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JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶ 1 A class of car-rental companies sued to invalidate a surcharge enacted to build sports facilities to be owned by the Arizona Tourism and Sports Authority ("AzSTA"). The car-rental companies argued the surcharge is invalid both under Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution and under the Dormant Commerce Clause implied by the United States Constitution. The tax court ruled the surcharge was invalid under the Arizona Constitution (but not under the Dormant Commerce Clause) and ordered a refund. ¶ 2 For reasons explained below, we reverse the tax court's order granting summary judgment to the car-rental companies under the Arizona Constitution and direct entry of judgment in favor of the Arizona Department of Revenue ("ADOR") and AzSTA on that claim. We affirm the judgment in favor of ADOR and AzSTA under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Because we conclude the surcharge is not invalid under either constitutional provision, we reverse the tax court's refund order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 3 AzSTA is a "corporate and political body" the legislature created in 2000. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 5-802 (2018). By statute, AzSTA's "boundaries" are those "of any county that has a population of more than two million persons," meaning (then and now) Maricopa County. A.R.S. § 5-802(A). The legislature directed AzSTA to build and operate a "[m]ultipurpose facility"-a stadium/events center-that could accommodate a professional football team, a college bowl game, and "other sporting events and entertainment, cultural, civic, meeting, trade show or convention events [.]" A.R.S. §§ 5-801(4) (2018) (defining "multipurpose facility"), -804(A) (2018), -807 (2018), -815 (2018) (powers of AzSTA). The legislature also granted AzSTA the power to contract to host the Super Bowl and college football national championship and playoff games and to build Major League Baseball spring-training facilities and youth and amateur sports and recreational facilities. A.R.S. §§ 5-808 (2018), -809 (2018). ¶ 4 Although AzSTA may charge for use of its facilities, it cannot levy taxes or assessments to build those facilities. A.R.S. § 5-802(C). Instead, the legislature authorized Maricopa County voters to approve taxes to fund AzSTA's construction projects. See id . Among the taxes the legislature authorized voters to impose is the one challenged here: A surcharge on the gross proceeds of car-rental businesses. See A.R.S. § 5-839(B) (2018). Maricopa County voters approved the car-rental surcharge authorized by § 5-839 in November 2000, just months after the legislature established AzSTA. As authorized, the surcharge is the greater of 3.25 percent "of the gross proceeds or gross income from the business" or $2.50 per car rental, payable by the car-rental business, not the customer. A.R.S. § 5-839(B)(1). If a customer rents a vehicle as a "temporary replacement" for another vehicle, the surcharge charged the car-rental company is a flat $2.50. See A.R.S. § 5-839(B)(2). ¶ 5 In August 2009, Saban Rent-A-Car, Inc. sought a refund of amounts it had paid under § 5-839, claiming the surcharge violated Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution and the Dormant Commerce Clause implied by the U.S. Constitution. After ADOR denied the refund and that decision was upheld on administrative review, Saban challenged the ruling in the tax court, seeking injunctive relief and a refund on behalf of a class of all similarly situated car-rental companies. The court granted AzSTA leave to intervene as a defendant, then certified a class of all businesses that paid the surcharge from September 2005 through March 2008. ¶ 6 After discovery, the tax court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that although the surcharge did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, it was invalid under Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution. The court ruled that ADOR would have to refund the tax to class members but could recoup the amount of the refund, over time, from AzSTA pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-5029(G) (2018). The court granted ADOR's motion for entry of judgment pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), leaving the amount of the refund to be determined. ¶ 7 We have jurisdiction of the parties' various appeals and cross-appeal from the Rule 54(b) judgment pursuant to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) (2018). See Empress Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Price , 116 Ariz. 34, 35, 567 P.2d 350 (App. 1977) ( Rule 54(b) appropriate when "the only question remaining to be resolved is the amount of recovery") (quotations omitted). DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review. ¶ 8 We review de novo the grant of a motion for summary judgment. See Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov , 216 Ariz. 195, 199, ¶ 15, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although a party ordinarily may not appeal an order denying summary judgment, see, e.g. , Fleitz v. Van Westrienen , 114 Ariz. 246, 248, 560 P.2d 430 (App. 1977), the court of appeals may review the denial of a motion for summary judgment if the superior court denied the motion on a point of law, Strojnik v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America , 201 Ariz. 430, 433, ¶ 11, 36 P.3d 1200 (App. 2001). B. Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 9 In relevant part, Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution states: No moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on the public highways or streets or to fuels or any other energy source used for the propulsion of vehicles on the public highways or streets, shall be expended for other than highway and street purposes.... Under this provision, revenues collected from certain "fees, excises, or license taxes" may be spent only for "highway and street purposes." ADOR and AzSTA concede the surcharge authorized by A.R.S. § 5-839 is an excise tax. See also Karbal v. ADOR , 215 Ariz. 114, 116, ¶¶ 9-10, 158 P.3d 243 (App. 2007). Therefore, if the surcharge is a tax "relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on the public highways or streets," it violates Section 14 because its proceeds are spent on sports and recreation facilities, not highways and streets. ¶ 10 Relying on dictionary definitions, Saban argues the phrase "relating to" in Section 14 broadly sweeps up any tax "having connection with or reference to the operation or use of vehicles on the public highways." To be sure, the phrase "relating to" is inherently indeterminate. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) ("If 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes [its scope] would never run its course, for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere.' " (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's Classics 1980) ) (alteration in original omitted) ). For that reason, as Saban conceded at oral argument, without some limiting principle, Section 14 would encompass not only the car-rental surcharge at issue here but also a broad range of taxes that Arizona does not now funnel to highways-including retail sales or business privilege taxes on car sales, tire sales, car leases and car repairs. ¶ 11 Nevertheless, Saban cites Landon v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. , 240 Ariz. 21, 375 P.3d 86 (App. 2016), for the proposition that we should look no farther than the dictionary in interpreting the words "relating to" in Section 14. The issue in Landon was whether the discharge of an injured employee fell within a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act concerning workers "terminat[ed] from employment for reasons that are unrelated to the industrial injury." Id. at 24, 25-26, ¶¶ 5-7, 15, 375 P.3d 86. We consulted dictionaries for the plain meaning of "related," namely "connected" to or "associated" with. Id. at 26, ¶ 16, 375 P.3d 86 (citing Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) and Webster's II New College Dictionary (3d ed. 2005) ). But we also considered the purpose of the legislation and applied common principles of statutory construction, including the rule that "when statutory provisions relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together and reconciled whenever possible, in such a way so as to give effect to all the statutes involved." 240 Ariz. at 25, 26, ¶¶ 12, 17, 375 P.3d 86 (quotation omitted). ¶ 12 We must use these and other like principles to discern whether Section 14 encompasses the car-rental surcharge. See Travelers Ins. , 514 U.S. at 656, 115 S.Ct. 1671 ("We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives [of the statute]."); RSP Architects, Ltd. v. Five Star Dev. Resort Communities, LLC , 232 Ariz. 436, 438, ¶ 8, 306 P.3d 93 (App. 2013) (phrase "relating to" in Prompt Payment Act, A.R.S. § 32-1129(A)(1) (2018), does not encompass every relationship or connection with the referenced term: "Common sense ... tells us there must be some bounds to the breadth of the statute."). We look to the "context, subject matter, effects and consequences, reason and spirit of the law" and try to construe it "in the context of related provisions and in light of its place in the statutory scheme." RSP , 232 Ariz. at 438, ¶ 9, 306 P.3d 93 ; see Landon , 240 Ariz. at 26, ¶ 17, 375 P.3d 86. And, in interpreting a voter-approved measure, we seek to give effect to " 'the intent of the electorate that adopted it.' " State v. Maestas , 242 Ariz. 194, 197, ¶ 11, 394 P.3d 21 (App. 2017) (quoting Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey , 233 Ariz. 1, 6-7, ¶ 21, 308 P.3d 1152 (2013) ). ¶ 13 Applying those principles here, the broad interpretation Saban urges would render multiple phrases in the provision superfluous-a result that we must seek to avoid. See RSP , 232 Ariz. at 439, ¶ 13, 306 P.3d 93. Section 14 expressly applies not only to excise taxes "relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on the public highways or streets" but also to such levies on "fuels or any other energy source used for the propulsion of vehicles on the public highways or streets." Saban's broad construction of "relating to" would render the fuels provision irrelevant because fuel used to propel a vehicle is related to use or operation of a vehicle. The same is true with respect to Section 14's express reference to "registration." A vehicle's registration is related to its use on public streets; one may not legally drive a vehicle that is not registered. Because a broad interpretation of "relating to" deprives these other terms of any effect, the text of Section 14 itself reveals that we should not construe "relating to" in its broadest possible sense. ¶ 14 Turning to the purpose of the provision, Section 14 was enacted in response to federal legislation that conditioned grants of federal highway funds on a state's assurance that revenue "from State motor vehicle registration fees, licenses, gasoline taxes, and other special taxes on motor-vehicle owners and operators of all kinds" would be used exclusively for highway purposes. H.R. 8781, 73rd Cong., Ch. 586, § 12, 48 Stat. 993, 995 (1934) (enacted). In an official publicity pamphlet mailed before the 1952 election, at which Section 14 was approved, voters were informed that 21 states had adopted similar "anti-diversion" laws to ensure and preserve eligibility for federal highway funds. See State of Ariz. Initiative & Referendum Publicity Pamphlet, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution at 4 (1952). ¶ 15 Significantly, the pamphlet assured voters that passage of Section 14 would "entail no change in the source or expenditure of highway revenues." But at the time, Arizona already was collecting a statewide excise tax on car-rental business revenues. That tax was enacted in 1935-17 years before voters enacted Section 14. See S.B. 118, 12th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 1935, Ch. 77, art. 2, § 2(f)(2) (encoded as Ariz. Code Ann. § 73-1303(f)(2) (1939) ) (subsequently encoded as A.R.S. § 42-1314 (1959), H.B. 41, 24th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 1959, Ch. 11, § 1) (repealed by S.B. 1038, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 1985, Ch. 298, § 11); A.R.S. §§ 42-5008 (2018), -5071 (2018); see also Alvord v. State Tax Comm'n , 69 Ariz. 287, 289, 213 P.2d 363 (1950) (recounting history of Arizona's business privilege tax on car-rental services). From the inception of that statewide car-rental business tax, and at the time Section 14 was adopted, proceeds from the tax were not reserved for highway uses but went instead to the state's general fund. Ariz. Code Ann. § 73-1303 (1939) (providing for tax for "the purpose of raising public money to be used in liquidating the outstanding obligations of the state and county governments" and "to aid in defraying the necessary and ordinary expenses of the state and counties"); see also Ariz. Code Ann. § 73-1303 (Supp. 1952) (same). The pamphlet sent to voters in 1952 did not mention the then-existing car-rental business tax, even while telling voters of other existing taxes that would fall within Section 14's scope: "[S]tate gasoline and diesel taxes, registration fees, unladen weight fees on common and contract motor carriers, and motor carrier taxes based on gross receipts." ¶ 16 Further, echoing the federal statute's focus on "motor-vehicle owners and operators," the pamphlet told voters that the purpose of the constitutional measure was "to INSURE THE EXPENDITURE OF ALL REVENUES DERIVED FROM ROAD USERS TO ROAD USES ONLY." Consistent with that focus on tax collections from road users, Arizona puts into its Highway Fund the proceeds of fees or taxes that must be paid in order to legally drive on public roads-motor carrier taxes, vehicle registration and in lieu fees and driver's license fees. ¶ 17 By contrast, as respects the surcharge at issue here, the relationship between the business of renting vehicles and the "operation, or use of vehicles on the public highways or streets" (emphasis added) is attenuated in at least two ways. First, the surcharge is not imposed on the road user (the driver-customer), but instead is imposed on the car-rental business, regardless of its own usage of vehicles on public highways or streets (and regardless of whether it chooses to pass along the surcharge to its customers). Second, the taxable event that triggers the surcharge is the rental of a vehicle , not its operation or use . While most every car-rental transaction will result in the customer using the car on public highways or streets, the surcharge is imposed regardless of whether, how much or how often the customer drives the car. ¶ 18 Ohio appellate courts have issued three decisions addressing a nearly identical constitutional provision. See generally State v. Curry , 97 Ariz. 191, 194-95, 398 P.2d 899 (1965) (consulting decisions interpreting similar statutory language in other states). In the first case, Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles , 134 Ohio St.3d 502, 983 N.E.2d 1262 (Ohio 2012), the state supreme court considered whether its anti-diversion constitutional provision applied to fees assessed on certified abstracts of motor vehicle records. The court rejected a strict plain-language approach to "relating to": At an extreme level, at the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, there is no doubt that fees for certified abstracts are related to the registration of vehicles on public highways. We are not convinced that this extreme view of "relating to" is logical; we know that it is not compelled by the language of [the constitutional provision] or the objectives of the amendment. Id. at 1267, ¶ 15 (quotation omitted). The court concluded that certified abstract fees were not sufficiently related to "registration, operation, or use" of vehicles because the abstract fees were "not necessary to the general motoring public" and "not triggered by the registration, operation, or use of a vehicle on the public highways." Id. at 1267, ¶ 16 (emphasis added). ¶ 19 In another case decided a day later, the same court held that a business tax on gross receipts from the sale of motor-vehicle fuel fell within the scope of the constitutional provision. Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa , 134 Ohio St.3d 565, 983 N.E.2d 1317, 1319-20, ¶ 1 (Ohio 2012). The tax at issue there, like the AzSTA surcharge, was a privilege tax paid by businesses, not a tax paid directly by motorists. After considering the words "relating to" "according to [their] plain and ordinary meaning given in the context of political discussions and arguments, in order to carry out the intention and objectives of the people," id. at 1325, ¶ 30 (quotation omitted), the court concluded that the "text and history" of the provision showed it was intended to apply "broadly" to business privilege taxes "derived from the sales of motor-vehicle fuel"-not solely to transactional taxes imposed directly on fuel sales, id. at 1325-27, ¶¶ 30, 33-36. ¶ 20 Although Beaver Excavating supports Saban's position that the anti-diversion measure may encompass a business privilege tax, the case says little about the meaning of "relating to the registration, operation, or use of motor vehicles." The tax at issue there was imposed on fuel, which Ohio and Arizona's anti-diversion provisions both explicitly mention in a separate clause without any words of limitation. Further, whether framed as a business tax or a sales tax, a tax on motor-vehicle fuel directly relates to the operation or use of a motor vehicle. ¶ 21 The third Ohio case, Fowler v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety , 95 N.E.3d 766, No. 16AP-867, 2017 WL 3263761 at *6, ¶ 21 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017), considered a "financial responsibility reinstatement fee" imposed on motorists ticketed for driving without insurance. The court concluded the fee was not "related to" vehicle registration, operation or use because it was not required of all motorists as a prerequisite to driving, see id. at *5-*6, ¶¶ 18-19, and because it was not "trigger[ed]" by registration, operation or use of a vehicle but rather by a lack of insurance, id. at *6, ¶ 19. The court acknowledged an undeniable relationship between the fee and motor vehicle registration, but found that relationship was "too attenuated" to fall within the scope of the Ohio provision. See id . ¶ 22 Under the reasoning of these cases, an anti-diversion provision applying to fees or taxes "relating to ... operation[ ] or use" of vehicles on public highways and streets only encompasses fees and taxes generally imposed on all who operate or use vehicles on public highways and streets, meaning fees or taxes that are a prerequisite to legally operating or using a vehicle on a public thoroughfare or that are triggered by operation or use of a vehicle on a public thoroughfare. ¶ 23 These general principles are reflected in the categories of taxes the publicity pamphlet told Arizona voters would be subject to Section 14, and those that voters reasonably understood would not. All of the non-fuel revenue sources the pamphlet stated would be encompassed by the constitutional provision-"registration fees, unladen weight fees on common and contract motor carriers, and motor carrier taxes based on gross receipts"-are prerequisites to the legal operation or use of a vehicle on a public highway or are triggered by such operation or use of a vehicle. See ¶ 16 supra . The surcharge authorized by A.R.S. § 5-839 lacks any such nexus to operation or use of a vehicle. Setting aside the fact that the surcharge is imposed on car-rental businesses, not on car-rental customers, it goes without saying that one need not rent a vehicle to legally operate or use that vehicle on an Arizona street; moreover, the surcharge is not triggered by operation or use of a vehicle, but rather by a rental transaction. Consistent with that conclusion, as stated, we infer that when voters enacted Section 14 in 1952 knowing that Arizona already imposed a statewide car-rental tax, they understood that Section 14 would not constrain the state's use of the proceeds of that existing revenue source. ¶ 24 Our analysis also is informed by the principle that "statutes must be given a sensible construction which will avoid absurd results." Sherman v. City of Tempe , 202 Ariz. 339, 343, ¶ 18, 45 P.3d 336 (2002) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 3 of Maricopa County v. Dailey , 106 Ariz. 124, 127, 471 P.2d 736 (1970) ). Acknowledging that Section 14's reach is not limitless, Saban asserts we should construe the provision so that it "reach[es] no further than A.R.S. § 5-839." That contention disregards the duty of a court that is interpreting a legal provision to strive to discern and apply sound principles of general applicability in accordance with the intent of those who enacted the provision. Saban offers no principled rule of textual interpretation that would invalidate the surcharge here without invalidating many other vehicle-related taxes that Arizona never has earmarked for highway purposes-including taxes on motor vehicle sales and leases, auto repairs, sales of automobile-related equipment and parts, and everything else that might be said to be "related to" use of motor vehicles. Voters approved Section 14 more than 60 years ago. We cannot ignore that so far as we know, at no time since then have they, the legislature or the executive branch seriously suggested that the provision might be or should be interpreted to sweep so broadly. ¶ 25 In sum, contrary to Saban's contention, Section 14's text, context and history teach that the voters did not intend it to encompass every tax or fee in any way "relating to" vehicles. Instead, we conclude Section 14 applies to a tax or fee that is a prerequisite to, or triggered by, the legal operation or use of a vehicle on a public thoroughfare. By that reasoning, we hold it does not apply to the surcharge enacted pursuant to A.R.S. § 5-839. C. The Dormant Commerce Clause. 1. General principles. ¶ 26 Saban cross-appeals the superior court's rejection of its challenge to the surcharge under the Dormant Commerce Clause implied by the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "[T]he Commerce Clause ... reflected a central concern of the Framers that[,] ... in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation." Hughes v. Oklahoma , 441 U.S. 322, 325, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). Accordingly, "[a]lthough the Clause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress, [the U.S. Supreme Court has] 'consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.' " Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 1794, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. , 514 U.S. 175, 179, 115 S.Ct. 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995) ). The concern of the Dormant Commerce Clause is with "economic protectionism[,] that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors." Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis , 553 U.S. 328, 337-38, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008) (quotation omitted). Here, Saban argues the surcharge violates the clause because it targets non-Arizona residents who rent vehicles when they visit the state. ¶ 27 A threshold question under the Dormant Commerce Clause is whether the activity alleged to be unconstitutionally burdened is part of interstate commerce. Interstate commerce includes the provision of goods or services aimed primarily at out-of-state visitors. See Heart of AtlantaMotel, Inc. v. United States , 379 U.S. 241, 256, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) ("transportation of passengers in interstate commerce"); Exec. Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 789 F.2d 1523, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1986) (limousine business primarily used by airport patrons); Op. of Justices to the House of Representatives , 428 Mass. 1201, 702 N.E.2d 8, 12 (1998) (car-rental business). Saban submitted evidence on summary judgment that a significant majority of the customers of class members Avis, Hertz and Budget-87%, 72.3% and 80%, respectively-are out-of-state residents. It does not matter, for purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause, that the surcharge is not imposed directly on travelers from out of state, but rather is paid by businesses whose revenues derive from transactions with those travelers. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me. , 520 U.S. 564, 580, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) ("no analytic difference" when "the discriminatory burden is imposed on the out-of-state customer indirectly by means of a tax on the entity transacting business with the non-[resident] customer"); Heart of Atlanta , 379 U.S. at 258, 85 S.Ct. 348 ("[I]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.") (citation omitted). Accordingly, the car-rental business in Arizona is part of interstate commerce. ¶ 28 That being said, the Dormant Commerce Clause is not violated whenever a state taxes a service primarily used by non-residents. "It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing ... business." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue , 303 U.S. 250, 254, 58 S.Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). Thus, "interstate commerce may be made to pay its way." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274, 281, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). A tax is not invalid if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Id. at 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076. ¶ 29 As framed on appeal, the only question under Complete Auto is whether A.R.S. § 5-839 impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce. See Complete Auto , 430 U.S. at 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076. In this context, " 'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Oregon Waste Sys. , Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of State of Or. , 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994). In that inquiry, "a fundamental element ... [is] the principle that 'any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.' " Davis , 553 U.S. at 342-43, 128 S.Ct. 1801 (quoting United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. , 550 U.S. 330, 342, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy , 519 U.S. 278, 298, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) ) ). Thus, a law is discriminatory if it "impose[s] disparate treatment on similarly situated in-state and out-of-state interests." Tracy , 519 U.S. at 298, n.12, 117 S.Ct. 811. Discriminatory laws are almost always per se invalid; they may survive a constitutional challenge only if they serve a legitimate local interest other than economic protectionism and there is no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis. , 340 U.S. 349, 354, 71 S.Ct. 295, 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951). 2. Facial discrimination. ¶ 30 Saban first argues the surcharge violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce. "State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are virtually per se invalid." Camps Newfound , 520 U.S. at 575, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996) ) (internal quotation omitted). But there is no discrimination evident on the face of the surcharge or its statutory authority, A.R.S. § 5-802 : The tax is imposed on all car-rental business revenues generated in Maricopa County, whether or not they are derived from transactions with customers who live in Arizona. ¶ 31 Saban argues, however, that the surcharge falls within what it calls a category of "facial discrimination-by-proxy" decisions by the Supreme Court that, according to Saban, "involve[ ] regulations that, while not drawn explicitly along state lines, contained language that either plainly was intended to serve as a neutral proxy for that demarcation or that impelled the Supreme Court to scrutinize the design or predictable effect of the tax scheme." But the two cases Saban cites both involve explicit facial discrimination. In the first, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias , 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984), the Court struck down a Hawaii tax on liquor sales. The text of the statute plainly discriminated along state lines: It specifically exempted "[o]kolehao manufactured in the State " and "fruit wine manufactured in the State from products grown in the State ." Matter of Bacchus Imports, Ltd. , 65 Haw. 566, 656 P.2d 724, 726, n.1 (Haw. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias , 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 244-4 (6), (7) ) (emphasis added); see also Bacchus Imports , 468 U.S. at 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049. In the second case, Camps Newfound , the Court struck down a Maine tax exemption that excluded charitable institutions "conducted or operated principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine ." 520 U.S. at 568, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (emphasis added). Neither case supports Saban's argument for "facial discrimination-by-proxy." 3. Discriminatory effect. ¶ 32 Even when no discrimination is evident on the face of a state provision, it may violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if its effects discriminate against non-residents. "The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate commerce." W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy , 512 U.S. 186, 201-02, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 129 L.Ed.2d 157 (1994) (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56, 61 S.Ct. 334, 85 L.Ed. 275 (1940) ). Saban argues the surcharge is discriminatory because it falls disproportionately on out-of-state residents, who make up the majority of car-rental customers in Arizona. ¶ 33 Because three-quarters or more of the customers of the plaintiff class are non-Arizona residents, it is undeniable that, to the extent class members pass along the surcharge to their customers, non-residents bear the main burden of the surcharge. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected the notion "that a state tax must be considered discriminatory for purposes of the Commerce Clause if the tax burden is borne primarily by out-of-state consumers." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mont. , 453 U.S. 609, 618-19, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981). The issue is whether non-residents bear a greater burden than similarly situated residents. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. , 481 U.S. 69, 88, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 95 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987) ; see also, e.g. , Commonwealth Edison , 453 U.S. at 617-18, 101 S.Ct. 2946 (Montana coal tax imposed on all customers at same rate was permissible even though 90% of revenues were collected from non-resident customers); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily , 373 U.S. 64, 70, 83 S.Ct. 1201, 10 L.Ed.2d 202 (1963) ("[E]qual treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state."). Under this analysis, the surcharge does not discriminate in its effect on non-residents: It is imposed at the same rates on all car-rental revenues, whether those revenues are generated from transactions with residents or transactions with non-residents. ¶ 34 Saban argues the surcharge here is not unlike the tax struck down for its discriminatory effect in W. Lynn Creamery , 512 U.S. 186, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 129 L.Ed.2d 157. But the tax at issue there-a facially neutral tax imposed even-handedly on both in-state and out-of-state milk producers-burdened out-of-state interests in a predictably disproportionate way because it was coupled with a subsidy that effectively refunded the tax to in-state milk producers, but not to out-of-state milk producers. Id. at 199, n.16, 114 S.Ct. 2205. Here, no subsidy or other like measure reimburses an Arizona resident (or Arizona car-rental company) for the surcharge when a resident rents a car-a distinction that renders W. Lynn Creamery inapposite. ¶ 35 By Saban's reasoning, all taxes on goods and services used primarily by out-of-state residents would be suspect. But courts routinely uphold "tourism" taxes; as long as such taxes do not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state residents, it is irrelevant whether the overall burden of the tax falls mostly on visitors to the state. See, e.g. , Youngblood v. State , 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671, 672, 673 (1990) (hotel tax used to help finance domed stadium; law "imposes an equal tax on residents of the state as well as nonresidents"); Geja's Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth. , 153 Ill.2d 239, 180 Ill.Dec. 135, 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1214, 1219-20 (1992) (restaurant tax); Second St. Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County , 445 S.W.2d 709, 711, 716 (Ky. 1969) (hotel tax to fund tourist and convention commissions); Hunter v. Warren County Bd. of Supervisors , 21 A.D.3d 622, 800 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233, 235 (2005) (tax on hotel room revenues); Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue , 329 P.3d 131, 151, ¶¶ 91-94 (Wyo. 2014) (same). By the same token, the lower rate charged on revenues from temporary-replacement rentals, which does not distinguish between residents and non-residents, is similar to residency-neutral exceptions in other tourism taxes that have been upheld. See, e.g. , Paustian v. Pa. Convention Ctr. Auth. , 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 16, 17, 20, 28-31 (Com. Pl. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Paustian v. Pa. Convention Ctr. Auth. , 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 470, 561 A.2d 1337 (1989) (hotel tax exempted those renting a room for 30 days or more; "the classification is rational and those within the class are treated equally"). ¶ 36 In the end, although the car-rental surcharge falls mostly on revenues generated by transactions with non-Arizonans, that is true only because non-Arizonans rent most of the cars. Saban has provided no evidence that the surcharge has an impermissible discriminatory effect. 4. Discriminatory purpose. ¶ 37 Saban also argues the surcharge is invalid because it purposefully discriminates against interstate commerce. Citing Bacchus Imports , Saban contends that a discriminatory purpose, by itself, may invalidate a law. See 468 U.S. at 270, 104 S.Ct. 3049 ("Examination of the State's purpose in this case is sufficient to demonstrate the State's lack of entitlement to a more flexible approach permitting inquiry into the balance between local benefits and the burden on interstate commerce."). As further support, Saban cites Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of Treasury , 490 U.S. 66, 75-76, 109 S.Ct. 1617, 104 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989), in which the Court said of Bacchus Imports that "because the exemption [in that case] was motivated by an intent to confer a benefit upon local industry not granted to out-of-state industry, the exemption was invalid." ¶ 38 Notwithstanding the dictum in Amerada Hess , however, the tax invalidated in Bacchus Imports expressly discriminated on its face in favor of liquor produced in the state. See ¶ 31 supra . And Saban cites no case in which the Supreme Court has invalidated any measure on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds solely based on discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, some circuit courts of appeals have concluded that discriminatory purpose alone may be a sufficient ground on which to invalidate a measure under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g. , S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine , 340 F.3d 583, 594, 597 (8th Cir. 2003) (striking down voter-approved measure when "pro-con" statement sent to voters before the election was "brimming with protectionist rhetoric"); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore , 252 F.3d 316, 337, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2001) (bill's sponsor stated it addressed "large volume of out of state waste" coming into Virginia, and governor declared the state "has no intention of becoming the nation's dumping grounds"); SDDS, Inc. v. S.D. , 47 F.3d 263, 268, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (ballot materials stated that "South Dakota is not the nation's dumping grounds"); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller , 44 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (statute's stated purpose was "the need to maintain and preserve as a valuable State resource the mining of coal in Illinois"). ¶ 39 If discriminatory purpose may be enough by itself to invalidate a state tax under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the question is the nature and amount of the evidence required to prove such purpose, issues as to which the Supreme Court has not laid out clear guidance. See Hazeltine , 340 F.3d at 596. In examining the evidentiary basis for the "purpose" of a measure challenged on equal-protection grounds, however, the Court has noted that: (1) it will assume that a law's stated purpose is its actual purpose; (2) the proper inquiry is into the law's "principal purposes"; and (3) it "will not invalidate a state statute ... merely because some legislators sought to obtain votes for the measure on the basis of its beneficial side effects on state industry." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456 463, n.7, 471, n.15, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (law whose actual purpose is permissible is not invalid merely because some legislators defended it with protectionist rhetoric). ¶ 40 At issue in Clover Leaf Creamery was a state law that banned the sale of milk in certain plastic containers. Id. at 458, 101 S.Ct. 715. Although proponents argued the measure was aimed at promoting conservation, the challengers contended the real purpose of the law was to promote local "dairy and pulpwood industries," id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 715, a contention supported by a statement by the law's chief legislative proponent chiding a colleague for letting "the guys in the alligator shoes from New York and Chicago come here and tell you how to run your business," Brief for Respondents, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), 1980 WL 339367 at *30 (cited in Clover Leaf Creamery , 449 U.S. at 463, n.7, 101 S.Ct. 715 ). Another legislator supporting the bill said: I don't think there is anything the matter with supporting the timber industry which is our third largest employer in the state. I think in fact that is one of our responsibilities to keep a healthy economy in the state rather than importing petrochemicals and importing plastic bottles from Chicago or wherever they are manufactured certainly the natural resources aren't from here. Id. at 30-31. ¶ 41 The Supreme Court acknowledged these statements, but nonetheless refused to invalidate the law based on an improper protectionist purpose. The Court remarked that the lawmakers' protectionist statements were "easily understood, in context, as economic defense of an Act genuinely proposed for environmental reasons," Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463, n.7, 101 S.Ct. 715, and concluded that "the principal purposes of the [law] were to promote conservation and ease solid waste disposal problems." Id. ¶ 42 As noted, the Arizona legislature enacted A.R.S. § 5-839 in 2000. According to the evidence offered on summary judgment and in the public record, the measure was proposed by a gubernatorial task force based on a report titled, "Arizona Tourism Retention and Promotion." According to the report, although the task force's original mission was to study how to pay for a new stadium to house the Arizona Cardinals and to maintain the Fiesta Bowl's "status as a 'Top-Tier' bowl," after considering "additional threats to the State's tourism tax base," the task force broadened its mission "to include the protection and promotion of Arizona's tourism industry and Cactus League[,] and directed that any capital finance plan to build a stadium also include resources to promote tourism retention." The report asserted that a new stadium would generate $800 million annually and that Arizona would not be allowed to host another Super Bowl without a new stadium. The report also stated that $200 million in annual revenues generated by the Cactus League were at risk because other warm-weather cities were offering new spring-training facilities to lure Major League Baseball teams away from Arizona. Pursuant to the Governor's reported directive "that the funding package minimize the impact on the average Arizona resident," the task force estimated that under the legislation it proposed, 85-90% of the car-rental and hotel assessments would be paid by visitors to Arizona. ¶ 43 At the sole legislative committee hearing on the bill that authorized AzSTA and its funding sources, members of the Governor's task force spoke on behalf of the measure, as did representatives of the Arizona Cardinals, the Fiesta Bowl and the Cactus League. The committee also heard words of support from the Arizona Office of Tourism, the Valley Hotel & Resort Association and from a representative of Enterprise Leasing, a car-rental company that has opted out of the present class action. ¶ 44 At the urging of a lawmaker who cited a desire to minimize the bill's "impact to residents," a House committee amended the proposed legislation to explicitly exempt vehicle rentals to Arizonans. See S.B. 1220, 44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., Committee on Program Authorization Review , Minutes of Meeting (March 9, 2000) page E-11 (considering S.B. 1220). Other committee members opposed the exemption out of concern for its constitutionality; one warned that "certain nonresidents cannot be targeted." Id. at E-12. Ultimately, the resident exemption was stricken from the bill before it became law. ¶ 45 Notwithstanding Saban's arguments to the contrary, the statements recited above are even less probative of a discriminatory purpose than the comments at issue in Clover Leaf Creamery . The statements in that case were made in support of the challenged law; the comments by the Arizona lawmakers concerned an amendment-an exemption for Arizona residents-that the legislature ultimately rejected. We cannot conclude a statute that is neither discriminatory on its face nor in its effect is rendered unconstitutional simply because lawmakers considered and dismissed a protectionist amendment at some point in the legislative process. Nor is it proper to impute protectionist intent to legislators who correctly inform their peers of the constitutional limits to their power. See also generally Julian Cyril Zebot, Awakening A Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce , 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1063, 1086 (2002) (invalidating statute based on purported discriminatory purpose when other legitimate purposes may exist "is a direct affront to state sovereignty, for it fails to respect legitimate state policymaking."). ¶ 46 Saban also cites as evidence of discriminatory intent a single sentence in the pamphlet sent to Maricopa County voters before the election on the surcharge. In the middle of the second page of the 22-page pamphlet, voters were told that "the surcharge on car rentals targets visitors to the State (and includes an exemption for 'replacement vehicles' for vehicles undergoing repair or similarly unavailable on a temporary basis)." We often look to election materials to discern the purpose of a voter-approved law. See ¶ 14 supra . But the language Saban cites is only one sentence in a lengthy document that broadly describes the purposes of the surcharge-to promote tourism; to build a "multipurpose facility" for professional football, college bowl games and other events, including college basketball tournament games and trade shows and concerts; to build and renovate Cactus League facilities; and to develop youth and amateur sports and recreational facilities. Guided by the Supreme Court's demonstrated reluctance to strike down a law based on isolated statements evidencing protectionist motives, we are not persuaded that the statement Saban cites proves discriminatory intent sufficient to invalidate the surcharge. ¶ 47 In addition, Saban points to the Governor's task force report and comments by task force and AzSTA members to the effect that the surcharge was created so that visitors to Arizona would pay most of the cost of the new AzSTA-owned facilities. Assuming for purposes of argument that these non-legislative statements may bear on the issue, they merely highlight that the facilities to be built with the surcharge were intended to spur tourism and its resulting positive effects on the Arizona economy. As noted, proponents of AzSTA and the surcharge argued that the new facilities would attract visitors to the state, who would spend large amounts not only on rental cars but on hotels, food and beverage and other recreational activities. Saban cites no authority for the notion that the Dormant Commerce Clause is offended by a tax on tourism activities when the proceeds of the tax are used to build facilities to attract tourists. Because the car-rental surcharge funds construction of facilities that benefit non-residents who visit Arizona to attend events at those facilities, we are not persuaded that the comments Saban cites are anything other than legitimate discussion about whether services those non-residents purchase should be taxed to fund those facilities. ¶ 48 In sum, A.R.S. § 5-839 and the resulting car-rental surcharge are not discriminatory on their face; nor do they cause any discriminatory effects on interstate commerce. Finally, assuming arguendo that a state tax that is non-discriminatory on its face and in its effect may be invalid solely based on a discriminatory purpose, Saban has not demonstrated that the challenged surcharge has a discriminatory purpose that violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. CONCLUSION ¶ 49 We conclude that the car-rental surcharge authorized under A.R.S. § 5-839 is not invalid under Article IX, Section 14 of the Arizona Constitution, and reverse the tax court's ruling on summary judgment to the contrary, including its award of attorney's fees and costs. We affirm the superior court's ruling that the surcharge is not unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we vacate the superior court's refund order, direct entry of judgment in favor of ADOR and AzSTA and remand for any further required proceedings consistent with this decision. Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current version of a statute or rule. This court already has denied two challenges to the tax. In Long v. Napolitano , 203 Ariz. 247, 251-53, ¶¶ 2-9, 53 P.3d 172 (App. 2002), we ruled that § 5-839 did not violate provisions of the Arizona Constitution unrelated to the provision at issue in this case. See id. at 253, ¶¶ 10-11, 53 P.3d 172. In Karbal v. ADOR , 215 Ariz. 114, 117, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 243 (App. 2007), a car-rental customer raised some of the same arguments made here against the surcharge, but we ruled that the customer lacked standing because the surcharge is imposed on the car-rental companies, not the customers. The first $2.50 collected for each car-rental transaction goes to the Maricopa County stadium district; the remaining revenues go to AzSTA. See A.R.S. §§ 5-801(1), -839(G)(1), (2). The legislature also authorized Maricopa County to tax hotels at up to 1 percent of room sales to support AzSTA. A.R.S. § 5-840 (2018). Empress Beauty Supply interpreted A.R.S. § 12-2101(G), which since was renumbered to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) without substantial change. See Empress Beauty Supply , 116 Ariz. at 35, 567 P.2d 350 ; H.B. 2645, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 2011, Ch. 304, § 1. Citing Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc. , 210 Ariz. 403, 111 P.3d 1003 (2005), Saban argues we may not use the voter pamphlet in interpreting Section 14. But the majority in Phelps held the constitutional provision at issue there was so plain it required no interpretation. Id. at 405, ¶ 10, 111 P.3d 1003. We may rely on voter pamphlets to determine the electorate's intent when necessary to resolve ambiguity. See, e.g. , Calik v. Kongable , 195 Ariz. 496, 500-01, ¶¶ 17-19, 990 P.2d 1055 (1999) ; Laos v. Arnold , 141 Ariz. 46, 47-48, 685 P.2d 111 (1984). Such a pamphlet assists us in ascertaining an "interpretation ... consistent with the purpose" of the measure "as communicated to the people of Arizona." Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. , 231 Ariz. at 351, ¶ 25, 295 P.3d 440. According to information provided by amicus Arizona Department of Transportation, the revenue sources of the Arizona Highway Fund for each year since 2000 have been "Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax Revenues," "Motor Vehicle Registration Fee Revenues," "Motor Carrier Tax Revenues," "Motor Vehicle Operators' License Fees and Misc. Fees and Revenues," and "Motor Vehicle License (In Lieu) Tax Revenues." See Sources of Revenues Deposited in the Arizona Highway User Revenue Fund and Arizona Highway Fund, Fiscal Year 2000 Through Fiscal Year 2016 (July 13, 2016), https://www.azdot.gov/docs/default-source/businesslibraries/hurf-annual-disclosure-file-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=10. The Ohio Constitution provides that "[n]o moneys derived from fees, excises, or license taxes relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways, or to fuels used for propelling such vehicles, shall be expended for other than" highway and related purposes. Ohio Const. art. XII, § 5a. Other out-of-state cases the parties cite are less helpful because the anti-diversion provisions in those cases do not use the phrase "relate to" or "relating to." See Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 833 P.2d 852, 856 (Colo. App. 1992) (provision applied to "proceeds from the imposition of any license, registration fee, or other charge with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle upon any public highway in this state") (alteration omitted); Wittenberg v. Mutton , 203 Or. 438, 280 P.2d 359, 362 (1955) (provision applied to "proceeds from any tax or excise levied on the ownership, operation or use of motor vehicles"). Saban argues § 5-839(C) echoes the language of Section 14 in that it authorizes a surcharge on the business of renting "motor vehicles ... that are designed to operate on the streets and highways of this state." Surely the lawmakers who enacted the statute did not intend the surcharge to fall within Section 14 -its purpose is to fund AzSTA facilities, not to benefit the Highway Fund. That being said, and accepting that the car-rental surcharge applies only to the renting of vehicles to be used on public thoroughfares, as stated above, the surcharge is imposed not on the user of those public thoroughfares but on the business that rents a vehicle to the user. Nor is it a tax that one must pay to legally operate a vehicle on a public thoroughfare or that is triggered by operation of a vehicle on a public thoroughfare. Per se discrimination is the only issue here. ADOR and AzSTA do not contend the surcharge can survive if it is per se discriminatory; Saban does not contend the surcharge is invalid under any lesser standard. See Oregon Waste Sys. , 511 U.S. at 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345 ("nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless 'the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits' ") (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) ). Saban contends the lower rate the surcharge imposes on revenues from temporary-replacement rentals (i.e., cars rented on a short-term basis to replace damaged or stolen cars) discriminates against non-residents, who are less likely to rent replacement vehicles and more likely to rent vehicles for vacations or other visits to Arizona. "[T]he Supreme Court 'never has articulated clear criteria for deciding when proof of a discriminatory purpose and/or effect is sufficient for a state or local law to be discriminatory. Indeed, the cases in this area seem quite inconsistent.' " Puppies 'N Love v. Phoenix , 116 F.Supp.3d 971, 987 (D. Ariz. 2015) (quoting E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies 444-45 (4th ed. 2011) ), superseded by statute , A.R.S. §§ 44-1799.10 to -1799.11 (2018), as recognized and vacated by Puppies 'N Love v. Phoenix , No. CV-14-00073-PHX-DGC, 2017 WL 4679258, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 2017). Nor does Saban argue that the surcharge is unconstitutional because it is not fairly related to the promotion of tourism. See Complete Auto , 430 U.S. at 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076. Saban repeatedly asserts that the surcharge was designed to pay for a new stadium for the Arizona Cardinals, suggesting that the proceeds of the surcharge have been spent primarily for the benefit of local sports fans. It offered no evidence, however, to support the proposition that (even apart from the multiplier effect of tourism dollars on the state's economy) the facilities built by the surcharge benefit local sports fans more than the out-of-state fans of professional and college football and Major League Baseball, concert-goers, trade-show visitors and others who use those facilities when they visit Arizona.

CAMPBELL, Judge: ¶ 1 Phoenix City Prosecutor (the "City") appeals the superior court's decision affirming two rulings by the municipal court in favor of Real Party in Interest Claudette Craig. The City argues the superior court erred when it found that the anti-marital fact privilege applied to Craig's driving under the influence charges and when it granted Craig's motion to sever those charges from a criminal damage charge. We hold that the anti-marital fact privilege precludes testimony by one spouse against another regarding DUI charges and that severance of the criminal damage charge from the DUI charges was proper. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Craig was charged with three counts of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") §§ 28-1381(A)(1) (impaired to slightest degree), -1381(A)(2) (blood alcohol of .08 or more), -1382(A)(1) (extreme DUI), and one count of criminal damage, a domestic violence offense, A.R.S. §§ 13-1602, -2601(A). Before trial in the municipal court, Craig moved to preclude testimony and statements by her husband regarding the three DUI charges. See A.R.S. § 13-4062(A)(1) (anti-marital fact privilege). Craig also moved to sever the three DUI charges from the criminal damage charge. ¶ 3 The City responded that Craig's husband had called the police to say he was concerned that Craig had been drinking and might attempt to drive. The City claimed he parked one of the couple's vehicles behind the couple's van to prevent Craig from driving away in the van. It alleged that, Craig, intoxicated and undeterred by the car blocking her way, backed the van out, shoving the other car fifteen feet down the driveway. When the police arrived, Craig was not in a vehicle. An officer noted property damage to the van consisting of a small dent and some scratches on the rear bumper and a large dent on the front bumper of the other vehicle. The City argued that the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege for crimes committed by a wife against her husband found in A.R.S. § 13-4062(1) applied to the DUI charges as well as the criminal damage charge. The municipal court disagreed, severed the criminal damage count from the DUI counts and precluded Craig's husband from testifying in the DUI trial. ¶ 4 The City filed a petition for special action. The superior court accepted jurisdiction but denied relief to the City. The City appealed to this court. DISCUSSION ¶ 5 Craig argues that this court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Section 12-2101(A)(1) confers "appellate jurisdiction over the superior court's final judgment in a special action." State v. Chopra , 241 Ariz. 353, 355, ¶ 8, 387 P.3d 1282, 1284 (App. 2016). The superior court's ruling, however, does not appear to be a final judgment within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). See State v. Bayardi , 230 Ariz. 195, 197 n. 4, ¶ 7, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065 (App. 2012). We need not decide this issue here. This appeal raises an issue of first impression, see State ex rel. Romley v. Martin , 203 Ariz. 46, 47, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142, 1143 (App. 2002), and there is no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). We therefore elect to exercise special action jurisdiction. See Bayardi , 230 Ariz. at 197, ¶ 7, 281 P.3d at 1065 (court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction). ¶ 6 Accordingly, we review the superior court's ruling on the applicability of the anti-marital fact privilege for an abuse of discretion. State v. Whitaker , 112 Ariz. 537, 542, 544 P.2d 219, 224 (1975). We review the interpretation and application of statutes de novo. See State v. Boyston , 231 Ariz. 539, 543, ¶ 14, 298 P.3d 887, 892-93 (2013). The anti-marital fact privilege provides, in part, that a wife may prevent her spouse from testifying for or against her regarding any "events occurring during marriage." A.R.S. § 13-4062(1). The anti-marital fact privilege does not apply, however, in "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by the husband against the wife, or by a wife against the husband." A.R.S. § 13-4062(1). Craig does not dispute that her husband can testify about the criminal damage claim because he is a co-owner of the car, and the crime therefore, allegedly was committed "against" him. Craig, however, argues that the criminal damage charge is the only charge to which the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applies and such testimony should be precluded for the other charged offenses pursuant to the privilege. ¶ 7 The legislative purpose of the privilege is "to support the peace and tranquility of families and to protect the marital relation[ship]." Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 540, 544 P.2d at 222. This means that "whether the marital privilege should be recognized and under what circumstances ... involves a determination of the rights and status which flow from the institution of marriage." State v. Williams , 133 Ariz. 220, 232, 650 P.2d 1202, 1214 (1982). As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232, 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293, 298, 614 P.2d 835, 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship.). ¶ 8 In construing the privilege in a predecessor statute, our supreme court concluded the exception allows "testimony in all cases in which the crime committed [s]o closely touches or affects the other spouse as to render the reason for the rule-promotion of marital peace and apprehension of marital dissension-inapplicable." State v. Crow , 104 Ariz. 579, 585, 457 P.2d 256, 262 (1969), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burchett , 107 Ariz. 185, 484 P.2d 181 (1971). Therefore, in determining whether a crime is a crime committed by one spouse against another, we look to whether the crime "places a strain on the marriage relationship." State v. Salazar , 146 Ariz. 547, 550, 707 P.2d 951, 954(App. 1985) (citing Crow , 104 Ariz. 579, 457 P.2d 256, and Williams , 133 Ariz. 220, 650 P.2d 1202 ). The exception does not require that the other spouse be the actual "victim" of the defendant-spouse's offense. While in some cases it is clear that the spouse is the victim, such as murder or assault, there are others when the victim-spouse suffered no physical injury, but the court found the exception to the privilege still applied. See Crow , 104 Ariz. at 586, 457 P.2d at 263 (husband murdered wife's brother and father, thereby effectively ending the marriage; no error in permitting wife to testify as to the first degree murder charges in addition to assault charge against her when spouses had agreed to terminate marriage and husband committed offenses when the brother and father accompanied the wife to husband's home to pick up her belongings); Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 539-42, 544 P.2d at 221-24 (husband was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon for shooting into estranged wife's apartment and exchanging gunfire with wife's live-in boyfriend; trial court did not err in finding the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applied because estranged husband endangered his wife and daughter by shooting into their apartment while they were inside). ¶ 9 The City argues that under Salazar , the exception for crimes committed by a wife against her husband applies to the DUI charges here. Salazar , however, is distinguishable. Salazar considered whether the crime of endangerment, which included reckless conduct, constituted a crime committed by a husband against his wife under A.R.S. § 13-4062(1). 146 Ariz. at 550, 707 P.2d at 954. The court found that "having an accident driving while intoxicated on a city street at 55 miles per hour with one's spouse as a passenger is a crime which most certainly places a strain on the marriage relationship, the test discussed by our supreme court in State v. Crow. " Id . Further, endangerment necessarily requires a defendant to place another, in that case the spouse, in substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury. See A.R.S. § 13-1201(A) ("A person commits endangerment by recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury."). Here, unlike in Salazar , there is no allegation that the DUI posed any physical threat to Craig's husband. And although the defendant in Salazar was also charged with a DUI, the issue of whether the DUI offense fell within the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege was not before the court. 146 Ariz. at 550, 707 P.2d at 954. ¶ 10 The City next argues, citing Salazar , that if the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applies to one charge, it applies to all charges when the charges arise out of the same course of conduct. Contrary to the City's argument, Salazar did not hold that if the exception applies to one charge, it applies to all of the others. ¶ 11 The City then argues that Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights, Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1, and its statutory counterpart, A.R.S. §§ 13-4401 to -4442, (collectively, the "VBR") make Craig's husband a "victim" of the DUI charges because he is a "victim" under A.R.S. § 13-4401(19). Section 13-4401(19) defines "victim," for purposes of the VBR, in part as "a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed." See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court , 184 Ariz. 409, 411, 909 P.2d 476, 478 (App. 1995). ¶ 12 A central purpose of the VBR is to grant rights to crime victims in an effort to promote the "respect, protection, participation and healing of their ordeals." State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein , 214 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 778, 780 (App. 2007). To this end, the VBR confers a broad range of rights on crime victims, including "the right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or other person acting on behalf of the defendant." Id. ; Ariz. Const. art. 2 § 2.1 (A)(5); A.R.S. § 13-4433. As such, the purpose of the anti-marital fact privilege is fundamentally different from the purpose of the VBR: the purpose of the privilege is to protect the marital relationship, whereas, the purpose of the VBR is to protect the victim. ¶ 13 The City does not cite to any legal authority holding that a determination that when a spouse is a "victim" under A.R.S. § 13-4401(19), the marital privilege is automatically forfeited pursuant to the exception for crimes committed by one spouse against another. The City cites only Romley , 184 Ariz. 409, 909 P.2d 476, arguing that because the "victim" of the DUI offense was shielded from the defendant's deposition requests under the VBR, the exception for crimes committed by one spouse against another applies here. Romley is distinguishable on its facts. The defendant there was charged with a felony aggravated DUI after colliding with another car and damaging the other car, but not injuring its driver. Id. at 410, 909 P.2d at 477. The driver of the other car sought to assert his rights not to be deposed under the VBR. Id. ; see A.R.S. § 13-4401(18). This court concluded that the DUI was "committed against" the driver, rendering him a victim under the VBR, even though he sustained no injury. Id . at 411, 909 P.2d at 478. The court relied in part on the definition of "criminal offense" in A.R.S. § 13-4401(6), which at the time included conduct that established "probable cause to believe that a felony or that a misdemeanor involving physical injury [or] the threat of physical injury ... ha[d] occurred." Id . ; 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 158, § 17 (1st Reg. Sess.). Thus, the defendant could not compel the driver (victim) to submit to a deposition pre-trial. Romley , 184 Ariz. at 411, 909 P.2d at 478. Here, the City is attempting to compel Craig's husband to provide testimony at trial in direct conflict with the anti-marital fact privilege. Romley provides no support for the City's contention that such compelled testimony falls within the purview of the VBR. ¶ 14 Further, the statutory anti-marital fact privilege and this exception pre-date the VBR by decades and were adopted from the common law which predates the VBR even further. See Crow , 104 Ariz. at 583, 457 P.2d at 260 (citation omitted). Nothing in the VBR suggests that the voters or the legislature intended the VBR to apply to the exception to the privilege for crimes committed by one spouse against the other. The focus of the VBR is on victims, a term not found in the exception, which only applies between spouses. ¶ 15 Even if we were to apply Romley's "threat of physical injury" standard, the City does not argue that when Craig backed the van out of the driveway, she threatened physical harm to her husband. The "victim" in Romley was at risk because he was the driver of the car hit by the defendant. Nothing in our record suggests that Craig's husband was likewise at risk when Craig backed the van down the couple's driveway. ¶ 16 The City also fails to recognize that, generally speaking, a DUI may be a "victimless" crime for all but VBR purposes. See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250, 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228, 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071, 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183, 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next argues that if the anti-marital fact privilege does not apply to the DUI charges, the superior court erred in granting Craig's motion to sever. We review a ruling on a motion to sever for an abuse of discretion. State v. Garland , 191 Ariz. 213, 216, ¶ 9, 953 P.2d 1266, 1269 (App. 1998). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.4(a) directs the court to sever counts "if necessary to promote a fair determination of any defendant's guilt or innocence of any offense." Here the court, exercising its discretion, severed the single count to which the exception applied from counts to which it did not. Allowing a jury to hear otherwise privileged testimony from the defendant's husband might well prejudice the jury on the DUI counts. Because we conclude that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in finding the anti-marital fact privilege applied to the DUI charges, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting Craig's motion to sever. Cf. Crow , 104 Ariz. at 586, 457 P.2d at 263. CONCLUSION ¶ 18 We affirm the superior court's decision and lift the stay previously entered by this court on April 7, 2017. The City filed a transcript of the hearing as an appendix to its opening brief, but did not file it as part of the record on appeal. Therefore, we do not consider it. See ARCAP 11(a), 11.1(d). The statute contains additional exceptions not at issue in this appeal. The City raises an additional argument in its reply brief, claiming that the superior court erred because Craig's husband will be permitted to testify in the criminal damage charge and therefore "[t]he policy reason[s] for the anti-marital privilege do[ ] not exist in this case." This argument is not properly before us and is waived. Nelson v. Rice , 198 Ariz. 563, 567 n.3, ¶ 11, 12 P.3d 238, 242 n.3 (App. 2000) (failure to raise argument in opening brief waives argument on appeal). Moreover, the trial court has the discretion to sever a charge on which testimony cannot be compelled from charges in which it can be compelled. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4(a). The City also argues that the exception applies because Craig's husband is a "victim" under State v. Superior Court (Moore) , 188 Ariz. 372, 936 P.2d 558 (App. 1997). There, the court held that a crime perpetrated by one spouse upon another occurs when jointly owned property is damaged by one spouse to the detriment of the other. Id . at 373, 936 P.2d at 559. As previously addressed, the parties here do not contest that Craig's husband may be compelled to testify about the criminal damage charge.

STARING, Presiding Judge ¶ 1 Private Motorsports Group, LLC ("PMG"), the Clerk of the City of Maricopa ("the Clerk"), and the Mayor and individual members of the City Council (collectively, "the City") appeal from the trial court's ruling in favor of Maricopa Citizens Protecting Taxpayers and its officers, Robert Rebich, and David Prom (collectively, "Maricopa Citizens") in their action seeking declaratory, injunctive, and special action relief regarding a petition seeking a referendum on the City's decision to grant PMG a permit to operate a motorsports facility. PMG also appeals from the court's denial of its counterclaims against Maricopa Citizens and cross-claims against the Clerk. On September 6, 2017, we reversed the trial court and directed it to enter judgment in favor of PMG, the Clerk, and the City, indicating a written opinion would follow. This is that opinion. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 The controversy in this case centers on a large parcel of land located in Pinal County. In 1963, it was zoned "CI-2-Industrial Zone." The City annexed the property in 2007, but retained its zoning designation under the then-existing zoning code ("the Old Code"). The City adopted a new zoning code ("the New Code") in 2015. Subsequently, PMG sought a permit to build a motorsports facility on the site and, pursuant to the City's instructions, submitted in February 2017 a "Conditional Use Permit Application" (a designation that existed only in the New Code) upon which someone had handwritten "Industrial Use Permit" (a designation that existed only under the Old Code). The Old Code expressly identified a "[r]acetrack or sports stadium" as a possible use under the property's existing CI-2-Industrial Zone designation. In April 2017, the City's Zoning and Planning Commission unanimously approved PMG's application, as did the City Council. ¶ 3 Maricopa Citizens then filed a referendum application and, in June 2017, submitted eighty-six petition sheets containing approximately 1,000 signatures. The Clerk determined the subject matter of the referendum was "an administrative act, rather than a legislative act and, therefore, not subject to referendum." The Clerk also disqualified thirty signatures for statutory reasons. ¶ 4 Maricopa Citizens filed a complaint naming PMG, the Clerk, and the City as defendants. Maricopa Citizens first argued the City had violated the New Code by issuing the permit, claiming the property had to first be rezoned and then approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission instead of the City Council. Thus, Maricopa Citizens reasoned, the City's action was "akin to a zoning decision and therefore referable" because a conditional use permit did not exist under the old zoning designation. According to Maricopa Citizens, the City had "made policy" by deciding "a property owner that was in a district under the Old Code in which he was eligible to apply for an industrial use permit [was] now eligible for a conditional use permit" and by determining "the decision whether to grant [a conditional use permit] should be governed by the Old Code." Maricopa Citizens further argued that, under the Old Code, the City's determination to award PMG a permit constituted a legislative decision. Finally, Maricopa Citizens contended the Clerk lacked authority to invalidate twelve of the signatures pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-121.01 because only the city or zip code was missing, and not the residence address. ¶ 5 PMG counterclaimed against Maricopa Citizens and cross-claimed against the City and the Clerk for declaratory, injunctive, and special-action relief, asserting the petition sheets "invert[ed] the placement of the designation of the 'Maricopa City Council' as the body enacting the matter to be referred" and thus did not comply with A.R.S. § 19-101(A). PMG further asserted the sheets violated A.R.S. § 19-121(A)(5)"by having a top margin of less than one-half inch." Thus, PMG concluded, the petition sheets were invalid because they did not strictly comply with applicable statutory requirements for referendum. ¶ 6 After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled in favor of Maricopa Citizens, concluding the grant of the use permit was legislative action and thus subject to referendum irrespective whether "the new code preserved the right to apply for an industrial use permit, or if the City Council made a policy decision to restore that right." It further concluded the Clerk's decision to disqualify twelve signatures "exceeds the permitted scope of the initial review" allowed by statute. Finally, the court determined the petitions were not "fatally defective," finding the "petition strictly complies with A.R.S. §§ 19-101(A) and 19-121(A) as reasonably construed to supplement its constitutional purpose." Accordingly, the court ordered the Clerk "to include the twelve signatures in the count of eligible signatures, include those signatures in the pool of eligible signatures for random selection, and promptly forward the legally required random sample of the subject referendum petition to the County Recorder." This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1) and 19-122(A). Discussion ¶ 7 We address first the question whether the trial court erred by concluding the City's decision to grant the use permit was a legislative rather than administrative act and therefore subject to referendum. We review the court's determination de novo. See Respect the Promise in Opposition to R-14-02 Neighbors for a Better Glendale v. Hanna , 238 Ariz. 296, ¶ 11, 360 P.3d 92 (App. 2015) ("Whether a particular action taken by the governing body of a municipality is subject to the referendum power is a question we review de novo."). ¶ 8 "The Arizona Constitution reserves the power of referendum to ... qualified electors...." Redelsperger v. City of Avondale , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 8, 87 P.3d 843 (App. 2004) ; Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1 § 1 (8). The power of referendum "permits qualified electors to circulate petitions and refer legislation which has been enacted by their elected representatives to a popular vote." Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 8, 87 P.3d 843. Although "broadly construed," the right to referendum "is limited to legislative acts." Id. ¶ 9 ; Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa , 169 Ariz. 485, 488, 821 P.2d 146, 149 (1991) ("The sound rationale for limiting the referendum to legislative actions is that to permit referenda on executive and administrative actions would hamper the efficient administration of local governments."). And, because referendum permits a minority to forestall implementation of enacted legislation, it "requires strict compliance with [applicable] constitutional and statutory requirements." W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale , 168 Ariz. 426, 429, 814 P.2d 767, 770 (1991) (enacted legislation may reflect view of majority); A.R.S. § 19-101.01 (requiring "strict compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the referendum process"). ¶ 9 In Wennerstrom , our supreme court established the analysis Arizona courts must employ when determining whether an act is legislative or administrative: Actions relating to subjects of a permanent and general character are usually regarded as legislative, and those providing for subjects of a temporary and special character are regarded as administrative. In this connection an ordinance which shows an intent to form a permanent rule of government until repealed is one of permanent operation. .... The test of what is a legislative and what is an administrative proposition, with respect to the initiative or referendum, has further been said to be whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already in existence. The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it. Similarly, an act or resolution constituting a declaration of public purpose and making provision for ways and means of its accomplishment is generally legislative as distinguished from an act or resolution which merely carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative body. 169 Ariz. at 489, 821 P.2d at 150, quoting 5 E. McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations , § 16.55, at 266 (3d rev. ed. 1989). Thus, under Wennerstrom , "we must consider whether the [City's grant of a use permit to PMG] is (1) permanent or temporary, (2) of general or specific (limited) application, and (3) a matter of policy creation or a form of policy implementation." Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 15, 87 P.3d 843. ¶ 10 We consider first whether granting a use permit to PMG was permanent or temporary in nature. In Redelsperger , applying the Wennerstrom analysis, we concluded "the approval of a conditional use permit is an administrative act and therefore not subject to the referendum power." Id. ¶ 1 ; see also Sandblom v. Corbin , 125 Ariz. 178, 184, 608 P.2d 317, 323 (App. 1980) ("When a Board of Supervisors enacts a zoning ordinance or amendment thereto, it acts in a legislative capacity.... On the other hand, the issuance of a special use permit is generally recognized as an administrative act."). In doing so, we observed that although the conditional use permit at issue in that case was not issued for a specific duration and "could arguably continue indefinitely," the zoning code authorized the planning commission "to impose conditions on a conditional use permit," including requiring periodic renewal. Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 15, 87 P.3d 843. Accordingly, we conclude the determination of whether the City's grant of a use permit to PMG was permanent or temporary does not turn upon whether the City issued the permit for a specific time period, but rather whether the City could impose such a limitation. See id. ¶ 11 The trial court, therefore, erred when it determined "the action is permanent, since there is no provision for an expiration date or periodic review." The record does not reflect any dispute that the City could have granted PMG a use permit for a specific duration, or that the City could amend the use permit to impose a time limit. ¶ 12 We turn now to the second part of the Wennerstrom analysis, namely whether granting a use permit to PMG was "of general or specific (limited) application." Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 15, 87 P.3d 843. On this point, there is no meaningful dispute. Both sides acknowledge the use permit granted to PMG was limited to a single parcel of land. See id. ("By definition, a conditional use permit is applicable only to a specific area...."). And, although Maricopa Citizens attempts to draw a distinction based on the large size of the property (280 acres), we do not find the distinction significant. We conclude the use permit was of limited application-a conclusion that supports finding its issuance to be an administrative act. ¶ 13 We now address the third part of the Wennerstrom analysis: whether granting a use permit to PMG was "a matter of policy creation or a form of policy implementation." Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 15, 87 P.3d 843. As in Redelsperger , the parties disagree about the significance of the decision-making body's discretion to this determination. Id. ¶ 16. Undoubtedly, "[d]iscretion is a factor of consideration when distinguishing between policy implementation and policy creation," and, in general, the greater the amount of discretion enjoyed by the body making the decision, "the more likely the act is legislative." Id. As PMG correctly points out, however, we made clear in Redelsperger that discretion "is not the ending point in our analysis," and is just one "factor to be considered." Id. ¶ 14 Our supreme court's opinion in Wennerstrom strongly supports the conclusion that discretion is but one factor to consider and is not dispositive. In Wennerstrom , after voters approved Mesa's "request for authorization to issue and sell $30 million of general obligation bonds" to improve city roads, the city council "passed a resolution 'conceptually approving' the widening of a portion of Country Club Drive from five to seven lanes 'with alignment as indicated by staff.' " 169 Ariz. at 486-87, 821 P.2d at 147-48. A group of citizens then sought to compel a referendum on the council's resolutions, but the city clerk refused to process them, asserting the resolutions were administrative acts. Id. at 487, 821 P.2d at 148. In the ensuing litigation, the trial court concluded the council's "resolutions were not subject to referendum because they were not legislative actions." Id. The supreme court affirmed and, as noted above, established the analysis that courts must employ in determining whether an act is administrative or legislative. Id. at 489, 495, 821 P.2d at 150, 156. The Wennerstrom court also wrote: Plaintiff has noted that the bond proposal itself did not specifically mention Country Club Drive, and argues from this that citizens had no notice that Mesa intended to use the bond funds to widen Country Club Drive. While it is true that the bond proposal was not focused on Country Club Drive, that fact does not alter our decision. The lack of specificity in a bond proposal grants the City much more leeway in deciding when and where to administer the bond funds. This lack of specificity may well be a valid reason to oppose a bond proposal. It does not change, however, the nature of the council's action from administrative to legislative. Id. at 492, 821 P.2d at 153. ¶ 15 As noted, under Wennerstrom , the test of what is legislative and what is administrative "has further been said to be whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already in existence," and an act is administrative "if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it." Id. at 489, 821 P.2d at 150, quoting 5 E. McQuillen, supra , § 16.55, at 266. In this instance, the City created policy and acted in a legislative capacity when it initially adopted the Old Code and then, upon later adopting the New Code, retained the Old Code's designations and regulations concerning the PMG property. However, when it approved PMG's use permit, thereby allowing a use of the property that had been expressly identified in the Old Code, the City merely executed already existing policy and, therefore, acted in an administrative capacity. ¶ 16 We are unpersuaded by Maricopa Citizens' reliance upon State v. Oakley , 180 Ariz. 34, 881 P.2d 366 (App. 1994). In Oakley , we concluded that the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors' "adoption of the boundaries of a [community college] election district is a legislative act." Id. at 37-38, 881 P.2d at 369-70. There, however, although the authority to establish the districts was delegated by statute, the board enjoyed nearly absolute discretion and was "free to fashion districts as it [saw] fit without reference to any particular legislative formula." Id. at 38, 881 P.2d at 370. We agree with PMG that this stands in "sharp contrast" to the circumstances at hand, in which the City adhered to an existing procedure to issue a permit for a use expressly identified in the Old Code designation applicable to PMG's property. ¶ 17 We are similarly unpersuaded by Maricopa Citizens' reliance upon Bartolomeo v. Town of Paradise Valley , 129 Ariz. 409, 631 P.2d 564 (App. 1981). In that case, we concluded "the granting or the refusal to grant rezoning by special use permit is a legislative function." Id. at 416, 631 P.2d at 571. Bartolomeo , however, is distinguishable because the Town of Paradise Valley was entirely residential in its zoning, with one-acre lots, and used the issuance of special use permits as a means of rezoning. Id. ; see also Pioneer Trust Co. v. Pima County , 168 Ariz. 61, 66, 811 P.2d 22, 27 (1991) (conditional approval of rezoning subject to referendum). Here, there was no rezoning; as noted, the City, in accordance with existing procedure, granted a use permit for a use expressly allowed by the Old Code. See Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 21, 87 P.3d 843 ("[T]he issuance or denial of a conditional use permit is a mean or method of implementing the general policy already set forth in the Zoning Ordinance."). ¶ 18 Accordingly, we conclude the issuance of the use permit to PMG was an administrative act, and was not subject to referendum. The trial court erred by concluding to the contrary. Disposition ¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court to grant judgment in favor of appellants. The parties subsequently stipulated that PMG be designated the real party in interest. Another form of referendum, which is not relevant here, "permits the legislature to refer a legislative enactment to a popular vote." Redelsperger , 207 Ariz. 430, ¶ 8, 87 P.3d 843 ; Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1 § 1 (3). Maricopa Citizens asserts Redelsperger reflects a misunderstanding of Wennerstrom , and that Wennerstrom "clearly indicates that it is the 'actions' and 'decisions' of a city council that are the critical part of the inquiry, not the actions that the city council could have decided to take." In support, it offers an abridged quote from Wennerstrom : "Other states have utilized various tests when distinguishing between administrative and legislative decisions: 'Actions relating to subjects of a permanent and general character are usually regarded as legislative, and those providing for subjects of a temporary and special character are regarded as administrative.' " 169 Ariz. at 489, 821 P.2d at 150, quoting 5 E. McQuillen, supra , § 16.55, at 266. We disagree that this language from Wennerstrom draws the distinction Maricopa Citizens asserts. The council subsequently passed two additional resolutions concerning the improvement of Country Club Drive. Id. at 487, 821 P.2d at 148. Because we conclude the City's grant of a use permit to PMG was administrative and therefore not subject to referendum, we need not address whether the petition signature sheets strictly complied with §§ 19-101(A) or 19-121(A)(5), or whether the Clerk had authority to disqualify twelve signatures because the city or zip code was not listed.

STARING, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 In this special action, we conclude the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, does not bar the State of Arizona from prosecuting a person for child abuse after a juvenile court found in a separate dependency action that he did not abuse the child in question and dismissed a dependency petition that was based solely on that alleged abuse. Consequently, the respondent judge did not err in denying petitioner Nikolas Crosby-Garbotz's motion to dismiss the underlying criminal action. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 The following facts are either undisputed or established by the record before us. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3623(A)(1), Crosby has been charged with abusing his daughter, C. She was born prematurely in February 2016 and remained in the hospital for almost two weeks after her birth. On July 5, 2016, when C. was approximately five months old, Crosby called 9-1-1 and stated she was unresponsive and appeared to be having a seizure. Paramedics transported C. to the hospital, where doctors determined she had a subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes, and retinoschisis, or splitting of the layers in the eye. C. had no external injuries, skull fractures, or other signs of physical trauma. ¶ 3 The Arizona Department of Child Safety (DCS) took temporary custody of C. and filed a dependency petition, alleging that Crosby had abused her, based on the definition of abuse in A.R.S. § 8-201(2), and that C. was dependent pursuant to § 8-201(15)(a)(i) or (iii). The dependency hearing began in November 2016 and concluded in February 2017, after eleven sessions. At the hearing, Crosby testified that since she was about three months old, C. had suffered "recurrent, but intermittent and persistent bouts of irritability and lethargy" and periods during which she "would become inconsolable," and that there were "multiple instances of projectile vomiting." He stated that on the morning in July, she had been "crying" and "fussy" and then had a seizure in his arms. ¶ 4 DCS and Crosby each presented two medical experts during the hearing. DCS's experts opined that C.'s injuries were not accidental and were the result of abuse, most likely "Shaken Baby Syndrome" (SBS). Crosby's experts, on the other hand, testified SBS has been discredited as an explanation for the kinds of injuries suffered by C. They opined C. could not have sustained her injuries as a result of shaking. Further, they opined that, other than the hematoma, there were no signs of abuse or trauma, and, in any event, there was no evidence C. had been shaken vigorously, such as bruising or neck trauma. Crosby's experts testified it would have been impossible for C. to have sustained a head injury of the kind alleged without some additional injury. They surmised that given C.'s medical history, which included premature birth and previous symptoms of vomiting and lethargy, the more likely explanation was that she had a dormant or chronic subdural hematoma, perhaps caused by viral encephalitis. ¶ 5 In March 2017, the juvenile court issued an under-advisement ruling in the dependency case, concluding DCS had not sustained "its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that ... Crosby inflicted physical injury, impairment of body function, or disfigurement to" C. The court found the evidence Crosby had presented "controverts or sufficiently calls into question the State's medical position that [C.]'s injuries were sustained only as a result of being violently shaken by the Father," positing it was more likely C. had a chronic subdural hematoma that was aggravated when she bumped her head on her crib. The court also concluded DCS had not sustained its burden of showing the mother had neglected C. by failing to protect her, "[a]s the Court has found that it is more likely than not that [Crosby] did not injure" C. The court therefore dismissed the dependency petition. ¶ 6 In December 2016, before the dependency case had concluded, the state charged Crosby with child abuse under § 13-3623(A)(1). In presenting the charge to the grand jury, a police detective testified Crosby had been caring for then-five-month-old C. while his wife, C.'s mother, was at work, and he had called 9-1-1 to report C. was unresponsive and had shown seizure-like behavior. The detective testified medical tests had revealed C. had a subdural hematoma, "a type of brain bleed, ... extensive retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes, as well as retinoschisis." He stated, "[P]er doctors, retinoschisis is from a very significant force, such as a high speed motor vehicle accident, multiple skull fractures from a crushing-type injury, a fall from a significant height or abusive head trauma." He added that C. did not have any external injuries and did not appear to have a bleeding disorder, but that Crosby had admitted he bounced her up and down on his chest when she became fussy, but denied he had shaken her. The detective informed the grand jury C. was still under the care of a neurologist and an ophthalmologist but it was unknown whether she would suffer permanent vision impairment. The grand jury returned an indictment on the charge. ¶ 7 Crosby filed a motion to remand the case to the grand jury for a new finding of probable cause, pursuant to Rule 12.9, Ariz. R. Crim. P. After a hearing, the respondent judge denied the motion in May 2017. Crosby then filed a motion to dismiss the charge based on collateral estoppel, arguing the state could not relitigate the issue of whether he had abused C. The respondent denied the motion after a hearing in August. In this special action, Crosby challenges the denial of both motions. Special-Action Jurisdiction ¶ 8 The denial of a motion to dismiss a prosecution is an interlocutory order not subject to direct appeal. Nowell v. Rees , 219 Ariz. 399, ¶ 10, 199 P.3d 654 (App. 2008). It can, however, be challenged on appeal following a conviction. See State v. Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 22, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004) (denial of motion to dismiss charges raisable on appeal but special-action review preferred when motion raises double-jeopardy claim). Ordinarily, the existence of a remedy by appeal weighs against accepting special-action jurisdiction, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), but, in our discretion, we may nevertheless review the denial of a motion to dismiss in a special action when there are other reasons for accepting jurisdiction, such as when the issue raised is a pure question of law. See Lewis v. Warner , 166 Ariz. 354, 355, 802 P.2d 1053, 1054 (App. 1990). Whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law. See Tripati v. Forwith , 223 Ariz. 81, ¶ 23, 219 P.3d 291 (App. 2009) ; see also Fitzgerald v. Superior Court , 173 Ariz. 539, 543, 845 P.2d 465, 469 (App. 1992) (accepting special-action jurisdiction to review denial of motion to dismiss charges based on claims of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel). In addition, whether the state is precluded from pursuing criminal prosecution because of a finding in a dependency action-a commonly occurring and accelerated process that can have implications concerning child safety and family preservation-is an issue of statewide importance, a fact that provides a compelling reason for accepting special-action jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Cruikshank , 214 Ariz. 40, ¶ 2, 148 P.3d 84 (App. 2006). For these reasons, we accept jurisdiction of this special action to review the denial of Crosby's motion to dismiss. But, as discussed below, because the respondent did not abuse his discretion in denying Crosby's motion to dismiss, we deny relief. See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3(c) (special-action relief appropriate when respondent abuses discretion). Discussion ¶ 9 Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "[w]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Fitzgerald , 173 Ariz. at 546, 845 P.2d at 472, citing Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and State v. Stauffer , 112 Ariz. 26, 536 P.2d 1044 (1975). Collateral estoppel serves to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) ; see also Fitzgerald , 173 Ariz. at 546, 845 P.2d at 472. Notably, however, although collateral estoppel may apply in criminal proceedings, even when the issue was decided in a prior civil action, Yates v. United States , 354 U.S. 298, 335, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and although Fitzgerald remains good law, our supreme court has made clear that the doctrine is not favored in criminal cases and should be applied sparingly. State v. Goudeau , 239 Ariz. 421, n.8, 372 P.3d 945, n.8 (2016) ; see also State v. Rodriguez , 198 Ariz. 139, ¶ 6, 7 P.3d 148 (App. 2000). ¶ 10 In Fitzgerald , upon which Crosby relies, we determined that a court's finding in a civil forfeiture proceeding precluded the state from bringing related criminal charges. 173 Ariz. at 548, 845 P.2d at 474. In the forfeiture proceeding, the court found that the defendant had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had not possessed and used guns and drug paraphernalia seized from him "for any criminal activity." Id. In the criminal action, the court found the state was estopped "from establishing the identical issues regarding [the] defendant's intent and use of these items necessary to prove" beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed weapons misconduct and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. We concluded all elements of collateral estoppel existed: "the same parties were involved in both actions"; the state agency that prosecuted the forfeiture, the party against whom the principle was being applied, " 'had a full and fair opportunity' to litigate the issue involved"; the same issue that was to be litigated in the criminal case had been determined in the forfeiture proceeding; and, a final judgment was entered in the forfeiture action. Id. at 546, 845 P.2d 465, quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 480, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). ¶ 11 In denying Crosby's motion, the respondent judge appeared to rely primarily on Ferris v. Hawkins , 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256 (App. 1983), which this court decided almost a decade before Fitzgerald . The question in Ferris was "whether a final judgment ... in an unemployment compensation appeal may be given ... collateral estoppel effect in an appeal from a decision of the State Personnel Board ... where both proceedings arose out of the discharge of the employee from the Department of Corrections." Id. at 330, 660 P.2d at 1257. The "principal reason" this court refused to apply collateral estoppel in that case was "the dissimilar and unrelated purposes between the two statutory schemes and the drastic difference in their respective remedies." Id. at 331, 660 P.2d at 1258. ¶ 12 We examined the legislative policies and purposes behind statutes designed to provide temporary relief to those who are capable of and willing to work but are suddenly unemployed, and the processes governing employment matters for state employees. Id. at 332-33, 660 P.2d at 1259-60. "Unemployment compensation is a 'social security' measure," we observed, "which is designed to alleviate the 'burden which ... falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.' " Id. at 332, 660 P.2d at 1259, quoting A.R.S. § 23-601. Personnel board proceedings, however, are available to certain state employees who have been dismissed, suspended, or demoted, and the available remedies include reinstatement or back pay. Id. at 333, 660 P.2d at 1260. We stated that we did not believe "the legislature ... intend[ed] that the merits of a personnel dispute, the resolution of which is governed under a carefully mandated statutory scheme, be decided in a completely and totally separate unemployment compensation proceeding." Id. ¶ 13 Here, the respondent judge reasoned the legal issues and remedies in dependency and criminal proceedings are different, as are the "statutory schemes." Agreeing with the state, he found the central issue in the juvenile proceedings was whether C. was dependent, not whether Crosby committed a criminal act. The respondent concluded Crosby's argument was "weakest on the traditional element of collateral estoppel": the requirement that the issue to be litigated is "precisely the same [as the] issue in the previous litigation," based, first, on a comparison of the statutes. ¶ 14 Relying primarily on Fitzgerald , Crosby argues, as he did below, the respondent erred because all four elements of collateral estoppel exist here, as do the purposes and policy goals underlying the doctrine. Crosby insists the respondent "misapplied the law surrounding collateral estoppel," and he maintains Fitzgerald , not Ferris , "provides the proper analysis" because the instant case is more like the former than the latter. Crosby also relies on Lockwood v. Superior Court , 160 Cal.App.3d 667, 206 Cal.Rptr. 785 (1984), in which the court applied collateral estoppel in a criminal prosecution, precluding the state from relitigating an issue decided against it in a prior dependency action. ¶ 15 The undisputed facts as well as the record before us establish the sole basis for DCS's allegation that C. was dependent pursuant to § 8-201(15)(a)(i) or (iii) was that Crosby had abused C., most likely by shaking her too vigorously when she had become fussy that morning in July 2016. Section 8-201(2) defines abuse as including "the infliction or allowing of physical injury, impairment of bodily function or disfigurement...." ¶ 16 In the criminal case, Crosby has been charged with abuse of a child under the age of fifteen years pursuant to § 13-3623(A)(1) by intentionally or knowingly, under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury, causing physical injury to C., specifically, "brain and retinal bleeding and retinoschisis." The charge follows the language of the statute, which states: "Under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury, any person who causes a child ... to suffer physical injury or, having the care or custody of a child ... who causes or permits the person or health of the child ... to be injured ... is guilty of" a class two felony if the offense is "done intentionally or knowingly." Id. ¶ 17 Applying the elements of collateral estoppel here, the factual issue decided by the juvenile court in its final judgment-that Crosby had not injured C.-is the same issue that underlies the criminal prosecution. The question whether Crosby had abused C. by shaking her, and thereby inflicted the injuries she sustained, was litigated in the dependency action. DCS and Crosby presented the testimony of their respective experts and other witnesses, including a DCS investigator, other DCS personnel, and therapists. Both parents testified, and records and reports, including medical records, were admitted. In its under-advisement ruling, the juvenile court not only made clear that DCS had failed to sustain its burden of proving the allegations of the dependency petition by a preponderance of the evidence, see A.R.S. § 8-844(C) ; it also found the evidence showed it was "more likely than not" that Crosby did not injure C. ¶ 18 The last element of collateral estoppel requires that the subsequent proceeding be between "the same parties or their privities." Hall v. Lalli , 194 Ariz. 54, ¶¶ 6-7, 977 P.2d 776 (1999). Crosby argues that the state was a party to the dependency proceeding, albeit through DCS, represented by the Arizona Attorney General, and that it is also the prosecuting entity in this criminal proceeding brought by the Pima County Attorney. He points to the supervisory relationship between the attorney general and the county attorney, arguing this demonstrates they are not distinct parties. In the criminal proceeding and this special action, however, the state insists it is not the same party as DCS. It argues that the counties independently prosecute criminal proceedings whereas the attorney general represents the various departments and distinct political subdivisions of the state. The state also asserts counties have no authority in dependency proceedings and DCS has no authority in criminal prosecutions. The disposition of this special action, however, does not require us to resolve the question of mutuality or privity of parties. Like the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel in this context, we find compelling reasons not to preclude Crosby's criminal prosecution on the basis of the ruling in the dependency case. ¶ 19 As previously noted, Crosby relies on the California Court of Appeals' decision in Lockwood in support of his argument that a finding in a dependency proceeding should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct. We agree with Crosby that Lockwood is not meaningfully distinguishable from the case before us. There, the juvenile court had dismissed a dependency petition against the parents based on the same facts that gave rise to a charge of felony child abuse. 206 Cal.Rptr. at 786. The appellate court granted the parents' petition for an extraordinary writ following the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss those charges. Id. ¶ 20 Although the Lockwood court agreed with the state that the purposes of dependency and criminal proceedings are different, it found those differences were not dispositive of whether collateral estoppel applied. Id. at 787. The court observed, "The narrow issue litigated in the dependency proceeding was whether the parents had cruelly inflicted the child's injuries upon him. The juvenile court expressly found no such abuse." Id. at 788. Because the criminal charge was based on willful injury of the child, the court concluded, all elements of collateral estoppel existed. Id. ¶ 21 In People v. Percifull , 9 Cal.App.4th 1457, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 331, 331-32 (1992), however, a different district of the appellate court refused to follow Lockwood . In light of the California Supreme Court's post- Lockwood decision in Lucido v. Superior Court , 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 (1990), the court reversed the trial court's application of collateral estoppel to bar a criminal prosecution against parents after a ruling in their favor in a related dependency proceeding. Percifull , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d at 333-35. For policy reasons, the court in Lucido had refused to apply collateral estoppel to bar a prosecution for indecent exposure, notwithstanding a decision in a probation revocation proceeding that the defendant did not commit the offense. 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d at 1229-33. ¶ 22 Other jurisdictions have either rejected Lockwood or simply reached a different result. In People v. Wouk , 317 Ill.App.3d 33, 250 Ill.Dec. 603, 739 N.E.2d 64, 69-70 (2000), for example, the Illinois Court of Appeals concluded that dismissal after a hearing on the state's request for an order of protection for the defendant's former wife did not preclude the state from prosecuting the defendant for domestic battery. The court found that, as in Lockwood , the issues in the protective order and criminal proceedings were the same and all other elements of collateral estoppel existed. Id. 250 Ill.Dec. 603, 739 N.E.2d at 69. Rejecting Lockwood , however, the court reasoned that collateral estoppel should not apply unless it is clear that there is no unfairness to the party being estopped. Id. 250 Ill.Dec. 603, 739 N.E.2d at 69-70, citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) (collateral estoppel should not apply when there is adverse impact on public interest). The court observed that protective orders are designed to be resolved quickly, the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, and the focus is on protecting the family, not prosecuting and punishing a person who committed a criminal act. Id. 250 Ill.Dec. 603, 739 N.E.2d at 70. ¶ 23 A few months after it decided Wouk , the same court decided People v. Moreno , 319 Ill.App.3d 445, 253 Ill.Dec. 173, 744 N.E.2d 906, 907, 912 (2001), affirming the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss charges of aggravated battery of a child on the ground that every contested factual issue to be tried in the criminal case had been resolved in her favor in a wardship, or dependency proceeding. The defendant relied on a case in which the court had found a favorable ruling in a civil forfeiture action had estopped the state from bringing a criminal action based on the same issue of whether the defendant's car had been used to facilitate unlawful delivery of controlled substances. Id. 253 Ill.Dec. 173, 744 N.E.2d at 910. Citing Percifull and the Washington Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Cleveland , 58 Wash.App. 634, 794 P.2d 546 (1990), the Moreno court found there were important public policy reasons not to apply collateral estoppel in the wardship context. 253 Ill.Dec. 173, 744 N.E.2d at 911-12. The court noted that in a dependency, "the State's purpose is protection of defendant's minor children; in the criminal proceeding, the State's purpose is discovering if defendant injured G.M. and punishing her if found guilty." Id. 253 Ill.Dec. 173, 744 N.E.2d at 912. It added that these differences may have a bearing on the state's actions in each of the two proceedings. Id. The court also noted that the record suggested the state had not presented all the evidence in the dependency proceeding that it could or intended to present at a criminal trial. Id. ¶ 24 In Cleveland , based on "overall considerations of public policy," the court rejected applying collateral estoppel to bar the state from prosecuting the defendant for child sexual abuse where a court had found in a related dependency proceeding that the state had failed to prove he had committed the alleged abuse. Cleveland , 794 P.2d at 547, 551. The appellate court reasoned that "[d]ependency proceedings are often attended with a sense of urgency, are held as promptly as reasonably possible, and the entire focus of the proceeding is the welfare of the child." Id. at 551. It also surmised that because the focus is more narrow, "the State normally does not need, nor does it perform, the extensive preparation typically required for felony trials." Id. Consequently, the court added, greater resources are typically available to the state in conducting a criminal prosecution than are utilized or available in a dependency. Id. ¶ 25 Moreover, the Cleveland court was concerned that, if the state knew findings in dependency proceedings could preclude criminal charges, it might become reluctant "to conduct dependency proceedings in cases where one or more of the same issues would arise in subsequent criminal prosecutions." Id. The court acknowledged the crucial importance of safeguarding children, but simultaneously recognized the critical importance "of not impeding enforcement of the criminal law when no overriding consideration requires it." Id. ¶ 26 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to apply collateral estoppel to bar a prosecution for sexual misconduct with a child after a dependency court had entered a ruling favorable to the defendant based on the same conduct. People v. Gates , 434 Mich. 146, 452 N.W.2d 627, 628, 633-34 (1990), cert. denied , 497 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 3238, 111 L.Ed.2d 749 (1990). The court stated that a contrary decision would place prosecutors in the position of having to choose between proceeding with a dependency action "because of concern for the child," or delaying it out of "concern that a verdict of nonjurisdiction would preclude criminal prosecution of the accused." Id. at 633-34. Like the Illinois Court of Appeals in Wouk , 250 Ill.Dec. 603, 739 N.E.2d at 69-70, the Gates court quoted and relied on Restatement § 28 and its exceptions to the application of collateral estoppel to serve the following policies: "A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts" or "because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in the initial action." Gates , 452 N.W.2d at 633 n.18, 634. ¶ 27 Further, in Criner v. State , 138 So.3d 557, 558, 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), an appeal from a conviction for three counts of child molestation, the court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court had erred by denying his motion to dismiss criminal charges based on collateral estoppel. In an earlier proceeding to terminate the defendant's parental rights, the court had found the Department of Children and Families had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had committed the same acts. Id. at 558. The Criner court relied in part on State v. Freund , 626 So.2d 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), which had concluded the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel to dismiss a criminal charge of child neglect based on the dismissal of a dependency petition arising from the same conduct. 138 So.3d at 558-60, quoting Freund , 626 So.2d at 1045-46. The court in Freund had found persuasive the policy reasons articulated in Cleveland and Gates for not applying collateral estoppel in this context. Id. ¶ 28 We find these cases highly persuasive for not applying collateral estoppel here. We are particularly concerned that permitting the doctrine to apply in this context could cause the state to forego dependency proceedings because of the possibility it would be precluded from relitigating the underlying issues in a criminal proceeding, with the potential effect of further endangering children. Similarly, to avoid application of collateral estoppel, the state might be compelled to present its entire criminal case in the dependency proceeding, which could unnecessarily complicate and delay the adjudication, placing an undue burden on the juvenile court system. In sum, the distinction between juvenile and criminal proceedings would be impermissibly blurred, and the state could be forced to shift its focus from the best interest of the child, which includes efforts to preserve and reunify the family, to establishing that a criminal act was committed. ¶ 29 Finally, we decline to adopt a case-by-case approach to claims of collateral estoppel arising from decisions in dependency actions. Given the policy considerations discussed at length above, the urgency of dependency proceedings and, most importantly, the need to protect children from harm, we conclude a bright-line rule against applying collateral estoppel in this context best serves the litigants, their attorneys, the courts of this state, and the public. Disposition ¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, although we accept special-action jurisdiction, we deny relief. Crosby-Garbotz refers to himself as Crosby in his petition; therefore, we will do the same. For example, A.R.S. § 8-842(C) directs that ordinarily "the dependency adjudication hearing shall be completed within ninety days after service of the dependency petition." See Joshua J. v. Ariz . Dep't of Econ . Sec. , 230 Ariz. 417, ¶ 17, 286 P.3d 166 (App. 2012) ("The 90-day time limit for the completion of a dependency hearing protects children's health and safety as well as the fundamental rights of parents regarding their children."). And, "absent waiver of the parties, the juvenile court is obligated to adhere to the deadlines found within our dependency statutes in order to comply with the Legislature's intent." Id. ¶ 21. As noted, Crosby also challenges the respondent's denial of his Rule 12.9 motion. Although a special action is the only means of obtaining appellate review of such a ruling, see State v. Snelling , 225 Ariz. 182, ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 409 (2010), Crosby has not provided this court with a copy of the motion or a transcript of the hearing on the motion. Because we cannot meaningfully review the respondent's ruling to determine whether he abused his discretion, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(c), we decline to accept jurisdiction concerning that issue and do not address it. Crosby did not provide this court with a copy of the motion to dismiss, the state's response, or his reply. However, he has provided a transcript of the hearing on the motion, which reflects his arguments, the state's responses, the respondent's consideration of the arguments, and the reasons for the ruling. Moreover, the state does not dispute Crosby's characterization of the arguments he raised below. Rather, it refutes them and asserts the respondent correctly ruled collateral estoppel does not apply here because there is no privity of parties and the issues in the criminal proceeding are not the same as the issues in the dependency. The statute defines a dependent child as a child adjudicated to be "[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control and ... who has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control," or "[a] child whose home is unfit by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by a parent...." § 8-201(15)(a)(i), (iii).

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Jewel C. appeals from the juvenile court's order changing the placement of her great-grandchildren from her care to that of their "psychological paternal grandmother," Kay. She contends the court "abused its discretion by granting" the state's motion requesting the change "in violation of the placement preferences established by A.R.S. § 8-514(B)." She further asserts the court made "numerous findings ... without credible bases." ¶ 2 In its answering brief, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) contends as a threshold matter that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. It asserts, "Jewel is not an aggrieved party and the order is not final and appealable." Our jurisdiction in juvenile matters is provided by A.R.S. § 8-235, which provides that "[a]ny aggrieved party in any juvenile court proceeding under this title may appeal from a final order of the juvenile court to the court of appeals." Both factors must be present-the person must be an aggrieved party and the court's order must be final. Id. Thus, we must determine whether Jewel is an "aggrieved party" and whether the juvenile court's order changing the children's placement is a "final order." ¶ 3 "To qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate to deny the party some personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden on the party." In re Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. B - 9385 , 138 Ariz. 291, 293, 674 P.2d 845, 847 (1983). And, in evaluating our jurisdiction, we do not employ a "narrow, technical conception" of a final order, but rather, "examine the practical effect of the juvenile court's order" on the appealing party's purported rights. In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JD-5312 , 178 Ariz. 372, 374, 873 P.2d 710, 712 (App. 1994). A final order is one "that disposes of an issue such that it conclusively defines the rights and/or duties of a party in a dependency proceeding." Francisco F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 228 Ariz. 379, ¶ 7, 266 P.3d 1075, 1077 (App. 2011). ¶ 4 Jewel contends she is entitled to appeal based on the juvenile court having allowed her to intervene in the matter. Jewel filed a motion to intervene in the dependency proceeding in June 2016, and the court granted permissive intervention. Arizona courts have long allowed grandparents, as well as other relatives, to be granted permissive intervention in dependency proceedings so long as the requirements of Rule 24, Ariz. R. Civ. P., are met and intervention advances the best interests of the children involved. See Bechtel v. Rose , 150 Ariz. 68, 73, 722 P.2d 236, 241 (1986) ; see also Allen v. Chon-Lopez , 214 Ariz. 361, ¶¶ 11-12, 153 P.3d 382, 386 (App. 2007). And in Bechtel , our supreme court, although accepting special action jurisdiction, suggested that grandparents are entitled to appeal a juvenile court's ruling denying their motion to intervene. 150 Ariz. at 71, 722 P.2d at 239. In allowing permissive intervention in Bechtel , however, our supreme court cautioned that "intervention merely allows the [relative] to be heard; it does not confer any right to custody upon them." 150 Ariz. at 73 n.3, 722 P.2d at 241. ¶ 5 Jewel also asserts that she is "an aggrieved party" because she has "a statutory interest in placement pursuant to" A.R.S. § 8-514(B)(2) and (3), "as a member of the extended family." That statute sets forth the preferences for placement and lists "kinship care" above placement in other foster care situations. Id. But, as we have previously pointed out, "the order of placement is a preference, not a mandate." Antonio P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 218 Ariz. 402, ¶ 12, 187 P.3d 1115, 1118 (App. 2008). More importantly, we have likewise made clear that "the intent [of the statutory scheme for placement] is to protect dependent children, not the interests of potential foster or adoptive placements." Lorenz v. State , 238 Ariz. 556, ¶¶ 14, 20, 364 P.3d 475, 477, 478 (App. 2015) (concluding DCS owed no duty to grandparents in negligence action). ¶ 6 Indeed, "[n]othing in the [kinship foster care] statute suggests that relatives are the intended beneficiaries of the kinship foster care program or that the program was designed to protect potential placements." Id. ¶ 17. Furthermore, under A.R.S. § 8-517, DCS may withdraw a child from a foster home when it "determines that withdrawal is according to written, specific standards and is clearly necessary for the child's interests and welfare" and may withdraw a child placed pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-514.02, including a placement with a relative, "if the change is necessary for the child's best interests and welfare." ¶ 7 A great-grandparent, or other third party, may, however, petition for placement under certain circumstances, pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-409. The legislature having provided a means by which a third party may independently obtain rights to placement of a child, we have no basis to read such a right into § 8-514, as Jewel suggests we should. Thus, we conclude that because a great-grandparent has no right to placement of a child in the absence of an order granting third-party rights pursuant to § 25-409, under the circumstances in this case, Jewel has no right that is aggrieved by a ruling changing placement of the children, and she therefore cannot appeal. See § 8-235 ; cf. Antonio M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 222 Ariz. 369, ¶ 2, 214 P.3d 1010, 1011 (App. 2009) (parent whose rights have been severed cannot appeal from subsequent order changing placement); Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 212 Ariz. 43, ¶ 11, 127 P.3d 59, 62 (App. 2006) (incarcerated parent aggrieved by disposition order and foster placement based on fundamental right to raise children); Elliott v. Elliott , 612 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (third party may obtain "the status of aggrieved part[y]" for purposes of appeal in custody proceedings when they have "become in loco parentis to the child" by virtue of custody decree). ¶ 8 We further conclude the order at issue in this matter is not a final order for purposes of § 8-235. Employing a broad conception of a final order in view of a parent's fundamental rights, our supreme court has determined that "orders declaring children dependent and orders reaffirming findings that children are dependent are final orders subject to appeal by aggrieved parties." In re Yavapai Cty. Juv. Action No. J-8545 , 140 Ariz. 10, 14, 680 P.2d 146, 150 (1984). But, "juvenile court orders which merely relate to a change of placement of a foster child from one foster home to another and which do not constitute a reaffirmation of dependency status vis-a-vis the parent are not 'final orders' appealable pursuant to Rule 24, Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court." In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. J-57445 , 143 Ariz. 88, 92, 691 P.2d 1116, 1120 (App. 1984). In contrast, change of placement orders affecting the rights of parents are viewed differently. Thus, when a natural father appealed from an order that changed placement of the child to another state, the order was appealable because it had "a substantial impact on [his] practical ability to have any contact with his child." In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JD-500116 , 160 Ariz. 538, 542, 774 P.2d 842, 846 (App. 1989) ; see also Antonio P. , 218 Ariz. 402, ¶ 12, 187 P.3d at 1118. ¶ 9 Regarding a person or party other than a parent or one who has established third-party rights with respect to a child, an order changing placement not only fails to conclude the dependency or termination proceeding, but also fails to adjudicate any party's right, and such an order remains subject to further modification pursuant to § 8-517. We concluded in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-57445 that placement orders, when challenged by foster parents, are not final as they "do not constitute a reaffirmation of dependency status vis-a-vis the parent." 143 Ariz. at 92, 691 P.2d at 1120. In view of the limited legal rights available to all third parties, foster parents or relatives, we see no reason to distinguish the finality of a change-of-placement order in the context of a relative placement from that of a foster-home placement. ¶ 10 For these reasons, we conclude we lack jurisdiction of this appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. As the parties acknowledged at oral argument, intervention of right is rare in this context, as the intervening party's interest generally does not meet that heightened standard. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (providing factors for intervention of right). We do not foreclose, however, the possibility that a potential placement could be "aggrieved" by a juvenile court's express refusal to consider the statutory preferences at all and, thus, be permitted to seek special action relief. At oral argument in this court, Jewel suggested that directing third parties to seek placement pursuant to § 25-409 would result in improper "forum shopping." We note, however, that in view of A.R.S. § 8-202, such proceedings, if brought during a dependency or other proceeding, would likely be consolidated with the juvenile proceeding. See Blevins v. Superior Court , 19 Ariz.App. 314, 506 P.2d 1099 (1973) (juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over custody determinations when juvenile a ward of the court). Appeals of such orders by children may also be treated differently. Cf. In re Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. B - 9385 , 138 Ariz. 291, 293-94, 674 P.2d 845, 847-48 (1983) (children were of an age to appreciate their "rights and responsibilities," making them aggrieved parties in adoption proceedings). Because the children in this case did not separately appeal, we do not address that question.

WINTHROP, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski ("Appellants") are the owners of Brush & Nib Studio, LC ("Brush & Nib"). Appellants filed a pre-enforcement action against the City of Phoenix ("Phoenix") challenging the constitutionality of Phoenix City Code 18-4(B) ("Section 18-4(B)") and seeking a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the ordinance. Appellants appeal the superior court's denial of their preliminary injunction and grant of summary judgment in favor of Phoenix. For the following reasons, we affirm as modified. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Brush & Nib is a for-profit limited liability company, which sells pre-fabricated and design artwork for home décor, weddings, and special events. Appellants provide retail goods and services to the public and acknowledge they operate a place of public accommodation as defined in Phoenix City Code § 18. ¶ 3 Appellants are devout Christians and believe their work is inextricably related to their religious beliefs. Appellants' goods and services include both customer-directed projects (work created through a consultation between Appellants and their customer) and pre-fabricated merchandise (work created without Appellants' knowledge of how the items will be used or who will use those products). Appellants believe their customer-directed and designed wedding products "convey messages about a particular engaged couple, their upcoming marriage, their upcoming marriage ceremony, and the celebration of that marriage." Appellants also strongly believe in an ordained marriage between one man and one woman, and argue that they cannot separate their religious beliefs from their work. As such, they believe being required to create customer-specific merchandise for same-sex weddings will violate their religious beliefs. ¶ 4 Appellants want to be able to legally refuse to create custom-made merchandise for all same-sex weddings. Additionally, Appellants desire to post a public statement explaining their religious beliefs. Appellants' proposed statement, in part, would notify potential customers that "Brush & Nib Studio won't create any artwork that violates [their] vision as defined by [their] religious and artistic beliefs and identity," which includes "artwork that demeans others, endorses racism, incites violence, contradicts [their] Christian faith, or promotes any marriage except marriage between one man and one woman." Appellants have not posted this statement because they believe it would violate Section 18-4(B). Instead, Appellants sought a preliminary injunction to bar Phoenix from enforcing Section 18-4(B) and a declaration that Section 18-4(B) violates the Arizona Constitution's free speech clause, religious toleration clause, equal protection clause, due process clause, and the Arizona Free Exercise of Religion Act ("FERA"). ¶ 5 Phoenix filed a motion to dismiss and the case proceeded to a bench trial before the superior court. The superior court denied Phoenix's motion to dismiss, finding Appellants had standing and the case was justiciable. The court then denied Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding Section 18-4(B) did not violate Appellants' freedom of speech nor substantially burden their exercise of religion. Appellants timely appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction to this court and moved to stay proceedings before the superior court. The court denied Appellants' request. Appellants then moved, and Phoenix cross-moved, for summary judgment. The court granted Phoenix's motion for summary judgment on all claims. Appellants filed a timely appeal from the court's summary judgment ruling and moved to consolidate that appeal with the appeal from the denial of the preliminary injunction. We granted Appellants' request, and have jurisdiction over this consolidated appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2016) and 12-2101(A)(1) (2016). ANALYSIS ¶ 6 Arizona courts have long upheld the public's right to participate in society without fear of discrimination. See Phillips v. Phoenix Union High Schs. , Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct. No. 72909 (1953) (enjoining Phoenix Union High Schools from segregating pupils based on race); accord, Heard v. Davis , Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct. No. 77497 (1954). The Phillips court expressly found that "democracy rejects any theory of second-class citizenship" and that "[a] half century of intolerance is enough." Id.; see also Paul Rees, A Civil Rights Victory, Pre-Loving , 53 Ariz. Att'y 84 (Aug. 2017) (noting that Arizona repealed its anti-miscegenation law before the United States Supreme Court found such laws unconstitutional). ¶ 7 In 2014, however, the Arizona legislature sought to amend FERA to expand the definition of a protected person from "a religious assembly or institution" to "any individual, association, partnership, corporation, church, religious assembly or institution, estate, trust, foundation or other legal entity." S.B. 1062, 2014 Leg., 51st 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014). Although S.B. 1062 was ultimately vetoed, it was viewed by some as a reaction to the development of antidiscrimination ordinances, which included sexual orientation as a protected class, and the national trend in favor of granting broader rights to same-sex couples. Dinita L. James, Amid SB 1062 Frenzy, Tempe Becomes 4th AZ City to Protect LGBT Status , 20 No. 11 Ariz. Emp. L. Letter 1 (2014). ¶ 8 Currently, nineteen states have enacted public accommodation antidiscrimination laws which include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes. See Equality Maps/Non-Discrimination Laws , Movement Advancement Project (2018), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws. Arizona's public accommodation antidiscrimination statute, however, does not specifically include sexual orientation as a protected class. See A.R.S. § 41-1442(A) (2017). Accordingly, several Arizona cities have enacted broader ordinances to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. See TEMPE CODE CH. 2 Art. VIII § 2-601 (2014); FLAGSTAFF CODE CH. 14 § 14-02-001-0001 (2013); TUCSON CODE Art. II § 17-1 (1999). Like Tempe, Flagstaff, and Tucson, Phoenix's Code, Section 18-4(B), as amended in 2013, prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation based on sexual orientation. Section 18-4(B) provides that: No person shall, directly or indirectly, refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person, or aid in or incite such refusal, denial or withholding of, accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability nor shall distinction be made with respect to any person based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability in connection with the price or quality of any item, goods or services offered by or at any place of public accommodation. It is unlawful for any owner, operator, lessee, manager, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation to directly or indirectly display, circulate, publicize or mail any advertisement, notice or communication which states or implies that any facility or service shall be refused or restricted because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability or that any person, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability would be unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, undesirable or not solicited. Phoenix City Code § 18-4(B)(2)-(3) (2013). ¶ 9 On appeal, Appellants raise a myriad of constitutional issues, arguing that Section 18-4(B) is unconstitutional, both on its face and as-applied, and that any enforcement of Section 18-4(B) would violate their First Amendment right to free speech and free exercise of religion under state law. Appellants are not the first to attempt to use their religious beliefs to justify practices others consider overtly discriminatory. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States , 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (finding a school, which prohibited interracial dating and marriage, could no longer receive tax-exempt status). Although the law has at times recognized religious beliefs as justification for discriminatory practices, modern societal trends are to the contrary. See McLaughlin v. Jones , 243 Ariz. 29, 33, ¶ 13, 401 P.3d 492, 496 (2017) ("Denying same-sex couples 'the same legal treatment' in marriage ... and 'all the benefits' afforded opposite-sex couples, 'works a grave and continuing harm' on [same-sex couples] in various ways-demeaning them, humiliating and stigmatizing their children and family units, and teaching society that they are inferior in important respects." (citing Obergefell v. Hodges , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2600-02, 2604, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) ) ); see also Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (finding when the state criminalizes same-sex couples' conduct it "is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres"). ¶ 10 While this case may be the first of its kind in Arizona, Brush & Nib is only one of numerous national litigants who seek to preserve and define their religious freedoms in the face of ordinances which prohibit places of public accommodation from discriminating based on sexual orientation. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock , 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (finding a photographer's refusal to take photographs of a same-sex wedding violated New Mexico's antidiscrimination laws), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1787, 188 L.Ed.2d 757 (2014) ; Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. , 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015) (finding Colorado's antidiscrimination statute, which prohibits places of public accommodation from refusing services on the basis of sexual orientation, did not violate the baker's freedom of speech or freedom of religion), cert. denied , No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), reversed on other grounds , Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n , No. 16-111, slip op., --- U.S. ----, S.Ct. ----, ---L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 2465172 (U.S. June 4, 2018) ; Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc. , 187 Wash.2d 804, 389 P.3d 543 (2017) (finding a florist's refusal to provide custom arranged flowers for a same-sex wedding constituted sexual orientation discrimination and was unlawful under Washington's antidiscrimination law), cert. docketed , No. 17-108 (U.S. Jul. 17, 2017); Telescope Media Grp. v. Lindsey , 271 F.Supp.3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017) (finding the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating based on sexual orientation, does not infringe a business owner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights); Gifford v. McCarthy , 137 A.D.3d 30, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (2016) (finding venue rental owners could not refuse to rent space for a same-sex wedding). ¶ 11 In light of these cases and consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions, we recognize that a law allowing Appellants to refuse service to customers based on sexual orientation would constitute a "grave and continuing harm." Obergefell , 135 S.Ct. at 2604. As most recently expressed by the Supreme Court: Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression. As this Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges , 135 S.Ct. at 2584, "[t]he First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths." Id. at 2607. Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law. See Newman v. Piggy [Piggie ] Park Enterprises, Inc. , 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 [88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263] (1968) (per curiam ); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. , 515 U.S. 557, 572 [115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487] (1995) ("Provisions like these are well within the State's usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments"). Masterpiece Cakeshop , Ltd ., slip op. at 9-10., --- U.S. at ---- - ----, --- S.Ct. at ---- - ----, 2018 WL 2465172. ¶ 12 With this background in mind, we address each of the parties' arguments in turn. I. Standing ¶ 13 As an initial matter, Phoenix argues in its cross-appeal that Appellants' claims fail for lack of standing and ripeness because no case or controversy exists. The parties agree that, in this case, the underlying concerns for standing and ripeness are the same; accordingly, we address both issues under one analytical framework. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n , 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing's injury in fact prong."). ¶ 14 The Arizona Constitution, unlike that of the United States, does not expressly limit courts to only deciding matters which involve a case or controversy. Bennett v. Napolitano , 206 Ariz. 520, 525, ¶ 19, 81 P.3d 311, 316 (2003). We find, however, "that as a matter of sound jurisprudence a litigant seeking relief in the Arizona courts must first establish standing to sue." Id. This is especially true "in actions in which constitutional relief is sought against the government." Id. at 524, ¶ 16, 81 P.3d at 315 (citing Sears v. Hull , 192 Ariz. 65, 71, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1998) ). Further, although federal law does not govern our standing analysis, we look to federal law as instructive on the issue. Id. at 525, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at 316. ¶ 15 Phoenix relies on Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n to argue Appellants have not asserted a justiciable claim. 220 F.3d 1134. In Thomas , the Ninth Circuit addressed its ability to hear a pre-enforcement action which alleged that Alaska's housing law, which prohibited landlords from discriminating against couples based on marital status, violated the landlords' First Amendment rights. Id. The Thomas court found that "neither the mere existence of a proscriptive statute nor a generalized threat of prosecution satisfies the 'case or controversy' requirement." Id. at 1139. Instead, a party may establish standing if she shows she suffered a "genuine threat of imminent prosecution." Id. (quoting San Diego Cty. Gun Rights Comm'n v. Reno , 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) ). A "genuine threat of imminent prosecution" exists if a party establishes a concrete plan to violate the law, the authorities intend to prosecute the party, and there is a history of past prosecution or enforcement. Id. (citing San Diego Cty. Gun Rights Comm'n , 98 F.3d at 1126-27 ). A party, thus, need not suffer arrest or actual prosecution before challenging a law. Susan B. Anthony List v. Dri e haus , ---U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 128-29, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) ("[W]here threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat."). ¶ 16 Although Appellants have not yet refused services to a same-sex couple, we find their claims are justiciable. Here, Appellants have a concrete plan to violate Section 18-4(B) by refusing to create "custom-made" announcements and invitations for same-sex weddings and by posting a statement about their commitment to their religious beliefs, which includes refusing to create design-on-request merchandise for same-sex weddings. Additionally, Phoenix acknowledges that Appellants would violate Section 18-4(B) if they posted their proposed statement. Moreover, unlike Thomas , where the parties brought a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute that had been in effect for over twenty years, but had never been enforced, here, Section 18-4(B) has only been in effect since 2013 and Phoenix has received and investigated complaints arising from the ordinance. Appellants' concrete plan to refuse to provide services for same-sex weddings, Phoenix's likelihood of prosecution, and the history of enforcement, although brief, is sufficient to confer standing onto Appellants. II. Standard of Review ¶ 17 Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo , and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund , 201 Ariz. 474, 482, ¶ 13, 38 P.3d 12, 20 (2002). ¶ 18 Appellants appear to have raised both facial and as-applied challenges to Section 18-4(B). Generally, to succeed on a facial challenge a party "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid." State v. Seyrafi , 201 Ariz. 147, 153, ¶ 28, 32 P.3d 430, 436 (App. 2001) (quoting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ). This heavy burden lightens, however, if a party raises a facial challenge which implicates First Amendment rights. State v. Boehler , 228 Ariz. 33, 35, ¶ 5, 262 P.3d 637, 639 (App. 2011). In a First Amendment challenge we consider whether the application of that law "as a whole prohibits a 'substantial' amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications." Virginia v. Hicks , 539 U.S. 113, 124, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). Even if a law burdens a substantial amount of free speech, we will not prohibit its enforcement if the law "reflects 'legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.' " Id. at 119, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) ). ¶ 19 Here, we need not distinguish between Appellants' facial and as-applied challenge because it has no bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case. See Isaacson v. Horne , 716 F.3d 1213, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the "precise characterization of the Physicians' complaint ... has little bearing on the resolution of the legal question"); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 331, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (noting the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not well defined). Although Appellants are subject to a heavier burden for their facial claims, the difference is irrelevant because, as discussed below, Appellants fail to succeed on both their as-applied and facial challenges. III. Free Speech ¶ 20 Appellants argue Section 18-4(B) impermissibly burdens their freedom of speech by forcing them to create custom-made goods for same-sex weddings and by prohibiting them from posting a statement that describes their religious objection to providing stationery and other services for same-sex weddings. Appellants attempt to distinguish their refusal to create custom-made work for same-sex weddings-which they argue is a lawful exercise of their freedom of speech and religion-from the refusal to serve a customer based on the customer's sexual orientation. We are unpersuaded by Appellants' distinction. Courts have consistently found "there is no basis for distinguishing between discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on someone's conduct of publicly committing to a person of the same sex." Gifford , 137 A.D.3d at 37, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (quoting Elane Photography, LLC , 309 P.3d at 62, ¶ 18 ). Further, the Supreme Court disfavors the conduct/status distinction that Appellants advocate. See, e.g. , Obergefell , 135 S.Ct. at 2604 (finding discrimination based on sexual orientation deprives individuals of their fundamental right to marry the person of their choice); Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (by criminalizing same-sex sodomy the state essentially discriminated against gay men); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic , 506 U.S. 263, 270, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (noting "a tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews"). ¶ 21 In support, Appellants rely on Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 284 P.3d 863 (2012), to argue that custom-made works for weddings and the stationery business constitute pure speech, and thus Section 18-4(B) is only constitutional if it survives strict scrutiny. In Coleman , the Arizona Supreme Court held that the process of tattooing, as well as the associated business of tattooing, constituted pure speech, and was entitled to First Amendment protections. Id. at 360, ¶ 31, 284 P.3d 863. Notably, the court did not address whether Mesa's denial of a permit to operate a tattoo parlor violated the business owners' free speech rights. Id. at 361, ¶ 36, 284 P.3d 863. Moreover, Coleman did not address the dichotomy between the speech of the artist and the speech of the patron choosing the message to be applied, and we do not read Coleman to approve using the First Amendment as a shield to protect a business owner's decision to discriminate against customers based on sexual orientation. ¶ 22 Whether we agree with Appellants that in certain hypothetical circumstances the operation of a stationery store, as well as the creation of design-on-request wedding-related merchandise, may constitute pure speech is irrelevant, because these hypotheticals are not at issue in this case. Instead, our inquiry is whether Section 18-4(B), which requires that Appellants provide equal services to customers regardless of sexual orientation, infringes their First Amendment rights, not whether Appellants have a free speech right to operate their stationery store. Thus, Appellants reliance on Coleman is misplaced. ¶ 23 The Arizona Constitution guarantees that "[e]very person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 6. Appellants assert that the Arizona Constitution provides broader free speech protections than the United States Constitution. Even assuming this to be true, Appellants do not explain how, in this case, our analysis under Arizona's free speech clause would differ from our analysis under federal free speech jurisprudence. Thus, we analyze Appellants' free speech claim pursuant to federal law. See State v. Stummer , 219 Ariz. 137, 142, ¶ 16, 194 P.3d 1043, 1048 (App. 2008) (applying federal free speech jurisprudence because courts have had limited opportunities to develop Arizona's free speech clause). ¶ 24 Appellants argue Section 18-4(B) compels them to speak in favor of same-sex marriages. We disagree. Although Section 18-4(B) may have an incidental impact on speech, its main purpose is to prohibit discrimination, and thus Section 18-4(B) regulates conduct, not speech. Because Section 18-4(B) regulates conduct, we find the Court's analysis and holding in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst'l Rights, Inc. , 547 U.S. 47, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006), to be most applicable to the issue here. In Rumsfeld , the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, which required that institutions seeking federal funding must allow military recruiters the same access to students as other employers. Id. at 54, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. ("FAIR"), an association of law schools and law faculties, sought to bar the military's presence on campus because it opposed the military's policy of forbidding individuals from joining the Armed Forces if they "engaged in homosexual acts," identified as "homosexual," or "married a person of the same sex." Id. at 52 n.1, 126 S.Ct. 1297. FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment violated its First Amendment right of free speech and freedom of association by forcing the schools to allow military recruiters on campus. Id. at 52-53, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Supreme Court rejected FAIR's argument, finding the Solomon Amendment did not limit what schools could say, but rather what they could do. Id. at 60, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Supreme Court recognized that while in some circumstances the Solomon Amendment may require the schools to speak, such as by sending out e-mails notifying students about the military recruiters' presence, this speech was merely incidental to the properly mandated conduct. Id. at 61-62, 126 S.Ct. 1297. ¶ 25 We find Rumsfeld controlling in this case. Here, the primary purpose of Section 18-4(B) is to prohibit places of public accommodation from discriminating based on certain protected classes, i.e., sexual orientation, not to compel speech. See Elane Photography, LLC , 309 P.3d at 64, ¶ 27 (finding New Mexico Human Rights Act "only mandates that if Elane Photography operates a business as a public accommodation, it cannot discriminate against potential clients based on their sexual orientation," but does not compel speech). Like Rumsfeld , Section 18-4(B) requires that places of public accommodation provide equal services if they want to operate their business. While such a requirement may impact speech, such as prohibiting places of public accommodation from posting signs that discriminate against customers, this impact is incidental to properly regulated conduct. ¶ 26 Appellants try to distinguish Rumsfeld by relying on Coleman 's holding that tattoos, and the business of tattooing, are pure speech, and by citing dicta in the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop that "a wedding cake, in some circumstances, may convey a particularized message celebrating same-sex marriage, and in such cases, First Amendment speech protections may be implicated." 370 P.3d at 288, ¶ 71. We are unpersuaded by this argument. We do not doubt that "words" are generally considered pure speech. Or that, in some instances, an ordinance may infringe a stationery store's First Amendment right, if for example, like Coleman , the ordinance completely bars the store's ability to create stationery or to operate its business. Nor do we doubt that a law prohibiting a baker from writing certain words on a cake may implicate the First Amendment. None of these hypothetical First Amendment violations are currently before us, and they do not affect the outcome of this case. The case before us is one of a blanket refusal of service to the LGBTQ community and not a First Amendment challenge to a specific message requested by a specific customer. ¶ 27 Simply stated, if Appellants, as an economic entity, want to operate their for-profit business as a public accommodation, they cannot discriminate against potential patrons based on sexual orientation. It bears repeating that Section 18-4(B) regulates conduct, not speech. Accordingly, the conduct at issue is not the creation of words or images but the conduct of selling or refusing to sell merchandise-either pre-fabricated or designed to order-equally to same-sex and opposite-sex couples. This conduct, even though it may incidentally impact speech, is not speech. Further, allowing a vendor who provides goods and services for marriages and weddings to refuse similar services for gay persons would result in "a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations." Masterpiece Cakeshop , Ltd ., slip op. at 10, --- U.S. at ----, --- S.Ct. at ----, 2018 WL 2465172. ¶ 28 Although Section 18-4(B) regulates conduct, this is not the end our inquiry. Next, we must determine whether the conduct regulated by Section 18-4(B) is inherently expressive. Rumsfeld , 547 U.S. at 65, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Conduct is entitled to full First Amendment protections if the "speaker" intended to convey a particularized message by the conduct and if, given the surrounding circumstances, there was a strong likelihood that the speaker's message would be understood by those who viewed it. Spence v. Washington , 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974). Like many similar cases decided in other jurisdictions, we find Appellants' act of creating design-to-order wedding announcements, invitations, and the like is not inherently expressive. See Elane Photography, LLC , 309 P.3d at 68, ¶ 41 ("While photography may be expressive, the operation of a photography business is not."); Arlene's Flowers, Inc. , 389 P.3d at 557 (finding the creation of floral arrangements is not inherently expressive); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. , 370 P.3d at 286, ¶ 62 (concluding "the act of designing and selling a wedding cake to all customers free of discrimination does not convey a celebratory message about same-sex weddings likely to be understood by those who view it"); Gifford , 137 A.D.3d at 42, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (finding "there is no real likelihood that the Giffords would be perceived as endorsing the values or lifestyle of the individuals renting their facilities as opposed to merely complying with anti-discrimination laws"). ¶ 29 The mere fact that Section 18-4(B) requires Appellants to comply with the law does not render their creation of design-to-order merchandise for same-sex weddings expressive conduct. The items Appellants would produce for a same-sex or opposite-sex wedding would likely be indistinguishable to the public. Take for instance an invitation to the marriage of Pat and Pat (whether created for Patrick and Patrick, or Patrick and Patricia), or Alex and Alex (whether created for Alexander and Alexander, or Alexander and Alexa). This invitation would not differ in creative expression. Further, it is unlikely that a general observer would attribute a company's product or offer of services, in compliance with the law, as indicative of the company's speech or personal beliefs. See Rumsfeld , 547 U.S. at 65, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (finding observers can appreciate the difference between sponsored speech and speech which is permitted because it is required by law). The operation of a stationery store-including the design and sale of customized wedding event merchandise-is not expressive conduct, and thus, is not entitled to First Amendment free speech protections. ¶ 30 The law has long recognized a state's authority to "create rights of public access on behalf of its citizens." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609, 625, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins , 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) ). It follows that a state may prohibit businesses from posting discriminatory signs. See Rumsfeld , 547 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (finding if Congress prohibits employment-based racial discrimination, then states can require employers to remove "White Applicants Only" signs as a proper restriction on conduct not speech); accord Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. , 564 U.S. 552, 567, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011) ; Pickup v. Brown , 740 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014). See also R.A.V. v.City of St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377, 389, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) ("[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct."). Thus, "[p]osting language on a website telling potential customers that a business will discriminate based on sexual orientation is part of the act of sexual orientation discrimination itself; as conduct carried out through language, [and] this act is not protected by the First Amendment." Telescope Media Grp. , 271 F.Supp.3d at 1112 (citing Rumsfeld , 547 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297 ); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. , slip op. at 12, --- U.S. at ----, --- S.Ct. at ----, 2018 WL 2465172 (noting that a baker interposing a sincere religious objection to providing a wedding cake for a gay couple was entitled to a neutral and respectful consideration of his claim, but disapproving of the baker or other businesses posting signs saying "no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages," observing such would "impose a serious stigma on gay persons."). ¶ 31 Although Appellants are prohibited from posting discriminatory statements about their intent to refuse services for same-sex weddings, they may post a statement endorsing their belief that marriage is between a man and a woman and may post a disclaimer explaining that, notwithstanding that belief, Section 18-4(B) requires them to provide goods and services to everyone regardless of sexual orientation. Or they may post a disclaimer that the act of selling their goods and services to same-sex couples does not constitute an endorsement of their customers' exercise of their constitutional right to marry or any other activities. See Hurley , 515 U.S. at 576-77, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (noting, in some circumstances, an individual can distance himself from expressive conduct by providing disclaimers that he does not identify with the speaker's viewpoint). ¶ 32 Appellants may have to change their proposed posting to ensure that they comply with Section 18-4(B). However, "an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible ... so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Rumsfeld , 547 U.S. at 67, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (quoting United States v. Albertini , 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985) ). Section 18-4(B) satisfies this requirement. Antidiscrimination laws, like Section 18-4(B), are content and viewpoint neutral. See Hurley , 515 U.S. at 572, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (finding Massachusetts' antidiscrimination statute, which is similar to Section 18-4(B), "does not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content, the focal point of its prohibition being rather on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services on the proscribed grounds"); see also Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed , 648 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 2011) ("As the Supreme Court has made clear, antidiscrimination laws intended to ensure equal access to the benefits of society serve goals 'unrelated to the suppression of expression' and are neutral as to both content and viewpoint." (quoting Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 623-24, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ) ). Further, Phoenix clearly has a substantial interest in discouraging discrimination in places of public accommodation. The way to effectively accomplish this goal is to explicitly prohibit places of public accommodation from discriminating. While it is imaginable that there may be other ways to achieve this goal, that does not render Section 18-4(B) unconstitutional. IV. Expressive Association ¶ 33 Appellants additionally argue Section 18-4(B) compels expressive association. Concurrent with the First Amendment's right to free speech is the "right of expressive association." Rumsfeld , 547 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 1297 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale , 530 U.S. 640, 644, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000) ). The right to associate, or not associate, "is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas." Dale , 530 U.S. at 647-48, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (citing Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ). Thus, "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." IDK, Inc. v. Clark Cty. , 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ). The right to associate, however, is not absolute and "may be curtailed if necessary to further a significant governmental interest like eliminating ... public evils." 3613 Ltd. v. Dep't of Liquor Licenses & Control , 194 Ariz. 178, 186, ¶ 36, 978 P.2d 1282, 1290 (App. 1999) (quoting Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ). ¶ 34 Although the First Amendment "fully protects expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, ethical, and other topics ..., it does not protect every communication or every association that touches these topics." IDK, Inc. , 836 F.2d at 1194 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S. 209, 231, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) ). Importantly, a state does not lose its ability to regulate commercial activity merely because the activity has a speech component. Id. A law, however, will be found to violate the right to "expressive association" if it requires the inclusion of an unwanted member, and that inclusion would significantly affect the group's association. Dale , 530 U.S. at 648-50, 120 S.Ct. 2446. ¶ 35 We are unpersuaded by Appellants' argument that Section 18-4(B) infringes their freedom of association by requiring that they provide equal services to same-sex couples. Appellants operate an economic entity and a place of public accommodation; as such, they are prohibited from discriminating against customers based on a protected class. Further, although Appellants argue they created Brush & Nib pursuant to their religious beliefs, this alone does not bestow on Appellants the unfettered right of expressive association in their business. We do not dispute that some aspects of Appellants' operation of Brush & Nib may implicate speech in some regard, but the primary purpose of Brush & Nib is not to convey a particular message but rather to engage in commercial sales activity. Thus, Appellants' operation of Brush & Nib is not the type of expressive association that the First Amendment is intended to protect. See IDK, Inc. , 836 F.2d at 1195 (finding an association is not fully protected by the First Amendment if its "activities are not predominately of the type protected by the First Amendment" (quoting Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 635, 104 S.Ct. 3244, (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ) ). Section 18-4(B)'s requirement that Appellants provide equal goods and services does not infringe their primary goal of operating a business; if anything, such mandate is more aligned with their commercial interests by requiring services be provided to a broader customer base. ¶ 36 Even assuming, arguendo , that Appellants' business constitutes an expressive association, Section 18-4(B) remains constitutional in scope and application. The right to associate may permissibly be infringed if the regulation is adopted to "serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Fraternal Order of Eagles, Inc., Tucson Aerie No. 180 v. City of Tucson , 168 Ariz. 598, 602, 816 P.2d 255, 259 (App. 1991) (quoting Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ). We have previously found that eliminating discrimination constitutes a compelling interest. See Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 626, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ("Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling state interests."). Further we have found that antidiscrimination ordinances are not aimed at the suppression of speech, but at the elimination of discriminatory conduct. Id. at 625, 104 S.Ct. 3244 ; accord Telescope Media Grp. , 271 F.Supp.3d at 1112. Appellants' compliance with Section 18-4(B) does not hinder their freedom to associate; as previously noted, Appellants remain free to disclaim and/or post their belief that their religion only recognizes marriage between one man and one woman. That said, however, Appellants cannot deny access to their goods and services based on potential customers' sexual orientation. V. Overbroad and Vague ¶ 37 Appellants argue Section 18-4(B) is both overbroad and vague because it is unclear which actions would violate Section 18-4(B)(3), and because the ordinance applies to a substantial amount of protected speech. While certain words or phrases in Section 18-4(B), in isolation, may appear to be overbroad or vague, that does not render the ordinance unconstitutional. See State v. Baldwin , 184 Ariz. 267, 270, 908 P.2d 483, 486 (App. 1995), corrected (Jan. 10, 1996) (finding we strive to give statutes a constitutional construction, and thus, shall give a limiting construction, where appropriate, to cure a statute of any "constitutional infirmity") (quoting State v. Takacs , 169 Ariz. 392, 395, 819 P.2d 978, 981 (App. 1991) ). ¶ 38 A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it burdens or punishes constitutionally protected activities. State v. Kessler , 199 Ariz. 83, 87, ¶ 15, 13 P.3d 1200, 1205 (App. 2000) (quoting State v. Jones , 177 Ariz. 94, 99, 865 P.2d 138, 143 (App. 1993) ). To determine whether a statute which regulates conduct is overly broad, we must assess on a case-by-case basis whether the overbreadth of the statute is real and substantial as it relates to its plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Thus, the mere fact that there are some impermissible applications of the ordinance is insufficient to render the entire ordinance overbroad. Id. ; see also United States v. Williams , 553 U.S. 285, 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (invalidating a provision as overbroad is a "strong medicine") (citing Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp. , 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999) ). ¶ 39 Section 18-4(B) does not by its terms implicate speech. Thus, Appellants must prove that Section 18-4(B)'s overbreadth is real and substantial, which they have failed to do. We decline to entertain Appellants and amici's parade of hypotheticals that, if present, could potentially render Section 18-4(B) overbroad. Instead, we review on a case-by-case basis whether the ordinance is overbroad. Here, Section 18-4(B) properly restricts Appellants from announcing they will discriminate against customers based on sexual orientation. As previously mentioned, Appellants are free to proclaim their religious beliefs, but must do so within the confines of the law. ¶ 40 Appellants additionally argue that Section 18-4(B) is unconstitutionally vague because it "encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." In response, Phoenix urges that we must construe Section 18-4(B) as objective because it prohibits statements which indicate that a person would be unwelcome as opposed to the subjective interpretation that Section 18-4(B)(3) prohibits statements that make a person feel unwelcome . ¶ 41 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "fails to give a person of average intelligence reasonable notice of what behavior is prohibited or permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kessler , 199 Ariz. at 87, ¶ 15, 13 P.3d at 1204 (quoting State v. Steiger , 162 Ariz. 138, 141-42, 781 P.2d 616, 619-620 (App. 1989) ). A statute, however, need not define proscribed conduct with absolute precision, but it must adequately warn an individual of the proscribed conduct. State v. Burke , 238 Ariz. 322, 325-26, ¶ 6, 360 P.3d 118, 121-22 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. McMahon , 201 Ariz. 548, 551, ¶ 8, 38 P.3d 1213, 1216 (App. 2002) ); see also Baldwin , 184 Ariz. at 270, 908 P.2d at 486 (finding undefined terms susceptible to multiple meanings does not necessarily render a statute unconstitutionally vague). ¶ 42 Section 18-4(B)(3) provides that: It is unlawful for any owner ... of any place of public accommodation to directly or indirectly display, circulate, publicize or mail any advertisement, notice or communication which states or implies that any facility or service shall be refused or restricted because of ... sexual orientation ... or that any person, because of ... sexual orientation ... would be unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, undesirable or not solicited. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 43 We are unable to interpret Section 18-4(B)(3)'s use of the words "unwelcome," "objectionable," "unacceptable," and "undesirable" in a way that would render Section 18-4(B)(3) constitutional. The presence of one invalid prohibition, however, does not invalidate all of Section 18-4(B)(3). See City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc. , 201 Ariz. 106, 110, ¶ 12, 32 P.3d 31, 35 (App. 2001) ("We need not invalidate the entire Ordinance if the invalid portion can be severed from the remaining valid portions of the Ordinance.") (citing Randolph v. Groscost , 195 Ariz. 423, 426-27, ¶ 13, 989 P.2d 751, 754-55 (1999) ). Instead, we consider whether the invalid portion of Section 18-4(B)(3) can be severed from the remainder of the ordinance and assess whether "the valid portion, considered separately, can operate independently and is enforceable and workable." Randolph , 195 Ariz. at 427, ¶ 15, 989 P.2d at 755. ¶ 44 Here, striking the second half of Section 18-4(B)(3)-which bans an owner of a place of public accommodation from making a person feel "unwelcome," "objectionable," "unacceptable," and "undesirable" based on sexual orientation-does not render the remainder of the ordinance unenforceable or unworkable. Moreover, removing this clause from Section 18-4(B)(3) does not "produce a result so irrational or absurd as to compel the conclusion that an informed [drafter] would not have adopted one portion without the other." Randolph , 195 Ariz. at 427, ¶ 15, 989 P.2d at 755. The remainder of Section 18-4(B)(3) operates independently and is enforceable as intended. Given this construction, we need not find Section 18-4(B) unconstitutional; instead we construe the ordinance as lawfully prohibiting discriminatory speech, but allowing Appellants to disclaim personal support for same-sex marriage and to proclaim their religious beliefs. See LaFaro v. Cahill , 203 Ariz. 482, 488, ¶ 21, 56 P.3d 56, 62 (App. 2002) ("We attempt to construe statutes with 'a reasonable and constitutional meaning' whenever possible in order to remove potential doubts regarding the statute's viability.") (quoting McGovern v. McGovern , 201 Ariz. 172, 178, ¶ 20, 33 P.3d 506, 512 (App. 2001) ). ¶ 45 We therefore sever the invalid portion of Section 18-4(B)(3), but leave the remainder of the ordinance intact. VI. Free Exercise of Religion ¶ 46 Appellants argue Section 18-4(B) burdens their free exercise of religion under state law by requiring them to create "custom artwork to celebrate and promote ... marriage[s] outside of God's design for marriage as an institution between one man and one woman." ¶ 47 FERA protects an individual's exercise of religion from undue governmental interference. A.R.S. § 41-1493.01 (2017); see also State v. Hardesty , 222 Ariz. 363, 365, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 1004, 1006 (2009). Under the statute, the "government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless the rule is both "[i]n furtherance of a compelling government interest [and is] [t]he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." A.R.S. § 41-1493.01(B)-(C). Pursuant to FERA, a party must establish that her act or refusal to act is motivated by her religious belief, that the religious belief is sincerely held, and that the governmental action substantially burdens the exercise of religious beliefs. Hardesty , 222 Ariz. at 366, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d at 1007. Once a party establishes those elements, the burden shifts to the government to prove the action "furthers a compelling governmental interest" and is "[t]he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." Id. (citing A.R.S. § 41-1493.01(C) ). What constitutes the "least restrictive means" depends on the compelling interest at stake. Id. at 368, ¶ 19, 214 P.3d at 1009. FERA parallels the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993; as such we look to federal law as instructive on this issue. See Hardesty , 222 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d at 1006. ¶ 48 On appeal, Phoenix does not dispute that Appellants' desire to refuse to create wedding-related merchandise for same-sex weddings and to post an explanatory statement is motivated by their religious beliefs, nor does Phoenix dispute the sincerity of Appellants' beliefs. Thus, we focus our inquiry on Appellants' burden to demonstrate that Section 18-4(B) substantially burdens their exercise of religious beliefs. A substantial burden on the free exercise of religion requires more than a government action which merely "decreases the spirituality, the fervor, or the satisfaction with which a believer practices his religion," and instead is akin to the government coercing an individual to act contrary to her religious beliefs or penalizing faith. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). To determine whether Section 18-4(B) places a substantial burden on religion we analyze whether the ordinance will force Appellants "to choose between following the precepts of [their] religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of [their] religion in order to accept work, on the other hand," Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), or whether the regulation "affirmatively compels [Appellants], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." Wisconsin v. Yoder , 406 U.S. 205, 218, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). ¶ 49 Here, Appellants have failed to prove that Section 18-4(B) substantially burdens their religious beliefs by requiring that they provide equal goods and services to same-sex couples. Appellants are not penalized for expressing their belief that their religion only recognizes the marriage of opposite-sex couples. Nor are Appellants penalized for refusing to create wedding-related merchandise as long as they equally refuse similar services to opposite-sex couples. Section 18-4(B) merely requires that, by operating a place of public accommodation, Appellants provide equal goods and services to customers regardless of sexual orientation. Appellants are free to discontinue selling custom wedding-related merchandise and maintain the operation of Brush & Nib for its other business operations. What Appellants cannot do is use their religion as a shield to discriminate against potential customers. Although providing the same goods and services to same-sex couples might "decrease ... the satisfaction" with which Appellants' practice their religion this does not, a fortiori , make their compliance with Section 18-4(B) a substantial burden to their religion. See Navajo Nation , 535 F.3d at 1063. ¶ 50 Even if Appellants had met their burden of proof to demonstrate that Section 18-4(B) places a substantial burden on their religious exercise, Section 18-4(B) is still constitutional because Phoenix has a compelling interest in preventing discrimination, and has done so here through the least restrictive means. When faced with similar contentions, other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly concluded that the government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination. See Arlene's Flowers, Inc. , 389 P.3d at 565-66, ¶¶ 74-75 (compiling cases where the state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination survived strict scrutiny). It goes without saying that providing equal access to places of public accommodation does "not simply guarantee access to goods or services," but "serve[s] a broader societal purpose: eradicating barriers to the equal treatment of all citizens in the commercial marketplace." Id. at 566, ¶ 77. Appellants, however, argue that Phoenix does not suffer from pervasive sexual orientation discrimination, as evident from the historic lack of lawsuits to date, and that Phoenix could have used other means to achieve its goal, such as posting lists of businesses that will provide services for same-sex weddings. Other courts have addressed this "go elsewhere" argument and found it unpersuasive. We agree with those courts. See Arlene's Flowers, Inc. , 389 P.3d at 566, ¶ 77 (rejecting Arlene's "go elsewhere" argument and finding that the "case is no more about access to flowers than civil rights cases in the 1960s were about access to sandwiches"). Prohibiting places of public accommodation from discriminating against customers is not just about ensuring equal access, but about eradicating the construction of a second-class citizenship and diminishing humiliation and social stigma. The least restrictive way to eliminate discrimination in places of public accommodation is to expressly prohibit such places from discriminating. VII. Equal Protection ¶ 51 Appellants' final argument is that Section 18-4(B) violates their right to equal protection under state law because Section 18-4(B) "favor[s] artists who support same-sex marriage and punish[es] those who oppose it." We disagree. ¶ 52 Arizona's equal protection clause provides that "[n]o law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 13. In interpreting Arizona's equal protection clause, we use the same standard as the federal equivalent. Coleman , 230 Ariz. at 361, ¶ 39, 284 P.3d at 872. If a law discriminates against a suspect class or denies fundamental rights to one group it must meet a higher level of scrutiny to be constitutional. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). A law which does not infringe on any fundamental rights, however, is subject to rational basis review, and is constitutional if it "relate[s] to a legitimate government purpose." State v. Panos , 239 Ariz. 116, 118-19, ¶ 8, 366 P.3d 1006, 1008-09 (App. 2016) (quoting State v. Lowery , 230 Ariz. 536, 541, ¶ 13, 287 P.3d 830, 835 (App. 2012) ). ¶ 53 Appellants have not alleged they are members of a suspect class; instead, they argue they are treated differently than other similarly situated businesses because "[a]rtists who support same-sex marriage can operate their businesses in accordance with their beliefs" whereas Appellants purportedly cannot. Even assuming this to be true, it does not render Section 18-4(B) unconstitutional. Section 18-4(B) applies to all places of public accommodation and all business owners equally, regardless of their beliefs. Contrary to Appellants assertions, Section 18-4(B) does not infringe their fundamental rights by requiring that they provide equal goods and services to all customers regardless of sexual orientation. As such, the provisions of Section 18-4(B) must only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. As previously demonstrated, Phoenix has a legitimate governmental purpose in curtailing discriminatory practices, and prohibiting businesses from sexual orientation discrimination is rationally related to that purpose. Thus, Section 18-4(B) does not violate Appellants' equal protection. VIII. Attorneys' Fees ¶ 54 Both parties request attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-342 (2016) and A.R.S. § 12-348 (Supp. 2017). In the exercise of our discretion, we decline both requests, but award Phoenix its taxable costs, to be determined upon compliance with ARCAP 21. CONCLUSION ¶ 55 We affirm as modified the superior court's summary judgment in favor of Phoenix. Section 18-3 defines places of public accommodation as: [A]ll public places of entertainment, amusement or recreation, all public places where food or beverages are sold, public places operated for the lodging of transients or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those seeking health or recreation and all establishments offering their services, facilities or goods to or soliciting patronage from the members of the general public. Any dwelling, any private club or any place which is in its nature distinctly private is not a place of public accommodation. Appellants may utilize hand-painting and hand-lettered calligraphy in designing announcements, invitations, table and place cards, menus, wedding signs, and other specialized wedding décor. Appellants do not raise in this appeal alleged violations of the religious toleration clause or their due process rights. Phoenix filed a cross-appeal, arguing Appellants lacked standing. Section 18-4(B)(4) provides an exemption for bona fide religious organizations. Appellants have not asserted that they qualify as a bona fide religious organization. In Loving v. Virginia , the trial court sentenced the Lovings to jail because of their interracial marriage and stated that: Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. The United States Supreme Court vacated the sentence, finding laws which criminalized interracial marriage unconstitutional. 388 U.S. 1, 3, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). At the time Appellants filed their complaint they had not yet received a request to provide services for a same-sex wedding. After they filed their complaint, however, they received such a request, though both the court and Appellants agreed the request was likely in retaliation for Appellants' lawsuit. Appellants did not respond to the inquiry. We recognize the standard of review for a preliminary injunction is different from that of a summary judgment. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 227 Ariz. 262, 268, ¶ 9, 257 P.3d 181, 187 (App. 2011). We need not address Appellants' appeal from the superior court's preliminary injunction ruling because we find Appellants failed to establish that they are entitled to relief pursuant to a de novo review. It follows that Appellants would fail to establish they are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to an abuse of discretion review. To the extent Appellants argue that Section 18-4(B) imposes unconstitutional conditions, this argument fails. To find an unconstitutional condition we must first find the waiver of a constitutional right. See Niehaus v. Huppenthal , 233 Ariz. 195, 202, ¶ 23, 310 P.3d 983, 990 (App. 2013). Here, there is no such waiver. At oral argument, Appellants primarily relied on Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston , 515 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995), to argue that forcing them to provide services for same-sex weddings violated their First Amendment right to free speech. Appellants' reliance on Hurley is misplaced. In Hurley , the United States Supreme Court found a parade was expressive conduct and that forcing an organization to include a gay, lesbian and bisexual group would alter the message of that expressive conduct. Id. at 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338. As explained throughout this opinion, Appellants' act of creating stationery and wedding-related goods is not expressive conduct. Accordingly, the fact that Section 18-4(B) requires Appellants to provide the same services for same-sex weddings as opposite-sex weddings does not implicate their First Amendment rights. Even assuming Section 18-4(B) directly regulates speech, it still survives constitutional scrutiny. Laws which are content and viewpoint neutral are subject to intermediate scrutiny. See State ex rel. Napolitano v. Gravano , 204 Ariz. 106, 112, ¶ 19, 60 P.3d 246, 252 (App. 2002) ("If a regulation serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression, it is neutral, even if it incidentally affects some speakers or messages but not others." (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) ) ). Thus, to be constitutional, under this test, Section 18-4(B) needs only to further a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech. See United States v. O'Brien , 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). We have previously found that antidiscrimination statutes are content and viewpoint neutral and unrelated to the suppression of speech. See Hurley , 515 U.S. at 572, 115 S.Ct. 2338 ; accord Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter , 648 F.3d at 801. Accordingly, Section 18-4(B), as an antidiscrimination ordinance which regulates the conduct of providing services in a place of public accommodation, is content and viewpoint neutral. Moreover, as explained throughout this opinion Phoenix has a substantial, if not compelling, interest in eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation. We strike the following language from Section 18-4(B)(3), "or that any person, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability would be unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, undesirable or not solicited." Brush & Nib does not explicitly argue on appeal that § 18-4(B) violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; however, even assuming such an argument was advanced, Phoenix's obligation is to not enact, interpret or apply its laws or regulations based on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint. There is no evidence in the record to support any suggestion that Phoenix's adoption of § 18-4(B), or its interpretation as it relates to Brush & Nib, has been anything other than neutral toward and respectful of their sincerely-expressed religious beliefs. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd ., slip op. at 16-18 --- U.S. at ----, --- S.Ct. at ----, 2018 WL 2465172. Further, as noted by Justice Kagan in her concurring opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd ., "As this Court has long held, and reaffirms today, a vendor cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion disapproves selling a product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait. A vendor can choose the product he sells, but not the customers he serves-no matter the reason." (Internal citation omitted.)

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 Pierre and Lynn Vanoss, parents of the decedent, Jon Pierre Vanoss, and guardians of two of his minor children, along with Erin Healey, parent and guardian of a third child (collectively, "the Family"), appeal from the trial court's judgment following a jury trial and verdict in favor of BHP Copper Inc., alleging numerous claims of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Factual and Procedural History ¶ 2 The following facts are not in dispute. In 2012, BHP began rebuilding and refurbishing certain facilities at the Pinto Valley Mine in Globe-facilities that had been inoperable for several years. BHP hired an independent contractor, Tetra Tech Construction Services, Inc. to refurbish the ore chute system in the secondary crusher building. BHP contractually required Tetra Tech to abide by a comprehensive safety program with specific procedures and training for all workers. BHP separately contracted with Stantec Consulting Services, Inc. to provide general construction and safety management for the project, and it hired Atwell Anderson, LLC as the project's general contractor. On September 22, 2012, Tetra Tech employee Jon Pierre Vanoss, who had been assigned to "fire watch" duty on the fourth floor of the secondary crusher building, did not return from lunch. Following a search, Vanoss was found on a conveyor belt at the bottom of the number eight chute, having died from an apparent fall. ¶ 3 In cases later consolidated, the Family brought this action alleging negligence and negligence per se and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of BHP and the court entered judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P. After the court denied the Family's motion for new trial, this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1), (5)(a). Non-Delegable Duty ¶ 4 The Family contends the trial court erroneously granted partial summary judgment in favor of BHP, alleging that, as a mine operator, BHP owed a non-delegable duty to Vanoss pursuant to certain mine-safety statutes and regulations. Accordingly, the Family urges that BHP is vicariously liable under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 424 (1965), for Tetra Tech's failure to abide by required safeguards. We disagree with both contentions. ¶ 5 Whether one party owes another a duty of care is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Stanley v. McCarver , 208 Ariz. 219, ¶ 5, 92 P.3d 849, 851 (2004). A landowner who hires an independent contractor "owes no duty" to protect the employee of an independent contractor from that contractor's own negligence. E.L. Jones Constr. Co. v. Noland , 105 Ariz. 446, 455, 466 P.2d 740, 749 (1970). Indeed, "a landowner is not liable for the negligent conduct of an independent contractor unless the landowner has been independently negligent." Lee v. M & H Enters., Inc. , 237 Ariz. 172, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 1153, 1157 (App. 2015). Although Arizona courts have recognized landowners may owe non-delegable duties to third parties for the tortious conduct of independent contractors, see Rand v. Porsche Fin. Servs. , 216 Ariz. 424, ¶ 36, 167 P.3d 111, 121 (App. 2007), such duties do not extend to the employees of those contractors, Sullins v. Third & Catalina Constr. P'ship , 124 Ariz. 114, 117, 602 P.2d 495, 498 (App. 1979). ¶ 6 Weighty policy considerations support this rule; most notably, employees are covered by our state's workers' compensation scheme-the premiums of which a landowner either directly or indirectly pays by hiring an independent-contractor employer. Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co. , 1 Ariz. App. 395, 404, 403 P.2d 330 (1965), rejected in part on other grounds by Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enters., Inc. , 170 Ariz. 384, 388-89, 825 P.2d 5, 9-10 (1992). Indeed, recognizing a non-delegable duty to such employees would serve only to increase the liability of the landowner merely for having hired an independent contractor. Id. As other courts have observed, this would "encourage the landowner to use [his] less experienced employees rather than an experienced contractor," thereby increasing the risk of harm to both employees and third parties. Dillard v. Strecker , 255 Kan. 704, 877 P.2d 371, 385 (1994). ¶ 7 Relying on § 424, Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Family argues that certain mine-safety statutes and regulations impose a non-delegable duty on BHP. See A.R.S. § 27-304 ("The [mine] operator shall conduct his operation with due regard to health and safety."). However, we have previously determined § 424"does not apply in the area of the law governing the relationship of an owner of property to an employee of an independent contractor." Sullins , 124 Ariz. at 117, 602 P.2d at 498. In Sullins , we reasoned "[t]hat section ... could create a non-delegable duty owed by a property owner to an employee of an independent contractor," a principle "Arizona courts have expressly rejected." Id. , citing Welker , 1 Ariz. App. at 403, 403 P.2d 330. Further, although Arizona's mine-safety statutes and regulations impose numerous requirements for the protection of miners, nothing in them indicates the legislature intended to create a right of action by imposing a non-delegable duty that supersedes the well-established rule in Arizona: a landowner is not liable to the employee of an independent contractor for the negligence of that contractor. See A.R.S. §§ 27-301 to 27-318 ; Ariz. Admin. Code R11-1-101 to R11-1-152. ¶ 8 The Family also asserts "[t]he concept and application of non-delegable duties is now well established in Arizona." They observe that in Rand , 216 Ariz. 424, n.5, 167 P.3d 111, 121, this court both recognized a non-delegable duty and also adopted § 424. But Rand is unavailing here because the plaintiff there was a third party and not the employee of an independent contractor. 216 Ariz. 424, ¶¶ 4, 22, 167 P.3d 111, 114, 118. Likewise, the Family's reliance on Koepke v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. is misplaced because the injured party there was a third-party customer of the landowner, not an employee of an independent contractor. 140 Ariz. 420, 423, 682 P.2d 425, 428 (App. 1984) ; see also Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. P'ship v. Kelly , 166 Ariz. 96, 98, 104, 800 P.2d 962, 964, 970 (1990) (landowner liable to employee of a third-party business operator for negligence of independent contractor). ¶ 9 At oral argument, the Family argued the legislature abrogated the common-law independent-contractor rule for mining operations when it enacted our state's mine-safety statutes. See § 27-304 ; 1968 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 111, § 5. But we can find no language therein that indicates any intent to do so. See § 27-304. ¶ 10 The Family specifically maintains that § 27-304(B) imposes a non-delegable statutory duty on BHP. Part of that subsection reads: "[The operator] shall be responsible for the safe performance of all work under him and for the safety of all employees." But the Family overlooks that the preceding sentence appears to contemplate delegation of specific safety responsibilities: "The operator, or some responsible person with authority appointed by him , shall be on duty at all times when employees are working." § 27-304(B) (emphasis added). In context, then, this section imposes a duty on BHP to operate a safe mine. But it does not expressly prohibit the operator from delegating that responsibility to an independent contractor. Nor does that language necessarily impose vicarious liability on the operator for the negligence of the independent contractor. ¶ 11 In the absence of such language, the Family emphasizes the relative dates of Welker (1965), our jurisprudence applying the independent-contractor rule in the mining context, and the statutes, which it claims modify that rule (1968). But none of the duties imposed by the later-enacted statutes conflict with the independent-contractor rule. See Carrow Co. v. Lusby , 167 Ariz. 18, 21, 804 P.2d 747, 750 (1990) ("[A]bsent a manifestation of legislative intent to repeal a common law rule, we will construe statutes as consistent with the common law."). ¶ 12 Here, the parties agree both that Vanoss was an employee of Tetra Tech and that Tetra Tech was an independent contractor hired by BHP. Thus, we conclude summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability was appropriate because Arizona law does not impose non-delegable duties on landowners to the employees of independent contractors. See Sullins , 124 Ariz. at 117, 602 P.2d at 498. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined BHP was not subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of Tetra Tech. Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning State and Federal Mining Statutes and Regulations ¶ 13 The Family asserts the trial court erred by preventing its mine-safety expert, Jack Spadaro, from testifying about certain mine-safety statutes and regulations. Rule 702, Ariz. R. Evid., provides that a properly qualified expert "may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if," among other requirements, "the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data" and "the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." We review a trial court's determinations on the admissibility of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Escamilla v. Cuello , 230 Ariz. 202, ¶ 20, 282 P.3d 403 , 407(2012). ¶ 14 Here, the trial court permitted Spadaro to testify provided "his testimony includes a differentiation of which defendant had what duty and what the defendant did to breach that duty," and on condition there be "timely disclosure of his opinions on duty and breach of duty." After reviewing the disclosure, the court noted that Spadaro's opinions depended on attributing vicarious liability to BHP for Tetra Tech's failure to comply with certain mine-safety statutes and regulations. Because the court had correctly granted summary judgment in favor of BHP on vicarious liability and non-delegable duty, see supra ¶¶ 4-12, it precluded Spadaro from testifying about the statutes and regulations. Our review of Spadaro's disclosure leads us to the same conclusion. His opinions regarding any failure to comply with mine-safety statutes and regulations depended on vicarious liability based on a non-delegable-duty theory of liability rather than BHP's independently tortious conduct. ¶ 15 The Family asserts the statutes and regulations were relevant as a measure of BHP's duty to provide adequate safety supervision. Although the court permitted Spadaro to testify about BHP's safety-oversight obligation, it correctly precluded any opinion based on mine-safety statutes and regulations because the opinions Spadaro disclosed "depend[ed] on ... non-delegable duty and ... strict liability." Indeed, the statutes and regulations at issue do not prescribe how a mine owner must oversee the work of its independent contractors; rather they either impose general safety obligations or require the use of certain equipment and procedures. See A.R.S. §§ 27-301 to 27-318 ; Ariz. Admin. Code R11-1-101 to R1-11-152. ¶ 16 The Family frames the issue as whether statutes and regulations, generally, may operate as the standard of care in a negligence action. But the trial court did not preclude Spadaro's testimony on this ground. Rather, the court's implicit reasoning was that any opinion based on the statutes and regulations at issue was only minimally probative of whether BHP failed to supervise Tetra Tech and risked confusing or misleading the jury by introducing the theory that BHP may be vicariously liable for the failures of Tetra Tech. Therefore, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. Admissibility of Deposition ¶ 17 The Family also complains the trial court improperly sustained BHP's untimely objections to "critical" portions of the deposition of Stantec employee Tracy Fischer, a former field-safety representative at the Pinto Valley Mine. Relying on Rule 32, Ariz. R. Civ. P., the Family insists BHP waived any objections not made during the deposition and, therefore, the court erred in excluding certain portions of it. We review admissibility determinations for an abuse of discretion. Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young , 185 Ariz. 493, 506, 917 P.2d 222, 235 (1996). ¶ 18 Rule 32(d)(3)(A), then in force, provided, "Objections to ... the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time." 106 Ariz. LXIII (1970). Rule 32, however, cannot transform evidence that is otherwise inadmissible into admissible evidence merely by operation of waiver. See Finn v. J.H. Rose Truck Lines , 1 Ariz. App. 27, 32, 398 P.2d 935 (1965) (counsel there cited "no authority holding that ... evidence, not ordinarily admissible ..., is rendered admissible by reason of the fact that there is no objection made at the time of the taking of a deposition"). Thus, a trial court may redact portions of a deposition that are "inadmissible under any theory of the rules of evidence." Rivera v. Hancock , 79 Ariz. 199, 207, 286 P.2d 199 (1955), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooker v. Canny , 103 Ariz. 529, 532, 446 P.2d 929, 932 (1968). Stated alternatively, Rule 32 waiver is not absolute. The trial court retains discretion over the admissibility of depositions and portions thereof. ¶ 19 BHP cites multiple cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that waiver under Rule 32 applies only to "objections to the form of the questions" but not to substantive objections. See, e.g. , Wynder v. Lonergan , 153 Ind.App. 92, 286 N.E.2d 413 (1972) ; Schalkofski v. Lawrence , 37 Mich.App. 686, 195 N.W.2d 292 (1972). But the language of Rule 32(d)(3) belies such an interpretation. By its plain language, subsection (A) pertains to "the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony," grounds upon which a party would raise a substantive objection. By contrast, subsection (B) pertains to "the form of the questions or answers." We need not, however, resolve every contour of whether and when waiver under Rule 32 applies because, in each case, we conclude either that the testimony at issue was inadmissible under any theory, see Rivera , 79 Ariz. at 207, 286 P.2d 199, or that its exclusion was harmless because it would have been cumulative of other statements not redacted. See Borja v. Phx. Gen. Hosp., Inc. , 151 Ariz. 302, 306, 727 P.2d 355, 359 (App. 1986). Accordingly, we determine the trial court did not commit reversible error in excluding these portions of Fischer's deposition. Statements Concerning Notice ¶ 20 The Family insists the trial court should not have excluded testimony about the notice BHP received from Fischer. The statements at issue are: Q. Did you share your opinion about these crews with anyone on the job site or do you recall- A. I shared my opinion about these crews with every single manager, person that would listen, and say, Why? Why do we still have these guys on-site? Why? I don't agree with this. I want them gone. Repeatedly. Q. Do you recall anyone specifically you told that to? A. Good grief. Name it? I told it to all of their management, Bruce Willis. Jim McCarthy. Lucian Rose. Woody. I told it to Brian Keavney. To Ken. To C.R., Ken's brother, to Ahmed, to Rob Crohn, to David Weichardt. You name it. Everybody knew, without a doubt, how I felt about this crew. I don't mix words. The court determined the statements would "confuse the issue and mislead the jury" because it was not clear Fischer made these complaints before Vanoss's death. Undoubtedly, this defect reasonably could have been cured had BHP noted its objection at the deposition. However, from a cold record we cannot determine how Fischer might have answered questions establishing whether she had warned BHP about Tetra Tech's dangerous practices before Vanoss's fall; and we do not see how the trial court could have done so either. ¶ 21 The Family insists "the timeline was clear when considered in context" of the deposition, but our independent review of the deposition and associated exhibits indicates Fischer does not clearly differentiate incidents and conversations that took place before Vanoss's fall from those that took place after. In particular, the Family argues the trial court's ruling on this point is inconsistent with its earlier ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Stantec, in which the court noted that prior to Vanoss's death, "Stantec ... had repeatedly communicated to BHP and others the propensity for Tetra Tech's employees to violate safety protocols." But the court did not specify that the evidence upon which it relied included Fischer's statements. Rather, the court placed greater emphasis on Stantec's limited role in the days leading up to the fall and, in particular, on the fact that on the day of the fall, "Stantec had no role in training Vanoss or others, providing safety supervision at the worksite," or ensuring compliance with specific safety statutes and regulations. ¶ 22 We agree with the trial court that any resolution as to when Fischer's warnings came in the overall timeline is too speculative. Although Finn provides that " Rule 32 appears to be designed to avoid an unfair l[ ]ying in wait by which another party is prejudiced," 1 Ariz. App. at 33, 398 P.2d 935, we also recognize that plaintiffs have a general obligation to produce admissible evidence. Cf. Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 311, 802 P.2d 1000, 1010 (1990) (proponent of claim or defense must present evidence to survive summary judgment and directed verdict). With respect to these statements, the court did not err because no evidence established Fischer made the statements to BHP personnel before Vanoss's fall and, therefore, they were not admissible on any theory of relevance. See Rivera , 79 Ariz. at 207, 286 P.2d 199. Party Admissions ¶ 23 The Family also contends the trial court improperly excluded certain party admissions. After asserting she complained to certain Stantec and Atwell Anderson employees, Fischer made the following statements, excluded by the court: Q. And what was each of their responses to you? A. They understood, but we were losing a lot of money on this job, and that we had to have workforce reduction. The court rejected the argument that the statements attributed to Stantec and Atwell Anderson employees about losing money and reducing workforce were party admissions, also finding them vague and misleading. But even assuming these employees made their statements as "agent[s] or employee[s] on a matter within the scope of [their respective companies'] relationship" with BHP "while it existed," Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), it is not at all apparent whether the purported admissions related to the actions and motivations of BHP rather than Stantec or Atwell Anderson. Although the defects in these statements possibly could have been cured by a timely objection, we will not speculate whether or how Fischer might have testified. Because no theory of admissibility clearly applies to these statements, see Rivera , 79 Ariz. at 207, 286 P.2d 199, we cannot say the trial court erred in excluding them. ¶ 24 The trial court also excluded the following statements, rejecting the Family's contention that they constituted party admissions: Q. Some of the documents say that the Stantec safety techs are being let go, and that BHP people are going to take over that function. Is that something you read or heard ... at the Pinto Valley mine? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you read it or hear it? A. I heard it[.] Q. Who[m] did you hear that from? A. That was just the general word when we objected to losing our safety people. Q. Did Carlton Pelts tell you that or Rob Crohn? [ ] A. I don't recall. Q. Did you ever see any BHP people step into those safety responsibilities? A. No, sir. Concerning these statements Fischer heard about BHP taking over particular safety functions, she was unable to attribute them to BHP when asked directly. Because she was unable to lay the necessary foundation when given the opportunity, the ground of objection could not have been obviated or removed during the deposition. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3)(A). Accordingly, BHP did not waive the objection with respect to these statements and the trial court did not err by precluding them. Stantec's Exclusion from the Investigation ¶ 25 The Family also contests the trial court's exclusion of Fischer's testimony that Stantec had been prevented from investigating Vanoss's death. But even assuming arguendo that the court erred, any such error was harmless because the court allowed the jury to hear other statements by Fischer that Stantec started an investigation into Vanoss's fall, "but BHP said that they were doing the investigation." See Borja , 151 Ariz. at 306, 727 P.2d at 359. Nineteen Near-Miss Incidents & Related Opinion Evidence ¶ 26 The Family further complains that, although the trial court allowed some of Fischer's testimony regarding "near-misses" implicating job safety, it improperly excluded numerous references that nineteen such incidents had occurred. The court excluded such references for lack of foundation because Fischer had not clearly articulated whether each near-miss incident had occurred before Vanoss's death and the raw number risked misleading the jury. ¶ 27 Accordingly, the trial court excluded the following opinions based on these nineteen near-miss incidents: Q. Okay. If Tetra Tech had safety technicians besides Lucian Rose working with him in the secondary crusher on Saturday, September 22, 2012, would that be sufficient safety supervision for that job site? A. Are you asking my opinion? Q. Yes, ma'am. A. No. Q. Why do you say that? A. 19 near-misses says no. Q. Okay. And so is that because based on your experience, Tetra Tech did things that were dangerous in the past? A. Yes. Q. And you felt it would have been-you felt that Tetra Tech needed someone to, I guess, supervise its own work for it? A. I felt that Tetra Tech needed more supervision that had no other job but safety supervision. Q. That didn't come through clearly here. A. I said, no, did not feel comfortable with only one safety technician. I felt they needed more safety supervision that had no other job other than safety supervision. ¶ 28 With regard to the raw number of nineteen near-miss incidents, we cannot say the trial court erred by excluding such references. But even if this was error, it was surely harmless because the court allowed the jury to hear that Fischer had reported twenty-two near misses to BHP for the duration of the whole project. See Borja , 151 Ariz. at 306, 727 P.2d at 359. ¶ 29 With regard to Fischer's opinions about whether BHP failed its safety-oversight duty, we find no error for the same reasons we cited in addressing the Family's claim of error for exclusion of Fischer's statements that she had told BHP about Tetra Tech's poor performance. See supra ¶¶ 20-22. Specifically, it is not clear that the facts and data upon which Fischer based her opinion occurred before Vanoss's death. See Ariz. R. Evid. 702(b) (expert testimony must be "based on sufficient facts or data"). Although this defect possibly could have been cured had BHP objected during the deposition, the statements as presented to the court appear inadmissible under any theory, see Rivera , 79 Ariz. at 207, 286 P.2d 199, and we will not speculate as to whether or how these defects might have been cured. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court erred by excluding these statements. Waiver of Privilege/Discovery Sanctions ¶ 30 Finally, the Family contends BHP waived attorney-client and work-product privileges for its internal-investigation documents when it "fail[ed] or refus[ed] to timely comply with [the privilege-log requirements of] Rule 26.1(f)(1)," costing the Family "significant amounts of time and effort." We will not disturb a trial court's decision regarding sanctions for a disclosure violation absent an abuse of discretion. Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope , 219 Ariz. 480, ¶ 111, 200 P.3d 977, 1002 (App. 2008). ¶ 31 Rule 37(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., authorizes the trial court to impose sanctions for disclosure failures, whether for untimeliness, inaccuracy, or incompleteness. Available sanctions include the reasonable expenses of the opposing party (including attorney fees), jury instructions, and "other appropriate sanctions," including rendering a default judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(3). The rule does not enumerate waiver as an available sanction and certainly does not mandate waiver as a matter of law. See id. ¶ 32 Here, the trial court found BHP's first privilege log, produced over a year after its initial disclosure statement, was incomplete because "it failed to fairly describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed sufficient to enable Plaintiffs to contest the claim of privilege." The court further found this caused the Family "to expend significant amounts of time and effort." Following a thorough review, the court awarded attorney fees incurred as a result of the untimely and incomplete log. Because the trial court "is in the best position to evaluate the quality and motivation of counsel in litigation," we cannot say it abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees as a sanction rather than ordering privileges waived. Hormel v. Maricopa County , 224 Ariz. 454, ¶ 30, 232 P.3d 768, 775 (App. 2010). ¶ 33 Advancing numerous arguments, the Family urges this court to determine that waiver was the only appropriate sanction for BHP's discovery failures. The Family implores us to adopt the four-factor test for sanctions articulated in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States District Court for District of Montana , 408 F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2005). We decline to do so because, even if we did, the trial court would have acted well within its discretion to sanction BHP as it did without also finding BHP had waived any privilege in the reports. See Hormel , 224 Ariz. 454, ¶ 30, 232 P.3d 768, 775. ¶ 34 Alternatively, the Family insists the trial court erred by declining to conduct an in-camera review of all documents after determining BHP had not waived any privilege. But whether to conduct such a review is within the discretion of the trial court. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Superior Court , 7 Ariz. App. 277, 281, 438 P.2d 424 (1968), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ott , 167 Ariz. 420, 808 P.2d 305 (App. 1990). Here, the court ordered an in-camera review of certain " 'third party' witness statements and summaries of witness interviews" but declined to review each item on the privilege log because the Family "failed to meet the requirements of Rule 26(b)(3) [for discovery of work product] ... [and] the Court f[ound] it unnecessary and inappropriate to examine [those] materials." Based on the court's findings, we cannot say it abused its discretion. See Phelps Dodge , 7 Ariz. App. at 281, 438 P.2d 424. Disposition ¶ 35 For all the above reasons we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The Family also named Stantec Consulting Services, Inc., Atwell Anderson, LLC, and Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America as defendants. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Travelers because it did not contain any allegations of wrongdoing against or seek any affirmative relief from Travelers. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Stantec, finding the Family failed to produce "sufficient evidence to establish proximate causation" or "to show that Stantec ... had any knowledge of the conditions ... or ... was in any position to remedy any alleged safety violation." The Family does not appeal either of these orders. At the close of the Family's case, the court dismissed Atwell Anderson after reaching a full and complete settlement. The Family attempts to distinguish the instant case from those determining "mere landowners" or "passive landowner[s]" do not owe non-delegable duties, asserting BHP was an "active mine operator," subject to statutory and regulatory requirements. See, e.g. , Sullins v. Third & Catalina Constr. P'ship , 124 Ariz. 114, 116, 602 P.2d 495, 497 (App. 1979) (defendant owned building at time of accident); Cordova v. Parrett , 146 Ariz. 79, 81, 703 P.2d 1228, 1230 (App. 1985) (defendants hired contractor to move and install mobile home). However, this distinction does not lend itself to vicarious liability. Instead, by emphasizing BHP's active role, this argument grounds itself in direct liability or retained control. See Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. P'ship v. Kelly , 166 Ariz. 96, 101, 800 P.2d 962, 967 (1990) ("nondelegable duty ... is somewhat of a misnomer because it refers to duties for which the employer must retain responsibility, despite proper delegation to another"). Section 424 states, "One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions." Similarly, the Family attempts to distinguish this court's rejection of non-delegable duties in Sullins because the plaintiff in that case had relied on the Occupational Safety and Health Act which, unlike our mining statutes and regulations, expressly states it "will not support a cause of action for personal injuries by an employee of a subcontractor against the employer of the subcontractor." 124 Ariz. at 117-18, 602 P.2d at 498-99, citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). But this provision of the Act was by no means dispositive; in the context of a landowner and the employee of an independent contractor, the court clearly stated, "Arizona does not recognize non-delegable duties." Sullins , 124 Ariz. at 118, 602 P.2d at 499. The Family interprets Ft. Lowell to stand for the proposition that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 422(b), Arizona courts have recognized vicarious liability for the negligence of "run-of-the-mill general contractors ... to employees of independent contractors." Accordingly, the Family insists that rejecting § 424 would be inconsistent, allowing BHP to "escape liability for [its] regulatory breach [ ]." However, in Ft. Lowell the injured party was not an employee of the negligent contractor, but an employee of a business operator-a distinct and unrelated third party. 166 Ariz. at 98, 800 P.2d at 964. The Family does not argue BHP is liable to Vanoss as a third party injured by the negligence of a different independent contractor. Ft. Lowell , therefore, is inapposite. Accordingly, while the mine-safety statutes arguably create non-delegable duties running to some third parties, they do not do so for the employees of independent contractors. Similarly, the Family's reliance on the "overlapping compliance responsibility" between BHP and Tetra Tech as a ground requiring admission of mine-safety statutes and regulations is misplaced. Spadaro's disclosure indicates a regulatory citation may be appropriate based on "overlapping" responsibility arising from a mine operator's own acts, omissions, or retained control. But as the trial court stated, "[it] didn't hear any testimony or see any exhibit" establishing such a theory. Accordingly, we also reject the Family's contention that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on both the mine-safety statutes and regulations, themselves, and negligence per se. None of these instructions distinguished between those safety duties retained by BHP and those it had delegated to its independent contractors. Thus, in the absence of any accompanying instruction distinguishing direct and vicarious liability, such instructions risked confusing the jurors as to the appropriate grounds for finding BHP liable. See State v. Musgrove , 223 Ariz. 164, ¶ 6, 221 P.3d 43, 46 (App. 2009) (court "should reject a 'proffered jury instruction that ... has the potential to mislead or confuse the jury' "), quoting State v. Rivera , 177 Ariz. 476, 479, 868 P.2d 1059, 1062 (App. 1994). The Family proposed no such clarifying instruction. Also, because the mine-safety statutes and regulations were properly kept from the jury, there was no statutory or regulatory basis upon which the jury could have returned a verdict in favor of the Family based on negligence per se. See Hutto v. Francisco , 210 Ariz. 88, ¶ 12, 107 P.3d 934, 937 (App. 2005) ("Negligence per se applies when there has been a violation of a specific requirement of a law."), quoting Griffith v. Valley of the Sun Recovery and Adjustment Bureau, Inc. , 126 Ariz. 227, 229, 613 P.2d 1283, 1285 (App. 1980). We therefore cannot say the court erred by denying the requested instructions. Employees of BHP. Similarly, the trial court properly excluded Fischer's equivocal answer to the question of whether "anyone took ... responsibilit [y] in the secondary crusher." That case proposed that, on a case-by-case basis, a court should consider: (1) the degree to which invocation of privilege frustrates the ability to determine whether withheld documents are actually privileged; (2) the timeliness of the invocation; (3) the magnitude of document production; and (4) other considerations that make responding unusually easy or difficult. Burlington , 408 F.3d at 1149. The Family also argues that the documents were not protected by the attorney-client privilege insofar as BHP officers merely distributed the documents to their attorneys. But as BHP observes, the trial court determined the documents constituted attorney work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. The Family also claims the trial court erred by finding the "dual purpose doctrine" inapplicable. However, it appears the Family misunderstands that doctrine as one that renders documents unprivileged rather than privileged. See United States v. Adlman , 134 F.3d 1194, 1201-03 (2d Cir. 1998) (documents prepared in anticipation of litigation "eligible for work-product privilege" even though prepared to serve other purposes as well). Here, the court correctly determined the documents were prepared "for the dual purpose of defending against anticipated litigation and participating in a regulatory investigation." Moreover, the Family cites the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission adjudication arising from this incident, in which that commission applied the doctrine and determined the documents were not privileged. See BHP Copper, Inc., Mine Safety and Health Admin., West No. 2013-636-M (Dep't of Labor Apr. 25, 2016). But the Family does not argue, let alone demonstrate, the trial court, or this court, is bound by that commission's privilege determination.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge: ¶ 1 Jesus Pina-Barajas appeals his conviction and sentence for unlawful possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor, arguing the court should not have precluded his defense of necessity. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Factual and Procedural History ¶ 2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting a jury instruction. State v. Almeida , 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 9, 356 P.3d 822, 824-25 (App. 2015). In April 2012, an officer with the Tucson Police Department was investigating an incident involving Pina-Barajas when he looked into the cab of Pina-Barajas's truck and saw the handle of a gun. The officer obtained a search warrant and found three handguns, a pistol magazine, and ammunition. After first denying that he owned the items, Pina-Barajas later admitted to owning the guns, to having been convicted of a felony, and that "he wasn't supposed to have guns." ¶ 3 At trial, Pina-Barajas sought to admit additional statements he had made to detectives explaining he had obtained the guns after a certain man threatened him and shot at him approximately two weeks earlier. Pina-Barajas also sought to admit the statements pursuant to the rule of completeness. See Ariz. R. Evid. 106. The court precluded the statements on both grounds, and the jury found Pina-Barajas guilty of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor. The court sentenced him to an enhanced, minimum term of three years. Pina-Barajas appealed; we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1). Necessity Defense ¶ 4 Pina-Barajas contends the trial court erred by precluding his necessity defense. Specifically, he argues he was entitled to introduce certain statements he made to detectives establishing that defense and to have the jury instructed accordingly. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fish , 222 Ariz. 109, ¶ 8, 213 P.3d 258, 263 (App. 2009). Although we normally review denial of a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, "we independently assess whether the evidence supported a justification instruction, because that is a question of law and involves no discretionary factual determination." Almeida , 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 9, 356 P.3d at 824-25. ¶ 5 The trial court may preclude a defense when the defendant fails to "demonstrate he can produce some evidence in support [thereof]." State v. Medina , No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0035, --- Ariz. ----, ¶ 12, --- P.3d ----, ----, 2018 WL 1403818 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018). To warrant an instruction a defendant need only produce "slightest evidence." Id. To establish necessity, a defendant must show that he "was compelled to engage in the proscribed conduct and ... had no reasonable alternative to avoid imminent ... injury greater than the injury that might reasonably result from the person's own conduct." A.R.S. § 13-417(A). An imminent injury is one that is immediate, "about to occur," or "impending." State v. Dominguez , 236 Ariz. 226, ¶¶ 4-6, 338 P.3d 966, 969 (App. 2014), quoting The American Heritage Dictionary 879 (5th ed. 2011). A threat of imminent injury is necessarily distinct from one of "eventual harm," which "would functionally erase the imminence element from our statute's definition of the necessity defense." Medina , --- Ariz. ----, --- P.3d at ----, 2018 WL 1403818 ¶ 9. In Medina , this court determined a threat occurring almost "a month" before the defendant was found in possession of a weapon was too remote in time to establish "slightest evidence" of a threat of imminent injury. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. ¶ 6 Further, in addressing other justification defenses, Arizona courts have determined that justification based on imminent or immediate threats dissipates rapidly or is confined within a particular transaction. See generally A.R.S. §§ 13-404 to 13-421. In In re Roy L. , this court concluded that a juvenile carrying a firearm was properly precluded from arguing self-defense because, on the day he was arrested, he had not seen the rival gang member who had threatened him. 197 Ariz. 441, ¶ 22, 4 P.3d 984, 990 (App. 2000). In State v. Almeida , we stated that a justification instruction for crime prevention is not warranted once a crime has been "fully completed, leaving nothing to prevent." 238 Ariz. 77, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d at 836. But we determined the defendant was entitled to a crime-prevention instruction because "[t]he evidence supported an ongoing episode of road rage ... rather than a discrete aggravated assault." Id. ¶ 15. ¶ 7 In addition to imminence, the necessity defense requires that the defendant have had no reasonable alternative. § 13-417(A). Thus, the risk of injury must be both imminent and the person at risk must have no reasonable alternative to avoid that injury short of violating the law. We read these two core requirements of a necessity defense together. See State v. Gaynor-Fonte , 211 Ariz. 516, ¶ 13, 123 P.3d 1153, 1155 (App. 2005) (we interpret individual provisions in context of entire statute). Specifically, a threat of injury must be sufficiently imminent that reasonable persons would have lacked the time to pursue reasonable lawful alternatives. Ordinarily, as time elapses, other reasonable, legal courses of action become increasingly available to such persons, lessening their need to violate the law to avoid an imminent injury. By this standard, few potential harms are so imminent that they must be addressed with urgent unlawful action. ¶ 8 Here, the statements Pina-Barajas sought to admit could have established that he had obtained and kept the guns in response to incidents that had taken place two weeks earlier. Nothing in Pina-Barajas's statements indicates that he had been subjected to any threat in the intervening period. Nor has Pina-Barajas made any showing that he lacked any legal alternatives during those two weeks, or that those alternatives-such as alerting law enforcement to his predicament-were unreasonable. Accordingly, by the time officers found the guns in his truck, the original threat of harm could not reasonably be characterized as imminent. ¶ 9 Relying on Richter , Pina-Barajas argues he was facing an ongoing and continuing threat, which is "always imminent" and "could materialize at any moment." In Richter , however, the defendant's duress defense hinged on the ongoing threat of physical harm she faced over many months because her husband "set the rules of the house," abused her if she challenged his authority, and constantly supervised her. 243 Ariz. 131, ¶¶ 22-26, 402 P.3d at 1023-24. Nothing in the instant case suggests the person who had threatened Pina-Barajas had any presence, much less such a continuing proximity, in the two weeks between the incident and the time officers discovered the guns. Indeed, that Pina-Barajas kept the guns locked in the cab of his truck, where they were not readily available to him while in his home, undercuts any argument based on an imminent threat. ¶ 10 Relying on United States v. Panter , Pina-Barajas insists the legislature could not have intended to make prohibited possessors "helpless targets for assassins," divested of the right to defend themselves. 688 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1982). But in Panter , the defendant, who had been stabbed and wrestled to the ground, grabbed a co-worker's gun and shot his assailant as he continued to attack him. Id. at 269. Thus, Panter serves as a concrete illustration of imminent harm. Similarly, although nothing in §§ 13-417 or 13-3102 prevents a prohibited possessor from threatening force by means of a firearm, that justification is narrowly circumscribed by the tandem requirements that the threat of harm be imminent and that no reasonable alternative exists. Because Pina-Barajas cannot establish by "slightest evidence" that he had been facing an imminent injury when found in possession of the guns, he cannot establish a legal basis for a necessity instruction and, therefore, the court properly precluded both the defense and his statements in support thereof. See Medina , --- Ariz. ----, --- P.3d at ----2018 WL 1403818 ¶ 12. Completeness ¶ 11 Pina-Barajas also argues he should have been permitted to introduce the same statements under the rule of completeness because they supplied the necessary context to understand his admissions. See Ariz. R. Evid. 106. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Fish , 222 Ariz. 109, ¶ 8, 213 P.3d 258, 263. ¶ 12 Rule 106 provides that "[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction ... of any other part ... that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." Under the rule, a trial court only need admit those portions of a statement "necessary to qualify, explain or place into context the portion already introduced." State v. Cruz , 218 Ariz. 149, ¶ 58, 181 P.3d 196, 209 (2008), quoting State v. Prasertphong , 210 Ariz. 496, ¶ 15, 114 P.3d 828, 831 (2005). Accordingly, a party may not invoke the rule to inject irrelevant issues into the case. See State v. Hughes , 189 Ariz. 62, 73, 938 P.2d 457, 468 (1997) ; Prasertphong , 210 Ariz. 496, ¶ 22, 114 P.3d at 833 (evidence admissible under Rule 106 may be excluded if danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading jury, or waste of time substantially outweighs probative value). ¶ 13 Here, the relevant issues were whether Pina-Barajas knowingly possessed the guns in question and whether he had been a prohibited possessor at the time. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3101(A)(7), 13-3102(A)(4). Concerning these issues, Pina-Barajas's relevant statements were that he owned the guns and that he was a convicted felon who "wasn't supposed to have guns." Because the trial court properly precluded Pina-Barajas from arguing justification by necessity, his reasons for possessing the guns were irrelevant and devoid of any probative value on the issues before the jury. Moreover, admitting the statements risked confusing the issues and misleading the jury by suggesting he might have been so justified. Accordingly, the court did not err by refusing to admit Pina-Barajas's statements under Rule 106. Disposition ¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Pina-Barajas's conviction and sentence.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 We here consider whether Arizona students granted deferred removal action by the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") under its Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") policy are eligible for in-state college tuition. "The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens." Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). Because Congress has not identified DACA recipients as "lawfully present" for purposes of public benefits eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1621, and Arizona has not made in-state tuition available to all citizens and nationals regardless of residence, we hold that DACA recipients are not eligible for in-state tuition in Arizona. I. ¶ 2 In 2012, DHS initiated the DACA program by exercising its prosecutorial discretion to defer the deportation of certain unauthorized aliens who entered the country as children. The program provided neither long-term authorization to remain in this country nor a path to citizenship, but it permitted qualified persons to live and work in the United States while they remained in the program. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Patrol, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't (June 15, 2012). ¶ 3 DACA recipients must apply to DHS for employment authorization documents ("EADs"), and the Maricopa County Community College District Board ("MCCCD") began accepting those EADs as evidence of residency for students to receive in-state tuition. Federal law generally bars granting in-state tuition to students based on state residency when they are not lawfully present in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Similarly, Arizona law bars in-state classification of certain students lacking lawful immigration status. A.R.S. § 15-1803(B). (Arizona statutes contemplate reduced tuition for "in-state" university students, A.R.S. § 15-1802, and "resident" community college students, id. § 15-1802.01; we herein use "in-state tuition" to encompass both forms of reduced tuition based on residency.) ¶ 4 In 2013, the Arizona Attorney General filed this action seeking a determination that MCCCD's policy violates Arizona law and an injunction prohibiting MCCCD from allowing DACA recipients to obtain the in-state tuition rates. Abel Badillo and Bibiana Vazquez ("the Students")-DACA-recipient MCCCD students who receive in-state tuition-intervened. Both MCCCD and the Students filed motions for summary judgment. Without reaching the Students' constitutional arguments, the trial court granted summary judgment to MCCCD and the Students, concluding that under the relevant federal and state law, DACA recipients are "lawfully present" and therefore eligible for in-state tuition benefits. ¶ 5 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment enjoining MCCCD from granting in-state tuition to DACA recipients. Two judges agreed that "Congress has not defined DACA recipients as 'lawfully present' for purposes of eligibility for in-state tuition," and MCCCD was thus prohibited from granting in-state tuition. State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd. , 242 Ariz. 325, 339 ¶ 46, 395 P.3d 714, 728 (App. 2017). The concurring judge reached the same conclusion under state law. Id. at 344 ¶ 68, 395 P.3d 714 (Norris, J., concurring). The court of appeals also rejected the Students' constitutional arguments based on preemption and equal protection. Id. at 337-39 ¶¶ 37-45, 395 P.3d 714. ¶ 6 We granted review solely on the issue of whether DACA recipients are eligible for in-state tuition, a legal issue of statewide importance. Previously, we issued a decision order ruling that DACA recipients are not so eligible and stating that a written opinion explaining our decision would follow. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ¶ 7 This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State v. Jurden , 239 Ariz. 526, 528 ¶ 7, 373 P.3d 543, 545 (2016). "[T]he words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended." State v. Miller , 100 Ariz. 288, 296, 413 P.2d 757, 765 (1966). ¶ 8 In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). As relevant here, IIRIRA provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a). ¶ 9 Section 1623(a) has been interpreted as applying to in-state tuition, and the parties do not dispute that in-state tuition is subject to IIRIRA's requirements. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. , 50 Cal.4th 1277, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d 855, 865 (2010) (applying IIRIRA to in-state tuition and noting legislative history stating that bill language that later became § 1623"provides that illegal aliens are not eligible for in-state tuition rates at public institutions of higher education" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ). ¶ 10 This case turns on the meaning of "lawfully present" as it appears in IIRIRA. We conclude that only those aliens designated as benefits-eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) are "lawfully present" for purposes of IIRIRA. ¶ 11 "Lawfully present" is not defined in § 1623(a), but the meaning can be ascertained from the statute's context. The term "lawfully present" also appears in § 1621, which, like § 1623, governs eligibility for postsecondary education public benefits. There, Congress directly equated aliens "not lawfully present" with those otherwise "ineligible under subsection (a)." 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). In § 1621(a), Congress provided that only certain categories of aliens are eligible for state and local public benefits: qualified aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1641 ; nonimmigrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"); and aliens paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) for less than one year. Thus, those aliens who do not fall within the categories of § 1621(a) are not "lawfully present" for purposes of state and local benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). ¶ 12 The two statutes are the only ones that use the phrase "lawfully present" in the subchapter of Title 8 concerning eligibility for state and local public benefits, and we construe the same words with only one meaning if possible. See Ratzlaf v. United States , 510 U.S. 135, 143, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) ("A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears."); State ex rel. Indus. Comm'n v. Pressley , 74 Ariz. 412, 421, 250 P.2d 992 (1952) ("[T]here is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning."). ¶ 13 MCCCD argues that we should instead look to the definition of the phrase "unlawfully present" in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) because that is the only definition of "lawfully present" or "unlawfully present" in the INA. That section provides: For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). MCCCD contends that because DACA recipients' stays in the United States are authorized by DHS while they are in the DACA program, they are "lawfully present" under this definition. ¶ 14 But this argument ignores that the INA definition of "unlawfully present" is qualified "[f]or purposes of this paragraph" only. That limiting clause is emptied of meaning if, as MCCCD contends, the definition extends to benefits eligibility under § 1623(a). Furthermore, § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) operates in the specific context of tolling admissibility so that an alien who is permitted to remain in the country for a period of time is not penalized for having spent that time in the country. And although this definition addresses how an alien's presence should be "deemed" after expiration of a stay, the statute suggests that these individuals would otherwise be unlawfully present during the stay period. Nothing in the statutory framework suggests that Congress intended for this definition to be applied in the benefits-eligibility context. ¶ 15 MCCCD's position highlights the fact that Congress and agencies use the phrase "lawfully present" as a technical term that takes on different meanings in different circumstances. In other words, an alien can be "lawfully present" for one purpose, but not another. See, e.g. , 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (permitting aliens who are "lawfully present ... as determined by the Attorney General" to receive Social Security benefits); 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (stating that an alien "currently in deferred action status" is "lawfully present" for purposes of Social Security benefits "only"); 45 C.F.R. § 152.2 (stating that an alien "currently in deferred action status" is "[l]awfully present" for purposes of Affordable Care Act benefits but explicitly excluding DACA recipients). Here, Congress determined in § 1621 that only certain groups of aliens are "lawfully present" for the specific purpose of receiving state and local benefits, including postsecondary education benefits governed by § 1623(a). ¶ 16 Because DACA recipients are not benefits-eligible under § 1621(a), we conclude they are not "lawfully present" for purposes of § 1623(a). DACA recipients are not "nonimmigrants" under the INA, nor are they aliens paroled into the United States for less than one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)(2), (3). They are also not "qualified" under 8 U.S.C. § 1641. Id. § 1621(a)(1). The term "qualified alien" means any of the following: (1) "an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence"; (2) "an alien who is granted asylum"; (3) "a refugee who is admitted to the United States"; (4) "an alien who is paroled into the United States ... for a period of at least" one year; (5) "an alien whose deportation is being withheld" on the basis that removal would threaten the alien's life or freedom; (6) "an alien who is granted conditional entry"; or (7) "an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant." Id. § 1641(b). DACA recipients do not fall within any of these designations. ¶ 17 Finally, we turn to whether DACA recipients may receive in-state tuition consistent with § 1623(a). That statute permits states to offer in-state tuition to aliens such as DACA recipients who are not lawfully present, as long as the state makes "a citizen or national of the United States ... eligible for such a benefit ... without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident." Arizona has not made in-state tuition available to all U.S. citizens and nationals without regard to residence, nor has it attempted to provide in-state tuition to students "not lawfully present." Indeed, the voters attempted to do just the opposite when they enacted A.R.S. § 15-1803, which provides that "a person who was not a citizen or legal resident ... or who is without lawful immigration status is not entitled to classification as an in-state student." A.R.S. § 15-1803(B). III. ¶ 18 Congress has the ultimate say in immigration matters and Arizona is bound under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to follow federal law. U.S. Const. art. VI. DACA recipients are not "lawfully present" for purposes of § 1623(a), which governs in-state tuition benefits. That section allows a state to provide in-state tuition to students who are not "lawfully present" only under certain conditions, and Arizona has not met those conditions. We therefore must conclude that DACA recipients are not eligible for in-state tuition, even if we agree on the desirability of affording them access to college education as a matter of public policy. ¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate paragraphs 12 through 35 of the court of appeals' opinion, and we remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the portions of the court of appeals' opinion that we did not review, including the instructions to enter a judgment enjoining MCCCD from granting in-state tuition to DACA recipients.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 Article 2, section 22(A)(2), of the Arizona Constitution ("the On-Release provision") precludes bail "[f]or felony offenses committed when the person charged is already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge and where the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charge." We hold that, on its face, the On-Release provision satisfies heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. I. ¶ 2 James Morreno was indicted for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, both felonies, in March 2016. After his initial appearance in that case, Morreno was released on his own recognizance. As a condition of his release, Morreno was ordered to "refrain from committing any criminal offense." ¶ 3 In May, the police received reports of a suspicious person and contacted Morreno. He admitted possessing marijuana and a marijuana pipe and was again charged with felony possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. His initial appearance in that case was scheduled for July, but Morreno failed to appear and an arrest warrant was issued. ¶ 4 Morreno was arrested in 2017 and held without bail pursuant to the On-Release provision. Relying on Simpson v. Miller (Simpson II ), 241 Ariz. 341, 387 P.3d 1270 (2017), he moved to modify his release conditions and argued that the On-Release provision was facially invalid because it deprived him of a pre-detention individualized determination of future dangerousness to which he was constitutionally entitled. The superior court disagreed and denied the motion. ¶ 5 Morreno filed a petition for special action, which the court of appeals stayed pending this Court's decision on whether to grant review in a similar case. Thereafter, Morreno filed a petition for review in this Court challenging the superior court's ruling and the court of appeals' stay order. ¶ 6 Although Morreno has since pleaded guilty to the charged offenses in both cases (rendering his constitutional challenge moot as applied to him), we granted review to address the facial constitutionality of the On-Release provision, a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution. II. ¶ 7 We review de novo the validity of the On-Release provision. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 344 ¶ 7, 387 P.3d at 1273. ¶ 8 In 1970, Arizona voters passed Proposition 100, and thereby amended the state constitution, adding among other things the On-Release provision. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(2); see also Ariz. Sec'y of State, Referendum and Initiative Publicity Pamphlet 2-4 (1970), http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/statepubs/id/10654. Under that provision, a defendant charged with a felony allegedly committed while "already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge" is ineligible for bail "where the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the [new] charge." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(2). A defendant like Morreno who was released on his own recognizance on a prior charge "has been 'admitted to bail' for purposes of [the On-Release provision]." Heath v. Kiger , 217 Ariz. 492, 493 ¶ 1, 176 P.3d 690, 691 (2008). ¶ 9 Throughout the briefing in this Court and below, Morreno framed his argument as a facial challenge to the On-Release provision. At oral argument in this Court, Morreno initially confirmed that position before contending that the provision is unconstitutional as applied to him. We consider only the facial challenge because Morreno's guilty plea renders moot any as-applied challenge. III. ¶ 10 Morreno's challenge to the On-Release provision requires us to revisit the delicate balance between "state interests of the highest order" and "the fundamental due process right to be free from bodily restraint." Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 345 ¶ 9, 387 P.3d at 1274. ¶ 11 Our court of appeals has upheld and applied the On-Release provision against constitutional attack. See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court , 185 Ariz. 160, 164, 913 P.2d 500, 504 (App. 1996) (ordering the defendant "to be held without bond pending trial" when proof was evident and presumption great that he committed a felony while released on bail on prior charge); State v. Garrett , 16 Ariz. App. 427, 429, 493 P.2d 1232, 1234 (1972) (same, and finding the On-Release provision's purpose and policy "entirely reasonable"). Morreno argues that those cases do not survive Simpson II and that the On-Release provision "deprives defendants of due process because it fails to comport with" our opinion in that case. Under Simpson II , he contends, bail "cannot be denied without a showing of [future] dangerousness following an individualized adversarial hearing" under A.R.S. § 13-3961(D), and not before considering various factors such as those set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3967(B). The State, in contrast, argues that the On-Release provision is constitutional under Simpson II because it is "not offense-based," but is instead "status-based" and narrowly focused on "recidivistic tendencies." ¶ 12 Before evaluating these arguments, we first address the Attorney General's assertion that " Simpson II was incorrect" and should be overruled "to the extent that it misapplies the facial challenge and substantive due process tests from United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)." Echoing an argument we rejected in Simpson II , the Attorney General contends that this Court misapplied the standard for evaluating facial challenges and erroneously pronounced a "heightened scrutiny standard for due process challenges to bail restrictions." Justice Gould's partial dissent mirrors those contentions, with which we disagree. ¶ 13 In Simpson II , we applied a "heightened scrutiny" standard derived from Salerno to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the state from automatically denying bail to all defendants charged with sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 344 ¶ 1, 348 ¶ 23, 387 P.3d at 1273, 1277 (1972). In so holding, this Court invalidated the no-bail provisions in article 2, section 22(A)(1), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(3) as they related to that charged offense, and we rejected the State's argument that "the challenged provisions [were not] unconstitutional on their face because they may not be unconstitutional in all instances." Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 31, 387 P.3d at 1278. ¶ 14 In Simpson II , we recognized that a party challenging a law as facially unconstitutional "must establish that it 'is unconstitutional in all of its applications.' " 241 Ariz. at 344-45 ¶ 7, 387 P.3d at 1273-74 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ); see also Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (stating that a successful facial challenge requires "the challenger [to] establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid"). We also recognized that in some instances the commission of sexual conduct with a minor "may indicate a threat of future dangerousness toward the victim or others." Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 31, 387 P.3d at 1278. That was not determinative, however, because the offense of sexual conduct with a minor "is not inherently predictive of future dangerousness," and therefore "detention [in those cases] requires a case-specific inquiry." Id. ¶ 15 Simpson II does not contradict Salerno or the other cases on which the Attorney General and Justice Gould's dissent rely. Salerno rejected a facial challenge to the 1984 Bail Reform Act because of its "extensive safeguards," which required not only a showing of probable cause for the charged offense, but also a showing "by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person." 481 U.S. at 750, 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ). The provisions at issue in Simpson II , in contrast, lacked any such safeguards and by their terms categorically denied bail to all defendants charged with sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen-a crime that does not inherently predict future dangerousness. 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1270. Thus, a facial challenge succeeded because the no-bail provisions deprived such defendants of what substantive due process requires: an individualized determination of, or a valid proxy for, future dangerousness. Id. ¶ 30. ¶ 16 That some defendants who are charged with sexual conduct with a minor may properly be denied bail when other facts are present (i.e., evidence of future dangerousness or flight risk) does not defeat a facial challenge. See id. ¶ 31 (noting that in arguing against a facial challenge, the State "confus[ed] the constitutionality of detention in specific cases with the requirement that it be imposed in all cases"). The facial challenge was to the denial of bail based merely on the charge without considering other facts that may-or may not-justify denying a defendant bail in a particular case. ¶ 17 Patel illustrates this point well. There, the government-much like the State here-argued that a statute should not be subject to a facial challenge because in some circumstances the conduct it authorized would be constitutionally permissible (there, a search of hotel guest records; here, pretrial detention). Patel , 135 S.Ct. at 2450-51. The United States Supreme Court rejected that argument, noting that "the proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is searches that the law actually authorizes, not those for which it is irrelevant." Id. at 2451. ¶ 18 Based on due process principles, the Court likewise has invalidated other laws that categorically denied important, protected interests without regard to individual circumstances. In Stanley v. Illinois , for example, the Court struck a state law under which "the children of unwed fathers became wards of the State upon the death of the mother." 405 U.S. 645, 646, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). Rejecting the law's "blanket exclusion" that "viewed people one-dimensionally," the Court concluded that, "as a matter of due process of law, [the father] was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him." Id. at 649, 655, 92 S.Ct. 1208. And though recognizing the possibility that "most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents" and that Mr. Stanley was "such a parent and that his children should be placed in other hands," the Court nonetheless noted that "all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children." Id. at 654, 92 S.Ct. 1208. Accordingly, the law could not stand because it "needlessly risk[ed] running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child." Id. at 657, 92 S.Ct. 1208 ; cf. Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 81-83, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (distinguishing Salerno and finding unconstitutional a state statute under which a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity was committed indefinitely to a psychiatric hospital unless he proved that he was not dangerous). ¶ 19 Here, that some defendants may properly be held without bail when they commit an offense while "on-release"-for example, pursuant to article 2, section 22(A)(3) -does not mean (as the Attorney General suggests) that the On-Release provision necessarily survives a facial challenge. We therefore decline his invitation to overrule or limit Simpson II . ¶ 20 Justice Gould's partial dissent is unpersuasive for several reasons. It selectively relies on portions of Salerno in describing the standard for finding a law facially unconstitutional but disregards key features of the Bail Reform Act that, as discussed, see supra ¶ 15, were critical to Salerno 's analysis and conclusion. See also United States v. Stephens , 594 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that Salerno "lauded the Bail Reform Act's procedures"). As Salerno observed, the Bail Reform Act required individualized hearings in which "the Government [had to] convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person." 481 U.S. at 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The dissent overlooks the Salerno Court's analytical emphasis that the Act contained those important "procedural protections" and "narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly acute problem," id. at 750-52, 107 S.Ct. 2095, features that were critical to its holding, id. at 751, 107 S.Ct. 2095. It was only those "narrow circumstances" and the Act's "extensive [procedural] safeguards" that "suffice[d] to repel a facial challenge." Id. at 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Nothing in Salerno suggests that the Court would have upheld the Act against a facial challenge even absent those safeguards, all of which were lacking in Simpson II . See supra ¶ 15. ¶ 21 The dissent's failure to recognize these key aspects of Salerno , in turn, causes it to incorrectly assert that Simpson II deviated from Salerno and to mischaracterize Simpson II as applying an "overbreadth analysis." See infra ¶¶ 39, 48. The provisions at issue in Simpson II were facially invalid because they did not-indeed, could not-afford any defendant what due process requires: an individualized hearing or a convincing proxy for future dangerousness. The mere charge itself was not a convincing proxy for future dangerousness, and therefore not narrowly focused, because it swept in situations that are not predictive of future dangerousness. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1278; see also Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (noting that the Bail Reform Act required "convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime , presents a demonstrable danger to the community" (emphasis added) ). Thus, Simpson II did not misapply the Salerno facial standard but instead comports with Salerno 's analysis. See United States v. Scott , 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Neither Salerno nor any other case authorizes detaining someone in jail while awaiting trial, or the imposition of special bail conditions, based merely on the fact of arrest for a particular crime."). ¶ 22 The dissent seemingly equates every facial challenge with an overbreadth challenge, which misapprehends those distinct doctrines. In essence, the dissent's quarrel with Simpson II is not with its application of Salerno 's standard for facial unconstitutionality, but with its application of Salerno 's"narrow focus" standard. Simpson II 's application of that standard is consistent with Salerno 's ultimate holding: "When the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 751, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Again, the Bail Reform Act in Salerno had numerous narrowing features that the provisions in Simpson II lacked. Key among these are a "careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted" and "convincing proof that the arrestee ... presents a demonstrable danger to the community." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095. ¶ 23 Here, Morreno's facial challenge under Salerno is based on his argument that it is never constitutionally permissible to detain a person without bail based merely on proof evident or presumption great that the person committed a felony while "on-release" from another felony charge. Although we ultimately reject that argument for the reasons stated below, it still is properly considered a facial challenge. Under Patel , which the dissent does not convincingly address, the facial challenge is not barred by the fact that a person might be legally detained for reasons in addition to those required by the On-Release provision. See State v. Ryce , 303 Kan. 899, 368 P.3d 342, 354 (2016) (" Patel emphasizes that the scope of circumstances we examine is determined and limited by the application of the statute-we do not consider the entire universe of possible scenarios, we must instead look to the circumstances actually affected by the challenged statute."). To be sure, the dissent's arguments here echo Justice Alito's dissent in Patel , but the Patel majority rejected Justice Alito's approach, and we likewise reject the dissent's mistaken view of Simpson II . IV. ¶ 24 The Due Process Clause places significant limitations on the state's ability to detain a defendant charged with violating the law. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 13, 387 P.3d at 1275. In Simpson II , we explained that to meet constitutional standards, a pretrial detention scheme "may be used only for regulatory rather than punitive purposes" and must satisfy the rigors of "heightened scrutiny" under the Due Process Clause, requiring that the scheme be "narrowly focused on accomplishing the government's objective." Id. at 346 ¶ 13, 348 ¶¶ 23, 25, 387 P.3d at 1275. The On-Release provision meets these demands. A. ¶ 25 We look to legislative intent (or here the intent of Arizona voters) to determine whether a pretrial detention scheme is punitive or regulatory. Id. at 347 ¶ 20, 387 P.3d 1270. The 1970 publicity pamphlet for Proposition 100 indicates that the purpose of the proposed amendment was to address the "rapidly increasing crime rate in Arizona" caused by "repeat offenders ... who continue their lives of crime while out on bail, awaiting trial." Ariz. Sec'y of State, Referendum and Initiative Publicity Pamphlet 3 (1970), http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/statepubs/id/10654; see also Heath , 217 Ariz. at 496 ¶ 14, 176 P.3d at 694 (recognizing Proposition 100's "purpose is to prevent those charged with felonies but released pending trial from committing additional crimes"). ¶ 26 There is no indication that the number of people denied bail under the On-Release provision is excessive in relation to that goal. Indeed, the provision applies only when strong evidence (more than probable cause) exists that a defendant committed another felony while on release from a prior felony charge. See Simpson v. Owens (Simpson I ), 207 Ariz. 261, 274 ¶ 40, 85 P.3d 478, 491 (App. 2004) ; see also Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 16, 387 P.3d at 1275. We therefore conclude, and Morreno does not specifically contest, that the On-Release provision is regulatory. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 20, 348 ¶ 24, 387 P.3d at 1276, 1277 (concluding that the challenged provisions "are regulatory, not punitive, and therefore do not constitute a per se due process violation" when "[a]ll ballot arguments supporting Proposition 103 focused on protecting public safety by preventing additional crimes," and noting that those state interests are " 'both legitimate and compelling' " (quoting Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ) ). B. ¶ 27 "Heightened scrutiny" under the Due Process Clause ensures that, absent "special circumstances," the government does not "restrain individuals' liberty prior to ... criminal trial and conviction." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095. To satisfy heightened scrutiny's rigors, the state's interest in enforcing a pretrial detention scheme must be "legitimate and compelling," and the scheme must be "narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly acute problem." Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 23, 387 P.3d at 1277 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749-50, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ). ¶ 28 Morreno contends that Simpson II controls here, such that "[a]rticle 2, § 22(A)(2) is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause" because "the State cannot hold [him] in custody without bond unless it first demonstrates [his] future dangerousness." In his view, the On-Release provision is a "hard-line," categorical denial of bail that fails to provide what due process requires: a pre-detention adversarial hearing of the type provided for in A.R.S. §§ 13-3961(D) and 13-3967(B). ¶ 29 We disagree. Although Simpson II guides our analysis, it is not dispositive of the very different provision at issue here and does not require an individualized determination of dangerousness in every case to comply with due process principles. See 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d 1270 ("[W]e do not read Salerno or other decisions to require ... individualized determinations in every case."). And despite Morreno's attempt to liken the On-Release provision to the constitutional and statutory provisions at issue in Simpson II , there are important differences. Unlike the sexual-conduct-with-a-minor provisions involved in Simpson II , the On-Release provision does not categorically deny bail to all defendants accused of committing enumerated crimes. Thus, unlike Simpson II , the issue here is not whether a particular charged offense is "in itself a proxy for dangerousness," id. at 349 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1278, or for unmanageable flight risk, id. at 346 ¶ 17, 387 P.3d at 1275. Rather, the issues are twofold: whether the state has a "legitimate and compelling" interest in preventing defendants from committing new felonies while on pretrial release from another felony charge, and whether denying bail to such a defendant (when the proof is evident or the presumption great he or she committed a new felony while on release from another felony charge) is "narrowly focuse[d]" on pursuing that goal. Id. at 348 ¶ 23, 387 P.3d at 1277 (quoting Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749-50, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ). ¶ 30 "The government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; accord Schall v.Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (rejecting due process challenge to statute that permitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any charge after a showing that the person might commit some undefined future crimes). The On-Release provision implicates that interest. Likewise, the state unquestionably has a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing defendants from committing new crimes while on pretrial release from prior criminal charges. See Rummel v. Estelle , 445 U.S. 263, 276, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (providing that states have a legitimate interest "in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law"). Committing a felony while on release, especially when a term of release requires crime-free conduct, evidences repeated lawlessness that society need not tolerate. And although the On-Release provision applies before any finding of guilt or conviction, its required showing of "proof evident" or "presumption great" for the "present charge[d]" offense committed while on release convincingly suggests recidivist tendencies. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(2). ¶ 31 The primary issue here, then, is whether the On-Release provision is "narrowly focused on accomplishing the government's objective" of preventing defendants from committing new felonies while on pretrial release from a prior felony charge. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 25, 387 P.3d at 1277. The On-Release provision has two important features that limit its scope. By its terms, the provision does not deny bail to all criminal defendants alleged to have committed any crime while on pretrial release, but to a smaller subset who are charged with felonies committed while on release from a prior felony charge. And importantly, the provision applies only where the "proof is evident or the presumption great," Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(2), a "robust" standard that requires an evidentiary hearing, Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 16, 387 P.3d at 1275, as to the defendant's guilt of the felony he allegedly committed while on pretrial release, see Simpson I , 207 Ariz. at 274 ¶ 40, 85 P.3d at 491 (discussing the proof evident/presumption great standard). These features together help ensure that the provision's reach does not extend beyond the government's legitimate and compelling interest in preventing arrestees from committing additional felonies while on release from prior felony charges. ¶ 32 Morreno contends that the On-Release provision is not narrowly focused because some felonies, including the drug offenses with which he was charged, are neither inherently dangerous nor predictive of future dangerousness. But he incorrectly presumes that the only state interest that could justify pretrial detention of "on release" offenders is future dangerousness. Salerno recognizes that a state has a compelling interest in preventing crime (not just dangerous crime) by arrestees, and that interest is even stronger when there is proof evident that the defendant violated the conditions of his first release by committing the second charged offense. The defendant's liberty interest, conversely, is reduced because it was already restricted by his arrest and release under conditions for the first charge. Under those circumstances, "the government's interest is sufficiently weighty," such that the defendant's right to be free from physical restraint is "subordinated to the greater needs of society." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095. ¶ 33 Conditioning pretrial release on a defendant refraining from committing new crimes while on pretrial release from prior criminal charges is neither a new nor remarkable concept. Rendel v. Mummert , 106 Ariz. 233, 238-39, 474 P.2d 824 (1970) ("Pretrial release with restrictions placed upon a defendant's actions has long represented a compromise between the liberties that a person normally enjoys and the right of the state to insure compliance with its processes."); see also A.R.S. § 13-3967(C) (permitting the revocation of release "[o]n a showing of probable cause that the defendant committed any offense during the period of release" from a prior felony charge (emphasis added) ). Moreover, the possibility of having pretrial release revoked for a subsequent felony is entirely consistent with the government's interest in preventing further crimes and avoiding recidivism, "assur[ing] compliance with its laws[,] and preserv[ing] the integrity of the judicial process by exacting obedience with its lawful orders." Paquette v. Commonwealth , 440 Mass. 121, 795 N.E.2d 521, 530 (2003) ; see also id. at 529 (stating that, aside from "any inquiry into dangerousness, a court has inherent power to revoke a defendant's bail for breach of any condition of release" (emphasis added) ). ¶ 34 We acknowledge the "variety of state procedures for implementing otherwise valid recidivism [laws]." Parke v. Raley , 506 U.S. 20, 27, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Although the On-Release provision's approach apparently is not widely applied, Arizona is not alone in denying bail to defendants charged with additional, on-release felonies. See , e.g. , Tex. Const. art I, § 11a (a)(2) (denying bail to defendants "accused of a felony less than capital ... committed while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted"); Utah Const. art. I, § 8 (1)(b) (denying bail to "persons charged with a felony ... while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge"); Iowa Code § 811.1(1) (denying bail to "defendant[s] awaiting judgment of conviction" who commit "a second or subsequent offense" of various felonies, including those involving marijuana possession); State v. Burgins , 464 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tenn. 2015) ("A defendant may forfeit her right to bail by subsequent criminal conduct."); cf. Parke , 506 U.S. at 26, 113 S.Ct. 517 ("[Recidivism] laws currently are in effect in all 50 States, and several have been enacted by the Federal Government, as well." (internal citations omitted) ). Regardless, what matters is that due process does not require an individualized hearing to reaffirm a defendant's recidivism risk when the state has met its burden of showing proof evident or presumption great that he engaged in recidivist behavior while on release. In such cases, an individualized determination serves no narrowing function and is therefore unnecessary. ¶ 35 In enacting the On-Release provision, Arizona voters left "the keys to continued freedom" in the hands of felony defendants who enjoy pretrial release. Rendel , 106 Ariz. at 238, 474 P.2d at 829. Yet, even before the Arizona voters adopted the On-Release provision in 1970, Arizona statutes conditioned release on an arrestee's "good behavior" and cautioned that release could be revoked based on probable cause to believe the arrestee committed a felony while on release. See 1969 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 129, § 5. In any case, we fail to understand how a defendant could complain "that his constitutional right to liberty has been violated when ... the deprivation thereof was an inevitable consequence of his alleged failure to conform his conduct to the law[ ] ... and to the explicit condition of his earlier release." Paquette , 795 N.E.2d at 530. Indeed, if a defendant "actively avoids all intended associations with the criminal elements of our society," or here avoids knowingly possessing illegal drugs or paraphernalia, "he will be able to avoid situations that could result in the revocation of his bail." Rendel , 106 Ariz. at 238, 474 P.2d at 829. V. ¶ 36 We briefly address and reject Morreno's suggestion that denying bail to recidivist felons is absurd in light of Simpson II and Chantryv. Astrowsky , 242 Ariz. 355, 395 P.3d 1114 (App. 2017). According to Morreno, upholding the On-Release provision "effectively rule[s] that a person charged with possession of marijuana is inherently more dangerous than a person charged with having sex with a minor or molesting a child." Again, the On-Release provision is concerned not with future dangerousness but rather with preventing additional felonies by defendants while on release from a prior felony charge, and the provision is narrowly focused on that legitimate and compelling governmental interest. Morreno ignores a critical component of Simpson II and Chantry and again overlooks the substantial differences between the provisions at issue in Simpson II and the On-Release provision here. In short, while on release Morreno continued to engage in conduct that implicated him in new crimes despite specific warnings to refrain from any illegal conduct while on pretrial release. This conduct placed him squarely within the government's interest in preventing future crime by arrestees. See Rummel , 445 U.S. at 284, 100 S.Ct. 1133 (stating that recidivism laws "segregate ... from the rest of society" "one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies"). This is a far cry from Simpson II and Chantry , where the defendants' charges were not inherently predictive of future conduct. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1278; accord Chantry , 242 Ariz. at 355 ¶ 3, 395 P.3d at 1114. ¶ 37 Finally, although our conclusion that the On-Release provision meets constitutional standards is neither based nor dependent on state statutes or rules, it comports with Arizona's pretrial release scheme. Under Arizona law, "[u]pon a finding of probable cause that the defendant committed a felony [while on] release, the defendant's release may be revoked." A.R.S. § 13-3968(B) ; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.5(d)(2) (authorizing courts to revoke pretrial release when "there is probable cause to believe a person committed a felony during the period of release"). It is well-established that this release condition passes substantive due process muster, see Rendel , 106 Ariz. at 238-39, 474 P.2d at 829-30 ; Burgins , 464 S.W.3d at 306, and is a "necessary step to ensure compliance with our legal system and preserve its integrity," Paquette , 795 N.E.2d at 530. In other words, the state may constitutionally revoke release when a defendant violates a release condition, even though such revocation directly implicates the defendant's due process right to be free from unwarranted pretrial restraint. That the state may constitutionally deny bail for a subsequent felony charge under these circumstances, as the On-Release provision requires, is entirely consistent with that principle. VI. ¶ 38 For the reasons stated above, we uphold the constitutionality of article 2, section 22(A)(2), of the Arizona Constitution and affirm the superior court's order denying Morreno bail. JUSTICE GOULD, joined by JUSTICE LOPEZ, dissenting in part and concurring in the result. ¶ 39 I concur in the majority's decision denying Morreno's facial challenge to Arizona's On-Release provision. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(2). However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's use of the overbreadth analysis contained in Simpson II to reach this result. I. ¶ 40 The standard for facially challenging the constitutionality of a statute is set forth in United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) : A facial challenge to a legislative [a]ct is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid. The fact that the [act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. ¶ 41 This standard was in place before Salerno and has been affirmed on many occasions. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2443, 2451, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) ("Under the most exacting standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." (quoting Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ) ); Reno v. Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 301, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (noting that to prevail on a facial challenge, a party must show there are no set of circumstances under which the regulation would be valid); Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789, 796, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (stating that a statute is invalid on its face if "it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application"); see also City of Chicago v. Morales , 527 U.S. 41, 78-80, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing cases pre- Salerno applying the facial challenge standard). ¶ 42 Under Salerno , facial challenges based on the overbreadth of a statute are limited to the First Amendment context. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; see also United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (stating that "[i]n the First Amendment context, however, this Court recognizes a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad" (internal quotation marks omitted) ); Vincent , 466 U.S. at 801, 104 S.Ct. 2118 ("[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds."). The reason for permitting First Amendment overbreadth challenges was clearly stated by the United States Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) : It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn.... Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. ¶ 43 Outside the First Amendment context, there are a number of reasons for strictly limiting facial challenges. One reason is that "constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously." Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908. However, when a person facially attacks a statute, he seeks to strike down a statute that is constitutionally applied to him but "may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others." Id. In addition, "facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution." Wash. State Grange , 552 U.S. at 451, 128 S.Ct. 1184. ¶ 44 Limiting facial challenges is also based on the principle that courts must be careful in striking down statutes with respect to parties and factual applications that are not before it. Id. at 449-50, 128 S.Ct. 1184 ; Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Facial challenges alleging overbreadth not only "invite judgments on fact-poor records," but they "allow a determination that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances" that are not before the court. Sabri , 541 U.S. at 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941. At bottom, courts must exercise judicial restraint under such circumstances, recognizing that "under our constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws." Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908. II. ¶ 45 While the majority, in reliance on Simpson II , purports to apply Salerno 's standard, in practice it does not. See supra ¶ 14; Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 344-45 ¶ 7, 387 P.3d at 1273-74 (stating a facial challenge requires "the party challenging the law [to] establish that it 'is unconstitutional in all of its applications' ") (quoting Patel , 135 S.Ct. at 2451 ). Rather, it abandons the facial standard set forth in Salerno , substituting the overbreadth standard used in Simpson II and by the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio , 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014). A. ¶ 46 In Simpson II , defendants asserted that article 2, section 22(A)(1), of the Arizona Constitution (and its corresponding provision in A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(3) ) was facially invalid. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 344 ¶ 5, 387 P.3d at 1273. The constitutional provision at issue stated that a defendant was ineligible for bail or pretrial release if (1) he was charged with committing the crime of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen, and, (2) after an evidentiary hearing, the court determined the proof was evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed this crime. Id . at ¶ 2. ¶ 47 Applying the "heightened scrutiny" test used by the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Valenzuela , Simpson II sustained the defendants' facial challenge on the grounds the subject provision violated substantive due process. Id . at 346, 348, 349 ¶¶ 17, 23, 30, 387 P.3d at 1275, 1277, 1278 ; see also Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d at 780 (discussing the application of a "heightened scrutiny" standard to a pretrial detention statute). Simpson II recognized that the purpose of the bond provision, protecting children from potentially dangerous sex offenders, was both legitimate and compelling. Id . at 348 ¶ 24, 387 P.3d at 1277. However, the Court determined that the provision was not "narrowly focused" to achieve this purpose. Id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 25-28, 387 P.3d at 1277-78. In reaching this conclusion, Simpson II held that the offense-based bond provision did not allow a court to make an "individualized determination" as to a defendant's dangerousness. Id . ¶¶ 25-26. The Court held that absent such an individualized hearing, any offense-based approach must be premised on crimes that "inherently predict future dangerousness," id. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278, and therefore serve as a "convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness," id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d at 1277-78 (quoting Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d at 786 ). ¶ 48 Ultimately, Simpson II concluded that the bond provision, on its face, violated due process because sexual conduct with a minor is not a "convincing proxy for ... dangerousness." Id . at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d at 1277-78. What is remarkable about this conclusion is that in reaching it, the Court abandoned Salerno and employed an overbreadth analysis. On the one hand, the Court recognized that there were circumstances where the provision would be valid. The Court stated that "[s]exual conduct with a minor is always a serious crime," and "[i]n many but not all instances , its commission may indicate a threat of future dangerousness." Id . at 349 ¶ 31, 387 P.3d at 1278 (emphasis added). On the other hand, the Court speculated that there were circumstances where the provision might not be valid. Specifically, the Court stated that the crime might involve "consensual sex" between two teenagers and, under such a scenario, the fact a "defendant committed the crime would suggest little or nothing about the defendant's danger to anyone." Id . ¶ 27. Thus, the Court concluded, even where the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed sexual conduct with a minor, detention on this basis "sweeps in situations" where a defendant might not pose a danger to the community. Id . ¶ 49 Thus, setting aside the well-established standard for facial challenges, Simpson II struck down a statute that had clear constitutional applications. The bond provision in Simpson II limited detention to those cases where the state proved, by the "robust" standard of proof evident/presumption great, id. at 346 ¶ 16, 387 P.3d 1270, that a defendant penetrated a child's anus or vagina with his penis or some object; had oral contact with a child's penis, vulva, or anus; or engaged in masturbation with a child's penis or vagina. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1405(A), -1401(A)(1), (4). In passing this constitutional provision, the people of Arizona made a judgment that, under these limited circumstances, a legitimate and compelling purpose-protecting children from severe sexual abuse-was served by temporarily detaining a defendant pending trial. At a minimum, this constitutional provision survives a facial challenge. Indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that in those cases where the proof is evident/presumption great that a thirty, forty, or fifty-year-old defendant sodomizes a five-year-old or has sexual intercourse with an eight-year-old, he may, if released before trial, pose a danger to his victim or other children in the community. See State v. Furgal , 161 N.H. 206, 13 A.3d 272, 279 (2010) (stating that New Hampshire's no bond procedure is limited to the "most serious offenses"; the procedure reflects the fact "[t]he legislature has made a reasoned determination that when 'the proof is evident or the presumption great,' the risk to the community becomes significantly compelling, thus justifying the denial of bail."). ¶ 50 Despite the "many instances" where the subject bond provision would protect the community by detaining dangerous sex offenders, Simpson II focused on one hypothetical situation-"consensual sex" between teenagers-in rendering the statute invalid on its face. Of course, this "consensual sex" hypothetical is based on a legal impossibility; a child under the age of fifteen cannot consent to such acts. See State v. Fischer , 219 Ariz. 408, 414-15 ¶ 20, 199 P.3d 663, 669-70 (App. 2008) (stating that consent is not an element of the offense of sexual conduct with a minor, and that a defendant may commit the crime "regardless of a minor's purported consent"). Moreover, the defendants in Simpson II certainly did not fall into the Court's hypothetical scenario; they were middle-aged men who repeatedly sexually abused young children. But, more fundamentally, the Court departed from well-established law and struck down the provision as overbroad because it could conceivably "sweep in" defendants who did not pose a danger to the community. ¶ 51 At bottom, Simpson II adopted the flawed analysis used in Lopez-Valenzuela . There, the court struck down a state constitutional provision ("Proposition 100") denying bail for undocumented immigrants charged with any of a broad range of felonies. Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d at 791. Lopez-Valenzuela took some extraordinary liberties in construing Salerno , including some interpretations that were expressly rejected by Simpson II . For example, Lopez-Valenzuela construed Salerno as applying strict scrutiny to detention statutes. Id ., at 791. Simpson II recognized, of course, that " Salerno did not require this standard." Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 23, 387 P.3d 1270. ¶ 52 Simpson II also disagreed with Lopez-Valenzuela 's conclusion that Salerno required "all statutory bail schemes" to include the specific procedural safeguards contained in the Bail Reform Act to satisfy due process. Id ., at 347 ¶ 21, 387 P.3d 1270. Rather, Simpson II recognized that in Salerno the United States Supreme Court "found that the Bail Reform Act's safeguards 'are more exacting' and 'far exceed' those found sufficient in other contexts." Id ., at 347 ¶ 21, 387 P.3d at 1276 (citing Salerno , 481 U.S. at 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ). In support of this conclusion we also cited the following holding from Furgal , 13 A.3d at 278-79 : "[w]e do not read Salerno to hold that all statutory bail schemes must include an individualized inquiry into a defendant's dangerousness in order to pass constitutional muster." Simpson II , Id . ¶ 53 Unfortunately, Simpson II also adopted several holdings from Lopez-Valenzuela that find no basis in Salerno . One of the most striking examples is Simpson II's reliance on the notion that any offense-based, categorical bond provision must be based on a crime that is a "convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness." Id ., at 348-49 ¶¶ 25-26, 387 P.3d 1270. This standard was derived from Lopez-Valenzuela . 770 F.3d at 786. Of course, the idea of a crime constituting a "convincing proxy" for dangerousness is not found anywhere in Salerno . Rather, in creating this novel test, Lopez-Valenzuela relied on United States v. Kennedy , 618 F.2d 557, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1980), which noted that "capital offenses may be made categorically nonbailable because 'most defendants facing a possible death penalty would likely flee regardless of what bail was set.' " (emphasis added). However, with no explanation, Lopez-Valenzuela modified this statement from Kennedy , concluding that a crime was not a "convincing proxy" for an "unmanageable flight risk" so long as "many " defendants did not pose a flight risk. Id ., at 785. (emphasis added). Simpson II then decided to raise the bar even higher, concluding that a crime is not a convincing proxy for dangerousness unless "all" defendants charged such a crime pose a danger to the community. Id ., at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 30-31, 387 P.3d at 1277-78. ¶ 54 Additionally, Simpson II set aside Salerno's standard for facial challenges and adopted Lopez-Valenzuela's overbreadth standard. In crafting its own novel standard for reviewing a facial challenge outside the First Amendment, Lopez-Valenzuela held that: [E]ven if some undocumented immigrants pose an unmanageable flight risk or undocumented immigrants on average pose a greater flight risk than other arrestees, [the provision] plainly is not carefully limited because it employs an overbroad, irrebuttable presumption rather than an individualized hearing to determine whether a particular arrestee poses an unmanageable flight risk. Id. at 784 (second and third emphases added). Applying this standard, Lopez-Valenzuela concluded that Prop 100 violated due process because it "employs a profoundly overbroad irrebuttable presumption , rather than an individualized evaluation, to determine whether an arrestee is an unmanageable flight risk." Id . at 791 (emphasis added). ¶ 55 Apart from Lopez-Valenzuela , the majority attempts, without success, to find cases that support Simpson II . For example, its citation to Patel is misplaced. In Patel , a group of motel operators brought a facial challenge to a municipal code provision requiring them to provide certain guest records to the police. Id . 135 S.Ct. at 2447-48. In response to this facial challenge, the City argued that there were situations where searches authorized by the code provision were constitutionally valid. Specifically, the City argued that a search of guest records would be valid if based on consent, exigent circumstances, or a search warrant. Id . at 2450-51. ¶ 56 Applying the Salerno standard, Patel stated that a party seeking facial relief must show "that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid." Id . at 2450. (quoting Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ). Patel concluded the motel operators met this standard, because the only valid applications urged by the City were irrelevant to its constitutional analysis. While the City's proposed applications (a search warrant, consent or exigent circumstances) provided constitutional grounds for obtaining a guest's hotel records, such searches were not regulated or authorized by the code provision itself. Id . at 2450-51. Thus, Patel emphasized that "the proper focus of the constitutional inquiry" must b e those "applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct," and "not those for which it is irrelevant." Id. at 2451 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 57 Patel provides no support for Simpson II . Patel applied Salerno's standard for facial challenges; it did not apply Simpson II's overbreadth analysis. Additionally, unlike Patel , Simpson II addressed relevant applications of the subject bond provision. Stated another way, Simpson II did not address circumstances where a defendant was being held without bond on grounds that were neither regulated nor authorized by article 2, section 22(A)(1), of the Arizona Constitution. Rather, the Court addressed circumstances that fell squarely within the terms of the subject constitutional provision: the denial of bail to defendants charged with sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen when the proof was evident/presumption great that they committed the crime. ¶ 58 The majority also claims that Simpson II is consistent with other cases where the United States Supreme Court has invalidated laws "that categorically denied important, protected interests, regardless of the particular circumstances." See s u pra ¶ 18. I agree that, as a general matter, the United States Supreme Court has struck down laws categorically denying important rights. However, I am not sure what relevance this broad statement has to this case. This general proposition certainly does not provide a justification for abandoning Salerno or abrogating the United States Supreme Court's well-established rule that facial challenges based on overbreadth are restricted to the First Amendment. See supra ¶ 43. ¶ 59 Moreover, what is relevant here is that the United States Supreme Court has upheld categorical pretrial detention statutes as constitutional. Salerno itself recognized that bond may be categorically denied in a capital case. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 753, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; see also Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 345, 349 ¶¶ 10, 26, 387 P.3d at 1274, 1278 (recognizing that pretrial detention is permitted for capital crimes and sexual assault); Demore v. Kim , 538 U.S. 510, 517-18, 521, 523, 531, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (holding that a categorical approach detaining undocumented immigrants during deportation proceedings who had been convicted of an "aggravated felony" did not violate due process); cf . Jennings v. Rodriguez , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 846-47, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (recognizing that under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), undocumented immigrants are ineligible for release based on the commission of certain enumerated offenses). ¶ 60 While liberty, in its broadest sense, is fundamental, the nature of the right is constrained by the circumstances of each case. Persons "may face substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of our criminal justice system," including arrest and detention of an individual suspected of committing a crime "until a neutral magistrate determines whether probable cause exists," incarcerating an "arrestee" "until trial if he presents a risk of flight," and detaining a defendant who poses "a danger to witnesses." Salerno , at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Indeed, the fact that every defendant charged with a felony is subject to some pretrial release restrictions demonstrates that once a person is charged with a crime, his liberty interest is reduced. See A.R.S. § 13-3967(E)(2) (stating that in cases where a defendant has committed a sex offense, he is prohibited "from having any contact with the victim"); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 7.3(a)(1) (stating that "every order of release must contain" a restriction the defendant not leave the state "without the court's permission"). The majority recognizes this principle when, in reference to the On-Release provision, it states "[t]he defendant's liberty interest ... is reduced , because it was already restricted by his arrest and release under conditions for the first charge." Supra ¶ 32 (emphasis added). ¶ 61 Thus, before a court can consider a due process challenge, it must first identify the nature of the liberty interest at stake. See Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 722, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (stating a court must carefully formulate the liberty interest at stake in substantive due process cases); cf. Demore , 538 U.S. at 521, 523, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (recognizing that while "the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings," "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens" (internal quotation marks omitted) ); Schall v. Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 264-65, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (explaining that a juvenile's liberty interest in "freedom from institutional restraints ... is undoubtedly substantial.... But that interest must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.") (citation omitted); cf . Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481-82, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ("[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) ). ¶ 62 Salerno illustrates this point. There, the Court did not analyze a defendant's liberty interest in the context of some generalized liberty interest. Rather, it focused on a defendant's liberty interest in the context of a temporary, pretrial detention where he is charged with a serious crime and the "the Government [has proved] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The Court concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances , we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Id . at 751, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (emphasis added) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). In short, the Court concluded that temporary pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act did not implicate a fundamental right. Cf. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (stating due process "protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' ") (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland , 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) ). ¶ 63 The majority's reliance on Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) is misplaced. Unlike Salerno , Stanley did not involve a statute where a defendant charged with committing a serious felony is temporarily detained pending trial. Rather, in Stanley , the statute at issue permanently deprived all unwed fathers of custody of their children. 405 U.S. at 649-51, 92 S.Ct. 1208. The statute presumed, without the benefit of a hearing, evidentiary showing, or even an allegation of parental unfitness, that all unwed fathers were unfit parents. Id . at 650, 92 S.Ct. 1208. Thus, the issue was not whether the existing statute was deficient in protecting the rights of some fathers; rather, Stanley addressed a statute permanently depriving an entire class of citizens of their parental rights without any procedural protections. See also Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 81-83, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (distinguishing the reduced liberty interest identified in Salerno from the total deprivation of liberty occurring under a Louisiana statute where persons, who were not charged with any crime, were detained indefinitely in a psychiatric hospital, despite the fact they were not suffering from a mental illness and could only be released by proving to the court they were not dangerous). B. ¶ 64 In fidelity to Simpson II , the majority once again abandons Salerno and applies the novel Lopez-Valenzuela overbreadth standard to analyze Morreno's facial challenge. See supra ¶¶ 14-16, 18. While the majority strives to distinguish the On-Release provision from the offense-based provision in Simpson II , I do not think it can for one simple reason: no categorical bond provision can survive scrutiny under the Simpson II overbreadth standard. Indeed, even Simpson II's holding that capital murder and sexual assault provide a convincing proxy for dangerousness collapse under the weight of the overbreadth standard, because it is always possible to think of factual scenarios where such offenses may not "inherently" predict future dangerousness or provide a reliable "proxy for dangerousness." See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348-49 ¶¶ 26-27, 30, 387 P.3d at 1277-78. ¶ 65 Applying Simpson II to the On-Release provision demonstrates this point. The majority first claims that the On-Release provision has a different purpose (preventing recidivism) than Simpson II (protecting the victim and the community). It then concludes that the On-Release provision, unlike the provision in Simpson II , is narrowly focused on accomplishing this purpose because it only applies to (1) defendants "who are charged with felonies committed while on release from a prior felony charge, and (2) the state must show the "proof is evident or the presumption great" the defendant committed the new felony. Supra ¶ 31. ¶ 66 But is a defendant who commits a new felony while on pretrial release for another felony always a risk to recidivate? Stated another way, are there factual scenarios where a defendant might not conceivably pose a risk to re-offend, and yet is "swept in" by the "overbroad" On-Release provision? Undoubtedly, we can speculate about such scenarios. As one example, consider a defendant who is arrested and charged for possessing marijuana. After he is arrested and booked into jail, the judge releases him on his own recognizance. The defendant is then picked up by his girlfriend, who is driving his car. Unfortunately, the defendant left his marijuana pipe in the car, and fifty feet from the jail a police officer pulls him over for a broken tail light. Defendant consents to a search of the car, the pipe is discovered, and defendant is charged with a new felony: possession of drug paraphernalia. Does the defendant's arrest for this new felony indicate he is a risk to commit new felony crimes while on pretrial release? ¶ 67 Of course, like the "consensual sex" scenario in Simpson II , this hypothetical stands the test for a facial challenge on its head. Rather than the defendant establishing there are no circumstances where the On-Release provision would be valid, an overbreadth analysis invites a court to speculate about circumstances where the law might not operate constitutionally. ¶ 68 To be clear, I think the On-Release provision is constitutionally valid because Morreno has failed to make a successful facial challenge under Salerno . The On-Release provision is narrowly focused on its purpose of preventing crime because, in many circumstances, when a defendant commits a new felony while on release it "strongly suggests recidivist tendencies." Supra ¶ 30. Thus, Morreno cannot show that there is "no set of circumstances exists under which" the On-Release provision would be valid. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The point, however, is that the On-Release provision is valid using the Salerno standard; it can never be valid using the Simpson II standard. ¶ 69 Applying the Salerno standard does not, as Morreno contends, leave him without a remedy. He can assert, just as he did here on the grounds of facial invalidity, that the On-Release provision is unconstitutional as applied to him. Cf . Schall , 467 U.S. at 273, 104 S.Ct. 2403 ("It may be, of course, that in some circumstances detention of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster. But the validity of those detentions must be determined on a case-by-case basis."); Hernandez v. Lynch , 216 Ariz. 469, 481 ¶ 47, 167 P.3d 1264, 1276 (App. 2007) (Kessler, J., concurring) (stating that defendant challenging his detention under former Proposition 100 was not precluded from making an as-applied challenge). Under such a challenge, this Court need not speculate about other cases or situations where the On-Release provision may or may not violate due process. Rather, we need only consider whether a particular defendant's constitutional rights were actually violated. ¶ 70 Ultimately, I am concerned that Simpson II's overbreadth analysis will open the floodgates to facial challenges. Simpson II may well require courts in this state to consider an increasing number of facial challenges asserted by parties who have not and cannot show that a statute is unconstitutional as to them. Rather, such litigants may seek to invalidate a statute because it may conceivably violate the constitutional rights of someone else who is not before the court-whether that person actually exists or is simply a hypothetical construct designed to invalidate the statute. Of course, this will require courts in many instances to speculate about the validity of an entire statutory scheme or a constitutional provision without the benefit of a developed factual record or concrete facts. ¶ 71 To avoid this unworkable scenario, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a very demanding standard for facial challenges. While it is not impossible, making a successful facial challenge is extremely difficult; indeed, it is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (emphasis added); see also Patel , 135 S.Ct. at 2447, 2451 (concluding that because there were no relevant circumstances under which the subject municipal code was valid, it was facially invalid). Thus, because I think it is wise to apply the Salerno standard to facial challenges, and, because I do not believe Simpson II follows that standard, I dissent. We similarly do not address Morreno's contention that the On-Release provision conflicts with Proposition 200, adopted by Arizona voters in 1996 and codified in A.R.S. § 13-901.01, which requires probation in limited circumstances for those convicted of certain crimes involving the possession or use of marijuana or drug paraphernalia. As of April 2, 2018, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure have been amended to incorporate the On-Release provision into a defendant's initial appearance. Order Amending Rules 4.2, 5.1, 5.4, 7.2, and 7.4, Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. R-17-0015 (Ariz. 2017). The 2018 amendments to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect January 1, 2018, did not materially alter Rule 7.5(d)(2). See Order Amending the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. R-17-0002 (Ariz. 2017). Facial overbreadth challenges have also been recognized in the context of abortion statutes. Sabri v. United States , 541 U.S. 600, 609-10, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (stating that facial challenges based on overbreadth are recognized in "relatively few settings," including free speech and abortion).

PERKINS, Judge: ¶ 1 Jennifer Foor appeals the superior court's order denying special action relief from an order of the Phoenix Municipal Court forfeiting Foor's cats to the City of Phoenix (the "City"). Foor argues undisclosed impeachment material pertaining to the Phoenix Police officer involved in her case amounts to a Brady violation by the City and requests the forfeiture of her cats be vacated. See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). For the following reasons, we hold that Brady and Giglio require disclosure of material information under these circumstances, but affirm the superior court's denial of relief on other grounds. See Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 Foor kept approximately forty-one cats in the backyard of her son's Phoenix home, where she resided. In October 2012, Traci Pepper, an emergency animal medical technician with the Arizona Humane Society ("AHS"), responded to Foor's residence to check the condition of the cats at the request of law enforcement. Pepper, after noting health concerns and poor sanitation, spoke to Foor about how to better care for and house the cats. ¶ 3 After a series of cancelled or missed appointments, Pepper returned to the home on December 4, 2012, and observed severely degraded living conditions, including overcrowding, poor sanitation, and signs of illness among the cats. Pepper contacted her supervisor at AHS, who, upon arriving at the house, contacted law enforcement. Pepper and her supervisor then began removing the cats while waiting for law enforcement officers to arrive. Officer Cohane of the Phoenix Police Department arrived, oversaw the seizure of the cats by AHS, and issued a notice of seizure to Foor. On arrival at the local shelter, Dr. Bradley, an AHS veterinarian, oversaw the immediate treatment and subsequent long-term care of the cats. ¶ 4 The municipal court promptly held a post-seizure hearing in accordance with Phoenix City Code ("Code") section 8-3.02(A). The court concluded the seizure was proper and Foor appealed by special action to the Maricopa County Superior Court. On review, the superior court determined it lacked sufficient information as to the extent of the municipal court's order and remanded the case for a forfeiture hearing in accordance with Code § 8-3.03. ¶ 5 The municipal court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in April and June of 2013 at which Pepper, Officer Cohane, Dr. Bradley, Foor, and Foor's son testified. After lengthy testimony, the court concluded the cats were cruelly neglected based upon the lack of shelter and sanitary conditions, and should be forfeited to the City. See Code § 8-3.03(B). ¶ 6 Foor then resumed her special action in the superior court, which denied her petition. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the superior court. See Foor v. Smith , 1 CA-CV 14-0089, 2015 WL 1516528 (Ariz. App. Apr. 2, 2015) (mem. decision) (" Foor I "). Foor next petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review. ¶ 7 Foor filed several additional requests for a stay of the forfeiture order and relief from judgment, all of which the superior court denied. Foor then filed an amendment to her original special action complaint alleging a Brady violation in the underlying civil forfeiture proceeding. The superior court granted review of the amended special action complaint and denied the requested relief on the merits, noting that Brady is inapplicable in civil cases. Foor now appeals that decision. DISCUSSION ¶ 8 We review the denial of relief in a special action before the superior court for abuse of discretion. Stoudamire v. Simon , 213 Ariz. 296, 297, ¶ 3, 141 P.3d 776, 777 (App. 2006). We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling. McCown v. Patagonia Union High Sch. Dist. , 129 Ariz. 127, 127, 629 P.2d 94, 94 (App. 1981). However, we review questions of law de novo . Whiteco Outdoor Advert. v. City of Tucson , 193 Ariz. 314, 316-17, 972 P.2d 647, 649-50 (App. 1998). ¶ 9 Foor's primary argument on appeal is that the City should be required to disclose exculpatory and impeachment information in its possession in civil forfeiture cases. State law authorizes municipal forfeiture proceedings based on "the violation of an ordinance." Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 22-406. While the instant case arises from a violation of the Phoenix animal cruelty and neglect ordinance, the disclosure question we confront is not exclusive to that context. ¶ 10 In criminal proceedings, Giglio and Brady require the disclosure of impeachment or exculpatory evidence potentially useful to the defense. Giglio , 405 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763 ; Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. As an issue of first impression, Foor seeks to extend Brady 's disclosure requirements to "quasi-criminal" civil forfeiture actions. Foor points to no authority for the extension of these disclosure requirements, but instead argues Brady and Giglio must be extended as a matter of due process. Although Foor rests her argument on Brady , the information at issue is impeachment evidence rather than exculpatory evidence. Thus, we characterize Foor's claim as a potential Giglio violation. ¶ 11 Foor identifies three pieces of potential Giglio evidence on appeal, asserting her Giglio argument is not waived because the evidence is newly discovered. First, Foor points to a 1994 disciplinary report regarding Officer Cohane's honesty in a 1993 incident. However, Foor admits she received this information from the City during the City's parallel criminal prosecution. Foor had actual knowledge of the 1994 report, since at least August 2013, and did not raise the issue at the superior court or on appeal in Foor I . Thus, Foor waived any argument related to the 1994 discipline. See Van Loan v. Van Loan , 116 Ariz. 272, 274, 569 P.2d 214, 216 (1977). Second, Foor relies upon Officer Cohane's 2004 placement on the Maricopa County Attorney's Office's ("MCAO") list of officers with potential violations discoverable under Brady (the " Brady list"). Foor alleges she obtained this information in 2016 and nothing in the record indicates otherwise. Thus, Foor's arguments related to the 2004 Brady list placement are timely and have not been waived. Finally, Foor asserts Officer Cohane was involved in additional misconduct in 2014. Because this alleged misconduct occurred after the forfeiture of Foor's cats, and thus after any impeachment opportunity, it is irrelevant and we do not consider it further. Before assessing the materiality of Foor's alleged Giglio material, we must first determine whether Brady and Giglio apply. See United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 112-13, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). I. Disclosure in Civil Forfeiture ¶ 12 The United States Supreme Court has long held that prosecutors in criminal cases cannot deliberately or inadvertently suppress evidence favorable to the accused in a criminal trial. See Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 ; see also Mooney v. Holohan , 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935). This has given rise to a prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence in criminal cases. Giglio , 405 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763. These requirements arise from the due process clause and are designed to ensure criminal trials are fair. Weatherford v. Bursey , 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Nothing in Brady created a general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases. Id. Indeed, defendants in criminal cases are generally entitled to only limited discovery. See Degen v. United States , 517 U.S. 820, 825, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) ; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15. Moreover, Brady does not automatically require a new trial when omitted evidence is discovered. See Agurs , 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392. Instead, a new trial is required only when material information unknown to the defense has been withheld. Id. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392. ¶ 13 Brady has rarely been extended beyond criminal cases, and never by this Court. The Arizona Supreme Court has previously held that criminal defendants are entitled to some discovery, even when otherwise denied by local rules. See State ex rel. Purcell v. City Court , 112 Ariz. 517, 518, 543 P.2d 1146 (1975) (holding that a criminal defendant in municipal court is entitled to discovery as a matter of fairness when no other opportunity for discovery exists). As with criminal cases at the time of Purcell , the Phoenix Municipal Court allows no pretrial discovery in civil cases, including forfeiture cases. City Ct. Local Prac. and Proc. Rules, Phoenix, 2.10. Thus, absent mandatory disclosure, private investigation, or disclosure incident to a parallel proceeding, a defendant in a forfeiture action before the Phoenix Municipal Court has no method of obtaining exculpatory or impeachment information known to the City. ¶ 14 In contrast, civil forfeiture cases in the superior court are subject to the disclosure and discovery requirements provided by the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4310 to 4312; see generally Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26 - 37. Similarly, civil cases brought in justice court are subject to extensive discovery and disclosure. See generally Justice Ct. Civ. Proc. Rules, 121-27. Finally, cities and towns seeking forfeiture based upon the violation of an ordinance must generally conduct the proceedings in accordance with the rules for civil proceedings in justice courts. See A.R.S. § 22-406. Thus, defendants in a forfeiture action before the superior court, justice court, and most municipal courts may seek almost any potentially relevant information about the petitioner's case, including exculpatory and impeachment information. Phoenix and the cities of Tucson and Yuma are exceptions in that they explicitly prohibit pretrial discovery in civil cases before their municipal courts. See City Ct. Local Prac. & Proc. Rules, Tucson, 11; Mun. Ct. Local Prac. and Proc. Rules, Yuma, 2.11. ¶ 15 The precise question we confront is not whether Brady and Giglio apply as a general matter to all cases in which the government is a party, or even to all civil forfeiture cases, but rather, whether Brady and Giglio should apply to the rare case where a defendant is deprived of the usual disclosure and discovery rights available in similar cases. We are unaware of any case in Arizona or the Ninth Circuit examining the minimum disclosures necessary for the State to deprive a defendant of his property rights. However, several courts have examined the application of Brady and Giglio in civil suits brought by the government. ¶ 16 In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky , the Sixth Circuit extended Brady to civil denaturalization and extradition proceedings in a case involving an alleged Nazi war criminal. 10 F.3d 338, 353-54 (6th Cir. 1993). Similarly, in United States v. Edwards , a district court extended Brady to federal civil commitment hearings because the issue involved "whether someone will be locked away." 777 F.Supp.2d 985, 994 (E.D.N.C. 2011). These cases focus primarily on the severity of the penalty sought by the government and appear to indicate Brady would not extend to civil forfeitures. Cf. Fox ex rel. Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co., 739 F.3d 131, 138-39 (declining to extend Brady to a civil case where no governmental entity sought a penalty). However, these cases did not have occasion to examine government forfeiture actions or weigh disparate disclosure rights. ¶ 17 Recently, in United States v. Sierra Pacific Industries , a district court declined to extend Brady to an action by the government seeking monetary damages. 100 F.Supp.3d 948, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The district court noted that, because the case before it involved a claim for damages, it was "no different from any other civil case," except that the government happened to be a party. Id. at 957. Thus, relying on the lack of "any ... consequences akin to a criminal conviction" the district court stated Brady does not apply to such cases. Id. at 957-58. In addition to its harm analysis, the district court examined the differences between procedural rights in civil and criminal cases. Significantly, the district court explained that these differences "underscore the need for Brady only in criminal cases" because the "expansive right to discovery in civil cases" provides civil defendants with constitutionally sufficient due process. Id. at 958 ; see also Brodie v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 951 F.Supp.2d 108, 120 (D.D.C. 2013) (voluminous disclosure obviated need to extend Brady to civil proceeding); United States ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted) , 209 F.R.D. 475, 483 (D. Utah 2001) ("[t]o extend Brady to this civil case is both unnecessary and unwarranted" because the defendants are in "possession of the underlying documents"). ¶ 18 The court's reasoning in Sierra Pacific Industries is persuasive: where the government does not seek relief unique to its police power, and defendants are provided with adequate discovery and disclosure to mount an effective and meaningful defense, Brady will not apply. Here, however, the City sought forfeiture of Foor's property, a remedy which may not rise to the level of imprisonment, but is nonetheless a unique deprivation of rights only the government may seek. See, e.g. , Austin v. United States , 509 U.S. 602, 611-15, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) (describing the origins of forfeiture); accord Leonard v. Texas , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 847, 847-50, 197 L.Ed.2d 474 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). Moreover, Foor had no means to discover any evidence held by the City, denying her the process necessary to mount a meaningful defense. Under these circumstances, from a Brady perspective, the City's civil action is virtually indistinguishable from a criminal action. Thus, Brady and Giglio apply in civil forfeiture actions absent a mechanism for the defendant to discover, at a minimum, non-privileged exculpatory and impeachment information in the government's possession. II. Materiality ¶ 19 Having concluded Brady and Giglio apply to forfeiture actions by the State where discovery is prohibited, we turn to the materiality of the alleged Giglio information. The only information relevant on appeal is Officer Cohane's placement on the MCAO Brady list in 2004. Though Foor contends this listing resulted from more than Officer Cohane's 1993 misconduct, the record contains no information to support this contention. At best, Officer Cohane's inclusion on the list amounts to impeachment evidence to undermine the credibility of her testimony. ¶ 20 The United States Supreme Court has held that constitutional error requiring a new trial based upon nondisclosure of information helpful to the defense exists only when the omitted evidence creates "a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Agurs , 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392. In Agurs , the Supreme Court was faced with a criminal charge requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, the appropriate measure to undermine a guilty verdict was reasonable doubt. Id. Here, however, the appropriate standard is a preponderance of the evidence. See Code § 8-3.03(B). Subsequent to its decision in Agurs , the Supreme Court clarified the materiality test for Brady information, holding that information is material "only if there is a reasonable probability ... the result would have been different." United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 681-83, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The appropriate materiality standard, therefore, is whether, in light of the additional evidence and in the context of the entire record, the City failed to establish the requisite neglect or mistreatment by a preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 21 The evidence presented here creates a question as to the credibility of Officer Cohane. We first consider the municipal court's findings and the testimony presented by the City's other witnesses. The municipal court found that Foor did not subject the animals to cruel mistreatment, which is defined as serious physical injury or torture. However, the court did find that Foor subjected the animals to cruel neglect because their sanitary conditions were so poor as to have deprived them of adequate shelter. This finding is fully supported by testimony from Pepper and Dr. Bradley, who cleaned and treated the cats when they were brought in. Moreover, Foor admitted she kept the animals confined in containers with inadequate sanitation and did not clean or check on them for several days prior to their seizure. Finally, Pepper, not Officer Cohane, took the pictures admitted into evidence by the City. ¶ 22 Thus, even assuming the municipal court disregarded Officer Cohane's testimony, the City proved cruel neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. The court's findings were based upon the deplorable sanitary conditions in which Pepper found the cats. These conditions were thoroughly established by Dr. Bradley and Pepper's graphic testimony and the City's photographic evidence. Therefore, the omission of Officer Cohane's 2004 inclusion on the MCAO Brady list was not material on these facts and no new trial is required. See Bagley , 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (holding that a new trial is not required unless the new evidence undermines the verdict). III. Remaining Arguments ¶ 23 Foor raises numerous additional minor arguments in an effort to overturn the forfeiture of her cats, all of which are unavailing. First, Foor argues that the City's procedure for animal forfeiture is unconstitutional because it does not provide the same protections as in juvenile dependency proceedings. Animals are not children; this argument is therefore meritless. Second, Foor argues the City failed to merge her criminal and civil case. Foor did not raise this issue at the superior court or in Foor I , and it is therefore waived. See Van Loan , 116 Ariz. at 274, 569 P.2d at 216. Foor also suggests the City acted improperly in her case out of a desire to punish animal hoarders, as implicated by the creation of the City's Animal Crimes Task Force. Foor never raised this issue before the superior court or in Foor I , and it too is waived. See id. CONCLUSION ¶ 24 When the State acts to divest private citizens of their property based upon proscribed conduct, due process requires-at a minimum-a fair and meaningful hearing. Absent some basic discovery or disclosure mechanism, the protections set forth in Brady and Giglio demand the State disclose exculpatory and impeachment information beneficial to the defendant's case. Because the City prohibits pretrial discovery or disclosure, the City must disclose Brady and Giglio information in civil forfeiture proceedings. ¶ 25 Though Brady and Giglio apply, on these facts, the undisclosed Giglio information was not material under Bagley . Thus, we affirm the superior court's denial of Foor's petition for special action. Foor has requested attorney's fees on appeal; as she is not the prevailing party, we decline to award fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348 and Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

HOWE, Judge: ¶ 1 Julie Rohr appeals the trial court's granting of summary judgment to Evangelos Armiros holding that a contract existed between them and that Julie breached it. Julie also appeals the trial court's $135,250 damages award to Evangelos following a bench trial. Evangelos cross-appeals, arguing that the court erred by dismissing Julie's husband, Daniel Rohr, as a defendant. We affirm the trial court's finding that a valid contract existed when Julie offered her diamond ring on eBay with the option for users to "Buy It Now" and Armiros accepted the offer by clicking the "Buy It Now" button. We also affirm the trial court's finding that, although Evangelos had not paid for the ring before Julie breached the contract, he was entitled to the benefit of the bargain and suffered damages. We further hold that Evangelos's cross-appeal against Daniel must be dismissed because Daniel is not an appellant for purposes of this appeal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 2 In February 2014, Julie listed a 10.17 carat diamond ring for sale on eBay for $100,000 using the "Buy It Now" option. Evangelos, a Georgia resident and sole owner of E-Diamond, LLC, saw Julie's listing and emailed her about the ring. Julie provided Evangelos with the ring's Gemological Institute of America ("GIA") report number and stated that she was the ring's original owner. Evangelos again emailed Julie stating that "[i]f we have a deal, would you be willing to meet face to face at your bank or attorney to do the transaction?" After Julie agreed, Evangelos clicked the "Buy It Now" button on the listing page but was temporarily unable to complete the purchase because eBay requested that he first confirm his identity. While on hold with eBay, Evangelos emailed Julie and asked that she hold the ring until he could make the purchase; Julie stated that she would try. After eBay cleared Evangelos to purchase the ring, he clicked the "Buy It Now" button, which closed Julie's listing. ¶ 3 Shortly after Evangelos clicked the "Buy It Now" button, he and Julie arranged a time to meet in Phoenix to complete the transaction, and he purchased an airplane ticket from Georgia to Arizona. Evangelos then emailed Julie through eBay stating that he was bringing a friend with more experience because "this is an expensive one to screw up[.]" Julie and Evangelos later texted each other confirming when and where they would meet. ¶ 4 Even though Julie's original eBay listing had closed, she received an email later that evening from another eBay user offering $150,000 for the ring. Julie responded that she believed she had already sold the ring. The eBay user told Julie that he would make a deposit on the ring and that his $150,000 offer was "well worth canceling the deal with [Evangelos]." Julie accepted the other user's offer and emailed Evangelos advising that she would no longer sell him the ring. She also texted him that she was sorry, but the other buyer offered her more money and that completing the transaction would be easier with the other buyer. Julie subsequently sent Evangelos a cancelation request through eBay and listed her reason as, "I made a mistake in my listing price." Evangelos denied Julie's cancelation request, stating that the two had a valid contract for the ring's purchase. ¶ 5 The next day, Evangelos called and texted Julie several times to change her mind, telling her that they had a legal contract and that he would have to go "the legal way" because she did not want to work it out. Evangelos then offered Julie $150,000 for the ring, but she declined, stating that she had decided to keep the ring and not sell it, even though she had already agreed to sell the ring to the other buyer. ¶ 6 Two months later, Evangelos sued Julie and Daniel (collectively, "the Rohrs") for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Evangelos also named as a defendant the other buyer who had purchased the ring, but the buyer was dismissed as a party and subsequently settled by paying Evangelos $60,000. Daniel moved to be dismissed from the lawsuit, arguing that although he had originally purchased the ring as an engagement ring for Julie in 2005, he currently had no property interest in the ring and was not a party to Julie and Evangelos's eBay transaction. The trial court denied Daniel's motion as premature. ¶ 7 In January 2016, Evangelos moved for summary judgment. He attached to his motion relevant portions of eBay's user agreement to show that a valid contract existed. The attached eBay user agreement stated that "[y]ou agree to comply with all the above when accessing or using our Services." It also stated that a user must be able to form a legally binding contract and that the actual contract for sale was directly between the seller and buyer. Under the "Purchase Conditions" section, the user agreement stated that buyers agree that a "legally binding contract" is entered when an item is bought or the buyer has the winning bid. After a buyer clicks the "Buy It Now" button, the buyer is "obligated" to complete the transaction and must send payment to the seller within three days. The user agreement also set a monetary limit on when a seller can request immediate payment on items less than $10,000 and allowed the buyer to pay "by any method the seller accepts" if the buyer picked up the item in person. ¶ 8 The Rohrs cross-moved for summary judgment, asserting that no enforceable contract existed and that Evangelos had no provable damages. After hearing oral argument, the court found that both Julie and Evangelos agreed to be bound by eBay's user agreement and that listing an item under the "Buy It Now" option obligates the seller to sell the item to the "Buy It Now" buyer for the listing's specified price. Consequently, the court found that a binding contract existed. The court held that "[t]he written contract is an unambiguous manifestation of mutual assent: [Julie] offered to sell for $100,000 and [Evangelos] accepted the offer" but that Julie repudiated the contract before the time for payment. The court denied Evangelos's request for summary judgment on damages, however, because the amount of damages was disputed. ¶ 9 In August 2016, the court held a one-day trial on damages. Before the presentation of evidence, Julie argued that Evangelos sought only lost profits damages and not damages under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), representing the difference in market value at the time of breach and the contract price for the ring. Evangelos responded that he had alleged UCC damages in his original complaint and the pretrial statement and therefore had the right to elect which type of damages he was pursuing, and he was pursuing UCC damages under A.R.S. § 47-2713(A). The court agreed that the damages sought to that point in the litigation were phrased in terms of lost profits but that "the law of contracts has always been that for a purchase and sale contract, the measure of damages is benefit of the bargain." The court advised the parties that it would address the measure of damages following trial. ¶ 10 At trial, Evangelos testified that he had the ability to purchase the $100,000 ring and that he had intended to complete the transaction in Phoenix. Evangelos also testified that he had $155,000 available to him from a home equity line of credit. He further testified that the reason he wanted to bring his friend was to ensure that the diamond was the same as the one that Julie had advertised and not a fraud. Evangelos's gemologist testified about Rapnet, an international network that producers and wholesalers use to sell diamonds at diamond exchanges. He testified that the price listed on Rapnet for a diamond is the price a buyer would actually pay. To determine the fair market value of Julie's ring, the expert conferred with colleagues in the industry and had found three similar rings listed on Rapnet ranging in price from $372,000 to $402,000. Additionally, the expert stated that one of the rings he found, listed for $389,000, appeared to be a little smaller than Julie's ring, but that after comparing the two GIA reports, he believed the diamond listed on Rapnet was Julie's ring. Lastly, he testified that the platinum setting and smaller diamonds that surrounded the ring in its setting had a market value of $3,500. ¶ 11 The court then heard evidence from Julie's gemologist. He testified that he had not been asked to determine the ring's market value. He stated that "Rapnet may be a shadow of the market. It is not the actual market." He further testified that market value should be determined by actual transactions and not asking prices-like those on Rapnet. The expert conceded that the diamond listed on Rapnet for $389,000 was the same diamond in question, albeit slightly smaller. Although the expert did not opine on the ring's market value, he did provide a report on two-carat diamonds listed on Rapnet to show that prices varied up to 25%. ¶ 12 The Rohrs testified next. Daniel testified that he and Julie went to New York together to pick out an engagement ring. Julie picked the ring she liked and Daniel purchased it for $166,765. Daniel stated that although the two had a prenuptial agreement, it did not address the ring. Daniel testified that he did not participate in the eBay transaction and did not communicate with either Evangelos or the other eBay user. Julie testified that Evangelos made her uncomfortable and that she was scared to meet with him in person. She stated that she lied to Evangelos when she told him that she was no longer selling the ring to the other buyer and that she "was going to tell him anything [she] could ... to make him go away." She testified further that she did not believe that a contract existed after Evangelos clicked the "Buy It Now" button because he did not give a deposit. She stated, however, that she "didn't realize [she] should have [requested a deposit] in the eBay listing." ¶ 13 Following trial, the court found that Evangelos was entitled to the benefit of his bargain and that even though the term lost profits was used in the parties' summary judgment briefing and pretrial statement, "[t]he pretrial statement makes clear that [Evangelos] was seeking the difference between the ring's value and the contract price." In determining the ring's value, the court found that Julie grossly undervalued the ring on her listing and that the other eBay buyer subsequently listed the same ring on Rapnet for $389,000. The court concluded that although Evangelos's expert testified that $389,000 was the ring's market value, that price was just a listing price and "therefore likely higher than the ring's true market value." To calculate the ring's market value, the court started with the $389,000 listing price and reduced it 25% based on Julie's expert's Rapnet report, resulting in a $291,750 market value. It further found that the platinum setting and smaller diamonds had a $3,500 value and therefore the ring's total value at the time Julie breached was $295,250. The court then subtracted the $60,000 Evangelos received from the other buyer and the $100,000 Evangelos would have had to pay to purchase the ring, thereby resulting in damages of $135,250. ¶ 14 The court also found that Daniel had given the ring to Julie as a gift before they were married and that they never comingled it with the couple's community property. Therefore, the ring was Julie's sole and separate property. Consequently, the court held that the Rohrs' marital community was not liable for the breach and dismissed Daniel from the case. ¶ 15 Evangelos requested his attorneys' fees, taxable costs, and expert witness fees. The court denied Evangelos's request for attorneys' fees but awarded his costs. The court also awarded Evangelos's request for expert witness fees under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 68(g). Julie moved for a new trial, which the court subsequently denied. After the court denied her request for a new trial, Julie timely appealed. Evangelos timely cross-appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Contract Formation and Breach of Contract ¶ 16 Julie argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Evangelos on the contract formation and breach of contract issues. She contends that a contract did not exist because the two did not have a meeting of the minds. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wickham v. Hopkins , 226 Ariz. 468, 470 ¶ 7, 250 P.3d 245, 247 (App. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when no material issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56 ; Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990). Additionally, the validity and enforceability of a contract is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo. Estate of Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care and Rehab, Inc. , 234 Ariz. 18, 20 ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 607, 609-10 (App. 2014). Because no material issues of fact exist, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment. ¶ 17 The UCC applies to contracts for the sale of goods. A.R.S. § 47-2102. Under the UCC, "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." A.R.S. § 47-2204(A). "For an enforceable contract to exist, there must be an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and sufficient specification of terms so that obligations involved can be ascertained." K-Line Builders, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 139 Ariz. 209, 212, 677 P.2d 1317, 1320 (App. 1983). Here, both parties agreed to abide by eBay's user agreement before using eBay's services. Julie made an offer by listing her ring with the "Buy It Now" option and inviting anyone who clicked the "Buy It Now" button to enter into a contract. Evangelos accepted the invitation by clicking the "Buy It Now" button, thereby entering into a "legally binding contract" pursuant to eBay's user agreement. Julie's eBay listing contained all the agreement's terms and the consideration, namely, that Evangelos would receive the 10.17 carat diamond ring and Julie would receive $100,000. As such, an enforceable contract existed and summary judgment was appropriate. ¶ 18 Julie argues that the requisite meeting of the minds sufficient to form a contract did not exist. This argument is not persuasive. While Julie is correct that the parties must have intended to be bound by the agreement for a valid contract to exist, see Goodman v. Physical Res. Eng'g, Inc. , 229 Ariz. 25, 28 ¶ 7, 270 P.3d 852, 855 (App. 2011), both Julie and Evangelos were experienced eBay users who understood how to sell and purchase items through eBay. The user agreement both parties agreed to be bound by discussed the different ways in which a buyer can acquire an item, either by bidding or clicking "Buy It Now." Had Julie wanted her listing to simply solicit offers for her ring, she could have allowed only open bidding and not a fixed "Buy It Now" price of $100,000. By posting the ring with the "Buy It Now" option, Julie expressed her intention to enter into a contract with anyone that clicked the "Buy It Now" button. Likewise, Evangelos knew that by clicking the "Buy It Now" button he would obligate himself to purchase the ring according to the listing's terms. ¶ 19 Julie counters that Evangelos did not intend to buy the ring because he wanted to inspect it in person before completing the purchase. The record does not support that assertion. Instead, the record shows that Evangelos wanted only to make sure that the ring he was purchasing was what Julie represented it to be. Before clicking the "Buy It Now" button, Evangelos asked Julie if she would be willing to meet face-to-face to complete the transaction. Julie agreed to do so; and only then did Evangelos click the "Buy It Now" button. Julie initially agreed to the sale and later agreed to wait for Evangelos to fly to Phoenix to complete the transaction. Even after Evangelos informed Julie that he was bringing a friend with more experience, Julie expressed her agreement to the sale going forward by confirming when and where the parties would meet to complete the transaction. Therefore, Julie's argument that Evangelos did not intend to purchase the ring is without merit. ¶ 20 Because a contract existed, Julie was required to abide by eBay's user agreement and complete the transaction. That agreement stated that sellers who offered items for over $10,000 could not request immediate payment. Instead, a buyer had three days to tender payment for any item that the buyer had the winning bid for or bought using the "Buy It Now" option. Julie, however, did not allow Evangelos the three days required to complete the transaction. Because Julie breached the contract, she was liable for Evangelos's damages and the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment. 2. Damages ¶ 21 Julie argues that the court erred by awarding Evangelos damages for three reasons: (1) Evangelos was not entitled to damages because no contract existed and nothing showed that Evangelos could have performed his contractual obligation; (2) Evangelos elected lost profit damages and provided no evidence to support those damages; and (3) even if Evangelos sought and was awarded damages for being denied the benefit of the bargain, the trial court ignored the method the UCC provided for calculating those damages. Whether the trial court applied the correct measure of damages is a mixed question of fact and law we review de novo. SDR Assocs. v. ARG Enters., Inc. , 170 Ariz. 1, 2, 821 P.2d 268, 269 (App. 1991). But "we defer to the trial court's superior position to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, and resolve conflicts in facts and expert opinions." Great W. Bank v. LJC Dev., LLC , 238 Ariz. 470, 482 ¶ 42, 362 P.3d 1037, 1049 (App. 2015). Because Evangelos elected damages for being denied the benefit of the bargain under A.R.S. § 47-2713(A) and because sufficient evidence supports the trial court's damages finding, no error occurred. ¶ 22 As indicated above, Julie's first argument that damages were improper because no contract existed is incorrect. See supra section 1. Additionally, the record does not support Julie's second argument that Evangelos could not perform the contract had Julie not breached it. Evangelos testified that he was able and willing to purchase the ring and had even purchased tickets the same evening to fly to Phoenix. Further, Evangelos testified at trial that he could have purchased the ring through his $150,000 home equity line of credit. Thus, her first two arguments are without merit. ¶ 23 Julie next argues that Evangelos elected lost profits damages and not the loss of the benefit of the bargain under the UCC. This too is incorrect. The record supports the court's finding that Evangelos sought benefit of the bargain damages. The trial court noted that although the parties had used the phrase lost profits in the pretrial statement and in the summary judgment briefing, Evangelos's disclosures clearly described benefit of the bargain damages. Moreover, on the day of trial, Evangelos stated that he was electing to pursue benefit of the bargain damages and not lost profits. ¶ 24 Benefit of the bargain damages are measured by "the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price[.]" A.R.S. § 47-2713(A). The test for determining market value is "what the property would sell for between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arms-length transaction." Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc. v. Maricopa Cty. , 118 Ariz. 171, 174, 575 P.2d 801, 804 (App. 1977). Here, sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that the ring's market value was $295,250. Evangelos's gemologist testified that he reviewed Rapnet to research other eight-carat diamond rings to find the ring's market value. The expert also testified that Rapnet had three eight-carat rings ranging in price from $372,000 to $402,000 and that he located Julie's ring on Rapnet with a $389,000 sale price. He further testified that diamond prices listed on Rapnet are final and inclusive of all discounts. Therefore, the expert testified that the ring's market value was $389,000. ¶ 25 Julie's gemologist refused to give his expert opinion on the ring's market value. Instead, he simply stated that Rapnet was only a "shadow of the market" price and that he would determine the market value by looking at actual transactions and not asking prices. Discussing Rapnet further, Julie's expert stated that diamonds on Rapnet varied in sale price by upwards of 25%. The trial court heard this conflicting testimony and determined that reducing Evangelos's expert witness's market value determination by the 25% variation Julie's expert testified to would produce the ring's most accurate market value. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court erred by valuing the ring at $295,250 and thus awarding Evangelos $135,250 in damages. See IB Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Rancho Del Mar Apartments Ltd. P'ship , 228 Ariz. 61, 66 ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 69, 76 (App. 2011) (citation omitted) ("We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on matters pertaining to the credibility and weight of expert testimony."). ¶ 26 Julie counters that the correct way to determine market value was looking at the actual transactions. According to Julie, the ring's true market value would be between $150,000 and $166,765-the price Julie sold the ring to the other eBay user for and the original price Daniel paid for the ring in 2005. The record, however, does not support this assertion. Both prices are drastically less than the prices of the three eight-carat rings Evangelos's expert found on Rapnet. Additionally, after purchasing the ring from Julie, the other eBay user listed it for sale at $389,000. Thereafter, the court found that Julie had grossly undervalued her ring at the time she initially offered the ring on eBay and did not know what the ring was worth when she subsequently sold it. As such, the record supports the court's finding that the listing prices on Rapnet better represented the ring's true market value than the ring's cost in 2005 or the price Julie sold it for when she apparently had made little, if any, inquiry into the ring's value and did not know the ring's actual worth. 3. Evangelos's Cross-Appeal ¶ 27 Evangelos cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing Daniel from the case. Cross-appeals may be filed only against opposing party appellants, however. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(b) ("[T]o cross-appeal a judgment a party must file a notice of cross-appeal under Rule 8 no later than 20 days after appellant's filing of a notice of appeal....") (emphasis added); see also Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 128 Ariz. 350, 352, 625 P.2d 939, 941 (App. 1981). Evangelos timely cross-appealed following the court's denial of Julie's motion for a new trial. Daniel was not listed as a party to Julie's request for a new trial nor was he listed in the notice of appeal. Instead, the notice of appeal specifically stated that "Defendant Julie Rohr" appealed the final judgment. Because Daniel had been dismissed as a party and was not listed on the notice of appeal, he is not considered an appellant in this case. Therefore, Evangelos's cross-appeal was not the proper way to appeal the trial court's ruling dismissing Daniel as a party. See Maxwell , 128 Ariz. at 352-53, 625 P.2d at 941-42 (dismissing a cross-appeal against one defendant when the original notice of appeal explicitly excluded that defendant). Evangelos could have appealed from the court's dismissal of Daniel, but he failed to do so and the time to do so has long since passed. Thus, Evangelos's cross-appeal against Daniel is dismissed. 4. Attorneys' Fees on Appeal ¶ 28 Both parties request their attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Although we dismiss Evangelos's cross-appeal, he is the prevailing party on appeal. As such, we will award Evangelos his reasonable attorneys' fees related only to the appeal, and his taxable costs, upon his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. CONCLUSION ¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the parties had a valid contract and that Julie breached it. We also affirm the trial court's method and calculation of damages incurred by Evangelos. Further, we dismiss Evangelos's cross-appeal. For clarity and convenience, we refer to each of the parties by their first name as certain parties share a same last name. The expert testified that the original GIA report for Julie's ring showed three inclusions in the diamond and that the new GIA report for the diamond listed on Rapnet cited two of the same inclusions. As such, the expert concluded that the other buyer had removed one of the inclusions in Julie's ring, which caused the diamond's weight to slightly decrease. Because we dismiss Evangelos's cross-appeal, we deny as moot "Appellant Cross-Appellee's Motion to Strike; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support."

CRUZ, Judge: ¶ 1 Felipe Petrone Cabanas seeks special action review of the superior court's rulings granting reconstruction of his 2002 sentencing proceeding and ordering him to disclose his mental health and medical records to the State as part of his post-conviction relief proceedings. We hold that Cabanas' defense of transient immaturity does not, by itself, place his mental health at issue such that the State is entitled to have access to his medical and mental health records over his objection. ¶ 2 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief, vacating the superior court's disclosure order. We also separately hold that no reconstruction hearing is necessary because the court's determination as to whether Cabanas' offense was the result of transient immaturity or irreparable corruption must be made based on evidence admitted at an upcoming evidentiary hearing, and not based on consideration of the previous sentencing judge's thought processes outside of his written orders. Accordingly, we vacate the order setting such hearing. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 3 In 2001, Cabanas pled guilty to first-degree murder for the killing of a police officer. Cabanas was 17 years, 8 months old at the time of the murder. During sentencing, the court considered Cabanas' age, level of intelligence, maturity, and other mitigating factors in a twenty-nine-page special verdict. The court specifically considered Cabanas' "juvenile impulsivity." Dr. Barillas, the psychologist that evaluated Cabanas prior to sentencing, presented mitigating evidence that Cabanas acted with "significant impulsivity." Determining that mitigation compelled against imposition of the death penalty, the court imposed a term of natural life in prison without the possibility of release. ¶ 4 In 2013, Cabanas initiated post-conviction relief proceedings in light of Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The superior court denied Cabanas' request on the grounds that his natural-life sentence was not mandatory, "but instead was imposed after the sentencing court had considered [Cabanas'] age and other mitigating factors." State v. Cabanas , 2017 WL 3599595, at *1, ¶ 5 (Ariz. App. Aug. 22, 2017) (mem. decision). This court reversed, stating Cabanas was "sentenced when there was no requirement that a sentencing court distinguish between crimes that reflect 'irreparable corruption' as opposed to 'transient immaturity of youth,' " and thus, "[a]lthough the sentencing court considered [his] age in deciding on a sentence of natural life, that is insufficient to deny relief ... based on Miller ." Id. at *2, ¶ 8. As a result, we held Cabanas was "entitled to an evidentiary hearing to allow him the opportunity to establish that his crime reflected transient immaturity" and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our decision. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. I. Disclosure of Medical Records ¶ 5 At an October 2017 status conference, Cabanas stated his intention to call himself, Dr. Barillas, and Professor Steinberg as witnesses, and further stated that Steinberg would testify in general regarding the transient immaturity aspect of the juvenile brain. Claiming the determination of transient immaturity requires analysis of the individual's current mental state compared to their juvenile evaluation, Cabanas stated he would call Dr. Barillas to testify to Cabanas' present-day maturity level to prove his crime reflected transient immaturity. Under this anticipated presentation of the defense's case, Dr. Barillas was set to testify specifically about Cabanas, while Steinberg would testify about general characteristics associated with juvenile impulsivity. ¶ 6 In January 2018, the assigned judge recused herself, Cabanas' counsel withdrew, and the Public Defender's Office was appointed. After Cabanas stated he would not call Dr. Barillas to testify but instead would perform a nationwide search to identify an appropriate mental health expert, the State requested the court order production of Cabanas' medical and mental health records for the State's expert to review. The court granted the State's request for disclosure of all Arizona Department of Corrections and/or Corizon reports dated February 20, 2002 through March 1, 2018, and all Maricopa County Correctional Health Services records from March 27, 1999 through March 4, 2002; June 25, 2015 through July 7, 2015; and January 16, 2018 through March 1, 2018. Cabanas objected, arguing he had not noticed a mental health defense nor designated an expert; the court overruled the objection, but allowed Cabanas to submit redacted records to the court for review. The court did not establish any parameters for such redactions. Cabanas again challenged the order but submitted unredacted copies of the records for the court to review in camera . The court denied Cabanas' challenge and ordered all the documents produced. ¶ 7 Cabanas now seeks special action review from the superior court's order compelling disclosure of his medical and mental health records. II. Reconstruction Hearing ¶ 8 Also discussed at the October 19 conference was the State's request for a reconstruction hearing on remand from this court's mandate in Cabanas , 2017 WL 3599595. In support of its request, the State stated that because it was unable to access the transcript of the 2002 sentencing, it wanted to call the sentencing judge to testify to reconstruct the record. The State argued that while the record contained the special verdict, there was no record of the original sentencing proceeding, and that if no transcript or court reporter notes were located, the court should reconstruct the original sentencing to complete the record. The State argued the record needed to be reconstructed because if Cabanas were to meet his burden under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 32.8(c), the State would then have the burden of proving that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 9 After argument on November 16, the court ordered a hearing to reconstruct portions of the record not included within the sentencing judge's twenty-nine-page special verdict, which could not otherwise be recreated by way of affidavit or declaration. The State filed a motion re-urging its request to have the original sentencing judge testify as a witness during a reconstruction hearing and the evidentiary hearing. ¶ 10 At the hearing on the State's motion, the State indicated it intended to call the sentencing judge to reconstruct the record as well as to rebut Cabanas' purported constitutional violation during the evidentiary hearing. The State intended to inquire whether the sentencing judge considered Cabanas' youth as a chronological fact or whether the judge considered the crime as being the product of youthful conduct. Previously-assigned counsel did not object and the court granted the State's request to call the former sentencing judge as a witness for the purpose of reconstructing the sentencing record, as well as to provide testimony at the subsequent evidentiary hearing; however, before allowing the judge to testify, the court directed the parties to research whether the State could delve into the mental processes of the sentencing judge. ¶ 11 New defense counsel was appointed in January 2018 and moved to vacate the reconstruction hearing. Through April 2018, the State continued to argue that "[i]n order to address [transient immaturity], the trial court will need to look at what was considered at the original sentencing." The court heard renewed argument on April 16, 2018, denied Cabanas' motion to vacate the reconstruction hearing, and ordered a three-day evidentiary hearing set for the beginning of July 2018 to "absorb, evaluate, and determine whether or not there was transient immaturity," and to reconstruct the evidence provided at the time of sentencing. Cabanas also seeks special action relief from this ruling. DISCUSSION I. Special Action Jurisdiction ¶ 12 Special action jurisdiction is proper when a party has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). We have discretion to accept special action jurisdiction in cases "involving a matter of first impression, statewide significance, or pure questions of law." State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage , 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 8, 30 P.3d 649, 652 (App. 2001). A. Disclosure of Medical Records ¶ 13 Cabanas argues compelled disclosure of all mental health and medical records, before he has placed his mental state at issue, violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Arizona's statutory psychologist-patient privilege. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 32-2085(A). The State claims Cabanas necessarily placed his mental health at issue by challenging his sentence on the grounds that his actions reflected "transient immaturity" and not "irreparable corruption." This case thus involves both a matter of first impression and a pure question of law. See Ulibarri v. Superior Court , 184 Ariz. 382, 384, 909 P.2d 449, 451 (App. 1995) ("Existence of a privilege is a question of law, and a special action is the appropriate means of relief when the trial court orders disclosure of information that a party believes is privileged."). ¶ 14 Further, Cabanas argues his case is one of more than thirty cases pending in the superior court where defendants have requested hearings to demonstrate their convictions were the result of "transient immaturity" and not "irreparable corruption," and that it is thus an issue of statewide importance likely to arise again. Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction. B. The Reconstruction Hearing ¶ 15 Special action jurisdiction is appropriate when the superior court has acted contrary to this court's mandate. See Demand v. Gordon , 106 Ariz. 475, 477, 478 P.2d 99, 101 (1970). Cabanas argues the superior court has ordered reconstruction of the record in nonconformance with this court's mandate in Cabanas , 2017 WL 3599595, which required an evidentiary hearing. The State argues reconstruction is necessary to fully set forth a record for review of Cabanas' sentence. See State v. Schackart , 175 Ariz. 494, 499, 858 P.2d 639, 644 (1993). ¶ 16 Because the superior court granted the State's request to reconstruct the original sentencing for use during the evidentiary hearing at issue, this case involves a challenge to the superior court's compliance with a mandate of this court. Similarly, the petition raises multiple purely legal issues that are capable of repetition and are of statewide importance; therefore, we accept special action jurisdiction. II. Disclosure of Mental Health and Medical Records ¶ 17 Cabanas argues his post-conviction petition did not place his mental state at issue and thus the court's order that he disclose his mental health and medical records to the State was in error. We agree. ¶ 18 Arizona's physician-patient privilege, A.R.S. § 13-4062(4), precludes a physician from testifying, absent the patient's consent, to any information acquired in attending the patient and extends from statements to medical records. State v. Zeitner , 244 Ariz. 217, 221, ¶ 16, 418 P.3d 990, 994 (App. 2018). Section 32-2085(A) applies the same privilege to psychologist-patient communications and records; however, such privilege is waived when a party places the relevant medical or mental state at issue. See Bain v. Superior Court , 148 Ariz. 331, 334, 714 P.2d 824, 827 (1986) (stating a defendant waives the psychologist-patient privilege when they either (1) offer themselves as a witness and voluntarily testify with reference to privileged communications, or (2) place a particular condition at issue by means of a claim or affirmative defense). ¶ 19 In Miller , the U.S. Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles without giving due consideration for the transient immaturity associated with their youth, because mandatory sentencing schemes that do not consider the characteristics of youth pose too great a risk that a defendant who acts with transient immaturity will be disproportionately punished. 567 U.S. at 479-80, 132 S.Ct. 2455. In Montgomery v. Louisiana , the U.S. Supreme Court held Miller applied retroactively, and further held that even discretionary life-without-parole sentences were unconstitutional for defendants whose crimes reflect transient immaturity. --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ("Even if a court considers a child's age before sentencing him ... to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). ¶ 20 In light of Miller and Montgomery , our supreme court clarified in Valencia that in the Rule 32 context, after they present a colorable claim for relief, defendants sentenced as juveniles to natural life are entitled to a Rule 32.8(a) evidentiary hearing "to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption but instead transient immaturity." State v. Valencia , 241 Ariz. 206, 210, ¶ 18, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (2016). If defendants can meet their burden and establish that their crimes reflected transient immaturity, then they will have established that their natural-life sentences are unconstitutional, thus entitling them to parole-eligible resentencing. Id. ¶ 21 Before imposing a natural-life sentence upon a juvenile, the court must consider: (1) evidence of juvenility's hallmark characteristics-immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile's family and home environment; (3) the circumstances of the offense, including the extent the juvenile's participation in the conduct and the way that familial and peer pressures may have affected them, and whether substance abuse played a role; (4) evidence as to whether the incompetencies of youth prevent the juvenile from being charged with a lesser offense; and (5) evidence bearing on the possibility of rehabilitation. Miller , 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S.Ct. 2455. ¶ 22 But nothing in the line of cases from Miller through Valencia supports the proposition that a defendant who challenges his natural-life sentence with Miller necessarily places his or her mental state at issue. Miller implicates the sentencing court's consideration of whether the juvenile's crime reflects transient immaturity based on the diminished culpable state of juveniles, but not necessarily his mental state as reflected in mental health records or medical records. 567 U.S. at 470-74, 132 S.Ct. 2455. While the Miller Court noted its holding resulted from studies and psychological developments, the object of consideration is the juvenile's "moral culpability," id. at 471-72, 132 S.Ct. 2455, not mental status. ¶ 23 The State cites Kansas v. Cheever and State v. Schackart to argue that Cabanas has placed his mental state at issue. In Cheever , the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admission of a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation on rebuttal, where the defendant presented a voluntary-intoxication defense and called an expert, whose own evaluation relied on the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, to testify on his behalf. 571 U.S. 87, 91-97, 134 S.Ct. 596, 187 L.Ed.2d 519 (2013). The defendant's "psychiatric evidence concerned his mental status because he used it to argue that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to premeditate," and thus the Fifth Amendment did not bar the State from using the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation to rebut the defendant's voluntary-intoxication defense. Id. at 96-97, 134 S.Ct. 596. Here, no affirmative defense was presented-only the claim that at the time of sentencing, Cabanas' crime did not reflect irreparable corruption: an evaluation that does not turn on his mental ability to premeditate or other "mental status," id. , but on the aspects of the crime and his level of maturity at that time. ¶ 24 In State v. Druke , a special action case, the court of appeals reviewed whether the superior court could grant the State's request to appoint a mental health expert to examine the accused where the defendant did not raise an insanity defense, but instead intended to present expert testimony pertaining to his mental condition to negate the element of intent. 143 Ariz. 314, 316, 693 P.2d 969, 971 (App. 1984). The court of appeals held the State was entitled to a fair opportunity to present its evidence and rebut the evidence of the defendant, because the defendant had placed his mental state at issue. Id. at 318, 693 P.2d at 973. On review, the Arizona Supreme Court then held that ordering the defendant to submit to a mental examination did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination because he had "opened the door" to an examination by the State's expert. Schackart , 175 Ariz. at 500-01, 858 P.2d at 645-46. ¶ 25 We find the above cases distinguishable, as each turned on the right to records or examination after mental state is first placed at issue by the defendant. Relying on juvenile characteristics and claiming transient immaturity does not ipso facto equate to a mental health defense, nor would it negate an element of the crime. The fair-opportunity rationale compelling the Cheever , Druke , and Schackart decisions is absent here. The reciprocal rights of discovery established by the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure were intended to further the concept that a defendant is not entitled to an unfair advantage in the presentation of his defense. Druke , 143 Ariz. at 318, 693 P.2d at 973. No such advantage would arise here by allowing Cabanas the opportunity to establish transient immaturity without the use of expert testimony or other clinical reference to his mental health. We hold that until Cabanas relies on such records or otherwise places his mental status at issue, the State is not entitled to disclosure of his mental health records or to a mental health evaluation. We vacate the court's order as premature. III. The Order Compelling Disclosure Is Overbroad ¶ 26 In light of State v. Valencia , this court held that Cabanas was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to allow him the opportunity to establish that his crime reflects transient immaturity. Cabanas , 2017 WL 3599595, at *2, ¶ 8. The State argues that because the original sentencing transcripts are lost, it is entitled to reconstruct the original hearing. The State further argues reconstruction is necessary to complete the record for reference during the evidentiary hearing. Cabanas argues reconstruction is inappropriate, redundant to the purpose of the evidentiary hearing, and violates this court's mandate. This court reviews whether the superior court has complied with the appellate court's mandate de novo . In re Marriage of Molloy , 181 Ariz. 146, 149, 888 P.2d 1333, 1336 (App. 1994). A. Whether a Harmless Error Burden Applies ¶ 27 Intertwined in the State's argument for reconstruction and questioning the sentencing judge during the evidentiary hearing is its belief that Rule 32.8 imposes a burden on the State to establish harmless error if the defendant meets his burden showing his sentence was unconstitutional. See Rule 32.8(c). The State's belief is mistaken. ¶ 28 Miller and Montgomery hold that a natural-life sentence imposed on a juvenile for a crime reflecting transient immaturity is categorically unconstitutional. Valencia , 241 Ariz. at 209-10, ¶¶ 16-18, 386 P.3d at 395-96. It is the imposition of a life sentence upon a youth whose crime reflects transient immaturity which violates the Eighth Amendment, not the sentencing court's consideration of age-related factors. Id. at 210, ¶ 17, 386 P.3d at 396 (citing Montgomery , 136 S.Ct. at 736 ) (" Montgomery noted that ' Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility,' but instead held that imposing a sentence of life without parole on a 'child whose crime reflects transient immaturity' violates the Eighth Amendment."). ¶ 29 The Valencia hearing thus operates as an eligibility determination: if Cabanas meets his burden then he will have established that his natural-life sentence is unconstitutional, thus entitling him to resentencing. Valencia , 241 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 18, 386 P.3d at 396 ; Montgomery , 136 S.Ct. at 734 (stating Miller "rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class of defendants because of their status-that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Though the State typically carries the burden to rebut a constitutional violation by showing it was harmless per Rule 32.8(c), it cannot prove that the failure to consider the Miller -type factors was harmless here; if Cabanas is successful, then the unconstitutional life sentence cannot stand. ¶ 30 To the extent the State relies on harmless error to support the need for reconstruction, that argument fails. The superior court is limited by our mandate to decide the material issue presently before it: whether Cabanas' crime reflected transient immaturity or irreparable corruption. It is not tasked with deciding whether the previous sentence should stand, nor may it base its decision on considerations by the previous sentencing judge. See Phillips v. Clancy , 152 Ariz. 415, 418-21, 733 P.2d 300, 303-06 (App. 1986) (discussing the impropriety of a judge testifying how he would have ruled had a circumstance or factor been different); In re Aubuchon , 233 Ariz. 62, 69-70, ¶ 34, 309 P.3d 886, 893-94 (2013) (discussing the impropriety of probing into the mental processes engaged in by a judge). B. Need for Reconstruction ¶ 31 The State argues Rule 31.8(f) allows reconstruction of a portion of the record on appeal because the original sentencing transcript is unavailable. See, e.g. , Schackart , 175 Ariz. at 497-98, 858 P.2d at 642-43. However, the current Rule 32.8 proceeding is a post-conviction relief petition and subsequent evidentiary hearing to determine whether Cabanas' crime reflected transient immaturity, not a direct appeal-thus, Rule 31.8 is inapplicable. See Rule 32.3(a) (discussing the nature of a post-conviction relief proceeding and its relation to other remedies); see also State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 579, ¶ 32, 278 P.3d 1276, 1282 (2012) (" Rule 32.8(a) provide[s] for an evidentiary hearing only to determine issues of material fact."). More to the point, the superior court is not tasked with reviewing a previous court decision for error and thus need not review the previous transcript. See Schackart , 175 Ariz. at 499, 503, 858 P.2d at 644, 648 (vacating death sentence and ordering new sentencing hearing based on a finding that the sentencing transcript was inadequate given the broad scope of the court's obligation to independently review defendant's death sentence); State v. Hart , 110 Ariz. 55, 57, 514 P.2d 1243, 1245 (1973) (remanding for a new trial where appellant could not make first appeal without transcripts which were unavailable by no fault of appellant). ¶ 32 The State claims "[r]econstruction will allow this Court to hear the facts and circumstances of [Cabanas'] crimes." The State's recited purpose of reconstruction is redundant to the evidentiary hearing. To the extent the superior court on remand seeks to "absorb, evaluate, and determine whether ... there was transient immaturity," it must do so during the evidentiary hearing, within the parameters established in Miller , Montgomery , Valencia , and this decision. We therefore hold that the superior court erred when it ordered a reconstruction hearing. ¶ 33 The superior court retains discretion to admit relevant evidence during the evidentiary hearing tending to prove or disprove that Cabanas' crime reflected transient immaturity, Ariz. R. Evid. 401 - 403, and make necessary factual findings and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 32.8. CONCLUSION ¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief. The superior court's order requiring disclosure of Cabanas' medical and mental health records is vacated. The court's order granting reconstruction and permitting the State to call the sentencing judge to testify is also vacated, and we remand for compliance with this court's previous mandate and this decision. Corizon is a correctional facility healthcare provider. While not applicable to this post-decree proceeding, unless the defendant waives the privilege by asserting an insanity defense, Arizona's rules and statutes governing mental health examinations preserve the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination grounded in the Fifth Amendment prior to conviction. State v. Hegyi , 242 Ariz. 415, 417, ¶ 12, 396 P.3d 1095, 1097 (2017). At oral argument, Cabanas argued Rule 32.8(a) was inapplicable as the hearing is controlled by Rule 32.8(d) as a "further proceeding." We disagree. Cabanas' successful Rule 32.1(g) petition for post-conviction relief, Cabanas , 2017 WL 3599595, entitles him to an evidentiary hearing because he has made a colorable claim for relief based on Miller . See Valencia , 241 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 18, 386 P.3d at 396 (relying on Rule 32.8(a) and State v. Amaral , 239 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶¶ 11-12, 368 P.3d 925, 928 (2016) (discussing when an evidentiary hearing is required) ). The State conceded at oral argument that Cabanas could challenge each of the Miller factors without relying on mental health or medical records. Though he may choose to rely upon such records, we agree he need not. While Rule 15 applies to the trial stage, not to post-conviction relief proceedings, Canion v. Cole , 210 Ariz. 598, 599, ¶ 9, 115 P.3d 1261, 1262 (2005), we nevertheless find the reciprocal-right-of-discovery rationale applicable. The Valencia hearing (1) grants the petitioner the opportunity to have the court determine an issue of material fact, Rule 32.8(a) ; (2) is part of the original criminal action, Rule 32.3; (3) applies the Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 32.8(b); and (4) requires the court to make specific findings of fact and state its conclusions of law, Rule 32.8(d)(1). The State argues that calling the sentencing judge to testify is necessary to complete the record; but a judge may be called upon to give evidence, if at all, only in "instances in which there is no other reasonably available way to prove the facts sought." In re Peasley , 208 Ariz. 27, 34-35, ¶ 30 n.14, 90 P.3d 764, 771-72 (2004) (citation omitted). That is not the case here, as the State conceded during oral argument that it has all other records of the original sentencing, including the exhibits, list of witnesses, and the original sentencing judge's detailed twenty-nine-page special verdict. The only missing portion is the transcript.

STARING, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Valer Clark (formerly Valer Austin), on behalf of herself and the entities she owns and controls, appeals from the judgment entered after a jury trial, in which the trial court awarded Dan and Myriam Roe a life estate in a house and surrounding property and concluded that the divorce settlement agreement ("Settlement") entered between Valer and Josiah Austin did not require Josiah to defend and indemnify Valer against the Roes' life estate claim. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment awarding a life estate to the Roes, as well as the judgment that Josiah is not required to defend and indemnify Valer. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 The parties' disputes stem from a life estate claim brought by the Roes against Valer, Cuenca Los Ojos Foundation Trust, El Coronado Ranch & Cattle Co. L.L.C., and El Coronado Ranch L.L.C. (collectively, "Valer"), and the interpretation of an indemnification provision in the Settlement. We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury verdicts. Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 208 Ariz. 252, ¶ 3, 92 P.3d 882 (App. 2004). ¶ 3 Valer and Josiah divorced in 2015, several years after the Roes had moved into a house on El Coronado Ranch ("Ranch"), which Valer and Josiah owned jointly. Valer obtained sole ownership of the Ranch pursuant to the terms of the Settlement. She subsequently demanded the Roes vacate the Ranch, and the Roes filed an action for declaratory judgment claiming a life estate in the house and surrounding property on the Ranch. ¶ 4 Valer asserted the statute of frauds as a defense to the Roes' claim, arguing there was no written contract evincing the creation of a life estate. She also filed a counterclaim to quiet title to the Ranch. In addition, Valer filed a third-party complaint against Josiah, alleging the Settlement required him to defend and indemnify her against the Roes' life estate claim. ¶ 5 Valer subsequently moved for summary judgment on the Roes' life estate claim and on her indemnification claim against Josiah. The trial court denied summary judgment on both claims, concluding issues of fact existed that required resolution at trial. At trial, pursuant to Rule 50, Ariz. R. Civ. P., Valer moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Roes' life estate claim, and the court denied her motion. After trial, the jury awarded the Roes a life estate in the house on the Ranch and found Josiah had not breached the indemnification provisions of the Settlement. Valer renewed her motions for judgment as a matter of law on the Roes' life estate claim and also moved for judgment as a matter of law on her third-party indemnification claim against Josiah. The court denied the motions and ultimately entered judgment in favor of the Roes, granting them a life estate in the house and 214 surrounding acres on the Ranch, and in favor of Josiah on the indemnification claim. ¶ 6 Valer appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1). Discussion Statute of Frauds ¶ 7 Valer argues the statute of frauds bars the Roes' life estate claim because it is based on an oral contract and, therefore, the trial court erred when it denied her motions for judgment as a matter of law. In its denial of the Rule 50 motion Valer made at trial, the court concluded the alleged acts of part performance by the Roes "raise a question for the trier of fact as to whether [the Roes'] acts are unequivocally referable to the alleged agreement." Subsequently, when denying Valer's renewed motions, the court concluded it "d[id]n't think any other explanation is plausible.... [e]xcept a life estate." We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz. , 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d 735 (App. 1999). ¶ 8 Arizona's statute of frauds, A.R.S. § 44-101, in relevant part provides: No action shall be brought in any court in the following cases unless the promise or agreement upon which the action is brought, or some memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized: .... 6. Upon an agreement for leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or an interest therein. Such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged. "The statute of frauds is by its terms absolute, providing that '[n]o action' can be brought on oral contracts for the conveyance of land." Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd. P'ship , 218 Ariz. 222, ¶ 14, 182 P.3d 664 (2008). ¶ 9 Arizona, however, recognizes a "part performance" exception to the statute of frauds, excusing the writing requirement when acts of part performance are "unequivocally referable" to the alleged agreement. Id . ¶¶ 14-18 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 129 cmt. d (1981) ). The exception thus "requires that any alleged act of part performance be consistent only with the existence of a contract and inconsistent with other explanations such as ongoing negotiations or an existing relationship between the parties." Owens , 218 Ariz. 222, ¶ 18, 182 P.3d 664 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). And, because the statute of frauds evinces a "clear legislative prohibition against enforcement of an oral agreement for the conveyance of land[, t]he requirement that the alleged acts of part performance be unequivocally referable to the alleged contract assures that only in rare circumstances will courts exempt oral agreements from the plain terms of the statute." Id. ¶ 24. Further, a party's explanations for acts of alleged part performance are "not relevant" because "the alleged part performance must be 'alone and without the aid of words of promise ... unintelligible or at least extraordinary unless as an incident of ownership.' " Id . ¶ 23 (quoting Burns v. McCormick , 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273, 273 (1922) ). Whether acts are sufficient to constitute part performance is a question of law, William Henry Brophy Coll. v. Tovar , 127 Ariz. 191, 194, 619 P.2d 19, 22 (App. 1980), which we review de novo, Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions , 243 Ariz. 111, ¶ 17, 402 P.3d 996 (2017). ¶ 10 In this instance, the acts of part performance alleged by the Roes include: (1) selling their home in Mexico; (2) moving to the Ranch with their young son; (3) contributing approximately $155,000 to finishing and furnishing the Ranch house; and (4) working on the Ranch for Valer and Josiah. The Roes argue that these acts were undertaken in reliance on the alleged promise of a life estate and that the question of whether they are unequivocally referable to the existence of a life estate was an issue of fact for the jury. In addition, they argue the proponent of an alleged contract need only show his acts are unequivocally referable to the alleged contract "as between the two positions articulated by the parties." Valer, on the other hand, argues the Roes moved to the Ranch and worked for her and Josiah as part of a "work-for-free-rent arrangement," disputes the amount the Roes allegedly contributed to the Ranch house, and asserts she and Josiah contributed over $799,000 to constructing the house. Valer argues the Roes' acts are not unequivocally referable to an oral contract for a life estate, and she suggests several other scenarios under which they could be explained. ¶ 11 In determining whether the part performance exception applies to the Roes' life estate claim, we first consider whether their acts are inconsistent with all other explanations. See Owens , 218 Ariz. 222, ¶ 18, 182 P.3d 664 ("If the alleged acts do not conclusively establish that a contract exists, reliance upon them would circumvent the evidentiary function of the statute [of frauds]."); see also Tovar , 127 Ariz. at 194, 619 P.2d at 22 ("[T]he part performance alleged must be unequivocally referable solely to the oral contract."). Relying on Tovar , the Roes argue that the question in this instance is whether their acts are unequivocally referable to their position and inconsistent with the position asserted by Valer. As explained in Owens , however, the proponent of an alleged oral contract must show that his acts by themselves can only be explained by the existence of the contract he asserts-not that his position on the issue, as compared to the position of the other party, is more persuasive. 218 Ariz. 222, ¶¶ 16-18, 182 P.3d 664. A party's explanation of the relative strength of his position is not relevant to determining whether the part performance exception applies. Id. ¶ 23. ¶ 12 Moreover, Tovar is factually distinguishable. 127 Ariz. at 194-95, 619 P.2d at 22-23. There, the proponents of an oral long-term lease had paid rent for six to eight months while they were not using the premises and they made improvements worth approximately five months' rent, while the landowner claimed there was merely a month-to-month tenancy. Id. In contrast, the Roes assert the existence of a life estate in a house that cost approximately $955,000, as well as an additional 214 acres of surrounding land; yet, they only contributed approximately $155,000 (over $50,000 of which was spent on appliances, furniture, and maintenance) to the house during a span of approximately eight years. Further, in addition to distinguishable facts, Tovar was decided nearly thirty years before Owens , in which our supreme court makes clear that the unequivocally referable standard is a demanding one, part-performance exceptions to the statute of frauds are rare, and the determination of whether acts are unequivocally referable does not depend on the relative strength of the parties' explanations. Owens , 218 Ariz. 222, ¶¶ 16-24, 182 P.3d 664. Indeed, the very fact the Roes argue that they need only show that, as between their position and Valer's, their acts are unequivocally referable to the creation of a life estate supports the conclusion that the Roes' conduct does not "itself supply the key to what is promised." See Burns , 135 N.E. at 273. ¶ 13 The Roes also cite the example from Burns of a buyer who pays the purchase price for a parcel, takes possession, and improves the land, asserting it supports the argument that by concluding their acts are not unequivocally referable to the creation of a life estate, we give license to Valer and other similarly situated defendants to simply concoct other possible explanations to avoid enforcement. See 135 N.E. at 273-74. We disagree. First, the example of the buyer is distinguishable from the case at hand. The Roes never claimed a purchase contract, that they paid a purchase price, or that they own the ranch house and the surrounding 214 acres. Further, we find the Roes' acts more closely align with the housekeeper example described in Burns : "The housekeeper who abandons other prospects of establishment in life and renders service without pay upon the oral promise of her employer to give her a life estate in land must find her remedy in an action to recover the value of the service." Id. at 273. ¶ 14 In addition, we conclude there are several plausible explanations for the Roes' acts, including an at-will tenancy arrangement in which the Roes lived on the Ranch and, rather than pay rent, worked for Valer and Josiah. Alternatively, the Roes' $155,000 contribution to the house could have been a down payment on a purchase contract or a purchase option, with the $155,000 being applied toward the ultimate purchase price. It is also plausible the Roes had a lease arrangement in which the $155,000 and the value of their work on the Ranch were applied toward lease payments over a span of several years. In sum, the Roes' acts could be consistent with these or other plausible explanations and thus are not sufficient to constitute part performance. ¶ 15 We thus conclude that, as a matter of law, the Roes' alleged acts of part performance by themselves are not unequivocally referable to a contract for a life estate. The statute of frauds, therefore, bars the Roes' life estate claim. See § 44-101. Indemnification ¶ 16 Valer also appeals from the trial court's ruling that Josiah has no obligation to defend and indemnify her against the Roes' life estate claim. In denying Valer's pretrial motion for summary judgment, the court considered extrinsic evidence, and concluded the Settlement's indemnification provisions were not "so clearly written that they can only be supported by one party's interpretation" and that the intent of the parties raised questions requiring resolution at trial. The interpretation of a contract, including "whether [it] is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation[,] is a question of law, which we review de novo." Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa , 222 Ariz. 588, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1045 (App. 2009) ; see also Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 175 Ariz. 148, 158-59, 854 P.2d 1134, 1144-45 (1993) ("Whether contract language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation so that extrinsic evidence is admissible is a question of law for the court."). ¶ 17 "The purpose of contract interpretation is to determine the parties' intent and enforce that intent." Grosvenor Holdings, 222 Ariz. 588, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1045. In determining the parties' intent, courts must decide what evidence is admissible in the interpretation process, bearing in mind that the parol evidence rule allows extrinsic evidence to interpret, but not to vary or contradict the terms of the contract. Taylor , 175 Ariz. at 152, 854 P.2d at 1138. Further, it remains "[a] general principle of contract law ... that when parties bind themselves by a lawful contract the terms of which are clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the contract as written." Grubb & Ellis Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C. , 213 Ariz. 83, ¶ 12, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006). Thus, "[w]here the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language, there is no need or room for construction or interpretation and a court may not resort thereto." Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co. , 101 Ariz. 470, 472, 421 P.2d 318, 320 (1966) ; see also Grosvenor Holdings, 222 Ariz. 588, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1045 ; Mining Inv. Grp., LLC v. Roberts , 217 Ariz. 635, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 1207 (App. 2008). In addition, courts must avoid an interpretation of a contract that leads to an absurd result. See Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. , 223 Ariz. 463, ¶ 48, 224 P.3d 960 (App. 2010). ¶ 18 Section 22(f) of the Settlement provides: REPRESENTATIONS RE: LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES. Each of the Parties represents that he or she has not created or been responsible for and is not aware of any other persons creating any liens or encumbrances on the title of any property which is being confirmed or assigned pursuant to this Agreement which are not known to the other Party or Parties. If, notwithstanding this paragraph, a Party has caused a lien or encumbrance to be placed on property assigned to the other in this Agreement, then the Party causing such a lien or encumbrance to be created shall promptly remove or pay it as his or her sole expense. Specifically, except as specifically disclosed in this Agreement, Josiah represents that there are no life estates, leasehold interests, or leases of any kind or nature that burden any of the real property awarded to Valer, including, without limitation, any life estates or leasehold interests to Dan Roe or Mr. Congdon and/or his spouse. (Second emphasis added.) The Settlement also provides in § 3: a. INDEMNIFICATION/THIRD PARTY CREDITORS. The parties acknowledge that this Agreement does not necessarily bind third party creditors. However, the requirement to pay any Obligation, or be responsible therefor, wherever that language occurs in this Agreement, requires a Party to pay such Obligation and to indemnify and defend the other Party or Parties and hold the other Party or Parties ... free and harmless therefrom, including any attorney's fees and all expenses, settlement payments, fees and costs in connection with such apportionment of Obligations. In the event a claim is brought by a third party creditor against either of the parties for an Obligation for which another Party is liable, either independently or jointly and severally, the Party who is liable for such Obligation under this Agreement shall, in the case of an independent Obligation, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the other Party or Parties for such Obligation, including attorneys' fees and costs ... for any failure to do so. b. JOSIAH'S OBLIGATIONS. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, Josiah shall pay and be responsible for ... i. All Obligations of any kind or nature that Josiah has personally incurred at any time, whether individually or jointly with a third party, any legal entity, or Valer, that remain unpaid except as otherwise specifically assigned to Valer. .... viii. All existing Obligations in connection with ... [El Coronado Ranch & Cattle Company L.L.C., the Valer-owned entity that owns the Ranch] ... except insofar as such Entity Obligations are specifically assigned to Valer in this Agreement. Furthermore, § 2(u)(ii) includes a list in which Josiah disclosed all obligations, other than those specifically disclosed as such elsewhere in the Settlement, that could "affect, impact or encumber in any manner" any of the assets awarded to Valer. The list did not include a life estate to the Roes and there is no mention of a life estate anywhere in the Settlement other than Josiah's specific representation in § 22(f) that none exists. ¶ 19 On appeal, Valer argues she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Settlement clearly and unambiguously requires Josiah to defend and indemnify her. Specifically, she asserts the last sentence of § 22(f) requires Josiah to defend and indemnify her against the Roes' life estate claim because Josiah specifically represented that no life estate existed and did not disclose that such life estate existed in § 2(u)(ii). Further, Valer argues Josiah accepted all obligations in connection with the Ranch in § 3(b) and that he must indemnify her pursuant to § 3(a). According to Valer, given its clear and unambiguous provisions, the Settlement is not reasonably susceptible to any interpretation other than that Josiah must defend and indemnify her in connection with the Roes' claim. She also argues the trial court erred by admitting parol evidence to vary and contradict the Settlement's plain terms. ¶ 20 Josiah, on the other hand, argues the third sentence of § 22(f) must be read as being modified by a clause in the first sentence of the same section: "which are not known to the other Party." Under Josiah's interpretation, § 22(f) only requires him to defend and indemnify Valer against liens and encumbrances which are not known to her . And, according to Josiah, Valer was aware during the settlement negotiations that both Josiah and Valer "had made a verbal promise of a 'life estate' to the Roes." Thus, Josiah argues the court was correct in finding the Settlement is reasonably susceptible to his interpretation and in admitting parol evidence to interpret the Settlement. We disagree. ¶ 21 As noted, even after Taylor , when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, and we must give effect to its terms. Grosvenor Holdings , 222 Ariz. 588, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1045 ; see also Mining Inv. Grp. , 217 Ariz. 635, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 1207 ; Grubb & Ellis , 213 Ariz. 83, ¶ 12, 138 P.3d 1210. Here, when read together, §§ 3(a), 3(b), and 22(f) of the Settlement clearly and unambiguously require Josiah to defend and indemnify Valer in the event he has caused a lien or encumbrance to be placed on property awarded to her in the Settlement. Further, the third sentence of § 22(f) contains a clear representation by Josiah that "there are no life estates, leasehold interests, or leases of any kind or nature that burden any of the real property awarded to Valer," except as specifically disclosed in the Settlement. The same sentence contains Josiah's specific disclaimer of any life estate in favor of Dan Roe. ¶ 22 It is true that Arizona has adopted a permissive approach to the parol evidence rule, Long v. City of Glendale , 208 Ariz. 319, ¶ 27, 93 P.3d 519 (App. 2004), allowing, as noted, extrinsic evidence to aid in contract interpretation. Taylor , 175 Ariz. at 152, 854 P.2d at 1138. Our supreme court has explained that, when faced with the question of whether to admit extrinsic evidence, a judge should "first consider[ ] the offered evidence and, if he or she finds that the contract language is 'reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation asserted by its proponent, the evidence is admissible to determine the meaning intended by the parties." Id. at 154, 854 P.2d at 1140. If the offered evidence varies or contradicts the terms of the contract, however, the parol evidence rule precludes it. Id. at 152, 854 P.2d at 1138. In other words, "even under Arizona's more permissive approach to the parol evidence rule, a proponent of parol evidence cannot completely escape the confines of the actual writing." Long , 208 Ariz. 319, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d 519. ¶ 23 Here, the trial court could properly consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the Settlement was reasonably susceptible to Josiah's interpretation. See Taylor , 175 Ariz. at 154-55, 854 P.2d at 1140-41. The court considered extrinsic evidence from both Valer and Josiah in support of their respective interpretations of the Settlement. Josiah's evidence consisted of testimony and documents purporting to show Valer was aware of the life estate allegedly promised to the Roes. But that evidence varies and contradicts the plain terms of the Settlement, which, as discussed, require Josiah to defend and indemnify Valer against the Roes' claim. Therefore, we conclude the court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence to contradict the Settlement's terms. Taylor, 175 Ariz. at 152, 854 P.2d at 1138 ("parol evidence rule prohibits extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict" contract). ¶ 24 Moreover, "[i]t is a cardinal rule of contract interpretation that we do not construe one term of a contract to essentially render meaningless another term." Aztar , 223 Ariz. 463, ¶ 56, 224 P.3d 960. Josiah's interpretation of § 22(f), which would have the words "which are not known to the other Party" relieve him of the obligation to defend and indemnify Valer in connection with the Roes' life estate claim, would render meaningless the following provisions: (1) Josiah's representations in § 22(f) that there were no liens or encumbrances other than those specifically disclosed in the Settlement and that there was no life estate; (2) the list of encumbrances that Josiah did disclose in § 2(u)(ii); (3) the indemnity provision in § 3(a); and (4) Josiah's acceptance of responsibility for obligations in connection with the Ranch in § 3(b). It is our duty to "adopt a construction of a contract which will harmonize all of its parts, and apparently conflicting parts must be reconciled, if possible, by any reasonable interpretation." U.S. Insulation, Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co. , 146 Ariz. 250, 259, 705 P.2d 490, 499 (App. 1985). The only reasonable interpretation of the Settlement is that Josiah must defend and indemnify Valer against all claims in relation to the Ranch that are not specifically disclosed in the agreement, including the Roes' life estate claim. ¶ 25 The trial court erred in finding the Settlement was reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. We conclude the Settlement requires Josiah to defend and indemnify Valer against the Roes' life estate claim. Attorney Fees ¶ 26 Valer seeks attorney fees pursuant to Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B) (against the Roes), § 22(o) of the Settlement (against Josiah), and A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (against both the Roes and Josiah). Although a prevailing party may recover attorney fees in quiet title actions under § 12-1103(B), Mariposa Dev. Co. v. Stoddard , 147 Ariz. 561, 565, 711 P.2d 1234, 1238 (App. 1985), and Valer counterclaimed to quiet title to the Ranch, the action underlying this litigation arises from an alleged contract. Therefore, we award Valer reasonable attorney fees against the Roes under § 12-341.01. Further, we award Valer reasonable attorney fees against Josiah under § 22(o) of the Settlement. Lastly, as the prevailing party, Valer is entitled to taxable costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341, upon compliance with Rule 21(b), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. Disposition ¶ 27 For the reasons above, we reverse the trial court's judgment awarding a life estate to the Roes, and its judgment in favor of Josiah on Valer's indemnification claim. The Settlement awarded ownership and control of Cuenca Los Ojos Foundation Trust, El Coronado Ranch & Cattle Co. L.L.C., and El Coronado Ranch L.L.C. to Valer. Although § 12-1103(B) ordinarily provides the exclusive basis for attorney fees in quiet title actions, see Lewis v. Pleasant Country, Ltd. , 173 Ariz. 186, 195, 840 P.2d 1051, 1060 (App. 1992) ; Lange v. Lotzer , 151 Ariz. 260, 262, 727 P.2d 38, 40 (App. 1986), we conclude Valer may recover under § 12-341.01 in this instance, because her quiet title action was a counterclaim to the Roes' life estate claim. See ML Servicing Co. v. Coles , 235 Ariz. 562, ¶ 30, 334 P.3d 745 (App. 2014) (meaning of "arises out of contract" is broad for purpose of attorney fees under § 12-341.01 ). Moreover, Valer's counterclaim to quiet title and the Roes' life estate claim were "so intertwined as to be indistinguishable," and in our discretion, we award attorney fees under § 12-341.01. See Zeagler v. Buckley , 223 Ariz. 37, ¶ 7, 219 P.3d 247 (App. 2009). Lastly, even if Valer's quiet title counterclaim did not arise out of contract or was not intertwined with the Roes' life estate claim, we could award attorney fees under § 12-1103(B) because she complied with that statute's requirements. On appeal, Valer also argues the trial court erred by misapplying disclosure and evidence rules, allowing Josiah's counsel to vouch for his client, and holding an ex parte meeting with the jury, the Roes, and Josiah. In light of our reversal on both the life estate and indemnification claims, we need not reach these issues.

MORSE, Judge: ¶ 1 In this special action, Petitioner Gilbert Prosecutor's Office asks us to reverse the decision of the Presiding Gilbert Municipal Court Judge to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider whether a notice of change of judge as a matter of right pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.2 was filed for an improper purpose. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that when a party timely files a notice of change of judge as a matter of right under Rule 10.2(b), a court cannot inquire beyond the required avowals into the reasons for the notice. Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction, reverse the superior court, vacate the evidentiary hearing, and remand to the Gilbert Municipal Court to reassign this case to a new judge. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 A Gilbert prosecutor filed a timely notice of change of judge as a matter of right in the Gilbert Municipal Court pursuant to Rule 10.2. The notice included the avowals required by Rule 10.2(b), but counsel for the defendant objected, claimed that the notice was for an improper purpose under Rule 10.2(b)(2), and requested a hearing. The originally-assigned judge transferred the case to the presiding judge for a notice of change of judge hearing. The prosecutor objected to a hearing and argued that the notice should be automatically granted. Counsel for the defendant argued that a hearing was proper to determine whether the notice was for an improper purpose and requested discovery about the prosecutor's history of notices. The presiding judge reviewed the parties' filings and set the matter for an "evidentiary hearing" on the notice of change of judge. ¶ 3 Petitioner then sought special action review in the superior court and requested a stay of the evidentiary hearing. The prosecutor again argued that it was improper for the presiding judge to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the notice of change of judge as a matter of right was filed for an improper purpose. The superior court accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. The superior court reasoned that an evidentiary hearing was appropriate because the defendant had objected on the ground that the notice was made for an improper purpose under Rule 10.2(b), and the rule "contemplates that the presiding judge should make a determination on the matters of a claim under Rule 10.2 that a notice was improper." ¶ 4 Petitioner then sought special action review in this court. JURISDICTION ¶ 5 Special action jurisdiction is appropriate when a party lacks "an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal," Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), and "the case presents an issue of statewide importance and first impression," Hamblen v. Hatch , 242 Ariz. 483, 486, ¶ 12, 398 P.3d 99, 102 (2017). This case presents issues of statewide importance and petitioner does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. See State v. Ingram , 239 Ariz. 228, 232, ¶ 16, 368 P.3d 936, 940 (App. 2016) (noting that "a challenge to the denial of a notice of peremptory change of judge filed pursuant to Rule 10.2 must be brought by special action"); see also State v. Kalauli , 243 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶¶ 4-5, 414 P.3d 690, 691 (App. 2018) (noting that while appellate jurisdiction may be unclear for a challenge of the denial of a lower-court special action, this court may exercise special action jurisdiction in such cases). Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction. DISCUSSION ¶ 6 Petitioner argues that a court may not hold a hearing to inquire into a party's reasons for requesting a change of judge as a matter of right under Rule 10.2(a)(1). The defendant responds that a court may inquire whether the assigned prosecutor is abusing the rule when defendant objects to the change of judge. For the following reasons, we agree with Petitioner, vacate the order setting an evidentiary hearing, and remand for reassignment to a new judge. ¶ 7 "Each side in a criminal case is entitled to one change of judge as a matter of right." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(a)(1). Historically, the procedure under Rule 10.2 was "summary and automatic." State v. City Court of Tucson , 150 Ariz. 99, 102, 722 P.2d 267, 270 (1986). Before 2001, a party to a criminal case could invoke that procedure simply by filing a " 'Notice of Change of Judge' signed by counsel, if any, stating the name of the judge to be changed." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(b) (2000). ¶ 8 However, in 2001, the Arizona Supreme Court promulgated "experimental" amendments to Rule 10.2. The amendments were intended to address "abuse of this rule" and "ensure a party's right to have a matter heard before a fair and impartial judge without the necessity of divulging details that could cause needless embarrassment and antagonism or showing actual bias which may be difficult to prove." Court Comment to Experimental 2001 Amendments to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2. These amendments added the following requirement for a Notice of Change of Judge: The notice shall also include an avowal that the request is made in good faith and not: 1. For the purpose of delay; 2. To obtain a severance; 3. To interfere with the reasonable case management practices of a judge; 4. To remove a judge for reasons of race, gender or religious affiliation; 5. For the purpose of using the rule against a particular judge in a blanket fashion by a prosecuting agency, defender group or law firm ( [ City Court of Tucson , 150 Ariz. 99, 722 P.2d 267 ] ); 6. To obtain a more convenient geographical location; or 7. To obtain advantage or avoid disadvantage in connection with a plea bargain or at sentencing, except as permitted under Rule 17.4(g). The avowal shall be made in the attorney's capacity as an officer of the court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(b) (effective July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002). The pertinent provisions of the rule have been restyled, but remain the same in all material respects today. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(a)(1) and (b)(1). ¶ 9 The question presented here is whether the 2001 and subsequent changes to Rule 10.2 altered the pre-existing "summary and automatic" nature of a notice of change of judge as a matter of right to allow a court to inquire beyond the required avowals into whether a notice is filed for a proper purpose. For the reasons that follow, the answer is no; the "summary and automatic" nature of the rule is explicit and continues. ¶ 10 First, the text of the rule as it has existed since 2001 provides no authority for a court to inquire into the reason for a notice of change of judge. Instead, the rule provides that if a notice is timely filed and contains the required avowals, "the judge should proceed no further in the action" and "the presiding judge must immediately reassign the action to another judge." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(b)(3) and 10.2(d)(2). Allowing either the original judge or the presiding judge to do anything other than "immediately" reassign the case is inconsistent with the rule's plain language. ¶ 11 Second, in Bergeron ex rel. Perez v. O'Neil , 205 Ariz. 640, 647-48, ¶ 21, 74 P.3d 952, 959-60 (App. 2003), the court examined the "experimental" amendments to Rule 10.2 and found that the trial court's inherent authority does not include determining the propriety of reasons for a Rule 10.2 notice. As discussed in Bergeron , the Arizona Supreme Court carefully crafted Rule 10.2 to avoid judicial involvement in notices, leaving potential sanctions for professional misconduct as the safeguard against misuse. See id . (noting "that the supreme court received the benefit of extensive debate and thereafter so carefully set forth the remedies for potential abuse of the rule ..."). Thus, a "lawyer who files a notice of change of judge in any of the circumstances enumerated in § 10.2(b) has abused the rule and may face discipline for violating the lawyer's professional responsibilities...." Court Comment to Experimental 2001 Amendments to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2. ¶ 12 None of the changes to Rule 10.2 promulgated after Bergeron suggest a different result. In enacting the 2004 Amendments to Rule 10.2, the Arizona Supreme Court commented that the changes were intended to preserve the historical benefits of the peremptory change of judge as a matter of right and keep courts out of evaluating the propriety of Rule 10.2 notices: Arizona's rule permitting peremptory change of judge has historically been viewed as "salutary" on the grounds that "it is not necessary to embarrass the judge by setting forth in detail the facts of bias, prejudice or interests ... nor is it necessary for judge, litigant and attorney to involve themselves in an imbroglio which might result in everlasting bitterness on the part of the judge and the lawyer." Court Comment to the 2004 Amendments to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2 (quoting Anonymous v. Superior Court , 14 Ariz. App. 502, 504, 484 P.2d 655 (1971) ). ¶ 13 Our supreme court specified the intended interaction between Rule 10.2 and the "amendments to ER 8.4, Rule 42, Rules of the Supreme Court ... to address abuse of Rule 10.2 while preserving the traditional benefits of the right to peremptory change of judge." Id . The corresponding amendments to the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "fil[ing] a notice of change of judge under Rule 10.2, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, for an improper purpose, such as obtaining a trial delay or other circumstances enumerated in Rule 10.2(b)" is "professional misconduct." Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 8.4(g). As with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the amendment to ER 8.4 was promulgated "to address abuse of Rule 10.2 while preserving the traditional benefits of the right to peremptory change of judge." Court Comment to 2004 Amendment to ER 8.4. ¶ 14 Thus, if a party or a judge has reason to believe that the rule is being abused, the remedy is to report the abuse to the State Bar. Bergeron , 205 Ariz. at 651-52, ¶ 35, 74 P.3d at 963-64. Requiring a party to appear at an evidentiary hearing and explain why she filed the notice eliminates the traditional benefits of the peremptory change of judge, is not expressly or implicitly contemplated by Rule 10.2, and violates the imperative of Rule 10.2(d)(2). Accordingly, upon receipt of a timely and complete notice of change of judge of right, "the presiding judge must immediately reassign the action to another judge." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.2(d)(2). CONCLUSION ¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we accept special action jurisdiction, reverse the decision of the superior court, vacate the hearing set by the presiding judge, and remand with instructions to immediately reassign the case to another judge. Except where a prior year is noted in parentheticals, e.g. , "(2000)," we cite to the current version of the rule. The "experimental" amendment was extended four times through September 30, 2004, then amended and adopted in final form effective October 1, 2004. Rule 10.2 was further amended effective in 2011 and 2018. Additionally, in response to a petition by a presiding judge under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 28, the Arizona Supreme Court has suspended application of Rule 10.2 as to a prosecutor's office "on grounds of abuse" of the rule. See Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 98-30 (June 26, 1998): http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/22/admorder/orders99/pdf98/9830.pdf

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶ 1 Four homeowners insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers") hired EcoDry Restoration of Arizona, LLC ("EcoDry") to repair water damage to their homes. In each case, the insureds assigned to EcoDry their "rights, benefits, proceeds and causes of action" under the policies. After Farmers refused to pay EcoDry's repair bills in full, EcoDry sued the insurer, alleging breach of the insurance policies. Farmers petitions this court for special action relief from a superior court order denying Farmers' Motion to Dismiss the complaint. We accept jurisdiction but deny relief, holding Farmers' insureds validly assigned to EcoDry their rights to sue to collect post-loss benefits under the policies. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Farmers issued homeowners' insurance policies to four homeowners who later required water damage mitigation and restoration services. Each policy contained an anti-assignment provision stating that the insured's "interest in this policy may not be transferred to another person without [Farmers'] written consent." ¶ 3 In August and September 2016, each insured signed a "Work Order Agreement to Perform Emergency Services, Direct Pay Authorization & Assignment of Benefits" ("Work Order") authorizing EcoDry to perform emergency water mitigation services. Each Work Order included an assignment of benefits clause ("the assignments"). Each assignment read, in part: [The insured] hereby assigns any and all insurance rights, benefits, proceeds and causes of action under any applicable insurance policies to [EcoDry]. This assignment is made in consideration of [EcoDry] performing the services and in consideration of [EcoDry] not requiring a down payment from [the insured] prior to starting work.... [The insured] further authorizes and instructs [the insured's] insurance company to pay directly to [EcoDry] the amount shown on the final billing for the work done by [EcoDry] in connection with this claim. [The insured] also understands that the insurance company is billed as a courtesy and convenience to [the insured]. Should [the insured's] insurance company fail to honor the assignment and direction to pay, [the insured] agrees to pay [EcoDry] any balances due from [the insured's] personal funds. [The insured] understands and agrees that [EcoDry] is working for [the insured] and not for [the insured's] insurance company. Therefore, it is understood that [the insured] is ultimately responsible for payment of said services. ¶ 4 Farmers did not consent to any of the assignments. After finishing its work for the insureds, EcoDry submitted invoices directly to Farmers. In each case, Farmers directly paid EcoDry an amount less than the invoice total. EcoDry then filed a complaint against Farmers, alleging the insureds had assigned to EcoDry their "post-loss rights" under the policies, and that Farmers breached the policies by "refus[ing] to pay the reasonable, usual, and customary charges to restore the insured property to pre-loss condition." ¶ 5 Farmers moved to dismiss EcoDry's complaint for failure to state a claim, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing EcoDry did not have a contractual relationship with Farmers nor a valid assignment of the insureds' rights under the insurance policies. After receiving EcoDry's response and Farmers' reply, the superior court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Farmers then petitioned this court for special action review. SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION ¶ 6 Special action jurisdiction is discretionary but appropriate when the petitioner has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). Generally, special action review of a denial of a motion to dismiss is not appropriate. Vo v. Superior Court , 172 Ariz. 195, 198, 836 P.2d 408, 411 (App. 1992). "However, where an issue is one of first impression of a purely legal question, is of statewide importance, and is likely to arise again, special action jurisdiction may be warranted." Id. ¶ 7 This special action asks whether EcoDry may bring a breach of contract claim against Farmers after its insureds assigned EcoDry their rights to post-loss benefits under the insurance policies, notwithstanding non-assignment provisions in the policies. As such, it presents a question of law. See Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. , 199 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 11, 13 P.3d 785, 788 (App. 2000) ("Interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law which we review de novo ."). Judicial efficiency also weighs in favor of our accepting jurisdiction. According to the briefs in this matter, over 150 similar cases involving water restoration contractors and insurance companies have been filed in Maricopa County superior and justice courts since April 2017. Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion, we accept special action jurisdiction. See Summerfield v. Superior Court , 144 Ariz. 467, 469, 698 P.2d 712, 714 (1985) ("[T]here are several pending cases in the superior courts which present the same issue. Normal appellate procedures will result in unnecessary cost and delay to all litigants. The question presented is a clear issue of law with obvious statewide significance. The congruence of these factors militates in favor of our accepting [special action] jurisdiction." (citations omitted) ). DISCUSSION ¶ 8 Farmers argues EcoDry lacks standing to sue for breach of the policies because EcoDry "enjoys no privity of contract with Farmers" and the insureds cannot assign their "right[s] to bring this lawsuit." Farmers contends that anti-assignment clauses are valid under Arizona law, and no exception to that rule renders the anti-assignment provisions in its policies ineffective. ¶ 9 A chose-in-action is the "right to bring an action to recover a debt, money, or thing." Chose , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). It is well settled in Arizona that assignees of a chose-in-action have standing to pursue the action in their own name. United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston , 37 Ariz. 554, 561, 296 P. 262 (1931). Arizona law also recognizes, however, that contractual provisions prohibiting assignment without consent may be enforceable. Hanigan v. Wheeler , 19 Ariz. App. 49, 51, 504 P.2d 972 (1972) ; see also Highland Vill. Partners, L.L.C. v. Bradbury & Stamm Const. Co., Inc. , 219 Ariz. 147, 150, ¶ 11, 195 P.3d 184, 191 (App. 2008) (a party can assign rights under a contract to a third party unless (1) the assignment materially changes the obligor's duty or increases the obligor's risk, (2) statute or public policy prohibits the assignment, or (3) the contract validly prohibits the assignment). ¶ 10 As applicable here, the general rule is that an indemnity insurance policy "cannot be assigned, especially where an assignment is expressly prohibited by the terms of the policy, unless the insurer consents." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. , 15 Ariz. App. 13, 15, 485 P.2d 837 (1971). This principle "is based upon the right of the insurer to choose its insured so as to know its risks." Id. An assignment made after a loss occurs , however, "is not of the policy itself, but of a claim under, or a right of action on, the policy." Id. Thus, "[a]fter a loss has occurred and the rights under the policy have accrued, an assignment may be made without the consent of the insurer," St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 25 Ariz. App. 309, 311, 543 P.2d 147 (1975), and the rule enforcing anti-assignment provisions is not applicable, Aetna , 15 Ariz. App. at 15, 485 P.2d 837. ¶ 11 Farmers argues we should narrowly construe Aetna and St. Paul Fire to permit an insured to assign a claim against an insurer only when the amount of the claim is undisputed. It urges that in those cases, the amount of the loss was plain; the only issue was whether the insurer could be compelled to pay policy proceeds to the assignee. See St. Paul Fire , 25 Ariz. App. at 311, 543 P.2d 147 ; Aetna , 15 Ariz. App at 14, 485 P.2d 837. Farmers argues those cases do not apply here, when EcoDry purports to challenge the amount of benefits due under the policies and the methods Farmers uses to determine how much to pay. We disagree that Aetna and St. Paul Fire apply only when the amount of damages the insurance company owes to the insured is not in dispute, or that, in exercising its rights as the insureds' assignee, EcoDry is only entitled to receive whatever sum Farmers determines is due and may not challenge Farmers' determination in court. ¶ 12 In 2004, more than 25 years after Aetna and St. Paul Fire , the legislature amended a statute barring specified "unfair claim settlement practices" to expressly recognize the right of an insured to assign a claim. As amended, the statute states that a property or casualty insurer cannot: [W]ith such a frequency to indicate as a general business practice ... fail[ ] to recognize a valid assignment of a claim. The property or casualty insurer shall have the rights consistent with the provisions of its insurance policy to receive notice of loss or claim and to all defenses it may have to the loss or claim, but not otherwise to restrict an assignment of a loss or claim after a loss has occurred. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 20-461(A)(7). Although § 20-461 does not provide a private cause of action, A.R.S. § 20-461(D), the statute evidences the legislature's intent to allow insureds to assign claims arising under an insurance policy. ¶ 13 An assignment of a chose-in-action transfers the assignor's interest in the claim to the assignee. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Interchange Res., Inc. , 14 Ariz. App. 414, 417, 484 P.2d 26 (1971). "The assignee then 'stands in the shoes' of the assignor, taking his rights and remedies as described in the assignment, subject to any defenses which the obligor or debtor has against the assignor prior to notice of the assignment." Id. ¶ 14 Here, the insureds executed the assignments after water damaged their homes, giving rise to their claims under the policies. The insureds did not assign their insurance policies to EcoDry, but rather they each assigned a claim under and a right of action on the policy. See Aetna , 15 Ariz. App. at 15, 485 P.2d 837. Accordingly, we hold the assignments were valid post-loss assignments of benefits under the insurance policies. As the recipient of a post-loss assignment of benefits, EcoDry stands in the shoes of the insureds, see Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. , 14 Ariz. App. at 417, 484 P.2d 26, and has standing to enforce the policy against Farmers. ¶ 15 We are unpersuaded by Farmers' contentions that the assignments increase the insurer's risk or alter the duties and obligations under the insurance policies, and agree with courts in other states that permit assignment of post-loss benefits due under insurance policies. In Millard Gutter Co. v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a judgment against an insurance company in favor of a contractor that sued as an assignee of claims under a homeowner's insurance policy. 295 Neb. 419, 889 N.W.2d 596, 598 (2016). The insurance company paid the contractor less than half the amount the contractor billed for a roof repair, and the contractor sued the insurance company for the difference. Id. The court held the assignment was a post-loss assignment of a claim under an insurance policy and the contractor had standing to bring a breach of contract claim, despite an anti-assignment provision in the insurance policy. Id. at 599, 605. The court found that while there are sound public policy reasons for enforcing anti-assignment provisions before a loss occurs, accord Aetna , 15 Ariz. App. at 15, 485 P.2d 837, those justifications are not implicated after the loss, Millard , 889 N.W.2d at 604-05. This approach, allowing post-loss assignment, appears to be the majority rule. Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am. , 384 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Ky. 2012) ("[T]he majority rule holds that an anti-assignment clause [without the insurer's consent] is unenforceable once an insured occurrence takes place because at that point the insured is entitled to recovery under the policy; that right is a chose in action...."); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co. , 640 N.W.2d 231, 237-38 (Iowa 2001) (the policy reason behind prohibiting an assignment prior to a loss "no longer exists after the insured sustains the loss because the liability of the insurer is essentially fixed.... Moreover, if we permitted an insurer to avoid its contractual obligations by prohibiting all post-loss assignments, we could be granting the insurer a windfall." (citations omitted) ). But see Conoco, Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co. , 819 F.2d 120, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Texas law and holding a post-loss assignment of benefits was invalid because the insurance policy contained an "unambiguous no-assignment clause"). Farmers and amici argue that such assignments will cause more expense and higher payouts by insurers, suggesting that over time, insureds will suffer higher premiums as a result. But the assignments do not grant EcoDry any rights greater than those held by the insureds-assignors. The policies obligate Farmers to pay the reasonable costs of repair, regardless of whether the claim for coverage is pressed by an insured or by EcoDry. ¶ 16 We hold the insureds made valid post-loss assignments of "rights, benefits, proceeds, and causes of action" under their insurance policies. Although the language of the assignments appears broad, EcoDry's pending complaint only seeks amounts payable under the policies, and at oral argument EcoDry acknowledged that the only claims it raises under the assignments are for post-loss damages suffered by the insureds. We therefore only address the validity of the assignments insofar as they apply to post-loss rights and benefits, and hold EcoDry has standing to enforce those claims under the policies. Accordingly, the superior court did not err by denying Farmers' Motion to Dismiss. See Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State, Dep't of Ins. , 191 Ariz. 222, 224, ¶ 4, 954 P.2d 580, 582 (1998) (a motion to dismiss should only be granted if plaintiffs "would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof"). ¶ 17 Farmers and amici suggest that the allegations in EcoDry's complaint amount to a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. We do not address whether the assignments at issue purport to assign such a claim, which the parties have not briefed, because EcoDry's second amended complaint presents just one claim-breach of contract, for which it seeks "actual damages, including interest, as a result of [Farmers'] failure to pay the full amount for services rendered pursuant to the contract." Nor do we accept Farmers' related contention that the assignments allow EcoDry to pursue its claims "unhampered by the policy's obligations." EcoDry conceded at oral argument it is subject to the same obligations under the policies as the insureds. Further, in responding to EcoDry's demands for payment, Farmers retains every defense to the claims it would have had against the insureds prior to the assignments, and may assert such defenses against EcoDry. See Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. , 14 Ariz. App. at 417, 484 P.2d 26 ; see also A.R.S. § 20-461(A)(7) (after a valid assignment of a claim under an insurance policy, the insurance company "shall have the rights ... to all defenses it may have to the loss or claim"); A.R.S. § 44-144 ("An assignment of a chose in action shall not prejudice any set-off or other defense existing at the time of the notice of the assignment."). CONCLUSION ¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction but deny relief. Other courts likewise have applied the majority rule. See, e.g. , Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 434 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2006) ; Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co ., 100 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1939) ; R.L. Vallee, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. , 431 F.Supp.2d 428 (D. Vt. 2006) ; SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC , 375 F.Supp.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Action Auto Stores, Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co. , 845 F.Supp. 417 (W.D. Mich. 1993) ; Int'l Rediscount Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. , 425 F.Supp. 669 (D. Del. 1977) ; Antal's Rest., Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. , 680 A.2d 1386 (D.C. 1996); One Call Prop. Servs. Inc. v. Sec. First Ins. Co. , 165 So.3d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ; Elat, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co ., 280 N.J.Super. 62, 654 A.2d 503 (App. Div. 1995) ; Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. , 112 Ohio St.3d 482, 861 N.E.2d 121 (2006).

McMURDIE, Judge: ¶ 1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of Arizona award and decision upon review for a non-compensable claim. The issues raised by the claimant can be summarized as whether the physical assault that caused Carlos Ibarra's injuries "arose out of" his employment. We hold: (1) an assault is caused by the relations and conditions of the employment (the "friction and strain" of the employment) when the claimant and the other party to the assault have no personal contact outside of the employment, regardless of whether other job-related factors exist; and (2) the passage of time between an original dispute and an assault, known as a "cooling off" period, is not material to the question of whether the assault was work related when parties have no personal relationship outside of employment and all interactions between them occurred at work. We set aside the award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Ibarra worked for the respondent employer, Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC"), as a correctional officer. He was injured during a fight with Jihad Bilal, another correctional officer at the prison. He filed a workers' compensation claim for injuries sustained during the altercation. The claim was denied for benefits by the respondent carrier, State of Arizona, and Ibarra timely requested a hearing. ¶ 3 The ALJ heard testimony from Ibarra, two other correctional officers, and three supervisory officers. Ibarra and Bilal testified they have known each other for at least four years. The men had a history of hostile work-related interactions culminating in a fight on August 11, 2016. They have never socialized, or even spoken to each other, outside of work. ¶ 4 Testimony about six incidents between Ibarra and Bilal was presented. The first incident occurred shortly after Ibarra began working at ADOC's Meadows Unit in 2012, when Bilal refused to assist Ibarra and correctional officer Travis Murty in performing "roll-ups," i.e., preparing inmates for the following day's activities. After that incident, Ibarra asked his supervisor, Sergeant Babeu, not to post him with Bilal. ¶ 5 Sergeant Babeu continued to post Ibarra with Bilal and the second incident occurred in a prison control room. Ibarra testified that Bilal asked him many personal questions about his family: where his mother worked, where his sister worked, lived, and went to school, etc. Officer Murty, who was also present at the control room, testified that Bilal insinuated he wanted to have sexual relations with Ibarra's sister. ¶ 6 The third incident occurred when Ibarra was working in the prison yard. Ibarra asked another officer to bring him a gate key. According to Ibarra, Bilal unilaterally left his assigned post to retrieve the key and verbally abused Ibarra in the process. Ibarra subsequently informed Lieutenant Perron about his difficulties with Bilal. In response, Perron directed Ibarra to speak to his direct supervisor. ¶ 7 The fourth incident occurred in May 2015. While walking down a narrow hallway during a shift change, Ibarra met Bilal and Lieutenant Perron coming from the opposite direction. Ibarra testified that Bilal intentionally bumped into him hard enough to cause him to stumble into the wall. Perron testified he was aware Ibarra and Bilal had a "personal issue," but denied having witnessed this incident. ¶ 8 The fifth incident between Ibarra and Bilal occurred in September 2015 in a briefing room. To address the hostile relationship, Ibarra approached Bilal and inquired what Bilal's problem was with him and if it could be resolved. In response, Bilal became loud and abusive. Although two supervisory officers, Lieutenant McClellan and Sergeant Bolf, were also present, neither supervisor recalled the incident. Also present was Officer Murty; he testified the argument started because Bilal was staring at Ibarra and made negative comments about Ibarra "still living with his mother." ¶ 9 The final altercation between Ibarra and Bilal occurred on August 11, 2016. At the end of a shift, an officer comes to an ADOC building's control room and picks up count sheets, which account for all inmates in the building. That night, Bilal came to pick up the count sheets from Ibarra, who was at his post in the control room. Ibarra did not know that Bilal would be picking up the sheets until he opened the control room door and saw Bilal. As he handed Bilal the count sheets, Bilal struck Ibarra in the face and said, "what are you gonna do now bitch?" Ibarra defended himself and a fight ensued. When the fight finally broke up, Bilal radioed for help, and Ibarra was taken to a hospital. There is no dispute that Ibarra was injured during the fight. ¶ 10 Sergeant Bolf testified he responded to Bilal's radio call about the fight. Soon thereafter, he interviewed both officers and each blamed the other for the altercation. Bilal denied any previous hostile interactions occurred between the two men; he also stated he did not initiate the assault, but merely defended himself. ¶ 11 After the hearing, the ALJ determined that the assault was not work related and thus not compensable. Although Ibarra timely requested administrative review, the ALJ supplemented and affirmed the decision. Ibarra then filed this statutory special action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(2) and 23-951(A), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10. DISCUSSION ¶ 12 We defer to the ALJ's factual findings, Young v. Indus. Comm'n , 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 298, 301 (App. 2003), because the ALJ is the sole judge of witness credibility, Holding v. Indus. Comm'n , 139 Ariz. 548, 551, 679 P.2d 571, 574 (App. 1984), resolves all conflicts in the evidence, and draws all warranted inferences, see Malinski v. Indus. Comm'n , 103 Ariz. 213, 217, 439 P.2d 485, 489 (1968). However, we review legal conclusions, such as whether the injury arose out of employment, de novo . PF Chang's v. Indus. Comm'n , 216 Ariz. 344, 347, ¶ 13, 166 P.3d 135, 138 (App. 2007). ¶ 13 Ibarra argues the ALJ erred by finding the altercation arose out of personal animosity unrelated to work; he contends his injuries were work-related because the exchange of count sheets brought him together with Bilal on the night of the assault. The ALJ considered each of Ibarra's six enumerated incidents with Bilal and concluded that, except for the initial "roll-ups" incident, each subsequent incident was personal in nature and, thus, not work-related. We disagree with the ALJ's legal conclusion about the classification of the incidents. ¶ 14 To establish a compensable claim, Ibarra had the burden of proving he had sustained an injury by accident "arising out of" and "in the course of" his employment. See A.R.S. § 23-1021. "Arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the injury, while "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury in relation to the employment. See, e.g. , Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 88 Ariz. 164, 168, 354 P.2d 28 (1960) ; Scheller v. Indus. Comm'n , 134 Ariz. 418, 420, 656 P.2d 1279, 1281 (App. 1982). These tests are interrelated, but each must be evaluated and satisfied separately. Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Indus. Comm'n , 165 Ariz. 91, 94, 796 P.2d 893, 896 (1990). This court has recognized the "arising out of" and "in the course of" tests are not independent, but instead jointly form the "quantum theory of work connection." See Noble v. Indus. Comm'n , 188 Ariz. 48, 50, 52-53, 932 P.2d 804, 806, 808-09 (App. 1996) ; 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 29.01, at 29-2 to -7 (2017); see also Arizona Workers' Compensation Handbook § 3.2.1, at 3-10 (Ray J. Davis, et al., eds.; 1992 and Supp. 2015). The ALJ found, and neither party disputes on appeal, Ibarra was injured "in the course of" his employment. ¶ 15 To arise out of employment, the injury must result from some risk of the employment or be incidental to the discharge of employment duties. Lane v. Indus. Comm'n , 218 Ariz. 44, 47, ¶ 10, 178 P.3d 516, 519 (App. 2008). The employment-related risks have been categorized pursuant to their nature as risks: (1) peculiar to the employment; (2) increased by the employment, but qualitatively not peculiar to the employment; (3) actual risks of the employment; or (4) risks that would not occur "but for the fact that the employment placed the employee in a position where he or she was injured" (positional risk). Id. at 48, ¶ 11, 178 P.3d at 520 (quoting Nowlin v. Indus. Comm'n , 167 Ariz. 291, 293, 806 P.2d 880, 882 (App. 1990) ). In addition to evaluating the nature of the risk, it is also necessary to consider whether the origin of the risk is: (1) distinctly work related; (2) wholly personal; (3) mixed, i.e., partially work related and partially personal; or (4) neutral. Id. at ¶ 12 ; PF Chang's , 216 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 16, 166 P.3d at 139. An injury is unlikely to "arise out of employment" when the origin of the risk is wholly personal. See Royall v. Indus. Comm'n , 106 Ariz. 346, 350, 476 P.2d 156, 160 (1970). ¶ 16 Assault-related injuries arise out of employment "when the altercation arises out of a work-related dispute." PF Chang's , 216 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 18, 166 P.3d at 139 (assault-related injuries are compensable "regardless of who was the aggressor, because workers' compensation is a no-fault system."). When the subject of the dispute is unrelated to the work, an "assault is compensable if 'the work of the participants brought them together and created the relations and conditions which resulted in the clash' "-the "friction and strain" of the employment. Id. at ¶ 19 (quoting Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 8.01[6][a], at 8-37). An assault is caused by the "friction and strain" of the employment when the parties have no personal contact outside of the employment. Under those circumstances, no other job-related factors beyond the relations and conditions created by the employment need be present. See id. ; Toler v. Indus. Comm'n , 22 Ariz. App. 365, 367-68, 527 P.2d 767 (App. 1974) (an unprovoked assault by an inebriated employee upon a co-employee was compensable as arising out of the employment because "the friction and strain of employment can often precipitate assaults even in the absence of other job-related factors"). ¶ 17 The record shows that Ibarra and Bilal had no personal relationship outside of work. They knew each other only through their employment. The men's negative personal feelings towards each other were rooted solely in their employment relationship and arose only from their interactions at work. See PF Chang's , 216 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 22, 166 P.3d at 140 (claimant's injuries from an altercation with a supervisor at work were compensable as arising out of employment when the record did not indicate the parties "had any acquaintance outside of the workplace"); see also Toler , 22 Ariz. App. at 368, 527 P.2d 767 ("except for routine or work-related contact, [the parties] had no personal association prior to the events leading to the assault" and the injuries resulting from an unprovoked assault by an inebriated co-employee were compensable). Ibarra's injuries were, thus, compensable as arising out of employment. ¶ 18 In concluding the attack arose out of personal animosity, the ALJ considered the time between the first incident and the fight. Although the ALJ found the "roll-ups" incident was work related, she found it was "sufficiently remote in time" to classify the fight as non-work related. We disagree. ¶ 19 An assault's compensability does not depend on whether there was a "cooling-off" period between the original dispute and the assault when the parties have no personal contact outside of employment. Instead, the question of compensability hinges on the relation between the employment and the attack. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. , 88 Ariz. at 172-73, 354 P.2d 28 ("The fact that, after a work-connected dispute has temporarily ceased, the personal feelings of one of the parties do not 'cool off,' but rather are intensified to cause him to continue the dispute and to commit an assault, should not operate to bar an award of compensation."). In assessing the relationship between the attack and the employment, "[t]he cooling-off period is naturally a circumstance to be considered; but of itself it should not be controlling." Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. , 88 Ariz. at 172, 354 P.2d 28 (quoting Augelli v. Rolans Credit Clothing Store , 33 N.J.Super. 146, 109 A.2d 439, 441 (1954) ). But if all interactions between the parties occurred at work, the passage of time between the original dispute and the assault is of no consequence to the nature of the interaction. See id. at 171-72, 354 P.2d 28 (the original dispute arose from the claimant's performance of his employment duties, there was no prior relationship between the parties, and no matters outside of employment could have spurred the assault in the period between the original work dispute and the assault); see also PF Chang's , 216 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 22, 166 P.3d at 140 (the claimant was harassed by his supervisor and coworkers over a two-month period, but the parties had no personal relationship outside of the workplace to convert the dispute into a personal one). ¶ 20 Ibarra's original dispute with Bilal arose from Ibarra's performance of his employment duties, the "roll-ups," as the ALJ found. The subsequent incidents, which occurred over several years, all occurred inside ADOC, with the parties having no other contact outside of the workplace. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that, "despite a lengthy cooling off period, a ... conflict between the two continued." Under these circumstances, however, the assault's relation to Ibarra's employment controls over the time between the original dispute and the assault. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. , 88 Ariz. at 172, 354 P.2d 28. ¶ 21 Based on the ALJ's resolution of the evidentiary conflicts in favor of Ibarra and her findings of fact, we cannot agree with the ALJ's legal conclusion that the assault was personal in nature and consequently did not arise out of Ibarra's employment. See Lane , 218 Ariz. at 48, ¶¶ 11-12, 178 P.3d at 520 ; PF Chang's , 216 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 19, 166 P.3d at 139. On this record, Ibarra satisfied both the "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment elements of the "quantum theory of work connection" test. See Noble , 188 Ariz. at 52-53, 932 P.2d at 808-09. CONCLUSION ¶ 22 For all the foregoing reasons, we set aside the ALJ's award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 Oswaldo Diaz, Jr., who faces prosecution for aggravated driving under the influence ("DUI"), seeks special-action relief from the superior court's refusal to suppress blood evidence obtained under A.R.S. § 28-1388(E) 's "medical-draw exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. ¶ 2 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief. Our supreme court's additions to § 28-1388(E) 's express requirements make clear that the medical-draw exception for seizure of blood samples requires a showing of exigent circumstances. And it is well-established that this showing must demonstrate an imminent risk of destruction of blood-alcohol evidence beyond that posed by the natural evanescence of alcohol in the bloodstream-a circumstance that will rarely be present when the state seeks to effect a warrantless seizure of an already-preserved blood sample. Here, no exigent circumstances were present, and the test results from the improperly seized blood sample therefore must be suppressed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 3 On March 7, 2016, at approximately 6:42 p.m., a witness discovered a vehicle crashed into a business's entry gate, with the engine still running. Diaz, the driver, was the vehicle's sole occupant. The witness saw Diaz turn off the engine and slump over the steering wheel. ¶ 4 Fire department personnel extracted Diaz and, finding him unresponsive with no visible trauma, placed him in an ambulance for transport to a hospital. Diaz was still unresponsive when he arrived at the hospital, and medical imaging revealed no trauma. Medical personnel determined that he was stable, but intubated him and placed him on a breathing machine while they worked to determine the cause of his unresponsive state and decide how to treat him. Hospital personnel also drew blood for medical purposes, and stored it securely. A nurse noticed the odor of alcohol on Diaz's breath and person. ¶ 5 Police were advised of all the foregoing, and of the fact that medical personnel had drawn blood from Diaz for medical purposes. Without attempting to obtain a warrant, a police officer took custody of the blood at approximately 7:38 p.m. The state eventually tested the blood for its alcohol content, and thereafter charged Diaz with aggravated DUI under A.R.S. §§ 28-1381 and -1383. Diaz seeks special-action relief from the superior court's denial of his motions seeking suppression of the blood evidence. JURISDICTION ¶ 6 We accept special-action jurisdiction because Diaz's petition presents a purely legal issue of statewide importance that is likely to recur. Vo v. Superior Court (State ) , 172 Ariz. 195, 198, 836 P.2d 408, 411 (App. 1992). DISCUSSION ¶ 7 The Fourth Amendment protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government; a warrantless search is reasonable only if authorized by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; State v. Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327, 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 1256, 1260 (2017). ¶ 8 In blood-alcohol cases, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated at three stages: "(1) the physical intrusion into [the] body to draw blood, (2) the exercise of control over and the testing of the blood sample, and (3) obtaining the results of the test." State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When the physical intrusion is conducted by treating medical personnel, independent of government action, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to that stage. See United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 113-14, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official' "). In such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered until the state takes custody of the existing blood sample. See Nissley , 241 Ariz. at 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d at 1260 ("[S]tate action occurred when medical personnel turned over the blood sample at the officer's request.' "). (A fortiori , the Fourth Amendment also applies when the state tests and receives test results for the sample). ¶ 9 Arizona law contains a "medical-draw exception" that authorizes the warrantless seizure of certain blood samples drawn by private actors. A.R.S. § 28-1388(E) provides: Notwithstanding any other law, if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person has violated § 28-1381 and a sample of blood, urine or other bodily substance is taken from that person for any reason, a portion of that sample sufficient for analysis shall be provided to a law enforcement officer if requested for law enforcement purposes. The statute, of course, cannot trump the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Cocio , the Arizona Supreme Court relied on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to graft an exigency requirement onto § 28-1388(E) 's substantially similar statutory predecessor. 147 Ariz. 277, 286, 709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and Cupp v. Murphy , 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973) ), abrogated by Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327, 387 P.3d 1256. Cocio established that the statute applies "if 1) probable cause exists to believe the person has violated [the law prohibiting DUI], 2) exigent circumstances are present and, 3) the blood is drawn for medical purposes by medical personnel." Id. And in Nissley , the supreme court recently added a fourth requirement that "the provision of medical services did not violate the suspect's right to direct his or her own medical treatment." 241 Ariz. at 330, 333, ¶¶ 10, 24, 387 P.3d at 1259, 1262. ¶ 10 The third and fourth Cocio and Nissley requirements establish that the Fourth Amendment analysis begins post-draw because the draw itself is the result of medical activities, not state action. The first and second Cocio and Nissley requirements, by contrast, define the substantive standard for a warrantless seizure of the already-drawn sample: probable cause plus exigency. That standard is identical to the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See McNeely , 569 U.S. at 148-49, 133 S.Ct. 1552 ; State v. Wilson , 237 Ariz. 296, 298, ¶¶ 9-10, 350 P.3d 800, 802 (2015). Accordingly, the medical-draw exception is, by virtue of the supreme court's recognition of an exigency requirement, simply an application of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 11 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court made clear in McNeely that the natural evanescence of alcohol in the bloodstream does not establish a per se exigency. 569 U.S. at 148-54, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (clarifying rule and describing consistency with Schmerber ); see also State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506, 512, ¶¶ 25-28, 389 P.3d 1251, 1257 (2017) (discussing McNeely and Schmerber ). Additional facts showing an imminent risk that the evidence will be destroyed are necessary. McNeely , 569 U.S. at 148-54, 133 S.Ct. 1552. When the Fourth Amendment analysis begins post-draw, it is difficult to imagine such additional facts. For a legally cognizable exigency to exist, an existing blood sample would have to be at imminent risk of destruction or degradation. That might be the case if, for example, the facility housing the sample were on fire or the custodian was about to immediately dispose of or alter the sample. But in the absence of such improbable circumstances, there is no exigency. As a practical matter, our supreme court's recognition of the constitutional exigency requirement as a necessary element of the statutory medical-draw exception renders the statute toothless. ¶ 12 We note that nothing prevents the state from requesting that medical personnel preserve already-drawn blood in a form that will permit subsequent testing. But the fact that the blood can be preserved in that manner highlights why the warrant requirement is a practical means of obtaining blood samples that have been legitimately secured by medical personnel for medical purposes. ¶ 13 Here, the state acknowledges that "the record does not demonstrate exigency for the officer's warrantless taking" of blood that "had already been drawn and preserved in vacutainers by medical personnel." The state contends, however, that Diaz's medical state created an exigency because he could have been treated with blood-content-altering medication, or he could have been rendered unavailable by surgery. The state thus argues that "where exigent circumstances would have permitted the officer to direct [a new/second] blood draw without a warrant, allowing the officer to seize a portion of blood from an already-drawn medical sample[ ] only serves to minimize the intrusion to the defendant by eliminating a second invasion of his veins." ¶ 14 The state's argument is unpersuasive because there would be no need for a second blood draw absent a risk that the already-drawn sample would not be available to the state after obtaining a warrant. And if there were such a risk, that risk would presumably constitute an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless seizure of the already-drawn blood sample. Either way, there would be no need to "minimize the intrusion to the defendant" by eliminating a second blood draw. ¶ 15 Finally, we note that under the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement, "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 232, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). We acknowledge that in Cocio , the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted Schmerber as recognizing exigency based on bloodstream evanescence alone. 147 Ariz. at 286, 709 P.2d at 1345. Cocio is arguably distinguishable from this case, however, because in Cocio , law enforcement officers requested (before the medical draw) that hospital personnel procure a sample for law enforcement purposes, id. at 285, 709 P.2d at 1344, whereas in this case, law enforcement officers did not request or seek a sample until after the blood had been drawn and evanescence was presumably no longer a concern. Nevertheless, we need not address that issue, because Cocio is not controlling in light of the United States Supreme Court's 2013 ruling in McNeely , which clarified that Schmerber does not stand for the proposition that exigency may be based on bloodstream evanescence alone. 569 U.S. at 148-54, 133 S.Ct. 1552. ¶ 16 After McNeely , therefore, Cocio could not reasonably be understood to permit a per se exigency standard in medical-draw cases. See Nissley , 241 Ariz. at 330-31, ¶¶ 11-12, 387 P.3d at 1259-60 (recognizing invalidity of Cocio 's definition of medical-draw exigency post- McNeely ); cf. State v. Reyes , 238 Ariz. 575, 578-79, ¶ 19, 364 P.3d 1134, 1137-38 (App. 2015) (recognizing widespread application of Cocio 's exigency standard in medical-draw cases as late as 2012). In view of the clear state of the law at the time of the seizure in this case (in 2016) and the state's failure to put forth any evidence or argument that the police officer's actions were not deliberate, we hold that application of the exclusionary rule is warranted. See Davis , 564 U.S. at 240, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (discussing propriety of exclusion when constitutional violation is deliberate and culpable); Havatone , 241 Ariz. at 511-14, ¶¶ 21-34, 389 P.3d at 1255-58 (declining, in view of Schmerber , to apply good-faith exception with respect to systemic misapplication of per se exigency standard to Arizona's implied-consent statute); cf. State v. Jean , 243 Ariz. 331, 342-45, ¶¶ 40-47, 407 P.3d 524, 535-38 (2018) (applying good-faith exception based on conclusion that police acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding case law). ¶ 17 Because the state did not obtain a warrant to seize Diaz's blood sample, and because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the seizure, the test results from the improperly-seized sample must be suppressed. CONCLUSION ¶ 18 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief. The improperly-obtained blood evidence must be suppressed. We assume for purposes of our analysis that probable cause existed to believe that Diaz had committed DUI. The state did not raise the good-faith exception in the superior court proceedings or in its response to Diaz's petition for special action. We suasponte ordered the parties to address the good-faith exception at oral argument. We raised the issue because we are required to consider whether there are any legally correct grounds for the superior court's decision. See State v. Boteo-Flores , 230 Ariz. 551, 553, ¶ 7, 288 P.3d 111, 113 (App. 2012). Citing Cocio , which held that "[o]nce physical evidence has been validly seized, it may be tested," 147 Ariz. at 287, 709 P.2d at 1346, the state also argues that Diaz has no privacy interest in the alcohol content of his "lawfully seized" blood. We need not decide that issue, because no search can be lawful if the material in which the search is conducted was obtained by an unlawful seizure. The issue here is whether the state lawfully seized the blood sample in the first place. We note that, if medical personnel retained any additional blood samples from Diaz, nothing prevents the state from seeking a warrant to conduct testing on those samples.

PER CURIAM: ¶ 1 In this opinion, we explain the reasons for our prior order disqualifying the Invest in Education Act initiative from the November 2018 general election ballot. We greatly respect the initiative process, including the civic activism required to collect the signatures necessary to qualify a ballot measure, and we do not lightly disturb the fruits of such efforts. However, we must do so, as the Court has done in various prior circumstances, when essential requirements necessary to qualify a measure are not adequately followed. We hold here that the initiative's proponents did not comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 19-102(A) because their description of the initiative's principal provisions omitted material provisions and created a significant danger of confusion or unfairness to those who signed petitions to place the measure on the ballot. I. ¶ 2 On April 30, 2018, the Invest in Education Committee ("Committee") filed with the Secretary of State a proposed initiative called the "Invest in Education Act," which would increase K-12 education funding and raise certain income tax rates to support it. As required by § 19-102(A), the Committee prepared a 100-word initiative description for placement on the petitions to qualify the measure for the ballot. The description provided: The Invest in Education Act increases the classroom site fund by raising the income tax rate by 3.46% on individual incomes over a quarter million dollars (or household incomes over half a million dollars), and by 4.46% on individual incomes over half a million dollars (or household incomes over a million dollars); designates 60% of new funds for teacher salaries and 40% for operations; adds full day kindergarten and pay raises for student support services personnel as permitted fund uses; requires governing boards seek teacher and personnel input on fund use plans; defines teacher and student support services personnel. ¶ 3 The petitions also contained the following language required by § 19-102(A) : Notice: This is only a description of the proposed measure (or constitutional amendment) prepared by the sponsor of the measure. It may not include every provision contained in the measure. Before signing, make sure the title and text of the measure are attached. You have the right to read or examine the title and text before signing. ¶ 4 On July 5, the Committee submitted approximately 270,000 signatures to the Secretary of State in support of the initiative. Although the Secretary invalidated some petition sheets, she determined that the Committee filed a sufficient number of valid signatures to qualify the initiative for the ballot. ¶ 5 Petitioners Jaime Molera and Jennifer Henricks ("Petitioners") filed a special action in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking to invalidate the initiative because (1) the 100-word initiative description was misleading in that it mischaracterized the size of the proposed tax increase and omitted a change in income tax indexing; and (2) although § 19-102(D) requires a circulator to check a box on petition sheets to indicate whether he or she is paid, a third party pre-marked the boxes on most petition sheets. The Committee filed a cross-complaint challenging the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 19-102.01(A), which requires strict compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements for statewide initiatives. The Committee also sought to restore some of the petition sheets invalidated by the Secretary of State. ¶ 6 The superior court ruled that § 19-102.01 is unconstitutional, that both the 100-word description and the pre-checked circulator boxes satisfied statutory requirements, and that the Secretary of State erroneously excluded some petition sheets. The court thus concluded that the initiative was eligible for the ballot. ¶ 7 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-122(C), Petitioners filed an expedited appeal in this Court contesting all but the last of those rulings. Following our review, we issued an order determining that the 100-word initiative description created a significant danger of confusion or unfairness, thus invalidating the petition. As a result, we do not decide the other issues raised in the appeal. We set forth the reasoning for our conclusion below. ¶ 8 The only issue before us involves interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions regarding initiatives, which we review de novo. See Pedersen v. Bennett , 230 Ariz. 556, 558 ¶ 6, 288 P.3d 760, 762 (2012). We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. II. ¶ 9 The Arizona Constitution reserves to this state's citizens the power to propose and enact laws by initiative. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1)-(2). Under our constitutional separation of powers, the courts must not intrude upon the people's power to legislate, subject to constitutional and proper statutory requirements. See Kromko v. Superior Court , 168 Ariz. 51, 57-58, 811 P.2d 12, 18-19 (1991). This Court has observed that the citizens' legislative authority "is as great as the power of the Legislature to legislate." State ex rel. Bullard v. Osborn , 16 Ariz. 247, 250, 143 P. 117 (1914) ; accord Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey , 233 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 8, 308 P.3d 1152, 1155 (2013). Indeed, with the enactment through initiative of the Voter Protection Act, legislation enacted by the voters is even more consequential, such that the legislature cannot repeal an initiative-enacted law and may only modify it by a three-fourths vote when the changes further the law's purposes. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (6)(C); see, e.g. , State v. Maestas , 244 Ariz. 9, 13-14 ¶¶ 19-20, 417 P.3d 774, 778-79 (2018) (striking down legislation restricting the possession of marijuana on college campuses because it did not further the purposes of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act); Cave Creek , 233 Ariz. at 4, 7-8 ¶¶ 9, 25, 308 P.3d at 1155, 1158-59 (concluding that legislative adjustments to voter-approved funding scheme for public education violated the Voter Protection Act). ¶ 10 Just as the legislature must comply with restrictions on its lawmaking powers, see, e.g. , Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (prohibiting the legislature from enacting local or special laws); Ariz. Const. art. 21, § 1 (requiring the legislature to refer constitutional amendments to voters separately), so too must the people comply with appropriate regulation of the initiative process. Article 4, part 1, section 1(14) of the Arizona Constitution provides that the initiative power "shall not be construed to deprive the legislature of the right to enact any measure except that the legislature shall not have the power to adopt any measure that supersedes" an enacted initiative. Further, article 7, section 12 directs the legislature to enact "registration and other laws to secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise." ¶ 11 Thus, although our decisions safeguard the voters' legislative power, this Court in many cases has invalidated citizen initiatives and referenda that did not comply with applicable requirements. See, e.g. , Transp. Infrastructure Moving Ariz.'s Econ. v. Brewer , 219 Ariz. 207, 211-14 ¶¶ 17-36, 196 P.3d 229, 233-36 (2008) (upholding dismissal of challenge to Secretary of State's invalidation of ballot measure signatures as time-barred by statute); Taxpayer Prot. All. v. Arizonans Against Unfair Tax Schemes , 199 Ariz. 180, 181-82 ¶¶ 1-8, 16 P.3d 207, 208-209 (2001) (invalidating initiative for violation of constitutional single-subject rule); McDowell Mountain Ranch Land Coal. v. Vizcaino , 190 Ariz. 1, 3-5, 945 P.2d 312, 314-16 (1997) (disqualifying petition signatures gathered by referendum circulators who were not qualified electors); Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County , 170 Ariz. 380, 382-84, 825 P.2d 1, 3-5 (1992) (holding referendum would not appear on ballot for failure to comply with signature requirement); W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale , 168 Ariz. 426, 428-32, 814 P.2d 767, 769-773 (1991) (determining referendum petitions were invalid because they did not contain required circulators' statements); Saggio v. Connelly , 147 Ariz. 240, 241-42, 709 P.2d 874, 875-76 (1985) (holding initiative invalid for failing to propose a law or ordinance); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc. , 134 Ariz. 46, 48-50, 653 P.2d 694, 696-98 (1982) (invalidating referendum petitions that did not attach resolution); Direct Sellers Ass'n v. McBrayer , 109 Ariz. 3, 5-6, 503 P.2d 951, 953-54 (1972) (holding referendum petitions invalid where amendments were not made within time limits); Kerby v. Griffin , 48 Ariz. 434, 446-56, 62 P.2d 1131, 1143-53 (1936) (holding that initiative failed to comply with publication requirement). ¶ 12 Challengers are also required to conform to statutory requirements. Two years ago, for example, in the context of an initiative that proposed raising the state's minimum wage, the trial court found the measure lacked sufficient valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. We vacated the judgment, reasoning that the opponents failed to meet the statutory deadline to file the challenge, thus allowing the initiative to proceed. Hitzeman v. Reagan , No. CV-16-0204-AP/EL, slip op. at 1-2 (Ariz. Aug. 30, 2016) (decision order). We explain below how the proponents here failed to meet the statutory requirements to qualify this measure for the ballot. III. ¶ 13 The statutory provision pertinent to our analysis is § 19-102(A), which requires an initiative's sponsors to provide on the petition "a description of no more than one hundred words of the principal provisions of the proposed measure or constitutional amendment." The description need not be impartial. See Save Our Vote, Opposing C-03-2012 v. Bennett , 231 Ariz. 145, 152 ¶ 28, 291 P.3d 342, 349 (2013). Nor must the description detail every provision, as the statutorily required disclaimer acknowledges. § 19-102(A). However, the description will require us to invalidate the petition if "it is fraudulent or creates a significant danger of confusion or unfairness." Save Our Vote , 231 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 26, 291 P.3d at 349 (citation omitted). ¶ 14 Petitioners assert that the description of the proposed Invest in Education Act violates the applicable requirements in two ways. First, it fails to mention that the measure modifies the inflation indexing of income tax rates that was adopted in 2015, thus exposing most taxpayers to tax increases. Currently, tax brackets and rates are set by A.R.S. § 43-1011(A)(5). The income dollar amounts for each tax bracket are indexed for inflation by § 43-1011(C). In other words, the tax brackets are adjusted by the rate of inflation so that as incomes rise, they are not subject to higher rates of taxation simply because of inflation. The proposed initiative replaces those brackets with new tax rates and brackets in § 43-1011(A)(6), restoring the pre-indexed brackets for individual taxpayers making less than $250,000 and for married taxpayers filing jointly making less than $500,000, and adding new brackets for taxpayers earning more than $250,000. The proposed initiative makes subsection (A)(6) "[s]ubject to" subsection C, the indexing provision, but that provision applies only to the old tax brackets set forth in § 43-1011(A)(5). By restoring the old pre-indexing tax brackets, Petitioners argue, the initiative would reverse indexing back to 2015 and place taxpayers in higher tax brackets; and by failing to apply the indexing provision to the new tax brackets in § 43-1011(A)(6), the initiative would repeal indexing going forward. This, they assert, would lead to higher taxes for most taxpayers, not just those earning more than $250,000 as stated in the initiative description. ¶ 15 Petitioners argue that the description's omission is deceptive, or confusing at best, in that petition signers were led to believe that only very wealthy taxpayers' rates would be increased. The Committee responds, and the Chief Justice's dissent asserts, that the initiative does not affect indexing as the new proposed tax rates and brackets in § 43-1011(A)(6) are "[s]ubject to" the indexing provision of § 43-1011(C). If the measure does change indexing, the Committee asserts, it does so inadvertently, not intentionally. ¶ 16 Second, Petitioners argue that the description of the funding source-"raising the income tax rate by 3.46% ... and by 4.46%" on specified taxpayers-is misleading and confusing in that it suggests a modest tax increase. In reality, Petitioners assert, the measure would raise the applicable rates by seventy-six percent and ninety-eight percent, respectively. The Committee responds that the description is accurate, and that any confusion could be alleviated by reading the initiative text, as the notice on the petition provides. ¶ 17 We address these two issues in turn. A. ¶ 18 The dispute over income tax indexing did not arise in the first instance in this lawsuit. Rather, it arose in the context of an analysis by the Legislative Council, whose nonpartisan staff reviews proposed bills for legislators of both parties. Although the Legislative Council opinion is not binding, had the challengers here sought such an analysis, the question might never have become a judicial one and the measure might well be before the voters. ¶ 19 Apparently recognizing the hazards inherent in initiative drafting, the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 19-111.01, which provides that upon filing an application for an initiative petition and a statement of organization, a political committee may submit a copy of the proposed text of the measure to the Legislative Council. Within thirty days, the Legislative Council staff must review the measure, limiting its consideration (as relevant here) to "errors in the drafting of the measure" and "confusing, conflicting or inconsistent provisions within the measure." § 19-111.01(B). The initiative's proponents may then "accept, modify or reject any recommendations made by the legislative council staff regarding the text of the measure solely in [their] discretion." § 19-111.01(C). In other words, if the proponents had requested an analysis as soon as the application was filed, they would have received an analysis within thirty days, well in advance of the filing deadline, and they could either have modified the text or description or taken the risk of having it invalidated. But the Committee failed to seek the Legislative Council's review. ¶ 20 The measure's opponents, in contrast, did avail themselves of this process while petitions were circulating. On June 20, Legislative Council staff issued its analysis, noting that it is "similar to the review that our office would conduct for a legislator on any draft of proposed legislation in that it identifies potential issues." The analysis noted multiple concerns, including the measure's effect on income tax indexing. Specifically, it explained that the measure would create new income tax brackets in § 43-1011(A)(6) and that the paragraph is subject to § 43-1011(C). However, the analysis concluded that the reference to subsection C is "meaningless" because subsection C "require[s] inflation adjustments only to the tax brackets prescribed in A.R.S. section 43-1011, subsection A, paragraph 5." Because subsection C "do[es] not apply to the new A.R.S. section 43-1011, subsection A, paragraph 6 ... the prefatory language does nothing." The analysis went on to observe that "[i]t might be that the drafters of the initiative intended that the dollar amounts in the new tax brackets be adjusted for inflation. The language of the initiative does not accomplish this purpose, however." ¶ 21 The Legislative Council staff was not alone in this analysis. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-123(E), the Joint Legislative Budget Committee ("JLBC") staff is required to prepare a fiscal-impact summary for voter-initiated ballot measures. The JLBC concluded the initiative "reinstates the individual income tax brackets for incomes up to $250,000 in effect in 2014." In its accompanying analysis, the JLBC staff explained that as a result, "most taxpayers would have a small portion of their income taxed in a higher bracket, resulting in a small increase on most taxpayers." By way of illustration, as a result of indexing, married taxpayers filing jointly and earning $108,617 in 2019 would have the same tax rates as married taxpayers filing jointly and earning $100,000 in 2014, according to the JLBC. But because the initiative would restore the brackets to 2014 levels, such taxpayers would be subject to a higher tax rate on the amount earned above $100,000. Eliminating indexing would affect tax rates at all income levels. And because indexing would not apply at all to the new brackets in § 43-1011(A)(6), the relatively modest initial tax impact would expand over time, resulting in a tax increase to most taxpayers. ¶ 22 We agree with Petitioners and the Legislative Council that the initiative's "subject to" language, even if intended to do so, does not preserve tax indexing. Section 43-1011(C) provides indexing "for each rate bracket prescribed by subsection A, paragraph 5." The proposed new subsection (A)(6) establishes new tax brackets after 2018, supplanting the tax brackets in subsection (A)(5). In other words, the "subject to" language circles us back to a subsection that is no longer operational. Even were we to credit intent rather than text, the new subsection (A)(6) establishes tax brackets "for taxable years beginning from and after December 31, 2018." Those brackets, on their face, erase the effects of indexing since 2015. And because both the "subject to" and indexing provision relate only to the tax rates in subsection (A)(5), which would no longer be active, the result is that the new tax brackets would not be indexed going forward. ¶ 23 That conclusion requires us to determine whether the indexing changes are "principal" provisions whose omission from the initiative description must disqualify the measure from the ballot. We conclude they are. ¶ 24 Because the statute does not define "principal provisions," we apply the term's common meaning. In Sklar v. Town of Fountain Hills , the court of appeals disqualified a citizen referendum because, as here, the petition failed to adequately describe the measure's principal provisions. 220 Ariz. 449, 453-55 ¶¶ 12-22, 207 P.3d 702, 706-08 (App. 2008). The court consulted dictionaries to determine the meaning of "principal" and found that the plain meaning includes "most important, consequential, or influential," "chief," and "a matter or thing of primary importance." Id. at 453 ¶ 13, 207 P.3d at 706 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ¶ 25 The change in indexing is a primary, consequential provision because it imposes tax increases on most Arizona taxpayers rather than only the state's wealthiest taxpayers, as the description clearly suggests. Indeed, identifying the source of new revenue was so significant to the initiative proponents that it is set forth in some detail in the opening part of the description. A description indicating that other people's taxes will be raised, but not the taxes of most of those signing the petition, creates a significant risk of confusion or unfairness and could certainly materially impact whether a person would sign the petition. Thus, the failure to disclose the measure's impact on tax indexing constitutes the omission of a principal provision that renders the initiative invalid. ¶ 26 The Chief Justice's dissent observes that the Committee disputes this reading of the measure's effects on income tax indexing, contending that we should extend the "subject to" language to the new tax brackets in subsection (A)(6) to avoid those effects, and that the proper place to resolve this dispute is at the ballot box rather than the courtroom. See infra ¶ 43. Although we try to give effect to all of a statute's words in order to resolve ambiguity, in this instance doing so would require us not merely to construe those words but to rewrite the proposed statute. That invitation must be rejected on separation-of-powers grounds. Just as we cannot rewrite statutes to smooth their rough edges, see, e.g. , City of Phoenix v. Butler , 110 Ariz. 160, 162, 515 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1973), so may we not rewrite proposed initiatives to arrest unintended consequences. We note that the measure's drafters could have corrected the errors themselves had they availed themselves of the Legislative Council's expertise. Their failure to do so does not empower us to do so now. Moreover, rewriting the proposed statute to preserve income tax indexing would necessarily substantially decrease the amount of revenue that the measure would generate. We cannot substitute our judgment on such a consequential matter for the plain words chosen by the measure's drafters. ¶ 27 Relatedly, Justice Timmer asserts in dissent that § 19-102(A) only requires the petition description to describe "known " principal provisions and not unintended consequences, so that the measure should proceed to the ballot. See infra ¶ 51. We hold § 19-102(A) requires an objective standard for evaluating the description of the actual provisions rather than crediting the drafters' subjective intent. Section 19-102(A) does not qualify "principal provisions" with either "known" or "intended." The purpose of the petition description is to inform prospective signers of the measure's principal provisions so they may determine whether to endorse it for the ballot. This Court has long held that the proper remedy for failure to satisfy statutory prerequisites is to enjoin the measure from appearing on the ballot. See, e.g. , Kerby , 48 Ariz. at 445, 62 P.2d 1131 ; cf. City & County of Honolulu v. State of Hawai'i , No. SCPW-18-0000733, slip op. at 1-2, 2018 WL 5117002 (Haw. Oct. 19, 2018) (order) (removing education funding measure from the ballot because it did not satisfy statutory requirement that the language must be "clear [and] neither misleading nor deceptive"). Our failure to determine whether the description omits a principal provision before the measure appears on the ballot would reward sloppy or even deceptive drafting, and would render the statutory transparency requirement meaningless because it would allow a measure to proceed even if voters signing the petition were not made aware of principal provisions. ¶ 28 Moreover, recourse here to the measure's text to correct any uncertainty is unavailing because that text is the source of the problem. Because the omission of the principal provision violates § 19-102(A) and creates a substantial danger of confusion or unfairness, the proper remedy is removal from the ballot. See Sklar , 220 Ariz. at 455 ¶ 22, 207 P.3d at 708. Indeed, were the measure to proceed and win voter approval, the legislature's authority to restore income tax indexing, as the proponents insist they intended, would be greatly circumscribed by the Voter Protection Act, so that a substantive fix might well require a second initiative. All of that underscores the important purposes served by the statutory requirement to describe an initiative's principal provisions in the petition. B. ¶ 29 The petition's description of the magnitude of the tax increase on wealthy taxpayers also "creates a significant danger of confusion." Save Our Vote , 231 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 26, 291 P.3d at 349. The petition description stated that the measure would increase taxes on wealthy Arizonans by 3.46% and 4.46%, which on its face seems modest. However, the affected tax rates would actually increase by seventy-six percent and ninety-eight percent, respectively. This difference is so significant that it could materially affect whether a person would sign the petition, as it is one thing to increase someone's taxes by between three and four percent and another to nearly double them. Indeed, as the JLBC observed, the changes would make Arizona's top tax rates the fifth highest in the country. ¶ 30 Given the description's required brevity, the initiative sponsors need not have described this change in great detail, but they may not describe it in a confusing way. Had they simply changed the wording, saying that the rates applicable to the two high-income categories would be increased by 3.46 and 4.46 percentage points, the description would have been much clearer. Indeed, the Chief Justice's dissent acknowledges that this wording "could have resolved the ambiguity." See infra ¶ 40. Instead, by choosing to describe the increase in percentage terms, the initiative proponents made it appear more likely that the magnitude of the increase was slight rather than substantial. Applying basic mathematics principles, "[i]f a quantity is increased by a percentage, then that percentage of the quantity is added to the original." Vassilis C. Mavron & Timothy N. Phillips, Elements of Mathematics for Economics and Finance 11 (2007). Thus, increasing the prior rate "by 3.46 percent" would change it only from 4.54% to 4.7%, and "by 4.46 percent" from 4.54% to 4.74%-quite a difference from the actual new rates of eight percent and nine percent in the initiative. ¶ 31 At best, the two possible interpretations of the "by [x] percent" language yield a significant danger of confusion. The Chief Justice's dissent characterizes the wording as ambiguous rather than confusing. See infra ¶ 40. Ambiguity is the root of confusion. Where the description lends itself to two sharply divergent interpretations with very different and significant ramifications, the danger of confusion is sufficiently great that it undermines any assurance that the voters received adequate notice of what they were signing. ¶ 32 The Chief Justice's dissent further asserts that voters who were confused could read the actual language of the text to clear up the ambiguity. See infra ¶ 41. But the description itself must be adequate in its description of the principal provisions to avoid confusion. The obvious purpose of § 19-102(A)"is to ensure that the public has immediate and full disclosure" of the initiative's principal provisions. Sklar , 220 Ariz. at 454 ¶ 17, 207 P.3d at 707. The description need not encompass minor provisions and may be presented in a biased manner, but it may not create a substantial danger of confusion or unfairness. To hold that such a confusing description is permissible because the truth may be discovered in the many pages of the initiative, or that the proponents actually intended something different from what the words they chose to use indicate, is to eviscerate the description requirement and its important purposes of transparency, fairness, and disclosure. IV. ¶ 33 The omission of the change in tax indexing paired with the confusing language about the magnitude of tax increases makes it clear that petition signers were not adequately informed about what they were signing, as the requisite description failed to provide adequate notice of the measure's principal provisions as required by § 19-102(A). ¶ 34 Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's decision. BALES, C.J., joined by TIMMER, J., dissenting. ¶ 35 I agree with the majority that better drafting of the 100-word description and Proposition 207 itself could have avoided the issues addressed in today's opinion. But we have never required perfection in drafting as a condition for the valid exercise of legislative authority, and doing so with initiatives would infringe upon the people's constitutional right to enact laws independently of the legislature. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1). Because I do not believe that the 100-word description presents a substantial danger of fraud, confusion, or unfairness sufficient to invalidate the initiative petitions, I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' decision to strike Proposition 207 from the ballot. ¶ 36 The description for Proposition 207 states: The Invest in Education Act increases the classroom site fund by raising the income tax rate by 3.46% on individual incomes over a quarter million dollars (or household incomes over half a million dollars), and by 4.46% on individual incomes over half a million dollars (or household incomes over a million dollars); designates 60% of new funds for teacher salaries and 40% for operations; adds full day kindergarten and pay raises for student support services personnel as permitted fund uses; requires governing boards seek teacher and personnel input on fund use plans; defines teacher and student support services personnel. ¶ 37 As required by A.R.S. § 19-102, the description appeared on the petition signature sheets along with this disclaimer: Notice: This is only a description of the proposed measure (or constitutional amendment) prepared by the sponsor of the measure. It may not include every provision contained in the measure. Before signing, make sure the title and text of the measure are attached. You have the right to read or examine the title and text before signing. ¶ 38 The majority accepts the challengers' arguments that the description poses a danger of confusion or unfairness by its "description of the change in the tax rate combined with the omission of any discussion of changes in indexing for inflation." ¶ 39 If passed, Proposition 207 would have increased the tax rate from 4.54% to 8.00% on individual incomes from $250,001 to $500,000 and from 4.54% to 9.00% for individual incomes over $500,000 (with corresponding increases for joint filers). Thus, two new tax brackets would have been created. The tax rates for amounts up to $250,000 would remain the same regardless of a person's total income. The proposed new tax rates are "marginal tax rates" in that they only apply to amounts of income in excess of the first $250,000. ¶ 40 The issue regarding the tax rate reflects that changes in percentage rates can refer to either absolute or relative changes. For example, if a percentage rate increases from 6% to 8%, the difference in absolute terms is 2%. The relative change, in contrast, is an increase of 33% (8% minus 6%, divided by 6%). In this respect, the 100-word description is not inaccurate but ambiguous. In terms of absolute change, the Proposition would-as the description stated-raise the tax rates by 3.46% (8/100 - 4.54/100 = 3.46/100 = 3.46%) and 4.46%. But in terms of relative change, as the majority correctly notes, the increase in the marginal rates would be approximately 76% (3.46/4.54) and 98% (4.46/4.54). To avoid ambiguity in describing changes in percentage rates, the commonly accepted convention is to use the term "percentage points" to refer to absolute changes. For example, here the 100-word description could have resolved the ambiguity by saying that Proposition 207 would raise the income tax rate by 3.46 percentage points instead of "by 3.46%." But this does not mean that the description, as worded, created a substantial danger of confusion or unfairness. See Save Our Vote, Opposing C-03-2012 v. Bennett, 231 Ariz. 145, 152 ¶ 27, 291 P.3d 342, 349 (2013). ¶ 41 In assessing the adequacy of a 100-word description, this Court considers not only the description itself, but also the fact that it is accompanied by a notice stating it is only a description prepared by the sponsor and alerting petition signers to their right to review the attached initiative's title and text before signing. See id. ; Wilhelm v. Brewer , 219 Ariz. 45, 48-49 ¶¶ 13-15, 192 P.3d 404, 407-08 (2008). The description clearly states that Proposition 207 would increase the tax rates on individual incomes greater than $250,000 (or twice that amount for joint filers). If-as the majority supposes-a prospective signer was confused about the exact quantitative change, the accompanying text clearly reflects in section 3 that Proposition 207 would add two new income tax brackets to A.R.S. § 43-1011 that would increase the marginal tax rates from 4.54% to 8% for individuals earning $250,001 to $500,000 and 9% for those earning more than $500,000 (or joint filers earning twice those amounts). Notably, even if the description had used the phrase "percentage points" instead of saying that the rates would be raised by 3.46% and 4.46%, a signer still would have had to refer to the text itself to identify the resulting tax rates. Although the majority is concerned that the description understated the proposed tax increases, the description also arguably overstated them by not explaining they were increases in only marginal rates rather than rates applicable to total income. ¶ 42 Nor is the 100-word description flawed for omitting any discussion of changes in the indexing of taxes for inflation. The 100-word description is not a complete description-it need only describe the principal provisions of a measure. A.R.S. § 19-102. See also Save Our Vote, 231 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 27, 291 P.3d at 349. Because Proposition 207 does not purport to eliminate inflation indexing, it is not surprising that the description does not discuss this matter. Even if the Proposition were ambiguous in its possible effects on indexing, that would not provide grounds for striking the measure from the ballot, but instead would properly be a subject of debate between proponents and opponents in their seeking to persuade the voters. Cf. Winkle v. City of Tucson , 190 Ariz. 413, 418, 949 P.2d 502, 507 (1997) ("... this court should not create an impediment to the exercise of one of our state government's bedrock institutions ... In a democracy, the process itself is often as valuable as the result."). For example, had the measure appeared on the ballot, the Secretary of State's Publicity Pamphlet for the 2018 Election would have included a fiscal impact summary prepared by the JLBC discussing the effects of eliminating indexing-an effect disputed by the proponents of Proposition 207. ¶ 43 The proponents of Proposition 207 disclaim any intent to affect inflation-based tax indexing. Rather than resolve the interpretative issue now (which, after all, concerns the effect of a proposed rather than enacted law), we should instead allow the voters to consider the competing arguments about inflationary indexing in deciding how to cast their votes. But if we must decide the issue, the proponents' reading of Proposition 207 is the one better supported by the measure's text. Currently, A.R.S. § 43-1011(A)(5) identifies five income tax brackets for taxable years beginning after December 1, 2006, "subject to subsections B and C" of § 43-1011. Subsections B and C in turn provide for the indexing of the brackets identified in subsection (A)(5). Proposition 207 would not repeal subsections (A)(5), (B), or (C). Instead, it would add a new (A)(6) for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2018 that restates the five (A)(5) brackets for incomes up to $250,000 and adds two new brackets for individual incomes exceeding $250,000 and $500,000 (or twice those amounts for joint filers). The new (A)(6), like (A)(5), is expressly subject to subsections (B) and (C) of § 43-1011 -the subsections that provide for inflation-based indexing. ¶ 44 On its face, Proposition 207 would not repeal the indexing of the tax brackets for incomes of $250,000 or less. The measure leaves in place the existing brackets for those income levels and it expressly states that it is subject to the subsections providing for indexing. While subsections (B) and (C) refer to indexing the brackets identified in (A)(5), those same brackets are echoed in proposed (A)(6). The only way to conclude that (A)(6) eliminates indexing is to assume that its reference to subsections (B) and (C) is meaningless and that it implicitly repeals rather than coexists with (A)(5) for tax years after 2018. Our usual approach, however, is to interpret statutes to harmonize and give effect to all their provisions. See David C. v. Alexis S. , 240 Ariz. 53, 55 ¶ 9, 375 P.3d 945, 947 (2016). And even if Proposition 207 would eliminate indexing for the new brackets for incomes over $250,000 and $500,000, such a change could hardly be called a "principal provision" of the measure that needed to be described in the description. Cf. Save Our Vote , 231 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 27, 291 P.3d at 349 (noting that A.R.S. § 19-102(A)"requires only a description of the principal provisions, not a complete description"). ¶ 45 Finally, if the majority were correct that Proposition 207 would eliminate tax indexing for all brackets, JLBC's analysis shows that the change would result in only a "small increase" in taxes for most taxpayers. For instance, JLBC estimated that a married couple with a taxable income of $101,000 would pay approximately $34 more in income tax due to this change, and that tax filers with adjusted gross incomes ranging from $0 to $200,000 (nearly 90% of all tax filers) would on average pay only $12 more annually. None of the additional revenues from eliminating indexing on the lower tax brackets would be dedicated to the Classroom Site Fund by Proposition 207. That Proposition 207 conceivably could result in "small increases" in taxes going to the general fund hardly makes that prospect a "principal provision" of a ballot measure aimed at increasing school funding by raising the marginal tax rates for higher income earners. ¶ 46 At bottom, the majority concludes that Arizona's voters should not be allowed to consider a legislative proposal supported by hundreds of thousands of petition-signers because the description used the % symbol instead of the words "percentage points" and the measure did not add "or 6" to A.R.S. § 43-1011(C). Even if one agrees with that analysis, it should give one pause that the conclusion only comes after untold hours of volunteer efforts over many months to place the measure on the ballot and then accelerated litigation in the trial court and this Court. The initiative provisions of the constitution are self-executing and do not require legislation to be effective. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1). ¶ 47 Our state could be well served, however, by legislation affording some pre-circulation review of ballot measures and their summaries and a resulting safe-harbor that could avoid measures being struck from the ballot only after their circulation and with substantial support by qualified electors. Cf. A.R.S. § 19-111.01 (allowing for non-binding review and recommendations on ballot measures by legislative council). Although the majority notes that the proponents could, and the challengers did, seek review and comment by the legislative council regarding Proposition 207 under A.R.S. § 19-111.01, that review only came late in the process-about two weeks before the signature filing deadline-and it has no binding effect in terms of a measure's validity. ¶ 48 Because I do not think that Proposition 207's description is fatally flawed, and I would otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment leaving the measure on the ballot, I respectfully dissent.

JUSTICE PELANDER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 Under the Arizona Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), an insurance carrier obtains a lien on a claimant's (or a claimant's dependents') recovery from third persons who negligently injured or killed the claimant to the extent of workers' compensation benefits paid (less reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in securing the recovery). A.R.S. § 23-1023(D). In Aitken v. Industrial Commission , this Court held that the insurance carrier may assert the lien "only to the extent that the compensation benefits paid exceed the [non-party] employer's proportionate share of the total damages fixed by verdict in the [third-party] action." 183 Ariz. 387, 392, 904 P.2d 456, 461 (1995). We today hold that a claimant who settles all of his or her third-party claims is not entitled to a post-settlement trial to determine the percentage of employer fault solely to reduce or extinguish the insurance carrier's lien. I. ¶ 2 Victor Leija died while working as a window washer when he fell from a building after a scaffold collapsed. Victor's widow and children (collectively, "Leijas") claimed workers' compensation benefits through Victor's employer's workers' compensation carrier, Twin City Fire Insurance Company ("Twin City"). Twin City accepted the claim and pays monthly benefits of $1857 to the Leijas. Eventually, the payments will total approximately $575,000. ¶ 3 Exercising their right under the Act to bring a tort claim against any third person who negligently caused Victor's death, see § 23-1023(A), the Leijas filed a negligence action against the City of Glendale, which owned the building from which Victor fell, the building's property manager and maintenance company, and the companies that furnished and fabricated the scaffold. ¶ 4 During settlement negotiations between the Leijas and the third-party defendants, Twin City asserted its right under § 23-1023(D) to fully enforce a lien against all settlement proceeds for the amount of workers' compensation benefits it had paid and would pay in the future. Nevertheless, Twin City offered to reduce its lien by five percent if the Leijas settled all their third-party claims. The Leijas rejected the offer, arguing that Twin City was required to reduce its lien by more than five percent due to the alleged comparative fault of Victor's employer in causing the accident. Although Twin City did not object to any settlement, it never wavered from its position that it was not required to reduce its lien. The Leijas ultimately settled with all the third-party defendants for $1.6 million. ¶ 5 After that settlement, Twin City filed this action against the Leijas to enforce its lien. Consistent with its pre-settlement position, Twin City sought to fully enforce its lien under § 23-1023(D) against all the settlement proceeds to the extent of past and future workers' compensation benefits. The Leijas counterclaimed, arguing, as relevant here, that Twin City breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to reduce its lien to account for Victor's employer's alleged comparative fault. Alternatively, the Leijas requested that the superior court set a trial to establish the employer's proportionate fault and the resulting amount of Twin City's lien. ¶ 6 On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court ruled in Twin City's favor, reasoning that "a separate action after compromise of the third-party claim is not the appropriate vehicle to allocate fault" to a non-party employer. The court further reasoned that, contrary to the Leijas' assertions, a workers' compensation insurance carrier does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to reduce its lien against a claimant's settlement proceeds to account for a non-party employer's alleged comparative fault. ¶ 7 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "when a worker settles a claim against a third party for less than the limits of the third party's insurance, the worker may obtain a judicial determination of whether the carrier's lien should be reduced to account for the employer's comparative fault." Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Leija , 243 Ariz. 175, 177 ¶ 1, 403 P.3d 587, 589 (App. 2017). The court reasoned that "the fact that the Leijas settled their [third-party] claims rather than try them to a verdict does not preclude equitable apportionment under Aitken ." Id. at 181 ¶ 20, 403 P.3d at 593. The court observed that "the settlement with [the City of] Glendale did not touch multiple layers of coverage and the record contains significant evidence of employer fault." Id. ¶ 21. Therefore, the court stated, Twin City's lien should be equitably apportioned because "estimations of [Victor's] employer's comparative fault undoubtedly affected the amount the Leijas were able to recover in settlement." Id. ¶ 19. The court of appeals remanded the case to the superior court to set "a trial to equitably apportion Twin City's lien" and directed that court to "address the specifics of such a proceeding," including "whether damages and the employer's comparative fault should be determined by the court or by a jury." Id. ¶ 23. ¶ 8 Finally, because the court of appeals "ruled that the Leijas have a right to a trial by which Twin City's lien may be apportioned," it found "no need" to reconsider the principle that a workers' compensation carrier does not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing when, "absent a fair adjudication of damages and employer comparative fault," it refuses to compromise or reduce its lien under § 23-1023(D). Id. at 182 ¶ 28, 403 P.3d at 594. ¶ 9 We granted review because this case presents recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ¶ 10 We review legal questions, including statutory issues, de novo. In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels , 244 Ariz. 111, 114 ¶ 11, 418 P.3d 884, 887 (2018). ¶ 11 The Arizona Constitution requires the legislature to "enact a workmen's compensation law" that generally permits a worker to collect compensation when he or she is injured in the course of employment. Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 8. The legislature implemented this constitutional mandate shortly after statehood. Grammatico v. Indus. Comm'n , 211 Ariz. 67, 70 ¶ 13, 117 P.3d 786, 789 (2005). The Act, now codified in A.R.S. §§ 23-901 to -1091, generally provides that every employee is "entitled to receive and shall be paid ... compensation" for the loss sustained due to the employee's injury when the employee's accidental injury or death occurred in the course of the employee's employment. § 23-1021. ¶ 12 An employer who complies with the Act is generally immune from tort liability for an employee's accidental injury or death that occurred in the course of the employee's employment. § 23-906(A); see also § 23-1022(A) (stating that an employee's "right to recover compensation" under the Act is generally "the exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment"); § 23-1024(A) (stating that "[a]n employee ... who accepts compensation waives the right to exercise any option to institute proceedings in court against his employer or any co-employee acting within the scope of his employment"). ¶ 13 Although an employer is generally immune from tort liability when an employee accepts compensation under the Act, the employee may bring a tort claim against a third person when the employee was "injured or killed ... by the negligence or wrong" of the third person. § 23-1023(A). When an employee brings such a third-party claim, the Act vests the employer's insurance carrier with a lien on any recovery (less reasonable and necessary expenses) that the employee collects from the third-party to the extent of the compensation benefits paid by the insurance carrier. § 23-1023(D) ; see also Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 169 Ariz. 505, 511, 821 P.2d 166, 172 (1991) (noting that "the lien provisions in favor of immune employers have been part of the workers' compensation system since 1925"). This case concerns the application of this lien on an employee/claimant's settlement proceeds recovered from third-party defendants. ¶ 14 After the legislature abolished joint and several liability by amending the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1987, we ruled in Dietz that a third-party defendant may name a plaintiff/employee's employer as a non-party at fault under A.R.S. § 12-2506. 169 Ariz. at 510-11, 821 P.2d at 171-172 ; see also § 12-2506(B) (stating that "[i]n assessing percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury ... regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit"); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (requiring notice for claims of non-party fault). ¶ 15 Following Dietz , this Court recognized in Aitken that permitting a third-party defendant to name a plaintiff/employee's employer as a non-party at fault creates an inequity when a trier of fact allocates some percentage of fault to the non-party employer. 183 Ariz. at 390-91, 904 P.2d at 459-60. That is so, we reasoned, because such an allocation forces the plaintiff "to endure the combined effect of first having his or her award reduced by reason of the employer's fault, and thereafter having to satisfy a lien against this diminished recovery in favor of the employer and its carrier to the full extent of compensation benefits provided." Id. at 392, 904 P.2d at 461. ¶ 16 To cure this inequity, Aitken held that "a carrier may assert a lien on a third party recovery only to the extent that the compensation benefits paid exceed the employer's proportionate share of the total damages fixed by verdict in the [underlying] action." Id. ; see also Grijalva v. Ariz. State Comp. Fund , 185 Ariz. 74, 76, 912 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1996) (stating that Aitken 's equitable apportionment rule applied "following a contested third party trial that necessitated a determination of liability and damages, including the apportionment of fault among parties and nonparties as required by law"); Weber v. Tucson Elec. Power Co. , 202 Ariz. 504, 504-05 ¶ 1, 506-07 ¶ 10, 47 P.3d 1142, 1142-43, 1144-45 (App. 2002) (concluding that equitable apportionment applied when a plaintiff/employee brought a tort claim against two third-party defendants, settled with one of them, and prevailed against the other defendant at trial, in which the jury assigned fault to the non-party employer, because the claimant's damages were in fact reduced due to the non-party employer's fault and because the trial was not "a sham or collusive proceeding that resulted in extraneous and irrelevant findings on damages or the apportionment of fault"). ¶ 17 Neither party nor any amicus has urged us to overrule Aitken or otherwise revisit its equitable apportionment rule as applied to contested cases that are tried to a verdict. Notably, in Aitken we explicitly invited the legislature to amend § 23-1023(D) if it disagreed with our interpretation of it. 183 Ariz. at 393, 904 P.2d at 462. Despite that invitation, the legislature has not statutorily abolished or modified the equitable apportionment rule that Aitken embraced, even though the legislature amended an unrelated part of § 23-1023(D) in 2012. 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 240, § 1 (2d Reg. Sess.). Therefore, we assume, without deciding, Aitken 's continued validity and adherence to legislative intent in applying the lien provision. ¶ 18 In contrast to the contested third-party action that was tried to verdict in Aitken , Grijalva involved a plaintiff/employee's "pretrial attempt to settle a third party claim without approval of the compensation carrier," followed by an "apportionment of fault apparently carried out for the sole purpose of impacting the carrier's lien rights." 185 Ariz. at 76, 912 P.2d at 1305. This Court viewed that as an "artful contrivance[ ]" that " Aitken neither requires nor authorizes." Id. at 76-77, 912 P.2d at 1305-06. Indeed, we stated that if a plaintiff/employee "is entitled to receive or has received settlement proceeds" from a third-party defendant, then the insurance carrier "has a lien and/or a future credit against those proceeds." Id. at 77, 912 P.2d at 1306; see also Stout v. State Comp. Fund (Stout I ), 197 Ariz. 238, 240 ¶ 7, 242 ¶ 15, 3 P.3d 1158, 1160, 1162 (App. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff/employee's argument that "the rule of equitable apportionment from Aitken should apply to cases that are resolved by settlement" and concluding that "equitable apportionment does not apply when a third-party action is settled at policy limits and there is no evidence that employer fault affected the offer to settle at policy limits"). ¶ 19 Twin City argues that claimants who settle all their third-party claims "should not be granted post-settlement trials to determine the percentage of employer fault," and insurance carriers should not be forced "to reduce their liens accordingly." It reasons that Aitken and Grijalva impose an equitable apportionment rule only when "two conditions are met: (1) the employer's share of fault was determined by verdict and applied to reduce the claimant's damages; and (2) the verdict was obtained in the third-party action." According to Twin City, "[w]ithout the statutorily required reduction of a claimant's recovery based on the percentage of employer fault apportioned by a jury in the third-party action, there is simply no Aitken -type of inequity to ameliorate." ¶ 20 The Leijas, on the other hand, argue that "[t]here is no justification for failing to offset the lien amount for an employer's fault simply because the parties have, with the [insurance] carrier's consent, settled before trial." Under the Leijas' view, a claimant should not "be penalized twice for the employer's fault, first by having to compromise during settlement negotiations, and second, by having a lien placed on an already reduced settlement for the full amount of compensation benefits, without any consideration of employer fault." ¶ 21 We agree with Twin City. Neither Aitken nor Grijalva authorizes the post-settlement trial process proposed by the court of appeals. Aitken expressly limits application of the equitable apportionment rule to situations where a claimant's total damages are "fixed by verdict" in the third-party action. 183 Ariz. at 392, 904 P.2d at 461. Grijalva likewise expressly recognized and applied that limitation. 185 Ariz. at 76-77, 912 P.2d at 1305-06. In the settlement context, a claimant's proceeds are not "fixed by verdict," Aitken , 183 Ariz. at 392, 904 P.2d at 461, and a settlement between a claimant and a third-party defendant does not "necessitate[ ] a determination of liability and damages, including the apportionment of fault among parties and nonparties," Grijalva , 185 Ariz. at 76, 912 P.2d at 1305. Simply stated, neither the applicable statutes nor our prior decisions authorize a post-settlement trial process. ¶ 22 In addition, there are good reasons to limit application of the equitable apportionment rule to only those cases that are tried to verdict. The inequity we recognized in Aitken will exist in every such case when the jury allocates some percentage of fault to a non-party employer. But that inequity will not exist in every case where a claimant settles with a third-party defendant. It is purely speculative to assume that, based solely on a claimant and a third-party defendant settling at some amount below the defendant's insurance policy limits, the claimant's recovery was reduced by the non-party employer's alleged fault. In short, a third-party defendant's insurance policy limits are not a proxy for employer fault. ¶ 23 Many factors may influence a plaintiff/employee's decision to settle with a third-party defendant and the settlement amount. Indeed, a claimant may settle below a third-party defendant's insurance policy limits for many reasons that have nothing to do with employer fault. For example, the claimant may not have suffered a severe injury, might have difficulty proving fault or causation on the part of the third-party defendant, or might be risk-averse and would prefer a potentially smaller recovery to avoid the risk of trial, including the risk that the jury will apportion a substantial amount of fault to the claimant or the claimant's employer. Cf. id. at 77, 912 P.2d at 1306 (observing that "it is uncertainty about the result that most often leads to settlement"). There is no basis to assume that in every settlement between a claimant and a third-party defendant, the claimant suffered the inequity that Aitken sought to cure. ¶ 24 Notably, an insurance carrier could also be concerned with the risk that a jury will apportion a substantial amount of fault to the claimant or the claimant's employer because that could adversely affect the carrier by reducing the claimant's recovery and, consequently, the value of the carrier's lien. Therefore, a carrier may understandably wish to incentivize the claimant to settle by voluntarily reducing its lien in exchange for a settlement. Cf. Boy v. Fremont Indem. Co. , 154 Ariz. 334, 337, 742 P.2d 835, 838 (App. 1987) ("By compromising its lien to help achieve settlement, the insurer may guarantee at least some recovery for itself."). ¶ 25 Moreover, the post-settlement trial process proposed by the court of appeals would itself create perverse incentives and inequities. Generally, a claimant in a third-party action "has every incentive to maximize the percentage of fault allocated to the third-party defendant" because the claimant wants to receive the highest amount of damages he or she can obtain. Stout v. State Comp. Fund (Stout II ), 202 Ariz. 300, 303 ¶ 11, 44 P.3d 178, 181 (App. 2002). Consequently, the claimant "necessarily has every incentive to minimize the percentage of fault allocated to the employer" because "any fault assigned to the employer will typically reduce that assigned to the third-party defendant." Id. ¶ 26 But a post-settlement trial process would transform this incentive structure. Under the court of appeals' construct, a claimant would try to maximize a third-party defendant's fault (and therefore to minimize the fault attributable to the claimant's employer) so as to maximize the amount of the claimant's settlement. Then, in the post-settlement trial with the insurance carrier, the claimant would be incentivized to take the diametrically opposite position by maximizing the fault attributable to the employer (and therefore minimizing the fault accruing to the settling third-party defendant) solely to reduce or extinguish the insurance carrier's lien on the settlement proceeds. ¶ 27 Even assuming that an insurance carrier's refusal to waive or reduce its lien might be inequitable in some circumstances, it is difficult to understand how the possible gamesmanship created by a post-settlement trial process is more equitable than permitting an insurance carrier to exercise its statutorily authorized lien on a claimant's settlement proceeds to the extent of compensation benefits paid when, for the reasons previously discussed, there may be no inequity at all. Accordingly, we hold that a claimant who settles all his or her third-party claims may not obtain a post-settlement trial to determine the percentage of employer fault solely to reduce or extinguish the insurance carrier's lien. ¶ 28 In so holding, we recognize that even in a settlement context, an insurance carrier has an obligation to act in good faith toward a claimant by giving equal consideration to the claimant's interests. See Stout I , 197 Ariz. at 242 ¶¶ 19-22, 3 P.3d at 1162; cf. Boy , 154 Ariz. at 335, 337, 742 P.2d at 836 (concluding pre- Aitken , that workers' compensation insurer "did not breach its duty to act in good faith when it refused to compromise its lien against any [third-party] recovery," and noting that "[t]he duty of good faith ... merely requires the insurer to give equal consideration to the interests of both parties"). Under these circumstances, as amicus CopperPoint Insurance Company acknowledged at oral argument, good faith might entail a workers' compensation insurer considering and reasonably acting on a claimant's request to reduce the lien on third-party settlement proceeds, particularly when evidence of employer fault is clear, undisputed, and substantial. ¶ 29 The record in this case includes some evidence of employer fault. Perhaps for that reason, Twin City offered to reduce its lien by five percent if the Leijas settled with the third-party defendants. In view of that offer and the Leijas' failure to preserve or argue in this Court any issue relating to their bad faith claim, we have no basis for overturning the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Twin City on that claim. See Stout I , 197 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 22, 3 P.3d at 1163 (stating that because "a carrier's statutory lien has strong protection under the law," "the carrier may reasonably protect its right to recover the lien amount" and is "not required to completely disregard its own interests"). III. ¶ 30 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the superior court's judgment in favor of Twin City as it relates to the enforcement of Twin City's lien and the Leijas' bad faith claim. We vacate paragraphs 9 through 28 of the court of appeals' opinion as well as paragraphs 1 and 33 to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the balance of the court of appeals' opinion. JUSTICE BOLICK, concurring in the result. ¶ 31 I join my colleagues' resolution of this difficult case. However, its difficulty is in large part the byproduct of the decision twenty-three years ago in Aitken that the Court should rewrite rather than apply the statutes governing the issues before us. The Court today chooses not to address whether we exceeded our constitutional powers in doing so, because the parties have not asked us to overrule Aitken . With respect, I disagree. ¶ 32 The notion that we can ignore the constitutional contours of our authority if the parties do not question it brings to mind a story told by the famed journalist Ambrose Bierce more than a century ago. The story essentially goes that a Supreme Court justice was sitting by a river when a traveler approached and asked, "I wish to cross. Will it be lawful to use this boat?" ¶ 33 "It will," the justice replied; "it is my boat." ¶ 34 The traveler thanked him and rowed away. But quickly the boat took on water, forcing the traveler to abandon the journey. An indignant spectator asked the justice, "Why did you not tell him that your boat had a hole in it?" ¶ 35 "The matter of the boat's condition," the jurist replied, "was not brought before me." See Ambrose Bierce, A Defective Peti tion , in 6 The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce 294 (1911). ¶ 36 The question that supposedly is not before us is the implied premise that this Court's decision in Aitken , which we persist in applying today, was a proper exercise of our constitutionally limited powers. Supra ¶ 17. In my view, that question, regardless of whether the parties raise it, is always properly before us. ¶ 37 In our constitutional system, which distributes separate and defined powers among the branches of government, no more fundamental tenet exists than that the judiciary must never exercise legislative powers. In The Federalist , Alexander Hamilton remarked that "liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone," but warned that we "have every thing to fear" from a union of judicial and legislative powers. The Federalist No. 78 , at 298 (The Legal Classics Library ed., 1983). Following nearly a century and a quarter of experience with the national constitution, the Arizona Constitution's framers considered separation of powers so important that they enshrined it in its own article, decreeing that the three branches "shall be separate and distinct, and no one ... shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others." Ariz. Const. art. 3. Specifically, the judicial power "does not license judges to craft new laws to govern future conduct, but only to 'discer[n] the course prescribed by law' as it currently exists and to 'follow it' in resolving disputes between people over past events." Sessions v. Dimaya , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1227, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Osborn v. Bank of U.S. , 22 U.S. 738, 866, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) ). ¶ 38 The Court transgressed that constitutional boundary, for beneficent purposes yet blatantly and overtly, in Aitken . 183 Ariz. 387, 904 P.2d 456. The case involved the interplay between the lien statute, § 23-1023(D), and the recent legislative abolition of joint and several liability, § 12-2506. The plaintiff argued that the combined effect of the two statutes violated the constitutional guarantee of a just and humane worker's compensation law, Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 8, and the prohibition against laws limiting the amount of damages for death or injury, id. art. 2, § 31. Aitken , 183 Ariz. at 389, 904 P.2d at 458. As the Court explained, "a reasonable balance between the rights of employer and employee, consistent with the underlying goals of the compensation scheme, has existed for more than twenty years. That balance appears to have been skewed by the almost complete abolition of joint and several liability." Id. at 392, 904 P.2d at 461. ¶ 39 When a statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, a court may and should construe it in a plausible manner that avoids holding it unconstitutional. State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145, 149 ¶ 17, 403 P.3d 145, 149 (2017) ("When we can reasonably interpret a statute in a way that preserves its constitutionality, we pursue that course."); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 66-68 (2012). But Aitken made no pretense that the statute was ambiguous, instead objecting to the statute as written. 183 Ariz. at 390, 904 P.2d at 459. Indeed, it examined cases from other states applying similar statutory language literally, characterizing the results in those cases as inequitable. Id. at 390-91, 904 P.2d at 459-60. ¶ 40 Instead of construing and applying the statutory language, the Court wrote into the law "a rule of equitable apportionment," thus "making it function as closely as possible to the way in which it has always operated and in accord with what appears to have been the intent of the legislature at the time of its passage." Id. at 393, 904 P.2d at 462. This it did because "[w]e know exactly how [the lien statute] is supposed to operate and what it was designed to accomplish because we have been working with and applying it since its enactment in the mid-1960s." Id. at 391, 904 P.2d at 460. The Court reasoned that when the legislature enacted § 12-2506, "it did not anticipate the manner in which compensation liens would operate outside the universe of joint and several liability." Id. Given that oversight, "we cannot agree with the suggestion that our courts are powerless to compensate for the clearly unintended consequences of these recent developments in the law.... Courts should not limit themselves to the rigid construction or application of a statute when significant changes in circumstance since its enactment produce results plainly contrary to legislative intent." Id. Thus, "[w]e now hold that a carrier may assert a lien on a third party recovery only to the extent that the compensation benefits paid exceed the employer's proportionate share of the total damages fixed by verdict in this action." Id. at 392, 904 P.2d at 461. ¶ 41 The Court may well have been correct that the legislature overlooked the impact the abolition of joint and several liability might have on the lien provisions. And unquestionably, the result was harsh. Neither of those facts, however, licenses courts to rewrite the law. ¶ 42 Aitken proceeded from the fundamentally flawed premise that "[w]e interpret and apply laws so as to further 'the general legislative goals that can be adduced from the body of legislation in question.' " Id. (quoting Dietz , 169 Ariz. at 510, 821 P.2d at 171 ). What a wide-ranging commission that would be, "adducing" not a statute's text, not even the particular statute's intent, but the "general legislative goals" of an entire "body of legislation." Regardless of a court's beneficent motivation, such a self-anointed mandate bestows vast legislative powers upon a branch of government intended to have none. ¶ 43 We should repudiate the premise and the precedent, both of which are antithetical to our constitutional separation of powers. I certainly cannot say it better than our own abundant opinions and other authorities. "Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous." BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp. , 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 782, 784 (2018). "It is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions." State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway , 87 Ariz. 206, 209, 349 P.2d 774 (1960). "To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. If the true construction will be followed by harsh consequences, it cannot influence the courts in administering the law. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of the courts to construe, not to make, the laws." Barlow v. Jones , 37 Ariz. 396, 399-400, 294 P. 1106 (1930) (quoting 25 Ruling Case Law 963, § 218); accord State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell , 239 Ariz. 405, 408 ¶ 12, 372 P.3d 929, 932 (2016) ("We decline to effectively, if not actually, rewrite [the statute], as that is the legislature's prerogative, not ours."). "The question ... is not what Congress 'would have wanted,' but what Congress enacted...." Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. , 504 U.S. 607, 618, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992). Thus, "[t]he absent provision cannot be supplied by the courts. What the legislature 'would have wanted,' it did not provide, and that is the end of the matter." Scalia & Gardner, supra ¶ 39, at 94. ¶ 44 In forbidding us legislative powers, the framers were prescient. The precept that courts can divine and effectuate law from intentions unmanifested in statute "is anomalous and philosophically indefensible as violating the separation of powers, and it produces considerable judicial mischief."Id. at 349-50. Not only are judges neither empowered nor equipped to perform legislative functions, but courtrooms are ill-suited to a legislative forum. Apart from sweeping legislative pronouncements in cases like Aitken , courts render decisions based not on broad social considerations but on the specific facts of the cases and parties before them. See Sessions , 138 S.Ct. at 1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Nor do judges ... act in the open and accountable forum of a legislature, but in the comparatively obscure confines of cases and controversies."). To determine how the judicial rule applies to different situations requires parties to either speculate or file more cases-and we have had quite a number, including Grijalva , 185 Ariz. 74, 912 P.2d 1303, Stout I , 197 Ariz. 238, 3 P.3d 1158, and Stout II , 202 Ariz. 300, 44 P.3d 178. Because of the ad hoc nature of litigation, once we enter the lawmaking arena, we must necessarily construct the law as we go along. Tellingly, the portions of the Court's opinion that apply the law to the facts, supra ¶¶ 19-29, reference only court decisions and not statutes, for perfectly good reason: there is no statute to apply . So that those who consult the statutes in this area will be misinformed, because the applicable rule exists only in an evolving series of court decisions. ¶ 45 I join the result today because my able colleagues have conscientiously navigated our prior decisions in a way that does not further extend the gulf between the statutes and our jurisprudence. However, the fact that our able colleagues on the court of appeals conscientiously reached a different decision highlights how difficult it is to predict from our prior opinions what we will decide next. ¶ 46 I join only the result, however, because we would do better to overturn Aitken and return this issue to the legislature, where it belongs. I recognize that the parties have not asked us to overrule Aitken , nor would I expect them to do so given that such a request is usually unnecessary to the outcome and might imply that existing law is not on that party's side. However, it is up to us to police our constitutional boundaries, and, by failing to overrule Aitken , we continue to exercise legislative powers we do not possess. ¶ 47 I also recognize that doing so could force us to confront two pillars of the stare decisis doctrine: legislative acquiescence and the reliance interest in our existing caselaw. In most cases, either basis would militate strongly in favor of maintaining precedent interpreting statutes, but for the following reasons they should not prevail here. ¶ 48 The Court observes that Aitken "explicitly invited" the legislature to change the statutes if it disagreed with the decision but it has not done so. Supra ¶ 17. The legislature's failure to RSVP to a judicial invitation cannot insulate a decision from reconsideration. As the United States Supreme Court has admonished, "the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is as best only an auxiliary tool for use in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions." Jones v. Liberty Glass Co. , 332 U.S. 524, 533-34, 68 S.Ct. 229, 92 L.Ed. 142 (1947). That limited use makes sense: if the court is choosing between two equally plausible statutory interpretations and the legislature does not disturb its holding, we generally should not disturb it either. ¶ 49 In Aitken , of course, there was nothing ambiguous in the statute, thus we should not impute to the legislature an intent to embrace the de facto statute the Court created. As we recognized recently, "The doctrine of legislative acquiescence is limited to instances in which the legislature has considered and declined to reject the relevant judicial interpretation." Delgado v. Manor Care of Tucson , 242 Ariz. 309, 314 ¶ 24, 395 P.3d 698, 703 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sw. Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Envtl. Quality , 194 Ariz 22, 25-26 ¶ 21, 976 P.2d 872, 875-76 (1999) ). Here, the Court notes that the legislature subsequently changed an unrelated part of the statute. Supra ¶ 17. However, "we do not presume legislative intent when a statute is amended in ways unrelated to the judicial construction at issue absent some affirmative indication the legislature considered and approved our construction." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 176 Ariz. 101, 106, 859 P.2d 724, 729 (1993) ); accord Sw. Paint& Varnish Co. , 194 Ariz. at 26 ¶ 21, 976 P.2d at 876 ("We have squarely rejected the idea that silence is an expression of legislative intent."). The Supreme Court applies the doctrine only when there is "overwhelming evidence," Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs , 531 U.S. 159, 169 n.5, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001), that Congress explicitly considered the "precise issue" presented to the court, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States , 461 U.S. 574, 600, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ; see also Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales , 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007). Mere inaction and passage of time are insufficient to invoke the doctrine. ¶ 50 However, even if the legislature had explicitly considered the Court's handiwork and voted unanimously to present us with an award for work well done, that would still be insufficient to sustain the precedent in this case. The legislature cannot, by either acquiescence or abdication, confer upon us legislative powers. That matter was already decided by our constitution. Ariz. Const. art. 3 ; see also Sessions , 138 S.Ct. at 1227 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). ¶ 51 Finally, it is usually inappropriate to upset precedent on which parties have come to rely. Here, I would deal with that issue by making our ruling prospective only, so that parties in litigation before the date of our opinion could still rely on the Aitken framework, amorphous as it is. Cf. Turken v. Gordon , 223 Ariz. 342, 351-52 ¶¶ 44-49, 224 P.3d 158, 167-68 (2010) (prospective application is appropriate when a ruling overturns settled precedent, establishes a new legal principle, or would produce inequitable results if retroactively applied). ¶ 52 The legislature, not the courts, should resolve the policy conundrum that was before us in Aitken and has reappeared repeatedly in different permutations since then. But until we correct the error, parties aggrieved by uncertainty in the law will continue to bring those issues to us, rather than to the branch of government that is constitutionally empowered to resolve them. In his concurring opinion, Justice Bolick faults the Court in Aitken for unconstitutionally usurping legislative powers it does not have and improperly rewriting the law. Infra ¶¶ 31, 38 (Bolick, J., concurring in the result). Professing to "police our constitutional boundaries," he therefore urges us to "overturn Aitken and return this issue to the legislature, where it belongs." Infra ¶ 46. Its nautical humor aside, infra ¶¶ 32-35, the concurrence disregards that courts generally refrain from addressing questions the parties did not raise-especially when doing so would, assuming the concurrence is correct, require us to sua sponte overrule our prior case law. See Dolan v. United States , 560 U.S. 605, 619, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010) (refusing to depart from the Court's precedents "when this case does not require us to do so" and when "the issue has not been adequately briefed" and lower courts "had no opportunity to consider the argument"); State ex rel. Brnovichv. City of Tucson , 242 Ariz. 588, 599 ¶ 45, 399 P.3d 663, 674 (2017) (stating that "[w]e generally do not reach out ... to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues"); State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, 306 ¶ 21, 371 P.3d 627, 634 (2016) (declining to address issues "[t]he parties did not brief"); cf. Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2409, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015) (stating that "stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision ... interprets a statute," even when the decision relied not on statutory text alone but on "the policies and purposes animating the law," because the legislature may alter what the Court does). I am indebted to Chief Justice Stephen Markman of the Michigan Supreme Court for a version of this story. In this instance, had the Court struck down the statutory scheme as unconstitutional in Aitken , it would have comported with separation of powers by preserving the legislature's role in determining whether and how to replace it.

JONES, Judge: ¶ 1 In this consolidated appeal, Intervenor Arizona State Hospital (ASH) challenges orders involuntarily committing Edgar T. and Juan A. (the Patients) for inpatient psychiatric treatment. Both Patients were deemed incompetent to stand trial for violent crimes, but upon commitment were unable to provide documentation establishing their lawful presence in the United States. ASH argues it cannot comply with the commitment orders without violating state and federal law governing the provision of state and local public benefits to unauthorized aliens. ¶ 2 As a matter of first impression, we consider whether court-ordered psychiatric treatment is a "state and local public benefit," as defined within 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) and A.R.S. § 1-502(I). Because individuals subject to court-ordered psychiatric treatment do not "apply" for the services, the treatment is not a "benefit" within the meaning of those statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's orders. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 3 In 2013, Edgar was charged with one count of aggravated assault and one count of assault by a prisoner with bodily fluids. Edgar spat upon an officer who tried to end a fight between Edgar and another inmate in the medical area of the Durango Jail. In 2015, Juan was charged with aggravated assault and criminal trespass after attacking officers who tried to remove him from a dumpster in which he had been living for four days. When the officers tried to move Juan, he refused to obey orders and swung a board at one of them. Ultimately, the officers resorted to the use of pepper spray to subdue him. ¶ 4 In March 2014 and July 2015, the criminal court found the Patients incompetent to stand trial and dismissed the charges pending against them without prejudice. The court ordered the Maricopa County Attorney's Office (MCAO) to file a petition for court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. See A.R.S. §§ 13-4517(A)(1) (authorizing the court to "[r]emand the defendant to an evaluating agency for the institution of civil commitment proceedings" if it finds he is "incompetent to stand trial and that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within twenty-one months"); 36-521(F) (authorizing the county attorney to file the petition for evaluation if court-ordered). Both Patients were evaluated, and their evaluators filed petitions for court-ordered treatment pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-531(B) (stating that, upon a determination that a patient is disabled or dangerous, the appropriate person "shall prepare, sign and file a petition for court-ordered treatment"). After considering the petitions, the superior court in both cases found the Patients to be "persistently and acutely disabled." The court also found Juan to be "a danger to others." Both Patients were ordered to submit to inpatient psychiatric treatment at ASH. ¶ 5 ASH moved to intervene in both cases, asking the superior court to reconsider the commitment orders-not because its findings were incorrect, but because the Patients were unable to provide documents establishing their lawful presence in the United States, and therefore were ineligible to receive public benefits. The court granted the motion to intervene but declined to reconsider its orders, and ASH timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(2). ¶ 6 On appeal, this Court granted the Maricopa County Special Healthcare District (the District) leave to intervene as well. The District operates Desert Vista Behavioral Health Center (Desert Vista), a facility that provides short-term court-ordered evaluation and treatment for individuals with mental disabilities, and therefore has an interest in the outcome of our decision. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 The parties dispute whether court-ordered psychiatric treatment is a "state and local public benefit" subject to immigration verification. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo . In re MH2010-002637 , 228 Ariz. 74, 78, ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 82, 86 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). "When interpreting a statute, our primary purpose is to give effect to the intent of the legislature." Pinal Cty. No. MH-201000029 , 225 Ariz. 500, 502, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1262, 1264 (App. 2010) (citing Maricopa Cty. No. MH 2001-001139 , 203 Ariz. 351, 353, ¶ 12, 54 P.3d 380, 382 (App. 2002) ). "The best indicator of that intent is the statute's plain language, and, if that language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written." State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd. (MCCCDB ), 242 Ariz. 325, 338, ¶ 39, 395 P.3d 714, 727 (App. 2017) (quoting State v. Liwski , 238 Ariz. 184, 186, ¶ 5, 358 P.3d 605, 607 (App. 2015) ). I. Court-Ordered Psychiatric Treatment Is Not a "Public Benefit" as Defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c). ¶ 8 In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which restricts welfare and public benefits for aliens. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. IV, §§ 400-51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-77 (1996) (partially codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1646 ). PRWORA defines which groups of non-citizens qualify to receive state and local public benefits. Under PRWORA, "state and local public benefits," include: any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual ... by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(B). ¶ 9 ASH argues the phrase "any health benefit" in the federal statute includes the involuntary civil commitment that occurred in these cases. This takes § 1621(c) out of context, however. The meaning of this language is clear when considered within the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.") (citations omitted); J.D. v. Hegyi , 236 Ariz. 39, 41, ¶ 6, 335 P.3d 1118, 1119-20 (2014) (explaining that, when interpreting a statute, the words "cannot be read in isolation from the context in which they are used") (citing Adams v. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments , 227 Ariz. 128, 135, ¶ 34, 254 P.3d 367, 374 (2011) ). When read as a whole, the unambiguous language in PRWORA limits the definition of public benefits to those benefits for which an individual applies. By its terms, PRWORA is intended to address concerns regarding the "self-sufficiency" of immigrants, given that "aliens have been applying for and receiving public benefits ... at increasing rates." 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1), (3) (emphasis added). Thus, PRWORA authorizes individual states "to require an applicant for State and local public benefits ... to provide proof of eligibility." 8 U.S.C. § 1625 (emphasis added). In contrast, PRWORA confers no rights or responsibilities upon individual states with regard to services imposed upon a person by court order. Because "state and local public benefits," within the context of PRWORA, unambiguously refers to benefits for which an individual voluntarily applies, we hold court-ordered psychiatric treatment is not a public benefit as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1). ¶ 10 Even if the statutory language of PRWORA were ambiguous, this Court would reject ASH's interpretation of "state and local public benefits" because it would lead to absurd results. See Compassionate Care Dispensary, Inc. v. AZDHS , 782 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 12, *5, ¶ 23, 244 Ariz. 205, ----, 418 P.3d 978, 985-87 (App. Jan. 16, 2018) (refusing to "advance an interpretation that leads to ... an absurd result" when resolving statutory ambiguities) (citing AEA Fed. Credit Union v. Yuma Funding, Inc. , 237 Ariz. 105, 109, ¶ 13, 346 P.3d 991, 995 (App. 2015) ). If statutory language is ambiguous, we determine legislative intent by "considering the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." MCCCDB , 242 Ariz. at 338, ¶ 39, 395 P.3d at 727 (quoting Calik v. Kongable , 195 Ariz. 496, 500, ¶ 16, 990 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1999) ). ¶ 11 ASH maintains "the method used to provide [mental health services]-voluntary admission or involuntary commitment-does not change their classification as public benefits." Instead, ASH argues, "the provision of free mental health services and treatment, together with other benefits associated with inpatient treatment-room, board, and physical medical examinations and treatment"-is the public benefit provided to the Patients. However, if voluntariness were truly irrelevant in defining "public benefit," the incarceration of persons unable to prove their lawful presence would likewise violate PRWORA because the State is required by law to provide prisoners the same "benefits" ASH argues should be denied the Patients-room, board, and physical and mental health examinations and treatment. See A.R.S. §§ 31-121(A) ("The sheriff shall receive all persons who are committed to jail by competent authority and provide them with necessary food, clothing and bedding, the cost of which shall be a county charge."); -201.01(B), (D) ("[T]he director may, in cooperation with [AZDHS], provide to prisoners psychiatric care and treatment ... [and] shall provide medical and health services for the prisoners."). Even ASH concedes incarceration, and its incidentals, do not constitute a "benefit," arguing the provisions are imposed upon the prisoner as a punishment. ¶ 12 Additionally, ASH tacitly acknowledged within the commitment proceedings below that its interpretation would increase the risk to public safety. In its motion for reconsideration, ASH stated it was "left with a Hobson's choice: break the law and indefinitely commit a person or potentially increase the risk to public safety." Indeed, interpreting court-ordered psychiatric treatment as a "state or local public benefit" subject to immigration verification would allow the Patients-who have already been determined to be a danger to themselves and others-to be released back into the general public because no viable alternative exists. The State is unable to prosecute and incarcerate the Patients because they are incompetent to stand trial for the violent crimes they allegedly committed. See Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (recognizing "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process") (citations omitted). Moreover, the District stated within its brief that its facility, Desert Vista, is not equipped for long-term psychiatric care, and, unlike ASH, does not offer "maximum security." See A.R.S. § 36-212 (requiring the state mental hospital to designate and operate a "maximum security area"). Although ASH suggests undocumented patients could be committed to a private hospital, a private hospital must first agree to take them. See A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(3) (authorizing the court to order "[i]npatient treatment in ... a private hospital," but only "if the private hospital agrees"). Moreover, it is unclear how ASH perceives the expenditure of state monies applied to the commitment of individuals to ASH is a violation of PRWORA, but the expenditure of state monies to pay for the commitment of individuals to Desert Vista or a private hospital is not. ¶ 13 The statutory language is clear and unambiguous when read within the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. And, as noted above, even if it were ambiguous, we would not advance an interpretation that lead to absurd results. Accordingly, we hold that court-ordered psychiatric treatment is not a public benefit as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c). II. Court-Ordered Psychiatric Treatment Is Not a "Public Benefit" as Defined by State Law. ¶ 14 ASH separately asserts that involuntary civil commitment is a "public benefit" not available, under state law, to a person who cannot prove his lawful presence. The Arizona State Legislature has adopted PRWORA's general definition of "state or local public benefits." See A.R.S. § 1-502(I). And like PRWORA, the statute's unambiguous purpose is to restrict the availability of public benefits for which an individual must apply. Section 1-502(A) states: [A]ny agency of this state or a political subdivision of this state that administers any state or local public benefit shall require each natural person who applies for the state or local public benefit to submit at least one of the following documents ... demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. (Emphasis added). Thus, the state statute also applies only to benefits for which a person voluntarily applies. ¶ 15 We find further support in A.R.S. § 13-4517(B), which, as amended in 2017, explicitly distinguishes court-ordered psychiatric treatment from "public benefits." That statute authorizes the superior court, after determining a defendant incompetent to stand trial, to order "an assessment of the defendant's eligibility for private insurance or public benefits that may be applied to the expenses of the defendant's medically necessary maintenance and treatment." A.R.S. § 13-4517(B). Although the relevant language was added after the Patients were deemed incompetent, it demonstrates that the Legislature does not consider court-ordered psychiatric treatment to be a public benefit in and of itself, but rather, as a circumstance whose expense might be mitigated through the use of public benefits, when available. Indeed, the Legislature specifically identified public benefits that could be used to offset the costs of court-ordered psychiatric treatment, including: "[the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System], state-only behavioral health services, [Social Security] services and [M]edicare part D prescription drug benefits, supplemental security income and supplemental security disability income." A.R.S. § 13-4517(B). ¶ 16 In a final public policy argument, ASH contends that because it "is not required to provide civil commitment treatment that exceeds the funded capacity," A.R.S. § 36-503.03, a U.S. citizen may be denied access to necessary services if its beds are filled by individuals not lawfully present in the United States. This argument is unpersuasive given that the maximum capacity of ASH is recalculated each year after collecting census data, see A.R.S. §§ 36-206(D), -503.03, and that the state maintains a contingency plan for the placement of patients in times of emergency and other unforeseen circumstances, see A.R.S. § 36-206(D). Thus, the Legislature has provided avenues for ASH to avoid potential capacity problems. CONCLUSION ¶ 17 Court-ordered psychiatric treatment is not a public benefit as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) and A.R.S. § 1-502(I). Accordingly, we affirm the superior court orders. ASH is a "state hospital ... maintained for the care and treatment of persons with mental disorders and persons with other personality disorders or emotional conditions" under the "charge and control" of the Arizona Department of Health Services (AZDHS). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 36-202(A), (D) (2018). For simplicity, we refer to AZDHS and the state mental hospital, collectively, as ASH. Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version. Both treatment orders have expired, but the Patients remain persistently and acutely disabled and are still committed to ASH. Although the orders themselves are moot, we consider the merits of the appeal "because the issue presented is of statewide importance and capable of evading review." In re MH-2008-000867 , 225 Ariz. 178, 179, ¶ 1, 236 P.3d 405, 406 (2010) (citing Coconino Cty. No. MH 1425 , 181 Ariz. 290, 292, 889 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995) ). At oral argument, ASH conceded that a public benefit must be applied for but argued the State and the evaluators effectively applied for mental health treatment on the Patients' behalf through the petitions for court-ordered evaluation and treatment. We disagree. MCAO did not apply to a treatment provider for mental health services; it petitioned the superior court for an order requiring the Patients to be evaluated, and then the evaluators petitioned the court for an order finding involuntary psychiatric treatment was necessary. ASH argues this Court should not compare involuntary civil commitment to incarceration, citing MH-2008-000867 , in which our supreme court held the confrontation clause did not apply to civil commitment proceedings and stated, "a civil commitment proceeding should not be constitutionally 'equated to a criminal prosecution' because the state is not acting in a punitive manner." 225 Ariz. at 180-81, ¶ 8, 236 P.3d at 407-08 (quoting Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 428, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) ). However, the narrow issue there-whether the admission of evidence in a particular manner comported with the patient's due process rights, id. at 179, 182, ¶¶ 1, 14, 236 P.3d at 406, 409 -does not foreclose all future comparisons, particularly here, where we consider the interplay between federal immigration law and state statutes authorizing courts to order psychiatric treatment. ASH relies heavily upon 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b)(4) (granting the U.S. Attorney General sole discretion to exempt certain state or local public benefits from PRWORA's restrictions), and U.S. Attorney General Order No. 2353-2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 3613 (Jan. 16, 2001) (specifying "the types of community programs, services, or assistance for which all aliens remain eligible"), to argue ASH's treatment was not an exempt state or local public benefit. This argument is only relevant if one begins with the assumption that court-ordered psychiatric treatment is a public benefit. Because we hold otherwise, we need not address this argument further.

BROWN, Judge: ¶ 1 In this special action, we hold that a person who uses a dangerous instrument in committing an animal cruelty offense may not be sentenced as a dangerous offender. Because we reject the State's argument that it may pursue enhancement of an animal cruelty crime as a dangerous offense, we accept special action jurisdiction but deny relief. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Police responded to a report of animal cruelty. A witness stated she heard a dog crying and went to her apartment complex's courtyard to see where the noise was coming from. She observed Shundong Hu in his apartment using a rod to hit a dog that was inside a pet enclosure. When police entered Hu's apartment, they saw a puppy with a bleeding mouth. The dog was taken to an animal care center for treatment and the medical records indicated the dog suffered "[c]ranial trauma." Police obtained a warrant the next day to search Hu's apartment and discovered a metal rod under the bed that "appeared to have blood and dog hair on it." ¶ 3 As relevant here, the State charged Hu with intentionally or knowingly subjecting an animal to cruel mistreatment, a class 6 felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-2910(A)(9). The State also alleged the crime was a dangerous offense because it "involved the discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a pole and/or rod, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-105 and 13-704." ¶ 4 Hu moved to dismiss the dangerousness allegation, asserting that as a matter of law "a dangerous offense cannot be committed against an animal." He did not dispute that the metal rod could constitute a dangerous instrument; instead, he argued the legislature's inclusion of the phrase "on another person" in the statutory definition of dangerous offense, A.R.S. § 13-105(13), means a dangerous offense may be committed only against a person, not an animal. The State countered that the plain language of § 13-105(13) indicates that a sentencing enhancement based on the use of a dangerous instrument is not limited to circumstances involving "another person." ¶ 5 Focusing on the definition of dangerous instrument, the superior court granted Hu's motion, explaining as follows: There are two ways to interpret the dangerous instrument definition: (1) it could be limited to items being used in a way readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury to a person ; or (2) it could encompass items being used in a way readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury to anything . Under the latter interpretation, poisoning someone's $1000 exotic fish tank with a gallon of bleach would constitute the crime of criminal damage, a class 6 dangerous felony. Surely the legislature did not intend such results. ¶ 6 The State petitioned for special action, asserting the superior court erred by dismissing the allegation of dangerousness. We have accepted jurisdiction because the State has no adequate remedy on appeal and the petition presents a legal issue of statewide importance. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; State ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogers , 237 Ariz. 419, 421, ¶ 5, 352 P.3d 451, 453 (App. 2015). DISCUSSION ¶ 7 We review the superior court's interpretation of statutes de novo. State v. Gates , 243 Ariz. 451, 453, ¶ 7, 410 P.3d 433, 435 (2018). "In interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent." Id. "If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written without further analysis." State v. Jurden , 239 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 15, 373 P.3d 543, 547 (2016). Because "this case involves the intersection of multiple statutes, we construe them together, seeking to give meaning to all provisions." State v. Francis , 243 Ariz. 434, 435, ¶ 6, 410 P.3d 416, 417 (2018) (citation omitted). If we conclude the statutes are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, "we consider other factors, including 'the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.' " Glazer v. State , 237 Ariz. 160, 163, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2015) (quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller , 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991) ). A. Construction of Related Statutory Definitions ¶ 8 As provided in A.R.S. § 13-704, the legislature has mandated increased punishment for a person convicted of a felony offense that is also considered "dangerous." A dangerous offense is "an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person." A.R.S. § 13-105(13) (emphasis added). A "person" is defined in pertinent part as a "human being." A.R.S. § 13-105(30). A dangerous instrument is "anything that under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury." A.R.S. § 13-105(12). " 'Serious physical injury' includes physical injury that creates a reasonable risk of death, or that causes serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb." A.R.S. § 13-105(39). Finally, " '[c]ruel mistreatment' means to torture or otherwise inflict unnecessary serious physical injury on an animal or to kill an animal in a manner that causes protracted suffering to the animal." A.R.S. § 13-2910(H)(2). ¶ 9 The State contends the word "or," emphasized above in the definition of dangerous offense, is clear in the sense that it must be read in the disjunctive, meaning the second phrase "on another person" does not apply to the first phrase involving a dangerous instrument. In other words, the State argues the two phrases unambiguously constitute independent clauses, meaning that when a dangerous instrument is used in committing a felony, the State need only prove a dangerous instrument was discharged, used, or threatened as part of the felony offense, regardless of whether it was targeted against a person, an animal, or any other living organism. Read in isolation, the State's proffered construction is defensible. See State v. Bowsher , 225 Ariz. 586, 587, ¶ 7, 242 P.3d 1055, 1056 (2010) ("The word 'or' generally means '[a] disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things.' " (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (6th ed. 1990) ) ). However, we must construe the meaning of dangerous offense in light of its related definitions to achieve harmony and thereby discern legislative intent. See id. at 589, ¶ 14, 242 P.3d at 1058 (recognizing that in construing multiple statutes, we seek to harmonize all the provisions). ¶ 10 Like the State, Hu does not offer an interpretation that considers each of the definitions affecting the meaning of dangerous offense. He focuses solely on the definition of dangerous instrument, asserting that "the only way" to interpret this provision is to add the words "to a person" at the end of the definition. Otherwise, he contends, the statute would be interpreted to cover harm to anything, which would require rewriting the statutory language and lead to absurd results. ¶ 11 Taking into account the parties' competing arguments, we must find the most sensible reading of the definition of dangerous offense that is in harmony with the definitions of dangerous instrument and serious physical injury, as well as other related statutes, including the dangerous offense and animal cruelty statutes. See id. In doing so, we note that our supreme court has recognized that not every crime involving the use of a dangerous instrument may be enhanced as a dangerous offense. See State v. Orduno , 159 Ariz. 564, 769 P.2d 1010 (1989) (exempting felony driving under the influence offenses from dangerous offense enhancements). ¶ 12 The definitions of dangerous instrument and serious physical injury are silent as to whether they apply in situations involving non-humans. Although both terms are "general" in nature, that does not mean they encompass every conceivable crime. Cf. Phillips v. O'Neil , 243 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 11, 407 P.3d 71, 73 (2017) (noting that the "general terms" canon of construction "is based on the reality that it is possible and useful to formulate categories (e.g., 'dangerous weapons') without knowing all the items that may fit-or may later, once invented, come to fit-within those categories" (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012) ) ). Dangerous instrument and serious physical injury are general in the sense they are broadly defined and would presumably include many items or injuries that could fall within those general categories. But the legislature did not use the same type of language to define the scope of when those two categories apply; instead of defining a general class, the legislature limited dangerous instrument and serious physical injury to specific circumstances, failing to further specify who or what must be the target of the dangerous instrument or the recipient of the serious physical injury. Accordingly, the definitions of dangerous instrument and serious physical injury are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation as to whether they apply to offenses directed toward non-humans, which also means the definition of dangerous offense can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way. ¶ 13 The State asserts that if "on another person" were to modify the first clause of A.R.S. § 13-105(13), then no crime could be charged as a dangerous offense absent "direct contact with another person." But the State construes the word "on" too narrowly, as it can function to identify a variety of situations. See, e.g. , Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 823-24 (1988) (giving the following definitions of "on": (1) "used ... to indicate position in close proximity with ... < stay [on] your opponent>"; (2) "used ... to indicate the object of collision, opposition, or hostile action ... < pulled a gun [on] me>"; and (3) "used ... to indicate destination or the focus of some action, movement, or directed effort < crept up [on] him>"). These varied definitions also defeat the State's arguments that "[o]ne does not discharge nor threateningly exhibit a dangerous instrument 'on' a person" and that "a dangerous instrument would be discharged at another person or threateningly exhibited to another person." Given the broad meaning of "on," there is no grammatical inconsistency in the language the legislature used to define a dangerous offense. ¶ 14 Moreover, the State's interpretation that "on another person" would not apply to the first clause absent direct contact with another person is inconsistent with established case law. In State v. Borbon , 146 Ariz. 392, 706 P.2d 718 (1985), the defendant struck the door of a cashier booth with a tire iron so violently the cashier thought the bulletproof glass door might break. 146 Ariz. at 394, 397, 706 P.2d at 723. Our supreme court concluded sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's conviction of attempted armed robbery based on the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument because the defendant was "readily capable" of causing physical injury and the cashier was afraid the defendant would break the glass and harm him. Id. at 397, 706 P.2d at 723. In State v. Gatliff , 209 Ariz. 362, 102 P.3d 981 (App. 2004), the defendant was convicted of arson of an occupied structure, which requires proof that a human being is either present or likely to be present when the fire occurs. 209 Ariz. at 362-63, 365, ¶¶ 1, 14, 102 P.3d at 981-82, 984. We held that the use of fire, a dangerous instrument, is an essential element of arson of an occupied structure and thus dangerousness is inherent in the crime. Id. at 366, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d at 985. ¶ 15 The State also ignores that threatened exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument can occur without any direct contact. Because the definitions of dangerous instrument, dangerous offense, and serious physical injury are reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we turn to secondary principles of statutory construction. B. Statutory Purposes ¶ 16 We consider the policy behind these statutes and the evils they were designed to remedy. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris , 237 Ariz. 98, 101, ¶ 13, 346 P.3d 984, 987 (2014). The legislature has determined that crimes involving deadly weapons or dangerous instruments are to be punished more severely than other crimes, particularly when the crime involves the potential of causing death or serious injury to human life. See State v. Bly , 127 Ariz. 370, 372, 621 P.2d 279, 281 (1980) ("[T]he potential for serious bodily injury or loss of human life arises when a crime is committed with a dangerous weapon. The crime itself is more reprehensible and for that reason a crime committed with a dangerous weapon or instrument shall be punished more severely...."); cf. Orduno , 159 Ariz. at 566, 769 P.2d at 1012 ("The clear intent of [the dangerous offense statutes] is to enhance sentencing when the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury increases the seriousness and dangerousness of the underlying crime."). ¶ 17 As set forth in A.R.S. § 13-704(A), "a person who is at least eighteen years of age or who has been tried as an adult and who stands convicted of a felony that is a dangerous offense" must be sentenced in accordance with the increased prison terms outlined in § 13-704. For instance, a first-time conviction for a dangerous, class six felony offense requires a presumptive sentence that is more than double that for a first-time conviction for a non-dangerous, class six felony offense. Compare A.R.S. § 13-702(D) (one year), with A.R.S. § 13-704(A) (two and one-quarter years). The conviction will also have a greater impact on subsequent crimes for which the defendant is convicted based on having a prior historical dangerous felony conviction. A.R.S. § 13-704(B)-(E). Further, the defendant is not eligible "for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon or release from confinement on any basis, except as specifically authorized." A.R.S. § 13-704(G). Finally, a defendant cannot seek to set aside the conviction. See A.R.S. § 13-907(E)(1). ¶ 18 Two purposes of Arizona's Criminal Code are "[t]o give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction" and "[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each." A.R.S. § 13-101(2), (4). If it was the legislature's intent, as the State urges, to enhance animal cruelty offenses by allowing the State to allege dangerousness, the legislature has not given fair warning of the enhanced sentencing and the consequences related thereto. See A.R.S. § 13-104 ("The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title, but the provisions herein must be construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in § 13-101."). ¶ 19 Moreover, the State's interpretation of the statute does not differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and the proportionate penalties for each. The animal cruelty statutes were structured to have tiered offenses. In re Jessie T. , 242 Ariz. 556, 559, ¶ 16, 399 P.3d 103, 106 (App. 2017). The legislature has classified cruel mistreatment as a felony offense, whereas the lesser-included offense of intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly inflicting unnecessary physical injury to an animal is a class one misdemeanor. Id. at 561, ¶ 23, 399 P.3d at 108 ; A.R.S. § 13-2910(A)(3), (G). Thus, the legislature already has accorded a more severe designation and punishment for a more egregious act against an animal. By classifying § 13-2810(A)(9) as a felony because it causes unnecessary serious physical injury on an animal, it is unlikely the legislature intended to increase the punishment for cruel mistreatment beyond classifying it as a felony, distinguishing it from less-serious animal cruelty offenses. ¶ 20 By comparison, other states, such as California and Pennsylvania, have adopted provisions in similar contexts that include more precise notice of how deadly weapon or dangerous instrument sentencing enhancements may be applied. See Cal. Penal Code § 12022(a)(1) (stating that a person using a firearm in the commission of a felony "shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment"); 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(1) (permitting sentence enhancement "[w]hen a court determines that the offender possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the current conviction offense"); People v. Smith , 150 Cal.App.4th 89, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 926, 929 (2007) ("The language of [the statute] prohibits the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon 'in the commission of a felony or attempted felony,' and states that an additional and consecutive one year term shall be imposed for its violation.... Cruelty to an animal ... is a felony."); Pennsylvania v. Hackenberger , 795 A.2d 1040, 1047, ¶ 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), aff'd , 575 Pa. 197, 836 A.2d 2 (2003) ("Here, it was appellant's possession of a firearm and use of a firearm in the furtherance of a crime [ (cruelty to animals) ] that triggered the application of the deadly weapon enhancement provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines."). If the Arizona Legislature was inclined to do so, it could have expressly stated that the dangerous offense definition applies to all felonies where a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon is discharged, used, or threatened, but it has not. See State v. Mott , 187 Ariz. 536, 541, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1997) ("[T]he legislature is responsible for promulgating the criminal law."). C. Sensible Construction ¶ 21 We strive to construe statutes "sensibly to avoid reaching an absurd conclusion." Harris , 237 Ariz. at 101, ¶ 13, 346 P.3d at 987. "A result is absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion." State v. Estrada , 201 Ariz. 247, 251, ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 356, 360 (2001) (internal quotation omitted). Limiting application of the dangerous offense enhancement to situations where a human is the target or potential target of a crime involving a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument avoids absurd conclusions. ¶ 22 For example, as the superior court noted, a person may be charged with criminal damage, a class six felony, for recklessly defacing or damaging property of another valued at $1,000 or more. See A.R.S. § 13-1602(A)(1), (B)(4). That type of crime could arise when a person recklessly sprays herbicide that drifts to neighboring property and kills plants valued at $1,000 or more. Under the State's interpretation, it could properly allege dangerousness. Similarly, a person who recklessly uses fireworks, destroying vegetation worth at least $1,000 would also be subject to an enhanced sentence under A.R.S. § 13-704, regardless of whether any human faced harm as a result of the crime. Recklessly using an ax to destroy a valuable tree would also be subject to enhancement as a dangerous offense. On the other hand, if a person destroyed valuable plants by uprooting them with his hands, or by cutting off the water supply, the State would be unable to charge the crime as a dangerous offense because no deadly weapon or dangerous instrument was involved. ¶ 23 Additionally, one could cause serious physical injury to an animal with his fists but the State could not seek an enhancement based on dangerousness because it is limited to "the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person." A.R.S. § 13-105(13) ; see State v. Gordon , 161 Ariz. 308, 311, 778 P.2d 1204, 1207 (1989) ("Because the Arizona statute increases the punishment for the crime if the defendant either uses a dangerous instrument or causes serious harm, no purpose exists for allowing the jury to find that body parts are dangerous instruments just because they caused serious bodily harm."). But if a stick caused the injury, instead of fists, the person hitting the animal with the stick would be subject to a dangerousness enhancement. Moreover, taking at face value the State's contention that the legislature sought to treat equally humans and animals, the State's construction of the statutes would not do that-one who punches a person's eye, causing blindness, would be subject to an enhancement while one who punches an animal and causes the same injury would not. ¶ 24 Restricting application of the dangerousness enhancement to humans does not yield irrational or unnatural results because the harm resulting from various crimes is treated similarly under the law. If a person uses a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument in any way to assault another person, then it could be charged as a dangerous offense. And if no deadly weapon or dangerous instrument is involved, but a person punches someone so hard it causes serious physical injury, then the attacker's conduct plainly fits within the dangerous offense definition. See Gordon , 161 Ariz. at 311, 778 P.2d at 1207. Unlike the scenarios involving plants, animals, or other living organisms, these statutes work in harmony when they are applied to situations involving actual or potential harm to humans. See Bowsher , 225 Ariz. at 589, ¶ 14, 242 P.3d at 1058 ("When construing two statutes, this Court will read them in such a way as to harmonize and give effect to all of the provisions involved."). ¶ 25 Our conclusion is consistent with the only other reported decision that has squarely addressed, based on similar statutes, whether a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement applied to an animal cruelty offense. See Prichard v. Texas , 533 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In Texas, a sentence may be enhanced if the defendant "used or exhibited [a deadly weapon] during the commission of a felony offense." Id. at 320 (internal quotation omitted). "Deadly weapon" includes "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17)(B). Cruelty to non-livestock animals is "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly ... tortur[ing] an animal or in a cruel manner kill[ing] or caus[ing] serious bodily injury to an animal." Tex. Penal Code § 42.092(b)(1). "Serious bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46). In Prichard , the defendant was convicted of cruelty to a non-livestock animal. 533 S.W.3d at 317. The state alleged, and the jury found, that the crime was a deadly offense because Prichard used a shovel and water, either individually or together, to harm his dog. Id. at 317-18. Prichard appealed the sentencing enhancement, "argu[ing] that a deadly weapon finding is improper when the only thing injured or killed as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct is an animal rather than a human being." Id. at 317. An intermediate appellate court upheld the deadly weapon finding but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding "that a deadly weapon finding may be made for human victims only." Id. ¶ 26 Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the legislature's purpose in drafting the dangerous offense definition and the related statutes was to enhance crimes as "dangerous offenses" to protect human life. Accordingly, we hold that the State cannot charge a crime as a dangerous offense unless it involves the discharge, use, or threatened exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument against another person. CONCLUSION ¶ 27 We affirm the superior court's order granting Hu's motion to dismiss the State's allegation of dangerousness because the use of a dangerous instrument in the context of animal cruelty does not qualify as a dangerous offense under A.R.S. § 13-105(13). We therefore accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

CATTANI, Judge: ¶ 1 The State of Arizona has charged real party in interest Derek Achenbach with one count of child molestation and two counts of sexual abuse, alleging that he committed these offenses against Z.W. In this special action proceeding, Z.W. challenges the superior court's ruling denying her request to preclude reference to her as the "alleged victim." She argues that allowing defense counsel to refer to her in that manner, rather than simply as the "victim," necessarily violates her statutory and constitutional rights under Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights. ¶ 2 We accept jurisdiction because Z.W. has no adequate remedy by appeal to cure an asserted violation of her pretrial rights. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; State v. Wein , 242 Ariz. 372, 374, ¶ 6, 396 P.3d 608, 610 (App. 2017). We conclude, however, that the constitutional protections afforded crime victims do not mandate that a specific term be used in referring to victims during court proceedings. Instead, the superior court retains discretion to address-on a case-by-case basis-whether using a particular term to refer to a victim violates the victim's right to be treated with respect and dignity. Accordingly, and for reasons that follow, we deny relief. ¶ 3 Arizona's Victims' Bill of Rights secures crime victims' rights to justice and due process throughout criminal proceedings. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A); Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") §§ 13-4401 to -4442. These important rights attach when a defendant is arrested or formally charged, and continue during trial and through the final disposition of the charges. A.R.S. § 13-4402(A) ; State ex rel. Romley v. Dairman , 208 Ariz. 484, 490, ¶ 20, 95 P.3d 548, 554 (App. 2004). ¶ 4 As Z.W. acknowledges, the Victims' Bill of Rights does not specify how a victim should be referred to in court proceedings, and it does not explicitly prohibit the use of the term "alleged victim." See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(1)-(12). Nevertheless, Z.W. asserts that because the Victims' Bill of Rights only uses the term "victim" to refer to the crime victim, there is an implicit right to be referred to as such throughout the proceedings. But in context, the use of the term "victim" in the Victim's Bill of Rights simply confers unequivocally the status of victim and all its attendant rights to those defined as crime victims; the use of that term does not require that any particular appellation be used in referencing a victim in court proceedings. Moreover, we note that the Victims' Bill of Rights defines the word victim to include not only the "person against whom the criminal offense has been committed," but also that person's "spouse, parent, child or other lawful representative" if that person is killed or incapacitated. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (C). Interpreting the Victims' Bill of Rights as Z.W. urges to require that all victims be referred to as they are in the constitutional provision would be confusing and impractical in court proceedings. Thus, we do not read the language of the constitutional provision to require that a specific appellation be used. ¶ 5 Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit or implicit right to be referred to in any particular manner, the Victims' Bill of Rights confirms that every crime victim in Arizona has the right to be treated throughout the criminal justice process with "fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(1). Z.W. argues that the term "alleged victim" necessarily (and as a matter of law) violates this right because it calls into question whether a crime was committed and whether someone is in fact a victim. But the term "alleged victim" simply reflects the procedural posture of a case such as this in which the defendant disputes that any crime occurred. Although "alleged victim" connotes some degree of uncertainty as to whether a crime occurred, until a defendant has been convicted of a charged offense, the case involves an alleged criminal act against an alleged victim. Characterizing the proceedings in this manner thus accurately conveys the procedural posture of the case and does not inherently violate a victim's right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity. ¶ 6 Z.W. also asserts that the term "alleged victim" improperly suggests she is untrustworthy. But the use of that term is not a comment on the victim's credibility, just as the use of the term "defendant" or-a more apt comparison-"alleged perpetrator" is not a comment on a defendant's credibility. Instead, such a reference simply avoids prejudging and reserves judgment on credibility issues, which are for the jury alone to decide. ¶ 7 That is not to say that using the term "alleged victim" is always appropriate. Rather, the superior court retains discretion to assess-on a case-by-case basis-whether a particular reference to a victim undermines the victim's right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity under the particular circumstances presented. When, for example, the proceedings involve circumstances in which there is no question that a crime has been perpetrated on the victim, and the defendant has only challenged who committed the crime, the superior court could reasonably conclude that referring to the crime victim as an "alleged victim" would mischaracterize the nature of the proceedings and be disrespectful to the victim. But in circumstances such as those presented here, where the core issue in dispute is whether any crime occurred, the superior court does not abuse its discretion by accurately conveying the nature of the proceedings, and by weighing the victim's request to be referred to in a specific way against the defendant's right to have the court reserve judgment on credibility issues. See State v. Bible , 175 Ariz. 549, 602-03, 858 P.2d 1152, 1205-06 (1993) (the court must balance the victim's rights against those of the defendant if the victim's rights conflict with the defendant's right to a fair trial); see also State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper ), 172 Ariz. 232, 236, 836 P.2d 445, 449 (App. 1992) (noting that "when the defendant's constitutional right to due process conflicts with the Victim's Bill of Rights in a direct manner ... then due process is the superior right"). Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Z.W.'s motion to preclude use of the term "alleged victim" on the basis that "nothing gives the victim the right to say a crime has been committed as a matter of law." ¶ 8 The question of whether using the term "alleged victim" necessarily violates a victim's rights is an issue of first impression in Arizona. But courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed similar arguments have likewise concluded that trial courts should have flexibility in determining how to refer to crime victims during criminal proceedings. See Jackson v. State , 600 A.2d 21, 24 (Del. 1991) ("The term 'victim' is used appropriately during trial when there is no doubt that a crime was committed and simply the identity of the perpetrator is in issue. We agree with defendant that the word 'victim' should not be used in a case where the commission of a crime is in dispute."); Veteto v. State , 8 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) ("The sole issue of [the defendant's] case was whether he committed the various assaults on [the child]. Referring to [the child] as the victim instead of the alleged victim lends credence to her testimony that the assaults occurred and that she was, indeed, a victim."), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Crook , 248 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We are unaware of any decisions that have reached a contrary conclusion. ¶ 9 Finally, we note that our holding that the superior court does not abuse its discretion by permitting reference to an "alleged victim" in a case such as this does not obviate the need to consider the victim's right to be referred to in a respectful manner. If, as Z.W. posits, a defendant refers to a victim-whether as "the victim" or "the alleged victim"-with a sarcastic or insulting intonation, the superior court is empowered to prohibit such intonation as disrespectful. Moreover, if a victim requests that a particular name or part of a name be used or not be used when being referenced in court proceedings, great deference should be accorded to the victim's wishes. And nothing prevents the prosecutor from complying with a victim's request to be referred to by name rather than as "the victim." In short, although the court maintains discretion in determining how to reference a crime victim in court proceedings, the victim maintains the right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity. CONCLUSION ¶ 10 Based on the foregoing, we accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: ¶1 Nearly seventy-five years ago, we held in DeGraff v. Smith that a dismissal with prejudice is a judgment on the merits that carries preclusive effect. 62 Ariz. 261, 269-70, 157 P.2d 342 (1945). We today hold that a stipulated dismissal with prejudice of an agent-surgeon does not preclude a party from asserting a claim against the surgeon's principal for its own independent negligence. This is true even when the independent negligence claim requires proof of the surgeon's negligence. This conclusion comports with our more recent holding in Chaney Building Co. v. City of Tucson that a stipulated dismissal does not trigger issue preclusion because only issues that have been "actually litigated" may be precluded. 148 Ariz. 571, 573, 716 P.2d 28, 30 (1986). Thus, we disavow our holding in DeGraff insofar as that case and its progeny conclude that a stipulated dismissal with prejudice "operate[s] as an adjudication that [the dismissed party] was not negligent in the treatment of [the] plaintiff." Torres v. Kennecott Copper Corp. , 15 Ariz. App. 272, 274, 488 P.2d 477 (1971). I. ¶2 Thomas Kopp, Melissa Ornelas, and Maria Judith Gonzalez (collectively, "Plaintiffs") underwent bariatric surgery performed by Dr. Eric Schlesinger, M.D., at Tempe St. Luke's Hospital. After experiencing post-operative complications, Plaintiffs filed medical malpractice actions against Physician Group of Arizona, IASIS Healthcare Corp., IASIS Healthcare Holdings, Inc., IASIS Finance, Inc., and St. Luke's Medical Center (collectively, the "Hospital") and Dr. Schlesinger. Plaintiffs' cases were later consolidated for discovery. Plaintiffs alleged Dr. Schlesinger was negligent in his surgical care and the Hospital was both vicariously liable for the doctor's negligence and independently negligent in the administration of its bariatric surgery program, including its hiring, selection, and credentialing. ¶3 Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with Dr. Schlesinger, which required Plaintiffs to "dismiss with prejudice the pending claims against" him and further "preclude[d] the [Plaintiffs] from pursuing claims against the [H]ospital ... based on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior," although Plaintiffs could bring "independent claims" against the Hospital. Additionally, the agreement stated that "no past or present wrongdoing on the part of [Dr. Schlesinger] is implied or should be inferred" from the settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice all claims against Dr. Schlesinger and "any claims against any co-defendants for vicarious liability," but in their stipulation specifically reserved independent claims against the Hospital. ¶4 The Hospital moved to dismiss most of the remaining claims, arguing they were derivative of Dr. Schlesinger's negligence. The trial court agreed and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs' negligent credentialing, hiring, and supervision claims, although it noted that "[a]ny independent negligence claims alleged against [the Hospital] survive the settlement with Dr. Schlesinger." ¶5 Affirming, the court of appeals stated that "[p]ursuant to both the plain terms of the settlement agreement and Torres , the dismissal of Plaintiffs' negligence claims against Dr. Schlesinger preclude[s] Plaintiffs from litigating [the Hospital's] alleged liability as vicariously derived from any alleged negligence of Dr. Schlesinger." Kopp v. Physician Grp. of Ariz. , 2017 WL 2470826, at *3 ¶ 14 (Ariz. App. June 8, 2017) (mem. decision). ¶6 We granted review because this case presents recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. II. ¶7 This case presents solely issues of law, which we review de novo. See Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions , 243 Ariz. 111, 114-15 ¶ 17, 402 P.3d 996, 999-1000 (2017) ("Questions of law and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo."). A. ¶8 We first consider whether Plaintiffs' negligence claims against the Hospital are properly characterized as vicarious or independent. Because "the surgery is a necessary component of any of Plaintiffs' theories" of liability, the Hospital seeks to characterize Plaintiffs' claims as "derivative" and thus based on vicarious liability. Consequently, the Hospital argues that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed because "[i]n cases of derivative liability, a judgment or dismissal in favor of the servant relieves the master of liability." Chaney Bldg. Co. , 148 Ariz. at 574, 716 P.2d at 31 ; see also DeGraff , 62 Ariz. at 266, 157 P.2d 342 ("[A] verdict in favor of the servant and holding the master guilty of negligence relieves not only the servant but the master from liability."). We disagree. ¶9 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for "the negligent work-related actions of its employees." Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng'g, Inc. , 230 Ariz. 55, 57 ¶ 9, 280 P.3d 599, 601 (2012). Vicarious liability results solely from the principal-agent relationship: "those whose liability is only vicarious are fault free-someone else's fault is imputed to them by operation of law." Wiggs v. City of Phoenix , 198 Ariz. 367, 371 ¶ 13, 10 P.3d 625, 629 (2000) ; see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B, cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1958) (stating that "the liability of the [principal] cannot exist without the liability of the [agent]"). Thus, we have often used "vicarious" liability synonymously with "derivative" liability. See e.g. , Chaney Bldg. Co. , 148 Ariz. at 573-74, 716 P.2d at 30-31 ; Degraff, 62 Ariz. at 264, 157 P.2d 342. ¶10 The Hospital and the courts below apparently reasoned that a principal's liability is "derivative" if a claim requires proof of the agent's wrongful acts. But that position conflicts with our case law, which recognizes that derivative liability is no broader than vicarious liability: a principal's liability for an agent's wrongful conduct that is imputed to the principal by operation of law. See, e.g. , Wiggs , 198 Ariz. at 371 ¶ 13, 10 P.3d at 629. Although Plaintiffs must prove Dr. Schlesinger's negligence to establish the causation and damages elements for their claims against the Hospital, those claims are not properly characterized as vicarious liability claims. Plaintiffs do not attempt to hold otherwise faultless defendants liable for Dr. Schlesinger's negligent surgical care, but rather assert that the Hospital breached a separate duty of care in its administration of the surgery program. ¶11 Indeed, Plaintiffs' claims against the Hospital fall squarely within the type of independent negligence claims this Court has previously recognized. See, e.g. , Fridena v. Evans , 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980) ; Tucson Med. Ctr. v. Misevch , 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976). In Misevch , we explained that a hospital can be held negligent "[i]f the medical staff [is] negligent in ... supervising its members." 113 Ariz. at 36, 545 P.2d at 960. We recognized in Fridena that the "true issue" for claims of this type "is not ... whether the hospital is vicariously liable ... but whether the hospital should be held liable on the theory of negligent supervision." 127 Ariz. at 518, 622 P.2d at 465. This reflects that a hospital's potential liability under a negligent supervision, credentialing, or hiring claim rests on the hospital's alleged breach of its duty to monitor the "quality of medical care furnished to patients within its walls." Id. at 519, 622 P.2d at 466. ¶12 Plaintiffs' claims for negligent credentialing, hiring, and supervision are based on the Hospital's independent negligence and thus were preserved in the settlement agreement with Dr. Schlesinger, which released the Hospital only from claims based on vicarious liability. This result comports with our case law, which recognizes that "[i]f there is an independent ground for finding the principal liable, judgment can be entered against him." Torres , 15 Ariz. App. at 274, 488 P.2d 477 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B, cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1958) ); accord DeGraff , 62 Ariz. at 266, 157 P.2d 342. B. ¶13 The Hospital contends that even if Plaintiffs' negligence claims are based on its independent negligence, those claims are still barred because "[a] dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits," DeGraff , 62 Ariz. at 269, 157 P.2d 342, thereby precluding Plaintiffs from litigating any claims requiring proof of Dr. Schlesinger's negligence. For that proposition the Hospital relies on the court of appeals' opinion in Torres . There, the plaintiff sued a hospital for two counts of negligence under both respondeat superior and negligent selection theories. 15 Ariz. App. at 273-74, 488 P.2d 477. The plaintiff dismissed with prejudice the claim against the co-defendant treating physician without determining his negligence. Id. at 274, 488 P.2d 477. Relying on DeGraff , the court of appeals held that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from bringing the negligent selection claim because the doctor's negligence was "an essential element to [the hospital]'s liability under [the negligent supervision claim]," and the issue of the doctor's negligence had "been adjudicated in his favor by the order of dismissal." Id. at 274-75, 488 P.2d 477. ¶14 But Torres conflicts with our issue preclusion jurisprudence. In Chaney Building Co. , we explained that a dismissal with prejudice does not, on its own, trigger issue preclusion: Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is applicable when the issue or fact to be litigated was actually litigated in a previous suit , a final judgment was entered, and the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked had a full opportunity to litigate the matter and actually did litigate it , provided such issue or fact was essential to the prior judgment. When an issue is properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated. However, in the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent or default, none of the issues is actually litigated. A judgment entered by stipulation is called a consent judgment, and may be conclusive, with respect to one or more issues, if the parties have entered an agreement manifesting such intention . 148 Ariz. at 573, 716 P.2d 28 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmts. d, e (Am. Law Inst. 1982) ). Thus, Chaney Building Co. abrogated DeGraff and Torres to the extent those cases suggest that a stipulated dismissal with prejudice is a judgment on the merits for purposes of issue preclusion. (By contrast, "a judgment can be 'on the merits' for purposes of claim preclusion even if it results from the parties' stipulation or certain pre-trial rulings by the court." 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa County , 212 Ariz. 98, 102, 128 P.3d 215, 219 (2006) (emphasis added).) ¶15 Here, issue preclusion does not apply because Plaintiffs' claim against Dr. Schlesinger was not actually litigated, nor did Plaintiffs agree that their settlement with him would preclude their independent negligence claims against the Hospital. In fact, the settlement and dismissal documents state just the opposite, expressly preserving those claims. Furthermore, the parties' agreement did not manifest an intent to conclusively establish the doctor's negligence or lack thereof-the agreement stated only that "no past or present wrongdoing on the part of [Dr. Schlesinger] is implied or should be inferred by" the settlement. Thus, Plaintiffs are not barred from bringing their claims for negligent hiring, credentialing, and supervision against the Hospital. III. ¶16 We vacate the court of appeals' memorandum decision, reverse the trial court's Rule 54(b) judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' independent negligence claims against the Hospital, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 In this special action, Ali Alsarraf challenges the respondent judge's ruling on his appeal from Tucson City Court, in which it reversed the city court's order suppressing breath evidence against him in a prosecution for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more and driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). Exercise of our special-action jurisdiction is appropriate when a party lacks "an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a). And it is particularly so when, as here, the issues are ones "of statewide importance," "of first impression," or "that are likely to arise again." State ex rel. Romley v. Martin , 203 Ariz. 46, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142 (App. 2002), aff'd, 205 Ariz. 279, 69 P.3d 1000 (2003). We therefore accept jurisdiction. ¶ 2 Alsarraf was arrested for DUI in August 2014. The investigating officer advised him, "Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily substance ... to determine alcohol concentration or drug content." Alsarraf agreed, and the officer administered a breath test. ¶ 3 Alsarraf filed a motion to suppress the results of the test, arguing that his agreement to the test had been coerced by the officer's admin per se admonition, quoted above, citing State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, 371 P.3d 627 (2016). He also claimed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because his arrest occurred after the decision in State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609 (2013). ¶ 4 At the suppression hearing, Alsarraf contended that, because Valenzuela did not distinguish between blood and breath tests, it gave Arizonans broader protection than the Fourth Amendment under the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). Additionally, Alsarraf submitted a supplemental memorandum at the city court's invitation, arguing that the Arizona Constitution offered greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment and that Arizona law had never made a distinction between the types of chemical testing, thereby requiring valid consent independent of Fourth Amendment concerns. The city court denied the motion to suppress, but subsequently vacated its ruling, and ordered argument on the question of Arizona's statutory good-faith exception. It cited this court's decision in State v. Navarro , in which we rejected a claim that the Arizona Constitution provides greater privacy protection as to breath testing. 241 Ariz. 19, ¶ 5, 382 P.3d 1234 (App. 2016). ¶ 5 In a subsequent memorandum, and at oral argument in the city court, Alsarraf maintained A.R.S. § 28-1321 required voluntary consent for any kind of testing. He further argued suppression was required and the good-faith exception set forth in A.R.S. § 13-3925 did not apply. His arguments on the later point paralleled those made by the defendant in State v. Weakland , No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0186, --- Ariz. ----, --- P.3d ----, 2017 WL 5712585 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017) -that there had been no clear, controlling precedent, the law was unsettled, and Butler should have suggested a change even if there had been a precedent before it. ¶ 6 The city court concluded Alsarraf's agreement to the test had not been voluntary and suppression was appropriate. It further concluded that the state had not met its burden to establish that the good-faith exception to the search-warrant requirement applied. It determined that, under either the Fourth Amendment analysis or the statutory good-faith provision, our supreme court's decision in Butler undercut existing law on the admonition in such a way that law enforcement could no longer rely on earlier cases validating the admonition. ¶ 7 The state appealed to the superior court. Relying on our decision in Weakland , --- P.3d ----, 2017 WL 5712585, the respondent judge concluded the good-faith exception applied and reversed the city court's suppression ruling. ¶ 8 In his special-action petition, Alsarraf argues that the respondent failed to defer to the city court's findings as to the totality of the circumstances in determining voluntariness of consent and that the good-faith exception should not apply. Alsarraf contends the respondent did not "giv[e] due deference to the findings of the trial court" that his "consent was involuntarily obtained." But the respondent did not address the voluntariness question directly, instead deciding the matter on a good-faith analysis. Indeed, in view of our supreme court's decision in Valenzuela , Alsarraf's agreement, like that given by Valenzuela, was clearly not voluntary but was given in response to a coercive admonition telling him he was "require[d]" to submit. ¶ 9 On the question of good faith, the respondent determined that, "[a]t the time of [Alsarraf's] arrest, the courts of this state had not concluded the admin per se admonition," which had previously been approved by those courts, "was coercive, ineffective, or otherwise negated consent after Butler ." Relying on Valenzuela and Weakland , the respondent concluded the officers had acted in good faith. Indeed, we rejected Alsarraf's arguments to the contrary in our opinion in Weakland . --- P.3d at ----, 2017 WL 5712585, ¶¶ 10-24. ¶ 10 While he primarily relies on a Fourth Amendment good-faith analysis, Alsarraf also cites § 13-3925, which sets forth Arizona's statutory good-faith exception. That statute provides: If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the trier of fact because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the proponent of the evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should not be kept from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. § 13-3925(B). It further directs, "The trial court shall not suppress evidence that is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation." § 13-3925(C). And it defines a "[t]echnical violation" as "reasonable good faith reliance on ... [a] controlling court precedent that is later overruled, unless the court overruling the precedent orders the new precedent to be applied retroactively." § 13-3925(F)(2)(c). ¶ 11 The statute's directive that actions taken in reliance on "controlling court precedent" are not subject to exclusion closely matches the standard applied in a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule analysis that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." State v. Jean , 243 Ariz. 331, ¶ 40, 407 P.3d 524 (2018), quoting Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 232, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). In this context, particularly in the absence of any distinguishing argument from Alsarraf, we conclude that the good-faith exception under the statute is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment exception. Thus, following our analysis in Weakland , we agree with the respondent that the officer acted in good faith, relying on pre- Valenzuela law in this state. See Weakland , --- P.3d at ----, 2017 WL 5712585, ¶¶ 10-24. ¶ 12 Therefore, although we accept special-action jurisdiction, we deny relief. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield , --- U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2184, breath tests administered as a search incident to arrest do not pose a Fourth Amendment problem. This court, however, has determined that § 28-1321 requires voluntary agreement to a test, as a statutory matter, independent of Fourth Amendment concerns. Diaz v.Bernini , No. 2 CA-SA 2017-0081, ¶¶ 9, 13-14, --- Ariz. ----, --- P.3d ----, 2018 WL 1783113 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2018).

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 These expedited election appeals and cross-appeals raise several issues concerning a political action committee's organizational formation, the adequacy of an initiative title, and whether the trial court erred in finding a sufficient number of valid petition signatures to support placement of the Proposition 127, Renewable Energy Standards Initiative on the November 2018 ballot. We previously issued orders affirming the trial court's rulings that the measure qualifies for the ballot. We now explain our reasoning for those orders. (At the election, the voters rejected the measure, but that does not affect our pre-election decisions.) BACKGROUND ¶ 2 Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona (the "Committee") is a political action committee ("PAC") that sought placement of an initiative measure on the November 2018 general election ballot. To that end, the Committee formed on February 9, 2018, by filing a "statement of organization" with the Secretary of State ("Secretary") on a form provided by her. See A.R.S. § 16-906(A). The statement identified and provided contact information for the Committee's chairperson, treasurer, and bank, as required by § 16-906(B). The statement did not identify a "sponsor." See § 16-906(B)(1)(b), (2) (requiring a statement of organization to list information about "any sponsor"). On receipt of the statement, the Secretary issued an identification number to the Committee, see § 16-906(D), which was then authorized to perform lawful activities, including applying for an initiative petition, see § 16-906(G). ¶ 3 On February 20, the Committee filed an application with the Secretary for an initiative measure that proposes a constitutional amendment to "require electricity providers to generate at least 50% of their annual sales of electricity from renewable energy sources" (the "Initiative"). See A.R.S. § 19-111(A) (setting forth initiative application requirements). The application was printed on a form issued by the Secretary, and it included the Committee's identification number where indicated. Upon receipt of the application, the Secretary assigned the Initiative petition a serial number, see § 19-111(B), which enabled the Committee to gather the 225,963 valid signatures required to qualify the Initiative for the ballot. ¶ 4 Two days after the Committee filed its application with the Secretary, NextGen Climate Action ("NextGen"), a California-based entity, made the first of several substantial contributions to the Committee (totaling more than $4 million in the first and second quarters of 2018 alone) by paying FieldWorks, LLC, about $140,000 to gather petition signatures for the Initiative. NextGen's contributions were publicly reported by the Committee in its mandatory campaign finance reports filed on April 17 and July 14. The Committee did not report receiving any contributions during the period before filing its application with the Secretary on February 20. ¶ 5 Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona, LLC ("CEHA LLC") formed on February 27, and the Arizona Corporation Commission approved its articles of organization on March 22. According to the Committee, CEHA LLC formed to protect the Committee's officers from personal liability. The Committee amended its statement of organization on May 14 to identify CEHA LLC as its "sponsor." See § 16-906(C) (authorizing amendments to the statement of organization). The Committee's campaign finance reports for the first and second quarters of 2018 did not reflect any contributions from CEHA LLC. The Committee did not list NextGen as a sponsor in the amended statement of organization. ¶ 6 FieldWorks hired, registered, and paid more than 1500 circulators to collect signatures supporting placement of the Initiative on the ballot. On July 5, the Committee filed petition sheets containing 480,707 signatures with the Secretary. The Secretary reviewed the sheets for statutory compliance pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-121.01(A) and determined that 454,451 signatures were eligible for verification. She then randomly selected a five percent sample (22,722 signatures) for verification by county recorders for the counties in which the signatories claimed to be qualified electors. See § 19-121.01(B). ¶ 7 Plaintiffs are qualified electors. On July 19, before completion of the signature verification process, they filed a complaint in the trial court against the Secretary, the Committee, all county recorders, and all members of county boards of supervisors, challenging the petition signatures on several bases and seeking to enjoin placement of the Initiative on the ballot. In an interlocutory judgment entered pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim alleging deficiencies in the Committee's statement of organization. The court also dismissed the claims against the county recorders and the board members as unripe. In addition, the court rejected the Committee's argument that Plaintiffs can only challenge petition signatures within the random five percent sample submitted to the county recorders for verification. On expedited appeal and cross-appeal, in an order filed August 20 (with an opinion to follow), this Court affirmed the trial court's interlocutory judgment. ¶ 8 Meanwhile, the county recorders completed their signature review of the five percent sample. After disqualifying some signatures and validating others, they established a 72.37% validity rate. The Secretary applied that rate to the 454,451 signatures eligible for verification, see A.R.S. § 19-121.04(A)(3), and concluded that "the estimated total number of valid signatures is 328,908, which exceeds the 225,963 minimum" number of required signatures. ¶ 9 Plaintiffs filed new complaints against eleven county recorders, alleging they improperly accepted invalid signatures during their reviews. The trial court consolidated these cases with the initial case. Although Plaintiffs raised several challenges, the core issue before the court was whether the Committee had obtained the 225,963 valid signatures required to place the Initiative on the ballot. ¶ 10 A five-day trial of extraordinary logistical complexity began on August 20. Approximately 5500 exhibits were admitted in evidence, some of which were thousands of pages in length, and more than fifty witnesses testified. Plaintiffs subpoenaed more than 1180 witnesses, most of whom were petition circulators. The trial court struck petition signatures gathered by more than 300 circulators because they either did not comply with their subpoenas, see A.R.S. § 19-118(C), or violated statutory requirements when gathering signatures, see A.R.S. §§ 19-112(A), -114(A). Ultimately, the court found that the Committee had gathered a sufficient number of valid signatures to place the Initiative on the ballot and therefore denied Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. On expedited appeal, we affirmed the trial court's judgment in an order filed August 29 (again, with an opinion to follow). ¶ 11 This Court has jurisdiction over this expedited election matter under article 6, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 19-118, -122. As noted above, we previously issued orders affirming both the trial court's initial Rule 54(b) judgment and its final judgment with opinions to follow. We have consolidated the appeals and provide a single opinion to explain our reasoning. DISCUSSION I. The defective statement of organization claim ¶ 12 Plaintiffs argue the Committee filed a defective statement of organization on February 9 by naming CEHA LLC as a sponsor before it existed, failing to name NextGen as a sponsor, and failing to incorporate "NextGen" into the Committee's name. Consequently, Plaintiffs assert, the Committee never properly formed, and the Initiative application was a nullity under § 19-111(A) because a valid statement of organization was not filed with the application. Because § 19-114(B) provides that signatures on initiative petitions "are void and shall not be counted" if collected by a PAC "prior to the filing of the committee's statement of organization," Plaintiffs claim that none of the petition signatures here are valid and the Initiative fails to qualify for the ballot. See Pacion v. Thomas , 225 Ariz. 168, 170 ¶ 12, 236 P.3d 395, 397 (2010) (recognizing that § 19-114(B) disqualifies signatures on initiative petitions collected before formation of a PAC). ¶ 13 The trial court dismissed this claim without deciding whether the statement of organization was defective, ruling that Plaintiffs did not have a private right of action to make this challenge. Alternately, the court found that Plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches. Reviewing the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim de novo as an issue of law, see Coleman v. City of Mesa , 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56 ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012), for the reasons below we affirm the trial court's ruling on the first ground and therefore do not address laches. ¶ 14 Any person may "contest[ ] the validity of an initiative or referendum measure based on the actions of the secretary of state or compliance with [chapter one of Title 19]." § 19-122(C). The issue here is whether the Plaintiffs' challenge based on the statement of organization identifies grounds for invalidating the initiative measure. The Committee argues, and the trial court agreed, that Plaintiffs' claim can only be asserted under Title 16, which sets forth the required contents for a statement of organization and provides remedies for non-compliance. See A.R.S. §§ 16-906(B), -938, -1021. Plaintiffs counter that their claim arises under § 19-122(C) because it challenges both (1) the Secretary's act in accepting a defective application package and issuing an official serial number in violation of § 19-111(A) and (B), and (2) the Committee's failure to file a valid statement of organization with its application as required by § 19-111(A). ¶ 15 Before resolving this issue, it is useful to consider the interplay between Titles 16 and 19 concerning a statement of organization. An entity wishing to form as a PAC to support or oppose an initiative measure must file a statement of organization in compliance with § 16-906(B). That statute directs how a committee must be named and requires the statement of organization to list other information, including "[t]he name, mailing address, e-mail address, website, if any, and telephone number of any sponsor." § 16-906(B)(2). ¶ 16 The statement of organization must be filed with a "filing officer," § 16-906(A), who is either the Secretary, for a statewide ballot measure, or a county, city, or town officer, for a local ballot measure, A.R.S. §§ 16-901(27), -928(A). "On filing a statement of organization, the filing officer shall issue an identification number to the committee," § 16-906(D), which implicitly evidences the statement's compliance with § 16-906(B) and authorizes the now-formed committee to "perform any lawful activity," including making expenditures and advocating for an issue, § 16-906(G). The committee must amend its statement of organization within ten days of any change in committee information. § 16-906(C). Importantly here, nothing in Title 16 provides that if a facially valid statement contains errors or omissions, it is a nullity and voids the PAC's lawful authority. ¶ 17 Title 16 also provides remedies if a PAC's statement of organization fails to comply with § 16-906(B). On receipt of a complaint by a third party, the filing officer who accepted the statement of organization is authorized to investigate a violation of § 16-906 and refer any violation to an "enforcement officer" for further investigation and proceedings. §§ 16-901(21), -938(A), (C), (E). (Depending on the identity of the filing officer, the "enforcement officer" is either the Attorney General, a county attorney, or a city or town attorney. §§ 16-901(21), -938(C).) "The enforcement officer has the sole and exclusive authority to initiate any applicable administrative or judicial proceedings to enforce an alleged violation of [ § 16-906 ]." § 16-938(F). If a violation is found, the committee is permitted to avoid any penalty by taking corrective action within twenty days after issuance of a notice of violation. § 16-938(G). The enforcement officer may also initiate civil or criminal proceedings to enforce provisions of Title 16, including § 16-906. See § 16-1021. ¶ 18 A PAC that proposes a statewide or local initiative measure must apply for an official petition serial number by filing an application with the Secretary on a form provided by her. § 19-111(A). The application must provide identifying information, the text of the proposed initiative, and a 100-word summary of the initiative's principal provisions. Id. ¶ 19 The committee must also simultaneously file "its statement of organization" with the Secretary, and if it fails to do so, she is prohibited from accepting the application. Id. If a committee files an application with an accompanying statement of organization, the Secretary "shall assign an official serial number to the petition," which is affixed to all petition sheets circulated for signatures. § 19-111(B) ; see also § 19-112 (addressing petition signatures). Signatures collected on initiative petition sheets by a PAC or its agents "prior to the filing of the committee's statement of organization are void and shall not be counted in determining the legal sufficiency of the petition." § 19-114(B). ¶ 20 We agree with the trial court that § 19-122(C) does not authorize Plaintiffs to either challenge the Secretary's actions or contest the validity of the Initiative based on the statement of organization's alleged non-compliance with § 16-906(B). Those claims do not arise under Title 19. ¶ 21 First, § 19-111 is not the statutory vehicle for validating a statement of organization. Instead, that statute requires an initiative applicant to file an existing statement of organization, presumably to demonstrate its lawful authority to file an application. There is no requirement in § 19-111 to disclose an existing sponsor, as the dissent repeatedly states. Because a PAC is not formed and cannot perform lawful activities until its statement of organization is filed with the appropriate filing officer under Title 16, § 19-111(A) necessarily contemplates that the statement of organization has previously been filed and an identification number issued under Title 16. See § 19-111(A) (requiring the applicant to file "its statement of organization"). Here, for example, the Committee's application included the statement of organization identification number issued under Title 16. ¶ 22 Second, an applicant satisfies § 19-111(A) by filing its existing statement of organization, even if the statement contains an error or omission. Plaintiffs contend that § 19-111(A) must require a valid statement of organization or applicants could bypass legislative intent by simply jotting "statement of organization" on a paper and filing it. We agree that § 19-111(A) requires an applicant to file a facially valid statement of organization; a bare scribbling would not suffice. But a statement of organization bearing an identification number issued by the appropriate filing officer demonstrates compliance with § 16-906. See supra ¶16. The PAC is formed and may engage in lawful activity, such as filing an initiative application. See §§ 16-906(G), 19-111(A). In short, a statement of organization filed under § 16-906 and accepted by the filing officer, as evidenced by issuance of an identification number, is valid for purposes of § 19-111(A), even if it contains errors or omissions. ¶ 23 Third, the Secretary is statutorily required to assign an official serial number upon the applicant's filing of an application and a statement of organization. See § 19-111(B) ("On receipt of the application [with the accompanying statement of organization], the secretary of state shall assign an official serial number to the petition...."). Nothing in § 19-111, or any other provision in Title 19, authorizes the Secretary to investigate a statement of organization's compliance with § 16-906(B) or to reject an application if a statement is found lacking. Relatedly, nothing in Title 19 authorizes or requires the Secretary to disqualify petition sheets or signatures if the statement of organization, or any amendments to it, did not comply with § 16-906. In contrast, elsewhere in Title 19, the legislature has explicitly stated the Secretary's obligation to investigate the accuracy of initiative-related filings. See, e.g. , § 19-121.01(A)(1)(h) (requiring the Secretary to remove filed initiative petition sheets if the circulator was not properly registered at the time of circulation). ¶ 24 Fourth, and finally, Title 16 establishes exclusive procedures for challenging a statement of organization. As previously explained, a third party can challenge compliance with § 16-906(B) by filing a complaint with the filing officer, who can then investigate and refer any violations to an enforcement officer. See §§ 16-901(21), -938(A), (C), (E). "The enforcement officer has the sole and exclusive authority to initiate any applicable administrative or judicial proceedings to enforce an alleged violation" of the statement of organization requirements. See § 16-938(F). And if a violation is found, the committee is permitted an opportunity to take corrective action before suffering a penalty. § 16-938(G). Interpreting § 19-122(C) as authorizing a plaintiff to file a lawsuit to challenge an initiative measure due to an allegedly defective statement of organization would nullify these Title 16 provisions. Cf. Butler Law Firm, PLC v. Higgins , 243 Ariz. 456, 459 ¶ 7, 410 P.3d 1223, 1226 (2018) ("Statutes relating to the same subject or general purpose should be considered to guide construction and to give effect to all the provisions involved."). ¶ 25 The dissent passionately argues that third parties must be entitled to challenge initiative petition signatures based on a PAC's failure to disclose a sponsor in its statement of organization so that citizens signing petitions are not misled. But the dissent fails to explain why this public protection goal cannot be achieved through Title 16. Here, for example, Plaintiffs could have filed a complaint with the Secretary as early as February and at least by mid-April (after the Committee filed its first required campaign finance report revealing NextGen as a substantial donor) alleging that the Committee's statement of organization was false because it failed to list NextGen as a sponsor. The Secretary could have investigated and referred any violation to the Attorney General, and the Committee could have taken corrective action by disclosing NextGen as a sponsor (if required) or faced an enforcement action that may have nullified its statement of organization and thus its ability to continue to act. The benefit of pursuing the Title 16 remedy early is obvious: waiting until hundreds of thousands of signatures are gathered to address the issue, as the dissent contends should occur, risks disenfranchising citizens who signed petitions because they supported the Initiative. ¶ 26 In sum, even though the Committee was required to file its statement of organization with the initiative application, see § 19-111(A), the statement's contents are not governed by chapter one of Title 19. Further, nothing in Title 19 authorizes the Secretary to reject a facially valid statement that did not, in fact, comply with § 16-906(B). Thus, even if the Committee's statement of organization failed to meet § 16-906(B) 's requirements, that deficiency neither nullified the initiative application under § 19-111(A) nor voided the later-collected signatures pursuant to § 19-114(B). To the extent the court of appeals suggested otherwise in Israel v. Town of Cave Creek , 196 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶ 24 n.7, 993 P.2d 1114, 1119 n.7 (App. 1999), we disapprove it. Plaintiffs' claim did not establish grounds for invalidating the Initiative under § 19-122(C), and the trial court properly dismissed this claim. II. Legally sufficient title ¶ 27 The Initiative's title declares that the measure amends the constitution "to require electricity providers to generate at least 50% of their annual sales of electricity from renewable energy sources." Plaintiffs argue this is false and misleading because the Initiative applies only to electricity providers that are also "public service corporations" and not others, most notably Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power District. We review this issue de novo as a mixed question of fact and law. See Wilmot v. Wilmot , 203 Ariz. 565, 568-69 ¶ 10, 58 P.3d 507, 510-11 (2002). ¶ 28 A "full and correct copy of the Title and text of the measure" must be attached to all petition sheets. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (9); see also §§ 19-112(B), -121(A)(3) (both to same effect). All that is constitutionally and statutorily required is "some title and some text." Arizona Chamber of Commerce & Indus. v. Kiley , 242 Ariz. 533, 541 ¶ 31, 399 P.3d 80, 88 (2017). Nevertheless, in Kromko v. Superior Court , this Court criticized using extraneous "short titles" in petition sheets that "contain[ ] either untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to incite partisan rage." 168 Ariz. 51, 59, 811 P.2d 12, 20 (1991). ¶ 29 The Initiative's title is not deceptive. It accurately states that the measure affects "electricity providers." Although the title does not mention that the Initiative applies only to "public service corporations" that provide electricity, such detail is neither required nor necessary to avoid misleading voters. Cf. id. at 60, 811 P.2d at 21 (noting the initiative title was misleading "if at all" because it was incomplete and concluding that "[w]e cannot say that a title's failure to describe every aspect of a proposed measure always creates the degree of fraud, confusion, and unfairness sufficient to invalidate the petition upon which the title rests"). Importantly, an initiative's title gives notice of the measure's subject matter-no more, no less. See Dennis v. Jordan , 71 Ariz. 430, 439, 229 P.2d 692 (1951) (stating "it is not necessary that the title be a synopsis or a complete index of the legislation that is to follow" but suffices if it "indicate[s], in a general way at least, what is to follow in the way of legislation" and "put[s] anyone having an interest in the subject matter on inquiry" (emphasis removed) (internal quotations omitted) ). The Initiative's title served this purpose by notifying interested parties that the measure imposes renewable-energy-source requirements on "electricity providers." Interested voters are placed on notice to read the Initiative's text for details, which include that the measure applies only to "public service corporations." The trial court correctly rejected Plaintiffs' challenge. III. Sufficient number of valid signatures ¶ 30 The Committee submitted 480,707 signatures to the Secretary, which, if valid, far exceeded the 225,963 signatures required to place the Initiative on the ballot. The trial court invalidated 79,252 signatures for various reasons not at issue here, leaving 401,455 potentially valid signatures. To disqualify the Initiative from the ballot, therefore, Plaintiffs were required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least another 175,493 signatures were invalid (401,455 - 175,493 = 225,962). Cf. McClung v. Bennett , 225 Ariz. 154, 156 ¶ 7, 235 P.3d 1037, 1039 (2010) (stating burden for challenging signatures to candidate nominating petitions). A. Improper circulator registration ¶ 31 Paid circulators who collect signatures for statewide ballot measures must register with the Secretary before circulating petitions. § 19-118(A). Among other information, the registration must include a proper service-of-process address. § 19-118(B)(2). A failure to properly register can result in a circulator's removal or disqualification. § 19-118(A). ¶ 32 The trial court rejected Plaintiffs' request to invalidate 116,098 signatures gathered by circulators who had not designated proper service-of-process addresses on their registration forms. The court reasoned that these circulators were not required to register as "paid circulators," and their failure to provide proper addresses therefore did not invalidate their petition sheets. Plaintiffs argue the court misinterpreted § 19-118(F) 's definition of "paid circulator" and, alternately, erred because the circulators' voluntary registration required them to provide a service-of-process address in compliance with § 19-118(B)(2). ¶ 33 At the time pertinent to events here, § 19-118(F) (2017) provided as follows: For the purposes of this title, "paid circulator": 1. Means a natural person who receives monetary or other compensation that is based on the number of signatures obtained on a petition or on the number of petitions circulated that contain signatures. 2. Does not include a paid employee of any political committee organized pursuant to title 16, chapter 6, unless that employee's primary responsibility is circulating petitions to obtain signatures. (Footnote omitted.) We interpret § 19-118(F) de novo with the goal of effecting legislative intent. See Ryan v. Napier , 245 Ariz. 54, 64 ¶ 41, 425 P.3d 230, 240 (2018). If the provision has only one reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis. Id. If more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we will apply secondary interpretive principles. Id . ¶ 34 We agree with the trial court that the circulators here were not "paid circulators" as defined in § 19-118(F). Section 19-118(F)(1) unambiguously defined "paid circulator" as a person whose compensation is based on the number of signatures collected or petitions circulated. See SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 243 Ariz. 477, 480 ¶ 8, 413 P.3d 678, 681 (2018) ("The best indicator of [legislative] intent is the statute's plain language...."). The circulators here were paid by the hour. Applying the plain language of § 19-118(F)(1), therefore, the circulators were not "paid circulators" required to register. ¶ 35 Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that § 19-118(F)(2) expanded the definition of "paid circulator" to include a PAC employee whose "primary responsibility is circulating petitions to obtain signatures," regardless of the basis for compensation. They assert that the circulators were the Committee's employees and, because their primary responsibilities were circulating petitions, they were "paid circulators" under (F)(2). ¶ 36 Even assuming the circulators were Committee "employees," an issue we do not decide, Plaintiffs' position is contradicted by (F)(2)'s plain language. Subsection (F)(2) did not define "paid circulator" but instead described what the definition in (F)(1) "[did] not include"-employees whose primary responsibility was not circulating petitions. Subsection (F)(2) was an exception, not a rule. The caveat in (F)(2) ("unless that employee's primary responsibility is circulating petitions to obtain signatures") limited the exception and kept the employee category described in the caveat within the definition of "paid circulator" if (F)(1) otherwise applied. ¶ 37 Plaintiffs assert that interpreting § 19-118(F)(1) as setting forth the single definition for "paid circulator" and viewing (F)(2) as an exception is absurd and contrary to the legislative intent, as evidenced by A.R.S. § 19-118.01. In 2017, twenty years after enacting the definition of "paid circulator" in § 19-118(F), the legislature added § 19-118.01, prohibiting circulators from being paid based on the number of signatures collected and declaring any violation a misdemeanor, but left the definition of "paid circulator" in § 19-118(F) intact. 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 52, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.). Thus, anomalously, circulators are prohibited from being paid by the signature but if paid by the signature, they must register. ¶ 38 Sections 19-118(F) and 19-118.01 cannot be reconciled. Cf. State v. Francis , 243 Ariz. 434, 435 ¶ 6, 410 P.3d 416, 417 (2018) (stating that courts seek to give meaning to all intersecting statutes). Even if we interpreted § 19-118(F)(2) as defining "paid circulator" rather than providing an exception to the (F)(1) definition, the conflict with § 19-118.01 would remain because (F)(1) was unaltered. And assuming the 2017 legislature intended to nullify § 19-118(F)(1) and apply (F)(2) as Plaintiffs interpret it, the legislature did not amend § 19-118(F) to reflect that intent. The enactment of § 19-118.01 alone could not alter the plain meaning of § 19-118(F). Cf. UnitedStates v. Price , 361 U.S. 304, 313, 80 S.Ct. 326, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48:20 (7th ed. 2018) ("[C]ourts generally give little or no weight to the views of members of subsequent legislatures about the meaning of acts passed by previous legislatures."). ¶ 39 Rewriting § 19-118(F) to cure the anomaly created by enactment of § 19-118.01 was a task for the legislature, which it undertook the next legislative session. Effective August 3, 2018, § 19-118(F) defines "paid circulator" as "a natural person who receives monetary or other compensation for obtaining signatures on a petition or for circulating petitions for signatures" unless an employee exclusion applies. Had this definition been in effect during the events here, the circulators would have been required to register. But it was not, and the trial court did not err in interpreting the prior version of § 19-118(F) as not applying to circulators paid by the hour. ¶ 40 We also reject Plaintiffs' alternate argument that by voluntarily registering with the Secretary, the circulators were required to provide a proper service-of-process address per § 19-118(B)(2), and their failure to do so should have invalidated all signatures they collected. Section 19-118(B) provides requirements only for "registration required by subsection A," which, as relevant here, applies to "paid circulators." Because the circulators here are not "paid circulators," subsection (A) did not impose the registration requirement that subsection (B) addressed. The circulators' voluntary registration did not require them to comply with subsection (B). ¶ 41 Relatedly, the circulators' declarations that the information in the registration forms was "true, complete, and correct" did not make their registrations "unlawful." See § 19-118(D) (authorizing any person to "challenge the lawful registration of circulators"). Subsections (A) and (B), the only provisions addressing the requirement to register and the form of registration, were inapplicable. Nothing required any registration, voluntary or mandatory, to be made under oath. In short, even assuming the circulators made false declarations, this did not make their registrations "unlawful" and subject to challenge under § 19-118(D). ¶ 42 Our resolution of this issue is consistent with the trial court's ruling that § 19-118(C) applied to disqualify signatures collected by circulators who did not appear at trial after being served with subpoenas. Unlike subsection (B), which applies only to registrations required by subsection (A), subsection (C) has no such restriction: "If a registered circulator is properly served with a subpoena" and fails to appear, "all signatures collected by that circulator are deemed invalid." Thus, if a circulator registers voluntarily, he or she is "a registered circulator" and subsection (C) applies. ¶ 43 In sum, the circulators here were paid on an hourly basis and were therefore not "paid circulators" required to register with the Secretary. Their voluntary registration did not require them to comply with § 19-118(B)(2), and their failure to provide proper service-of-process addresses did not make their registrations "unlawful" and subject to challenge under § 19-118(D). The trial court did not err by refusing to invalidate 116,098 signatures collected by these circulators. B. Exhibit C issues ¶ 44 Plaintiffs attached to their second amended complaint a spreadsheet identifying one or more deficiencies in 384,459 petition signatures ("Exhibit C"). At Plaintiffs' request before trial, and without objection, the trial court ordered the Committee to provide Plaintiffs with a written response to these challenges within eleven days. The Committee complied by providing its own spreadsheet, created from its pre-existing quality control research, identifying which challenged signatures had "no problem," a "potential problem," or were "unreviewed." The Committee failed to make any notation regarding several thousand signature lines because, according to counsel, the Committee had not conducted research regarding those lines. ¶ 45 Plaintiffs moved to strike 272,245 signatures on Exhibit C to which the Committee had responded by noting anything other than "no problem." They argued that Exhibit C was part of the complaint, and the court's order for a response meant the Committee was required to deny the alleged signature deficiencies or they would be admitted, as would occur with any answer. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(6). Relatedly, Plaintiffs later moved to strike about 46,000 signatures based on the Committee's failure to make any responsive notation to those signatures within Exhibit C. The court denied both motions, reasoning its prior order was one for expedited discovery and did not require the Committee to "stipulate or admit" to Plaintiffs' challenges. ¶ 46 Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred because the Committee's "calculated decision not to admit the invalidity of signatures it knew to be invalid should not benefit the Committee." But this argument incorrectly presupposes that the Committee was required to admit or deny the Exhibit C challenges. The court's discussion with counsel that culminated in the order for a response to Exhibit C makes clear that the court entered a discovery order. Nothing required admissions or denials. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions. Cf. State v. Acuna Valenzuela , 245 Ariz. 197, 207 ¶ 11, 426 P.3d 1176, 1186 (2018) ("We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion...."). ¶ 47 Exhibit C was admitted in evidence at trial, and Plaintiffs' political consultants testified and explained how their organizations identified the signature line deficiencies reflected in that document. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to shift the burden of proof to the Committee because it had not responded to or denied many Exhibit C challenges. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning, "the mere fact that you've put on evidence doesn't mean that the burden then shifts. I still have to evaluate the evidence that you put on. And if you haven't met your burden, then the burden doesn't shift and there's nothing that the defendants need to do." ¶ 48 In contesting this ruling, Plaintiffs argue that the burden shifted to the Committee because it "had superior access to the information that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' objections." See Parker v. City of Tucson , 233 Ariz. 422, 432 ¶ 24 n.9, 314 P.3d 100, 110 n.9 (App. 2013) ("[T]here is support for the notion that a party with superior knowledge about and access to evidence regarding certain facts should bear the burden of producing that evidence, rather than charging the adverse party with the task of proving a negative."); Healey v. Coury , 162 Ariz. 349, 354-55, 783 P.2d 795, 800-01 (App. 1989) (upholding jury instruction stating that "the burden of proof as to a matter which is peculiarly within the knowledge or control of the opposite party is placed on that party"). Plaintiffs claim the Committee had superior access to information because it had four months "to conduct quality control" while the petitions circulated whereas Plaintiffs had only two weeks to examine the petitions, and the Committee had access to its circulators to address issues. ¶ 49 The trial court did not err. Plaintiffs did not (and do not here) identify any information within the Committee's control that Plaintiffs could not access. Indeed, in a Herculean effort, Plaintiffs reviewed all petition signatures, challenged 384,459 signatures based on twenty-seven categories of purported deficiencies, and subpoenaed more than 1100 circulators to testify. The fact that the Committee had more time to analyze information does not mean it had superior access sufficient to shift the burden of proof. If that were so, the burden would rarely, if ever, be placed on a challenger in election cases, considering their expedited nature. ¶ 50 Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred by failing to accept Exhibit C as a "summary [or] chart ... to prove the content of voluminous writings." See Ariz. R. Evid. 1006. But Exhibit C was admitted in evidence, and the court relied on it in deciding the challenges, even though the court reviewed some signatures individually. Plaintiffs have not directed us to any ruling refusing to consider this exhibit or requiring them to address each signature individually, and our review of this voluminous record has not turned up one. It appears the issue was not raised to the trial court and is therefore waived. See Ryan , 245 Ariz. at 66 ¶ 53, 425 P.3d at 242. ¶ 51 Finally, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by failing to resolve challenges to 72,014 signatures based on various deficiencies, as set forth in Exhibit C. The court concluded it did not need to address these challenges because invalidating 72,014 signatures would still leave a sufficient number to qualify the Initiative for the ballot. Plaintiffs agree that this group of signature challenges is not dispositive but contends it could be in combination with other challenges. Plaintiffs do not ask us to remand to the trial court to rule on these challenges. Rather, they argue these signatures should be invalidated because "the Committee failed to rebut [the] evidence" on these challenges. But Plaintiffs fail to develop this argument. They do not identify which signatures comprise this group, the bases for objection, or what other evidence impacted these challenges. The Committee asserts it provided rebuttal evidence. In short, we cannot assess whether Plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof as to these challenges, and we do not attempt to do so. See id. To the extent Plaintiffs assert the Committee admitted these challenges or bore the burden to disprove them, we reject those arguments for the reasons previously explained. C. Objection 12: voter registration ¶ 52 The trial court rejected Plaintiffs' Exhibit C "objection 12" that thousands of signatures should be invalidated because the signatories' names and addresses did not match the statewide voter registration database. See §§ 19-112(C) (requiring signatories to be registered voters), -122(B) (designating the "most current version of the general county register statewide voter registration database" as "the official record to be used to determine on a prima facie basis by the challenger that the signer of a petition was not registered to vote at the address given on the date of signing the petition"). Plaintiffs argue the court erred by relieving the Committee of the burden to demonstrate that the signatures were nevertheless valid. ¶ 53 Before addressing Plaintiffs' argument, we consider the Committee's cross-appeal assertion that Plaintiffs were restricted to challenging signatures within the five percent random sample submitted by the Secretary to the county recorders, see supra ¶6, and that the trial court erred by ruling otherwise. This issue is moot considering our holding permitting placement of the Initiative on the ballot. Because the issue is likely to recur, however, we address it to provide guidance in future cases. The issue is a legal one, which we review de novo. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Leija , 244 Ariz. 493, 495 ¶ 10, 422 P.3d 1033, 1035 (2018). ¶ 54 The Secretary is not required to check whether a signatory was a registered voter at the time he or she signed the petition. Instead, the county recorders examine petition signatures in the five percent random sample and certify the number of signatures disqualified for statutorily enumerated reasons, including voter non-registration. See A.R.S. § 19-121.02(A), (B). These certifications establish a signature validity rate, which the Secretary applies to the total number of eligible signatures. See § 19-121.04(A)(3). Section 19-121.03(B) authorizes any citizen to challenge the county recorders' certifications, which, if successful, would change the validity rate. ¶ 55 The Committee argues that because the random sample process provides the only mechanism for reviewing compliance with § 19-112(C) 's voter registration requirement, § 19-121.03(B) necessarily provides the exclusive remedy for challenging signatures on that basis. It adds that permitting a challenge to signatures outside the random sample would be unworkable because it could conflict with the valid signature count derived from the random sample process or result in double counting. ¶ 56 We agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs were entitled to challenge petition signatures outside the random sample based on voter non-registration. Section 19-122(C) authorizes any person to contest an initiative based on "compliance with this chapter," which includes § 19-112(C) 's voter registration requirement. Nothing suggests that § 19-121.03(B) precludes such a challenge. Cf. Kromko , 168 Ariz. at 55-56, 811 P.2d at 16-17 (stating that a former, similar version of § 19-122(C) "permits any citizen to explore beyond the county recorder's certification and question the overall legal sufficiency of an initiative petition," and noting that "[t]he elector status of each signatory ... is only one of the many facets of the court's inquiry into whether a petition is legally sufficient under § 19-122(C)"). ¶ 57 We are not persuaded that permitting a challenge that encompasses signatures outside the random sample would be so unworkable that the legislature could not have intended to authorize it. The random sample process establishes procedures for the Secretary and county recorders to follow to determine whether an initiative has a sufficient number of valid signatures for placement on the ballot. Those officials are not required to exclude any non-compliant signatures identified in a private action under § 19-122(C). If the valid signature count totaled by the Secretary would qualify the measure for the ballot while the count identified by the § 19-122(C) plaintiff would not, the trial court would resolve the conflict as it resolves other conflicts in election challenges. ¶ 58 Turning now to Plaintiffs' challenge, we confront a signature calculation dispute. The trial court found that 116,237 signatures were subject to objection 12 while Plaintiffs contend that the correct number is 179,119. Resolving the dispute is imperative. Even if 116,237 signatures are invalidated, the Initiative petition would still exceed the 225,963 signatures required to place the Initiative on the ballot (401,455 - 116,237 = 285,218). But if Plaintiffs' calculation is correct, the Initiative petition would fail to meet the required mark (401,455 - 179,119 = 222,336). ¶ 59 Plaintiffs have not shown that the trial court erred by finding that objection 12 applied to 116,237 signatures. To support its 179,119 calculation, Plaintiffs rely on a chart created for this appeal, which they say is derived from four trial exhibits. But Plaintiffs do not explain how 179,119 is calculated from the exhibits, which contain more than thirty thousand pages, and our cursory review was unenlightening. ¶ 60 In contrast, the trial court's 116,237 calculation is supported by the record. Objection 12 originally challenged 204,740 signatures. During trial, that number was reduced as signatures subject to objection 12 were invalidated for other reasons. At the start of the final trial day, Plaintiffs informed the court that objection 12 then applied to 117,519 signatures and introduced a demonstrative chart to that effect. See trial exhibit 5687. At the end of the day, Plaintiffs updated the chart to reflect that objection 12 applied to 116,237 signatures. See trial exhibit 5689. ¶ 61 The trial court's finding that objection 12 applied to 116,237 signatures was not clearly erroneous. See Shooter v. Farmer , 235 Ariz. 199, 200 ¶ 4, 330 P.3d 956, 957 (2014). Because invalidating those signatures would not disqualify the Initiative from the ballot, we do not further address the merits of objection 12. D. A.R.S. § 19-118(C) ¶ 62 The trial court applied § 19-118(C) to invalidate numerous signatures gathered by circulators who did not appear at trial after being served with subpoenas. The Committee challenges this ruling on cross-appeal and argues that, as applied here, § 19-118(C) violates the constitutional right of initiative. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 - 2. Because the Initiative qualified for the ballot without the invalidated signatures, we do not address this argument. CONCLUSION ¶ 63 We affirm the trial court's judgment denying injunctive relief to Plaintiffs. ¶ 64 I join fully in the majority's careful disposition of this complex case and write separately only to address an argument made by our dissenting colleagues. As they point out, the majority does not decide whether the NextGen Action Committee is a sponsor for purposes of A.R.S. § 16-906(B). Infra ¶73. The dissent contends that NextGen had to be identified as a sponsor in CEHA's statement of organization and name. I disagree. When § 16-906(B) is properly construed along with other provisions in Title 16, NextGen falls outside the definition of "sponsor" even though it provided nearly all the contributions to CEHA after the political action committee's formation. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs can challenge the adequacy of CEHA's organizational statement or name under A.R.S. § 19-122(C), their claims based on NextGen's alleged status as a sponsor fail. ¶ 65 Section 16-906(B) requires that, if a committee is sponsored, the committee must include the name of its sponsor in the committee's name. Section 16-901(47), in turn, defines a sponsor as "any person that establishes, administers, or contributes financial support to the administration of a political action committee or that has common or overlapping membership or officers with that political action committee." If these two statutes were the only relevant sections of Title 16, our dissenting colleagues might be correct that NextGen is a sponsor of CEHA. Read literally and in isolation, these provisions might suggest that any "person" that establishes or contributes financial support to a political action committee is a "sponsor." That reading is mistaken, however, because we must consider the "context of the statute" when interpreting its meaning. See Glazer v. State, 237 Ariz. 160, 163 ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2015). ¶ 66 Section 16-906 can only sensibly be understood in context. Under A.R.S. § 16-911(B)(9), payments made by a sponsor "for the costs of establishing, administering, and soliciting contributions from its employees, members, executives, stockholders, and retirees" are excluded from the definition of "contribution", which in turn exempts such payments from the campaign finance reporting requirements of A.R.S. § 16-926. Thus, § 16-906 's requirement for the identification of a "sponsor" serves to ensure that the ongoing relationship between an entity and its affiliated political action committee (e.g., one operated by a corporation or labor union) is reflected in the committee's name and organizational statement, as such support is not otherwise required to be reported as campaign contributions. ¶ 67 The rationale for § 16-906(B) is further illuminated by other provisions of Title 16. In that title, there is only one provision that specifically authorizes sponsorship-§ 16-916(B). That section authorizes corporations, limited liability companies, and labor organizations to sponsor a separate segregated fund. Such a fund must register as a political action committee. A.R.S. § 16-916(C)(1). Thus, sponsors are those corporations, LLCs, and unions that create separate segregated funds, and thereby may lawfully use entity resources to support committees that can make direct candidate contributions that may not be permitted for the entities themselves. Such a construction matches federal law, to which our own statutes refer. See A.R.S. § 16-916(C)(5) (referencing 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b) ). ¶ 68 The fact that NextGen made nearly all the contributions to CEHA after its formation-contributions that were publicly reported pursuant to Arizona's campaign finance laws-does not mean that NextGen was a sponsor. Every functioning political action committee is established by some person, and all monetary contributions received by such a committee to some degree support its administration (either directly or by freeing up other funds for administrative costs). But creating a committee or making reportable contributions to it cannot suffice to make someone a sponsor. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the plain language of § 16-906(B), which expressly contemplates that a committee may not be sponsored at all. Moreover, requiring even major contributors to be identified as sponsors would be unworkable, as it would result in unwieldy committee names that could require amendment as contributors change. (This problem is not avoided by the dissent's novel interpretation proposing that only those contributors who "actually" contribute to the administration of the committee, infra at ¶97, qualify as sponsors.) Instead, when considered in context, the term "sponsor" in § 16-906(B) is most reasonably understood as referring to an entity sponsoring an affiliated committee as allowed by A.R.S. § 16-916(B). NextGen is not such an entity. ¶ 69 The dissent seems particularly concerned that not identifying NextGen as a sponsor could perpetrate some great deception on Arizona's citizens. But other provisions of Title 16 address that concern. Contributions made by NextGen to CEHA are subject to periodic reporting requirements-and there is no contention here that those requirements have been violated. Moreover, the legislature has specified when it believes it appropriate for committees to otherwise identify their major funding sources. In its current version, A.R.S. § 16-925(B) requires committees to identify in their campaign advertising the names of the three political action committees "making the largest aggregate contributions to the political action committee making the expenditure and that exceed twenty thousand dollars during the election cycle." This requirement-which did not apply to CEHA because NextGen is not itself a political action committee-is narrower than the statute's predecessor, which applied to contributors broadly and not only other political action committees. See A.R.S. § 16-912.01 (2015). (Incidentally, the principal committee opposing Proposition 127-Arizonans for Affordable Electricity-received all its funding from one source (some $30 million from Pinnacle West Capital Corporation) without identifying that contributor in its name or advertising.) ¶ 70 Our campaign finance and disclosure laws seek to facilitate free and open elections. Those same laws, however, are complicated, technical, and legitimately subject to persons structuring campaign strategies within the existing legal requirements. Those requirements did not require CEHA to identify NextGen as its sponsor. If that conclusion raises concerns about the adequacy of our disclosure requirements, they should be addressed by the legislature, and not by this Court stretching A.R.S. § 16-906(B) to apply in a way neither compelled by the statutory language nor recognized in prior administrative guidance or caselaw. ¶ 71 I join in the majority's analysis regarding the interplay between Title 16 and Title 19 and its conclusion that Plaintiffs may not "contest the validity of the Initiative based on the statement of organization's alleged non-compliance with § 16-906(B)." Supra ¶20; see also supra ¶26. But I share the dissent's concerns regarding the need for full, honest disclosure of those who actually spearhead and fund initiative measures, and the danger of misleading or deceiving petition signers (inadvertently or intentionally) when such information is lacking. In addition, reasonable minds may differ on the meaning and scope of "sponsor" as broadly defined in § 16-901(47), but on that point I join in the Chief Justice's concurring opinion. Given the sharp differences of opinion among the justices on the meaning, overlap, and application of key Title 16 and 19 provisions in this context, legislative review and clarification would be helpful so that everyone knows and complies with the applicable requirements regarding initiatives. ¶ 72 The Committee received millions of dollars-essentially all of its funding-to circulate petitions for its Initiative from one source: "NextGen Climate Action" ("NextGen"), a San Francisco-based organization. Nonetheless, the Committee never disclosed NextGen as its sponsor. This conduct violated Title 19 ( A.R.S. §§ 19-101 to -161) rendering the Committee's petition signatures void. As a result, the Initiative should not have been placed on the ballot. ¶ 73 The majority, however, never reaches this issue. Rather, it concludes that Plaintiffs, as private parties, have no remedy under Title 19. I disagree. Section 19-122(C) allows Plaintiffs to bring a private cause of action to strike the Committee's petition signatures. As a result, while I concur in the remainder of the majority's decision, I dissent on this issue. I. ¶ 74 Plaintiffs allege two separate causes of action under A.R.S. § 19-122(C). The first cause of action alleges that the Initiative is invalid because the Committee violated Title 19. See § 19-122(C) (permitting "[a]n action that contests the validity of an initiative ... based on ... compliance with this chapter"). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Committee failed to disclose NextGen as a sponsor in its statement of organization, committee name, and initiative application. As a result, they contend that the Committee's statement of organization and initiative application are invalid, and all of its petition signatures are void pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-114(B). As to this claim, Plaintiffs have named the Secretary of State as a party solely because she is the public officer responsible for approving the Initiative for placement on the ballot. See A.R.S. § 19-121.04(B) (stating the Secretary of State must certify and approve whether an initiative has a sufficient number of signatures to be placed on the ballot). ¶ 75 Plaintiffs' second claim is based on the actions of the Secretary of State. See § 19-122(C) (permitting "[a]n action that contests the validity of an initiative ... based on the actions of the secretary of state"). Plaintiffs assert that because the Committee failed to disclose NextGen as a sponsor on its statement of organization and initiative application, the Secretary of State should have rejected these "defective" documents and declined to issue the Committee a serial number to circulate initiative petitions. ¶ 76 I agree with the majority's conclusion that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a cognizable claim against the Secretary of State. No statute requires the Secretary of State to investigate or reject a statement of organization or initiative application that appears, on its face, to be complete. Moreover, as a practical matter, when these documents are filed, the Secretary of State does not have the time or information to determine whether they contain errors or omissions. ¶ 77 However, Plaintiffs' first cause of action under § 19-122(C) is distinct from its claim against the Secretary of State. Section 19-122(C), by its terms, provides that "[a]ny person" can "contest the validity of an initiative" based on "compliance with this chapter." In Kromko v. Superior Court , 168 Ariz. 51, 811 P.2d 12 (1991), we recognized that this statute creates a broad private cause of action. There, plaintiffs asserted that defendants' initiative petitions were invalid under § 19-122(C) because they contained misleading, extraneous short title descriptions. Kromko , 168 Ariz. at 53, 57, 811 P.2d at 14, 18. As a general matter, no statute expressly prohibited defendants from placing extraneous short titles on their petitions. Id. at 59, 811 P.2d at 20. However, we held that simply because there was no express prohibition, defendants could not circulate petitions in "any form" they chose, nor could they use "short titles containing ... untrue representations designed to defraud potential signatories." Id. at 59, 811 P.2d at 20. In reaching this conclusion, we stated that fraud in the election process is hard to detect, and that allowing "lay citizens" to assert a cause of action under § 19-122(C) assists in "keep[ing] the circulation process free from fraud." Id. at 56, 811 P.2d at 17 ; see also id. at 59-60, 811 P.2d at 20-21. Thus, we held that § 19-122(C)"permits any citizen to explore" the "overall legal sufficiency of an initiative petition." Id. at 55-56, 811 P.2d at 16-17 (emphasis added); see also Israel v. Town of Cave Creek , 196 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶¶ 24-25 & n.7, 993 P.2d 1114, 1119 n.7 (App. 1999) (holding that a genuine factual dispute existed as to whether defendant's petition signatures were invalid under § 19-114(B) because defendant failed to disclose that he was supported by an "organization" on his referendum application). ¶ 78 In short, Plaintiffs' private cause of action under § 19-122(C) is not limited to whether the Secretary of State should have rejected the Committee's statement of organization or its application. It also is not limited to the information the Committee chose to disclose in these documents. Rather, § 19-122(C) allows Plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action based on the Committee's failure to disclose NextGen as a sponsor. II. ¶ 79 In Arizona, a political action committee ("PAC") must disclose whether it is sponsored by any person or organization. This disclosure requirement is robust. When a PAC files its statement of organization, it must include the "name, mailing address, e-mail address, website, if any, and telephone number of any sponsor." A.R.S. § 16-906(B)(2). Additionally, the "sponsor's name, or commonly known nickname" must be incorporated into the name of the PAC. § 16-906(B)(1)(b). Thus, "[f]or example, if the PAC is established and funded by the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club, the terms 'NRA' or 'Sierra Club' must appear in the PAC's title." See Office of the Sec'y of State, Initiatives and Referenda 6 (2017). ¶ 80 In terms of disclosure, requiring PACs to incorporate sponsors in their committee name has ramifications extending far beyond the statement of organization itself. When a PAC files an application to circulate initiative petitions, it must list its committee name-which necessarily includes the name of any sponsor-on its application. A.R.S. § 19-111(A). Perhaps most importantly, the committee name must be included in campaign advertisements and solicitations. See A.R.S. § 16-925(A)-(D). Thus, a PAC is effectively required to disclose the name of a sponsor in most campaign advertisements and solicitations. See id. ¶ 81 Requiring a PAC to disclose its sponsors is essential to preventing fraud. As stated in Van Riper v. Threadgill , 183 Ariz. 580, 583, 905 P.2d 589, 592 (App. 1995), "it is important for interested parties to know exactly who is backing a referendum drive." Thus, "it is reasonable to require individuals to file a form which discloses whether they are acting alone or in concert with others." Id. ¶ 82 At least one other jurisdiction has enjoined an initiative from being placed on the ballot due to a PAC's failure to disclose a sponsor. In Loontjer v. Robinson , the plaintiff, a private party, sought an injunction to prevent an initiative from being placed on the ballot. 266 Neb. 902, 670 N.W.2d 301, 303-04 (2003). The plaintiff asserted that the defendants violated a statute requiring a PAC, before gathering signatures on an initiative petition, to "file[ ] with the Secretary of State" a "sworn statement containing the names and street addresses of every person, corporation, or association sponsoring the petition." Id. at 307 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1405(1) ). The plaintiff argued that the defendants violated this law by submitting an unsworn statement and omitting the street addresses of individuals and organizations sponsoring the initiative. Id. at 307-09. ¶ 83 The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 309. The court explained that "the sworn statement provision is mandatory" and is not an "onerous" requirement; rather, it promotes accountability and prevents fraud in the initiative process. Id. at 308-09. The court further explained that the sponsor requirement "allows the public to make an informed judgment whether to sign the petition." Id. at 308 ; see also Hamilton Twp. Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Warwick , 180 N.J.Super. 243, 434 A.2d 656, 658 (1981) (holding that a referendum petition was legally insufficient because the petitions did not include the names of the referendum sponsors, and stating that "[t]he evident legislative purpose of the requirement ... is to inform voters, who are solicited for their signatures, who the sponsors of the petition are ... not only to enable the voters to charge the sponsors with responsibility as agents but to guide the voters whether to sign"); cf. Thompson v. Jaeger , 788 N.W.2d 586, 592 (N.D. 2010) ("The obvious purpose of the constitutional mandate that the petition contain the sponsors' names and addresses is to provide material information to potential signers when they contemplate signing the petition."). III. ¶ 84 The majority contends that because Title 16 (specifically, § 16-906(B) ) requires a PAC to disclose its sponsors, then Title 16 necessarily provides the exclusive procedure for enforcing this requirement. See A.R.S. § 16-938. To allow a private party to pursue a separate cause of action under § 19-122(C), it reasons, "would nullify these Title 16 provisions." See supra ¶24. ¶ 85 Neither Title 16 nor Title 19 supports such a narrow construction. As noted above, § 19-122(C) creates a broad private cause of action for violations of Title 19; the statute, by its terms, does not limit or bar an action simply because a related government enforcement action exists under Title 16. ¶ 86 Here, the Committee violated both Title 16 and Title 19. Specifically, § 16-906 and § 19-111(A) required the Committee to file a statement of organization with the Secretary of State. This document, regardless of whether it was filed pursuant to § 16-906 or § 19-111(A), required the Committee to disclose the name of any sponsor. See supra ¶79. Additionally, before the Committee could circulate any petitions, it had to file an initiative application disclosing the name of any sponsor. See supra ¶80. ¶ 87 Allowing Plaintiffs to bring a private cause of action under § 19-122(C) does not render the available Title 16 remedy superfluous. Government enforcement actions under Title 16 are separate and distinct from Title 19 proceedings. Title 16 "contains a comprehensive statutory scheme governing election campaign finance," whereas Title 19 "governs initiatives and referenda." Pacion v. Thomas , 225 Ariz. 168, 169 ¶ 6, 170 ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 395, 396, 397 (2010). In addition, the two statutory schemes provide different remedies. "The legislature expressly chose in § 19-114(B) to disqualify signatures on initiative and referendum petitions obtained before formation of a [PAC], yet [under Title 16] provided only a civil penalty for violations of the campaign finance statutes governing candidates." Id. at 170 ¶ 12, 236 P.3d at 397. ¶ 88 The fines and suspensions provided under Title 16 are not designed to fully address a Title 19 violation. See A.R.S. § 16-937(A)-(D) ; § 16-938(A), (C)(1), (E)(2), (F)-(I) (discussing the imposition of fines and suspensions for violations of Title 16). When a PAC conceals the name of a sponsor during the petition signature process, voters may sign the petition without knowing exactly who is sponsoring the initiative. In short, voters are deprived of information that may have affected their decision to sign the petition. See supra ¶¶81-83. Imposing a fine or suspension after the voters have signed the petitions under these circumstances is not an adequate remedy. Rather, the proper remedy is to strike the signatures that were obtained under these misleading circumstances. See § 19-114(B). ¶ 89 However, as support for its argument that Title 16 provides the exclusive remedy, the majority contends that here, the voters could have been protected from the Committee's failure to disclose its sponsor "through Title 16" "as early as February and at least by mid-April." See supra ¶25. There are several flaws in this argument. Based on the record, nothing would have alerted Plaintiffs that NextGen was a sponsor in February. The Committee's original statement of organization and application certainly make no reference to NextGen. Indeed, there were no public filings indicating NextGen's role as sponsor until the Committee's April 17 campaign finance report. As noted above, for the thousands of uninformed voters who may have signed the initiative petitions before that date, Title 16 does not provide a suitable remedy. See supra ¶88. ¶ 90 More importantly, assuming there was sufficient information to initiate a Title 16 action by mid-April, it does not follow that Plaintiffs are, as a matter of law, precluded from bringing an action under Title 19. If a Title 16 action had been initiated in April, this might have allowed the Committee to correct its defective filings and obtain enough signatures to place the Initiative on the ballot. But the duty to comply with the law is on the Committee, and its failure to do so is not grounds to abrogate the important right of all citizens in this state to pursue a private cause of action under § 19-122(C). In some circumstances early detection of fraud might not be possible; there is no guarantee that such conduct will come to light before the filing deadline for initiative petitions. Section 19-122(C) serves as an important backstop in keeping the initiative circulation process free from fraud. As we stated in Kromko , "fraudulent conduct in connection with the circulation or signing of a petition may be very difficult for even state officials to detect," and therefore a private cause of action under § 19-122(C) is vital "to keep[ing] the circulation process free from fraud." 168 Ariz. at 56, 811 P.2d at 17. In short, if the legislature's goal is to prevent fraud and ensure that the public knows who is sponsoring a PAC, that goal is best served by allowing enforcement actions under both Title 16 and Title 19. IV. ¶ 91 The question, then, is whether NextGen is a sponsor. If it is, the Committee violated Title 19 and the Initiative is invalid. A. ¶ 92 In Arizona, a sponsor is defined broadly. It includes "any person" that "establishes," "administers," "contributes financial support to the administration of [a PAC]," or that has "common or overlapping membership or officers" with a PAC. A.R.S. § 16-901(47). Additionally, the term "[p]erson" is defined as "mean[ing] an individual or a candidate, nominee, committee, corporation, limited liability company, labor organization, partnership, trust, association, organization, joint venture, cooperative or unincorporated organization or association." § 16-901(39). ¶ 93 Section 16-901(47), by its terms, does not apply to a person or an organization that simply contributes money to a PAC. N. Valley Emergency Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana , 208 Ariz. 301, 303 ¶ 9, 93 P.3d 501, 503 (2004) (explaining that a statute's language is "the best and most reliable index" of its meaning (citation omitted) ). Rather, the contributions must be directed "to the administration of " a PAC. § 16-901(47) (emphasis added). Stated another way, a person or organization is not a sponsor unless it can be proven that they actually contributed funds to pay the administrative costs and expenses necessary to operate a PAC. ¶ 94 The statute's legislative history supports this construction. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris , 234 Ariz. 343, 345 ¶ 13, 322 P.3d 160, 162 (2014) (stating that if a statute's language is ambiguous, we will consider its relevant legislative history in construing its meaning). The current definition was proposed by the Secretary of State and was drafted to make it clear that the term "sponsor[ ]" applies to "groups that establish, administer or contribute financial support to the administration of the committee, rather than just making contributions to the committee ." Ariz. H.R. Minutes of Comm. on Judiciary , 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 7 (Mar. 17, 1994) (emphasis added). ¶ 95 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bales contends that the term "sponsor" only applies to corporations or labor unions that establish "separate segregated funds" to make financial contributions to political candidates. See supra ¶¶66-67; see also § 16-916(B), (C)(1)-(2) (stating that corporations and labor unions may sponsor a separate segregated fund to support political candidates and that such funds must register as a PAC). I disagree. ¶ 96 In Arizona, sponsors are defined broadly, and include virtually any individual or group. See supra ¶92. Our statutes do not limit the definition of a sponsor to corporations and labor unions establishing separate segregated funds. See supra ¶92. Indeed, the Secretary of State, who drafted the current statutory definition, has not restricted the application of sponsor to corporate and union PACs. See supra ¶79. In contrast, the Legislature has specifically limited the application of statutes regarding PACs based on "separate segregated funds" to those "established by a corporation, limited liability company, labor organization or partnership." § 16-901(45). ¶ 97 Chief Justice Bales' concern that Arizona's broad statutory definition of a sponsor results in "unwieldy committee names" and eliminates unsponsored PACs is based on the unwarranted assumption that any person or organization contributing money to a PAC qualifies as a sponsor. See supra ¶68. As noted above, a person or group does not qualify as a sponsor simply by contributing to a PAC. See supra ¶¶93-94. Rather, a sponsor is limited to those persons or organizations that actually contribute "to the administration of" a PAC. See supra ¶¶93-94. B. ¶ 98 Title 19 requires a PAC to file a statement of organization and an initiative application listing the name of any sponsor. See supra ¶¶79-86. A PAC is not authorized to conceal or omit the identity of a sponsor in these documents; to permit such a noncompliant, defective filing would render the filing provisions in §§ 19-111(A) and -114(B) meaningless. See State v. Thompson , 204 Ariz. 471, 475 ¶ 10, 65 P.3d 420 (2003) (stating that "we avoid constructions that would render statutes invalid or parts of them meaningless"). ¶ 99 When a PAC files a statement of organization or initiative application that fails to disclose a sponsor, such documents are invalid, and do not satisfy the filing requirements of § 19-111(A). As a result, pursuant to § 19-114(B), any signatures obtained based on such defective filings are void. See Israel , 196 Ariz. at 155 ¶ 24 n.7, 993 P.2d at 1119 n.7 ("We note that a failure to make a required organizational listing does not, strictly speaking, invalidate an application under A.R.S. § 19-111(A). Instead, pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-114(B), it invalidates any signatures obtained on referendum petitions circulated pursuant to an insufficient application. The effect, however, is the same, for it renders an insufficient application a futility."); cf. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey , 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 815 N.E.2d 1107, 1109, 1112, 1114 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that a pre-circulation "certified copy" of initiative petition "filed" before a proponent circulated and obtained the requisite signatures was invalid; evidence showed that pre-circulation petition was, in fact, not properly attested under the statutory definition of a "certified copy," thus invalidating initiative petition). C. ¶ 100 The Committee's lack of disclosure began when it filed its original statement of organization and its initiative application. The Committee did not list a sponsor in either of these documents. It also did not incorporate the name of any sponsor in its committee name. Rather, the Committee represented that it was an unsponsored PAC until May 14, 2018. Then, for the first time, it listed the LLC as a sponsor in its amended statement of organization. ¶ 101 The facts, however, show that the Committee was a sponsored PAC after the LLC was formed. Daryl Tattrie served as the Committee's Treasurer and as one of the LLC's "Members." Thus, the LLC qualified as a sponsor because it shared "common or overlapping membership" with the Committee. § 16-901(47). Indeed, counsel for the Committee conceded that the LLC was a sponsor. Nonetheless, the Committee waited over two months to disclose the fact that it was a sponsored PAC. ¶ 102 Perhaps this was a careless oversight. But this pattern of nondisclosure continued with NextGen. The Committee did not list NextGen as a sponsor in either its original or amended statement of organization. Additionally, the Committee has never incorporated NextGen into its committee name. ¶ 103 The Committee's campaign finance reports, however, show that NextGen was a sponsor. Indeed, NextGen helped establish the Committee and has been involved in administering the Committee since its inception. See Mathieu v. Mahoney , 174 Ariz. 456, 457 n.1, 851 P.2d 81, 82 n.1 (1993) (stating that this Court may take judicial notice of public records filed with the Secretary of State). In its first-quarter report, the Committee's Treasurer avowed that, at the time the Committee registered as a PAC, it had no cash on hand. See A.R.S. § 16-907(I) (requiring a PAC to "report all contributions, expenditures and disbursements that occurred before qualifying as a committee" (emphasis added) ). The Committee's first contribution came from NextGen on February 22, 2018, or just two days after it filed its application to begin circulating initiative petitions. See § 19-111(A)-(B) ; A.R.S. § 19-121(A). This in-kind contribution of $141,666.67 was for "Goods/Services" for "Petition Gathering through Fieldworks, LLC," and was used to assist in "register[ing] 1,652 circulators to collect signatures on behalf of the Initiative." Additionally, the initial report shows that on March 31, 2018, NextGen gave the Committee a $65,680.00 in-kind contribution for "Staffing and Overhead." ¶ 104 Throughout the petition circulation process, virtually all of the Committee's funding and in-kind support came from NextGen. In short, NextGen provided the only viable source of funding to operate and administer the Committee. The Committee's first-quarter report (filed April 17) shows it received $957,346.67 from NextGen, while all other contributions were $0. Indeed, from the Committee's inception until the petitions were filed on July 5, NextGen contributed $6,857,346.67 to the Committee; all other contributions combined were $318.36. See Clean Energy for a Healthy Ariz., Campaign Finance Report: Amended 2018 6th Report (1st Quarter) (2018), https://apps.azsos.gov/apps/election/cfs/search/PublicReports/2018/6970C81E-5195-4311-92F0-75B5A05F2F80.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GMR-3896]; Clean Energy for a Healthy Ariz., Campaign Finance Report: Amended 2018 7th Report (2nd Quarter) (2018), https://apps.azsos.gov/apps/election/cfs/search/PublicReports/2018/8857E34A-F8E7-43EE-BCFA-A66A8C654176.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK6W-9AV7]; Clean Energy for a Healthy Ariz., Campaign Finance Report: 2018 8th Report (Pre-Primary) (2018), https://apps.azsos.gov/apps/election/cfs/search/PublicReports/2018/874642B3-5BC9-4915-B5BE-DC12977922DA.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ADD8CWJ]. V. ¶ 105 Under the Arizona Constitution, the people of Arizona have the power to propose and enact laws by initiative. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (1)-(2). However, our citizens also have the right to an initiative process that is transparent and free from fraud. Thus, we recognized in Kromko that citizens should not be deprived of the right to challenge "the legal sufficiency of initiatives" because [t]his would run counter to the general spirit of the initiative and referendum, which recognizes "no reason why the interest of a citizen may not be as great in preventing an initiative petition not legally sufficient from being submitted to a vote as in compelling that one legally sufficient should be so submitted." Kromko , 168 Ariz. at 56, 811 P.2d at 17 (quoting Barth v. White , 40 Ariz. 548, 553, 14 P.2d 743 (1932) ); cf. Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 12 (stating the legislature has the authority to enact "registration and other laws to secure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise"). ¶ 106 Here, the Committee is proposing an amendment to the Arizona Constitution. If enacted, this measure is immune to repeal by the legislature. Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (6)(B). Additionally, the legislature may not amend it unless such amendment passes by a three-fourths supermajority in each house and furthers the purpose of the measure. Id. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1 (6)(C). On a matter of such great public importance, it is not too onerous to require the Committee to follow the law and disclose its sponsor to the voters. ¶ 107 The Committee suggests, however, that even if NextGen qualified as a sponsor, its support of the Initiative was fully disclosed in its campaign finance reports. These reports do show NextGen's financial contributions to the Committee. However, this information was not available to the people who signed the Initiative petitions before the Committee filed its first campaign finance report on April 17. And, of course, if the Committee had properly disclosed NextGen as a sponsor, voters may well have learned that NextGen was sponsoring the Initiative when-by virtue of the committee name-they read the Committee's solicitation letters or watched its campaign advertisements. ¶ 108 In either case, it is not up to the Committee to decide how it will comply with the law. It must comply with both the campaign finance requirements of Title 16 and the sponsor disclosure requirements of Title 19. Here, Title 19 required the Committee to disclose NextGen as a sponsor. It is no defense that the Committee believed the disclosure laws were not very effective, or that there were "better" ways to disclose NextGen as a sponsor. It is also no defense that other PACs, including those opposing the Initiative, may have failed to disclose their sponsors. See supra ¶69. No person or organization is above the law, and regardless of its political position on an initiative, a PAC must disclose its sponsors. VI. ¶ 109 Finally, although the majority does not address this issue, I would reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim on the grounds of laches. Plaintiffs filed their § 19-122(C) claim ten business days after the Committee filed its initiative petitions with the Secretary of State. This does not constitute delay, much less unreasonable delay; indeed, filing suit before the Committee filed its petitions would raise issues of ripeness. ¶ 110 Although NextGen's financial contributions have been available to the public since April 2018, it would be unreasonable to expect private parties to investigate and call attention to potential legal violations at the risk of foreclosing a then-unripe private cause of action-especially where there is no guarantee that a circulating initiative measure will garner the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot. See Senate of Cal. v. Jones , 21 Cal.4th 1142, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810, 988 P.2d 1089, 1097 (1999) ("It would place an unreasonable and unrealistic burden on those who may wish to challenge an initiative measure, as well as on the courts, to adopt a rule that would require any preelection challenge to an initiative measure to be brought while petitions still are being circulated and prior to the time that a measure qualifies for the ballot."). Thus, because no delay occurred, laches does not bar Plaintiffs' claim. The record does not support the factual foundation for Plaintiffs' argument. As noted above, see supra ¶ 2, the February 9 statement of organization did not list a sponsor. CEHA LLC was identified as a sponsor in the amended statement of organization after CEHA LLC was formed. Also, because NextGen had not made any financial contributions to the Committee as of February 9, and Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence that NextGen otherwise established or administered the Committee as of that date, nothing supports the allegation that NextGen served as a sponsor when the Committee filed the February 9 statement of organization. See A.R.S. § 16-901(47) (defining "sponsor"). Nevertheless, because we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' defective statement of organization claim on a procedural ground, we do not delve further into its merits. Plaintiffs did not specify whether the burden should shift concerning all or only a portion of the challenged signatures. On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the court's failure to shift the burden requires invalidation of 272,245 signatures. The Secretary of State's handbook is entitled to some weight. Arizona law requires that the Secretary of State, each election cycle, "publish an initiative, referendum and recall handbook that provides guidance on interpreting, administering, applying and enforcing the laws relating to initiative, referendum and recall."A.R.S. § 19-119.02. According to Plaintiffs, the Committee asserts that the Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona, LLC (the "LLC") was its sponsor during this period. Characterizing the Committee's argument in this way, Plaintiffs argue the LLC could not have been a sponsor because it did not come into existence until February 27. Plaintiffs misunderstand the Committee's position. As noted above, the Committee asserts that it had no sponsor during this period.

BREARCLIFFE, Judge: ¶ 1 Angel Soza petitions for special action relief from the respondent judge's order reversing a Tucson City Court judge's order suppressing breath-test evidence obtained incident to his lawful arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). This case presents a legal question of statewide significance, see State v. Superior Court , 198 Ariz. 109, ¶ 2, 7 P.3d 118 (App. 2000), and of first impression, see State ex rel. Romley v. Martin , 203 Ariz. 46, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142 (App. 2002) : whether the exclusionary rule is a remedy for the warrantless taking of a breath test incident to a lawful arrest but in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1321. We therefore accept special action jurisdiction. But, because we conclude the respondent judge properly reversed the city court ruling, we deny relief. Factual and Procedural History ¶ 2 In August 2015, Soza was arrested for driving while impaired to the slightest degree and driving while having a blood alcohol concentration in excess of .08. See A.R.S. §§ 28-1381(A)(1), (2). After his arrest, he was given an administrative admonition like that rejected by our supreme court in State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, 371 P.3d 627 (2016), including the language, "Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily substance ... to determine alcohol concentration or drug content." Id. ¶ 5. He then submitted to a breath test. ¶ 3 Soza filed a motion to suppress in Tucson City Court, arguing his breath test was subject to the Fourth Amendment, because, under Valenzuela , the admonition was coercive, and Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) did not apply. Birchfield , which held that the Fourth Amendment permitted warrantless breath tests as a search incident to arrest, was inapplicable, he argued, because Arizona "has long accorded 'implied consent' breath tests protection under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis." The state responded that breath tests are lawful searches when incident to arrest under Birchfield and State v. Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19, 382 P.3d 1234 (App. 2016). It asserted that Soza's consent had been voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, but, even if involuntary, the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the officer's good faith belief that the admonition was proper. Finally, it argued that suppression was unwarranted under the implied consent statute, even assuming a violation of § 28-1321. ¶ 4 The city court granted Soza's motion to suppress, concluding the admonition violated § 28-1321 and rendered his consent involuntary. The court determined the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because, after our supreme court's decision in State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609 (2013), no binding precedent supported giving the admonition. The state appealed to the superior court, arguing the city court had erred by concluding § 28-1321 had been violated, by failing to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and by finding that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not apply to breath tests taken in violation of § 28-1321. It also argued that "whether exclusion is an appropriate remedy for violation of" § 28-1321 must be addressed separately from Fourth Amendment exclusion. The respondent judge reversed the city court's ruling, concluding that, pursuant to our decision in State v. Weakland , 244 Ariz. 79, 418 P.3d 446 (App. 2017), the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply, and it therefore did not need to address the other grounds raised by the state. Soza then filed the instant petition for special action relief. ¶ 5 Soza argues that the breath-test evidence must be excluded because he did not voluntarily agree to the test, and therefore the evidence was not obtained in compliance with § 28-1321, which directs that "[i]f a person under arrest refuses to submit to the test" "[t]he test shall not be given." The state argues that, even if the officer failed to comply with the statute, suppression of the evidence was not required. Principles of Law and Analysis Implied Consent and Chemical Testing ¶ 6 Arizona adopted an implied consent regime in 1969. See 1969 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1. The statute provided: Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent ... to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 1969 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1. The statute further dictated, "If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test ... none shall be given." Id. The statute directed the Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend the arrested person's license for so refusing. Id. ¶ 7 As our supreme court recognized, "[t]he purpose of the Implied Consent Law is to remove from the highways of this state drivers who are a menace to themselves and to others because they operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Campbell v. Superior Court , 106 Ariz. 542, 546, 479 P.2d 685, 689 (1971). In upholding the laws against constitutional challenge, the Campbell court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), which held that a blood draw did not violate the Fourth Amendment when taken based on exigent circumstances and as a search incident to arrest, and State v. Berg , 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Pina , 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963), its own opinion which had upheld forcibly-administered breath tests. Campbell , 106 Ariz. at 547, 479 P.2d at 690. As to the taking of a test after an arrestee's refusal, the court explained, the law "does not give a person a 'right' to refuse to submit to the test[,] only the physical power." Id. at 549, 479 P.2d at 692. ¶ 8 Subsequently, in State v. Cocio , 147 Ariz. 277, 709 P.2d 1336 (1985), and State v. Brita , 154 Ariz. 517, 744 P.2d 429 (App. 1987), approved in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 158 Ariz. 121, 761 P.2d 1025 (1988), our courts limited the admissibility of blood-draw evidence taken under the implied consent statutes. In Cocio , the court did so by limiting admission of warrantless blood-draw evidence to that taken by medical personnel for a medical purpose and under exigent circumstances. 147 Ariz. at 286, 709 P.2d at 1345. And in Brita , it did so by barring admission of warrantless blood-draw evidence taken by law enforcement officers pre-arrest but with consent obtained after the giving of an implied consent admonition. 158 Ariz. at 123, 761 P.2d at 1027. The court of appeals in Brita concluded, and our supreme court agreed, that the implied consent statutes provided "the only circumstances in which a blood sample may be seized from a person suspected of driving while intoxicated." Brita , 154 Ariz. at 521, 744 P.2d at 433. And this did not include the pre-arrest drawing of blood without a warrant. Id . This court noted it had "assumed ... that a violation by police officers" of the statutes "would give rise to exclusion of evidence thereby obtained, just as would a violation of a constitutional right under the [F]ourth [A]mendment. The state does not argue otherwise in this case." Id. at 522 n.2, 744 P.2d at 434. In approving that analysis, our supreme court concluded suppression was appropriate. Brita, 158 Ariz. at 123, 761 P.2d at 1027. ¶ 9 Later, in Collins v. Superior Court , 158 Ariz. 145, 146-47, 761 P.2d 1049, 1050-51 (1988), stating that its decisions in " Cocio and Brita [we]re dispositive of th[e] matter," our supreme court concluded that, when blood was drawn after the defendant had refused a test, even pursuant to a search warrant, it was not admissible. In so doing, the court relied on decisions from several other states, noting they had also concluded that blood taken pursuant to a warrant was inadmissible because the implied consent laws did not provide for taking of blood evidence by warrant. Id. ¶ 10 "In what obviously was a response to the court's holding in Collins , the legislature amended the statute in 1990." State v. Clary , 196 Ariz. 610, ¶ 12, 2 P.3d 1255 (App. 2000) ; see also State v. Stanley , 217 Ariz. 253, 257, 172 P.3d 848, 852 (App. 2007). "The 1990 amendment provides that if an arrested person refuses to submit to the designated test, 'the test shall not be given, except ... pursuant to a search warrant.' " Clary , 196 Ariz. 610, ¶ 12, 2 P.3d 1255 (quoting 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 375, § 7). In Clary , this court discussed that change and further determined that reasonable, physical force could be used to obtain a blood test pursuant to a warrant. Id. ¶ 15. We noted the legislature's "heightened legislative effort" in the years since Campbell as evidence of a "policy shift" under which "simple revocation of a driver's license for failure to consent to a chemical test" was no longer "a sufficient sanction." Id. ; see also Koller v. Ariz. Dep't. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div. , 195 Ariz. 343, ¶ 25, 988 P.2d 128 (App. 1999) (noting policy shift towards increasing criminal penalties and facilitating prosecution of DUIs). ¶ 11 A decade later, in Carrillo v. Houser , 224 Ariz. 463, ¶ 4, 232 P.3d 1245 (2010), our supreme court revisited the implied consent statutes, concluding that § 28-1321"generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer [a] test without a warrant unless the arrestee expressly agrees to the test." Carrillo , 224 Ariz. 463, ¶ 1, 232 P.3d 1245. Thus, the mere fact that the defendant does not resist the test is insufficient under the statute; consent must be express. Id . ¶ 19. The court explained that the consent requirement "assures that no physical violence or coercion will occur against a person who is non-cooperative with a law officer's effort to obtain necessary chemical evidence of intoxication." Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Sherrill v. Dep't of Transp. , 165 Ariz. 495, 498, 799 P.2d 836, 839 (1990) ). The court pointed out that prompt license suspension was the method the legislature had chosen: "Rather than statutorily authorizing the warrantless administration of tests on such persons, the legislature instead deemed a failure to expressly agree to be a refusal, thus expanding the class of arrestees subject to administrative sanctions." Id. ¶ 13. The court further explained that it was "resolv[ing] th[e] case as a matter of statutory interpretation," and was not "address[ing] any constitutional issues raised by Carrillo," although it cited Schmerber parenthetically. Id. ¶ 21. It remanded the case to the lower court to determine if Carrillo had expressly agreed to the blood draw. Id. ¶ 22. ¶ 12 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court, in Missouri v. McNeely , determined that "the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream" did not provide a "per se exigency" justifying "an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement" for blood draws. 569 U.S. 141, 145, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). Any exigency must be determined from the totality of the circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. Id . After McNeely , our supreme court, in Valenzuela , returned to the question of consent in response to the implied consent admonition. 239 Ariz. 299, 371 P.3d 627. It concluded that both blood and breath tests were subject to Fourth Amendment protections and, although such tests could be taken after consent, consent gained after an admonition that consent was required was coerced. Id . ¶¶ 10 -11, 22. And further that, unless evidence was presented that the coercive effect of such an admonition was dispelled, the results of any subsequent tests would be inadmissible. Id . ¶ 31. The Valenzuela court acknowledged that it was deciding the case while awaiting the United States Supreme Court's consideration of two cases involving warrantless chemical testing. Id . n.2. ¶ 13 Shortly thereafter, in Birchfield , the United States Supreme Court, for Fourth Amendment purposes, distinguished between blood draws and breath tests in the context of a search incident to arrest. --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160. The Supreme Court concluded that, unlike blood draws, breath tests do not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns." Id. at 2176 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc. , 489 U.S. 602, 626, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ). Thus, the Court concluded that breath tests could be conducted as a search incident to arrest without a warrant. Id. at 2185. After Birchfield , this court rejected a claim that the Arizona Constitution gave greater protection than the U.S. Constitution to DUI arrestees as to breath tests. Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19, ¶ 5, 382 P.3d 1234. Navarro noted that, sixteen years before the implied consent laws were adopted in Arizona, the court in Berg , 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261, had held that the taking of warrantless breath tests did not violate either Article 2, § 8 or § 10 of the Arizona Constitution. Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19, ¶ 4, 382 P.3d 1234. However, Navarro did not address whether a court must exclude evidence of a breath test taken in violation of § 28-1321. Id. n.3. ¶ 14 In Diaz v. Bernini , we returned to the question "left open in Navarro -whether suppression [of breath test results] is required under Arizona's implied consent statute." 244 Ariz. 417, ¶ 9, 419 P.3d 950 (App. 2018). Citing Brita , we concluded that "the required agreement to testing under § 28-1321 must be voluntary. If it is not, the officer has not secured a statutorily required pre-condition to conduct testing, and the officer has taken the sample unlawfully." Diaz , 244 Ariz. 417, ¶ 14, 419 P.3d 950. We strongly implied that a defendant's consent gained after an admonition such as that condemned in Valenzuela would be deemed coerced under § 28-1321 as well, and any resulting search unlawful and resulting evidence inadmissible. Diaz , 244 Ariz. 417, ¶ 14, 419 P.3d 950. However, because the defendant had given express consent in response to an admonition without the language deemed coercive in Valenzuela , we ruled the tests results were admissible. Diaz , 244 Ariz. 417, ¶¶ 18, 20, 419 P.3d 950. Significantly, Diaz stopped short of actually reaching the question left open by Navarro as to whether a court must exclude evidence of a breath test taken in violation of § 28-1321. ¶ 15 Here, the officer who arrested Soza read him a coercive admonition telling him he was "require[d]" to submit to testing. See Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 5, 371 P.3d 627. Soza thereafter submitted to a breath test. No warrant required by § 28-1321 was obtained before the test was administered. Id . ¶ 10. The trial court found that Soza's consent to the test, coming after the admonition, was not voluntarily given. For the purposes of this opinion, we will assume without deciding that Soza's consent was involuntary as found by the trial court. Consequently, because there was no consent and no warrant, the breath test violated § 28-1321. ¶ 16 Because a warrantless, non-consensual breath test incident to a lawful arrest does not raise significant privacy concerns so as to violate the U.S. Constitution or Arizona Constitution, Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2184 ; Navarro , 241 Ariz. 19, ¶ 5, 382 P.3d 1234, we must now address the question left open by Diaz and Navarro -whether suppression of warrantless and non-consensual breath-test evidence is required under § 28-1321. We conclude that it is not because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to § 28-1321. Exclusionary Rule ¶ 17 The federal courts have long applied the exclusionary rule to remedy violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, but only in limited circumstances to statutory violations. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon , 548 U.S. 331, 348, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006) (recognizing application of exclusionary rule for certain Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations but not for violation of consular notice law). "The few cases in which we have suppressed evidence for statutory violations ... the excluded evidence arose directly out of statutory violations that implicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests." Id . (citing McNabb v. United States , 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), and Miller v. United States , 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) ); cf. Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 599, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (suppression not required where manner of lawful search violated law). ¶ 18 The United States Supreme Court first adopted the exclusionary rule over 100 years ago. See Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). A half century later, the Court imposed the rule on the states as a matter of constitutional doctrine. Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In the years following, the Arizona Supreme Court, alluding to the supremacy clause of Article VI, clause 2, of the United States Constitution, overruled a series of search and seizure cases in light of Mapp . State v. Pina , 94 Ariz. 243, 245, 383 P.2d 167 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Yuma Cty. Attorney v. McGuire , 111 Ariz. 437, 532 P.2d 157 (1975). A few decades later, however, the United States Supreme Court retreated from Mapp , recognizing the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created" doctrine that is "prudential rather than constitutionally mandated," Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott , 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998), and that any "reflexive" application of the doctrine was "expansive dicta," not required by the Constitution, Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (suppression not "a personal constitutional right," and the Fourth Amendment "says nothing about suppressing evidence"). ¶ 19 The supremacy clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Arizona Constitution compel our courts to follow rulings of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal statutory and constitutional interpretation. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 3 ; see McLaughlin v. Jones , 243 Ariz. 29, ¶ 37, 401 P.3d 492 (2017). Beyond matters of federal statutory and constitutional interpretation, state courts are bound by state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."); see Pool v. Superior Court , 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984) (decisions of United States Supreme Court are binding with regard to interpretation of federal constitution; interpretation of state constitution is the province of state courts). ¶ 20 Arizona courts have also adopted the exclusionary rule as a state-court "prudential doctrine" to remedy Fourth Amendment violations for its deterrent effect. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, ¶¶ 28-33, 371 P.3d 627. Our courts have nonetheless endeavored to keep the application of the rule in state matters the same as its application by the federal courts. In State v. Bolt , 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984), our supreme court considered extending the state application of the exclusionary rule beyond the federal application as to state constitutional violations. In particular, whether state courts should adopt the federal "independent source rule" exception to the exclusionary rule. The court determined that, although there were sound policy reasons for not adopting the exception, it was better to keep the application of the exclusionary rule uniform and not apply the state exclusionary rule more broadly than the federal rule. Id. at 268-69, 689 P.2d at 527-28. It concluded that, though it may not always agree with the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence, it would "so long as possible, ... keep the Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal," because "one of the few things worse than a single exclusionary rule is two different exclusionary rules." Id. at 268-69, 689 P.2d at 527-28. ¶ 21 Our courts, like the federal courts, have not employed the exclusionary rule for statutory violations, unless the statute implicates Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Moorman , 154 Ariz. 578, 584, 744 P.2d 679, 685 (1987) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to violations of prison search rules); State v. Bishop , 137 Ariz. 361, 363, 670 P.2d 1185, 1187 (App. 1983) (no right to suppress evidence when prison rules violated, only when Fourth Amendment rights infringed); cf. Collins v. Superior Court, 158 Ariz. 145, 146-47, 761 P.2d 1049, 1050-51 (1988) (excluding evidence in reliance on Cocio and Brita , both of which addressed statutorily infirm blood draws while acknowledging their constitutional dimension). When a statute does not implicate Fourth Amendment rights, the remedy for any violation is left to the legislature. That is, as a general rule, because the legislature is charged with providing remedies for the violations of the laws it enacts, unless a law states that exclusion of evidence is a remedy for its violation, the exclusionary rule is not imposed by the courts. See, e.g. , Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 22, 302 P.3d 609 (exclusionary rule inapplicable to violations of Parents' Bill of Rights because statute does not provide such remedy, noting law did not "provide that evidence will be suppressed if the statute is violated"); see also State v. Politte , 136 Ariz. 117, 125-26, 664 P.2d 661, 669-70 (App. 1982) (evidence not excluded when state wiretap law lacked exclusionary rule provision although federal wiretap law did). The legislature has not mandated exclusion as a remedy for a violation of § 28-1321. ¶ 22 Soza nonetheless argues that the legislature has "occupied the field" by creating the implied consent statutory scheme for chemical testing. He thus maintains that chemical-test evidence is only admissible as allowed by the implied consent law. To be sure, the implied consent regime is extensive and was intended "to facilitate the criminal prosecution of those who drive while intoxicated," Koller , 195 Ariz. 343, ¶ 25, 988 P.2d 128, but that does not mean it is the only means by which competent evidence may be admitted. For example, A.R.S. § 28-1323 is a "statutory method [that] allows a proponent to admit scientific evidence without qualifying a witness as an expert, as required by the rules of evidence method." State ex rel. McDougall v. Johnson , 181 Ariz. 404, 407, 891 P.2d 871, 874 (App. 1994). However, where a proponent fails to comply with the statute, breath evidence may still be admissible under Rule 702, Ariz. R. Evid. See Seidel , 142 Ariz. at 590-91, 691 P.2d at 681-82 ; see also State v. Superior Court ex rel. Co. of Yavapai , 195 Ariz. 555, ¶ 11, 991 P.2d 258 (App. 1999). As the Seidel court stated, "when a conflict arises, or a statutory rule tends to engulf a general rule of admissibility, we must draw the line." Id. at 591, 691 P.2d at 682. Thus, even though § 28-1323 provides a relaxed statutory standard of admissibility of breath evidence, it did not supplant the rules of evidence. Cf. Summerfield v. Superior Court , 144 Ariz. 467, 472, 698 P.2d 712, 717 (1985) (where no evidence to suggest legislature intended to occupy field completely, room remains for future judicial action). ¶ 23 Finally, our dissenting colleague makes much of the failure of the legislature to curtail the courts' use of the exclusionary rule when it "revisited" § 13-3925 in 2000 after the blood-draw cases of Brita and Collins . The dissent concludes that the failure of the legislature to act after Brita and Collins to strip the courts of the power to exclude blood evidence amounts to its approval of the use of the exclusionary rule for violations of § 28-1321. See State v. Pennington , 149 Ariz. 167, 717 P.2d 471 (App. 1985) (failure of legislature to amend statute reflects agreement with court decision); but see, e.g., Smith v. Lewis , 157 Ariz. 510, 759 P.2d 1314 (1988) (despite legislative inaction, reversed earlier decision barring indigent representation by county public defenders in federal courts). It is dangerous to equate legislative inaction with approval. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 326 (2012) ("The mere failure of a legislature to correct extant lower-court, intermediate-court, or agency interpretations is not, in our view, a sound basis for believing the legislature has 'adopted' them."). Even so, all we can gather from the legislature's inaction post- Brita and Collins is that it approved the use of the exclusionary rule for the unlawful taking of blood evidence-an act that we fully agree implicates constitutional Fourth Amendment rights under our current jurisprudence. (We note that the legislature has not acted, despite Navarro , to declare that the taking of breath-test evidence incident to a lawful arrest without a warrant requires exclusion of evidence.) ¶ 24 Because the legislature nowhere in § 28-1321 prescribed suppression of evidence as the remedy for its violation, were we to do so of our own accord, we would be engrafting on the law a remedy neither provided for by the legislature nor required by the Constitution. Consequently, exclusion of the evidence is not a remedy for the violation of § 28-1321 by the warrantless, non-consensual taking of a breath test as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Although the breath test here may have not complied with the statute, the trial court's suppressing the breath-test evidence as a sanction was improper. And, because the exclusionary rule is not applicable here in the first instance, it was unnecessary for the respondent court to examine the administering officer's good faith to avoid its application. Disposition ¶ 25 Because the respondent court correctly reversed the trial court's suppression of the breath-test evidence, albeit on different grounds, we accept special action jurisdiction, but we deny relief. ¶ 26 In my view, the majority has overlooked the holdings of Arizona's highest court in resolving the disputed question before us: whether we should suppress blood-alcohol evidence when that evidence has been acquired in violation of the "implied consent" statute, A.R.S. § 28-1321. In two separate cases, the Arizona Supreme Court has suppressed blood samples secured in violation of our state's implied-consent laws. Collins v. Superior Court , 158 Ariz. 145, 146-47, 761 P.2d 1049, 1050-51 (1988) (suppressing blood-test result secured by warrant when warrant process not contemplated by statute); State v. Brita , 158 Ariz. 121, 123, 761 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1988) (approving court of appeals decision which suppressed test result secured before arrest in violation of implied-consent statute). Neither of those cases has been reversed or questioned by subsequent supreme court jurisprudence. And, although the legislature amended the implied-consent statute to allow for the collection of samples by warrant, it did not revise the implied-consent law to restrict the application of the exclusionary rule in light of either Brita or Collins . See 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 375, § 7. ¶ 27 In those cases, the Arizona Supreme Court did not articulate why it had chosen to apply the rule of exclusion to violations of state statute. However, it fully understood that it was doing so. In Brita , the court expressly approved and adopted the court of appeals opinion on the merits of the underlying violation. Brita , 158 Ariz. at 123, 761 P.2d 1025 (characterizing the court of appeals opinion as a "thorough analysis we approve"). In that approved opinion, the court of appeals expressly noted that it was applying the exclusionary rule to a violation of state statute notwithstanding the absence of any Fourth Amendment violation. State v. Brita , 154 Ariz. 517, 522 n.2, 744 P.2d 429, 434 (App. 1987). And in Collins , the supreme court observed that blood taken in violation of state implied-consent laws should be "inadmissible" and it cited other jurisdictions that had similarly suppressed blood samples taken in violation of state law. See 158 Ariz. at 146-47, 761 P.2d at 1050-51. ¶ 28 In short, the Arizona Supreme Court has twice sanctioned violations of the implied-consent law by applying the exclusionary rule. As a subordinate court, I believe we are compelled to follow those cases and apply the rule to the similar violation here. See Lind v. Superior Court , 191 Ariz. 233, ¶ 20, 954 P.2d 1058 (1998). ¶ 29 The majority suggests that Brita and Collins are distinguishable on the grounds that they involved blood draws while this case instead involves a breath test for blood alcohol. Although this is a relevant distinction in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim, Brita and Collins address violations of state statute. The pertinent provision of our implied-consent statute violated here-that a test result can be secured only by voluntary submission or warrant-expressly sets forth that limitation for all types of blood-alcohol tests. See A.R.S. § 28-1321(D) (applying (D)(1) requirements to all tests itemized in "subsection A" including breath or urine tests). ¶ 30 Undeterred by the precedential weight of Brita and Collins , the majority contends that our supreme court has otherwise declined to apply the exclusionary rule to state statutory violations. The majority supports this claim with two Arizona Supreme Court cases that do not address that question. The first case, State v. Moorman , held that suppression is not a remedy for a violation of prison regulations governing the search of an inmate's cell. 154 Ariz. at 584, 744 P.2d at 685. The majority overlooks that prison regulations, while enabled by statute, are not themselves statutes and do not carry the weight of legislative deliberation and enactment. See A.R.S. § 41-1604 (enabling prison officials to develop rules). And, the case that Moorman cited in support of its terse holding, State v. Bishop , emphasizes that prisoners have diminished expectations of privacy, a factor not present here. Id. ; State v. Bishop , 137 Ariz. 361, 363, 670 P.2d 1185, 1187 (App. 1983). Further, any ambiguity about the scope of the court's ruling in Moorman was resolved a year later when the supreme court decided Brita and Collins : cases that, as seen, manifestly did apply the exclusionary rule to violations of state statute. ¶ 31 The majority's reliance on the more recent case of Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 22, 302 P.3d 609, is similarly misplaced. There, our supreme court "decline[d] to address" a juvenile's argument that violation of the Parents' Bill of Rights would justify suppression of his blood test. Id. Although the court mentioned that the "parental rights" statute contained no provision for suppression, it concluded that the juvenile lacked standing to assert his parents' rights. Id. It did not address whether, or to what extent, the Court would view itself empowered to apply an exclusionary rule notwithstanding the lack of an express statutory provision for exclusion. Id. Thus, the dicta in Butler suggests at most that the express terms of a state statute might be a relevant factor in analyzing whether suppression would be required under a statutory provision. Of course, it would always be a relevant factor-if a state statute were to mandate suppression as a remedy for its violation, the court need not consider whether to apply a common law exclusionary rule at all. ¶ 32 The Arizona Court of Appeals has also applied the exclusionary rule to violations of Arizona statutes in the absence of any legislative guidance to the contrary. Specifically, we routinely suppressed evidence collected in violation of our state's statute forbidding the nighttime execution of search warrants without good cause, A.R.S. § 13-3917. See State v. Rypkema , 144 Ariz. 585, 590, 698 P.2d 1304, 1309 (App. 1985) (noting statute demonstrates legislative concern for privacy and suppressing evidence secured in violation of state night-time search statute); State v. Wilson , 25 Ariz. App. 49, 50, 540 P.2d 1268 (App. 1975) (same). Thereafter, our legislature affirmatively directed that suppression should not be a remedy in such cases. A.R.S. § 13-3925 (evidence seized pursuant to warrant not suppressed except "as required by the United States Constitution and the constitution of this state"). This is a directive we have honored. See State v. Foncette , 238 Ariz. 42, ¶ 25, 356 P.3d 328 (App. 2015) (citing A.R.S. § 13-3925 in declining to suppress for night-time search violation). By contrast, the legislature has not similarly disclaimed application of a state exclusionary rule for violations of the implied-consent statute. ¶ 33 Nor has the Arizona Legislature expressed any general hostility to judicial remedies for violations of its criminal statutes. Section 13-3925, while comprehensively addressing issues related to the exclusionary rule, as seen, implicitly exempts violations of the state search warrant statute from the exclusionary rule. But none of its other five parts exempt any other state criminal statutes from the application of the rule. Rather, § 13-3925(A) affirmatively endorses the application of the exclusionary rule for violations of the Arizona Constitution. Id. (retaining exclusionary rule for evidence seized pursuant to search warrant in violation of "the constitution of this state"). ¶ 34 Further, the legislature revisited § 13-3925 in 2000-after the Arizona Supreme Court had applied the exclusionary rule to substantive violations of the implied-consent law in Brita and Collins -yet set forth no general prohibition on the application of the exclusionary rule to state statutes. See 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 49, § 4. And, as noted, the amendments to the implied-consent statute itself, triggered by Collins , did not counter or criticize our supreme court's application of the exclusionary rule in that case. Thus, neither § 13-3925 nor § 28-1321 demonstrates any broad legislative hostility to judicial remedies designed to enforce the requirements of our state criminal statutes. ¶ 35 To the contrary, the legislative history of each provision and their amendments suggest legislative acquiescence to a state exclusionary rule-and specific legislative acquiescence to the application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the implied-consent statute. See State v. Pennington , 149 Ariz. 167, 168, 717 P.2d 471, 472 (App. 1985) (citations omitted) ("It is presumed the legislature is aware of existing case law when it passes a statute, and that it is aware of court decisions interpreting the language of the statute; and when it retains the language upon which those decisions are based, it approves the interpretations."). Notably, the relevant statutory provision we address here-designed in part to avoid state coercion in securing a test in the absence of a warrant-certainly implicates nontrivial boundaries on an officer's entitlement to interfere with a suspect's privacy interest in their bodily integrity. See Carrillo v. Houser , 224 Ariz. 463, ¶ 13, 232 P.3d 1245 ("The 'consent' aspect of the statute also assures that no physical violence or coercion will occur against a person who is noncooperative with a law officer's effort to obtain necessary chemical evidence of intoxication." (quoting Sherrill v. Dep't of Transp. , 165 Ariz. 495, 498, 799 P.2d 836, 839 (1990) ) ); see also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."). Given these stakes, our supreme court's application of the exclusionary rule conforms to and enforces the legislature's intent to confine officers to statutorily authorized means of securing a test. ¶ 36 Our supreme court's lone discussion on the virtues and costs of a state exclusionary rule is found in Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 265-69, 689 P.2d at 524-28. There, the court considered whether to erect a common-law exclusionary rule to sanction violations of state law. Specifically, the court addressed whether to impose the exclusionary rule to protect the state privacy interests articulated in article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution. ¶ 37 In doing so, the court harnessed the genius of the common law: the collective experience of the judicial branch. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."). That experience, the court observed, was that law enforcement officers, driven to secure evidence of crime, tended to ignore constitutional limitations on the collection of evidence in the absence of an exclusionary rule. Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 266, 689 P.2d at 525 ("[S]tate law enforcement agencies usually ignored the Fourth Amendment while investigating criminal cases."). In reviewing pertinent jurisprudence, it concluded: "As in earlier decisions from both federal and state courts, the result in Mapp appears to have been reached as a matter of necessity, all other attempts at deterrence and enforcement of the constitutional provisions seemingly having failed." Id. (citing Mapp , 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ). Speaking nearly twenty-five years after Mapp , the court further concluded that the exclusionary rule "had [arguably] accomplished just what was intended." Id. (describing the salutary effects of enhanced officer training post- Mapp ). ¶ 38 The court also identified and discussed the societal costs of exclusion. Id . at 267, 689 P.2d at 526 (acknowledging that "suppression certainly allows some who are guilty to go free"). And, it considered the objective data on the number of criminal cases affected by the resulting suppression of evidence. Id. at 267 n.9, 689 P.2d at 526 (concluding therefrom that "one might well conclude that the societal costs of enforcing the Fourth Amendment is not disproportionate to the benefit"). The court analyzed whether "other deterrents" short of exclusion may exist, but remained skeptical of the deterrent effect of tort remedies in practice given the expense and difficulty in prevailing on such claims. Id. at 268, 689 P.2d at 527. ¶ 39 In short, our state's highest court has both comprehensively addressed and imposed a state common-law exclusionary rule in Arizona. It has applied that rule to enforce the Arizona Constitution's protection of privacy interests set forth article II, § 8. Id. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528. And, it has applied the rule in practice to violations of the implied-consent law that implicate a person's privacy interest in bodily integrity. See Brita , 158 Ariz. at 123, 761 P.2d at 1027 ; Collins , 158 Ariz. at 146, 761 P.2d at 1050. We are duty bound to follow both the reasoning of our highest court in Bolt and the courts' repeated application of a state-common-law exclusionary rule to the particular species of statutory violation here. ¶ 40 Our supreme court has also directed us to "keep the Arizona exclusionary rule uniform with the federal." Bolt , 142 Ariz. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528. For this reason, our supreme court's application of the good-faith exception in the context of analogous Fourth Amendment error would apply equally to this statutory violation. See Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 35, 371 P.3d 627 (applying good-faith exception to identical violation of Fourth Amendment in context of implied-consent statute). ¶ 41 The statutory violation here, unlike the violation in Valenzuela , occurred after our supreme court issued its opinion in Butler , 232 Ariz. 84, 302 P.3d 609. We therefore would apply this court's analysis in State v. Weakland, 244 Ariz. 79, ¶¶ 12, 24, 418 P.3d 446 (App. 2017) (finding good-faith exception for post- Butler arrests). I acknowledge that the trial court's application of the good-faith exception conforms with the majority opinion in that case. However, I dissented in Weakland , and would hold that the state is not entitled to the benefit of the good-faith exception for an arrest made after Butler . ¶ 42 Although I dissent as to remedy, I concur with my colleagues that the state violated A.R.S. § 28-1321(D) when it secured a sample of Mr. Soza's breath in the absence of either a warrant or his voluntary submission to the test. Much of the following discussion involves cases addressing blood draws, not breath tests. Arizona's precedent for chemical testing by implied consent, although primarily dealing with blood draws, provides an important backdrop and guidance for the issues addressed here. The statutes were renumbered to their current location in 1997. See 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 76, § 3; 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 102. Bernard v. Minnesota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 615, 193 L.Ed.2d 495 (2015), and Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 614, 193 L.Ed.2d 494 (2015). The Valenzuela court concluded that the giving of a coercive admonition alone does not render consent involuntary; rather, a court must examine "the totality of the circumstances." 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 21, 371 P.3d 627. Our dissenting colleague takes issue with our citation of Moorman , noting it involved a "lesser expectation of privacy [among prison inmates], a factor not present here." This criticism overlooks that the very heart of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Birchfield , as well as this court's conclusions in Navarro and even going back to Berg , arise from the fundamental difference between the taking of breath and that of blood, and the determination that breath tests do not implicate significant privacy concerns. In Bolt , our supreme court, in reaching its conclusion that the state and federal application should be uniform, in a footnote, discussed the propriety of courts allowing the use of evidence gathered in a way "the law does not permit." 142 Ariz. at 266 n.7, 689 P.2d at 525. However, in context, the discussion was limited to purposeful violations of the constitution, not of a statute. Id. Our dissenting colleague criticizes our use of the Politte case here, asserting that the court stated that the wiretap evidence would have been suppressed had the defendant's argument been accepted. While true, it would have been so because, had the defendant been correct, Arizona's wiretap law would have been pre-empted by a federal statute that had an express exclusionary remedy that Arizona's statute did not . 136 Ariz. at 126, 664 P.2d at 670. Our dissenting colleague argues that the courts, not the legislature, control the admission of evidence. Although that is certainly true, our courts have never mandated the suppression of evidence where, as here, constitutional rights are not implicated. Our dissenting colleague states that this opinion has "overlooked" holdings of the Arizona Supreme Court as to suppression of illegally obtained blood evidence. That is incorrect. Illegally obtained blood evidence has been repeatedly held to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. Here, however, we are dealing with breath-test evidence taken incident to a lawful arrest which has, repeatedly, been held not to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. Simply stated, blood, along with the necessarily invasive methods of obtaining it, is different. Accordingly, our colleague's repeated references to "bodily integrity" have little, if any, application to this case. We do not hold that there is no remedy for a violation of § 28-1321, but only that the remedy of suppression urged by Soza and imposed by the trial court was an unauthorized, and therefore improper, one. The majority also cites Politte , 136 Ariz. at 125-26, 664 P.2d at 669-70, for the proposition that "evidence [was] not excluded when state wiretap law lacked [an] exclusionary rule provision although federal wiretap law did." Politte noted Arizona's statute did not contain an express exclusionary provision, whereas the federal statute did. Id. That distinction, however, was made in the context of a discussion of whether Arizona's wiretap statute was entirely invalid based on federal pre-emption. Id. The majority has overlooked that the court proceeded to discuss the defendant's claims of substantive statutory violations and found them meritless, but additionally noted that "[i]f the trial court had found these [state statutory] grounds meritorious the evidence would have been excluded ." Id. at 126-27, 129, 664 P.2d at 670-71, 73 (emphasis added). The majority implies that legislative pronouncements on the admissibility of evidence should control. However, the Arizona Constitution provides the judicial branch, not the legislative branch, with the "[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court." Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 (5). Although our supreme court has welcomed legislative involvement in evidentiary questions when that involvement does not conflict with its own rules or when the legislation addresses a matter of substantive law, our supreme court has held that it is the judicial branch, not the legislative branch, which is presumptively empowered to determine what evidence is admissible in an Arizona courtroom. See Seisinger v. Siebel , 220 Ariz. 85, ¶ 7, 203 P.3d 483 (2009) (Arizona Constitution vests supreme court with power "to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court"; rules of evidence " 'generally ... procedural in nature.' " (quoting Collins , 142 Ariz. at 590, 691 P.2d at 681 ) ). Since our supreme court's analysis of the costs of the exclusionary rule in 1984, the United States Supreme Court has substantially limited the application of the exclusionary rule by expanding the scope of the good-faith exception. See Davis , 564 U.S. at 237, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (reviewing how the Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule since Mapp ). Thus, the "societal costs" of the exclusionary rule are markedly less today than when our state supreme court last analyzed them in 1984. Here, bodily integrity refers to the legislature's interest in avoiding physical confrontations between an officer who might seek to force an unwilling defendant to conduct a test of breath or blood: both of which are impractical to conduct without the defendant's cooperation. See Carrillo , 224 Ariz. 463, ¶ 13, 232 P.3d 1245 (acknowledging this legislative interest expressed by A.R.S. § 28-1321(D) ).

EPPICH, Judge: ¶ 1 This is an appeal from the Arizona Corporation Commission's (the Commission) Decision No. 75975 (Feb. 24, 2017) (the Decision), which established electricity rates for the customers of Tucson Electric Power (TEP). Appellant Freeport Minerals Corporation challenges the Decision's allocation of revenue between rate classes, arguing that it violates constitutional and statutory mandates for just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, and was not supported by substantial evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 TEP, a wholly owned subsidiary of UNS Energy Corporation, is an Arizona public service corporation authorized to provide electricity services. On September 4, 2015, TEP filed with the Commission a notice of intent to file a rate case application, seeking, among other things, a new rate schedule to allow it to "recover its full cost of service, including a reasonable opportunity to earn appropriate return on invested capital." Numerous entities, including government bodies, advocacy groups, and corporations, including Freeport, sought and were granted permission to intervene. ¶ 3 TEP initially requested an increase in rates that would result in a non-fuel revenue increase of approximately $109.5 million over adjusted test year revenues. However, following settlement discussions, many of the parties to the proceeding, including TEP and Freeport, entered into an agreement dated August 15, 2016 ("Settlement Agreement") which provided for a non-fuel revenue increase of $81.5 million, resulting in a total rate of return for TEP of 7.19 percent. The Settlement Agreement, which ultimately was approved by the Commission, did not address all issues, leaving open the revenue allocation among the rate classes. ¶ 4 On January 24, 2017, after taking several days of testimony and receiving a number of briefs on the issue of revenue allocation, the Commission issued a proposed order, to which Freeport and a number of other parties filed exceptions. On February 8, 2017, the Commission held an open meeting to discuss the proposed order and the exceptions filed to it, and on February 24, 2017, the Commission issued the Decision, which adopted a nearly identical revenue allocation scheme as the one set forth in the proposed order. Freeport timely sought review, challenging only the revenue allocation portion of the Decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 40-254.01. Discussion ¶ 5 "The Arizona Corporation Commission, unlike such bodies in most states, is not a creature of the legislature, but is a constitutional body which owes its existence to provisions in the organic law of this state." Residential Util. Consumer Office v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 240 Ariz. 108, ¶ 11, 377 P.3d 305 (2016), quoting Ethington v. Wright , 66 Ariz. 382, 389, 189 P.2d 209 (1948) ; see Ariz. Const. art. XV, §§ 1 - 19. The Arizona Constitution grants the Commission "full power to ... prescribe just and reasonable classifications to be used and just and reasonable rates and charges to be made and collected, by public service corporations within the state for service rendered therein." Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 3. As such: [I]n the matter of prescribing classifications, rates, and charges of public service corporations and in making rules, regulations, and orders concerning such classifications, rates, and charges by which public service corporations are to be governed, the Corporation Commission ... is supreme and such exclusive field may not be invaded by the courts, the legislature, or the executive. Residential Util. Consumer Office , 240 Ariz. 108, ¶ 12, 377 P.3d 305, quoting Ethington , 66 Ariz. at 392, 189 P.2d 209 (first alteration in original). ¶ 6 Notwithstanding what has been described as the Commission's "plenary" authority to prescribe rates, the Arizona Constitution's requirement of "just and reasonable" rates imposes an outer limit for the Commission's discretion. Residential Util. Consumer Office v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 199 Ariz. 588, ¶ 11, 20 P.3d 1169 (App. 2001). Because ratemaking is a function specifically entrusted to the Commission by the Arizona Constitution, a stringent standard of review applies: "We generally presume the Commission's actions are constitutional, and we uphold them unless they are arbitrary or an abuse of discretion." Residential Util. Consumer Office , 240 Ariz. 108, ¶ 10, 377 P.3d 305. Freeport must therefore "demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that the Commission's decision is arbitrary, unlawful or unsupported by substantial evidence." Litchfield Park Serv. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 178 Ariz. 431, 434, 874 P.2d 988, 991 (App. 1994) ; accord A.R.S. § 40-254.01(A), (E). Utilities Regulation ¶ 7 "The general theory of utility regulation is that the total revenue, including income from rates and charges, should be sufficient to meet a utility's operating costs and to give the utility and its stockholders a reasonable rate of return on the utility's investment." Scates v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 118 Ariz. 531, 533-34, 578 P.2d 612, 614-15 (App. 1978). The Commission determines rates using a proceeding called a "rate case." See Ariz. Admin. Code R14-2-103. "Rule 103 or 'full' rate case proceedings are complex. They typically attract many intervenors, require voluminous and detailed filings, and involve multiple, lengthy hearings." Residential Util. Consumer Office , 240 Ariz. 108, ¶ 6, 377 P.3d 305. In a rate case, "[t]he Commission sets rates by finding the 'fair value' of a utility's in-state property, Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 14, and then using that value as the 'rate base' in the following rate-of-return formula: (Rate Base x Rate of Return) + Expenses = Revenue Requirement." Residential Util. Consumer Office , 240 Ariz. 108, ¶ 6, 377 P.3d 305. In determining a utility's rate base, operating income, and rate of return, the Commission uses data from the test year. Ariz. Admin. Code R14-2-103. No party has challenged the Commission's determination of the revenue requirement. ¶ 8 Having determined TEP's revenue requirement, the Commission next allocated said revenue to the various customer classes. As a starting point for allocating the revenue requirement to each class, the utility's costs were first allocated to each class through a "Class Cost of Service Study" (CCOSS). See id. As the Commission's Utilities Division Staff's (Staff) rate design witness testified, the CCOSS is "intended to assist the Commission to allocate revenue requirements among customer classes." ¶ 9 Preparing a CCOSS is far from a straightforward endeavor. As Staff explained, preparing a CCOSS "involves judgment and decisions on the part of the practitioner in assigning costs to the various customer classes." TEP's CCOSS witness made the same point: Fundamentally, performing cost of service studies is comprised of applying experience and science.... The art of applying experience involves the subjective application of certain methods, in conjunction with consideration of policy objectives, regulatory case law, emerging issues, and other factors, within the framework of the regulatory process.... The art of the cost study is having an understanding of how the unique characteristics of the utility should be combined with the various scientific methodologies. Freeport has not challenged the CCOSS in this case. ¶ 10 Once the CCOSS is complete, it may be used to measure the degree to which each class rate schedule produces more or less revenue than would be produced if revenue were allocated solely using the CCOSS, that is, the degree of "subsidy" paid by (or received by) each customer class. There are various ways this can be measured, such as computing the relative rate of return (RoR) produced by each class. However, as Staff explained, "regulators have historically used" the CCOSS "as a guideline to allocate revenue among classes" but "[r]egulators typically also consider economic, social, historical and other factors that may affect customers when determining revenue allocation" and that such factors "often result in rates that deviate from strict cost of service." The 2015 Rate Case ¶ 11 Here, the CCOSS showed that while TEP's total RoR for the test year was 6.57 percent, the RoR on the rate bases for individual classes differed significantly, with the Residential Class at 0.94 percent, the General Service Class at 21.33 percent, the Large General Service Class at 3.59 percent, the Lighting Class at 2.96 percent, and the Large Power Service Class at 10.94 percent. This difference in RoR produced the "significant [pre-Decision] inter-class subsidies," acknowledged by the Commission, with classes above the total rate of return of 6.57 percent subsidizing classes with a rate of return below 6.57 percent. ¶ 12 Staff, TEP, Freeport, and the Commission all agreed that rates should generally be based on costs derived from the CCOSS. Further, all agreed with the goal of reducing the pre-existing interclass subsidies in the instant rate case. To that end, Staff, TEP, and Freeport each submitted allocation proposals for the Commission's consideration. While all three proposals reduced the size of the interclass subsidies, albeit by varying amounts, none proposed a revenue allocation that would erase all subsidy and bring complete class parity under the CCOSS. ¶ 13 Staff stated, "The individual rate classes should be gradually moved toward [the elimination of interclass subsidies] over one or more rate cases depending on the frequency of rate cases and the distance of the class[ ] [from parity]." However, Staff noted that since the last rate case TEP changed its production plant allocation methodology. Further, in this rate case, two new rate classes were implemented: a Medium General Service Class, split off from the Small and Large General Services Classes, and a 138kV Class for large industrial users, split off from the Large Power Service Class. Given the changes in rate base and changes in TEP's cost allocation methodology, Staff recommended that the Commission use the CCOSS as a general guideline, tempered by the concept of gradualism, as explained below. ¶ 14 Additionally, since the previous rate case TEP had completed the purchase of a new combined cycle generating unit, in order to stabilize energy costs for all customers. Staff submitted that it therefore would be inappropriate to reduce rates for any individual customer class. It recommended that the $81.5 million in approved revenue increases be allocated by increasing the Residential, Large General Service, and Lighting Classes by fifty percent of the amount needed to eliminate the pre-existing subsidies, and increasing the other classes by varying amounts to account for the remaining $23.3 million. Under this plan, the RoR for all classes below the approved total of 7.19 percent would increase, and the RoR for all classes above the 7.19 percent would decrease, "moving the classes towards parity." ¶ 15 TEP stated that it was "willing to use Staff's suggestion as a guide to adjust the allocation of revenue between the rate classes in the interest of compromise, gradualism and movement in the right direction to eliminate some of the interclass subsidies." TEP accepted Staff's "concerns that new rates should be designed to reflect appropriate cost allocation while still setting rates that exhibit the principle of gradualism," and agreed that "the CCOSS should be used as a guideline, not as a rigid structure, for revenue allocation decisions." However, recognizing that "[l]arger customer classes [were] seek [ing] a greater movement towards parity," TEP proposed a revenue allocation scheme "somewhere between the proposals of Staff and the parties representing large customers." Its scheme allocated less to the large power using classes and Residential Class, and more to the General Service Classes and the Lighting Class. Both TEP and Staff asserted that their proposed schemes were designed to allow elimination of the interclass subsidies in the near future: TEP stated its proposal "provide[d] the best opportunity to reach parity in the next rate case," and Staff stated its proposal "allow[ed] for the completion [of moving all classes to parity] in following cases." ¶ 16 The Commission ultimately adopted a hybrid of Staff and TEP's revenue allocation schemes, allocating the larger amount recommended by Staff, approximately $54.5 million of the $81.5 million in revenue increases, to the Residential Class, and employing TEP's proportionate allocation between the other classes for the remaining $27 million. It explained that allocating the "$81.5 million increase evenly across classes would perpetuate existing inequities," but moving all the rate classes to parity would cause an approximate increase of 39.5 percent in margin revenues to the Residential Class, equal to a roughly twenty-five percent increase in rates, resulting in "unreasonable rate shock." Given that "[a]ny reduction in allocation to one class, of necessity increases the allocation to another in order to produce the same overall revenue increase," and "considering the entirety of the circumstances," the Commission found that its allocation produced just and reasonable rates, which "move[d] toward[s] more equitable revenue recovery without overly burdening an individual customer class." The adoption of this revenue allocation scheme is the sole issue which Freeport challenges in this appeal. Just, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory Rates ¶ 17 Freeport argues the adopted revenue allocation scheme violates both the Arizona Constitution's mandate that the Commission set "just and reasonable" rates for public services, Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 3, and A.R.S. § 40-334's prohibitions against "subject[ing] any person to any prejudice or disadvantage" as to rates, and "establish[ing] or maintain[ing] unreasonable difference[s] as to rates ... between classes of service." The revenue allocation adopted by the Commission requires Freeport to pay approximately $4.2 million annually in subsidies. It contends that "[b]y setting rates that exceed the cost of providing service to Freeport by such a significant margin, and by not adopting the cost standard of rate design, the Commission has set rates that are not just and reasonable." Freeport also argues that the adopted revenue allocation scheme is arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence. ¶ 18 Freeport has not argued that the Commission must set rates based only on cost of service to customers, and it has conceded that interclass subsidization may be "just and reasonable" in certain situations. It further concedes that the Commission's rate allocation reduced the overall amount of interclass subsidies being paid. Freeport argues, however, that the interclass subsidies were not reduced enough , and the reasons provided in support of the adopted allocation scheme are insufficient to support this perceived lack of "meaningful progress towards that goal." Therefore, the question before us is whether the record contains sufficient reasons upon which the Commission could, in its broad discretion, deviate from a strict cost standard of rate design and adopt a rate plan that considers more than the cost of service and the rate of return. ¶ 19 The Commission's adopted allocation scheme is primarily supported by gradualism and the need to avoid rate shock, and the proposition that, due to TEP's acquisition of the new combined cycle generating unit, it would be inappropriate to reduce rates for any individual customer class. Freeport challenges both of these justifications. ¶ 20 " 'Gradualism' is a principle of rate design that rates will be gradually increased to avoid 'rate shock' ... by 'gradually' reducing rate of return differentials between the classes." Lloyd v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n , 904 A.2d 1010, 1018 n.14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). Gradualism is a well-recognized tenet of, and generally accepted as a legitimate concern in, utility ratemaking. See id. at 1019 n.16 (listing utility regulation cases recognizing the legitimacy of "gradualism" from Connecticut, Indiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and South Dakota). [C]onsumers value stability and predictability in the bills they receive from their utility company: stability, so that the utility's call upon their income will not yo-yo beyond their control from period to period; predictability, permitting them to fashion their future budgets with some assurance that their increment for utility services will not be widely off the mark. Stability and predictability are important considerations to be kept in mind whenever a restructuring ... is being implemented. Rate shock is not a sought for result. Roger L. Conkling, Energy Pricing: Economics and Principles § 8.3, 231 (2011). To mitigate ... rate shock, the remedy is "gradualism," i.e., phasing in rates or closing rate differentials over a longer period of time allowing consumers to gradually make the adjustments in the "elastic" part of their spending so as to pay for increased utility costs, not to mention lessening the pressure on the Commission and the utilities to dampen rate increases. Lloyd , 904 A.2d at 1018 n.14. The Commission having determined that subsidy reduction is appropriate, we conclude that rate shock is a well-founded concern which permits the Commission to invoke gradualism to deviate from strict cost of service when establishing a revenue allocation scheme that is just and reasonable. This, however, does not mean that the instant rate allocation necessarily passes constitutional muster. ¶ 21 Freeport has put forth a number of alternate allocation schemes which it argues would be more just and reasonable. Each of these schemes entails a rate decrease for the 138kV Class. During the hearings, however, Staff argued that TEP's "purchase of the Gila River combined cycle generating unit was intended to stabilize energy costs, which provides benefits to all customers." Staff continued, "Therefore, it would be inappropriate to reduce rates for any customer class because that would send a confusing message about the new plant expenditure." TEP also accepted this principle in its revised position, and the scheme ultimately adopted by the Commission was a hybrid of their two proposals. ¶ 22 Freeport challenges the notion that no class of service should have a rate decrease as arbitrary and based on Staff's " 'perceptions' rather than 'facts.' " It points out that Staff explained, "in relation to that power plant, 'there could be a perception, maybe not a fact, but there could be a perception among certain customers that they paid for the whole thing and some of the benefits went to people who didn't pay at all.' " Freeport further argues, "Whether a newly purchased power plant facility benefits 'some' or 'all' customers does not undercut the conclusions reached in the class cost of service study, and certainly should not be a basis to disregard the allocations set forth therein," and that Staff "[p]lainly" discounted the CCOSS to address its own "perceptions." ¶ 23 In fact, when pressed on this principle, Staff explained that "[t]he increase in rate base in this case was not solely due to Gila River. It was due to investments all across the spectrum of the company ... investments made other than Gila River that benefit[ ] all classes." Thus, that TEP's new investments benefited all customer classes was not a perception, but a stated fact. ¶ 24 Moreover, the "perceptions" Staff spoke of were not its own, but the anticipated reactions of the customer classes that Freeport argues should have shouldered the entire $165 million cost of that acquisition to the exclusion of itself. We conclude that Staff's concerns were reasonable, based on fact, and that the Commission was within its discretion in accepting the proposition that, due to TEP's new acquisitions and investments, no individual class should see a rate decrease. ¶ 25 The CCOSS in this case showed that, for the test year, the Residential Class was subsidized by the other classes by approximately $109 million. As the agreed-upon revenue increase was $81.5 million, it would have been mathematically impossible to eliminate the subsidization of the Residential Class without decreasing rates for other classes of service. Allocating the entire $81.5 million to the Residential Class would have resulted in roughly a twenty-five percent increase in residential customers' bills. Freeport argues that this increase "does not constitute 'rate shock' because the Commission has imposed much higher rate increases on other utility customers," and cites to several 2016 rate cases in which "the Commission approved a number of increases for rates that range between 51.1 percent to 274.6 percent." Freeport is correct that the Commission authorized those rate increases. However, an examination of each of those decisions shows that those rate increases were brought about by extreme circumstances, and in each of those cases anything less than the approved revenue increases would have potentially violated our constitution's mandate for just and reasonable rates. ¶ 26 In Decision No. 75925 (Jan. 13, 2017), Eden Water Company, an Arizona non-profit, member-owned cooperative which serves 135 customers, had a test year revenue shortfall of $13,609. The 51.1 percent increase in a median customer's bills was required in order to allow Eden to eliminate its operating losses and earn the reasonable return on its rate base. ¶ 27 Similarly, in Decision No. 75811 (Nov. 21, 2016), Dateland Water LLC, which serves fourteen customers, had not had a rate increase since 1999, and had a revenue shortfall of well over thirty percent. The Commission approved rate increases of 274.97 percent, but even with that increase Dateland still ended up with a negative operating income, and it was the principle of avoiding rate shock which kept the Commission from adopting the 360.92 percent increases which would have been required to earn Dateland a positive return. ¶ 28 The other two cases cited by Freeport are similar: In Decision No. 75696 (Aug. 5, 2016), the utility had a $32,071 revenue shortfall on $79,086 of operating expenses; in Decision No. 75686 (Aug. 5, 2016), a $6,012 shortfall on $56,213 in operating expenses. Each of these cases presents a situation in which, due to historical circumstances, a small utility had to raise rates significantly to address substantial revenue shortfalls, and they do not persuade us that, in the instant case, the Commission's concerns about rate shock were unfounded or arbitrary. ¶ 29 Finally, Freeport argues that "barring no other substantial reasons or evidence, gradualism and rate shock" should not, by themselves, provide a sufficient "basis for sustaining continued inequitable subsidies," between classes of service, relying on Lloyd , 904 A.2d 1010. ¶ 30 Lloyd dealt with circumstances similar to those before us. There, the CCOSS showed that, for the test year, commercial customers were subsidizing the Residential Class. Id. at 1016. The Pennsylvania Commission also adopted an allocation scheme which raised rates on every customer class, and justified this by appealing to gradualism and the need to avoid rate shock. Id. at 1018. Freeport correctly points out that the court in Lloyd found that, "principles of gradualism," while permitted, "cannot be allowed to trump all other valid ratemaking concerns and do not justify allowing one class of customers to subsidize the cost of service for another class of customers over an extended period of time," and struck down the revenue allocation scheme. Id. at 1020-21. However, despite the superficial similarities with the instant case, Lloyd is distinguishable on several key points. ¶ 31 In Lloyd , the Pennsylvania Commission employed gradualism not as a general rate-making principle, but as a bright line rule holding that no individual customer's bill should increase more than ten percent, without providing any explanation for why ten percent "is the magic number that will prevent rate shock." Id. at 1020. Here, the Commission applied the general and long-accepted principle that rates should be adjusted over time broadly, not allowing a threshold number to prevent them from reducing the subsidization of the Residential Class. ¶ 32 More importantly, in Lloyd the Pennsylvania Commission's allocation scheme significantly increased the amount of interclass subsidization. First, while "[i]t proposed to increase its distribution charges by an average of 32.8%" it "proposed an increase to the distribution charges paid by the [subsidizing] class of 35.8%," resulting in an increase in the pre-existing difference between the subsidizing and subsidized classes' respective RoRs. Id . at 1016-17. Further, the Pennsylvania Commission sought to allocate $57.2 million in transmission fees without any reference to a CCOSS, but instead through a uniform per kWh charge to all customers, resulting in large customers bearing a disproportionate amount of the transmission, and thus increasing any previous discrimination in rates even further. Id. at 1017. ¶ 33 Here, the opposite is true. The Commission specifically noted that allocating the $81.5 million evenly across the classes would perpetuate existing inequities between the classes. While interclass subsidization is not eliminated by the Decision, it does provide for significant movement towards parity for the rate classes. Freeport's rates only increased by approximately 1.7 percent compared to the test year, whereas residential rates increased by approximately 12.6 percent. The $54.5 million in revenue increases allocated to the Residential Class customers represents fifty percent of the amount needed to bring that class to parity, effectively cutting the subsidy they receive in half. Gradualism can be a sufficient justification for eliminating such subsidies incrementally. Conclusion ¶ 34 The Arizona Constitution limits our role to deciding whether utility rates adopted by the Commission are so far outside of its considerable discretion so as to be unjust or unreasonable. We are not empowered to substitute our judgment of what we may find to be an optimal rate structure for the Commission's. The alternative rate allocations proposed by Freeport may well be just and reasonable, but that does not mean the scheme adopted by the Commission is not. For the foregoing reasons, Freeport has failed to "demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that the Commission's decision is arbitrary, unlawful or unsupported by substantial evidence." Litchfield Park Serv. Co. , 178 Ariz. at 434, 874 P.2d at 991. Accordingly, we affirm. A public service corporation is any non-municipal corporation: engaged in furnishing gas, oil, or electricity for light, fuel, or power; or in furnishing water for irrigation, fire protection, or other public purposes; or in furnishing, for profit, hot or cold air or steam for heating or cooling purposes; or engaged in collecting, transporting, treating, purifying and disposing of sewage through a system, for profit; or in transmitting messages or furnishing public telegraph or telephone service. Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 2. A "test year" is a one-year historical period ending on the most recent practical date available prior to the filing. Ariz. Admin. Code R14-2-103. As a class A utility with annual operating revenue in excess of $10 million, TEP was required to prepare a CCOSS pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code R14-2-103. Freeport's proposal eliminated the subsidies paid by itself and the Large Power Service Class, but retained a level of subsidy to be paid by the General Services and Large General Service Classes to the benefit of the Residential and Lighting Classes. Freeport is the only member of the 138kV Class, which was created for its benefit. Combined cycle generators can start and stop operations more easily than coal generators. By purchasing the plant, TEP became less reliant on coal and, as a result, gained flexibility. We infer that this allows TEP to increase energy output with a lesser effect on fuel costs during periods of high energy demand. Staff allocated significantly less to the Small General Service Class than TEP, but a slightly larger amount to the Medium and Large General Service Classes. In total, TEP allocated roughly $5.35 million more to the three General Service Classes than did Staff. Freeport arrived at this $4.2 million figure using figures from Staff's proposed revenue models presented during surrebuttal testimony. Those models showed that Freeport paid approximately $32 million during the test year. The Commission authorized a revenue increase of $561,000 to the 138kV Class in the Decision, allocating a total of roughly $32.5 million in revenue to Freeport. The CCOSS showed that a under a strict cost standard it would pay roughly $28.3 million, resulting in the $4.2 million figure. Freeport argues that the record does not support the Commission's concerns regarding rate shock, contending at oral argument that the Commission should have conducted surveys to assess the ability of residential consumers to manage the increased rates necessary to achieve rate parity. Freeport noted that the Residential Class likely contains higher-income individuals readily capable of absorbing significant rate increases. While this is undoubtedly true, the Commission is not required to set individualized rates based upon a particular customer's ability to pay-it need only set reasonable rates for classes of consumers. Moreover, the twenty-five percent rate increase necessary to eliminate the Residential Class subsidy in this case is of such magnitude that the potential for rate shock is self-evident. Freeport suggests eliminating the subsidies paid only by it, reducing the subsidies it pays by half, or reducing the rates for itself and other large power users and allocating larger increases to the Residential Class. The Decision decreases the revenue allocated to the Small General Service Class by approximately $3.6 million compared to the test year. However, this rate case saw the creation of a new Medium General Service Class, which is comprised of four thousand former Small General Service Class members and eighty-five Large General Service Class members. Rates paid by the remaining members of the Small General Service Class were in fact increased over the test year. As such, we surmise that the apparent $3.6 million decrease to the Small General Service Class was the result of this class-split, and not an actual reduction in rates for the Class. At oral argument, the Commission maintained its Decision was not predicated on Staff's recommendation against any rate decreases due to TEP's acquisition of the generating unit. While the Decision does not expressly state the Commission relied on this proposition in its "Analysis and Conclusion Regarding Revenue Allocation" subsection, its consideration of this factor is readily apparent from the record. The proposition is discussed in the preceding subsections regarding TEP and Staff's revenue allocation positions, and the Decision expressly notes that it has adopted "Staff's recommendation for the Residential Class of $54.5 million and employs TEP's proportionate allocations for the remaining $27 million." Cf. Thomas v. Thomas , 142 Ariz. 386, 390, 690 P.2d 105, 109 (App. 1984) (appellate courts may infer from a judgment findings necessary to sustain it if such findings do not conflict with express findings and are reasonably supported by evidence). In any event, we conclude the Commission's Decision is adequately supported by considerations of rate shock and gradualism, regardless of whether or not it also relied on Staff's reasoning regarding the acquisition of the generating unit.

ESPINOSA, Judge: ¶ 1 In January 2015, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Northwest Medical Center (Northwest or the hospital) in the medical malpractice action filed by Karyn Rasor and her husband (the Rasors). They appealed, and in an opinion filed on May 17, 2016, we concluded the Rasors' proffered expert witness was unqualified to give standard-of-care testimony; however, we reversed the trial court's denial of the Rasors' request for additional time to secure a new expert and vacated its summary judgment order. Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC (Rasor I ), 239 Ariz. 546, ¶¶ 15, 38, 373 P.3d 563 (App. 2016). ¶ 2 Upon review, our supreme court agreed that the Rasors' expert did not qualify as a standard-of-care expert but remanded the case to us to determine two additional issues: whether the expert was qualified to testify to causation, or if expert testimony on causation was not required. Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC (Rasor II ), 243 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 3, 29, 32-33, 403 P.3d 572 (2017). We conclude the case does call for expert causation testimony and although the Rasors' expert witness was not qualified on the standard of care, she was competent to testify about causation. We therefore remand to the trial court to provide the Rasors an opportunity to file a motion to obtain additional evidence pursuant to Rule 56(d), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and for any other appropriate proceedings. Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 3 On appeal from summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. See Wilson v. Playa de Serrano , 211 Ariz. 511, ¶ 2, 123 P.3d 1148 (App. 2005). The underlying facts describing Karyn's critical care hospitalization at Northwest are detailed in Rasor I , 239 Ariz. 546, ¶¶ 2-4, 373 P.3d 563. For present purposes, we note that in July 2011, Karyn underwent open-heart surgery at Northwest, after which she received an intra-aortic balloon pump (IABP) threaded through her femoral artery and requiring the immobilization of her leg. Following surgery, Karyn spent several days in the intensive care unit (ICU), where the nurses eventually discovered a pressure ulcer on her coccyx that ultimately reached "stage IV" and required thirty-one debridement procedures. ¶ 4 Based on Karyn's allegedly permanent pain and other symptoms, the Rasors brought a medical malpractice action against Northwest in July 2013, alleging the hospital had "breached its professional duties ..., proximately causing the development of a decubitus ulcer" by failing to "appropriately off-load" Karyn and "negligently fail[ing] to timely discover" the ulcer during her intensive care. In support of their claim, the Rasors retained a single expert, a board-certified wound-care nurse, Julie Ho, R.N. In Ho's opinion, Northwest had not adequately repositioned Karyn during recovery, causing the development of a pressure ulcer, which worsened because of the hospital's failure to respond appropriately after discovering it. The Rasors filed a motion to qualify Ho as an expert on the standard of care, causation, and prognosis, or, in the alternative, to be permitted to identify a new expert. ¶ 5 Northwest subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Nurse Ho "d[id] not qualify under Arizona Rule of Evidence, Rule 702, A.R.S. § 12-2603, and A.R.S. § 12-2604" to render opinions in this matter such that the Rasors "[we]re unable to establish that [the hospital] breached the applicable standard of care and [the] Complaint should be dismissed." At the hearing on the Rasors' motion, the trial court found that Ho could testify to the standard of care and stated, "I'm going to let you go with a wound care witness rather than an ICU nurse. You can take that to the bank, okay?" However, the court also said, "[W]hat I'm concerned about is whether or not she could testify as to causation," ultimately concluding that the Rasors could introduce her expert opinion "regarding wound care." ¶ 6 At the oral argument on Northwest's summary judgment motion, the Rasors again asked that they be permitted to find a new expert witness if the trial court determined that Nurse Ho was unqualified. The court, however, denied that request and granted summary judgment without explanation. The Rasors appealed, and as noted above, we concluded that Ho was unqualified as a standard-of-care expert. Our supreme court agreed, but remanded the case for this court to determine whether Ho might nevertheless be qualified to provide expert testimony on causation, or whether this case does not require a causation expert as a matter of law. See Rasor II , 243 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 8, 29, 32, 403 P.3d 572. On remand, we ordered supplemental briefing on "the requisite qualifications for causation experts in medical malpractice cases under Arizona law," and the parties filed simultaneous briefs. Causation Expert Witnesses ¶ 7 Before addressing whether Nurse Ho was qualified to testify to causation in this case, we must determine whether the Rasors needed to provide a causation expert at all. See id. ¶¶ 32-33. " '[U]nless a causal relationship is readily apparent to the trier of fact,' expert medical testimony normally is required to establish proximate cause in a medical negligence case." Salica v. Tucson Heart Hosp.-Carondelet, L.L.C. , 224 Ariz. 414, ¶ 16, 231 P.3d 946 (App. 2010), quoting Gregg v. Nat'l Med. Health Care Servs., Inc. , 145 Ariz. 51, 54, 699 P.2d 925, 928 (App. 1985) (alteration in Salica ). In their opening brief before this court, the Rasors asserted "the nature of the risk from the failure to relieve pressure over Ms. Rasor's tailbone and the ensuing injury there provides the kind of evidence of causal relationship that is readily apparent to a jury, even without expert testimony." We disagree. ¶ 8 The Rasors' generalized contention is undercut by another section of their opening brief that quoted an explanation of "the mechanism of injury" from the hospital's disclosure statement: Pressure over a bony prominence causes tissue ischemia in the skin, muscle, and the fascia between the skin surface and bone. The pressure compresses small vessels and prevents both supply of oxygen and nutrients at the capillary interface as well as venous return of metabolic wastes. Metabolic wastes accumulate and cause local vasodilatation, which contributes to edema, which further compresses small vessels and increases edema and ischemia. Local tissue death then occurs, resulting in a pressure ulcer. The record also includes testimony from the hospital's expert regarding numerous factors contributing to development of a pressure ulcer, which he stated in Karyn's case went beyond her being "critically ill in the ICU, on vasopressors, with decreased circulation" and "the intubation with mechanical ventilation and an intra-aortic balloon pump" making her "difficult to mobilize in bed." He went on to identify as "additional risk factors" that Karyn was "hypoalbuminemic," "mildly anemic," "a smoker," and had "two collagen vascular disorders, rheumatoid arthritis and systemic lupus erythematosus," both of which were "pro-inflammatory conditions" that would contribute to other risk factors for development of pressure ulcers. ¶ 9 We cannot conclude a jury would find the process of developing a pressure ulcer and attendant contributing factors, particularly in Karyn's case, as well as the resulting existence or lack of a causal relationship "readily apparent." Accordingly, this case requires expert testimony regarding causation. Cf. Frausto v. Yakima HMA, LLC , 188 Wash.2d 227, 393 P.3d 776, ¶ 8 & n.2 (2017) (concluding expert causation testimony was required given process responsible for causing bedsores ). ¶ 10 We next turn to the issue of expert qualifications. "Apart from issues of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo, we review trial court determinations on expert qualifications for an abuse of discretion," applying this standard of review "equally ... to admissibility questions in summary judgment proceedings." Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare , 231 Ariz. 379, ¶ 30, 296 P.3d 42 (2013). Expert witness testimony in general is governed by Rule 702, Ariz. R. Evid., which allows the testimony if the witness "is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" and the testimony meets certain other requirements. "In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove negligence by presenting evidence that the healthcare provider(s) fell below the standard of care and that these deviations from the standard of care proximately caused the claimed injury." Ryan v. S.F. Peaks Trucking Co. , 228 Ariz. 42, ¶ 23, 262 P.3d 863 (App. 2011). ¶ 11 As it did below, the hospital primarily relies on the fact that the Rasors' proffered witness was a nurse, and not a doctor, to argue she was unqualified to testify as a causation expert. Specifically, Northwest asserts, "Given the complex pre-existing conditions that Ms. Rasor had, along with her complex medical problems, surgery and post-surgical complications, conditions and interventions, it is beyond the scope of a nurse to render a medical causation opinion," particularly "in this case where Ms. Ho admitted that the development of a pressure ulcer is multifactorial and depends on the patient's co-morbidities and conditions-areas which she did not even consider." In the hospital's supplemental brief, it requests that we "state a bright line rule that a nurse cannot offer causation opinions in a medical malpractice action." ¶ 12 Section 12-2603(A), A.R.S., governs expert testimony in medical malpractice cases and requires the filing of an affidavit stating "whether or not expert opinion testimony is necessary to prove the health care professional's standard of care or liability for the claim." If such affidavit asserts the need for expert testimony, claimants must then file a "preliminary expert opinion affidavit" including "[t]he expert's qualifications to express an opinion on the health care professional's standard of care or liability for the claim." § 12-2603(B)(1). Section 12-2603(H)(2) defines an expert in the same terms as Rule 702 : " 'Expert' means a person who is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to express an opinion regarding a licensed health care professional's standard of care or liability for the claim." ¶ 13 Our supreme court has previously noted that "[t]he overall purpose of Rule 702... is simply to ensure that a fact-finder is presented with reliable and relevant evidence." State v. Bernstein , 237 Ariz. 226, ¶ 14, 349 P.3d 200 (2015), quoting State v. Langill , 157 N.H. 77, 945 A.2d 1, 10 (2008) (first alteration added, second alteration in Bernstein ). In addition, we have observed that § 12-2603 aims to "curb frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits by imposing a stricter standard of pleading and setting deadlines for the early involvement of the plaintiff's expert witnesses." Passmore v. McCarver , 242 Ariz. 288, ¶ 9, 395 P.3d 297 (App. 2017), quoting Gorney v. Meaney , 214 Ariz. 226, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 799 (App. 2007). Indeed, the Arizona legislature, in enacting § 12-2603, expressly declared its purpose "to curtail the filing of frivolous lawsuits against health care professionals." 2004 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 4, § 2 (adding § 12-2602.01, subsequently renumbered § 12-2603 ). Notably, however, the statute does not impose stricter requirements on experts in medical malpractice cases and instead appears to accomplish its purpose through the imposition of the expert affidavit procedure. See § 12-2603. ¶ 14 But for standard-of-care experts in such cases, A.R.S. § 12-2604(A) imposes additional criteria that must be met for the expert to testify. Section 12-2604(A) specifically limits its application to "expert testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care." But no corresponding statute or rule imposes additional requirements on causation experts in medical malpractice cases. See State v. Christian , 205 Ariz. 64, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241 (2003) ("[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning is the plain text of the statute."); cf. Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin. , 206 Ariz. 1, ¶ 22, 75 P.3d 91 (2003) ("Neither the statute's plain language nor its intent contemplates that such a narrow, bright line distinction be drawn between what is an emergency condition and what is not."). Nor is there Arizona precedent holding medical malpractice causation experts to a higher standard than those in other cases, as there has been for standard-of-care experts dating back even before the adoption of Rule 702. Cf. Seisinger v. Siebel , 220 Ariz. 85, ¶¶ 33-35, 203 P.3d 483 (2009) (discussing history of requirements for standard-of-care experts in medical malpractice cases). As the hospital acknowledges in its supplemental brief, given this backdrop and the fact that § 12-2603(H)(2) defines "Expert" in the same terms as Rule 702, "[t]he qualifications for a causation expert in a medical malpractice case in Arizona are those that apply to all testifying experts pursuant to Rule 702." ¶ 15 The issue still remains whether a nurse, and Nurse Ho in particular, is qualified to testify regarding causation. At the outset, we reject the hospital's request for a bright line rule prohibiting nurses from testifying as causation experts in medical malpractice cases. As noted above, through § 12-2604, the legislature expressly created stricter criteria for standard-of-care experts in such cases than for other experts, including those testifying to causation. As our supreme court recognized in Seisinger , quoting from our decision in that case on appeal, § 12-2604"precludes a witness who is otherwise qualified under Rule 702 from testifying [to the standard of care] in a medical malpractice case unless he or she meets the additional criteria set forth in the statute." 220 Ariz. 85, ¶ 18, 203 P.3d 483. Northwest has identified no Arizona authority, nor are we aware of any, imposing a blanket prohibition upon nurses testifying as standard-of-care experts. Were we to create such a prohibition in medical malpractice cases, we would impose stricter requirements for causation experts under Rule 702 than exist for standard-of-care experts under § 12-2604, counter to the implicit legislative intent. The legislature not having done so, neither will we. Cf. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n , 220 Ariz. 587, ¶ 20, 208 P.3d 676 (2009) (courts defer to legislative enactments in part because legislature far better equipped than judiciary to evaluate data bearing upon legislative questions). ¶ 16 Our conclusion also comports with those of several other jurisdictions. See Frausto , 393 P.3d 776, ¶¶ 16, 28-29 & n.5 (permitting nurses as causation experts in medical malpractice cases and identifying eight states doing the same, plus an additional six, including Arizona, with case law arguably permitting it); see also, e.g. , Williams v. Eight Jud. Dist. Ct. , 127 Nev. 518, 262 P.3d 360, 365-67 (2011) (rejecting argument nurses can never testify as to medical causation and holding nurses "may obtain the requisite skill, knowledge, or experience to testify as to cause"); Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc. , 177 N.C.App. 290, 628 S.E.2d 851, 855-56 (2006) (same). In Frausto , the Washington Supreme Court noted that certain jurisdictions holding to the contrary "rely on provisions within their state's statutory frameworks prohibiting nurses from making medical diagnoses" and contrasted Washington's framework allowing advanced registered nurse practitioners "to practice independently and make diagnoses within the limited scope of their certification." 393 P.3d 776, ¶¶ 1, 16. ¶ 17 Northwest seeks to distinguish Frausto on the basis that the proffered expert there was a nurse practitioner while this case involves a nurse, asserting, "A nurse does not have the education, nor is a nurse allowed by law to make a medical diagnosis. A nurse cannot diagnose or treat any medical condition." Section 32-1601(23)(a), A.R.S., however, provides, " 'Registered nursing' includes ... [d]iagnosing and treating human responses to actual or potential health problems." Section 32-1601(23)(d) additionally allows a registered nurse to "[e]stablish[ ] a nursing diagnosis," which Ariz. Admin. Code R4-19-101 defines as "a clinical judgment, based on analysis of comprehensive assessment data, about a client's response to actual and potential health problems or life processes. Nursing diagnosis statements include the actual or potential problem, etiology or risk factors, and defining characteristics, if any." Moreover, "etiology" means "[t]he branch of medicine that deals with the causes or origins of disease" or "[t]he cause or origin of a disease or disorder as determined by medical diagnosis." The American Heritage Dictionary 611 (5th ed. 2011). ¶ 18 To the extent there is a distinction between the "diagnosing" that nurses are permitted to do under Arizona law and a "medical diagnosis," we find it a distinction without a difference as it pertains to the threshold question of whether nurses in general may give causation testimony in medical malpractice cases. Like Washington's supreme court, we conclude that "[a] sweeping ban on causation testimony from expert [nurses] is unnecessary and inconsistent with" the authority granted to them under Arizona statutes and the Arizona Administrative Code. Frausto , 393 P.3d 776, ¶ 29. Thus Rule 702 remains the test for whether Ho was qualified to give expert testimony as to causation in this case. ¶ 19 Rule 702 provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) The expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. In the context of this rule, our supreme court has stated, "The test of whether a person is an expert is whether a jury can receive help on a particular subject from the witness. The degree of qualification goes to the weight given the testimony, not its admissibility." Seisinger , 220 Ariz. 85, ¶ 16, 203 P.3d 483, quoting State v. Davolt , 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 70, 84 P.3d 456 (2004). Moreover, the rule "must be interpreted and applied with some flexibility to encompass the multitude of scenarios that may be presented and to maintain the division in function between the fact-finder and [the judge as] gatekeeper." Bernstein , 237 Ariz. 226, ¶ 14, 349 P.3d 200, quoting Langill , 945 A.2d at 10. And, "[i]n close cases, the trial court should allow the jury to exercise its fact-finding function, for it is the jury's exclusive province to assess the weight and credibility of evidence." Id. ¶ 18. "Cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. to 2012 amend. ¶ 20 In this case, when the Rasors identified Nurse Ho as an expert witness they intended to call at trial, she was a registered and certified wound-care nurse, then working as a director of wound care at a long-term, acute-care hospital. During Ho's deposition, she stated that her role at that hospital included "admission assessments," "weekly re-assessments," and "care planning," and she "provided treatments and collaborat[ed] with physicians[ and others] for the plan and care for the patients." Additionally, although she was then working in a long-term, acute-care hospital, she had spent the first nine years of her career in a coronary care unit of an acute-care hospital like Northwest, was cross-trained for the ICU, and had gained experience working with patients recovering from open-heart surgery. ¶ 21 According to the Rasors' disclosure, Nurse Ho had reviewed Karyn's medical records, the hospital's policies for preventing pressure ulcers, and information from the nurses regarding their interaction with Karyn. The Rasors proffered that Ho would testify Northwest "should have relieved the pressure created over Ms. Rasor's coccyx by repositioning her correctly and utilizing a specialty pressure relieving surface" and "[h]ad Northwest Hospital properly provided these standard interventions, the deep tissue injury should have been avoided." Ho would also testify that after one of the nurses observed "bruising over the coccyx," she should have "[a]t a minimum" "attempt[ed] to remove all pressure which caused the deep tissue injury" and the "failure to intervene likely le[ ]d to a worsening of the injury, which ultimately ended in a stage IV decubitus ulcer open to the coccyx bone." ¶ 22 During Nurse Ho's deposition, the hospital elicited her testimony that she did not "intend to give an opinion with regard to any predisposing or premorbid conditions that Ms. Rasor had with respect to the development of the pressure ulcer" and had not been given access to Karyn's entire medical chart for the time she was at Northwest. Additionally, although Ho stated that her opinion was "to a reasonable degree of medical probability," "relying on best practice[s] and research," she also stated she was not making a medical diagnosis as to causation but rather "an assessment" because "[a] pressure ulcer is not a medical diagnosis." ¶ 23 On appeal, Northwest points to these portions of Nurse Ho's testimony and argues "her opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data, the product of reliable principles and methods, and principles and methods reliably applied to the facts of this case" and "she disqualif[ied] herself based on her testimony." Initially, we disagree with the hospital's conclusion that Ho disqualified herself by stating she was making "an assessment" of causation rather than a medical diagnosis of causation. Northwest has identified no authority, nor are we aware of any, for the proposition that testimony on the causation of injuries must be a "medical diagnosis" as opposed to "an assessment." As we concluded in Lohmeier v. Hammer , "under Arizona law, it is not necessary that an expert witness be a medical doctor in order to offer testimony regarding the causation of physical injuries so long as ... the expert has specialized knowledge that will assist the jury in its resolution of that issue." 214 Ariz. 57, ¶ 28, 148 P.3d 101 (App. 2006). ¶ 24 As for the hospital's argument that Nurse Ho's opinion is not sufficiently well-founded, we note that in both its answering and its supplemental brief, Northwest falls back on its assertion that a nurse is not qualified to give causation expert testimony, a premise we have already rejected. Additionally, although the hospital may question the foundation and strength of Ho's opinion given that she did not review Karyn's complete medical records, that issue goes to the weight of her testimony and is not sufficient to render the opinion so unreliable as to preclude it altogether. See Bernstein , 237 Ariz. 226, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 200 ("Whether errors in application [of methodology] render evidence unreliable will not always be clear. In close cases, the trial court should allow the jury to exercise its fact-finding function, for it is the jury's exclusive province to assess the weight and credibility of evidence."). The hospital's concerns that Ho did not consider enough of the factual record in the case and that her "opinion seems to be that because Ms. Rasor developed a pressure ulcer, the ICU nurses must have been negligent" are appropriate subjects for cross-examination by Northwest and restriction by the trial court should Ho venture into the impermissible realm of offering legal conclusions. See id. ("[A]s long as an expert's scientific testimony rests upon good grounds, ... it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies."), quoting Langill , 945 A.2d at 11 (first alteration in Bernstein , second alteration in Langill ). Conclusion ¶ 25 As our supreme court has observed, under Rule 702, "[f]or a witness to be qualified as an expert, he or she need only possess 'skill and knowledge superior to that of [people] in general.' " State v. Romero , 239 Ariz. 6, ¶ 17, 365 P.3d 358 (2016), quoting State v. Girdler , 138 Ariz. 482, 490, 675 P.2d 1301 (1983) (first alteration added, second alteration in Romero ). As previously noted, Nurse Ho was both a certified wound-care nurse and a registered nurse, whom Arizona empowers to "[e]stablish[ ] a nursing diagnosis," § 32-1601(23)(d), which includes determining the "etiology" or cause of a disorder, Ariz. Admin. Code R4-19-101. She had been a registered nurse for more than twenty years and a hospital director of wound care since 2013. Certainly, she possessed greater knowledge and skill than the average layperson, and we conclude she was "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," Ariz. R. Evid. 702, to testify as a causation expert in this case. Disposition ¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for the Rasors to seek Rule 56(d) relief and for any other proceedings consistent with this opinion. Our supreme court specifically directed that should we determine summary judgment was inappropriate on causation, on remand to the trial court, the Rasors should be provided an opportunity to use Rule 56(d) to seek to obtain a qualified standard-of-care expert. See Rasor II , 243 Ariz. 160, ¶ 33, 403 P.3d 572. It is for the trial court in the first instance to resolve any Rule 56(d) motion filed in this case. Rule 56(a), Ariz. R. Civ. P., directs that trial courts "should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying" a motion for summary judgment. To the extent that Nurse Ho's proposed testimony may blend causation and standard of care, the parties and trial court are not prevented from addressing the issue and, if necessary, restricting it to the former by way of further proceedings, such as a motion in limine and/or limiting instruction.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 Persons charged with sexual assault must not be released on bail if they pose a danger of committing new sexual assaults or other dangerous crimes while awaiting trial. The question here is how this may be accomplished in a manner that furthers this public-safety goal while preserving an accused's constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest. ¶ 2 Article 2, section 22(A)(1), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(2) categorically prohibit bail for all persons charged with sexual assault if "the proof is evident or the presumption great" that the person committed the crime, without considering other facts that may justify bail in an individual case. We hold that these provisions, on their face, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Unless the defendant is accused of committing sexual assault while already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge, the trial court must make an individualized bail determination before ordering pretrial detention. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(2)-(3). BACKGROUND ¶ 3 The Arizona Constitution provides that all persons charged with crimes shall be bailable unless the accused is charged with a crime that falls within an exception and the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed that crime. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A). Before 2002, these exceptions were limited to capital offenses, felony offenses committed while the accused is on bail for a separate felony charge, and felony offenses when the person charged poses a substantial danger to any other person or the community and no conditions of release would reasonably assure safety. A.R.S. § 13-3961, historical note. ¶ 4 In 2002, Arizona voters added to the listed exceptions by passing Proposition 103, which amended article 2, section 22(A)(1), to forbid bail when the proof is evident or the presumption great that an accused committed sexual assault, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age, or molestation of a child under fifteen years of age ("Proposition 103 offenses"). See id. ; see also A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(2)-(4) (codifying Proposition 103). Proposition 103 also declared that the purposes of bail and any conditions for release include "[a]ssuring the appearance of the accused," "[p]rotecting against the intimidation of witnesses," and "[p]rotecting the safety of the victim, any other person or the community." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (B); A.R.S. § 13-3961, historical note. ¶ 5 In Simpson v. Miller (Simpson II ), 241 Ariz. 341, 349 ¶ 31, 387 P.3d 1270, 1278 (2017), cert. denied , Arizona v. Martinez , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 146, 199 L.Ed.2d 37 (2017), this Court held article 2, section 22(A)(1), and § 13-3961(A)(3) facially unconstitutional as they related to charges of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age. After Simpson II the superior court required individualized bail determinations pursuant to § 13-3961(D) for all persons charged with Proposition 103 offenses. Section 13-3961(D) provides, in relevant part: [A] person who is in custody shall not be admitted to bail if the person is charged with a felony offense and the state certifies by motion and the court finds after a hearing on the matter that there is clear and convincing evidence that the person charged poses a substantial danger to another person or the community or engaged in conduct constituting a violent offense, that no condition or combination of conditions of release may be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the community and that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person committed the offense. ¶ 6 In 2017, the State charged Guy Goodman with sexually assaulting a victim in 2010. "A person commits sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without consent of such person." A.R.S. § 13-1406(A). The state can charge a person with sexual assault at any time as no statute of limitations applies to the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-107(A). ¶ 7 Over the State's objection that sexual assault remains a non-bailable offense after Simpson II , the superior court conducted a § 13-3961(D) bail hearing. A police officer testified that the victim claimed that Goodman, a guest in the victim's home after a night of socializing, touched her vaginal area beneath her underwear while she was sleeping and without her consent. DNA tested from an external vaginal swab confirmed this contact. The officer also said that Goodman, when confronted with the DNA results, admitted digital penetration. The court ruled that although there was proof evident or a presumption great that Goodman committed the offense, the State had failed to "meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence to show that [Goodman] poses a substantial danger to other persons or the community." (The State did not assert that Goodman committed a "violent offense," which is defined as either a dangerous crime against children or terrorism. A.R.S. § 13-3961(D).) The court reasoned that "[t]here was no evidence of any recent felony criminal history or prior similar offenses or arrests nor any evidence of criminal offenses between the time of this alleged offense in 2010 and today," nor any history of contact, threats, or intimidation aimed at the victim or any witnesses. The court set bail at $70,000, required that Goodman's movements be electronically monitored upon release, and imposed other conditions, including that he not possess any weapons, use non-prescription drugs, or contact the victim. ¶ 8 On special action review, the court of appeals vacated the bail order, holding that "[s]exual assault remains a non-bailable offense" after Simpson II , and so a § 13-3961(D) hearing is not required. State v. Wein , 242 Ariz. 352, 353 ¶ 1, 395 P.3d 1111, 1112 (App. 2017). ¶ 9 We granted review to determine whether the categorical denial of bail for persons charged with sexual assault, when the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge, violates due process, an issue of statewide importance. Although Goodman pleaded guilty and was sentenced while this matter was pending, we nevertheless decide the issue because it is capable of repetition yet could evade review due to the temporary duration of pretrial detention. See State v. Valenzuela , 144 Ariz. 43, 44, 695 P.2d 732, 733 (1985). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. DISCUSSION I. Restrictions on pretrial detention: the Salerno standards ¶ 10 The constitutional validity of Proposition 103's prohibition on bail for defendants accused of sexual assault is an issue of law we review de novo. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 344 ¶ 7, 387 P.3d at 1273. As the challenging party, Goodman bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the restriction is facially unconstitutional. United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). ¶ 11 The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from punishing an accused by jailing him before trial. See id. at 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095. But if pretrial detention is regulatory rather than punitive, the government's interest can, in appropriate and exceptional circumstances, outweigh an individual's "strong interest in liberty," an important, fundamental right. Id. at 748, 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; see also id. at 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception."). ¶ 12 In Salerno , the United States Supreme Court used a two-step standard to determine whether the Bail Reform Act's provisions permitting pretrial detention constituted impermissible punishment or potentially permissible regulation. Id. at 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095. "Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on [1] whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [2] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Schall v. Martin , 467 U.S. 253, 269, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) ). The Court concluded that the Act was regulatory. Id. at 748, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; cf. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 20, 387 P.3d at 1276 (applying the Salerno standard). ¶ 13 The Salerno Court next used a two-step "heightened scrutiny" standard to determine whether the Bail Reform Act, although regulatory, nevertheless violated the due-process restriction on pretrial detention. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 748-50, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 23, 387 P.3d at 1277. Under that standard, pretrial detention is constitutionally permissible if the government has both a "legitimate and compelling" purpose for restricting an accused's liberty, and the restriction is "narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly acute problem." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749-50, 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The Court determined that the Act met this standard. Id. at 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ; cf. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 345, 348 ¶¶ 9, 23, 387 P.3d at 1274 (applying the second Salerno standard to conclude that the categorical prohibition of bail for arrestees charged with sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen violates due process). ¶ 14 Consistent with Salerno and Simpson II , we first examine whether Proposition 103's categorical prohibition on bail for arrestees charged with sexual assault is regulatory or punitive. If the latter, the prohibition constitutes a per se due-process violation. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 20, 387 P.3d at 1276. If the restriction is regulatory, we must determine whether it nevertheless violates due process. Finally, we decide whether any due-process violation renders the restriction facially unconstitutional. II. Application here A. Regulation vs. punishment ¶ 15 In Simpson II , we concluded that Proposition 103's categorical prohibition of bail for an arrestee charged with sexual conduct with a minor under age fifteen, when the proof is evident or presumption great that the person committed the offense, is regulatory rather than punitive. Id. For the same reasons, Proposition 103's identical prohibition on bail for persons charged with sexual assault is regulatory. B. Due process 1. Legitimate and compelling purpose ¶ 16 The publicity pamphlet for Proposition 103 reflects that the measure's purpose was both to ensure that sexual predators facing potential life sentences would be present for trial and to keep "rapists and child molesters" from endangering others while awaiting trial. The senator who sponsored the legislation placing Proposition 103 on the ballot explained to voters that "sexual predators ... know they could be facing lifetime incarceration" and therefore "ha[ve] no incentive to ever return" to court, making Proposition 103 necessary to "keep dangerous sexual predators off our streets." See Ariz. Sec'y of State, 2002 Publicity Pamphlet 16 (2002), http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2002/Info/pubpamphlet/english/prop103.pdf ("Publicity Pamphlet"). Others echoed the senator, focusing on the need to "prevent the worst sexual predators from jumping bail or even simply walking our neighborhoods," stopping "rapists and child molesters" from reoffending, and treating "bail for rapists and child molesters ... like bail for murderers." Id . at 16-17. ¶ 17 Ensuring that an accused is present for trial serves a legitimate and compelling purpose. Cf. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ("[A]n arrestee may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight."). And the government has an equally compelling interest in protecting victims and the public from those who would commit sexual assault while on pretrial release. See id. at 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095 ("There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal."); Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 24, 387 P.3d at 1277 (finding that Proposition 103's prohibition on bail for persons accused of sexual contact with a minor under fifteen years of age serves the legitimate and compelling purpose of crime prevention). ¶ 18 Goodman takes issue with our analysis in Simpson II and argues that Proposition 103 did not advance a legitimate and compelling government purpose because voters were misled by suggestions that, without the categorical prohibition, courts would have to grant bail to persons charged with Proposition 103 offenses. We disagree. The Publicity Pamphlet stated that without the measure, persons charged with Proposition 103 offenses would be "eligible for bail," not automatically granted bail. Publicity Pamphlet, supra ¶ 16 at 16. ¶ 19 The prohibition on bail for those charged with sexual assault serves legitimate and compelling regulatory purposes and thus satisfies the first prong of the Salerno standard. 2. Narrowly focused measure ¶ 20 Proposition 103's categorical prohibition of bail for persons charged with sexual assault is "narrowly focused" if the proof is evident or the presumption great regarding the charge, and a sexual assault charge either presents an inherent flight risk or inherently demonstrates that the accused will likely commit a new dangerous crime while awaiting trial even with release conditions. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348-49 ¶¶ 26, 30, 387 P.3d at 1277-78. a. Flight risk ¶ 21 A sexual assault charge does not present an inherent flight risk. "Sexual assault" concerns an array of deviant behaviors and, depending on individual circumstances, punishment ranges from 5.25 years' imprisonment to life imprisonment. A.R.S. § 13-1406(B)-(D). The State does not cite any authority, and we are not aware of any, suggesting that the prospect of imprisonment for a non-capital offense inherently predicts that an accused will not appear for trial. Cf. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1278 ("Historically, capital offense charges have been considered to present an inherent flight risk sufficient to justify bail denial."). And even if the possibility of a life sentence presents an inherent flight risk, a concern expressed in the Publicity Pamphlet, supra ¶ 16, the prohibition is excessive as it sweeps in those arrestees facing only a term of years' imprisonment if convicted. b. Future dangerousness while awaiting trial ¶ 22 To begin, the question here is not whether sexual assault is a deplorable crime that endangers and dehumanizes victims-it is, and it does. Cf. Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S. 584, 597, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (describing rape as "highly reprehensible" and "the ultimate violation of self" after homicide). The pertinent inquiry is whether a sexual-assault charge alone, when the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge, inherently demonstrates that the accused will pose an unmanageable risk of danger if released pending trial. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278 ; cf. Kansas v.Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (stating in the civil commitment context that "[a] finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground" to justify commitment and that some additional factor is required to narrow the class to persons "who are unable to control their dangerousness"). For three reasons, we agree with Goodman that it does not. ¶ 23 First, Proposition 103 does not provide any procedures to determine whether a person charged with sexual assault would pose a danger if granted pre-trial release. Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 81-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (invalidating Louisiana's continued detention of insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill because, "[u]nlike the sharply focused scheme" in Salerno , which involved individualized assessment, Louisiana's scheme does not include "an adversary hearing at which the State must prove ... that [the acquittee] is demonstrably dangerous to the community"); Salerno , 481 U.S. at 742-43, 747, 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (finding that the Bail Reform Act was narrowly focused on preventing danger to the community because, in part, a court could only order pre-trial detention after conducting a "full-blown adversary hearing" and finding that no conditions would "assure ... the safety of any other person and the community"). A court's finding that the proof is evident or the presumption great only shows a likelihood that an accused committed the charged sexual assault. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 16, 387 P.3d at 1276 (describing the standard as requiring substantial proof that the accused committed the charged crime). It does not address the likelihood that an accused would commit a new sexual assault or other dangerous crime if released pending trial. Cf. United States v. Scott , 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Neither Salerno nor any other case authorizes detaining someone in jail while awaiting trial, or the imposition of special bail conditions, based merely on the fact of arrest for a particular crime."). ¶ 24 Second, nothing shows that most persons charged with sexual assault, or even a significant number, would likely commit another sexual assault or otherwise dangerous crime pending trial if released on bail. Cf. Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 348-49 ¶¶ 26, 30, 387 P.3d at 1277-78 (stating that any category of crime must serve as "a convincing proxy" for future dangerousness (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ). Indeed, this showing would be a difficult undertaking. Cf. Schall , 467 U.S. at 279, 104 S.Ct. 2403 ("We have also recognized that a prediction of future criminal conduct is an experienced prediction based on a host of variables which cannot be readily codified.") (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 25 The State points to recidivism rates among sex offenders as evidence of the likelihood that sexual assault arrestees would commit a new sexual assault pending trial if released on bail. The cited empirical studies are not illuminating, however, as they concern a wide variety of sex crimes besides sexual assault, arrive at disparate conclusions, and for the most part do not focus on the relatively short time period between arrest and trial. Regardless, none of the studies cited reflects that most convicted rapists reoffend, the highest number being 5.6% reoffending within five years of release from prison. See Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010 , at 2 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510_st.pdf. And the only cited study concerning accused rapists released on bail reflects that 3% committed another unspecified felony pending trial. See Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009-Statistical Tables 21 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf. ¶ 26 Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), and McKune v. Lile , 536 U.S. 24, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002), relied on by Justice Bolick in his dissent, do not persuade us that recidivism rates justify a categorical denial of bail. See infra ¶45. At issue in Smith was whether Alaska's registration requirement for convicted sex offenders imposed punishment so that any retroactive application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith , 538 U.S. at 89, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Employing a test like the one used in Salerno to determine whether an act is regulatory or punitive, the Court concluded that the registration requirement was regulatory. Id . at 105-06, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In rejecting an argument that application of the registration requirement to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness was excessive in relation to a proper regulatory purpose, the Court noted that a sex-offense conviction could provide evidence of a "substantial risk of recidivism," and that Alaska could "legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness." Id. at 103-04, 123 S.Ct. 1140. ¶ 27 But Smith did not establish that a state can regulate sex offenders as a class in every situation without violating due process, as Justice Bolick asserts. See infra ¶¶45-47. Indeed, the Court suggested the opposite by distinguishing Alaska's sex-offender-registration requirement from a Kansas act that authorized civil commitment of sexually violent predators for a maximum of one year, subject to new commitment proceedings. 538 U.S. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing Hendricks , 521 U.S. at 364, 117 S.Ct. 2072 ). In Hendricks , the Court rejected a due-process challenge to the Kansas act, reasoning that because it required an individualized finding of future dangerousness linked with a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder," it sufficiently "narrow[ed] the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness." 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. (Contrary to Justice Bolick's characterization, the Hendricks Court's due-process analysis did not turn on the potential that sexually violent predators could be indefinitely confined. See infra ¶48.) The Smith Court concluded that a similarly individualized risk assessment was not necessary to uphold Alaska's law as regulatory, noting that "[t]he State's objective in Hendricks was involuntary (and potentially indefinite) confinement of particularly dangerous individuals," which made individual assessments appropriate given "[t]he magnitude of the restraint." Smith , 538 U.S. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Court contrasted sex-offender registration as a "more minor condition" and concluded that in that context "the State can dispense with individual predictions of future dangerousness and allow the public to assess the risk on the basis of accurate, nonprivate information about the registrants' convictions." Id. Pretrial detention is more like civil commitment than sex-offender registration, making this case closer to Hendricks . And Smith does not support a conclusion that the risk of recidivism by some persons on pretrial release justifies categorically dispensing with individual assessments of that risk. ¶ 28 McKune addressed whether requiring convicted sex offenders to admit their crimes as part of an in-prison rehabilitation program violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 536 U.S. at 29, 122 S.Ct. 2017. The Court began its analysis by noting that "[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation" and "[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault." Id. at 33, 122 S.Ct. 2017. The empirical study relied on by the Court for this conclusion, however, reflects that 7.7% of convicted rapists released from prison in 1983 were rearrested for rape within three years. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983 , at 6 (1997), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf. Although we share the McKune Court's view that sex offenders are a "serious threat," the post-conviction recidivism rates do not inherently demonstrate that a person charged with sexual assault will likely commit another sexual assault if released pending trial, particularly if conditions like GPS monitoring are imposed. ¶ 29 Third, alternatives exist "that would serve the state's objective equally well at less cost to individual liberty." Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 28, 387 P.3d at 1278. The Arizona Constitution already forbids bail for those charged with any felony when the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge, "the person charged poses a substantial danger to any other person or the community," and "no conditions of release which may be imposed will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the community." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (A)(3); see also A.R.S. § 13-3961(D) (codifying art. 2, § 22(A)(3) ). Also, a court can set bail and impose restrictions intended to preserve public safety, like the GPS monitoring imposed on Goodman. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 22 (B)(3) ("The purposes of bail and any conditions of release that are set by a judicial officer include ... [p]rotecting the safety of the victim, any other person or the community."). ¶ 30 The court of appeals reached a different conclusion from ours by mistakenly focusing on the dangerousness of sexual assault and not on whether a charge inherently predicts the commission of a new sexual assault or otherwise dangerous offense pending trial. Wein , 242 Ariz. at 355 ¶ 5, 395 P.3d at 1114 ; see also Hendricks , 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 ; Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278. The court seized on a citation signal to interpret Simpson II as turning on the fact that sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age could be committed with a victim's consent and therefore "may involve a defendant who is not a danger to the community." Wein , 242 Ariz. at 353 ¶¶ 7-8, 395 P.3d at 1112. The court reasoned that after Simpson II , a charge of sexual assault, which is always non-consensual, "fulfills the requirement for finding inherent dangerousness." Id. ¶ 9. Justice Bolick shares this view. See infra ¶42. ¶ 31 In retrospect, the court of appeals' confusion is understandable. We should have immediately explained that just as commission of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age is not always dangerous, it does not inherently demonstrate future dangerousness pending trial. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1278. We made that point later in the opinion. See id. ¶ 30 ("[T]he state may deny bail categorically for crimes that inherently demonstrate future dangerousness" when the proof is evident or the presumption great, but "[w]hat it may not do, consistent with due process, is deny bail categorically for those accused of crimes that do not inherently predict future dangerousness."); see also Morreno v. Hon. Brickner/State , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶ 21, 243 Ariz. 543, 416 P.3d 807 (May 2, 2018) ("The mere charge itself [in Simpson II ] was not a convincing proxy for future dangerousness, and therefore not narrowly focused, because it swept in situations that are not predictive of future dangerousness."). Justice Bolick's view that showing proof evident or presumption great that an accused committed sexual assault alone demonstrates future dangerousness is at odds with Simpson II 's holding and also disregards key aspects of Salerno 's reasoning and holding. See infra ¶50; see also Morreno, 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶ 21. ¶ 32 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, infra ¶46, we reaffirm our view expressed in Simpson II that due process does not require individualized determinations in every case. 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1277. Indeed, we recently rejected a due-process challenge to article 2, section 22(A)(2), of the Arizona Constitution, which precludes bail "[f]or felony offenses committed when the person charged is already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge and where the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charge." Morreno , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶ 38. We concluded that the state had a legitimate and compelling interest in "preventing defendants from committing new felonies while on pretrial release from a prior felony charge," and article 2, section 22(A)(2), narrowly focused on this objective by applying only to defendants who, in fact, likely reoffended while on release. Id . ¶¶ 31, 34 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "In such cases, an individualized determination serves no narrowing function and is therefore unnecessary." Id . ¶ 34. But unlike Morreno , the issue here is whether a sexual assault charge inherently predicts that a defendant will commit another dangerous offense pending trial. Due process requires an individualized assessment of this risk because it is not categorically demonstrated, as is the risk presented by a felon who has already reoffended while on pretrial release. ¶ 33 In sum, although Proposition 103 has legitimate and compelling regulatory purposes, its categorical prohibition of bail for persons charged with sexual assault, when the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge, is not narrowly focused on accomplishing those purposes. The Salerno standard is unmet, meaning the categorical prohibition of bail violates substantive due process. See Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 30, 387 P.3d at 1278. III. Facial unconstitutionality ¶ 34 The Arizona Attorney General, in an amicus role, and Justice Gould, in his dissent, argue that even if Proposition 103's categorical prohibition on bail for those charged with sexual assault violates Goodman's substantive-due-process rights, he failed to establish that the prohibition is facially unconstitutional. To succeed on a facial challenge, an admittedly difficult feat, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the [Act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. ¶ 35 Here, Proposition 103's categorical prohibition of bail for everyone charged with sexual assault deprives arrestees of their substantive-due-process right to either an individualized determination of future dangerousness or a valid proxy for it. See Morreno , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶ 15. There is "no set of circumstances" under which the prohibition would be valid because it lacks either of these features in every application. ¶ 36 Echoing his partial dissent in Morreno , Justice Gould asserts that (1) the prohibition here is not facially unconstitutional because it applies to arrestees who would, in fact, likely commit a new sexual assault while on pretrial release, and (2) we apply an overbreadth analysis that is properly confined to First Amendment cases. See id. ¶¶42, 49 (Gould, J. concurring); infra ¶¶54, 56. We reject these arguments for the same reasons we did in Morreno . See Morreno , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶¶ 20-23. CONCLUSION ¶ 37 As in Simpson II , we do not lightly set aside citizen-enacted constitutional provisions, whether they are narrowly passed or approved "overwhelming[ly]" by Arizona's voters (an irrelevancy for constitutionality purposes). Infra ¶39. Nevertheless, article 2, section 22(A)(1), and § 13-3961(A)(2) are facially unconstitutional because they categorically prohibit bail without regard for individual circumstances. To be clear, courts can deny bail to a person charged with sexual assault when the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge and must do so when that person "poses a substantial danger to another person or the community." A.R.S. § 13-3961(D). Before doing so, however, courts must engage in an individualized determination by conducting a § 13-3961(D) hearing. We affirm the superior court and vacate the court of appeals' opinion. BOLICK, J., joined by GOULD, J., and LOPEZ, J., dissenting. ¶ 38 Although our colleagues' opinion has substantial merit, we conclude that the differences between the crime of sexual assault at issue here and the crime of sexual conduct with a minor at issue in Simpson II are of constitutional magnitude, justifying Arizona citizens' determination that those who are likely to be adjudged guilty of sexual assault should be held without bail pending trial. ¶ 39 We begin by recognizing, as did the Court in Simpson II, that the challenged provision is part of our state's organic law, whose review against federal constitutional challenges we undertake with "great care" and whose provisions "we strive whenever possible to uphold." 241 Ariz. at 345 ¶ 8, 387 P.3d at 1274. In a close case, we should not expansively construe United States Supreme Court precedents to compel ourselves to invalidate a provision of our constitution; we should seek to the fullest extent possible to harmonize the two. We conclude that no such irreconcilable conflict exists here and that the majority too lightly sets aside the voters' overwhelming determination that those who are shown to be likely guilty of sexual assault should not be released pending trial. The framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Salerno , while recognizing core liberty interests implicated by pretrial incarceration, emphasized that it has "repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest." 481 U.S. at 748, 107 S.Ct. 2095. This is one of those appropriate circumstances. ¶ 40 In Simpson II , we held that individual determinations of future dangerousness are not necessary in all cases, but that where pretrial incarceration is categorically required, the crime giving rise to such conditions must serve as a "convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness." 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1277 (quoting Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio , 770 F.3d 772, 786 (9th Cir. 2014) ). The Court's determination that sexual conduct with a minor was not an adequate proxy for dangerousness was based on the crime's definition, which encompassed consensual activity so that dangerousness was not "inherent" in the crime. Id. at 349 ¶¶ 26-27, 387 P.3d at 1278 ("The crime can be committed by a person of any age, and may be consensual," thereby "sweep[ing] in situations where teenagers engage in consensual sex. In such instances, evident proof or presumption great that the defendant committed the crime would suggest little or nothing about the defendant's danger to anyone."). The Court's analysis made clear that where a crime is not a convincing proxy for dangerousness, an individual assessment of dangerousness is necessary to deny pretrial release. But where a crime is a convincing proxy for dangerousness, a determination by proof evident or presumption great that a defendant committed the crime is sufficient to establish dangerousness and to sustain a categorical prohibition of bail. ¶ 41 Sexual assault is by definition an extremely dangerous crime. As this Court highlighted in Simpson II , absence of consent is a defining feature of sexual assault. Id. ¶27 (citing A.R.S. § 13-1406(A) defining sexual assault as "intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact ... without consent of such person"). Our statutes carefully define and circumscribe the term "without consent," which can occur in four discrete circumstances: where the victim (a) "is coerced by the immediate use or threatened use of force against a person or property"; (b) "is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep[,] or any other similar impairment of cognition and such condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant"; (c) "is intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act"; or (d) "is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the person is the victim's spouse." A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7). Thus, by definition, sexual assault necessarily involves the sexual violation of a person through force, coercion, or deception. As such, it is an inherently dangerous crime, and proof evident or presumption great that a defendant has committed the crime demonstrates that the defendant is dangerous. ¶ 42 As noted in Simpson II , the crime at issue there was defined to encompass both consensual and nonconsensual acts. 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 27, 387 P.3d at 1278. Here the crime is defined only to encompass nonconsensual sexual violations. The Court highlighted that distinction because the risk of future dangerousness encompasses not only the likelihood of recidivism but the inherent danger and human impact of the crime. The majority now "explain[s]" that the nature of the crime is irrelevant to the risk of future dangerousness. Supra ¶ 31. In that way, it removes from the constitutional equation that sexual assault is by definition a uniquely horrific act, in which a person's most intimate parts are violated through force, coercion, or deception. ¶ 43 As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Coker v. Georgia , sexual assault is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate violation of self." It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to overcome the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as well. 433 U.S. 584, 597-98, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Lisa Brodyaga et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies (1975) ). ¶ 44 Unsurprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has recognized that sexual crimes justify distinctive legislative treatment in the confinement context. ¶ 45 In Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Court upheld a state's sex-offender registry against an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge. Although a distinct provision of the Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause is closely related to substantive due process because it likewise "forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated." Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346, 370, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington , 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) ). In Smith , the challengers argued the law was excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose because it "applies to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness," 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140, which parallels Goodman's argument here. The Court held that the state reasonably "could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism." Id. Specifically, the Court cited findings justifying "grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class ." Id. (emphasis added); see also McKune v. Lile , 536 U.S. 24, 32-33, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) ("Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.... When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.... [T]he rate of recidivism of untreated offenders has been estimated to be as high as 80%."). ¶ 46 The majority acknowledges that sex offenders constitute a serious threat but is unconvinced that recidivism statistics "inherently demonstrate that a person charged with sexual assault will likely commit another sexual assault if released pending trial." Supra ¶28. That conclusion misstates the constitutional requirement and implies the necessity of individualized assessments in every case, which we expressly rejected in Simpson II . 241 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1277 ("[W]e do not read Salerno or other decisions to require such individualized determinations in every case," but rather to require that its procedure serve as a convincing proxy for dangerousness.); accord State v. Furgal , 161 N.H. 206, 13 A.3d 272, 278-79 (2010), cited with approval in Simpson II , 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1278. Rather, the Constitution requires only that the state reasonably could conclude that the risk of dangerousness requires pretrial confinement of those who are determined to have likely committed sexual assault. See, e.g. , Smith , 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140 ("The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences."); see also id. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140 ("The State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness," did not violate the clause.). ¶ 47 Smith and related cases establish that a state may categorically regulate sex offenders as a class for public safety purposes, both because of the uniquely horrific nature of the crimes and sex offenders' propensity for recidivism. Indeed, while the statute in Smith exposed all sex offenders to special burdens, the provision here deals only with a particularly heinous and dangerous subcategory of sex offenders. Nor does it amount to a substantial difference that Smith involved convicted sex offenders, given that the bail exclusion here applies only to defendants who are demonstrated at an adversarial hearing to have committed sexual assault by proof evident or presumption great. As we noted in Simpson II , the procedure to determine proof evident or presumption great is "robust," requiring a prompt and complete adversarial hearing with specific factual findings in which "the state's burden 'is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding ... [and] dispassionate judgment of the court that the accused committed' " the crime. 241 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 16, 387 P.3d at 1275 (alteration in original) (quoting Simpson v. Owens , 207 Ariz. 261, 274 ¶ 40, 85 P.3d 478, 491 (App. 2004) ). ¶ 48 The majority notes that Smith distinguished the earlier opinion in Hendricks , supra ¶ 27, which upheld a statute requiring an individualized assessment of dangerousness for involuntary civil commitment for sexual offenders who were likely to recidivate due to mental abnormalities or personality disorders. Hendricks , 521 U.S. at 350-52, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The scheme at issue differed from the prohibition of bail here in two crucial respects. First, it involved involuntary civil commitment after, and in addition to, the criminal sentence. Id. at 351-52, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Further, the period of involuntary commitment was potentially indefinite. Id. at 364, 117 S.Ct. 2072 ; see also Foucha , 504 U.S. at 83, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (striking down "indefinite detention of insanity acquittees" in the absence of sufficient safeguards). As the Court observed in Smith , the "magnitude of the restraint made individual assessment appropriate." 538 U.S. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. ¶ 49 In contrast to Hendricks , which exposed sex offenders to potentially indefinite involuntary commitment after having fully served their sentences, the bail prohibition here applies only to defendants who by proof evident and presumption great are likely to have committed sexual assault and whose pretrial confinement will be only temporary. It thus provides greater protection than the baseline requirement of a probable cause finding for pretrial confinement upheld by the Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Additionally, the Arizona Constitution, statutes, and rules guarantee a speedy trial. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 (guaranteeing the right of criminal defendants to speedy trial); A.R.S. § 13-114(1) (same) ; see also Ariz. Const. art 2, § 2.1 (A)(10) (guaranteeing the right of crime victims to speedy trial); A.R.S. § 13-4435(A) (same) ; A.R.S. § 13-4435(D) (limiting continuances to "extraordinary circumstances" and when "indispensable to the interests of justice"). The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe time for trials, including 150 days after arraignment for defendants in custody. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(1). Rule 8.6 provides that the court must dismiss any prosecution when it determines that the applicable time limits are violated. Those protections ensure that defendants adjudged by proof evident or presumption great to have committed sexual assault will be subjected only to the pretrial detention necessary to protect the public against dangerous criminal acts. ¶ 50 For all of those reasons, we conclude that the bail-exclusion provision here fits comfortably within the Salerno framework. First, the provision applies to "a specific category of extremely limited offenses." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Indeed, it is far more limited than the array of offenses for which bail was restricted in the law at issue in Salerno . Id. at 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), which includes crimes of violence, offenses with a penalty of life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, and certain repeat offenders) ). Second, it is narrowly focused on "preventing danger to the community," id. at 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, because it is limited to a crime that the Supreme Court has recognized as particularly dangerous and whose perpetrators are likely to commit similar crimes in the future, see, e.g. , Smith , 538 U.S. at 103-04, 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; supra ¶¶45-47. Third, like the "full-blown adversary" hearing in Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750, 107 S.Ct. 2095, pretrial detention in Arizona is preceded by a hearing requiring not merely probable cause but proof evident or presumption great. Although the Bail Reform Act at issue in Salerno included individualized assessments of dangerousness, id. , the nature of the crime here, as discussed above, justifies categorical treatment so that an adversarial hearing regarding probable guilt serves as an ample proxy for dangerousness. Fourth, the duration of pretrial detention is limited by speedy-trial guarantees and rules. See id. at 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Finally, if any doubt exists that these safeguards "suffice to repel a facial challenge," the Court in Salerno admonishes that the protections sustained there are "more exacting" and "far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited pretrial detention" in other cases. See id. at 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095. ¶ 51 Simpson II also suggests that the existence of less-restrictive alternatives may demonstrate the bail exclusion is not narrowly focused in some instances. 241 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 28, 387 P.3d at 1278. However, we emphasized that individualized determinations of dangerousness are unnecessary if the crime is a convincing proxy for unmanageable flight risk or dangerousness. Id. at 348-49 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1277-78 (noting that historically, bail is often denied categorically to capital defendants due to flight risk). We expressly recognized that "certain crimes ... may present such inherent risk of future dangerousness that bail might appropriately be denied by proof evident or presumption great that the defendant committed the crime." Id. at 349 ¶ 26, 387 P.3d at 1278. As discussed above, the Supreme Court's decisions in Smith and McKune make clear that sexual assault is a uniquely grave and dangerous crime. The statutory definition limiting sexual assault to nonconsensual acts narrowly focuses the bail exclusion to an especially serious and inherently dangerous crime. The extensive safeguards further ensure narrow focus and satisfy the Salerno standards. Indeed, we held recently in Morreno that individualized dangerousness determinations are unnecessary to categorically deny bail to felony defendants who are arrested for any new felonies before trial. 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶¶ 34-35. We therefore conclude that the majority unnecessarily oversteps by concluding that federal precedent compels it to invalidate a provision of our constitution. ¶ 52 If it is presented the opportunity to do so, we urge the Supreme Court to review this decision. If we are correct that its precedents allow Arizona to deny pretrial release to those who by proof evident or presumption great have committed sexual assault, this Court has unnecessarily invalidated a part of our organic law. As a matter of comity and federalism, we urge the Supreme Court to correct the error if this Court has misread its precedents. In the meantime, with great respect to our colleagues, we dissent. GOULD, J., joined by LOPEZ, J., dissenting. ¶ 53 For the reasons set forth in my partial dissent in Morreno v. Hon. Brickner/State , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶¶ 39-71, I also dissent from the majority's decision today. Specifically, I conclude the sexual assault bond restriction contained in article 2, section 22(A)(1), of the Arizona Constitution (and codified in A.R.S. § 13-3961(A)(2) ) is facially constitutional. Additionally, while I do not join in Justice Bolick's dissenting opinion to the extent he applies the overbreadth analysis used in Simpson II , I do join in his analysis and conclusion that the bond provision at issue here is facially constitutional. ¶ 54 As it did in Simpson II , the majority abandons the facial standard set forth in Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, substituting the overbreadth standard used by the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Valenzuela , 770 F.3d 772. See Morreno , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶¶ 39-45 (discussing Salerno's standard for facial challenges and Simpson II's adoption of the overbreadth standard used in Lopez-Valenzuela ). Thus, applying Simpson II's overbreadth standard, this Court strikes down yet another offense-based bond provision. Now, the only remaining offense-based restriction is for capital offenses. Undoubtedly, this provision cannot survive the majority's overbreadth test. See Morreno , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶¶ 64, 67-68, 70 (discussing how offense-based bond restrictions cannot survive the Simpson II overbreadth standard). ¶ 55 Here, like Simpson II , the majority contends that to be facially valid, sexual assault must serve as a "valid proxy" for future dangerousness and "inherently demonstrate[ ] that [an] accused will likely commit a new dangerous crime while awaiting trial." See supra ¶¶20, 35. Thus, if there are instances where a defendant charged with sexual assault might remain crime-free on pretrial release, the crime cannot serve as a "valid proxy" for future dangerousness. ¶ 56 Not only does the majority's approach create an impossible standard for "inherently dangerous" crimes, it essentially turns Salerno on its head. In contrast to the majority approach, Salerno provides that "[t]he fact that the [act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Thus, applying Salerno , the subject provision survives a facial challenge because there are instances where a defendant who commits sexual assault poses a danger to the victim or the community. Indeed, as Justice Bolick notes in his dissent, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that sex offenders are a "serious threat" to this "Nation," and that such offenders pose a risk of recidivism. See supra ¶¶44-46 (Bolick, J., dissenting). Admittedly, this does not mean that all sex offenders will reoffend, or that even most will reoffend. But any offender charged with sexual assault, when the proof of the offense is evident or the presumption great, inherently presents a risk of danger to society, and the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court do show that at least some sex offenders almost certainly will commit new crimes while on pretrial release. Under Salerno , this is sufficient to survive a facial challenge. Supra ¶54. ¶ 57 In abandoning Salerno , the majority has effectively imposed a due process requirement that all determinations denying pretrial release must include an individualized determination of future dangerousness. There is, of course, no authority for this requirement. Indeed, Salerno did not impose such a requirement. See Morreno , 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶¶ 59-62. ¶ 58 In response, the majority asserts that Morreno upheld a categorical bond restriction that did not provide an individualized determination. Supra ¶32. While true, Morreno addressed a bond restriction involving defendants who had already been charged with a felony and, while on pretrial release, committed another felony. Of course, preventing defendants from committing new crimes while on pretrial release is the very objective the voters sought to achieve in passing the subject bond provision, particularly when a defendant has been charged with a serious crime such as sexual assault. Supra ¶¶4, 16. ¶ 59 Applying the Salerno standard, I would deny Goodman's facial challenge. Following Salerno does not leave Goodman without a remedy. As I noted in Morreno , he can assert that the sexual assault provision is unconstitutional as applied to him. 790 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 ¶ 69. Therefore, I dissent.

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court: ¶ 1 In this case, we address the procedure for evaluating a capital defendant's intellectual disability ("ID") status before trial. Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-753(B) states the trial court shall order a pretrial ID evaluation in every capital case unless the defendant objects. If an objection is lodged, the defendant waives the right to a pretrial evaluation. Id. ¶ 2 We hold a defendant cannot void his waiver under § 13-753(B) by later withdrawing his objection. We also hold, however, that a defendant's waiver does not deprive the court of its discretionary authority to order a pretrial ID evaluation if the defendant later requests or consents to one. I. ¶ 3 In January 2015, Apolinar Altamirano was charged with first degree murder. Following his indictment, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. In April 2015, the trial court ordered Altamirano to undergo an ID prescreening evaluation pursuant to § 13-753. Altamirano objected to the evaluation but also stated he did "not waive his right to raise these issues at a later time, if appropriate, and his refusal to participate in the evaluation [ ] pursuant to the Court's order ... should not be deemed or construed as a waiver of that right." ¶ 4 In May 2017, more than two years after filing his objection, and only four months before the scheduled trial date, Altamirano filed a motion "withdraw [ing] his objection to court-ordered testing" and "requesting that the statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 13-753(B) be applied." Over the State's objection, the trial court granted the motion. The court concluded that § 13-753(B) permits Altamirano to reinstate his right to a pretrial ID evaluation by withdrawing his objection. ¶ 5 The State filed a special action with the court of appeals, which declined to exercise jurisdiction. The State then filed a petition for review with this Court. ¶ 6 We granted review because this case involves a legal issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution. II. ¶ 7 We review the trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 212 Ariz. 255, 257 ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 530, 532 (2006). In interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Peek , 219 Ariz. 182, 184 ¶ 11, 195 P.3d 641, 643 (2008). If a statute, by its terms, is unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to other rules of statutory interpretation. State v. Jurden , 239 Ariz. 526, 530 ¶ 15, 373 P.3d 543, 547 (2016). Statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose "should be read in connection with, or should be construed together with other related statutes, as though they constituted one law." State ex rel. Larson v. Farley , 106 Ariz. 119, 122, 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970) ; see Stambaugh v. Killian , 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 575 (2017) (same). ¶ 8 Here, we also construe § 13-753(B) against the backdrop of the Eighth Amendment. Executing a defendant who has an ID violates the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 307, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Thus, if a court or a jury determines a defendant has an ID, a death sentence cannot be imposed. Id . ; see also A.R.S. § 13-753(A) (stating a person who has an ID "shall not be sentenced to death"); State v. Escalante-Orozco , 241 Ariz. 254, 266 ¶ 8, 386 P.3d 798, 810 (2017). ¶ 9 In Atkins , the United States Supreme Court left to the states "the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce" this constitutional restriction. 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 ; see also Moore v. Texas , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1048-49, 197 L.Ed.2d 416 (2017) (holding that states do not have unfettered discretion to reject medical community standards in defining ID); Bobby v. Bies , 556 U.S. 825, 831, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009) (stating that Atkins "did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person" has an ID). As relevant here, Atkins does not require an ID determination be made before trial. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 614 Pa. 1, 36 A.3d 24, 51-53 (2011) (noting that Atkins did not prescribe a procedure mandating a pre-trial determination of a defendant's ID status). ¶ 10 Arizona's procedure for determining a defendant's ID status is set forth in § 13-753(B), which states: If the state files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the court, unless the defendant objects, shall appoint a prescreening psychological expert in order to determine the defendant's intelligence quotient.... If the defendant objects to the prescreening, the defendant waives the right to a pretrial determination of status. The waiver does not preclude the defendant from offering evidence of the defendant's intellectual disability in the penalty phase. ¶ 11 Section 13-753 thus grants a capital defendant the right to obtain a pretrial evaluation of his ID status. Stated another way, under the statute, the court is required to order an ID evaluation; the defendant does not have to request an evaluation, nor is he required to make any showing to obtain one. Id . ¶ 12 If the defendant objects to prescreening, he waives his right to a pretrial determination of his intellectual status. Id .; Escalante-Orozco , 241 Ariz. at 287 ¶ 134, 386 P.3d at 831. This waiver provision is, by its terms, limited to a defendant's right to obtain a pretrial evaluation; a defendant may still present evidence of his ID status during the penalty phase. Id ; § 13-753(B). ¶ 13 Altamirano argues that § 13-753(B) permits him to void any waiver by withdrawing his objection. We disagree. Altamirano's construction of the statute renders the waiver provision meaningless. If, as Altamirano contends, he can withdraw his objection at any time before trial and obtain a pretrial evaluation, there is, effectively, no statutory waiver. "We presume the legislature did not intend to write a statute that contains a void, meaningless, or futile provision"; thus, "[w]hen possible, we interpret statutes to give meaning to every word." State v. Pitts , 178 Ariz. 405, 407, 874 P.2d 962, 964 (1994). ¶ 14 Accordingly, we conclude that § 13-753(B) prohibits Altamirano from reinstating his right to a pretrial ID evaluation by withdrawing his objection. And this conclusion is not altered by Altamirano's qualified objection in which he tried to avoid waiver by preserving "his right to raise these issues at a later time." III. ¶ 15 As noted above, a defendant's waiver under § 13-753(B) only applies to his right to a pretrial ID determination. See supra ¶ 12. The waiver provision does not, however, prohibit the court from ordering an ID evaluation despite a defendant's earlier waiver. Section 13-753(B) authorizes courts in capital cases to order a prescreening determination of a defendant's ID status. See also A.R.S. § 13-753(H) (stating that if a "trial court finds that defendant has an [ID]," it "shall dismiss the intent to seek the death penalty," and "shall not impose a sentence of death on the defendant") (emphasis added). And courts generally have the authority to evaluate a criminal defendant's mental status before trial in both capital and noncapital cases. See A.R.S. § 13-754 (authorizing a court, unless defendant objects, to order a competency exam in a capital case); A.R.S. § 13-4503 (stating courts have the authority to order a competency exam in a noncapital case); A.R.S. § 13-4506 (permitting a court to order an insanity examination). ¶ 16 However, the court's authority to order an examination is not unlimited. Because a defendant has the right to object to an ID evaluation, the court may not order an examination unless the defendant either requests or consents to the examination. See supra ¶¶ 11, 14. Additionally, in making a post-waiver determination, the court must consider whether ordering an evaluation would prejudice the state or the victims. Such prejudice includes, but is not limited to, whether the evaluation would require the court to continue an existing trial date. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(10) (stating the victim has a right "[t]o a speedy trial ... and prompt and final conclusion of the case"). Moreover, if the court, after considering all the above factors, decides to deny the defendant's request, the defendant may still offer evidence of his ID status during the penalty phase. A.R.S. § 13-753(B). IV. ¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court's order, and we remand this case for that court to consider Altamirano's request for an ID evaluation applying the guidelines set forth in this opinion.

WEINZWEIG, Judge: ¶1 At issue here is whether parties may remove a trial judge under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 42.1(e) if they secure a new evidentiary hearing from the appellate court in a special action and they have not previously exercised their right to a change of judge. ¶2 This is the second of two consecutive petitions for special action in this matter. In the first, Coffee v. Ryan-Touhill ("Coffee I "), No. 1 CA-SA 18-0217, 2018 WL 5117110 (Ariz. App. Oct. 18, 2018), Joshua M. Coffee ("Father") moved for special action relief from the superior court's order that his minor son ("Son") immediately move from Arizona to Kansas and live with Jennifer Leigh Appling ("Mother"). A different panel of this court accepted jurisdiction and concluded the superior court had deprived Father of due process. This court ordered the superior court to conduct a second evidentiary hearing at which Father receives due process, and then revisit its decision to relocate the child based on a developed record. The superior court was also ordered to consider Mother's request for modified child support and Father's counter-petition to modify legal decision-making. ¶3 This second special action followed after Father unsuccessfully moved to change the trial judge before the second evidentiary hearing under Rule 42.1(e). The superior court determined that Rule 42.1(e) did not apply because Coffee I did not reverse the court's relocation decision or require it to conduct a new trial. We accept jurisdiction and grant relief because Father's right to change the trial judge was renewed under Rule 42.1(e) after Coffee I granted relief requiring a new evidentiary hearing and decision. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶4 Mother and Father divorced in 2008 with one minor child, Son. The superior court ordered joint legal decision-making authority over Son in the dissolution decree, but designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother moved to Kansas in 2010 and the parties stipulated to a long-distance parenting plan. In July and August 2018, Mother filed a petition and emergency motion to modify parenting time and child support based on allegations that Son was engaging in dangerous behavior. Mother requested a "role reversal" in which Son would move from Arizona to Kansas and Mother would become the primary residential parent. Father responded and counter-petitioned. ¶5 The court treated Mother's emergency motion as one for temporary orders without notice under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 48, and denied the motion after finding that Mother had not shown irreparable injury, loss or damage. The court set a limited evidentiary "return hearing" or "emergency hearing," at which it would hear testimony, but only from the parties and with no exhibits. ¶6 The actual hearing was more expansive than forecast. The trial judge considered and relied on medical notes from the child's therapist in Kansas. The notes had not been disclosed to Father before the hearing, yet the judge questioned him about their contents and relied on his answers in deciding that Son should be relocated to Kansas. At hearing's end, the judge expressed concern about Son's safety in Arizona and doubt about Father's parenting skills before announcing that "[Son] is going to Kansas" based on the court's "risk analysis." ¶7 The superior court entered what it described as a "temporary order," stating that "[b]ased on testimony presented," Son "shall reside with Mother in Kansas effective immediately pending further order of the Court." The court did not mention or include any specific findings on the relevant factors for parenting time under A.R.S. § 25-403(A) or child relocation under § 25-408(I). The court did not address Mother's request to modify child support or Father's counter-petition to modify legal decision-making. A telephonic follow-up hearing was scheduled. ¶8 Five weeks later, Father petitioned this court for special action relief to vacate the superior court's ruling on due process grounds and sought an order for Son's immediate return to Arizona. This court accepted jurisdiction, concluded that Father was denied due process, ruled that the order "cannot stand," determined that "a new hearing [was] required," and thus "direct[ed] the superior court to conduct an evidentiary hearing" within 60 days "that complies with applicable rules and statutes." Coffee I, 2018 WL 5117110, at *1-5, ¶¶ 1, 5, 8, 20, 22. The decision also directed the superior court to address the relevant statutory factors when it ruled on "the pending requests to modify legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support," id. at *5, ¶ 22, which meant revisiting the relocation question, see Berrier v. Rountree , 245 Ariz. 604, 606, ¶ 8, 433 P.3d 8, 10 (App. 2018) (parties "framed the issue as one of parenting time" even though court was "effectively faced with a relocation question"). The court did not reverse the superior court outright and order Son to remain in Arizona because the child had already moved to Kansas by the time Father pursued special action relief. Coffee I , 2018 WL 5117110, at *2, ¶ 8. ¶9 After securing relief in Coffee I , Father moved for a change of judge under Rule 42.1(e). The superior court denied the motion, stating the court of appeals had not ordered a "new trial" but only asked the superior court to explain why it entered the temporary relocation order. The superior court stressed that the court of appeals "did not reverse" its decision and "there is no evidence the trial court has any ill-feelings" against the parties based on the special action: [T]here is nothing in the court of appeal's mandate that reverses this Court's decision or requires the trial court to try the pending issues anew. Instead, the appellate court requires this Court afford the parties an opportunity to have an "appropriate" evidentiary hearing and direct[s] this Court to make findings under A.R.S. § 25-403. ¶10 At the same time, the superior court did not schedule the rapid evidentiary hearing (within 60 days) required under Coffee I , but instead asked the parties for input on how to proceed and requested amended pleadings while promising "an evidentiary hearing [would be conducted] at an appropriate time determined by the court." ¶11 Father responded with a second petition for special action, asking this court to either reverse the superior court's denial of his motion to change judge, or to direct that the court comply with Coffee I and hold an evidentiary hearing within 60 days of October 25. We stayed all proceedings in the superior court on November 5, and then accepted jurisdiction and granted relief on November 26, issuing a brief order to grant a change of judge and conduct an evidentiary hearing. We advised a written decision would follow. ¶12 The superior court later raised concerns about its jurisdiction to hold the evidentiary hearing absent a mandate from the court of appeals that "revest[ed] jurisdiction with [the superior court]." In response, we reaffirmed our previous orders, addressed the superior court's jurisdictional concerns and lifted our November 5 stay. This decision explains our reasoning. JURISDICTION ¶13 We accept jurisdiction of this special action because it presents a pure legal question and "the denial of a peremptory request for a change of judge is properly reviewed only by special action." Smith v. Mitchell , 214 Ariz. 78, 79, ¶ 2, 148 P.3d 1151, 1152 (App. 2006). ¶14 Before reaching that issue, however, we address the interplay between a special action in the court of appeals and the superior court's jurisdiction in the underlying matter. Unlike an appeal, jurisdiction never transfers from the superior court to the court of appeals in the special action context. Compare Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 24(a) ("An appellate court retains jurisdiction of an appeal until it issues the mandate.") (emphasis added), with A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1), (4) (conferring "[j]urisdiction [on court of appeals] to hear and determine petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions, without regard to its appellate jurisdiction"). A special action represents a separate, original proceeding where an appellate court examines the action or inaction of public officials and may issue orders (similar to a common law writ) affecting future proceedings in a case. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) (combining writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition into the "special action" proceeding); see also State ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles , 178 Ariz. 591, 594-95, 875 P.2d 824, 828-29 (App. 1993) ("[T]he legislature expanded our special action jurisdiction" under A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4) to "cases to which our appellate jurisdiction does not extend."). ¶15 As a result, unless the appellate court issues a stay, the superior court may proceed in the underlying action during a special action. And even when a stay is entered, the superior court is only limited in its actions by the express language of the stay order. Although the superior court must comply with such orders, it does not lose jurisdiction as it would when an appeal is commenced. ¶16 In this special action, the superior court thus never lost jurisdiction of the underlying case, and any limitations set forth in the stay order were removed when that order was lifted. DISCUSSION ¶17 Rule 42.1(e) authorizes a party to obtain a new trial judge "[i]n actions remanded from an appellate court" if "the appellate decision requires a new trial" and the movant has not previously removed a trial judge in the action. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 42.1(e). Father has not previously sought or received a change of trial judge. As such, the only question is whether Coffee I "remanded" this matter for a "new trial" under Rule 42.1(e)(1). We review the denial of a change of judge for an abuse of discretion, but interpret Rule 42.1(e) de novo . Anderson v. Contes , 212 Ariz. 122, 124, ¶ 5, 128 P.3d 239, 241 (App. 2006). ¶18 Rule 42.1(e) hinges on principles of fairness and impartiality. It is concerned about trial judges who might prejudge an issue on remand, having already tackled the issue, heard the arguments and reached a conclusion. Valenzuela v. Brown , 186 Ariz. 105, 109, 919 P.2d 1376, 1380 (App. 1996) ("Where, as here, the judge has made a decision on the merits of the case, he has shown unequivocally what he believes the proper outcome of the case to be ...."). It also guards against the "possibility of judicial bias" where trial judges might begrudge the parties who successfully seek review of their rulings. Id. at 108, 919 P.2d at 1379 (explaining "the reason for the rule-avoiding the possibility of judicial bias after reversal and remand-is as applicable as if there had been a trial"); Mitchell , 214 Ariz. at 80, ¶¶ 6-7, 148 P.3d at 1153. ¶19 We conclude that Coffee I renewed Father's right to change trial judges under Rule 42.1(e) because the decision directed the superior court to reexamine issues it already decided based on evidence it never heard. Valenzuela , 186 Ariz. at 109, 919 P.2d at 1380 ("The judgment now having been reversed, the policy reasons for permitting a change of judge as a matter of right on remand are all the more apparent."). We interpret the word "trial" in Rule 42.1(e) broadly enough to include a contested evidentiary proceeding. Trial , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding."). ¶20 To reiterate, the superior court conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded, based on the testimony it heard, that Son must reside with Mother in Kansas. Coffee I determined the court's relocation order "cannot stand" because Father was deprived of due process in the first evidentiary hearing and thus ordered a new evidentiary hearing at which due process is afforded. The bottom line is that the superior court must revisit the same relocation issue based on the same factors and new evidence. A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A), -408(I) (parenting time and relocation of child); see Rountree , 245 Ariz. at 606, ¶ 9, 433 P.3d at 10 ("The court's power to enter relocation orders is rooted in (and limited by) A.R.S. § 25-408."). ¶21 Mother offers various arguments against the application of Rule 42.1(e) here. None are persuasive. Mother asserts the Coffee I decision did not require a "new trial," emphasizing the court of appeals never said "the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's ruling." We disagree. This court ordered a new hearing in Coffee I because Father was denied procedural due process in the first hearing, including "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Comeau v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs , 196 Ariz. 102, 106-07, ¶ 20, 993 P.2d 1066, 1070-1071 (App. 1999). The superior court was ordered to allow Father to offer new and different evidence. See, e.g. , Cruz v. Garcia , 240 Ariz. 233, 235, ¶ 1, 377 P.3d 1028, 1030 (App. 2016) ("Because we agree Cruz was denied due process [when the court made its ruling on legal decision-making and parenting time], we vacate the order and remand the case for such a hearing."). ¶22 Nor are we persuaded that Rule 42.1(e) only applies if the words "reversal" or "new trial" appear in an appellate decision. Rule 42.1(e) does not require any magic words, but instead turns on what the superior court must do after the appeal or special action to resolve the error. Substance controls over form. See Valenzuela , 186 Ariz. at 108-09, 919 P.2d at 1379-80. If the superior court need only perform a ministerial act or function (e.g., recalculate interest) a change of judge is unavailable. But an order that the court revisit its prior decision based on new and different evidence renews the option to exercise an unused change of judge. ¶23 We likewise reject any argument that Rule 42.1(e) requires proof that trial judges are upset with the movants who successfully challenge their decisions on appeal or special action. Actual bias is not required. This prophylactic rule is premised on the mere potential for judicial bias, whether subconscious, intuitive or intentional. King v. Superior Court , 108 Ariz. 492, 493, 502 P.2d 529, 530 (1972) ("[I]t is always possible that the trial judge may subconsciously resent the lawyer or defendant who got the judgment reversed. The mere possibility of such a thought in the back of a trial judge's mind means that a new judge should be found."). ¶24 The superior court here relied on Anderson to deny Father's request for a new trial judge: "Just as in this case, no part of the Anderson decision by the trial court was vacated but rather the trial court was directed to explain why it entered certain orders." We affirmed the superior court's refusal to change the trial judge in Anderson after an earlier appellate court decision remanded the case for "a continuation of the proceedings already held rather than a de novo redetermination of the remanded issues." 212 Ariz. at 125, ¶ 9, 128 P.3d at 242. ¶25 Anderson is dissimilar and does not govern here. The superior court there was not ordered (as here) to conduct a brand new, full-blown evidentiary hearing. Anderson , 212 Ariz. at 126, ¶ 14, 128 P.3d at 243. The superior court there was not directed (as here) to revisit issues it had previously decided or to enter new and potentially different orders; it was instead ordered to conduct further proceedings on ancillary issues (calculated interest and attorneys' fees). Id. at 125-26, ¶¶ 9, 14, 128 P.3d at 242-43. And the superior court there was not ordered (as here) to "explain" its ultimate relocation decision on "pending" requests under a developed record; it was instead asked to explain its rationale behind then-existing, historical orders. Id. ; see Mitchell , 214 Ariz. at 81, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d at 1154 ("In essence, [ Anderson ] asked the trial court to explain why it had entered particular orders, not to enter new and potentially different ones."). Given the limited remand in Anderson , this court correctly observed that "the specter of judicial resentment [on remand was] virtually nonexistent." 212 Ariz. at 126, ¶ 15, n.4, 128 P.3d at 243, n.4. ¶26 We find Mitchell more instructive. As here, it involved a marriage dissolution. Wife petitioned for dissolution and then appealed the superior court's decree disposing of real property. Mitchell , 214 Ariz. at 79, ¶ 3, 148 P.3d at 1152. The court of appeals remanded "for redetermination of the ownership interests in the property." Id. Wife moved to change trial judges on remand, but the superior court denied the request. Id. at 79-80, ¶ 4, 148 P.3d at 1152-53. Wife petitioned for special action. Id. at 79, ¶ 1, 148 P.3d at 1152. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Wife should have received a new trial judge on remand because the superior court had to determine the remanded issue anew. Id. at 81, ¶ 12, 148 P.3d at 1154. The same is true here. ¶27 Last, we recognize that Rule 42.1(e) is couched in terms of a "remand," an unnecessary term in the special action lexicon because jurisdiction never transfers from the superior court to the court of appeals. A narrow reading of Rule 42.1(e) might thus imply that the right to change judges is never renewed after special action review. We reject that interpretation, and hold that an order granting relief and directing additional evidentiary proceedings to redo an earlier proceeding is the functional equivalent of a remand under Rule 42.1(e). CONCLUSION ¶28 We reverse the superior court's denial of Father's notice of change of judge under Rule 42.1(e). If not already done, the superior court shall comply with our orders of November 26, 2018 and February 4, 2019, which require the court to assign a new trial judge to this matter and conduct a new evidentiary hearing. ¶29 Mother requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs under A.R.S. § 25-324. She offers no evidence of the parties' financial resources, however, and Father's positions throughout the proceedings were not unreasonable. We therefore deny her request. Father moved under Rule 42.1(e) because Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 6 directed that Rule 42.1 applied to "[a]ll notices and requests for a change of judge." Since January 1, 2019, the family court rules clarify the right to change judges is renewed "if the appellate decision requires a new trial or contested hearing." Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 6(f)(1). Coffee I questioned whether a temporary order was proper because Mother had not requested one and her motion was identical to her petition for modification. 2018 WL 5117110, at *3-4, ¶¶ 14, 20. In family court, there are many types of evidentiary hearings, which might or might not be labeled "trials" in practice. To that end, Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 6(f)(1), effective January 1, 2019, expressly refers to a "new trial or contested hearing."

WINTHROP, Judge: ¶1 These consolidated appeals arise from two class action lawsuits to foreclose on real property in Mohave County, Arizona. Defendants Arizona Acreage LLC ("AZ Acreage") and Sunny Lakes Ranchos LLC ("Sunny Lakes") (collectively "Appellants") appeal the superior court's denial of their cross-motions for partial summary judgment and grant of partial summary judgment in favor of representative plaintiffs Jean M. Monroe and Boyd Family Partnership (collectively "Appellees"). Co-defendant Leonard Mardian ("Mardian") also appeals the superior court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellees. For the following reasons, we hold: (1) the six-year statute of limitations in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 47-3118(A) (2019) controls the underlying debts, the deeds of trust, and the guaranties signed by Mardian; (2) Appellees had standing to seek foreclosure of the deeds of trust; (3) the certification of each class satisfied the requirements for initiating a foreclosure action as outlined in the deeds of trust; and (4) Nevada Revised Statutes ("N.R.S.") section 645B.340 did not apply to bar Appellees' claims. We further reject Appellants' arguments concerning issue and claim preclusion. Because Appellees properly demonstrated they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the judgments entered. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In September 2006, Sunny Lakes executed a promissory note in favor of multiple lenders in exchange for $5,000,000. Over one hundred individuals and entities contributed money to the Sunny Lakes loan, and no lender contributed more than fourteen percent of the total loan value. The note was secured by a deed of trust encumbering several acres of undeveloped land in Mohave County ("Plot A"). In addition to the note and deed of trust, Mardian executed a guaranty agreement, promising to repay the loan in the event Sunny Lakes failed to do so. The execution of the promissory note was conditioned on Mardian providing a personal guaranty on the note. ¶3 In August 2007, AZ Acreage executed a promissory note in favor of multiple lenders in exchange for $4,000,000. Over eighty individuals and entities-many of whom contributed to the Sunny Lakes loan-contributed money to the AZ Acreage loan. The loan was secured by a deed of trust encumbering another plot of undeveloped land in Mohave County ("Plot B"). No lender contributed more than twenty-one percent to the total loan value. Mardian also executed a guaranty agreement as a material condition for execution of the AZ Acreage loan. ¶4 Both Sunny Lakes and AZ Acreage made payments on their respective notes until July 2008, when both companies stopped making payments. In late June 2014, believing the statute of limitations was just days from expiration, Appellees filed two class action lawsuits to foreclose on Plot A and Plot B and recover any resulting deficiency. Although many of the investors contributed money to both promissory notes, some contributed towards one note but not the other-resulting in two different classes. Sunny Lakes and Mardian were named defendants in one lawsuit (the "Boyd Case"); and AZ Acreage and Mardian were named defendants in the other lawsuit (the "Monroe Case"). ¶5 Appellants moved to dismiss each case pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), arguing that the four-year statute of limitations under A.R.S. § 12-544(3) applied and had expired and that Appellees lacked standing because they did not obtain the requisite fifty-one percent ("51%") majority agreement outlined in the deeds of trust to declare a default and bring a judicial foreclosure action. The superior court denied Appellants' motions and later certified the classes. ¶6 Mardian then moved for summary judgment in both cases, arguing the four-year statute of limitations period in A.R.S. § 12-544(3) barred the claim against him for enforcement of the guaranty contracts. Both sides briefed the issue and presented oral argument, and the court denied the motions. ¶7 Thereafter, Appellees moved for partial summary judgment to: (1) establish the dollar amount due under each note; (2) establish that the classes were entitled to payment under the notes; (3) order a sheriff's sale of Plot A and Plot B; and (4) establish liability against each defendant for payment of any deficiency that may arise. Appellants each cross-moved for summary judgment, again arguing the claims were barred by a four-year statute of limitations and Appellants had failed to bring the actions in accordance with the terms of the deeds of trust and controlling Nevada law. In July 2018, the court granted the Appellees' motions in part-reserving the issue of Mardian's liability to pay a deficiency until after the properties were sold and a fair market value hearing could be held. In its Rule 54(b) order, the court determined Sunny Lakes owed $13,870,277.75 on its promissory note plus interest, and AZ Acreage owed $10,933,666.62 on its promissory note plus interest. Sunny Lakes and AZ Acreage timely appealed the superior court's order in August 2018, and the appeals were consolidated. ¶8 While the first two appeals were pending, Plot A and Plot B were sold at a sheriff's sale in September 2018. Appellants and Mardian did not contest the sale price for either property, and the court vacated the fair market value hearing. Plot A sold for $80,000, resulting in a deficiency for Sunny Lakes. Plot B sold for $195,000, resulting in a deficiency for AZ Acreage. ¶9 A week later, Appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Appellants and Mardian admitted all the material facts in the complaints and failed to show any viable defense to their claims. Appellants and Mardian opposed the motions. The court ultimately granted the motions and entered final Rule 54(c) judgments in favor of Appellees. Mardian appealed the judgments, and those appeals have been consolidated with the previous appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.21. ANALYSIS ¶10 The promissory notes, deeds of trust, and guaranties were all executed in Nevada and include choice-of-law provisions designating Nevada law as governing the agreements. We therefore review the substantive issues according to the laws of Nevada but apply Arizona law to resolve any procedural issues. Ross v. Ross , 96 Ariz. 249, 251-52, 393 P.2d 933 (1964) ("Matters respecting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissibility of evidence, [and] statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.") (internal quotation omitted). ¶11 Appellants and Mardian raise three main arguments on appeal: (1) the Appellees' claims are barred by the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion; (2) the Appellees' claims are governed by a four-year statute of limitations and, accordingly, are untimely; and (3) the Appellees' claims are barred because they failed to obtain written consent of 51% of the lenders before filing the lawsuits, as required by the deeds of trust and by N.R.S. § 645B.340. We review each issue below. I. Issue Preclusion and Claim Preclusion Do Not Apply ¶12 Appellants argue the holding in related litigation, Karayan v. Mardian , 690 Fed. Appx. 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem. decision), under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion bars both class action lawsuits. Before the superior court, however, Appellants only argued that the Karayan decision should preclude one class member, the Karayan Family Trust, from participating in the class. Appellants never argued that Appellees as class representatives should be barred from bringing suit, and we will not consider the argument for the first time on appeal. ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) ; In re MH 2008-002659 , 224 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 9, 226 P.3d 394, 396 (App. 2010). II. Statutes of Limitations ¶13 We review the application of each statute of limitations de novo . Broadband Dynamics, LLC v. SatCom Mktg., Inc. , 244 Ariz. 282, 285, ¶ 5, 418 P.3d 1055, 1058 (App. 2018). We discuss the applicable limitations period for the deeds of trust and guaranty agreements separately. A. The Judicial Foreclosure Claims Were Timely Filed ¶14 Appellants failed to make payments on the notes starting in July 2008. The subject lawsuits were filed on June 27, 2014. Appellants contend the superior court erred by denying their cross-motions for summary judgment, arguing that the four-year limitations period under A.R.S. § 12-544(3) applies to bar Appellees' claims. Appellees assert the six-year limitations period under A.R.S. § 47-3118(A) applies and the claims were timely filed. ¶15 Section 12-544(3) provides, "[t]here shall be commenced and prosecuted within four years after the cause of action accrues ... [an action] upon an instrument in writing executed without the state." Alternatively, A.R.S. § 47-3118(A) provides, "an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date." ¶16 Both Appellants and Appellees rely on the proposition that where one statute of limitations has general application and another arguably competing statute of limitations is specific, the specific statute should prevail. See Evans v. Young , 135 Ariz. 447, 449, 661 P.2d 1148, 1150 (App. 1983). The parties disagree, however, as to which of these arguably competing statutes is specific and controlling. Appellants argue § 12-544(3) is specific because it applies to instruments created outside this state and is therefore directly applicable to the promissory notes and deeds of trust executed in Nevada. In contrast, Appellees argue § 47-3118(A) is more specific and should prevail because it outlines the limitations period for particular negotiable instruments created pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), including promissory notes. ¶17 When the Legislature "enacts a new statute that applies to preexisting statutes, we presume [the Legislature] intended some change in existing law." Lavidas v. Smith , 195 Ariz. 250, 254, ¶ 17, 987 P.2d 212, 216 (App. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). In enacting statutory amendments, the Legislature is presumed to be "aware of existing statutes." Washburn v. Pima Cty. , 206 Ariz. 571, 576, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 1030, 1035 (App. 2003). "[W]hen there is conflict between two statutes, the more recent, specific statute governs over the older, more general statute." In re Estate of Winn , 214 Ariz. 149, 152, ¶ 16, 150 P.3d 236, 239 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, this court generally follows the rationale that "[t]he defense of the statute of limitations is not favored ... and where two constructions are possible, the longer period of limitations is preferred." Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., Inc. , 141 Ariz. 520, 524, 687 P.2d 1275, 1279 (App. 1984) (internal citation omitted). ¶18 For decades, Arizona applied different limitations periods depending upon whether a written instrument was executed within Arizona or elsewhere. Under Section 2061 of the Arizona Revised Code of 1928, for example, an action "upon an instrument in writing executed without this state" had to be brought within four years after the claim accrued, while Section 2062 provided that an action for a written debt "upon a contract in writing, executed within this state, shall be commenced and prosecuted within six years after the cause of action has accrued." Moore v. Diamond Dry Goods Co. , 47 Ariz. 128, 131, 54 P.2d 553 (1936). The reason for this dichotomy as it existed decades ago is not certain. What is certain, however, is that the law has evolved since that time. ¶19 The U.C.C. was promulgated in 1953 and has been adopted in some form in all fifty states. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. U.S. , 552 F.2d 302, 303, n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) ; see also William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code , 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 1, 8 (1977). Article One § 1-103(a) of the U.C.C. (adopted as A.R.S. § 47-1103(A) ) outlines three underlying purposes for the code: "(1) [t]o simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) [t]o permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; and (3) [t]o make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." This court has previously explained that the U.C.C., as adopted in Arizona, must be "construed in accordance with [these] underlying purposes and policies." Koss Corp. v. Am. Express Co. , 233 Ariz. 74, 79, ¶ 13, 309 P.3d 898, 903 (App. 2013). ¶20 As applicable here, in 1993, Arizona adopted Article Three of the U.C.C., which includes § 47-3118. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 108, § 6 (1st Reg. Sess.). This enactment, made long after the "within" or "without" general limitations periods in the Arizona Revised Code of 1928, deals solely with negotiable instruments-a specific subset of the "instruments" set forth in § 12-544(3). ¶21 Considering the more recent enactment of Article Three and the clear purpose and policies of the U.C.C., we conclude § 47-3118(A) is the more specific limitations statute and applies to the promissory notes and related deeds of trust at issue in this case. See Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Flagstaff Dairy , 116 Ariz. 513, 519, 570 P.2d 200, 206 (App. 1977) (explaining the U.C.C. should be interpreted in a way that does not create "violence to the obvious intent expressed in the provisions of the code" and does not "ignore commercial realities"). Interpreting § 47-3118(A) as the more specific statute furthers the overarching policies of the U.C.C.-particularly simplicity and uniformity in commercial transactions-by providing that, in Arizona as elsewhere, there is a six-year limitations period to enforce a negotiable instrument. ¶22 Our conclusion is supported by the fact that Nevada has also adopted the six-year statute of limitations period outlined in Article Three. See N.R.S. § 104.3118(1). And since Arizona's initial adoption of the U.C.C. in 1967, this court has interpreted § 12-544(3) only in regard to claims brought by a plaintiff seeking to enforce a foreign judgment. See e.g. , Cristall v. Cristall , 225 Ariz. 591, 242 P.3d 1060 (App. 2010) ; Grynberg v. Shaffer , 216 Ariz. 256, 165 P.3d 234 (App. 2007) ; cf. Clark Equip. Co. v. Ariz. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund , 189 Ariz. 433, 439, 943 P.2d 793, 799 (App. 1997). This narrow application of the older limitations provision further supports our conclusion that the more recent limitations provision is specific to promissory notes and should therefore apply in this case. ¶23 Finally, the Arizona Supreme Court has long "held that while the defense of the statute of limitations is a legitimate one, it is not favored by the courts, and, where two constructions are possible, the one which gives the longer period of limitations is the one to be preferred." O'Malley v. Sims , 51 Ariz. 155, 165, 75 P.2d 50 (1938). O'Malley has been followed by this court and the Arizona Supreme Court many times. See e.g. , San Manuel Copper Corp. v. Redmond , 8 Ariz. App. 214, 218, 445 P.2d 162 (1968) ; Guertin v. Dixon , 177 Ariz. 40, 45, 864 P.2d 1072, 1077 (App. 1993) ; Physical Therapy Assocs., Inc. v. Pinal Cty. , 154 Ariz. 405, 407, 743 P.2d 1, 3 (App. 1987) ; Woodward , 141 Ariz. at 524, 687 P.2d at 1279. For all of these reasons, we conclude § 47-3118(A) applies to the promissory notes and deeds of trust at issue in this case and Appellees' claims were timely filed. See Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Schwartz , 230 Ariz. 310, 312, ¶ 7, 283 P.3d 41, 43 (App. 2012) ("[T]he debt and all the potential recovery flow from the promissory note."). B. The Breach of Guaranty Claims Were Timely Filed ¶24 Mardian argues Arizona case law establishes that provisions from the U.C.C., as codified in Arizona, do not apply in any respect to guaranty agreements-regardless of the underlying instrument the guaranty agreement relates to-because the guaranty is a separate contract. He therefore contends that the shorter four-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 12-544(3) should apply to bar Appellees' claim against him, irrespective of whether the six-year limitations period of A.R.S. § 47-3118(A) applies to the judicial foreclosure claims against Appellants. ¶25 Mardian correctly states that Arizona treats guaranty agreements as contracts separate from their related instruments. Flori Corp. v. Fitzgerald , 167 Ariz. 601, 602, 810 P.2d 599, 600 (App. 1990). However, we do not agree that the cases Mardian relies upon broadly prohibit U.C.C. application to all guaranty agreements. Pi'Ikea, LLC v. Williamson , 234 Ariz. 284, 321 P.3d 449 (App. 2014), and Consolidated Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Grimm , 140 Ariz. 452, 682 P.2d 457 (App. 1984), addressed continuing guaranty agreements-unconditional promises to pay any debt that a borrower creates with a lender. Here, Mardian signed specific guaranty agreements, which obligated him to repay only the debts of the particular promissory notes related to each loan. Further, in Grimm , this court contemplated that the U.C.C. could apply to a guaranty agreement in situations where the borrower under a negotiable instrument is an entity owned by the guarantor. See Grimm , 140 Ariz. at 456, 682 P.2d 457. We determine that this case is such a case. Accordingly, § 47-3118(A) applies to Appellees' breach of guaranty claims against Mardian. ¶26 We reach this conclusion after examining the unique facts of this case. At the time of execution, Mardian was the owner and managing member of both AZ Acreage and Sunny Lakes. He signed both promissory notes on behalf of each entity, and he executed each guaranty agreement as a material condition to obtaining each loan. The guaranty agreements were executed days before the promissory notes, and a copy of each promissory note was attached as an exhibit to each guaranty agreement. On these facts, it would be illogical to hold that A.R.S. § 12-544(3) applies and the limitations period governing Mardian's liability to repay the debts should be shorter than that of Appellants'. Absent any prior agreements to the contrary by the parties, the applicable statute of limitations for bringing a claim on the guaranty agreements should not expire before the statute of limitations on the underlying promissory notes. See Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Northpark Joint Venture , 958 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) ("We recognize that, as a general rule, the liability of a guarantor is equal to that of its principal."). ¶27 Therefore, we conclude § 47-3118(A) applies and the superior court did not err in finding that Appellees timely filed a claim against Mardian. Beck v. Hy-Tech Performance, Inc. , 236 Ariz. 354, 360, ¶ 23, 340 P.3d 433, 439 (App. 2015) ("On appeal, we will sustain the trial court's ruling on any theory supported by the evidence, even though the trial court's reasoning may differ from our own.") (quoting Lake Havasu Resort, Inc. v. Commercial Loan Ins. Corp. , 139 Ariz. 369, 373, 678 P.2d 950, 954 (App. 1983) ). III. The 51% Requirement Under the Default Clause and N.R.S. § 645B.340 ¶28 Appellants argue the claims are barred because Appellees lacked standing to sue. They assert Appellees did not comply with certain terms of the default clause that had to be met before bringing the foreclosure actions. In the alternative, Appellants contend Appellees' claims are barred for failure to comply with N.R.S. § 645B.340. ¶29 Each deed of trust included a default clause stating: Section 11.33 Default Clause The Beneficiaries herein named agree and affirm the provision that any default of this Deed of Trust may be declared by the Beneficiaries holding a minimum of 51% of the beneficial interest in said Deed of Trust, and in addition, those Beneficiaries holding a minimum 51% beneficial interest may commence foreclosure proceedings against the Trustor herein, upon a declared default. A. Appellees Sufficiently Pled a Declared Default ¶30 Appellants argue Appellees did not have standing to bring these claims because they did not obtain the agreement of 51% of the lenders before declaring a default on the deeds of trust. ¶31 To initiate a claim in Arizona, a party must have standing-that is, a plaintiff must allege a "distinct and palpable injury." See Sears v. Hull , 192 Ariz. 65, 69, ¶ 16, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr., Inc. , 240 Ariz. 597, 603, ¶ 17, 382 P.3d 812, 818 (App. 2016). "[T]he question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate ... [and] [i]n addressing the question of standing, therefore, we are confronted only with questions of prudential or judicial restraint." Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Cmty. Serv. in Ariz. , 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914, 919 (1985). Stated differently, "[t]he issue in Arizona is whether, given all the circumstances in the case, the [plaintiff] has a legitimate interest in an actual controversy ... and whether judicial economy and administration will be promoted by allowing representational appearance." Id. ¶32 Here, Appellees alleged in their complaints that a default under the deeds of trust had occurred, resulting in the full amount being due under each note. Appellees' motions for partial summary judgment asserted that Appellants were in default as of July 1, 2008. Appellants originally challenged the sufficiency of a specific "declared default" date in their 2014 motion to dismiss, but later abandoned this position and did not contest the July 1, 2008 date in their response to the motions for partial summary judgment or their cross-motions for summary judgment. On this record, Appellees sufficiently established an injury-the July 1, 2008 default-giving them standing to bring both lawsuits. ¶33 It is undisputed that Appellants failed to make payments on either note since July 1, 2008. It also is undisputed that each class is owed money under the notes. Furthermore, Appellants have not asserted that they were improperly prejudiced or damaged in this litigation due to the alleged failure to properly "declare" a default. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61. Therefore, we determine that "judicial economy and administration" is promoted by affirming that Appellees have standing to seek recovery for the money owed under each note. Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n , 148 Ariz. at 6, 712 P.2d at 919. B. Appellees Met the Deeds of Trust's 51% Requirement ¶34 Appellants next argue Appellees lack standing because the default clause required written consent by a 51% majority of lenders before this action could be commenced. Appellees assert the deeds of trust do not require written consent; instead, the deeds of trust required 51% of lenders to simply "agree" in order to pursue the judicial foreclosures. Appellees further assert that the certification of the classes satisfied the 51% requirement because the lenders were specifically given a chance to opt-in or opt-out of the lawsuits, and the affirmation from all but five of the lenders to opt-in related back to the filing of the complaints. The superior court found that by providing notice to the class members and an opportunity to opt-out, Appellees complied with the 51% majority requirement under the default clause. ¶35 Nevada law governs the interpretation of the default clause, which is a question of law reviewed de novo . May v. Anderson , 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254 (Nev. 2005). In interpreting a contract, "the court shall effectuate the intent of the parties, which may be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances if not clear from the contract itself." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC , 123 Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (Nev. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). "[A]n interpretation which renders the contract or agreement valid and its performance possible will be preferred to one which makes it void or its performance impossible or meaningless." Mohr Park Manor, Inc. v. Mohr , 83 Nev. 107, 111, 424 P.2d 101 (Nev. 1967). Likewise, "an interpretation which makes the contract or agreement fair and reasonable will be preferred to one which leads to harsh or unreasonable results." Id. ¶36 In 2011, the Nevada federal district court aptly explained the basic principle behind including a 51% agreement requirement in contracts related to mortgage loans with multiple lenders. The court there stated: Nevada Administrative Code section 645B.073 requires-and did so long before Nevada Revised Statutes section 645B.340(1) passed-that any document related to a mortgage loan must contain a provision to allow the holder of 51% or more of the beneficial interests in the loan to act on behalf of all the remaining beneficial interest holders in that loan. ... The 51% Rule recognizes that 51% or more of the fractional beneficial interest holders in a loan are entitled to exercise management control over that loan, including designating their loan servicer and deciding whether to foreclose on a loan[ ] [or] to sell foreclosure property .... The 51% Rule is premised on the fact that the fractional beneficial interest holders are the owners of their loans. In re USA Commercial Mortg. Co. , 802 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1159 (D. Nev. 2011). ¶37 Applying the principles outlined in In re USA Commercial Mortgage , we conclude the superior court did not err in permitting the class certification to relate back to the date of the filing of the complaints, thereby satisfying the 51% requirement in the default clause. That decision effectuated the purpose of the default clause-that a majority of the lenders are entitled to exercise management and control over the loans. See DeChambeau v. Balkenbush , --- Nev. ----, 431 P.3d 359, 362 (Nev. Ct. App. 2018) ("When examining the supposed 'intent' behind contractual words, what matters is not the subjective intention of the parties ... but rather the more objective inquiry into the meaning conveyed by the words they selected to define the scope of the agreement.") (internal citation omitted). The consensus among a majority of the lenders was sufficiently evidenced by the lenders opting-in to the class action lawsuits. All but five-three in the Boyd Case and two in the Monroe Case-explicitly chose to pursue the judicial foreclosures and assert their rights to collect any deficiency that resulted from the sales. ¶38 Appellants had not made payments on the notes at the time Appellees initiated the lawsuits and have not alleged they were prejudiced in any way by the class certification process effectively satisfying the 51% agreement. Indeed, Appellants could have filed a counterclaim for breach of contract if they felt their rights under the deeds of trust were violated, but they did not. Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. Maricopa Cty. , 234 Ariz. 125, 140-41, ¶¶ 67-72, 318 P.3d 419, 434-35 (App. 2014) (explaining a trustor may bring a breach of contract claim in Arizona to recover attorneys' fees, costs, and accruing interest on a promissory note when the beneficiary failed to comply with certain procedures outlined in the deed of trust that had to be performed before the beneficiary could attempt to foreclose on the secured collateral). Likewise, Appellants could have identified and asserted any prejudice on appeal once the classes were certified in 2015. See A.R.S. § 12-1873(A). They did not do so, however, and have not shown any reversible error regarding the 51% requirement. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61. C. N.R.S. § 645B.340 's 51% Majority Requirement Does Not Apply to The Deeds of Trust ¶39 Appellants argue in the alternative that N.R.S. § 645B.340 required written consent by at least 51% of the lenders under each note thirty days before the lawsuits could be filed, and Appellees' claims therefore should be barred for failure to adhere to the statute's requirements. Appellees assert that the class certification process and order satisfied the requirements of the statute, or alternatively, the statute does not apply because the terms in the deeds of trust outline and control the requirements for foreclosure proceedings. The superior court found that the class certification sufficiently complied with the terms of N.R.S. § 645B.340. ¶40 Without deciding whether the superior court erred in finding the class certification complied with the thirty-day requirement in N.R.S. § 645B.340(2), we conclude the statute does not apply to bar Appellees' claims because the deeds of trust-and not the statute-controlled the parties' agreements. See Beck , 236 Ariz. at 360, 340 P.3d at 439. ¶41 Section 645B.340 states it is applicable only when the parties have not made other agreements for when the "holders of [the] majority" may act. Under the express terms of the statute, either the statute or the deeds of trust-but not both-control in this case. ¶42 The default clause demonstrates the parties expressly contemplated the procedure for when the majority could initiate "foreclosure proceedings." Unlike the statute, the deeds of trust impose no thirty-day written notice requirement on the lenders before filing a judicial foreclosure. If the parties intended to require a written notice be distributed before a foreclosure action was commenced, they were free to explicitly state as much in the deeds of trust. Indeed, other clauses in the contracts include a written notice requirement, but the default clause does not. We therefore conclude N.R.S. § 645B.340 does not apply to Appellees' claims. IV. Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal ¶43 Appellees request an award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal pursuant to ARCAP 21 and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Appellants do not oppose the request. Each promissory note and guaranty agreement provided that Appellees may recovery their attorneys' fees and costs in actions arising from the execution of the loan agreements. We therefore award Appellees their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21. CONCLUSION ¶44 For the stated reasons, we affirm the superior court's grant of partial summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellees. Unless otherwise specified, we cite to the current version of the applicable statutes because no revisions material to this opinion have since occurred. Mardian's wife also executed a guaranty agreement for both loans. However, she filed for bankruptcy once the two lawsuits commenced and was subsequently dropped as a defendant in both cases. The interest in the promissory note was originally distributed as follows: eighty percent to a mortgage brokerage firm and the remainder to eighteen different lenders. The brokerage firm subsequently assigned its interest to several other investors, resulting in the current class of approximately eighty entities and individuals. Although a promissory note secured by a mortgage and a promissory note secured by a deed of trust are different kinds of transactions, when a deed of trust is judicially foreclosed in Arizona, Arizona procedural law treats the foreclosure action the same as a judicial foreclosure of a mortgage. See A.R.S. § 33-807(A). Therefore, A.R.S. §§ 33-721 to -730 apply to the foreclosure actions in this case. Even assuming the issue was properly preserved for appeal, Appellants' argument misses the mark. In Karayan , the federal district court determined that Nevada's statutorily-created "one action rule," N.R.S. § 40.435(2)(a) -and alternatively the "51% rule" set forth in N.R.S. § 645B.340 -applied to the plaintiff's claim and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Without addressing the "51% rule," the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling based on the "one action rule," determining the district court properly dismissed the claim without prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice does not preclude later litigation, and therefore is not considered a judgment "on the merits" for purposes of preclusion. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. n (1982). As such, the Karayan Family Trust was free to file another action on the same claim; however, it chose instead to remain a class member in the current litigation. That choice was not precluded by the Ninth Circuit's ruling. Mardian also argues the purported waiver of the statute of limitations defense provided for in the express terms of the guaranty agreements is void as against public policy. Because we determine the breach of guaranty claims were timely filed, we do not address this argument. Other jurisdictions have recognized the U.C.C.'s applicability to guaranty agreements executed separate from their related promissory notes where the facts show the guaranty was an essential part of a loan transaction. See Gunter v. True , 203 Ga.App. 330, 416 S.E.2d 768 (1992) (holding that the U.C.C. governed a guaranty agreement written on a separate piece of paper where the guaranty was executed contemporaneously with the promissory note; the guaranty applied exclusively to the debt evidenced in the note; and the note and guaranty were affixed together); Commerce Bank of St. Louis, N.A. v. Wright , 645 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the U.C.C. governed a separate guaranty agreement when it was related exclusively to the promissory note and was an "integral part" of executing the loan transaction). The parties' intent that the default clause would govern their agreements is further confirmed by the inclusion of an integration clause in the contract language. Because the parties contractually agreed to the award of attorneys' fees and costs, we do not address whether an award of fees and costs is supportable under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. See First Interstate Bank of Nev. v. Green , 101 Nev. 113, 116, 694 P.2d 496 (Nev. 1985) (stating attorneys' fees are recoverable under Nevada law if authorized by an agreement between the parties).

MORSE, Judge: ¶1 John L. Norman and Gerry Molotsky ("Movants") appeal the superior court's denial of their motion to intervene and corresponding award of attorneys' fees to Heritage Village II Homeowners' Association ("Heritage") and Richard and Laine Weinberg. The Weinbergs cross-appeal the court's partial denial of their application for attorneys' fees. The superior court denied intervention for two reasons: (1) Movants did not seek intervention in a timely manner, and (2) Movants' ability to protect their interests would not be impaired or impeded because they could pursue a separate cause of action. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Movants were not untimely and that the availability of a separate cause of action does not create a per se prohibition to intervention of right. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's order denying the motion to intervene and vacate the orders awarding fees and dismissing the lawsuit. We remand for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The Weinbergs own a home located in Heritage Village II, which is part of the McCormick Ranch master-planned community in Scottsdale. In July 2014, Heritage sued the Weinbergs alleging they violated the applicable covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CC&Rs") in building their new home. The complaint included claims for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. ¶3 After a three-day hearing, the superior court granted declaratory relief, concluding the Weinbergs had violated the CC&Rs and ordering them to bring their home into compliance. Thereafter, the court awarded Heritage $111,711.53 in attorneys' fees and $3,932.22 in costs. ¶4 The superior court then entered an order directing the Weinbergs to take specific remedial measures to bring their home into compliance with the CC&Rs. Nine months later, Heritage moved to compel compliance with the order. Granting the motion in part, the superior court noted that the parties were still unable to agree on modifications necessary to bring the Weinbergs' home into compliance with the CC&Rs. ¶5 Meanwhile, Heritage's Board of Directors (the "Board") began to disagree on litigation strategy, dividing into a four-member majority and a three-member minority. In July 2017, the Board majority voted to settle with the Weinbergs, who agreed to make minor changes to their home in exchange for Heritage's promise to release them from liability for all attorneys' fees, including the $111,711.53 already awarded. The majority reasoned that there was "no end in sight" to the litigation and that Heritage was not financially able to further pursue the litigation. ¶6 Movants are homeowners and members of Heritage. One day before Heritage and the Weinbergs filed their notice of settlement, Movants filed an emergency motion to intervene pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 24(a)(2), and filed an independent lawsuit in superior court against the Weinbergs. See generally Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2017-009249. ¶7 Heritage and the Weinbergs opposed Movants' intervention motion. Following oral argument, the superior court denied the motion to intervene and awarded Heritage and the Weinbergs some, but not all, of their attorneys' fees incurred in responding to the motion. The court then entered final judgment approving the settlement and dismissing all claims. ¶8 Movants appealed, and the Weinbergs cross-appealed from the partial denial of their request for attorneys' fees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-2101(A)(1) and (A)(3). See McGough v. Ins. Co. of N. Am ., 143 Ariz. 26, 30, 691 P.2d 738, 742 (App. 1984) ("[A]n order denying intervention is an appealable order ...."). DISCUSSION ¶9 In reviewing the denial of a motion to intervene, we accept the allegations of the motion as true. Saunders v. Superior Court , 109 Ariz. 424, 425, 510 P.2d 740, 741 (1973). We review de novo the superior court's ruling on an applicant's right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). Dowling v. Stapley , 221 Ariz. 251, 269-70, ¶ 57, 211 P.3d 1235, 1253-54 (App. 2009). We review the court's ruling on the motion's timeliness, however, for an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 196 Ariz. 382, 384, ¶ 5, 998 P.2d 1055, 1057 (2000). I. Denial of Motion to Intervene ¶10 A third party's ability to intervene as a matter of right is governed by Rule 24(a)(2). Under this rule, the superior court must permit intervention when four conditions are satisfied: (1) the motion is timely; (2) the movants claim an interest relating to the subject of the action; (3) the movants show that disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and (4) the movants show that existing parties do not adequately represent their interests. Woodbridge Structured Funding, LLC v. Ariz. Lottery , 235 Ariz. 25, 28, ¶ 13, 326 P.3d 292, 295 (App. 2014) ; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). ¶11 Movants satisfy condition two and four. As homeowners and members of Heritage, they have an interest in ensuring the Weinbergs comply with the CC&Rs, which expressly provide that any owner "shall have the standing and right to enforce" the restrictions against other owners. Likewise, Movants contest the settlement agreement between Heritage and the Weinbergs and allege that the settlement permits violations of the CC&Rs to go forward unremedied. We must accept these allegations as true, and agree that Heritage no longer adequately represents Movants' interest in enforcing the CC&Rs against the Weinbergs. See Woodbridge, 235 Ariz. at 27, ¶ 3, 326 P.3d at 294 ("[W]e take the allegations of [the] motion to intervene as true ...."). ¶12 The superior court found that Movants failed to satisfy conditions one and three. We address these conditions in turn. A. Timeliness of the Motion ¶13 Intervention as a matter of right requires a "timely motion." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Timeliness hinges on two discrete questions: "the stage at which the action has progressed before intervention is sought and whether the applicant was in a position to seek intervention at an earlier stage of the proceedings." Winner Enterprises, Ltd. v. Superior Court (Hancock) , 159 Ariz. 106, 109, 765 P.2d 116, 119 (App. 1988). ¶14 Movants argue that timeliness is measured "not from the inception of the case, but from when the movant has notice that its interests are no longer being adequately represented." Both the text of the Rule and the relevant case law support their position. ¶15 The Rule does not allow intervention of right where "existing parties adequately represent" the interest of the proposed intervenor. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Because Movants could not seek intervention of right until their interests diverged from those of Heritage, the Rule implicitly provides that timeliness must be measured from the stage in the proceedings at which Heritage no longer represented Movant's interests. ¶16 Our supreme court reached the same conclusion in interpreting an earlier version of the Rule. See John F. Long Homes, Inc. v. Holohan , 97 Ariz. 31, 396 P.2d 394 (1964). In that case, a home builder obtained a use permit from the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment to construct a mobile home park. Id . at 32, 396 P.2d 394. A third party then petitioned the superior court to review the Board's decision, and the superior court entered a judgment finding the permit void. Id. The builder asked the City of Phoenix, a party to the superior court action, to appeal the court's judgment, but the City refused. Id . The builder moved to intervene after receiving notice from the City that it would not appeal. Id. Our supreme court found the builder's motion was timely: [A]n application to intervene in the lower court under Rule 24(a) is improper where arguments presented by the city are those which would be presented by the applicant. Thus, applicant was in no position to intervene under Rule 24(a) prior to judgment and the receipt of notice by the city that it did not intend to prosecute the appeal. Upon receipt of this notice petitioner made application to intervene within three hours. We are of the opinion that an application made to intervene within three hours after the first time an application could be entertained has been timely made. Id . at 34-35, 396 P.2d 394 ; see also United States v. Carpenter , 298 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a motion to intervene was timely because movants "acted as soon as they had notice that the proposed settlement was contrary to their interests"); Smith v. Marsh , 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The crucial date for assessing the timeliness of a motion to intervene is when proposed intervenors should have been aware that their interests would not be adequately protected by the existing parties."). ¶17 Here, the majority of the Board voted to accept the Weinbergs' settlement offer on July 7, 2017. Movants filed their emergency motion to intervene only five days later, before the Weinbergs and Heritage even filed their notice of settlement. Movants acted promptly after realizing that Heritage no longer adequately represented their interests. Therefore, the superior court abused its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene was untimely. See Winner Enterprises, Ltd. , 159 Ariz. at 109-10, 765 P.2d 116 (finding intervention was timely when it was sought at least 21 days after movant had notice of the proceedings and entry of a preliminary injunction). B. Impaired or Impeded Ability to Protect Interests ¶18 Movants also must show that disposition of the action "may as a practical matter impair or impede" their ability to protect their interests. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). In denying the motion to intervene, the superior court did not determine whether the resolution of this case could possibly have an impact on the Movants' interest in enforcing the CC&Rs against the Weinbergs. Instead, the superior court relied on its determination that Movants "are free to file a separate lawsuit against the ... Weinbergs concerning the matters the instant action raises." ¶19 Arizona cases have not yet opined on whether the availability of a separate action acts as a bar to intervention, but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is substantively indistinguishable from Arizona Rule 24, and we may look for guidance to federal courts' interpretations of their rules. See Marquette Venture Partners II, L.P. v. Leonesio , 227 Ariz. 179, 182, ¶ 11, n.6, 254 P.3d 418, 421 (App. 2011). ¶20 There is a split in authority in the federal cases and even among courts within the same circuit on this issue. Some courts have found that an intervenor's interest is not impaired or impeded unless the intervenor will be precluded from protecting its interests in another forum. See, e.g. , California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States , 450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that even if a pending lawsuit "would affect the proposed intervenors' interests, their interests might not be impaired if they have 'other means' to protect them"); Meridian Homes Corp. v. Nicholas W. Prassas & Co. , 683 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that impairment "depends on whether the decision of a legal question involved in the action would as a practical matter foreclose rights of the proposed intervenors in a subsequent proceeding"). However, other cases from those courts recognize that an interest may be impaired or impeded even when alternative forums exist. See Johnson v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. , 500 F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing intervention even though appellants had "the practical alternative of asserting in a subsequent lawsuit that the new policies adopted by the school district are unconstitutional"); Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Heritage Capital Advisory Services, Ltd. , 736 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It is true that where a proposed intervenor's interest will be prejudiced if it does not participate in the main action, the mere availability of alternative forums is not sufficient to justify denial of a motion to intervene."). ¶21 Other courts, including the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, take the broader view that "a would-be intervenor must show only that impairment of its substantial legal interest is possible if intervention is denied. This burden is minimal." Utah Ass'n of Ctys. v. Clinton , 255 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger , 188 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) ); W. Energy All. v. Zinke , 877 F.3d 1157, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating that the possibility of alternative forums is not sufficient to deny intervention if the intervenor's interest will be prejudiced if it is not allowed to participate in the main action) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Com'n , 736 F.2d at 387 ). ¶22 Our Rule, like its federal counterpart, does not require certainty, and only requires that an interest "may" be impaired or impeded. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Because "[i]t is well settled in Arizona that Rule 24 'is remedial and should be liberally construed with the view of assisting parties in obtaining justice and protecting their rights,' " Bechtel v. Rose, ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 150 Ariz. 68, 72, 722 P.2d 236, 240 (1986) (quoting Mitchell v. City of Nogales , 83 Ariz. 328, 333, 320 P.2d 955 (1958) ), we agree with the broader approach. When proposed intervenors meet the minimal burden of showing that disposition of the action may impair or impede their ability to protect their interest, then the availability of an alternative forum, by itself, does not preclude intervention. ¶23 Thus, even if Movants can independently sue to enforce the CC&Rs, intervention is proper if Movant's ability to enforce the CC&Rs may be impaired by the resolution of the current action. At a minimum, without intervention, Movants are denied the ability to weigh in on the merits of any settlement. See Johnson , 500 F.2d at 353 (allowing intervention where proposed intervenors sought "to influence the manner in which the school district exercises its admitted discretion" in resolving the underlying action). In light of the remedial nature of Rule 24 and the minimal burden placed on proposed intervenors, we conclude that the disposition of the underlying case may, as a practical matter, impair or impede Movants' ability to protect their claimed interests. ¶24 Accordingly, we reverse the superior court's order denying intervention and remand for further proceedings. Because we reverse the denial of intervention, we must vacate the judgment approving the settlement agreement and dismissing all claims. See McGough , 143 Ariz. at 30, 691 P.2d at 742 (explaining that if an order denying intervention is reversed, the entire judgment will be reversed). On remand, Heritage and the Weinbergs may re-urge whatever settlement agreement they deem appropriate between those parties. II. Attorneys' Fees ¶25 Because we reverse the denial of Movants' motion to intervene, we also vacate the accompanying award of attorneys' fees, thereby mooting the Weinbergs' cross-appeal. CONCLUSION ¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the superior court's denial of the motion to intervene and vacate the award of fees and the final judgment approving the settlement agreement and dismissing all claims. We remand for further proceedings. We also deny the Weinbergs' and Heritage's requests for fees and costs on appeal. The Weinbergs appealed from the attorneys' fee award, but this court dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See generally Heritage Vill. II Homeowners' Ass'n v. Weinberg , 1 CA-CV 15-0547, 2017 WL 929743 (Ariz. App. Mar. 9, 2017) (mem. decision). The parties do not dispute that individual members have standing to enforce the CC&Rs, but they disagree as to how this authority applies in the context of architectural approval under the CC&Rs. Because the broad grant of standing is sufficient to confer an interest in enforcement of the CC&Rs, we need not decide how far that interest extends. Federal Rule 24 was liberalized to its current form in 1966, and "an earlier draft would have required that the judgment 'substantially' impair or impede the interest, but that higher barrier was deleted in the course of approving the amendment." Nuesse v. Camp , 385 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citing Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure , 54 Geo. L. J. 1204, 1232 (1966)). During oral argument, counsel for both Heritage and the Weinbergs expressly reserved the right to assert that Movants could not pursue an independent action against the Weinbergs for the alleged violations of the CC&Rs at issue in this action. We only determine that Movants have met the minimal burden for intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2). Our decision does not address whether the actions to be taken pursuant to the proposed settlement between Heritage and the Weinbergs would or would not cure any noncompliance with the CC&Rs. Such matters are left to the superior court in the first instance.

CATTANI, Judge: ¶1 Matthew and Elena Tagge appeal their convictions for illegal possession or use of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The Tagges maintain that, because they held cards entitling them to possess and use marijuana under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act ("AMMA"), they were immune from prosecution. We hold to the contrary that, because immunity under the AMMA does not extend to smoking marijuana in a public place, the Tagges could be prosecuted for doing so in their car in a public parking lot. Accordingly, and for reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 The facts are undisputed. Bound for a music festival in Mesa one afternoon, the Tagges parked in a commercial lot near the concert venue. The lot was owned by the City of Mesa and had been leased to a radio station for parking for the event. The Tagges pulled up next to two undercover Mesa police officers, who watched as the Tagges sat in their car and smoked marijuana from a pipe they passed between them. Although the windows of the Tagges' car were up, police saw smoke coming from the pipe, ordered them out of the car and seized the pipe, along with approximately one gram of marijuana. ¶3 Each of the Tagges was a "qualifying patient" under the AMMA. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") §§ 36-2801(13), -2811. At trial, they argued that they were immune from prosecution under § 36-2811, which generally immunizes AMMA cardholders' marijuana use, subject to several exceptions, including one at issue in this case: smoking in a public place. See A.R.S. § 36-2802(C)(2). The superior court rejected the Tagges' argument, finding that although they were inside a closed car, they were in a public place and were not entitled to immunity. After a bench trial, the court convicted them of misdemeanor marijuana and paraphernalia offenses and imposed six months' unsupervised probation. The Tagges each filed a timely appeal. DISCUSSION ¶4 By law, the State may not subject a qualifying patient to arrest or prosecution for "use of marijuana pursuant to [the AMMA]." A.R.S. § 36-2811(B)(1). This protection "broadly immunizes qualified patients, carving out only narrow exceptions from its otherwise sweeping grant of immunity." Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt , 237 Ariz. 119, 122, ¶ 8, 347 P.3d 136, 139 (2015). Among the exceptions: A qualifying patient may not possess or use marijuana "[o]n a school bus," "[o]n the grounds of any preschool or primary or secondary school," or "[i]n any correctional facility." A.R.S. § 36-2802(B). And a qualifying patient may not smoke marijuana "[o]n any form of public transportation" or "[i]n any public place." A.R.S. § 36-2802(C). The dispositive issue here is whether the "public place" exception to immunity applies to smoking inside a private vehicle in a public parking lot. ¶5 This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Reed-Kaliher , 237 Ariz. at 122, ¶ 6, 347 P.3d at 139. In interpreting statutes, we give special care "to give effect to every clause and word." Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro , 240 Ariz. 193, 196, ¶ 16, 377 P.3d 988, 991 (2016). "[W]e look to the statute as a whole, and construe together all parts of the statute relating to the same subject." Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. Bentley , 187 Ariz. 229, 232, 928 P.2d 653, 656 (App. 1996) ; see J.D. v. Hegyi , 236 Ariz. 39, 41, ¶ 6, 335 P.3d 1118, 1120 (2014) ("Words in statutes ... cannot be read in isolation from the context in which they are used."). When a term in a statute may have differing meanings, we "consider[ ] secondary factors, such as the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Premier Physicians , 240 Ariz. at 195, ¶ 9, 377 P.3d at 990. ¶6 The Tagges first argue that the parking lot itself was not a public place within the meaning of the AMMA. They urge us to adopt the limited definition of "public place" found in the Smoke-Free Arizona Act ("SFAA"), which includes only an "enclosed area to which the public is invited or in which the public is permitted." A.R.S. § 36-601.01(A)(9) (emphasis added). The Tagges assert that because both the SFAA and the AMMA appear in Title 36 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, we must read the two in pari materia so that the SFAA's definition of "public place" would apply to every use of the phrase in Title 36. ¶7 The Tagges' argument is unavailing because the SFAA expressly applies only to tobacco products, not marijuana. See A.R.S. § 36-601.01(A)(11) (defining "[s]moking" by reference to "any lighted tobacco product"). The AMMA drafters could have expressly incorporated the public place definition from the SFAA, but they did not do so. That the two statutes are in the same title is insufficient to warrant application of the SFAA's definition to the AMMA given the distinct subject matters and the different purposes of the two acts. See Moreno v. Jones , 213 Ariz. 94, 99, ¶ 28, 139 P.3d 612, 617 (2006) (in pari materia statutes "relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose") (citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that a public place under the AMMA is not limited to enclosed areas. Instead, a public place is simply "a place open to or frequented by the general public," see State v. Whitaker , 164 Ariz. 359, 362, 793 P.2d 116, 119 (App. 1990), and the city-owned parking lot in this case meets that definition. See Florida v. White , 526 U.S. 559, 566, 119 S.Ct. 1555, 143 L.Ed.2d 748 (1999) (employer's parking lot is a "public area" for purposes of a Fourth Amendment challenge); People v. Strider , 177 Cal. App. 4th 1393, 1402, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 (2009) (parking lot is a "public place" under statute criminalizing carrying loaded firearm in a public place); Dornbusch v. State , 262 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (parking lot is akin to public roadway in interpreting "public place" element of driving-under-influence statute). ¶8 The Tagges counter that the parking lot was not a public place within the meaning of the statute because, although municipally owned, the lot was leased to a radio station, which in turn charged concert-goers to park there. The Tagges do not cite and we are unaware of any authority for the proposition that a fee requirement for entering or using a space that otherwise is open to everyone renders a parking lot a non-public place, and we hold that the parking lot in this case was a public place for purposes of the AMMA. ¶9 The Tagges also argue that, even if the parking lot were considered to be a public place, they nevertheless were not subject to prosecution because they did not smoke marijuana in the open, but instead did so inside a closed private vehicle. But the interior of a vehicle is not a separate place distinct from the location in which the vehicle is found. The expedient of being enclosed in a vehicle parked in a public place does not, without more, remove a person from the public place. Criminal trespass, for example, is not decriminalized if a trespasser's unauthorized presence on a property is inside a vehicle. Simply put, a location-including a public place-does not change its character when a person is present in a vehicle, rather than on foot. ¶10 Although this is a case of first impression in Arizona, our conclusion that immunity under the AMMA does not extend to smoking in a private vehicle in a public parking lot is consistent with that reached by the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Carlton , 313 Mich.App. 339, 880 N.W.2d 803 (2015). Construing a similarly worded medical-marijuana statute, the Michigan court concluded that a qualifying patient cited for smoking in his car in a casino parking lot was not immune from prosecution. Id. at 805-08. Noting that the statute withdrew immunity for smoking in "any public place" (but did not condition immunity on whether the act was done "in public"), the court held that immunity from prosecution for smoking marijuana does not extend "to [qualifying patients] who smoke medical marijuana in a parking lot that is open to use by the general public, even when smoking inside a privately owned vehicle, and even if the person's smoking is not directly detectable by the members of the general public." Id. at 807-10. Although the court acknowledged that the interior of a privately owned car can be private, it ultimately rejected the notion that a vehicle's interior could be a "place" whose public or private character would determine immunity under the statute. Id. at 809-10. ¶11 Like the Michigan court in Carlton , we acknowledge that, in general, motorists in private vehicles enjoy privacy interests entitled to constitutional protection. See id. ; see also Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 345, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). But we agree with the Michigan court that applicability of the "public place" exception in the statute hinges on the character of the place, not on whether the qualifying patient takes steps to conceal the act or limit its effect on others within that place. ¶12 The Tagges alternatively argue that our statutory analysis ignores a separate prong of § 36-2802(C), which withdraws immunity for smoking marijuana "[o]n any form of public transportation." In their view, the statute's express withdrawal of immunity for smoking on public transportation implicitly preserves immunity for smoking inside private transportation. The Tagges suggest that, if a patient's immunity when smoking marijuana in a means of private transportation hinges on the location of the means of private transportation, the statute's separate reference to "public transportation" would be redundant because "any form of public transportation" necessarily will be located in a "public place," i.e., a roadway, railway, bus station, or parking lot. ¶13 We disagree that our interpretation of the statute renders the "public place" and "public transportation" provisions redundant. The statute withdraws immunity for smoking in any public place, as well as for smoking on any form of public transportation (without regard to whether the public transportation is in a public or private place). Although public transportation vehicles usually travel in public places, they sometimes venture into otherwise non-public spaces. For example, a public bus may transport people over private property. Similarly, a bus may be parked in a restricted area of a bus depot or may undergo mechanical work in a private garage. In any of these scenarios, under the express language of the statute, smoking marijuana is not permitted on the bus, even though it is located in a non-public place. Thus, although the "public place" and "public transportation" restrictions overlap to a significant extent, it is not necessary to read the "public transportation" provision as an implicit exclusion of "private transportation" to give it meaning. ¶14 Furthermore, accepting the Tagges' view that the statute implicitly allows smoking in any form of private transportation would lead to anomalous results. Such an interpretation would allow an individual to smoke marijuana in the open, for example in a public park, by the simple expedient of perching on a motorcycle or some other form of private transportation. To avoid this absurd result, the court would presumably have to write in a windows-up requirement in addition to finding an implicit private-vehicle exception, all based on the statute's reference to public transportation. We decline to judicially amend the AMMA to reach so far beyond the text of the statute, and we conclude that the public transportation and public place restrictions in the AMMA are complementary and not impermissibly redundant. CONCLUSION ¶15 The Tagges, even though qualifying patients under the AMMA, lost their immunity from prosecution for marijuana and paraphernalia-related offenses because they were smoking marijuana in a public place. Although the Tagges could have consumed marijuana in the same location by other means, they ceded their immunity by smoking marijuana in a public place. We thus affirm their convictions. We note that the Department of Health Services issued regulations defining "public place" under the AMMA to include "parking lots." Ariz. Admin. Code R9-17-101(24)(xiv). The superior court in this case, however, ruled that the department lacked authority to issue the regulation and held it invalid. The State did not cross-appeal from that ruling, see A.R.S. § 13-4032(3), and does not argue that the regulation bears on this appeal.

WINTHROP, Presiding Judge: ¶ 1 Ernest F. Mashler ("Ernest") appeals from the superior court's judgment denying his petition to partition certain real property ("Farmland") and approving the restatement of his mother's trust. ¶ 2 We address in this opinion whether precatory language in a will directed to a personal representative or executor rather than devisees creates an enforceable instruction. We hold that, read with the other provisions of a will, precatory language may create an enforceable directive rather than a discretionary request. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court erred in approving a restatement of the decedent's trust, permitting the trustees to "decant" an otherwise irrevocable trust. We hold that, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 14-10819(A) , a trustee has discretion to decant-the authority to appoint or distribute trust property to a new or different existing trust with terms that differ from those of the original trust-only when the trust instrument expressly provides. ¶ 3 Accordingly, we affirm the court's denial of Ernest's petition to partition the Farmland but vacate the court's order approving restatement of the trust. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶ 4 In 1986, Lucille F. Sibley ("Lucille") and her husband, Phillip R. Sibley ("Phil"), created the Phil R. Sibley & Lucille F. Sibley Trust (the "Trust"), which became irrevocable upon their deaths. Lucille and Phil had one child together, Patricia Sibley Knott, and Lucille had three children by a prior marriage, Ernest, Christine Wolleson ("Christine"), and John Mashler ("John"). ¶ 5 When Phil died in 2004, Lucille's separate property and her share of the community property were allocated to "Trust A." When Lucille died in 2015, the Trust directed that the remaining principal and income of Trust A be distributed pursuant to the terms of Lucille's Last Will and Testament (the "Will"). ¶ 6 The Will directed that: [A]ll liquid assets of Trust "A" shall be divided into three equal shares and distributed free of trust to: [Ernest, Christine, and John,] or their issue per stirpes. It is my desire that the real property ( [F]armland) which is part of Trust "A" ... be held in further trust and that the income of such [F]armland, after the payment of expenses to keep it in trust, be divided equally among [Ernest, Christine, and John,] or their issue per stirpes. Unless required to satisfy the administration of my estate ... I desire that the [F]armland not be sold until my youngest great-grandchild reaches the age of twenty-one . At such time, the proceeds of which would be distributed equally to [Ernest, Christine, and John,] or their issue per stirpes. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 7 Upon Lucille's death, John applied to superior court for the informal probate of the Will and appointment of a personal representative. The court appointed John as personal representative. John and Christine were the remaining co-trustees of the Trust. ¶ 8 Approximately one year later, John petitioned the superior court to approve the exercise of his and Christine's power, pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-10819, to restate the terms of the Trust. He asserted that the Trust "was outdated and lacked modern administrative provisions." Christine later joined the action. Ernest objected to their petition and filed his own petition seeking to partition the Farmland. ¶ 9 After a hearing on both petitions, the superior court entered a judgment (1) denying Ernest's petition to partition the Farmland and (2) approving John and Christine's restatement of the Trust. Ernest timely appealed from the judgment, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(9). ANALYSIS I. Statute of Limitations ¶ 10 As a preliminary matter, John and Christine argue that Ernest was barred from contesting the validity of the Trust by A.R.S. § 14-10604(A). That statute provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the validity of a trust that was revocable at the settlor's death within ... [o]ne year after the settlor's death." A.R.S. § 14-10604(A)(1) (emphasis added). Here, the Trust became irrevocable upon Phil's and Lucille's deaths. Therefore, § 14-10604, which applies to revocable trusts, did not preclude Ernest from contesting the validity of the Trust. ¶ 11 John and Christine additionally argue that A.R.S. § 14-3306 also prohibits Ernest from contesting the Trust. Section 14-3306 prohibits an heir "from commencing a formal testacy proceeding to contest the probate of the will after four months have elapsed" following receipt of information regarding informal probate of a will. A.R.S. § 14-3306(B). John and Christine's brief, however, fails to explain how this statute applies to bar Ernest's petition to partition the Farmland or his objection to John and Christine's petition to restate the Trust. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring "supporting reasons for each contention" with citations to legal authorities). Accordingly, they have waived this argument on appeal. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm'n , 214 Ariz. 489, 491 n.2, ¶ 6, 154 P.3d 391, 393 (App. 2007) (explaining that a party who fails to develop and support an argument waives that issue on appeal). Further, Ernest did not commence a formal testacy proceeding to contest the probate of the Will; simply stated, § 14-3306 does not apply. II. Construction of the Will ¶ 12 In appealing the denial of his motion to partition the Farmland, Ernest first argues the superior court improperly interpreted the Will "as directing that the Farmland be held in trust." ¶ 13 The "cardinal rule" of will construction is to ascertain the intent of the testator from the words of the will. See Newhall v. McGill , 69 Ariz. 259, 262, 212 P.2d 764 (1949). On appeal, we review any legal issues raised de novo , and apply "the appropriate legal standard to the facts found" by the superior court. In re Estate of Shumway , 198 Ariz. 323, 326, ¶ 9, 9 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2000). "[W]e do not reweigh conflicting evidence" but rather "examine the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists" to support the court's ruling. In re Estate of Pouser , 193 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d 704, 709 (1999). ¶ 14 Lucille's intent regarding the disposition of her "liquid assets" is easily ascertained from the language of the Will. She stated that the assets "shall be divided into three equal shares and distributed free of trust" to Ernest, Christine, and John. Her intent regarding the Farmland was expressed differently. She indicated that it was her "desire" that the Farmland "be held in further trust and that the income of such [F]armland, after the payment of expenses to keep it in trust, be divided equally among" Ernest, Christine, and John. She further expressed her "desire" that the Farmland not be sold until her youngest great-grandchild turned twenty-one. ¶ 15 The phrase "I desire" is "precatory," which means "requesting, recommending, or expressing a desire rather than a command." Precatory , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A precatory trust is "[a] trust that the law will recognize to carry out the wishes of the testator or grantor even though the statement in question is in the nature of an entreaty or recommendation rather than a command." Precatory trust , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The issue we must resolve is whether Lucille's words placed the Farmland in the Trust. ¶ 16 More than seventy-seven years ago, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the effect of precatory language in a will. The court interpreted a will that provided: It is my wish, though this is not a restriction or a limitation upon the use and enjoyment of the legacies and bequests herein made, that my estate, after the payment of my debts, the cash bequests and expenses of administration, shall be kept among the descendants of my late father and mother. In re Hayward's Estate , 57 Ariz. 51, 58, 110 P.2d 956 (1941). Our supreme court concluded that this language constituted "a recommendation or request directed to legatees and devisees" rather than a command. Id. at 60, 110 P.2d 956. In reaching this conclusion, however, the court acknowledged "many cases" in which precatory language is properly "construed as dispositive." Id. at 58, 110 P.2d 956. The court cited with approval a California case holding that "[w]here the words are used to describe a disposition of property, that is, where they are directed to the executor or to the law, and not to a devisee or legatee, the authorities are uniform that the word ['desire'] is sufficient to declare a disposition of the property." Id. at 59, 110 P.2d 956 (quoting In re Tooley's Estate , 170 Cal. 164, 149 P. 574, 575 (1915) ). ¶ 17 Several years later in Newhall v. McGill , our supreme court explained how a court should determine whether precatory language creates a trust: [I]n order that a trust may arise from the use of precatory words, the court must be satisfied, from the words themselves, taken in connection with all the other terms of the disposition, that the testator's intention to create an express trust was as full, complete, settled, and sure as though he had given the property to hold upon a trust declared in the ordinary manner. 69 Ariz. at 263, 212 P.2d 764 (citing Fields v. Fields , 139 Or. 41, 3 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Or. 1931) ); see In re Conness' Estate , 73 Ariz. 216, 218-19, 240 P.2d 176 (1952) (concluding that "for the education of" was a precatory phrase that did not create a trust, but was instead "only an expression of a wish or desire on the part of the testator to the legatees as to how they should use the bequest"); see also In re Rowlands' Estate , 73 Ariz. 337, 340, 241 P.2d 781 (1952) ("Precatory words directed to an executor indicate a trust while the same words to a devisee do not") (citing Newhall , 69 Ariz. 259, 212 P.2d 764 ). ¶ 18 After carefully reading the language of the Will, we conclude that the evidence supports the superior court's finding that, Lucille's words regarding the disposition of the Farmland, examined with the other terms of the Will, reflect her intent to hold the Farmland in further trust. Her words "it is my desire" are not directed to her devisees but to the personal representative of her estate. Unlike the testator in Hayward's Estate , Lucille did not include qualifying language stating that her desire should not be construed as "a restriction or limitation." And, most importantly, the Will reflects Lucille's intent to dispose of her "liquid assets" separately and differently from the Farmland. She expressly directed that her liquid assets be distributed "free of trust." If Lucille wanted the same disposition for the Farmland, she would have so stated. Instead, she addressed the Farmland separately and expressed her will that it be held in "further trust." ¶ 19 On appeal, Ernest argues that the superior court's ruling contradicts the testimony of Stephen Shadle, the attorney who drafted the Will. Although it is true that Shadle testified that the word "desire" was precatory and not obligatory, his testimony was contradicted by a letter he sent following Lucille's death that stated, "I think the time for closing the Trust and selling is about ten years out," and that he needed "to get great grandchildren birth dates nailed down to get the exact date." The letter suggests Shadle's pre-litigation understanding that the Farmland should be held in "further trust." It is not for this Court to reweigh conflicting evidence. See In re Estate of Pouser , 193 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d 704. ¶ 20 We conclude that the language of the Will supports the superior court's finding that Lucille intended the Farmland to be held in trust until her youngest great-grandchild, alive at the time of Lucille's death, reaches the age of twenty-one. Accordingly, we affirm the court's denial of Ernest's petition to partition the Farmland. III. Restatement of the Trust ¶ 21 Ernest next argues that the superior court erred in approving John and Christine's restatement of the Trust pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-10819. He asserts that the power to appoint under § 14-10819 arises only when "the trustee has 'discretion' with respect to trust asset or income distributions," and that the Trust here did not provide such discretion. We agree. ¶ 22 Section 14-10819 provides, in part: Unless the terms of the trust instrument expressly provide otherwise, a trustee who has the discretion under the terms of a testamentary instrument or irrevocable inter vivos agreement to make distributions , regardless of whether a standard is provided in the trust instrument to or for the benefit of a beneficiary of the trust, may exercise without prior court approval the trustee's discretion by appointing part or all of the trust property in favor of a trustee of another trust. A.R.S. § 14-10819(A) (emphasis added). ¶ 23 Section 14-10819(A) grants a trustee the power to "decant" an irrevocable trust under certain conditions. As explained by the Uniform Law Commission, decanting refers to "the distribution of assets from one trust into a second trust, like wine is decanted from the bottle to another vessel." A trustee with decanting power has "authority to amend an unamendable trust, in the sense that he or she may distribute the trust property to a second trust with terms that differ from those of the original trust." Morse v. Kraft , 466 Mass. 92, 992 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (2013) (citation omitted). ¶ 24 The rationale behind decanting is that "if a trustee has discretion to distribute trust property to or for the benefit of a beneficiary, the trustee in effect has a limited power of appointment in favor of the beneficiary and thereby can appoint the property to a new or existing trust for the benefit of that beneficiary." Alan S. Halperin, Zoey F. Orol, Modern Variations on an Ancient Theme: Fundamental Changes in Trust Law-Part II , N.Y. St. B.J. 25, 26 (March/April 2017). Thus, it is a trustee's discretionary authority to make distributions in favor of a beneficiary that provides the premise for decanting. See William R. Culp, Jr., Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities , 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 1 37-38 (2010). Based on this rationale, Arizona's statute, like those of other states, requires that a trustee have the power to make discretionary distributions for the benefit of a beneficiary under the terms of the original trust. See A.R.S. § 14-10819(A) ; see also Ferri v. Powell-Ferri , 476 Mass. 651, 72 N.E.3d 541, 553-54 n.12 (2017) (citing decanting statutes from twenty-seven states). ¶ 25 We have reviewed the Trust here and find no evidence that John and Christine, as trustees, have discretion to make distributions for the benefit of the beneficiaries, who include themselves. Prior to Lucille's death, the trustees had discretion to distribute principal for the benefit of Lucille's "maintenance, support, health and well being." Upon Lucille's death, the trustees had discretion to draw upon the principal to cover any funeral expenses and death taxes. However, the Trust provides no authority for the trustees to make discretionary distributions for the benefit of the beneficiaries following Lucille's death. ¶ 26 John and Christine cite Article IV(B) of the Trust, which provides that, upon Lucille's death, the trustees: [S]hall distribute the then remaining principal and undistributed income to or hold the same for the benefit of such person or persons or the estate of [Lucille] in such amounts and proportions, for such estates and interests, and outright, or upon such terms, trusts, conditions and limitations as [Lucille] shall appoint by a Will referring specifically to this power of appointment. This provision directs John and Christine to distribute or hold the Trust principal and income in compliance with Lucille's Will. It does not grant John and Christine discretion over the distribution of principal or income. ¶ 27 Alternatively, John and Christine argue "that the discretionary power need not come directly from the testamentary instruments themselves." We disagree. Section 14-10819 expressly requires that the trustee's discretion come from "the terms of a testamentary instrument or irrevocable inter vivos agreement." A.R.S. § 14-10819(A). ¶ 28 Because the Trust does not grant John and Christine the discretion to make distributions for the benefit of the beneficiaries, they did not have the authority to restate the Trust pursuant to § 14-10819. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the superior court's judgment. The original Trust remains in effect. If the parties wish to modify the Trust going forward, they must follow the appropriate statutory procedure. See A.R.S. § 14-10410. IV. Attorneys' Fees ¶ 29 John and Christine request an award of attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-11004, which provides: A. A trustee ... is entitled to reimbursement from the trust for that person's reasonable fees, expenses and disbursement, including attorney fees and costs, that arise out of and that relate to the good faith defense or prosecution of a judicial ... proceeding involving the administration of the trust, regardless of whether the defense or prosecution is successful. B. A court ... may order that a party's reasonable fees, expenses and disbursements pursuant to subsection A be paid by any other party or the trust that is the subject of the judicial proceeding. A.R.S. § 14-11004. We grant John and Christine's request for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs on appeal to be paid by the Trust pursuant to § 14-11004(A) but deny their request for fees against Ernest personally pursuant to § 14-11004(B). CONCLUSION ¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's denial of Ernest's petition to partition the Farmland but vacate the court's approval of the restated trust. We award John and Christine their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs on appeal upon their timely compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. We cite the current versions of all applicable statutes as no revisions material to this opinion have since occurred. Patricia Sibley Knott is not a party to this appeal. The Missouri Court of Appeals recently articulated the rule set forth in Newhall . See Day v. Hupp , 528 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (reasoning that a trust will arise from the use of precatory words only if the court is "satisfied from the words themselves, considered in connection with all the other terms of the disposition, that the grantor's intention to create a trust was as complete and certain as if she had given the property to hold in a trust declared in the ordinary manner"). Ernest's petition also asserted that Lucille's testamentary power of appointment violated the rule against perpetuities set forth in A.R.S. § 14-2901(A), because she directed that the Farmland not be sold until her youngest great-grandchild reached the age of twenty-one. The superior court found that the language of the Will could "be construed to apply to the youngest great-grandchild then living at the time of Lucille's death." Ernest has not challenged this ruling on appeal. Accordingly, we do not review the superior court's finding. The Uniform Trust Decanting Act, A Summary , http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trustdecanting/UTDA% 20-% 20Summary.pdf The Uniform Trust Decanting Act likewise authorizes decanting only when the trust confers discretionary distribution powers. See Uniform Trust Decanting Act , §§ 11, 12 ( Unif. Law Comm'n 2015).

JOHNSEN, Judge: ¶1 A motorist died before dawn one day when his car slammed into some horses that had wandered onto State Route 77 near Dudleyville. Tracks showed the horses had passed through an open gate in a barbed-wire fence maintained by the State of Arizona adjacent to the highway. Investigators also spotted tire tracks of one or more all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") leading through the gate. The motorist's parents sued several defendants, including the State, which filed a notice of nonparty at fault asserting that "unknown ATV riders were responsible for leaving" the gate open. The superior court struck the notice, noting the State had not tried to identify or locate the ATV riders and there was no evidence that any nonparty "was actually known" to be at fault. We hold the notice was valid. The claim against the State is that the highway gate was open because the State did not secure it. On these facts, the State may name as a nonparty at fault the individual who negligently left the gate open even though the State cannot identify that person by name. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Joseph Ragsdale was driving to work in Miami when his car collided with the horses. Ragsdale was killed, and four of the horses also perished. His parents (the "Plaintiffs") sued a couple that owned property near the highway (the "Owners"), the couple who kept the horses in a fenced pasture on that property (the "Ranchers"), and the State. The Plaintiffs alleged the Owners and the Ranchers negligently failed to secure the gate to the pasture in which the Ranchers kept the horses. The Plaintiffs alleged the State negligently failed to secure a gate in another fence that ran along the highway about a half-mile beyond the pasture. ¶3 Discovery had revealed that hunters and hikers sometimes came and went through the pasture gate, and the State, joined by the Owners, filed a notice naming as nonparties at fault "unknown persons" who opened the pasture gate without closing it. The State separately filed another notice naming "Unknown ATV Riders" who, the State alleged, had left the highway gate open in disregard of a sign on the gate saying, "KEEP GATE CLOSED." ¶4 In support of its allegation about the ATV riders, the State cited a DPS report that stated as follows: [T]he horses came from the pasture and traveled towards State Route 77, where they located the opened right-[of-way] fence gate, traveled through it and up onto the highway where the collision occurred. It could not be determined who had left ... either the pasture gate or the right-[of-way] fence gate open, but ... a subject(s) operating [ATVs], based upon tire prints, had left the right-[of-way] fence gate open. The Plaintiffs objected to the notices of nonparty at fault, and, after briefing and oral argument, the superior court struck them both. JURISDICTION ¶5 The State petitioned for special action relief from the superior court's order striking its notice of the ATV riders as nonparties at fault. By prior order, we accepted jurisdiction of the State's petition because it raised a purely legal question and, in the circumstances presented, the State lacked an adequate remedy. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; Bowen Prods. v. French , 231 Ariz. 424, 426-27, ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 87, 89-90 (App. 2013) ; Ocotillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court , 173 Ariz. 486, 488, 844 P.2d 653, 655 (App. 1993). DISCUSSION ¶6 As our supreme court explained in Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 169 Ariz. 505, 821 P.2d 166 (1991), "[w]ith certain exceptions ... the liability of tortfeasors in Arizona is several only." Id. at 506, 821 P.2d at 167 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 12-2506(A) (2019) ("Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault ....")). "In assessing percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury, death or damage to property, regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit." A.R.S. § 12-2506(B). ¶7 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) sets out the procedure by which a defendant may exercise its rights under the statute: Notice of Nonparty at Fault . No later than 150 days after filing its answer, a party must serve on all other parties--and should file with the court--a notice disclosing any person: (A) not currently or formerly named as a party in the action; and (B) whom the party alleges was wholly or partly at fault under A.R.S. § 12-2506(B). The notice must disclose the identity and location of the nonparty allegedly at fault, and the facts supporting the allegation of fault.... The trier of fact may not allocate any percentage of fault to a nonparty who is not disclosed in accordance with this rule except on stipulation of all the parties or on motion showing good cause, reasonable diligence, and lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties. We review a superior court's rulings on discovery and disclosure issues for abuse of discretion. Bowen , 231 Ariz. at 427, ¶ 9, 296 P.3d at 90. ¶8 The Plaintiffs argue the superior court correctly struck the State's notice because it did not identify the ATV riders by name, in violation of Rule 26(b)(5). In Rosner v. Denim & Diamonds, Inc ., 188 Ariz. 431, 937 P.2d 353 (App. 1996), however, we held a defendant's failure to identify a nonparty by name was not fatal to its notice. The plaintiff in Rosner was injured in a nightclub brawl, but his assailants left the club before police arrived. Id. at 432, 937 P.2d at 354. The plaintiff sued the nightclub, alleging its negligence caused the fight. Id. After the nightclub tried without success to locate the assailants, it filed a notice of nonparty at fault designating them as nonparties. Id. at 432-33, 937 P.2d at 354-55. On appeal from a defense verdict, the plaintiff argued the superior court should have struck the notice of nonparty at fault. Id. at 432, 937 P.2d at 354. As here, the plaintiff argued the notice did not comply with Rule 26(b)(5) because it did not identify the nonparties nor give their location. Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 432, 937 P.2d at 354. ¶9 We held that, like any procedural rule, Rule 26(b)(5)"can only affect procedural matters and cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights created by statute." Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355. Under § 12-2506(A), we explained, the issue is whether the defendant's notice discloses "facts sufficient to establish the existence of another tortfeasor, despite the inability to further identify the tortfeasor." Rosner, 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added); cf. McKillip v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc. , 190 Ariz. 61, 945 P.2d 372 (App. 1997) (upholding allocation of fault to a nonparty in mode-of-operation case against grocer without deciding whether evidence was sufficient to support fault of unknown person who dropped piece of paper on which plaintiff slipped); Smith v. Johnson , 183 Ariz. 38, 899 P.2d 199 (App. 1995) (jury allowed to consider fault of unidentified driver of a "red Mercedes" who negligently waved the defendant driver through an intersection, where the defendant collided with an oncoming car). ¶10 The nightclub in Rosner filed its notice only after going to "great lengths" to identify the patrons who had beaten up the plaintiff. 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355. Here, the Plaintiffs assert that, by contrast, the State has done nothing to try to identify the ATV riders who left the tracks through the highway gate. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (court may grant relief from rule upon showing of "good cause, reasonable diligence, and lack of unfair prejudice to all other parties"). But while the existence of the ATV riders may be material to the jury's allocation of fault, the Plaintiffs do not argue the names of the riders are material to that determination. The State will have the burden at trial to prove that the horses made their way onto the highway because ATV riders left the gate open. The State's failure to try to learn the names of the ATV riders, and its resulting inability to offer specifics about how they left the gate open and when, are things the Plaintiffs may ask the jury to weigh at trial, but under these circumstances, they are not grounds for striking the notice of nonparty at fault. ¶11 Citing dictum in Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Cendejas , 220 Ariz. 281, 205 P.3d 1128 (App. 2009), the Plaintiffs nevertheless argue we cannot disregard the requirement in Rule 26(b)(5) that a defendant provide the "identity and location" of the alleged nonparties at fault. See Cendejas , 220 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 24, 205 P.3d at 1133 (noting the defendant's unsuccessful efforts in Rosner to locate the assailants and warning that Rosner "did not hold that a party could ignore the Rule's requirements"). But we did not rule in Cendejas that a notice of nonparty at fault that lacks the name and location of the nonparty necessarily fails under Rule 26(b)(5) unless the defendant can show it tried without success to find the nonparty. The notice in that case identified the nonparty by name but did not explain what the nonparty did that deserved fault. Id. Here, there is no doubt that the State alleges the ATV riders should bear fault because they opened the gate and did not close it behind them. ¶12 In any event, we question any suggestion in Cendejas that Rule 26(b)(5) must be applied in a way that ensures a plaintiff has sufficient information "to bring [the nonparty] into the action before the statute of limitations expires." 220 Ariz. at 286, 205 P.3d at 1133. At its heart, Rule 26(b)(5) is in service of a defendant's substantive right to have the jury assess fault to a nonparty - regardless of whether the plaintiff may hail that nonparty into court. See Dietz , 169 Ariz. at 510, 821 P.2d at 171 (upholding defendant's right to name as a nonparty at fault an employer that is immune from suit by the plaintiff); Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355 ("[T]he comparative fault statute apportions fault, even at the expense of the plaintiff."); Ocotillo West , 173 Ariz. at 488, 844 P.2d at 655 ("Essentially, a defendant can name a nonparty at fault even if the plaintiff is prohibited from directly naming or recovering from such a party."). ¶13 It follows that Rule 26(b)(5) may not be read to undermine a defendant's statutory right to be assessed no more than its proportionate share of fault. See Daou v. Harris , 139 Ariz. 353, 358, 678 P.2d 934, 939 (1984) (when legislature creates substantive right, court may not diminish that right by procedural rule); Marsin v. Udall , 78 Ariz. 309, 312, 279 P.2d 721, 723 (1955) ("Any rule of court that operates to lessen or eliminate the right is of no legal force."). Although a defendant will be better served at trial if it can offer detailed information about a nonparty it alleges should bear some share of fault, a notice of nonparty at fault is not necessarily defective if it lacks information that would enable the plaintiff to sue the nonparty directly. See Rosner , 188 Ariz. at 433, 937 P.2d at 355 ( § 12-2506 was enacted "to allow the trier of fact ... to apportion fault among all tortfeasors based on the facts presented at trial") (citing Dietz , 169 Ariz. at 510, 821 P.2d at 171 ( § 12-2506"establish[ed] a system of several liability making each tortfeasor responsible for paying for his or her percentage of fault and no more ")). ¶14 The Plaintiffs argue that, as the superior court reasoned, in Rosner and the other nonparty cases cited above, it was undisputed that a nonparty had in fact committed a fault-worthy act. The Plaintiffs contend that here, by contrast, as the superior court found, "there is no person who actually saw anyone leave open the gate." On the facts presented, however, the State need not support its notice with testimony by someone who saw ATV riders open the highway gate and leave without closing the gate behind them. It is undisputed that the highway gate was open; indeed, the Plaintiffs allege the State negligently failed to secure the gate so that horses could not come from the nearby ranch onto the highway. Although the Plaintiffs do not concede that a human being must have opened the gate, at oral argument, they admitted they have no evidence to support the notion that the gate could have been opened any other way. And one of the Owners testified that gates like the one in the highway fence are not easy to open and "generally ... don't get opened very often by people that can't close them." ¶15 As the superior court noted, the premise of the State's notice is that the horses came onto the highway because someone left the gate open. Tire tracks mixed with the tracks of the horses show it may have been ATV riders who did so. On this record, given the nature of the gate and the other evidence in the record, the superior court erred by concluding the State's notice was too speculative. The Plaintiffs' claim against the State presumes the highway gate was open, and the State is entitled to argue to the jury that it should apportion fault to the ATV riders if it finds they opened the gate without closing it. CONCLUSION ¶16 For these reasons, we accept jurisdiction of the State's petition for special action and grant relief by vacating the order of the superior court striking the State's notice of nonparty at fault concerning "unknown ATV riders." Our order vacated the ruling striking the State's notice and stated that we would issue an opinion in due course. This is that opinion. Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current version of a statute or rule.

BROWN, Judge: ¶ 1 We address here whether a defendant charged with misdemeanor theft of services is entitled to a jury trial under the Arizona Constitution. Under our criminal code, theft is a unified offense and a defendant's eligibility for a jury trial must therefore be analyzed within that context. Because at least one of the varieties of theft has a common-law antecedent, we hold that a defendant charged with misdemeanor theft has the right to have his or her guilt determined by a jury. BACKGROUND ¶ 2 The State charged Deliana Kroll with theft, a class one misdemeanor, alleging she failed to pay the fare for a shuttle ride she took in Lake Havasu City. She was also charged with disorderly conduct for cursing and other offensive conduct directed toward the driver. The State filed a motion requesting a bench trial, asserting in part that Arizona's "misdemeanor theft statute has never had a common law antecedent and shares no substantially similar elements to common law larceny." Kroll disagreed, pointing to case law recognizing larceny as the antecedent of shoplifting, and suggesting the jury eligibility question must be determined by recognizing theft as a single offense that may be committed in a number of ways. The Lake Havasu City Municipal Court denied the State's motion, concluding that "[h]istorically [,] theft charges have been [j]ury [t]rial eligible." ¶ 3 The State filed a petition for special action in superior court challenging the municipal court's ruling. The superior court accepted jurisdiction but denied relief, reasoning in part that although the State had raised "credible arguments regarding why the specific theft in this case does not fit the common law definition of larceny ... the bottom line ... is that the State of Arizona has always allowed for jury trials for theft.... Misdemeanor theft requires a jury trial." The State then filed a notice of appeal. JURISDICTION ¶ 4 Although neither party questions this court's jurisdiction relating to the State's challenge of the superior court's ruling, we have an independent duty to determine our jurisdiction to consider an appeal. Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. , 191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008 (App. 1997). The State asserts that appellate jurisdiction exists pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 8(a). This procedural rule alone, however, does not provide a statutory basis for jurisdiction, and it is unclear whether we have appellate jurisdiction over a superior court order denying special action relief. See State v. Bayardi , 230 Ariz. 195, 197 n.4, ¶ 7, 281 P.3d 1063, 1065 (App. 2012). ¶ 5 Without deciding whether we have appellate jurisdiction, we may nonetheless consider the State's challenge if we elect to exercise special action jurisdiction. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 8(a). The State appears to have no "equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal," and the issue raised is one of first impression with statewide importance. See Sanchez v. Gama , 233 Ariz. 125, 127, ¶ 4, 310 P.3d 1, 3 (App. 2013) (citations omitted). Thus, we exercise our discretion to accept special action jurisdiction over this matter. DISCUSSION ¶ 6 Article 2, Section 23, of the Arizona Constitution provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." In Derendal v. Griffith , 209 Ariz. 416, 419, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d 147, 150 (2005), our supreme court explained that this provision preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the time Arizona adopted its constitution. The court concluded that the right to a jury trial is guaranteed "for any defendant charged with an offense for which a jury trial was granted prior to statehood." Id. The court also noted the longstanding principle that "when the right to jury trial for an offense existed prior to statehood, it cannot be denied for modern statutory offenses of the same 'character or grade.' " Id . at ¶ 10 (quoting Bowden v. Nugent , 26 Ariz. 485, 488, 226 P. 549 (1924) ). Thus, to determine whether Section 23 assures a right to a jury trial for a particular offense, we consider first whether the modern crime has a common-law antecedent for which a defendant was afforded a jury trial. Id ."To reach this determination, we evaluate whether the charged offense contains elements 'comparable' or 'substantially similar' to those found in a jury-eligible common law offense." Sulavka v. State , 223 Ariz. 208, 210, ¶ 9, 221 P.3d 1022, 1024 (App. 2009) (quoting Derendal , 209 Ariz. at 419, 425, ¶¶ 10, 39, 104 P.3d at 150, 156, and citing Crowell v. Jejna , 215 Ariz. 534, 536-37, ¶ 7, 161 P.3d 577, 579-80 (App. 2007) ). Whether Kroll is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law we review de novo. Bosworth v. Anagnost , 234 Ariz. 453, 454-55, ¶ 3, 323 P.3d 736, 737-38 (App. 2014). ¶ 7 The roots of theft are larceny and its related offenses. Before statehood, larceny was defined under Arizona's territorial statutes, in part, as "the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading, or driving away the personal property of another," Rev. Stat. Ariz. Territory, Penal Code § 441 (1901), and the same definition was adopted in our first criminal code, Rev. Stat. Ariz., Penal Code § 481 (1913). Our supreme court stated that the 1913 statutory language was consistent with the common law, describing the essential components of larceny as "the taking of the thing which is the subject of the crime from the possession of the owner into the possession of the thief; and ... an asportation thereof." Pass v. State , 34 Ariz. 9, 10, 267 P. 206 (1928). ¶ 8 Following California's lead, in 1939 our legislature substituted theft for larceny, such that theft was now defined in five subparts, including (1) the felonious taking of property, (2) fraudulently appropriating entrusted property, and (3) defrauding a person of money, labor, or property by fraudulent representation. See Ariz. Code § 43-5501(1)-(5) (1939) ("Any law which refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing, shall be interpreted as if the word 'theft' was substituted therefor."). Arizona's current theft statute, titled "Theft; classification; definitions," provides as follows: A. A person commits theft if, without lawful authority, the person knowingly: 1. Controls property of another with the intent to deprive the other person of such property; or 2. Converts for an unauthorized term or use services or property of another entrusted to the defendant or placed in the defendant's possession for a limited, authorized term or use; or 3. Obtains services or property of another by means of any material misrepresentation with intent to deprive the other person of such property or services; or 4. Comes into control of lost, mislaid or misdelivered property of another under circumstances providing means of inquiry as to the true owner and appropriates such property to the person's own or another's use without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner; or 5. Controls property of another knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen; or 6. Obtains services known to the defendant to be available only for compensation without paying or an agreement to pay the compensation or diverts another's services to the person's own or another's benefit without authority to do so.... Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 13-1802(A)(1)-(6). ¶ 9 The State does not dispute larceny was jury-eligible under the common law. Instead, the State argues common-law larceny is not an antecedent to theft of services because the two offenses lack substantially similar elements. Specifically, it contends services cannot be taken and carried away, and "asportation" is a necessary element of larceny. Kroll counters that because theft is a unified offense, she has the right to a jury trial because larceny and theft are "of the same character." ¶ 10 Arizona law is well established that "theft as defined in A.R.S. § 13-1802 is a single unified offense," State v. Cotten , 228 Ariz. 105, 107, ¶ 5, 263 P.3d 654, 656 (App. 2011), which means that the statute identifies a "single crime and provide[s] more than one means of committing the crime," State v. West , 238 Ariz. 482, 489, ¶ 19, 362 P.3d 1049, 1056 (App. 2015) (quoting In re Det. of Halgren , 156 Wash.2d 795, 132 P.3d 714, 720 (2006) ). As recognized by our supreme court, "in adopting A.R.S. § 13-1802, the legislature has created a single crime of 'theft,' combining or merging the common law crimes of larceny, fraud, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pretenses, and other similar offenses." State v. Tramble , 144 Ariz. 48, 52, 695 P.2d 737, 741 (1985). The court explained that "[t]he obvious purpose in enacting this 'omnibus' theft statute was to eliminate technical distinctions between various types of stealing and to deal with all forms in a single statute, thus simplifying prosecution for the unlawful 'acquisition' of property belonging to others." Id. (citing State v. Jones , 499 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) ). ¶ 11 Among the implications of theft being a unitary crime, at least two are significant here. First, when charging a defendant with theft, the State is not required to specify a subsection of A.R.S. § 13-1802 within the charging document. See State v. Winter , 146 Ariz. 461, 464-65, 706 P.2d 1228, 1231-32 (App. 1985) ("[A] general citation to the theft statute in the indictment suffices to charge a violation of its subparts" because of the unitary nature of the crime of theft). Second, the jury need not unanimously agree on the manner in which the defendant committed the offense. See Cotten , 228 Ariz. at 107-08, ¶¶ 4, 6, 263 P.3d at 656-57 (rejecting defendant's argument that the trial court erred in failing to submit special verdict forms to distinguish between two subsections of theft); State v. Dixon , 127 Ariz. 554, 561, 622 P.2d 501, 508 (App. 1980) (concluding that jury unanimity is not required for theft cases "as to the means by which the crime is committed provided there is substantial evidence to support each of the means charged"). ¶ 12 Kroll's charging document is not in the record before us, but it makes no difference whether she was accused of committing theft by violating A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(6) (theft of services) or by violating another subsection of the statute. The essence of the charge is that she allegedly obtained transportation services without paying for them. Regardless of the actual theory the State decides to pursue at trial, if she is found guilty, the conviction will be for committing the unified crime of theft in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1802, or "stealing," see Tramble , 144 Ariz. at 52, 695 P.2d at 741, not theft of services. Whether a person unlawfully acquires tangible property, such as a bicycle, or intangible property, such as a shuttle ride, the character of the crime is the same-stealing property (tangible or intangible) that the person does not have a right to acquire, control, or convert. See A.R.S. § 13-1801(A)(12), (14) (defining "property" as "any thing of value, tangible or intangible , including trade secrets," and "services" including "labor, professional services, transportation, cable television, computer or communication services, gas or electricity services, accommodation in hotels, restaurants or leased premises or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions and use of vehicles or other movable property") (emphasis added). Stated differently, it does not matter how the State intends to prove the unlawful acquisition of property at trial because each of the nine subsections defines a different way to commit one crime-theft. ¶ 13 The State acknowledges that theft is a unitary offense but contends the legislature's decision to combine the subsections of theft under one statute does not mean that just because some subsections of the statute are jury-eligible, all of them are. In support, the State directs us to this court's decisions in Bosworth and Sulavka , asserting that because we addressed individual subsections of the shoplifting statutes in those cases to determine jury trial eligibility, we should do the same here with the theft statute. See Bosworth , 234 Ariz. at 457, ¶ 11, 323 P.3d at 740 ; Sulavka , 223 Ariz. at 211, ¶ 13, 221 P.3d at 1025. But the State does not cite, nor has our research revealed, any authority suggesting the legislature combined common-law offenses into a single crime when it adopted the shoplifting statute, A.R.S. § 13-1805. As such, we are not persuaded by the State's assertion that we must ignore the theft statute's unitary nature when determining jury trial eligibility. ¶ 14 Without question, not every element of the nine subsections, including theft of services under A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(6), has a corresponding element in common-law larceny. Jury trial eligibility in this instance, however, does not turn on such a technical analysis. See Buccellatov. Morgan , 220 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶ 7, 203 P.3d 1180, 1183 (App. 2008) (noting that the elements of the two offenses need not be identical as long as they are "of the same character"); Crowell , 215 Ariz. at 539, ¶ 22, 161 P.3d at 582 ("We acknowledge that our analysis of whether the elements of a modern-day offense are 'comparable' or 'substantially similar' to a historical common-law offense may not always be guided by a bright-line rule."). Utilizing a strict element-by-element analysis of each of the subsections of theft to determine jury trial eligibility would run counter to the legislature's purpose-to eliminate technical distinctions and to simplify prosecution-when it joined other states by combining various forms of stealing into a unified offense called theft. See Tramble , 144 Ariz. at 52, 695 P.2d at 741. Because the legislature has determined the different subsections of theft have such commonality to be properly unified, the statute's unitary nature calls for a unitary jury-eligibility determination. ¶ 15 The unified nature of the theft statute makes prosecution easier because the State can file charges and proceed to trial on any theory supported by the evidence, without regard to technical distinctions that previously existed between offenses like larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. Supra ¶11; People v. Myers , 206 Cal. 480,275 P. 219, 221 (1929) (recognizing that California's consolidated theft statute was designed to simplify procedure and relieve the courts from difficult questions that permit defendants to "escape just conviction solely because of the border line distinction existing between these various crimes"). Our holding is a corollary to that principle-avoiding a situation wherein a defendant charged with theft would be eligible for a jury trial on some evidentiary theories but not others. ¶ 16 Finally, as the superior court noted, Arizona has "always" allowed jury trials for misdemeanor theft, and the State has not challenged that assertion. See Derendal , 209 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d at 150 ("[O]ur constitution requires that the state guarantee a right to jury trial for any defendant charged with an offense for which a jury trial was granted prior to statehood."). Nor does the State argue that theft, as a single crime, cannot be jury-eligible. At oral argument in the superior court, the State acknowledged that "some" of the subsections of A.R.S. § 13-1802 could have substantially similar elements to a common-law crime. Likewise, amicus City of Peoria argues that theft of any service is not jury-eligible but acknowledges that theft of property such as water or electricity would be jury-eligible under A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(2). Notwithstanding the positions urged by the State and the amicus that theft of services has no common-law antecedent, over more than a century, no Arizona appellate court has held that a person charged with any variety of larceny or theft, in all degrees, is ineligible for a jury trial. And the only authority we have found indicates to the contrary. See State v. Paramo , 92 Ariz. 290, 293-94, 376 P.2d 554 (1962) (affirming conviction for petty theft after trial to a jury). ¶ 17 We therefore hold that the unified statutory scheme of theft adopted by our legislature is a comparable and substantially similar crime to common-law larceny in that the foundation of both crimes is the unlawful deprivation of property. For that reason, one charged with violating the unified crime of theft is entitled to a jury trial, regardless of the degree of the offense or the nature of the property alleged to have been taken. CONCLUSION ¶ 18 We accept jurisdiction, but deny relief. We therefore affirm the orders of the municipal court and superior court confirming Kroll's right to a jury trial for theft. Section 24 further provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. Similar to territorial statutes, the 1913 code criminalized other acts as larceny, including (1) appropriating lost property to one's own use without making reasonable efforts to restore the property to its owner, (2) buying or receiving stolen property, (3) stealing or embezzling property in another state or country and bringing it to this state, and (4) connecting to service lines or pipes conveying gas, electricity, or water without payment. Rev. Stat. Ariz., Penal Code §§ 482, 493-497 (1913). Section 13-1802(A) includes three additional subsections addressing theft of ferrous and nonferrous metals. A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(7)-(9). To clarify, embezzlement and false pretenses were not common-law crimes under English law. Instead, Parliament created the two crimes "to fill gaps in the law of larceny." 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.1 (3d ed. 2017). However, other offenses relevant here, such as larceny by trick, appear to have been crimes under the common law. See, e.g., State v. Medina , 357 Or. 254, 355 P.3d 108, 116 n.9 (2015) ( "Unlike larceny by trick, embezzlement is not a common-law crime."); Commonwealth v. Gold , 123 Pa.Super. 128, 186 A. 208, 210 (1936) (noting that "larceny by trick is a common-law offense"). Regardless, this does not affect our analysis. Given the unitary nature of our theft statute, we decline to analyze jury eligibility based on the "thin and technical" dividing lines between larceny and related crimes. See Substantive Criminal Law , § 19.1(b) ; see also Sulavka , 223 Ariz. at 209, ¶ 5, 221 P.3d at 1023 (noting that "jury eligibility under the Arizona Constitution turns on whether a statutory offense is sufficiently linked to a common law offense for which a jury trial was granted prior to statehood"). The Arizona Criminal Code Commission noted "[t]he essence of theft ... is the obtaining of unlawful control over property of another.... For all practical purposes, the verbal distinctions among embezzlement, receiving stolen property, finding and keeping lost property, defrauding an innkeeper and similar theft offenses are abolished and replaced by a singular concept of depriving another of his or her property or services ." State v. Winter , 146 Ariz. 461, 464, 706 P.2d 1228, 1231 (App. 1985) (emphasis added). For example, accepting the State's view that theft of property and theft of services must be analyzed separately would mean a person who rides a bus without paying a fare or sneaks into a concert without a ticket would not be entitled to a jury trial because no tangible property is involved, but a person who steals a bus pass or concert ticket would be entitled to a jury trial. Such a distinction has no logic.

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: ¶1 These consolidated cases involve alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. To address these claims, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona certified the following questions to this Court: 1. Does a manager of an Arizona limited liability company ("LLC") owe common law fiduciary duties to the company? 2. Does a member of an Arizona LLC owe common law fiduciary duties to the company? 3. Can an Arizona LLC's operating agreement lawfully limit or eliminate those fiduciary duties? ¶2 We answer the first question in the affirmative. We answer the second question in the affirmative, provided that the member is an agent of the LLC. We answer the third question in the affirmative but note that the operating agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. I. A. ¶3 Arizona enacted its first limited liability company act ("LLC Act") in 1992. See 1992 Sess. Laws 395 (2d Reg. Sess.). The statutory scheme is codified at A.R.S. § 29-601 et seq. Last year, Arizona's legislature enacted a new Arizona Limited Liability Company Act ("ALLCA") to eventually replace the LLC Act. See 2018 Ariz. Sess. Laws 833 (2d Reg. Sess.) (to be codified at A.R.S. § 29-3101 et seq. ). ALLCA will first apply only to LLCs formed on or after September 1, 2019, but will apply to all LLCs starting September 1, 2020. Id. Thus, to address the certified questions, we analyze only the LLC Act. ¶4 The LLC Act does not expressly impose any fiduciary duties on members or managers. See generally Scott DeWald, James Reynolds & Matthew Engle, Fiduciary Duties and Indemnification , Ariz. Att'y, Mar. 2019, at 18-19 (contrasting the LLC Act with ALLCA, which recognizes fiduciary duties). By statute, however, "the law of agency" applies to the entire LLC Act. See A.R.S. § 29-854(B). We thus apply common law agency principles to answer the certified questions. ¶5 Arizona case law has not addressed these issues directly. This Court has observed that "unlike both corporations and partnerships, LLC members do not owe each other fiduciary duties unless they are expressly included in the LLC operating agreement." Butler Law Firm, PLC v. Higgins , 243 Ariz. 456, 462 ¶ 23, 410 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2018). As support for this proposition, Butler cited TM2008 Investments, Inc. v. Procon Capital Corp. , 234 Ariz. 421, 424-25 ¶ 15, 323 P.3d 704, 707-08 (App. 2014), which declined to "mechanically apply fiduciary duty principles from the law of closely-held corporations or partnerships to a limited liability company created under Arizona law." TM2008 Investments involved an action for breach of fiduciary duty filed by one member of an LLC against another, and the court of appeals found that the operating agreement itself established certain duties. Id. at 422 ¶ 1, 425-26 ¶¶ 16-17, 323 P.3d at 705, 708-09. Butler concerned whether an LLC is an "other corporation" for purposes of Arizona's venue statute. 243 Ariz. at 459 ¶ 6, 410 P.3d at 1226. Neither case considered whether, based on the common law of agency, managers or members owe fiduciary duties to the LLC. ¶6 "Absent controlling authority to the contrary, we generally follow the Restatement when it sets forth sound legal policy." CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC , 236 Ariz. 410, 414 ¶ 18, 341 P.3d 452, 456 (2014). Under traditional agency rules, agency is the "fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (Am. Law. Inst. 1958). The agent is the one who acts on behalf of another, the principal. Id. Agents are characterized by their "power to alter the legal relation between the principal and third persons and between the principal and" themselves. Id. § 12. Importantly, "[a]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency." Id. § 13. ¶7 We have characterized a fiduciary duty as imposing "the obligation of loyalty," Ghiz v. Millett , 71 Ariz. 4, 8, 222 P.2d 982 (1950), "the obligation of the utmost good faith in their dealings," DeSantis v. Dixon , 72 Ariz. 345, 350, 236 P.2d 38 (1951), and "requiring a high degree of care," Master Records , Inc. v. Backman , 133 Ariz. 494, 497, 652 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1982) (quotations omitted). Thus, the nature of the fiduciary relationship for agents includes a duty of loyalty, a duty of good faith, and a duty of care. Partnerships, joint ventures, and corporations are all owed fiduciary duties by those empowered to act on behalf of such businesses. See DeSantis , 72 Ariz. at 350, 236 P.2d 38 (describing the fiduciary nature of duties owed by partners to a partnership); Ghiz , 71 Ariz. at 8-9, 222 P.2d 982 (describing the fiduciary nature of those involved in a joint venture); Monterey Water Co. v. Voorhees , 45 Ariz. 338, 347, 43 P.2d 196 (1935) (describing the fiduciary duties owed by officers to a corporation). B. ¶8 By default, the members of an LLC are agents of the LLC "for the purpose of carrying on its business in the usual way." A.R.S. § 29-654(A)(1). However, if an LLC's management is vested in one or more managers, members are not automatically agents "solely by reason of being a member except to the extent that authority has been delegated to the member by" the manager or the operating agreement. § 29-654(B)(1). If management is vested in one or more managers, by law they are deemed agents of the LLC "for the purpose of carrying on its business in the usual way." § 29-654(B)(2). Thus, if an LLC is managed by one or more managers, such managers are agents, and under § 29-854 and agency law, they would owe common law fiduciary duties to the LLC. ¶9 The answer to the second question depends on whether management has been vested in one or more managers. If not, then all members are deemed agents of the LLC and thus would owe common law fiduciary duties to the LLC. If, however, the LLC is managed by one or more managers, members are considered its agents to the extent they have been delegated authority by the managers or the operating agreement under § 29-654(B)(1). Thus, a member owes common law fiduciary duties to the LLC if the member acts as an agent of the LLC. C. ¶10 Although the common law recognizes that an LLC's managers or members, when acting as agents of the LLC, owe fiduciary duties to the company, these duties may be lawfully limited by a valid operating agreement. ¶11 The LLC Act provides for an operating agreement to govern relationships between members and managers and between managers, members, and the LLC itself. See A.R.S. § 29-682(B). The agreement "may contain any provision that is not contrary to law and that relates to ... the rights, duties or powers of its members, managers, officers, employees or agents." Id. However, an LLC is not required to adopt an operating agreement. § 29-682(A) (stating that an LLC "may" adopt an agreement). Neither the LLC Act nor any other applicable law broadly prohibits an operating agreement from altering or limiting fiduciary duties that otherwise would be owed to the LLC by its managers or members. ¶12 The defendants in both certified cases concede that, regardless of their arguments relating to common law fiduciary duties, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be eliminated by an operating agreement. Based on public policy and case law, this is a well-supported concession. See Rawlings v. Apodaca , 151 Ariz. 149, 163, 726 P.2d 565, 579 (1986) ("A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract ....The covenant ... may be breached even though the express covenants of the contract are fully performed"). ¶13 Thus, we answer the third question in the affirmative. Under the LLC Act, an operating agreement may lawfully limit or eliminate common law fiduciary duties owed to the LLC by its members or managers, although it may not erase the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. We have no occasion here to address whether the provisions of any particular operating agreement are contrary to law in this respect or otherwise. II. ¶14 For the reasons noted, the LLC Act imposes common law fiduciary duties on managers and members serving as agents of the LLC. The LLC Act permits an LLC to limit or eliminate such common law duties through an operating agreement, except for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

CATTANI, Judge: ¶1 Both sides in these consolidated condemnation cases appeal from the superior court's rulings (1) fixing a valuation date for purposes of calculating just compensation for a right of way for electric transmission lines and (2) determining the ownership of existing support structures and transmission lines within the right of way. We affirm the court's ruling as to ownership of the existing structures and transmission lines, but we reverse the ruling as to valuation date. Under the right-of-way clause of Article 2, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitution, a private corporation with statutory eminent domain authority cannot effect a taking (which establishes the valuation date) by simply occupying property. Instead, the taking occurs only after the jury determines damages and the private corporation pays full compensation. Because the superior court chose a pre-taking valuation date, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 On May 15, 1981, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), granted a 30-year right of way to Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., across public lands in Mohave County for use as an easement for 69kV electric transmission lines. Both 69kV and 230kV transmission lines were built within the right of way. ¶3 By 1990, the BLM had transferred title to the property subject to the right of way into private hands. DJL 2007 LLC, DJL Enterprises LLC, East Coast Investor Group 535, LLC, Mark and Carol Knorr, Silver Creek Land Co., Michael Suda, and Donald Suda (collectively, "Landowners") are the current owners of the relevant parcels. Southwest Transmission Cooperative, Inc., as a successor in interest, obtained Arizona Electric Power's interest in the right of way in the early 2000s, and Southwest Transmission sold the 69kV line to Mohave Electric Cooperative, Inc., a few years later. ¶4 The BLM right-of-way grant expired on May 14, 2011. But Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric continued to operate the transmission lines thereafter, and in January 2013, Landowners sent Southwest Transmission a letter alleging that it was trespassing. ¶5 Southwest Transmission is a nonprofit electric generation and transmission cooperative corporation under Title 10, Chapter 19, Article 4 of the Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") and, as such, has statutory authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for purposes of maintaining or operating electric transmission lines. See A.R.S. § 10-2127(A)(11) ; see also A.R.S. § 12-1111(10). Accordingly, in January 2014, Southwest Transmission filed these eminent domain actions to condemn rights of way for the transmission lines. Mohave Electric intervened as the owner of one of the transmission lines. ¶6 The superior court ruled that Southwest Transmission was not entitled to an order of immediate possession under A.R.S. § 12-1116. Instead, recognizing the practical reality that Southwest Transmission would need to continue to operate, maintain, and repair the lines during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings, the court entered a preliminary injunction allowing ongoing access to and operation of the lines. ¶7 Landowners then moved the court to determine the valuation date for purposes of calculating just compensation to be paid for the property subject to condemnation. Landowners argued that the land should be valued as of the date the court eventually enters the final order of condemnation. Southwest Transmission countered that the land should be valued as of May 15, 2011, the date it remained in possession immediately following expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant. After briefing and oral argument, the court adopted a middle ground, ruling that the valuation date would be January 15, 2014: the date the summons issued in the condemnation suit. The court further ruled that Landowners would be entitled to rental damages from expiration of the grant to the summons date, and that interest would accrue from the valuation date on the amount of compensation ultimately awarded. The court denied Landowners' subsequent motion for reconsideration. ¶8 The parties then filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment concerning ownership of the transmission lines and support structures, which would determine whether just compensation for the taking includes the value of those improvements or just of the underlying real property interest. The superior court ruled in favor of Southwest Transmission, finding no indication that title to the improvements had passed to Landowners. ¶9 At the parties' request, the superior court then entered a partial final judgment related to the two issues (valuation date and ownership of the improvements). See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Landowners timely appealed, and Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric timely cross-appealed. ¶10 This court initially dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (appeal from final judgment), noting that the judgment was not subject to Rule 54(b) certification because it did not resolve any claims of any of the parties. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ; Musa v. Adrian , 130 Ariz. 311, 313, 636 P.2d 89, 91 (1981). The Arizona Supreme Court then granted Landowners' petition for review and remanded to this court to consider whether appellate jurisdiction existed under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6). See Bilke v. State , 206 Ariz. 462, 466, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 269, 273 (2003). ¶11 A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) authorizes appeal "[f]rom an interlocutory judgment that determines the rights of the parties and directs an accounting or other proceeding to determine the amount of the recovery." But a right to appeal from such an interlocutory judgment is not automatic; instead, the superior court has discretion to determine whether an immediate appeal should be available. See Bilke , 206 Ariz. at 466-67, ¶¶ 20-21, 80 P.3d at 273-74. To do so, the superior court must make two distinct findings: first, whether the ruling as to the rights of the parties is final, and second, whether amount of recovery is indeed the only issue remaining. See id. at 467-68, ¶¶ 21, 23, 28, 80 P.3d at 274-75 ; see also Ciena Capital Funding, LLC v. Krieg's, Inc. , 242 Ariz. 212, 215-16, ¶ 7, 394 P.3d 39, 42-43 (App. 2017). Although the superior court's Rule 54(b) certification satisfied the finality prong, see Bilke , 206 Ariz. at 467, ¶ 23, 80 P.3d at 274, the parties had not requested and the superior court had not made the requisite discretionary finding "expressly direct[ing] that the only issue remaining is the amount of recovery." See id. at 468, ¶ 28, 80 P.3d at 275. Accordingly, we stayed the appeal and revested the superior court with jurisdiction to determine whether (A)(6) certification was appropriate. The superior court did so, and we now have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6). DISCUSSION I. Valuation Date. ¶12 The superior court ruled that Southwest Transmission lacked authority to condemn property simply by occupying it (a "taking by occupation"), so Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric were holdover tenants between expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant and the date of the taking, and Landowners would be entitled to rental damages for that period. The court further reasoned that Southwest Transmission became an agent of the state for condemnation purposes when it filed the direct condemnation action, see A.R.S. § 12-1115(C), at which point the taking occurred because the government (through Southwest Transmission) was in actual physical possession of the property. ¶13 Although the parties agree that the valuation date must reflect the date of the taking, both sides challenge the court's determination of the valuation date. Southwest Transmission (joined by Mohave Electric) asserts that the taking occurred by occupation immediately following expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant. Landowners counter that, because Southwest Transmission is exercising eminent domain power as a non-municipal corporation, the taking cannot occur until a jury determines and Southwest Transmission tenders payment of just compensation. Neither side challenges the superior court's ruling as to holdover tenancy pending the date of taking (regardless of when it occurred) or Landowners' entitlement to rental damages, although accepting Southwest Transmission's proposed taking date would in effect moot these issues. We review the superior court's ruling de novo as a pure question of law. See League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Brewer , 213 Ariz. 557, 559, ¶ 7, 146 P.3d 58, 60 (2006). ¶14 Both the United States and the Arizona Constitutions proscribe the taking of private property without payment of just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V ; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17 ("No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made...."). To satisfy the constitutional requirement of providing "just compensation," the property condemned must be valued as of the date of the constitutional taking. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States , 467 U.S. 1, 9-10, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) ; Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller , 176 Ariz. 190, 193-95, 859 P.2d 1323, 1326-28 (1993). ¶15 By statute, Arizona has designated the date of the summons in a condemnation action as the presumptive valuation date. A.R.S. § 12-1123(A). When the summons and the taking occur close in time, the summons date "establishes a practical and uniform date for valuation purposes that is presumptively reasonable." City of Scottsdale v. CGP-Aberdeen, L.L.C. , 217 Ariz. 626, 634, ¶ 36, 177 P.3d 1198, 1206 (App. 2008) ; see also Calmat , 176 Ariz. at 193-94, 859 P.2d at 1326-27. But if the summons is remote in time from the taking and the value of the property has changed in the interim, the value of the property on the date of the taking must control. CGP-Aberdeen , 217 Ariz. at 629, 634, ¶¶ 10, 36, 177 P.3d at 1201, 1206. ¶16 Here, Southwest Transmission continued to occupy the property after the expiration of its right to do so under the BLM right-of-way grant in May 2011. If a governmental entity had so occupied Landowners' property, that occupation would have constituted a taking, subject to an owner's claim for inverse condemnation. See In re Forsstrom , 44 Ariz. 472, 481, 488, 38 P.2d 878 (1934) (describing a "taking" as "[a]ny substantial interference" with an owner's property rights), overruled in part on other grounds by Mohave County v. Chamberlin , 78 Ariz. 422, 430, 281 P.2d 128 (1955), and State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg , 87 Ariz. 318, 324, 350 P.2d 988 (1960) ; see also A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty. , 222 Ariz. 515, 525, ¶ 18, 217 P.3d 1220, 1230 (App. 2009). But the Arizona Constitution imposes additional limitations on the exercise of eminent domain by a private corporation (like Southwest Transmission) that preclude a taking by occupation. In particular, as explained below, a private corporation may not effect a taking until there has been a jury determination of damages and full compensation has been paid to the property owner. ¶17 As relevant here, the Arizona Constitution's eminent domain provision includes two operative clauses: [ (1) ] No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made, paid into court for the owner ..., [ (2) ] and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal, until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, ... which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived.... Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17 (line break added). The Arizona Supreme Court described the interplay of these two clauses in Hughes Tool Co. v. Superior Court : the first-the general clause-requires just compensation in all takings, whereas the second-the right-of-way clause-"imposes further limitations and conditions on the acquisition of rights of way by private corporations through the exercise of powers of eminent domain." 91 Ariz. 154, 156, 370 P.2d 646 (1962). ¶18 In Hughes Tool , a private corporation with eminent domain authority filed a direct condemnation action to condemn power line rights of way. Id. at 155, 370 P.2d 646. The superior court issued an order under A.R.S. § 12-1116 permitting immediate possession and use before conclusion of the condemnation proceedings, and the property owner sought review. Id. at 155-56, 370 P.2d 646. The Arizona Supreme Court directed the superior court to vacate the order for immediate possession. Id. at 160, 370 P.2d 646. The court highlighted the distinction between the requirements of the general clause, which authorizes a taking once just compensation is "paid into court for the owner," as compared to the right-of-way clause, which requires compensation first be "ascertained and paid into court for the owner." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17 (emphasis added); Hughes Tool , 91 Ariz. at 158, 370 P.2d 646. The supreme court thus held that the right-of-way clause required "an advance jury determination of damages (unless the jury be waived) before a corporation other than municipal takes possession of property through exercise of the power of eminent domain." Hughes Tool , 91 Ariz. at 160, 370 P.2d 646. ¶19 In Hughes Tool , that meant that a private corporation could not receive a § 12-1116 order for immediate possession, because that would allow a private corporation to take possession before a jury determined damages. Id. Here, the Hughes Tool holding means that a private corporation exercising statutory eminent domain authority is not constitutionally authorized to effect a taking until after trial and payment; it cannot take property in a constitutional sense simply by occupation. Thus, Southwest Transmission's ongoing use of the property was as a holdover tenant and not as a condemnor in possession. ¶20 Southwest Transmission argues, however, that Hughes Tool only applies to § 12-1116 orders for immediate possession and does not apply where, as here, the private condemnor is already occupying the property subject to condemnation. Although Hughes Tool arose from an order for immediate possession, its reasoning and holding apply generally to a private corporation seeking to "take[ ] possession of property through exercise of the power of eminent domain," not just to a single manner in which a private corporation might do so. See id. at 156, 160, 370 P.2d 646. More importantly, the constitutional right-of-way clause itself draws no such distinction. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17. ¶21 The authority on which Southwest Transmission relies does not support the premise that a private corporation with the power of eminent domain can effect a taking by occupation. All of the Arizona case law on which Southwest Transmission relies for general principles of taking by occupation involve takings by governmental entities, not private corporations. See, e.g. , Calmat , 176 Ariz. 190, 859 P.2d 1323 ; Gardiner v. Henderson , 103 Ariz. 420, 443 P.2d 416 (1968) ; State v. Leeson , 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958) ; In re Forsstrom , 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878 ; A Tumbling-T Ranches , 222 Ariz. 515, 217 P.3d 1220. And all the out-of-jurisdiction cases specific to condemnation by private entities on which Southwest Transmission relies arose in jurisdictions that do not have constitutional limitations analogous to Arizona's Article 2, § 17 right-of-way clause. See, e.g. , Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. , 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) ( U.S. Const. amend. V ; N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 7 ); Windrow v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp. , 376 S.W.3d 733, 737-38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) ( Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 21 ); see also, e.g. , Cantu v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. , 189 Cal.App.3d 160, 234 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1987) ( Cal. Const. art. 1, § 19 ). ¶22 The closest thing to contrary authority in Arizona case law cited by Southwest Transmission appears in a single reference in Gardiner : The immediate taking of possession of property by a municipality is a taking of property. Possession is certainly one of the greatest attributes of ownership of property. The possessor exercises dominion over the property, and a condemnor, be it municipality or private corporation thereafter denies the owner of its usage, its rental value, and its enjoyment. 103 Ariz. at 424, 443 P.2d at 420 (emphasis added). But Gardiner itself involved a taking by a municipality, not a private corporation. Id. at 421, 443 P.2d at 417. And Gardiner construed the requirements for taking by means of an order for immediate possession under § 12-1116, which Hughes Tool had already ruled was not available to a private corporation. See 103 Ariz. at 423, 425, 443 P.2d at 419. In short, Gardiner did not consider the right-of-way clause's restrictions on taking by a private corporation. Although this language would support Southwest Transmission's position if read broadly, Gardiner 's dicta cannot override the express language of the constitutional right-of-way clause or the express holding of Hughes Tool . ¶23 For the same reasons, the superior court's ruling that the taking occurred on the date of the summons also fails. That conclusion made practical sense under the circumstances of this case: it recognized that Southwest Transmission could not unilaterally exercise eminent domain by occupation, but also that Southwest Transmission was in fact in possession when it began to exercise its eminent domain power properly by filing the direct condemnation action. But the right-of-way clause as construed in Hughes Tool forecloses this result. As a private corporation, Southwest Transmission cannot take possession of property as a condemnor until after trial and payment of just compensation. See Hughes Tool , 91 Ariz. at 160, 370 P.2d 646. To hold otherwise would, in effect, allow the result that Hughes Tool reversed: a private corporation could achieve the same result as an order for immediate possession (even though § 12-1116 is unavailable) by simply entering the property during the pendency of the condemnation action. ¶24 Southwest Transmission's other arguments are similarly unavailing. It suggests that Landowners could have formalized the taking by filing an inverse condemnation action immediately after expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant (locking in that date as the date of the taking), so the date of the taking should not be controlled by Landowners' decision not to do so. But this argument assumes that the taking occurred when Southwest Transmission outstayed the BLM right-of-way grant, which the right-of-way clause forbids. Moreover, Southwest Transmission itself could have eliminated this delay by pursuing a direct condemnation claim years earlier. ¶25 Southwest Transmission further argues that using the end of the condemnation action as the valuation date provides an incentive for delay, as one party or the other (depending on whether property values were rising or falling) would wish to delay resolution for economic gain. But such policy concerns cannot override the constitutional limitations on a private corporation's condemnation authority. And the argument ignores that, in straight-condemnation proceedings under federal law, the date of the taking is similarly the date the government tenders payment after final judgment on just compensation. See, e.g. , Kirby Forest , 467 U.S. at 3-4, 11-12, 104 S.Ct. 2187. In any event, the superior court has other tools to ensure the efficient processing of cases before it and, in appropriate circumstances, to sanction a party that unreasonably delays the proceeding. See, e.g. , A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(3) ; Fenton v. Howard , 118 Ariz. 119, 121, 575 P.2d 318, 320 (1978) ("Every court has inherent power to do those things which are necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction."); State v. Superior Court , 39 Ariz. 242, 247-48, 5 P.2d 192, 197-98 (1931) (same); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 1 (directing that the civil rules "be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding"). ¶26 Although Southwest Transmission continued to possess and use the transmission lines after the BLM right-of-way grant expired, it did not-and it constitutionally could not -do so in the capacity of a condemnor. Instead, Southwest Transmission simply became a hold-over tenant on that date, and under the right-of-way clause of Article 2, § 17, could not take Landowners' property in a constitutional sense until after trial and payment. Accordingly, the value of just compensation must reflect the value at that time. ¶27 We thus reverse the superior court's ruling as to valuation date as described in this decision. As neither side challenged the court's ruling as to the status of Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric as holdover tenants from expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant through the date of the taking and Landowners' entitlement to rental damages as compensation for the period, the balance of the ruling stands. II. Ownership of the Electric Transmission Lines and Structures. ¶28 The superior court granted Southwest Transmission's motion for partial summary judgment (joined by Mohave Electric) on ownership of the electric transmission lines and structures. The court ruled as a matter of law that Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric originally owned the improvements and, under the undisputed factual circumstances presented, title had never passed to Landowners. Accordingly, the value of the improvements would not be included when calculating just compensation for the taking. Landowners challenge this ruling, urging that Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric became trespassers and thus forfeited the improvements when they neither paid rent nor removed the lines after expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant, or alternatively, that disputed facts as to the reasonableness of Southwest Transmission's conduct preclude summary judgment. ¶29 Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and, based on those undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Orme Sch. v. Reeves , 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen , 231 Ariz. 209, 213, ¶ 14, 292 P.3d 195, 199 (App. 2012). ¶30 The undisputed facts establish that Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric own the transmission lines and structures. Southwest Transmission built the lines and structures while lawfully occupying the property pursuant to the BLM right-of-way grant. And the terms of that grant contemplated that Southwest Transmission would retain these improvements. The grant incorporated regulations including 43 C.F.R. § 2807.19(a), which required the grantee to remove all facilities (defined as improvements or structures) after the grant expired. See also 43 C.F.R. § 2801.5(b) (defining "Facility"). By requiring removal, the agreement made clear the parties' intent that Southwest Transmission, not the property owner, owned the improvements. ¶31 Because Southwest Transmission retained ownership of the lines and structures, even the authorities on which Landowners rely support the notion that Southwest Transmission need not pay compensation for these pre-condemnation improvements. In State v. Teller Native Corp. , for instance, the Supreme Court of Alaska acknowledged the general rule that a condemnor need not pay for its own pre-condemnation improvements unless those improvements were made under a contract giving the landowner the right to keep them. 904 P.2d 847, 850 (Alaska 1995). Because the condemnor in that case had specifically agreed to build certain improvements (an airport, taxiway and runway, roadway, and parking area) as partial consideration for the lease and to leave them for the landowner's benefit after termination of the lease, the condemnor would have to pay the landowner compensation for the improvements. Id. at 849-50, 850-51 ; see also United States v. Five Parcels of Land , 180 F.2d 75, 76-77 (5th Cir. 1950) (distinguishing improvements the condemnor/prior-lessee had a right to remove (no compensation owed) from those improvements the lease contemplated would revert to the landowners after termination (compensation required)). Here, in contrast, the fact that the grant allowed and required Southwest Transmission to remove the improvements means it owned the improvements and need not pay compensation for those improvements upon condemnation. ¶32 Landowners contend, however, that Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric became trespassers after expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant and, by failing to pay rent or promptly remove the improvements, forfeited their ownership of the transmission lines and structures. See Russell v. Golden Rule Min. Co. , 63 Ariz. 11, 29-30, 159 P.2d 776 (1945) (noting common law rule regarding abandonment of right to remove fixtures by failing to remove such fixtures within a reasonable time). But Landowners did not demand that Southwest Transmission remove the improvements after the right-of-way grant expired. And the rule Landowners propose simply does not apply in the same way to an entity with eminent domain authority that constructs improvements to facilitate the public use for which it has the authority to condemn the land, and then in fact exercises its power to condemn the property. See, e.g. , Anderson-Tully Co. v. United States , 189 F.2d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 1951) ; see also, e.g. , Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co. , 831 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1987) ; Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Le Blanc , 74 Miss. 650, 21 So. 760, 762 (1897) (collecting cases); Seattle & Mont. Ry. v. Corbett , 22 Wash. 189, 60 P. 127, 128 (1900). Moreover, the superior court's prior ruling that Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric were holdover tenants between expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant and the date of the taking and that Landowners are entitled to rental damages for that period ensures that Landowners will receive full compensation for the period over which they now fault Southwest Transmission for failing to pay rent. See Etalook , 831 F.2d at 1444. ¶33 In short, Southwest Transmission and Mohave Electric retained ownership of the improvements after expiration of the grant, and we thus affirm the superior court's ruling as to ownership of the transmission lines and structures. III. Attorney's Fees on Appeal. ¶34 Landowners request an award of attorney's fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Without addressing whether Landowners' counterclaim for rental damages renders this condemnation case an "action arising out of a contract" for purposes of § 12-341.01, we decline to award attorney's fees at this time, without prejudice to a request for fees in the superior court if appropriate on remand. CONCLUSION ¶35 We reverse the superior court's ruling as to valuation date, affirm as to holdover tenancy from expiration of the BLM right-of-way grant through valuation date and Landowners' right to rental damages for that period, affirm as to ownership of improvements, and remand for valuation proceedings consistent with this decision. Southwest Transmission merged into Arizona Electric Power after this appeal was filed, and Arizona Electric Power was substituted as appellee/cross-appellant. Given Southwest Transmission's participation throughout the superior court proceedings and adopting the convention employed by the parties, we refer to Southwest Transmission rather than Arizona Electric Power as prospective condemnor throughout this decision. In full, the general and right-of-way clauses read: No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made, paid into court for the owner, secured by bond as may be fixed by the court, or paid into the state treasury for the owner on such terms and conditions as the legislature may provide, and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal, until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the manner prescribed by law. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17.

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court: ¶1 In Post v. Industrial Commission of Arizona , we held that when an administrative law judge ("ALJ") fails to make findings on all material issues necessary to resolve the case, the award is legally deficient and must be set aside. 160 Ariz. 4, 7-9, 770 P.2d 308, 311-13 (1989). Today, we further hold that a claimant does not waive appellate review of the legal sufficiency of findings before the Industrial Commission of Arizona ("ICA"). I. ¶2 Gilbert Aguirre has worked as a firefighter for the City of Goodyear ("City") since August 2007. As a firefighter, he has responded to several fires, including a large fire in a cabinet factory that contained "paints, thinners, [and] lacquers," a fire in an airport hangar with burning jet fuel, a house fire with chlorine stored in the attic, and several burning methamphetamine labs. In May 2015, Aguirre was diagnosed with chronic myeloid leukemia ("CML"). He filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that his CML was caused by the toxic chemicals he had been exposed to while fighting fires for the City. ¶3 After Aguirre's claim was denied by the City's workers' compensation carrier, CopperPoint American Insurance Company ("CopperPoint"), he requested a hearing before the ICA. At the hearing, Aguirre asserted a claim for benefits pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-901.01. Under that statute, a firefighter diagnosed with Aguirre's type of cancer is entitled to a presumption that he is suffering from a compensable occupational disease upon showing that he: (1) "passed a physical examination before employment and the examination did not indicate evidence of cancer," (2) "was assigned to hazardous duty for at least five years," and (3) "was exposed to a known carcinogen ... and the carcinogen is reasonably related to the cancer." § 23-901.01(B)(1), (C)(1)-(3) ; see also Hahn v. Indus. Comm'n , 227 Ariz. 72, 75 ¶ 12, 252 P.3d 1036, 1039 (App. 2011) (holding that in making a claim for occupational diseases under § 23-901.01, a claimant must "demonstrate that at least one carcinogen he was exposed to during hazardous duty is reasonably related" to his medical condition). ¶4 The testimony at the hearing focused primarily on whether Aguirre was exposed to any carcinogens that were "reasonably related" to his CML. See § 23-901.01(C)(3). Marc Wilkenfeld, M.D., board-certified in occupational medicine, authored a report and testified on behalf of Aguirre. Wilkenfeld testified that Aguirre had repeated exposure to the carcinogens present at the fires, often without proper protective equipment. Wilkenfeld further concluded, based on his review of peer-reviewed studies, medical literature, exposure records, and Aguirre's medical history, that Aguirre developed CML "as a result of the exposure to carcinogens he experienced during his work as a firefighter." ¶5 Jason Salganick, M.D., board-certified in medical oncology, prepared a report and testified on behalf of CopperPoint. Salganick testified that although firefighters are generally exposed to potential carcinogens, he could not determine if Aguirre was exposed to a known carcinogen because his records did not identify which specific toxins were present at particular fires, what protective gear Aguirre wore, or how long he spent at each fire. Salganick further stated that the medical literature only supported a possible connection between Aguirre's work as a firefighter and CML. Salganick testified that, in his opinion, he could not conclude whether Aguirre's CML was "causally related to his work as a firefighter." ¶6 After the hearing, the ALJ denied Aguirre's claim for benefits. In his decision, the ALJ briefly summarized the testimony and noted that "[t]his is a claim under the Occupational Disease Statute § 23-901.01 (A) and (B)." The ALJ then issued the following ruling: After a careful review of all the evidence, the undersigned is more persuaded by [CopperPoint's] Legal Memorandum and therefore, concludes [that Aguirre] has failed to carry his burden of proving by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a work related injury.... ¶7 Aguirre filed a request for administrative review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-943. In his request, Aguirre did not specifically challenge the ALJ's failure to make material findings as required by Post . See 160 Ariz. at 7-9, 770 P.2d at 311-13. The ALJ summarily affirmed the award. ¶8 Following a petition for special action, the court of appeals set aside the award based on "the absence of legally-sufficient findings," and held that "Post 's requirement that an ALJ make findings sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review[ ] applies even if a party fails to raise that specific issue in a request for review." Aguirre v. Indus. Comm'n , 245 Ariz. 587, 592 ¶ 20, 594 ¶ 31, 432 P.3d 946, 951, 953 (App. 2018) (citation omitted). ¶9 Because this case involves an issue of statewide importance, we granted review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. II. ¶10 CopperPoint contends that because Aguirre did not challenge the lack of material findings required by Post in his request for review, he has waived appellate review on that issue. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. A. ¶11 In Post , the claimant requested a hearing to reopen his claim for benefits. 160 Ariz. at 5, 770 P.2d at 309. The claim required the ALJ to resolve two material issues: (1) whether the claimant was suffering from a new condition, and (2) whether the original work-related accident was a cause of his new condition. Id. at 6-7, 770 P.2d at 310-11. At the hearing, the parties presented conflicting medical expert testimony on both issues. Id. However, in his decision, the ALJ made no findings resolving the conflicting medical testimony, nor did he make any findings regarding the material issues in the case. Id. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312. Rather, he "merely stated the ultimate conclusion that the evidence did not establish that [the claimant] had a new condition" necessary to reopen his claim. Id. at 6, 770 P.2d at 310. ¶12 We set aside the ALJ's award as legally deficient because it contained "no findings at all." Id. at 8-9, 770 P.2d at 312-13. We stated that under Arizona law, the ALJ was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 7 & n.4, 770 P.2d at 311 n.4 ; see A.R.S. § 41-1063 (stating that final decisions in administrative cases must "include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated," and that each finding of fact must contain an "explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings"). However, because the ALJ did not comply with his statutory duty, any meaningful appellate review was not possible because there was no basis to examine "the factual support for, or the legal propriety of" the award. Post , 160 Ariz. at 7, 770 P.2d at 311. Thus, we held that to permit appellate review, an ALJ must fulfill his statutory responsibility and make specific findings on all material issues and resolve all material "conflicts in the evidence, especially when the conflicts involve expert medical testimony." Id. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312 ; see also Douglas Auto & Equip. v. Indus. Comm'n , 202 Ariz. 345, 347 ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 342, 344 (2002) (holding that an ALJ's findings "must be specific, not only to encourage judges to consider their conclusions carefully, but also to permit meaningful judicial review"); Perry v. Indus. Comm'n , 112 Ariz. 397, 398, 542 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1975) (stating an ALJ in a workers' compensation case must resolve conflicts involving expert medical testimony). ¶13 Here, because the ALJ made no findings, the award is legally deficient and must be set aside. See A.R.S. § 23-951(D) (stating that on review, an appellate court may only affirm or set aside an award). Although the ALJ generally cited the occupational disease statute, he made none of the findings required under § 23-901.01(B) and (C). Specifically, the award neither resolves the material issue of whether Aguirre "was exposed to a known carcinogen ... and the carcinogen is reasonably related to" his CML, nor does it resolve the conflicting opinions of Drs. Wilkenfeld and Salganick on this material issue. See § 23-901.01(C)(3). B. ¶14 CopperPoint claims, however, that because Aguirre did not identify the Post issue in his request for review, he has waived it on appeal. In support of this claim, CopperPoint relies on Stephens v. Industrial Commission , 114 Ariz. 92, 559 P.2d 212 (App. 1977). There, the court of appeals held that apart from the sufficiency of the evidence or "matters which are extant in the record," a party waives any issue not raised in its request for review. Id. at 95, 559 P.2d at 215. ¶15 The waiver rule set forth in Stephens does not apply in this case. Here, the ALJ made no material findings at all. Thus, because he failed to fulfill his statutory duty, we cannot, as a practical matter, review his decision on appeal. See supra ¶ 12. As a result, the award is legally deficient and must be set aside regardless of whether the claimant has raised the issue. See § 41-1063 ; Post , 160 Ariz. at 7-8, 770 P.2d at 311-12 ; see also Cammeron v. Indus. Comm'n , 98 Ariz. 366, 370-71, 405 P.2d 802 (1965) (setting aside award where ALJ failed to make necessary material findings as to whether claimant's mental disability was caused by the accident); Hatfield v. Indus. Comm'n , 89 Ariz. 285, 288-89, 361 P.2d 544 (1961) (setting aside award because ALJ made no findings as to material issue of whether claimant's accident and physical injury caused her mental illness); Garcia v. Indus. Comm'n , 26 Ariz. App. 313, 315, 548 P.2d 26 (1976) (setting aside award where ALJ made no findings on the material issues in the case, including necessary findings resolving the conflicting testimony of the medical witnesses). ¶16 CopperPoint's reliance on Teller v. Industrial Commission , 179 Ariz. 367, 879 P.2d 375 (App. 1994), and Spielman v. Industrial Commission , 163 Ariz. 493, 788 P.2d 1244 (App. 1989), is misplaced. Neither case addressed an award that lacked material findings. Rather, in both cases the court determined that the claimant, by failing to make a request for additional findings, waived that issue on appeal. See Teller , 179 Ariz. at 371, 879 P.2d 375 ; Spielman , 163 Ariz. at 495-97, 788 P.2d 1244 ; see also Releford v. Indus. Comm'n , 120 Ariz. 75, 77-78, 584 P.2d 56, 58-59 (App. 1978) (holding that the claimant, by failing to challenge the ALJ's finding regarding medical causation in his request for review, waived his claim that the finding was erroneous on appeal). CONCLUSION ¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the ALJ's award. Further, we affirm the court of appeals decision in part but vacate paragraphs 16-18. The parties cite to the former version of this statute, which was amended in 2017. See 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 318, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.). In the current version of the statute, some of the sections have been renumbered. Because no material changes were enacted, for ease of reference we refer to the current version of the statute.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court: ¶1 At issue here is whether the "Building a Better Phoenix Act" initiative measure qualifies for placement on the City of Phoenix's August 2019 special election ballot. We must decide whether petition signatures are void pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-118.01(A) because the measure's proponent paid petition circulators by the signature and whether the measure's 100-word description fails to comply with A.R.S. § 19-102(A). We previously issued an order affirming the lower courts' decisions that the initiative measure qualifies for the ballot. We now explain our reasoning. BACKGROUND ¶2 Light rail in Phoenix is funded from many sources, including rider fares, advertising proceeds, and regional and federal funds. Before 2015, Phoenix imposed a transaction privilege and use tax to further fund the city's transportation network, which included light rail. In 2015, voters passed Proposition 104, which set that tax at 0.7% until 2051 and created a Citizens Transportation Committee to review all tax revenue expenditures. See Phx. City Clerk, August 25, 2015 Sample Ballot: Mayor and Council Election (2015), https://www.phoenix.gov/cityclerksite/Documents/d2sb.pdf. Proposition 104 authorized use of the tax revenues, among other things, to "[e]xpand[ ] light rail ... to serve more Phoenix neighborhoods and employment, education and entertainment centers" as depicted on an included map. Id. Proposition 104 did not authorize use of these funds for light rail maintenance and repair. See id. ¶3 Building a Better Phoenix ("BBP"), a political action committee, sought to amend the Phoenix City Charter to discontinue "light rail extensions" and redirect local sales tax funding for light rail extensions to "infrastructure improvements." To do so, BBP filed an application in September 2018 with the City Clerk of the City of Phoenix, see A.R.S. § 19-143(B), seeking placement of the "Building a Better Phoenix Act" initiative measure (the "Initiative") on the August 2019 special election ballot. Upon receipt of the application, the City Clerk's office assigned the Initiative petition a serial number, see A.R.S. § 19-111(B), which enabled BBP to gather the number of valid signatures required to qualify the Initiative for the ballot. To that end, BBP hired a commercial petition circulation firm, which paid circulators on a per-signature basis. ¶4 Arizona Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America and David Martin (collectively, "Contractors") filed a complaint pursuant to A.R.S. § 19-122(C) seeking to enjoin placement of the Initiative on the ballot. They allege that petition circulators were paid by the signature in violation of § 19-118.01 and that the 100-word summary circulated with the petition created a significant danger of confusion or unfairness in violation of § 19-102(A). The superior court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Ariz. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Phoenix , No. 1 CA-CV 19-0257 EL, 2019 WL 2399703, at *1 ¶ 3, *6 ¶ 25 (Ariz. App. June 6, 2019) (mem. decision). ¶5 On expedited review, we affirmed the superior court's judgment in an order filed June 12, 2019 (again, with an opinion to follow). We have jurisdiction over this matter under article 6, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution. DISCUSSION I. Payment by the signature ¶6 Section 19-118.01(A) provides that "[a] person shall not pay or receive money or any other thing of value based on the number of signatures collected on a statewide initiative or referendum petition." Signatures collected in violation of this provision are "void and shall not be counted in determining the legal sufficiency of the petition." Id. Contractors argue BBP violated § 19-118.01(A) by paying petition circulators based on the number of signatures collected. Because voiding the signatures collected in violation of § 19-118.01(A) would leave BBP without enough signatures to qualify the Initiative for the ballot, Contractors assert that the superior court was required to enjoin placement of the Initiative on the ballot. ¶7 Resolution of this argument turns on whether § 19-118.01(A) applies to local measures such as the Initiative. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Molera v. Reagan , 245 Ariz. 291, 294 ¶ 8, 428 P.3d 490, 493 (2018). In doing so, "[w]e interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject." Nicaise v. Sundaram , 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 925, 927 (2019). Our goal is to effectuate legislative intent. Leach v. Reagan , 245 Ariz. 430, 438 ¶ 33, 430 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2018). ¶8 Section 19-118.01(A) applies on its face only to "statewide" initiative and referendum petitions, and the Initiative is a local measure. Contractors nevertheless argue that § 19-118.01(A) applies by virtue of A.R.S. § 19-141(A). Section 19-141(A) provides that chapter 1 of title 19, which regulates initiatives, referenda, and recalls and includes § 19-118.01(A), "applies to the legislation of cities, towns and counties, except as specifically provided to the contrary in [article 4 of chapter 1 ]." (Emphasis added.) Because nothing in article 4 expressly exempts § 19-118.01(A) from applying to local measures, Contractors argue that § 19-118.01(A) applies here. We are unpersuaded. ¶9 Contractors' interpretation of § 19-141(A) as applying § 19-118.01(A) to local measures would render the word "statewide" in § 19-118.01(A) superfluous. "A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous." Nicaise , 245 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 11, 432 P.3d at 927. We are particularly persuaded that the legislature did not intend the word "statewide" to be meaningless as it added § 19-118.01(A) in 2017, along with other statutes addressing statewide measures, presumably knowing that § 19-141(A) existed. See City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. , 242 Ariz. 139, 144 ¶ 19, 393 P.3d 919, 924 (2017) ("[W]e presume that the legislature, when it passes a statute, knows the existing laws." (quoting Daou v. Harris , 139 Ariz. 353, 357, 678 P.2d 934, 938 (1984) )). Under Contractors' argument, § 19-141(A) would apply § 19-118.01(A) to local measures whether or not the latter statute included the adjective "statewide," thus rendering that term superfluous. ¶10 Relatedly, interpreting § 19-141(A) as not applying § 19-118.01(A) to local measures harmonizes these statutes. See Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt , 237 Ariz. 119, 123 ¶ 17, 347 P.3d 136, 140 (2015) (noting that "when possible, we harmonize apparently conflicting statutes" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estate of Hernandez v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents , 177 Ariz. 244, 249, 866 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1994) )). Section 19-141(A) would apply chapter 1, title 19 statutes without a "statewide" restriction to local measures, and § 19-118.01(A), per its language, would apply only to statewide measures. ¶11 Contractors argue that their interpretation of § 19-141(A) as applying "statewide" restricted provisions to local measures is supported by examining § 19-111(D), enacted in 2014. Like § 19-118.01(A), § 19-111(D), which concerns circulation training materials, only applies to "statewide" measures. Significantly, the last sentence in § 19-111(D) provides that "[n]otwithstanding § 19-141, this subsection does not apply to initiative, referendum or recall petitions for cities, towns and counties." Contractors assert that "[i]f use of the word 'statewide' were enough to make a provision not apply locally, the subsequent 'notwithstanding' language in § 19-111(D) would have been unnecessary." They conclude that the legislature's omission of similar language in § 19-118.01(A) means the statute applies to local measures per § 19-141(A). Cf. Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. , 226 Ariz. 345, 349 ¶ 15, 248 P.3d 193, 197 (2011) (stating that including a requirement for Spanish-language forms in some statutes but not in A.R.S. § 20-259.01 indicates that the legislature intentionally omitted this requirement). ¶12 The "notwithstanding" sentence in § 19-111(D) could evidence the 2014 legislature's view that § 19-141(A) might otherwise apply, or it may have been included out of caution to remove any doubt about that statute's inapplicability to local measures. Regardless, we are unconvinced that the 2017 legislature's omission of similar language in § 19-118.01(A) evidenced an intent to apply that provision to local measures. The 2017 legislature could have reasonably concluded that § 19-118.01(A) 's express reference to "statewide" initiative and referendum petitions sufficiently precluded application to local measures. Section 19-118.01(A) is thus unlike § 20-259.01, at issue in Ballesteros , which had no language requiring a Spanish-language insurance form. See Ballesteros , 226 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 15, 248 P.3d at 197. Also, the 2017 legislature plainly focused on "statewide" measures when enacting § 19-118.01 by finding that "[s]tatewide initiative measures enact broad and sweeping changes to the laws of this state" and that protecting the integrity of that process "is a significant state interest." See 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 52, § 5 (1st Reg. Sess.). ¶13 We also disagree that § 19-111(D) 's "notwithstanding" language shows that § 19-141(A) applies to "statewide" restricted statutes because the legislature has also taken the opposite position. Specifically, to apply A.R.S. § 19-121.01(A)(1)(h) to local measures, the 2015 legislature did not rely on § 19-141(A) but instead deleted the words "statewide ballot measures only." See 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 285, § 5 (1st Reg. Sess.). If the legislature had viewed § 19-141(A) as applying § 19-121.01(A)(1)(h) to local measures even with the "statewide" language, as Contractors argue, there was no need to delete that language. ¶14 In sum, because § 19-118.01(A) applies only to statewide measures, the superior court correctly refused to apply that provision here. II. 100-word description ¶15 Section 19-102(A) requires an initiative petition to set forth "a description of no more than one hundred words of the principal provisions of the proposed measure or constitutional amendment." The description need not be impartial nor "detail every provision." Molera , 245 Ariz. at 295 ¶ 13, 428 P.3d at 494 ; Save Our Vote, Opposing C-03-2012 v. Bennett , 231 Ariz. 145, 152 ¶ 27, 291 P.3d 342, 349 (2013). But we will invalidate a petition if the description is "fraudulent or creates a significant danger of confusion or unfairness." Molera , 245 Ariz. at 295 ¶ 13, 428 P.3d at 494 (quoting Save Our Vote , 231 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 26, 291 P.3d at 349 ). In making this determination, we consider the meaning a reasonable person would ascribe to the description. Molera , 245 Ariz. at 297 ¶ 27, 428 P.3d at 496 ("We hold § 19-102(A) requires an objective standard for evaluating the description of the actual provisions rather than crediting the drafters' subjective intent."). ¶16 The 100-word description in the Initiative petition provided: This initiative measure amends the City Charter to terminate construction of all future light rail extensions and redirect the funds toward infrastructure improvements. Revenues from terminating light rail extensions other than the South Phoenix extension will fund infrastructure improvements throughout the City. Revenues from terminating the South Phoenix light rail extension will fund infrastructure improvements in South Phoenix (defined as South Mountain Village plus the area between Seventh Street, Seventh Avenue, Jefferson Street and the Salt River). A Citizens Transportation Committee will solicit public input, make recommendations to the City Council regarding infrastructure improvements, and review transportation expenditures. As required by § 19-102(A), the petition also stated that the Initiative sponsor had prepared the description, which "may not include every provision contained in the measure," and advised petition signers of their "right[s] to read or examine the title and text [of the measure] before signing." ¶17 Contractors argue that the 100-word description was misleading in three respects and therefore created a significant danger of both confusion and unfairness. First, Contractors assert that the description's references to "revenues" falsely suggest that terminating light rail extensions would generate income. We disagree. The first sentence speaks of "redirect[ing]" existing funds from future light rail extension projects. Read in context, a reasonable person would know that the "revenues" mentioned in the succeeding sentences refer to the redirected funds. ¶18 Second, Contractors argue that the summary's statement that funds will be redirected from light rail extensions is misleading because only funds controlled by the City of Phoenix can be redirected; regional and federal funding for light rail in Phoenix would purportedly cease if the Initiative passes. We have never required an initiative description to explain all potential effects of a measure. See Save Our Vote , 231 Ariz. at 152 ¶ 27, 291 P.3d at 349 (rejecting argument that a description failed to "completely describe the effects of implementing" the measure because § 19-102(A) "requires only a description of the principal provisions, not a complete description"). The proper forum to argue the consequences of passing the Initiative is in statements of support and opposition, editorials, and the like. See Tilson v. Mofford , 153 Ariz. 468, 473, 737 P.2d 1367, 1372 (1987) ("[T]he proper place to argue about the potential impact of an initiative is in the political arena, in speeches, newspaper articles, advertisements and other forums."). ¶19 Third, Contractors argue that the summary is misleading because it proposes to redirect "light rail extension[ ]" funds to "infrastructure improvements" but fails to reveal that "infrastructure improvements," as defined in the Initiative, excludes repairs to light rail. Consequently, Contractors contend, signers were not informed that passing the Initiative would terminate funding for light rail upkeep as well as expansion. ¶20 Contractors' argument fails because the Initiative does not, in fact, eliminate funding for upkeep of the existing light rail system. The Initiative defines "light rail extensions," as "any and all construction, development, extension or expansion of, or improvement to, light rail transit authorized by Proposition 104." Thus, the light rail funds at issue in the Initiative are only those dedicated to light rail extensions, not upkeep, as authorized by Proposition 104. See supra ¶ 2. Neither Proposition 104 nor the Initiative addresses funding to repair and maintain the existing light rail system. Therefore, the 100-word description is not misleading by stating that light rail extension funds would be redirected if the Initiative passes. CONCLUSION ¶21 We affirm the superior court's judgment and the court of appeals' decision. See Valley Metro Rail, Inc., Valley Metro Rail FY20 Budget 7 (2019), https://www.valleymetro.org/sites/default/files/uploads/event-resources/vmr_fy20_budget_book_adopted.pdf. Before the court of appeals, Contractors also argued that the Phoenix City Charter adopts title 19, including § 19-118.01(A), as a local requirement. They do not repeat this argument here, so we do not address it.

JONES, Judge: ¶1 In this consolidated statutory special action, Meno's Construction, L.L.C. and AIG Insurance Co. (collectively, MC) and the Special Fund Division/No Insurance Section (the Fund) challenge an Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) decision finding MC and Juan Estopellan were Victor Reyes's employers at the time of his December 2015 industrial injury. We affirm the factual findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge (ALJ) with respect to those employers. We also hold that an ALJ is required to evaluate the liability of each contractor and subcontractor made a party to a workers' compensation claim. Because the ALJ did not do so in this case, we set aside the award. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In 2012, Taylor Morrison contracted with Younger Brothers Group, L.L.C. (YB) to complete the framing for various new home construction and lot improvement projects in and around Phoenix, including at Lot 31 of a housing development in Gilbert. That contract required YB to provide supervision, labor, materials, and services necessary to complete the work and provided that "no such subcontracting shall relieve Younger Brothers from its obligations under th[e] agreement." ¶3 YB subcontracted the framing work on Lot 31 to a second framing contractor, Genaro's Framing Construction, L.L.C. (GFC). Pursuant to the independent contractor agreement, YB would provide general guidelines and framing materials for each job, but GFC was responsible for supplying the labor and tools, carrying workers' compensation insurance for employees, and controlling the day-to-day operations of the jobsite. YB did not return to the jobsite until it was completed, and then only to inspect the work and approve payment. Because GFC did not employ any actual framers, it subcontracted the Lot 31 job to a third framing contractor, MC, under similar terms. ¶4 In 2015, MC assigned responsibility for completing the framing on Lot 31 to Estopellan, as it occasionally did when Estopellan sought additional work. At the time, Estopellan was also employed as a foreman for YB and responsible for supervising various projects including one near Lot 31. Nonetheless, Estopellan sometimes accepted other jobs through his own sole proprietorship. MC did not provide tools, materials, or labor; did not require any proof Estopellan maintained workers' compensation insurance; and did not direct or supervise Estopellan's work. As with YB and GFC, MC did not pay for a job until it had inspected and approved the work. ¶5 Estopellan immediately hired Roberto Navarro to help with Lot 31, as was Estopellan's practice when working side jobs, and paid Navarro a lump sum for the job via personal check. Estopellan then directed workers to Navarro, who provided the day-to-day instruction and supervision. The framing crew received safety training and t-shirts from GFC. ¶6 Reyes, the injured worker, met Navarro and Estopellan in September 2015 when he arrived on a construction site looking for work. Reyes immediately began to work with the two men, first as an assistant, and then as a framer, at various locations. Over the next few months, Navarro told Reyes when and where to work and paid him weekly via cash or personal check. However, Navarro received a written budget and instructions from Estopellan, who would visit the jobsites in a YB truck, deliver tools and materials, and supervise the work. ¶7 On December 21, 2015, Reyes injured his hip and wrist after falling from a ladder while working at Lot 31. Navarro notified Estopellan, as he did with all issues that arose at a jobsite. Estopellan then reported the injury to MC, as MC had requested, and directed Reyes to the specific clinic MC preferred. Ultimately, YB inspected and approved the framing on Lot 31 but never paid Estopellan directly for any work on that project. ¶8 Reyes reported his injury to the ICA, which resulted in consolidated claims against five potential employers - Navarro, Estopellan, MC, GFC, and YB - and their insurers, all of whom denied liability for the claim. Because neither Navarro nor Estopellan had workers' compensation insurance, the Fund was also joined in the action. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) §§ 23-907, -1065 (governing the creation of and expenditures from a special fund to compensate employees whose employers fail to secure required workers' compensation insurance). ¶9 After a three-day hearing, the ICA issued a consolidated decision in which the ALJ found Estopellan had employed both Navarro and Reyes to work on Lot 31 and MC maintained control over the project. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Estopellan was Reyes's direct employer, MC was Reyes's statutory employer, and both were responsible for payment of Reyes's workers' compensation claim. The ALJ made no findings regarding GFC's or YB's status or liability. The ICA decision was affirmed upon review. MC and the Fund separately petitioned for special action review of the ICA's award and decision upon review, and the cases were consolidated for our review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2), 23-951(A), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10. DISCUSSION I. Estopellan Was Reyes's Employer. ¶10 The Fund argues Estopellan was not an employer subject to the Workers' Compensation Act as defined in A.R.S. § 23-902(A). We will not disturb the ALJ's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and will affirm so long as the findings were properly made and support the award. A.R.S. § 23-951(B) ; Jenkins v. Indus. Comm'n , 77 Ariz. 377, 386, 272 P.2d 601 (1954) (citing Todaro v. Gardner , 72 Ariz. 87, 91, 231 P.2d 435 (1951) ). "A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence supports it, even if substantial conflicting evidence exists." Ramsey v. Ariz. Registrar of Contractors , 241 Ariz. 102, 109, ¶ 22, 384 P.3d 316, 323 (App. 2016) (quoting Kocher v. Dep't of Revenue of Ariz. , 206 Ariz. 480, 482, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 287, 289 (App. 2003) ). However, Estopellan's status as an employer is a conclusion of law subject to de novo review. Faraghar v. Indus. Comm'n , 184 Ariz. 528, 531, 911 P.2d 534, 537 (App. 1995) (citing Cent. Mgmt. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 162 Ariz. 187, 189, 781 P.2d 1374, 1376 (App. 1989), and Anton v. Indus. Comm'n , 141 Ariz. 566, 569, 688 P.2d 192, 195 (App. 1984) ). ¶11 The Fund contends Estopellan was not an employer required to maintain workers' compensation insurance because he did not have a "hiring plan" or "own and operate a complex framing company." But the Workers' Compensation Act does not require a formal hiring process or complex operations. See Putz v. Indus. Comm'n , 203 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶¶ 25-26, 51 P.3d 979, 984 (App. 2002) (explaining there is no bright-line rule for determining when a self-employed employer is subject to the Act). Instead, an employer is subject to the Workers' Compensation Act "when he employs at least one employee in the regular course of his business." Donahue v. Indus. Comm'n , 178 Ariz. 173, 179, 871 P.2d 720, 726 (App. 1993) ; see also A.R.S. § 23-902(A) (defining an employer subject to the Act to include "every person who employs any workers or operatives regularly employed in the same business or establishment under contract of hire" and defining "regularly employed" to mean "all employments, whether continuous throughout the year, or for only a portion of the year, in the usual trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer"). ¶12 The ALJ found that "Estopellan was operating a side business known as Juan Estopellan Construction, which includ[ed] framing, at the time of [Reyes]'s injury and that he hired Roberto Navarro to run the injury jobsite, to hire men to perform the work, and to oversee the work being performed." This finding is supported by the record and justifies the conclusion that Estopellan employed at least one employee in the regular course of his business as a sole proprietor. Accordingly, we find no error in the ALJ's findings and conclusion that Estopellan was an employer subject to the Act. II. All Employers Are Jointly Responsible for Payment of an Injured Worker's Claim. ¶13 The Fund argues the ICA erred in holding Estopellan and MC jointly responsible for Reyes's injuries. In advancing this position, the Fund relies entirely upon a single line in U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission , 42 Ariz. 422, 434, 26 P.2d 1012 (1933), stating that the statutory employer has "a primary and not a secondary liability for compensation" of an injured worker's claim. ¶14 U.S. Fidelity does not support the Fund's contention that Estopellan is less liable than other employers. There, the court affirmed the ICA's award holding both the direct and statutory employers jointly and severally liable for the injured worker's claim. Id. at 435, 26 P.2d 1012. The line upon which the Fund relies stands only as a rejection of the statutory employer's argument that its liability is secondary to that of the direct employer. See id . Indeed, our supreme court later clarified: Where two or more persons are employers of the same employee engaged, as here, for the common benefit of both, and so found and determined by the proper tribunal, their liability is joint and common. The liability of one employer is not secondary to the other. Both are primarily liable. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. , 63 Ariz. 352, 362-63, 162 P.2d 609 (1945) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the ICA correctly found that all of Reyes's employers were jointly responsible for the claim. III. The ALJ Must Evaluate the Liability of Each Contractor and Subcontractor Named in the Action. ¶15 MC and the Fund argue the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether YB and GFC were also subject to liability for payment of Reyes's workers' compensation claim as statutory employers under A.R.S. § 23-902(B). Pursuant to this section: When an employer procures work to be done for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision or control, and the work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, then the contractor[ ] and the contractor's employees, and any subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees, are, within the meaning of this section, employees of the original employer. Id. Thus, a so-called statutory employer "is required to provide workmen's compensation [insurance] for its remote employees, just as is required of direct employers." Young v. Envtl. Air Prods., Inc. , 136 Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (1983) (citing A.R.S. § 23-902(A) ); see also U.S. Fid. , 42 Ariz. at 435, 26 P.2d 1012. The statutory employer provisions exist to prevent unscrupulous employers from evading responsibility under the Act "through the aid of various dummy intermediaries." Grabe v. Indus. Comm'n , 38 Ariz. 322, 328, 299 P. 1031 (1931) ; see also Basurto v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co. , 15 Ariz. App. 35, 41, 485 P.2d 859 (1971) (explaining that the purpose of imposing liability upon the statutory employer is "to prevent evasion of the Act by an employer through the device of subcontracting its regular operations and thereby avoiding direct employment relations with the workers and making them dependent on their immediate employer for compensation") (quoting Jamison v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 375 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1967) ). ¶16 Appellants do not dispute the ALJ's finding that MC was a statutory employer but argue that this conclusion does not foreclose consideration of YB's and GFC's liability. Whether an employee may have multiple statutory employers under the Workers' Compensation Act requires us to interpret and apply statutes, a task we undertake de novo . Buehler v. Retzer ex rel. Indus. Comm'n , 227 Ariz. 520, 521, ¶ 4, 260 P.3d 1085, 1086 (App. 2011) (citing Baker v. Dolphin Beach Rental & Mgmt., L.L.C. , 224 Ariz. 523, 524, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 636, 637 (App. 2010) ). "Our goal in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the legislature's intent." SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 243 Ariz. 477, 480, ¶ 8, 413 P.3d 678, 681 (2018) (citing State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Pandola , 243 Ariz. 418, 419, ¶ 6, 408 P.3d 1254, 1255 (2018) ). "The best indicator of that intent is the statute's plain language, ... and when that language is unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to secondary statutory interpretation principles." Id. Although the Act should be construed liberally in favor of protecting the employee, "[t]he court may 'not impose burdens and liabilities which are not within the terms or spirit' of the Act." Putz , 203 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶ 24, 51 P.3d at 983-84 (citing Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n , 32 Ariz. 265, 271-72, 257 P. 641 (1927), and then quoting Bergstresser v. Indus. Comm'n , 13 Ariz. App. 91, 93, 474 P.2d 450 (1970) ). ¶17 The Workers' Compensation Act defines the statutory employer in terms of the nature of the work procured and the level of supervision or control retained over the work. See A.R.S. § 23-902(B) ; Young , 136 Ariz. at 161, 665 P.2d at 43. The plain language of the Act does not limit the classification to a single link in a chain of contractors and subcontractors. See Faraghar , 184 Ariz. at 532, 911 P.2d at 540 ("Nothing in [ A.R.S. § 23-902(B) ] suggests that the original employer's responsibility is exclusive , or that the independent contractor is thereby relieved of liability for benefits."); Hamrick v. Indus. Comm'n , 15 Ariz. App. 277, 279, 488 P.2d 482 (App. 1971) ("[A] determination by an award that a workman is an employee of a subcontractor does not preclude a subsequent determination that this same workman is an employee of the original contractor."). Rather, the Act explicitly contemplates an umbrella of liability under the statutory employer that covers "the contractor[ ] and the contractor's employees, and any subcontractor and the subcontractor's employees" if the criteria set forth in A.R.S. § 23-902(B) are met. A.R.S. § 23-902(B) ; see also Basurto , 15 Ariz. App. at 41, 485 P.2d 859 (announcing "the general rule of thumb ... that the [statutory employer] statute covers all situations in which work is accomplished which this employer, or employers in a similar business, would ordinarily do through employees") (citation omitted). ¶18 The broad language of the statute is consistent with the overriding purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act: to protect the employee. Young , 136 Ariz. at 163, 665 P.2d at 45 (quoting U.S. Fid. , 42 Ariz. at 430, 26 P.2d 1012 ); see also Putz , 203 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶ 24, 51 P.3d at 983-84 (describing the Act's purpose to "hav[e] industry bear its share of the burden of human injury as a cost of doing business") (citing Ocean Accident , 32 Ariz. at 271-72, 257 P. 641 ). We accomplish this goal by liberally construing the Act to impose liability for payment of benefits, which includes spreading the cost of injury amongst all those who retain supervision and control over work that is part of their business. See Young , 136 Ariz. at 163, 665 P.2d at 45 (citing U.S. Fid. , 42 Ariz. at 430, 26 P.2d 1012 ). This goal is not met, however, when an employer retains a level of control over its remote employees but is relieved of responsibility for their industrial accidents. ¶19 YB nonetheless urges this Court to adopt the "first responsible contractor" rule, which designates "the lowest insured party on the chain to be the singular statutory employer." We decline to do so. Nothing within Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act supports such a rule, and the jurisdictions that have adopted it have done so under statutory schemes that, unlike Arizona's, impose liability for workers' compensation claims upon a statutory employer only if the direct employer is un- or underinsured. See, e.g. , Minnaugh v. Topper & Griggs, Inc. , 69 A.D.2d 965, 416 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1979) ; Peck v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Prison Inspectors , 572 Pa. 249, 814 A.2d 185 (2002) ; Brogno v. W & J Assocs., Ltd. , 698 A.2d 191 (R.I. 1997). Adopting the first responsible contractor rule would also create a disincentive for employers to secure workers' compensation insurance to cover remote employees, which is entirely inconsistent with the obligations imposed by A.R.S. § 23-902(B). ¶20 The Act requires the ALJ to evaluate the liability of each contractor and subcontractor made a party to a workers' compensation proceeding under A.R.S. § 23-902(B). The ALJ erred in failing to do so here. Because the record contains conflicting evidence regarding the level of supervision and control YB and GFC retained over MC, Estopellan, Reyes, and Lot 31, we cannot resolve the question as a matter of law. See Home Ins. v. Indus. Comm'n , 123 Ariz. 348, 350, 599 P.2d 801, 803 (1979) (describing several non-exclusive factors to consider when determining whether a person or entity is a statutory employer). CONCLUSION ¶21 The ICA's decision and award are set aside. We view the evidence adduced at the hearing in the light most favorable to upholding the ICA's findings and award. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm'n , 214 Ariz. 489, 490-91, ¶ 2, 154 P.3d 391, 392-93 (App. 2007) (quoting Roberts v. Indus. Comm'n , 162 Ariz. 108, 110, 781 P.2d 586, 588 (1989) ). Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current version of rules and statutes. Although contractors and subcontractors may choose to require indemnification via the terms of their contracts, the indemnification provisions do not control over the rights and duties prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Act. See U.S. Fid. , 42 Ariz. at 434-35, 26 P.2d 1012 (holding the statutory employer responsible for compensating the injured employee notwithstanding an indemnification clause in the contract between the statutory and direct employers).

JONES, Judge: ¶1 The Department of Child Safety (DCS) seeks special action review of a juvenile court order granting a motion by Mark R. (Father) to strike an ex parte order authorizing DCS to take temporary custody of two young children. In our discretion, we accept special action jurisdiction and hold that the legal standard to be applied to a motion challenging temporary custody depends upon the timing of the motion. Because the court applied an incorrect legal standard here, we grant relief and vacate the order granting Father's motion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 On October 26, 2018, M.S., an Indian child, was born substance-exposed. At the same time, her mother (Mother) tested positive for methamphetamine. Two days later, DCS filed an electronic application and sworn declaration in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking an ex parte order authorizing it to assume temporary custody over M.S. and his eighteen-month-old sister, L.S.-R. (collectively, the Children). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-821(B) (authorizing temporary custody where, "on a sworn statement or testimony," the court finds "probable cause exists to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect the child from suffering abuse or neglect and it is contrary to the child's welfare to remain in the home"); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(A) ("On application under oath ..., the court will determine whether to authorize [DCS] to take temporary custody of a child."). ¶3 After considering DCS's application and sworn declaration, the superior court found it "contrary to the [C]hildren's welfare to remain" with Mother and Father and that "temporary custody was necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the [C]hildren." Thus, on October 28, 2018, the court found probable cause "to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect" the Children and issued an ex parte order authorizing DCS to take temporary custody of the Children. ¶4 DCS took custody of the Children, and, on October 31, 2018, filed a verified petition in Yuma County Superior Court alleging the Children were dependent as to Mother and Father based upon substance abuse and neglect. After reviewing the petition, the juvenile court found it would be contrary to the Children's welfare to place them with Mother and Father and issued a separate order, on November 1, authorizing DCS's temporary custody of the Children. See A.R.S. § 8-821(B) (authorizing temporary custody where, "on a dependency petition filed ... under oath," the court finds "probable cause exists to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect the child from suffering abuse or neglect and it is contrary to the child's welfare to remain in the home"); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 48(B) ("Upon the filing of a [dependency] petition, the court may issue temporary orders necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the child."). The court also scheduled and held a preliminary protective hearing (PPH) on November 6. Although Father did not appear, at the conclusion of the PPH, the court issued a third order finding temporary custody was necessary to prevent abuse and neglect and that return of the Children to Mother and Father was contrary to their best interests. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 50(A) ("At the [PPH], the court shall determine whether continued temporary custody of the child is necessary and shall enter appropriate orders as to custody ...."). ¶5 Three days later, Father personally appeared before the juvenile court at the initial dependency hearing (IDH). Although given the opportunity to do so, Father did not challenge the orders authorizing temporary custody of the Children at the IDH. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court again found "temporary custody [with DCS] is necessary to prevent abuse or neglect and return of the Children to the Parents ... is contrary to the best interest[s] of the Children" and issued a fourth order authorizing temporary custody on November 9, 2018. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 52(D)(6) ("At the conclusion of the [IDH] the court shall ... [a]ffirm prior orders making the child a temporary ward of the court[.]"). ¶6 On November 27, 2018, Father filed a motion to return the Children to his care, arguing that the October 28 application and sworn declaration in support of DCS's request for the original ex parte temporary custody order "d[id] not set forth sufficient facts to support findings of probable cause" to remove the Children from his care. In response, DCS asked the juvenile court to set an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court (Rule) 59. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 59(E)(1) (authorizing the juvenile court to return a child to a parent upon request made after the PPH if it finds, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child would not create a substantial risk of harm to the child's physical, mental or emotional health or safety"). The court held oral argument on December 31 but did not apply Rule 59 or require Father to show the Children would be safe in his care; nor did the court allow DCS to present evidence regarding the need for continued out-of-home care. Instead, the court found the application and declaration in support of the ex parte order deficient and ordered the Children returned to Father. This Court stayed the return order pending resolution of the special action. JURISDICTION ¶7 This Court has discretion to accept special action jurisdiction and will generally do so when there is no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal and the case presents purely legal issues, issues involving a matter of first impression, or issues of statewide importance. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) ; Glenn H. v. Hoskins , 244 Ariz. 404, 407, ¶ 7, 419 P.3d 567, 570 (App. 2018) (quoting State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage , 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 8, 30 P.3d 649, 652 (App. 2001) ). Invoking "[s]pecial action jurisdiction is also appropriate to prevent the superior court from acting without jurisdiction." Glenn H. , 244 Ariz. at 407, ¶ 7, 419 P.3d at 570 (citing Caruso v. Superior Court , 100 Ariz. 167, 170, 412 P.2d 463 (1966) ). ¶8 The appropriate mechanism to challenge a temporary custody order presents a novel legal question of statewide importance. Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction of DCS's petition. DISCUSSION ¶9 DCS argues the juvenile court failed to comply with applicable law when considering Father's motion. To resolve this issue, we interpret and apply the statutes and procedural rules governing temporary custody orders, a task undertaken de novo . See Logan B. v. DCS , 244 Ariz. 532, 537, ¶ 12, 422 P.3d 1072, 1077 (App. 2018) (citing Premier Physicians Grp., P.L.L.C. v. Navarro , 240 Ariz. 193, 194-95, ¶ 6, 377 P.3d 988, 989-90 (2016), and Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 219 Ariz. 155, 161, ¶ 19, 195 P.3d 192, 198 (App. 2008) ). If the rules and statutes are clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning as written. Id. (quoting State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145, 147, ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145, 147 (2017) ). ¶10 Until recently, DCS assumed temporary custody over a child using a DCS-issued "temporary custody notice" that involved no advanced court review or approval. See, e.g. , Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 218 Ariz. 39, 41, ¶ 5, 178 P.3d 511, 513 (App. 2008) ; Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr. , 198 Ariz. 154, 155, ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 960, 961 (App. 2000). In 2017 and 2018, in response to litigation in federal court concerning the constitutionality of removing a child from a parent's care without judicial authorization, see Rogers v. Cty. of San Joaquin , 487 F.3d 1288, 1294-96 (9th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases), the legislature amended A.R.S. § 8-821(A) to abolish this practice, see 2018 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 191, § 1 (2d Reg. Sess.); 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 282, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.). Our supreme court adopted Rule 47.3, effective July 1, 2018, to implement those amendments. ¶11 Currently, absent exigent circumstances or parental consent, DCS may take temporary custody of a child only if it first obtains an ex parte order authorizing it to do so on the grounds that "probable cause exists to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect the child from suffering abuse or neglect." A.R.S. § 8-821(A)-(B) ; accord Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(B). If the child is an Indian child, the superior court must also find "temporary custody is necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child." Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(B). DCS may request such an order from Maricopa County Superior Court "[o]n application under oath." Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(A) ; accord A.R.S. § 8-821(B) ; see also Sup. Ct. Admin. Dir. No. 2018-06 (requiring all applications for orders authorizing a child's removal to be filed in Maricopa County Superior Court); accord Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(C)(1). ¶12 Father relies exclusively upon principles underlying the issuance of criminal warrants to justify his objection to the juvenile court's procedural approach. But, although a criminal warrant and an ex parte temporary custody order in a dependency proceeding have some similarities, they are quite different in practice. Most notably, a criminal warrant is not reviewed unless challenged. By contrast, an ex parte order authorizing temporary custody either expires automatically if no dependency petition is filed, or, if a dependency is initiated, subject to automatic, immediate, and continued review and scrutiny. Pursuant to Rule 47.3(D)(4), "[t]he temporary custody authorized by the [ex parte ] order will expire after 72 hours excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays unless a dependency petition is filed. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(D)(4). Thereafter, "[t]he court with dependency jurisdiction over the child will review continuation of temporary custody as provided in [the Rules]." Id. Thus, unlike a criminal warrant, a temporary custody order is subject to continuous review by the juvenile court. ¶13 The continuous-review process promulgated by our legislature and supreme court begins as soon as a child is removed from the home: • Between five and seven days after a child is taken into custody, "[t]he court shall hold a [PPH] to review the taking into temporary custody of a child pursuant to [A.R.S.] § 8-821." A.R.S. § 8-824(A) ; see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 50(A) ("At the [PPH], the court shall determine whether continued temporary custody of the child is necessary."); accord Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(D)(4); A.R.S. § 8-829(A)(1). • After considering the allegations of a verified dependency petition, the juvenile court may issue temporary custody orders "necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the child." Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 48(B) ; see also A.R.S. § 8-821(B) (authorizing issuance of a temporary custody order based upon review of the dependency petition); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.1(A) (directing the court to determine "[i]n the court's first order that sanctions the removal of a child in dependency proceedings, whether continuation of the child's residence in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child. This order may be the temporary order that the court issues on the filing of a dependency petition."). • Once a dependency petition is filed, "the court shall set the [IDH] within twenty-one days," A.R.S. § 8-842(A), at which time it is tasked with entering findings and orders concerning the placement and custody of the child, Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 52(D)(6) ("At the conclusion of the [IDH] the court shall ... [a]ffirm prior orders making the child a temporary ward of the court."). • Thereafter, the juvenile court is directed to periodically address placement and the need for out-of-home care at the dependency adjudication, disposition, and review hearings. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 55(E)(5) (directing the court to "[e]nter orders concerning the placement and custody of the child" at the dependency adjudication hearing); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 56(E)(2) (same at the disposition hearing); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 58(F)(3) (same at review hearings, which, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-847(A), must be held "at least once every six months"). Thus, by rule and statute, temporary custody, even if initiated via an ex parte order, is reviewed first upon the filing of the dependency petition, a second time within five to seven days after the child is taken into custody at the PPH, and a third time within twenty-one days after the dependency petition is filed at the IDH. The need for continued out-of-home care is then reviewed at least once every six months until the dependency is resolved. Recurring review of a child's placement ensures that the court's orders remain in his best interests - a consideration that "permeates dependency and severance proceedings." DCS v. Beene , 235 Ariz. 300, 304, ¶ 9, 332 P.3d 47, 51 (App. 2014) (collecting authority). ¶14 Importantly, the juvenile court does not engage in a perpetual review of the same evidence; the record differs - and typically expands - at each stage of review. While the initial temporary custody order is likely based solely upon the application and sworn declaration, see Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 47.3(C), the order issued after a dependency petition is filed will be based upon the verified allegations in the petition, Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 48(B); A.R.S. § 8-821(B), and the orders entered after the PPH, IDH, and review hearings may be informed by additional reports, evidence, and testimony, see Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 50(B)(4), (6), 51(C), 58(C)-(E). The cumulative nature of the review process means the duration of a temporary order may be quite brief; each new order necessarily replaces the last as the court gains information and perspective. For these reasons, the timing of a parent's challenge to temporary custody is critical to determining both the record upon which the review occurs and the standard to be applied. ¶15 Applying these principles, the original ex parte order authorizing temporary custody ceased to be of effect on November 1, 2018, when the juvenile court approved temporary custody based upon the allegations of the verified dependency petition. Therefore, to the extent Father's November 27 motion to return the Children sought to challenge the ex parte order, it was untimely and should have been denied. ¶16 Father suggests the juvenile court should treat the November 27 motion as a challenge to the temporary custody order issued at the PPH and governed by Rule 51. Rule 51 directs the court to set an evidentiary hearing "to determine whether removal of the child was necessary and whether the child should remain in out-of-home placement." Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 51(A). At that hearing, DCS bears the burden of proving "there is probable cause to believe that continued temporary custody of the child is clearly necessary to prevent abuse or neglect." Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 51(B). If the child is an Indian child, DCS must also prove "by clear and convincing evidence ... that continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child" and "that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts have proven unsuccessful." Id. ¶17 By its terms, however, Rule 51 directs the court to conduct a hearing "if requested by the parent ... at the [PPH]." Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 51(A). Father did not challenge temporary custody at the PPH, and Rule 51 does not apply. Nor did Father challenge temporary custody at the IDH, where he made his first appearance in the case. Because Father expressly waived review of temporary custody at the IDH, we need not consider whether Rule 51 applies solely to a challenge made at the PPH - as the text of Rule 51 provides - or whether it applies more broadly to the hearing at which a parent first appears after service is completed. ¶18 Father's failure to avail himself of Rule 51 does not mean he is unable to challenge temporary custody. A parent may still request return of a child "[a]t any time after the temporary custody hearing" pursuant to Rule 59. Rule 59 directs the juvenile court to set an evidentiary hearing on the motion within thirty days. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 59(B). At that hearing, the court may return the child to the parent if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not create a substantial risk of harm to the child's physical, mental, or emotional health or safety. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 59(E)(1) ; see also A.R.S. § 8-861. This procedure was available for disposition of Father's motion, and the court erred in not following these procedures. ¶19 Father suggests the application of these rules and statutes results in a manifest injustice. Not so. The focus at each stage of the temporary custody inquiry is whether there is a present need for out-of-home care. This focus is consistent with the directive that, at all stages of the removal and dependency proceedings, the paramount concern is the child's health and safety. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 36 ("The rules [of procedure for the juvenile court] should be interpreted in a manner designed to protect the best interests of the child, giving paramount consideration to the health and safety of the child."), 47.1(A) ("If a child has been removed from the child's home by the state authority, the court shall make protecting the child from abuse or neglect the first priority."); accord A.R.S. §§ 8-821(E), -824(E)(9), -829(A), -843(A), -845(B); see also Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Lee ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa , 228 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 23, 264 P.3d 34, 39 (App. 2011) ("The clear purpose of the governing statutes and Rules demands that, in dependency cases, if a child is held in temporary custody, all other considerations become subordinate to the child's health and safety."). "When a state expresses such an interest through particular legislation, its policy judgments are entitled to judicial deference." Lee , 228 Ariz. at 153, ¶ 13, 264 P.3d 34 (quoting Diana H. v. Rubin , 217 Ariz. 131, 136, ¶ 23, 171 P.3d 200, 205 (App. 2007) ). We cannot interpret the rules and statutes in a way that permits the court to ignore presently known facts that justify continued out-of-home care and remain true to the principle of treating the child's welfare as paramount. See id. at 155, ¶ 23, 264 P.3d at 39 (concluding DCS's non-compliance with statutory directives did not justify placing a child's health and safety at risk) (citing Hays v. Gama , 205 Ariz. 99, 102-03, ¶ 18, 67 P.3d 695, 698-99 (2003) ). For this additional reason, the juvenile court erred in focusing solely upon the facial sufficiency of the electronic application and sworn declaration to support the by-then defunct ex parte temporary custody order, and erred by declining to hear any evidence or testimony regarding Father's present willingness or ability to care for them, particularly in light of DCS's avowals within the dependency petition and at the hearing that Father had been neglecting the Children and was unable or unwilling to provide them a safe home. CONCLUSION ¶20 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief. The applicable rules and statutes provide a mechanism for review of the propriety of ongoing temporary custody through Rules 47.1 (mandating a review and judicial determination that out-of-home care is necessary at the court's first order approving the removal of a child), 50 (governing the PPH), 51 (governing challenges to the temporary custody order), and 59 (governing motions to return the child to a parent). Each rule requires the juvenile court to act quickly, provides the parent with a reasonable opportunity to present argument and evidence in support of his position, and represents a careful balance between the competing interests of protecting a child's health and welfare and a parent's right to custody and control. ¶21 The juvenile court did not follow the prescribed procedures, and its order striking the original ex parte order authorizing DCS to take temporary custody of the Children is vacated. This Court's order staying execution of that order is now moot. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current version of rules and statutes. The ex parte order also authorized removal of three of the Children's half-siblings who are not at issue here. We reject Father's suggestion that prompt review of temporary custody at the PPH violates the directive in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) that "[n]o foster care placement ... proceeding [for an Indian child] shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the parent." 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) ; accord Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 48(D)(9) ; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (defining "foster care placement" to mean "any action removing an Indian child from its parent ... for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent ... cannot have the child returned upon demand"). The ten-day notice requirement does not apply where, as here, the PPH is part of an emergency proceeding to protect an Indian child from harm. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 48 cmt. ("When the [PPH] is held as an emergency hearing under [ICWA], the 10-day notice requirement does not apply."), 50(A) ("The [PPH] may be held as an emergency hearing as provided in [ICWA]."); 25 U.S.C. § 1922 ("Nothing in [ICWA] shall be construed to prevent the emergency removal of an Indian Child ... under applicable State law, in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child."); 25 C.F.R. § 23.113(b)(3) (requiring the state court to continue to assess, as part of the emergency proceeding, whether continued temporary custody is necessary to protect the child from imminent harm).