist attack that have not been previously used? Should U.S.officials reach out more to non-governmentalorganizations and individuals for help in this regard? Protecting against threats posed by persons with legitimate access. What is the best way to defend against terroristattacks by persons with legitimate access to U.S. installations or forces? The Cole was refueled by a private Yemeniship supply company that had advanceinformation on the ship's itinerary. Although it now appears that the attack may have been carried out by personswith no connection to this firm, the attack stillraises questions about the security implications of relying on private foreign companies to refuel U.S. Navy ships. What steps can be taken to reduce the riskposed by relying on such firms? Should, for example, the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program(ATA) be enhanced so that it can better assistforeign governments, when needed, in personnel screening and security procedures? The role of the FBI in overseas counter-terrorism investigations. Some observers have asked whether (or underwhat circumstances) it is appropriate for the FBI, traditionally a domestic U.S. law-enforcement agency, to take a de facto lead role in overseas investigations ofterrorist attacks. Although the FBI's investigative skills are critical to such investigations, some observers argue thatother skills outside the FBI's area ofspecialization, including having an in-depth understanding of foreign countries and cultures and the diplomaticability to ensure host nation cooperation, areequally important components of such investigations. Clearly, small nations may feel overwhelmed by largenumbers of FBI agents and the political sensitivitiesof their insistence on questioning local witnesses/suspects. Conferees on the FY2001 Foreign OperationsAppropriations bill ( H.R. 4811 ) made $4million for counter-terrorism training in Yemen contingent on FBI certification that Yemen is fully cooperating inthe Cole investigation. Insuring coordination of any retaliatory response. An important challenge facing U.S. counter-terrorism officials isto ensure that U.S. actions for military/economic retaliation for terrorist attacks are adequately planned. The needfor maintaining secrecy in planning militaryactions can discourage interagency coordination, which in turn can create a potential for making a planning mistake. Some observers argue that the U.S. cruisemissile attack on what some believe was a legitimate pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in response to the 1998embassy bombings in East Africa was a mistakecaused in part by lack of interagency coordination that deprived decisionmakers of important data which might haveinfluenced the target-selection process. (8) If itis determined that the attack was linked to Bin Ladin, a major issue is how the U.S. responds and prevents furtherattacks from a network that is believedresponsible for several anti-U.S. attacks since 1992. The U.S. retaliatory attack on Afghanistan in August 1998,a response to the East Africa Embassy bombings,did little to damage Bin Ladin's network or his ability to plan attacks.

On October 12, 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked by a small boat ladenwith explosives during a briefrefueling stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen. The suicide terrorist attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew,wounded 39 others, and seriously damaged theship. Evidence developed to date suggests that it may have been carried out by Islamic militants with possibleconnections to the terrorist network led by Usamabin Ladin. The FBI, Defense Department, and Navy launched investigations to determine culpability for the attackand to review procedures. A broad DoD reviewof accountability was conducted by a special panel. On January 9, 2001, the panel issued its report which avoidedassigning blame but found significantshortcomings in security against terrorist attacks, including inadequate training and intelligence. On January 23,2001, Senate Armed Services CommitteeChairman, John Warner, announced intentions for the Committee to hold its own investigation. Issues for Congressinclude the adequacy of (1) procedures byU.S. forces to protect against terrorist attacks; (2) intelligence related to potential terrorist attacks; and (3) U.S.anti-terrorism policy and response. This report willbe updated if major new developments warrant.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), P.L. 95-511 , 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as amended, provides a statutory framework for the U.S. government to engage in electronic surveillance and physical searches to obtain foreign intelligence information. It also provides a statutory structure for the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices for use in federal investigations to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Such an investigation of a U.S. person may not be conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. In addition, FISA provides statutory authority for the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or his designee to seek a U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order authorizing the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Again, such an investigation of a U.S. person may not conducted solely on the basis of First Amendment-protected activities. A production order for tangible things may be accompanied by a nondisclosure order. Under Section 501(d) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d), no person shall disclose to any other person that the FBI has sought or obtained tangible things pursuant to an order under this section, other than to those persons to whom disclosure is necessary to comply with such order, an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance with respect to the production of things in response to the order, or other persons as permitted by the Director of the FBI or the designee of the Director. A person to whom a disclosure is made is also subject to the nondisclosure requirements. Any person making or intending to make a disclosure to a person to whom disclosure is necessary to comply with the order or to whom disclosure is permitted by the Director of the FBI or his designee must, at the request of the Director or his designee, identify the person to whom disclosure is to be or has been made. With limited exceptions, electronic surveillance and physical searches may be conducted under FISA pursuant to court orders issued by a judge of the FISC, and pen registers and trap and trace devices may be installed and used pursuant to the order of a FISC judge or a U.S. Magistrate Judge authorized to act in that judge's behalf. In all instances in which the production of any tangible thing is required under FISA, an order from a FISC judge or a U.S. Magistrate Judge authorized to act in the judge's behalf must be obtained. Appeals from the denial of applications for FISC orders approving electronic surveillance, physical search, or production of tangible things may be made by the U.S. government to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Court of Review (Court of Review). If the denial of an application is upheld by the Court of Review, a petition for certiorari may be filed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This report discusses the creation and structure of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review and their respective jurisdictions. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1803, establishes the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. The FISC is composed of 11 U.S. district court judges publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States from seven circuits, at least three of whom must reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia. The Chief Justice publicly designates one of the FISC judges to be presiding judge. Although there is a procedure for the publication of FISC opinions, such publication is extremely rare. Only one opinion has been published since the court's inception in 1978, In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court , 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct. 2002). Under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rule 5(c), [o]n request by a Judge, the Presiding Judge, after consulting with other Judges of the Court, may direct that an Opinion be published. Before publications, the Opinion must be reviewed by the Executive Branch and redacted, as necessary, to ensure that properly classified information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 12958 as amended by Executive Order 13292 (or its successor). Three of the FISC judges who reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia, or, if all of those judges are unavailable, other FISC judges designated by the presiding judge of the FISC, comprise a petition review pool that has jurisdiction to review petitions filed pursuant to subsection 501(f)(1) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(1), to challenge a production order for tangible things in a foreign intelligence, international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities investigation under section 501 of FISA, or a nondisclosure order imposed in connection with such a production order. The Court of Review is composed of three judges publicly designated by the Chief Justice from the United States district courts or courts of appeals. The Chief Justice also publicly designates one of the three judges as the presiding judge of the court. Only one opinion has been published by the Court of Review, In re Sealed Case , 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intell. Surveil. Ct. Rev. 2002), which is the first opinion the court has issued. Each FISC and Court of Review judge serves for a maximum of seven years and is not eligible for redesignation. The FISC has jurisdiction to hear applications for and to grant court orders approving electronic surveillance or physical searches anywhere in the United States to obtain foreign intelligence information under FISA. No FISC judge may hear an application for electronic surveillance or a physical search under FISA that has been denied previously by another FISC judge. In general, such applications are either granted, granted as modified, or denied. If a FISC judge denies an application for an order authorizing electronic surveillance under FISA, such judge shall provide immediately for the record a written statement of each reason for his or her decision and, on motion of the United States, the record shall be transmitted, under seal, to the Court of Review. Proceedings in the FISC, conducted pursuant to procedures adopted under subsection 103(f)(1) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(f)(1), and proceedings of the Court of Review, are to be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The record of such proceedings, including applications made and orders granted, must be maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. Either a FISC judge or a U.S. Magistrate Judge publicly designated by the Chief Justice to act on behalf of such judge may hear applications for and grant orders approving installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a U.S. person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. As in the case of pen registers and trap and trace devices, either a FISC judge or a U.S. Magistrate Judge publicly designated by the Chief Justice to act on behalf of such judge may hear applications for and grant orders approving production of any tangible thing for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a U.S. person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. A person who receives a production order may challenge that order by filing a petition with the petition review pool created by section 103(e) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e). The recipient of a production order must wait at least a year before challenging the nondisclosure order imposed in connection with that production order by filing a petition with the petition review pool to modify or set aside the nondisclosure order. If the judge denies a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order, the recipient of such order must wait at least another year before filing another such petition with respect to such nondisclosure order. Any production or nondisclosure order not explicitly modified or set aside remains in full effect. Judicial proceedings under this subsection are conducted under the Procedures for Review of Petitions filed pursuant to Section 501(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended, and are to be concluded as expeditiously as possible. The record of proceedings, including petitions filed, orders granted, and statements of reasons for decision, are maintained under security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. All petitions under this subsection are filed under seal. In any proceedings under this subsection, the court shall, upon request of the government, review ex parte and in camera any government submission, or portions thereof, that may include classified information. The procedure for challenging production or nondisclosure orders before the petition review pool of the FISC contrasts with that applicable to motions to suppress information obtained through or derived from electronic surveillance, physical search, or the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device under FISA, which a federal, state, or local government intends to use or disclose in a trial or other official proceeding. If a federal, state, or local government intends to use or disclose information obtained by or derived from a FISC order authorizing electronic surveillance, a physical search, or the use of a pen register or trap and trace device, any challenges to the use or disclosure of that information must be made in the U.S. district court in which the motion or request is made, or, if the motion or request is made before another federal, state, or local authority, in the United States district court in the same district as that authority. Such challenges may include motions to suppress made under FISA by an "aggrieved person" against whom such information is intended to be used or disclosed; and any motion or request made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States or any state before any court or other authority of the United States or any state to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to FISA electronic surveillance, physical search, or use of a pen register or trap and trace device or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from the use of such investigative techniques under FISA. Similar, but not identical, to the proceedings before the petition review panel regarding production orders or nondisclosure orders, the U.S. district court proceedings addressing motions to suppress information obtained by or derived from a FISA electronic surveillance, physical search, or pen register or trap and trace device, or seeking to discover or obtain related materials may be considered ex parte and in camera if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or any adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States. If the United States district court determines that the electronic surveillance, physical search, or installation and use of the pen register or trap and trace device in regard to the aggrieved person was not lawfully authorized or conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of law, suppress the evidence that was unlawfully obtained or derived therefrom or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved person. If the court determines that the electronic surveillance, physical search, or installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device was lawfully authorized or conducted, it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure. Orders granting such motions or requests, decisions that a FISA electronic surveillance, physical search, or installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device was not lawfully authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States district court requiring review or granting disclosure of applications, orders, or other materials relating thereto shall be final orders and binding upon all courts of the United States and the several states except a United States Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The government may seek review of a denial of an application for a court order under FISA authorizing electronic surveillance, physical search, or production of any tangible thing before the Court of Review. If the denial is upheld by the Court of Review, the government may seek U.S. Supreme Court review of the decision by a petition for certiorari. In addition, the Court of Review has jurisdiction over petitions for review of a decision under section 501(f)(2) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2), to affirm, modify, or set aside a production order or nondisclosure order filed by the government or any person receiving such an order. Upon the request of the government, any order setting aside a nondisclosure order shall be stayed pending such review. The Court of Review shall provide for the record a written statement of the reasons for its decision and, on petition by the government or any person receiving such order for writ of certiorari, the record shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision. The U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction, on a petition for certiorari, to review decisions of the Court of Review affirming a denial of an application for an order authorizing electronic surveillance, physical searches, production orders, or nondisclosure orders under FISA.

The national debate regarding the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) focused congressional attention on the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Congressional interest in these courts has been heightened by the January 17, 2007, letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter advising them that a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge had "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization," stating that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and noting that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. This report examines the creation, membership, structure, and jurisdiction of these courts. It will be updated as subsequent events may require.

Since China established the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) on July 1, 1997, there have been questions about when and how the democratization of Hong Kong will take place. At present, Hong Kong's Chief Executive is selected by an "Election Committee" of 800 largely appointed people, and its Legislative Council (Legco) consists of 30 members elected by universal suffrage in five geographic districts and 30 members selected by 28 "functional constituencies" representing various important sectors. Hong Kong's Basic Law (adopted in 1990) establishes the goal of election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and Legislative Council by universal suffrage, but does not establish a concrete timetable or path for such a transformation. The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPCSC) released its "Decision on Issues Relating to the Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage" on December 29, 2007. In its decision, the NPCSC ruled out the direct election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and Legco by universal suffrage in the elections of 2012. However, the decision also stated that the Chief Executive may be directly elected by universal suffrage in 2017, provided certain conditions were met. The NPCSC also decided that all members of the Legco may be elected by universal suffrage after the direct election of Chief Executive has taken place, effectively setting 2020 as the first possible year for fully democratic Legco elections. The NPCSC's decision also included a number of guidelines for the conduct of future elections in Hong Kong, as well as possible changes in election procedures that can and cannot be made before 2017. The decision was in response to a report on Hong Kong's constitutional development and the need to amend its election methods submitted to the NPCSC by Hong Kong's current Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen on December 12, 2007. According to an NPCSC decision of 2004, in order to amend Hong Kong's methods or voting procedures, Hong Kong's Chief Executive must submit a report justifying its need. The initial responses to the NPCSC's decision—both within Hong Kong and internationally—were varied both in their interpretations of the content of the decision and the implications for democratization in Hong Kong. Tsang welcomed the decision as a clear timetable for democratization. Opinions from Hong Kong's various political parties ranged from strong approval to strong disappointment. U.S. and U.K. government representatives gave the decision a more mixed review, while Taiwanese officials considered the decision more proof that "one country, two systems" model would not work for Taiwan. In part, the differences in the response to the NPCSC's decision may be attributed to the perceived ambiguity of its wording, which allows for differing interpretations of its content. However, the apparent ambiguity of the decision's wording might also be the result of the NPCSC's efforts to abide by the technical legal aspects of the issues addressed by the decision. Portions of the decision are unequivocal. The first sentence of the first section of the decision clearly prohibits the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2012, and the second sentence clearly prohibits the election of Legco by universal suffrage in 2012. The second sentence also prohibits altering the 50-50 split in the Legco between members elected by geographic regions and members selected by functional constituencies in the 2012 election. Other portions of the decision are more open to interpretation. Regarding both the Chief Executive and Legco elections of 2012, the decision states that "appropriate amendments may be [emphasis added] made to the specific method" of selection. However, the original Chinese— keyi zuo chu shidang xiugai —could be construed either as the NPCSC granting Hong Kong permission to make appropriate amendments or that Hong Kong may propose appropriate amendments, without implying that the amendments would be necessarily accepted by the NPCSC. Similarly, regarding the Chief Executive election of 2017 and subsequent Legco elections, the decision states it "may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage" [ keyi shixing you puxuan chansheng de banfa ], but the language is subject to the same ambiguity of interpretation between the granting of permission or the statement of possibility. Regardless of one's interpretation of these phrases, the decision does provide a clear statement of how election changes are to be made. Amending the election process involves a six-step process. First, the Chief Executive "shall make a report" [ ti chu baogao ] to the NPCSC on the need for amendment of Hong Kong's election process. Second, the NPCSC will make a determination [ queding ] on the issue of the need for amendment, but not on specific changes. Third, the Hong Kong government shall introduce a bill of amendments to the Legco. Fourth, Legco must pass the bill of amendments by at least a two-third majority. Fifth, the Chief Executive must approve the bill passed by Legco. Sixth, the bill shall be reported to the NPCSC for its approval [ pizhun ] when amending the election of the Chief Executive, and "for the record" [ beian ], when amending the election of Legco. The decision also is clear that a nominating committee [ timing weiyuanhui ] is also a required part of any process of selecting the Chief Executive, and that the nominating committee "may be formed with reference to" [ ke canzhao ] the Election Committee that currently selects the Chief Executive. On the day of the decision, Tsang issued an official statement, saying "The HKSAR Government and I welcome this decision, which has set a clear timetable for electing the Chief Executive and Legislative Council by universal suffrage." He also called on the people of Hong Kong to "treasure this hard-earned opportunity" and urged "everyone, with utmost sincerity, to bring an end to unnecessary contention, and to move towards reconciliation and consensus." Tsang set a goal of settling the election reforms for 2012 by the end of his second and final term in office, and hopes to "have formulated options" by the fourth quarter of 2008. To that end, he asked Hong Kong's Commission on Strategic Development "to consider the most appropriate electoral methods for the elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council in 2012." Opinions among Hong Kong's political parties were mixed, generally along established ideological lines, with disagreement on the general and specific implications of the decision. According to Jackie Hung Ling-yu, a member of Hong Kong's Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), "Beijing only tries to play with words to cheat Hong Kong people. There has not been any promise that we can have universal suffrage in 2017." Civic Party leader, Audrey Eu Yuet-mee, echoed Hung's view, maintaining that this was the second time that the NPCSC had ruled out universal suffrage in a specific election in Hong Kong. Martin Lee Chu-ming, founding chairman of Hong Kong's Democratic Party, called the decision "hollow and empty," providing neither a detailed roadmap nor a clear model for universal suffrage. In an interview on RTHK radio in Hong Kong, Tam Yiu-chung, chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), said that, in light of the NPCSC's decision, the focus should be on how the functional constituencies could work with universal suffrage. However, Yeung Sam, current Legco member from the Democratic Party, disagreed, stating that the functional constituencies were incompatible with universal suffrage. Liberal Party chairman James Tien Pei-chun took a broader view of the decision, stating, "No matter how you see it, you should try your best to ensure Hong Kong's three million-odd registered voters have a chance to elect the Chief Executive in 2017." Public opinion polls taken after the announcement of the decision have revealed a generally positive response. A telephone-based poll of over 1,000 Hong Kong residents conducted by a Hong Kong radio station on December 30 and 31, 2007, found half of the respondents were satisfied with the overall content of the decision, but 35% were dissatisfied. In a survey of 500 people done by Hong Kong University for the Hong Kong newspaper, Ming Pao , 42.7% of the respondents had welcomed the decision, 28.7% were opposed, and 23.6% were "half and half." A similar poll done by Chinese University of Hong Kong found 72.2% of the 909 respondents found the decision acceptable and 26.7% considered it unacceptable. A coalition of groups supporting universal suffrage in 2012 are organizing a public rally to be held on January 13, 2008. In support of the planned rally, members of Hong Kong's Democratic Party have pledged to continue their hunger strike—begun on December 23, 2007, the day the NPCSC opened their meeting to consider Tsang's report—until the day of the rally. A spokesperson for the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong indicated that the U.S. government was disappointed that the NPCSC had ruled out election by universal suffrage in 2012, but hope that all parties would work to make election reforms possible in 2012 and 2017. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband called the prohibition of direct elections in 2012 "a disappointment to all," but then noted that "the NPC's statement clearly points towards universal suffrage for the Chief Executive election in 2017 and the Legislative Council election thereafter." Taiwanese officials were more critical of the NPCSC's decision. Tung Chen-yuan, a member of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, stated that the decision indicated that "the Chinese Communist Party does not allow genuine democracy," and demonstrated that the "one country, two systems" policy would not be accepted by the people of Taiwan. In light of the NPCSC's decision, Hong Kong's advancement towards democracy faces three critical issues. First, the status of Legco's functional constituencies will need to be resolved. Some Hong Kong politicians and analysts maintain that the functional constituencies are incompatible with the concept of universal suffrage and they will eventually have to be eliminated. Other Hong Kong politicians and analysts—as well as the NPCSC—hold that functional constituencies are not irreconcilable with universal suffrage, and that they represent sectors of the community which are considered important to Hong Kong's economic stability and development. A wide range of proposals have already been offered on how to handle the functional constituencies (including changing the number of functional constituencies and altering their voter eligibility requirements so that every Hong Kong voter could vote for at least one functional constituency Legco member), but finding a suitable compromise may prove to be difficult. Second, the composition of the nominating committee for the Chief Executive, and the requirements necessary to officially be nominated are possibly the greatest challenges facing the direct election of the Chief Executive. Currently, to be nominated, a person must receive the support of at least 100 of the 800 members of the largely appointed Election Committee. There have been calls to increase the number of members on the committee by including more people, and, in particular, the elected members of Hong Kong's District Councils. However, adding more people to the committee would either increase the possible number of nominees (assuming the 100 votes requirement was kept) or would necessitate changing the number of votes required to be nominated. Third, possibly the greatest challenge will be finding a proposed set of amendments for the elections in 2012 and 2017 that will receive the support of at least two-thirds of Legco. A proposal in 2005 to amend the election process for the 2007 Chief Executive election and the 2008 Legco election failed when a coalition of the various "pro-democracy" parties and the Liberal Party voted against the proposed amendments because they were seen as being too modest. In 2008 and beyond, the Hong Kong government will need to develop proposed legislation that provides enough "democracy" to obtain support from a sufficient number of Legco members associated with the parties that opposed the 2005 proposal without losing too many Legco members associated with parties (such as DAB) that supported the 2005 proposal. Support for the democratization of Hong Kong has been an element of U.S. foreign policy for over 15 years. The Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-383 ) states, "Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong. This will remain equally true after June 30, 1997." Congress might act to assist Hong Kong's progress towards universal suffrage and democracy by closely monitoring the development of "appropriate amendments" to the 2012 election process for both the Chief Executive and Legco. Congress might also encourage the State Department to provide greater assistance to its democracy-promotion efforts in Hong Kong. In FY2006, the State Department's Human Rights and Democracy Fund allocated $450,000 to a project in Hong Kong designed to strengthen political parties and civil society organizations. In addition, Congress could opt to pursue greater contact with Legco via provisions set out in Section 105 of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act. Finally, Congress could include language in suitable legislation to reactivate the Section 301 provision of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act that requires an annual report from the State Department to Congress on the status of Hong Kong.

The prospects for democratization in Hong Kong became clearer following a decision of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPCSC) on December 29, 2007. The NPCSC's decision effectively set the year 2017 as the earliest date for the direct election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and the year 2020 as the earliest date for the direct election of all members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco). However, ambiguities in the language used by the NPCSC have contributed to differences in interpretation of its decision. According to Hong Kong's current Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, the decision sets a clear timetable for democracy in Hong Kong. However, representatives of Hong Kong's "pro-democracy" parties believe the decision includes no solid commitment to democratization in Hong Kong. The NPCSC's decision also established some guidelines for the process of election reform in Hong Kong, including what can and cannot be altered in the 2012 elections.

Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time. It is not a new concept. In 1784, Benjamin Franklin, Minister to France, had an idea that part of the year when the sun rises while most people are still asleep, clocks could be reset to allow an extra hour of daylight during waking hours. He calculated that French shopkeepers could save one million francs per year on candles. In 1907, William Willett, a British builder, Member of Parliament, and fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society, proposed the adoption of advanced time. The bill was reported favorably, asserting that DST would move hours of work and recreation more closely to daylight hours, reducing expenditures on artificial light. After much opposition, however, the bill was not adopted. During World War I, in an effort to conserve fuel, Germany began observing DST on May 1, 1916. As the war progressed, the rest of Europe adopted DST. The plan was not formally adopted in the United States until 1918. "An Act to preserve daylight and provide standard time for the United States" was enacted on March 19, 1918 (40 Stat 450). It both established standard time zones and set summer DST to begi n on March 31, 1918. The idea was unpopular, however, and Congress abolished DST after the war, overriding President Woodrow Wilson's veto. DST became a local option and was observed in some states until World War II, when President Franklin Roosevelt instituted year-round DST, called "War Time," on February 9, 1942. It ended on the last Sunday in September 1945. The next year, many states and localities adopted summer DST. By 1962, the transportation industry found the lack of nationwide consistency in time observance confusing enough to push for federal regulation. This drive resulted in the Uniform Time Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-387). The act mandated standard time within the established time zones and provided for advanced time: clocks would be advanced one hour beginning at 2:00 a.m. on the last Sunday in April and turned back one hour at 2:00 a.m. on the last Sunday in October. States were allowed to exempt themselves from DST as long as the entire state did so. If a state chose to observe DST, the time changes were required to begin and end on the established dates. In 1968, Arizona became the first state to exempt itself from DST. In 1972, the act was amended (P.L. 92-267), allowing those states split between time zones to exempt either the entire state or that part of the state lying within a different time zone. The newly created Department of Transportation (DOT) was given the power to enforce the law. Currently, the following states and territories do not observe DST: Arizona, Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. During the 1973 oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in an effort to conserve fuel, Congress enacted a trial period of year-round DST ( P.L. 93-182 ), from January 6, 1974, to April 27, 1975. From the beginning, the trial was hotly debated. Those in favor pointed to the benefits of increased daylight hours in the winter evening: more time for recreation, reduced lighting and heating demands, reduced crime, and reduced automobile accidents. The opposition was concerned about children leaving for school in the dark. The act was amended in October 1974 ( P.L. 93-434 ) to return to standard time for the period beginning October 27, 1974, and ending February 23, 1975, when DST resumed. When the trial ended in 1975, the country returned to observing summer DST (with the aforementioned exceptions). DOT, charged with evaluating the plan of extending DST into March, reported in 1975 that "modest overall benefits might be realized by a shift from the historic six-month DST (May through October) in areas of energy conservation, overall traffic safety and reduced violent crime." However, DOT also reported that these benefits were minimal and difficult to distinguish from seasonal variations and fluctuations in energy prices. Congress then asked the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to evaluate the DOT report. In an April 1976 report to Congress, Review and Technical Evaluation of the DOT Daylight Saving Time Study , NBS found no significant energy savings or differences in traffic fatalities. It did find statistically significant evidence of increased fatalities among school-age children in the mornings during the four-month period January-April 1974 as compared with the same period (non-DST) of 1973. NBS stated that it was impossible to determine what proportion of this increase, if any, was due to DST. When this same data was compared between 1973 and 1974 for the individual months of March and April, no significant difference was found for fatalities among school-age children in the mornings. Yes. In 1986, Congress enacted P.L. 99-359 , which amended the Uniform Time Act by changing the beginning of DST to the first Sunday in April and having the end remain the last Sunday in October. In 2005, Congress enacted P.L. 109-58 , the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Section 110 of this act amended the Uniform Time Act, by changing DST to begin the second Sunday in March and end the first Sunday in November. The act required the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) to report to Congress on the impact of extended DST on energy consumption in the United States. In October 2008, DOE sent its report to Congress. After reviewing the DOE report, Congress retained the right under the law to revert DST to the 2005 time schedule. For more information on the legislation that changed DST, see CRS Report RL32860, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Legislation in the 109th Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Arizona (except for the Navajo Nation), Hawaii, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands do not recognize daylight saving time. DST is observed in approximately 70 countries, including most of those in North America and Europe. For a complete listing of countries that observe DST, please see Worldtimezone.com and WebExhibits .org websites . The Department of Transportation, Office of the General Counsel, oversees and regulates DST. Under the Uniform Time Act, moving an area on or off DST is accomplished through legal action at the state level. Some states require legislation, whereas others require executive action such as a governor's executive order. Information on procedures required in a specific state may be obtained from that state's legislature or governor's office. If a state decides to observe DST, the dates of observance must comply with federal legislation. As of September 2015, 12 states were considering opting out of the Uniform Time Act of 1966. An area's time zone can only be changed by law. Under the Standard Time Act of 1918, as amended by the Uniform Time Act of 1966, moving a state or an area within a state from one time zone to another requires DOT regulation. The governor or state legislature makes the request for a state or any part of the state; the highest county-elected officials may make the request for that county. The standard for deciding whether to change the time zone is the area's convenience of commerce. The convenience of commerce is defined broadly to consider such circumstances as the shipment of goods within the community; the origin of television and radio broadcasts; the areas where most residents work, attend school, worship, or receive health care; the location of airports, railways, and bus stations; and the major elements of the community's economy. After receiving a request, DOT determines whether it meets the minimum statutory criteria before issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, which would solicit public comment and schedule a public hearing. Usually the hearing is held in the area requesting the change so that all affected parties can be represented. After the comment period closes, comments are reviewed and appropriate final action is taken. If the Secretary agrees that the statutory requirement has been met, the change would be instituted, usually at the next changeover to or from DST. A number of studies have been conducted on DST's impact on energy savings, health, and safety. Following are some recent examples from database searches, such as EbscoHost, ProQuest, and ScienceDirect, including a few select sample reports that discuss the impacts of DST on the listed topic. This is not a comprehensive literature review. The first national study since the 1970s was mandated by Congress and conducted by the DOE in 2006 and in 2008: U.S. Department of Energy (2006), Potential Energy-Saving Impacts of Extending Daylight Saving Time: A National Assessmen t : "Total potential electricity savings benefits of EDST are relatively small. Total potential electrical savings of 1 Tera Watt-hour (TWh) are estimated (with an uncertainty range of ± 40 percent), corresponding to 0.4 percent per day for each day of EDST or 0.03 percent of electricity use over the year. The United States consumed 3,548 TWhs in 2004. Total potential energy benefits are small. Total potential primary energy savings are estimated from 7 to 26 Trillion Btu (TBtu), or 0.01 percent to 0.03 percent of total annual U.S. energy consumption." U.S. Department of Energy's Report to Congress (2008), Impact of Extended Daylight Saving Time on National Energy Consumption : "The total electricity savings of Extended Daylight Saving Time were about 1.3 TeraWatt-hour (TWh). This corresponds to 0.5 percent per each day of Extended Daylight Saving Time, or 0.03 percent of electricity consumption over the year." M.B. Aries and G.R. Newsham (2008), "Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Lighting Energy Use: A Literature Review," Energy Policy , 36(6), 1858–1866. "The principal reason for introducing (and extending) daylight saving time (DST) was, and still is, projected energy savings, particularly for electric lighting. This paper presents a literature review concerning the effects of DST on energy use. Simple estimates suggest a reduction in national electricity use of around 0.5%, as a result of residential lighting reduction. Several studies have demonstrated effects of this size based on more complex simulations or on measured data. However, there are just as many studies that suggest no effect, and some studies suggest overall energy penalties, particularly if gasoline consumption is accounted for. There is general consensus that DST does contribute to an evening reduction in peak demand for electricity, though this may be offset by an increase in the morning. Nevertheless, the basic patterns of energy use, and the energy efficiency of buildings and equipment have changed since many of these studies were conducted. Therefore, we recommend that future energy policy decisions regarding changes to DST be preceded by high-quality research based on detailed analysis of prevailing energy use, and behaviours and systems that affect energy use. This would be timely, given the extension to DST underway in North America in 2007." M.J. Kotchten (2011), "Does Daylight Saving Time Save Energy? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Indiana," The Review of Economics and Statistics , 93(4): 1172–1185. "Our main finding is that, contrary to the policy's intent, DST increases electricity demand." A. Huang and D. Levinson (2010), "The Effects of Daylight Saving Time on Vehicle Crashes in Minnesota," Journal of Safety Research , 41 (6), 513-520 : "Our major finding is that the short-term effect of DST on crashes on the morning of the first DST is not statistically significant." T. Lahti et al. (2010). "Daylight Saving Time Transitions and Road Traffic Accidents," Journal of Environmental and Public Health , 657167: "Our results demonstrated that transitions into and out of daylight saving time did not increase the number of traffic road accidents." Y. Harrison (2013), "The Impact of Daylight Saving Time on Sleep and Related Behaviours," Sleep Medicine Reviews ,1(4), 285-292: "The start of daylight saving time in the spring is thought to lead to the relatively inconsequential loss of 1 hour of sleep on the night of the transition, but data suggest that increased sleep fragmentation and sleep latency present a cumulative effect of sleep loss, at least across the following week, perhaps longer. The autumn transition is often popularised as a gain of 1 hour of sleep but there is little evidence of extra sleep on that night. The cumulative effect of five consecutive days of earlier rise times following the autumn change again suggests a net loss of sleep across the week. Indirect evidence of an increase in traffic accident rates, and change in health and regulatory behaviours which may be related to sleep disruption suggest that adjustment to daylight saving time is neither immediate nor without consequence." MR Jiddou et al. (2013). "Incidence of Myocardial Infarction with Shifts to and From Daylight Savings Time," The American Journal of Cardiology , 111(5), 631-5: "Limited evidence suggests that Daylight Saving Time (DST) shifts have a substantial influence on the risk of acute myocardial infarction (AMI). Previous literature, however, lack proper identification necessary to vouch for causal interpretation. We exploit Daylight Saving Time shift using non-parametric regression discontinuity techniques to provide indisputable evidence that this abrupt disturbance does affect incidence of AMI." P.L. 109-58 , the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (introduced as H.R. 6 ), was enacted on August 8, 2005. Section 110 of this act amended the Uniform Time Act, changing the beginning of DST to the second Sunday in March and the ending date to the first Sunday in November. This is the only bill related to DST that has been enacted since 1966. Between the 95 th and 109 th Congresses, there were generally a few DST-related bills introduced each Congress. None of the bills were enacted. Illustrative examples include the following: H.R. 1646 —To amend the Uniform Time Act of 1966 to modify the State exemption provisions for advancement of time. H.R. 4212 —To direct the Secretary of Energy to conduct a study of the effects of year-round daylight saving time on fossil fuel usage. H.R. 3756 —To establish a standard time zone for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and for other purposes. S. 1999 —Daylight Savings Time Amendments Act of 1991 Amends the Uniform Time Act of 1966 to extend the period of daylight savings time from the last Sunday of October to the first Sunday in November . H.R. 2636 —A bill to amend the Uniform Time Act of 1966 to provide for permanent year-round daylight savings time. The Department of Transportation, Office of the General Counsel, oversees and regulates DST. The Naval Observatory also has useful information, as does NASA .

Daylight Saving Time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time. DST is currently observed in the United States from 2:00 a.m. on the second Sunday in March until 2:00 a.m. on the first Sunday in November. The following states and territories do not observe DST: Arizona (except the Navajo Nation, which does observe DST), Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and open the country to immediate and comprehensive verification inspections. Libya pledged to eliminate its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification; eliminate ballistic missiles with a 300 km range or greater and a payload of 500 kilograms; accept international inspections to fulfill Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations; and sign the Additional Protocol. Further, Libya would eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify these actions. Since December 2003, Libya has also agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Libya's decision likely rested on several factors. The burden of 30 years of economic sanctions had significantly limited oil exports and stagnated the Libyan economy, making the prospect of renewed international investment that would follow a renunciation of WMD very attractive. Further, Libya's elimination of its WMD programs was a necessary condition for normalizing relations with the United States. The Administration has attributed Libya's decision to abandon its WMD to President Bush's national security strategy. Some officials claim that Iraq's example convinced Libya to renounce WMD; others point specifically to the interdiction of centrifuge parts (used for uranium enrichment) in October 2003. Still other observers have suggested that Libya's WMD programs were not very successful, while ending Libya's pariah status became particularly important to Colonel Qadhafi. At least two accounts record Libyan offers to renounce its WMD programs dating back to 1992 and 1999. Despite Libya's membership in the NPT (from 1975) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or BWC, (from 1982), most observers believed Libya was pursuing a range of WMD programs, albeit not entirely successfully. The Bush Administration noted in 2003 that "we have long been concerned about Libya's longstanding efforts to pursue nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles." Libya continues to deny any BW program, but its chemical weapons capability (including use of CW against Chad in the 1980s and facilities at Rabta and Tarhuna) was well known. Libya's ballistic missile arsenal was comprised of Scud Bs (300-km, 700 kg payload) acquired from the former Soviet Union, a handful of North Korean Scud-Cs (600-km, 700 kg payload), and a 500-700km-range missile under development, called Al Fatah. The Al Fatah program reportedly continued throughout the 1990s, although hampered by international sanctions. Israeli intelligence claimed also that Libya had received 1300-km-range No Dong missiles from North Korea, but U.S. intelligence disputed this notion. A 2001 National Intelligence Council assessment stated that "Libya's missile program depends on foreign support, without which the program eventually would grind to a halt." Libya signed the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) in November 2002. According to many reports, Libyan officials approached British officials in March 2003 with an offer to give up their WMD programs. After several months of secret negotiations, U.S. and British officials first inspected Libyan weapon sites, laboratories, and military factories in October 2003. This coincided with the interdiction in the Italian port of Taranto of a shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuge equipment ultimately bound for Libya. Initial visits revealed more extensive Libyan nuclear activities than previously thought, and significant quantities of chemical agent. Thus far, U.S. and British officials apparently have found no evidence of an offensive biological weapons program. Some observers have suggested that each of Libya's programs suffered from shortages of parts and technical expertise as a result of years of sanctions. Libya has provided significant information about its nuclear, chemical, and missile programs, including data on foreign suppliers. In fact, Libya's revelations about Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market dealings have aided IAEA inspections of Iran's nuclear program and helped prompt Pakistan to investigate Khan. Many observers over the years discounted Libya's nuclear weapons program because of its failure to procure key components and lack of indigenous resources and expertise. Yet, Libya's declarations revealed that A.Q. Khan seemed to have solved the procurement problem, if not the problem of expertise. In 1997, Libya acquired 20 pre-assembled P-1 centrifuges and the components for another 200. Libya constructed three different enrichment cascades, but only the smallest (using 9 centrifuges) was completely installed by 2002. In 2000, Libya received 2 centrifuges of a more advanced design (P-2 using maraging steel) and placed an order for 10,000 of those. Assistance on centrifuge enrichment reportedly came from A.Q. Khan, former head of Pakistan's enrichment facility. Khan reportedly also provided Libya with an actual nuclear weapons design, which was handed over to IAEA inspectors in December 2003 and sealed on-site. According to one source, the design closely resembles a 1960s-vintage Chinese nuclear warhead. One report suggested that such a warhead would not fit on Libya's SCUD-C missiles and that key parts of the weapons design were missing. Libya also dabbled in separating minute quantities of plutonium between 1984 and 1990. Libya declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on March 5, 2004 that it had produced approximately 23 tons of mustard agent in one chemical weapons production facility (Rabta) between 1980 and 1990 and stored those materials in two storage sites. Libya also declared thousands of unfilled munitions. Libya pledged to eliminate all ballistic missiles with a range of 300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms or greater. In early 2004, Libya relinquished 5 North Korean Scud-C missiles, which U.S. officials described as an "emerging" Scud-C program. Libya hoped to convert its Scud-B arsenal, estimated at between 80 and a few hundred, into shorter-range, defensive purpose missiles and end military trade with North Korea. According to one source, in February 2005, Libya asked the United States to buy 417 Scuds for $2 million each; the United States reportedly bought ten for testing. There is no further information on the status of the Al Fatah program. Libya's missile pledge will leave Libya primarily with shorter-range cruise missiles—SS-N-2c Styx, Otomat Mk2, and Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles. The United States eliminated the most sensitive aspects of Libya's WMD and missile programs first. On January 22, 2004, nuclear weapons design information was sent to the United States and days later, U.S. officials airlifted about 55,000 pounds of documents and components from Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile programs to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Nuclear components included several containers of uranium hexafluoride (used as feedstock for enrichment); 2 P-2 centrifuges from Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories and additional centrifuge parts, equipment, and documentation. Beginning in December 2003, IAEA inspectors visited Libya to confirm its declarations. Since then, the IAEA has had unlimited access to requested locations and has verified the consistency of Libya's declarations concerning its uranium conversion program, enrichment program, and other past nuclear-related activities. Libya has applied the Additional Protocol, which it ratified on August 8, 2006, on an interim basis since December 2003. In March 2004, over 1,000 tons of additional centrifuge parts and MTCR-class missile parts reportedly were shipped from Libya, including five Scud-C missiles, partial missiles, missile launchers, and related equipment. Russia also removed 17 kg of fresh, 80% highly enriched uranium it had supplied in the 1980s to the 10-megawatt research reactor at Tajura, which the United States plans to help convert to use low-enriched uranium fuel. Libya continues the dismantlement of its chemical weapons program and has requested formal assistance from the United States for the destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpile. The OPCW visited Libya first in February 2004, after Libya acceded to the CWC. The OPCW has supervised the on-site destruction of more than 3,500 unfilled shells for CW. Destroying the mustard agent, however, is a bit more complicated, and will require a destruction plan and a special facility for destruction. In June 2006, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Director James Tegnelia estimated the cost of destruction at $100 million, given the location of the chemicals in a remote desert area. Libya requested and received an extension of the CWC requirement to destroy all its chemical weapons and production capacity by April 29, 2007. Libya also received permission from the OPCW to convert the Rabta facility to produce pharmaceuticals. In September 2004, Libya, the United States, and the UK established the Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee (TSCC) to oversee the final stages of elimination of Libya's WMD and MTCR-class missile programs and to promote cooperation. Libya had been subject to one of the strictest U.S. sanctions regimes as a result of its support of international terrorism. Libya's cooperation in several areas has allowed sanctions to be lifted. In September 20, 2004, President Bush made three determinations about Libya that would allow lifting certain sanctions pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. First, he determined: that Libya received nuclear enrichment equipment, material or technology after August 1977; that the continued termination of assistance under Section 101 of the AECA would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests; and that he has received reliable assurances that Libya will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so. Second, he determined that Libya sought and received design information intended for use in the development or manufacture of a nuclear explosive devices, and that the application of sanctions would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests, pursuant to Section 102 (b) of the AECA. Third, he determined that, pursuant to Section 2 (b) (4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, it is in the national interest for the Export Import Bank to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of U.S. exports to Libya. President Bush also rescinded the national emergency with respect to Libya and lifted trade, travel, and commercial restrictions. Further measures included releasing $1.3 billion in frozen assets, providing OPIC guarantees, and removing restrictions on direct flights between Libya and the United States. Libya was finally removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on June 29, 2006. Prior to Libya's removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, U.S. assistance in WMD dismantlement was limited to funding provided by the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), because such funds are not restricted by limits imposed by other laws. Since 2004, NDF has committed about $34.2 million to the WMD disarmament process in Libya, including funds for: removal of equipment and material ($5 million); retraining of former WMD scientists and personnel ($2.5 million); export control assistance ($1 million); securing radiological sources ($ .7 million); and destroying chemical weapons and agents ($25 million). State Department officials estimate that about $20 million more will be required to help Libya destroy the rest of its chemical stockpile. Senator Lugar has stated that the NDF "does not have the size, scope, or experience to do dismantlement operations, to employ nuclear scientists, or undertake longer term nonproliferation efforts." One possibility is to use Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funds for these activities, which became theoretically possible with the expansion of the application of CTR funds since FY2004, but which was impossible in a practical sense before July 2006 because of Libya's status as a state sponsor of terrorism. CTR funds may also contain more restrictions than NDF funds, particularly in contractual requirements. Congress may wish to consider whether to provide additional assistance to Libyan disarmament, and if so, how.

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs. Since then, U.S., British, and international officials have inspected and removed or destroyed key components of those programs, and Libya has provided valuable information, particularly about foreign suppliers. Libya's WMD disarmament has been a critical step towards reintegration into the world community. This report will be updated as needed. See CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed].

Unemployment Compensation (UC) is a joint federal-state program financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). The underlying framework of the UC system is contained in the Social Security Act (SSA). Title III of the SSA authorizes grants to states for the administration of state UC laws; Title IX authorizes the various components of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF); and Title XII authorizes advances or loans to insolvent state UC programs. If a state UC program complies with all federal rules, the net FUTA tax rate for employers is 0.6% on the first $7,000 of each worker's earnings. The 0.6% FUTA tax funds both federal and state administrative costs as well as the federal share of the Extended Benefit (EB) program, loans to insolvent state UC accounts, and state employment services. Federal law defines which jobs a state UC program must cover for the state's employers to avoid paying the maximum FUTA tax rate (6.0%) on the first $7,000 of each employee's annual pay. Congress first passed a temporary FUTA surtax in 1976, and since 1983 this surtax had been applied as 0.2% on the first $7,000 of employee wages until July 1, 2011. Since July 1, 2011, the effective FUTA tax on employers for each employee is 0.6% (a decrease from 0.8%) on the first $7,000 of wages. States levy their own payroll taxes on employers to fund regular UC benefits and the state share of the EB program. The SUTA tax rate of an employer is, in most states, based on the amount of UC benefits paid to former employees. Generally, the more UC benefits paid to its former employees, the higher the tax rate of the employer, up to a maximum established by state law. The UTF is designated, by law, as a trust fund in the U.S. Treasury. The designation as a trust fund is a federal accounting mechanism to directly link revenues and distributions connected to the UC programs. The UTF accounts include the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA), the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA), the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA), 53 state accounts, the Federal Employees Compensation Account (FECA), and two accounts related to the Railroad Retirement Board. Federal unemployment taxes are credited to the ESAA; each state's unemployment taxes are credited to the state's unemployment account. Federal taxes are dedicated to pay for UC administration grants to the states—including administration of the EB program—and the federal share of EB. State taxes are dedicated to pay for regular UC benefits and the state share of EB. Typically, the EB program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states, however, P.L. 111-5 , as amended, temporarily provided for 100% federal funding of EB from February 22, 2009, through December 31, 2013. Although the UTF contains 59 separate accounts (often referred to as book accounts ) to attribute and distribute the monies based on program purpose, the UTF is a single trust fund. The use of separate accounts solely means that revenues and distributions are directly linked to UC program purpose. The use of a single trust fund (the UTF) for all UC programs permits a balance to carry over surplus spending authority to subsequent years. The balance represents reserve spending authority available to these programs in addition to the spending authority provided by the automatic appropriation of current tax receipts. This reserve spending authority is used during recessions when UC outlays exceed UTF tax revenues, that is, when current spending exceeds current receipts. Like many of the UTF's other transactions, the balance is effectively a bookkeeping entry. All UC tax receipts and outlays for benefits and administration flow through the Treasury, and thus affect federal revenue, outlays, and the overall financial position (deficit or surplus) of the federal government. The UTF accounts for all UC and EB financial transactions. This accounting device (designation as a trust fund) is used to accumulate legal spending authority that is available automatically when needed. However, the UTF does not contain financial resources. The required cash the federal government needs to pay benefits or administrative costs must be drawn from current resources through either taxation or borrowing. The revenue and the expenditures of the UC system are counted in the federal budget. Federal unemployment taxes are deposited into the unemployment trust fund. Following federal law, the Treasury invests all receipts in federal securities that bear interest. This investment increases the federal debt. When these securities are redeemed to pay for administration of the program, to lend funds to the states, or to pay for extended benefits, this investment decreases the federal debt. State unemployment taxes are deposited into the unemployment trust fund. Following federal law, the Treasury invests all state unemployment tax receipts in federal securities that bear interest. This investment increases the federal debt. When states pay UC benefits to unemployed individuals, the Treasury redeems those securities held within that state's unemployment trust fund account. Thus, the payment of regular state UC benefits decreases the federal debt. If states do not have enough reserves in their UTF account, Title XII of the SSA allows the states to borrow funds from the FUA within the UTF. (States may borrow from other sources although some states are prohibited from doing so under state laws.) The issuing of loans to the state would require that the FUA redeem securities. This redemption would decrease the federal debt. If the FUA is insolvent and the other federal accounts within the unemployment trust fund do not have sufficient balances to lend the funds that states need (as occurred in FY2010 through FY2015), Title XII of the SSA allows the FUA to borrow funds from the Treasury. If the Treasury issues new securities in order to lend funds to the FUA, this will increase the federal debt. When a state pays back the state loan from the FUA, the FUA would then use those funds to repay its debt to the Treasury and the federal debt would be decreased. The UTF is credited with revenues from three primary sources: state unemployment taxes on employers, federal unemployment taxes on employers, and U.S. government agency transfers. Although UC benefits are taxable and are fully subject to the federal income tax, those revenues do not support the UC system and are not credited to the UTF. These three types of revenues are depicted at the top of Figure 1 . States are authorized to designate that these funds be used to pay UC benefits. State unemployment account funds that are attributable to state unemployment taxes may only be used for unemployment benefits and the state's portion of EB payments. Administrative costs are funded through distributions from the ESAA to the state unemployment accounts. At the end of FY2016, states were estimated to have collected $40.9 billion while expending $32.3 billion in regular UC benefits. Each fiscal year, funds are appropriated through the federal budget process to make distributions from the ESAA for the states' costs of administering their unemployment compensation programs, and for the federal costs of administration. The Secretary of Labor determines (certifies) the amount of the administrative payments, and permits the Secretary of the Treasury to make the payments to the states. The Secretary of Labor in certifying a state for payment takes into account (1) that the state's UC programs contain specific provisions related to the payment of monies from the state unemployment system, (2) the state agency's specific responsibilities in administering the UC program and UC benefits, and (3) the rights and responsibilities of the UC benefit recipients. Net monthly activity is the sum of revenues credited to the ESAA less distributions for refunds of FUTA taxes and additional taxes attributable to a reduced credit for SUTA taxes. By the end of FY2016, the federal accounts had collected an estimated $4.8 billion; the ESAA had a net balance of $2.1 billion. Since the ceiling for the ESAA was $1.7 billion, $0.4 billion in excess funds were transferred to the EUCA. By the end of FY2016, the ESAA had distributed a total of $4.1 billion to the states for administrative costs. If states have an active EB program, EUCA distributions are made for the federal portion (50%). At the end of the fiscal year after any required distribution from the ESAA, the EUCA balance is calculated. The EUCA balance is limited to the maximum of $750 million or 0.5% of covered wages. If the EUCA balance exceeds the limitation, the excess is distributed to the FUA. At the end of FY2016, no funds were expended to pay for the federal share of EB benefits as no state met the economic criteria to provide an EB benefit in FY2016. The EUCA net balance was an estimated shortfall of (negative) $11.0 billion (a cash balance of $1.2 billion, $8.7 billion owed to the general fund of the Treasury and $3.5 billion owed to FUA/ESAA). The EUCA ceiling was $28.8 billion; thus, there was no fund transfer to the FUA. In addition to any EUCA distribution, the FUA is credited with the additional taxes paid by employers when a reduced credit against federal taxes exists because the state has an outstanding unpaid loan from FUA. FUA funds are distributed as loans to states, through the state unemployment accounts. (See the discussion below on " Loans to Insolvent Accounts " for a more detailed explanation of these loans.) The FUA balance is limited to the maximum of $550 million or 0.5% of covered wages. At the end of FY2016, the estimated net FUA balance was an estimated $8.2 billion ($4.5 billion borrowed by the states, and $3.5 billion owed from ESAA/EUCA, and an end of year cash balance of $0.14 billion). The balance was lower than the $28.8 billion ceiling and so no Reed Act distribution occurred. (See below for details of the Reed Act distributions.) In addition, distributions are made to the state unemployment accounts from the FECA to reimburse the states for employment compensation paid to former federal employees. Each federal agency reimburses the UTF for its share of federal workers' UC benefits. At the end of the fiscal year, there is a limitation on the balance in the ESAA—the account balance cannot exceed 40% of the prior fiscal year's appropriation by Congress. If the balance in the ESAA exceeds this limitation, the excess is distributed to EUCA. After the distribution, if the balance in the EUCA exceeds the limitation, the excess is distributed to the FUA. If after the distribution from the EUCA, the FUA balance exceeds the limitation, the excess is distributed, as a Reed Act distribution, to the states. At the end of FY2016 there was no Reed Act distribution. The Treasury can write checks for a state unemployment account, provided that legal spending authority exists for such spending if the state unemployment account has a positive balance. During the most recent recession, current taxes and reserve balances were insufficient to cover expenditures for UC benefits. Many state unemployment accounts required and/or continue to require "loans" to pay for state UC benefits. The state unemployment accounts can borrow from the FUA. If states do not increase their SUTA taxes to repay the loan, federal law requires that the principal of the loan is repaid by reducing federal tax credits for SUTA taxes and crediting those increased revenues to the FUA. The state cannot pay the interest on such loans using the state unemployment account but must pay the interest through state general revenues or other measures. Federal law also authorizes appropriations if balances in the federal accounts are insufficient to cover their expenditures. For example, if the states' borrowing needs exceed the available FUA balance, Congress is authorized to appropriate additional spending authority to cover the amount needed. Such appropriations require discretionary action by Congress and the President. From FY2009 through FY2015, the FUA had to borrow funds from the Treasury in order to loan funds to the state accounts.

This report provides a summary of how Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits are funded through the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). The UTF in the U.S. Treasury is designated as a trust fund for federal accounting purposes. Although the UTF is a single trust fund, it has 59 accounts: the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA), the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA), the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA), 53 state accounts (including District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands), the Federal Employees Compensation Account (FECA), and two accounts related to the Railroad Retirement Board. Federal unemployment taxes are credited to the ESAA; each state's unemployment taxes are credited to the state's unemployment account. Federal taxes pay for administration grants to the states. State unemployment taxes are dedicated to pay for regular UC benefits. The extended benefits (EB) program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states.

An automatic annual Social Security benefit increase is intended to reflect the rise in the cost of living over a one-year period. The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), updated monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), is the measure that can trigger a benefit increase. The Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) is based on the growth in the index from the highest third calendar quarter average CPI-W recorded (most often, from the previous year) to the average CPI-W for the third calendar quarter of the current year. If the CPI-W triggers a COLA, the COLA becomes effective in December of the current year and is payable in January of the following year. (Social Security payments always reflect the benefits due for the preceding month.) A COLA trigger mechanism was first adopted in P.L. 92-603, the Social Security Amendments of 1972, and triggered COLAs were first payable in 1975. Prior to 1975, Congress sporadically approved COLAs through the adoption of legislation. On October 11, 2018, the Social Security Administration (SSA) announced that a 2.8% Social Security COLA would be paid in January 2019. The BLS release of the September 2018 CPI-W on that day made possible the comparison of the two July-September sets of CPI-W data needed to compute the COLA (one for 2017 and another for 2016). Table 1 shows how the determination for a January 2019 COLA is computed under procedures set forth in Section 215(i) of the Social Security Act. Since automatic Social Security benefit COLAs began in 1975, there have been three years in which no COLA was payable: 2010, 2011, and 2016. The Social Security Act specifies that a COLA is payable automatically if the average CPI-W for the third quarter of the current year is higher than the highest average CPI-W for the third quarter of past years, which is called the "cost-of-living computation quarter." From 1975, when this provision became effective, to 2008, a new cost-of-living computation quarter was established in each subsequent year, which triggered the payment of a COLA each year. If the average CPI-W for the third quarter of the current year is equal to or less than the average CPI-W for the cost-of-living computation quarter, no COLA is payable. For example, the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2009 was less than the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2008 (211.001 and 215.495, respectively). As a result, an automatic COLA in January 2010 was not triggered and the third quarter of 2008 remained the cost-of-living computation quarter (i.e., the benchmark) used to determine if a COLA would be payable in January 2011. Though the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2010 (214.136) was greater than the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2009, it did not exceed the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2008. The third quarter of 2008 remained the cost-of-living computation quarter for at least one more year and a COLA was not payable in January 2011. When the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2011 (223.233) exceeded that for 2008, a 2012 COLA was triggered and the third quarter of 2011 became the cost-of-living computation quarter. New cost-of-living computation quarters were subsequently established in each year from 2012 to 2014, when the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2012, 2013, and 2014 exceeded that for the third quarter of each preceding year. Similarly, since the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2015 (233.278) did not exceed that of 2014 (234.242), no COLA was paid in January 2016. Thus, for the COLA payable beginning in January 2017, the cost-of-living computation benchmark quarter remained the third quarter of 2014 where it was compared with the average CPI-W for the third quarter of 2016. See Table 2 for a recent history of average CPI-W performance for the third calendar quarter, and how that has affected changes to the cost-of-living computation quarter and the triggering of COLAs in some years. Social Security benefit amounts cannot be reduced if the CPI-W decreases between the measuring periods. If the performance of the CPI-W does not trigger a COLA, benefits remain the same (prior to deductions for Medicare Part B and Part D premiums). The absence of a COLA increase (or a very small increase) may impact certain Medicare Part B enrollees. For Medicare Part B enrollees who have their Part B premiums withheld from their monthly Social Security benefits, a hold-harmless provision in the Social Security Act (§1839[f]) ensures that their net benefits will not decrease as a result of an increase in the Part B premium. In most years, the hold-harmless provision has little impact; however, in a year in which there is a small or no increase in the Social Security COLA and a Part B premium increase, the hold-harmless provision may apply to a much larger number of people. For example, as a result of a 0% Social Security COLA in 2016 and a 0.3% COLA in 2017, an estimated 70% of Medicare beneficiaries were protected by this provision in those years and their premiums were reduced so that their Social Security benefits, net of the Medicare premium, would not decline. As a result of the relatively higher 2.0% Social Security COLA in 2018, the hold-harmless provision was not as broadly applicable in that year, and the percentage of Medicare Part B enrollees held harmless in 2018 declined to 28%. The Medicare trustees project that 2019 Medicare Part B premiums will increase by about $1.50 per month—from $134.00 per month in 2018 to about $135.50 in 2019. Under this scenario, the 2019 2.8% Social Security COLA would likely result in a further reduction in the number of Medicare Part B enrollees held harmless. In most cases, the dollar amount of the increase in enrollees' Social Security benefits, for both those who were and were not held harmless in 2018, would be more than sufficient to cover their 2019 Part B premium increases. Thus, it is likely that many of those held harmless in 2018 will not be held harmless in 2019 and will return to paying the normal standard premium amount. The actual 2019 Medicare premiums will likely be announced later in 2018 and could be higher or lower than projected. Regardless of the size (or absence) of a COLA, beneficiaries may see a net reduction in Social Security benefits as a result of increases in their Medicare Part D premiums or changes in their Medicare Part D plan selections. Social Security COLAs trigger increases in other programs. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and railroad retirement "tier 1" benefits (equivalent to a Social Security benefit) are increased by the same percentage as the Social Security COLA or are held constant when a COLA is not paid to Social Security beneficiaries. Railroad retirement "tier 2" benefits (equivalent to a private pension) are increased by an amount equivalent to 32.5% of the Social Security COLA. (If no COLA is paid to Social Security beneficiaries, then the railroad retirement tier 2 benefits are not increased.) Veterans' pension benefits often are increased in the same amount as Social Security, but legislation must be passed annually for this purpose. Although COLAs under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the federal military retirement system are not triggered by the Social Security COLA, these programs use the same measuring period and formula for determining their COLAs. The COLA for recipients of Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) benefits equals the Social Security COLA if inflation is 2% or less, but is lower than the Social Security COLA otherwise. Some Social Security program elements, like the taxable earnings base , the retirement earnings test (RET) exempt amounts , and the substantial gainful activity (SGA) earnings level for the blind (which applies to Social Security disability beneficiaries), are indexed to wages, as opposed to prices, but increase only when a COLA is payable. Although changes to those three elements are based on growth in national average wages (rather than changes in prices ), these elements can be increased only when a COLA is payable. If a COLA is payable, then these amounts increase by the percentage that the national average wage index has increased. The taxable earnings base, the RET exempt amounts, and the SGA for the blind were unchanged in 2010, 2011, and 2016 when no COLA was payable. For example, had there been a COLA trigger in 2015, the taxable earnings base would have increased from $118,500 in 2015 to $122,700 in 2016. Because there was no COLA trigger in 2015, the base instead remained unchanged. With the 0.3% COLA announced in 2016, the taxable earnings base increased in 2017 as well. Similar to how the COLA's reference period is calculated, the increase in the taxable earnings base is calculated on the increase in the average wage index from 2013 to 2015 (about 7.2%). Table 3 shows the history of Social Security COLAs since the automatic COLAs began in 1975. Table 4 provides a comprehensive summary of all ad-hoc legislative cost-of-living adjustments to Social Security benefits before automatic adjustments began in July 1975. The first increase occurred in October 1950, 10 years after Social Security benefits were first issued in 1940. At that time, Social Security benefits were increased by 77%. After 1950, smaller increases were granted by separate legislation at irregular intervals. Table 4 shows the percentage increases and the dates from which these increases were paid. As noted, in 1974 the increase occurred in two steps: an increase of 7% was paid from April 1974 until June 1974; and an increase of 11% was paid from July 1974 onward. Both increases used February 1974 as the base level. Authorization for the automatic benefit increase beginning in 1975 appears as part of P.L. 92-336.

To compensate for the effects of inflation, Social Security recipients usually receive an annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). According to parameters outlined in the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 415(i)), a 2.8% COLA is payable in January 2019. For a retired worker receiving the average monthly benefit amount of $1,422, the COLA will result in a $39 increase in Social Security benefits (after final rounding down to the nearest dollar for a total of $1,461). Social Security COLAs are based on changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), updated monthly by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The COLA equals the growth, if any, in the index from the highest third calendar quarter average CPI-W recorded (most often, from the previous year) to the average CPI-W for the third calendar quarter of the current year. The COLA becomes effective in December of the current year and is payable in January of the following year. (Social Security payments always reflect the benefits due for the preceding month.) If there is no percentage increase in the CPI-W between the measuring periods, no COLA is payable. No COLA was payable in January 2010, January 2011, or in January 2016. The January 2019 COLA will also be applied to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and railroad retirement "tier 1" benefits, among other changes in the Social Security program. Although COLAs under the federal Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the federal military retirement program are not triggered directly by the Social Security COLA, these programs use the same measuring period and formula for computing their COLAs. As a result, their recipients will receive a similar COLA payable in 2019.

Increasing pressures on the quantity and quality of available water supplies are raising interest in—and concern about—changing operations at Corps facilities to meet municipal and industrial (M&I) demands. Corps M&I reallocations at Lake Lanier (GA) are central to an ongoing tri-state conflict involving Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Furthermore, the agency is studying whether to reallocate storage to M&I use at dams in numerous states (e.g., Colorado, Kentucky, and Georgia), and Corps data indicate that more reallocation requests are forthcoming. A reallocation embodies tradeoffs; shifting storage to M&I use from a currently authorized purpose (e.g., hydropower or navigation) changes the types of benefits produced by a dam and the stakeholders served. The federal role in M&I water supply development is constrained, with states and local entities having the prominent role. Congress recognized state primacy in developing M&I supplies in the Water Supply Act of 1958 (1958 WSA; P.L. 85-500; 72 Stat. 319; 43 U.S.C 390b) as follows: It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to recognize the primary responsibilities of the States and local interests in developing water supplies for domestic, municipal, industrial, and other purposes and that the Federal Government should participate and cooperate with States and local interests in developing such water supplies in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of Federal navigation, flood control, irrigation, or multiple purpose projects. Therefore, although the federal government has made significant investments in water resources infrastructure, these investments primarily have been to support flood control, navigation, irrigation, multipurpose dams (including hydropower), and diversion facilities. The largest federal projects were constructed by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation under the Reclamation Act of 1902 and subsequent project authorizations known as Reclamation Law, and by the Department of Defense's Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter referred to as the Corps) through myriad Rivers and Harbors, Flood Control, and Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) legislation. Since the 1960s, construction of large federal dams has slowed markedly, in response to their high cost, their ecological and social impacts, and the availability of appropriate sites. Reservoir planning in recent decades largely has focused on balancing competing objectives in operating existing reservoirs (as opposed to planning new projects), and in some cases on managing for new objectives. Congress authorizes the Corps to undertake construction of dams and other water resources infrastructure. Each dam and the reservoir it creates are operated in large measure to meet the project's authorized purposes and for compliance with federal laws. For each project (or set of projects in a basin), the principal purposes generally are laid out in the language authorizing project construction or in agency documents supporting the authorization, and in subsequent legislation specific to that project. Approximately 91 Corps reservoirs have M&I storage as a specifically authorized purpose (e.g., Lake Sakakawea, ND; Joe Pool Lake, TX). Congress, through general legislation, has included additional requirements (e.g., fish and wildlife protection and coordination) for all Corps facilities, and has given the Corps authority to provide some additional benefits from its projects, such as recreation. The 1958 WSA and Section 6 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 890, 33 U.S.C. 708) provide the Corps some general, but limited, authority to provide M&I water supply. The 1944 authority allows the Corps to provide surplus water at its facilities (i.e., water not assigned to a project purpose) for M&I use on a temporary basis. This report does not analyze the Corps' use of the 1944 authority because it is not likely to have a significant future role in the permanent reallocation of significant quantities of water for M&I purposes. Instead, this report focuses on how the 1958 WSA has been implemented by the Corps, and provides data on the 44 Corps reservoirs that have had all or some of their storage reallocated under the Corps' 1958 WSA discretionary authority. For a discussion of legal issues related to the 1958 WSA, see CRS Report R40714, Use of Federal Water Projects for Municipal and Industrial Water Supply: Legal Issues Related to the Water Supply Act of 1958 (43 U.S.C. § 390b) , by Cynthia Brougher. In the 1958 WSA, Congress provided the Corps some general M&I water supply authority, but limited the agency's decision-making without congressional approval. Specifically, Section 301 of the 1958 WSA provides: Modifications of a reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed to include storage [for water supply] which would seriously affect the purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which would involve major structural or operational changes shall be made only upon the approval of Congress. That is, M&I water supply can be provided as long as it is accomplished incidental to operations for the authorized purposes. If provision of water supply seriously affects a facility's authorized purposes or would cause a major operational change, the reallocation requires congressional authorization. How to gauge whether an effect is serious or a change is major was not defined by Congress. After passage of the 1958 WSA, the Corps developed a guidance manual for implementing this authority (EM 1165-2-105). In March 1977, the Corps adopted as part of its manual the following provision for determining when a reallocation does not require congressional approval: Modifications of reservoir projects to allocate all or part of the storage serving any authorized purpose from such purpose to storage serving domestic, municipal, or industrial water supply purposes are considered insignificant if the total reallocation of storage that may be made for such water supply uses in the modified project is not greater than 15 per centum of total storage capacity allocated to all authorized purposes or 50,000 acre feet, whichever is less. Earlier guidance had not included numeric criteria. The questions of whether the Corps has regularly exceeded its discretionary authority and how many reservoirs have storage reallocated under this authority have received attention in the wake of a federal court decision related to Corps operations and reallocations at Lake Lanier (GA). Numerous lawsuits related to Lake Lanier were consolidated and transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2007. A July 17, 2009, court order addressed a fundamental question common to many of the cases: whether the Corps violated Section 301 of the 1958 WSA by not seeking congressional approval for changes made in Lake Lanier operations to provide M&I water supply. The court order largely agreed with Florida, Alabama, the Alabama Power Company, and the Southeastern Federal Power Customers. These litigants had contended that the Corps was obligated to seek congressional approval, because the provision of water supply required major operational changes that harmed authorized purposes. The court estimated that, since the mid-1970s, the Corps had reallocated more than 21% of Lake Lanier's usable storage without seeking congressional authorization; this reallocation represents roughly 260,000 acre-feet (AF). The court found that "de facto reallocations" started in the mid-1970s with operational changes that shifted storage from hydropower to M&I supply. Subsequently the Corps contracted with M&I water providers for storage space for withdrawals directly from the lake. The court found that the cumulative impacts of the Corps' actions exceeded its discretionary authority to reallocate. The court order and its effect on M&I water supply for communities in northern Georgia have raised questions about how the Corps has reallocated water at its other facilities. A total of 135 Corps reservoirs have roughly 11 million acre-feet (AF) of storage designated for M&I water. Most of the M&I water stored is authorized under project-specific authorities. However, 44 reservoirs derive all or part of their M&I storage authority from the 1958 WSA (see Table 1 for a list of the reservoirs). The 1958 WSA is the basis for less than 640,000 AF of the Corps' M&I storage. Table 1 shows that the Corps has reallocated more than 50,000 AF of storage space for M&I use at only one reservoir, Lake Texoma (TX/OK). The Corps has used its discretionary authority to perform four reallocations at Lake Texoma—one for 84,099 AF and three smaller reallocations, for a total of 103,003 AF. Other Texoma reallocations have been made with specific congressional approval. The 84,099 AF reallocation from hydropower to M&I use was approved in a 1985 Corps document that included a compensation arrangement for lost hydropower, which had been negotiated among Lake Texoma stakeholders. The Corps found that the reallocation would neither significantly harm the lake's authorized purposes (in part because of the compensation arrangement), nor require significant structural modifications. The Corps thus concluded that the transfer could be performed under the 1958 WSA without congressional approval, even though it exceeded the agency-established policy limiting reallocations without congressional approval to 50,000 AF. Table 1 shows that the Corps stayed below the 15% of usable storage criterion, except at Cowanesque Lake (PA), where reallocated water supply represents almost 30% of storage. The Cowanesque Lake case is unusual in that it represents a mix of project-specific reallocation direction from Congress and use of the Corps' discretionary authority under the 1958 WSA. The Cowanesque reallocation was mentioned in P.L. 99-88 , the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1985, and was discussed as occurring under the Corps' 1958 WSA discretionary authority in the accompanying H.Rept. 99-236. As previously noted, the 1958 WSA indicates that the reallocation to water supply should not be made if it seriously affects authorized purposes or results in a major operational or structural change. The Corps is to evaluate these potential effects when studying whether to make or recommend to Congress a reallocation. Whether the studies used to support the reallocations shown in Table 1 sufficiently evaluated how an M&I reallocation may affect authorized purposes or may constitute a major operational change is a general concern raised by the 2009 court order's questioning of the Corps evaluations related to Lake Lanier operations. An evaluation of the sufficiency of Corps reallocation analyses is beyond the scope of this CRS report. Lake Lanier is not in Table 1 because the July 2009 court order found that the M&I uses exceeded the 1958 WSA authority. Similarly, Lake Cumberland (KY) is not included, although M&I withdrawals occur there, because these withdrawals have not been authorized. Enforcement action to stop the withdrawals at Lake Cumberland has not been taken. How many other unauthorized withdrawals and operational actions that support M&I uses occur at other Corps facilities is largely unknown; many Corps dams are decades old, often predating the 1958 WSA, and their operations have evolved incrementally over time. To date, the Corps' operation of Lake Lanier for M&I water supply has constituted the agency's most controversial provision of M&I water supply. The 2009 court order raised numerous concerns, including the possibility that previous reallocations at other Corps facilities could be disputed, and uncertainty about how future reallocation at Corps facilities will be evaluated and performed. Thus far, most Corps reallocations have taken place without the national attention or litigation of Lake Lanier, either using the Corps' delegated authority or through specific congressional legislative direction. As shown in Table 1 , existing reallocations under the 1958 WSA, with few exceptions, were within the numeric criteria that the Corps established for implementing its discretionary authority. Whether Congress agrees with the Corps' interpretation and use of its discretionary authority is a policy issue of increasing relevance as interest grows in M&I reallocation at federal facilities. Other issues raised by current use of the discretionary authority and reservoir operations include whether multiple reallocations in a single basin are to be treated separately or on a watershed basis, how much discretion the agency should have in making reallocation agreements with stakeholders, including financial charging and crediting arrangements, and how the agency should handle ongoing unauthorized withdrawals. Current policies on M&I reallocations at Corps facilities reflect numerous decisions and tradeoffs that may be reexamined as more reallocations are requested. For example, if reallocations to M&I are made, how is the transition to be carried out, given that stakeholders, such as recreation interests and hydropower customers, have developed around existing operations? How should the federal government charge for the M&I storage space provided? Should the federal government credit for return flows (i.e., water not consumed by M&I uses that is returned to a Corps reservoir)? M&I water supply at Corps facilities also is part of several broader water policy questions for Congress. For example, what is the appropriate federal role in municipal water supply? Should that role change if a community's existing water supply is reduced by potential climate change effects, such as extended drought? Do current water resources infrastructure operations, laws, divisions of responsibilities, and institutions reflect the national interest and present challenges? Addressing these questions is complicated by the wide range of opinions on the proper response and the difficulty of enacting any change to how federal facilities are operated, other than incremental change or project-specific measures, because of the many affected constituencies.

Congress has limited the use of Army Corps of Engineers dams and reservoirs for municipal and industrial (M&I) water supply. Growing M&I demands have raised interest in—and concern about—changing current law and reservoir operations to give Corps facilities a greater role in M&I water storage. A reallocation of storage to M&I use from a currently authorized purpose (e.g., hydropower or navigation) changes the types of benefits produced by a facility and the stakeholders served. While Congress has specifically authorized 91 Corps multi-purpose facilities for M&I supply, it also has delegated to the Secretary of the Army constrained authority to reallocate storage to M&I water supply. In the Water Supply Act of 1958 (1958 WSA; P.L. 85-500), Congress provided that storage at Corps facilities could be allocated to M&I water supply without congressional approval if this reallocation did not seriously harm authorized project purposes or involve major structural or operational changes. Whether the Corps has regularly exceeded its discretion to reallocate is a concern raised in response to a July 2009 federal court order that found the Corps exceeded its discretion at Lake Lanier (GA). In order to guide its implementation of the discretionary authority to reallocate, the agency developed guidance on what may constitute a major change or serious harm to an authorized purpose. Since 1977 that guidance has included quantitative limits on reallocations conducted without congressional authorization. Issues for Congress include whether the Corps' interpretation of its discretionary authority is consistent with congressional intent and whether current law and policy are appropriate for current demands and constraints on water resources. CRS analysis of available data indicates that the Corps generally has not exceeded agency-established quantitative limits, with two exceptions in addition to Lake Lanier. One of the exceptions, Cowanesque Lake (PA), was made with the consent of Congress but conducted under the 1958 WSA authority. The other exception was a 1985 reallocation from hydropower to M&I use at Lake Texoma (TX/OK). The Corps found that a reallocation at Lake Texoma would neither require significant modification of the project, nor seriously harm authorized purposes (as the result of compensation being provided for lost hydropower). The Corps concluded that it could make the reallocation without congressional approval using its discretionary authority, in spite of the reallocation exceeding the agency-established quantitative limit. Whether this or other Corps reallocations and operational changes performed without congressional authorization (including those that have fallen within agency-established quantitative guidelines) have seriously harmed other project purposes or constituted a major operational change cannot be independently determined by available data, and is beyond the scope of the analysis herein.

In June 2009, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , a case in which the Court evaluated a mixed-motive claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits employment discrimination against individuals over the age of 40. In Gross , the plaintiff alleged that his employer's decision to reassign him was motivated at least in part by his age, while the employer claimed that its decision was based on other legitimate factors. The question at trial was what types of evidence the parties must present and who bears the burden of proof in such mixed-motive cases, which generally involve employment actions that are based on both permissible and impermissible reasons. Sidestepping the evidentiary question presented, the Court determined that an employer never bears the burden of persuasion because the traditional mixed-motive burden-shifting framework is not applicable to the ADEA. Finding instead that the ADEA does not authorize the type of mixed-motive claims that are available under a similar employment discrimination law, the Court, in a 5-4 ruling, held that an employee in a mixed-motive case bears the burden of establishing that "age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action," meaning that the employee must show that age was the deciding factor, rather than just one of several motivating factors, behind the employer's action. This standard is likely to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in age discrimination cases in which age is only one of several factors behind the adverse employment decision. In 1971, Jack Gross began working for FBL Financial Group, Inc. as a claims adjustor. In 2003, after several promotions, Gross was reassigned to a new position, while some of his job responsibilities were transferred to a newly created position that was given to a younger employee. Believing his reassignment to be a demotion, Gross sued his employer, claiming the company had intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of age. Although FBL denied that its decision was based on age, the company argued that even if it had considered age, its reassignment of Gross was based on other reasons that were lawful. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that if Gross proved by a preponderance of the evidence—direct or circumstantial—that age was a "motivating factor" in the company's decision to demote him, then the burden of persuasion would shift to FBL to prove it would have taken the same action even if the company had not considered Gross's age. Finding for Gross, the jury awarded him $46,945 in lost compensation. FBL, however, challenged the district court's jury instruction, and the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed. In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jury instructions were flawed and that the precedent established by the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins allows "a shift in the burden of persuasion only upon a demonstration by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in an adverse employment decision." The Supreme Court granted review in order to determine "whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case," or whether the burden of proof in a mixed-motive ADEA case shifts to the employer regardless of whether the evidence of bias presented by the employee is direct or circumstantial. When bringing a civil case alleging employment discrimination, there are two types of claims that a plaintiff can make: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment, which was at issue in Gross , occurs when an employer intentionally discriminates against an employee or enacts a policy with the intent to treat or affect the employee differently from others because of the employee's age. Such disparate treatment claims require proof that the employer intended to discriminate against the complaining party when it took the challenged employment action. Intent, the critical element of a disparate treatment claim, may be shown directly (e.g., by discriminatory statements or behavior of a supervisor towards a subordinate) or, perhaps more likely, by circumstantial evidence. Over the years, the courts have developed a complicated set of rules and procedures that govern how disparate treatment claims are adjudicated. Many of the cases in which these rules have emerged are cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment "because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Since the ADEA is largely patterned on Title VII, the reasoning in these cases frequently applies in the ADEA context as well. In general, plaintiffs may establish their individual disparate treatment claims under the ADEA in one of two ways, sometimes referred to as the indirect method and the direct method. When evidence of discrimination is lacking, plaintiffs generally use an indirect method that involves the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine . When the plaintiff can directly present evidence of age discrimination, use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting model is unnecessary, and the plaintiff can usually present either direct or circumstantial evidence that would enable a jury to conclude that discrimination occurred. Much of the confusion regarding the types of evidence plaintiffs are required to produce in mixed-motive cases, which are a variation on disparate treatment cases, can be traced to the Court's opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . Prior to the decision, it was unclear whether Title VII prohibited employment actions that were partly based on discriminatory reasons or whether the statute only covered actions that were wholly motivated by discrimination. In Price Waterhouse , the Court addressed these so-called "mixed-motive" cases and held, in part, that once a "plaintiff shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision," the burden shifts to the employer "to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive." This is the framework that currently applies to Title VII mixed-motive claims. However, the Court also held that employers could avoid liability if they made this showing. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which formally established mixed-motive claims under Title VII by clarifying that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." The 1991 amendments also partially overruled Price Waterhouse by altering the rules regarding employer liability in mixed-motive cases. Despite making these amendments to Title VII, Congress did not add similar language to the ADEA recognizing mixed-motive claims, nor did Congress address another apparent holding of the divided Price Waterhouse Court, as expressed in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, that plaintiffs must present "direct evidence" of discrimination in order to pursue a mixed-motive claim. Further adding to the confusion, the Court later held in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa that plaintiffs are not required to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII. Ultimately, the Court granted review in Gross in order to determine what types of evidence plaintiffs were required to present in order to receive a burden-shifting jury instruction in an ADEA mixed-motive case. Citing Desert Palace , Gross argued that plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases should be entitled to present both circumstantial and direct evidence. Rather than focusing on the question presented, FBL argued that Price Waterhouse should be overruled and that the burden of proof in ADEA mixed-motive cases should fall on the employee. In a highly unusual move, the Court's ruling focused on the issue raised in FBL's merit brief rather than on the question presented, thus meaning that interested parties were not given a full opportunity to address the issue in the briefs they submitted to the Court. In Gross , the Court ultimately ruled 5-4 in favor of FBL. According to the Court, the ADEA does not authorize the type of mixed-motive claims that are available under Title VII. As a result, even though an employee may still bring a claim whenever an employer has mixed motives for the adverse employment action, the Court held that an employee must show that "age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action." Because the Court found that the burden never shifts to an employer in such a case, there was no reason to determine what types of evidence a plaintiff must present in order to receive a burden-shifting jury instruction, thus rendering moot the question presented. In contrast to the Court's decision, the appellate courts that had previously considered the issue had unanimously applied the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework to the ADEA. In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA. Unlike Title VII, the ADEA does not contain a provision allowing a plaintiff to establish discrimination by showing that age was a motivating factor. Indeed, the Court found it significant that Congress amended Title VII to add such a provision but did not choose to make a corresponding change to the ADEA. As a result, the Court held that because "Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion," the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework, in which an employer bears the burden of proof once an employee establishes that his membership in a protected class played a motivating part in an employment decision, does not apply to ADEA claims. Turning to the language of the ADEA, the Court examined the statutory text and determined that the ADEA does not authorize the traditional type of mixed-motive claim available under Title VII. Instead, the ADEA prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment action against an individual "because of such individual's age." Reasoning that "because of" age must mean that age is the reason behind the employer's action, the Court concluded that an employee seeking to establish a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA must establish that age is the "but-for" cause of the employer's action. Thus, the plaintiff, not the employer, bears the burden of persuasion. According to the Court: Hence, the burden of persuasion necessary to establish employer liability is the same in alleged mixed-motive cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment action. A plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the "but-for" cause of the challenged employer decision. In other words, employees can still bring mixed-motive ADEA claims in the sense that they can sue if an employer cites both permissible and impermissible reasons for their actions. However, now the employee has to prove that the impermissible reason—age—was the decisive factor, whereas under traditional Title VII mixed-motive claims, an employee must simply demonstrate that the impermissible reason was only one of several motivating factors, at which point the burden shifts to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive. Based on its decision, the Court remanded the case for a new trial. Meanwhile, two separate dissents were filed in the Gross case. In the first dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the "because of" age language in the ADEA should be interpreted to prohibit employment actions motivated either in whole or in part by age. Specifically, the dissenting opinion noted that prior to the 1991 amendments that added the "motivating factor" language to Title VII, the Court in Price Waterhouse had interpreted identical "because of" language in that statute to encompass claims based on both permissible and impermissible reasons and should therefore apply the same interpretation to the ADEA. Moreover, Justice Stevens was highly critical of the Court's decision to issue an opinion based on a question that had not been presented or briefed by the parties. Therefore, he would have based his decision on the question presented and would have held that a plaintiff was not required to present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction. In the second dissent, Justice Breyer, who also joined the first dissenting opinion, wrote separately to highlight potential problems with extrapolating a "but-for" causation standard from tort law and applying that standard to the discrimination context. Ultimately, the Gross decision makes it harder for an employee to successfully prove an ADEA claim whenever an employer has both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for an employment action. There are two primary reasons for this. First, the new "but-for" causation standard established in Gross means that an employee now has to show that age was the deciding factor in an employment decision, not just one of several motivating factors. Second, after Gross , the employee always retains the burden of persuasion with respect to proving discrimination because the burden no longer shifts to the employer to prove that nondiscriminatory motives led to the employment decision, as it does under the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting mixed-motive framework that exists for Title VII. It is also important to note that the Gross decision could potentially affect claims brought under statutes other than the ADEA. For example, several other employment discrimination statutes are patterned on Title VII, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Like the ADEA, these two statutes, which, among other things, prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of disability, were not amended as Title VII was to include language authorizing mixed-motive claims. Therefore, these statutes appear to be susceptible to the same interpretation that the Court applied to the ADEA. Although it is unclear how far the logic of Gross may extend, it is also conceivable that such an analysis could be applied to other non-discrimination statutes in which employees may sue employers, such as labor or whistleblower laws. In addition, the Gross decision may spur congressional efforts to overturn the ruling. Since Gross was decided on statutory grounds, several legislators who disagree with the Court's interpretation have introduced legislation that would amend the ADEA to clarify that a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice under the ADEA or any other federal law prohibiting employment discrimination if the plaintiff demonstrates that the employment action was motivated by an impermissible factor. Under this legislation ( H.R. 3721 / S. 1756 ), which would apply retroactively to all claims that were pending on or after the date of the Gross decision, a plaintiff would be able rely on any form of circumstantial or direct evidence to establish such a claim, at which point the burden would shift to the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor. Such congressional action is not uncommon. For example, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. , Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which superseded the Ledbetter decision by amending Title VII to clarify that the time limit for suing employers for pay discrimination begins each time they issue a paycheck.

This report discusses Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., a recent case in which the Supreme Court evaluated a mixed-motive claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits employment discrimination against individuals over the age of 40. In Gross, the plaintiff alleged that his employer's decision to reassign him was motivated at least in part by his age, while the employer claimed that its decision was based on other legitimate factors. The question at trial was what types of evidence the parties must present and who bears the burden of proof in such mixed-motive cases, which generally involve employment actions that are based on both permissible and impermissible reasons. Sidestepping the evidentiary question presented, the Court determined that an employer never bears the burden of persuasion because the traditional mixed-motive burden-shifting framework is not applicable to the ADEA. Instead, based on its conclusion that the ADEA does not authorize the type of mixed-motive claims that are available under a similar employment discrimination law, the Court held that an employee bears the burden of establishing that age is the decisive cause of the challenged employment action. This standard is likely to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in age discrimination cases in which age is only one of several factors behind the adverse employment decision. Currently, several bills that would supersede the Gross decision by amending the ADEA have been introduced in the 111th Congress, including H.R. 3721 and S. 1756.

Although judicial nominations sometimes do not receive Senate confirmation, they historically have been heavily outnumbered by judicial nominations which the Senate has confirmed. For example, according to the most recent CRS data, of the 2,927 nominees to Article III circuit and district court judgeships between the start of the 79 th Congress in 1945 and the end of the first session of the 113 th Congress on January 3, 2014, only 287 nominees (or approximately 10% of the total number of nominees in this period) failed to be confirmed by the Senate. Even smaller has been the number of lower court nominations which received unfavorable votes by the Senate Judiciary Committee or rejection votes by the full Senate. More often than not, when a circuit or district court nominee lacks key Senate support (such as the support of one or both home state Senators), the Judiciary Committee simply has declined to consider or act on the nomination. Neither the Judiciary Committee nor the full Senate is compelled to act on nominations which come before it, and nominations that receive no action are eventually returned to, or withdrawn by, the President. The vast majority of unconfirmed nominees from 1945 through 2013—approximately 90%—failed to receive a committee vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The procedural route for a circuit or district court nomination is as follows: Once the President has submitted such a nomination to the Senate, it is almost invariably referred to the Judiciary Committee. The committee may then hold a hearing on the nomination. After the hearing, the committee has several options: (1) it may report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation; (2) it may vote against reporting the nomination; or (3) it may choose to take no action at all. Typically, if the committee votes on a nomination, it votes to report favorably; however, in a very small number of cases, the committee has voted against reporting a nomination, or has voted to report the nomination either unfavorably or without recommendation. If a majority of the committee agrees to any one of the motions to report, the nomination moves to the full Senate. Note that, in the event of a tie vote, the nomination fails to be reported by the committee. Additionally, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination. Once a lower court nomination is reported to the full Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senate's Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. If the Senate, when voting on whether to confirm, rejects the nomination (as has happened on rare occasions), it is returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval. If a judicial nomination does not receive a Senate vote, the nomination ultimately will either be withdrawn by the President or returned to the President by the Secretary of the Senate upon a Senate adjournment or recess of more than 30 days. This report identifies, from the 76 th Congress (1939-1941) through the first session of the 113 th Congress (January 3, 2014), 19 U.S. circuit court or district court nominations that received other than a favorable vote from the Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. Among these 19 nominations were 18 (or all but one of the nominations) on which the Judiciary Committee voted other than to report favorably. The only nomination that did not receive a vote other than to report favorably was that of Ronnie L. White to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The White nomination, as Table 2 shows, was reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee, only to be rejected by the full Senate. Table 1 , below, summarizes the final committee and floor dispositions of these 19 nominations. Each row indicates a possible committee outcome ( report favorably, report without recommendation, report unfavorably , and fail to report ), and each column indicates a possible floor outcome ( confirmed, rejected, returned, and withdrawn ). Each cell provides the total number of circuit and district court nominations receiving the final committee and floor actions as indicated by the corresponding row and column. Totals for final committee and floor dispositions are found in the last column and row, respectively. Table 2 lists the nominations to the circuit courts of appeals (7 in all) and district courts (12 in all) in separate sections. Within the two sections, nominations are arranged chronologically. From left to right, columns one, two, and three identify the Congress, nominee, and court of each nominee. Columns four through seven provide the Judiciary Committee vote on each nomination, stating the type of vote, vote breakdown, and date on which the vote occurred. Column eight provides information concerning the final disposition of the nomination in the Senate. Beyond the scope of this report are U.S. circuit and district court nominations which were reported out of the Judiciary Committee and on which the Senate failed to invoke cloture. For the purposes of this report, such nominations are not considered up-or-down Senate votes to reject a nomination. Table 1 indicates that all seven circuit court nominations accounted for in the table received a committee vote other than to report favorably. Of the seven nominations, the Senate Judiciary Committee failed to adopt motions to report five, resulting in the return of four nominations to the President and the withdrawal of one. The remaining two nominations were reported without recommendation; one was confirmed and one was returned to the President. During the 1939-2013 period, no circuit court nominations were rejected by a vote of the full Senate. Additionally, Table 1 indicates that, of the 12 district court nominations accounted for in the table, four were never reported out of the Judiciary Committee; one of the four nominations was returned, and three were withdrawn by the President. Two district court nominations were reported to the Senate favorably. One, who was confirmed, had initially failed in a Judiciary Committee vote to have his nomination reported (only to have the committee decide, in a later vote, to report the nomination). The other, although reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee, was rejected by the full Senate. Five district court nominations were reported to the Senate unfavorably (all five were rejected by the Senate). One nomination to a district court, which is the most recent listed in Table 2 , was reported to the Senate without recommendation; that nomination was confirmed by the Senate. Note that, as of this writing, this is the only nomination listed in Table 2 in which a vote on a motion to report unfavorably or without recommendation was not first preceded by a vote to report favorably. Table 2 reveals that, from 1939 through 1951, one circuit and six district court nominees received votes from the Senate Judiciary Committee other than to report favorably. In all but one of these seven cases, the committee declined to report favorably after home state Senators, in opposing the nominations, invoked "senatorial courtesy." Floyd H. Roberts, nominated to be U.S. district court judge for the Western District of Virginia, was the first judicial nominee reported unfavorably by the committee and rejected by the Senate within the 1939-2013 time period. The committee adversely reported Roberts in 1939 on the grounds that his nomination was "personally offensive" to the two Virginia Senators. The Senate, in turn, rejected the Roberts nomination by a 9-72 vote. In another case, in 1943, the Judiciary Committee failed, in a 9-9 tie vote, to report the Fifth Circuit Court nomination of James V. Allred, a former Texas governor, after Texas's junior Senator invoked senatorial courtesy. In doing so, the Senator reportedly notified the committee that "this nomination is obnoxious to me." Additionally, in 1950 and 1951, four district court nominations faced opposition from home state Senators invoking senatorial courtesy. The opposing Senators stated that that the nominations to district judgeships in their states were "personally obnoxious" due to the manner in which they were handled by the Truman Administration. The Senators, in each case, had submitted the names of their preferred judicial nominees to the Administration. The President, however, without consulting with the home state Senators, proceeded to submit the names of other nominees—not of the Senators' choosing—to the Senate for consideration. One of the Senators, in objecting to the two judicial nominations in his state, noted it was not the nominees themselves but rather "the manner and method of their selection that made them personally obnoxious." All four nominations were reported adversely and rejected by voice vote in the Senate. From 1952 through 1977, as Table 2 shows, there were no instances in which the Senate Judiciary Committee voted against reporting a circuit or district court nomination or voted to report such a nomination without recommendation or unfavorably. In 1976, however, one nomination, that of William B. Poff, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, was laid on the table by a 9-0 vote of the Senate Judiciary Committee reportedly due to senatorial courtesy. Since 1978, six circuit and five district court nominees have received votes from the Senate Judiciary Committee other than to report favorably. Two of these nominees (one circuit and one district) were ultimately reported without recommendation and confirmed by the Senate in relatively close roll call votes. One district court nominee was ultimately confirmed by a voice vote after his nomination was reported favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The successful motion to report favorably occurred, though, after a prior motion to report the nomination favorably failed to gain committee approval. One circuit and two district court nominations were ultimately withdrawn by the nominating President. The four remaining circuit court nominations were returned to the President. The Senate Judiciary Committee failed to report all but one of these nominees to the full Senate. One nominee subsequently received a recess appointment while another was renominated and confirmed by the Senate during a later Congress. Finally, during the 106 th Congress, one district court nomination, that of Ronnie L. White to the Eastern District of Missouri, was reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee but rejected on the floor of the Senate by a 45-54 vote. Senators' objections to these 11 nominations since 1978 rested largely on the perceived ideological orientation of judicial nominees, the professional qualifications of the nominees, or both. For example, Daniel Manion, nominated in 1986 by President Reagan to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, was criticized for lacking "the record of distinction and achievement that was expected of appointees to the courts of appeals," while his supporters "argued that opposition to his nomination was based on his conservative views and his activities with his father," who had co-founded the John Birch Society. Likewise, in 2002, objections to President George W. Bush's nomination of Priscilla R. Owen to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appeared primarily concerned with her ideological orientation. In Senate Judiciary Committee debate preceding a vote on her nomination, Democratic members of the committee, it was reported, characterized the nominee "as a judicial 'activist' whose opinions were colored by strong anti-abortion and pro-business views, while Republicans defended her as a fair-minded jurist who was given a top rating by the American Bar Association but ran afoul of liberal interest groups." While Owen's two nominations during the 107 th Congress were returned to the President, she was renominated during the next two Congresses (the 108 th and 109 th ), and ultimately was confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 2005. The most recent nomination listed in Table 2 , that of J. Leon Holmes to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, was also opposed by some Senators on ideological grounds. Mr. Holmes had been nominated by President G.W. Bush and had the support of both of Arkansas's Democratic Senators. Concern by opponents of the nomination cited the nominee's past "comments about abortion, women's rights and other topics," while those who supported his nomination emphasized that his comments were made "20-plus years ago" and that regardless of his personal views, the nominee would "abide by the rule of law." Mr. Holmes's nomination was ultimately confirmed by the Senate on July 6, 2004, by a vote of 51-46. Unlike the nominations listed in Table 2 that were considered between 1939 and 1951 (all of which occurred during periods of unified party government), consideration of nominations listed in Table 2 from 1976 through 2013 occurred primarily during periods of divided government. This was the case for 9 of 12 of the nominations during this period that received other than favorable votes by the Judiciary Committee or the full Senate. In particular, all six circuit court nominees in question were nominated by a Republican President (three by Reagan, one by George H.W. Bush, and two by George W. Bush) while Democrats held a majority in the Senate. Of the six district court nominations during this period receiving other than favorable votes in the Judiciary Committee or the full Senate, three (one Ford nominee, one Reagan nominee, and one Clinton nominee) received such votes during periods of divided government. Note, however, that of the 3 nominations (1 circuit and 2 district) that were confirmed during the 1976 to 2013 period (i.e., the Manion, Collins, and Holmes nominations), all were approved by the Senate during periods of unified government. In other words, in each of those three cases, the same party controlled the presidency as well as held the majority in the Senate.

Once a nomination to a U.S. circuit court of appeals or district court judgeship is submitted to the Senate by the President, the Senate almost invariably refers it to the Senate Judiciary Committee. If the Judiciary Committee schedules a vote on a nominee, it usually will vote on a motion to report the nomination favorably. However, the committee could also vote on a motion to report without recommendation, to report unfavorably, or to table the nomination. If the committee votes to report—whether favorably, without recommendation, or unfavorably—the nomination moves to the full Senate. By contrast, the nomination remains in committee if the committee votes against reporting, if there is no committee vote on the nomination, or if the committee votes to table the nomination. Once a nomination is reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, the nomination is listed on the Senate's Executive Calendar, with Senate consideration of the nomination scheduled by the majority leader. On rare occasions, the Senate, when voting on confirmation, has rejected a circuit or district court nomination. In such cases, the nomination is then returned to the President with a resolution of disapproval. Between 1939 and the adjournment sine die of the first session of the 113th Congress on January 3, 2014, 19 U.S. circuit or district court nominations received other than a favorable vote from the full Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee, or both. These 19 nominations represent less than 1.0% of the total circuit and district court nominations during this period. Among these 19 nominations were 7 circuit court nominations and 12 district court nominations. This report lists the votes cast by the Judiciary Committee and the full Senate on each of the 19 nominations and identifies senatorial courtesy, ideological disagreement, and concern over nominees' qualifications as among the circumstances that led to committee consideration of actions other than a favorable report (or other than approval by the full Senate). Beyond the scope of this report are U.S. circuit and district court nominations which were reported out of the Judiciary Committee and on which the Senate failed to invoke cloture. Senate and Senate Judiciary Committee actions on judicial nominations are discussed more generally in CRS Report R43369, U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations During President Obama's First Five Years: Comparative Analysis With Recent Presidents; and CRS Report R42556, Nominations to U.S. Circuit and District Courts by President Obama During the 111th and 112th Congresses.

United States v. Santos involved a challenge to the conviction of the operator of an illegal lottery and one of his collectors for violating a provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, a key federal criminal anti-money laundering statute. The defendants were charged with using the "proceeds" of unlawful activity to conduct a financial transaction with intent to promote the illegal gambling business. For a conviction under this particular subsection of the statute, which covers a form of money laundering, referred to as "promotional money laundering," the prosecution must prove: (1) that the defendant engaged in a financial transaction involving the "proceeds" of an unlawful activity; (2) that the unlawful activity had been designated by the statute as a "specified unlawful activity"; (3) that defendant knew that the property involved in the transaction "represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity"; and (4) the defendant had the "intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity." At their trial, the defendants were convicted of operating an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, anyone convicted of conducting or owning an illegal gambling business is subject to a criminal fine and imprisonment for up to five years. Proof of "illegal gambling business" requires a showing that the gambling business violates state law; involves five or more persons; and has been in operation for more than thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 a day. The evidence showed that gambling receipts were used to pay the expenses of the operation—payouts to winners, salaries to employees, costs of betting slips, etc.—as well as to realize profits. The promotional money laundering charge was based on payments to winners and to employees—runners—of the gambling business. These payments were part of the underlying charge of operating an illegal gambling business. The defendant convicted of operating the gambling business received a 60-month sentence for the illegal gambling conviction and 210 months for the money laundering. The issue presented to the Court was a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, does "proceeds" mean "profits" or "gross receipts?" For Santos and his co-conspirators, the answer the Court provided is "profits." For others, however, the answer is not clear because there is no majority opinion in the case; there is an opinion for a plurality of four justices which is joined by a concurring opinion by a fifth justice, Justice Stevens, that limits the reach of the holding to a narrower ground. This means that the case may be cited as authority only for the narrow ground. Complicating this, however, are two factors: (1) the plurality opinion includes language seeking to confine the meaning of Justice Stevens's opinion; and (2) all of the other justices disavowed the approach taken by Justice Stevens. Justice Scalia, in the plurality opinion, writing for himself and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Thomas, found no way to decipher what Congress intended in using the word "proceeds" in 18 U.S.C. § 1956. He found that (1) there is no definition of "proceeds" in 18 U.S.C. § 1956; (2) the federal criminal code does not provide a consistent definition or use for the term; (3) either "profits" or "gross receipts" would fit everywhere "proceeds' is used in the statute; and (3) dictionaries revealed no overwhelming preference for a primary ordinary meaning of the term. Declaring himself unable to resolve the ambiguity, Justice Scalia resorted to the rule of lenity which requires clarity in criminal statutes and ambiguities resolved in favor of defendants. He reasoned that, because "profits" is harder to prove than "gross receipts," defining "proceeds" as "profits" is more lenient towards defendants, and, therefore, it is the required interpretation in the statute. This means that, under this statute, prosecutors must prove, in addition to the other elements of the offense, that the defendant knew that the property involved in the transaction is " profits " of "some form of unlawful activity" and that the transaction involves " profits " of "specified unlawful activity." In the opinion, Justice Scalia seeks to dispel arguments raised by the Solicitor General that defining "proceeds" as "profits" undermines the purpose of the money laundering statute—punishing concealment and promotion of illegal activities—because it does not capture all the funds generated by the illegal activity. He first asserts that the purpose of the money laundering laws might well have been eliminating the harm caused by pouring criminal profits into expanded criminal activity (i.e., "leveraging" profits). He, then, notes that the "profits" interpretation avoids the merger problem that would occur in many of the predicate offenses named in 18 U.S.C. 1956, including operating an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. This is because, if "proceeds" were interpreted to mean "gross receipts," every separate expense of the underlying crime paid after its commission would be subject to prosecution both as the substantive crime and as the money laundering offense. This would raise the double-jeopardy-like situation that the merger doctrine seeks to prevent. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens essentially limits the reach of the plurality opinion. He did not focus on the rule of lenity although his rationale is consistent with it to the extent that he would interpret "proceeds" to mean "profits" in the case before the Court. He begins with a premise which no other justice embraces—that courts may choose different interpretations of ambiguous terms in statutes depending on the factual circumstances. He draws a parallel between the scope of judicial interpretation of statutes and the power of Congress to flesh out terms in statutes. He concludes that because Congress could specify separate meanings for a term in a statute, courts having to fill in statutory gaps occasioned by ambiguous language do not have to decide on one meaning for all circumstances. To him, the logic is: if Congress may apply different definitions drafting legislation, courts may also do so. From this premise, he seems to have concluded that Congress intended different meanings for "proceeds" in § 1956. Following this conclusion, Justice Stevens finds that "proceeds" is intended to mean "profits" where, as with the predicate offense of conducting an illegal gambling business, there is no legislative history of congressional intent to the contrary. On the other hand, the opinion seems to assert that legislative history of congressional intent is necessary before courts may extend the meaning of "proceeds" to gross receipts. The opinion also contains language indicating that there is the possibility that there is legislative history to substantiate congressional intent to authorize money laundering prosecutions based on gross receipts transactions for certain offenses. Although Justice Stevens alludes to the possibility that legislative history supports interpreting "proceeds" as "gross receipts" for some types of prosecutions, it is significant that the plurality opinion disputes this and characterizes it as dicta. This may raise uncertainty as to the sustainability of convictions involving the contraband and organized crime offenses of the kind Justice Stevens cited as having legislative history supporting a "gross receipts" definition of "proceeds." Because many of the money laundering cases that have been brought under the subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 at issue have involved payment of expenses of the underlying crime, the Justice Department's ability to shut off the funding of criminal activities may be severely inhibited. An added problem will be the difficulty of sustaining the burden of proof that will be required to show "profits" of criminal activities. In its merits brief, the Solicitor General argued that this burden would be substantial and perhaps insurmountable. In a dissenting opinion, written by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, there is a further indication of the difficulties that the "profits' definition will present to prosecutors: (1) one of the main purposes of enacting the money laundering laws was to target professional money launderers who are unlikely to know or care whether the property they are dealing with is "profits" or "gross receipts"; (2) a "profits" interpretation would require courts to determine the ordinary expenditures of criminal activities to distinguish them from "profits"; and (3) under the plurality opinion, if the government charges a continuing offense over period of years—as in the case before the Court—the government would have to show that the operation yielded a profit over the course of time charged. Another dissenting opinion, written by Justice Breyer, who also joined Justice Alito's dissent, alludes to possible solutions to what he, agreeing with the Justices Scalia and Stevens, sees as a merger problem—that prosecutors are able to transform one crime into two and add the money laundering punishments for "financial transactions that constitute an essential part of" the predicate offense. One approach he mentions is requiring that the money laundering transaction be "distinct" from the underlying offense. He also suggests that the merger problem could be corrected by relying on the U.S. Sentencing Commission to use its authority to address the unfairness resulting from using the money laundering statute to under 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). Justice Scalia takes issue with each of these suggestions: the first because "it has no basis whatever in the words of the statute" ; the second because it lacks certainty. S. 386 , the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, has been passed by both the House and Senate and, as of May 19, 2009, awaits the signature of the President. It was introduced on February 5, 2009, by Senator Leahy to enhance federal enforcement capabilities to counteract mortgage fraud, securities fraud, and fraud with respect to federal financial assistance. In addition to provisions which provide funding for investigation and prosecution of this type of fraud; substantive provisions extending the reach of specific criminal statutes addressing financial fraud; and (in the version passed by the House) the creation of a legislative branch Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the bill includes an amendment to the definition of "proceeds" in the anti-money laundering laws to cover "gross receipts" of the underlying criminal activity. This is designed to solve the problems identified in the Santos decision by clarifying the ambiguity found by the Court and making it clear that "proceeds" means "gross receipts." Specifically, as passed by both House and Senate, S. 386 would add the following provision to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) and incorporate it into 18 U.S.C.§ 1957(c): "the term 'proceeds' means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity." The House-passed version also includes a provision addressing the merger problem. It sets forth a sense of Congress that prosecutions under the major anti-money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, should not be undertaken in combination with the prosecution of any other offense, without prior approval of specified Department of Justice Officials or the relevant United States Attorney if the underlying predicate offense for the money laundering prosecution "is so closely connected with the conduct to be charged as the other offense that there is no clear delineation between the two offenses." This provision also includes a requirement that, for the next five years, the Department of Justice provide the House and Senate Judiciary Committees with annual reports on the prosecutions under such approvals, denied such approvals, and undertaken without such approvals where such approvals would have been relevant. Other measures in the 111 th Congress include: S. 378 , introduced by Senator Bayh, as a stand-alone measure to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(8) to specify that "proceeds" includes "gross receipts," and H.R. 1793 , introduced by Representative Lungren, to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) to define "proceeds" as "any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of any specified unlawful activity, including the gross proceeds of that specified unlawful activity."

On June 2, 2008, the U. S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Santos (No. 06-1005), vacated convictions of the operator of an illegal lottery and one of his runners who had been charged with conducting financial transactions involving the "proceeds" of an illegal gaming business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The ruling is that "proceeds," as used in this money laundering statute, means "profits" rather than "gross receipts" of the underlying unlawful activity. The decision combines a plurality opinion interpreting the word "proceeds" in the statute to mean "profits" and a concurring opinion, necessary for a majority ruling, that leaves room for interpreting "proceeds" as "gross receipts" in other circumstances. A strong dissenting opinion emphasized the constraints the ruling will place on prosecutors. The interpretation rests on two principles of statutory construction: the rule of lenity and the merger doctrine. Under the rule of lenity, ambiguities in criminal statutes are construed in favor of the defendant. Application of the merger doctrine avoids the prospect that a defendant would receive two punishments under different statutes for what is essentially a single offense. On February 5, 2009, Senator Leahy introduced S. 386, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, which was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 23, 2009, S.Rept. 111-10. On April 28, the bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate. On May 7, an amended version of the bill was passed by the House. It was returned to the Senate, amended, and passed; thereafter, on May 18, it was passed by the House for presentation to the President. The bill includes provisions amending the definition of "proceeds" under the anti-money laundering criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(8) and 1957(c), to specify that the term includes the "gross receipts" of the underlying criminal activity. As passed by the House, the bill also includes a provision addressing the possibility of a merger problem in money laundering prosecutions for predicate offenses closely connected with the elements of the money laundering offense. Other legislation with provisions to cover "gross receipts" includes S. 378 and H.R. 1793. This report will be updated on the basis of major legislative activity.

Considerable congressional attention has been placed on the treatment of consumers within the private health insurance marketplace. Among the many concerns, particular attention has been paid to the value of coverage in terms of out-of-pocket (OOP) costs relative to premiums. One method that lowers the value of coverage is the use of annual limits on the dollar amount of coverage. Private health insurers use annual limits to require the consumer to assume 100% of the cost of coverage after a certain amount of spending for the year has been reached. The spending can be for the total health benefits covered or targeted to specific services, such as hospitalizations. Policyholders and plan members that exceed these coverage caps end up with very high OOP costs. However, market demand for low-premium coverage has led to the proliferation of limited benefit plans ("mini-med plans") that rely on annual limits to keep premiums down. According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) approximately 18 million Americans are subject to annual limits in their health coverage. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , PPACA) was enacted on March 23, 2010, and amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act ( P.L. 111-152 , HCERA), enacted on March 30, 2010 (hereafter collectively referred to as PPACA). PPACA, among other provisions, reorganizes and amends title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to reform the private health insurance marketplace. The "immediate" reforms in sections 2711 through 2719 of the PHSA become effective for plan years beginning on or after September 23, 2010. The plan year refers to the 12-month period during which a policy or plan benefit is effective. Among the immediate reforms are consumer protections from high OOP costs by placing restrictions on and eventually prohibiting the use of annual limits. This report provides an overview of the waiver available for the restriction on annual limits and will be periodically updated to reflect any legislative or regulatory changes. For plan years beginning on or after six months after enactment, group health plans, grandfathered group health plans, and health insurance issuers offering group or individual plans are restricted, as determined by the Secretary of HHS (hereafter the Secretary), from establishing annual limits on the dollar value of essential health benefits for any participant or beneficiary. Essential health benefits may be further defined by the Secretary, but they must include at least the following types of care: ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services and devices, laboratory services, and preventive and wellness and chronic disease management and pediatric services, including oral and vision care. Annual limits are permissible for health care expenses that are not considered part of the essential health benefits. PPACA also requires the Secretary to ensure that there is access to needed services with a minimal impact on premiums in the context of defining the restriction on annual limits. This provision is the basis for the Secretary's waiver authority. On June 28, 2010, the Secretary promulgated regulations, with the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury, defining the restrictions on annual limits. In order to limit the magnitude of the likely premium increases for coverage that previously used annual limits, the regulations have a three-year phase-in period allowing insurers to implement annual limits of $750,000 in the first year culminating in a $2 million allowable annual limit in the final year, as illustrated in Figure 1 . On January 1, 2014, annual limits will be prohibited altogether. There is substantial variability in the marketplace due to different consumer demands, but generally, a limited benefit plan offers coverage with restrictive annual limits on total benefits and/or on specific service categories (e.g., surgeries). Table 1 illustrates an example of grandfathered limited benefits plan called Fundamental Care. In this example, Fundamental Care has a annual deductible of $500 and a policy year maximum or annual limit of $100,000 and service specific benefit maximums. The plan has a drug benefit with a $100 deductible and a $1,000 annual limit. Premiums vary by covered group, but the employer is required to make at least a 50% contribution to the cost of the coverage. HHS estimates that about 17.9 million persons have plans or policies that are subject to annual limits, primarily in the individual (65% of total) and small group (31% of total) markets. Industry groups have argued that limited benefit plans are necessary because more comprehensive coverage would be too costly without the federal subsidies for qualified health plans in the exchanges that are not available until 2014. They say that without the option of limited benefit plans, these workers would likely become uninsured. This assertion has been the basis for requesting and granting waivers from the restriction on annual limits. On the other hand, some consumer groups have argued that limited benefit plans are not deserving of any regulatory leniency. They assert that many consumers enroll in these plans without understanding how little protection they provide against large health expenses, resulting in a lack of access to care and substantive medical debt when they experience a major illness or accident. These concerns prompted a December 1, 2010, hearing by the Senate Commerce Committee. Limited benefit plans do not have a categorical exemption from the reforms of PPACA. However, regulators have found the industry argument for waivers compelling while acknowledging the potential risks to consumers. In the interim final regulations on restricted annual limits, the Secretaries of HHS, Labor, and the Treasury announced that HHS would establish a waiver process for limited benefit plans in order to preserve coverage at similar premiums. In other words, it was assumed that applying the restriction on annual limits to limited benefit plans would result in substantive increases in the premiums charged for those insurance products. HHS, however, expressed concern that consumers might be confused about the value of their coverage in relation to the restriction on annual limits. Accordingly, HHS is requiring plans that are approved for the waiver to prominently display in their materials a "black box type" warning in 14-point bold font explaining that their plan does not meet the standards of the law with respect to annual limits. Organizations may apply for a waiver on an annual basis until January 1, 2014, when annual limits are prohibited. The standards of the waiver apply equally to all applicants, as there are no differential or preferred paths to a waiver by the category of the applicant, such as unions or small businesses. The operational process for applying for a waiver was published as a memorandum on September 3, 2010. The memorandum, and subsequent guidance, establishes the following reporting requirements: the terms of the plan or policy for which a waiver is sought; the number of individuals enrolled in the plan or covered by the policy; the annual limit(s) and rates applicable to the plan or policy; and a brief description of why compliance with the restriction on annual limits standard would result in a significant decrease in access to benefits or a significant increase in premiums paid. As of April 1, 2011, 1,168 waivers have been approved, representing slightly more that 2.9 million enrollees and policyholders. This means the enrollees and policyholders of the accepted waiver applicants represent around 1.5% of the approximately 194.5 million individuals with private health insurance in the United States. HHS did not provide any data on denied waiver applicants, but has reported that 94% of the applicants were granted waivers. As illustrated by Figure 2 , most (94.3%) of the waivers were approved for either self-insured employers (40.6%), health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs, 28.9%), or multiemployer union plans (24.7%). As illustrated by Figure 3 , most (92.5%) of enrollment for the approved waivers was for either health insurance issuers (29.7%), multiemployer union plans (29.4%), non-Taft Hartley union plans (19.1%), or self-insured employers (14.3%). On March 17, 2011, the Health Care Waiver Transparency Act was introduced by Representative Darrell Issa ( H.R. 1184 ) and Senator John Ensign ( S. 650 ). H.R. 1184 / S. 650 would require the Secretary of HHS to publish, on the HHS website, detailed criteria used to determine approval of an application submitted for a waiver, adjustment, or other compliance relief provided for under the authority of PPACA or title I or subtitle B of title II of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act ( P.L. 111-152 ). The Secretary of HHS would be further required to publish each application for a waiver, the determination of the Secretary of HHS whether to approve or reject the application, and the reason for such approval or rejection. H.R. 1184 / S. 650 would also expressly prohibit preferential treatment being given to any waiver applicant based on political contributions or association with a labor union, a health plan provided for under a collective bargaining agreement, or another organized labor group. Section 1856(b) of P.L. 112-10 requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to submit to Congress a report that includes the results of an audit of requests for waiver of the restricted annual limit not later than June 14, 2011. The report must include an analysis of the number of approvals and denials of such requests and the reasons for such approval or denial. Concern regarding the favoritism toward unions in granting waivers, the frequency of the waivers, and the transparency of the waiver process has prompted oversight and legislative activity. On January 20, 2011, the House Energy and Commerce Committee sent a letter to the director of the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) asking for, among other things, documents and information regarding the submission and approval of the waivers for restricted annual limits. Similar letters requesting additional details on the waivers and waiver applicants have been sent by Senator Hatch and by Senator Ensign. On March 22, 2011, the House Committee on Small Business sent a letter to the Secretary of HHS asking a series of questions and for documentation concerning the specific impact of the waivers on small businesses. The waivers have also been a topic of discussion in several hearings on PPACA. For context, it is relevant to note that Congress has not consistently specified the manner in which information concerning health care waivers is to be released to the public. Indeed, the annual limits provision of PPACA does not even have a specific public reporting requirement. As a result of different legal standards, or in some cases the absence of a congressional directive, no standardized practice for releasing information about health care waivers has ever been developed. As illustrated in Table 2 , there is substantial variation in the release of information between different health care waiver types. No obvious bias could be found in the publicly available application materials for the annual limits waivers. The available evidence suggests no favoritism for any particular applicant groups (e.g., unions). The Hill obtained records of waiver denials and reported that as of mid-February, CMS had denied 79 requests for waivers and that unions accounted for roughly 60% of those denials. Moreover, in completing the work required by P.L. 112-10 , the GAO found that CMS granted waivers when an application projected a significant increase in premiums or significant reduction in access to health care benefits rather than organizational factors (e.g., union membership, geographical location, number of employees).

Considerable congressional attention has been placed on the dollar value of health insurance coverage in terms of out-of-pocket (OOP) costs placed on policyholders. One method that lowers the dollar value of coverage is the use of annual limits on the dollar amount of coverage. Private health insurers use annual limits to require the consumer to assume 100% of the cost of coverage after a certain amount of spending for the year has been reached. While annual limits may be a benefit design feature in any type of health insurance, they are used as the primary method of cost control for limited benefit plans, which provide low premium coverage typically to low-income part-time or seasonal workers. Limited benefit plans generally have annual limits on both the total dollar coverage and on specific coverage categories (e.g., hospitalizations and outpatient surgeries). Without the limited benefit plan option, many of these low-income workers would likely be uninsured. On the other hand, these plans have been criticized as providing little value and giving a false sense of security to policyholders. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA) prohibits the use of annual limits effective 2014 and places certain restrictions on their use effective for plan years starting on or after September 23, 2010. These restrictions would effectively eliminate limited benefit plans. Accordingly, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has implemented a waiver process for limited benefit plans under the authority provided by Section 1001 of PPACA to define restricted annual limits in such a way as to "ensure that access to needed services is made available with a minimal impact on premiums." Considerable attention has been paid to the fairness and transparency of the waiver process. For context, it is relevant to note that Congress has not consistently specified the manner in which information concerning health care waivers is to be released to the public. Indeed, the annual limits provision of PPACA does not even have a specific public reporting requirement. As a result of different legal standards, or in some cases the absence of a congressional directive, no standardized practice for releasing information about health care waivers has ever been developed. With respect to the annual limits waivers, no obvious bias could be found in the publicly available application materials. Moreover, the Government Accountability Office found that the waivers were granted when an application projected a significant increase in premiums or significant reduction in access to health care benefits and not based on organizations factors (e.g., being a union).

The Anti-Spyware Coalition (ASC) defines spyware as "technologies deployed without appropriate user consent and/or implemented in ways that impair user control over (1) material changes that affect their user experience, privacy, or system security; (2) use of their system resources, including what programs are installed on their computers; and/or (3) collection, use, and distribution of their personal or other sensitive information. The main issue for Congress over spyware is whether to enact new legislation specifically addressing spyware, or to rely on industry self-regulation and enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice under existing law. Opponents of new legislation argue that industry self-regulation and enforcement of existing laws are sufficient. They worry that further legislation could have unintended consequences that, for example, limit the development of new technologies that could have beneficial uses. Supporters of new legislation believe that current laws are inadequate, as evidenced by the growth in spyware incidents. Advocates of legislation want specific laws to stop spyware. For example, they want software providers to be required to obtain the consent of an authorized user of a computer ("opt-in") before any software is downloaded onto that computer. Skeptics contend that spyware is difficult to define and consequently legislation could have unintended consequences, and that legislation is likely to be ineffective. One argument is that the "bad actors" are not likely to obey any opt-in requirement, but are difficult to locate and prosecute. Also, some are overseas and not subject to U.S. law. Other arguments are that one member of a household (a child, for example) might unwittingly opt-in to spyware that others in the family would know to decline, or that users might not read through a lengthy licensing agreement to ascertain precisely what they are accepting. In many ways, the debate over how to cope with spyware parallels the controversy that led to unsolicited commercial electronic mail ("spam") legislation. Whether to enact a new law, or rely on enforcement of existing law and industry self-regulation, were the cornerstones of that debate as well. Congress chose to pass the CAN-SPAM Act ( P.L. 108-187 ). Questions remain about that law's effectiveness. Such reports fuel the argument that spyware legislation similarly cannot stop the threat. In the case of spam, FTC officials emphasized that consumers should not expect any legislation to solve the spam problem—that consumer education and technological advancements also are needed. The same is true for spyware. Software programs that include spyware may be sold or available for free ("freeware"). They may be on a disk or other media, downloaded from the Internet, or downloaded when opening an attachment to an electronic mail (e-mail) message. Typically, users have no knowledge that spyware is on their computers. Because the spyware is resident on the computer's hard drive, it can generate pop-up ads, for example, even when the computer is not connected to the Internet. One example of spyware is software products that include, as part of the software itself, a method by which information is collected about the use of the computer on which the software is installed, such as web browsing habits. Some of these products may collect personally identifiable information (PII). When the computer is connected to the Internet, the software periodically relays the information back to another party, such as the software manufacturer or a marketing company. Another oft-cited example of spyware is "adware," which may cause advertisements to suddenly appear on the user's monitor—called "pop-up" ads. In some cases, the adware uses information that the software obtained by tracking a user's web browsing habits to determine shopping preferences, for example. Some adware companies, however, insist that adware is not necessarily spyware, because the user may have permitted it to be downloaded onto the computer because it provides desirable benefits. Spyware also can refer to "keylogging" software that records a person's keystrokes. All typed information thus can be obtained by another party, even if the author modifies or deletes what was written, or if the characters do not appear on the monitor (such as when entering a password). Commercial key logging software has been available for some time. In the context of the spyware debate, the concern is that such software can record credit card numbers and other personally identifiable information that consumers type when using Internet-based shopping and financial services, and transmit that information to someone else. Thus it could contribute to identity theft. Spyware remains difficult to define, however, in spite of the work done by groups such as the ASC and government agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). As discussed below, this lack of agreement is often cited by opponents of legislation as a reason not to legislate. Opponents of anti-spyware legislation argue that without a widely agreed-upon definition, legislation could have unintended consequences, banning current or future technologies and activities that, in fact, could be beneficial. Some of these software applications, including adware and keylogging software, do, in fact, have legitimate uses. The question is whether the user has given consent for it to be installed. A report on spyware law enforcement by the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) summarizes active and resolved spyware cases at the federal and state levels. Additionally, the FTC maintains its own list of cases. The FTC has consumer information on spyware that includes a link to file a complaint with the commission through its "OnGuard Online" website. The FTC has also issued a consumer alert about spyware that lists warning signs that might indicate a computer is infected with spyware. The FTC alert listed the following clues: a barrage of pop-up ads a hijacked browser—that is, a browser that takes you to sites other than those you type into the address box a sudden or repeated change in your computer's Internet home page new and unexpected toolbars new and unexpected icons on the system tray at the bottom of your computer screen keys that don't work (for example, the "Tab" key that might not work when you try to move to the next field in a web form) random error messages sluggish or downright slow performance when opening programs or saving files. The FTC alert also offered preventive actions consumers can take: update your operating system and web browser software download free software only from sites you know and trust don't install any software without knowing exactly what it is minimize "drive-by" downloads by ensuring that your browser's security setting is high enough to detect unauthorized downloads don't click on any links within pop-up windows don't click on links in spam that claim to offer anti-spyware software install a personal firewall to stop uninvited users from accessing your computer. Finally, the FTC alert advised consumers who think their computers are infected to get an anti-spyware program from a vendor they know and trust; set it to scan on a regular basis, at startup and at least once a week; and delete any software programs detected by the anti-spyware program that the consumer does not want. In March 2004, Utah became the first state to enact spyware legislation. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, by January 2009, at least 15 states had enacted spyware legislation: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Washington. No legislative action has been taken at this time. No legislative action on spyware. During the 110 th Congress, two bills were introduced in the House of Representatives and one bill was introduced in the Senate; the House held two hearings. The "SPY ACT" was introduced by Representative Towns on February 8, 2007, and a hearing on it was held by the Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection on March 15, 2007. This bill would make it unlawful to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices to take unsolicited control of computer, modify computer settings, collect personally identifiable information, induce the owner or authorized user of the computer to disclose personally identifiable information, induce the unsolicited installation of computer software, and/or remove or disable a security, anti-spyware, or anti-virus technology. This bill would also require the FTC to submit two reports to Congress. The first report would be on the use of cookies in the delivery or display of advertising; the second would be on the extent to which information collection programs were installed and in use at the time of enactment. H.R. 964 was reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 24, 2007, and referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 7, 2007. No further action was taken. The "I-SPY" Act was introduced by Representative Lofgren on March 14, 2007, and a hearing on it was held by the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on May 1, 2007. This bill would amend the federal criminal code to impose a fine and/or prison term of up to five years for intentionally accessing a protected computer without appropriate authorization by causing a computer program or code to be copied onto the protected computer and intentionally using that program or code in furtherance of another federal criminal offense. The bill would impose a fine and/or prison term of up to two years if the unauthorized access was for the purpose of—— intentionally obtaining or transmitting personal information with intent to defraud or injure a person or cause damage to a protected computer intentionally impairing the security protection of a protected computer with the intent to defraud or injure a person or damage such computer. H.R. 1525 was reported by House Committee on the Judiciary, where it was reported on May 21, 2007, and then referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on May 23, 2007. No further action was taken. The Counter Spy Act was introduced by Senator Pryor on June14, 2007. This bill would prohibit unauthorized installation on a protected computer of "software that takes control of the computer, modifies the computer's settings, or prevents the user's efforts to block installation of, disable, or uninstall software." It also would prohibit the installation of "software that collects sensitive personal information without first providing clear and conspicuous disclosure ... and obtaining the user's consent. Additionally, S. 1625 would prohibit installation of software that "causes advertising windows to appear (popularly known as adware) unless: (1) the source is clear and instructions are provided for uninstalling the software; or (2) the advertisements are displayed only when the user uses the software author's or publisher's website or online service." This bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 14, 2007, and a hearing was held on June 11, 2008. No further action was taken. Federal Trade Commission "Microsite" on Spyware [web page]. Available online at http://www.ftc.gov/ bcp/ edu/ microsites/ spyware/ index.html . Anti-Spyware Coalition [web page]. Available online at http://www.antispywarecoalition.org . 109 th Congress Two bills passed the House on May 23, 2005— H.R. 29 (Bono) and H.R. 744 (Goodlatte)—both of which were very similar to legislation that passed the House in the 108 th Congress. Three bills were introduced in the Senate— S. 687 (Burns), which is similar to legislation that was considered in 2004, but did not reach the floor ( S. 2145 ); S. 1004 (Allen); and S. 1608 (Smith). S. 687 and S. 1608 were ordered reported from the Senate Commerce Committee in 2005. At the markup that favorably reported S. 687 , the committee rejected Senator Allen's attempt to substitute the language of his bill ( S. 1004 ) for the text of S. 687 . S. 687 was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under general Orders, Calendar no. 467, on June 12, 2006. S. 1608 was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, on April 19, 2006. 108 th Congress The House passed two spyware bills in the 108 th Congress— H.R. 2929 and H.R. 4661 . The Senate Commerce Committee reported S. 2145 (Burns), amended, December 9, 2004 ( S.Rept. 108-424 ). None of these bills cleared that Congress. The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Communications held a hearing on spyware on March 23, 2004. The House Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet held a hearing on April 29, 2004. The House passed two spyware bills ( H.R. 2929 and H.R. 4661 ) and the Senate Commerce Committee reported S. 2145 , but there was no further action.

The term "spyware" generally refers to any software that is downloaded onto a computer without the owner's or user's knowledge. Spyware may collect information about a computer user's activities and transmit that information to someone else. It may change computer settings, or cause "pop-up" advertisements to appear (in that context, it is called "adware"). Spyware may redirect a web browser to a site different from what the user intended to visit, or change the user's home page. A type of spyware called "keylogging" software records individual keystrokes, even if the author modifies or deletes what was written, or if the characters do not appear on the monitor. Thus, passwords, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information may be captured and relayed to unauthorized recipients. Some of these software programs have legitimate applications the computer user wants. They obtain the moniker "spyware" when they are installed surreptitiously, or perform additional functions of which the user is unaware. Users typically do not realize that spyware is on their computer. They may have unknowingly downloaded it from the Internet by clicking within a website, or it might have been included in an attachment to an electronic mail message (e-mail) or embedded in other software. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has produced a consumer alert on spyware. The alert provides a list of warning signs that indicate that a computer might be infected with spyware and advice on what to do if it is. Additionally, the FTC has consumer information on spyware that includes a link to file a complaint with the commission through its "OnGuard Online" website. Several states have passed spyware laws, but there was no specific federal law and no legislation introduced in the 111th Congress.

There are an estimated 4 billion incandescent light bulbs (sometimes referred to as "lamps") in use in the United States. The basic technology in these bulbs has not changed substantially since they were first introduced over 125 years ago. They convert less than 10% of the energy they use into light and over 90% into heat. Some critics refer to traditional incandescent bulbs as "resistance heaters that also give off light." DOE estimates that about 10% of the average U.S. residential electricity bill is spent on lighting. Illuminating U.S. homes and businesses consumes nearly 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity each year, equivalent to the output from about 100 large power plants. The environmental impacts of the electricity production used to power that lighting—including greenhouse gas emissions—are well documented. Given rising attention to energy prices, energy insecurity, and climate change, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (hereafter referred to as the "Energy Independence Act") to address, among other things, the efficiency of current incandescent light bulbs. By one projection, the new standards will cumulatively save more than $40 billion on electricity costs and offset about 750 million metric tons of carbon emissions by the year 2030. The Energy Independence Act sets new performance requirements for certain common light bulbs. The Tier I requirements, set to take effect in 2012-2014, require these bulbs to be 25% to 30% more efficient than today's products (see Table 1 ). Stricter Tier II standards will be defined in an upcoming DOE rulemaking that may require that lamps produced in 2020 use at least 60% less energy than today's bulbs. Some bulbs are not covered by the requirements. There are 22 categories of special-use incandescent bulbs that are exempted from the standards, including appliance bulbs, plant lights, infrared bulbs, bug lights, rough-service lamps, and reflector (i.e, recessed or flood) bulbs. The DOE is required to undertake an additional rulemaking no later than June 2009 to set new standards for reflector lights. DOE is also directed to monitor sales of key categories of excluded bulbs to ensure that the exemptions are not exploited. Incandescent bulbs are not banned or prohibited by the new law. Instead, a performance standard is set for non-excluded categories of bulbs, requiring them to meet minimum energy efficiency requirements. If bulbs cannot meet the standards as defined above, suppliers are not allowed to continue selling them. The law does not specify technology winners and losers. Rather, the intent of the standard is to draw more efficient light bulbs into the market. Manufacturers are introducing advanced incandescent bulbs, such as halogen lamps with special coatings, that meet the standards or are very close to doing so. In October 2007, Philips Lighting Company introduced the Halogená Energy Saver incandescent bulb series that reportedly meets Tier I standards. The 70-watt bulb in this product line, for example, looks similar to "regular" light bulbs and can be used in table lamps, floor lamps, and ceiling fixtures. It provides high-quality light, equivalent to the output from many traditional 100-watt bulbs. Other new incandescent products will likely be introduced by the effective dates of the law. General Electric (GE), for example, says that it will have an incandescent bulb that uses half the energy of today's bulbs by 2010 and only a quarter by 2012. Non-incandescent products, including compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) and light emitting diode (LED) bulbs, can already meet Tier I standards. Energy efficient light bulbs can save significant quantities of electricity compared to traditional incandescent bulbs. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of several types of bulbs. Although a CFL bulb is more expensive to purchase than a traditional incandescent bulb, its electricity savings recover the higher purchase price in several months, depending on use. The LED example in the table is not directly comparable to the other options because it produces a different type of light than incandescent and fluorescent bulbs. Consumers today have a wide range of product options to meet their lighting needs. Both traditional and efficient lighting products are now available at large retail stores and on the internet, as well as at some local supermarkets. These options often require consumers to decide what types of lighting best suits their needs. Traditional incandescent bulbs are preferred by some consumers because of their familiarity, low purchase price, and relatively high quality light. These bulbs are quiet, dimmable, and turn on instantly. Despite their high energy use and relatively short lifetimes, there is a reason this technology has survived for over 125 years. Advanced incandescent technology is now entering the market and could address the shortcomings of incandescent bulbs. Fluorescent lights have been used in commercial and industrial settings since the 1930s due to their lower operating costs. They were slower to enter residential markets until compact versions became available in the 1980s and 1990s. Early brands had poor light quality and higher purchase costs, which gave many consumers a negative first impression of CFLs. Two decades of market pull and technology push strategies has led to improved quality and cheaper CFLs today. There are now many varieties of CFLs that meet "Energy Star" certification requirements defined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the DOE. In 2007, nearly 300 million Energy Star certified CFLs were sold in the United States, doubling previous year sales, and accounting for 20% of the light bulb market. There are inexpensive, high-quality CFLs available in retail stores and through the internet, but brands can vary significantly in quality. As described more fully below, CFLs have tradeoffs, including the fact that they contain small quantities of mercury. LEDs are ubiquitous. They are found in computers, radios, televisions, traffic lights, exit signs and holiday lights. However, they have only recently become available for general illumination. Manufacturers are developing new types of LED bulbs for general lighting and expect rapid cost reductions. Although LED bulbs are beginning to match CFL and incandescent alternatives in light quality, purchase costs are still an order of magnitude higher. LEDs produce light in a way that is fundamentally different from incandescent or fluorescent bulbs. LEDs used for general illumination are expected to be more efficient than CFLs in the near future, but remain slightly less so today. LEDs can produce almost any color light and last about five times longer than CFLs. They turn on instantly, contain no mercury, and—because they have no filament or fragile bulb—are not easily damaged by vibration or external shock. But LEDs are not widely available in general illumination markets. Besides high cost, LEDs can experience problems in cold (below 15°F) or hot (above 120°F) environments. With light that is highly directional or focused, LEDs currently seem better for task lighting than for general illumination. Some consumers complain that LED light is too cold or blue. These issues may be addressed as the technology matures. Some consumers complain about the quality of CFL products. They report that CFLs generate harsh, unflattering light or that they don't last as long as advertised. Some of these objections may be due to experience with earlier bulbs that had poor color temperature rendition or that were used incorrectly. Some objections involve personal preference; CFLs may not be appropriate for every lighting application. CFLs are now available with a broad range of size, shape, brightness, and color temperature characteristics. Consumers have also reported objections to noise and flicker in CFL bulbs. Most of these problems have been solved with the introduction of improved electronic ballasts, although some low quality brands may still exhibit these problems. There is concern about mercury in CFL bulbs. Used and disposed of properly, CFLs can actually reduce mercury in the environment due to the lower demand for coal-fired electricity—which emits that element to the atmosphere. Still, the EPA recommends special precautions in using and disposing of CFL bulbs. For a more complete discussion of CFLs and mercury, see CRS Report RS22807, Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs (CFLs): Issues with Use and Disposal , by [author name scrubbed]. Another concern involves difficulty dimming CFL bulbs. There are new varieties of CFLs designed to be used with dimming switches. These versions cost more than standard CFLs and usually have only three settings (off, low, and high) compared to a full range of light output in incandescent bulbs. Some consumers also complain about the time lag between when the light is turned on and when the bulb illuminates. Again, modern electronic ballasts have at least partially addressed this issue, but most CFLs still need to warm up before reaching full illumination. Advanced CFL products may overcome this consumer concern. On March 13, 2008, the Light Bulb Freedom of Choice Act ( H.R. 5616 ) was introduced to repeal the new lighting performance standards unless the Government Accountability Office finds that (1) consumers would obtain a net financial savings by switching to the more efficient bulbs, (2) no health risks would be introduced by the switch, and (3) total U.S. CO 2 emissions would decline by 20% by 2025 as a result of the switch.

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) sets new performance standards for many common light bulbs. Tier I standards require a 25%-30% increase in the energy efficiency of typical light bulbs beginning in 2012, and still greater improvements through Tier II standards starting in 2020. Supporters expect these new measures to save consumers billions of dollars in electricity costs, offset the need to build dozens of new power plants, and cut millions of tons of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Efficient lighting products such as compact fluorescent lights and light emitting diodes have advanced rapidly in recent years. Light quality has improved, costs have declined, and consumer choice has expanded. Still, many consumers prefer traditional incandescent lighting products. Incandescent bulbs are not banned or outlawed by the new law, but they will need to meet the new efficiency standards to remain on the market. Some new incandescent products already available can meet Tier I requirements, and at least one manufacturer claims that it will have advanced incandescent products available in time to meet the Tier II requirements. The Light Bulb Freedom of Choice Act (H.R. 5616) was introduced on March 13, 2008, to repeal the new standards unless special provisions are met.

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and international companies. They generally incorporate a "V"-shaped hull and armor plating designed to provide protection against mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). DOD originally intended to procure three types of MRAPs. These included Category I vehicles, capable of carrying up to 7 personnel and intended for urban operations; Category II vehicles, capable of carrying up to 11 personnel and intended for a variety of missions such as supporting security, convoy escort, troop or cargo transport, medical, explosive ordnance disposal, or combat engineer operations; and Category III vehicles, intended to be used primarily to clear mines and IEDs, capable of carrying up to 13 personnel. The Army and Marines first employed MRAPs in limited numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, primarily for route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. These route clearance MRAPs quickly gained a reputation for providing superior protection for their crews, and some suggested that MRAPs might be a better alternative for transporting troops in combat than up-armored HMMWVs. DOD officials have stated that the casualty rate for MRAPs is 6%, making it "the most survivable vehicle we have in our arsenal." By comparison, the M-1 Abrams main battle tank was said to have a casualty rate of 15%, and the up-armored HMMWV, a 22% casualty rate. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has approved an acquisition objective of 25,700 MRAP vehicles for all services. Of this total, 8,100 will be the new MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) designed to better handle the rugged terrain of Afghanistan. DOD officials have indicated that this requirement may increase depending upon the operational needs in Afghanistan. Reports in September 2010 suggested that DOD was actively discussing a new follow-on contract for additional M-ATVs over and above the original 8,100 and that new variants might also be developed. According to DOD, as of July 21, 2011, 14,749 MRAPs had been delivered to Afghanistan, including 6,980 M-ATVs. Reports suggest that many of the older model MRAPs deployed to Afghanistan are not used, as they are considered too large and bulky for tactical missions. As U.S. forces began drawing down in Iraq, the Army and Marines had planned to put the majority of the earlier versions of the MRAPs into prepositioned stocks at various overseas locations, ship a number back to the United States for training, and place a number into logistics and route clearance units. However, with the increase of U.S. forces deploying to Afghanistan and Secretary of Defense requirements to make better use of MRAPs, these plans have been adjusted. Currently, of the almost 15,000 Army MRAPs, according to a June 2010 Army briefing, about 5,750 will be assigned to infantry brigade combat teams, 1,700 to heavy brigade combat teams, and about 165 to Stryker brigades. Support units will be assigned about 5,350 vehicles, about 1,000 MRAPs will be used for home station and institutional training, and approximately 1,000 MRAPs will be assigned to war reserve stocks and be used to replace damaged or destroyed MRAPs. The Marines are reportedly still developing their ground vehicle strategy and have previously suggested that MRAPs have deployability limitations under the concept of a sea-based, expeditionary Marine force. In an interview with outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, it was suggested that MRAPs have proven to be 10 times safer than HMMWVs in protecting soldiers during IED attacks. The Pentagon's Joint Program Office for MRAPs also reportedly estimated that as many as 40,000 lives had been saved—10,000 in Iraq and 30,000 in Afghanistan—by MRAPs, based on estimates derived from numbers of attacks and troops inside of the vehicles. Some defense experts suggest that the Joint Program Office's estimates seem too high. Secretary Gates also noted the morale value of the MRAP to service members in terms of both soldier survival as well as knowing that the U.S. government would spare no expense in protecting them from IEDs. In the summer of 2008, DOD began to examine the possibility of developing and procuring a lighter-weight, all-terrain capable MRAP variant to address the poor roads and extreme terrain of Afghanistan. This new vehicle—designated the MRAP-All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)—weighs 12 tons (as opposed to the 14 to 24 tons of the earlier MRAP variants) and has better off-road mobility, while providing adequate armor protection. While M-ATVs initially enjoyed success in Afghanistan, reports suggest that insurgents have increased the size of IEDs, thereby negating much of the protective value of M-ATVs, resulting in increased U.S. casualties. In response to the enhanced IED threat, two additional layers of Israeli-made armor plates are being installed to the M-ATV's underside and new padding and crew harnesses inside the vehicle, which reportedly will enable the M-ATVs to withstand explosions twice as large as their current classified capability. DOD reportedly concluded a $245 million dollar contract with Oshkosh—the M-ATV's developer—to acquire 5,100 sets of armor. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Ashton Carter supposedly intends to outfit all of the almost 7,000 M-ATVs in Afghanistan with these armor kits. While additional armor and interior improvements could improve M-ATV survivability up to a point, there are concerns that additional armor might have an adverse impact on vehicle mobility, which was the prime consideration for the development of the M-ATV. Prior year MRAP funding, including wartime supplemental and reprogramming, in billions: FY2006 and prior: $0.173 FY2007: $5.411 FY2008: $16.838 FY2009: $6.243 FY2010: $6.281 FY2011: $3.4 TOTAL: $38.346 Through FY2011, Congress appropriated $38.346 billion for all versions of the MRAP. The full FY2011 DOD budget request of $3.4 billion for the MRAP Vehicle Fund was authorized by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 ( P.L. 111-383 ). In the President's FY2012 DOD budget request, there was no request for procurement funds for the MRAP program. Citing an operational requirement for 27,344 MRAPS to support CENTCOM operations, DOD requested $3.195 for the MRAP vehicle program for FY2012, broken down as follows: $2.4 billion for operations and sustainment, repair parts, sustainment, battle damage repair and contractor logistics support and foe leased maintenance facilities in Kuwait; $.765 billion for survivability and mobility upgrades; and $.03 billion for automotive and ballistic testing. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees recommended fully funding the FY2012 OCO budget request. The House Committee on Appropriations recommended fully funding the FY2012 OCO budget request. As previously noted, many older MRAPs shipped to Afghanistan are reportedly not being used because their size and weight severely limit their effectiveness. If a large number of MRAPS are, in fact, not being used then a fundamental question is, why were they shipped to Afghanistan in the first place? Were these vehicles shipped to Afghanistan, as some say, for symbolic as opposed to operational reasons and, if so, what is the total cost for these unused vehicles to be shipped and maintained in theater? If these vehicles are not being used, is there a better use for them elsewhere or are they to be left in country after the eventual departure of U.S. forces? It was reported that Pentagon agreed to loan 300 MRAPs in Afghanistan for one year to 15 allied nations currently fighting in Afghanistan. Approximately 85 MRAPs are already out on loan to Poland, Romania, Georgia, and the Czech Republic. All countries that are loaned MRAPs can request an extension on the loan and the borrowing countries are responsible for the costs associated with maintaining these vehicles. Loaning unused MRAPs to coalition partners could not only help to reduce allied casualties but can also help to recoup some of the associated procurement costs of these vehicles. In August 2009 briefings to the House Armed Services Committee Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittees, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that "the introduction of MRAP, M-ATV and eventually the JLTV creates a potential risk of unplanned overlap in capabilities; a risk that needs to be managed." Defense officials have also been asked if there is a need for the MRAP/M-ATV and JLTV programs, as these programs share as many as 250 requirements. While DOD leadership notes that there are 450 additional requirements that the MRAPs and M-ATVs cannot meet, thereby justifying the JLTV program, some analysts question the need for three distinct tactical wheeled vehicle programs, particularly in light of anticipated defense budget cuts. If the services continue to look for "the next best thing" in terms of tactical wheeled vehicles instead of committing to the M-ATV and JLTV programs, they could run the risk of significant redundancies and not being able to afford recapitalizing and replacing the HMMWV fleet. The use of larger and more lethal IEDs by Afghan insurgents has necessitated adding additional armor to M-ATVs. While this course of action is intended to provide additional protection for the vehicle's occupants, it might also result in a less maneuverable vehicle that might be too heavy for many Afghan roads (the main reason why many MRAPs deployed to Afghanistan are not in use) and perhaps more prone to roll over accidents. Congress might wish to explore the performance characteristics of these modified M-ATVs in greater detail with DOD to ensure that a proper balance between protection and operational utility is reached. Another consideration is whether unused MRAPs—even if less maneuverable than M-ATVs—might be used on certain Afghan routes that can accommodate their weight. Substituting MRAPs whenever operationally feasible might be a more timely and cost-effective option as opposed to DOD's plans to arbitrarily uparmor approximately 7,000 M-ATVs.

Congress has played a central role in the MRAP program, suggesting to defense and service officials that MRAPs would provide far superior protection for troops than the up-armored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs ). Congressional support for MRAPs, as well as fully funding the program, has been credited with getting these vehicles to Iraq and Afghanistan in a relatively short timeframe, thereby helping to reduce casualties. Congress will likely continue to be interested in the MRAP program to ensure that the appropriate types and numbers are fielded, as well as to monitor the post-conflict disposition of these vehicles, as they represent a significant investment. In 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a major procurement initiative to replace most up-armored HMMWVs in Iraq with Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. MRAPs have been described as providing significantly more protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than up-armored HMMWVs. Currently, DOD has approved an acquisition objective of 25,700 vehicles, of which 8,100 are the newer Military-All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) version, designed to meet the challenges of Afghanistan's rugged terrain. DOD officials have indicated that this total may be increased depending on operational needs in Afghanistan. DOD reports that as of July 21, 2011, 14,749 MRAPs had been delivered to Afghanistan, including 6,980 M-ATVs. Many MRAPs deployed to Afghanistan are not in use because they have been deemed too heavy for some Afghan roads and do not have sufficient cross-country mobility. Afghan insurgents are employing larger improvised explosive devices (IEDs), resulting in increased casualties to M-ATV occupants. In response, DOD is installing additional armor to M-ATVs. While this armor is intended to provide additional protection to occupants, it might also result in operational restraints associated with a heavier and possibly less stable vehicle. Through FY2011, Congress appropriated $38.35 billion for all versions of the MRAP. In FY2012, there was no procurement funding requested for the MRAP program. The FY2012 MRAP Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request is for $3.195 billion to repair, sustain, and upgrade existing MRAPs. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees recommended fully funding the MRAP budget request, and the House Appropriations Committee has also recommended full funding. Among potential issues for congressional consideration are the status of older, unused MRAPS in Afghanistan that are reportedly not being used because of their size and weight; possible redundancies with the MRAP, M-ATV, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) programs; and the impact of adding additional armor to M-ATVs.

RS20558 -- The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Discipline Legislation in the 106th Congress January 12, 2001 IDEA provides federal funds to the states to assist them in providing an education for children with disabilities. As a condition for the receipt of these funds,IDEA contains requirements on the provision of services and detailed due process procedures. In 1997 Congressamended IDEA in the most comprehensive andcontroversial reauthorization since IDEA's original enactment in 1975. One of the most contentious issuesaddressed in the 1997 legislation related to thedisciplinary procedures applicable to children with disabilities. IDEA was originally enacted in 1975 because children with disabilities often failed to receive an education or received an inappropriate education. This lack ofeducation led to numerous judicial decisions, including PARC v. State of Pennsylvania (1) and Mills v. Board of Education of theDistrict of Columbia (2) whichfound constitutional infirmities with the lack of education for children with disabilities when the states wereproviding education for children without disabilities. As a result, the states were under considerable pressure to provide such services and they lobbied Congress to assistthem. (3) Congress responded with the grantprogram still contained in IDEA but also delineated specific requirements that the states must follow in order toreceive these federal funds. The statute providedthat if there was a dispute between the school and the parents of the child with a disability, the child must "stay put"in his or her current educational placementuntil the dispute is resolved. A revised stay put provision remains in IDEA. Issues relating to children with disabilities who exhibit violent or inappropriate behavior have been raised for years and in 1988 the question of whether there wasan implied exception to the stay put provision was presented to the Supreme Court in Honig v. Doe. (4) Although the Supreme Court did not find such animpliedexception, it did find that a ten day suspension was allowable and that schools could seek judicial relief when theparents of a truly dangerous child refuse topermit a change in placement. In 1994, Congress amended IDEA's stay put provision to give schools unilateralauthority to remove a child with a disability to aninterim alternative educational setting if the child was determined to have brought a firearm to school. In 1997 Congress made significant changes to IDEA in P.L. 105-17 and attempted to strike "a careful balance between the LEA's (local education agency) duty toensure that school environments are safe and conducive to learning for all children, including children withdisabilities, and the LEA's continuing obligation toensure that children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education." (5) This current law does not immunize a child with a disability from disciplinaryprocedures but these procedures may not be identical to those for children without disabilities. In brief, if a childwith a disability commits an action that would besubject to discipline, school personnel have the following options: suspending the child for up to ten days with no educational services provided, conducting a manifestation determination review to determine whether there is a link between the child's disability and the misbehavior. Ifthe child's behavior is not a manifestation of a disability, long term disciplinary action such as expulsion may occur,except that educational services may notcease. If the child's behavior is a manifestation of the child's disability, the school may review the child's placementand, if appropriate, initiate a change inplacement. placing the child in an interim alternative education setting for up to forty five days (which can be renewed) for situations involving weaponsor drugs, and asking a hearing officer to order a child be placed in an interim alternative educational setting for up to forty-five days (which can berenewed) if it is demonstrated that the child is substantially likely to injure himself or others in his currentplacement. School officials may also seek a Honig injunction as discussed previously if they are unable to reach agreement with a student's parents and they feel that the newstatutory provisions are not sufficient. (6) Violence in schools surfaced on the congressional agenda in the 106th Congress with S. 254 , the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Accountability andRehabilitation Act of 1999 which passed the Senate on May 20, 1999, and H.R. 1501 , the Child Safety andProtection Act which passed the House onJune 17, 1999. Both of these bills contained amendments offered on the floor relating to discipline under IDEA. Essentially these amendments would havechanged section 615 of IDEA to eliminate IDEA's different disciplinary procedures for children with disabilitiesin certain situations. In the Senate theamendment applied to children with disabilities who carry or possess a gun or firearm while in the House theamendment would have covered a weapon. TheSenate passed Amendment 355, offered by Senators Frist and Ashcroft, by a vote of 74 to 25. (7) The House passed Amendment 35, offered byRepresentativeNorwood, by a vote of 300 to 128. (8) The legislationwas not enacted. These House and Senate amendments were the subject of emotional debate. The general theme sounded by proponents of the amendments was that recentincidents of gun violence in the schools necessitated the changes in IDEA to allow school officials more control overdiscipline. The opponents of theamendments argued that the discipline provisions in IDEA had been carefully crafted in the 1997 reauthorizationand that the result of the amendments would bemore criminal behavior by depriving children with disabilities who had possessed weapons of supervision andeducational services. (9) Two amendments relating to children with disabilities were offered and accepted during House Education and Workforce Committee markup of H.R. 4141 , 106th Cong. One amendment, offered by Representative Norwood, concerned the disciplineof a child with a disability who carries or possesses a weapon. The other amendment, offered by Representatives Talent, McIntosh and Tancredo, concerned the discipline of achild with a disability who knowingly possessesor uses illegal drugs at school or commits an aggravated assault or battery at school. The amendment offered by Rep. Norwood required that each state that receives funds under the Act shall require each local educational agency to have in effect apolicy which would allow school personnel to discipline a child with a disability who carries or possesses a weaponat school in the same manner in which schoolpersonnel may discipline a child without a disability. This would have included expulsion or suspension and a childwho is suspended or expelled would not havebeen entitled to continue educational services, including the provision of a free appropriate public education(FAPE), if the state does not require a child without adisability to receive educational services after being expelled or suspended. However, a local educational agencymay have chosen to provide educational ormental health services for such a child. If such services are provided, there was no requirement to provide the childwith any particular level of service and thelocation of the services is at the discretion of the local educational agency. School personnel were permitted tomodify the disciplinary action on a case by casebasis. A child with a disability who is disciplined under this amendment would have been able to assert a defense that the carrying or possession of the weapon wasunintentional or innocent. This provision could have helped to address the problem of a child with limited mentalcapacities who had someone place a gun in hisor her backpack; however, the exact implications of this provision are somewhat uncertain since it was not specifiedto whom or when this defense would beasserted. The term weapon was defined as having the meaning given to "dangerous weapon" at 18 U.S.C. �930(g)(2). That definition stated: "The term 'dangerousweapon' means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or isreadily capable of, causing death or seriousbodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of less than 2 � inches in length." The amendment offered by Representatives Talent, McIntosh and Tancredo required that each state that receives funds under the Act shall require each localeducational agency to have in effect a policy under which school personnel may discipline a child with a disabilityin the same manner as a child without adisability if the child with a disability (1) knowingly possesses or uses illegal drugs or sells or solicits the sale ofa controlled substance at a school, on schoolpremises, or to or at a school function or (2) commits an aggravated assault or battery, as defined under State or locallaw, at a school, on school premises, or to orat a school function. Like the amendment offered by Representative Norwood, this amendment would have includedexpulsion or suspension and a child who issuspended or expelled would not have been entitled to continue educational services, including FAPE, if the statedoes not require a child without a disability toreceive educational services after being expelled or suspended. However, a local educational agency may havechosen to provide educational or mental healthservices for such a child. If such services are provided, there was no requirement to provide the child with anyparticular level of service and the location of theservices was at the discretion of the local educational agency. School personnel were permitted to modify thedisciplinary action on a case by case basis. As with the Norwood amendment, a child with a disability who is disciplined under this amendment would have been able to assert a defense that the possessionor use of the illegal drugs, or the sale or solicitations of the controlled substance, was unintentional or innocent. This provision could have helped to address theproblem of someone placing drugs in the backpack of a child with limited mental capacities; however, the exactimplications of this provision were somewhatuncertain since it was not specified to whom or when this defense would be asserted. The amendment did notprovide for any similar defense for an allegation ofaggravated assault or battery. The definition of controlled substance was the same as the definition in section 4141 of H.R. 4141 . This section states that the term controlledsubstance "means a drug or other substance identified under Schedule I, II, III, or IV, or V in section 202(c) of theControlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.�812(c))." Illegal drug "means a controlled substance, but does not include such a substance that is being legallypossessed or used under the supervision of alicensed health-care professional or that is legally possessed or used under any other authority under the ControlledSubstances Act or under any other provision ofFederal law." These amendments were not enacted.

Although Congress described its 1997 changes to discipline provisions in theIndividuals with Disabilities EducationAct (IDEA) as a "careful balance," it was not long before amendments to change the provisions surfaced. In 1999the Senate passed S. 254, 106thCong., the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, and the House passedH.R. 1501, 106th Cong., the ChildSafety and Protection Act, both of which contained amendments to IDEA. These amendments would have changedsection 615 of IDEA to eliminate IDEA'sdifferent disciplinary procedures for children with disabilities in certain situations. In the Senate the amendmentapplied to children with disabilities who carry agun or firearm while in the House the amendment would cover a weapon. These amendments were not enacted. Two amendments relating to children with disabilities were offered and accepted during House Education andWorkforce Committee markup of H.R. 4141, 106th Cong., the Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments. One amendment, offered byRepresentative Norwood, concerned the discipline ofa child with a disability who carries or possesses a weapon. The other amendment, offered by RepresentativesTalent, McIntosh and Tancredo, concerned thediscipline of a child with a disability who knowingly possesses or uses illegal drugs at school or commits anaggravated assault or battery at school. Theseamendments were not enacted. This report will be updated as appropriate. For a more detailed discussion of the due process provisions inIDEA see CRS Report 98-42, Individuals withDisabilities Education Act: Discipline Provisions in P.L. 105-17, by [author name scrubbed].

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was established by Title II of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-344 ; July 12, 1974; 2 U.S.C. 601-603). The organization officially came into existence on February 24, 1975, upon the appointment of the first director, Alice Rivlin. CBO's mission is to support the House and Senate in the federal budget process by providing budgetary analysis and information in an objective and nonpartisan manner. Specific duties are placed on CBO by various provisions in law, particularly Titles II, III, and IV of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended. CBO prepares annual reports on the economic and budget outlook and on the President's budget proposals and provides cost estimates of legislation, scorekeeping reports, assessments of unfunded mandates, and products and testimony relating to other budgetary matters. In addition to statutory duties, CBO is subject to directives included in annual budget resolutions. The FY2009 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. 70 , 110 th Congress), for example, imposed a requirement that the CBO director prepare estimates of the deficit impact of certain legislation in support of a point-of-order procedure in the Senate against legislation increasing the deficit over the long term. Nine persons so far have served as CBO director: Alice Rivlin, Rudolph Penner, Robert Reischauer, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter R. Orszag, Douglas Elmendorf, and Keith Hall. The current director, Keith Hall, was first appointed on March 3, 2015. Eleven persons have served as deputy director; five of them also served as the acting director (for periods amounting in total to about three years). The current deputy director, Robert A. Sunshine, was appointed to the position in August 2007; he served as acting director during the two-month interregnum between directors Orszag and Elemendorf. The requirements regarding the appointment and tenure of the CBO director, which are simple and straightforward, are set forth in Section 201(a) of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended, and codified at 2 U.S.C. 601(a) (see the Appendix ). The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly appoint the director after considering recommendations received from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committee chairs inform the congressional leaders of their recommendations by letter. The appointment usually is announced in the Congressional Record . Section 201(a) requires that the selection be made "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties." Media reports over the years indicate that the CBO director is selected under informal practices in which the House and Senate Budget Committees alternate in recommending a nominee to the Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate. These reports also indicate that the Speaker and President pro tempore have adhered to the Budget Committees' recommendations in making past selections. To the extent that these practices are informal, there may be disagreement with regard to their operation in the future selection of a CBO director. The director is appointed to a four-year term that begins on January 3 of the year that precedes the year in which a presidential election is held. If a director is appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term, then that person serves only for the unexpired portion of that term. There is no limit on the number of times that a director may be reappointed to another term. Section 201(a) also authorizes a CBO director to continue to serve past the expiration of his term until a successor is appointed. A CBO director may be removed by either house by resolution. Section 201(a) also provides that the director shall appoint a deputy director. The deputy director serves during the term of the director that appointed the deputy director (and until his or her successor is appointed) but may be removed by the director at any time. The deputy director serves as the acting director if the director resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise absent. Nine persons have served as director of CBO during the nine terms beginning in 1975 (see Table 1 ): Alice Rivlin served two terms as CBO director from 1975 to 1983. Prior to serving as CBO director, Rivlin served as assistant secretary for planning and evaluation with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and as a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. Rudolph Penner served as CBO director for one term from 1983 to 1987. Previously, Penner served as chief economist at the Office of Management and Budget under President Gerald Ford and as director of tax policy studies with the American Enterprise Institute. Robert Reischauer served two terms as CBO director from 1989 to 1995. (He was not appointed until about halfway into the first four-year term.) Reischauer previously served as CBO deputy director (under Alice Rivlin) and as a senior vice president of the Urban Institute. June O'Neill served as CBO director for one term covering 1995-1999. Previously, O'Neill headed the Center for the Study of Business and Government at Baruch College and was an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Dan Crippen served as CBO director for one term covering 1999-2003. Prior to his appointment, Crippen served as chief counsel and economic policy adviser to Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and domestic policy adviser to President Ronald Reagan and was a member of the law firm Washington Counsel. Douglas Holtz-Eakin served as CBO director for one term (leaving a little more than a year before the term's completion). Prior to beginning his term, he served as chief economist for the Council of Economic Advisers. While director, he was on leave from Syracuse University, where he held the position of Trustee Professor of Economics at the Maxwell School. Peter Orszag served as CBO director for about half of one term. He resigned on November 25, 2008, a little more than two years before the term's completion. Previously, Orszag was the Joseph A. Pechman senior fellow and deputy director of economic studies at the Brookings Institution, and before that, he held positions with the President's Council of Economic Advisers and National Economic Council. Douglas Elmendorf began his service as CBO director on January 22, 2009, about half-way through the term to which Peter Orszag had originally been appointed. Prior to his appointment, Elmendorf was a senior fellow in the economic studies program at the Brookings Institution, serving as the director of the Hamilton Project, and before that, he was a senior economist at the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, a deputy assistant secretary for economic policy at the Department of the Treasury, and an assistant director of the Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve Board. Keith Hall began his term as the director of CBO on March 3, 2015. Previously, Hall spent more than 10 years with the U.S. International Trade Commission conducting studies on international trade and trade policy. In addition, he served a four-year term as the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and served as the chief economist for both the White House Council of Economic Advisers and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Eleven persons have served as deputy director of CBO: Robert Reischauer (in two instances), Robert A. Levine, Raymond Scheppach, Eric A. Hanushek, Edward Gramlich, Robert Hartman, James Blum, Barry Anderson, Elizabeth Robinson, Donald B. Marron, and Robert A. Sunshine, the current deputy director. The position was vacant on two occasions. Five different deputy directors served as acting director, as discussed below. As Table 1 shows, the gap between the beginning of a term and the appointment of the director has varied considerably. Peter Orszag was appointed 15 days after the beginning of his term; Alice Rivlin, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Keith Hall were appointed (or reappointed) within three months of the beginning of their terms. Rudolph Penner, however, was not appointed until nearly seven months after his term had begun (and did not assume his office until more than a month later). Robert Reischauer began his first term more than two years after it had started. As a consequence of these appointment gaps, incumbent directors have remained in office for weeks or months after their terms have expired, or CBO has operated with an acting director. Alice Rivlin stayed in office for nearly eight months (until August 31, 1983) before her successor, Rudolph Penner, took over. Penner remained in office for about four months (until April 28, 1987) but left long before a new director was appointed. Edward Gramlich, and then James Blum, served successively as acting directors for a period of nearly two years. Robert Reischauer stayed on as director for almost two months (until February 28, 1995) before he was succeeded. June O'Neill stayed in office nearly a month after her term ended (until January 29, 1999) but left about a week before her successor was appointed. James Blum served as acting director during the interim. Barry Anderson served as acting director from the time that Dan Crippen left office on January 3, 2003, until Douglas Holtz-Eakin was appointed to succeed him on February 5. Douglas Elmendorf stayed on as director for two months before he was succeeded. Similarly, appointment gaps may occur when a director resigns before his or her term is completed. As indicated previously, Douglas Holtz-Eakin resigned on December 29, 2005, a little more than a year before the completion of his term (on January 3, 2007). The deputy director, Donald B. Marron, began serving as acting director at that time; he continued in that capacity until the appointment of Peter Orszag just over a year later. Orszag resigned on November 25, 2008, a little more than two years before the term's completion. On the same day, Robert A. Sunshine, the current deputy director, also began serving as the acting director; he continued in that role until the appointment of Douglas Elmendorf about two months later. (2 U.S.C. 601(a))

The requirements regarding the appointment and tenure of the CBO director, which are simple and straightforward, are set forth in Section 201(a) of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, as amended, and codified at 2 U.S.C. 601(a). The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly appoint the director after considering recommendations received from the House and Senate Budget Committees. The Budget Committee chairs inform the congressional leaders of their recommendations by letter. The appointment is usually announced in the Congressional Record. Section 201(a) requires that the selection be made "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of his fitness to perform his duties." Media reports over the years indicate that the CBO director is selected under informal practices in which the House and Senate Budget Committees alternate in recommending a nominee to the Speaker and President pro tempore of the Senate. These reports also indicate that the Speaker and President pro tempore have adhered to the Budget Committees' recommendations in making past selections. To the extent that these practices are informal, there may be disagreement with regard to their operation in the future selection of a CBO director. The director is appointed to a four-year term that begins on January 3 of the year that precedes the year in which a presidential election is held. If a director is appointed to fill a vacancy prior to the expiration of a term, then that person serves only for the unexpired portion of that term. There is no limit on the number of times that a director may be reappointed to another term. Section 201(a) also authorizes a CBO director to continue to serve past the expiration of his term until a successor is appointed. A CBO director may be removed by either house by resolution. Section 201(a) also provides that the director shall appoint a deputy director. The deputy director serves during the term of the director that appointed the deputy director (and until his or her successor is appointed) but may be removed by the director at any time. The deputy director serves as the acting director if the director resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise absent. Nine persons so far have served as CBO director: Alice Rivlin, Rudolph Penner, Robert Reischauer, June O'Neill, Dan Crippen, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter R. Orszag, Douglas Elmendorf, and Keith Hall. The current director, Keith Hall, was appointed on March 3, 2015. Eleven persons have served as deputy director; five of them also served as the acting director (for periods amounting in total to about three years). The current deputy director, Robert A. Sunshine, was appointed to the position in August 2007; he served as acting director during the two-month interregnum between directors Orszag and Elemendorf. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 2499 , introduced by Representative Pedro Pierluisi, would have established procedures to determine Puerto Rico's political status. It would have authorized a two-stage plebiscite in Puerto Rico to reconsider the status issue. H.R. 2499 was similar to H.R. 900 as introduced in the 110 th Congress. A possible outcome of this process is Puerto Rican statehood. If Puerto Rico's citizens vote in favor of statehood in the series of plebiscites as outlined in H.R. 2499 , then Puerto Rico would, most likely, be entitled to five Representatives in the House of Representatives as well as two United States Senators. If the size of the House remains fixed at the legally mandated 435-seat limit, then five states would likely have one fewer Representative than they would have had if Puerto Rico had not become a state. Another option that the House could choose, given the entrance of another state, is to increase the size of the House. General congressional practice when admitting new states to the union has been to increase the size of the House, either permanently or temporarily, to accommodate the new states. New states usually resulted in additions to the size of the House in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries. The exceptions to this general rule occurred when states were formed from other states (Maine, Kentucky, and West Virginia). These states' Representatives came from the allocations of Representatives of the states from which the new ones had been formed. When Alaska and Hawaii were admitted in 1959 and 1960 the House size was temporarily increased to 437. This modern precedent differed from the state admission acts passed following the censuses in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, which provided that new states' representation would be added to the apportionment totals. Table 1 lists the number of seats each state has received after each census, and the notes show the initial seat assignments to states admitted between censuses. The apportionment act of 1911 anticipated the admission of Arizona and New Mexico by providing for an increase in the House size from 433 to 435 if the states were admitted. And, as noted above, the House size was temporarily increased to 437 to accommodate Alaska and Hawaii in 1960. In 1961, when the President reported the 1960 census results and the resulting reapportionment of seats in the reestablished 435-seat House, Alaska was entitled to one seat, and Hawaii two seats. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Missouri each received one less seat than they would have if the House size had been increased to 438 (as was proposed by H.R. 10264, in 1962). If Puerto Rico were admitted to statehood between censuses, Congress would have at least three options for handling the five Representatives the new state would be entitled to under the current apportionment formula using the 2010 apportionment figures: (1) subtract seats from states that would have lost them if Puerto Rico had been admitted before the previous census; (2) temporarily increase the size of the House until the next census; or (3) permanently increase the size of the House. The first option, subtracting seats from other states, has only been done by Congress when new states were formed from existing states. If Puerto Rico were to be given statehood after 2012, then this would require the losing states to redraw the new, 2012 district boundaries in their states to account for these losses. The second option, temporarily increasing the House size, has only been done once, in the Alaska and Hawaii precedent. The third option, permanently increasing the House size (probably to 440), was the procedure commonly used in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries. What would the apportionment of the House of Representatives look like if Puerto Rico were to become the 51 st state? The most recent population figures for the states are from the 2010 Census and are displayed in Table 2 , below. One complicating factor concerns the overseas military and federal employees and their dependents. The state figures used in apportioning seats in the House of Representatives are based on the sum of the each state's resident population and the number of persons included in the overseas military and federal employees and their dependents who designate the state as their state of residency (i.e., where they would return to when their tour of duty was completed). The total figure for this number in the 2010 apportionment process was 1,039,648 for all 50 states. However, as Puerto Rico was not a state and was not apportioned seats based on its population, no figure for the overseas population for Puerto Rico was produced. Consequently, only the total 2010 resident population for Puerto Rico is used in Table 2 . Table 2 shows two comparisons. First, the 2010 apportionment of the House of Representatives is shown both without and with Puerto Rico's resident population included. As can be seen, when Puerto Rico is included as the 51 st state, it is allocated five seats in the House of Representatives. Without Puerto Rican statehood, California, Florida, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington would have been allocated the last five seats rather than Puerto Rico. It is fairly clear that with a population of almost 4 million people, Puerto Rico's statehood would have an impact on the apportionment process unless the size of the House is increased. The second comparison, and the more involved, is between the current allocation of seats based on the 2000 Census population and the allocation of the 2012 seats based on the, just released, 2010 apportionment population figures. Examining the "winners" and "losers" with respect to the change between 2000 and 2010, several points are worth noting. First, Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, South Carolina and Utah will all gain a seat relative to the current allocation, regardless of the statehood status of Puerto Rico. Second, Florida will gain two seats relative to its current status, but if Puerto Rico became a state Florida would only gain one seat. Similarly, Texas will gain four seats relative to its current status, but would only gain three seats if Puerto Rico were to become a state. Third, Washington will gain a seat relative to its current status, but if Puerto Rico were to become a state, Washington remains at its 2000 allocation of House seats. Fourth, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania will each lose a seat relative to their current allocation of House seats, regardless of the status of Puerto Rico. Similarly, New York and Ohio will each lose two seats relative to their current allocation, regardless of the status of Puerto Rico. Fifth, California and Minnesota will lose a seat if Puerto Rico were to become a state, but will retain the same number of seats relative to its current allocation of House seats if Puerto Rico does not become a state. The strong 20 th century tradition that the total number of Representatives in the House of Representatives should total 435 Members might prevent an increase in the House size should Puerto Rico be admitted to statehood. The U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 2) requires that "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state." The requirement that districts must be apportioned among states means that district boundaries cannot cross state lines. The Constitution also sets a minimum size for the House of Representatives (one Representative for every state) and a maximum size for the House (one Representative for every 30,000 persons). Congress is free to choose a House size within these parameters by changing the relevant law. Thus, the House size of 435 may be altered by changing statutory law rather than by enacting a constitutional amendment. Based on the 2010 apportionment population of 309,183,463 from Table 2 above, the House could be as large as 10,306 Representatives (based on the constitutional maximum of one Representative for every 30,000 persons). Statehood for Puerto Rico would raise the maximum to 10,430 Members. The House size was increased in every decade except one in the 19 th century to accommodate the growth of the country's population, but the permanent increases stopped after the 1910 census, when the House reached 435 Members. As noted previously, the House size was increased temporarily to 437 in 1960, to accommodate the admission of Alaska and Hawaii as states, but the total went back to 435 in 1963, with the new reapportionment following the 1960 census. Although one cannot say for sure why the House size has not been permanently increased since the 1910 census, the arguments most often raised center on efficiency and cost. Proponents of the status quo suggest that a larger House would work less efficiently and at greater cost, due to Member and staff salaries and allowances. Proponents of increasing the House size often argue that other legislative bodies seem to work well with larger memberships, and less populous districts might give minorities greater representation in Congress. Since 1940, the average population of a congressional district has more than doubled (from 303,827 in 1940 to 710,767 in 2010).

For years, the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been involved in discussions relating to changing the political status of Puerto Rico from a commonwealth of the United States to either the 51st state or an independent nation, or maintaining the status quo as a commonwealth. In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2499, introduced by Representative Pedro Pierluisi, would have established procedures to determine Puerto Rico's political status. It would have authorized a two-stage plebiscite in Puerto Rico to reconsider the status issue. H.R. 2499 was similar to H.R. 900 as introduced in the 110th Congress. A possible outcome of this process is Puerto Rican statehood. Proposals to change Puerto Rico's governmental relationship with the United States from a commonwealth to some other model raise many political, social, and economic issues. This report focuses exclusively on what impact adding a new state that is more populous than 22 of the existing 50 states would have on representation in the House of Representatives. Statehood for Puerto Rico would likely cause Congress to explore whether the current limit of 435 seats in the House of Representatives should be changed. If Puerto Rico had been a state when the 2010 census was taken, it would have been entitled to five Representatives based on its 2010 census population of 3.7 million residents. If the House were faced with the addition of five new Representatives, it could accommodate them either by expanding the size of the House or adhering to the current 435-seat statutory limit, which would reduce the number of Representatives in other states.

In FY2006, the federal government's real property portfolio consisted of 3.87 billion square feet of owned and leased office space. The General Services Administration (GSA), through its Public Buildings Service (PBS), is the primary federal real property and asset management agency, with a real property portfolio consisting of 8,847 buildings and structures with an estimated replacement value of $68.8 billion in FY2006. In addition to GSA, 27 other federal agencies have independent landholding and leasing authorities that enable them to acquire or construct specific types of buildings. GSA is responsible for the design and construction of its buildings, and for alterations and repairs to existing facilities. One of its primary goals has always been to assure the physical safety of federal employees who work in, and the private citizens who visit, government-owned or leased buildings. However, the federal government had no formally established building security standards for either federally owned or leased buildings when the April 1995 domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building occurred in Oklahoma City, OK. The Oklahoma City bombing brought a new awareness to the potential for violent acts directed at federal buildings as symbolic attacks against the federal government as a whole. The day following the April 19, 1995, bombing, President William Clinton directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assess the vulnerability of federal facilities to acts of terrorism or violence and to develop recommendations for minimum security standards. Because of its expertise in federal courts' security, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) coordinated two working groups to accomplish these tasks, a Standards Committee and a Profile Committee. The Standards Committee, composed of security specialists and representatives from GSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Secret Service, the Social Security Administration, and the Departments of Defense and State, identified and evaluated the various types of security measures that could be used to strengthen potential vulnerabilities. The committee compiled a list of proposed minimum standards pertaining to secure perimeter buffer zones; the security of entrances and exits and related access procedures; the identification and admittance of employees and visitors; garage and vehicle service entrances; the location of day care centers; and the use of closed-circuit television monitoring. Because of the differences among federal buildings and their related security issues, the Standards Committee categorized federal facilities into five different levels (with corresponding security standards) based on factors such as building size, agency mission and function, tenant population, and volume of public access. A Level I building is defined as having not more than 2,500 square feet (sq. ft.) of space, with 10 or fewer federal employees, and little public access. A Level II building contains between 2,500 to 80,000 sq. ft., and has between 11 and 150 federal employees engaged in routine activities, with a moderate level of public access. An example of a Level II building is the Social Security Administration Office in El Dorado, CO. A Level III building is defined as occupying between 80,000 to 150,000 sq. ft. of space, and housing between 151 and 450 federal employees, with a moderate to high volume of public access. Level III facilities may house several federal tenants, law enforcement agencies, or court-related or archival agencies. Level IV facilities are categorized as occupying more than 150,000 sq. ft. of space, and housing more than 450 federal employees. These Level IV facilities are defined as having "high volume public contact" and include federal courthouses with high-risk court chambers, judicial offices, and buildings that house highly sensitive government records. Level V facilities are similar to Level IV buildings in size and numbers of federal employees. However, the missions of Level V facilities are considered "critical to national security." The Central Intelligence Agency headquarters and the Pentagon, for example, are both classified as Level V for security purposes. The Profile Committee, composed of USMS deputies and GSA security specialists, conducted inspections at more than 1,200 federal facilities to obtain security data on buildings for use in upgrading existing conditions to comply with the proposed minimum standards. Sixty days later, the working groups' findings and recommendations were published in a June 1995 report entitled Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities . The publication of the 1995 Vulnerability Assessment report was significant in that it represented the first time that broad security standards were applied to federal facilities, and they are still in effect. In conjunction with publication of the report, President Clinton directed all executive branch agencies to begin immediately upgrading their facilities to meet the recommended minimum security standards, to the extent possible within funding limitations. Based on the DOJ recommendations, he also required GSA to establish building security committees for all GSA facilities and called upon other landholding agencies to establish programs for upgrading their facilities to appropriate minimum security standards. Four months later, on October 19, 1995, President Clinton issued E.O. 12977, which established a permanent Interagency Security Committee (ISC) within the executive branch to address "continuing government-wide security" for federal facilities. Chaired by the GSA Administrator, the ISC was composed of representatives from each of the executive branch agencies, the Office of Management and Budget, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Other members included the following individuals or their designees: the Director of USMS; the Assistant Commissioner of the Federal Protective Service (FPS); the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Director of the Security Policy Board; and other federal officials appointed by the President. The ISC was also authorized to consult with other parties, including the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, in order to perform its duties. Section 5 of E.O. 12977 required the ISC to develop and evaluate existing security policies and to take necessary actions to enhance the quality of security and protection for federal facilities. These actions might include encouraging agencies with security responsibilities to share security-related intelligence in a timely manner; evaluating technology and information systems to facilitate cost-effective security upgrades; developing long-term construction standards for high-risk facilities that require blast-resistant structures or have other specialized security requirements; evaluating standards for the location and security of day care centers in federal facilities; and assisting the GSA Administrator in creating and maintaining a centralized security database of all federal facilities. While the 1995 Vulnerability Assessment report provided guidance for overall security standards for existing facilities, it did not provide criteria for the design and construction of new federal buildings. In January 1997, GSA completed its first draft of a document entitled GSA Security Criteria , which was revised and issued on October 8, 1997, to establish design standards for the protection of federal employees in civilian facilities. The GSA security document attempted to integrate security standards throughout all functional and design phases of the building process, including site and interior space planning, as well as structural and electrical design elements. Building upon GSA's 1997 Draft Security Criteria, the members of the ISC established a series of working groups that addressed new technology developments, cost considerations, the experience of architects and builders in applying GSA's design criteria, and the need to balance security standards with public access to federal buildings. In May 2001, the ISC issued its Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects , based on the five security levels for federal facilities. New ISC security requirements for future construction projects included the use of glazing protection for windows, the establishment of distances that buildings should be set back from the street, the control of vehicular access to the buildings, and the location and securing of air intakes. In July 2001, the ISC issued a second product for federal agencies to implement that set forth minimum standards for federal building access procedures. Two draft documents, one that addressed entry security technology, and the second, which pertained to preparedness for nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, were not officially issued by the ISC membership. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center heightened concerns about the vulnerability of federal buildings to violence or bombing attacks. In response to these events, the ISC issued revised procedures to respond to potential vehicle bomb attacks by recommending that new federal buildings be constructed at a minimum distance of between 20 to 50 feet from the nearest perimeter barrier, depending upon the security level. Even though the ISC successfully completed its Security Design Criteria and related draft documents , a 2002 General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that the committee had made "little progress" in other mandated responsibilities. Although the ISC had established 13 working groups since 1995, only two of the groups were still active as of July 2002. Also, while GAO reported that the ISC was successfully disseminating security information to member agencies, it also found that the group's effectiveness was hindered by GSA's "lack of aggressive leadership and support," in that the agency failed to issue operating procedures, and did not provide sufficient staff support and funding. GSA was also unable to provide any documentation indicating that the agency or the ISC had actually monitored agency compliance with the ISC's security recommendations. Congressional enactment of the Homeland Security Act in 2002 and the associated creation of the Department of Homeland Security centralized the federal government's efforts to respond to terrorism, including physical security for federal facilities. On February 28, 2003, the chairmanship of the ISC was transferred from the GSA Administrator to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and a representative from GSA was added to the ISC's membership. Within DHS, the chairmanship of the ISC was subsequently delegated to the Director of the Federal Protective Service in January 2004. Given the challenges that the ISC faces to successfully integrate security initiatives encompassing diverse agency needs, GAO recommended in September 2004 that DHS direct the ISC to develop a plan that "identifies resource needs, implementation goals, and time frames for meeting the ISC's ongoing and yet-unfulfilled responsibilities." GAO reported that standard operating procedures had been approved by agency members in September 2004, and included new requirements for attendance and participation at ISC meetings. DHS is also helping the ISC meet its requirement to create and maintain a centralized security database of all existing federal facilities. The ISC issued updated security standards for leased facilities in July 2003, as well as new recommendations to member agencies pertaining to the use of escape hoods. The updated version of the ISC Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects was approved by concurrence of the ISC membership on September 29, 2004. In addition to its duties to coordinate federal facility security efforts and to develop security standards for the construction of new federal facilities, the ISC has been assigned responsibilities to review federal agencies' physical security plans. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, issued on December 17, 2003, established requirements for federal agencies "to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks," and assigned implementation responsibilities to DHS. In July 2004, the ISC was designated to oversee and review each agency's physical security plan pertaining to protection of the nation's infrastructure and key resources. According to GAO, the ISC's successful completion of these new responsibilities relating to homeland security issues would "represent a major step" toward carrying out its existing duties pertaining to compliance and oversight. A fundamental ISC objective is to improve the management of security programs by establishing policies and minimum standards for security operations. The successful integration of the federal government's facility protection standards is a formidable challenge because it involves diverse agencies with varying perspectives on security issues. On December 13, 2006, the ISC issued its 2007-2008 Action Plan, which included operational procedures for identifying and applying updated security technologies. Current ISC projects include the updating of the 1995 Vulnerability Assessment Report to make the document more specific to agencies' missions and strategic plans. The ISC membership is also striving for better formulation of security policies and directives to gain more consensus and compliance within the federal community. Through greater accountability and oversight, the ISC hopes to provide one leadership voice to integrate physical security initiatives successfully for the federal government.

The federal government owns or leases 3.7 billion square feet of office space, which may be vulnerable to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) was created by E.O. 12977 in 1995, following the domestic terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, to address the quality and effectiveness of physical security requirements for federal facilities. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center renewed concerns about the vulnerability of federal buildings to bombing or other forms of attack. On February 28, 2003, the chairmanship of the ISC was transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security from the Administrator of General Services by E.O. 13286. In July 2004, based on Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, the ISC began reviewing federal agencies' physical security plans to better protect the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources. On December 13, 2006, the ISC issued its 2007-2008 Action Plan, which sets forth revised policy recommendations for enhancing the quality and effectiveness of security in federal facilities. This report will not be updated.

The federal role in assisting states and communities to clean up brownfields for productive use has been an ongoing issue for more than a decade. As defined by statute, brownfield sites are "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant" (emphasis added). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) addresses environmental contamination primarily through the Superfund and Brownfields Programs. Although EPA's Superfund and Brownfields Programs are related, the programs are different in their objectives and the sites they address. The Superfund Program and its federal funding generally cover only the sites with the highest levels of contamination or those that present immediate risks. In contrast, EPA's Brownfields Program assists communities with the cleanup of abandoned, idled, or underutilized commercial and industrial properties. EPA estimates that there are more than 450,000 brownfields sites throughout the country. As the brownfields definition indicates, whether contamination is present at all of these sites is uncertain. The environmental contamination at a brownfield site, if it exists at all , is not as serious or threatening as the contamination at Superfund sites. Often, the mere perception of environmental contamination may hinder site reuse, because interested parties may be concerned they would face cleanup responsibilities. Thus, a primary objective of the Brownfields Program is site assessment. This report describes the scope and purpose of EPA's Brownfields Program, reviews appropriation levels for the program, and highlights considerations for policymakers. The Superfund and EPA Brownfields Programs are authorized by the same statute, but the programs were developed at different times and for different purposes. With the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675), Congress established the Superfund Program. This is the federal government's principal program for cleaning up the nation's contaminated waste sites and protecting public health and the environment from releases of hazardous substances. Pursuant to the general response authorities of CERCLA, EPA developed the Brownfields Program in 1993. Initially, the program provided "seed money" in the form of grants and loans to communities to stimulate redevelopment and reuse of brownfield properties. Funding originally came from the Superfund Program appropriations. Between FY1998 and FY2001, the program received approximately $90 million each year, accounting for about 5% of annual Superfund appropriations. In 2002, Congress provided specific statutory authority for EPA to address brownfields with the enactment of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act ( P.L. 107-118 ). Among other things, the statute (hereinafter the "Brownfields Act") authorized a grant program, similar to the one EPA had established administratively under general CERCLA authority in the mid 1990s. The stated purpose of the 2002 act was "to promote the cleanup and reuse of brownfields, to provide financial assistance for brownfields revitalization, to enhance State response programs, and for other purpose." Section 201 of the Brownfields Act authorized $200 million annually for a grant program to support site assessment and cleanup activities at brownfield properties. Section 231 of the act authorized an additional grant program in the amount of $50 million annually to assist state and tribal cleanup programs. The funding authority for both grant programs expired at the end of FY2006; program authority is permanent unless repealed by subsequent legislation. Regardless of expired authorization, Congress has continued to provide a consistent funding level for both grant programs (provided in Table 1 , below). The grants awarded from EPA's Brownfields Program can be divided into two categories: (1) competitive grants awarded to communities, which are often referenced by the CERCLA section—Section 104(k)—that authorizes them; and (2) non-competitive grants—authorized by Section 128, and thus often described as Section 128 grants—awarded to states and Indian tribes to support their response programs. Section 104(k) grants comprise the core of EPA's Brownfields Program, receiving the bulk of the annual appropriation. In general, eligible grant recipients include state, local, and tribal governments, and certain quasi-governmental authorities. In some cases (identified below), other parties may receive grants. However, private persons and corporations are not eligible in any case. There are four types of competitive brownfields grants: Assessment grants provide funding for a grant recipient to inventory, assess, and conduct planning and community involvement related to brownfields sites. Site assessment is a primary component of the EPA Brownfields Program. The mere perception of contamination at brownfield sites often hinders redevelopment. Assessment grants help address these information gaps and determine whether cleanup may be needed to make a property suitable for its intended use. As required by statute, grants are limited to $200,000, but the statute allows EPA to waive that limitation and award a grant up to $350,000. In addition, eligible parties may apply for separate grants to address hazardous substances and petroleum at a brownfield site. Cleanup grants provide funding for remediation activities that may be needed to address contamination at a brownfields site. As directed by the statute, grants may be awarded for up to $200,000. Grant recipients must provide a 20% cost share, which may include money, labor, material, or services. In addition to the eligible entities listed above, nonprofit organizations are eligible for cleanup grants. Job training grants are available to certain educational and other nonprofit organizations, as well as the eligible entities above. EPA awards grants of up to $200,000 (a threshold not based on statutory limitations) to create local environmental job training programs. EPA maintains that the job training grants, which were first awarded under general CERCLA authority in 1997, complement the funding for brownfields sites by encouraging local citizens to take advantage of the growing market for environmental cleanup activities. Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) grants are awarded to state, local, or tribal governments to capitalize RLFs, which can provide no-interest or low-interest loans for brownfield cleanups. The statute limits these grants to $1 million. RLF grant recipients may also award cleanup subgrants, not requiring repayment, of up to $200,000 per site. Like the general cleanup grants, RLF cleanup subgrants may be awarded to nonprofit groups. The Brownfields Act added Section 128 to CERCLA. Subsection 128(a) created a non-competitive grant program to support state and tribal response programs. The funding authority for this program—authorized at $50 million annually from FY2002 through FY2006—is separate from the competitive grant program under Section 104(k). A 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that all 50 states have some type of response (or cleanup program), although these programs vary considerably in scope and breadth. In general, these state programs address contaminated properties that are not covered by the federal Superfund Program. EPA states that Section 128 funding is not intended to supplant, but instead "supplement,"state or tribal funding for their response programs. However, the 2004 GAO report noted that in some states, their programs would not exist without EPA's funding. Section 128 identifies one general and two specific uses of funding. Regarding the former, the statute prescribes that funding can be used to "establish or enhance" a state or tribal response program. EPA interprets this phrase to include: developing legislation, regulations, procedures, or guidance; creating and maintaining relevant public records; and conducting limited site-specific activities, such as assessment or cleanup. The statute also identifies two specific uses of the Section 128 funding: financing a revolving loan fund for brownfield cleanups; and purchasing environmental insurance or developing an insurance mechanism to provide financing for cleanup actions under the program. Congress funds EPA's Brownfields Program with appropriations from two large accounts: the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) Account and EPA's Environmental Programs and Management Account. From within these large accounts, the Brownfields Program is funded by three line-items ( Table 1 ). The STAG account funds two line-items: Section 104(k) and Section 128 grant programs. The management account includes a line-item for the administrative expenses of the Brownfields Program. Since the enactment of the 2002 Brownfields Act, appropriations for the aggregate of these three brownfields line-items have been relatively consistent, with total funding ranging from $163 million to nearly $170 million ( Table 1 ). There appears to be broad consensus that a federal role in the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields is desirable. However, issues regarding the degree of financial assistance and overall program effectiveness have been raised. Since the enactment of the Brownfields Act in 2002, Congress has funded the program below its initial authorized level. Total appropriations (in Table 1 ) represent approximately 66% of the initial funding authorization—$250 million each year, between FY2002 - FY2006. Some states and communities would argue that the demand for funding far exceeds what has been made available by Congress. On the other hand, the program has arguably struggled to demonstrate its effectiveness. What are federal funding levels achieving: environmental risk reduction, economic redevelopment, or some combination thereof? The 2004 GAO report found that "the agency has not yet developed measures to determine the extent to which the Brownfields Program helps reduce environmental risks." This concern raises the question as to whether the program should be evaluated by its ability to reduce threats to human health or whether the program should be assessed with different metrics, such as economic redevelopment. If this is the case, some may question whether EPA is the most appropriate agency to administer this program.

The federal role in assisting states and communities to clean up brownfield sites—real property affected by the potential presence of environmental contamination—has been an ongoing issue for more than a decade. With the enactment of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act ( P.L. 107-118 ) in 2002, Congress provided specific authority for EPA to address brownfield sites. In contrast to Superfund sites, environmental contamination present at brownfield sites is typically less of a risk to human health. With the primary motivation to aid cleanup efforts, the 2002 statute, among other things, authorized two grant programs: (1) a competitive grant program to address specific sites; and (2) a non-competitive grant program to support state cleanup programs. While there appears to be broad consensus that a federal role in the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields is desirable, issues regarding the degree of financial assistance and overall program effectiveness have been raised.

Biochar—a charcoal produced under high temperatures using crop residues, animal manure, or other organic material—has the potential to offer multiple environmental benefits. Some contend that biochar can meet pressing environmental demands by sequestering large amounts of carbon in soil. It is of interest to those seeking to sell or purchase carbon offsets, increase soil conservation efforts, improve crop yield, and produce renewable energy. However, little is known about how biochar production systems could successfully be implemented and what the effect would be on long-term operations in the U.S. agriculture and forestry sectors. Some contend that it will be a considerable amount of time before this technology reaches its full potential. Studies underway at federal government research institutions and in academia are focused on ensuring that biochar production systems are a practical and reliable technology for producers to adopt. Biochar is a soil supplement that sequesters carbon in the soil and thus may help to mitigate global climate change. It has the potential to curtail greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental hazards in the near term and to benefit agricultural producers as a soil amendment and source of renewable energy. Thus far, biochar use in the United States has been confined to small-scale applications reflective of the limited but growing number of researchers in this area over the last few years. Biochar is similar in appearance to potting soil or to a charred substance, depending on the feedstock ( Figure 1 ). Modern biochar production is based on an ancient Amazon technique for creating a nutrient-rich soil, terra preta . As a charcoal containing high levels of organic matter, biochar is formed from plant and crop residues or animal manure under pyrolysis conditions. Pyrolysis is the chemical breakdown of a substance under extremely high temperatures in the absence of oxygen. The quantity and quality of biochar production depends on the feedstock, pyrolysis temperature, and pyrolysis processing time. A "fast" pyrolysis (~500°C) produces biochar in a matter of seconds, while a "slow" pyrolysis produces considerably more biochar but in a matter of hours. Biochar production via pyrolysis is considered a carbon-negative process because the biochar sequesters carbon while simultaneously enhancing the fertility of the soil on which the feedstock used to produce the bioenergy grows ( Figure 2 ). The biochar production system is operated using energy produced by the system. The three main outputs of a biochar production system are syngas, bio-oil, and biochar ( Figure 3 ). Whether used as a soil amendment or burned as an energy source (e.g., for cooking and heating), biochar provides numerous potential environmental benefits, some of which are not quantifiable. The three primary potential benefits are carbon sequestration, greenhouse gas emission reduction, and soil fertility. Carbon sequestration is the capture and storage of carbon to prevent it from being released to the atmosphere. Studies suggest that biochar sequesters approximately 50% of the carbon available within the biomass feedstock being pyrolyzed, depending upon the feedstock type. The remaining carbon is released during pyrolysis and may be captured for energy production. Large amounts of carbon may be sequestered in the soil for long time periods (hundreds to thousands of years at an estimate), but precise estimates of carbon amounts sequestered as a result of biochar application are scarce. One scientist suggests that a 250-hectare farm could sequester 1,900 tons of CO 2 a year. Primary greenhouse gases associated with the agriculture sector are nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and methane (CH 4 ). Cropland soils and grazing lands are an agricultural source of nitrous oxide emissions. Livestock manure management and enteric fermentation are leading agricultural sources of methane emissions. When applied to the soil, biochar can lower greenhouse gas emissions by substantially reducing the release of nitrous oxide. One report showed a 40% reduction in emissions of this greenhouse gas, which is approximately 310 times stronger than carbon dioxide in terms of global warming potential. Laboratory studies suggest that nitrous oxide emission reductions from biochar-treated soil are dependent on soil moisture and soil aeration. Greenhouse gas emission reductions may be 12%-84% greater if biochar is land-applied instead of combusted for energy purposes. Biochar retains nutrients for plant uptake and soil fertility. The infiltration of harmful quantities of nutrients and pesticides into groundwater and soil erosion runoff into surface waters can be limited with the use of biochar. If used for soil fertility, biochar may have a positive impact on those in developing countries. Impoverished tropical and subtropical locales with abundant plant material feedstock, inexpensive cooking fuel needs, and agricultural soil replenishment needs could see an increase in crop yields. Recognizing that biochar technology is in its early stages of development, there are many concerns about the applicability of the technology in the United States. Three issues are feedstock availability, biochar handling, and biochar system deployment. Successful implementation of biochar technology depends on the ability of the agricultural community to afford and operate a system that is complementary to current farming and forestry practices. The availability of a plentiful feed supply for biochar production is an area for further study. To date, feedstock for biochar has consisted mostly of plant and crop residues, a primary domain of the agricultural community. There may be a role for the forestry community to be involved, as woody biomass is deemed a cost-effective, readily available, feasible feedstock. Little is known about the advantages of using manure as a biomass feedstock. According to a group of researchers in Australia, manure-based biochar "has advantages over typically used plant-derived material because it is a by-product of another industry and in some regions is considered a waste material with little or no value. It can therefore provide a lower cost base and alleviate sustainability concerns related to using purpose-grown biomass for the process." The spreading of biochar as a soil amendment is ripe for further exploration. Specific questions concern the ideal time to apply biochar and how to ensure that it remains in place once applied and does not cause a risk to human health or degrade air quality. Particulate matter, in the form of dust that is hard for the human body to filter, may be distributed in abnormal quantities if the biochar is mishandled. There are potential public safety concerns for the handling of biochar, as it is a flammable substance. Additionally, the amount of land available for biochar application requires further investigation. Biochar systems are designed based on the feedstock to be decomposed and the energy needs of an operation. It would be ambitious to expect a "one size fits all" standard biochar system. According to proponents, a series of mass-produced biochar systems designed for the needs of a segment of the agriculture or forestry communities might prove to be feasible (e.g., forestry community in the southeastern region, corn grower community in the midwestern region, poultry producer community in the mid-Atlantic region). Extensive deployment of biochar systems would depend on system costs, operation time, collaboration with utility providers for the sale of bio-oil, and availability of information about technology reliability. Carbon offsets were a prominent factor in the climate change debate in the 111 th Congress. A carbon offset is defined as "a measurable avoidance, reduction, or sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) or other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions." Carbon sequestration projects are one type of carbon offset. In addition to direct carbon capture and sequestration activities, Congress may consider the role of biological (indirect) sequestration—such as biochar production technology—that can be implemented by agricultural producers at the field level. The establishment of an offset program, identification of eligible project types, carbon offset ownership, and offset verification may be pertinent to the adoption of biochar production technology. Congress may examine the use of biochar as an indirect carbon sequestration technology that could be used to offset carbon emissions from major emitters. In 2008, 6% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions were attributed to the agricultural sector. While not as large as the amounts produced by some other sectors, agricultural emissions come from a large number of decentralized sources, leading many to conclude that controlling such emissions would be difficult. On the other hand, some argue that soil carbon sequestered as a result of biochar application is easily quantifiable and transparent, which may be ideal for carbon trading requirements. Others contend that ancillary benefits could include additional revenue earned by agricultural producers through the sale of carbon credits earned from biochar application or the sale of biochar as a soil amendment. Energy costs for a producer's operation may be reduced by using the energy generated from the biochar production system. Additionally, some assert that the use of biochar results in higher crop yields. This could be a criterion to consider within the larger land use debate. The Water Efficiency via Carbon Harvesting and Restoration (WECHAR) Act of 2009, introduced during the 111 th Congress, sought, among other things, to establish loan guarantee programs that would develop biochar technology to use excess plant biomass and establish biochar demonstration projects on public lands. The legislation was primarily focused on woody biomass as the feedstock. Some asserted that the legislation addressed research and development needs for biochar production. Others argued that the legislation lacked specific actions regarding technology transfer or commercial development of biochar production systems. The discussion draft of the American Power Act offered during the 111 th Congress contained three provisions relevant to biochar. The first provision identified projects for biochar production and use as an eligible project type under the domestic offsets program. The second provision instructed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to submit to Congress a report on the sources and effects of black carbon emissions, and strategies to reduce black carbon emissions, including "research and development activities needed to better characterize the feasibility of biochar techniques to decrease emissions, increase carbon soil sequestration, and improve agricultural production, and if appropriate, encourage broader application of those techniques." The third provision directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide grants for up to 60 facilities to "conduct research, develop, demonstrate and deploy biochar production technology for the purpose of sequestering carbon." The 110 th Congress promoted biochar development through the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), which listed it under grants for High Priority Research and Extension Areas. Noted research areas include biochar production and use, co-production with bioenergy, soil enhancements, and soil carbon sequestration. Listing biochar development as a high-priority research area in the 2008 farm bill did not authorize a specific appropriations amount. Funding for biochar development research would be determined in future appropriation bills and by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Farm managers facing needs with respect to soil fertility, residue and manure management, energy efficiency, and additional revenue generation may benefit from a policy that further supports biochar production and use (e.g., technology practice standard, cost-share). Biochar's fate as a viable component of the long-term solution to mitigate climate change by way of carbon sequestration depends upon further development by the scientific and technology transfer communities. In particular, biochar's practical application at various locations and scales using multiple feedstocks throughout the United States is an area for additional study. Policy that encourages academia and other institutions to conduct in-depth research and development could quicken the pace of technology deployment. One study hypothesizes that a U.S. research program (technical demonstrations and a coordinated national field trial program), funded at $100 million-$150 million for eight years, could support the research, development, and deployment of commercial-scale biochar production and use. An assessment of external factors (e.g., feedstock transportation costs and disposal fees) associated with the economic growth of biochar production systems, similar to studies conducted for the biofuels industry, could provide guidance on the types of federal financial and technical incentives necessary to spur development (e.g., regulatory requirements, technical standards). The definition of biomass used in climate change and energy legislation will directly affect the eventual impact of biochar in limiting GHG emissions. Indeed, the biomass definition would determine what sources of material are deemed acceptable and which lands would be eligible lands for biomass removal. According to a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Research Service (ARS) official, an estimated $2.6 million was spent in 2010 on in-house biochar research by ARS. ARS has multiple projects underway to ascertain biochar's value as a soil amendment given varying soil, climate, and cropping system conditions. Additionally, ARS is examining feedstock types and pyrolysis conditions for biochar production. ARS estimates that the United States could use biochar to sequester 139 Tg of carbon on an annual basis if it were to harvest and pyrolyze 1.3 billion tons of biomass.

Biochar is a charcoal produced under high temperatures using crop residues, animal manure, or any type of organic waste material. Depending on the feedstock, biochar may look similar to potting soil or to a charred substance. The combined production and use of biochar is considered a carbon-negative process, meaning that it removes carbon from the atmosphere. Biochar has multiple potential environmental benefits, foremost the potential to sequester carbon in the soil for hundreds to thousands of years at an estimate. Studies suggest that crop yields can increase as a result of applying biochar as a soil amendment. Some contend that biochar has value as an immediate climate change mitigation strategy. Scientific experiments suggest that greenhouse gas emissions are reduced significantly with biochar application to crop fields. Obstacles that may stall rapid adoption of biochar production systems include technology costs, system operation and maintenance, feedstock availability, and biochar handling. Biochar research and development is in its infancy. Nevertheless, interest in biochar as a multifaceted solution to agricultural and natural resource issues is growing at a rapid pace both nationally and internationally. Past Congresses have proposed numerous climate change bills, many of which do not directly address mitigation and adaptation technologies at developmental stages, such as biochar. However, biochar may equip agricultural and forestry producers with numerous revenue-generating products: carbon offsets, soil amendments, and energy. This report briefly describes biochar, some of its potential advantages and disadvantages, legislative support, and research and development activities underway in the United States.

Section 36 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides for a credit for many taxpayers who bought a principal residence in 2008, 2009, or 2010. The amounts of the credit vary depending upon whether the property was purchased in 2008 or was purchased later and, for purchases made after 2008, whether the purchaser qualified for the "long-time resident" exception. Credits based on purchases made in 2008 generally must be repaid over a 15-year period. Those for subsequent years' purchases generally are not subject to repayment. However, Section 36(f)(2) provides for acceleration of the repayment in certain circumstances if the taxpayer ceases to use the property as a principal residence. For credits based on purchases after 2008, acceleration of repayment means that the entire credit must be repaid if taxpayers cease using the purchased properties as their principal residences within the 36 months following the purchase. For credits based on a 2008 purchase, acceleration of repayment means that the outstanding balance of the credit becomes due. In each case, the repayment is calculated and included as tax on the tax return for the tax year in which the property ceased to be the taxpayer's principal residence. There are several exceptions to these repayment provisions. This report addresses the exception for involuntary conversions of the property, as well as the limitation on repayment based on gain (if any) realized on the disposition of the property as it applies to involuntary conversions. Generally, an involuntary conversion will not trigger acceleration of repayment in the tax year in which the involuntary conversion occurs. Under the exception for involuntary conversions, taxpayers who have received the homebuyer tax credit have two years from the date of the involuntary conversion to replace the property and, thereby, avoid acceleration of repayment. For those who purchased their homes in 2008, the involuntary conversion will not suspend their existing duty to repay the credit over a 15-year period. Those who purchased property in 2008 and received the maximum $7,500 credit were required to begin repayment of the credit at $500 per year beginning with their 2010 tax returns. If the property was destroyed or otherwise involuntarily converted in 2011, they still would be required to repay $500 on their 2011 and 2012 tax returns. Only acceleration of repayment is affected by an involuntary conversion. Although the acceleration provision is not triggered in the year of the involuntary conversion, the involuntary conversion must nonetheless be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the tax return for the year in which the involuntary conversion occurs. This is done on Form 5405. The form requires taxpayers to report any disposition or change in the use of the property on which the credit was based. On the 2010 Form 5405, two options apply to involuntary conversions. The first (line 13f) states, "My home was destroyed, condemned, or disposed of under threat of condemnation and I acquired or plan to acquire a new home within 2 years of the event (see instructions)." The second (line 13g) states, "My home was destroyed, condemned, or disposed of under threat of condemnation and I do not plan to acquire a new home within 2 years of the event (see instructions)." Even if the taxpayer does not currently intend to replace the property within two years, accelerated repayment is not due until the tax year for the year in which the two-year replacement period expires. In some cases, a taxpayer may be unable or unwilling to replace a home within the two-year replacement period that provides an exception to the acceleration of repayment. In some of these cases, repayment may not be necessary due to the limitation based on gain. A taxpayer may have gain from an involuntary conversion due to either insurance proceeds (in the case of property that has been damaged or destroyed), condemnation awards, or selling price (in the case of property that has been sold under threat of condemnation). In this case, the taxpayer who does not replace the principal residence within the two years allowed must determine whether there was a gain or loss realized on the property. Section 36(f)(3) limits the repayment of the homebuyer credit to the amount of gain from the disposition of the property. If there is a loss or no gain, no accelerated repayment is required. However, for purposes of determining gain on the disposition, the property's adjusted basis must be reduced by the total amount of the homebuyer credit that was claimed. When there is a gain, that gain would be compared to the outstanding balance of the homebuyer credit. The smaller of the two would be the amount that is added to tax as accelerated repayment of the credit in the year in which the two-year replacement period expires. 1. My principal residence was destroyed by flooding in 2011. Do I have to repay the outstanding balance of my homebuyer credit with my 2011 tax return? No. The destruction of your home is an involuntary conversion. The homebuyer tax credit provisions include an exception to the repayment acceleration requirements when the property is destroyed. •    If, within two years of the date your property was destroyed, you replace your principal residence with another that would have qualified you for the credit if acquired in 2008, repayment of your credit will not be accelerated. •    If you do not replace the residence within this two-year period, your credit will be accelerated, but will be reported on the tax return for the tax year in which the two-year period expires. •    Despite the involuntary conversion, if your residence was purchased in 2008, you must continue to repay the usual amount ($500 per year if the credit was $7,500) with your tax returns. 2. My residence was not completely destroyed by the flooding, but it was severely damaged. I will have to move out of it while it is being repaired. Do I have to repay the outstanding balance of my homebuyer credit with my 2011 tax return? No. Generally, you do not abandon your principal residence due to temporary absences; therefore, it is likely that you would not be considered to have ceased using the property as your principal residence even if you actually move out of it while it is being repaired. Additionally, your property does not need to be completely destroyed for there to be an involuntary conversion; therefore, the involuntary conversion exception (explained above) would also apply. 3. My house was destroyed and was in a federally declared disaster area. Does this mean that repayment of my credit will not be accelerated if I replace my house within four years? No. The involuntary conversion exception for acceleration of repayment of the homebuyer tax credit requires you to replace the property within two years. There currently is no provision to expand that replacement period when the property is within a federally declared disaster area. 4. My house was destroyed or damaged in 2011. Do I have to do anything special when I file my 2011 tax return? Yes. You must file Form 5405 with your tax return. On it, you will enter the date on which the damage or destruction occurred and indicate that your house was damaged or destroyed (rather than sold, converted to business or rental use, or abandoned). You will also need to indicate whether you currently intend to replace your property within two years. 5. If I say that I am not going to replace my house, does it mean that I will owe a lot more in taxes for 2011? No. You are indicating that you currently do not intend to replace the property. If you do not replace the property, the accelerated repayment of the tax credit will not be reported on your tax return until 2013. If you change your mind and do replace the property within two years, there would be no accelerated repayment requirement. 6. I purchased my house in 2008 and it was destroyed in 2011. I started repaying the credit on my 2010 tax return. What do I need to repay in 2011 and subsequent years? •    You will need to continue paying your scheduled repayment amount ($500 if the credit was $7,500) in 2011 and 2012. •    If you replace your home within two years after its destruction, your repayment will not be accelerated. You will continue repaying your scheduled repayment amount each year. •    If you do not replace your house within the two-year replacement period, you generally would need to repay the outstanding balance on your credit ($6,000 if originally $7,500), showing it on your 2013 tax return. However, that repayment may be reduced or eliminated depending on whether there was a gain from the involuntary conversion. •    If there was no gain, you would not have to repay any more of the credit. •    If the gain was less than the outstanding balance on the credit, your repayment would be the amount of the gain. •    For purposes of calculating this gain, you would be required to reduce your cost basis in the house by the original amount of the credit.

Taxpayers who purchased a principal residence in 2008-2010 (and in some cases, 2011) may have qualified for a tax credit under Section 36 of the Internal Revenue Code—the first-time homebuyer credit. This credit was amended several times with changes being made to the amount of the credit, the requirements for qualifying for the credit, and the requirements for repaying the credit. These details are available in CRS Report RL34664, The First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit, by [author name scrubbed]. Generally, taxpayers claiming the credit based on a 2008 credit are required to repay the credit over a 15-year period beginning with the 2010 tax return. Taxpayers who purchased after 2008 generally are not required to repay the credit. However, repayment of the credit may be accelerated when the taxpayer no longer uses the property as the principal residence. For those who purchased property in 2008, acceleration means that any outstanding credit balance must be repaid with the tax return for the year in which the taxpayer ceased using the property as the principal residence. For those who purchased after 2008, the credit must be repaid in full if the taxpayer ceased using the property as the principal residence within the 36 months immediately following the date of purchase. There are several exceptions to the repayment requirements. This report focuses on the exception due to involuntary conversion and the limitation based on gain. The term "involuntary conversion" includes either the partial or complete destruction of the property due to a casualty such as a fire, flood, or tornado. Alternatively, the term may mean the loss of some or all of the property by theft or condemnation, which would include a sale under threat of condemnation. Generally, an involuntary conversion will not trigger acceleration of repayment in the tax year in which the involuntary conversion occurs. Under the exception for involuntary conversions, taxpayers who have received the homebuyer tax credit have two years from the date of the involuntary conversion to replace the property and, thereby, avoid acceleration of repayment. However, those who purchased in 2008 will need to continue repaying one-fifteenth of their credit annually in the interim. If a taxpayer does not replace the residence within the allowed two-year period, the outstanding credit balance generally would be included in the tax liability for the tax return for the year in which the two-year period expires. However, repayment of the credit could be limited by the gain realized on the involuntary conversion. If the taxpayer realized a loss on the involuntary conversion, there would be no obligation to repay the outstanding credit balance. If the taxpayer realized a gain, but the gain was less than the outstanding credit balance, the credit repayment would be limited to the amount of gain. That lower amount would be added to the taxpayer's tax liability for the year in which the two-year period expired. In either case, the taxpayer would have no obligation to repay any remaining credit balance in future years. This report includes an Appendix with questions that are representative of questions being raised by constituents in areas that have been affected recently by flooding and are applicable to other sorts of involuntary conversions.

Churches jeopardize their tax-exempt status under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 501(c)(3) if they participate in campaign activity. Legislation has been introduced in the past several Congresses that would allow churches to engage in at least some campaign activity without risking their § 501(c)(3) status. Churches would still be subject to applicable campaign finance laws. This report provides an overview of tax and campaign finance laws and discusses these bills. For further analysis of the legal restrictions on electioneering activities by churches, see CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Churches qualify for tax-exempt status as IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations. These organizations may not "participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." This is an absolute prohibition. Thus, a church that engages in any amount of campaign activity may have its § 501(c)(3) status revoked. It may also, either in addition to or in lieu of revocation, be taxed on its political expenditures under IRC § 4955. The tax equals 10% of the expenditures, which is increased to 100% if the church does not take timely action to recover the expenditures and establish policies preventing future ones. The tax may also be imposed on church managers at lower rates. IRC § 501(c)(3) only prohibits campaign intervention. Other types of political activities are permitted. The line between the two can be difficult to discern. Clearly, churches may not make statements that endorse or oppose a candidate, publish or distribute campaign literature, or contribute to a campaign. On the other hand, they may conduct activities not related to elections, such as issue advocacy and supporting or opposing individuals for nonelective offices. In general, an activity is permissible unless it is structured or conducted in a way that shows bias towards or against a candidate. Thus, churches may do such things as create and distribute voter education materials, host candidate forums, and invite candidates to appear at church functions so long as these activities do not show a preference for or against a candidate. Biases can be subtle, and whether an activity is campaign intervention depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The tax laws do not prohibit religious leaders from participating in campaign activity as individuals. Religious leaders may endorse or oppose candidates in speeches, advertisements, etc., in their capacity as private citizens. A leader may be identified as being from a specific church, but there should be no intimation that he or she is speaking as a representative of the church. The church may not support the activity in any way. Thus, a leader may not make campaign-related statements in the church's publications, at its events, or in a manner that uses its assets. This is true even if the leader pays the costs of the publication or event. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which regulates the raising and spending of campaign funds, is separate and distinct from the tax code. FECA prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections, but does not prohibit unincorporated organizations from making such contributions and expenditures. FECA also requires regular filing of disclosure reports by candidates and political committees of contributions and expenditures, and by persons making independent expenditures that aggregate more than $250 in a calendar year. Under FECA, the term "political committee" is defined to include any committee, club, association, or other group of persons that receives contributions or makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year. As a result of a 2002 amendment to FECA, corporations—including tax-exempt corporations—are further prohibited from funding "electioneering communications," which are defined as broadcast communications made within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary that "refer" to a federal office candidate. Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations provide an exception to this prohibition for "qualified nonprofit corporations," which do not include churches. In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of FECA's prohibition on corporate treasury funds being spent for electioneering communications. More recently, however, the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL II) found that this prohibition was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. sought to run. While not expressly overruling its decision in McConnell v. FEC, which had upheld the provision against a First Amendment facial challenge, the Court limited the law's application. Specifically, it ruled that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore, cannot be regulated. Bills introduced in the 110 th , 109 th , 108 th , and 107 th Congresses would have allowed churches to engage in some amount of political campaign activity without risking their tax-exempt status. Each bill addressed the issue in a different way. Thus, they provide examples of various approaches Congress could take, if it so chose, to amend the tax code's prohibition on campaign activity by churches. No such legislation has yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress. None of the bills would have changed the reporting requirements under current law. Churches, unlike most tax-exempt organizations, are not required to file an annual information return (Form 990) with the IRS. Tax-exempt organizations permitted to engage in political activities are generally required to report information about those activities on the form's Schedule C. Thus, while the bills would have permitted churches to engage in campaign activities, they would not have required churches to report to the IRS on those activities. H.R. 2275 would have repealed the political campaign prohibition in IRC § 501(c)(3). Thus, it would have allowed churches and other § 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in all types of campaign activity without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status. The bill did not expressly impose any limitation on the amount of permissible campaign activity. However, the existing requirement in I.R.C.§ 501(c)(3) that organizations be "organized and operated exclusively" for an exempt purpose would appear to require that any such activity have been insubstantial. Churches and other organizations would have still been subject to tax on their political expenditures, thus possibly providing a disincentive to engage in activities with associated taxable expenditures. It appears the bill would have allowed churches and other § 501(c)(3) organizations to establish § 527(f)(3) separate segregated funds to conduct election-related activities. Churches would have still been subject to applicable campaign finance laws. Under H.R. 235 , the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, churches would not have been treated as participating in campaign activity "because of the content, preparation, or presentation of any homily, sermon, teaching, dialectic, or other presentation made during religious services or gatherings." This rule would have applied for purposes of § 501(c)(3) status, eligibility to receive tax-deductible contributions under § 170(c)(2), various estate and gift tax provisions (§§ 2055, 2106 and 2522), and the § 4955 excise tax on political expenditures. The bill clarified that no church member or leader would be prohibited from expressing personal views on political matters or elections during regular religious services so long as those views were not disseminated beyond the service's attendees. Dissemination would have included a mailing with more than an incremental cost to the church and any electioneering communication. The bill expressly stated that it did not permit disbursements for electioneering communications or political expenditures prohibited by FECA. It appears that H.R. 235 would have permitted activities such as the express endorsement of a candidate by church leaders and others during religious services, requests for contributions to candidate committees and other political committees during religious gatherings, and written endorsements in church bulletins and inserts. Any expenditures for these activities would not have been subject to the § 4955 tax. The bill would not have allowed churches to set up § 527(f)(3) separate segregated funds or change existing campaign finance laws. H.R. 235 , an earlier version of the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, was identical to the version introduced in the 109 th Congress except it did not reference IRC §§ 2055, 2106, 2522 and 4955 nor did it include the clarification concerning church leaders. While this version did not provide an exception from the § 4955 tax, it would seem from a practical standpoint that this difference between the two versions could be insignificant because many of the activities permitted under the bills would have little or no associated expenditures. The provision in H.R. 4520 , former section 692 (Safe Harbor for Churches), was only briefly in the bill before the House Ways and Means Committee struck it by unanimous consent. It would have done several things. First, churches would not have been treated as participating in campaign activity solely because of their religious leaders' private statements. Second, churches that unintentionally intervened in a political campaign would not have lost their tax-exempt status or eligibility to receive deductible contributions unless the church or its religious leaders had done so on more than three occasions during the year. Third, unintentional violations of the § 501(c)(3) prohibition would have been subject to a new excise tax. If the church had at least three unintentional violations during the year, the tax would have equaled the highest corporate tax rate multiplied by the church's gross income, contributions, and gifts. If the church had two violations, then the tax would have equaled that amount divided by two. If the church had one violation, then the tax would have equaled the full amount divided by 52. The tax would have been reduced by any amount imposed under § 4955. This bill was more restrictive than the others because it would have only permitted unintentional violations of the campaign prohibition and even those violations would have been fined. Thus, this bill was specifically targeted at removing the risk that churches that inadvertently engaged in campaign activity could lose their tax-exempt status, as opposed to permitting churches to engage in such activity. The impact of the provision addressing religious leaders' private statements could be unclear because it could be interpreted as simply codifying existing law. H.R. 2357 and S. 2886 , the Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, would have allowed § 501(c)(3) churches to engage in campaign activity so long as it was "no substantial part" of a church's activities. S. 2886 —but not H.R. 2357 —clarified that the bill would not allow disbursements for electioneering communications not permitted under FECA. H.R. 2357 received a floor vote on October 2, 2002, and failed to pass by a vote of 178 to 239. The "no substantial part" test, which is currently used to measure § 501(c)(3) organizations' lobbying activities, is a flexible standard. Thus, the bills would have required each church to be judged on a case-by-case basis as to whether its campaign activities were a substantial part of its activities. Churches would have been allowed to engage in any type of campaign activity; however, the § 4955 tax could have discouraged churches from conducting activities with associated taxable expenditures. It could be unclear the extent to which the bills would have permitted churches to establish § 527(f)(3) separate segregated funds without overstepping the "no substantial part" rule. Churches would have still been subject to applicable campaign finance laws. Under, H.R. 2931 , the Bright-Line Act of 2001, a church would only have violated the campaign prohibition if it normally made expenditures for campaign activity in excess of 5% of its gross revenues. Lobbying expenditures could not have normally exceeded 20% of its gross revenues, and the church could not have normally spent more than 20% of its gross revenues on campaign and lobbying activities combined. The bill did not define the term "normally." The bill would have permitted churches to routinely engage in any type of campaign activity without risking their tax-exempt status so long as their expenditures for such activities did not "normally" exceed the limits. Thus, in practice, no or low-cost campaign activities could have been conducted almost without limit. Churches would have been allowed to occasionally engage in campaign activity in excess of the limits so long as this did not normally happen. It could be unclear the extent to which a church would have been able to establish a § 527(f)(3) separate segregated fund under the bill and still comply with the 5% limit. Any campaign activity would have been subject to the applicable campaign finance laws.

In recent years, there has been increased attention paid to the political activities of churches. Churches and other houses of worship qualify for tax-exempt status as Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) organizations. Under the tax laws, these organizations may not participate in political campaign activity. Separate from the prohibition in the tax code, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) may also restrict the ability of churches to engage in electioneering activities. Legislation had been introduced in the past several Congresses that would have allowed churches to participate in at least some campaign activity without jeopardizing their § 501(c)(3) status. These bills were the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235 (109th Congress) and H.R. 235 (108th Congress); a provision briefly included in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520 (108th Congress); the Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R. 2357 and S. 2886 (107th Congress); and the Bright-Line Act of 2001, H.R. 2931 (107th Congress). In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2275 would have repealed the prohibition against campaign intervention in IRC § 501(c)(3). Unlike the other bills, H.R. 2275 would have applied to all § 501(c)(3) organizations and not just churches. No similar legislation has yet been introduced in the 111th Congress. This report provides an overview of the tax and campaign finance laws relevant to these bills and a discussion of how each bill would have amended current law. For further discussion of the laws restricting campaign activity by churches, see CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

The Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service (hereinafter, the Board) was created by the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970 (PRA, 39 U.S. C. §202). The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) describes the Board as " comparable to a board of directors of a private corporation ." Guided by statute and its bylaws , the Board "directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service." The Board is composed of 11 members, including nine Governors who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. As noted in a USPS Office of Inspector General (USPSOIG) white paper , as an executive branch agency, the Postal Service is to be led by presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officers. The nine Governors serve this role. Additionally, the Board includes the Postmaster General, who is appointed, or may be removed, by the Governors, and the Deputy Postmaster General, who is appointed, or may be removed, by both the Governors and the Postmaster General. Under the PRA, Governors served nine-year terms, with the first nine appointees serving staggered terms of one to nine years. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA, P.L. 109-435 ) reduced the Governors' staggered terms to seven years. Additionally, the PAEA requires that Governors represent the public interest and that at least four Governors be chosen based on their demonstrated ability to manage organizations with at least 50,000 employees. No more than five Governors may belong to the same political party. The President is required by law to consult with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, and the minority leader of the Senate in selecting a nominee to the Board of Governors. While the statute stipulates that "not more than 5 of [the Governors] may be adherents of the same political party," it does not specify an order in which nominations are to be considered and confirmed to satisfy this requirement. Because USPS Governor nominations are advice and consent positions, Senate procedural considerations may affect the confirmation process. For example, a Governor nomination, like any other measure or matter available for Senate floor consideration, may be the subject of a Senate "hold." Senators place holds to accomplish a variety of purposes—to receive notification of upcoming legislative proceedings, for instance, or to express objections to a particular proposal or executive nomination—but ultimately the decision to honor a hold request, and for how long, rests with the majority leader. Typically, an executive agency head is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In the case of USPS, however, the Postmaster General is only appointed, or may be removed, by the Governors. Similarly, the Deputy Postmaster General is only appointed, or may be removed by the Postmaster General and the Governors. No term limits exist for either the Postmaster General or Deputy Postmaster General. It is unclear whether the appointment or removal clauses of 39 U.S.C. §202 could operate as written, given the Board's current composition. As of the date of this report, the Board has no Governors. The term of the last Governor, Chairman James H. Bilbray, expired on December 8, 2016. The Board's membership as a whole includes the Postmaster General, Megan J. Brennan, and the Deputy Postmaster General, Ronald A. Stroman. Figure 1 shows the terms of Governors serving at the time the PAEA was enacted and Governors appointed or reappointed since the PAEA was enacted. President Barack Obama sent seven nominations to the position of Governor of the United States Postal Service to the Senate during the 114 th Congress. All seven nominations were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI at the conclusion of the 114 th Congress on January 3, 2017. Of these seven nominations, one received a hearing. On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing to consider the nomination of Jeffrey A. Rosen. All seven nominations were subsequently reported favorably from the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and all were placed on the Senate Executive Calendar. No votes were held on any of the nominations. In the 115 th Congress, President Trump sent four nominations for Governors of the USPS to the Senate on October 30, 2017. The three nominees are Robert M. Duncan of Kentucky (who is the subject of two nominations to two separate terms), Calvin R. Tucker of Pennsylvania, and David Williams of Illinois. Of the four nominations, three were placed on the Senate Executive Calendar on May 7, 2018. The fourth nomination, of Calvin R. Tucker, received a hearing on April 18, 2018. Table 1 provides details on each nomination. Although many authorities and responsibilities are given to the Board, certain matters are reserved for decision by the Governors alone. Table 2 lists selected matters that are reserved for decision by the Governors alone or by the full Board. It is unclear whether decisions that are reserved to the Governors alone (e.g., appointment and removal of the Postmaster General) could be made when no Governors remain on the Board. The Postal Service's day-to-day operations are largely the responsibility of USPS senior leadership and may not be affected by the absence of Governors. As shown in Table 2 , however, certain actions may only be authorized or approved by the Board or the Governors. However, under 39 U.S.C. § 205 , vacancies may not prevent the Board from conducting its business as long as there is a quorum of members. To have a quorum, generally at least six members of the Board must be present. For example, if the Postmaster General, Deputy Postmaster General, and four Governors are present, then the Board would have a quorum for the transaction of business. The quorum requirement applies to the business of the Board, but not to the conduct of business related to those matters that are reserved for decision by the Governors alone. The Board lost its quorum when the term of former Governor Mickey D. Barnett expired on December 8, 2014, and the Board's makeup dropped to five members. Just prior to the loss of its quorum, the Board adopted a resolution delegating its authority to a Temporary Emergency Committee (TEC) , in order to "provide for continuity of [postal] operations" in light of the loss of a Board quorum. While the Board has the authority (with certain restrictions) to create such a committee, it is unknown to what extent the TEC may act on matters that are explicitly reserved to the Board . Further, unlike the loss of quorum, the loss of the final Governor leaves the USPS without legal authority for several actions that must be authorized by the Governors. Select USPS appointment authority is provided to the Governors rather than to the Board. For example, the appointment of, removal of, and setting compensation for the Postmaster General requires an absolute majority of the Governors currently in office. In addition, the Inspector General is appointed by the Governors and may be removed only for cause "upon the written concurrence of at least 7 Governors." In the event the Postmaster General is incapacitated due to "an enemy attack or other national emergency," USPS guidance names the Deputy Postmaster General followed by the Vice President, Area Operations, Eastern Area, in the line of succession to perform the Postmaster's duties. The guidance does not specify whether a vacancy caused by lack of Governors would qualify as an emergency or trigger its emergency succession plan. The Governors have sole authority to (1) establish rates for Competitive Mail Products (e.g., Priority Mail®, Priority Mail Express®) and (2) adjust rates of Market Dominant Products (e.g., First-Class Mail, Advertising Mail). As noted by the USPSOIG , without at least one sitting Governor, the USPS cannot perform these actions—or any actions listed in the left column of Table 2 —without subjecting itself to potential legal challenge. While Governor Bilbray remained on the Board, he continued to act on those matters alone. Prior to his departure, Bilbray wrote Governors' Decision No. 16-8 allowing for an increase in rates for USPS competitive products "on or about January 21, 2018." On October 6, 2017, USPS filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) a notice of its intent to increase prices for certain Market Dominant Products under this authority, and the PRC approved the request on November 9, 2017. As mentioned earlier, Governor Bilbray's term expired on December 8, 2016. Another issue for consideration is the authority, in absence of a quorum, of any newly appointed Governors to act on matters reserved to the Board. As discussed above, prior to the loss of its quorum, the Board established and delegated its authority to the TEC in order to "provide for continuity of [postal] operations" in light of the loss of a Board quorum. The Board will continue without a quorum until four or more Governors have been confirmed. In its resolution establishing the TEC, the Board affirmed that "the inability of the Board to constitute a quorum does not prevent the Governors then in office from exercising those powers vested solely in the Governors, as distinguished from the Board" (emphasis added). The resolution, however, did not specify whether newly appointed Governors are automatically members of the TEC.

Unlike other executive agencies, the United States Postal Service is governed not by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency head, but rather by an entity known as the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service (hereinafter, the Board) was created by the Postal Reorganization Act in 1970 (PRA, 39 U.S.C. §202). The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) describes the Board as "comparable to a board of directors of a private corporation." As currently constructed under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (PAEA, P.L. 109-435), the Board consists of the Postmaster General, the Deputy Postmaster General, and nine Governors, appointed to staggered terms of seven years. The Governors appoint, or may remove, the Postmaster General; the Deputy Postmaster General is appointed, or may be removed, by both the Governors and the Postmaster General. Currently, there are no Senate-confirmed Governors and the only members on the Board are the Postmaster General and the Deputy Postmaster General. It is unclear whether the appointment or removal clauses of 39 U.S.C. §202 could operate as written, given the Board's current composition. President Trump sent four Governor nominations to the Senate on October 30, 2017; however, as of the date of this report, none of the nominations have been confirmed. Under 39 U.S.C. §205, vacancies may not prevent the Board from conducting its business as long as there is a quorum of members. Without any appointed Governors, the Board cannot have a quorum. Just prior to the loss of its quorum, the Board adopted a resolution delegating its authority to a Temporary Emergency Committee (TEC), in order to "provide for continuity of [postal] operations." The Board will continue without a quorum until four or more Governors have been confirmed. Although the Board, as a whole, has many authorities and responsibilities, certain matters are reserved for decision by the Governors alone. The lack of any appointed Governors leaves the USPS without legal authority for actions that must be authorized by the Governors, such as the establishment of rates and classes of competitive products; the adjustment of rates for market dominant products; and setting compensation for the Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster General.

In 2003, Maine passed laws that instituted requirements for shipping and delivery sales of tobacco products that attempted to end sales to minors. The state argued that such laws helped the state "prevent minors from obtaining cigarettes." The first law at issue, the "recipient-verification" provision, stated: The tobacco retailer shall utilize a delivery service that imposes the following requirements: 1) The purchaser must be the addressee; 2) The addressee must be of legal age to purchase tobacco products and must sign for the package; and 3) If the addressee is under 27 years of age, the addressee must show valid government-issued identification that contains a photograph of the addressee and indicates that the addressee is of legal age to purchase tobacco products. The second law, referred to as the "deemed to know" provision, stated: A person is deemed to know that a package contains a tobacco product if the package is marked in accordance with the requirements of section 1555-C, subsection 3, paragraph B ["The tobacco retailer shall clearly mark the outside of the package of tobacco products to be shipped to indicate that the contents are tobacco products and to show the name and State of Maine tobacco license number of the tobacco retailer."] or if the person receives the package from a person listed as an unlicensed tobacco retailer by the Attorney General under this section. Violators of either provision could be subject to civil penalties. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association , the Supreme Court held that the two Maine provisions were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). That law prohibited states from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." This language was similar to language previously enacted in the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, which included a preemption provision stating "no State ... shall enact or enforce any law ... relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier." The Supreme Court had analyzed the air carrier preemption language in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. and held that "federal law pre-empts States from enforcing their consumer-fraud statutes against deceptive airline-fare advertisements." In finding that Maine's mail-order tobacco product delivery laws were preempted, the Court relied on its interpretation of the preemption language at issue in Morales . The Court indicated that passage of the FAAAA motor carrier preemption language took into account its previous interpretation of the air carrier preemption language in Morales . The Morales Court found that preemption could occur even if the state law only had an indirect effect on carrier rates, routes, or services and that preemption did occur if "state laws have a 'significant impact' related to Congress's deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives." However, the Morales Court effectively said that preemption may not occur if the state law affects carrier rates, routes, or services "in only a 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... manner." The Rowe Court first held that Maine's recipient-verification provision had a "direct 'connection with' motor carrier services" because "it focuse[d] on trucking and other motor carrier services" and that the Maine law had "a 'significant' and adverse 'impact' in respect to the federal Act's ability to achieve its pre-emption-related objectives." Therefore, the Rowe Court found that federal law preempted Maine's recipient-verification provision. The Court reasoned that Maine's law had the effect of substituting "government commands for 'competitive market forces' in determining ... the services that motor carriers will provide." The Rowe Court next held that Maine's "deemed to know" provision "applies yet more directly to motor carrier services" because the provision would "impose[] civil liability upon the carrier" if the carrier did not check each tobacco shipment "for certain markings and ... compare it against the Maine attorney general's list of proscribed shippers." As a result, the Court found that Maine's law would affect "Congress' major legislative effort to leave ... decisions, where federally unregulated, to the competitive marketplace," because if the Court allowed Maine's shipment checking system, then other states could impose their own shipment checking systems. This would appear to result in a "significant impact" on Congress's deregulatory objectives. Thus, the Rowe Court held that federal law preempts Maine's regulation "of the essential details of a motor carrier's system for picking-up, sorting, and carrying goods—essential details of the carriage itself." In making this determination, the Court rejected Maine's argument that federal law did not "preempt a State's efforts to protect its citizens' public health" and its assertion that its laws should not be preempted because they helped prevent underage smoking. Maine based its argument on the legislative history of the FAAAA and the Synar Amendment. The legislative history reference was to a conference report "containing a list of nine States, with laws resembling Maine's, that Congress thought did not regulate 'intrastate prices, routes and services of motor carriers.'" The Court held that the FAAAA did not include a public health exception for preemption of state laws. First, the Court stated that the legislative history did not indicate that Congress made a determination on or "focused upon" the delivery regulation issue. Second, the Court discounted Maine's reliance on the Synar Amendment, which "does not mention specific state enforcement methods." The Court further referenced the potentially broad nature of a "public health" exception to federal preemption of state laws related to carriers, noting "the number of products, the variety of potential adverse public health effects, ... and the difficulty of finding a legal criterion for separating permissible public-health-oriented regulations" and found that Congress did not likely intend to create a public health exception that could potentially affect tobacco shipments. However, the Rowe Court stated that general state public health laws would not always be preempted by federal law and that federal law would not preempt state laws with a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection to carrier rates, routes, or services. Maine had further argued that because it could legally ban tobacco shipments "from entering into or moving within the State," it had the power "to regulate the manner of tobacco shipments." The Court also rejected this argument, noting that such regulation would allow the state to regulate carrier rates, routes, and services, and that federal law preempts such state laws that have a "significant impact" and more than a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" effect. The Court also found that Maine's laws would be preempted for these reasons, regardless of whether, as Maine alleged, the overturning of Maine's laws would hurt its efforts to stop underage smoking. Justice Ginsburg "wr[o]te separately to emphasize the large regulatory gap left by an application of the FAAAA perhaps overlooked by Congress, and the urgent need ... to fill that gap." In particular, she restated the concerns of Maine and others that age verification methods for mail-order sales of tobacco products could be used as an enforcement strategy to prevent tobacco sales to minors but noted that the FAAAA preemption provisions block states from enacting such methods. She stated that there is a lack of federal tobacco laws aimed at preventing tobacco sales to minors. Her concurrence then stated that state tobacco control measures, such as those that resulted from the Synar Amendment, "are increasingly thwarted by the ease with which tobacco products can be purchased through the Internet." Legislation has been introduced in the 110 th Congress, including H.R. 4081 and S. 1027 , the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act, that would address sales of tobacco products over the internet. Justice Scalia, who is well-known for not favoring the use of legislative history as a method of interpreting congressional intent, issued a one sentence concurrence. He joined the Court's opinion except where it relied on congressional committee reports to demonstrate congressional intent "with regard to propositions that are apparent from the text of the law, unnecessary to the disposition of the case, or both."

Maine adopted two laws regarding shipping and delivery sales of tobacco products that were aimed at preventing minors from acquiring tobacco products. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, the Supreme Court held that the two Maine laws were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). That law prohibited states from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." In finding that Maine's mail-order tobacco product delivery laws were preempted, the Court noted that federal preemption would occur if state laws had a "significant impact" on carrier rates, routes, or services and if the connection with motor carrier services is not "tenuous, remote, or peripheral." Legislation related to federal regulation of tobacco products, including shipment and delivery, has been introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 1108, H.R. 4081, S. 625, S. 1027.

The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) was created by §20301 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and it is currently codified in §241(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The program is administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which is part of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) aids BJA in administering the program. SCAAP is designed to reimburse states and localities for correctional officers' salary costs incurred for incarcerating "undocumented criminal aliens." The INA defines the term "undocumented criminal alien" in the context of SCAAP to mean an alien who (3)(A) has been convicted of a felony or two or more misdemeanors; and (I) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General; (ii) was the subject of exclusion or deportation proceedings at the time he or she was taken into custody by the State or a political subdivision of the State; or (iii) was admitted as a nonimmigrant and at the time he or she was taken into custody by the State or a political subdivision of the State has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted or to which it was changed under Section 248, or to comply with the conditions of any such status. Any state or locality that incurred costs for incarcerating "undocumented criminal aliens" is eligible to apply for SCAAP funding. Currently, this includes all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and more than 3,000 counties and cities. For states and localities to qualify for SCAAP reimbursement, aliens under their jurisdiction must have at least one felony or two misdemeanor convictions under state or local law and be incarcerated for at least four consecutive days. Although the program is intended to compensate states and localities for correctional officers' salary costs, funds provided through SCAAP payments until recently have been unrestricted and could be used for any lawful purpose. In some instances, SCAAP funds were used for projects such as interoperable communications systems, inmate medical care, and construction. In many instances, funds were used for the jurisdiction's criminal justice system or jails. The criteria for the amount of SCAAP funds received have evolved over time. Prior to FY2003, the criteria were based on factors such as average cost per inmate multiplied by the number of eligible inmates and the total number of foreign-born inmates claimed. In many cases, this resulted in reimbursement for ineligible aliens such as naturalized citizens and legal permanent residents (LPRs). The formula is determined administratively by DOJ. In FY2007, the SCAAP reimbursement formula was determined through a multi-step process, as follows. DOJ determined a per diem rate per inmate, using a combination of correctional officers' annual salary costs and the total number of all inmate days. (The average inmate per diem for FY2007 was $30.30); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in DHS analyzed applicant inmate records submitted by the applicants, and provided BJA with a report reflecting the number of eligible, ineligible, unknown, and invalid inmates; The number of inmate days and a percentage of unknown days were totaled, then multiplied by the applicant's per diem rate; The value of each applicant's correctional officers' salary costs associated with its eligible and credited unknown inmate days was totaled. (This value reflected the maximum allowable reimbursement); and The values were compared with the annual appropriation and a percentage factor was developed, and the percentage factor was applied uniformly to all jurisdictions. The reimbursement factor for FY2007 SCAAP awards was approximately 42%. Funding for SCAAP has been appropriated by Congress annually since 1995. Levels of funding for the program have fluctuated from $130 million in FY1995 to $565 million in FY2002 and have remained relatively consistent between $400 and $410 million for FY2006 through FY2009. The Administration's FY2010 budget did not request funding for this program. From FY2000 to FY2008, SCAAP reimbursements totaled approximately $4 billion. As Table 1 illustrates, California historically has received the largest annual awards, having received more than $1.7 billion since the program's inception. Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas have consistently received larger awards as well, with smaller awards going to states such as West Virginia, Vermont, North Dakota, and the U.S. territories. In 2005, SCAAP was reauthorized through FY2011, and a provision was added that required SCAAP reimbursement funds be used for correctional purposes only. Legislation had been introduced in previous Congresses that would have modified the program to include covering costs for indigent defense, translators, criminal aliens charged with two misdemeanors or a felony, and limited reimbursement to border states and states with large numbers of unauthorized aliens. In the 111 th Congress, legislation has been introduced to reauthorize the program until FY2014 ( H.R. 2282 ), and to allow costs related to criminal aliens charged with specified crimes to be considered for SCAAP reimbursement ( S. 168 ). The Administration's FY2010 budget request did not include funding for SCAAP; however, funding for the program was included in the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010 ( H.R. 2847 ). H.R. 2847 as passed by the House on June 18, 2009, would appropriate $300 million for SCAAP, and the Senate reported version would appropriate $228 million for the program.

The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) is a formula grant program that provides financial assistance to states and localities for correctional officer salary costs incurred for incarcerating "undocumented criminal aliens." Currently, SCAAP funds do not cover all of the costs for incarcerating immigrants or foreign nationals. The program is administered by the Office of Justice Programs' Bureau of Justice Assistance, located in the U.S. Department of Justice, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Between FY1995 and FY2009, a total of more than $5 billion has been distributed to states in SCAAP funding. Recent changes to SCAAP include reauthorization through FY2011 and the requirement that SCAAP reimbursements be used for correctional purposes only. Legislation introduced in the 111th Congress includes provisions that would extend the program through FY2014 and authorize appropriations at $1 billion annually for FY2011-FY2014 (H.R. 2282); and would change SCAAP eligibility guidelines to reimburse states not only for criminal aliens convicted of two misdemeanors or a felony, but also for those charged with these crimes as well (S. 168). Funding for the program has also been included in the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 2847). H.R. 2847 as passed by the House on June 18, 2009, would appropriate $300 million for SCAAP, and the Senate reported version would appropriate $228 million for the program. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative, funding, or policy developments.

The sheer number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by parents or legal guardians has raised considerable concern. Overwhelmingly, the children are coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This report focuses on the demographics of unaccompanied alien children while they are in removal proceedings. It discusses the characteristics of these children by nationality, age, and sex and explores these trends over the past few years. It further builds on a set of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports examining the issues surrounding unaccompanied alien children. After Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have apprehended and processed an unaccompanied alien child, DHS transfers the child into the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). ORR is responsible for placing unaccompanied alien children in appropriate care. The law requires that ORR ensure that the interests of the child are considered in decisions and actions relating to the care and custody of an unaccompanied child. ORR also oversees the infrastructure and personnel of residential facilities for unaccompanied alien children, among other responsibilities. ORR arranges to house the unaccompanied child either in one of its shelters or in a foster care arrangement, or it reunites the unaccompanied child with a family member. In this report, the demographic and placement trends of unaccompanied children are based upon summary data extracted from case file data that ORR maintains on unaccompanied alien children. Due to the confidential nature of ORR data generally, CRS used only selected variables for this analysis. The summary data span the period between FY2011 and FY2014. The FY2014 data are partial (available through April 30, 2014), which made it difficult to reach conclusions about patterns or trends when comparing to the other three fiscal years. Much attention has been focused on the top countries of origin for the unaccompanied children. Over the past four years, ORR had unaccompanied children in its custody from 87 different countries, ranging from 41 to 50 different countries each fiscal year. Nevertheless, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have consistently accounted for the overwhelming majority of all unaccompanied children in ORR custody ( Table 1 ). While the most notable increase in unaccompanied children over the past three fiscal years and the first seven months of FY2014 was from Honduras (980%)—as it steadily increased in overall rank from fourth in FY2011 to first through the first seven months of FY2014—even the smallest increase in unaccompanied children in ORR custody of the three countries (El Salvador) was notable: 463% from FY2011 through the first seven months of FY2014 ( Figure 1 ). Not all apprehended unaccompanied children are transferred to ORR, as some are voluntarily returned to their home countries. Although Mexican children generally make up a sizeable number of the unaccompanied alien children apprehended by CBP officers, only a portion of them end up in ORR custody. For example, CBP apprehended 11,577 Mexican unaccompanied children in the first eight months of FY2014, and only 494 Mexican unaccompanied children were placed in ORR custody during the first seven months of FY2014. Age is a key factor to qualify as an unaccompanied alien child under the law. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines an unaccompanied alien child as an individual who has no lawful immigration status in the United States, has not yet reached the age of 18, and has no parent or legal guardian in the United States or no parent or legal guardian in the United States who is available to provide care and physical custody. Those 18 and older in ORR custody could have entered the United States shortly before turning 18, could be awaiting transfer back to DHS custody, or could have special needs that have kept them in ORR custody past the age of 18. The median age of unaccompanied children in ORR custody was 17 years old in FY2011 and FY2012, as Table 2 presents. The median age fell to 16 years old in FY2013 and has remained there in the first seven months of FY2014. The youngest three age groups (0-9, 10-12, and 13-15 years old) experienced the most percentage growth compared to the oldest three age groups (16-17, 18, and 19+ years old), which have experienced a percentage decrease during the period examined ( Figure 2 ). While there continued to be a greater overall number of older children in ORR custody, there was also a noteworthy increase in younger children in ORR custody, particularly in the 10-12 age group ( Figure 2 ) over the period studied. From October 1, 2010, through April 30, 2014, ORR had a total of 8,879 unaccompanied children under the age of 13 in its custody. From FY2011 through the first seven months of FY2014, there was an increase in the number of children in each of the three youngest age brackets (0-9, 10-12, and 13-15) for Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Most notably, in the first seven months of FY2014, the youngest three age brackets for Honduras made up over half of all Honduran unaccompanied children (6,242). Like Honduras and El Salvador, Guatemala had an increase in the three youngest age brackets, however, it also had the greatest number of unaccompanied children in the oldest three age brackets (16-17, 18, and 19+) ( Figure 3 ). Traditionally there have been more male than female unaccompanied children in ORR custody. In 2002, immigration officials testified that the overwhelming majority of unaccompanied alien children were male. The number of unaccompanied females increased from 1,075 in FY2011 to 5,385 in FY2013. The number of unaccompanied girls reached 2,959 in the first seven months of FY2014. Similarly, the percentage of females among unaccompanied children has grown. The share of females was stable at about 22% in FY2011 and FY2012 and increased to about 27% in FY2013 and 33% in the first seven months of FY2014 ( Figure 4 ). As previously shown in Figure 1 , the overwhelming majority of unaccompanied children in ORR custody from FY2011 through the first seven months of FY2014 originated from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The sex distribution from the top countries of origin among children in ORR custody was examined to provide a better understanding of the female population. Examining the male-to-female ratio for each specific top source country reveals that a greater proportion of females in ORR custody originated from El Salvador than from Honduras, while a lower proportion of females originated from Guatemala ( Figure 5 ). Honduras had the most females in ORR custody and was also the country with the greatest number of minors in ORR custody overall. In absolute numbers, most males in ORR custody were ages 16-17 in each of the three fiscal years and in the first seven months of FY2014; however, the number of males age 0-9, 10-12, and 13-15 steadily increased over the past three fiscal years and in the first seven months of FY2014 ( Figure 6 ). Similar patterns occurred for females. In the first seven months of FY2014, the number of females in the 16-17 age bracket increased, whereas the number of males decreased ( Figure 7 ). The median age of unaccompanied children by year, sex, and top country ( Table 3 ) present the age trends a bit more starkly. The median age of females has dropped from 17 years in FY2011—the year that was the median age across all groups of children—to 15 years in the first seven months of FY2014. The median age for females in FY2013 was 13 years. When viewed by country, the median age decreased for all three and fell to 15 years for Honduran children during the first seven months of FY2014.

The number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by parents or legal guardians and who lack proper immigration documents has raised complex and competing sets of humanitarian concerns and immigration control issues. This report focuses on the demographics of unaccompanied alien children while they are in removal proceedings. Overwhelmingly, the children are coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The median age of unaccompanied children has decreased from 17 years in FY2011 to 16 years during the first seven months of FY2014. A greater share of males than females are represented among this population. However, females have steadily increased in total numbers and as a percentage of the flow since FY2011. The median age of females has dropped from 17 years in FY2011—the year that was the median age across all groups of children—to 15 years in the first seven months of FY2014.

Environmental activities of the U.S. Coast Guard fall within the service's program for protection of natural resources, and consist of maritime oil spill prevention, marine debris, and pollution response preparedness. Protection of living marine resources and fisheries also falls in this category, but is not discussed here. Marine environmental protection is one of six "non-homeland security missions" specified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Congressional appropriations for the Coast Guard are not broken down by specific mission (e.g., marine environmental protection), but are allocated to broader categories, such as "operating expenses." The Coast Guard accounts for mission-specific funding by using a "sophisticated activity-based costing model." Table 1 identifies the estimated levels of spending for the marine environmental protection mission in recent years. Protecting the marine environment from accidental oil and chemical spills is a key mission of the Coast Guard. Along with representatives of 15 other federal departments and agencies, the Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) comprise the National Response Team and 13 Regional Response Teams. EPA serves as the chair, and the Coast Guard is the vice-chair of these teams. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) provides the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and hazardous substances on both water and land. Coast Guard responsibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) spill response and (2) spill prevention/preparedness. As the primary response authority in coastal zone waters, the Coast Guard has the ultimate authority to ensure that a spill is effectively removed and that actions are taken to prevent further discharge from the source. During such response operations, a Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator would coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and private parties. Preventing and preparing for spills is also a Coast Guard responsibility, and the Coast Guard's jurisdiction covers vessels; onshore, transportation-related facilities; and deepwater ports. The Coast Guard's prevention/preparedness duties are based on international agreements and federal standards and regulations. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) and the international treaty MARPOL 73/78 require the owners and operators of vessels that carry oil and designated hazardous substances to submit to the Coast Guard "Vessel Response Plans" and/or "Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans." These vessel-specific plans address such matters as spill mitigation procedures, training requirements for the crew, and spill mitigation equipment required to be carried onboard. The Coast Guard must approve the plans for a ship to operate legally in U.S. waters. Under these authorities vessel operators also must submit to regular inspections, and the Coast Guard's inspection program is a key component of their oil spill prevention effort. The Coast Guard represents the United States at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which, through treaties, sets international environmental and safety standards for vessels. Important treaties cover the following topics: accidental and operational oil and chemical pollution; the right of a coastal state to take measures on the high seas to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate danger to its coastline from pollution by oil; a global, cooperative framework for combating major incidents or threats of marine pollution from oil and hazardous and noxious substances; and pollution from the dumping of wastes and other materials. The Coast Guard conducts "certificate of compliance" examinations—both on a random and targeted basis—on foreign vessels that make port calls in the United States. The inspection program emphasizes compliance with environmental and safety standards and, particularly since September 2001, is concerned with port security as well. The inspecting officers verify that the vessels and their crews are in substantial compliance with international conventions and applicable U.S. laws. The pollution prevention examination covers the various waste streams onboard and related record keeping, which vary for different types of ships, and may include the following: Oil pollution prevention systems include the oily water separator and the sludge containment system. The oily water separator is a high-maintenance device, and ships sometimes alter their piping to bypass the system. Further, pumping oily sludge ashore is expensive and ships have been known to take illegal steps to avoid it. The black water system includes marine sanitation devices and other systems to treat, store, and discharge sewage. Hazardous waste includes paints, thinners, and cleaning solutions that contain hazardous substances. The types and volumes of hazardous waste vary depending on the technology and processes used aboard. Non-hazardous waste is shipboard garbage, including food waste, plastics, and other synthetic materials, as well as recyclables like glass, and aluminum and steel cans. The gray water system includes discharges from the galley, sinks, showers, and baths. In recent years, cruise ships, most of which are registered in foreign countries, have gained attention. These very large vessels carry up to 5,000 passengers who generate a large amount of sewage and gray water. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL32450, Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues , by [author name scrubbed].) The domestic inspection system is similar to the port state control program in assuring compliance with applicable laws and treaties. Rules vary according to size and type of vessel (e.g., tanker, passenger, cargo, and mobile offshore drilling units), and the number of passengers carried. In 1996, the Coast Guard initiated its Alternate Compliance Program (ACP), under which "classification societies" can perform inspections that satisfy certain periodic Coast Guard test and inspection requirements. The Coast Guard created the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) in 1991 to carry out many of the requirements of Title I of the OPA. The NPFC manages the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF). The OSLTF is primarily used to finance prompt responses to oil spills and to reimburse parties for applicable costs associated with oil spills (e.g., cleanup costs, natural resource damages, economic losses). Initially, the primary source of revenue for the fund was a 5-cents-per-barrel fee on imported and domestic oil. Collection of this fee ceased on December 31, 1994, because of a "sunset" provision in the law. However, in April 2006, the tax resumed as required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). Moreover, in 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343 ) increased the tax rate to 8 cents per barrel through 2016; in 2017, the rate is scheduled to increase to 9 cents per barrel. The tax terminates at the end of 2017. To ensure that responsible parties can be held accountable for cleanup costs and damages in the event of an oil spill (thereby preserving the oil spill fund), OPA requires that vessels show evidence of financial responsibility, such as insurance. The NPFC carries out this mandate by issuing Certificates of Financial Responsibility (COFRs) to shipping vessel owners when owners demonstrate the ability to pay for oil spill cleanup and damages. In general, vessels over 300 gross tons are required to have a valid COFR to operate in U.S. waters. The NPFC also takes action to recover cleanup costs from responsible parties. It documents ongoing costs and damages from the spill area, and bills the responsible party. About 40% of spills in U.S. waters are "mystery" spills, and the costs go unrecovered. Marine debris (e.g., discarded fishing lines or nets) can endanger birds and marine animals, and cause damage to coral reefs. Even less lethal trash from recreational fishing and boating (such as beverage cans and bottles, food wrappers, and foam plastic pieces) degrades beaches, coral reefs, and the oceans. The Coast Guard's approach to debris is preventive, promoting compliance by boarding and inspecting vessels, and working with local port agencies to ensure there are facilities to receive garbage from vessels. The Coast Guard also coordinates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Marine Fisheries Service, the National Park Service, and the Ocean Conservancy in monitoring and measuring amounts of marine debris. This activity is authorized in the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. 1905 and 1915, as well as MARPOL Annex V. The Coast Guard has a history of scientific study of the oceans dating back to 1881, when it began Arctic cruises along the Alaska coast. Today the Coast Guard's role is that of a facilitator, supporting the scientific efforts of other groups. Moreover, many of the oceanographic and other scientific activities conducted by federal agencies, including the Coast Guard, were consolidated in 1970 with the creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Coast Guard operates three icebreakers in the Arctic and Antarctic, and provides supplies to remote stations. The Coast Guard also participates in the International Ice Patrol, which monitors iceberg danger in the northwest Atlantic, particularly in the area of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The iceberg season is usually from February to July, but the Ice Patrol is logistically flexible and can commence operations when iceberg conditions dictate. Coast Guard operations must comply with applicable environmental laws. Ongoing initiatives include meeting the more stringent emission requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and developing strategies to minimize the generation of hazardous waste. There also are continuing efforts to design pollution prevention into shore facility improvement projects, and to conduct environmental audits at facilities to find and correct potential environmental violations.

The U.S. Coast Guard's environmental activities focus on prevention programs, accompanied by enforcement and educational activities. A key component of the Coast Guard's environmental activities involves maritime oil spill prevention. As required by several environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act, the Coast Guard's pollution preparedness and response activities aim to reduce the impact of oil and hazardous substances spills. Related to this duty, the Coast Guard inspects U.S. and foreign-flagged ships to ensure compliance with U.S. laws and international agreements. In addition, the Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) manages the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is primarily used to finance prompt responses to oil spills and to reimburse parties for applicable costs associated with oil spills (e.g., cleanup costs, natural resource damages, economic losses). The Coast Guard's approach to marine debris (e.g., discarded fishing lines or nets) is preventive, promoting compliance by boarding and inspecting vessels, and working with local port agencies to ensure there are facilities to receive garbage from vessels. With other agencies, the Coast Guard monitors and measures marine debris. The Coast Guard has a history of scientific study dating back to the 1880s, but its current role is that of a facilitator, supporting the scientific efforts of other groups. The Coast Guard operates three icebreakers in the Arctic and Antarctic, and provides supplies to remote stations. Coast Guard operations must comply with applicable environmental laws. Requirements include air emission standards and waste management.

The United States has an abundance of natural resources. For much of the nation's history, energy availability was not a concern as commerce and industry needs could be met by domestic supplies. However, industrialization and population growth, and the continuing development of a consumer-oriented society, led to growing dependence on foreign sources of energy during the 20 th century to supplement the demands of a growing economy. Recognition of the implications of dependence on foreign sources of energy, coupled with concerns over the volatility of prices driven by fluctuations in supply spurred by world events, prompted federal efforts to increase U.S. energy independence and reduce domestic consumption. A major result has been the establishment of a number of programs focused on energy efficiency and conservation of domestic resources and on research programs that target the development of renewable sources of energy. Many of these programs have roots going back almost 40 years and have been redesigned many times over that period. Many of the current programs have been reauthorized and redesigned periodically to meet changing economic conditions and national interests. The programs apply broadly to sectors ranging from industry to academia, and from state and local governments to rural communities. Each program has been designed to meet current needs as well as future anticipated challenges. Since 2005, Congress has enacted several major energy laws: the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005; P.L. 109-58 ); the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140 ); the Energy Improvement and Extension Act (EIEA), enacted as Division B of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343 ); and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ). Each of those laws established, expanded, or modified energy efficiency and renewable energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) operates the greatest number of efficiency and renewable energy incentive programs. The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) operate several programs. A few programs can also be found among the Departments of the Interior (DOI), Labor (DOL), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). This report outlines current federal programs and provisions providing grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other direct or indirect incentives for energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable energy RDD&D. The programs are grouped by administering agency with references to applicable federal agency websites. Incentives are summarized and indexed in the appendixes. Most program descriptions were compiled from authorizing statutes, the U.S. Code, and Administration budget request documents. Other program descriptions and some funding information were compiled from The Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), the Assistance Listings (formerly the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance or CFDA) housed on the beta.SAM.gov website , and the Energy Star website. Most budgetary figures were compiled from executive agency budget justifications and congressional committee reports. For more information on agriculture-related grant programs, please see CRS Report R43416, Energy Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79): Status and Funding , by [author name scrubbed]. For more information on programs supporting the development and deployment of alternatives to conventional fuels and engines in transportation, please also see CRS Report R42566, Alternative Fuel and Advanced Vehicle Technology Incentives: A Summary of Federal Programs , by [author name scrubbed] et al. Please note that tax credits for biofuels and vehicles are covered in detail another CRS Report R42566, Alternative Fuel and Advanced Vehicle Technology Incentives: A Summary of Federal Programs , by [author name scrubbed] et al. Cross-Cutting Appendix A. Summary of Federal Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Incentives/Index of Programs Appendix B. Index of Programs by Applicant Eligibility and Technology Type Appendix C. Expired Federal Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Incentive Programs 1. Assisted Housing Stability and Energy and Green Retrofit Investments Program (Recovery Act Funded) 2. Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs) 3. Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants Program (EECBG) 4. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology Deployment, Demonstration, and Commercialization Grant Program 5. Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program (EEARP) 6. Energy Efficient Appliance Tax Credit for Manufacturers 7. New Era Rural Technology Competitive Grants Program 8. Program of Competitive Grants for Worker Training and Placement in High Growth and Emerging Industry Sectors 9. Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds 10 . Qualifying Advanced Energy Manufacturing Investment Tax Credit 11. Renewable Energy Grants (1603 Program) Appendix D. Appendix D. Summary of Expired Federal Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Incentives/Index of Programs

Energy is crucial to the operation of a modern industrial and services economy. Concerns about the availability and cost of energy and about environmental impacts of fossil energy use have led to the establishment of a wide variety of federal incentives for renewable energy and energy efficiency. These incentives are aimed at the implementation of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures and the development and commercialization of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. Many of the existing energy efficiency and renewable energy programs have authorizations tracing back to the 1970s. Many of the programs have been reauthorized and redesigned repeatedly to meet changing economic factors. The programs apply broadly to sectors ranging from industry to academia, and from state and local governments to rural communities. Since 2005, Congress has enacted several major energy laws: the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005; P.L. 109-58); the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140); the Energy Improvement and Extension Act (EIEA), enacted as Division B of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343); and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). Each of those laws established, expanded, or modified energy efficiency and renewable energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D) programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) operates the greatest number of efficiency and renewable energy incentive programs. The Department of the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) operate several programs. A few programs can also be found among the Departments of the Interior (DOI), Labor (DOL), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA). This report describes federal programs that provide grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other direct or indirect incentives for energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable energy. For each program, the report provides the administering agency, authorizing statute(s), annual funding, and the program expiration date. The appendixes provide summary information in a tabular format and also list recently expired programs.

This report provides summary data on the number of Senators and Members of the House who first entered Congress between the 64 th Congress (1915-1917) and the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). Since the convening of the 64 th Congress, 4,201 individuals have entered the House of Representatives for their first, or "freshman," terms as a Representative. An additional 28 have begun service as a Delegate or Resident Commissioner. During th e same period, 844 individuals began their first terms in the Senate. First-term membership is divided into two broad categories in each chamber: Members chosen prior to the convening of a Congress, and those chosen after a Congress convenes. The "pre-convening" category includes Members who were elected in the general election, and in any special elections held prior to the convening of a Congress. The 64 th Congress was chosen as the starting point for data collection because it was the first Congress for which Senators were chosen by direct popular election. This provides a single date upon which most Members in both chambers are chosen to serve prior to the convening of a Congress. In the Senate, the pre-convening category also includes any Senators who were appointed to the Senate prior to the convening of a new Congress. The "post-convening" category includes Members who joined either chamber after the convening of a Congress. Means by which seats may be filled by a post-convening Member in either chamber include special elections held after a Congress convenes or electoral challenges that result in a new Member being seated. In the Senate, a first-term Member may also join the chamber through appointment or special election. Members whose congressional service in one chamber is not consecutive are counted as first-term Members in the first instance of their service as a Member, if that term occurred between the 64 th and 114 th Congresses. For example, a Representative who served in the 87 th Congress (1961-1962), and 89 th Congress (1965-1966), but not the 88 th Congress (1963-1964), would be counted as a first-term Representative only for the 87 th Congress. Members with service in the House and Senate are listed in each capacity in which they served a first term, if those terms occurred between the 64 th and 114 th Congresses. The resulting data, combining pre-convening and post-convening first-term Members, provide a count of all Members who served a first term in the House or Senate. Data on pre-convening first-term Members provide partial insight into the extent of membership turnover in the House and Senate since 1915, and are discussed in greater detail below. Post-convening first-term Member data do not reveal clear patterns within individual Congresses, or over time. This is due in part to the wide range of reasons that a seat in the House and Senate may become vacant in the course of a Congress, and the circumstances under which it may be filled. Data describing the number and partisan breakdown of first-term membership in the Senate are provided in the " Data Tables " section in Table 6 . Data describing first-term Representatives are available in Table 7 . Table 8 in the same section provides information for Members of the House serving as a Delegate or Resident Commissioner. Data on pre-convening first-term Members provide insight into the extent of membership turnover in the House and Senate. Table 5 in the " Data Tables " section summarizes the number of pre-convening Members entering the House and Senate at the beginning of a new Congress, and as a percentage of the seats in each chamber. These data identify most of the turnover in each chamber, but they may not identify all of the changes in every Congress, since they only reflect the number of Members who served their first term in the chamber. Some Members who had prior service that is not consecutive may have been reelected to the House, or reelected or appointed to the Senate. In those circumstances, the data in Table 5 may understate the extent of change in some Congresses. Since the 64 th Congress, the average turnover in the House with each election has been 72 seats, or 16.57%. The election with the greatest change occurred in 1932, resulting in a turnover of 158 seats, or 36.32% of the Representatives between the 72 nd Congress (1931-1933) and the 73 rd Congress (1933-1934). The smallest pre-convening turnover among Representatives in the House occurred in the 101 st Congress (1989-1990), with a change in 30 seats, or 6.90%. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the percentage change in House membership between the 64 th Congress and the 114 th Congress. The data suggest that while there is no consistent pattern of change from Congress to Congress, the overall number of new, pre-convening, first-term Representatives has declined. This appears to be consistent with some academic findings that argue that the durations of Members' careers have been increasing in the past century. Table 1 provides data for the House on the number of seats and percentage change of the five Congresses that saw the greatest change in pre-convening Representatives between the 64 th and 114 th Congresses. With one exception, the 103 rd Congress (1993-1994), these changes occurred in Congresses convening prior to the 74 th Congress (1935-1936). Table 2 provides data on the number of seats and percentage change of the six Congresses that saw the least change between the 64 th and 114 th Congresses. The smallest pre-convening turnover among Representatives in the House occurred in the 101 st Congress (1989-1990), with a change in 30 seats, or 6.90%. All of the smallest changes occurred after the 89 th Congress (1965-1966). The distribution of greater changes occurring earlier in the period between the 64 th -114 th Congresses, and smaller changes happening in the later period may also support contentions regarding the duration of Representatives' careers. Data describing the number and partisan distribution of first-term Representatives are provided in Table 7 . Table 8 provides similar information for Members of the House serving as a Delegate or Resident Commissioner. As shown in Table 5 , in the " Data Tables " section, since the 64 th Congress, the average number of pre-convening first-term Senators each Congress has been 10. Table 6 shows that the 79 th Congress (1945-1946) produced the greatest change in membership with 33 new Senators, 34.38%, taking seats in the chamber in the course of the Congress. Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the percentage change in first-term Senate membership between the 64 th Congress and the 114 th Congress. The data suggest that while there is no consistent pattern of change from Congress to Congress, the overall number of pre-convening, first-term Senators has declined since the 64 th Congress. Changes in Member career patterns in the Senate may explain some of the change. Table 3 provides data on the number of Senate seats and percentage change of the five Congresses that saw greatest change between the 64 th and 114 th Congresses. All of those Congresses occurred before the 87 th Congress (1961-1962). The smallest turnover of pre-convening Senators occurred in the 102 nd Congress (1991-1992), with a change of three seats. In the 73 rd Congress (1932-1933), a 15-seat change amounted to a percentage change of 15.63%, since the Senate had 96 seats. Table 4 provides data on the number of seats and percentage change of the seven Congresses that saw the least change between the 64 th and 114 th Congresses. Smaller changes appear to be more evenly distributed through the latter half of the Congresses observed. This may be explained in part by electoral patterns. While the entire House stands for election every two years, only one-third of the seats in the Senate are subject to election in the same period; barring change in membership for other reasons, this assures that two-thirds of Senate membership will remain unchanged. Data describing the first-term membership of the Senate are provided in Table 6 .

This report provides summary data on the number of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who first entered Congress between the 64th Congress (1915-1917) and the 114th Congress (2015-2016). First-term membership is divided into two broad categories in each chamber: Members chosen prior to the convening of a Congress, and those chosen after a Congress convenes. The resulting data, combining pre-convening and post-convening first-term Members, provide a count of all Members who served a first term in the House or Senate. Since the convening of the 64th Congress, 4,201 individuals have entered the House of Representatives for their first, or "freshman," terms as Representatives. An additional 28 have begun service as Delegates or Resident Commissioners. During the same period, 844 individuals began their first terms in the Senate. Data on pre-convening first-term Members provide partial insight into the extent of membership turnover in the House and Senate since 1915. In both chambers, the data suggest that the overall number of first-term Members elected to Congress who take their seats at the convening of a new Congress has declined since the 64th Congress. This appears to be consistent with findings that argue that the duration of Members' careers has been increasing in the past century. Taken on their own, post-convening first-term Member data do not reveal clear patterns within individual Congresses, or over time. This is due in part to the wide range of reasons that a seat in the House and Senate may become vacant in the course of a Congress, and the circumstances under which it may be filled.

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, is a means-tested income assistance program financed from general tax revenues. Under SSI, disabled, blind, or aged individuals who have low incomes and limited resources are eligible for benefits regardless of their work histories. In December 2013, more than 8.3 million people received SSI benefits. In that month, these beneficiaries received an average cash benefit of $529.15 and the program paid out over $4.6 billion in federally administered SSI benefits. All but four states and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands supplement the federal SSI benefit with additional payments, which may be made directly by the state or combined with the federal payment. For SSI recipients who live in another person's household and receive in-kind support and maintenance, the federal benefit rate is reduced by one-third (to about $481 per month for an individual in 2014). Individuals who reside in public institutions throughout any given month are generally not eligible for SSI. A cost of living adjustment (COLA) is applied annually in January using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) to reflect changes in the cost of living. After a 1.7% COLA adjustment in 2013, a 1.5% COLA was applied for 2014. Most SSI recipients are also eligible for Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. In some cases, the income and resources of non-recipients are counted in determining SSI eligibility and payment amounts. Individuals and couples must have limited assets or resources to qualify for SSI benefits. Resources are defined by regulation as "cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and could convert to cash to be used for his or her support and maintenance." The countable resource limit for SSI eligibility is $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples. These limits are set by law, are not indexed for inflation, and have been at their current levels since 1989. Two types of income are considered for purposes of determining SSI eligibility and payment amounts: earned and unearned income. Earned income includes wages, net earnings from self-employment, and earnings from services performed. Most other income not derived from current work (e.g., Social Security benefits, other government and private pensions, veterans' benefits, workers' compensation, and in-kind support and maintenance) is considered "unearned." In-kind support and maintenance includes food, clothing, or shelter that is given to an individual. If an individual (or couple) meets all other SSI eligibility requirements (including the resource test described below), their monthly SSI payment equals the federal benefit rate minus their countable income. Generally, assets held in a trust that could be used for the benefit of an individual are considered a resource for SSI purposes unless there is no circumstance under which a payment from the trust could ever be made for the benefit of the individual or the individual's spouse. The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-169 ) changed the status of irrevocable trusts for SSI benefit calculations. Before its passage, assets placed in irrevocable trusts were not considered assets when determining benefit eligibility. P.L. 106-169 changed SSI eligibility requirements so that the value of income and resources from both irrevocable and revocable trusts are considered in determining eligibility and payment amounts. However, the Commissioner of Social Security may waive this provision if it would cause undue hardship for certain individuals. When applying for SSI, an individual must provide documentation that the Social Security Administration uses to determine income and resource eligibility, such as a Social Security card or record of a Social Security number; a birth certificate or other proof of age; a copy of a mortgage or lease and landlord's name; payroll slips, bank records, insurance policies, car registration, and other income information; medical information if applying for disability; and proof of immigration status (if not a U.S. citizen). Not all resources are counted for the purposes of determining SSI eligibility. Excluded resources include an individual's home, a car used for essential transportation (or, if not essential, up to $4,500 of its current value), property essential to income-producing activity, household goods and personal effects totaling $2,000 or less, and life insurance policies with a combined face value of $1,500 or less. A certain amount of monthly earned and unearned income is excluded from SSI eligibility and benefit determinations. Monthly unearned income exclusions include a general income exclusion of $20 per month that applies to non needs-based income. Monthly earned income exclusions include any unused portion of the $20 general income exclusion, the first $65 of earnings, one-half of earnings over $65, and impairment-related expenses for blind and disabled workers. Laws governing several federal benefit programs prohibit the SSA from counting benefits paid under these programs as resources and include food stamps, housing and energy assistance, state and local needs-based assistance, in-kind support and maintenance from nonprofit organizations, and student grants and scholarships used for educational expenses. In addition, the Social Security Act and federal regulations provide various types of resource exclusions that allow individuals or couples to own certain assets and not have them counted against their $2,000 or $3,000 resource limit. The following section of this report will detail the four types of accounts that a person or couple may deposit money and not have that money counted as a resource for the purposes of determining their SSI eligibility. Money set aside by an SSI recipient to pay for his or her burial expenses can be excluded from the SSI resource limits. Each person may set aside up to $1,500 for burial expenses, and these expenses must be separately identifiable from other assets and money held. A burial plot owned by an individual or a couple is not considered a resource and its value is not counted against the $2,000 or $3,000 resource limit. There are two cases in which the amount of the burial expense exclusion may be reduced. First, the total amount permitted to be excluded is reduced by the face value of all life insurance policies held by the individual or his or her spouse. The face value of a policy is the amount the insurer agrees to pay the beneficiary upon the death of the insured. Second, the excluded amount of burial expenses is reduced by the total amount of money held in an irrevocable trust (commonly called an irrevocable burial trust) available to meet the burial expenses of the individual or his or her spouse. A Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS) is an individual plan for employment designed by an SSI beneficiary. An SSI beneficiary designs his or her own PASS, usually with the assistance of a state Vocational Rehabilitation agency, disability service organization, or Ticket to Work Employment Network. The plan must be submitted in writing to the SSA and must be approved by a special network of SSA employees called the PASS Cadre. A PASS must include a specific goal for employment, such as a specific job type desired or a plan for setting up a small business. In addition, a PASS must include a timeline for achieving the employment goal. The PASS must also include a list of any goods, such as assistive devices or job-specific tools, or services, such as schooling, that will be needed by the beneficiary to achieve his or her goal and must include a timeline for the use of these goods or services and their cost. Resources included in an approved PASS are not counted against the SSI resource limits. There is no limit to the amount of resources that can be excluded as part of a PASS and these resources can include money set aside to pay for elements of the PASS such as training or items purchased as part of the PASS such as assistive technology devices. If a beneficiary does not fulfill the terms of the PASS, then these resources can be counted and he or she may lose SSI eligibility and be required to reimburse the SSA for benefits paid after eligibility was lost. Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are matched savings accounts that allow families and persons with low incomes to set aside money for education, the purchase of a home, or the creation of a business. An individual may place money from his or her earnings into an IDA and have that amount of money matched by the state with funds from the state's Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. In addition, under the provisions of the Assets for Independence Act, P.L. 105-285 , nonprofit organizations, and state, local, or tribal governments may compete for grants to fund IDAs for low-income households. IDAs funded through this grant process are often referred to as Demonstration Project IDAs. Money saved in a TANF IDA or a Demonstration Project IDA, including the state contribution and any interest earned, is not counted as a resource for the purposes of determining SSI eligibility. There is no limit to the amount of money in an IDA that can be excluded from the SSI resource calculation. However, there are limits to the amounts states and other entities can contribute to IDAs. When a child SSI beneficiary is owed back SSI benefits of more than six months, his or her representative payee is required to place those benefits in a dedicated account at a financial institution. This dedicated account must be in the child's name and cannot be invested in stocks, bonds, or other types of securities. Any money placed in the account and any interest earned on the account is the property of the child. The representative payee may use the money from the dedicated account for the medical care or education and training needs of the child. In addition, money from this account can be used for personal needs assistance, special equipment, housing modifications, or therapy for the child based on his or her disability or for other items and services for the child approved in advance by the SSA. Money from a dedicated account cannot be used for the daily expenses, food, clothing, or shelter of the child. The representative payee is responsible for keeping records and receipts of all deposits and expenditures and is liable to the SSA for any misuse of money in a dedicated account. Money in a dedicated account for children is not counted as a resource for the purposes of determining the child's SSI eligibility or the SSI eligibility of the representative payee.

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, is a means-tested income assistance program financed from general tax revenues. Under SSI, disabled, blind, or aged individuals who have low incomes and limited resources are eligible for benefits regardless of their work histories. In December 2013, more than 8.3 million individuals received SSI benefits, receiving monthly payments of $529.15 on average. The SSI program paid out over $4.6 billion in federally administered benefits that month. All but four states and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands supplement the federal SSI benefit with additional payments, which may be made directly by the state or combined with the federal payment. As a means tested program, SSI places a limit on the assets or resources of its beneficiaries. However, there are four types of accounts that represent an important part of the overall SSI program and can be used by SSI beneficiaries to build assets or plan for the future, including (1) money placed into burial accounts, (2) money used as part of a Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS), (3) money placed in Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), and (4) money placed in dedicated accounts for children. For the purposes of determining SSI eligibility these accounts are not counted as resources and can be used by beneficiaries without affecting their eligibility. This report provides an overview of income and resource limits for SSI benefit determinations as well as the four types of accounts exempt from the SSI resource limitations.

Small businesses have always been of interest to Congress when discussing tax policies to promote economic growth and job creation. Within these discussions it is common to equate, or at least associate, "small" businesses with pass-through businesses (e.g., sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies, S corporations). An obvious question is then, are all small businesses also pass-throughs? Relatedly, are all large businesses also C corporations? Answering these questions may help to better target particular tax, and nontax, policies. This report uses 2015 U.S. Census data to investigate how the size of businesses varies by legal form (corporate and pass-through), as well as the distribution of employment across firm types. Firm size is measured by using employment. The majority of both corporations and pass-throughs in 2011 had fewer than five employees (55% of C corporations and 64% of pass-throughs). Nearly 99% of both corporations and pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees, the most common employment-based threshold used by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Thus, it appears that based on an employment-based measure of size most businesses were small, with the exact share depending on the definition chosen. Looking further into the data reveals that while the majority of firms were small, the largest firms accounted for the majority of employment. For example, about 53% of all employees worked at firms with 500 or more employees. This statistic is being driven mostly, but not wholly, by corporate employment. Roughly 76% of corporate employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees. In contrast, 25% of pass-through employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees. Thus, a nontrivial share of pass-through workers were employed at the largest firms, but not to the same degree as in the corporate sector. This report may prove useful to Congress when considering tax and nontax policies directed at businesses based on size. This report does not analyze questions related to the economics of providing preferential tax treatment for small businesses, or the extent to which small businesses are responsible for job creation in the economy. Before discussing the data in greater detail it may be helpful to briefly review the tax treatment of business income. In the United States, how a business is taxed at the federal level is partly dependent on how it is organized. The income of C corporations, often referred to as simply corporations, is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level according to the individual tax system when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are realized. This leads to the so-called double taxation of corporate profits. The income of pass-through businesses is, in general, taxed only once at individual income tax rates. That is, the income of certain businesses passes through to the individual business owners and is taxed according to individual income tax rates. The most popular forms of these alternative pass-through forms of organization are sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and subchapter S corporations. While this report relies on data from tax year 2015, it is important to note that the 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ) made significant changes to the federal tax system that affected corporations and pass-throughs. A detailed discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this report; however, it is worth highlighting two changes starting in 2018. First, the revision permanently reduced the top corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. Second, the revision provided pass-throughs, depending on their size and line of business, with a special deduction equal to up to 23% of their income. The deduction reduces the amount of income subject to tax at the individual income tax rates, thus reducing the effective tax rate on qualifying pass-throughs. This change is scheduled to expire after 2025. Comparing the size of pass-throughs and corporations is complicated by the fact that there are several different ways to measure firm size. Size could be measured by employment, profits, assets, or a variety of other statistics. Additionally, two different industries may require different measures of size. For example, one industry may be more capital intensive (i.e., more machines and equipment per worker) than another, leading firms in that industry to naturally have more capital assets, whereas firms in another industry may generally have fewer capital assets while employing a large number of workers. Still, given the association of small businesses with pass-throughs, and small businesses with job creation, particularly startups, the presentation below relies on an employment-based measure of firm size. Settling on an employment-based metric to measure size still leaves another unresolved issue: what is the employment threshold between small businesses and large businesses? A business with only a handful of employees would constitute being a small business in nearly all cases. But what if a business has 50, 100, 200, or even 500 employees? Currently, there is no consensus on a single criterion that determines the threshold between large and small businesses. For most industries the Small Business Administration (SBA) considers a business small if it has 500 or fewer employees, although this threshold can reach 1,500 employees in some cases. This report does not attempt to resolve the debate over what exactly constitutes a small business. The data presented below are from the Census Bureau's 2015 Statistics of U.S. Businesses, the most recent Census data by legal form. The Census provides data separately for businesses with no employees (their nonemployer data) and businesses with at least one employee (their employer data) at some point in the year. This report uses employer data only, mainly because nonemployers generate less than 4% of all business sales and receipts according to Census, and because Census excludes nonemployers from the majority of its own statistics. It could also be argued that many nonemployers likely represent individuals involved in side work or short-term contract work, which can be viewed as distinct from the more traditional businesses captured in the employer data. In 2015, 124.1 million people were employed by employer firms. C corporations accounted for approximately 54.9 million employees (44.2%), S corporations accounted for 32.6 million employees (26.2%), partnerships accounted for 14.3 million employees (11.6%), sole proprietors accounted for 4.7 million employees (3.8%), nonprofits accounted for 15.7 million employees (12.6%), governments accounted for 1.3 million employees (1.0%), and 0.5 million employees were categorized as being employed at "other" entities (0.4%). Corporations and pass-throughs account for a combined 96.5 million workers, with 55% employed at corporations and 45% employed at pass-throughs. In 2015, there were 5.5 million corporations and pass-throughs with at least one employee at some point during the year. There were 2.9 million S corporations, 1.0 million C corporations, 0.9 million sole proprietorships, and 0.7 million partnerships. As a percentage of the total, C corporations accounted for 18.1% of firms while pass-throughs accounted for 81.9%, with 52.9% of all firms being S corporations, 16.3% being sole proprietorships, and 12.7% being partnerships. Figure 1 displays the distribution of corporations and pass-throughs by firm size. The employment categories used to create the distributions are the same as those used by the Census to present the data. Figure 1 shows a key fact about the size of corporations and pass-throughs: the majority of both (55% of corporations and 64% of pass-throughs) had fewer than five employees in 2015. Naturally, as the definition of small is expanded to include more employees, the share of businesses that fall into this classification increases. For example, 73% of corporations and 81% of pass-throughs had fewer than 10 employees; 85% of corporations and 91% of pass-throughs had fewer than 20 employees; 97% of corporations and 99% of pass-throughs had fewer than 100 employees; and 99% of corporations and 99.7% of pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees—the most common employee-based threshold used by the SBA for small business determination. The general pattern displayed in Figure 1 holds across the various pass-through types. Figure 2 displays the distribution of sole proprietors, partnerships, and S corporations by firm size. The greatest concentration of pass-throughs is found in the 0 to 4 employees category, with the number of firms dropping off rather quickly as firm size increases. This relationship is the most pronounced with sole proprietorships, which had the greatest proportion of small firms; almost 78% of sole proprietorships had 0 to 4 employees, with the remaining proportion of firms decreasing more rapidly than partnerships and S corporations. Interestingly, comparing corporations ( Figure 1 ) and partnerships ( Figure 2 ) reveals they have nearly the same size distributions. An alternative way to analyze the data is to examine the distribution of employment by firm size. This approach reveals that while the majority of firms had fewer than 500 employees in 2015 (see Figure 2 ), the largest firms account for the majority of employment. Figure 3 shows that just over 53% of employees worked at firms with 500 or more employees. Firms with fewer employees employ a smaller share of the overall workforce. About 14% of employees worked at firms with 100 to 499 employees; 17% worked at firms with 20 to 99 employees; 7% worked at firms with 10 to 19 employees; 5% worked at firms with 5 to 9 employees; and 5% worked at firms with fewer than 5 employees. The picture changes somewhat when employee distributions are plotted separately for the corporations and pass-throughs as in Figure 4 . Two features of the data are immediately apparent. First, employment in the corporate sector was heavily skewed toward the largest firms. Roughly 76% of corporate employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees in 2015. No other size category accounts for more than 10% of corporate employment. Second, employment in the pass-through sector was more evenly distributed across the employee size categories. For example, about 25% of employees at pass-throughs worked at firms with more than 500 employees, which is less than the portion who worked at firms with 20-99 employees (27%), but more than double the share who worked at firms with either 0-4 employees, or 5-9 employees (with 9% each). Thus, nearly a quarter of pass-through workers were employed at the largest firms, while in the corporate sector the share was nearly 76%. Observing the average number of employees at large firms (more than 500 employees) offers insight into how large the largest firms were in 2015. Among firms with more than 500 employees the average number of employees differs quite significantly between corporations and pass-throughs (see Figure 5 ). The average number of employees at the largest C corporations (500 or more employees) was slightly above 4,100, while the average number of employees for pass-throughs was just over 1,100. Among large pass-throughs, partnerships tended to have the most employees on average with 1,203, S-corporations fall in the middle with 1,102 employees on average, and sole proprietorships have the fewest with 1,086 employees on average. The analysis presented here sheds light on the distribution of small and large businesses, the distribution of employment across businesses of various sizes, and differences in the employment patterns and sizes of corporations and pass-throughs. Understanding these data may help policymakers when considering tax policy. For example, particular attention is often given to the effect tax policy may have on pass-throughs under the assumption that pass-throughs and small business are synonymous. But the analysis presented here shows this is not the case. Additionally, 99% (968,134) of C corporations have less than 500 employees, which is the most common employment-based threshold used by the SBA. Not considering the ramifications of particular policies on small C corporations could result in a large share of small businesses being overlooked. Additionally, when formulating policy it may be useful to keep in mind the distribution of employment across firm size. While the vast majority of corporate and pass-through businesses are small in terms of number of employees, the 0.4% (21,561) of firms with more than 500 employees account for over 50% of all employees.

In tax policy discussions it is not uncommon for the terms pass-through and small business to be interchanged, or, similarly, for the terms corporation and large business to be interchanged. This report uses 2015 U.S. Census data to investigate how the size of businesses varies by legal form (corporate versus pass-through). For this report, firm size is based on employment. The analysis finds that the majority of both corporations and pass-throughs in 2015 had fewer than five employees (55% of C corporations and 64% of pass-throughs). Nearly 99% of both corporations and pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees, the most common employment-based threshold used by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Thus, when using an employment-based measure of size, the majority of all businesses can be considered small, with the exact share depending on the chosen definition of small. Analysis of the data also reveals that while the majority of firms were small, the largest firms accounted for the majority of employment. About 53% of all employees worked at firms (corporate and pass-through) with 500 or more employees in 2015. Looking at this statistic separately for corporations and pass-throughs, 76% of corporate employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees, while 25% of pass-through employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees. Thus, while a greater proportion of workers in the corporate sector were employed by the largest firms, the proportion of pass-through employees employed at the largest firms was not small. The average number of employees at large firms (more than 500 employees) was computed to gain insight into how large the largest firms were in 2015. There was a substantial difference in the average number of employees at large firms that were corporations as opposed to pass-throughs. The average number of employees at the largest C corporations (500 or more employees) was 4,143, while the average number of employees for pass-throughs was 1,141. Among large pass-throughs, partnerships tended to have the most employees on average with 1,203, S-corporations fall in the middle with 1,102 employees on average, and sole proprietorships have the fewest with 1,086 employees on average. Understanding the data presented in this report may help policymakers when considering tax and nontax policies. Specifically, it may help to better target policies that are geared toward affecting businesses of a particular size.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has not released a composite estimate of Iraqi civilian deaths during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, in the report Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq , it has released a chart containing two separate estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths from January 2006 to August 2008. The first estimate is derived from a compilation of coalition and Iraqi reports of civilian deaths while the second estimate is derived from the Iraq Significant Activities (SIGACTS) III database, which includes coalition reports only. The DOD noted in the December 2007 update of Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq that "host nation reports capture some types of deaths on which the Coalition does not have visibility, in particular, murders and deaths in locations where Coalition forces are not present." While the chart provides a guideline to Iraqi civilian deaths trends, the specific data used to create the chart have not been released. Using the DOD chart as a guideline, therefore, CRS has reproduced an approximation of the original chart in the figure below. For some time, the United Nations has attempted to release comprehensive statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths. From August 2005 to March 2007, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) published a series of quarterly reports on human rights in Iraq that included sections on Iraqi civilian casualties. On April 25, 2007, however, the Iraqi government announced its intention to cease providing civilian casualty figures to the United Nations. Ivana Vuco, a UN human rights officer, stated, "[Iraqi] government officials had made clear during discussions that they believed releasing high casualty numbers would make it more difficult to quell unrest." The UNAMI report on human rights released on October 11, 2007 and concerning the period between April - June 2007 expressed regret that "for this reporting period, [UNAMI] was again unable to persuade the Government of Iraq to release data on casualties compiled by the Ministry of Health and its other institutions. UNAMI continues to maintain that making such data public is in the public interest." UNAMI did not publish another human rights report until December 2, 2008, when it issued a report covering the human rights situation in Iraq from January 1, 2008 – June 30, 2008. This latest report provides a list of instances of bombings in which civilians were killed, but does not give a comprehensive estimate of civilian deaths. The report's first recommendation to the government of Iraq is to "Issue on a regular basis mortality data compiled by the Ministry of Health, based on information received from all governorates and statistics kept at the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad, together with details of the methodology used to calculate the figures." In a November 2008 statement in front of the United Nations Security Council, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad announced that the security situation in Iraq had "significantly improved since June 2007." According to the Ambassador, the number of overall attacks since June 2007 had decreased by 86% and Iraqi civilian deaths due to violence had decreased by 84% in the same time period. The non-profit Iraq Body Count also reported a decrease in civilian deaths in 2008; according to their database, 8,315-9,028, or approximately 25 people a day, Iraqi civilians died due to violence in 2008. By comparison, 22,671-24,295 (or approximately 67 a day) civilian deaths were added to their database in 2007, and 25,774-27,599 civilian deaths (or approximately 76 a day) were added in 2006. However, the reported decrease has not been entirely consistent on a month-to-month basis. The New York Times reports that the Iraqi Health Ministry counted a total of 148 civilian deaths for November 2008, compared with 118 deaths in October and 156 in September. Table 1 , below, provides Iraqi civilian dead and wounded estimates from non-governmental sources. These estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, and therefore readers should exercise caution when using these statistics. Three cluster studies of violence-related mortality in Iraq have recently been undertaken. The first two studies were both conducted by researchers from Johns Hopkins University and Baghdad's Al-Mustansiriya University and are commonly referred to in the press as "the Lancet studies" because they were published in the British medical journal of that name. The third study was conducted by a consortium of researchers, many of whom are associated with the World Health Organization, and so the study is commonly referred to as "the WHO study" in the press. The first of these studies, published in 2004, used a cluster sample survey of households in Iraq to develop an estimate ranging from 8,000 to 194,000 civilian casualties due to violent deaths since the start of the war. This report has come under some criticism for its methodology, which may not have accounted for the long-term negative health effects of the Saddam Hussein era. Former British Foreign Minister Jack Straw has written a formal Ministerial Response rejecting the findings of the first Lancet report on the grounds that the data analyzed were inaccurate. The second study, published in 2006, increased the number of clusters surveyed from 33 to 47 and reported an estimate of between 426,369 and 793,663 Iraqi civilian deaths from violent causes since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This article, too, has sparked some controversy. Stephen Moore, a consultant for Gorton Moore International, objected to the methods used by the researchers, commenting in the Wall Street Journal that the Lancet article lacked some of the hallmarks of good research: a small margin of error, a record of the demographics of respondents (so that one can be sure one has captured a fair representation of an entire population), and a large number of cluster points. On the other hand, documents written by the UK Ministry of Defence's chief scientific advisor have come to light, which called the survey's methods "close to best practice" and "robust." In the third and most recent study, a team of investigators from the Federal Ministry of Health in Baghdad, the Kurdistan Ministry of Planning, the Kurdistan Ministry of Health, the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology in Baghdad, and the World Health Organization formed the Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS) Study Group to research violence-related mortality in Iraq. In their nationally representative cluster study, interviewers visited 89.4% of 1,086 household clusters; the household response rate was 96.2%. They concluded that there had been an estimated 151,000 violence-related deaths from March 2003 through June 2006 and that violence was the main cause of death for men between the ages of 15 and 59 years during the first three years after the 2003 invasion. This study seems to be widely cited for violence-related mortality rates in Iraq. Neither the Lancet studies nor the IFHS study make an effort to distinguish different victims of violence, such as civilians versus police or security force members. The Associated Press has kept a database of Iraqi civilian and security forces dead and wounded since April 2005. According to its database, between April 2005 and January 5, 2009, 44,971 Iraqi civilians have died and 51,540 have been wounded. A number of nonprofit groups have released unofficial estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths. The Iraq Body Count (IBC) is one source often cited by the media; it bases its online casualty estimates on media reports of casualties, some of which may involve security forces as well as civilians. As of January 7, 2009, the IBC estimated that between 90,253 and 98,521 civilians had died as a result of military action. The IBC documents each of the casualties it records with a media source and provides a minimum and a maximum estimate. The Brookings Institution has used modified numbers from the UN Human Rights Report , the Iraq Body Count, General Petraeus's congressional testimony given on September 10-11, 2007, and other sources to develop its own composite estimate for Iraqi civilians who have died by violence. By combining all of these sources by date, the Brookings Institution estimates that between May 2003 and January 5, 2009, 108,707 Iraqi civilians have died. Finally, the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (ICCC) is another well-known nonprofit group that tracks Iraqi civilian and Iraqi security forces deaths using an IBC-like method of posting media reports of deaths. ICCC, like IBC, is prone to the kind of errors likely when using media reports for data: some deaths may not be reported in the media, while other deaths may be reported more than once. The ICCC does have one rare feature: it separates police and soldier deaths from civilian deaths. The ICCC estimates that there were 44,276 civilian deaths from April 28, 2005 through January 7, 2009.

This report presents various governmental and non-governmental estimates of Iraqi civilian deaths. The Department of Defense (DOD) regularly updates total U.S. military deaths statistics from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as reflected in CRS Report RS21578, Iraq: U.S. Casualties, by [author name scrubbed]. However, no Iraqi or U.S. government office regularly releases publically available statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths. Statistics on Iraqi civilian deaths are sometimes available through alternative sources, such as nonprofit organizations, or through statements made by officials to the press. Because these estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, readers should exercise caution when using these statistics and should look on them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact. See also CRS Report RS22532, Iraqi Police and Security Forces Casualties Estimates, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as needed.

In order to "improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets," Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on August 21, 1996, P.L. 104-191 , 110 Stat. 1936, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d et seq. Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA is entitled "Administrative Simplification," and states that the purpose of the subtitle is to improve health care by "encouraging the development of a health information system through the establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health information." Sections 261 through 264 of HIPAA contain the administrative simplification provisions. HIPAA requires health care payers and providers who transmit transactions electronically to use standardized data elements to conduct financial and administrative transactions. Section 262 directs HHS to issue standards to facilitate the electronic exchange of information. Section 263 of HIPAA delineates the duties of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics. Section 264 of HIPAA requires HHS to submit to the Congress detailed recommendations on standards with respect to privacy rights for individually identifiable health information. In the absence of the enactment of federal legislation, HIPAA required HHS to issue privacy regulations. The final Privacy Rule was issued by HHS and published in the Federal Register on December 28, 2000 at 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, shortly before the Clinton Administration left office. The Privacy Rule went into effect on April 14, 2001. On August 14, 2002, HHS published in the Federal Register a modified Privacy Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 53181. Enforcement of the Privacy Rule began on April 14, 2003, except for small health plans (those with annual receipts of $5 million or less) who have until April 2004 to comply. The HIPAA Privacy Rule covers health plans, health care clearinghouses, and those health care providers who conduct certain financial and administrative transactions electronically. Covered entities are bound by the new privacy standards even if they contract with others (called "business associates") to perform essential functions. HIPAA does not give HHS authority to regulate other private businesses or public agencies. Covered entities that fail to comply with the rule are subject to civil and criminal penalties, but individuals do not have the right to sue for violations of the rule. Instead, the law provides that individuals must direct their complaints to HHS' Office for Civil Rights (OCR). OCR maintains a Web site with information on the new regulation, including guidance at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ . HHS also recently issued a 20 page "Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule." HHS will enforce the civil money penalties, and the Department of Justice will enforce the criminal penalties. Criminal penalties may be imposed if the offense is committed under false pretenses, with intent to sell the information or reap other personal gain. HIPAA authorizes the HHS Secretary to impose civil money penalties of up to $25,000 for each year for those entities failing to comply with the privacy rule. Several statutory limitations are imposed on the Secretary's authority to impose civil money penalties (CMP). A penalty may not be imposed: with respect to an act that constitutes an offense punishable under the criminal penalty provision; "if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the person liable for the penalty did not know, and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have known, that such person violated the provisions;" if "the failure to comply was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect" and is corrected within a certain time period. A CMP may be reduced or waived "to the extent that the payment of such penalty would be excessive relative to the compliance failure involved." In addition, a number of procedural requirements are incorporated by reference in HIPAA that are relevant to the imposition of CMP's. The Secretary may not initiate a CMP action "later than six months after the date" of the occurrence that forms the basis for the CMP action. The Secretary may initiate a CMP by serving notice in a manner authorized by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Secretary must give written notice to the person to whom he wishes to impose a CMP and an opportunity for a determination to made "on the record after a hearing at which the person is entitled to be represented by counsel, to present witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses against the person." Judicial review of the Secretary's determination and the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas is available in the United States Court of Appeals. With respect to ascertaining compliance with and enforcement of the Privacy Rule, the Secretary of HHS is to seek the voluntary cooperation of covered entities. The Secretary is authorized to provide technical assistance to covered entities in order to facilitate their voluntary compliance. Enforcement and other activities to facilitate compliance include the provision of technical assistance; responding to questions; providing interpretations and guidance; responding to state requests for preemption determinations; investigating complaints and conducting compliance reviews; and seeking civil monetary penalties and making referrals for criminal prosecution. An individual may file a compliant with the Secretary if the individual believes that the covered entity is not complying with the rule. Complaints must be filed in writing, either on paper or electronically; name the entity that is the subject of the complaint and describe the acts or omissions believed to be in violation of the applicable requirements of the Privacy Rule; and be filed within 180 days of when the complainant knew or should have known that the act or omission complained of occurred, unless the time limit is waived by the Secretary for good cause shown. Complaints to the Secretary may be filed only with respect to alleged violations occurring on or after April 14, 2003. The Secretary has delegated to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) the authority to receive and investigate complaints as they may relate to the Privacy Rule. Individuals may file written complaints with OCR by mail, fax or e-mail. For information about the Privacy Rule or the process for filing a complaint with OCR, they may contact any OCR office or go to http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/howtofileprivacy.htm . After April 14, 2003, individuals have a right to file a complaint directly with the covered entity, and are directed to refer to the covered entity's notice of privacy practices for information about how to file a complaint. The Secretary's investigation may include a review of the policies, procedures, or practices of the covered entity, and of the circumstances regarding the alleged acts or omissions. The Secretary is also authorized to conduct compliance reviews. Covered entities are required to provide records and compliance reports to the Secretary to determine compliance; and to cooperate with complaint investigations and compliance reviews. In cases where an investigation or compliance review has indicated noncompliance, the Secretary is to inform the covered entity and the complainant in writing, and attempt to resolve the matter informally. If the Secretary determines that the matter cannot be resolved informally, the Secretary may issue written findings documenting the noncompliance. In cases where no violation is found, the Secretary is to inform the covered entity and the complainant in writing. On April 17, 2003 HHS published an interim final "Enforcement Rule" that applies to standards, including the Privacy Rule, adopted under the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA, 68 Fed. Reg. 18895. The interim final rule establishes procedures for investigations, imposition of penalties, and hearings for civil money penalties; and is effective May 19, 2003 thru September 16, 2003. It is to be revised when HHS issues a complete Enforcement rule that will include procedural and substantive requirements for the imposition of civil money penalties, such as HHS' policies for determining violations and calculating CMP's. Although HHS recognized that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that most of the provisions of the complete Enforcement Rule be promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, it concluded that the interim final rule's procedural provisions are exempted from the requirement for notice and comment rulemaking under the "rules of agency . . . procedure, or practice" exemption of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). As a result, HHS published the procedural rules in final form without notice-and-comment to inform covered entities and the public of the procedural requirements for compliance. In addition, HHS requests public comment thru June 16, 2003 on the interim final rule. The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) serves as the statutory public advisory body to the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the area of health data and statistics. As part of its responsibilities under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) monitors the implementation of the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA, including the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (Privacy Rule). Last fall, the NCVHS held three hearings to learn about the implementation activities of covered entities. In its November 2002 letter to Secretary Thompson summarizing its findings the Committee stated that "there is an extremely high level of confusion, misunderstanding, frustration, anxiety, fear, and anger as the April 14, 2003 compliance date nears." Reportedly the Privacy Rule has "touched off a quiet revolution in the health care industry." According to NCVHS, the OCR is widely viewed as not providing adequate guidance and technical assistance as evidenced by the lack of model notices of privacy practices, acknowledgments, authorizations, and other forms. The general guidance was judged to be of limited value because of special industry or professional circumstances, and NCVHS reported that witnesses conveyed a great sense of frustration that they could not obtain clarification from OCR or answers to the questions they submitted. Covered entities report the undertaking of substantial compliance measures ranging from the adoption of new policies, the training of employees, and the development of privacy notices. Another area of widespread concern at the NCVHS hearings was HIPAA preemption. According to NCVHS, witnesses said that issues of preemption made compliance much more difficult, costly, and complicated. The term "preemption" is a judicial doctrine that originated through interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. In effect, the Supremacy Clause stands for the proposition that the Constitution and the laws of the federal government rise above the laws of the states. As a result, federal law will always override state law in cases of conflict. Absent a direct conflict, however, preemption depends on the intent of Congress. Such intent may be express or implied. Express preemption exists when Congress explicitly commands that a state law be displaced. Where Congress has not expressly preempted state and local laws, two types of implied federal preemption may be found: field preemption, in which federal regulation is so pervasive that one can reasonably infer that states or localities have no role to play, and conflict preemption, in which "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." HIPAA sets forth a general rule, based on the principles of conflict preemption. Basically, this rule establishes that any federal regulation resulting from implementation of the Act preempts any contrary state law. "Contrary" is defined as situations where: (1) a covered entity would find it impossible to comply with both the state and the federal requirements, or (2) when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Congress established three exceptions to this general rule. First, there is an exception for state laws that the Secretary determines are necessary to prevent fraud and abuse, to ensure appropriate state regulation of insurance and health plans, for state reporting on health care delivery, or for other purposes. The second exception provides that state laws will not be superseded if the Secretary determines that the law addresses controlled substances. Both of these exceptions require an affirmative "exception determination" from the Secretary of HHS for the state law not to be preempted. The third exception provides that state laws will not be preempted if they relate to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and are "more stringent" than the federal requirements. A state law is "more stringent" if it meets one or more of the following criteria: 1) the state law prohibits or further limits the use or disclosure of protected health information, except if the disclosure is required by HHS to determine a covered entity's compliance or is to the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable information; 2) the state law permits individuals with greater rights of access to or amendment of their individually identifiable health information; provided, however, HIPAA will not preempt a state law to the extent that it authorizes or prohibits disclosure of protected health information about a minor to a parent, guardian or person acting in loco parentis of such minor; 3) the state law provides for more information to be disseminated to the individual regarding use and disclosure of their protected health information and rights and remedies; 4) the state law narrows the scope or duration of authorization or consent, increases the privacy protections surrounding authorization and consent, or reduces the coercive effect of the surrounding circumstances; 5) the state law imposes stricter standards for record keeping or accounting of disclosures; 6) the state law strengthens privacy protections for individuals with respect to any other matter. In addition to the general rule and exceptions, Congress "carved out" two provisions whereby certain areas of state authority will not be limited or invalidated by HIPAA rules. First, the public health "carve out" saves any law providing for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or death for the conduct of public surveillance, investigation or intervention. The second "carve out" allows states to regulate health plans by requiring the plans to report, or provide access to, information for the purpose of audits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or certification. S. 16 , The Equal Rights and Equal Dignity for Americans Act of 2003, would, in section 903, reverse the August 2002 modifications to the privacy rule.

As of April 14, 2003, most health care providers (including doctors and hospitals) and health plans are required to comply with the new Privacy Rule mandated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and must comply with national standards to protect individually identifiable health information. The HIPAA Privacy Rule creates a federal floor of privacy protections for individually identifiable health information; establishes a set of basic consumer protections; institutes a series of regulatory permissions for uses and disclosures of protected health information; permits any person to file an administrative complaint for violations; and authorizes the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. In hearings prior to the effective date of the Rule, there was widespread concern over aspects of the rule, including the extent to which it preempted state laws. On April 17, 2003, HHS published an interim final rule establishing the rules of procedure for investigations and the imposition of civil money penalties concerning violations. This interim final rule will be effective May 19, 2003 through September 16, 2003. HHS plans to issue a complete Enforcement Rule with both procedural and substantive provisions after notice-and-comment rulemaking. This report will be updated.

Under current statute, the President generally is required keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions and that any covert action "finding" shall be reported to the committees as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding. If, however, the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding in order to "meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," then rather than providing advanced notification to the full congressional intelligence committees, as is generally required, the President may limit such notification to the "Gang of Eight," and any other congressional leaders he may choose to inform. The statute defines the "Gang of Eight" as being comprised of the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees and the House and Senate majority and minority leadership. In addition to having to determine that vital interests are implicated, the President must comply with four additional statutory conditions in notifying the Gang of Eight. First, the President is required to provide a statement setting out the reasons for limiting notification to the Gang of Eight, rather than the full intelligence committees. The two intelligence committee chairmen, both Gang of Eight Members, also must be provided signed copies of the covert action finding in question. Third, the President is required to provide the Gang of Eight advance notice of the covert action in question. And, lastly, Gang of Eight Members must be notified of any significant changes in a previously approved covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding. In report language accompanying the 1980 enactment, Congress established its intent to preserve the secrecy necessary for very sensitive covert actions, while providing the President with a process for consulting in advance with congressional leaders, including the intelligence committee chairmen and ranking minority Members, "who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters." Such consultation, according to Congress, would ensure strong oversight, while at the same time, "share the President's burden on difficult decisions concerning significant activities." In 1991, following the Iran-Contra Affair, Intelligence Conference Committee Conferees more specifically stated that Gang of Eight notifications should be used only when "the President is faced with a covert action of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of the covert action should be restricted to as few individuals as possible." Congressional Conferees also indicated that they expected the executive branch to hold itself to the same standard by similarly limiting knowledge of such sensitive covert actions within the executive. Congress approved several changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedures as part of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 111-259 ). First, it required that a written statement now be provided outlining the reasons for a presidential decision to limit notification of a covert action or significant change or undertaking in a previously approved finding. Previously, such a statement was required, but there was no explicit requirement that it be written. Second, the President is now required no later than 180 days after such a statement of reasons for limiting access is submitted, to ensure that all members of the congressional intelligence committees are provided access to the finding or notification, or a statement of reasons, submitted to all committee members, as to why it remains essential to continue to limited notification. Finally, Congress required that the President now ensure that the Gang of Eight be notified in writing of any significant change in a previously approved covert action, and stipulated further that the president, in determining whether an activity constitutes a significant undertaking, shall consider whether the activity: involved significant risk of loss of life; requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations; results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; requires notification under Section 504 [50 USCS §414]; gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without authorization. The unclassified version of the FY2011 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 112-72 ), enacted June 8, 2011, contained no further changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedure. Although the statute requires that the President provide the Gang of Eight advance notice of certain covert actions, it also recognizes the President's constitutional authority to withhold such prior notice altogether by imposing certain additional conditions on the President should the decision be made to withhold. If prior notice is withheld, the President must "fully inform" the congressional intelligence committees in a "timely fashion" after the commencement of the covert action. The President also is required to provide a statement of the reasons for withholding prior notice to the Gang of Eight. In other words, a decision by the executive branch to withhold prior notice from the Gang of Eight would appear to effectively prevent the executive branch from limiting an-after-the-fact notification to the Gang of Eight, even if the President had determined initially that the covert action in question warranted Gang of Eight treatment. Rather, barring prior notice to the Gang of Eight, the executive branch would then be required to inform the full intelligence committees of the covert action in "timely fashion." In doing so, Congress appeared to envision a covert action, the initiation of which would require a short-term period of heightened operational security. During the Senate's 1980 debate of the Gang of Eight provision, congressional sponsors said their intent was that the Gang of Eight would reserve the right to determine the appropriate time to inform the full intelligence committees of the covert action of which they had been notified. The position of sponsors that the Gang of Eight would determine when to notify the full intelligence committees underscores the point that while the statute provides the President this limited notification option, it appears to be largely silent on what happens after the President exercises this particular option. Sponsors thus made it clear that they expected the intelligence committees to establish certain procedures to govern how the Gang of Eight was to notify the full intelligence committees. Senator Walter Huddleston, Senate floor manager for the legislation, said "the intent is that the full oversight committees will be fully informed at such time the eight leaders determine is appropriate. The committees will establish the procedures for the discharge of this responsibility." Senator Huddleston's comments referred to Section 501(c) of Title V of the National Security Act which stipulates that "The President and the congressional intelligence committees shall each establish such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title." With regard to Section 501(c), Senate report language stated: The authority for procedures established by the Select Committees is based on the current practices of the committees in establishing their own rules. One or both committees may, for example, adopt procedures under which designated members are assigned responsibility on behalf of the committee to receive information in particular types of circumstances, such as when all members cannot attend a meeting or when certain highly sensitive information is involved. Congressional intent thus appeared to be that the collective membership of each intelligence committee, rather than the committee leadership, would develop such procedures. Moreover, the rules that each committee have subsequently adopted, while they deal in detail as to how the committees are to conduct their business, do not appear to address any procedures that might guide Gang of Eight notifications generally. Rather, to the extent that any such procedures have been adopted, those procedures appear to have been put into place at the executive branch's insistence, according to congressional participants. Congress approved the Gang of Eight notification provision in 1980 as part of a broader package of statutory intelligence oversight measures generally aimed at tightening intelligence oversight while also providing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) greater leeway to carry out covert operations, following a failed covert operation to rescue American embassy hostages in Iran. Congressional approval came after President Jimmy Carter decided not to notify the intelligence committees of the operation in advance because of concerns over operational security and the risk of disclosure. Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner briefed the congressional intelligence committees only after the operations had been conducted. Although most members reportedly expressed their understanding of the demands for secrecy and thus the Administration's decision to withhold prior notification, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Birch Bayh expressed concern that the executive branch's action reflected a distrust of the committees. He suggested that future administrations could address disclosure concerns by notifying a more limited number of Members "so that at least somebody in the oversight mechanism would know.... If oversight is to function better, you first need it to function [at all]." Such sentiments appear to have contributed to the subsequent decision by Congress to permit the executive branch to notify the Gang of Eight in such cases. Even with statutory arrangements governing covert action, including Gang of Eight covert actions, Congress does not have the authority under statute to veto outright a covert action. Indeed, former Senator Howard Baker successfully pushed the inclusion in the 1980 legislative package of a provision making clear that Congress did not have approval authority over the initiation of any particular covert action. Nonetheless, the Gang of Eight Members, as do the intelligence committees, arguably have the authority to influence whether and how such covert actions are conducted over time. For example, Members could express opposition to the initiation of a particular covert action. Some observers assert that in the absence of Members' agreement to the initiation of the covert action involved, barring such agreement, an administration would have to think carefully before proceeding with such a covert action as planned. The Gang of Eight over time could also influence funding for such operations. Initial funding for a covert action generally comes from the CIA's Reserve for Contingency Fund, for which Congress provides an annual appropriation. Once appropriated, the CIA can fund a covert action using money from this fund, without having to seek congressional approval. But the executive branch generally must seek additional funds to replenish the reserve on an annual basis. If the Gang of Eight, including the two committee chairmen and ranking Members, were to agree not to continue funding for a certain covert action, they arguably could impress on the membership of the two committees not to replenish the reserve fund, providing they informed the committees of the covert action, a decision which the congressional sponsors said they intended to be left to the discretion of the Gang of Eight in any case. Thus, the Gang of Eight could influence the intelligence committees to increase, decrease or eliminate authorized funding of a particular covert action. Some observers point out, however, that the leaders' overall effectiveness in influencing a particular covert action turns at least as much on their capability to conduct effective oversight of covert action as it does on their legal authority. The impact of Gang of Eight notifications on the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight continues to be debated. Supporters of the Gang of Eight process contend that such notifications continue to serve their original purpose, which, they assert, is to protect operational security of particularly sensitive covert actions that involve vital U.S. interests while still involving Congress in oversight. Further, they point out that although Members receiving these notifications may be constrained in sharing detailed information about the notifications with other intelligence committee members and staff, these same Members can raise concerns directly with the President and the congressional leadership and thereby seek to have any concerns addressed. Supporters also argue that Members receiving these restricted briefings have at their disposal a number of legislative remedies if they decide to oppose a particular covert action program, including the capability to use the appropriations process to withhold funding until the executive branch behaves according to Congress's will. Critics counter with the following points. First, they say, Gang of Eight notifications do not provide for effective congressional oversight because participating Members "cannot take notes, seek the advice of their counsel, or even discuss the issues raised with their committee colleagues." Second, they contend that Gang of Eight notifications have been "overused." Third, they assert that, in certain instances, the executive branch did not provide an opportunity to Gang of Eight Members to approve or disapprove of the program being briefed to them. And fourth, they contend that the "limited information provided Congress was so overly restricted that it prevented members of Congress from conducting meaningful oversight." Notwithstanding the continuing debate over the merits of such notifications, what remains less clear is the historic record of compliance with Gang of Eight provisions set out in statute. Questions include: have such notifications generally been limited to covert actions, ones that conform to congressional intent that such covert actions be highly sensitive and involve the risk to life? When prior notification is limited to the Gang of Eight, has the executive branch provided an explanatory statement as to why it limited notification to the Gang of Eight? If the Gang of Eight is not provided prior notice, has the executive branch then informed the intelligence committees at a later date and provided a reason why prior notification was not provided? Has the Gang of Eight, once notified, ever then made a determination to notify the intelligence committees, a prerogative envisioned by its congressional sponsors? Have the congressional intelligence committees, at any time since they were established, attempted to develop procedures to guide Gang of Eight notifications, as envisioned by the sponsors of the Gang of Eight provision? Striking the proper balance between effective oversight and security remains a challenge to Congress and the executive. Doing so in cases involving particularly sensitive covert actions presents a special challenge. Success turns on a number of factors, not the least of which is the degree of comity and trust that defines the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. More trust can lead to greater flexibility in notification procedures. When trust in the relationship is lacking, however, the legislative branch may see a need to tighten and make more precise the notification architecture, so as to assure what it views as being an appropriate flow of information, thus enabling effective oversight.

Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress—the "Gang of Eight"—when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority Members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. Congress, in approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those "rare" cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of congressional intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible. In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. On July 8, 2009, the executive branch issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) in which it stated that it strongly objected to the House Committee's action to replace the Gang of Eight statutory provision, and that the President's senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act if the committee's language was retained in the final bill. The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements. Ultimately, the House accepted the Senate's proposals, which the President signed into law as part of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 111-259). Both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees did not make any further changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedure when both committees approved respective versions of the 2011 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 112-72) enacted on June 8, 2011. This report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight. Contents

North Korea's systematic violation of its citizens' human rights and the plight of North Koreans trying to escape their country have been well documented in multiple reports issued by governments and other international bodies. The Bush Administration initially highlighted and later de-emphasized Pyongyang's human rights record as its policy on nuclear weapons negotiations evolved. Congress has consistently drawn attention to North Korean human rights violations on a bipartisan basis. On several occasions, Congress has criticized the executive branch for its approach to these issues, through tough questioning of Administration witnesses during multiple hearings and through written letters of protest to high-level officials. Although the Obama Administration has indicated that it will seek to continue the nuclear negotiations, it has not indicated how the issue of human rights will be addressed. The passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 ( H.R. 4011 ; P.L. 108 - 333 ; and 22 U.S.C. 7801.) and its reauthorization in 2008 ( H.R. 5834 , P.L. 110 - 346 ) serve as the most prominent examples of legislative action on these issues. The legislation both reinforced some aspects of the Bush Administration's rhetoric on North Korea and expresses dissatisfaction with other elements of its policy on North Korea. The reauthorization bill explicitly criticizes the implementation of the original law and reasserts Congressional interest in adopting human rights as a major priority in U.S. policy toward North Korea. U.S. attention to North Korean human rights and refugees is complicated by the geopolitical sensitivities of East Asia. China is wary of U.S. involvement in the issue and chafes at any criticism based on human rights. South Korea also had reservations about a more active U.S. role, particularly in terms of refugees, although the current Lee administration in Seoul has been more amenable to such efforts. Both want to avoid a massive outflow of refugees, which they believe could trigger instability or the collapse of North Korea. U.S. executive branch officials worry that criticism of how Seoul and Beijing approach North Korea's human rights violations could disrupt the multilateral negotiations to deal with Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. North Korean refugees seeking resettlement often transit through other Asian countries, raising diplomatic, refugee, and security concerns for those governments. In the first several years of the Bush Administration, high-level officials, including the President and Secretary of State, publicly and forcefully criticized the regime in Pyongyang for its human rights practices. As efforts to push forward the Six-Party talks accelerated in 2007, the Administration did not propose any negotiations with North Korea over human rights but asserted that human rights is one of several issues to be settled with North Korea after the nuclear issue is resolved. The Six-Party Agreement of February 13, 2007, calls for the United States and North Korea to "start bilateral talks aimed at resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations." Prior to the Agreement in 2007, the Bush Administration held that it would not agree to normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea until there was progress on human rights (presumably including refugees) and other issues. However, after the signing of the agreement in February 2007, some observers say that former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill focused exclusively on a satisfactory settlement of the nuclear issue. The 108 th Congress passed by voice vote, and President Bush signed, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (NKHRA). The legislation authorized up to $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2005-2008 for assistance to North Korean refugees, $2 million for promoting human rights and democracy in North Korea and $2 million to promote freedom of information inside North Korea; asserted that North Koreans are eligible for U.S. refugee status and instructs the State Department to facilitate the submission of applications by North Koreans seeking protection as refugees; and required the President to appoint a Special Envoy to promote human rights in North Korea. The act also expressed the sense of Congress that human rights should remain a key element in negotiations with North Korea; all humanitarian aid to North Korea shall be conditional upon improved monitoring of the distribution of food; support for radio broadcasting into North Korea should be enhanced; and that China is obligated to provide the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with unimpeded access to North Koreans inside China. Some hail the NKHRA as an important message that human rights will play a central role in the formulation of U.S. policy towards North Korea. Passage of the legislation was driven by the argument that the United States has a moral responsibility to stand up for human rights for those suffering under repressive regimes. Advocates claim that, in addition to alleviating a major humanitarian crisis, the NKHRA will ultimately enhance stability in Northeast Asia by promoting international cooperation to deal with the problem of North Korean refugees. Critics say the legislation risks upsetting relations with South Korea and China, and ultimately the diplomatic unity necessary to make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program through the Six-Party Talks. Further, they insist that the legislation actually worsens the plight of North Korean refugees by drawing more attention to them, leading to crackdowns by both North Korean and Chinese authorities and reduced assistance by Southeast Asian countries concerned about offending Pyongyang. While the passage of the NKHRA raised the profile of congressional interest in North Korean human rights and refugee issues, many of the activities had existing authorizations already in place. The State Department had programs directed toward raising awareness of North Korean human rights issues as well as providing some assistance to vulnerable North Korean refugees through other organizations. Korean-language broadcasting by Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of American (VOA) pre-dated the passage of the law. However, some activities appear to have been enhanced as a result of the law's enactment, particularly the admission of North Korean refugees for resettlement in the United States. Reports required by the act have outlined steps taken by the State Department and other executive branch bodies to promote human rights in North Korea. The State Department has not requested funding explicitly under the NKHRA, but officials assert that the mission of the NKHRA is fulfilled under a number of existing programs. For democracy promotion in North Korea, the State Department's Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) Bureau gives grants to U.S.-based organizations: in the FY2008 budget, DRL requested $1 million for North Korea human rights programs, as well as $1 million for media freedom programs. DRL also considers several other programs, such as those under the National Endowment of Democracy account specific to North Korea, as fulfilling part of the NKHRA's mission. The Special Envoy attended three international Freedom House conferences organized to raise awareness of human rights conditions in North Korea in 2005-2006. The U.S. government has also sponsored and supported United Nations resolutions condemning North Korea's human rights abuses. The NKHRA appears to have had the greatest impact in the area of refugee admissions. As of January 2009, the United States had accepted 71 North Korean refugees for resettlement from undisclosed transit states. The first refugees—four women and two men—were accepted in May 2006. The State Department's Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Bureau annually provides funds for UNHCR's annual regional budget for East Asia, which includes assistance for North Korean refugees, among other refugee populations. PRM funds international organizations such as UNHCR and the International Committee for the Red Cross. The NKHRA calls on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to "facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in North Korea" by increasing the amount of Korean-language broadcasts by RFA and VOA. (A much more modest amount has been appropriated to support independent radio broadcasters.) The hours of radio broadcasts into North Korea, through medium- and short-wave, were modestly increased beginning in 2006, and original programming was added in 2007. The BBG currently broadcasts to North Korea ten hours per day: RFA broadcasts three and one-half hours of original programming and one and one-half hours of repeat programming, and VOA broadcasts four hours of original and one hour of repeat programming with news updates each day. In FY2008, the BBG's budget request included $8.1 million to implement the 10-hour broadcast schedule, and the FY2009 request includes $8.5 million to maintain this schedule. Content includes news briefs, particularly news involving the Korean peninsula, interviews with North Korean defectors, and international commentary on events happening inside North Korea. The BBG cites an InterMedia survey of escaped defectors that indicates that North Koreans have some access to radios, many of them altered to receive international broadcasts. The BBG continues to explore ways to expand medium wave broadcast capability into North Korea. VOA is broadcast from BBG-owned stations in Tinian, Thailand, and the Philippines, and from leased stations in Russia and Mongolia. RFA is broadcast from stations in Tinian and Saipan and leased stations in Russia and Mongolia. The reauthorization bill renews funding that expired in FY2008, reasserts key tenets of the legislation, and criticizes the pace of the executive branch implementation of the original law. It also cites the small number of resettlements of North Korean refugees and the slow processing of such refugees overseas. Funding is reauthorized through 2012 at the original levels of $2 million annually to support human rights and democracy programs, $2 million annually to promote freedom of information to North Koreans, and $20 million annually to assist North Korean refugees. It also requires additional reporting—portions of which can be classified as necessary—on U.S. efforts to process North Korean refugees, along with reporting from the Broadcasting Board of Governors on progress toward achieving 12 hours per day of broadcasting Korean language programming. The role and activities of the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea (per the reauthorization bill, now the "Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues") have garnered particular attention from Congress. Jay Lefkowitz, appointed as the Special Envoy by President Bush nearly five months after the law was enacted in August 2005, was criticized for accepting the job as a part-time position while maintaining his legal career in New York. The reauthorization bill stipulates that the Special Envoy be an ambassador-level position—which requires confirmation by the Senate—and expresses the sense of Congress that the position should be full-time. Whereas the original legislation was vague on whether the refugee-specific provisions fell under the Envoy's responsibilities, the reauthorization bill includes the sense of Congress that the Envoy should "participate in policy planning and implementation" on North Korean refugee issues. The Obama Administration has not yet selected its Special Envoy. Lefkowitz's role varied in its public profile: at times he was an active and vocal advocate for human rights issues, and at other times he faded from public view. He attended international conferences dedicated to raising awareness of human rights abuses in North Korea and testified at multiple congressional hearings. As the Korean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was negotiated, he raised questions about labor practices at the Kaesong complex, an industrial park located in North Korea in which a consortium of South Korean firms employ North Korean labor. Lefkowitz's visibility declined particularly in 2007 as the Bush Administration renewed its effort on nuclear negotiations. His statements occasionally sparked controversy: in January 2008, he gave a speech at a Washington think tank in which he criticized the denuclearization talks and voiced doubt that North Korea would ever give up its nuclear weapons. In response, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, "Jay Lefkowitz has nothing to do with the Six-Party Talks ... he certainly has no say in what American policy will be in the Six-Party Talks." In his final report to Congress in January 2009, Lefkowitz criticized some aspects of U.S. handling of refugee admissions and critiqued the North Korean policies of the South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese governments. Some observers contend that good-faith implementation of NKHRA's refugee provisions may be counterproductive. They argue that the legislation on North Korean refugee admissions could send a dangerous message to North Koreans that admission to the United States as a refugee is assured, encouraging incursions into U.S. diplomatic missions overseas. State Department officials say that given the tight security in place at U.S. facilities abroad, unexpected stormings could result in injury or death for the refugees. Secondly, granting of asylum status to North Korean refugees involves a complex vetting process that is further complicated by the fact that the applicants originate from a state with which the United States does not have official relations. In congressional hearings, State Department officials have cautioned that effective implementation of the NKHRA depends on close coordination with South Korea, particularly in developing mechanisms to vet potential refugees given the dearth of information available to U.S. immigration officials on North Koreans. Some government officials and NGO staff familiar with providing assistance to North Korean refugees say that funding explicitly associated with the NKHRA is problematic because of the need for discretion in reaching the vulnerable population. Refugees are often hiding from authorities, and regional governments do not wish to draw attention to their role in transferring North Koreans, so funding is labeled under more general assistance programs. In addition, many of the NGOs that help refugees do not have the capacity to absorb large amounts of funding effectively because of their small, grass roots nature. South Korea remains the primary destination for North Korean refugees. In addition to automatically granting South Korean citizenship, the South Korean government administers a resettlement program and provides cash and training for all defectors. According to press reports, over 14,000 defectors from North Korea have resettled in the South since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953, including over 2,500 in 2007 alone. The South Korean system of accepting refugees is faster and more streamlined than the U.S. process. As part of its policy of increasing economic integration and fostering better ties with North Korea, South Korea until recently refrained from criticizing Pyongyang's human rights record and downplayed its practice of accepting North Korean refugees. Lee Myung-bak's election as South Korea's president in December 2007, however, appeared to usher in a new approach: Lee's administration has tied assistance from the South to North Korean progress on denuclearization and openly criticized North Korea's human rights situation. In years past, South Korea had usually abstained from voting on United Nations resolutions calling for improvement in North Korea's human rights practices. At the U.N. Human Rights Council meeting in March 2008, however, South Korea voted for a similar resolution. Lee has also conditioned fertilizer and food aid on improved access to the North's distribution systems to ensure that such aid is not going only to Pyongyang's elite and military. This approach has contributed to a considerable chill in North-South relations since Lee took office. A joint statement from President Bush and President Lee in August 2008 urged progress in improving North Korea's human rights, the first time such a mention appeared.

As the incoming Obama Administration conducts a review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, addressing the issue of human rights and refugees remains a priority for many members of Congress. The passage of the reauthorization of the North Korean Human Rights Act in October 2008 (P.L. 110-346) reasserted congressional interest in influencing executive branch policy toward North Korea. In addition to reauthorizing funding at original levels, the bill expresses congressional criticism of the implementation of the original 2004 law and adjusts some of the provisions relating to the Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea and the U.S. resettlement of North Korean refugees. Some outside analysts have pointed to the challenges of highlighting North Korea's human rights violations in the midst of the ongoing nuclear negotiations, as well as the difficulty in effectively reaching North Korean refugees as outlined in the law. Further, the law may complicate coordination on North Korea with China and South Korea. At this point, it remains unclear what focus the Obama Administration will place on human rights and refugees as it takes over the nuclear negotiations. For more information, please see CRS Report RL34189, North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

The Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy, or ARPA-E, was established to "overcome the long-term and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy technologies" ( P.L. 110-69 , §5012). This budget and appropriations tracking report summarizes the Administration's FY2016 budget request for ARPA-E and tracks legislative action on FY2016 appropriations. It also provides selected (proposed) appropriations authorizations under consideration in the 114 th Congress, historical funding data, and an overview of selected policy debates about the agency. Table 1 summarizes authorized funding levels for ARPA-E under certain proposed, but not yet enacted, reauthorization measures under consideration in the 114 th Congress. Table 2 shows FY2014 current funding, FY2015 enacted funding, the FY2016 request, and FY2016 House-passed and Senate committee-reported funding levels for ARPA-E. This table will be updated to include FY2016 Senate-passed amounts, as well as final enacted appropriations, when those numbers become available. For a longer perspective, Table 3 provides ARPA-E authorizations, budget requests, and appropriations from FY2008 through the FY2016 request. Appropriations to ARPA-E, which is part of the Department of Energy (DOE), are typically included in annual energy and water development and related agencies appropriations acts. (The Congressional Research Service tracks these acts each fiscal year. See the "Appropriations Status Table" on CRS.gov, at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx .) ARPA-E's budget justifications are published on the agency's website at http://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=arpa-e-site-page/arpa-e-budget . Patterned after the widely lauded Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—which played a key role in the development of critical technologies such as satellite navigation and the Internet—ARPA-E was established by the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. 110-69 ) in FY2008. The agency received its first appropriations in FY2009: $15 million in regular appropriations and $400 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) funding. The America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-358 ) amended and reauthorized ARPA-E's statutory authority, which is codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. 16538, and authorized appropriations to the agency through FY2013. Although ARPA-E is relatively young by federal science agency standards, the agency asserts that its awardees already have produced significant scientific and technological gains. ARPA-E states that its awardees have developed a 1 megawatt silicon carbide transistor the size of a fingernail; engineered microbes that use hydrogen and carbon dioxide to make liquid transportation fuel; [and] pioneered a near-isothermal compressed air energy storage system. At the February 2015 annual ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit, the agency announced that [a]t least 30 ARPA-E project teams have formed new companies to advance their technologies and more than 37 ARPA-E projects have partnered with other government agencies for further development. Additionally, 34 ARPA-E projects have attracted more than $850 million in private-sector follow-on funding after ARPA-E's investment of approximately $135 million and several technologies have already been incorporated into products that are being sold in the market. To date, ARPA-E has invested approximately $1.1 billion across more than 400 projects through 23 focused programs and two open funding solicitations (OPEN 2009 and OPEN 2012). News reports indicate that ARPA-E also has cancelled 21 projects —an expected outcome for this type of agency, which is designed to support high-risk, high-reward research that sometimes produces unanticipated (positive and negative) results. Monitoring progress and recommending termination of research projects are express statutory responsibilities of ARPA-E program directors. Authorizations of appropriations to ARPA-E, which were last enacted in the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-358 ), expired in FY2013. Members of the 114 th Congress have introduced measures to reauthorize provisions from P.L. 111-358 , including provisions that authorize appropriations to ARPA-E. An analysis of these bills may be found in CRS Report R43880, The America COMPETES Acts: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed]. Table 1 summarizes authorized funding levels for ARPA-E under selected, proposed reauthorization measures. The Obama Administration has requested $325 million for ARPA-E in FY2016, a $45 million (16%) increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $280 million. In keeping with its historical practice, the agency expects to use its FY2016 appropriations to support between 7 and 10 focused funding opportunity announcements (FOAs). Each FY2016 FOA would provide approximately $10 million to $40 million in funding for programs that focus on specific technical barriers in a specific energy area. ARPA-E groups its projects into two broad categories: transportation systems and stationary power systems. Project types can vary widely within these categories. In general, ARPA-E anticipates that the focus in FY2016 will be on transportation fuels and feedstocks; energy materials and processes; dispatchable energy; and sensors, information, and integration. The annual ARPA-E budget justification also contains a line item for program direction, which includes salaries and benefits, travel, support services, and related expenses. As passed by the House on May 1, 2015, the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2028 ) would provide $280 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. This amount is $45 million (-14%) less than the FY2016 request. H.Rept. 114-91 accompanied H.R. 2028 when it was reported by the House Committee on Appropriations. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has indicated that the President's senior advisors will recommend a veto if the President is presented with H.R. 2028 , as passed by the House. The "Statement of Administration Policy" cites insufficient funding for ARPA-E as one of several reasons behind the Administration's opposition. As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 2028 would provide $291 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. This amount is $11 million more than both the FY2015 enacted and House-passed levels, but $33 million less than the Administration request. S.Rept. 114-54 accompanied H.R. 2028 when it was reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Table 3 shows ARPA-E authorizations of appropriations, budget requests, and appropriations since the agency was first authorized in 2008. Congress has funded ARPA-E at approximately $280 million since FY2012—with the exception of FY2013, when the process commonly known as sequestration (as well as enacted rescissions) reduced the agency's funding level to about $250 million. ARPA-E is a comparatively new addition to the federal research and development (R&D) portfolio. Given the nature of R&D, which can take decades to produce widely recognized or transformative results, it may be many years before ARPA-E's ultimate impact is fully understood. Some early concerns about the agency focused on perceived differences between ARPA-E and the DARPA model. These include differences in the markets for defense and energy-related products. DARPA, for example, has a built-in customer (the U.S. military), which ARPA-E does not have. Further, some analysts have argued that industrial relationships and characteristics of the energy sector (including powerful incumbent firms and the wide array of energy-dependent products) have the potential to stop the dissemination of disruptive innovations. It is not clear whether these early concerns have become actual challenges for ARPA-E, or whether ARPA-E has been able to adjust and respond to its unique position. It is also possible that factors perceived (rightly or wrongly) as key to the success of DARPA may not be as important to the success of ARPA-E. Other early congressional concerns focused on whether ARPA-E would compete with, duplicate, or otherwise undermine other DOE research units, such as the Office of Science, and on whether the agency would focus too closely on late-stage technology development and commercialization activities that some policymakers perceive as best left to the private sector. The Government Accountability Office investigated such concerns in 2012 and found that ARPA-E had taken steps to avoid duplication with other DOE offices and that "most ARPA-E projects could not have been funded solely by the private sector."

The Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy, or ARPA-E, was established within the Department of Energy to "overcome the long-term and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy technologies" (P.L. 110-69, §5012). Patterned after the widely lauded Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—which played a key role in the development of critical technologies such as satellite navigation and the Internet—ARPA-E has supported more than 400 energy technology research projects since Congress first funded it in FY2009. This budget and appropriations tracking report describes selected major items from the Administration's FY2016 budget request for ARPA-E and tracks legislative action on FY2016 appropriations to the agency. It also provides selected historical funding data. This report has been updated to include House-passed amounts for FY2016. It will be updated to include FY2016 Senate-passed amounts and final enacted FY2016 appropriations. Overall, the Obama Administration has requested $325 million for ARPA-E in FY2016, a $45 million (16%) increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $280 million. The House-passed Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2028) would provide $280 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a "Statement of Administration Policy" opposing the House-passed version of H.R. 2028. OMB cited a number of factors in its decision to oppose H.R. 2028 as passed by the House, including insufficient funding levels for ARPA-E. As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 2028 would provide $291 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. With the exception of FY2013—when ARPA-E was subject to reductions as a result of certain rescissions and under the process commonly known as sequestration—Congress has funded ARPA-E at about $280 million since FY2012.

How long may a city hold property, seized for forfeiture purposes, before it must justify either the validity of its seizure or its right to confiscation? And should the delay be judged by speedy trial or general due process standards? The speedy trial standards focus on which party is most responsible for the delay and the consequences of the delay for the accused. The due process standards ask whether a delay-resulting procedure involves a risk of erroneous governmental deprivation of an individual's interests; the extent to which additional safeguards will mitigate or eliminate that risk; and the costs to the government (including administrative burdens) should those safeguards be required. The United States Supreme Court agreed to consider the issue in Alvarez v. Smith (Doc. No. 08-351), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 1401 (2009), but the case became moot before the Court could address the issue. Had the property owners prevailed, adjustments in federal law might have been required. The case was complicated by several factors. First, the Supreme Court has already said in United States v. $8,850 (Vasquez) , that the due process consequences of delays between seizure and a forfeiture hearing are to be judged using the speedy trial standards of Barker v. Wingo . Second, the lower federal appellate court instead found applicable the general due process standards of Mathews v. Eldridge , but remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy. This failure to identify the necessary remedial safeguards could have made Supreme Court review more difficult, since one of the Mathews factors is the extent of governmental inconvenience posed by the safeguards proposed in the name of due process. Third, the appropriate remedy may be elusive since the same level of proof is required to justify both the seizure and final confiscation—probable cause. But the fatal complication was mootness. Before the Court could rule on the merits, the city returned the cars it had seized from the claimants and settled their other claims. Forfeiture is the confiscation of property as a consequence of the property's relation to some criminal activity. Forfeiture comes in one of two forms, depending upon the procedures used to accomplish confiscation. Criminal forfeiture involves the confiscation of the property following conviction of the property owner. Civil forfeiture involves the confiscation of property following a civil proceeding in which the property itself is often treated as the defendant. In most cases, due process permits civil forfeiture notwithstanding the innocence of property owner. Neither magistrate nor court need necessarily approve the seizure of personal property for forfeiture purposes. The law enforcement agencies which seize forfeitable property often share in the distribution of proceeds following confiscation. Under the Illinois law at issue, cars and other conveyances used to facilitate or conceal controlled substance offenses are subject to forfeiture. The same is true of any money or thing of value furnished, used, or acquired in the course of a controlled substance offense. Property may be seized under process or a warrant. Alternatively, it may be seized without a warrant or process, if there is probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture and seizure would be otherwise reasonable. The state may confiscate the property administratively (without a court hearing), if the forfeiture is uncontested and the property is valued at under $20,000 or is a car or other conveyance. To secure his day in court, a person with an interest in the property must file a claim along with a bond equal to 10% of the value of the property (90% of which is returned if the property is found not to be forfeitable). The statutory deadlines are such that several months will ordinarily pass before judicial proceedings begin. In the judicial proceedings, the state has the burden of establishing probable cause to believe that the property is subject to confiscation, after which the burden shifts to the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his interest in the property is not forfeitable. Sixty-five percent of the proceeds of any uncontested or judicially approved confiscation are distributed to the law enforcement agency which conducted the investigation, ordinarily the agency which seizes the property. The property owners in Smith filed a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. 1963 against city and state officials asserting that the Illinois procedure constituted a violation of due process because of its failure to provide a prompt post-seizure probable cause hearing. The district court dismissed on the basis of circuit precedent. A decade and a half earlier, the same Illinois procedure had been challenged for want of a prompt post-seizure hearing in Jones v. Takaki . Then, the circuit court felt bound by the Supreme Court's $8,850 (Vasquez) decision, which held that the Barker v. Wingo speedy trial factors govern the outcome, that is, "the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of this right, and prejudice to the defendant." On the basis of a second Supreme Court decision, United States v. Von Neumann , Jones rejected the argument that in light of the anticipated delay due process required a preliminary judicial probable cause determination. Von Neumann held that due process did not require prompt consideration of a petition to release forfeitable property as a matter of administrative grace. In Smith , the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to dismiss . It did so because a Second Circuit opinion helped persuade it that the foundation of its decision in Jones had been eroded. After $8,850 (Vasquez) , Von Neumann , and Jones , the Supreme Court had decided United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property . There, the Court observed that, absent exceptional circumstances, due process required pre-seizure notice and an opportunity to be heard in forfeiture cases. More to the point, it declared that the question of whether the circumstances of a particular case warranted an exception must be answered using the factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge : "the risk of erroneous deprivation of [a private] interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the Government's interest, including the administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would impose." Some years later, the Second Circuit faced a due process challenge to the New York City civil forfeiture procedure used in the driving-under-the-influence cases, Krimstock v. Kelly . The court, in an opinion by then Judge Sotomayor, concluded that vehicle owners had a due process right to "ask what justification the City has for retention of their vehicles during the pendency of [forfeiture] proceedings, and to put that question to the City at an early point after seizure in order to minimize any arbitrary or mistaken encroachment upon plaintiff's use and possession of their property." Moreover, the court asserted, the Mathews analysis governs the due process inquiry into the prompt review of the government's seizure and retention of private property. The Seventh Circuit in Smith endorsed the views of the Second Circuit expressed in Krimstock . It remanded with instructions to identify a procedure (1) under which a property owner might contest the validity of the seizure and the continued governmental retention of his or her property, and (2) under which vehicles and property other than cash might be released under bond or other security order pending a forfeiture proceeding on the merits. Among the other circuits to consider the question, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to continue to apply Barker v. Wingo factors to the question of whether various pre-trial forfeiture delays offend due process. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a State or local government to provide a post-seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850 , 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 (1972) or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Illinois officials raised five points in their argument before the Court. First, the Court has historically held that "a separate proceeding, prior to the forfeiture hearing itself, was unnecessary to determine the reasonableness of the initial seizure." Second, $8,850 (Vasquez) and Von Neuman n provide appropriate standards for purposes due process analysis. Third, given the attendant additional burdens on the government, the Constitution does not require an interim, adversarial hearing. Fourth, the Illinois statute is modeled after the federal statute, neither of which offends due process, in light of the right under either law to seek return of seized property. Fifth, the Illinois system survives due process scrutiny under either the Barker or Mathews standard. The property owners answered, first, that due process assured them of a hearing within a meaningful time, not after the six months that the Illinois procedure contemplated. Second, Mathews supplies the appropriate standard by which to assess the due process implications of the delay. Third, application of Mathews here is not inconsistent with the Court's decisions in $8,850 (Vasquez) or Von Neumann . Fourth, the specific Illinois forfeiture procedures preempt the more general Illinois return of property statute. Finally, an informal hearing or the opportunity to post a bond is constitutionally required and is feasible. The United States filed an amicus brief in support of state and city officials which argued that the final "forfeiture hearing provides adequate pre-forfeiture process unless it is delayed beyond the time that the government's valid administrative interests reasonably require." The Court learned upon inquiry that the groups' claims had been resolved. It felt it had no choice but to dispose of the case without reaching the merits. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of a "case or controversy." Since the group had been denied certification to act as representatives in a class action, they stood before the Court only on the basis of their individual claims. The Court unanimously agreed that when those claims were settled, disputes over the appropriate procedure to resolve them became moot and the presence of a case or controversy disappeared. The members of the Court were only slightly more divided over whether the Seventh Circuit opinion should be vacated or allowed to stand. The prevailing statute affords the Court considerable latitude. The majority favored application of a general rule under which the judgment in a moot case is vacated. Justice Stevens alone would have opted for a rule under which a judgment pending on the Court's docket would stand when mooted by an intervening settlement by the parties.

Alvarez v. Smith became moot while pending before the United States Supreme Court. At the time, the Court had agreed to decide whether a six-month delay between a state's seizure of property and its forfeiture hearing requires additional procedural safeguards. Traditionally, forfeiture hearing delays have been judged by the speedy trial standards of Barker v. Wingo. The Court had been asked to decide whether they should instead be judged by the general due process standards of Mathews v. Eldridge. Alvarez v. Smith arose in Chicago where a group of property owners filed a civil rights class action against city and state officials over city practices under the Illinois drug forfeiture statute. Under the statute, cars and trucks regardless of their value and money or other property valued at under $20,000 may be seized without a warrant by officers with probable cause to believe it is subject to confiscation. The forfeiture hearing may be held as late as 187 days after the seizure. The Smith group argued their property could not be held for that long without intervening safeguards against hardship and erroneous seizure. The district court dismissed their suit using the higher threshold Barker speedy trial standards to assess the delay and its impact. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It felt use of the Mathews standards better suited and returned the case to the lower court for determination of an appropriate remedy. At that point, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Before the Court could rule, however, the city returned the cars it had seized from members of the group and settled the group's claims relating the other property seized. In the absence of a case or controversy, the Court vacated the Seventh Circuit opinion and returned the matter to the lower court. The Illinois statute tracks the federal statutes in several respects. Thus, had the Seventh Circuit view prevailed, changes in federal law might have been required. Related reports include CRS Report 97-139, Crime and Forfeiture, by [author name scrubbed], which is also available in abbreviated form as CRS Report RS22005, Crime and Forfeiture: In Short, by [author name scrubbed].

Levels of pay for congressional staff are a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. In House committees, the chair and ranking member set the terms and conditions of employment for majority and minority staff, respectively. This includes job titles and descriptions; rates of pay, subject to maximum levels; and resources available to carry out their official duties. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff pay data in a readily retrievable form. Pay information in this report is based on the House Statement of Disbursements (SOD), published quarterly by the Chief Administrative Officer, as collated by LegiStorm, a private entity that provides some congressional data by subscription. Data in this report are based on official House reports, which afford the opportunity to use consistently collected data from a single source. Additionally, this report provides annual data, which allows for observations about the nature of House committee staff compensation over time. This report provides pay data for 11 staff position titles that are used in House committees, and for which sufficient data could be identified. Position titles and the years for which data are available since 2001 are provided in Table 1 . Titles were identified through a two-step process. The first step identified 358 job titles used in House committees in 2014. Of those titles, 282, or 78.8%, were filled by only one staff member, and were excluded. In the second step, the remaining 76 titles were assessed to determine how many of the House committees for which data were available employed staff with each title. Fifty-nine position titles that were used by six or fewer panels (five for minority positions) were excluded. Pay data were then collected for the remaining 17 positions. In order to be included, annual pay data for staff in each position needed to be available from at least five committees (four for minority positions). This eliminated another 6 positions, leaving 11. When committees had more than one staff member with the same job title, data for no more than two staff per committee were collected. House committee staff had to hold a position with the same job title in the same committee for the entire year examined, and not receive pay from any other congressional employing authority for their data to be included. Every recorded payment ascribed in the LegiStorm data to those staff for the fiscal year is tabulated. Data collected for this report may differ from an employee's stated annual salary due to the inclusion of overtime, bonuses, or other payments in addition to base salary paid in the course of a year. Pay data for staff working in Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014 , and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014 , respectively. Data presented here are subject to some challenges that could affect findings presented or their interpretation. Some of the concerns include the following: Given the large number of positions with titles held by one House employee, data provided here almost certainly do not represent all of the jobs carried out by House committee staff. The manner in which staff titles are assigned might have implications about the representativeness of the data provided. Of positions for which data were collected, two broad categories emerge. The first category identifies position titles that usually apply to one staff member per committee. Since almost all available data were collected for those positions, pay information provided is likely to be highly representative of what House committees pay staff in those positions. The second category includes positions for which committees might hire two or more staff members. Since pay data were collected for no more than two staff per committee for each position, it is more likely that data for those positions are a sample of staff in those positions rather than nearly complete data, and therefore may be less closely representative of what all staff in those positions are paid. Pay data provide no insight into the education, work experience, position tenure, full- or part-time status of staff, or other potential explanations for levels of compensation. Potential differences might exist in the job duties of positions with the same title. Aggregation of pay by job title rests on the assumption that staff with the same title carry out the same or similar tasks. Given the wide discretion congressional employing authorities have in setting the terms and conditions of employment, there may be differences in the duties of similarly titled staff that could have effects on their levels of pay. Tables in this section provide background information on House pay practices, comparative data for each position, and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 2 provides the maximum payable rates for House committee staff since 2001 in both nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars. Constant dollar calculations throughout the report are based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), various years, expressed in 2016 dollars. Table 3 provides the available cumulative percentage changes in pay in constant 2016 dollars for each of the 11 positions, Members of Congress, and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas. Table 4 - Table 14 provide tabular pay data for each House committee staff position. The numbers of staff whose data were counted are identified as observations in the data tables. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from 2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay for that position, in constant 2016 dollars, to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between 2011 and 2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 14.96% increase for communications directors to a -12.24% decrease for subcommittee staff directors. Of the eight staff positions for which data were available, two positions saw pay increases while six saw declines. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over the same period. Between 2006 and 2015, all of the seven staff positions for which data were available saw decreases. The change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a -4.78% decrease for counsels to a -31.06% decrease for professional staff members. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -10.41%, and General Schedule, DC, -0.13%, over the same period. Between 2001 and 2015, all of the five staff positions for which data were available saw decreases. The change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a -9.22% decrease for counsels to a -22.32% decrease for professional staff members. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -10.40%, and General Schedule, DC, 7.36%, over the same period.

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 11 staff position titles that are used in House committees, and include the following: Chief Counsel; Communications Director; Counsel; Deputy Staff Director; Minority Professional Staff Member; Minority Staff Director; Professional Staff Member; Senior Professional Staff Member; Staff Assistant; Staff Director; and Subcommittee Staff Director. Tables provide tabular pay data for each House committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from 2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay of that position, to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay, in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (2011-2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 14.96% increase for communications directors to a -12.24% decrease for subcommittee staff directors. Of the eight staff positions for which data are available, two positions saw pay increases while six saw declines from 2011 to 2015. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over the same period. Pay data for staff working in Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014, and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014, respectively. Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016.

From the late 1930s through the 2004 crop, the USDA operated the tobacco price support program. It was designed to raise and stabilize farm tobacco prices at higher levels than they otherwise would have reached. This was accomplished through a combination of farm marketing quotas and federal nonrecourse commodity loans. Administration was done through the county offices of the Farm Service Agency (FSA), and loan program funding was provided through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In 1982, legislation was adopted that applied an assessment on all tobacco marketings to be used to offset price support losses and make the loan operations function at no net cost to taxpayers. On two occasions legislation relieved the program of its obligations on large inventories. These actions cost about $1 billion. In addition, Congress made so-called tobacco loss payments of $852 million during FY2000-FY2003 to offset a sharp decline in farm sales to domestic and foreign buyers. Overall, from FY1982 through FY2005, tobacco support net expenditures totaled about $1.57 billion, for an annual average cost of $71 million. After Congress enacted the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-357 ), the tobacco support program came to an end. Tobacco quota owners and farm operators were compensated for the diminished value of their farms and the loss of future support with a payment of $9.6 billion over 10 years, funded by an assessment on tobacco manufacturers and importers. Because of this tobacco buyout, CCC support program expenditures have been eliminated, and it is not anticipated there will be any future ad hoc assistance to tobacco farmers. FSA administrative expenditures associated with the buyout are estimated to be $1.827 million in FY2006, and the budget for FY2007 is zero. (For additional information, see CRS Report RS20802, Tobacco Farmer Assistance , and CRS Report RS22046, Tobacco Quota Buyout .). The federal crop insurance program, administered by USDA's Risk Management Agency, provides farmers with subsidized multi-peril insurance on tobacco and other crops. The insurance covers unavoidable production losses due to adverse weather, insect infestations, plant diseases, and other natural calamities. It does not cover avoidable losses caused by neglect or poor farming practices. Sales and servicing of policies are done by private companies with some federal reimbursement, and most of the net indemnity losses fall upon the government. Additionally, the premiums have been subsidized since 1980 in order to encourage participation and avoid enactment of ad hoc disaster assistance programs. Experimental Crop Revenue Coverage, available for wheat, corn, and soybeans, is not available for tobacco. Total net federal expenditures for tobacco crop insurance coverage include outlays for crop loss indemnity payments, plus the premium subsidies, plus sales administrative expenses, less the farmer-paid premiums. Net federal outlays are estimated to be $27.9 million in FY2006, and are budgeted at $28.7 million for FY2007. The USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) carries out voluntary inspection and grading services at tobacco auction markets and import terminals. The establishment of uniform standards of quality, with grading by unbiased experts, helps assure that auction markets perform efficiently and fairly. Historically, federal grading provided an assurance of quality for tobacco held as collateral for CCC price support loans. Additionally, imported and domestic tobacco is inspected voluntarily to guard against illegal pesticide residues. Since 1981, the grading and inspection services have been financed through user fees (now set at $0.62 per 100 pounds for grading and $0.85 per 100 pounds for pesticide testing). These fees are sufficient to fully cover the costs of inspection activities as well as the cost of developing and maintaining the standards applied by the inspectors. This has dramatically reduced the use of AMS inspectors. AMS inspection work now is done on imported tobacco, as nearly all of the domestic crop is contracted for sale rather than auctioned. The Agricultural Marketing Service provides a market news service for sellers and buyers of tobacco. Daily reports of grades, prices, and sales volume at the auction markets are distributed throughout the tobacco industry. The cost of the tobacco news service in FY2006 is an estimated $190,000, and the budget for FY2007 is $194,000. Similar market news services are provided for all major agricultural commodities. Market news services are designed to provide farmers, and others in the marketing chain, with timely, accurate, and unbiased information on market conditions, to help them make better decisions on where and when to sell and buy commodities. According to economists, such information is necessary for a market economy to function efficiently and effectively. In the absence of a taxpayer-funded market news service, the information might be collected and sold by commercial enterprises, but questions of bias could arise. In the past, USDA-funded research related to tobacco production, processing, and marketing. Some of the research was carried out by Agriculture Research Service (ARS) scientists and some was done by university scientists funded through the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES). Annual research spending by the USDA averaged about $6.6 million until it was terminated under the FY1995 agricultural appropriations law and subsequent laws. The restriction does not apply to research on medical, biotechnological, food, and industrial uses of tobacco. A special research grant of $329,000 was approved for FY2006 to investigate alternative uses of tobacco plant material. No similar spending is anticipated in FY2007. The jointly funded federal-state-county extension education and technical assistance program is designed to serve as a link between the nation's agricultural research institutions and farmers. The term extension conveys the concept of extending the work of researchers into the community. At the county level, extension agents distribute information and expert advice to farmers and others through published materials, seminars, and direct consultation. The state extension staff, given their close proximity to researchers, continuously trains the county agents and designs and prepares materials for use by the county agents. In FY1997, CSREES spent $680,000 on tobacco-related extension activities. Federal funding was eliminated in FY1998 by the Administration and remains at zero. All state and county extension activity related to tobacco is funded by the states. The Economic Research Service (ERS) is responsible for assembling and analyzing economic data and forecasting market data within the USDA. As with the other major commodities, ERS assembles and analyzes supply and demand data on tobacco. ERS periodically publishes analytical findings in a Tobacco Situation and Outlook Report. Economists also conduct studies on related topics, such as the structural characteristics of tobacco farming, the role of tobacco in local economies, and the likely impact of program changes and policy options. ERS spending on tobacco analysis during FY2006 is estimated at $123,000, and the budget for FY2007 is $125,000. The Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS), through its network of agricultural counselors and attaches, collects economic intelligence throughout the world. This intelligence is used by trade negotiators, economists, policymakers, and the business community. Tobacco is one in a long list of commodities on which the FAS staff collects information. The USDA estimates that the cost of this effort for tobacco will be $200,000 in FY2006, and the budget for FY2007 is $205,000. The National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) collects field-level data on planting intentions, crop conditions, harvesting progress, yield, and production. This information helps the business community, including farmers develop marketing plans. Also, it serves to alert policy officials of likely shortages or surpluses, thereby facilitating plans for any government action that might be taken. The information that NASS compiles and distributes is considered by economists to be critical to an efficiently functioning market economy. It is argued that the absence of NASS data would most severely disadvantage farmers and government officials, who are least able to obtain information through alternative sources. Tobacco is one in a long list of commodities on which NASS staff collects information. The estimated cost of this effort for tobacco is $231,000 in FY2005, and the budget for FY2007 is $231,000.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has long operated programs that directly assist farmers and others with the production and marketing of numerous crops, including tobacco. In most cases, the crops themselves have not been controversial. However, where tobacco is involved, the use of federal funds has been called into question. Taken together, all of the directly tobacco-related activities of the USDA generated net expenditures of an estimated $30.8 million in FY2006, and the budget anticipates net expenditures of $29.5 million for FY2007. Over 90% of this spending is related to crop insurance. The federally financed tobacco price support program, once the major form of tobacco farmer assistance and in some years a costly program, was terminated at the end of crop year 2004. The USDA is prohibited by language in the annual appropriations law from spending funds to help promote tobacco exports and to conduct research relating to production, processing, or marketing of tobacco and tobacco products. Other tobacco-related activities have been subjected to congressional scrutiny. The USDA does operate numerous programs that are not tobacco-specific, but are available to farmers that produce tobacco and other crops. These are not examined in this report.